EXPERIENCE AND VALUE

Essays on John Dewey & Pragmatic Naturalism

S. Morris Eames

Edited by
Elizabeth R. Eames and
Richard W. Field

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Contents

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Finally, we are grateful for the assistance of a number of individuals who contributed in various ways to the completion of the editing of the present volume. Ivan Lee Eames, Morris Eames's son, offered valuable advice at the initial stages of the project. Dr. Larry Hickman, the director of the Center for Dewey Studies, graciously placed the resources of the Center at our disposal. In addition, we wish to thank several people at Southern Illinois University Press for their valuable assistance. James D. Simmons, editorial director of the Press, offered valuable advice concerning the preparation of the manuscript. Susan Wilson and Carol Burns have been especially helpful in bringing the project to completion.

Editorial Note

While editing the original texts for the present compilation, the editors considered primarily two criteria. First, during S. Morris Eames's later career he became concerned with the gender bias of his earlier writings. One indication of this concern was the revision of *Logical Methods* undertaken by the Eameses that included a degendering of the language of the book. In accordance with this concern, the editors have degendered the original language of the essays included in the present volume. The second criterion considered was present-day conventions with respect to two practices. (1) The first regards standard methods of citation. Current standard practice, with respect to the citation of the works of John Dewey, now refers to *The Collected Works of John Dewey,* a project that was not completed when the included essays were originally published. The editors, in accordance with current practice, have added to Morris Eames's original citations the appropriate references to the *Collected Works*. In addition, we have adopted the parenthetical citation method that is standard practice in Deweyan scholarship today. (2) The editors have also adopted the convention of using single quotation marks only to indicate the mention of terms and not the use of terms. Italics are used exclusively for emphasis. The only other changes to the original text were a few rephrasings in the interest of clarity.

Introduction

> The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of modern life. It is the problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from that life.
>
> —John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*

This volume brings together a number of papers written by S. Morris Eames over his professional career. Although each of these essays was meant to stand on its own and was intended for specific occasions and audiences, there is a unity among them. Each addresses one or another of the aspects of value theory, and each is suffused with the influence of John Dewey. Morris's interpretation and critique of Dewey's value theory began with his dissertation, "John Dewey's Theory of Valuation" (1958), at the University of Chicago. His work includes "Dewey's Theory of Valuation" in *Guide to the Works of John Dewey* (1970). In his book *Pragmatic Naturalism: An Introduction* (1977) he addressed some of the same themes in relation to the movement of pragmatism represented in the works of William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and George Herbert Mead, as well as in the works of John Dewey.

When I say that the present volume is "suffused" with the influence of John Dewey, I am referring to Morris as himself a Deweyan, one who criticized, adapted, and stretched Dewey's ideas to fit what he saw as the contemporary needs of philosophy, of the social and political world, and of the requirements of his own philosophical reason. While most of the essays are tied directly to Dewey's writings, some do not refer directly to Dewey. This is especially true of the essays in the last two parts of the book, such as "General Education and the Two Cultures," "Scientific Grounds for Valuational Norms," "The Lost Individual and Religious Unity," "Religion as the Quality of Excellence," and the draft of the book on democracy, "Creativity and Democracy." While these pieces are Morris's own reflections, they are the reflections of a mind bearing the imprint of Dewey's philosophy.

As an undergraduate, Morris went to Culver-Stockton College with an interest in religion and was strongly influenced by Henry Barton

Robison, his beloved "Doc Rob," whose meticulous scholarship in unraveling texts, Socratic teaching method, and pragmatic orientation to life were abiding models for Morris's scholarship, teaching methods, and emerging philosophy. In the aftermath of the Great Depression and through World War II, the problems of social and political life were especially troublesome and prompted his intensive study of social philosophies. He received master's degrees in sociology and in philosophy at the University of Missouri. At that university, Morris was influenced as a student and as a teacher by the pragmatic humanism of Willis Moore and Lewis Hahn, his teachers and colleagues. Further study, under Charles Hartshorne and Charles Morris in particular, at the University of Chicago deepened his understanding and analysis of pragmatism as he pursued the scholarly discipline of the field of philosophy. During these years he continued to write poetry and participate in community activities, and became, as he remained throughout his career, a remarkable teacher who taught, as he lived and thought, pragmatically.

The different aspects of Morris's life and thought emerge in the groupings that we have imposed on the material. The framework of Deweyan philosophy is expressed in the first part, where the essays concentrate on the overall metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of Dewey's philosophy. "Experience and Philosophical Method in John Dewey" and "Primary Experience in the Philosophy of John Dewey" develop what Morris believed to be a central theme in Dewey's thought. The more generalized statement in "The Leading Principles of Pragmatic Naturalism" was a collaborative effort on the part of Morris and me (his partner and present coeditor). This essay anticipates many of the themes developed by Morris in detail in relation to the classical pragmatists in his 1977 *Pragmatic Naturalism*.

Against the framework provided by the essays of the first part, the second part addresses the specific details and difficulties of Dewey's value theory and proposes an interpretation and elaboration of Dewey's statements. The essays on the cognitive and noncognitive and on the immediate and mediated focus on a central problem for value theory in general and Dewey's theory in particular. These are the most technical and the most documented of the materials in the volume. But while they are thus in the mold of articles in philosophical journals, where they appeared initially, they are not written from the neutral standpoint of the scholar-critic, but with the concern to solve the value problems arising in Dewey's work and in the dilemmas of human life.

The third part of the volume includes "Valuing, Obligation, and Evaluation," which asks how Dewey, starting with what is in fact valued by persons, can derive what ought to be valued. As a central problem in twentieth-century moral philosophy, the distinction between fact and

value is a challenge for Dewey's value theory, and here Morris attempts to clarify and defend it. This part also includes the comprehensive article "Dewey's Views of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness." This is the only place where aesthetic considerations are specifically the topic of discussion, which serves to bring the different aspects of value theory together and link them with the essays of the first and second parts in an overall picture of where Dewey's value theory fits in with both its premises and its applications to morals and aesthetics.

In the fourth part, social and political questions are the focus of discussion. Here there are fewer specific references to Dewey's texts; instead Morris is concerned with contemporary problems from a Deweyan perspective. His own life involvement with education is reflected in "General Education and the Two Cultures," which takes an approach to education that is similar to his teaching of logic as a method of inquiry, as seen in our text *Logical Methods* (1993). A late-twentieth-century concern with environmental problems provides the occasion for his return to the problem of bridging the gap between fact and value as a basis for solving contemporary social problems in "Scientific Grounds for Valuational Norms." This essay hints at a major project of Morris's intellectual life—the theory of democracy.

During all his years of teaching and writing, the theory of democracy was uppermost in Morris's thought. In retirement he began work on his long-planned book on the subject. He had drafted outlines of eleven different topics and had assembled references, material, and examples from newspapers and journals around each of them. Each topic was to be a chapter in the book. While he was working on this, the invitation to address the Society for the Philosophy of Creativity became the occasion for bringing the material he was working on together in summary form, suitable for an hour-long lecture. Two of the intended eleven chapters were omitted; these were on freedom and political representation. The editors have not tried to supply these topics from the existing notes and outlines. We have also chosen to shorten a historical introduction that seems too long in proportion to the abbreviated form in which the book is extant.

The fifth part of this volume concerns the topic that first brought Morris to philosophy—the meaning of religion and the religious life. While the perspective is Deweyan, the developments of the themes are original to Morris, both in their concern with the psychological crises facing persons and with the immediate social and political problems. The suggested solutions offered in "The Lost Individual and Religious Unity," and the connection of a religious perspective with the living of one's life in "Religion as the Quality of Excellence" are a personal point of view. In a way, this last article brings us back full circle; it was presented in a

series honoring Morris's first and most influential teacher, Barton Robeson. The article itself shows us the author's life of inquiry, a life that included moral, social, aesthetic, and religious dimensions of value.

—Elizabeth R. Eames

Key to Citations of John Dewey's Writings

Parenthetical citations to John Dewey's writings refer first to the original published work, and then to the corresponding reference in *The Collected Works of John Dewey,* the current standard for Deweyan scholarship, by volume and page number. Abbreviations for references to the *Collected Works* are as follows.

MW = *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899–1924*. 15 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976–83.

LW = *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953*. 17 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981–90.

Abbreviations for often cited books by John Dewey are as follows.

AE = *Art As Experience*. New York: Minton, Balch, 1934.

CE = *Characters and Events: Popular Essays in Social and Political Philosophy.* 2 vols., ed. Joseph Ratner. New York: H. Holt, 1929.

CF = *A Common Faith*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1934.

EE = *Experience and Education.* New York: Macmillan, 1938.

EEL = *Essays in Experimental Logic*. 1916. Reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1953.

EN = *Experience and Nature*. 2d edition. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1929. (The same impression was published in New York by W. W. Norton and Co., 1929.)

FC = *Freedom and Culture*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939.

GPP = *German Philosophy and Politics*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942.

HNC = *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology.* New York: The Modern Library, 1930.

HWT = *How We Think*. Boston: D. C. Heath, 1910.

ID = *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*. New York: H. Holt, 1910.

ION = *Individualism, Old and New.* New York: Minton, Balch, 1930.

Logic = *Logic, The Theory of Inquiry.* New York: H. Holt, 1938.

PM = *Problems of Men*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946.

PP = *The Public and Its Problems*. New York: H. Holt, 1927.

QC = *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*. New York: Minton, Balch, 1929.

RP = *Reconstruction in Philosophy.* New York: H. Holt, 1920.

TV = *Theory of Valuation.* International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, no. 4. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

Part One

The Pragmatic Method

1

The Leading Principles of Pragmatic Naturalism

(Coauthored by Elizabeth Ramsden Eames)

In the last half century, since the outline of his position has been visible, John Dewey's philosophy has been subjected to the careful analyses of many critics. From Bertrand Russell and A. O. Lovejoy to H. S. Thayer and Morton White these critics have labored, each from his own viewpoint, to explicate the ambiguities and reveal the flaws in Dewey's philosophy, especially in his theories of inquiry, perception, and experience. It is interesting that, in spite of Dewey's own tireless restatements and rebuttals, the aspects of his philosophy that his earliest critics found questionable have remained the foci of criticism to this day. The widely divergent perspectives, the comparative unanimity, and the undoubted ability of Dewey's critics should lead us to suspect that these foci of criticism are sensitive and significant points in his philosophy at which real ambiguities and weaknesses exist. The purpose of this study is to analyze some of the repeated criticisms of Dewey's philosophy and ask whether critics have found fatal flaws in his position that render it untenable;[1] whether they have indicated points at which it stands in need of major revision;[2] or whether they have pointed to undeveloped, ambiguous areas that are susceptible to a pragmatic restatement with the help of other principles found in his philosophy.[3]

The most frequent criticisms of Dewey's philosophy center on his theory of inquiry, in particular, on the definition of "warranted assertibility," on the kinds and roles of propositions, and on the description of the problematic situation.

The sins of Dewey's view of "warranted assertibility," in the critics' eyes, are of both omission and commission. By restricting the war-

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rantedly assertible judgment to that which terminates specific inquiry, in which the solving of the problem reaches a satisfactory conclusion, Dewey has failed to provide for truth as a goal common to all inquiry, truth as objective, real, if unobtainable. The other serious fault is to speak of the solution of the problem as "satisfying." This leaves open the possibilities that truth is personally pleasing, accepted by a given culture at a given moment, or enunciated by a person with the greatest number of offspring (Russell 1951: 148–52). When Dewey refuses to accept this interpretation of warranted assertibility, and points out that the critic has overlooked the context of the judgment in a situation of inquiry within which it *is* warranted, and that he did not intend to imply that either the initial doubt or the final satisfaction of it are subjective in a personal, social, or biological sense, then Dewey is said to mean that the indeterminateness of the situation is objective, and that the conditions to be satisfied are objective. The objectivity of situation and conditions means that the warrantedly assertible is what is true, that is, conforms to "what is there." In order for the conclusion of an inquiry to be recognized as satisfactory, the "old-fashioned" sense of truth must be implied (Russell 1951: 150ff.; see also Mackay 1942a).

A similar and related dilemma faces Dewey with respect to his description of the scope of the situation. Since he insists that it is within the situation that inquiry must be understood, it is fair to ask for a description of the limits of the situation. On the one hand, if the situation is limited to the specific question that is here and now being inquired into, then the significance of the solution of the problem is also limited (Mackay 1942b). The question then is how the individual situation can be connected with other situations of inquiry and with the rest of experience. On the other hand, if Dewey does not intend the situation to be so restricted, but intends it to extend over a considerable span of time and include many complex issues, then it is difficult to see how the situation could be limited at all. The situation in that case expands indefinitely to include the whole of experience, and Dewey is committed to "holism" (Russell 1951: 139ff.).

Dewey's critics then present him with a dilemma: if truth is defined with respect to subjective satisfaction, he is committed to subjective idealism; with respect to the whole situation, he is committed to objective idealism. If both of these idealistic interpretations are refused, then he has concealed in the concept of "warranted assertibility" a realist view of truth as correspondence with fact, since the situation, the doubt, and its satisfaction are objective.

Another criticism of Dewey's theory of inquiry centers on his treatment of propositions. Dewey's treatment of propositions in the context of their role in specific inquiries in which they serve as tools, as proposals

for the solutions of problems, has the unacceptable consequence of denying that propositions are true or false. The critics object that this is not in accord with usage (Thayer 1951), that it has the awkward consequence of denying the universal applicability of the law of the excluded middle (Russell 1940: 274ff.), and that it is not in accord with our common understanding of the word 'proposition' (Thayer 1952: 119–61).[4] As Dewey himself pointed out, the seriousness of the consequences adduced to follow from his unorthodox treatment of propositions seems to be implied within the context of the critics' theory of inquiry rather than within his own.

More serious criticisms are made of Dewey's treatment of "generic and universal" propositions. He says that generic statements describe kinds in existence, while universals express the relations of implication holding between abstract possibilities. The latter are logical and abstract, but they are said to be related to generic propositions as prescribing the operations by which the descriptive kinds are to be instituted. The "conjugate relation" holding between the two kinds of propositions is difficult to understand, and Dewey gives few examples of such relations. Hence a major difficulty of interpretation exists for Dewey's critics (Nagel 1954: 144ff.).[5] Some critics have interpreted Dewey as a rationalist, assuming that the distinction between the two kinds of universals amounts to the usual synthetic-analytic distinction, and, consequently, that the relation of the two kinds of universals means that the logical structure of discourse is close enough to the structure of existence that the relations of the former may be used to direct the construction of the classes descriptive of the latter (Brodbeck 1949: 786). If Dewey does not intend the rationalistic interpretation, which is clearly at odds with his dislike of rationalism, then he must mean that both kinds of general statements are, in different degrees, empirical. Then Dewey seems to have left no place in his logic for necessary, logical, analytic, or mathematical propositions (Thayer 1952: 96–119). Hence, from the standpoint of logic he could be considered an extreme empiricist.

Dewey's critics seem to have placed his theory of inquiry between the horns of several dilemmas. With respect to the situation within which inquiry takes place, Dewey must choose between atomistic pluralism of unconnected individual situations and holistic unity. With respect to the doubtful or indeterminate situation and the satisfying or determinate situation, Dewey must choose between subjective idealism or dualistic realism. With respect to his treatment of propositions, the choice is between extreme rationalism or extreme empiricism. With respect to warranted assertibility, the alternatives are an idealism in which truth is determined within inquiry or a realistic view of truth as conformity to external fact.

With respect to two other issues on which Dewey's philosophy has been subjected to repeated criticism, his treatment of perception, and the status of the "object of knowledge," Dewey saw that the opposing points of view in contemporary epistemological controversy constituted dilemmas that could be neither settled nor solved. He attributed the sterility of this discussion to the acceptance of dichotomies such as those between knower and known, subject and object (Logic: 534f.; LW 12: 526f.), to the conversion of the product of analysis into a prior reality, as in the case of sense-data, and to the treatment of the knowledge relation as if it were the only relation sustained between organism and environment (EEL: 264–80; MW 6: 111–22/EEL: 301f.; MW 8: 96f.).

In his desire to avoid these difficulties, Dewey developed a theory of perception that even his sympathetic critics have had difficulty interpreting (Reichenbach 1951: 164f.; see also Nagel 1954: 108ff.). Dewey writes of the construction of the objects of common sense and science from the materials of the immediate qualities of experience. In the analogy of the change from crude ore to manufactured object, the star Arcturus is the object constructed from the crude ore of the twinkling light seen in the sky. There can be no issue of what the star really is, since the layperson's commonsense star, and the astronomer's much more complicated star, are the objects constructed to answer the needs of the specific inquiry. At the same time, Dewey denies that this means that the star-object is a fiction, an imaginative extrapolation, from the twinkling light. The star itself is said to be the real object that causes the twinkling light by processes understood through physics and optics (Dewey 1951: 534f.; LW 14: 19f.). The statement seems to lead us in a strange circle; we start with the light seen, we make from it an object, yet the object causes the light from which it was made. Again his critics see Dewey as facing a dilemma: if the object, the star itself, causes the perception of it, Dewey is a realist with respect to his theory of perception and must say what the object really is. However, if he refuses this alternative and emphasizes that the kind of object is determined by the needs of inquiry, he has a phenomenalist view of perception.

Some of Dewey's critics have realized that Dewey claims to escape this dilemma by distinguishing perceptual experience, having no cognitive status, from perceptual knowledge, in which the qualities of perceptual experience are used as representative, or as having meaning. Yet Dewey is said not to escape the alternatives of idealism or dualistic realism with respect to the object of knowledge by this distinction (Lovejoy 1920: 58ff.). Does what is represented in cognitive experience lie within or beyond experience? If we speak of knowing an event in the past, are we not forced to distinguish between the present idea and the past event to which the idea refers? On this view Dewey must regard knowledge

as representative and commit himself to a dualistic realism, or else he must regard the object of knowledge as having neither transcendence nor external reference and admit himself an idealist.

The dilemmas with respect to his theory of inquiry into which Dewey's critics attempt to drive him apply in an analogous way to his metaphysics or theory of experience. Here the specific issues are lifted to a level of greater generality, and some concepts are offered that might serve to rescue Dewey from the forced alternatives we have been discussing. Dewey's metaphysics is a plea for a concept of nature and a concept of experience that are without dualistic implication. His treatment of "experience" carries the burden of this nondualistic metaphysics (EN, LW 1: ch. 1). If experience is understood as both public and private, as enjoyed and suffered through, as well as deliberate method, as an ongoing and active transaction in which nature and experience participate, Dewey believes he may escape the traditional dualisms of philosophy.

Many critics have found this attempt a failure. It has been said that Dewey's view of nature is anthropomorphic, since it implies reading the characteristics of human experience back into nature (Cohen 1940), that his view of experience is that of objective idealism since the concept of experience is all-inclusive (Hocking 1940), that he achieves the union of experience and nature by dissolving everything into the immediacy of experiencing, and that this is a mysticism of the immediate (Santayana 1951: 256). At best Dewey's metaphysics is said to involve a shifting between two meanings of experience and to leave in doubt the question, "nature includes experience, does experience include nature?" (Laird 1925).

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Dewey's critics present him with some uncomfortable alternatives: if experience is dominant and inclusive of nature, Dewey is an idealist; if nature is dominant and inclusive of experience, Dewey must attribute some characteristics to nature that it has regardless of how it is experienced, and hence he is a realist. To this Dewey's reply is that he is neither idealist nor realist, but a naturalist who refuses to go beyond the realm of nature as experienced in his description of it. To defend this position, Dewey expands his description of experience.

The crux of Dewey's view of experience, and the means by which he claims to escape the critics' dilemmas, is his distinction between experience as "given," as "had," suffered or enjoyed, qualitatively immediate, noncognitive; and experience as the deliberate institution of inquiry, the recognition of meaning, the connecting of present experience with past and future, prediction and control, or cognitive experience (EN: 85f.; LW 1: 74f.). Dewey says it is from failure to appreciate this distinction that many misinterpretations of his philosophy stem (Dewey

1951: 547f.; LW 14: 31f.). With respect to the limits of the situation, for instance, the situation begins in the felt difficulty, the break in the continuity of experience, pain, or frustration, and this is a noncognitive experience. When the problem has been worked through to final judgment the solution is a restoration of balance that is immediately felt as satisfying. Hence the problem of setting the limits to the situation, of knowing *that* the problem is solved in the old-fashioned sense, does not arise. The limits of the situation occur as "had" frustration or fulfillment (PM: 322–30; LW 15: 34–45).

Similarly, Dewey claims that the criticism of his theory of perception rests on neglect of the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive experience. The occurrence of qualities on the noncognitive level has no significance in terms of perceptual knowledge. Perceptual knowledge occurs only when qualities present in experience are "taken" as related to other qualities; this is the occurrence of meaning (Logic: 119; LW 12: 122). In the construction of the object we are uncovering real "connections" in nature. The object of perception transcends present immediate experience in that it has connections with past and future (Dewey 1922b: 354; MW 13: 49f.). The past event is an object of present knowledge because it is connected with present experience by consequences, which, flowing from it, bring it into present experience (Dewey 1922a: 313f.; MW 13: 40f.).

There is another way in which Dewey claims that the two aspects of experience allow him to escape the dilemma of realism or idealism. The transactions of organism and environment are many, and experience in its widest sense covers all of them. However, cognitive experience is but a small part of these transactions. It is only if cognitive relations were the sole relations sustained in this interaction that Dewey would be forced into choosing between representative realism and idealism (Dewey 1951: 548; LW 14: 32f.).

The problem of the relation of experience to nature is also pertinent to the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive experience. For experiential method means the penetrating into nature in going from experience as "had" to experience as "understood." The qualities of noncognitive experience simply "are," but empirical method finds connections in ongoing experience that are a revelation of the structure of nature. And again, since cognitive experience is only one phase of the transaction of experience-nature, this relation is part to whole. However, the sum of all ongoings in nature are within the range of possible experience.

The dilemmas of subjectivity-objectivity with respect to truth, of idealistic monism or realistic dualism with respect to the object of knowledge, of phenomenalism or realism with respect to perception, of ideal-

ism or anthropocentric naturalism with respect to experience and nature, are all avoided, in Dewey's view, by virtue of the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive experience.

The success of this claimed escape from the critics' dilemmas rests on the clarity and persuasiveness of this description of experience. The repeated difficulties of Dewey's critics give some evidence of lack of clarity in this concept. Is the immediacy of experience a veil concealing the underlying connections of nature? Or, are these connections painted into the canvas in the passage from the immediacy of pigment to the mediation of the work of art? Or, if neither aspect of experience is to be given priority, can we conceive of the cognitive and noncognitive as dual dimensions of any one moment of experience? It must be admitted that the answers to these questions are not clear and that the answers would be very helpful in assessing the worth of Dewey's reply to the dilemma-posing critics.

Is Dewey's philosophy untenable? Does it require revision? Or, can the difficulties be overcome within the framework of his philosophy? In the case of some of the criticisms, notably those concerning warranted assertibility and the definition of a proposition, it seems that the alternatives stated to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive are not really so, except in the context of the critics' own frame of reference.[6] In the case of the criticisms of the theory of perception, the status of the object of knowledge, and the relation of experience and nature, it seems that a third alternative is viable if Dewey's account of experience is not rejected. For only if it can be shown that Dewey's account of experience is inadequate can the dilemmas be made cogent. But, although there is unclarity in the description of experience, none of Dewey's critics have claimed that his description of experience is wrong, that is, at war with common experience. The position of the critics who claim that Dewey's philosophy needs major revision is not different from that of the critics who hold his philosophy untenable, except that the revising critics take the further step of showing what changes could be made to free Dewey from the dilemmas. Hence, if the dilemmas are not cogent for one group of critics, they are not cogent for the second group either. The conclusion of this study is that the third alternative evaluation of Dewey's philosophy may be undertaken. The criticisms reveal difficulties but do not eliminate a promising approach to the philosophic problems involved. Further, we think it is possible to find in Dewey's philosophy some leading principles of his pragmatic naturalism by which it can be clarified and expanded to answer the major points of criticism.

There are certain principles of pragmatic naturalism that Dewey implicitly assumes when he is working on a specific problem; sometimes, however, he makes these principles explicit. The first of these "leading

ideas" of Dewey's philosophy is that of *immediacy* (EN: 298f.; LW 12: 26f.), or what we have called the noncognitive element in his thought. We have seen the important part this principle plays in Dewey's view of experience as both "had" and "known." The second principle is that of "connections," or "relations," "interactions," and "transactions" as he variously termed them. Dewey makes specific reference to this principle of connections in his reply to a criticism of Reichenbach's, when he says that "the actual operative presence of *connections* (which when formulated are *relational*) in the subject-matter of direct experience is an intrinsic part of my idea of experience" (Dewey 1951: 535; LW 14: 20). The third principle of Dewey's philosophy is what he calls the "naturalistic postulate," or *continuity,* and he explicitly states this (Logic: 23f.; LW 12: 30f.). It is our contention that these three leading ideas form the basis for Dewey's description of experience and nature; that they provide the grounds for defending these descriptions against the criticisms that we have been discussing; and that they clarify the unresolved difficulties of the relation of the cognitive and the noncognitive. Dewey uses these three principles in many different contexts of his writings, and if analysis is extended beyond the problems of inquiry, perception, and experience as treated in the foregoing, then it will be seen that these leading ideas are always implicit, often explicit, in Dewey's views of psychology, theory of meaning, theory of valuation, and philosophy of education.

The importance of *immediacy* in Dewey's thought has been suggested in the discussion of the noncognitive and the cognitive in experience. Dewey holds, for instance, that the qualities and connections in experience are immediately felt; initially the indeterminate situation is immediately felt; the continuum of inquiry undergone by the organism is immediately felt; and the consummatory phase of that situation is immediately felt. Perceptual awareness is immediately felt, and as such, is undifferentiated; it is only when immediately felt qualities are *related,* either by causes or by consequences, that out of perceptual awareness emerges sensation, thought, emotion, and desire (EN: 304f.; LW 1: 230f.). In the *Logic,* the noncognitive aspect of experience is explicated when the impossibility of "immediate knowledge" is discussed (Logic, LW 12: ch. 8). This principle of immediacy extends to his theory of valuation in which it is said of immediate values that "they just occur, are enjoyed, possessed; and that is all" (EN: 403; LW 1: 301).

When Dewey says that connections in experience, which when formulated are relational, form an integral part of his idea of experience, this can be taken as a second principle of his philosophy. The "connections in existence" are the "existential involvements" of his theory of meaning (Logic: 55; LW 12: 61); a quality "taken" as connected or related to another quality affords the basis for sign-signification, and here

is where "meaning" emerges in experience. Furthermore, a quality found to be related to another quality is party to an *inference* and a clue to the understanding of the meaning of *evidence;* thus the inferential and evidential functions of qualities are founded upon the principle of connections or relations. When symbolic formulations become part of the meaning situation, more relations are involved; in the same way that qualities are related to other qualities in existential involvements, symbols are related to existences under the designation of *reference,* and symbols are related to other symbols in language-sets and symbol implications.

It is integral to Dewey's psychology that its subject-matter be interpreted with the use of this leading idea of connections or relations. Dewey's early use of the term 'interaction' was an attempt to describe a process cross-sectionally; but the term was interpreted by many critics to mean that two isolated objects or persons "inter-act" with one another. In order to avoid this misinterpretation, Dewey introduced the term 'transaction' to apply to the principle of connections or relations in describing the organism functioning in an environment (Logic: 25; LW 12: 32).[7] It is true that Dewey claims that events are "centered" in an organism (PM: 263; LW 15: 75), but this means only that such events are "felt" in that organism; that which is immediately felt must be *connected* with causes and consequences, or both, in order for their meanings to emerge. Furthermore, this principle of relations affords a basis for an understanding of Dewey's value theory. He uses this principle, for instance, to show that ejaculatory behavior has *causal connections* that are primarily biological; and he does not treat desire, as he says, "at large," but in its specific relations to specific objects (TV: 19; LW 13: 207).

Dewey refers directly to the principle or postulate of continuity in two important passages: one, referred to above, refers to the principle of continuity in the context of a theory of inquiry; the other reference is in a chapter of *Experience and Education* in which he describes continuity as the longitudinal aspect of experience in contrast to interaction as the latitudinal aspect of experience (EE, LW 15: ch. 3). Other references to this principle occur in specific contexts of his writings. In replying to the criticisms of Bertrand Russell, Dewey alludes to the principle of continuity when he says, "the interpretation put by Mr. Russell upon quotation of passages in which I have used the word *situation* contradicts what, according to my basic leading principle, is designated by it" (Dewey 1951: 545; LW 14: 30). This "basic leading principle" is that of the *experiential continuum*. Dewey says that he did not discover this principle of continuity, but that he attempted to interpret the duality of traits in an organism "in terms of the identity of experience of life-functions." Furthermore, he regards his relating this principle of continuity

to the development and growth of the individual as one of his chief contributions to philosophy (ibid.).

In the *Logic,* Dewey's aim was to develop a naturalistic account of logical subject-matters. Continuity is referred to in this work as the naturalistic postulate, and it is made clear that it is not an arbitrary postulate, but one that is experientially justified. Continuity has two aspects in this context; it means that there is no break between the operations of inquiry and the biological and physical operations, and it means that logical operations grow out of organic activities, and yet are not identical with those activities from which they have emerged. A similar point is made in Dewey's theory of valuation; the principle of continuity allows us to understand how valuational behavior emerges from other forms of behavior, such as vital impulses, yet is not reducible to these organic functions (TV: 18; LW 13: 207).[8] When desires emerge out of organic foreshadowings, it is on the principle of continuity that these values escape the "pallid remoteness" of a transcendental theory (QC: 258; LW 4: 206). Furthermore, it can be shown that the principle of continuity underlies Dewey's view of "transformation," a term that he applied to mathematics and art, but this analysis would carry us beyond our present purpose.

When the three principles employed throughout Dewey's philosophy are stressed, it becomes apparent that they are important in all the answers Dewey himself gave to his critics, answers that failed to prevent the recurrence of the same criticisms, since the critics did not grasp the significance of Dewey's responses. The dilemma of an atomistic pluralism of unconnected situations or a holistic unity of one universal situation was premised on the neglect of what Dewey said about the immediately felt difficulty and the immediately felt consummation that define a situation, about the objective counterpart of these termini in specific connections of inquirer and the objective situation, and about the individual situation as understood within a continuum of inquiry. The unhappy choice of subjective idealism or dualistic realism in the interpretation of the indeterminate situation was biased through a neglect of the same principles that would have revealed the situation as felt, as involving connections, and as a continuity. The role of propositions and the concept of warranted assertibility also need to be interpreted in this framework. We have already suggested how immediacy in the interpretation of Dewey's theory of perception enables him to escape the dilemma of dualistic realism or phenomenalism.

With respect to his theory of experience and nature, Dewey explicitly invoked the denotative method as part of the meaning of experience to clarify his empiricism (EN, LW 1: ch. 1). Denoting is itself immediate, connective, and involves continuity of experience; it is also of feel-

ings, connections analyzed into relations, and continuities discovered in nature as well as legitimately constructed in inquiry.

These considerations drawn from the references scattered throughout Dewey's works suggest a basis for a systematic way of restating Dewey's philosophy by beginning where he did not, with the three principles of immediacy, connections, and continuity, and from these, tracing the development of the themes of theory of experience and nature, of inquiry, and of value. The present discussion is a prospectus of such an exposition and an argument for the importance of these principles as reflected in the puzzles and problems of Dewey's critics.

Notes

1. The expression of deep and unresolvable differences between the point of view of critic and criticized is tantamount to a judgment that the criticized philosophy is untenable. This seems to be the sense of Santayana's and Russell's criticism. See Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945: 822–27). See also George Santayana's "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics" (1951). Also, Russell's essay, "Dewey's New *Logic*" (1951) in the same volume seems a similar sweeping rejection. For expression of a rejection of Dewey's philosophy on one specific issue, see May Brodbeck's "The New Rationalism: Dewey's Theory of Induction" (1949).

2. Most of Dewey's critics belong to this group, although in most cases, it seems that the "revision" would be less of an amendment than a remaking. For an example of the revising critic, see A. O. Lovejoy's "Pragmatism *versus* the Pragmatist" (1920). See also the continuation of this discussion in *Journal of Philosophy:* "Pragmatism and the New Materialism" (Lovejoy 1922a); "Time, Meaning, and Transcendence, I" (Lovejoy 1922b); "Time, Meaning, and Transcendence, II" (Lovejoy 1922c); "Pastness and Transcendence" (Lovejoy 1924). For revision in another direction, see W. E. Hocking's "Dewey's Concepts of Experience and Nature" (1940). For a critic suggesting drastic revision, see H. S. Thayer, *The Logic of Pragmatism: An Examination of John Dewey's Logic* (1952).

3. Many pragmatists, commenting on Dewey's philosophy, find ambiguities and try to restate and rescue Dewey's position. See Hans Reichenbach's "Dewey's Theory of Science" (1951). See also Ernest Nagel's "Dewey's Theory of Natural Science" (1950).

4. See also Russell 1948: 148f, and Welsh 1954: 861–67.

5. This discussion makes a point of the difficulty of understanding the distinction and its implications. Nagel also concludes that Dewey has not provided for mathematical propositions. He thus seems to believe that an adequate interpretation of Dewey's view of universals is empiricist rather than rationalistic.

6. See Russell's criticisms (Russell 1951: 144f.) and Dewey's reply (Dewey 1951: 544–49; LW 14: 28–33) in *The Philosophy of John Dewey.* See also Welsh 1954: 861–67, and the reply to Welsh by Elizabeth Eames (E. Eames 1958).

7. See also Dewey 1949: 69; LW 16: 348.

8. See also Dewey 1949: 64f.; LW 16: 344.

2

Experience and Philosophical Method in John Dewey

John Dewey was born in 1859 and died in 1952. Over his long life time, he worked at trying to show what experience is and means. The results of this dedicated task are now deposited in 40 books and almost 700 articles published in some 140 journals. Among these materials are his lectures in China and his many letters about China, some of which have been published recently (Dewey 1919–1920).

I have selected out of the multitude of Dewey's writings some of the most important ideas that I consider the source of much misunderstanding on the part of his critics. I will start with Dewey's notion of primary experience; I will then move to an analysis of what I consider to be Dewey's "categories" or what he calls his "leading ideas" of experience; then I will treat briefly his relational theory of meaning; I will attempt to show what I believe is his pragmatic analytical method; and finally, I will attempt to show that his views of emergence and nonreductionism are vital to our understanding of his philosophy.

The history of philosophical thinking shows that most philosophers postulate a separation of what is called "experience" from what is called "nature." When this postulation is made, "experience" is taken to be subjective and "nature" is taken to be objective. The most obvious example of this kind of philosophical dichotomy is Descartes. Dewey rejects this Cartesian dualism, and develops his view of "naturalism" from two directions. First, he says that he was impressed during his undergraduate days with the writings of T. H. Huxley on the interrelations of the human organism and nature (Dewey 1931: 13; LW 5: 147–48). Second, the part of his philosophical background that was Hegelian had developed an abstract view of the doctrine of internal relations. As Dewey

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matured in his thinking, he came more and more to stress the biological interrelations of the human organism and nature, and the Hegelian aspects of his philosophy faded away (Dewey 1931: 21; LW 5: 154).

'Experience', for Dewey, is not a solipsistic term; the word does not refer to an individual's experience solely; it includes the experiences and reports of experiences of other men, living and dead, mature and immature, normal and abnormal. Experience is thus taken in a broad and full sense; it covers anything and everything that can be denoted. Experience includes feelings, sensations, concepts, psychical events, physical things, relations, actualities, potentialities, the harmonies and disharmonies of life. Experience includes our memories and imaginations, our pasts and projected futures, our present awareness, our illusions and hallucinations; it includes truths and falsehoods, objects of beauty and ugliness, goods and evils; it includes language and events, and "death, war, and taxes" (EN, LW 1: ch. 1).[1] Experience includes all that is, has been, and has potentiality of becoming. For Dewey, experience is ultimate reality, if one chooses to use an old metaphysical term.

According to Dewey's analysis of past philosophical thinking, philosophers have had a prejudice or bias in their account of experience (EN: 24–25; LW 1: 31). Some philosophers have selected that part of experience that appeals to them and have made it supreme and ultimate. For instance, the rationalists are partial to conceptual forms, to abstract entities, to the purity of intellectual operations. They tend to raise rational forms to a status and prominence compared to which all other parts of experience are pale and remote. On the other hand, traditional empiricists select sensory experiences as the "most real" in experience, and they tend to use these as the vantage points from which all the other aspects of experience are viewed. The factual, the sensory, the sense-datum (or any other name by which this aspect of experience is called) becomes the base from which the criteria for truth statements are formulated.

Other philosophers have emphasized the "mental" or the "psychical," and some have gone so far as to declare that these functions are the result of a mind-substance. Other thinkers have selected the physical aspects of experience, and they have gone so far as to declare that psychological functions are basically materialistic. A common habit of philosophers has been to treat functional activities as if they were antecedent realities, and Dewey calls this practice "the philosophical fallacy" (EN: 29; LW 1: 34). Any philosophy that selects and hypostatizes certain aspects of experience, that makes these hypostatized entities into ultimate criteria by which the rest of experience is judged, is a philosophy of prejudice and bias, according to Dewey. From his point of view of starting with the fullness of experience, much of the function of modern philosophical analysis is a critique of the prejudices of other philosophers.

Dewey has suffered at the hands of his critics because they have not seen the starting place of his philosophy. When Dewey himself selects some part of experience to analyze, such as the role of ideas, his critics read him as a disguised idealist; when he deals with the significance of physical objects, then the critics see him as a materialist.[2] Some critics think that his analysis and use of concepts is another form of traditional rationalism (Brodbeck 1949: 780–791); other critics feel that the context that shows the importance of sensory experience is simply another form of traditional empiricism. Dewey admits that his starting place in philosophy lends itself to some difficulties, but he thinks that these can be overcome by the adoption of his philosophical method.

Another difficulty in reading Dewey seems to stem from a lack of understanding of what I call his "categories" or what he calls his "leading ideas or principles," the concepts with which he understands and explains nature and experience.

Dewey believes that the primary existential state of life in nature is *immediate feeling*. He writes: "The existential starting point is immediate qualities. Even meanings taken not as meanings but as existential are grounded in immediate qualities, in sentiencies, or 'feelings,' of organic activities and receptivities" (EN: 298–99; LW 1: 226). These feeling-states are simply "had"; they are not cognized or known. Even on the subconscious level, however, these feeling-qualities have a powerful effect in organic behavior, for they guide it into similar kinds of responses or into new experiences. At the later stages of development where the human organism's more complex activities and knowing-states emerge, these organic feelings are never absent.

Sometimes in the history of philosophy it has been held that we encounter in experience ready-made sensations and ready-made concepts. Dewey denies this. We are not born with any antecedently structured sensations and concepts, for these aspects of experience grow out of our responses as they become demarcated and symbolized. Dewey makes this clear when he says:

> Immediately, every perceptual awareness may be termed indifferently emotion, sensation, thought, desire: not that it *is* immediately any one of these things, or all of them combined, but that when it is taken in some *reference,* to conditions or to consequences or to both, it has, in that contextual reference, the distinctive properties of emotion, sensation, thought or desire. (EN: 304–5; LW 1: 230–1)

Thus, the primal feeling-state of the organism is undifferentiated. On this level of experience, say that of a newborn infant, there are no sensations (no colors or shapes or sizes); there are no concepts (no definitions or classifications or forms); there are no emotions (no fears or loves or angers); there are no desires (no prizings or likings or enjoyments).

Furthermore, since these primal feeling-states are existences, they can only be pointed to or denoted; they cannot in this state of experience be described or defined. Borrowing a phrase from William James, but true to Dewey's context, these feeling-states are "pure thats"; they are not yet "whats." In this sense of the primordial, Dewey claims that existence precedes essence.

Immediate feeling is always present in the organism as long as it is alive; it pervades its whole life, its living through space and time. Feeling is present at every conjunction in immediate experience and at every disjunction. Immediate feeling is present when a perplexity occurs; it is a *felt* perplexity; there is a dumb feeling that life is not going well or that something is blocking the forward movement of the organism. Even when the human organism reaches the level of the knowing process, immediate feeling lies at its base; it pervades the whole process of inquiry. It marks the beginning of a historical continuity and it marks its close.

Immediate feeling is what Dewey calls the "noncognitive" or the "precognitive" aspect of experience (Logic: 107; LW 12: 111). At the same time, immediate feeling is not cut discretely from the higher and more complex functions of the cognitive (knowing) aspects of experience that emerge from it. To place the noncognitive in one compartment and the cognitive in another, as the logical positivists do, results in a radical dualism of feeling and knowing and creates problems of the relations between them. For Dewey there is no sharp line between the noncognitive and the cognitive; on the contrary, there is a line of continuity between them.

A second leading principle important for the understanding of experience is the principle of "connections" or "relations," or what Dewey calls in his later writings, "transactions"[3] (Logic: 25; LW 12: 32). Connections in experience are also what Dewey calls "existential involvements." These belong to immediate experience, to the perceptual flow that contains them. Dewey says that "the actual operative presence of *connections* (which when formulated are *relational*) in subject-matter of direct experience is an intrinsic part of my idea of experience" (Dewey 1951: 535; LW 14: 20). It should be noted that this passage contains a very important distinction between *connections* and *relations*. Connections are "given" or felt in primary experience; they are noncognitive, and thus not known. This is Dewey's view of radical empiricism. Relations, on the other hand, are formulated, symbolized, and thus are known. Since there is no sharp demarcation between connections and relations, but a line of continuous process, it has been customary to use 'connections' and 'relations' synonymously. If this is done, confusion concerning many important parts of Dewey's philosophy will result.

A third principle of Dewey's naturalism is called "the principle of continuity." Dewey also calls this principle the "naturalistic postulate." The naturalistic postulate means that there is a line of continuity from the less complex to the more complex forms and functions of life. The growth of a seed into a plant is an example of continuity. Dewey makes it clear that this naturalistic postulate is not arbitrary; it functions in experience and is tested in experience.

The principle of continuity becomes a means by which many things in experience and nature can be understood. Continuity and discontinuity make up what Dewey calls "the generic traits of existence." The principle of continuity is found in the history of natural things, of things-in-process, things that have beginnings and termini. Knowledge situations involve a continuum of inquiry from a felt problem to be investigated to the final judgmental close. The aesthetic experience has a continuity from its inception to its consummation or fulfillment. The principle of continuity lies at the base of any constructed history, whether it be the history of an individual's life, the life of a nation, or the life of the geological world.

When Dewey speaks of the generic traits of existence as those of continuity and discontinuity, of harmony and disharmony, he brings into focus two problems that have been the concern of philosophers from the time of the ancients to the present. The discontinuities of nature and experience make life precarious, unstable, unbalanced. Since the dawn of human experience, people have felt and known the uncertainties of living. The unstable and distressing situations that people must live through or in which they must come to defeat are real. Dewey made this problem the topic of an entire book, *The Quest for Certainty.* He shows that humanity has grasped at almost everything to make life secure; people have used sacrifices of their own children, ceremonial rites, and magical formulas in their attempt to bring harmony and peace of mind to their existence. Sometimes they have tried to control the disasters of their experience with a contrite heart or with an attitude of religious resignation. Often they have placed all responsibility for their plight upon a supernatural god, and then consoled themselves with waiting until they could escape the perils of earthly existence by thinking of a future heaven made out of their own imagination and vision.

Philosophers have been more sophisticated in their attempts to explain the evils of the world. They have erected in their thought-forms absolutes that gather together all the disharmonies of experience and nature, and they have attempted to reconcile these disharmonies into a "oneness" in which the pains are illusions or at best, as in Leibniz, incomplete and obscure ideas. Some have tried to unite a world with pregnant discontinuities by constructing a "first cause" from which all the

causal lines in empirical presentations radiate; others have tried to gather together all the divergent continuities and relate them to some "final end." Still others have tried to construct a world of abstractions, of eternal forms, that are permanent and unchanging, and in the contemplation of which we may find peace of mind and solace.

The attempts by religious people and philosophers to make the world seem unified and secure have failed. Causal lines cannot be made to converge into a "first cause" or a "final end" except by a kind of faith or belief that this must be so. There is no "one form" that contains all the other forms, and the abstractions of the philosopher leave humanity at the mercy of the vicissitudes of life. Thus, for Dewey, we must accept the fact that we live in a world that is loosely organized, not complete in its unity; we live in what William James calls "a pluralistic universe." The discontinuities of this world are challenges to be overcome in a more practical way. This practical way is the way of scientific understanding of the events of nature and experience, and the arts of control of those parts that are pliable and adaptive. We build dams to control the flooding of rivers; we experiment to find ways to control disease; we deliberate on means to ends to construct the good life.

Previously I mentioned that there are difficulties in Dewey's starting place, with a denotative method, of which he himself is aware. If one could select one aspect of experience, such as the sensory or the conceptual, one could at least have a measuring rod against which the rest of experience could be compared. But Dewey has no such measuring rod. How can he develop a theory of knowledge and how can he develop a method by which we can cope with the disjunctions, the discontinuities, the perils and frustrations of living? The answer to these questions is found in Dewey's conception of experience. In the movement of the organism through space-time, it encounters difficulties and perplexities; questions are asked and problems are posed. How can these irritations be removed? How can the discontinuities be bridged or overcome so that life can proceed? In the course of the organism's living through time, its responses at first are of the trial-and-error sort. The organism explores its environment; it searches and finds some way out of the perplexity it faces; if it does not find a way out, it dies.

In trying to overcome its organic irritation and uneasiness, the organism finds that certain *means* that are accidentally discovered lead to certain *ends*. These relationships of means to ends are so integral to each other that they cannot be separated except in abstract thought. On the lower levels at which stimulus-response sequences have become automatic over the long years of evolutionary development, these sequences result in efficiencies that are difficult to match by the deliberate control of the more complex levels. When symbolic behavior emerges from these

organic foreshadowings, then people can transcend certain parts of their experience and can reflect upon what happens to them in the course of living. They become aware of the relationships that sustain them on the nonreflective level. They note that these relationships involve various parts of their experience that have become differentiated into physical objects, sensations, concepts, and intellectual operations. In overcoming some discontinuities in experience, they find that certain methods are more successful than others. They study these means-ends continuities, describe them in symbols to themselves and others, and recognizing their great usefulness in the solutions of problems, they evolve a method from experience that is their greatest single means of understanding and controlling all experience. The search for a method results in finding the method of intelligence.

Intelligence is a method of solving problems, of establishing continuities in experience and nature where disjunctions have occurred. When intelligence is defined functionally, the problem-solving behavior of other animals may be viewed as intelligent, and this is one of the ways by which the continuity of human life with animal life is found. The method of intelligence in human life becomes more sophisticated, however, because a human being is able to construct and use a language. Dewey was among the first to give a description of the way humans solve their problems. His famous steps in an act of reflective thought are now commonplace in almost every account of rational inquiry. Briefly the outline is this: awareness of a problem; location and definition of a problem; entertainment of suggestions, ideas and hypotheses for the solution of the problem; reasoning out the consequences of each hypothesis before acting; and finally acting in order to test or verify the judgment (HWT: ch. 6; MW 6: ch. 6/Logic, LW 12: ch. 6). If the judgment adopted is successful in solving the problem, we call the judgment or the statement that carries it "true"; if the judgment fails, we call it "false."

In the search for a method we have moved far up on the cognitive ladder from the noncognitive feeling-states, and we must return momentarily to the notion of primary experience in order to analyze the theory of meaning from which and by means of which that method emerged.

It will be recalled that Dewey's starting place is gross qualitative experience; humans become aware of qualities, connections, and continuities. If Dewey has any metaphysical realities, one would have to say that these are qualities and relations. It is from this starting point that meanings arise in experience; early humans found that qualities are connected with other qualities, and once this discovery was made they were on their way to a development that made their survival possible and afforded the basis for the development of symbolic experience. Because of the complexity of the symbolic process it is not easy to find a starting place

for exposition and analysis. I will begin with the nature and function of *signs,* and I hope that it is realized that I am extrapolating a tiny part of the whole symbolic process for analysis.

As a simplified starting place, I will say that *a sign is a quality taken to be connected with another quality* (Logic, LW 12: ch. 3). In commonsense experience we often use expressions like "Smoke means fire" and "Dark clouds mean rain." We mean that the greyish-black-spiraling qualities that we call "smoke" are connected with the yellowish-glowing qualities that we call "fire." If one expands one's observations of sign-connections in experience, it should be obvious how important the role is that qualities taken as signs have in our lives. A baby's cry (sound quality) may be a sign to the parent of the baby's hunger. A rash appearing on the body is a sign of some disease. The green qualities of the leaves of a tree, the cracks in the soil, the gathering of dark clouds in the sky—all have connections with other qualities, and these connections we have learned from experience. For Dewey an "event" is the appearance of a quality with meaning, that is, the quality is connected and related to another quality. Thus, an object becomes, for Dewey, a cluster of quality-signs.

After we have had experience of the connection of smoke with fire, if we see smoke qualities in the distance, we can *infer* that there is a fire, even though the fire is not observed. If someone asks us what *evidence* we have that there is a fire, we could reply that the smoke qualities that we see are evidence of the fire qualities that we have experienced to be connected with them. Thus, inference and evidence are built upon the experiences of quality-connections. Qualities such as colors, shapes, sizes, movements, smells, tastes, textures, and so on, play an important role in both common sense and science. In fact, scientists in every field of subject-matter must learn how to read the signs, that is, the meanings and connections of the qualities they encounter.

When it is said that a quality of an object is taken to be a sign of some other quality in another object, attention is called to the word *taken.* In the cases mentioned above, it is assumed that those qualities taken as signs in their connections with other qualities actually occur in existence, that is, in space-time. Smoke is actually connected with fire; there is a kind of *existential involvement* of smoke qualities with fire qualities. There are instances, however, when we "take" a quality to be a sign of some other quality when, in fact, the connections of these qualities are not found in existence. One need only survey the countless numbers of superstitions and magical notions in the history of human beliefs to be aware that people have made relations between events (quality occurrences) that are unfounded in existence.

The fact that we can "make" meanings by relating qualities with each other that have little or no basis in existence shows how we can con-

struct fantasies and create the fictional meanings of poetry and literature. This dimension of the symbolic life allows us to build up meanings that are a delight to our imagination. In the practice of science, however, qualities taken as signs must actually have an involvement in existence with other qualities. Only in this way can scientific inquiries result in truth.

Scientists seek for dependable signs, and when direct experience does not yield these, then the scientists invent elaborate instruments to aid them in detecting the qualities that lie below the surface of the commonsense object. For instance, reading the needle of a barometer is a different dimension of sign interpretation from observing dark clouds as the approach of rain. Weather prediction now rests upon the sign-connections of a falling or rising barometer with certain atmospheric conditions. The use of a thermometer in detecting whether a person has fever is more dependable as a sign than feeling the body for unusual warmth.

Thus far we have been speaking as if one could interpret signs without the use of language, and this is highly doubtful. What has been intended in the foregoing explanation of sign-connections is to make vivid the connections of qualities with each other as a very important dimension of meaningful experience. It is unlikely, however, that humans can detect a quality-connection without the aid of symbols to mark off and discriminate a quality of any kind, or to relate it to another quality. At least one point seems clear; humans cannot "know" that a quality is a sign without the use of a symbol. We can respond to the appearance of a quality as an animal responds to it; in this case the quality acts only as an excitation for a reaction.

A symbol is a quality or cluster of qualities taken to represent objects as sign-connections. This statement may seem strange until it is realized that symbols, such as words, are simply visual marks on paper (color and shape qualities) or sounds that are uttered. The marks or scratches on paper have a shape, a size, a configuration, and these are taken to stand for objects. In English, we have adopted the shape and combination of the letters 's-m-o-k-e' to represent or stand for the actual greyish-black-spiraling qualities that we have seen in existence. In another language the shape and combination of the letters or characters for the greyish-black-spiraling qualities of the object we call "smoke" may be different, as any student of language knows.

In common usage we do not know why particular symbols were first chosen to represent objects; we could have called the sweet-smelling object "rose" in English by another name. The adoption of many symbols seems arbitrary when we look at their origins, but the use of a symbol in communication is not arbitrary. Two or more people must respond to the use of a symbol in such a way that the symbol represents for both

of them the same object. Let us say that two people are sitting at a table, and one asks the other to hand him the knife. If the other person responds to the symbols used by actually picking up the knife and handing it to the other, we say that communication has taken place. This is why it is maintained by Dewey and other students of language that symbols and language have a social origin.

Thus far description of the use of symbols has been presented as if a symbol were singular, isolated from other symbols. Singling out an individual symbol has been done for analysis, but this breaks up the contextual whole in which individual symbols operate. Symbols operate in contexts, and they operate in conjunction with other symbols, as in a sentence, a paragraph, or a universe of discourse. Sometimes we may utter single words, "Fire!" and "Help!", but these are understood to have relations in certain contexts of life. On the whole, however, symbols are implicated with one another, that is, they are related to one another. Logical symbols, for instance, are a special set of symbols with special rules for their specified implications with each other. Symbols used in chemistry are a special set of symbols, like the use of "H_20" for water, and so on. Poetry and literature use symbols with different purposes and in different contexts from those of logic and chemistry. Once it is grasped that the emergence of symbols in human life allows expanded meanings with many different uses, it is easy to see how very significant is the symbolic dimension of experience.

Dewey thus holds that there are three dimensions of symbolic functions: (1) qualities are connected with other qualities as signs; (2) symbols are related to objects in a reference function; (3) symbols are implicated with each other in symbol-sets or constellations of meanings that we call a language. I will not pursue this aspect of Dewey's method of philosophy any further at this point, but I want to emphasize in my analysis that Dewey has a "relational theory of meaning."

For Dewey, analyzing, describing, and explaining the occurrence of any event is based upon the procedure of looking at an event in two directions: (1) the antecedent conditions that brought about the event, and (2) the consequent conditions to which the event leads. Dewey says that this procedure is the heart of science. He writes: "The knowledge of the relations between changes which enable us to connect things as antecedents and consequences *is* science" (QC: 274; LW 4: 219). This way of looking at experience and nature permeates all of Dewey's writings, and it is important to note that his analysis and explanation of all events, whether they be events of far-reaching consequences such as a war or simple events such as sugar's sweetening tea, are based upon it. I call this part of his method "pragmatic analysis," that is, the analysis of relating events or quality occurrences with one another in terms of

their antecedents or consequences. When one grasps the relational theory of meaning, one then understands that there is no such thing as the intuition of a quality standing alone, disconnected from other qualities. Thus Dewey does not believe that there is immediate knowledge known only by intuition; all knowledge is inferential; that is, knowledge of an event must be ascertained by connecting the event to its antecedents or to its consequences or to both. For instance, a toothache may occur in a single organism, that is, the organism feels it, but the toothache is *known* in terms of the conditions that brought it about and the consequences to which it leads. If this were not the case, then the science of dentistry could not exist.

When Dewey uses this pragmatic analytical method beyond the examples of science, he sometimes relates antecedents and consequences of events that his critics cannot accept. For instance, on Dewey's view, it is not enough to know that Plato and Aristotle emphasized the importance of forms in their philosophies. With the tools of pragmatic analysis, one asks: What were the antecedent conditions for the occurrence of forms in Greek experience? What have been the consequences in subsequent thought of treating forms as static species or as an eternal realm? The antecedent conditions that produce concepts or ideas may vary according to circumstance. In some cases, concepts come about because of social and economic conditions, and Dewey thinks that the class divisions in Greek culture led to the split of the connection of the theoretical and the practical. Sometimes the conditions of the practical arts, the arts of making things, foreshadow the abstraction of the forms from these arts and their intellectualization into a separate realm.

It is not always easy to determine the antecedent conditions for the occurrence of a concept or idea, and there are those who do not agree with Dewey's selection of the specific antecedents that he claims have brought about certain ideas in the past. His pragmatic analysis in terms of antecedent conditions and consequences of *German Philosophy and Politics* also stirs up disagreement. But I do not want Dewey's specific use of the pragmatic analytical method to detract from the method itself. I believe that the method is basic to understanding experience and nature, and that it is necessary to look at any event in terms of the conditions that brought it about and the conditions to which it leads.

The foregoing emphasis upon antecedent conditions as part of the pragmatic analysis of the occurrence of an event has some pitfalls which must be avoided, and I want to turn to some cautions about the use of the method. Again, let us turn to Dewey's view of experience to make this point clear. I wish to draw attention to Dewey's concept of *emergence* as belonging to primary experience and to his nonreductive method in dealing with this dimension of experience and nature.

Dewey is an emergent naturalist, that is, he sees nature as evolving in the manner indicated by Darwin over one hundred years ago. Dewey's famous essay, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," should be read as Darwin's influence on Dewey, although Dewey did not accept all of Darwin (ID: 1–19; MW 4: 3–14). For Dewey, new forms or species emerge out of old ones. Where nature is ongoing, that is, where new forms have survival value and do not pass into extinction, these new forms make new demands upon other parts of nature. For instance, the development of lungs in animals involves the function of breathing, and breathing is a complex affair of the lungs' transactions with the air. The concept of emergence means that there is a line of continuity linking the lower, less complex forms of nature with the higher, more complex forms. An example of this line of continuity is the growth of a seed into a plant, and the development of the various qualities of the seed into a plant is called "growth," and sometimes Dewey calls this process a "transformation." New qualities emerging in the plant mean new transactions with the environment. Forms and functions of rocks, plants, animals, and humans are characteristically different. Human life, for instance, has physical characteristics, and a complete description of human life must take account of the physical particles, the chemical elements, that make up the human body. The peculiar organization of these physical elements brings about functions that we call "organic," that is, humans breathe, reproduce by sexual union, and the like. The physical and biological conditions are the foreshadowing of the emergence of psychological and mental functions. One of the most important emergents in humans is the function of speech.

Determining whether a specific problem occurs on a physical, organic, psychological, or social level is not always easy. For instance, if a child is doing poorly in his or her reading functions, what procedure is used to locate the antecedent conditions for this occurrence? It could be that the child is suffering from poor eyesight; it could be that the size of the type in the books is too small for the normal functioning of the child's eyes at a certain stage of physiological development; it could be that the child has psychological problems; it could be that the classroom situation or the family environment has social elements that disturb the child. The child's problem could be a combination of several antecedent conditions. The problem of the child's poor reading functions can be determined only by a careful analysis of the kind of situation that is present.

The foregoing examples point up the complexities of emergence and novelty in Dewey's view of experience. Now, if one is attempting to explain the connections and relations between antecedent conditions and the occurrence of an event, it is possible that the fact of emergence may be overlooked, and that a complex function, an emerging one, may be

explained in terms of the simpler conditions that foreshadow it. This method of explanation is what Dewey calls "reductionism," and he goes to great lengths to show that this philosophical fallacy must be avoided. For instance, there was a time when some psychologists thought that they could reduce speech functions in humans to the movements of the voice box. Whereas it is true that the occurrence of the voice box is a biological condition for the emergence of speech, it is a mistake to reduce complex speech functions in humans to their preconditions. Reductionism is sometimes called the "nothing but" fallacy. Water is said to be "nothing but" the elements that compose it; yet we know that water has qualities and relations that emerge from the combination of oxygen and hydrogen, qualities that oxygen and hydrogen do not have.

I wish to include here an example of Dewey's use of nonreductionism and his concept of emergence because it has been the subject of so much misunderstanding (Kaufmann 1959). How do logical processes arise in human experience? What are the antecedent conditions for their emergence? Dewey shows that logical processes grow out of, but are not reducible to, the preconditions of organic responses of the organism. The organism responds; its responses are a kind of crude classification of its life. The amoeba, for instance, pushes out into its immediate environment or conditions of its life. If this simple organism finds parts of its environment unfriendly, then it recoils and rejects those parts; if it finds other parts of its environment friendly, then it selects those parts. On this very simple level of life, there is emerging in the responses of the organism a kind of logic; that is, the processes of selections are affirmations and the processes of rejections are negations. Thus, organisms make discriminatory responses, and, in a crude way, they are classifying and defining. These crude beginnings are not on the level of a more complex and highly developed logic, a logic that emerges from a biological foreshadowing into the development of abstract symbols and their implications.

By relating the more complex and sophisticated logical operations to the organic conditions out of which they emerge, Dewey cuts the ground from under theories that attribute the origin of logical forms to the structure of the human mind (as in Kant) or to some transcendental reality (as in Hegel). Dewey proposes a "naturalistic logic," a logic in which complex logical operations are emergents or developments out of the less complex and simple responses of organic life. Dewey is not maintaining that there is or can be a reduction of logical operations of the more sophisticated kinds to biological functions; this would be a case of reductionism.

There is another kind of reductionism that Dewey rejects. One explanatory technique frequently adopted by some thinkers is that of ana-

lyzing complex forms and functions by reducing them to their historical origins. The explanation of emergent and transformed qualities and functions in terms of their origins is called "the genetic fallacy." For instance, the plant is said to be nothing more than its original state, which is a seed. This kind of explanation of the plant's emergent qualities and their transactions ignores the transformations the plant has undergone in its developmental history. When the explanatory technique of reduction to origins is carried over into studies of organic, social, and cultural subject-matters, then descriptions of any process become distorted. Take, for instance, the explanations of the emergent complexities of the human species. The human organism's emergent life-functions are reduced by this method to its genetic state or origin, which is the embryo, and the many transformations a human organism goes through in its development are ignored. The more complex social and cultural organizations of humans, such as family, political, and economic systems, are explained by a description of how they originated. American democracy has undergone many transformations since the founding fathers wrote the Mayflower Compact. To claim that the complex forms of democracy that have evolved since the days of 1620 are nothing more than their original forms is to commit the genetic fallacy.

Because of the limitations of time, I have not been able to analyze in detail the full meanings of the topics covered above. It has been my intention to sketch briefly those topics that I think are essential to the understanding of Dewey's thought. When works other than those cited above are approached, one should note how he analyzes each problem. His view of experience, his categories of feelings, connections, and continuities, his theory of meaning, his pragmatic analytical method, and his views of emergence and nonreductionism, appear on almost every page of his writings. For instance, his theory of relations connects desires with objects in his theory of value, connects organism and environment in his social psychology, connects individual and society in his social philosophy, connects means and ends in his ethics. His theories of continuity and emergence appear in those passages where he is showing the transformation of an idea throughout its history.

I would like to add a postscript to the above treatment of Dewey's views of experience and philosophical method. I have always thought of Dewey as a modern thinker in the classical tradition. His life's work centered upon the activities of inquiry, creation, and conduct. Inquiry in the modern mode of science leads to truth; creation is the making of art objects and involves the pursuit of beauty; conduct concerns human behavior and our search for the good life. Thus, John Dewey was a philosopher of the twentieth century seeking truth, beauty, and goodness.

Notes

1. Dewey says in the preface of the new edition: "The publication of this new edition has made it possible to rewrite completely the first chapter as well as to make a few minor corrections throughout the volume. The first chapter was intended as an introduction. It failed of its purpose; it was upon the whole more technical and harder reading than the chapters which it was supposed to introduce" (EN: i; LW 1: 3).

2. John Battle, for example, writes: "Among the different types of categorical monism Dewey has chosen a materialistic monism, in which only material events exist and they are constantly in change" (Battle 1951: 110). This statement misrepresents Dewey's view of experience.

3. Dewey used the word 'interaction' in his earlier writings, but the term is sometimes taken to mean that two separate entities, organism and environment, *inter*-act. This, of course, is not what he means; in his later writings he adopts the term 'transaction'.

3

Primary Experience in the Philosophy of John Dewey

John Dewey wrote in *Experience and Nature* that his empirical method exacts of philosophy two things; in the first place, it means that the "refined methods and products" that emerge from analytic reflection or cognitive experience "be traced back to their origin in primary experience, in all its heterogeneity and fullness;" and second, "that the secondary methods and conclusions be brought back to the things of ordinary experience, in all their coarseness and crudity, for verification" (EN: 36; LW 1: 39). It is my contention that the precognitive experience out of which emerges reflection, inquiry, or cognitive experience and the postcognitive experience to which reflection or inquiry returns constitute problems for Dewey's philosophy that have not been adequately analyzed and solved. There is a certain vagueness in Dewey's description of primary experience and the relation of primary experience to the cognitive process is a crucial issue.[1]

While the center of attention in this study is Dewey's problem of the relation of primary experience to the more "refined methods and products" of knowledge, this problem is also important in other pragmatic philosophies, especially those of William James and Charles S. Peirce. While there may be other difficulties in the relation of primary experience to the more mediated aspects of experience, the problems considered here can be conveniently grouped around three questions.

(1) Is something given in primary experience that is *felt* and noncognitive? Admitting that it is impossible to describe such experience in linguistic symbols, we can ask the following: What specific items can be pointed out or denoted in primary experience? Are there any *primitives* in primary experience beyond which no kind of experience, whether noncognitive or cognitive, can go? In Dewey's own view, what do terms

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like 'qualitative immediacy' and 'existential involvement' mean and what roles do they play? When Dewey claims that the highly refined methods and products of cognitive experience must be brought back to primary experience in all its "coarseness and crudity" what is meant by this phrase? These questions all center on the *given-ness* and *felt-ness* of primary experience.

(2) Are there levels of immediacy and layers of meaning in primary experience? Consideration of Dewey's treatment of the felt quality of primary experience might lead one to conclude that his primary experience is a formless flux upon which cognition imposes an order of relations. However, the following passage concerning valuational experience suggests a different interpretation: Dewey writes, "After the first dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good, subsequent perception of the good contains at least a germ of critical reflection" (EN: 401; LW 1: 300). One would suppose from this passage that there are levels of immediacy containing varying degrees of mediation. If this is the case, then one would think that primary experience would contain "germs of critical reflection" in some situations but be precognitive and immediate in other situations. If primary experience does at times contain these "germs of critical reflection," then this ought to be explicitly stated. If this is the case, other problems arise for Dewey's philosophy, especially concerning the concept of truth.

(3) Another aspect of the problem of the relation of primary experience to highly refined cognitions pertains to the manner in which Dewey attempts to use primary experience as a means of verification for those cognitions. For, when the highly refined products are brought back to primary experience, is it possible that this primary experience, already designated as being "coarse" and "crude," might give rise to errors as well as to truths?

The discussion of the description of the felt, given, noncognitive aspect of experience may well begin with Dewey's description of organic states before differentiations have taken place, or what may be called "undifferentiated feeling" (EN: 304f.; LW 1: 230f.). This feeling state of the organism seems to be akin to James's description of the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of early life and to Peirce's category of "firstness."[2] This flow of feeling is a support to all organic life; without this pervasive feeling life would not be possible. Is this undifferentiated feeling what Dewey means by primary experience when he speaks of tracing back cognitive experience to its *origins* in primary experience? If it is, it is strange that, in this context, he refers to primary experience "in all its heterogeneity and fullness." Sometimes Dewey uses the term 'immediate qualities' (EN: 298; LW 1: 226) or 'qualitative immediacy', and there is a question of whether this refers to the same undifferentiated

feeling or to an immediacy in which sensations, concepts, desires, and emotions have already been differentiated. Dewey makes it clear, at least, that the differentiations mentioned are not given in experience. Are they, however, part of primary experience? That is, does primary experience contain more than undifferentiated feeling?

Among the items differentiated in our ongoing experience are sensory qualities. An analysis of these might throw light on the problem at hand. Pragmatists treat sensory qualities in a way sharply contrasted with that of traditional empiricism. Traditional empiricism, for the most part, lumps sensory qualities together in terms of what they have in common; but the pragmatists are quick to point out that almost everything in denotative experience has something in common with everything else (Logic, LW 12: ch. 8), and that this method does not render an adequate theory of how sensory qualities actually function in common sense and in science. According to the pragmatic interpretation, to be significant qualities must function as sign-connections (ibid.: 128f.; ibid.: 131f.). In fact, an object is not a "bundle of sensory qualities" for the pragmatists, but it is a "bundle of sensory qualities functioning as signs"; that is, qualities cohere as signs under different and varying conditions to give continuity to an object. Qualities that function as signs enable us to plan and to chart our responses to the world about us. As long as these qualities enable our habitual responses to function smoothly, there is no trouble. Our "primary experience" is immediate and automatic. But qualities in their sign functions become disarranged, incoherent, disorganized, and then a "felt difficulty" arises or emerges in our experience. This is what Dewey calls an "indeterminate situation." Fortunately, not all of life becomes disorganized at once, not all of it is brought into doubt, or we could not survive. Even at that, problems may converge in experience, the multiplicity of which may drive us to despair. But as long as some habits and responses rest on sign-connections operating reliably to allow responses to be carried out, we survive.

Dewey holds that in the ongoing of experience, questions, doubts, and perplexities arise. It seems that these belong to primary experience. Not only would the perplexities of an individual's experience be part of *that individual's* primary experience, but also problems that are broad and cover wide areas of human experience would be part of collective primary experience. These human problems provide, for Dewey, the proper business of philosophy, in contrast to the narrow and pedantic problems of the specialist. These problems of men, as well as the felt perplexities of the individual's experience, must belong within primary experience. Indeterminate situations are immediately felt and they are denoted by the derangement of qualities functioning as signs. Thus, it appears that differentiated qualities in some cases become part of primary experience.

There is another dimension of the analysis of qualities functioning as signs that must be considered. Dewey holds that qualities taken alone and without connection or relation to other qualities are meaningless. If such disconnected qualities do occur, they are simply "had" or "felt." These occurrences are instances of "qualitative immediacy." When one begins to relate a quality with what occurred before or what comes after, a new dimension enters experience. At this point we would enter upon a discussion of cognition, but a more basic issue must be discussed first. There is another aspect of experience that may be considered as "primary" or, in the sense used above, as one of Dewey's "primitives." I refer to what Dewey calls "connections in experience" or "existential involvements," and these terms, in turn, are to be considered as basic to the emergence of "formulated relations."

Dewey's distinction between "connections in experience" and "relations" is not always sharp and clear in his writings. For instance, it was only when Hans Reichenbach made a criticism of Dewey's philosophy that Dewey made explicit the distinction. In answer, Dewey wrote that "the actual operative presence of *connections* (which when formulated are *relational*) in the subject-matter of direct experience is an intrinsic part of my idea of experience" (Dewey 1951: 535; LW 14: 20). By distinguishing "connections" found in direct experience and "relations" formulated in inquiry, Dewey has thus distinguished two levels of experience. Furthermore, by maintaining that connections are found in direct experience, Dewey is some kind of "radical empiricist." But Dewey retains the traditional use of the term 'relations' by placing them on the cognitive level of experience.

There is another term Dewey introduces that seems to mean the same as 'connections' of direct experience; it is the term 'existential involvements'. He writes: "Existential involvement of things with one another alone warrants inference so as to enable further connections among things themselves to be discovered" (Logic: 55; LW 12: 61). The distinction that Dewey made in his reply to Reichenbach is repeated; and here connections of direct experience are said to be the basis for inference. He says that he uses "the words *connection* (and *involvement*) to designate that kind of relation sustained by *things* to one another in virtue of which *inference* is possible" (ibid.). Dewey is aware that the term 'relations' is ambiguous, and he attempts to show at least three senses in which the word is used. These are (1) sign-signification, (2) symbol reference, and (3) symbol implication. In symbol implication, symbols are related directly to one another; in symbol reference, symbols are related to existence; in sign-signification, "existences are 'related' to one another in the evidential sign-signified function" (ibid.; LW 12: 60). It appears that the level above existential involvement or connections in

experience is that of sign-signification. Dewey seems to hold that "the evidential sign-signified function" is on the level of mediation or cognition. He makes the point that without language "we might react to the qualities in question in animal-like fashion" and that "no inference could be made that was not blind and blundering" (Logic: 56; LW 12: 61). Now, all this creates no difficulties on the relation of inferential functions to symbolic functions, but it leaves unanalyzed the relation of connections in experience or existential involvements to the inferential function, to sign-signification, as well as to the symbolic formulations.

On Dewey's account, there seems no doubt that connections in experience or existential involvements are given; that is, they are felt but not known. But how do these existential involvements give rise to mediated experience? Furthermore, what is the status of the terms 'interaction' and 'transaction' in Dewey's philosophy? Are these terms of mediation or of noncognitive experience? In his later writings, Dewey preferred the term 'transaction' to 'interaction', for the latter sometimes signified that two separate entities were in a state of interaction, whereas 'transaction' seemed to signify a more intimate connection or an existential involvement. If 'transaction' and 'interaction' are terms of mediation, then what relation do their referents bear to connections and existential involvements in experience? If 'transaction' and 'interaction' are terms synonymous with 'connections in experience' and 'existential involvements', and their referents are to be interpreted as components of primary experience or direct experience, then are transactions when formulated on the cognitive level to be designated 'relations'?

I do not think that the terms 'interaction' and 'transaction' are designated clearly as cognitive or noncognitive in Dewey's philosophy, but I am inclined to maintain that he intends what he calls 'transactions' to be something like connections in experience or existential involvements. In this sense, they are given, felt, and denoted, but can only be defined, classified, discriminated, and symbolized in cognitive terms. This would mean that connections in experience are basic in awakening in us the cognitive experience, of prodding us to infer and to symbolize. It seems that connections in experience and existential involvements belong to primary experience; that these are given, felt, and on the side of the *origin* of cognitive experience must be taken to play a key role. Furthermore, the way in which Dewey uses the terms 'connections in experience' and 'existential involvements' surely makes him a radical empiricist.

It must be kept in mind that James uses the term 'relations' to designate what is "given" in primary experience, whereas Dewey uses the term 'connections' for what is "given" and 'relations' for what is cognitively formulated. James's famous passage on this problem shows what is involved. James wrote:

> Every examiner of the sensible life *in concreto* must see that relations of every sort, of time, space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what not, are just as integral members of the sensational flux as terms are, and that conjunctive relations are just as true members of the flux as disjunctive relations are. (James 1909: 279f.)

For James, the concept of radical empiricism freed him from those types of philosophies, both rationalistic and sensationalistic, that attempt to lodge relations in that area of experience in which they are formulated by mental operations. Now, the problem in James's account of radical empiricism seems to be the relation of the noncognitive to the cognitive. He claims that "relations" are directly experienced, yet he names them, discriminates them from one another, and uses examples involving what most would consider to be a complex cognitive refinement. That there is "something" given in direct experience that affords the basis for "relations" seems clear, and James recognizes this.

If we take James's undifferentiated experience as described by him as a "blooming, buzzing confusion," this experience is simply felt by the organism; it is noncognitive and it is an undifferentiated feeling as yet in the baby. Perhaps the ambiguity in James is his use of the term 'relations' to denote what he is pointing to in direct experience. For, the term 'relations' is usually used on the cognitive level, and generally has meant that the inquirer "formulated" certain relations of experience; historically, philosophers have formed relations between so-called atomistic sensations, between various concepts, and between conceptions and sensations. James is undoubtedly correct in maintaining that both rationalists and empiricists have classified relations as operations of the mind, or at least have placed them in the realm of mental activity. But what James does himself is to push relations into the area of the feeling state of the organism without giving a description of how these relations in direct experience are or appear; and this is especially the case when one considers the connection or relation between the feeling state of the organism and the cognitive experience that emerges.

There seems to be much agreement among Peirce, James, and Dewey on what might be called their "leading principles" or "categories," to use Peirce's term. It has been noted that James and Dewey begin with undifferentiated feeling, with qualitative immediacy, and that both find in direct experience "connections" (Dewey) or "relations" (James). Peirce's position on these matters is open to various interpretations.[3] In some passages Peirce tends to make 'firstness' mean sheer feeling; in some passages he tends to make 'secondness' refer to connections in experience, or to use one of his terms, "bumpings" (Peirce 1931: 162); in some passages cause and effect are included here. When Peirce equates 'thirdness' with thought, this seems comparable to Dewey's view of

cognition. To trace the different possible interpretations of Peirce's categories on the treatment of primary experience and compare it point by point with those of James and Dewey would be too large a task for this study. However, a preliminary survey suggests that Peirce's distinction of three levels of feeling, bumping, and thinking faces the same problem we have found in Dewey's treatment of direct experience: How much cognition, if any, is found in primary experience? Is "firstness" an immediacy that is felt, but not known? Under "secondness," are there direct experiences that are not cognized? If there are uncognized direct experiences under "secondness" how is it that Peirce would include cause and effect under this category? This treatment would compare with James's claim of the direct experience of causal relations, but contrast with Dewey's treatment of cause as a logical category, since a logical category would be on Peirce's level of "thirdness."

At any rate, it seems clear that in Dewey's philosophy "existential involvements" or "connections in experience" make up one of the elements of the meaning of 'primary experience' and that these must be given a place of fundamental importance. However, the question now becomes: To what extent, if any, does primary experience contain cognitive formulations of these connections as relations? We are now led into Dewey's treatment of "sign-significations" and the emergence of linguistic symbols; this, in turn, must be considered in the light of the primitive experience of human beings, or what may be called "common sense."

In Dewey's analysis, qualities can act as stimuli for certain behavioral responses. This is the manner in which animals respond to such qualities functioning as stimuli. On the human level, however, qualities may be taken as significant of certain consequences. When this occurs, qualities act as sign-significances. There is a question as to whether human beings can perform this function of taking qualities as signs of certain consequences without the intervention and use of linguistic symbols. The mental operation of "relating" qualities as signs of certain consequences is the emergence of cognition. This means that qualities now become evidence for other qualities to follow, and the function of inference means that from a quality taken as a sign, one "infers" that there is a relation of this quality with others.

Now it is obvious that no organic life could have survived without being able to respond to certain qualities as "signs"; that is, as being connected with consequences that follow. Once humans achieved language, they could manipulate, even if incorrectly, many of the qualities around them to form relations that only a kind of blind or trial-and-error experience could verify. These qualities taken as signs and used for survival were cherished and became part of the common sense of humankind. There thus grew up a kind of unorganized body of beliefs about

the meanings of certain qualities in experience. This body of beliefs contains errors and superstitions as well as truths. The problem is: How much cognitive content does this so-called common sense have? And is common sense part of "primary experience"?

Dewey claims that "the attainment of knowledge of some things is necessarily involved in commonsense inquiries" (Logic: 60; LW 12: 66), but the purpose of common sense is different from that of scientific inquiry. Commonsense inquiries involve use and enjoyment. However, Dewey holds that scientific subject-matter and procedures "grow out of the direct problems and methods of common sense, of practical uses and enjoyments" (Logic: 66; LW 12: 71). The description of the relation of common sense to science seems to mirror that of the relation of primary experience to cognition discussed in the opening paragraphs of this study. Just as cognition is traced back to its origins in the heterogeneity and fullness of primary experience, science is shown to have originated in the practical purposes of common sense; and just as cognition must be verified with reference to the coarseness and crudity of the primary experience to which it is brought back, science has consequences in the area of common sense. Thus, it appears that "primary experience" is in some way made to contain what is found in "commonsense experience."

Thus far we have seen that tracing back the cognitive aspects of experience to "primary experience" involves on the very lowest level "undifferentiated feeling"; that there emerges "qualitative immediacy" in which qualities are simply felt. But qualities are connected, and these connections in experience or existential involvements appear to be primitives in primary experience. The question is, however, How much of experience containing "at least a germ of critical reflection" is to be regarded as primary? It would appear from Dewey's treatment of common sense that some intellectual content is necessarily involved. And when he says that scientific method and subject-matter grow out of commonsense experience and return to it, this suggests that commonsense experience is regarded as primary.

The other aspect of cognitive experience, that of bringing it back to the things of ordinary experience, in all their coarseness and crudity, for verification, remains to be discussed. The problem here is, To what level of immediacy, or to what layer of meaning are these cognitive formulations brought? The problem at this juncture is the confrontation between a judgment and primary experience. The attainment of a solution of an indeterminate situation means that the judgment confronts, and when applied brings harmony to, the disordered situation. The solution of a problem is "felt" with the same kind of qualitative immediacy as was the instigation of the problem. Now, Dewey claims that undergoing

reflective experience means that the level at which a problem is solved is not the same as the level at which it was instigated. This suggests that there are levels of immediacy. The difference between the level at which inquiry begins and the level at which it ends presents further problems as to the meaning of "primary experience."

If there *are* levels of immediacy and layers of meaning in "primary experience," first, just how do we know that we have really gotten hold of an indeterminate situation (we may be fooled in such a way that our formulated problem is a pseudoproblem), and second, how do we know that our formulated judgment, even if carefully constructed, is really true? We could "think" that we have solved a problem by confronting our formulated judgment with one level of immediacy and a corresponding layer of meaning, but subsequent experience would show that the problem was not yet solved.

The only answer I can see for the foregoing problem is to claim that the primitives of primary experience—qualitative immediacy and existential involvements or connections—are the ultimate grounds upon which any verification of judgments can rest. Because it is difficult to correctly formulate relations so that they mirror the connections given in experience, there is always room for error. This is why, I think, Dewey claims that formulated judgments are always open to revision in the light of future experience. And since it is not easy to extract from experience and nature the connections that lie hidden below its surface meanings, our formulated judgments must continually be tested in our ongoing experience.

There is another aspect of primary experience that involves qualitative immediacy and connections. It has been shown that we can formulate "relations" that have no basis in the connections of experience; this fact makes fiction possible. But every "true" formulation of relations that is verified by direct experience must have a connection corresponding with that relation. This would mean that there will be a multiplicity of connections in experience, as has already been discovered; and if the continuing development of our universe is anything like the past, surely new connections are occurring now that have not been formulated into a knowledge relation.

Dewey's contention that primary experience is both the starting place and the consummation of cognitive formulations contains its difficulties. The levels of immediacy and the layers of meaning from which inquiry starts and to which it returns have their pitfalls and their dangers. Deepest down in our experience are undifferentiated feelings. There are immediate qualities and existential involvements given in direct experience. There are qualities acting as signs in the whole process of sign-signification. Inference and evidential functions emerge, but not,

it seems, without symbolic formulations. Next arises a kind of commonsense knowledge out of which scientific methods and products arise and to which they return bringing refinement, expansion, and excellence. Primary experience in Dewey's philosophy has been shown to play a vital role. Even with all its vagueness and difficulties of statement, using primary experience as the starting place is the only way that I can see that philosophy and science can keep in touch with human problems and render some service to their solution.

Notes

1. In the Paul Carus lectures Dewey himself made the relation of primary experience to the cognitive process a central issue in his philosophy. The best discussion of this problem is found in chapter 1 of the first edition of *Experience and Nature* (Dewey 1925). Chapter 1 of this book was rewritten for the new edition.

2. [James 1890: 488; Peirce 1931: 183.—*Ed.*]

3. The "categories" of Peirce, for instance, are at the center of the problem treated here. The most extended treatment I have seen listing the terms that Peirce names in relation to each category is found in Eugene Freeman's book, *The Categories of Charles Peirce* (Freeman 1934: 57f.).

Part Two

Value Theory

4

The Cognitive and the Noncognitive in Dewey's Theory of Valuation

John Dewey maintained that his theory of valuation is a "special case" of his general method of inquiry[1] (Dewey 1943: 315; LW 15: 70); that valuation judgments are not marked off "methodologically" from other kinds of scientific judgments[2] (Dewey 1949: 77; LW 16: 357); that a "unified logical method" is needed for the solution of all problematic situations (value problems being in their general features like all other problems) (Logic: 79; LW 12: 84)[3]; and that "knowledge of the relations between changes which enable us to connect things as antecedents and consequences *is* science" (QC: 274; LW 4: 219), such knowledge of *relations* extending into valuational situations. The claim that methodology has logical applications to any and all kinds of subject-matters and that the study of valuational subject-matters is only a "special case" of the use of a general methodology forms the context of this paper. The hypothesis to be proved is that certain crucial problems appear in Dewey's conception of methodology as applied to valuational subject-matters, problems that Dewey never adequately solved. It will be shown that as Dewey stated his theory of valuation and the methodology applicable to it certain consequences result that are incompatible with his intended purpose. It will be shown, further, that it is possible to construct an answer to these difficulties if other parts of Dewey's philosophy are brought to bear upon the troublesome issues and if a certain interpretation of his theory of valuation and his general methodology as applied to it be allowed.

The *role* of methodology in Dewey's philosophy appears to be a clue to his entire position (EN, LW 1: ch. 1). A complete description of his methodology would carry us beyond this study, for our concern is with those points at which methodological procedures emerge in human

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behavior and at which they are consummated. It is at these junctures in experience that the problems centering around the relation of the *cognitive* and the *noncognitive* are found. The order of development in Dewey's philosophy is from *gross qualitative experience* through *mediation* or *inquiry* and back to gross qualitative experience (ibid.: 36; ibid.: 39). There are two junctures in the process of importance to valuational theory: (1) where gross qualitative experience emerges into inquiry; and (2) where inquiry comes back to gross qualitative experience. In other words, the problems emerge where *immediacy* passes into *mediation* and again where *mediation* comes back to *immediacy.*

At the first juncture of the two phases of experience, where immediacy passes into mediation, there are crucial issues in Dewey's theory. What is the relation of the "given value" or the "qualitatively immediate value" to the "mediating" conditions that follow? Or what is the relation of antecedent reality to the consequent thought processes that follow upon it? Is valuing a discrete kind of experience such that it is completely cut off from the thought processes that follow? Is there some principle that connects these two phases of experience? If so, what is this principle? And if these two phases of experience are connected by some principle, has Dewey adequately explained it in his theory of valuation?

At the second juncture, where inquiry comes back to gross qualitative or immediate experience, there are other problems. The principal difficulty at this juncture of the two phases of experience concerns Dewey's view of the relation of mediation to existence, or the relation of the *continuum of inquiry* to the *continuum of experience*. How are the abstract relations of thought processes or discourse made applicable to existential conditions met in experience? What is the relation of the cognitive to the noncognitive, that is, the relation of inquiry to existence?

The problem of the relation of the immediate to the mediate in valuational theory comes ultimately to this question: Are the qualitatively given valuings discrete and different in kind from the mediated values that follow them? As the problem of the relation of the immediate to the mediate is one of the most crucial in modern philosophy[4] (Logic: 515; LW 12: 508), methodological approaches to valuational theory must somehow defend whatever position is explicitly taken or implicitly assumed on the issue. In the case of Dewey's valuational theory, if he holds that valuings are discrete and completely cut off from the mediation that follows (and he admitted that he had gone too far in this direction [Dewey 1949: 75n; LW 16: 354n]), then he is a realist. If his theory can be read as a type of realism, then he is caught up in the problem of showing how "ideas" of value, or thought-forms employed in thinking or mediation, somehow "agree" with the antecedent reality of the valuings that are given in experience. If, on the other hand, Dewey's theory is read

in such a way that the relation of the immediate to the mediate is a matter of *degree* or *emphasis,* then it seems that he is caught between two consequences that are disturbing for his theory of valuation. He must hold either (1) that all valuings and evaluations are immediate, and thus his theory of valuation collapses into immediacy or into some form of subjectivity; or (2) that mediation, that is, inquiry, thought-forms, rational discourse, or whatever one wishes to call it, exhausts all reality, and this position means that his theory becomes some sort of idealism. I shall show that it is possible to read Dewey's theory as it now stands in either of these directions, and therefore the theory is vague and incomplete.

Dewey makes a distinction between "valuing" and "evaluation" (TV: 19–33; LW 13: 208–20), and, from the standpoint of methodology, the relation of these two phases of experience is the relation of the immediate to the mediate. Let us examine Dewey's description of the term 'valuing', the process by which valuings "pass into" evaluations, and the problems which present themselves at this first juncture of experience.

At various times Dewey assigns numerous synonyms to the term 'valuing.' In one passage, 'valuing' has as synonyms such terms as 'prizing', 'holding dear', 'honoring', 'regarding highly', 'esteeming' (TV: 5; LW 13: 195). In another passage, he lists 'prizing', 'cherishing', 'admiring', 'relishing', 'enjoying' (PM: 269; LW 15: 80).[5] The first distinctive description of valuing may be found in what Dewey calls *qualitative immediacy,* or the bare occurrence of a value. Valuing is at first "a dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good." Bare existence and qualitative immediacy can only be "pointed at," or "denoted" in the sense in which Dewey uses that term. Discourse cannot give one the experience of these immediate qualities; it can only intimate connections which may lead one to the experience. In Dewey's account of valuings, the meaning of the term is further complicated by his description of experiences like believing in ghosts, devils, etc., as cases of qualitative immediacy. This suggests that (at least in some contexts) he probably holds that there are levels of immediacy (EN: 396–405; LW 1: 297–303).

In Dewey's view of experience, there is denoted both stability and instability, so that stable things become unstable, unsettled; and on the other hand, unstable things become stable, settled. If it were not for the former, thought would never intervene in experience; if it were not for the latter, life would be one long experience of neurosis (AE: 60f.; LW 10: 66f.). These generic traits of existence, of course, apply to the field of value. Qualitative immediacy of the things or persons prized or enjoyed becomes disrupted. The disruption is "felt" as immediate, too, and the pulsation of these feeling states *may* bring about mediation, but there is no guarantee that this will be the case (PM: 269f.; LW 15: 80f). If values were plentiful there would be no occasion for mediation, but such

is not the case in the kind of world in which we live. Values in their immediacy are as "unstable as the forms of clouds."

The manner in which the immediately enjoyed objects pass into mediation is not entirely clear in Dewey's theory of valuation. Evidence for this statement is found in the cases in which he speaks of how immediacy "passes insensibly" over into mediation and in cases in which he describes a definite shock or felt difficulty. He claims that "the possession and enjoyment of goods passes insensibly and inevitably into appraisal" (EN: 398; LW 1: 298). "Passing insensibly" from conscience, taste, conviction, and enjoyment into critical judgment appears oversimplified when one considers Dewey's description of the *problematic situation.* In his controversy with Philip Rice over theory of valuation, he held that the key word in his view is 'situation', and that a situation is held to be *directly and immediately qualitative* (PM: 257; LW 15: 69). In another work he describes the felt immediacy of the problematic situation as "confused, obscure, conflicting, relatively disordered qualities" (Logic: 105f.; LW 12: 109f.). Again, he says, "There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they are the necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves they are precognitive" (Logic: 107; LW 12: 111). This statement shows that the gross qualitative experience that precedes inquiry, out of which inquiry arises, is noncognitive. Inquiry, or mediation, is cognitive. However, even in this statement, which may be taken to be one of the most direct Dewey ever made on the problem, there is still no consideration of the *relation* of the noncognitive to the cognitive. The foregoing quotations are taken from his general methodology; let us turn to statements of a similar nature made in his theory of valuation. A value situation is described as follows:

> Valuation takes place only when there is something the matter; when there is some trouble to be done away with, some need, lack, or privation to be made good, some conflict of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions. This fact in turn proves that there is present an intellectual factor—a factor of inquiry—whenever there is valuation, for the end-in-view is formed and projected as that which, if acted upon, will supply the existing need or lack and resolve the existing conflict. (TV: 34; LW 15: 221)

Other cases of the immediately qualitative and felt valuing experiences being the stimulus to inquiry or mediation only repeat the previous point. In *The Quest for Certainty,* he says: "Without the intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values but problematic goods, becoming values when they re-issue in a changed form from intelligent behavior" (QC: 259; LW 4: 207). In another place, he says: "their unsettled or dubious state

qua value is precisely that which calls out judgment . . .” (PM: 270; LW 15: 81).

“After the first dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good, subsequent perception of the good contains at least a germ of critical reflection” (EN: 401; LW 1: 300). The crucial issue here is the meaning of the relation between the immediate and the mediate as found in the expression “contains at least a germ of critical reflection.” At what point in experience does mediation occur? Again, Dewey writes: “the moment we begin to discourse about these values, to define and generalize, to make distinctions in kinds, we are passing beyond value-objects themselves; we are entering, even if only blindly, upon an inquiry into causal antecedents and causative consequents, with a view to appraising the ‘real,’ that is the eventual, goodness of the thing in question” (EN: 403; LW 1: 301f.). Dewey seems to be saying that when symbolic behavior enters into experience we are entering into mediation. Furthermore, he claims that when we go beyond direct occurrence, then definition and a process of discrimination imply a reflective criterion (EN: 398; LW 1: 298).

Any discussion of the problem of the relation of the immediate to mediation in Dewey’s theory of valuation would be incomplete without an analysis of the distinction he makes between the “desired” and the “desirable.” “The fact that something is desired only raises the *question* of its desirability; it does not settle it” (QC: 260; LW 4: 208). Another dimension must be added to the desired object to bring about its emergence into a value. This distinction is an important one for Dewey, for he claims that it is “the key to understanding the relation of values to the direction of conduct” (QC: 261; LW 4: 209). The regulation of desires in terms of the direction of conduct is what Dewey thinks separates his view from the traditional empirical views.

When the generic traits of experience, such as stability and instability, are brought into the analysis of the valuational situation, the locus of specific imbalances in valuational behavior may occur in either of two broad contexts: (1) in the organism itself, or (2) in the environment (Logic: 25f.; LW 12: 31f.). But the organism-environment constitutes one functioning unit, so the term ‘locus’ of the instability seems appropriate (Logic: 107; LW 12: 111).

Once this approach is made to valuational behavior, Dewey then describes at various places in his writings how the immediately felt difficulties or imbalances take place. (1) The “changes in ourselves” are not limited to the exhaustion of the organs; other organic changes may cause enjoyed objects to become unstable. When there is added to these organic changes “the external vicissitudes to which they [values] are subjected . . . there is no cause to wonder at the evanescence of

immediate goods" (EN: 399; LW 1: 299). (2) A thing enjoyed at one time may lead to disturbing consequences. (3) Enjoyment ceases to be a datum and becomes a problem. (4) The pleasing experience of an object may be a warning to look out for consequences. (5) Enjoyments may become problematic, thus arousing reflective inquiry (EN: 398f.; LW 1: 297). (6) Enjoyments provide the primary material of problems of valuation (TV: 39; LW 13: 225). (7) A desire may be questioned as to its desirability.

Dewey thinks that immediate values should be lifted out of immediacy and subjected to inquiry in order to make values secure; and he thinks the model used in the natural sciences is the pattern to adopt in the theory of valuation. Since he thinks intelligence or inquiry is the primary method of the successful management of scientific objects, it follows that this method is the one he hopes will be successful in the management of secure valuational objects (QC: 260f.; LW 4: 208f.).

The distinction Dewey has made in the foregoing analysis between the immediate and the mediate creates a serious problem for his theory of valuation. As the statement of his theory of valuation now stands, several questions arise. Is the value that arises after inquiry is instituted related to immediate valuings or is it discrete and different? If it is discrete and different, then has not Dewey the problem of showing how the *constructed* object in inquiry is related to the *antecedently given* value object? The problem centers around what Dewey calls the "immediate value-object" and the "ulterior value-object," the "given" good and the "reflective" good, the "now-apparent" good and the "eventual" good (EN: 402f.; LW 1: 300f.).

What makes a study of Dewey's theory of valuation difficult is that, throughout his major works on the subject, he assumed a certain position concerning the immediate and the mediate that was not stated explicitly until after all his important works on valuational theory were written. In his article "Some Questions about Value," Dewey raises the question of "whether the undeniable difference between direct valuing and the indirectness of evaluation is a matter of *separation* or of *emphasis*" (PM: 278; LW 15: 105). In this article, Dewey did not himself take a position on the question he raised. But later, in his essay in the Lepley volume "The Field of 'Value'," he wrote in a footnote:

> The answer to the question I raised in my original list of 'Questions' as to whether the distinction between direct valuings and evaluations as judgments is one of separate kinds or one of emphasis is, accordingly, answered in the latter sense. I am the more bound to make this statement because in some still earlier writings I tended to go too far in the direction of separation. I still think the reason that actuated me is sound. In current discussion, traits distinctive

> of valuing are frequently indiscriminately transferred to valuation. But the resulting confusion can be escaped by noting the distinction to be one of phase in development. (Dewey 1949: 75n; LW 16: 354n)

By rejecting the position that the immediate and the mediate are discrete and separate existences, Dewey rejects the distinction that creates a problem for the realists, although it must be said that the foregoing analysis shows that in his actual writings he makes the distinction between the immediate and the mediate quite sharp. This, of course, he admits. But our analysis does show that there is a certain vagueness of the theory at this point, making it possible to read the theory in many different directions. For, if he takes the position that the relation of immediate to mediated values is one of degree, he must face other consequences to his theory, which again he seems not to have met. Taking the position that the relation is one of degree entails other problems in Dewey's theory that he must solve if he is to escape the charge of being an idealist, a position that his denotative method seeks to avoid. For this position entails either of two kinds of idealism: (1) a kind of idealism in which all values collapse into immediacy; or (2) a kind of idealism in which cognition exhausts all reality.

It has already been shown that Dewey's theory starts with valuings—such as prizing, enjoying, desiring—that are immediately felt. The shock of instability is also immediately felt. Furthermore, the process of inquiry or mediation has likewise an element of immediacy to it (EEL: 18; MW 10: 330). But there are other passages in which the immediacy of all aspects of the situation is stressed and that seem to lead to a kind of subjective idealism. The vagueness of Dewey's position came out in his discussion with Philip Rice, when Dewey admitted that he had been misunderstood and restated his view to say: "The undeniable *centering* of the events which are the more immediate condition of the occurrence of events in the way of observation and of knowledge generally, within a particular organism, say that of John Smith, has been taken as proof that the resulting *observation* is itself 'individual'" (PM: 263; LW 15: 75). Resorting to a specific example to explain his position, Dewey claimed that (1) the *pain* of a toothache is centered in an organism; and (2) the *knowledge* of the toothache is also centered in an organism. Now, if valuings are immediate, if the shock or unstable condition that brings about inquiry is immediate, if the process of evaluation has elements of immediacy in it, if events are "centered" in organisms, and if knowledge of such events is also centered in organisms, there is little wonder that many have read Dewey's theory as collapsing into immediacy, or some kind of subjectivism. At the very least, Dewey's analysis needs a more extended treatment.

Further problems are involved in Dewey's theory of valuation when purely mediational aspects are considered. His behavioral approach makes it possible to formulate propositions about such events as enjoying, prizing, liking, and so forth. Such a catalog of propositions about what humans have enjoyed, desired, liked, or prized, would, on Dewey's view, be only a sociological description and report (TV: 58; LW 13: 243).

As "thought goes beyond immediate existence to its relationships," we take it that appreciation, criticism, appraisal, and judgment are therefore entrances into mediation, and that any specific instance of this kind of thinking may be termed an 'evaluative process'. Now, Dewey maintains that the passage from immediacy to mediation is marked by the occurrence of such logical procedures as defining, generalizing, classifying, discriminating. At one place he says that mediation begins when we look to see what *sort* of value is present (EN: 400; LW 1: 299). Dewey assumes in another passage that values are classified into *kinds,* and that some kinds of prizing are thought to be better than others (TV: 20; LW 13: 208f.).

How do values become classified into sorts or kinds? The answer to this problem is found in Dewey's notion of the existential situation; it is the problematic situation which generates the end-in-view. While each situation is unique in that it occurs at a particular time and place, there is a "generality" of situations, that is, there are "recurrent kinds of situations," and on this account there are recurrent kinds of ends-in-view. The generalized "ideas" of ends-in-view in valuational behavior originate in the same manner as "ideas" are generated in other types of inquiry (TV: 44; LW 13: 230). The starting place in organic behavior is in excitation-reaction and stimulus-response. The recurrence of similar problems and responses builds up and consolidates a habit, a habit being a generalized mode of behavior. As generalized modes of behavior, habits become the organic bases for ends-in-view. Traces of these stimulus-response sequences in organic behavior make possible the emergence of memory. The "simple presence of distance stimuli" becomes the organic basis for imagination; but the condition for setting up goals and ends-in-view is more complicated than what is found in the simple presence of distance stimuli, for the "intervening process of search" for the attainment of the goal or end-in-view becomes "more seriated in temporal span and in connecting links" (Logic: 34; LW 12: 41). We take it that the "intervening process of search" refers to "means" in the total process of the "means-end" relationship. Thus Dewey says: "A schedule of general ends results, the involved values being 'abstract' in the sense of not being directly connected with any particular existing case but not in the sense of independence of all empirically existent cases" (TV: 44; LW 13: 230).

If these clues from Dewey's general methodology are traced through his treatment of valuational subject-matters, we would expect to find an application there of his view of propositions, terms, and judgments to this part of his theory. Unfortunately, Dewey never worked out this part of his theory of valuation in detail. It suffices to point out here that Dewey did think that inquiry involves propositions: "inquiry, involving propositions so determined and arranged as to yield final judgment, is the logical whole upon which propositions depend, while terms as such are logically conditioned by propositions" (Logic: 349; LW 12: 347). On his view, judgment is about the whole situation (Logic: 166; LW 12: 168).

Dewey claims that inquiry arises out of a "biological matrix"; nevertheless, he claims that "thought" and "rational discourse" are of a different order from that of the mere given or immediate (Logic: 278f.; LW 12: 276f.). Take, for instance, his treatment of the subject-predicate relation, when he holds that "the subject-matters of subject and predicate are determined in correspondence with each other in and by the process of 'thought,' that is, inquiry" (Logic: 125; LW 12: 128). Another passage closely parallels this position when he writes, "Operational thinking needs to be applied to the judgment of values just as it has now finally been applied in conceptions of physical objects" (QC: 258; LW 4: 206). Speaking of ends-in-view in *Theory of Valuation,* he says that "ends-in-view as anticipated results reacting upon a given desire are *ideational* by definition or tautologically. . . . Any given desire is what it is in its actual content or 'object' *because* of its ideational constituents" (TV: 52; LW 13: 237).

Thus, by Dewey's own description of his theory of valuation and of the methodology applicable to it, we arrive at the following summary: (1) mediation is entrance into "thought"; (2) determination of subject-predicate relationship in inquiry is a process of thought; (3) while abstract universals and generic universals are conjugate, the abstract universals or definitions found in "thought" determine the structures of the generics; (4) ends-in-view are objects of thought, or, as he says, are ideational; (5) even though the final judgment is individual, that is, about the situation in question, the final judgment as such is an ideational construction.

Now, if Dewey's theory of valuation is taken in its own terms, value inquiries are thought processes, and the existential qualitative experiences to which they are to apply are in a separate realm. In that case the "real" value would be the value constructed in thought, even though this has been extrapolated from existential gross qualitative experience. The eventual value, even though dialectically worked over and transformed by abstract conceptions both in the theory of general ideas and in the propositions that carry them, would still be cut off from experi-

ence of the existential type. This would encourage an idealistic interpretation of Dewey's theory of value.

Our analysis has shown that the actual statements that Dewey has written on theory of valuation are often confusing and are often worded in such a way that it is easy for some to accuse him of being a realist, others to see aspects of subjectivism, others to find marks of idealism. It is my contention that all of these interpretations are incorrect and that Dewey is partially responsible for these in failing to make explicit the naturalistic criteria of experience. I shall try to show in these concluding pages how I think other parts of Dewey's philosophy can be brought in to make more explicit a naturalistic view of valuation. My starting place is a passage from *Experience and Nature*. Dewey says:

> Emotional conditions do not *occur* as emotions, intrinsically defined as such; they occur as 'tertiary' qualities of objects. Some cases of awareness or perception are designated 'emotions' in retrospect or from without, as a child is instructed to term certain perceptual situations anger, or fear, or love, by way of informing him as to their consequences. Immediately, every perceptual awareness may be termed indifferently emotion, sensation, thought, desire; not that it *is* immediately any one of these things, or all of them combined, but that when it is taken in some *reference,* to conditions or to consequences or to both, it has, in contextual reference, the distinctive properties of emotion, sensation, thought, or desire. (EN: 304f.; LW 1: 230f.)

The previous quotation points up two main principles in Dewey's view of experience: immediately felt qualities and the principle of interconnections.[6] Immediately felt qualities have no meaning in and of themselves; they must be *connected* with other events to become meaningful. The significant phrase in the quotation is "to conditions or to consequences or to both." Now, these conditions or consequences of the feeling state I take to be the connections that Dewey finds in experience, such connections being either personal or nonpersonal. They form the basis for Dewey's view of scientific method as applied to physical matters and to human valuation. In an answer to Reichenbach, Dewey once wrote: "the actual operative presence of *connections* (which when formulated are *relational*) in the subject-matter of direct experience is an intrinsic part of my idea of experience" (Dewey 1951: 535; LW 14: 20). In another work Dewey called such connections in experience *existential involvements*. Again, he claims that sign-significances describe things in their connection with one another. Existential involvements and sign-significances are necessary for the basic meaning of inference and for evidential functions (Logic: 51–54; LW 12: 57–60). Furthermore, this basic principle is necessary for an understanding of the term "conditions

and consequences," for his notion of cause and effect, and for his view of means-ends relationships.

When Dewey applies the principle of interconnections to the human organism, it yields the concept of "transaction" (or 'interaction' in his earlier sense); when applied to desire it refers to the *conditions* for desire or the *consequences* of desire. Thus, the principle underlies his contention that desires are not just subjective states of immediacy centered in an organism; desires are connected with things outside its skin. Subjectivity is explained as the abstracting of only one side of the two-sided experience, namely, the immediately felt quality, and making it a self-enclosed reality shut off from the interconnections an organism has with its environment. Thus, the causes that produce the immediately felt quality and the consequences that flow from it are but other instances of the principle of interconnections running through the human organism.

Furthermore, Dewey alludes to his basic principle of interconnections in experience when he discusses competing theories of valuation, such as mentalism and emotivism. Mentalistic views attempt to lodge value in a separate and unconnected realm of the "knower." Emotive theories attempt to isolate certain behavioral events from the causes and consequences involved in them. The principle of interconnections is involved further in Dewey's view of naturalism when he deals with means-ends relationships; it is possible to contend that Dewey believes that when one deliberately selects a connection in experience, a connection determined to be a cause-effect relationship, it becomes a means-end relationship. Again, it seems that it is on this principle that his view of "norm" in valuational theory is to be understood. When he describes a norm as a "condition to be conformed to," it is a condition already determined by the interconnections finally wrested from experience and formulated symbolically into a cause-effect relationship. This seems to be his meaning when he says that normative statements "rest upon" descriptive statements. It appears, then, that if the principle of interconnections in Dewey's total view of naturalism is made explicit in his theory of valuation, any charge of subjectivism must be dismissed.

It remains to clear up the vagueness in Dewey's theory of valuation concerning the relation of the continuities of inquiry and the continuities of experience. How do thought-forms, developed in inquiry, get into touch with existence? How is the immediately given valuing experience transformed into an eventual value?

In the first place, we must turn to Dewey's treatment of signs, meanings, and linguistic symbols for clues to the problem of the relation of inquiry to existence. It will be recalled that he speaks of three relational aspects of experience in this respect. First, there are existential involvements or interconnections between objects of experience. This is the

order of existence, but the special interpretation Dewey gave to this dimension of nature is that it is the relational aspects of sign-qualities that constitute meaning on this level. Second, Dewey holds that symbols are implicated with one another in sets, no symbol standing alone, and such implicatory functions of symbols make the strict and powerful systems of formal logics possible. If the analysis is left here, we would have the situation described in his valuational theory: an order of existence on the one hand and an order of symbolic formulations on the other. But such is not the case in Dewey's theory of general methodology. There is a third relation, namely, that of reference, but reference understood in a very special sense. How do symbolic formulations get in touch with existence? Symbols themselves must be brought to *interact* (using the principle of interconnections) with the objects of existence. On this point Dewey says:

> Without the intervention of a specific kind of existential operation they [symbols] cannot indicate or discriminate the *objects* to which they refer. Reasoning or ordered discourse, which is defined by development of symbol-meanings in relation to one another, may (and should) provide a basis for performing these operations, but of itself it determines no existence. (Logic: 54; LW 12: 60)

Thus, there is "a specific kind of existential operation" that gets symbols in touch with existence. There seems to be no other principle of experience upon which these operations can be performed other than the principle of interconnections. Thus, the principle of interconnections must then be brought into the process of solving a valuational problem in order to get the symbolically formulated value-object in touch with existence.

In the second place, while the point is not made explicit in his theory of valuation, Dewey does maintain in his general methodology that abstract universals and generic universals are conjugate in their functions in inquiry. While the abstract universals are definitional and do not refer to existence, they are tested in their function of resolving a problem. Dewey deplores that kind of abstract conceptualism in which such concepts are not "applied" to natural existence. The formal logics erred in this respect: "The necessity of existential operations for application of meanings to natural existence was ignored" (Logic: 58; LW 12: 64). Failure to institute particular existential involvements of symbols and existences worked for the detriment of both. Without deliberate connection of symbols with existences, there is no way to "test" such abstract symbols; and, of course, the abstract symbols are needed in order to classify existences into "kinds." The conjugate relation of these constituents of inquiry must be brought into valuational theory to make explicit how "the generalized ideas of ends-in-view" are connected with

existence. Again, the principle that is needed to make the valuational theory complete and to save it from the charge of being some kind of idealism is the principle of interconnections.

In the third place, we propose that Dewey's theory of valuation can escape the consequences of symbolic formulations cut off from existence by considering the special way in which he used the principle of continuity. We should remember that Dewey himself maintains that his contribution to naturalistic theory is to be found in the way in which he connects the principle of continuity with the human organism. But this point involves all three principles that I deem integral to pragmatic naturalism. For the continuity of the organism involves a continuity of feeling, and feeling pervades all the experiences of the human organism, symbolic and nonsymbolic, immediate and mediate alike. There seems to be only one passage in Dewey's value writings that makes this point explicit. He says: "Since human life is continuous, the possibility of using any one mode of experience to assist in the formation of any other is the ultimate postulate of *all* science—non-ethical and ethical alike" (PM: 245; MW 3: 35). Thus, the principle of continuity as applied to the organism ties all the activities of the organism together. It is *one* organism that thinks and feels and relates one part of experience to another. So the principle of feeling is always present as is the principle of continuity wherever there is life. But when Dewey claims that "one mode of experience" can be used "to assist in the formation of any other," there is a third principle involved, namely, the principle of interconnections.

In the fourth place, we must consider the way in which Dewey thinks of the purpose of science, for in this respect we are able to connect symbolic formulations with existence. Science is for the "direction of further experience," and, as scientific inquiry is carried on by a human organism, any part of one type of experience can be related to any other experience. It is noted on Dewey's view that scientific determinations of cause-effect relationships (involving the principle of interconnections) become the basis of means-ends relationships (also involving the principle of interconnections). Since it is one and the same, continuous organism undergoing both scientific inquiries of the physical type and inquiries of the valuational type, then, on Dewey's theory, there is no reason for a complete separation of the two types of experience and there is no reason to rule out the "distinctive traits" of each type. The principles of continuity, interconnections, and feeling are principles that bring together all the activities of the valuing experience and unify them into a contextual whole.

There is one further consideration to be given to this phase of Dewey's valuational theory. The theory of experience that underlies his theory of valuation is constituted by a gross qualitative aspect undergoing, as

we have seen, certain shocks or disruptions out of which inquiry or mediation emerges. There is a line of continuity from the starting place of inquiry to its close, eventuating in the valuational judgment that is about the situation. The starting place of inquiry and the terminus of inquiry may be regarded as interrelated aspects. Thus, inquiry is a *function* or *form* that emerges in human behavior. It is only by use of the principle of continuity and of the category of transformation that such functions can be understood. And the starting place of inquiry in behavior and the terminus of inquiry in behavior can be understood only upon the principle of interconnections.

Notes

1. Dewey says: "And in calling my theory on this matter a special case of my *general* theory I intend to call attention to the fact that I have denied that as judgments, or in respect to method of inquiry, test, and verification, value-judgments have any peculiar or unique features" (PM: 258; LW 5: 70f.).

2. "There is nothing whatever that methodologically (*qua* judgment) marks off 'value-judgments' from conclusions reached in astronomical, chemical, or biological inquiries" (Dewey 1949: 77; LW 16: 357).

3. Cf. "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," PM: 211–49; MW 3: 3–39.

4. "The difference between idealistic and realistic theories of knowledge ultimately depends upon the attitude taken towards immediate and mediate elements in knowledge" (Logic: 516; LW 12: 508).

5. Dewey added other synonyms for 'valuing' in "Some Questions about Value" (PM: 273; LW 15: 101). Other synonyms were used in "The Field of 'Value'" in the Lepley volume (Dewey 1949: 68; LW 16: 347).

6. By introducing these two principles designated later as feeling and interconnections, along with a third, namely, continuity, a claim is made that these three principles constitute Dewey's metaphysics of experience. More analysis of these three principles in Dewey's philosophy is needed, particularly in regard to how Dewey's metaphysics of experience is related to Peirce's categories. In the present study Dewey's principles of experience are simply used in order to show how they clear up problems in Dewey's theory of valuation.

5

Immediate and Mediated Values

Empirical theories of value have usually been built upon a psychological theory that takes impulse, desire, and emotion as the touchstones of experience in which is found whatever is called "a value." Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill may be taken as the more recent historical antecedents of this position and, in the contemporary world, the theory finds various shades of expression in the writings of many logical empiricists and pragmatic naturalists. It is my contention that most of these theories rest upon a view of immediate value, which, granted its starting place as worthy of attention, fails to be faithful to much of commonsense experience and to those kinds of experience in which a critical component is present, in which such terms as 'appreciation', 'appraisal', and 'evaluation' are used. The theories of Charles L. Stevenson and of John Dewey (Stevenson 1944; TV) are the most promising in attempting to show the relation of immediate to mediated values, and I shall use these theories as bases from which I attempt the following sketch of an empirical theory of value.

Some empirical theories of value have been built (1) upon a particular human psychology that takes impulses, desires, emotions, and sensations to be atomistically separate and discrete; (2) upon a general theory of meaning and symbols that treats of semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics in a very special sense; and (3) upon a theory of knowledge that bifurcates the nature of knowledge into sharp divisions of the cognitive and the noncognitive. Some empiricist theories, traditional and contemporary, tend to designate all value experience as falling into a realm in which immediate valuing becomes the sole source as well as the only criterion of value. Some of these theories tend to reduce all valuing, even that which others call "mediated values," to immediacy.

The connection of value with impulse seems essential for any naturalistic theory, for the postulate upon which any naturalism is built is

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continuity of prior qualities and relations with emergent qualities and relations, and it is this notion that demarcates naturalistic, empirical theories from transcendental theories that lodge value in a realm remote from human feeling-states, both physical and psychological. Since the time of Kant, critics of empirical, naturalistic theories of value of the kind here described have pointed out, from their view, that such theories tend to be subjectivistic, anthropological, even solipsistic, and to result in a relativity that produces chaos and irreconcilable conflicts when the valuings of different persons disagree. The current state of the discussion brings us to this question: Can an empirical theory of value be developed that keeps value connected with impulse and desire and yet does not fall into the difficulties that are pointed to by the critics?

In the first place, it seems necessary to start with a different empirical psychology, a psychology that does not begin with a view of human beings as having an antecedently fixed nature, with various parts of that nature atomistically separated into discrete impulses or into discrete sensations. By considering the human organism in a behavioral rather than a behavioristic way, we can start with activities, with movements of the organism. These movements of the entire organism are responses, not reactions taken in the narrowly mechanical sense. If we view impulse as a movement of the organism toward or away from specific objects in either selection or rejection, we have the starting place of a behavioral theory of value. Impulse and desire, then, are connected with objects; their content is known in terms of their functions, and thus they are not barren and devoid of content. This approach makes for a theory of value that is more empirical than that, say, of Ralph Barton Perry, who defined a value as "any object of any interest," for it shows that human behavior is directed toward or away from specific objects, not just *any* object.

It has been held by some philosophers that impulses and desires are just *there* in experience; they are *given* and that is all there is to it. It may be the case that impulses and desires viewed as activities become hardened into habitual forms and often function in a mechanical way, but this is not a complete description of their natures. A theory of human psychology in which activities, movements of the organism toward and away from objects, are the starting place, and in which activities can be classified, defined, and discriminated, opposes the psychological view that takes these human phenomena as fixed and isolated from other parts of experience. For example, impulses and desires can be seen to have "conditions" for their appearance and to have "consequences" flowing from their occurrence. This psychological view needs more extended treatment than can be given here, but a sketch of its direction may be noted. Activities, say those of the very early years, are given

meanings by adults. The random activities of grabbing, of pulling close or pushing away helpful or harmful objects, are given meanings in terms of the consequences to which they lead. In some such way, specific fears, loves, hates, angers, likes, and dislikes, are given meanings in the child's behavior. Of course, these are specific loves and fears, specific likes and dislikes. This way of describing value-behavior seems to be more faithful to commonsense observations and to those sociological studies that indicate that the fears and loves of specific kinds of objects vary from culture to culture and from group to group. Thus, this psychological starting place seems to be more sociologically sound than those theories that allow no variation in the functions of impulses and desires in human behavior.

A crucial aspect of some empirical theories of value is found in their acceptance of a theory of knowledge that divides human psychology into knowing and feeling. The cognitive, or knowing, process classifies the subject-matter as formal, covering such studies as logic and mathematics, and as empirical, covering such studies as the natural and social sciences. Since it is claimed that impulse plays no part in the knowing process, then valuings, which by definition are relegated to impulse and desire, are not knowledge. The origin, understanding, and criteria for values is sealed off from any kind of knowledge relation. The relation of symbols to impulse and desire is one in which symbols "express" the emotion, or one in which symbols "incite" another person to action. Stevenson, on the contrary, tries to show how knowledge enters into valuations on two different patterns of analysis. On the first pattern, reasonings (logic and scientific statements) are applied to conflicts in valuational behaviors in the description of how one might try to persuade others. On the second pattern, Stevenson shows how the symbol 'good' can have scientific content accrue to it. Dewey approaches the value problem in a slightly different way, but along a similar line of analysis, when he says, "After the first dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good, subsequent perception of the good contains at least a germ of critical reflection" (EN: 401; LW 1: 300).

Most empirical theories of value have overlooked those experiences in which particular value-objects fail us or there is a more extensive disruption in our value-structures. Some objects "sweet in the having are bitter in after-taste" (EN: 398; LW 1: 298), writes Dewey; thus it is often the case that a frustration, a conflict, is set up in the valuational situation. This kind of value-frustration has many psychological and sociological implications, as psychiatrists, for instance, know. But in the lesser value-frustrations, in which there is no catastrophic breakdown in the organism's activities of valuing or total value scheme, the organism endures, and often it is possible to construct a value-object that will

enable a person to find a way out. Of course, this is not the case in regard to every value problem, as some contemporary analyses of the human condition have shown, but when it is, then a certain pattern of investigation emerges. When the value-object fails, then inquiry must be undertaken into the "conditions and the causes" that brought about the value situation's frustration or into the "consequences" to which the value-object led. The impulses and desires that inclined the organism toward the object may be questioned, and the past and current selections of a particular value-object in a particular kind of situation may be questioned as well. Thus, the question of the "worth" of the value-object is raised.

The primary theoretical and practical problem at this juncture is, however, whether value experience involving impulse and its specific object can be brought into the cognitive process. If this cannot be done, if immediate valuings cannot be mediated, then all value experience built upon impulse is destined to be immediate and unreflective. Furthermore, value theory appears to be at an impasse if certain psychological, semantical, and epistemological theories are taken for granted in stating the value problem. This is why it seems better to strike out on a different empirical psychology, a behavioral one, and a different theory of meaning, a relational one. Again, the relation of the noncognitive to the cognitive must be approached from the standpoint of continuity rather than discreteness. If there can be shown to be a continuity between the noncognitive and the cognitive, then it is possible to relate impulse and desire to the cognitive process in a way that makes them transactive, that is, influencing and correcting each other. There are empirical grounds for approaching impulse and knowledge in this way; for instance, the impulsive movement of the organism toward or away from objects in terms of selection and rejection. Acceptance is a kind of affirmation, and rejection is a kind of negation. Thus, the organism in its responses to objects begins to classify, to define, and to discriminate them.

In humans the supervening of symbolic behavior upon existential situations opens the way for a precise logic and a controlled methodology. When a relational theory of meaning and of symbols is brought into the analysis, then denotation and reference is possible, but other dimensions of the symbolic situation are also present. Denotation is not simply the relation between a symbol and an object or an activity, but between a symbol and objects in their relation to other objects, of activities to other activities, of impulsive activities to objects. The intimacy of impulse and knowing makes the line between the noncognitive and the cognitive one of continuity, of emergence of the latter out of the former. Immediate values described as specific objects tied to specific behavioral activities (impulses) can now be questioned in terms of their grounds

or consequences, a critical appraisal can be applied to them, and mediation can enter into value experience. If immediate values are never questioned or found to fail us, they remain immediate values. On this theory, there is no guarantee that immediate valuings will always be lifted into the cognitive process to be questioned, critically analyzed, appraised, and evaluated.

It was pointed out above that commonsense experience does encounter some situations in which a value-object is questioned, in which examination into its ground and condition is made, and in which the problem of "worth" emerges. And people do take inventory of their value-objects, of the things they love and hold dear, and they do this with regard to how the value-objects function in sustaining and maintaining a certain quality of life. A cursory examination of the value patterns of individuals shows that valuations concerning certain objects of some individuals, at least, have been changed by the knowledge of what scientific discovery tells us about the consequences of holding a certain object as a value. The impact of medical science on the specific matters of health as an object of value is an example. Selections and rejections of value-objects have shifted with various scientific discoveries about the meanings of those objects. A descriptive psychology and sociology of the actual valuational activities of people is needed as a base from which to develop a thoroughgoing theory of value. The outline and direction of value inquiry presented above turns the examination of values in a new direction. It attempts to get value considerations out into the open where they can be observed, thus cutting the ground from under any charge of subjectivism or mentalism. By adopting a theory of meaning and symbols that treats of qualities in terms of their relations and by using a theory of inquiry that ties impulse to reason in a more intimate manner, it will be possible to study the conditions and consequences of valuational activities. For instance, the recurring *kinds* of situations and the *kinds* of objects that best fulfill them could be the starting place for building up a stock of generic value-objects. With value-objects classified, defined, and discriminated in terms of value situations, it would then be possible to develop a logic of evaluation, a logic that runs the entire gamut from judgments of perception to final judgments concerning the solutions of value problems.

In the final analysis it may turn out, as Aristotle suggested, that much knowledge may precede an act, but the quality of such an act seems by common sense and by the history of science destined to be one in which reason and impulse are intimately connected. It may be the case, as Hume suggested, that much reasoning must precede the coming into existence of a proper sentiment, that in the valuational process reason and sentiment somehow concur. If the foregoing proposal can be car-

ried out, if immediate valuings can be questioned, criticized, and evaluated in terms of the sustaining and expansive nature of mediated values, then valuational activities can be approached in such a way that civilized impulses, desires, and emotions can be developed and made more secure for all humankind.

Part Three

Morals

6

Valuing, Obligation, and Evaluation

Contemporary naturalistic theory, as represented by John Dewey, has been criticized for having a moral principle of mere expediency[1] and for failure to develop a theory of moral obligation.[2] These are serious charges. In the following analysis I shall attempt to answer these criticisms and to extend naturalistic theory beyond what has been generally regarded as the ground of "good" and "right."

The analysis of valuational behavior from the point of view considered here rests upon a *naturalistic postulate*. This postulate is best described in terms of a continuity that runs through much of our gross and refined experience, from the simplest processes to the most complex. It starts with a human organism that is driven forward by energetic impulsion, and this impulsion is differentiated into various constituents of experience. In the broad aspects of experience, these constituents become sensations, conceptions, emotions, and desires. Under these broad classifications of gross experience are found the impulsive activities of human beings, but these impulses are not private in the usual sense; they are *connected* with objects, persons, and activities in such ways that they take on *relational* meanings. Out of these impulses desires emerge, and a desireful activity is one in which (1) the activity is blocked in its fulfillment, or (2) the activity is alerted to dangers that may threaten what the organism holds dear or loves. A desire is different from a mere wish in that the former involves an expenditure of effort, while the latter may be merely a symbolic expression. A desire signifies that something is lacking in the situation or that something is threatened, and with the help of memory, perception, imagination, and thought, desires then generate ends-in-view, or goals to be achieved. If the desire cannot be immediately fulfilled in a space-time activity, then we say that an *interest* develops, a long-term desire to bring about something that one prizes

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or cares for. The difference between this theory and that of Ralph Barton Perry on this point is important; Perry takes interest and object in the large; whereas in Dewey's view of valuing, interests and objects are specific.

The term 'valuing' has been introduced, and it is important to see the specific sense in which Dewey uses that term. Valuings do not occur in isolation, but are connected with objects, persons, and activities; that is, valuings are themselves activities, and as such are open to observation. Synonyms for 'valuing' may be designated as 'prizing', 'cherishing', 'admiring', 'enjoying', 'holding dear', 'honoring', 'regarding highly', 'esteeming'. Other terms may be added to this list, but all of them are taken in a behavioral sense, and for this reason valuings are out in the open and capable of objective treatment. Because of its behavioral approach to valuing, naturalistic theory claims several advantages: (1) it avoids the metaphysical problems created by other value theories which view values as occurring in a subjective or mental realm that is self-enclosed and cut off from the rest of experience; (2) it avoids the epistemological problems that result from treating the object known as separate from the idea of the value-object; (3) although this theory agrees with emotivist ethics in connecting valuational behavior with impulse, as in the theories of A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson, it avoids the conclusion that such behavior can be reduced to expressions of emotion; (4) it avoids making values transcendental and cut off from experience because it finds a vital connection of valuings with desires, both emerging from the natural continuity of life-processes. This modern naturalistic theory is akin to the traditional axiological theories of Aristotle and Mill, but with some important differences that will be pointed out later. Before the fuller account of a naturalistic theory of valuing is given, I shall first sketch what I think is a naturalistic basis for obligation, and then I shall show how the two are related.

In a naturalistic theory of experience, the conditions of moral obligation are found in a human being's intrinsic ties to others. The interdependence of humans is a fact that ought to require little argument. Our birth, our nurture, and our social, economic, and intellectual lives are tied in with other people, with things, with nature. It is out of dependence, transactions, frustrations, and fulfillments that these intrinsic ties of human sociality become emergent. There is a sense in which existence, bare feeling, precedes essence; such an existence is meaningless until its connections with other forms of experience take on relational meanings. At first, this existential state is felt as a social one; it is out of the social situations in which the individual lives, and moves, and has his or her being, that he or she achieves individuality. When this life existence is felt by a human being, the feeling of obligation emerges in his or her experience. There dawns an *expectation* of what others re-

quire of us and what we require of them. This is the barest and most germinal meaning of obligation I can understand. Add to this behavioral condition in its barest meaning the emergent social relations as that of parent to child, or those of producers and consumers of food, shelter, and clothing. These activities cannot be carried on alone; the existential situation is social by nature. When these activities are lifted into cognitive awareness, they become observationally objective and capable of symbolic description. These various functions that emerge in the social ties of humans to one another bind each to the other; and this is the meaning of social faith. To renounce a social existential condition is to break faith with the conditions of life; it is to commit social and individual suicide.

Out of the transactions of human life, coupled with the ongoing of life through a temporal span, there emerges a continuity of actions, of deeds. A behavioral psychology that accounts for the emergence of habit or generalized ways of behaving does so on the basis that a stimulus-response is a *pursuit* and not merely an excitation-reaction. Similar situations *recur* as similar problems are met, and at least some of them must be solved if humanity is to survive. There occurs, then, a logic of human behavior in which the human organism classifies, discriminates, defines, selects, and marks off certain of its activities. This analysis accounts for the fact of obligation in its various manifestations; for obligations arise in some personal and social activities, but not in others. It is likely that the *feeling* of obligation is at first a dumb awareness with little critical reflection attached to it. This accounts for such behavioral patterns as persistence and endurance in the face of obstacles, which is one meaning of courage. At another time, the functional activity of impartiality and equity is uppermost, an impartiality in which people feel that all human life is at stake, and this accounts for at least a part of justice. In other situations an immediate satisfaction must be forgone in order to experience a more comprehensive and enduring satisfaction, and this is one meaning of self-control. Communication emerges in social existence; at the lowest level it occurs when a gesture becomes what George H. Mead called a "significant symbol"; but communication breaks down when people lie to each other. It is possible for some people to lie or to break a promise in social existence only because others tell the truth and keep their promises. Once people are thrust into social situations and choose and act, then the behavior of moral *responsibility* emerges, a responsibility that means that they must accept the consequences of their own behavior. All the other habits connected with the moral life emerge in this same manner. As habits, these activities are general. When symbolically formulated, they become rules or laws. As rules and laws, they are ready-made principles quickly available for use

without deliberation, except the deliberation required in applying the law to a specific case. It is in this sense that such rules and laws are regarded as "right."

"Right" thus has an independent moral status in the same way that any other item in a process of thought has independence; that is, it can be discriminated by the nature of its peculiar function in conduct. After the general idea of obligations has arisen out of specific situations, then this idea acts or functions as a control over certain impulses and desires that may be destructive to the very nature of human existence. "Right" functions as a regulatory principle over inclinations, impulses, desires, in a manner similar to that described by Kant. "Right" is thus a corrective of valuings, prizings, cherishings, carings-for, and it admonishes one not to put emotive preferences above the requirements of duty. "Right" checks the impulse of telling a lie to gain a consequence that is narrow and blind to the wider meanings of that activity. "Right" corrects the principle of acting upon expediency, that is, an immediate valuing, in terms of a long-term and more widely shared good. "Right" reminds us of what others expect of us and what we expect of them; it reminds us of our intrinsic ties to one another in human existential situations.

The first part of a naturalistic theory of value has been described in terms of a behavioral psychology that treats of value as particular kinds of activities, such as prizing and loving. So far, this is the traditional axiological theory done over in terms of a modern psychology so as to avoid the charges of subjectivism, mentalism, and emotivism. If, however, valuings, even considered behaviorally, are the subject-matters with which the present-day naturalistic theory stops, it seems likely that many of the criticisms of its position would be crucial. For instance, a sociologist would merely catalog what valuings the people of a culture held to be uppermost, and this would be the end of the matter. Accordingly, this is what Dewey finds wrong with the current and, we might add, the traditional empirical theory of value. He writes:

> The fundamental trouble with the current empirical theory of values is that it merely formulates and justifies the socially prevailing habit of regarding enjoyments as they are actually experienced as values in and of themselves. It completely side-steps the question of regulation of these enjoyments. (QC: 259; LW 4: 207)

If this analysis is pushed further, I believe that it will show that traditional and contemporary empirical theories of value view valuings as "immediate," as simply "had," and viewed as such, they are noncognitive, unreflective, and unquestioned. Furthermore, I think that it can be shown that all empirical theories of value, including Dewey's, involve levels of immediacy.

A similar situation regarding obligations can be noted. On one level of experience, obligations are simply experienced, and on this commonsense level such obligations are noncognitive, unreflective, and unquestioned. Both valuings and obligations stand in need of another process, namely, that of *evaluation,* in order to make their functions intellectually secure.

It is not necessary for my purposes here to give a complete account of how valuings and obligations, taken as noncognitive, unreflective, and simply given, are lifted into the more complex realm of cognitive consideration. I will mention only a few instances in which this process comes about, as I have treated the problems centering around this point elsewhere.[3] The shocks that cause the emergence into cognitive process are fairly well-known in our daily lives. Objects enjoyed today lead to consequences that are bitter; thus enjoyment ceases to be merely a fact and becomes a problem. A desire may be questioned as to its desirability. Old obligations, such as those of slave to master, no longer demand allegiance. When valuings and obligations are questioned, if the process is to be cognitive in the naturalist's sense, there emerges some pattern to that inquiry, or what I will call "the logic of evaluation."

If it is granted that valuings can be brought into the open and observed, there is little difficulty in maintaining that this behavior can be described by a behavioral psychology and that *propositions* about valuings can be constructed. These descriptive propositions are of the same kind as those found in any of the general fields of scientific endeavor. However, the crux of the problem comes when attention turns to the relation of propositions about valuings, which signify events as had, prized, loved, desired, and enjoyed, to what may be called "valuation-propositions in the distinctive sense." That is, are the propositions about valuings capable of being appraised themselves? When the question is raised as to whether or not some acts of prizing are better than others, then valuation-acts are themselves evaluated. It is thus that the subject-matter of valuation-propositions in the distinctive sense is founded upon valuational facts. In this way, the subject-matter of the field of value is marked off from propositions of physics and chemistry and from sociological and historical propositions about what human beings have, in fact, done in the past. Although moral valuings and evaluations are only one form within the broader field of value, the precise discrimination of moral behavior from other types of valuational behavior is not attempted here; it is simply assumed that moral values occur and have their own characteristics.

It is not possible within the limits of this study to present all of the elements, and their interrelated functions, that make up what I have called "the logic of evaluation." I will indicate the approach that I think

can be made, and I shall mention some of the logical processes that seem most obvious. The logical model for the handling of situations of evaluation, I believe, is the same as in any of the other fields of empirical inquiry. This logical model is determined by the way this particular type of naturalism conceives of scientific inquiry. As a starting place, it is claimed that there is a sense in which all generic scientific propositions, all statements of laws, have as their primary function the capacity to regulate *descriptions* of individual cases. In other words, they operate instrumentally, as Peirce showed, in firsthand dealings with reality or existences. In the same manner the purpose of the cognitive process in valuational theory is to lead us to an analysis and description, and eventually to a *prescription* of an individual case. In the case of a valuational situation, there is one important difference from situations in such fields as physics and chemistry; in the former, concern is with *human activity,* but with human activity that is directed toward what *shall* or *should* or *ought* to be done. Evaluative situations involve the intervention of personal acts; however, the intervention of personal acts can be described, and I see no reason why the logic of prediction cannot apply to them.

There are many logical processes that make up the total method of inquiry, and I will relate only a few of these to evaluation in order to show the direction I think such an inquiry must take. For instance, the same kind of logical determinations of definition, classification, discrimination, and symbolization apply to valuational behaviors as to other scientific subject-matters. When a problematic situation occurs, the question is, What *kind* of valuing process is present? For valuing processes can be classified into sorts or kinds. The frustrated activity sets up an end-in-view, and the end-in-view takes on a generality in exactly the same way as any other belief about end-in-view objects in the general sciences. A schedule of general ends-in-view brought about by recurring similar situations makes possible the formulation of *generic* propositions in valuational theory. It is true that generic propositions in valuational theory are not always based upon a logically precise discrimination of kinds, but this can be corrected. It is possible that the *selective* operations, which determine *affirmative* propositions, and the *eliminative* operations, which determine *negative* propositions, be applied to valuational inquiry. As in other scientific situations, valuational inquiries contain different kinds of propositions. I will mention only a few of these to show this is the case. *Singular* propositions are used to mark off and to determine any specific situation as one of a kind; that is, it is *this* situation that is one of a kind, and the "this" is demonstrative and has existential reference. Again, singular propositions are used to select and to reject particular aspects of the valuational situation, and these are also formulated as demonstrative and as existential. In the

course of inquiry, *particular* propositions emerge, but they are deficient; what inquiry reaches for is a process of generalization that covers similar recurring kinds of valuational situations.

The logic of the evaluative process involves the foregoing propositions—singular, particular, generic, affirmative, and negative—and, of course, a complete analysis of the entire cognitive process includes much more. It requires little insight to see that evaluative situations involve alternative and disjunctive propositions. (Moral philosophers have worked these over since the reflective process began.) The function of hypothetical reasoning in moral matters can surely be widened beyond Kant's limitations of it to "rules of skill" and "counsels of prudence." Recent moral thinkers have had difficulty adapting syllogistic reasoning to moral situations, but their failure, I believe, rests upon a false dichotomy of fact and value. There is no doubt that the evaluative process needs more detailed analysis, and that the logical processes that go into the construction of ethical judgment need more specific treatment. At present I will merely point out what I think is the most difficult problem in the logic of evaluation.

The chief difficulty arises in the field of value in general, and in the field of ethics in particular, when an analysis is attempted of abstract universal propositions. In the subject-matter of the logic of evaluation, the abstract conceptions that determine the generic universals and are used to mark them off and discriminate them are not always clear. I am not saying that such abstract conceptions do not at present exist or that they are not used; we do not wait for a modern-day Aristotle to write out a logic of evaluation before we evaluate. The abstract conception of justice, for instance, which determines the various kinds of just acts, lacks precision and indicates one of the areas where there is an intellectual lag in the logical treatment of valuational subject-matters. I do not believe that this is an unsurmountable problem; it means rather that it is an area in which more analysis, deliberation, and thought must be centered.

There is a very important point to be made in the distinction between the subject-matters of fields such as physics and chemistry, for instance, and those of valuational subject-matters. The point I wish to make can be made clear if we start with the view that the heart of scientific procedure is understanding any event in terms of its *conditions* and *consequences*. The most usual way of conceiving these relations is in terms of causes and effects. An occurrence, as simply occurring, is meaningless unless related through a theory of meaning to its conditions and consequences. The *connection* of an event to its conditions and consequences is important in all fields of scientific study, including the field of value. My main point, however, is that evaluative processes "grow

out of," "emerge from," "rest upon," the scientific determinations of cause and effect in all the other fields outside of valuational subject-matters. It is on this point that I think Stevenson is correct in maintaining that the field of value or ethics draws upon the entire body of our knowledge. But I do not think that Stevenson makes clear the relation between science, as represented by such fields as chemistry and physics, and the field of value.

I propose that one way in which statements of fact found in the several sciences are related to propositions that are distinctively evaluative is founded upon the relation of cause-effect propositions to means-ends propositions. The primary difference here is that means-ends propositions depend upon the interception of a human act. A concrete example perhaps will clarify the point. If it has been found by scientific determinations of cause and effect that polio vaccine will control the occurrence of polio, then polio vaccine "emerges" as a means to the end, namely, the control of the disease. It is at this juncture that an "ought" emerges; one "ought" to be vaccinated. Thus, a "norm" emerges in human behavior, but it is not a norm in the traditional sense. It is not a norm in the sense of a prescription imported into the value situation apart from the logical determinations and propositions that have been previously described; thus it escapes the charge that such a norm is dogmatic. It is a norm in the sense of "a condition to be conformed to," but a condition to be conformed to that is formulated by the empirical and conceptual determinations of causes and effects related to the generic situations in which these norms emerge and operate.

The outcome of the evaluative process is a *judgment* that has been determined by the cognitive activities and applies to reality in the existential sense. In this way the evaluative judgment in valuational theory is similar in kind to a judgment in other scientific fields; for the latter leads to a *description* of an individual case, while the former leads to a *prescription* of an individual case. In this sense the evaluative judgment indicates what one "should" or "ought" to do in a particular situation.

Thus far I have tried to show that a naturalistic theory of valuation begins with the continuity of life-processes, and that in this continuity there emerge functions of human behavior that cannot be reduced to their foreshadowings or precognitive conditions. I have tried to show that a modern empirical theory of valuation differs from others, in that valuings can be questioned and that the process of cognition emerges that may be called the logic of evaluation. I have tried to show that there is a possibility of constructing a naturalistic theory of obligation and that this conception can function as an integral part of experience. Naturalists such as C. I. Lewis, R. B. Perry, and John Dewey are fairly well agreed on the distinction made between the *desired* and the *desirable*. The analy-

sis needs to be pushed further, I think, in the direction of the logic of evaluation. That valuings can be questioned and brought under critical appraisal extends naturalistic value theory in a new direction. On the other hand, I think that any naturalist would want a ground for the "right," for "obligation," for "duty," which is based on more than something like W. D. Ross's bare intuition. Just as valuings can be questioned, obligations can be too. It remains to show the relations of valuing and obligation and evaluation to one another in the total process of valuational theory.

I have indicated that one of the functions of right, of obligation, is that it takes precedence over impulse and desire. But there is another dimension of this relation. The touchstone of all moral progress, perhaps all human progress, is lodged in human impulsive activities. Without impulse and desire running counter to established customs, blind habits, accepted moral principles, dogmatic pronouncements, and prescriptions for human conduct, there would be no moral change. There would be stagnation of duties and obligations regarded as absolute and unyielding in their applications. The obligation of slave to master and master to slave would remain as eternally binding ties on each other. As social situations change, there would develop a social lag between the old obligations and the new demands. When we say that we no longer feel obligated to carry out our responsibilities to a government that has grown oppressive and corrupt, we start with valuings, prizings, with immediate desires, which are the touchstones of revolution. (Witness the grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence.) Without the growth of a *cultivated feeling,* as Hume might call it, we would never let go of the obligations to a smaller unit of sovereignty, such as a nation, and develop a wider loyalty, perhaps to a community of all humankind. These impulsive feelings foreshadow any change in our notions of obligation and duty, even a change that is reflectively and intelligently executed. Without these impulses and feelings, the zest of life is lost; and where morals are concerned, the moral nerve is cut.

But those impulses, prizings, desires that are purely explosive are likely to be chaotic. Appeal to immediate feeling, or desire alone, takes us back into the traditional empirical theory of value, or it leads us forward into the contemporary emotive theory. This is why the evaluative process must be brought in to correct, to guide, to administer the valuings that are immediate and noncognitive. And this is why, too, obligations must be surveyed now and then by the evaluative process in order to keep them from becoming static and hardened into outmoded dogmatic prescriptions; for obligations become outmoded when new occasions teach new duties. Furthermore, in some situations duties conflict. Should one make a promise not to tell the truth? Should one repay the

kindness of a gangster? I would not go so far as Hume and maintain that when one is captured by ruffians all moral obligations are to be suspended in this distressful situation, nor would I maintain, again with Hume, that in dire situations of scarcity no rules of justice apply. This is why I would hold that a naturalistic theory of evaluation is needed to determine what moral rules or duties or obligations are pertinent to the situation in which one finds oneself; and I would make, in the final analysis, the ground for the "right" depend upon the "evaluative good."

The conclusion of my analysis can be summarized as follows: (1) Valuings can be wrong when they run counter to our human ties of expectations and obligations, when such expectations and obligations are *really* right. The right is thus a corrective of impulsive activities and of unreflective valuings. (2) Valuings can be good and right when the old obligations no longer hold us, because the nature of the particular duty or obligation is no longer applicable to social situations that have changed. Here, however, valuings must coincide with the evaluative good in order to correct the obligation. (3) Obligations are wrong when they are not grounded upon a *reflective good,* found to be such through the cognitive process of evaluation. (4) Obligations are *really* right when they are grounded upon a reflective or evaluative good.

One might designate a situation as "ideal" naturalism when valuings, obligations, and evaluations all coincide. Often we hear it said that we do not want people to do something for us out of a sense of duty or obligation, such as the duties and obligations found in the social ties of marriage and parenthood. We would like someone to express gratitude, repay a kindness, because they wanted to, because the activity is prompted by an impulse of love, of cherishing, of prizing; yet I am sure that all of us agree with Kant that one might be disposed in this way, that is, one might be gregarious, or friendly, and act from a kind of unreflective impulse. The gratitude expressed, the kindness repaid, lacks something of a deeper quality even when it is done from an impulsive zest and when it accords with what the principles of social obligation impose upon the situation. We would want, I think, the act to spring from impulse, from a cherishing, from a desire to act, and we would want it to coincide with what the general situation requires of human beings; but I think we would want the gratitude expressed, the kindness repaid, to be grounded and constructed upon a reflective good, a good that is more secure and enduring. In this case, desire (valuing), obligation, and evaluative good coincide; and what we give to others we expect to give wholeheartedly, and with an intelligence that takes account of the existential situation of human beings tied together in mutual association.

There is one final remark I feel should be made, which is an outcome of my analysis of valuing, obligation, and evaluation. Pragmatic natu-

ralists have been haunted ever since the days of William James with the proposition that "truth" is a species of the "good." The foregoing analysis shows that specific goods of human life emerge from the truths of experience, and it gives to these truths a status that is distinct from the goods. At the same time, it relates beliefs about the world (the truths of cause-effect connections) to beliefs about values (the goods of means-ends relationships). Furthermore, "good," like "truth," is a synthetic concept, not an analytic one. There are specific "truths" for specific recurring physical situations; and there are specific "goods" for specific recurring evaluative situations. But when "goods" emerge from "truths" and the evaluative judgment brings one into contact with immediate experience *after* the cognitive process has been completed, there is a safer and more secure feeling, an immediate experience on a different level of intuition. It is felt as desired, but it is more secure because its object is desirable. The feeling of obligation is not blind devotion to a principle; the feeling that emerges after evaluation is a feeling of an obligation that has been investigated and found to be "right." At this moment of immediacy, after criticism and reflection, the experience is aesthetic. In the case of moral behavior, the good that emerges from truth and is felt in a new dimension of experience is a moral beauty that floods our whole being. It is an experience that, when remembered, haunts us "like the sense of being founded on a rock" (AE: 17; LW 10: 23).

Notes

1. See Vivas 1950. "No Deweyian can give one good, radically theoretical reason, one that goes beyond expedience, why he prefers democracy to totalitarianism or why he regards other men as his moral equals" (128).

2. See White 1949: 321–29. "Evidently pragmatism is united on the subject of value but not on obligation or justice. Dewey, in spite of a valiant attempt, has not given us a naturalistic account of obligation and Lewis forsakes the task as impossible. We can safely say, therefore, that contemporary pragmatism is still without a solution of the fundamental problem of ethics" (165).

3. See "The Cognitive and the Noncognitive in Dewey's Theory of Valuation," chapter 4 of the present volume.

7

Dewey's Views of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness

Since so many crimes have been committed in the name of John Dewey's philosophy of education, and so many crimes laid at its door, it seems that there is a need to clarify Dewey's theory of experience,[1] from which stem his own views of education, and particularly where such views of his general philosophy touch upon the humanities. My main purpose is to set forth as faithfully as I can what I consider to be Dewey's principal views on the traditional concepts of truth, beauty, and goodness. Perhaps it would be better to refer to these traditional terms as "inquiry," "creation," and "conduct" as Dewey did in the *Logic* (Logic: 178; LW 12: 179); or, again, one may refer to these terms as "belief," "appreciation," and "conduct" as Dewey did in *Experience and Nature* (EN: 436f.; LW 1: 325). However, as my analysis proceeds it should become clear why these latter terms can be equated with truth, beauty, and goodness, and while the limits of this analysis will not allow a full treatment of the implications of Dewey's views for education as applied to the humanities, at least I hope that the direction of his thought can be detected.

John Dewey was born in 1859, the same year that Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published. Notation of the publication of a book at the time a man is born is of little significance, unless it can be shown that the book had an important influence upon the life and thought of that man (ID: 1–19; MW 4: 3–14). In the case of Dewey, the Darwinian theory is significant because the principle of *continuity* that underlies the theory is one of the basic principles of pragmatic naturalism[2] (Logic: 19; LW 12: 26). The implications of the theory of evolution for the development of Dewey's philosophy are numerous, though only a few will be mentioned here.

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Previous to Darwin, the view of nature projected a world in which *forms* were static, *species* unchanging, and the knowledge of these fixed forms and species was regarded as permanent. What change was admitted was a change whereby individual specimens were generated and decayed within the outlines of the species or form. Once a definition of the species was obtained, then the work of the knowing process was complete, except for the addition of a speculative metaphysics. The mind could rest in its fixities, could contemplate its achievements in the abstract; and where such knowledge did touch the practical and observable, it was for the purpose of identification of a singular as one of a kind. To know was to know pure forms, and it was knowledge for the sake of contemplation or knowledge for the sake of knowledge.

With the Darwinian revolution, it was seen not only that there is change within a species or form, but also that the form itself is changing. Thus, the old logic, the old theory of knowledge built upon a pre-Darwinian theory of experience, was no longer adequate in such a world. Whatever knowledge we had of species or forms had to be dated, thus *time* became an important category in knowledge, a point that Dewey made much of in his various writings. Then, too, since the forms were changing into other forms, the category of transformation, or development, or growth, became another leading principle of the pragmatic movement (Logic: 24; LW 12: 31). It was seen that it was better to give up the old idea of essences, of Aristotelian definitions, of changeless forms, and to reinterpret forms not in terms of sensory qualities to be stared at and cataloged (ibid.: ch. 5), but as functions of adaptation and accommodation. The science that started with Galileo also brought about a new method, the method of experimentation, and experimentation yielded classifications that are more adequate for inferential functions in science. Nature and experience present *qualities* that are meaningless when each stands alone, but when these qualities are related they reveal a world in which the deeper, more secure, fruitful meanings have to be wrested from nature by operational devices.

A world envisaged in intellectual imagination as changing both in its specimens and in its species and forms is a world that is open—"an open universe," as James called it—one in which there is no final purpose or goal, and one which has no final destiny of the metaphysical sort. Thus, when static forms gave way to change, and when final causes were eliminated one by one from the universe of science (TV: 2f.; LW 13: 192f.), the ground upon which all types of absolutisms were built collapsed. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge, taken as an absolute end of inquiry, is a concept that belongs both philosophically and educationally to a pre-Darwinian world.

The response to the world as Darwin revealed it meant a redirection

in the purpose of attaining knowledge. If the ground for absolutism had been cut away, why follow the natural curiosities to seek and to find out? Why seek knowledge at all, if the final goal of all seeking is only temporary and ultimately shattered as time and nature move on to new developments? The answer that James and Dewey gave to this question was that knowledge is important; in fact, it is of the utmost importance, and undoubtedly more important than it had ever been for the attainment of a rich and fruitful life. Knowledge is no longer a luxury, an adornment worn by those who have the leisure time to pursue it. Knowledge consists in ideas as instruments for living, and for living well. There came into the world of thought with pragmatic naturalism some new terms to describe this process. These were the terms 'adaptation', 'accommodation', and 'adjustment', terms that are very often misunderstood and mistakenly identified in meaning. But Dewey meant by "adaptation" the active means by which life is made over, changed about, manipulated, so that specific and total life-processes can be made more secure; by "accommodation" he meant the passive means by which one submits to conditions one cannot change, accepting them without pointless protest; and by the term "adjustment" he meant the two processes of adaptation and accommodation by which the organism finds complete aesthetic unity with its world (CF: 15f.; LW 9: 12).

If we start with the biological foreshadowings of the more complex cultural activities that emerge from the organism's life, we will start first with an organism that *feels*. Thus, the perceptive organism is at first mere *feeling;* at most it is an impulsion (AE: 58; LW 10: 64) or bundle of energy, as any of us who have held a tiny baby surely know. There is a significant passage in *Experience and Nature* that I believe is the proper starting place for an understanding of this point. Dewey says:

> Immediately, every perceptual awareness may be termed indifferently emotion, sensation, thought, desire: not that it *is* immediately any one of these things, or all of them combined, but that when taken in some *reference,* to conditions or to consequences or to both, it has, in that contextual reference, the distinctive properties of emotion, sensation, thought or desire. (EN: 304f.; LW 1: 230f.)

This passage is significant for several reasons; first, it lies at the heart of Dewey's psychology and differentiates his view from behaviorism of the Watsonian type; second, in Dewey's view it signifies the embryonic biological and psychological conditions for the development of inquiry, creation, and conduct, or, as we shall see later, for his views of truth, beauty, and goodness. For *sensory perceptions* and *conceptual feelings* are fundamental in Dewey's view of truth; perceptual feelings called

"emotions" are the basis for his view of creation, of art, of the aesthetic; and the perceptual feelings called "desires" form the basis for his view of valuation, evaluation, and the construction of the good. Connections between this passage just quoted and each of these fields of experience will be shown in that order.

First, let us consider Dewey's view of the function of inquiry. As Dewey has written so much on the origin, nature, function, and consequence of inquiry, it can almost be held that an understanding of the role of methodology in his philosophy is a clue to his entire position.[3] A complete description of his methodology would carry us beyond the scope of this study. Our discussion will be limited to Dewey's view of how method arises in experience and what it effects. For Dewey there are two ways to approach experience: either one begins with (1) gross qualitative experience or (2) with a selection, emphasis, or bias. Dewey begins with "experience in gross," with experience in its primary and crude forms, and this is a crucial point in his analysis of philosophic method.

Dewey claims that when one starts with a "simplified and selected" characteristic of experience, one is "already pointed in a special direction and loaded with preferred conclusions" (Dewey 1925: 9; LW 1: 371). The starting place may be simply the conclusion of "some prior epistemological or metaphysical theory"[4] (TV: 1; LW 15: 191). The selective emphases or biases of philosophers throughout history are not to be neglected, however, as each has singled out some phase or constituent of experience that is important. For Dewey, all philosophers from Plato through Locke to the present have laid hold of some actual constituent of knowing but have failed to place it in the context in which it actually functions. Here, I think, is a clue to Dewey's treatment of the history of thought.[5]

Dewey's starting place in gross qualitative experience implies a denotative method pointing to the varied constituents of the wide universe. In this view of experience, Dewey shows that denotation points to the precarious, to the ugly, the false, to illusions, hallucinations, dreams, and as he puts it, to "death, war, and taxes." These gloomy items are mentioned because once they are regarded as properly denoted by the word 'experience' and understood as such, there will no longer be the need for the term 'experience'. What is important, however, is that one of the items denoted is the fact that *questions are asked and answers are given,* and that in this process some methods of answering the questions asked are better or more successful than others. The method that is most effective in the settlement of such perplexities is that of intelligence. When intelligence is adopted in opposition to the methods of impulse, custom, tradition, and authority, it is described as a kind of experimental activity. When intelligence is adopted as a method, it exacts of phi-

losophy two things: these are (1) the "origin in primary experience" of the refined methods and products; and (2) verification in primary experience of "methods and conclusions" (EN: 36f.; LW 1: 39). Now, the origin in primary experience of methods and products is described by Dewey as a problematic situation; and the verification of methods and conclusions is found in the consummatory experience. Between these two phases of experience, the problematic situation and the settled outcome of that situation, is the process of inquiry.

When inquiry intervenes in the situation, overt action is not suspended entirely, but one kind of overt action, that of inquiry, is substituted for another kind (QC: 223; LW 4: 178). The pattern that inquiry takes is worked out in detail by Dewey and perhaps the most comprehensive and systematic statement of it occurs in chapter 6 of the *Logic*. A shortened statement of this pattern of inquiry is as follows: (1) awareness of a problem; (2) location and definition of the problem; (3) entertainment of suggestions, ideas, hypotheses for the solution of the problem; (4) reasoning out the consequences of each proposed solution; and (5) testing the selected hypothesis in direct experience. The details that go into this procedure are many and they are involved. But what Dewey calls *truth* lies at the end of such inquiries, as the outcome of inquiries, and the *belief* arrived at is not severed from the process by which it is attained.

It is this context of inquiry that caused Dewey to use the term 'warranted assertion' for judgments that are successful in inquiry, thus he sought to distinguish his view from that of others who used 'belief', 'knowledge', and 'truth' as if these terms referred to items that lay outside of inquiry itself (Logic: 8f.; LW 12: 16f.). Statements of fact (derived from sensory perceptions) and abstract conceptions form divisions of labor in the total process of inquiry; they are "data" for the solution of a problem. The judgment about any situation under inquiry becomes true in the process. While Dewey wrote much about his view of truth and defended it on many occasions, it seems that the most explicit statement of his view of truth appears in the *Logic*. He writes, "The best definition of *truth* from the logical standpoint which is known to me is that of Peirce: 'The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented by this opinion is the real'" (Logic: 345n; LW 12: 343n).

The implications of Dewey's emphasis upon inquiry for the educational process are many, and I will suggest only a few. The heart of the case is that Dewey thinks that enduring habits of inquiry ought to be the aim of the school and that this procedure would be the beginning of cultural reform in so many of the neglected, unintelligent ways of behaving. In Dewey's terms, the purpose of education, or at least one of the purposes, is "learning how to think," and one learns how to think

by thinking, by solving problems, by engaging in inquiry. Thus, school experience and experience beyond school is one long process, punctuated by beginnings and terminations in each specific case, of "finding out." Since inquiry must begin, if it is sincere and not just intellectual busywork, in a problematic situation, the process begins with a perplexity in the inquirer, and the teacher is simply a more mature inquirer sharing with the immature the best methods that the history of inquiry has produced. Once the student has undergone the experience of solving a problem efficiently, the stage (or should we say the organism) is set for the recurrence of the same *kind* of pattern of thinking. Thus, once the experience of thinking through to the solution of a problem has taken place, the organism retains traces in its nervous system that build up into a habit (Logic: 31f.; LW 12: 38f.). But the habit of inquiry, if it is secure, is not a haphazard experience; it is rationally and critically justified at every step and its final success depends upon the hypothesis that solves the problem.

There are other phases of experience, other kinds of problems that we face, and one of these is the act of creation. This is the experience of the artist. The main problem of the philosopher of art as Dewey sees it is "to restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings, that are universally recognized to constitute experience" (AE: 3; LW 10: 9). But art as experience is not just an imitation of everyday life; it is everyday experience transformed, made over, reconstructed, intensified, and refined into something filled with emotional meaning, and finally it is aesthetically satisfying.

Dewey has much to say about the way in which the modern museum functions in our society, as well as about the role of private art collectors. Some people collect money; others collect facts; still others collect art pieces. Many collectors of art enhance their prestige in the economic and social world by the size and the monetary value of their collections. On the other hand, the museum is to our day what the great cathedral was to the past; it bolsters our cultural pride. Unfortunately, neither kind of collection is part of our native and spontaneous culture.

Much of Dewey's analysis of art and the artist turns around the artist as creator, as maker of art, and as spectator or enjoyer of what is created. The maker of art is a live, perceptive creature, perceptive of meanings that escape the commonplace but are imbedded in the sufferings and undergoings of experience. All art is sensuous, but it is not sensuous in the traditional empiricist meaning. It is sensuous in the meaning that thought has penetrated the very nature of its inner being and in the meaning that "nothing . . . penetrated by any probing insight is inherently such that it may not become the heart and core of sense"

(AE: 29; LW 10: 36). Artists as creators bring to their respective media all the experiences and meanings they have found in life, meanings proceeding from public lives and from a self that are social in nature, and they incorporate into their matter or material the forms or meanings they wish the art object to possess. Emotions have meanings; that is, they are related to objects integral to their feeling states (AE: 64; LW 10: 69f.). Thus, emotions are significant, and if they were not, they would be *mere biological eruptions*. Furthermore, artists think, but they do not think with linguistic symbols unless their medium be that of language, as in poetry and prose. They think with qualities, with lines, with colors, with sounds (AE: 16; LW 10: 21).

It has been traditional to regard the act of creation or production of a work of art as *artistic* and the perception and enjoyment of the completed art object as *aesthetic*. Dewey minimizes this distinction. He claims that the enjoyment of the production of a work of art cannot be cut completely from the creative act; nor can the creative acts of the artists themselves be cut from the enjoyment of the work they have done. There is no active and passive distinction between the creator and spectator. That creators are active is a tautology; but spectators must re-create the work of art; they must let the work of art speak with all its meanings, meanings of such richness, uniqueness, and intensity that they cannot be grasped at once. Spectators must return again and again to appreciate the transformed meanings in all their fullness. To sit and stare in a passive manner is the antithesis of an aesthetic experience; at the same time the spectators of a work of art must let the art object speak its own transformed meanings, the sense in which any art piece is objective.

The same sort of creation and appreciation goes on in the lives of artists. They make something, then contemplate what they have made; they add to it, or remake it, or transform it, and in so doing they are both creator and spectator. The alternating phases of making and appreciating what is made, what is yet to be done, results in a successful creative work of art, in a moment of consummation in which the creative process is complete and the appreciation of it is a fulfilled expectation. In this moment, all the movements, thoughts, emotional meanings, are blended and heightened to such intensity that a perfect union of creator and created is achieved.

To me it has always been significant that Dewey's philosophy of art is not confined to the creation of what we have come to call "fine" art, as significant as fine art is for life. Art is a way of living with such care for the mundane, the ordinary, the commonplace, that the aesthetic can enter into daily experience. This way of viewing art transforms the humdrum, and so-called routine, of everyday experience into a kind of aesthetic living. It comes about in those moments when we feel most alive,

when an inner harmony of life and environment exists, when happiness and delight are planned and, out of the conflicts and perturbations of life, are finally achieved. These are mountain-peak experiences, not cut from ordinary experience, but part and parcel of it. Of course, as Dewey says, if we try to perpetuate this moment of supreme fulfillment beyond its normal duration, we lose its significance. But if the time of consummation becomes a time for beginning anew, we are left with a memory of the aesthetic experience just lived through, a memory the "sense of which haunts life like the sense of being founded on a rock" (AE: 17; LW 10: 23).

It is Dewey's contention that much of our experience lacks this aesthetic quality in areas like business, work, home life, and school. What is dull and ordinary never takes flight; it is locked in and surrounded by routine. Business is something to get over and done with; work is drudgery; home life is uneventful or turbulent with unregulated emotion. Many of us would say that schools are too much like jails with discipline *externally* imposed and without purpose, lacking in the thrill of creating something new. Pleasures may come and go in such an existence, but regulated emotion, happiness, and delight belong to life with much deeper and more significant meanings.

This broad and comprehensive view of aesthetic experience allows Dewey to approach any work of art with a receptive emotional attitude. His view of art allows one to seek out the meanings in all schools of art without prejudice. The impressionists, the abstractionists, the formalists, and all the rest, have something of meaning to convey in their media. But if one approaches the art object with one's mind already made up about what beauty is, one rules out many aesthetic experiences in advance. If the term 'beauty' is connected with the consummatory phase of artistic experience in such a way that the truly aesthetic is the beautiful, then Dewey would adopt the term 'beauty'. But if beauty is a concept that predetermines the artistic creation, then he thinks it better that we not use the term. By attaching beauty to the aesthetic experience, Dewey thus makes the concept synthetic, not analytic (AE: 129; LW 10: 135).

This brief statement concerning Dewey's theory of creation, of the aesthetic, is not intended to be comprehensive; I have drawn out some of the significant passages in his writings that point up a certain direction in this area of his thought. Both in the creator and in the spectator the aesthetic experience is one that moves forward to a consummation, to appreciation; but appreciation is not cut off from the entire movement of the experience. While its fullness comes in that moment when art object and creator and spectator are fused into unity, this does not mean that it is not present throughout the ongoing experience. If we wish

to make 'appreciation' a term that represents this wholeness of the experience from beginning to end, then we can say that appreciation is the goal of aesthetic experience. This is a point that I think many of my colleagues in education have missed. Recently I heard it said that Dewey claims that we read literature for the purpose of "adjustment." If this statement is taken to mean that we read literature for therapeutic reasons, then I take it that such is not Dewey's view of art.

Dewey holds that we read literature for appreciation, and appreciation is a quality belonging to a fully alive, adjusted individual. I feel all the more compelled to make this point, for I believe that a misinterpretation of Dewey on this issue has led to many conflicts between the English and literature departments and education departments in American universities. Such a position, that of taking appreciation as the full aesthetic experience, does not rule out the possibility that on specific occasions literature and art may be *used* for therapeutic or even diagnostic purposes. Such uses may be accepted by psychiatrists, educators, and artists themselves without detracting from the dominant aesthetic intent of art.

I turn now to a third phase of Dewey's thought, which is his theory of valuation. For Dewey the relation between beliefs about the world established by science and beliefs about the regulation of conduct is the central problem of contemporary life (QC: 256; LW 4: 204). In stating the problem of value, Dewey begins by showing its historical setting and by eliminating various areas of subject-matters where value-facts are not found (TV: 2f.; LW 13: 192f.). Value-facts are eliminated from the fields of science such as physics, chemistry, and astronomy. (It follows that any attempt to drag moral considerations into certain purely scientific inquiries is *not* the manner in which Dewey thought the relationship between fact and value could be solved.) Historically, one phase of the contemporary value discussion grew out of the elimination of final causes or final ends from the fields of strictly scientific studies; and this, of course, is one consequence of the influence of Darwin on philosophy. The present confusion in value theory resolves generally into three positions, none of which Dewey supports: (1) some hold that there are no genuine value-propositions or judgments; (2) others hold that values are located in a mentalistic or emotional realm; (3) still others claim that values are located in a transcendent realm above science.

Dewey holds that value-facts are found in life-processes called human behavior. Valuings begin in selection-rejection behavior, and this behavior is observable, open to scientific study (Dewey 1949: 65; LW 16: 344). Dewey says:

> Values of some sort or other are not traits of rare and festive occasions; they occur whenever any object is welcomed and lingered over; whenever it arouses aversion and protest; even though the

> lingering be but momentary and the aversion a passing glance toward something else. (EN: 400; LW 1: 299)

The connection of valuings with organic activities follows a line of development from the gross organic movement of the latter called "impulsion" to the strictly defined and mediated value-object. The impulsion or forward movement of the organism meets many things that deflect and oppose it. If the organism did not meet these obstacles, it would remain thought-less and emotionless, and since it would not have to "give an account of itself in terms of the things it encounters," these objects would not become significant. At first, impulsion is a sort of blind surge; as a blind surge it meets obstacles and becomes differentiated into impulses (AE: 58; LW 10: 64). But now this blind surge, at first merely a welling up of energy, becomes channeled by means of its environment into forms called "habits." The biological flows into the psychological and the sociological. Impulses in children take on meaning through the aid of adults with their formed habits (HNC: 89f.; MW 14: 65). Vital impulses are thus a condition for valuings, but values cannot be reduced to mere impulses (TV: 8; LW 13: 197). Vital impulses foreshadow and emerge into new forms called "desires" and "interests." The terminology that Dewey suggests for his analysis is as follows. (1) Valuings are described by such terms as 'prizing', 'holding dear', 'loving', 'caring for'. These are ways of behaving that tend to maintain something in factual (space-time) existence or that tend to bring something into existence that is lacking (PM: 275; LW 15: 102f.). (2) 'Interest' stands for the enduring or long-time-span disposition of this nature, that is, of prizing, and interest holds together in a system a variety of acts otherwise having diverse directions. (3) *Desire* is then described as the behavioral attitude that arises when prizings are temporarily blocked or frustrated, while (4) 'enjoying' is the name for the consummatory phase of prizing.[6]

When 'valuing' is defined in terms of desiring, Dewey claims that desire must be treated "in terms of the existential context in which it arises and functions" (TV: 16; LW 13: 204). Thus, desire is not taken in the large, that is, without specifiable content or connection with environing conditions. To take desire in the large without specific connection with an object is to relapse into a mentalistic psychology. The connection of the theory of valuation with concrete experiences of desire and satisfaction is the main concern of the naturalistic theory of value. This connection of desire with value is contrasted with two rejected theories of a priori rationalism and transcendentalism (QC: 256ff.; LW 4; 205f.).

If we return for a moment to Dewey's contention that his theory of value begins with selection-rejection behavior, animal as well as human,

we find that the distinctively human type of selection-rejection behavior is found in carings-for or prizings *with foresight*. The anticipation or foresight of the outcome of activities, and the recognition of the result as the ground or reason for engaging in them, makes the selection-rejection behavior of humans different from that of animals (Dewey 1949: 65f.; LW 16: 344f.). According to Dewey, however, much of human behavior is so direct that no desires and ends intervene and no valuations take place (PM: 269; LW 15: 80). Vital impulses and habits operate in a direct manner; but desires and ends-in-view take place when desires are *questioned* and inquiry intervenes. Thus, the desirability of certain desires is brought under critical analysis. The purpose of inquiry about valuings is to bring more control and management into life. The goal of valuational experience of this type is the *regulation of desires* and the *construction of the good* (PM: 246f.; LW 15: 207f.). The *good,* or should we say *goods,* are found at the ends of specific inquiries into valuational experience, and each good is unique as is the situation in which it arises. But similar situations recur, thus similar goods are found; that is, the same *kinds* of goods may recur (TV: 44; LW 13: 230). Each good is unique in that it comes into existence at a particular time and place; but the logic of valuation constructs kinds of goods. The relation of the unique good to the kinds of goods is one instance in Dewey's logic of the fusion of the unique and the generalities of experience.

The relation of beliefs about the world found in the sciences and beliefs about human conduct is intimate. A "norm" for Dewey means the conditions to be conformed to as found in the sciences; such norms are what we "ought" to choose in our evaluations. Thus, the cause-effect relationships found in primarily scientific studies emerge into means-ends relationships in conduct. Of course, not every cause-effect relationship in scientific studies is selected for the direction of human conduct; some ought to be avoided, for they lead to disastrous consequences. An example of the cause-effect relationship adopted in the direction of human conduct might be as follows: if scientific experimentation finds that a certain vaccine will prevent polio, then the value judgment becomes "one ought or should be vaccinated." The value judgment "rests upon" the factual judgment (TV: 21f.; LW 13: 209f.). Dewey calls this kind of valuation a secular one, and he claims that such value judgments are on the increase in modern society.

The foregoing is a bare outline within which I think we can understand Dewey's philosophy of inquiry, creation, and conduct, or, in traditional terms, of truth, beauty, and goodness. Each of these is a phase of experience, and at any one time, one or the other of these phases of experience will be uppermost. However, a human being is one organism, and as one organism, the various parts of his or her psychological

and social nature interact. This oneness of the organism is considered to be such an important point by Dewey that he said that the recognition of this was his contribution to naturalistic theory (Dewey 1951: 545; LW 14: 30). Such a view accounts for the individual differences among humans, and at the same time affirms that each human being as human is one organism that thinks and feels and acts. If we develop the function of thinking and leave out the emotions and desires, the latter are left in a no-man's-land to drift about with no refinement or regulation; if we refine the emotions and do not learn how to think, our mental life will become clogged with prejudices and irrational methods.

The goal of all philosophical and educational experience for Dewey is a human being who is perceptive, imaginative, apt in memory, and creative in thought. The end product of the experiential process is a human being with sharpened faculties of inquiry, with refinement of emotion, and with control or regulation of desires. When a person such as this emerges from the living process, he or she has achieved humanity, a humanity (as William James described it) a little higher than the animals. The achievement of humanity is not mere life, but life with an *excellence* to it, an excellence that is the primary mark of full adjustment. When our science, art, and valuings blend into one unique quality of life, it is this quality that approaches the divine and thus takes on religious aspects.[7]

The analytic outline presented in the foregoing paragraphs is merely an extension of a significant passage in Dewey's *Logic:*

> The generalized and abstract conceptions of truth, beauty and goodness have a genuine value for inquiry, creation, and conduct. They have, like all genuine ideals, a limiting and directive force. But in order to exercise their genuine function they must be taken as reminders of the concrete conditions and operations that have to be satisfied in actual cases. In serving as such generalized instruments, their meaning is exemplified in their further use, while it is also clarified and modified in this use. The *abstract* meaning of *truth,* of *being* true, for example, has changed with development of the methods of experimental inquiry. (Logic: 178; LW 12: 179)

Since so many crimes against education have been laid at the door of Dewey's philosophy, especially by those who would attack his theory of education from the standpoint of their interest in what is commonly called the "humanities" as over against the "vocational" studies, it is a responsibility of those of us who are Dewey's followers to meet these unfounded claims with a detailed analysis of his writings. My attempt in this direction has been to show in the foregoing that Dewey's views of inquiry, creation, and conduct are his ways of treating in a modern setting the traditional concepts of truth, beauty, and goodness.

Notes

1. See chapters 1–5 of this volume.

2. Dewey says, "'Continuity', on the other side, means that rational operations *grow out of* organic activities, without being identical with that from which they emerge" (Logic: 19; LW 12: 26). Thus, Dewey's theory of experience is a nonreductionism, meaning, for instance, that symbolic behavior cannot be reduced to physical activities.

3. See chapter 1 of *Experience and Nature* in both the American and English editions of this work. Dewey rewrote the chapter for the second or new edition, his reason being as stated in the preface: "The first chapter was intended as an introduction. It failed of its purpose; it was upon the whole more technical and harder reading than the chapters which it was supposed to introduce" (EN: i; LW 1: 3). For one who has the patience to analyze these two versions of "Philosophic Method" the study is rewarding, and it is these chapters on philosophic method that afford the basis for my contention that this part of Dewey's writings is a clue to his entire position on methodology. [The American edition that Eames refers to is the first edition published by Open Court of LaSalle, Illinois, in 1925 (Dewey 1925). The English edition is the second, published in England by George Allen and Unwin of London in 1929 and concurrently published by W. W. Norton of New York. The 1929 edition is used for original references throughout this volume (see Key to Citations of John Dewey's Writings). The copytext for the *Later Works* 1 edition is the 1929 edition. The 1925 version of chapter 1 appears in appendix 2.—*Ed.*]

4. Dewey showed how such selective emphasis or bias might preclude any statement about valuation.

5. Dewey wrote a reply to Arthur E. Murphy on this point concerning his view of how thinkers of the past contribute to the history of philosophy in his "Reply to Criticisms" in the Schilpp volume (Dewey 1951: 561; LW 14: 45f.). Dewey attempts throughout his writings to show that all philosophers have laid hold of some vital constituent of the knowing process, and this procedure makes him vulnerable to many misinterpretations of his denotative method. Thus, Dewey's attempt to show that experience has within it *physical things* causes some to see only *materialism* as his philosophy; his attempt to show that *ideas* are also found in experience causes others to see only strands of *idealism* in his thought. Similarly, Dewey's attempt to show how *sensory experience* enters into scientific method causes some critics to see only *empiricism* as his philosophy; on the other hand, his theory of how *concepts* and *abstract universals* enter into inquiry causes other critics to interpret his theory of inquiry as some kind of *new rationalism*. Instances of other types of criticisms stemming from the same misunderstanding of Dewey's view of the wholeness of experience can be multiplied. The foregoing points up how Dewey can be labeled alternately a materialist, an idealist, an empiricist, and a rationalist.

When I say that this passage concerning how all philosophers from Plato through Locke to the present have laid hold of some constituent of knowing is a clue to Dewey's treatment of the history of thought, I mean that it can be maintained that all thinkers can be viewed as having selected out some part of

experience that is important. In theory and in practice, Dewey never did repudiate the past as Robert M. Hutchins claims that pragmatists, among others, do (See Hutchins 1953: 86). A direct denial of such a position as Hutchins takes concerning pragmatism is made by Dewey in *Experience and Education* (EE: 93f.; LW 13: 51f.).

6. Dewey uses many synonyms for these terms, but this description is representative of his view.

7. This religious quality is the theme of *A Common Faith*. [See chapter 12 of this volume, "Religion as the Quality of Excellence."—*Ed.*]

Part Four

Social Philosophy

8

General Education and the Two Cultures

What S. Morris Eames characterized back in 1968 as a "wide chasm . . . between the two cultures" has since broken out in open hostility—what has come to be known as the "science wars." The first shots in the hostility can be traced back to two parallel developments. The first was the proposal in the late 1970s of the so-called "Strong Programme" for the sociology of knowledge, a research program that its critics charge attacks the objectivity of science in favor of the errant view that all scientific knowledge is wholly socially and historically determined. The second development has been the growing body of writings in the postmodernist movements of philosophy and literary studies that offer an epistemic relativism opposed to the epistemic realism upon which the practice of science has traditionally been based. The most notable, or notorious, returning fire has come from Alan Sokal, a New York University physicist, whose article "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," an admitted spoof of postmodernist research in science, was accepted as serious work by *Social Text,* a journal of cultural studies. In the wake of the hoax, scores of books and articles have appeared by scientists and defenders of science disputing the excesses of science's harshest critics. In the following article, Eames looks at the historical and cultural underpinnings of the chasm-become-war between the liberal arts and the sciences, and offers suggestions for rapprochement that, in light of recent events, appear more viable and necessary than ever before.—*Eds.*

What we have come to call "Western civilization" is an intellectual house divided within itself. One part of our life is a culture made by science. Another part is a culture made by literature and the arts, or what we call generally "the humanities." A wide chasm has developed between these two cultures, and our lives reflect this deepening split.

A few years ago, C. P. Snow shocked us into a discussion of this problem with his famous Cambridge lecture, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (Snow 1959a) followed by his book, *The Two Cultures: And a Second Look* (Snow 1959b). Snow stated the problem simply:

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There are scientists who appear to know little about our literary culture and there are literary people who appear to know little about science.

From his own experience, Snow selected an extreme example of a scientific man who told him that once he tried to read Charles Dickens and gave it up. The scientist said he couldn't understand Dickens. On the other hand, Snow says that once he was in a gathering of literary people and asked if they knew what was meant by the second law of thermodynamics. The literary people were negative and cold. Our intellectual life, Snow declared, is deeply split between a culture developed by scientific theorists and technological experts in one camp, and a culture developed by literary and humanistic thinkers on the other.

In considering this problem, let us look at that part of a university that is designated as a college of liberal arts and sciences. Having all the courses in the humanities and the sciences listed in one catalog gives the impression of unity of intellectual program and purpose; but this is an illusion. Any professor who has worked on curriculum planning knows that the courses listed have come out of conflicts and compromises between the two cultures and have emerged as the final requirements. Students across our land who are compelled to take these requirements are victims of this compromise process. Their intellectual attitudes reflect this condition. Students in the sciences ask why they must waste their time taking courses in the humanities; students in the humanities ask why they must waste their time taking courses in the sciences. Sometimes students are told that if they take these fragmented courses in each culture that somehow, by some miracle perhaps, they will emerge a unified intellectual personality. I don't think this happens, and for many reasons. In the first place, we cannot force unity of our knowledge from without and we cannot pin it on our academic gowns as decorations. My experience in three large universities shows me that the attitudes of professors in the sciences and in the humanities, in their lectures and in their personal responses, reflect this conflict in our intellectual life. In many cases their attitudes are bitter, especially when they are compelled to teach students outside their fields of specialization, and their bitterness is symptomatic of our intellectual sickness. The problem of the relation of the culture of science to the culture of the humanities is the central problem of our time.

It is my belief that this problem has been in the making for several centuries. It began with the scientific revolution, which, I will say arbitrarily, was initiated by Galileo. Galileo's critical attitude and his use of scientific instruments brought about a new approach to the pursuit of knowledge. This emerging knowledge, with its new attitudes and new methods of inquiry, cut the ground from under the old solidarities, the old unities, the established beliefs of the Middle Ages.

Francis Bacon, while slight in his scientific accomplishments, felt the winds blowing from a new world and he proclaimed the land of scientific promise from afar. But it was René Descartes who drove the division deeper between the life of the mind and the physical world. He split the world into inner and outer, into spirit and matter, into a realm of value and a realm of fact. The ideas of Descartes had a powerful effect upon the climate of scientific endeavor, for his bifurcation of intellectual life brought a measure of freedom to the pioneering scientists. The physical scientist could work in his laboratory more or less unhampered. He could make his observations and carry on his experiments without interference from zealous men of religion or those who were institutional guardians of an alleged sacred truth. The latter concerned themselves with the life of the spirit, while the new scientists concerned themselves with the happenings in the physical world. It is true that, from time to time, some scientists expressed a guilty feeling about this growing split in the intellectual culture, and some, like Isaac Newton, made valiant attempts to reconcile the two worlds. Philosophers such as Leibniz also tried to unify the growing divergencies in the accumulation of knowledge, but all such attempts failed.

The scientific revolution gained momentum. The growth of new knowledge increased at a rate never before known. This could be called the "knowledge explosion" of the last three centuries. It brought forth developments such as atomic theory, the theory of evolution, and the theory of quantum physics. The complexities of these theories went beyond the comprehension of many people outside the culture of the scientists. In the more recent past, developments such as nuclear fission and space travel stagger the imaginations of most people outside of science. The common person today stands amid these scientific revolutions with about the same puzzlement and awe as did the primitives who stood amid the dark clouds, the lightning, the thunder, and other forces of nature that they did not understand and in the midst of which they trembled.

With the advance of the scientific revolution a curious reversal of attitude toward science has taken place. Galileo and Copernicus suffered because of violent rejections of their methods and beliefs. However, people learned gradually of the practical advantages of the applications of what seemed so abstruse, of what they once thought was so dangerous in scientific endeavor. From these scientific activities an expanding technological culture arose and the tremendous advantages of the new productive facilities were welcomed. Important people of both cultures, and the common person as well, began to praise science, to worship it, to make of it a new fetish. It has become commonplace to claim that something is "scientific," to use this word as a sort of halo around any

preferred value or prejudice. When it is said that "science has proved this" (whether this is actually the case or not), then this kind of authoritative statement is supposed to end all discussion; no more inquiry is necessary; no more questions need be asked. This fetish has invaded the advertising media, and it is used to incite approval and purchase of certain products. There is almost a religious glow, a sacred aura, that hovers over any product or cause or value that falls under the emotional approval of the word "scientific."

The emotional acceptance of science does not mean that the complicated theories of the scientific revolution are part of every person's intellectual culture. Most of us are about as far from understanding what kind of culture the new science has brought as would be the primitives in their unreflective wonderments of nature. Once I asked a class in humanities if anyone could explain Newton's law of gravitation, and not a single one, from freshmen through seniors, could do it. They had heard of it, and they knew it had something to do with falling apples, but the full meaning of it was as remote as it might have been to a cultural primitive. I never had the courage to ask Snow's question put to literary people concerning the second law of thermodynamics, and a query about Einstein's theory of relativity or the Michelson-Morley experiment seemed impossible. In all humility I must add that if some bright student had come forth with answers to my question on Newton, I would have been hard put to know if he or she stated the scientific theory correctly. Thus, I experience in my own life the seriousness of the problem of the two cultures.

I believe that these facts, along with others that could be cited, point up an obvious condition in our intellectual lives. Scientific methods and beliefs for most intellectuals outside of science are things apart, things isolated in a different world. It is a culture that, for the most part, only scientists themselves understand and share.

This is not to say that the scientific revolution has not brought about radical changes in all our lives. Scientific research has touched our lives in many ways, and we may think first of matters of health and longevity of life. The inventions and applications flowing from many of these theories produced a mammoth industrial system. The scientific revolution released new energies of creativity and made obsolete old habits of craftsmanship. The technological applications of scientific theories brought results that the common person and intellectuals outside the worlds of science and technology could experience directly. It produced more objects for the fulfillment of desires; it made possible the biological revolution and population explosion of the last four hundred years without a greater disaster of starvation and poverty. Industrialization could not have taken place without the advance of scientific discovery,

and today its consequences and values are so desired that every so-called "backward" nation aspires to move into the technological age.

If science and its technological applications solved some problems, they have created others in our emotional, social, and intellectual lives. Mass production and the mass organization it required thrust us into the great complexes of a corporate culture. Mass governments were created, not merely to control the new phenomenon of industry, but to protect it and extend it. As corporate industrial powers grew, corporate governments created mass military organizations and mass warfare. This corporate-type culture has flowed into many of our other institutions, into many of our churches and many of our schools. Some churches have become more like corporations and some schools have become more like factories. For the most part, decisions affecting individual human destinies are now made by a very few people in powerful positions of authority in various corporate organizations, particularly government, industry, and the military. New impulses and new emotions have not been generated to cope with these rapidly moving and wholesale changes in our lives, and this condition creates part of the crisis of our age. The old loves, the old fears that acted as defense mechanisms in the past no longer fit our modern world, yet they push us forward into the rush of new circumstances. The old desires for dominance and the old objects of national pride impel us onward to what threatens to be a suicidal death of our civilization.

The advance of scientific theory and of technological developments has produced various kinds of responses by people in the humanities. One of these responses is noted by C. P. Snow. He claims that many literary intellectuals never fully accepted the industrial revolution. We might add to this and say that many in the humanities, in their personal lives and in their writings, condemn it and even hate it. (A former colleague of mine hates the industrial society so much that he refuses to buy a television set.) Many say that their chief concern is with people's inner lives, with "the life of the mind," and that they are trying to rescue modern humanity from the terrible calamity of an empty spiritual life.

When we look more closely into what the poets, the novelists, the artists are doing, we see that they are giving expression to people's feelings in the modern age, to their frustrations, to their absurdities, to their alienation and loneliness. In the same manner in which scientific theories have become more complicated, artistic and literary expressions have grown more complex. If the scientist who told Snow that he had given up trying to understand Dickens had encountered some of the modern literary works, there would be no difficulty in predicting his bewilderment. What could he do with those who write in the mood of the philosophy of absurdity and the philosophy of alienation? Do many out-

side the humanities feel and experience the absurdities of modern life? For instance, we wage war to make peace and we kill men and women to make them democratic. All this seems absurd to some literary and humanistic writers, and many other aspects of modern life also seem absurd, as Albert Camus shows in *The Stranger.*

How do people outside the humanities, including the scientists, evaluate human life in a corporate society? It can be shown that the power elites of government, industry, and the military have emerged with an ever-tightening control over a large number of people's lives. To many sensitive writers, our freedom is being curbed, our individuality crushed, and our goals and purposes diverted into daydreams. What is happening to our spirit, to our emotional life? Some say we are becoming "things" that feel not and think not, that we are not brothers to the ox, as Edwin Markham put it, but brothers to the machine and its impersonal organization. To dramatize the condition of modern life, Franz Kafka wrote a story about a man who found himself turning into a cockroach.

It is often said that one of the marks of a civilization is the value that civilization places upon its artists. If there is any truth in this contention, then we must admit that the poet, the novelist, the painter, the musician are pushed to the outer rim of our culture. To be sure, these artists are accorded a kind of idle curiosity by many outside of their interests, and their creations often become mere "conversation pieces" to those who do not understand. The center of life today is occupied by the scientist and the technological expert. Intellectuals in the humanities pushed out of the center of things paint in vivid colors the paucity of our emotional lives. No doubt some of these expressions are fantasies of their own minds, others are esoteric reveries, some are grotesque emotional inventions. These responses must be understood, however, in light of the kind of existential situation in which we find ourselves. Be that as it is, there is much truth and insight in what these people tell us about ourselves. Modern life does lack emotional and intellectual unity, and the disharmonies and imbalances are real.

Perhaps some of you will think I am overstating the problem of the relation of the two cultures. I believe the problem is primary and crucial. Furthermore, I believe that American education is headed for disaster unless present trends in the two cultures are reversed. Change, growth, and decay are natural processes, and some dawn of a new age will always come to us, but its unplanned occurrence may be accidentally fortunate or tragic. Our only hope against the blind happenings of change is a redirection of life; and conscious education, intelligently and humanely planned, is our only way out.

If anyone thinks I am overplaying my theme, let us remind ourselves of one of the most devastating episodes in all human history, and it is

an episode so well remembered from only yesterday. The Nazi Germans emerged from a society that had developed the two cultures to a high degree. Long ago the division between science and value had been driven deeply into their lives, for Immanuel Kant, among others, had taught that reason marks off two distinct worlds—one of science and the other of morals. Morality was placed in a compartment where motive ruled supreme, and it was a motive taken without regard to the consequences it produced. Where duties were delineated, they were not duties emerging from the new human relations of a scientific and technological culture. Furthermore, motives and duties were completely divorced from feelings, impulses, and emotions. In this philosophy of experience, the impulses were left with no intelligent guidance, and the powerful in government, industry, and the military seized upon this no-man's-land of impulse with demonic intentions. The impression must not be left that it is the German nation alone that has experienced this problem. The division in intellectual culture is a problem for all in what we call "Western civilization." It is a problem that grew from the time of Galileo, an Italian, that passed through Descartes, a Frenchman, that was deepened by Kant, a German, and that is carried forward today by British and American thinkers who continue to split the world into two cultures, into science and value.

I would not have selected this problem of the two cultures if I had not given serious consideration to an answer. I believe that we need to create a new "intellectual public," a new kind of teacher and a new kind of college graduate. I believe that this is the task of the college of liberal arts and sciences. The wide divergencies between the sciences and the humanities must be overcome, even if slowly, by certain kinds of teaching. We need a teacher of science who is a student of science and who can translate the attitudes, the methods, and the conclusions of science into the language of the nonscientific student or the student who is not planning on becoming a research scientist. We need a teacher of humanities who is a student of the great poets, novelists, artists, musicians, and who can translate these complex expressions of feelings and sentiments into the emotional life of the general student or the student who is not going to be, say, a poet. The emphasis here is upon the teacher as scholar and as communicator of meanings. This kind of teacher will not replace the research professor; the temperaments and interests of both are needed in the total intellectual process. But the teacher who synthesizes the conclusions of both cultures and communicates these to his or her students must be valued and rewarded in the same manner as the research professor is honored and rewarded today.

Teachers of science too often think of their task as that of making more scientists, and too often they look upon the task of creating un-

derstanding and appreciation of science on the part of nonscientists as beneath their professional dignity. We should remind these teachers of the fate of their colleagues in totalitarian countries. When those in a general culture do not understand enough to appreciate the work of the scientist, then scientists live at the precarious mercy of an ignorant populace and of the raw impulses of the blind but powerful individuals. Their freedom to inquire and even their lives are in constant peril. Scientists do not live in a cultural vacuum, isolated in their laboratories and smug in their pride of working on research contracts from industry, the government, or the military. As our scientists are learning every day, some decisions are made using their research in ways of which they disapprove. In these cases, they have little or no power over the decisions directing the uses of their research, and about all they can do is protest the employment of their findings for the purposes of mass murder. Protest, however, is a weak form of power; it does not have the kind of effectiveness that comes from the power of decision and the execution of policy.

On the other hand, intellectuals in the humanities have a positive role to play in the healing of the breach between the two cultures. I have mentioned the contributions made in understanding what has happened to us emotionally. The literature of absurdity and alienation sets the problems of modern life; it does not solve them. Some of these artistic expressions lapse too easily into a vulgar psychology of the human spirit. It is the nature of creative art to move through the human existential situation to some kind of aesthetic fulfillment. When art does this, then it enhances the meaning and quality of life. The life and work of the humanist can become as segmented and isolated as the life of certain scientists mentioned above. It is possible to teach a course in ethics, for instance, that is so analytic that it is detached from human problems. It should be remembered that in the final analysis moral principles are clarified in their application; their ambiguity or clarity is made vivid in the quality of life they produce.

While I have been speaking of the sciences and the humanities, no doubt many of you have been wondering about the culture of the social scientists. To which of the two cultures do they belong? I could write a long personal narrative here, having taught in this field and having mediated many conflicts concerning the role of the social scientists in the liberal arts college. Time does not allow an extended treatment of this problem, so I will state my conclusions without the qualifications. The social sciences are more akin to the humanities when they select as their subject-matter genuine human problems, or what may be called the "problems of men," problems of poverty, war, crime, hunger, housing, and cultural deprivation. The social sciences are more akin to the

physical sciences when they strive to develop methods of inquiry that are as precise as their subject-matter allows. A tremendous work is marked out for the social scientists, a work that ought to command respect and appreciation from both those in the humanities and those in the physical sciences. The problems of the social scientists are vital, deeply human problems, and the methods they need for the solution of these are the precise methods of a science.

When I say that we need a new "intellectual public" created by teachers who are dedicated to the values put forth here, no doubt many of you will think me hopelessly romantic. The channels of intellectual history are running in a different direction and their currents are swift and strong. Intellectual habits are the most difficult to change and, as A. E. Housman says of Earth and high heaven, they are "fix'd of old and founded strong." Even while I speak to you, there are plans across the country to eliminate the college of liberal arts and sciences in many educational institutions. This new proposal drives the split even deeper, for it creates within the university structure "divisions," and these are divisions in more than the organizational sense of the word. There is a further move to set all technological and professional schools apart; thus there is a danger that we will move into four cultures—natural science, social science, humanities, and technical and professional schools. When these are shut off from one another in their interactions, then what influence they have upon one another is purely accidental and capricious. A technology student is not allowed even a slight acquaintance with the great ideas of a Plato or a glimpse into the deeper meanings of the emotions of a Shakespeare or an insight into the great moral teachings of an Aristotle. The student in the humanities will be shut off from what the other cultures can contribute to his or her life. Thus, certain intellectual areas in each person's life will become poverty-stricken and primitive.

What kind of people will we become if our scientists and technological experts have no way of knowing of the finer sensibilities of the emotions, and if our poets and novelists and artists live in a primitive world of understanding nature? Can a humanist be content to be only half a human being, to be content to look up at the stars and around at the rocks, the plants, and the animals, realizing that his or her understanding of these things has little advancement over the primitive who gazed upon this world with childish wonderment and fear? I should think that literary people who know little or nothing of the world in which they live and have their being would feel that they are indeed strangers on a foreign planet. Can a scientist who feels the raw emotions of love or fear or sympathy be content to know that his or her feelings are little more advanced than those of the primitive whose emotions were simply biological explosions of energy and violence? I should think that a scien-

tist who said that he tried to read Dickens and gave it up would feel that there is an important area of his life which is deficient and empty.

Ultimately, all questions of knowledge and action come down to the problems: What kind of life is in the making? and What kind of world is being created? These two problems are intertwined and inseparable. The kind of intellectual life we map out for ourselves determines what kind of people we become and what kind of intellectual home we make of the universe. Today our intellectual life is broken into compartments. This split in our intellectual personalities is a challenge to all educational institutions, both large and small. Being large or small, however, has nothing to do with the problem of healing the sickness of our intellectual lives. The new intellectual public is brought to birth by a new kind of Socratic midwife, by the teacher who can sensitize the student to the humanistic implications of scientific developments and by the teacher who can help the student whose first love is the artistic to live in a world that is something more than a forest primeval.

9

Scientific Grounds for Valuational Norms

Many of the examples of environmental problems and many of the studies cited in this essay reflect the twenty-year gap between its writing and our present situation. The alarm first raised by *Silent Spring* produced controls on some damaging chemicals in our country, and the fears of the effects of both military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy have shifted with the end of the cold war, and the decommissioning of many nuclear plants. Yet it cannot be said that there is no cause for concern about the unintended consequences of our technological advances. In a single week's news (the first week of November 2000) we heard of a ship foundered off the French coast with possible serious chemical contamination; of the dangerous radioactivity found in Russian waterways flowing from a nuclear complex, "more than would come from 10,000 commercial nuclear reactors"; of the Marine Corps's attempt to contact the parents of an estimated 10,000 children born between 1968 and 1985 in Camp Lejeune housing at risk for birth defects and childhood leukemia because of chemical contamination of the water supply. We are also told that a common component of cold medicines sold over the counter may trigger strokes. So we live with the consequences of scientific and technological breakthroughs that come back to haunt us, with the unsolved problems such as the disposal of spent fuel rods from nuclear plants, and with the long-term worries concerning our future lives in a warmer world. It seems that there is still need for the kind of enlightened risk/benefit analysis that science could provide and that is called for in this essay.—*Eds.*

The relation of science to value is generally recognized as the central and deepest problem of our age. The problem centers around the relation of our beliefs about the world in which we live to the beliefs that should or ought to direct our conduct. Value theorists in the Western world are generally agreed upon the goals and ideals of human endeavor. From Aristotle and the ancient Greeks we inherited the view that the good life consists of human happiness, this happiness consisting of goods of the body (health, good children, long life), of external goods (economic security, citizenship, friendship), and of the virtues (courage, temperance, and so forth). David Hume taught us that what is useful

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and beneficial is the basis of standards of approbation. Immanuel Kant taught us that every person (rational being with will and intellect) should be treated as a person, as an end and not as a commodity. Along with these goals and ideals of moral theory arose the language of morals: 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong'. Often the terminology of value has been vague, and too often the statements about the goals and ideals have been too abstract. Some value theorists, like John Dewey, sought to give these goals and ideals empirical content; and some philosophers, like Bertrand Russell, have tried to show the scientific means to the accomplishment of ends that are postulated.

The foregoing statements set the stage for the hypothesis that I propose for the solution of part of the contemporary problem of the relation of science to value. The preliminary statements will reveal that there is an implicit assumption in the reasoning of concerned scientists and value theorists concerning these goals and ideals: human happiness, usefulness to all humanity, and the importance of human life as an end in itself. Science and technology, which some had thought were value free, have now come under attack from within the scientific community and from without. The nuclear age and the revolution in chemistry have thrust us into new discussions of what is "beneficial" or "harmful" to human happiness, and indeed, into discussions about survival of humans and other species. Among concerned scientists, the value terms of 'benefit' and 'risk' are heard more frequently than ever before. Dr. Barry Commoner writes that what is required at present is a common approach of adopting the principle of balancing "risk against benefit." Writing about one aspect of our modern value problem, that of pollution, he says:

> The risk can be determined by estimating the number of people exposed to the pollutant, the amounts which they may be expected to absorb, and the physical harm that might result. The benefit can be determined by estimating the economic, political, or social gains expected from the operation which produces the pollutant and the possibilities of substituting less hazardous operations. (Commoner 1970: 118)

The problem of the relation of science and value in contemporary times is complicated by some old habits, feelings, ideas about science and technology that consolidated in the days when science had to fight for acceptance into the culture. Once accepted, however, science and technology gained strong commitments from the general public and from leaders in economics, government, and education. Science and technology became almost religious in the respect and awe generated. We were led to believe that any scientific discovery or invention was a progressive step, and that this kind of progress was historically inevitable. The benefits

and risks of scientific and technological innovations were not seriously or extensively discussed until recently. Then a new development within science arose: some concerned scientists became alarmed at the consequences of some experiments and some technological applications of the sciences. The value terms of 'risk', 'hazards', 'damages', began to appear with alarming frequency when the more extended consequences of experiences in the uses of sciences and technologies were uncovered.

Value concerns have entered areas of experience today where the value theorist is often a nonexpert; the value theorist is dependent upon scientists for factual information, for the scientific grounds for new valuational norms. (I define a norm as a condition to be conformed to.) Commoner makes this point: "Scientific knowledge is our best guide to the control of natural forces" (ibid: 8). Value theorists who have worked closely with the scientific community, however, have made some observations that are pertinent to our present problem of the relation of science to value. For instance, there has been a long fight to emancipate some objects of nature from value strongholds of the culture in order that scientists can experiment to discover deeper and more extensive meanings. Finally, there emerged the idea that no object of nature comes to human experience marked 'good' or 'bad', 'benefit' or 'risk', on its surface. The object's worth, the benefits or risks it produces, is determined by the kinds of interactions it has with other objects and human beings. The object's full range of meanings, its *factual meanings* and *value meanings,* can be determined in no other way. The crisis of science and value at present arises because the factual meanings of an object have been selected and the value meanings, especially those involving risks, have been minimized or ignored.

A starting place for a brief statement of the contemporary value problems involved in science and technology is not obvious. One is charged with being naive, of oversimplifying, of being a novice in the treatment of very complex matters. Indeed, some insensitive to the value problems have been known to smother value concerns within the complexity of the issues. Furthermore, in order to trace out my hypothesis concerning the scientific grounds for valuational norms, it is necessary to review some well-known facts, and this review may seem tedious. It is the context within which I place these well-known facts, however, that I hope will merit the discussion.

During World War II it was discovered that certain kinds of chemicals could control pests, particularly mosquitoes, and the benefits of ridding ourselves of this pesky insect were heralded as a scientific triumph. Battlegrounds and backyards, forests and parks, streams and lakes were sprayed with the insecticide DDT. On a summer's night almost every town and city was "fogged." Then some alert scientists ob-

served the harmful effects of these chemicals upon animals, plants, and humans. Rachel Carson amassed this information and published a book, *Silent Spring* (Carson 1962). This book awakened many of us to the value dimensions of experimental science and its applications. Within a few years of what is now called this "chemical revolution" some five hundred new chemical compounds invaded our lives. Sprays, dusts, aerosols became a part of the daily routine.

Then came the other side of the truth. That which destroys some parts of nature annoying to humans, like mosquitoes, houseflies, and weeds, destroys other parts of nature vital to human life and to the balance of nature. Since the day of the occurrence of *Silent Spring,* continued research has shown the "risks" and "harmful effects" of other innovations. Studies of bird life, the effect of some chemicals upon egg composition, studies of plants and their rate of photosynthesis and cell production, and studies of fruit flies and their chromosomal changes are experiments that affect the balance of life and death. More and more humans have been affected by this chemical revolution. Workers in farm fields who come into close contact with pesticides and herbicides have been damaged. Residues in some foods have been found to have one hundred eight times the "accepted human tolerance." (Note that 'accepted human tolerance' is a new value term.) Pesticide residues have been found in alarming amounts in patients with liver cancer, leukemia, and high blood pressure. A scientific colleague of mine points out that there is now so much of these new chemical compounds in our bodies that the Department of Agriculture would have to declare us not fit for human consumption.

We learned of the benefits and risks of new ways of cleaning clothes, dishes, and our bodies. Long ago humans found that soap and dirt combined in such ways (there is a scientific account of this now) that with the addition of water, the dirt would float away. About thirty-five years ago chemists gave us a new cleaning agent, one that would work in hard water, and these new detergents were welcomed as a great benefit. Then came the other side of the detergent box, when the full range of the meanings of how these detergents interact with other things came to light. These detergents entered our sewage plants, our streams, and eventually our rivers and lakes. A reaction was started that upset the oxygen balance for fish and other species of nature. Some rivers and lakes, like Lake Erie, became sewage dumps.

Since the days of DDT and other pesticides and herbicides, and the detergent mess, we have encountered new disasters, new risks and hazards involving already many deaths of plants, animals, and humans. We have had some rivers so polluted that one actually caught fire. Then came the risk of mercury. No one can forget the disaster of Minamata, Japan, where a plastics plant dumped chemical wastes into the bay; the fish and

crustaceans, taking water through their gills and feeding on the contaminated marine life, absorbed and concentrated the mercury in their tissues, and later this was transmitted to the fishermen and their families who ate the fish. Over two hundred people were poisoned, over fifty died, and the victims who survived had symptoms of ataxic gait, convulsions, numbness in the mouth and limbs, constriction of the visual field, and difficulty in speaking.

All industrialized countries and some emerging ones have experienced disastrous consequences of the chemical revolution. No nation is an island. From Sweden to Greenland to Canada to the United States to Japan the toll mounts. Britain and her disposal of sewage, the Soviet Union and the pollutants from pulp and cellulose plants running into Lake Baikal, the copper oxychloride fungicide entering Lake Nakuru in Kenya, the materials dumped into the Mediterranean, the PCBs dumped into the Hudson River, and the Kepone plants and their pollution of the James River in the United States are all instances of our new problems. And many more instances can be cited. When the carbon monoxide from autos, the smog, the fluorocarbons, and even the addition of such generally accepted things as red dye and saccharine are added to the list, the fears grow more intense and there is more to fear than fear itself.

The transformation of fire and heat by modern science and technology was vividly demonstrated in the early morning of August 6, 1945, when an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. This holocaust killed over 78,000 people. The rationalization and the moral implications of this event are still debated. Not too long ago an atomic cloud drifted over Japan, Canada, and the United States, and old fears returned from the days of Hiroshima. After atomic testing of a kind was banned by the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States in 1953, the attention turned toward the so-called "peaceful" uses of atomic energy. Some scientists and technologists see this new source of energy as an alternative to fossil fuels and oil; others see this new energy source as a threat and hazard to all humanity and nature. During this last year the debate appears to center around four main problems: (1) reactor safety; (2) the disposal of radioactive wastes; (3) transporting and reprocessing of spent fuel; and (4) the increasing danger of political implications of dependence upon plutonium, and this includes the risks of sabotage, blackmail, and terrorism.

The debate over the safety of nuclear power plants is often confusing; it is not always simple, and it is difficult to sift out the truth from statements coming from self-interest arguments of entrenched economic institutions and feelings of national prestige that are clouded in secrecy. A sufficient number of concerned scientists, however, has shown that an accident in the handling of this delicate energy source could wipe out

whole cities or regions of a nation. The health hazard becomes more and more a frightening problem. More and more studies result in governmental agencies lowering the amount of radiation that is an "acceptable risk" (Commoner 1970: 115); these studies continue to show that radiation is connected with genetic defects, heart disease, leukemia, and cancer. One United States scientist, however, has claimed that an extra 32,000 lives a year is not too dear a price to pay for nuclear energy. But another nuclear scientist, John Gofman, is shocked by this kind of value judgment and claims that such a contention comes from a realm of technology without a human face (Gofman and Tamplin 1971).[1]

The foregoing account is oversimplified, I admit; but the issue and the crises are real. Collective action has taken place on many fronts; the nations attempting to protect the waters of the Mediterranean is a case to note. Gradually, the scientific basis for valuational norms becomes assimilated to an informed conscience. As philosophers of science, philosophers, and value theorists devoted to the valuational consequences of what science and technology have forced upon us, we cannot ignore these responsibilities. Benefits and unacceptable risks must be debated and weighed in every case, and information must be free and accessible so that an informed conscience can guide decision-making processes that will ensure the future of humankind and all other species upon the earth.

Note

1. See also Gofman 1981 for a technical treatment in detail of this subject.

10

Creativity and Democracy

Democracy as a general idea is usually identified with a political form, one of the most significant expressions being a "government of the people, by the people, for the people."[1] The root meaning of the word came from the Greeks and means "rule of the people." Democracy as an historical form, however, is more than a political concept; it is a cluster of concepts or a family of concepts, some of which are liberty or freedom, equality, fraternity, and representation.[2]

The relation of the concept of democracy to the concept of creativity is intimate; in some usages they are synonymous, especially when each signifies genuine communication, creative interchange, and community. Broadly conceived, creativity is increase in meaning and value.[3] Meanings arise when existential connections are felt in experience, when these take on reference meanings in symbols, and when symbols are related to other symbols in symbol-sets or languages.

Novelty is the most significant mark of creativity.[4] A novel or new meaning may or may not take on the meaning of creativity, however; a novel meaning may signify aberration, deterioration, or death. Furthermore, uniqueness cannot be equated with creativity, for uniqueness means an occurrence of a quality in space and time, and the uniqueness of this or that quality may signify a disharmony or a harmony of qualities in their functional relations. Sometimes the words 'innovation' and 'invention' are used to mean novelty and its relation to creativity. 'Innovation' sometimes means a modification of a form already functioning in experience, or it may designate a new functional form or a new synthesis. 'Invention' is sometimes used as a mark of creativity, especially when it refers to discovery of a new instance of a means in the means-ends relationship.[5]

A meaning may be novel, innovative, inventive, however, and not possess the full designation of creativity because of its lack of relation

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to value. For instance, a certain act, such as committing a murder, may be novel and innovative, but we would hardly call this kind of act 'creative', except for purposes of literary fiction. Fascism may be a novel social form, but from the standpoint of an evaluation that uses the full meaning of creativity as a standard, it is an aberration.

How are the meanings of democracy related to the meanings of value? The best answer to this problem is found in the following statement:

> Can we find any reason that does not ultimately come down to the belief that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience, one which is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do non-democratic and anti-democratic forms of social life? Does not the principle of regard for individual freedom and for decency and kindliness of human relations come back in the end to the conviction that these things are tributary to a higher quality of experience on the part of a greater number than are methods of repression and coercion or force? Is not the reason for our preference that we believe that mutual consultation and convictions reached through persuasion, make possible a better quality of experience than can otherwise be provided on any wide scale? (EE: 25f.; LW 13: 18)

Democracy as a social form may be viewed as creative in two respects: (1) as an emergent form, democracy has novelty in meaning and value; (2) when partially actualized, democracy affords the conditions that make possible creativity in all areas of experience. There is no way, however, that democratic social conditions can guarantee that any acts or forms of creativity will emerge. A casual glance at the history of creativity, however, shows that there is little or no creativity when some forms of freedom are not present, particularly freedom of the mind.[6] Creativity is retarded when equality in some of its forms is denied because of individual or group discrimination; creativity is hampered when restrictions are placed upon fraternity, upon the right to assemble, to share, to have wide interactions and interchange with others. This is not to say that creativity cannot be born out of adversity, desperation, exploitation, wretchedness, alienation, and even war; there are many pages in the history of creativity that are stained with blood. The mountain peaks of creativity in the past, however, seem to be related to the foundations of freedom for the creators—philosophers, scientists, artists, poets, and so on—who may not have found freedom of expression in their native lands, but who found in their exiles islands of freedom somewhere on the face of the earth.

In what follows, an attempt will be made to sketch in broad and bold strokes the outlines of some of the creative meanings that have emerged in the various forms of democracy; to show how these concepts are now

undergoing a revitalization and modification; to point up some old and new challenges; and finally to project from our present plateau of experience some new democratic vistas.

Rights Reconsidered

For many centuries the essential meaning of democratic theory was identified with the concept of natural rights. After the adoption of the Constitution of the United States with its amendments of the Bill of Rights, the theory went into eclipse. The theory was resurrected in a most significant way when the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The preamble starts with the statement that the "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." The declaration continues: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."[7] Of course, these declarations are statements of ideals, but they are ideals of democracy, of the liberation of individuals on a worldwide scale, and thus they are ideals of the conditions of creativity.

Furthermore, in our own country during the last two decades, there has been a revolution in the extension of human rights. The American Civil Liberties Union now lists the following booklets on rights: the rights of aliens, candidates and voters, doctors and nurses, ex-offenders, government employees, hospital patients, lawyers and clients, mental patients, mentally retarded persons, military personnel, older persons, parents, police officers, the physically handicapped, the poor, prisoners, racial minorities, reporters, students, suspects, teachers, tenants, union members, veterans, young people, gay people, and women. Much attention is now being given to the rights of children, and just last week a court handed down a decision on the rights of grandparents.

What does all this consideration of rights mean? I think it means that there is a new awareness of the life of the individual, of *all* kinds of individuals. There is a new concern for the individual, for the individual is the channel through which creativity flows into the world.

On the conceptual side, the discussion of rights is voluminous and much too extensive to be treated here. Some problems can be noted: What is a right? Are there any natural or inherent rights? What is the source and justification of rights? Natural rights, inherent rights, civil rights, human rights seem to enter the spectrum of discussion. Robert Nozick, for instance, writes in the preface of his book: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating

their rights)" (1974: ix). The most popular book on this topic is Ronald Dworkin's *Taking Rights Seriously.* He writes: "The constructive portion [of his theory] emphasizes an idea that is also part of the liberal tradition, but that has no place in either legal positivism or utilitarianism. This is the old idea of individual human rights" (Dworkin 1977: vii). These works by Nozick and Dworkin have stirred up much discussion; and there is much controversy over each author's meanings.

Another work that should be cited is that of Alan Gewirth, because he puts forth an innovative view of human rights. He writes: "Human rights are a species of moral rights; they are moral rights which all persons equally have simply because they are human." Gewirth holds that human rights are "entirely or mainly kinds of claim-rights." These, he says, are "in contrast to liberties, powers and immunities." "A claim-right of one person entails a correlative duty of some other person or persons to act or to refrain from acting in ways required for the first person's having that to which he has a right" (Gewirth 1982: 1f.).

Of all the rights being considered at present, one may be of special interest to philosophers of democracy and creativity, especially if one holds that creativity springs from the thoughts and acts of individuals who need privacy in order to be creative. We are only one year away from George Orwell's 1984, which is a frightening look at what invasion of privacy might do to the individual. From the opening line of "Big Brother is watching you" to the closing one of "Big Brother, I love you," there is a sordid ordeal of lost critical-mindedness, lost self-direction, and lost individualism.

The current discussion on the right to privacy indicates the problem of developing conceptual formulations of the problem (Crawford 1968).[8] This is too extensive to cover here. I call attention to the excellent bibliographical essay "Privacy" by Barbara Baum Levenbrook in the *APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law* (1982). Part of her summary of writers on the subject is pertinent to the topic of democracy and creativity. Some hold "that privacy is valuable because it protects self-determination against pressures to conform"; "privacy promotes self-discovery"; "it maintains a sense of self"; "it promotes social relationships in general"; "it avoids mental distress, distortion or injury to self-image"; and one author "identifies a range of goals which privacy serves, including creativity, growth, autonomy, mental health, relaxation, liberty of action, authenticity, and individual dignity."

New Demands for Equality

The United States Declaration of Independence put forth the proposition that all men are created equal. The context of the meaning of equal-

ity here meant political equality of white males; it did not include equality for Blacks and women. The outcome of a bloody civil war brought the abolition of slavery and gave Black males the right to vote. For centuries women protested their disfranchisement, sometimes with classic documents like the Seneca Falls Declaration of 1848; they were given the right to vote in the United States in 1920.

In 1896 the Supreme Court handed down a decision that approved racial segregation under the "separate but equal" doctrine. In this decision, equality of treatment was accorded when the races were provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities were separate. During the next fifty years the plight of the Blacks became an acute problem. The social and economic conditions of Blacks were detailed in a monumental work by Gunnar Myrdal and his associates, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944). These scholars analyzed racial beliefs, documented the economic inequality of Blacks, noted their status and treatment in business, the public economy, and labor unions. They pointed out that Blacks suffered unequal treatment in political organizations, before the courts, and in schools. When the Supreme Court handed down its controversial and now famous decision of the case of *Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,* in 1954, it contained these words: "Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. . . . Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." The judges of the Supreme Court cited Myrdal's work in giving evidence of the inequality of Blacks in American life. The court asked for all deliberate speed in righting this situation.

The next important move in the march for equality was made by Congress with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This act bars employment bias on the grounds of race, sex, religion, or national origin. Executive directives and interpretations by the courts have added refinement to these emerging concepts.

In the drive toward social, economic, educational equality by Blacks, women, Hispanics, and others, many heated controversies have developed. Some new terms have entered the vocabulary: 'affirmative action,' 'equal opportunity,' 'preferential treatment,' and 'reverse discrimination.' The literature on this topic is extensive; I will select some parts that I consider enlightening and helpful in righting the wrongs of past history. Richard Wasserstrom affords one analysis (1983). He claims that much confusion on the thinking about racism and sexism stems from the failure to consider three different perspectives. First, there is the

perspective of what the social realities are at present. I presume that he has in mind factual studies comparable to the early studies of Myrdal. Second, there is the perspective of "the way things ought to be," and I take it that this means that we examine the ideals of our democracy, also comparable to Myrdal's study. Third, this perspective "looks forward to the means by which the ideal may be achieved" (ibid.: 55). Wasserstrom's thesis needs a fuller analysis than I can attempt here; I want to point out, however, that he grapples with the method of achievement that stands between ideals and reality. In this he offers a sensible guide:

> The instrumental perspective is important for our purposes because all affirmative action programs are properly assessed from within this perspective. If the social reality is one of racial and sexual oppression—as I think it is—and if, for example, the most defensible picture of a nonracist, nonsexist society is the one captured by the assimilationist ideal, then the chief (and perhaps only) question to be asked of such programs is whether they are well suited to bring about movement from the existing state of affairs to a closer approximation of the assimilationist ideal. (ibid.: 71)

What is useful about Wasserstrom's approach is that it keeps before society the ideals of equality; it constantly surveys the facts of social existence to see where we are in relation to those ideals; and it allows us to critically analyze the various methods of bringing reality closer to those ideals. Various institutions can set up goals in relation to the ideal of equality, and then seek, either by quotas or by some other system, to move toward the accomplishment of those goals. When institutions do not project goals and do not institute means to goals of equality, then those institutions remain racist, sexist, undemocratic (E. Eames 1982: 10–15).

The demand for equality has provoked a conceptual analysis of the ideal of equality from widely different points of view. Some of the views put forth are absurd. Take, for instance, the title of Antony Flew's book, *The Politics of Procrustes* (1981), which takes off from the ancient notion of Procrustes, who "forced passing travellers to lie down on a bed, and if any were too long for the bed he lopped off those parts of their bodies which protruded, while racking out the legs of the ones who were too short." The subtitle of Flew's book is *Contradictions of Enforced Equality.* I will pass over views that claim that equality means that every individual must be made equal to every other individual in every particular attribute, thus inducing a rigid conformity.

Some current attacks on the notion of equality should be noted. When Arthur Jensen reported that he found lower average IQ's in American Blacks in relation to American Whites, and the contention was made that this inferiority could not be attributed to environmental factors, his

findings were greeted with an uproar. Intelligence tests, it had already been claimed, are constructed by middle-class white academics, and the test items reflect their values; so, tests designed for white middle-class children put Black children, working-class children, Eskimos, West Indians, and others at a disadvantage[9] (Jensen 1980). Another study that aroused controversy is that of Christopher Jencks and his associates, *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* (1972). In this work three prevalent assumptions are questioned and regarded as erroneous. (1) "Eliminating poverty is largely a matter of helping children born into poverty to rise out of it." (2) "The primary reason poor children do not escape from poverty is that they do not acquire basic cognitive skills." (3) "The best mechanism for breaking this vicious circle is educational reform" (ibid.: 7). Jencks believes that inequality, particularly inequality in economic life, can be overcome by other methods; one of these is tax reform.

At the other end of the spectrum on the concept of equality is the view of David Hawkins. He says: "my argument is simply that human beings can, ideally, attain equal levels of educated talent, knowledge, and creativeness in any area of human endeavor" (Hawkins 1977: 111). He goes further in this direction: "What I do not in the least doubt is that in a given milieu and subject to *similar* musical inducements and instructions, we will in fact display talents and develop them, in a very unequal degree. But so likewise, I urge, different kinds of children—different genetically and in human nurture and early choice—become musical along *different* pathways and yet grow to be equal in merit as musicians" (ibid.: 73f.).

The problem of inequality for philosophers of democracy runs through a long history. The feeling of superiority of some humans seems to derive from various conditions of human life; of being born into a group or class with power, or with wealth, or with prestige (Béteille 1969: 15). In his classic work on equality, Tawney wrote: "the truth is that it is absurd and degrading for men to make much of their intellectual and moral superiority to each other, and still more of their superiority in the arts which bring wealth and power, because, judged by their place in any universal scheme, they are infinitely great or all infinitely small." He goes on to say that it does not follow from the fact that some men are inferior to others in respect of their intellectual endowments "that such individuals or classes should receive less considerations than others, or should be treated as inferior in respect of such matters as legal status, or health, or economic arrangements, which are within the control of the community" (Tawney 1931: 37, 39).

The new demands for equality of Blacks, women, Hispanics, and others are not likely to be deterred by the writings of Jensen, Flew, and

Jencks; these new demands are likely to grow with a guidance toward an ideal of democracy and creativity that Tawney envisioned. I hold that there has developed an interpretation and criticism of democracy that is related to the foregoing discussion. It is the challenge of elitism.

Challenges: Elitism

Criticisms of democracy appeared almost immediately with its conception. From antiquity to the present, the general idea of democracy and almost all, if not all, of the concepts affiliated with it have been under attack.[10] The most recurrent criticisms have run thus: Democracy means the rule of the average human being who is unintelligent, ruled more by passions and impulses and emotions than by reason. The average person is suspicious of the superior ability of others, is unfriendly to, and unappreciative of, scientific and artistic progress. Democracy gives power to those who are tradition-loving, custom-bound, and habit-bound; thus democracy is the enemy of real liberty and freedom. The average person lacks leisure in order to acquire information on issues even if he or she were intelligent enough to make decisions. Some social psychologists have claimed that democracy appeals to the lowest common denominator of intelligence and is close to the mob mind (Le Bon 1952).

The foregoing criticisms are based upon a view that has come to be called "elitism." The meaning of the term seems to have been transferred from a designation of excellence in certain commodities to that of superiority of certain social groups, such as military units and the nobility (Bottomore 1965: 7). In current discussion many of the concepts of elitism stem from the writings of Vilfredo Pareto. First, he claimed that in every branch of human activity people could be ranked on a scale of capacities—the most successful, according to his selected criteria, put at the top and the least successful put at the bottom. Those who have the highest ranking on the scale will be given "the name of 'elite'" (ibid). Pareto shifted his meaning in another work; there he is concerned with the simple opposition of those who have power and those who have none. This designation came to be "the governing elite" and the "masses" (ibid.: 8).

The concept of the rulers and the ruled was carried further by Robert Michels, who maintains that the average person is indifferent to the rule of democracy; political bosses and the political parties are allowed to rule. He writes: "The majority of human beings, in a condition of eternal tutelage, are predestined by tragic necessity to submit to the domination of a small minority and must be content to constitute the pedestal of an oligarchy" (Michels 1915: 329). Elitism, according to Jack Lively, can be summed up: "All organizations, no matter what their

formal structure, will be dominated by small elites. Even those most openly dedicated to democratic principles are subject to what Michels called the 'iron law of oligarchy', under which the leadership of organizations is bound to escape any forms of real control from below" (1975: 6).

Joseph Schumpeter attacks classical democracy on the vagueness of certain concepts. First, he says that classical democracy assumes that there exists a common good; but there is "no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument" (Schumpeter 1942: 251). Second, "even if a sufficiently definite common good . . . proved acceptable to all, this would not imply equally definite answers to individual issues." (Health might be desired by all, yet people would still disagree on vaccination and vasectomy.) (ibid.: 252). Third, "as a consequence of both preceding propositions, the particular concept of the will of the people . . . vanishes into thin air."

Schumpeter offers his own theory of democracy. He thinks that classical democracy has been wrong in the view that the people decide every individual question and choose representatives to see that their opinions are carried out. He wants to reverse this procedure; he wants the politicians to work up opinions on some social and political issue, present their views, and compete with one another for the electoral vote. Schumpeter thinks that he is modeling his view of democracy upon the parliamentary system. He claims that his theory leaves room for the vital meaning of leadership; the political leader takes the problems of a people, say unemployment, and works it up into a viable political offering; this view means a competition for the free vote, since the primary purpose of the elector's vote is to produce a government, by the same elector's vote the government can be dissolved. Thus, the ultimate power is in the hands of the people, but the decision-making functions are in the hands of a minority leadership.

The concept of elitism runs counter to egalitarian democracy in many ways. In the first place, elitism is based upon the inequality of individual endowment, whereas egalitarian democracy has emphasized the underlying equality of all individuals. With all our idiosyncratic differences, there are similarities of our physical, emotional, and intellectual needs. If this were not so, then we would have no science of health, nutrition, psychology, or education. In the second place, whatever the individual characteristics we select to differentiate one human being from another, the social distinctions are usually based on other criteria. Inequalities in society are products of social, economic, and political causes and have nothing to do with excellence in other matters. In the third place, granted the issue of inequality and equality cannot be resolved, then the matter

becomes a moral and a valuational one. This is the position taken in the first part of this paper.

Egalitarian democracy involves "a working faith in the possibilities of human nature." These remarks by John Dewey are to the point: "That belief is without basis and significance save as it means faith in the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human being irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and family, of material or cultural wealth." Again: "The democratic faith in human equality is belief that every human being, independent of the quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has." Leadership, for Dewey, is universal; it means "the capacity of every person to lead his own life free from coercion and imposition by others" (Dewey 1940: 223f.; LW 14: 226f.).

Sometimes it is argued that the elitist position is necessary to ensure "creativity." When Arnold Toynbee speaks of a "creative minority," some question arises concerning his meaning. I do not think that his concept can be taken to be that of upholding an elitist concept; he seems to be saying that creativity is found in a plurality of individuals, not in any class or elite. What he actually says is: "In all acts of social creation the creators are either creative individuals or, at most, creative minorities" (Toynbee 1934, vol. 3: 239). Whatever Toynbee means by the term, I think it can be shown that intellectual and artistic creativity, and other kinds as well, depend upon creative interchange between the creative individuals and the society in which they live. Creative individuals come from all walks of life, from all classes of various societies. Furthermore, the argument that societies need elite classes or families to preserve "high culture" (whatever T. S. Eliot meant by that) and to transfer this culture to new generations no longer conforms to social fact. All culture is transmitted today through the schools, through books, journals, audio and visual media, and thus all people have access to the creations of high culture through public art museums and public libraries. An egalitarian culture opens the way for more creativity to more individuals, to be shared with more people (Miller 1967).

Challenges: Bureaucracy

Large, complex organizations, governmental, economic, educational, and religious have developed a social phenomenon called "bureaucracy." Max Weber thinks that individuals performing certain functions, namely, administrative functions, in large institutions constitute a new class in modern society (Weber 1947). C. Wright Mills, in his influential book, *The Power Elite,* writes:

> The bureaucratic career, properly defined, does not mean merely a climb up, from one level to the next, of a hierarchy of offices. It does involve this, but more importantly, it means the setting up of strict and unilateral qualifications for each office occupied. Usually these qualifications involve both specified formal training and qualifying examinations. (Mills 1956: 133)

Thus, there emerges the dictatorship of the so-called expert, who confronts inferiors in the hierarchy of a social organization with power, who also operates behind administrative rules that are sometimes self-created, who covers the application of the rules with a cloak of secrecy, and who protects the administrative slot and function played in it. Weber saw this development having dire effects upon the individual—the loss of individual freedom and the regimentation of social life. Almost all critics see the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of controlling a bureaucracy by a democratic system.

There are some who claim that bureaucracy has grown out of the necessity of the division of labor in modern industrial society. Even Marx saw that this is a critical problem of the economic organization of productive life. He writes: "As soon as labor is distributed, each person has a particular, exclusive area of activity, which is imposed upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and he must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood" (Marx 1967: 424). The division of labor led more and more to the fragmentation of work, to monotony, regimentation, boredom, and loss of creativity. Dewey refers to changes of this kind on the part of the public and control on the part of a new "oligarchy."

> Industry and inventions in technology . . . create means which alter the modes of associated behavior and which radically change the quantity, character and place of impact of their indirect consequences. . . . The new public which is generated remains long inchoate, unorganized, because it cannot use inherited political agencies. The latter, if elaborate and well institutionalized, obstruct the organization of the new public. (PP: 30f.; LW 2: 254f.)
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> . . . . . .
>
> The oligarchy which now dominates is that of an economic class. It claims to rule . . . in virtue of ability in management and of the burden of social responsibilities which it carries, in virtue of the position which superior abilities have conferred upon it. (PP: 203f.; LW 2: 362)

The democratic response to bureaucracy in social and political organizations has come from various sources and with alternative programs. One of these has been the attack on largeness itself, and these social critics urge a return to smaller and more manageable social organiza-

tional life. "What is the meaning of democracy, freedom, human dignity, standard of living, self-realization, fulfillment? Is it a matter of goods, or of people? Of course it is a matter of people. But people can be themselves only in small comprehensible groups." So writes E. F. Schumacher in *Small Is Beautiful* (1973: 75). For some this position is not an ideology; it is an age-old way of life; it is a reminder of Rousseau's third stage of nature in which the village life is the norm. Theodore Roszak gives his approval to this philosophy when be says: "small is free, efficient, creative, enjoyable, and enduring" (ibid.: 4). In a following companion to *Small Is Beautiful,* George McRobie has written *Small Is Possible* (1981). This study is comprehensive and descriptive of how attempts to reorganize groups here and abroad actually work.

Weber claims that bureaucracy grows because of the functions of so-called experts in modern social life. The function of the expert is now being called into question; note the movement in regard to health and medicine to obtaining a second opinion. A very disturbing book has appeared on the expert's treatment of women in health care, *For Her Own Good* (Ehrenreich and English 1978), that exposes some of the practices of the experts over the years. No doubt the relation of the expert to the nonexpert is a problem in modern society, but if the expert has become shut off from an adequate knowledge of the needs of the people or the groups that he or she is to serve, unless there is continual consultation and widespread discussion designed to uncover needs and difficulties, the expert fails to be educated in a most important area. The so-called expert does not have the advantage of being a sharer of the common interests of the group that he or she is to serve. Instead, this person becomes a member of a class with private knowledge and private interests. In the area of political life, Dewey writes:

> No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few. And the enlightenment must proceed in ways which force the administrative specialists to take account of the needs. The world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses. (PP: 208; LW 2: 365)

I shall indicate some other ways of dealing with bureaucracy in the topic that follows.

Challenges: Cultural Pluralism

Some observers of American life refer to our nation as a pluralistic culture. (Here I am not speaking of political pluralism.)[11] Terms like 'cultural pluralism', 'a pluralistic society', and 'multicultural nation' are

not easy to define. Ordinarily we mean that our nation has within its larger social organization a variety of cultures based upon national origin (Irish, Polish, Italian, and so forth), religious beliefs (Jewish, Islamic, Christian—Catholic and Protestants, Buddhist, and so on), and community lifestyles (Amish, Quakers, and others). Add to this list Hispanics, Blacks, and Native Americans, and the picture is enlarged. Some sociologists want to include in this classification various economic groupings.

At one time in American history, it was thought that all the various cultures would melt into one homogeneous group, become one culture, and live happily ever after. But Michael Novak, in his book *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnic,* has shown that this concept did not take hold (Novak 1972). Of course there has been an acculturation process at work to a degree; this has grown out of the interactions of these different groups with one another, but the cultural facts of existence belie the dream; in fact, there is a steady interest in the opposite direction, that of attempting to preserve the "culture" of each group. Often the search for that cultural differentiation becomes the basis for personal identity (Hertzberg 1971).

One of the most significant positions taken on cultural pluralism is that of the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, which says:

> Multicultural education is education which values cultural pluralism. Multicultural education rejects the view that schools should seek to melt away cultural differences or the view that schools should merely tolerate cultural pluralism. Instead, multicultural education affirms that schools should be oriented toward the cultural enrichment of all children and youth through programs rooted to the preservation and extension of cultural alternatives. . . . To endorse cultural pluralism is to endorse the principle that there is no one model American. (American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education 1973: 264–65)

The adjustment required of the schools to this position varies in different states and school districts across the country. California, for instance, "requires that every school district must provide its professional staff with sixty to ninety hours of training in the history, culture, and the current problems of ethnic groups in the district, if they number twenty-five percent or more of the school population" (Stickel 1978).[12] In 1974 the California Supreme Court held "that special language programs must be provided by districts of children that speak little or no English."

The problems generated by cultural pluralism within the wider organization of a democracy have been present for a long time in American history. The problem concerns how much cultural autonomy should be allowed. If the problem concerns only freedom to worship, then gen-

erally no conflict arises. But with the emergence of hundreds of religious cults in recent years, some concern is voiced over the treatment of individuals within those groups. The varieties of ethnic foods and restaurants in the country is often mentioned with pride; but these foods must be inspected and pass scientific tests for healthful consumption. Ethnic dress, dances, ceremonies, holiday celebrations add to the richness of the comprehensive culture.

Difficulties arise in other matters where the ethnic values and practices run into the values of a democratic morality. If the Amish do not believe in education, or at least little education, for their children, then a conflict arises when democratic values affirm that an opportunity to education is a natural right. If some Jehovah's Witnesses refuse to have themselves and their children vaccinated against contagious diseases, then this practice runs counter to values founded upon scientific determination. Perhaps the greatest problem for democracy and cultural autonomy is found in relation to the Native Americans. There is a rising tide of red power with demands "for self-determination: the right of Indians to decide programs and policies for themselves, to manage their own affairs, to govern themselves, and to control their land and its resources" (Josephy 1968: 17).[13] One of the problems of the relation of the Native Americans to the wider organizational culture is found in the use of peyote in religious ceremonies. To what extent does the larger culture permit cultural autonomy in this case?

There has evolved a universal concept of the rights of the individual, and this philosophy can be used to relate democratic values to cultural pluralism. If the declaration of the rights put forth by the United Nations is taken as a kind of democratic framework in which these problems can be settled, we might have an answer. For instance, in respect to the rights of an individual, no ethnic group has a right to abuse their children simply on the grounds that it is an ethnic custom; and the same principle can be applied to all other matters in which there is a conflict between democratic values and ethnic practices.

New Vistas: The Reach Toward Omniscience

A few centuries ago only a few people on the face of the earth could read and write. Literacy is still a problem in many parts of the world, but some observations about the communications revolution are pertinent to what I call "New Vistas of Democracy," put forth in the spirit of Walt Whitman. The printing press opened doors to new experiences for millions of people. The spread of knowledge and other forms of culture through low-cost books expanded the experience, the knowledge, and the feelings of millions and millions of humans. Recent developments in communications have brought the world to our living rooms. We see

more, hear more, understand more, feel more, can sympathize more than ever before in history. This is a new reach toward omniscience. Omniscience in some ways carries a heavy burden. Edna St. Vincent Millay in one of her poems imagines what it means to have so much knowledge and experience, so much feeling. All suffering in the world was hers:

> A man was starving in Capri,
> He moved his eyes and looked at me.

Today through the new media we can see and feel the pain of those who suffer in India from a disastrous flood, of those in Colombia who suffer from a tremendous earthquake, of those in Africa who die from starvation. Knowing, feeling, and caring are the prerequisites of compassionate action.

What does the revolution in communication mean for democracy? It means that large groups of people can have more interaction, more creative interchange, more knowledge and concern for each other. We can see and bear our legislators and congressional representatives as if we were sitting in the galleries or in the committee rooms. Before long we can register a vote on any issue immediately and from our own living rooms. This is a promise of direct democracy that Rousseau thought impossible. Of course, these new media can be turned into means of dishonest propaganda; the advance of reading and writing did not prevent that. But we have democratic safeguards that can be used to protect the values of democracy.

New Vistas: The Rise of Public Interest Groups

One of the most significant developments in American life in recent years is the growth of groups interested in the public welfare. Leaving aside the debate over the meanings of the terms 'public interest' and 'common good', we can move on to note that many groups made up of informed and concerned people have organized and become a major educational influence. These groups conduct reliable scientific studies, disseminate this knowledge through all media to a large citizenry, and take moral positions when the consequences are vital to human life. The older public service groups are well known; the American Civil Liberties Union gathers information, publishes, and takes an active part in protecting individuals and groups in their civil rights. The *Consumer Reports* publication has had a long and influential part in analyzing products from every angle, of quality and of harm to users. Common Cause has become a power in transforming and reforming our democracy. Its list is long in accomplishments: open-meetings laws or sunshine laws, disclosure laws for politicians, political action committees and their operations, and so on. The Union of Concerned Scientists has alerted us to the dangers of nuclear

developments; Amnesty International sensitizes us to the treatment of political prisoners around the world. When governmental agencies that are supposed to protect the public interest fail us, then these concerned citizens as individual scholars and as groups become the source and vanguard of the informed conscience of our democracy.

New Vistas: Workplace Democracy

In the last decade or so there have been experiments in what is called 'Workplace Democracy'. The Association for Self-Management was founded in 1974 in the United States. (Self-management schemes have sprouted here and there around the world from time to time; perhaps the most extensive development that bears watching is the experiment in Yugoslavia.) The Constitution of the U.S. group says that it is "an open, democratic association for the study of self-management and the enhancement and development of self-management and organizational democracy" (Zwerdling 1980: xi).[14] These people are dedicated to the humanization of work, to the establishment of worker-owned companies, and to worker self-management. They advocate regular participation in decision making and profit sharing, and espouse guaranteed civil rights corresponding to civil liberties; they have worked out grievance procedures for individuals involved in the work processes with independent boards of appeals composed of peers. In one chapter they cite the working paper of a department in a large university which is an attempt to democratize the administrative bureaucracy.

The foregoing treatment of democracy has omitted two important topics: the new reach of freedom as found in the Freedom of Information Act, and the new views of representation as found in the reapportionment revolution in the United States.

This survey of democratic concepts, broadly conceived and often asserted without argument, points up the fact that democracy is a cluster of concepts, as I said in the beginning. By now it may be obvious that democracy is a hodgepodge of vague generalizations, of half-developed ideas, of scattered and often unrelated historical practices. Democracy has grown out of responses to oppression, exploitation, alienation, and revolution. Democracy in America has grown up like Topsy; it just grew. This is why Dewey says that democracy has causes but not reasons for its existence. By this statement he means that there has been no guiding idea or ideal throughout its historical life; democracy lacks an idea or ideal that is intellectually conceived and philosophically grounded to make it secure.

Perhaps with the help of what history gives us in the way of democratic notions and with the aid of Dewey's philosophy we can formu-

late two ideals for the guidance of the future of creative democracy. First, the philosophical ideal might be stated this way: Every institution should be designed to serve and service the community; the community should share in determining the policies of any institution; the community should choose those who are to execute the policies. This ideal can remain more or less constant while specific methods of democracy change. For instance, majority rule could be replaced with consensus methods without betraying the ideal. Second, the moral ideal is related to a morality of democracy. We put forth the idea that the ethical justification of democracy is found in the quality of life that it produces in individuals. We can formulate some questions to ask of every policy and practice: What effects will this proposal have upon the individual? Will perceptions be made more attentive and alive or will perceptions be dulled and blunted? Will memories be made more apt, will they feed the present and enrich it, or will memories be made experiences from which to escape? Will imagination be made more suggestive and fruitful, or will imagination be diverted into daydreams? Will thought be made more creative, or will thought be channeled into pedantic bypaths? These questions will help make us aware and sensitive to the consequences of our policies, practices, and acts upon individuals. This is the beginning of a democratic morality. Dewey once wrote: "We have advanced far enough to say that democracy is a way of life. We have yet to realize that it is a way of personal life and one which provides a moral standard for personal conduct" (FC: 130; LW 13: 155).

For these reasons, and many more, I believe that democracy is the world's best hope for creativity.

Notes

1. Abraham Lincoln, "Gettysburg Address." There is some question of whether the words "of the people, by the people, for the people" appeared in the address as actually delivered in Gettysburg; they may have been added later when Lincoln edited the final version.

2. Recent works on democracy as a general idea I have found most helpful are: Dorothy Pickles, *Democracy* (1972); Jack Lively, *Democracy* (1975); Harold J. Laski, *Liberty in the Modern State* (1949); Henry S. Kariel, *Frontiers of Democratic Theory* (1970); Carl Cohen, *Democracy* (1973); J. Roland Pennock, *Democratic Political Theory* (1979); Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956); Benedetto Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty* (1941); Carl Becker, *Modern Democracy* (1941); James Bryce, *Modern Democracies,* 2 vols. (1921); A. D. Lindsay, *Essentials of Democracy* (1929); Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amerique* (1835–1840); W. E. H. Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty,* 2 vols. (1899); A. D. Lindsay, *The Modern Democratic State* (1962). Other works will be cited as needed in special topics of democracy.

3. This concept of creativity is developed in my essay, "Meaning, Value, and Creativity in Dewey and Wieman," in *Creative Interchange* (Eames 1982: 208–31).

4. For a comprehensive historical treatment of creativity, see Albert Rothenberg and Carl R. Hausman, editors, *The Creativity Question,* (1976). See also Denis Dutton and Michael Krausz, *The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art* (1981). The many papers read to the Society for Philosophy of Creativity are now housed in the special collections of Morris Library, Southern Illinois University Carbondale; this is a rich resource on the concept of creativity.

5. The anthropologist Alexander A. Goldenweiser holds that invention is a discovery of a new way to an end; that is, the invention of the wooden match is a new means to an end. He holds that an invention to be creative, however, must have some practicality to its use (Goldenweiser 1922).

6. John M. Warbeke in *The Power of Art* (1951) emphasizes the importance of the social and cultural context as providing conditions for the flowering of the arts.

7. This is reprinted in George L. Abernethy, *The Idea of Equality* (1959), 311–15.

8. See also Edward V. Long, *The Intruders* (1967). This book summarizes the findings of the Senate subcommittee investigation into privacy invasion and ends with concrete recommendations for broadening the legal protection of privacy. See also *Nomos XIII* (Pennock and Chapman 1971).

9. For a critique of educational tests, see *The Rights of Students: The Basic ACLU Guide to a Student's Rights* (1973), 89–90. A judge in a court decision concerning tracking based on such tests termed them "unconstitutionally discriminatory" and said: "Because these tests are standardized on and are relevant to a white middle-class group of students, they produce inaccurate and misleading test scores when given to lower class and Negro students. As a result, rather than being classified according to ability to learn, these students are in reality being classified according to their socioeconomic or racial status, or—more precisely—according to environmental and psychological factors which have nothing to do with innate ability."

10. As in the writings of Herodotus, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Plato in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.; Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century; Algernon Sidney in the seventeenth century; Edmund Burke in the eighteenth century; Ernest Renan in the nineteenth century.

11. Political pluralism has come to have a special meaning to political scientists; various interest groups organized politically is one meaning. In this arrangement Robert A. Dahl, in *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956), speaks of a majority of minorities.

12. See chapter 2, "Review of Literature."

13. See also Stan Steiner, *The New Indians* (1967).

14. See also Ronald Mason, *Participatory and Workplace Democracy* (1982).

Part Five

Religion

11

The Lost Individual and Religious Unity

It is strange that a philosopher who makes all inquiry, all thinking, all reconstruction begin with a "problematic situation," with an "indeterminacy," with a "felt perplexity," should have had many aspects of his philosophy overlooked even by his most devoted followers and students. John Dewey's analyses of the whole range of problems confronted by modern humanity starts on a note of pessimism, of despair, of confusion, of obscurity, of conflict. Situations are "confused" when their "outcome cannot be anticipated"; they are "obscure" when their "course of movement permits of final consequences that cannot be clearly made out"; they are "conflicting" when they tend "to evoke discordant responses" (Logic: 106; LW 12: 109). When a whole range of problems, perplexities, and puzzlements are brought under broad treatment, one finds Dewey talking about our "sick world." He says:

> The world has always been more or less a sick world. The isles of harmony and health with which we dot the map of human history are largely constructions of the imagination, cities of refuge against present ills, resorts for solace in troubles now endured. But it may be doubted if the consciousness of sickness was ever so widespread as it is today. Our optimism of the cheery word, of sunshine and prosperity is a little too assertive; the lady protests too much. Our recourse to enjoyment is a little too fevered and noisy. They both testify to the pervasive and overhanging consciousness of disease. (CE: 760f.; MW 15: 42f.)

Modern humanity's predicament is described in Dewey's own words with the following terms: life is "bewildered," "chaotic," "insecure," "fearful"; it is filled with "unrest," "impatience," "irritation," "hurry," "feverish love," "meaninglessness," "apathy"; it has elements of the

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"sick," the "groping," the "distracted," the "divided" (ION: 35–73; LW 5: 58–76).

Naturalistic realism is basic in Dewey's philosophy. By 'naturalistic realism' is meant a philosophy that starts with an "existential situation," one in which "real," "objective" problems are present. It is one that makes "discontinuities" an essential part of a metaphysics of experience. The passages in which Dewey's accounts of the disordered qualities of human experience are contained stretch across many decades, and occur in peace and war, depression and prosperity. In his Gifford lectures (which became *The Quest for Certainty*), he starts with an analysis of the "perilous" in experience and the escape from it; again, in his Carus lectures (which became *Experience and Nature*), he designates part of experience as being "precarious." These lectures show that "the world of empirical things includes the uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and hazardous" (EN: 42; LW 1: 43); that "the pathos of unfulfilled expectation, the tragedy of defeated purpose and ideals, the catastrophes of accident" (QC: 7; LW 4: 6) are always with us. This analysis of the human situation fits in with a reported conversation with Dewey immediately prior to his death; to a query as to what he thought of the condition of the world, he replied that he thought it was in a "sorry mess." Dewey thought that the perilous and the precarious side of experience had been so little described by philosophers in the past, in their concern to construct a world of being, permanence, perfection, and eternality, that it is necessary to call attention to the real disharmonies, the real perplexities, the real evils that punctuate experience at almost every turn. In fact, Dewey thought that it would be possible to dispense with the term 'experience' when all that is designated by that term is incorporated into empirical method (EN: 2f.; LW 1: 14).

This precarious and perilous, this disturbing and perplexing condition of modern humanity's life seems to me to be the proper starting place for an analysis of Dewey's view of the religious aspect of experience. For, at the opposite pole from our confusions, conflicts, perplexities is the goal of religious unity, of situations synthesized into a kind of harmony and balance. But the starting place must be with the existential situations in which we are caught. It is here that Dewey's analyses of modern humanity's predicament are most perceptive; it is here that he shares much with contemporary existentialists. The interpretation of Dewey's thought that follows is an attempt to describe some of the perplexities that we suffer and undergo, and to show how distant is the vision of a unified life.

Some years before Karl Marx's essay "Alienated Labor" was rediscovered, and some years before Erich Fromm popularized the notion of ancient and modern humanity's idolatry brought about by alienation of

the work of his hands,[1] John Dewey wrote a very penetrating analysis of the "lost" individual (ION: 51–73; LW 5: 66–76). Much of this work has been overlooked. As a result, the image that many people have of John Dewey is that he is a man who believes in inevitable progress, who has unbounded faith in human intelligence, who is committed to the advance of the common man, who believes in the miraculous opportunities of a new heaven upon an old earth through some kind of reconstruction. It is unfortunate that Dewey's naturalistic realism has gone unheeded, for it is problem oriented, and the picture he paints of modern humanity's predicament in its economic, artistic, intellectual, moral, and political life is of a life that is so fragmented, so disordered and lacking in unity, so deeply tragic that he describes the contemporary period as one of the most disturbed ages in human history. The statement of a problem vividly and precisely is the first and most important step toward solving it; and this is where Dewey's analysis is significant.

Let us start with Dewey's analysis of the "lost individual," which seems to be the polar opposite of that religious unity that is the goal of human endeavor. In the first place, we live in a mechanistic and corporate society that we did not plan and that pushes us about with a kind of tragic unconcern for anything meaningful and unified. Even those who are thought to be in power and control of these corporate associations really are not; or, as Dewey puts it, "it may be held . . . that those outwardly in control are in reality as much carried by forces external to themselves as are the many; that in fact these forces impel them into a common mold to such an extent that individuality is suppressed" (ION: 51f.; LW 5: 66). Note that phrases such as "outwardly in control," "forces external to themselves," and "a common mold," along with "individuality is suppressed," appear in this analysis, phrases that indicate Dewey's sensitivity to humanity's troubles of this kind long before the writings of David Reisman, William Whyte, and C. Wright Mills appeared. The business corporation is both a cause and a symbol, says Dewey, "of the tendency to combination in all phases of life" (ION: 36; LW 5: 58).

Impersonal forces mold and shape the life of modern humanity to the extent that personal motives hardly count at all. The movement toward a corporate society has forces too vast and complex to turn back. We now have a "mental and moral corporateness for which history affords no parallel." Amusements, sports, colleges, theatres, radio, newspapers, and even crime are organized; all make for "a common and aggregate mental and emotional life." Dewey calls this condition "mental collectivism," a collectivism that is created by "massed methods." He thinks that modern humanity is subjected to "the greatest flood of mass suggestion that any people has ever experienced." There has been an "invasion and decline of privacy," and "private rights" have almost ceased

to have a definable meaning. "United action" and the "supposed need of integrated opinion and sentiment" are created by propaganda and advertising. We live in a society where "sentiment can be manufactured by mass methods for almost any person or any cause" and "the publicity agent is perhaps the most significant symbol of our present social life" (ION: 41ff.; LW 5: 61f.).

This social condition of the corporate society and of mental collectivism has created certain types of persons at the top and at the bottom of the industrial ladder. At the top is the executive type, who acts mostly under the determination of the corporate situation. His ethic is that of "success, putting things over, getting things done." He gives conspicuous tribute to all established institutions as "guardians of ideal interests"; he denounces "all who defy conventionalized ideals" (HNC: 6; MW 14: 7). Of course these established institutions and conventionalized ideals are for other people, not for himself. He thinks of himself as being above these ordinary and customary things; but he needs these elements in order to control the dupes he manages. The executive type is a captain of motivational behavior; he knows how to appeal to one person with rewards, to another with money, to another with sentiment; he capitalizes on anything and everything to get his job done. He is a man of expediency, and Dewey describes expediency as selecting narrow consequences of one's actions rather than broad and enduring ones; but the executive type knows that all is forgiven of him who succeeds. The executive type is the supreme hypocrite of our society, for he combines in his same person an "intensely executive nature" and "a love of popular approval by conventional morality" (ibid.). Nevertheless, the executive-type man is lost in the corporate life in which he lives and moves about because he acts from causes and not from deliberate reasons; he is submerged in the customary and habitual responses of his group. He is an organization man, who has been conditioned to behave according to the pattern of the executive type; certain responses are expected of him and he automatically fulfills them.

At the other end of the industrial corporate society are the workers. They are shaped by a corporate condition brought about by the machine. They operate the machine, but they do not understand it, and they do not control it. That is, they do not share in determining the ends to which the machines are put, and this creates their indifference to them. Apart from their interest in their wages, they do not care. They operate an instrument, a means, cut off from the ends, and the alienation of means from ends affects their whole attitude. Dewey's observation about the modern worker in a corporate society is summed up: "Highly mechanized activity tends as Emerson said to turn men into spiders and needles" (HNC: 144; MW 14: 100).

It is obvious that the artisan has become more of a mechanic and less of an artist in modern society. Those who remain and still call themselves "artists" turn in either of two directions: they join organized business or they "are pushed out to the edge as eccentric bohemians." Dewey thinks that "the status of the artist in any form of social life affords a fair measure of the state of its culture." But the artist is cut off, is alienated, has an "inorganic" position in American life and is "convincing evidence of what happens to the isolated individual who lives in a society growing corporate" (ION: 40f.; LW 5: 60f.).

In his major work on art, Dewey starts by showing how difficult it is under present conditions to develop a theory of art because the very existence of art objects as held in our culture is an obstacle to any intelligent theory. By this he means that works of art are not integral to the life of our people; they are things apart, external and physical, often without meaning. Art exists in a separate realm cut off and alienated from the rest of life. A work of art is integral when it is an expression of our life; it is a fusion of thought and emotion; it is a product in which the people have some stake in creating and in enjoying, in which they find satisfaction. It should be noted here that Dewey thinks that the act of expression is one of the most difficult to achieve, and what he designates by this term is far more complex, far deeper and broader in meaning than those simple views of expression that have become current in emotive theories of ethics and art. When art objects are cut off from the thoughts and feelings of a people, then there is an aesthetic vacuum left in life. To fill this aesthetic vacuum, of course, we have collected art objects; we own them like stocks and bonds, but we do not possess them, or rather they do not possess us. As Dewey says, "When, because of their remoteness, the objects acknowledged by the cultivated to be works of fine art seem anemic to the mass of people, aesthetic hunger is likely to seek the cheap and the vulgar" (AE: 6; LW 10: 12).

When we turn to the intellectual and moral aspects of modern life, we find Dewey making the significant statement that "the loyalties which once held individuals, which gave them support, direction and unity of outlook on life, have well-nigh disappeared." And he goes on to claim: "It would be difficult to find in history an epoch as lacking in solid and assured objects of belief and approved ends of action as is the present." The intellectual confusion that Dewey sees is one in which "Individuals vibrate between a past that is intellectually too empty to give stability and a present that is too diversely crowded and chaotic to afford balance or direction to ideas and emotion" (ION: 52f.; LW 5: 66f.).

In 1946 Dewey wrote a sharp criticism of a report of a committee of the American Philosophical Association, a report concerned, among other things, with "the present state of philosophy and the role philoso-

phy might play in the postwar world." Dewey's response to this report is one of the touchstones of my present analysis, and I wish to call attention to two significant themes in his criticism of the views put forth by the committee. First, the report left out the entire supernaturalist account of the interpretation of experience, and this very fact in itself seems an admission of the cleavage in our intellectual life. Second, the report clung largely, but not exclusively, "to the view that the primary aim of philosophy is knowledge of Being or 'Reality' which is more comprehensive, fundamental and ultimate than the knowledge which can be provided by the organs and methods at the disposal of the 'special' sciences" (PM: 5; LW 15: 156). The real split in the intellectual phase of our culture, however, might place both supernaturalists and the philosophers who seek a reality lying behind or beneath or above the objects of scientific inquiry on the one side of a great divide, and philosophers who hold some kind of naturalism on the other. Dewey quotes with approval Matthew Arnold to show the predicament of modern humanity's intellectual confusion; humanity is pictured as

> Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
> The other powerless to be born.

What brought about this uncertain condition in our intellectual life? Why do we not know what we believe? Why do we not know what ends of action to approve?

The story of the disintegration of traditional beliefs is a long one, and I wish to confine myself briefly to two concepts here. Intellectually, I think it can be shown that Occam's razor has cut away gradually beliefs in a "substance metaphysics," or, at least, the metaphysics that starts with "being" as a primary concept. At one time, and this by no means indicates that the same beliefs are not current, the belief in a concept of a substantial being gave people something to hold on to; it was permanent, unchanging, eternal, indestructible. Since the days of David Hume, perhaps before that, it has been difficult for some intellectuals, at least, to believe in the old idea of substantial being or of substance. Objects in experience have taken on a different interpretation; they are "events with meanings," or they are "qualities" that have "relations" with other "qualities." Without laboring the argument, it can be shown that the shift in interpretation of experience from being and substantial entities as primary concepts had profound implications for any concept of a soul or mind or spirit.

A second intellectual revolution that has affected modern beliefs is the elimination of final ends or purposes from nature and from human life (TV: 2; LW 13: 192). There has been a strong and pervasive belief since the time of Aristotle, at least, that nature does nothing in vain and

that the forms or species of nature are fixed and unchanging. The theoretical revolution that brought the ends of nature and of human life most clearly into question was Darwin's view of evolution. For Darwin showed that nature does many things in vain, that the forms or species of nature do change, and that there is no special end or destiny that can be given to the human species in the natural scheme of things. The havoc that this theory brought into theory of value and of valuings has not yet been analyzed in all its extensive consequences. On one side, at least, confusion in moral theory stems from the belief in "a single, final and ultimate" good or law for all people (RP: 162; MW 12: 172), for this conception is inconsistent with other views of nature and experience. On the side of practice, new occasions have appeared that the old principles will not fit. Dewey says:

> In countless ways the customary loyalties that once held men together and made them aware of their reciprocal obligations have been sapped. Since the change is due to alteration of conditions, the new forms of lawlessness and the light and loose way in which duties are held cannot be met by direct and general appeal to a sense of duty or the restraint of an inner law. (Dewey and Tufts 1932: 256; LW 7: 234)

The intimate ties and responses of certain days of the past are gone with the wind. Today new occasions have not taught new duties. An industrial and mobile population has torn the old ties asunder. Worker is alienated from employer; producer is alienated from consumer; home is alienated from factory. The center of gravity in social life has shifted and there is a moral vacuum that results.

The chaos created in our beliefs by these intellectual and moral changes is a fact. One thing seems certain: some intellectuals, at least, who have thought through the scientific and philosophical developments of the past few hundred years, and who have seen the implications of an emerging world in which humanity's and nature's destinies cannot be discerned, have reached a point of no return. People today may not know where they are going as far as ends and goals and purposes are concerned. Some may wish in moments of black despair that they could return to the bygone ages, when all objects of belief were secure and all goals and purposes were well defined—but intellectually and emotionally, they cannot go back. They cannot go forward either, for they do not know what to believe and they have no value scheme to guide them. In this respect, many intellectuals in modern times are intellectually and morally lost.

The foregoing statement brings me to the observation that Dewey makes about the so-called "liberalism" of our times, and while he is

speaking of liberalism in politics, I think the concept might be stretched to apply to other areas of experience. He says:

> The lack of secure objects of allegiance, without which individuals are lost, is especially striking in the case of the liberal. The liberalism of the past was characterized by the possession of a definite intellectual creed and program; that was its distinction from conservative parties which needed no formulated outlook beyond defense of things as they were. In contrast, liberals operated on the basis of a thought-out social philosophy, a theory of politics sufficiently definite and coherent to be easily translated into a program of policies to be pursued. Liberalism today is hardly more than a temper of mind, vaguely called forward-looking, but quite uncertain as to where to look and what to look forward to. (ION: 60; LW 5: 70)

On the political side of experience, Dewey is skeptical of the importance of so-called democratic forms and outward expressions, such as the right to vote, majority rule, universal suffrage, frequent elections, secret ballot, and representation. A culture may have all these forms written into its political life and yet not have what Dewey calls the "democratic method" and the "democratic ideal." As he sees it, democracy in the West has been mostly a matter of accident; that is, it has *causes* for it, but it lacks *reasons;* it is unplanned, nondeliberate, nonrational. Democracy has grown up with the corporate society; it is a necessary adjunct to the largeness of wholesale associations; in fact, in such a corporate society, the committee system, representative government, and some kind of polling must be used. But none of these outward forms guarantees democracy as Dewey conceives it (PP: 144f.; LW 2: 325f.).

What is needed is a democratic idea, and this democratic idea or ideal is, at most, a vague and confused concept in countries of the West, especially in America. In order to see what religious qualities are embedded in Dewey's democratic ideal, let us start with his primal concept and work up to the kind of unified society that expresses this democratic idea. We begin with *association* as a primal fact of human life, and association implies *communication,* and communication makes possible the setting up of plans and purposes. *Freedom* means, along with other elements, the power to form purposes (HNC: 303–13; MW 14: 209–15), and this freedom is conditioned by physical and cultural circumstances. Thus, freedoms may expand or contract in a culture depending upon the social conditions under which individuals and groups have the power to pursue their goals. Now, it is obvious that in American society, for instance, there is a multitude of groups that set up plans and purposes; in fact, each group sets up its plans and purposes irrespective of the goals and plans of others and of the whole of society. This fact

has prompted some philosophers to think of the role of government in America as an agency of compromise, preventing any one group from assuming complete control over any or all of the others. To Dewey, government, democracy, or political life conceived in this way is obnoxious. It tolerates a splintered, fragmented, competing, power-driven, conniving, nonunified type of society. For Dewey, this kind of a society is undemocratic.

On Dewey's view, the formation of goals and purposes cannot be self-contained, either for individuals or for groups. *Consultation* is the primal method of democracy. Each individual or association should form its goals and purposes with concern for all other groups in society. These goals should be formed not in the light of expediency, which means some narrow consequence or special benefit, for example, immediate pleasure or monetary advantage, but in the light of the "broad consequences" to which they lead. Dewey speaks of "the law of mental integrity" or "responsibility" as groups and individuals accepting the consequences of their decisions. Little observation is needed to show us how far we are from this democratic ideal as Dewey conceives it. Community pride, states' rights, sectionalism, nationalism, and blind patriotism all hinder the development of a kind of synthetic and unified culture in which the parts support the whole and the whole sustains the parts. Even members of families are known to formulate goals and purposes with disrespect and indifference for others; and families often operate in disrespect for the concern of the community. Institutions with narrow self-preserving goals frustrate the social ideal. The unified society that is democratic is a synthesis of all the goals and purposes of all the groups and individuals blended into a concept of general welfare. At present our society is competitive, fragmented, splintered. Individuals who seek to find a unity of their impulses and desires and the institutional expression of the values of a democracy are stopped before they start; they are lost in the fragmentation of the present, and try as hard as they can, they remain alienated from the wholeness of a quality of life which the idea of democracy ensures.

The analysis given here of humanity's alienation, estrangement, and bewilderment includes those experiences suffered by some people affiliated with traditional religion. They have made loud protestations and their outcries have been heard throughout the land. Dewey thinks that these loud protestations are symptoms that they are uneasy about their beliefs and that these expressions merely indicate that "the tide is set against them" (ION: 52; LW 5: 67). Perhaps the most conspicuous case of our failure to retain the old beliefs is the skepticism with which is regarded the ontological, cosmological, and teleological proofs for the existence of God (CF: 11; LW 9: 9). These arguments no longer con-

vince; we may wish that belief could come from them, but it is gone, seemingly forever. The response to this intellectual condition offered by those associated with traditional religion may go in any of several directions. Some try to reaffirm faith in a dogmatic fundamentalism with newspaper announcements of having found the faith again; some may develop an esoteric occultism, such as is found in the cults now frequenting the shores of America; or some may develop a "private aestheticism," and in reverie play with the traditional religious symbols. All of these behaviors show, says Dewey, "how far the individual has become lost through detachment from acknowledged social values" (ION: 64; LW 5: 72).

It should be clear why the foregoing analysis and interpretation of this part of Dewey's thought starts with the lost individual. The statement that guided this presentation is one in which Dewey claims that "religion is not so much a root of unity as it is its flower or fruit" (ibid.). Dewey does not think it possible to find the sources of human construction in any individual "will," in anything designated as a "special kind" of religious experience, or in most so-called religious institutions, for they are too steeped in tradition. The sick cannot heal themselves by means of their own disease; the faculty psychology that underlies admonition of the "will" is more "a manner of yearning and not a principle of reconstruction." To ask individuals to put an end to all this misery by acts of personal volition is "to profess faith in moral magic." This does not mean that on Dewey's psychology there are not such behaviors as innovations, inventions, and experimentations. In fact, he thinks the first step out of confusion, out of alienation, estrangement, bewilderment, is by an act of humility. Humility means acceptance of the "existential situations" of the present. There is no escape from these perils; there is "no exit" from the feeling of perplexity. We must "live through" and "suffer" and "undergo" these existential realities. We must "observe existing social realities" and must "direct them according to their own potentialities" (ION: 69; LW 5: 74). As we attempt to move toward the goal of religious unity, we must tap every institutional and experiential source of secular values.

Can we envision a life in which this religious quality is present? Is there a kind of promised land that we can see from afar and that entices us to seek and claim it? Can we fashion a synthesis of group ideals and of a unified self into a concept that takes hold upon us and possesses us? It seems possible to catch a glimpse of this religious vista, of this synthesized life, when certain experiences come to fulfillment. At moments of fulfillment, the intensity and power of that consummation floods our emotions and thoughts, and it is then that we feel most alive.

This is the nature of particularized aesthetic experience. Some of us, however, seem doomed to live out our lives in a world of conflict, confusion, obscurity, distress, loneliness, estrangement, and disenchantment. Our economic life, our art, our intellectual and moral beliefs will, to the end of our days, prevent our achieving that synthetic unity that haunts us to the depths of our being. Because of the disordered nature of our social life, it will be impossible to escape bewilderment, even if experience is punctuated now and then with moments of delight. We will slip back again into a world that is distracted, unstable, frustrated, fragmented, and competitive.

Particularized experiences that have aesthetic quality afford the basis for a glimpse of this life of unity. After we have lived through being confused and lost, that vision will haunt us with its own power. It is a life in which the part is integral with the whole and the whole sustains the parts, whether of families, schools, governments, or societies. It is a life in which becoming and fulfillment involving continuity and stability have been achieved without recourse to a static substance or being, isolated, permanent, and timeless. It is a life in which there is energetic impulsion or the forward movement of the organism, searching, inquiring, longing, and finding fulfillment. It is a life in which the energetic or active relation between beginning and termini matures in a process that produces objects. I take Dewey seriously when he says that we need not use the term 'God' at all; however, there is an "active relation" in experience and nature, whatever name we give to it, and without this energetic propulsion or impulsion, how can we explain the processes of nature and of human life? The implications of this idea of an "active relation" have not been worked out in detail, but I think that it is filled with more novelty and surprises than most conceptions yet developed in imagination and thought.

The vision of this unified life is one in which science, art, and morals—that is, truth, beauty, and goodness—are synthesized into harmony. It is a life in which the attitudes of doubt, suspense, the willingness to follow truth rather than some personally preferred conclusion, have religious qualities. It is an attitude that treats ideas as hypotheses and not as dogmatic conclusions. It is a life in which the common objects of experience take on aesthetic quality. It is a life in which no interest feeds upon itself and goes up in smoke, but one in which interests are blended into the whole of social existence. It is a life in which people do not stand alone, isolated and lost individuals, but one in which they are "sustained and soothed by an unfaltering trust" (Bryant, "Thanatopsis"). It is a life that has achieved the flower of unity, and this achievement is the religious aspect of experience.

Note

1. It is interesting to compare Dewey's views on the lost individual with those of Karl Marx and Erich Fromm. See Marx's "Alienated Labor" in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (1967: 287–301). See Fromm, *The Sane Society* (1955: passim).

12

Religion as the Quality of Excellence

Traditional Judeo-Christian religion was born in the alienation of human beings from their creator, and its adherents have spent most of their history trying to overcome this estrangement by "binding back" the relationship that was lost. Hence, the earliest meaning and application of the term 'religion' is "to bind back."

The relationship of human beings to their god has always been of primary concern. This religion grew from a simple faith and practice into an institution with elaborate creeds, ceremonies, literature, art, music, architecture, and with organizations that expressed the various themes, both Catholic and Protestant. When other religions of the world are added to the many expressions of Judaism and Christianity, the varieties of religious experience grow to staggering proportions. All of these different religions give a richness of meaning to life.

Religion is thus an enduring and almost universal part of human history and its force is so persistent that no serious inquirer can ignore its presence. What is the creative contribution of religion? When the ceremonial robes are discarded, when the superficial and the incidental are stripped away, when the petty and the secular are exposed, when the creative and the destructive are distinguished, what is there to religion that all who inquire into its meanings can appreciate? Some say that this question is impossible to answer, because there seems to be no common denominator to all religious expressions, and whatever answer is given will bring forth widespread disagreement. What follows is one attempt to define what genuine religion is and does, and how it can be related to nature, culture, and personal living. The analysis and evaluation is intended to be ruthlessly critical and sincerely appreciative.

In the first place, religion pertains to the quality of the human abode. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the relation of human life to nature started with an admonition that may have been useful at the time, but

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that has come to haunt us by bringing all creation to the edge of extinction. The ancient admonition was: Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it. In the Western world our philosophy of nature, for the most part, has been couched in the teachings of the Judeo-Christian religion. The attitudes toward the earth and its creatures from the beginning and throughout most of subsequent history have been ones of domination and subjugation, and these attitudes soon led to acts of exploitation.

When Christianity came into contact with the beliefs of animism, the view that spirits inhabit natural things, a struggle of ideas and emotions took place. Animism protected natural things from human exploitation, but the relentless evangelism of Christian theologians finally succeeded in driving out the idea that spirits reside in natural things. Spirits became the private possessions of human beings and God. What had been natural *subjects* in nature became natural *objects,* and all the things of nature were taken to be devoid of feeling. A tree or a grove of trees was no longer regarded as sacred; trees are nonfeeling objects; they can be cut from their habitats and used or misused at human will. To the Europeans who invaded these shores the forest was called a "wilderness," something to be conquered and transformed, transformed by their children into cities that are 90 percent concrete. To the American Indian the so-called wilderness was a home. The traditional Christian view of nature emerged triumphant. Nature is created for exploitation by human beings; it exists to serve human purposes.

When natural theology arose in the course of European and American history, human attitudes toward nature did not change significantly. Religious thinkers took their departure from the existence of nature to argue for the existence of God, a God who is distantly related to human beings and the world. God is held to be the First Cause far away at the beginning of creation or thought to be the Great Designer who fashioned the world and then left it to run on its own mechanical watch spring. Even in natural theology, natural things are not loved or cherished in themselves; they are only facts from which inferences can be made to the existence of the Supreme Being beyond nature.

More recent outlooks on life, religious and philosophical, are concerned with declaring human superiority over other creatures, with asserting transcendence over nature, with developing a view that bolsters human arrogance and pride. Some have kept alive the ancient notion that rationality sets humans apart from the rest of nature; others claim that the ability to develop and use language makes humans unique and superior to other animals. Thus, recent thinkers have neglected to develop a philosophy of nature. "Our science and technology," says Lynn White, "have grown out of Christian attitudes toward man's relation

to nature which are almost universally held not only by Christians and neo-Christians but also by those who fondly regard themselves as post-Christians." White maintains that "we are *not,* in our hearts, part of the natural process. We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim" (White 1970: 23).

The consequences of the abuses to our human abode over the centuries, and particularly in the more recent past, have come upon us like an avalanche. We have plundered our planet, destroyed its resources, polluted its air and water. We have created and let loose chemical monsters in our world that cannot be controlled. These creations of the Frankensteins of our laboratories are so prevalent now that they invade our bodies from the moment of conception until death.

They are found in a mother's milk, in a baby's teeth, and in an elderly person's bones. They are found in the fish of the sea, in the birds of the air, in domestic animals, and in all the living things that crawl upon the earth. When nuclear pollution from military and so-called peaceful uses are compounded with the other destructive elements, and when the pressures of population explosion mount in a Malthusian way, when the crisis of world hunger increases, then the shadows of death lengthen and grow more intense with darkness.

We thus encounter a living death; we are faced with cancers that destroy slowly but eventually, and with the possible extinction of nature and all that is within it, including our own species. In this crisis we witness the same hysterical and frantic responses as found in other crucial periods of human history. Crash programs are devised to avoid immediate annihilation of millions of people; attitudes of resignation and acceptance of imminent death abound; there are attempts to escape into the occult; there are preparations to make the journey into a supernatural world. There is no doubt that our generations, more so than in any of the recent centuries, now face the problem of wholesale death, and a catastrophe of this magnitude is a crucial religious problem.

The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children, and these are the sins of domination, subjugation, and exploitation of the human abode. This philosophy must be purged from our minds, and our attitudes pointed in the opposite direction.

The current crisis of the relations of humans to nature calls for respect and appreciation for the source of life. Respect, not worship, and appreciation, not fear, bring us closer to natural things. The ancients feared nature and were awed by it, so much so that some claim that all religion began in awe. But these attitudes cannot function in our present need. Fear is a negative response and awe is paralyzing to action. Other attitudes are needed.

In the history of Christianity there are two notable exceptions in their

attitude toward nature; Jesus of Nazareth had tender feelings toward the lilies of the field and Saint Francis of Assisi had tender feelings for all natural things and particularly the birds of the air.

Intelligent and sensitive people are now committing their lives to a respect and appreciation for nature. Those of us with a religious orientation want to go further. We want to believe that the creative element in nature is God, and it is to this reality that our commitment is made. God has always been the creative process of nature, but our theologians took God out of nature and placed the divine abode in another world. They convinced the majority of Western people that God is not in nature; God is far away and out of sight, and, it might be said, for the most part, out of mind. Theologians left human beings alienated from God and alienated from nature, and as we shall see, alienated from one another, and there was no place for a person to turn except to a psychiatrist.

Religious thought has suffered because of a logical habit that makes every issue hang on an all-or-nothing dichotomy. Thought alternates between two extremes: God is in all of nature, and God is in none of nature. This all-or-nothing philosophy has dulled our sensitivities and our thoughts, not only in developing an intelligent view of God, but also in making finer distinctions that must be made between good and evil, truth and falsehood, and beauty and ugliness. God pervades parts of nature and human experience, but not all of nature and human experience. To hold that God is all of nature destroys the meaning of divine love; to hold that God is no part of nature denies that God is a creative process.

God is a process that creates, sustains, and protects. God is present in every breath we take, in every heartbeat of life, in every healing process that conquers disease. The quality of the human abode depends upon our life in nature with God. God has loved us even when we were destructive caretakers of the gardens of the earth. And God never went away to another world; and God never died, except in some theologians' minds. The living God is always present, intimate and loving.

One of the great philosophers of the twentieth century has designated God as the active relation between the actual (what is) and the ideal (what should become) (CF: 51; LW 9: 34).[1] God is the creative relation in nature, and in this relation God needs our partnership. Most of theological history has been devoted to views of how human beings are absolutely dependent upon God, and little has been said or written about God's dependence upon human beings. Partnership implies respect and love and appreciation for those processes that make for life and meaning, for creative advance and abiding values. Some may not want to use the word 'God' as a name for this creative process in nature, but this will not matter as long as the attitudes of love and respect are taken

toward the creative process; for it is commitment to the reality, and not to the semantics or the word, that is important.

In the second place, religion pertains to the quality of social life and its organizations. Individuals develop through associated living. Random activities of the infant become meaningful impulses through connections with consequences taught by adults. Impulses become consolidated into social habits, and social habits that persist through time become customs, and customs extending through organizational life become traditions. Many of these customs and traditions become organized into institutions with moral and legal sanctions. How much social life influences the organizational structures and how much organizational structures influence social life are always debatable issues, but the realities of these interactions are not denied. These are the bare and oversimplified sociological facts, but the real problem for those concerned with the religious involves the quality of life that social life and its organizations produce in their members.

Most neglected in the entire history of the study of human nature are the impulses that propel human life. Some impulses may be presocial, but there seems to be general agreement that most impulses have social origins. Impulses are given meaning and direction by the social groups in which the individual lives, such as the family, the peer group, the school, the church, the community, the state, and now by the powerful directive force of television. The attachments of human impulses to specific objects and actions and ideals may vary from culture to culture. But there is little doubt that specific fears and loves, hatreds and esteems, anxieties and tranquilities, rivalries and friendships, resentments and appreciations are forces that move human beings. Impulses are primal in life; they are the source of our energies; they eventuate in our activities of action and reaction, of conservatism and radicalism, of status quo and revolution, of counterrevolution and revolt.

Recent political history in America has been a shock to some who had grown sentimental over the ideals of brotherhood and the goals of democracy, and who had forgotten about the impulses that direct so much of human life. Theoretical ideals and goals float above the actual happenings of life unless the means to their ends are secured. Much of our existence has a duality—we live in a world of hardened impulses on the one hand, and in a world of sentimental ideals on the other.

Our impulsive life has been educated by methods that are antidemocratic in morality and antireligious in quality. Intellectual and moral issues are still settled, for the most part, by methods of authoritarianism. Habits are thus formed that buttress antidemocratic means for antidemocratic ends and that support immoral ways for achieving immoral goals. When social crises occur, and the issue of law and order is raised, then

the impulses of coercion, violence, and suppression of civil liberties begin to surface. Beneath the manners, etiquette, and protocol of our so-called civilization lie the impulses of human destructiveness. The rhetoric expressed in democratic and religious ideals is not strong enough to control the deep and hard driving forces of impulsive life.

Social organizations with their structures and built-in values make a tremendous impact upon an individual's life. The social organizations in which one functions demand certain kinds of impulsive activities. These activities may be those of extreme competition, which creates rivalry, envy, hatred, and anxiety; or these activities may be those of cooperation, which promote mutual respect and the feeling of being wanted and appreciated, and encourage participation in the decisions and evaluations throughout the entire organizational enterprise. The ways in which social organizations bring about brutalization, deterioration, and final destruction have been the themes of numerous artists, poets, novelists, playwrights, and social critics of our day. Willy Loman lived and worked in an economic system that led to the death of a salesman. The family system in which Blanche DuBois worked out the fulfillment of her desires, desires that she thought were the opposite of dying, brought on her deterioration and mental illness. Franz Kafka reacted so vehemently to the impersonalization of modern life that he wrote into one of his characters the notion that he was turning into a cockroach.

Authoritarian organizational structures create personalities that are sadist if they exercise authority and masochist if they are victims of authority. Furthermore, the built-in values of authoritarian organizational structures create in their members the feelings of alienation, resentment, and revolt. In order to keep the authoritarian system going, elaborate spy programs must be developed, surveillance of all members must be constant, and frequent and systematic reports must be recorded on their failing or unfailing allegiance. This kind of organizational structure results in creating fear and suspicion in its members, lack of faith and trust in one another, and finally leads to all the horrors of Orwell's *1984*.

In recent years attention has focused upon the organizational structures and values of "total" institutions, called "total" because the life of the individual is externally regulated during the twenty-four hours of every day of every month of every year. These are the institutions in which the orphaned, the aged, the indigent, the handicapped are kept: they include mental hospitals, penal institutions, concentration camps, boarding schools, and others. Nowhere else in our culture has conformity been so ruthlessly imposed. The food, the dress, the work, the play, and even the haircuts are so conformist that all individuality is crushed.

These total institutions do not produce a quality of life that can be called "religious" by any stretch of the imagination.

Many social organizations have grown so large that they are corporate in structure and impersonal and mechanistic in their functions. Individuals are put into particular niches in the organization and each fulfills certain bureaucratic operations. We say in universities that there is a certain "slot" into which the individual professor fits. Students in large universities are well aware of their anonymity. The organizational man and woman say what they are expected to say and do what they are expected to do. The individual's personal motives, desires, and ideas are ignored or suppressed. Organizational decisions are made by a few, who think they are in control, but too often the executives are carrying out decisions that the organizational life forces upon them. Often these decisions are made with little or no concern for the total human community or for humanitarian values.

The making of the weapons of biological warfare, the creation of nerve gas, napalm, and chemicals designed to blind whole populations, are instances of decisions made without vision of the consequences of natural and human destructiveness. If a member of a corporate organization is asked why he or she is making such deadly items, the reply is predictable: "Don't ask me, I just work here." This unconcern for the way in which the purpose of the organization is carried on points up how individuals in corporate structures are submerged or lost. The social organization is a vast computer, which grinds out numbers; individual lives are forgotten. The individual is elevated in theory and rhetoric, but submerged in fact. No one seems to ask how large a business or school or church should become. Quantitative growth has become a religious concept and the creed of contemporary society. And the creed is buttressed by an unbounded faith in unlimited growth.

In order to bring moral and religious quality into social life and its organizations, it is necessary to set up criteria by which the quality of social life and its structural processes can be judged. The moral and religious dimension of this evaluation is concerned with the quality of life produced in each individual. What quality of impulses, perceptions, memories, imagination, and thought is effected by the social life and organizations in which the individual lives and functions? Are the impulses destructive or creative? What is created in the individual—anxiety or contentment, hatred or love, fear or trust?

One of the marks of a civilized human being is the quality of the impulses and emotions, and surely there is general agreement that the Christian emotion of love is one of the most humanizing and civilizing forces in the world. Where this kind of love is absent, we can expect brutality, slavery, and torture to be the way of life and death. In order

to judge any social custom or organization, then we must ask: Are the impulses and emotions of the individuals involved made more humane and civilized or are they made more brutal and destructive?

Are the perceptions of individuals made more sensitive and lively or are they dulled? Are individuals made into robots by the performance of monotonous tasks and routine skills? Is the individual's imagination made more fertile with the opportunity to entertain new suggestions and innovations or is imagination diverted into daydreams? Do social life and the organizational structures create within the individual two worlds—the world of drudgery and the world of escape?

Are memories appropriate and helpful to present life or are memories like nightmares that the individual seeks to suppress? How does one look back upon the past? Does one look back in anger or does one look back with fondness and delight? How many individuals have good memories, memories that enrich the present with meaning and help guide the future with warnings and approvals? What memories does one have of family life, school, work, and church? Finally, is the individual's thought made more creative or is it diverted into matters that are trivial, unessential, and pedantic?

Thus, if the cumulative effects of social life and its institutions upon the individual are impulses that are destructive, perceptions that are dulled, imaginations that are fantasies, memories that are haunting, and thought that is useless, then those functions of social life and its organizations produce a condition of life that is lacking in religious quality. On the other hand, if minds are made lively and perceptive, if imagination is made fertile with innovations and inventions, if memories enrich the present with meaning, if there are few regrets about the past, and if thought is creative, then religious quality emerges as a living reality.

The church group to which this college has been attached[2] historically has had a stormy experience over the issue of the organizational form of the New Testament church. Scholars have expended much energy in the attempt to discover the truth of the past. This dedication is admirable, but it seems that it is time to point some of that energy in another direction, in the direction of determining how ecclesiastical structures affect the quality of life of their members. What kinds of impulses and emotions do church organizations produce in individuals? For instance, is the impulse of selfishness appealed to in the quest for salvation? Is imagination centered upon the escape from present problems and a flight into the fanciful? Do church members have good memories in their associations in the church, or do they remember only the quarrels and the conflicts? Is thought stimulated to creativity or is it dulled into a repetition of the creeds and the thoughts of the past?

Religion pertains to social life and its organizations, and if it does not

pervade the feelings, habits, and ideals of a people, then it is not a living reality, and it is not the leaven that lifts the entire culture to a higher quality of excellence.

Religion also pertains to the quality of personal life and the individual perspective. From what has been said in the preceding, it may seem as if human beings were completely determined in all their activities because the influences operating in social life and its organizations were so powerful. If this were the case, then there would be no place for individual freedom, innovation, invention, and creativity. But we do not live in a world of absolute determinism; if this were the condition of human existence, then all events, no matter how we tried to manipulate them, would lead to predestined ends. If all roads led to the same identical end, then fatalism would result. We know, however, that some parts of reality can be manipulated and directed in various ways. And neither do we live in a world of absolute chance. That world would be completely undependable. We live in a world that is partly determined and partly undetermined, and this makes our world dependable in some respects, and open to new directions in other respects.

If we look at some of the extreme cases of subjugation of the individual by social groups and organizations, we can find an answer to how the individual can transcend, at least in part, the social conditioning and the pressures of organizations that are so influential. Political and religious institutions, for instance, at various times in history have attempted to inflict numerous tyrannies on the minds of individuals. Extreme institutional practices have been those of indoctrination of minds, of keeping a people ignorant by suppression of information, of enlisting passions of hatred for those who deviate from the settled authority, of punishing those who think differently. Punishment, torture, and even death are the principal procedures of a tyrannical organization. Under these extreme conditions, how can the individual break the chains of intellectual slavery and gain freedom?

Experience shows that it is difficult for any institution to regulate all the opinions of every group of people upon every subject. Administrators of "total institutions," previously mentioned, know that absolute control is impossible. Opinions grow up outside the institutional authority, and these opinions often clash with the official decrees.

Experience is usually so varied that different opinions arise within the same individual, and those opinions that conflict bring on perplexities. Beliefs clash with those of other members of the immediate community. If some communication is allowed with other groups, such as people from other countries, other religions, other social customs, other forms of government, then the number of beliefs that conflict increases. These clashes of opinions, perplexities, and questionings create doubt,

and doubt is the primal condition for the beginning of intellectual freedom. Some individuals recoil from doubt and retreat into the solace of their settled beliefs. For others, however, doubt is the beginning of self-examination and social criticism. Once the critical element is introduced into the individual's life, then the mind is set free, and freedom of the mind is the first and most important of all the freedoms we cherish.

Every individual selects and rejects certain stimuli from the environment, orders and integrates these experiences into a life movement. These direct experiences combine with the social inheritance to enable the individual to build up a personal perspective. The individual interacts with others, takes the role of others, assumes the attitudes and points of view of others, and otherwise enters into the perspectives of others. The individual perspective and the self that emerges may be narrow or broad; that is, the individual may draw a circle around his or her activities, around the life of the family, or the community, or the nation, or a religious organization. The extent to which one perspective includes the perspectives of others varies.

Narrow, partial, and fragmented perspectives—that is, perspectives that do not take into account the broad concerns of all humanity—are the sources of secularism. When goals and purposes are conceived without regard for the perspectives of other individuals and groups, then this results in the lowering of the quality of life of all people involved. This fact describes the criminal who does not relate his purposes and goals and methods to others in the larger society. This describes also the selfish and the self-centered whose narrow perspectives are motivated by expediency, the philosophy of selecting only the narrow consequences of any action, such as monetary gain, prestige, and the domination of others.

The religious perspective encompasses the whole of life, and it seeks to harmonize and unify all individuals and groups. The religious perspective includes the sufferings and triumphs of peoples near and far away; it seeks for universality, and it is this universal quality that makes the religious perspective divine.

A traditional view of the nature of the individual human being needs some critical examination. Some theologians postulate a separate, discrete self or soul and claim that the primary purpose of human life is selfish salvation. When individuals act upon this postulate, they tend to withdraw from the world and attempt to keep the self pure and undefiled by closing out as many interactions with others as possible. Perspectives of other human beings are not regarded as another part of the individual self. Furthermore, psychological and psychiatric problems appear to arise from this philosophy, for this view means that the self is alienated and lonely by definition and not because of the functioning of the individual perspective. Problems mount for the individual with

this philosophy, for the individual is alienated from God (in the traditional account of human existence), alienated from nature, and alienated from other human beings. This perspective is fated to produce despair, for there is no way out of this human predicament. This perspective is so unreal that it has no function to perform in the creative advance of life and nature.

A group of theologians recently decided to withdraw from work in current social and moral problems, at least partially, because they were afraid of losing their faith in something more transcendental. This is a problem every person faces who feels socially responsible, for there is fear of losing one's self in something that is fragmented and partial. But this kind of withdrawal can be detrimental to religious life.

Withdrawal can turn into indifference, into a neglect of responsibility, into a recoiling backward into another perspective that is more secular and less divine. A truly transcendental perspective includes the social causes to which the individual has made dedication and relates each social cause to a wider perspective. The temporal commitment is seen under the aspect of eternity. The transcendental and universal perspective to which all specific causes are related is what some call the "Kingdom of God" or the "Blessed Community."

The problem of creating a moral and religious quality in personal life in the midst of social conditions and group perspectives that are fragmented and self-centered demands the greatest of courage. The pessimists claim that it is almost impossible. How can an individual's lungs be healthy, they say, if the air one breathes is polluted? How can the individual self maintain its integrity, its integration, in a world that is torn apart by conflicts and wars? As long as we live in social conditions such as these, our actual lives will always achieve less of the ideal of the blessed community.

Personal lives must be built among the mine traps, the exploding rockets, the intercontinental missiles, and the threat of nuclear holocausts. These are the conditions of our times. Santayana once said that in the midst of battle there is room for love,[3] and what room individuals have for expression of freedom, for selecting what is important for a personal perspective, will depend upon where they are located and how they function in existing society.

Freedom is always related to social circumstance, and this is why freedom of the individual expands or contracts with the freedoms of society. The range of selections for the individual is related to the range of selections afforded by the culture. This is why religious quality pertains to all the dimensions of experience, to the human abode, to social life and its institutions, and to the personal perspective.

It should be clear by now that when the term 'quality of life' is used,

it does not mean the American standard of living as determined quantitatively by the United States Census Bureau. (On their calculations Jesus of Nazareth had about the lowest standard of living in all history.) The quantitative life of "One Dimensional Man" is so disgusting to Herbert Marcuse that he advocates a "Great Refusal" of these quantitative values.

For the individual, the qualitative life is deeper and richer in meaning, broader in its perspective, more inclusive in its love. The qualitative life is enhanced by poetry, music, painting, and all the arts. The qualitative life desires to read the greatest poetry human beings have ever written, listen to the most glorious music ever composed, and view the most magnificent art ever painted. The qualitative life needs to know the conclusions of the sciences about the human abode so that an adequate picture can be had of the world in which we live and move and have our being. The individual must not be left to wander through nature like a child in a forest primeval. The qualitative life encompasses a philosophy that analyzes, evaluates, and synthesizes all perspectives into a universal unity, and when this is accomplished, the religious quality emerges.

A very perceptive and wise thinker of our times has written: "Loyalty to whatever in the established environment makes a life of excellence possible is the beginning of all progress. The best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain the habits of decent and refined life" (HNC: 21; MW 14: 19).

Henry Barton Robison taught that religion is a quality of life, and that life is the life of excellence. Religion as the quality of excellence is a radical religion, for it goes to the very roots of human existence, to the qualitative relations human beings have with nature and nature's God, to the qualitative relations of an integrated personal life, and to the qualitative relations humans have with one another in the blessed community.

Notes

1. "It is this *active* relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 'God'."
2. [The Christian Church—Disciples of Christ—*Ed.*]
3. Sonnet XXV, in *The Philosophy of Santayana* (Santayana 1942: 25).

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