

**PAPERS ON THE SOUTHERN
SPANISH COLONIES OF AMERICA**

BY

BERNARD MOSES

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*Univ. of
California*

BERKELEY
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1911

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70 VINU
ANNO 1910

PREFATORY NOTE.

These papers, relating to some phases of colonial life in the southern Spanish dependencies of America, were written during the period of recent journeys in South America, and were originally printed in the *University of California Chronicle*. The copies here brought together are reprints from that publication.

CONTENTS.

I. Flush Times in Potosi	1-24
II. The Schools of Colonial Chile	25-54
III. Francisco de Aguirre, a Minor Conquistador	55-81
IV. The Spanish-Portuguese Treaty of 1750	83-102
V. The Removal of the Jesuits from Rio de La Plata and Chile	103-126
VI. The Serfs of Chile and Their Emancipation	127-153

FLUSH TIMES AT POTOSI.

Returning from a campaign against certain revolted towns in the Charcas, the Inca Huaina Capac halted at Cantumarca in the valley of Tarapaia, not far from the site of Potosi. The legends of the Indians affirm that he suspected the presence of precious metals in the now famous hill, and that he sent to the mines of Porco, six or seven leagues away, for Indians to extract the ore from the new mine; but when they began to dig, they heard a terrible noise and a mysterious voice which gave this command in Quichua: "Take no silver from this hill which is destined for other owners." Whether the mysterious voice had any influence or not, it appears to be a fact that no silver was taken from the hill until after the arrival of the other owners.

The cold and inhospitable region, lying between thirteen and fourteen thousand feet above the level of the sea, was used by the Indians chiefly for grazing and mining. Whatever agricultural products were consumed here were raised in the lower valleys. The life of the Indians, even under the far-famed empire of the Incas, was not merely simple; it was a low and mean form of existence. The precious metals which the mines yielded brought them little or no amelioration, for the ordinary Indians had no opportunity to transmute them into means for personal enjoy-

ment or social advancement. They were wrought into the forms of plants, trees, animals, and flowers, which were used to adorn the temples. They were for the Sun and the monarch. There was thus no temptation to steal them, no object in possessing them, and no incentive to search for them.

After centuries of isolation the Indians were suddenly startled and terrified by the coming of the Spaniards. Atahualpa was murdered, the temples were pillaged, and the inhabitants of the conquered regions were distributed among the invaders. In a few years the old social system was destroyed, and the imagination of this present generation is unable to picture the barbarities of the new order of things.

The first mines exploited by the Spaniards were those that had been worked by the Incas. Those of Porco were taken in 1543. They seem to have fallen into the hands of three Spaniards: Captain Juan de Villaruel, Captain Diego Centeno, and Captain Santardia. Some of the Indians allotted to these men were employed in the mines, and others attended the herds of animals that grazed in this region. Gualca was in the service of Villaruel. His flocks were accustomed to feed about the base of the hill of Potosi, and to him is attributed the accidental discovery of the veins of silver which, through their attraction, made this desolate spot the site of the Imperial City of Potosi. This discovery was made in January, 1545.¹

¹ In his *Cronicas Potosinas*, I., 25-27, Dr. Vicente G. Quesada has included three versions of the story of the discovery:

"1. It is said that after having gone with his llamas the distance from Porco to Potosi, with the slow pace of these animals, Gualca arrived in the evening at the latter place fatigued from the journey. As the night was dark, he did not dare to go on to the huts of the shepherds of Cantumarca; and then, in order to secure the llamas, he tied them to some shrubs of *lichu* and there passed the night in the open air. The next day the llamas, by the efforts they made to graze, pulled up by the roots the *lichu*, and disclosed a valuable vein of metal, the richness of which the Indian, with the knowledge he possessed as a miner of Porco, was able to appreciate.

"2. Others say that Gualca went from the place already referred

From time to time Gualca extracted small quantities of ore for his own use, and for a month kept his secret. But it became evident to the other Indians with whom he was associated that he had some unusual source from which he got silver. One Guanca, as an intimate friend, obtained the secret in confidence. Then Villarroel knew it, and then all the world. Villarroel and Guanca together registered the first claim. This was the vein called the Centeno, April 21, 1545. Gualca was treacherously left out; later Guanca mysteriously disappeared, and Villarroel remained the sole proprietor.

In a few days Porco was almost entirely abandoned, nearly the whole population having gone to the site of the new mine. A little later the vein called *Estaño* was found, and information of these discoveries soon reached Chuquisaca. Then the rush to Potosi began. The Spaniards brought their Indian dependents, but in the beginning they

to in search of the llama that had gone astray. Skilful in following the tracks which animals make in the soil, he followed this one to Potosi, where he arrived at night. The cold was intense, and it soon became very dark, so that in order to secure the animal that had been lost he tied him to a bush of *queñua*, gathered some dry grass, cut some branches from the neighboring shrubs, made a fire with the stroke of a flint, and passed the cold night in light and warmth. The next day the fire had melted the metal on the surface, which ran in little streams of pure silver. As a skilful miner, he knew the immense richness of the vein.

“3. Still others affirm that Gualca followed a deer or a llama up the hill, and, while the animal was climbing along the slope and sharp cliff, he, wishing to seize it, was on the point of slipping and falling over the precipice. Then, to avoid the accident, he grasped the branch of a *queñua*, and by the force which he exerted to hold himself, he pulled the bush up by the roots. He saw with surprise, laid bare in the hole left by the roots of the plant, the rich vein of a silver mine, the finding of which filled him with delight. Having a knowledge of the method of melting the metal by *guayras*, he took some pieces, built a fire, and, having convinced himself of the richness of the ore, carried away several pieces to repeat the experiment.”

The method referred to was that used by the Indians of this region. It involved the use of portable furnaces of clay, *guayras*, in which the metals were placed and melted (Quesada, *Cronicas Potosinas*, I, 90). This attractive work is based on the *Anales de la Villa Imperial de Potosi*, by Don Bartolomé Martinez y Vela, which was printed, in 1872, in *Archivo Boliviano*, Vol. 1, 283-487.

all lived exposed to the rigors of this mountain climate rather than take the time to construct houses. The support of this increasing population was derived from the products of the neighboring valleys cultivated by the Indians. When it became absolutely necessary on account of the number of inhabitants and the storms of winter to have houses, the Indians of Cantumarca were brought in to build them. But this forceful conscription of laborers involved the risk of neglecting the harvests on the lower lands, thus causing a dangerous scarcity of provisions. It, moreover, aroused hostility among the Indians, and led those engaged in making *adobes* to form a conspiracy to punish the invaders. The Spaniards, who were not well armed, undertook to enter into negotiations. But the Indians had learned of the injustice done the discoverer of the mine, and demanded as a basis for the establishment of peace that those persons in possession of the hill should abandon it, and turn it over to Gualca. The Spaniards had no mind to accept these terms, but, having sent to Porco for arms, prepared to resist the Indians who had gathered a few miles from the mine, and were advancing to take possession of it. The fight that ensued lasted two hours. Fifty Indians and twenty-five Spaniards were killed, besides many wounded in both parties. In consequence of this conflict, many Indians who had had no part in it fled from Cantumarca and other adjacent villages. The surviving Spaniards remained in control of the mine, and continued their efforts to found here a town.

A sloping plain of a few square leagues, thirteen or fourteen thousand feet above the sea; a barren hill of many colors, about three leagues in circumference, rising two thousand feet above the plain; a horizon of broken mountain peaks; a climate of thin air rigid in the extreme, frequently varied by icy winds and terrific storms: these were the characteristics of the site and the environment of the city of Potosi.

The building of the town was begun in December, 1545. In a short time all the inhabitants had roofs to shelter them, either those of the new houses or those of the cabins made vacant by the withdrawal of the Indians. Early in the next year they laid the foundations of the church. A certain part of the site of the town was swampy, and the rapid growth of the population made artificial drainage necessary. This part had also to be filled to prepare it for buildings. At first the houses were built here and there without regard to order or street lines, but in later decades this irregularity was corrected. At the end of eighteen months two thousand five hundred houses had been erected, and the number of the inhabitants was fourteen thousand. The fame of the mines was extended throughout Peru, and Potosi became the chief point of attraction in America.

Throughout the colonial period Potosi was known as the Imperial City. It was given this designation in honor of the emperor, Charles V. In 1546 Captain Villarroel, the owner of the first mine put on record, had accumulated an immense fortune, and wished to acquire the distinction he might attain with the title of discoverer and founder. With this object in view, he applied to the emperor. He sent to him a description of the discovery and ninety-six thousand ounces of silver. The silver was sent on account of the royal fifths. The emperor confirmed the title sought by Villarroel, conferred upon him the order of Santiago, decreed arms for the city and established its title as the Imperial City. The first census of Potosi was taken under the order of Francisco de Toledo, who was viceroy of Peru from 1569-1581. It showed one hundred and twenty thousand inhabitants. A subsequent enumeration made under the order of the viceroy Montes-Claro, in 1611, indicated a population of one hundred and fourteen thousand. Of these sixty-five thousand were Indians, forty-two thousand were Spaniards and creoles, and six thousand were negroes and mulattoes. In 1650, the population was one hundred and

sixty thousand. In 1825, it was eight thousand. The abundance of silver and this large increase of inhabitants in a region ill adapted to the production of food made prices very high. The prices of the ordinary articles of consumption in Potosi for a long period might be compared with those of California in 1849. The improved means of communication in the middle of the nineteenth century soon made the prices in California normal. California, moreover, possessed the most favorable conditions for raising food; while the region about Potosi was a mountain desert, relieved only by a few small and poorly cultivated valleys. Many persons who had made fortunes in the mines of California found it agreeable to continue to live in this region; but the bleak tableland of Upper Peru offered few attractions to those whose wealth enabled them to choose freely the place of their permanent residence. The country, moreover, had few or no other sources of wealth adequate to support a large population when the mines failed. But while the mines continued to pour out their abundant riches the towns increased, and society assumed there many of the features of civilization. It matured early. For a period the mining region of Upper Peru might claim superiority in cultivation and in the perfection of its institutions over the low lands of other parts of the continent that were later to outstrip it.

Under the system of the *mita* the owners of the mines of Potosi drew into their service, earlier or later, a large part of the Indian population of the town and the surrounding country. The *mita* as here employed was a form of conscription, under which a certain number of Indians between the ages of eighteen and fifty were forced to work in the mines. Those liable to this service were arraigned in seven divisions, and each group drawn worked for six months, and were then, under the rule, free for two years. But the severity of the labor and the unfavorable conditions were such that eighty per cent., or four out of

every five, died the first year. It is affirmed that under this system eight millions of Indians perished in the mines of Peru.

The employment of forced labor made possible a very rapid accumulation of wealth in the hands of the dominant class. A certain evidence of this wealth may be seen in the enormous sums spent by the city in public works and celebrations. In 1556, eleven years after the founding of the town, the inhabitants celebrated the accession of Philip II. to the throne of Spain. The city spent on this occasion eight million dollars. The funeral ceremonies of the emperor, Charles V., in 1559, involved an expenditure of one hundred and forty thousand dollars. In 1577, three million dollars were spent on water-works. The fortunes of the dominant class, in 1580, ranged from a minimum of \$300,000 or \$400,000 to \$2,000,000 or \$6,000,000. On the death of Philip II., a funeral service was held costing one hundred and thirty thousand dollars. Prior to 1593, the royal fifth had been paid on three hundred and ninety-six millions of silver. There had been deposited for safety in the royal treasury and in the Augustinian and Dominican monasteries in 1624, jewels and money belonging to the residents of the town amounting in value to two million dollars.

Other statistics show that the treasure known to be held by the inhabitants, in 1650, amounted to thirty-six million dollars. This leaves out of account that which was concealed from the persons who had been ordered to take the census. It goes without saying that in a city of one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty thousand inhabitants, there were numerous traders of all sorts. There were fourteen dancing-schools, thirty-six gambling houses, and one theatre, to which the price of admission ranged from forty to fifty dollars. The luxury in dress was in keeping with the enormous incomes received. Touching this point, the writer of the *Cronicas Potosinas* says: "The ladies of Potosi had jewels and dresses for each *fiesta* which

were worth from twelve to fourteen thousand dollars; one lady spent five hundred dollars merely for pearls for her embroidered overshoes. The mestizas wore sandals (*alpar-gatas*) and belts of silk and gold, with pearls and rubies, skirts and jackets of fine cloth of silver, pendants and chains of gold, and other rich jewels."²

Other evidence of the wealth and extravagance of Potosi may be found in the life of Doña Clara, the gayest, the most beautiful, the most accomplished, and the most elegant woman of the Imperial City: "the first in wealth, the most superb in her oriental ostentation, the one, in a word, whose jewels had no rivals either for their price or for their variety."³ Her house was the centre of the worldly society of the most powerful miners, who were zealous rivals for the first place in the good graces of its attractive mistress. Sober historians have found the details of her life worthy of their attention. | According to Martinez y Vela, "she had as many chemises of fine cambric and Dutch linen as there are days in the year, and a change was made every night; four rich bedsteads of wood and bronze, with featherbeds and draperies of beautiful cloths; and she changed from one to another every three months. In a word, she was the most affluent woman in Potosi." "She had a large number of slaves, *encomiendas* of Indians, and white servants whom she paid very liberally. Her treasure of gold, silver, jewels, precious stones, pearls, and ornaments was immense. Her table service was all of silver and gold; filigree with emeralds and rubies was abundant among her ornaments. The silversmiths were continually occupied with her orders." "Her reception room was magnificent. The Venetian mirrors had frames of burnished silver; her furniture was adorned with gold and mother of pearl, upholstered with cloth of gold and silver from Milan; figures of gold taken from Quichuan antiquities adorned her

² Quesada, *Cronicas Potosinas*, I, 66.

³ *Archivo Boliviano*, I, 465.

tables."⁴ Her writing desk was of ebony and ivory; her floors were covered with rugs from Cairo, Persia, and Turkey. Her pride did not permit her to allow any one to rival her in the splendor of her ornaments or in the extent of her expenditures. In the games at her house the rich miners took delight in staking sums equivalent to a modern fortune.

For many years Potosi was the scene of great disorder. There were duels between individual persons, and fights between social groups. Medieval anarchy found here an excellent illustration. The local government was incompetent to preserve order. The Europeans with their easily acquired riches, and the poor Indians dependent on them under the law of *encomiendas*, constituted the elements of a feudal society. The *fiestas*, the gambling, the intrigues, the antagonism of Europeans and creoles, and the rivalries for the favors of women, produced ever recurring conflicts; and when the lords followed by their dependents quarreled, there was civil war. Fighting became a pastime, a social function. The parties to a duel "sometimes fought in trousers and shirt, sometimes naked to the waist, scorning the use of a shield; and again they were dressed in trousers and shirt of crimson tafety, so that the blood from the wounds might not be seen and they might not lose courage."⁵ Sometimes, moreover, they fought kneeling. In every case the challenge indicated the etiquette of the duel and the weapons to be used.

In January, 1552, the chronicler relates that Potosi was full of life and movement. A multitude of gentlemen carrying all kinds of weapons, pressed along the streets. Before five o'clock in the morning of the day to which he makes special reference, the whole population was abroad. They were on foot, on horseback, in *carramatas*, and in litters, as if going on a pilgrimage. There were men and

⁴ *Archivo Boliviano*, I, 465.

⁵ Quesada, *Cronicas Potosinas*, I, 189.

women, mestizos and negroes, Indians and Spaniards. Everywhere rose the peculiar murmur of an interested crowd. There was to be fought a duel on horseback and with lances. It was a medieval crowd, with a wealth of color and variety of dress that no other city could present. Knowledge of the publicity of these combats at Potosi had been spread to all parts of America; and a distinguished champion had come from Cuzco to add to his laurels by a victory in the Imperial City. On his arrival Montejo had found that Doña Clara was the most noted woman in Potosi; and at her house he had met Godines, whose prestige as a fighter he hoped to dispute. From the quarrel which had been bred here arose the joust that was moving half the population. Even before the beginning of the battle Montejo had made one conquest; he had awakened a new emotion in the heart of Doña Clara.

The chronicler, Bartolome Martinez y Vela, has described the event of this combat, with all the details that might be expected in an account of the Field of the Cloth of Gold. The crowd, the arrival of the mounted contestants, their fine horses, their gorgeous costumes and waving plumes, their spears and shields, the onset, the shock, the first wounds, and the final fall of Montejo make a picture we are not accustomed to think of as formed on a background of America in the sixteenth century.

The death of Montejo was the beginning of the end of Doña Clara's glory. Recovering from a distressing illness which followed this event, she found a number of her servants had fled, carrying off her jewels and a large part of her treasure; her Indians had deserted; and hereafter in mourning costume she divided her time between the solitude of her home and prayers at the church.

The years following the death of Montejo were filled with treachery, rebellions, and assassinations, in which Godines had a leading part. He was, however, finally arrested and placed in irons in the prison of La Plata.

Tried before Alonzo de Alvarado, whom he had intended to assassinate, he was condemned to be quartered; in the words of Garcilaso de la Vega, he was condemned "as a traitor to God, to the king, and to his friends." One after another the individual actors played out their roles, and Doña Clara with the rest; but the drama of public disorder and crime went on. Many years later, "on a day that was comparatively warm for the rigid climate of Potosi, an old woman of ninety-two years entered the church of Merced. She was poorly clothed, for she was accustomed to beg and lived from charity. She knelt and heard mass with great devotion, and prayed for a long time. This beggar was the splendid Doña Clara."⁶ Martinez y Vela wrote: "Finalment pagó en esta vida los desordenes de la pasada y sufrió con admirable paciencia sus trabajos, desengañando á los avaros y ricos soberbios con razones de experiencia, y asi murió muy pobre de riquezas temporales, pero muy rica de virtudes; entarráronla de limosna los piosos y nobles vecinos. Pongo este caso para desengaño y enmienda de los que se hallan muy asegurados de sus temporales bienes."

The fact of the abdication of Charles V. was known at Potosi in October, 1559. The sentiment of surprise at the retirement of the emperor was followed by public rejoicing over the accession of Philip II. This was a new experience for Potosi; for Charles V. was on the throne when the city was founded. The inhabitants immediately began preparations for their remarkable celebration, which lasted twenty-four days, and consisted of almost every form of public rejoicing then known.⁷

But while Potosi was celebrating the accession of Philip II., Peru was in a state of political turmoil. The civil war

⁶ Quesada, *Cronicas Potosinas*, I, 231.

⁷ Martinez y Vela says: "Se solemnizaron con generales aplausos, tanta vanidad y competencia de fiestas, costosas galas, mascararas, torneos, cañas, toros, justas, sortejos, saraos, comedias, banquetes soberbios, y otros ingeniosas invenciones de las mayores que se habian visto en este reino."

had left the country full of restless and adventurous spirits. The Imperial City was not exempt from their influence, and the streets sometimes witnessed bloody conflicts. These things, however, disturbed the viceroy less than the fact that Potosi had dared to celebrate the accession of the king without first applying for and receiving his viceregal permission. As soon as he had heard what had been done at Potosi, he sent a special messenger to convey his reprimand and vigorous threats to the inhabitants for their audacity. His personal dignity appears to have been slighted, and this apparently moved him more, and was regarded as a greater social offense, than brigandage, treason, or rebellion.

Irritated by the independent action of the authorities of Potosi, and provoked by letters he had received casting doubt on the loyalty of certain prominent residents of that city, the viceroy determined to make an example of General Robles. He, therefore, sent to Potosi one of the judges of the *audiencia*, with express orders that he should have Robles garroted. Robles, aware of the coming of the messenger, but not knowing the purpose of his mission, went out to meet him and to extend to him an honorable welcome to the city. The reason of Robles' failure to return was for a time veiled in mystery; later it transpired that he was murdered by the direct command of the viceroy. This barbarous act aroused the inhabitants of Potosi, and put them in a mood to take vengeance on the pusillanimous judge, who found it advisable to seek the protection of the authorities. He wished to excuse himself by showing his instructions, and by making it appear that he had acted under a specific command issued by the viceroy. The fact that a high officer of the colonial government was willing to obey a command in a field of action to which the orders of a superior cannot properly reach is an indication of the length the political system had gone in suppressing the independence of individual character.

With all the extravagance and display of wealth which the unparalleled richness of the mines made possible, there was still, in 1557, little provision for agreeable living. The great storm of that year showed how ill prepared the city was to meet an emergency of that kind. The snow continued to fall for seven days without ceasing. It was piled up like mountains in the plazas, the streets were blocked, and all ways leading to the city were impassable. The temperature fell to a point where it was almost unendurable. The houses were comfortless. There were no means of heating them except the braziers; and the little fire which they ordinarily contained, made with wood and charcoal, filled the room with smoke and gas, leaving the occupant in doubt whether his end would come by choking, asphyxiation, or freezing. At first the inhabitants, driven from the streets, gathered about the family brazier; but as the town was supplied with wood and charcoal from day to day by the Indians, the store was necessarily limited, and was soon exhausted; for the snow prevented the Indians from coming to the city. Many perished in the attempt, and, in the city itself, many persons whose hold on life had been weakened by age were cut off.

Two years later another event of public importance excited general interest in the city. Towards the end of the year 1559, a special messenger from the viceroy at Lima brought to Potosi information of the death of Charles V. A communication announcing this event was read in public, together with an order fixing twenty days as the official period of mourning. A committee of the most distinguished citizens took charge of the preparations for a formal funeral ceremony, which was held in the church of San Francisco. Within the church a temple-like structure was erected, and appropriately draped. All classes were disposed to unite in honoring the memory of the emperor; even the Indians wished to have part in the public demonstration, and they respectfully asked the privilege of

appearing in their ancient national costume. Their petition was at first refused; but when the effect of this refusal on the Indians was observed, there was somebody wise enough to see that, in disregarding this profound sentiment of the Indians, the authorities had blundered. The decision was then modified: the Indians might wear their national costume, but they were expressly required to submit to the order of the ceremonial as fixed by the Spaniards.

The function in the church lasted from two o'clock in the afternoon until seven o'clock in the evening, and it was repeated the following day. Around the newly constructed funeral temple, on the altars, and in the chapels, were distributed fifteen hundred candles, which the chronicler informs us contained two thousand pounds of white wax valued at eight dollars a pound, making a total of sixteen thousand dollars for this item of expenditure. But the most remarkable features of the meetings were the crowds and the unprecedented richness and variety of the costumes. The rich miners vied with the nobles, the nobles with the members of the orders of Calatrava and Santiago; and more noticeable than all the rest were the quaint and original costumes of the Indians.

An important change made at this time in public affairs was the establishment, at Chuquisaca, of an *audiencia*, or supreme court, which exercised not only judicial, but also administrative, powers. This was needed to strengthen the government and to prevent the population from falling into complete anarchy. Hitherto the chief official had been the corregidor of the district, whose jurisdiction embraced not only the Imperial City, but also Chuquisaca, or La Plata. During this time he had resided six months of each year in Chuquisaca, and six months in Potosi. In the absence of the corregidor, the administration was necessarily inefficient under a deputy, or a lieutenant, corregidor. After this change the corregidor resided permanently at Potosi, which thus became an important centre of local government. In

the brief period of fifteen years the desolate spot at the foot of the hill of Potosi had become the site of a rich city and a local capital, the seat of a petty governor, or corregidor, in the Spanish colonial system.

Potosi was not founded in accordance with any established rules, or methods of proceeding determined by Spanish legislation. The inhabitants, called together by the discovery of the mines, made a city without previous governmental authorization and without a prearranged plan. In fact, during the civil wars that had unsettled affairs in Peru, in the middle of the sixteenth century, it was not easy to find a person whose pretensions to authority were not questioned. The failure of the founder to follow the legal formula was a sufficient excuse for Chuquisaca to maintain that Potosi was properly under its jurisdiction. In order to confirm this view, the *cabildo* of Chuquisaca appealed to the *audiencia*, and that body acting as the supreme authority in this region ordered the founders of Potosi to obey the magistrate who might be appointed by the corregidor of the dominant city. The official appointed by Chuquisaca under this decision was the deputy, or lieutenant, corregidor. If Villarroel as the founder had followed the prescribed rules for establishing a municipal government, the town might have enjoyed the usual independence of a municipality from the beginning. As it was, the corregidor of Chuquisaca and three regidores went to Potosi and established a municipal government, and at the same time fixed the dependence of Potosi on the neighboring city. Under the regulations adopted at this time, six regidores were to be appointed from the residents of Potosi, who should manage the ordinary affairs of the town; but in matters of grave importance the regidores of Chuquisaca should be summoned, and the presence of one of them would be sufficient to legalize such a meeting of the *cabildo*.

The drama of municipal government in Potosi was not wanting in action. The members of the council attended

the meetings armed with swords and pistols, and in coats of mail. The discussions often ended in fights, as the chronicler observes, "in the place consecrated to the consideration of the interests of the community, and neither the *audiencias* nor the viceroys were able to stop them."⁸ In fact, the persistence of this form of disorder made it sometimes necessary to suspend the meetings for long periods. The dependence on Chuquisaca was a fruitful source of conflicts. Potosi wished to be independent, and in the election of *alcaldes*, members of the council, who were residents of that city, were naturally zealous for their own candidates. In the election of 1563, the two parties were vigorously opposed to one another. Each wished the election of its candidates. Juan Lucero Cigali, the senior regidor from Chuquisaca, presided. In the hall of the *ayuntamiento* the disputes very early passed beyond the control of the presiding officer. Shouts, insults, and threats filled the air; and in the next scene we find the whole company in the plaza engaged in a very noisy battle, with the presiding officer as the central object of attack. During the confusion which attended his death, his partisans had the good fortune to escape by flight.

It was evident the union could not be maintained in peace. Potosi appealed to the superior government at Lima for emancipation; while Chuquisaca defended the existing order. The authorities at Lima were disposed to uphold the claims of Chuquisaca. Not finding the desired satisfaction in the courts, Potosi resorted to her wealth, and offered the regidores of Chuquisaca thirty thousand dollars. The offer was accepted and Potosi was emancipated; but it does not appear that this sum went to the private accounts of the regidores, for it is reported that the city hall of Chuquisaca was built with this money. The new position of Potosi was recognized in 1565, by Philip II., who granted the city by a royal decree "the same liberties, dignities,

⁸ Quesada, *Cronicas Potosinas*, I, 387.

and privileges as were held by the *ayuntamiento* of Seville.⁹ Under this decree the city might have twenty-four regidores, but it became customary to have only twelve. The corregidor as governor of the district embracing the city presided at meetings of the council. In addition to the twelve regidores, the corregidor, and the two alcaldes, there were a number of other officials, making the whole number twenty-six.

The corregidor's removal from Chuquisaca to Potosi, in 1564, was not solely for the purpose of improving the political administration. He was attracted by the prospect of receiving some part of the increasing wealth of the city. Exercising his practically absolute power, he ordered that all those persons who held Indians in *encomiendas* should present them the first of each month for a personal review, and should pay at this time for each Indian the amount of two marks of silver, or sixteen ounces. For failure to meet this requirement, a fine of four thousand dollars was fixed for the first offense, and double this amount for the second; and for the third failure the penalty was loss of Indians and confiscation of property. It might have been urged that the object of this monthly review was to insure to the Indians the payment of their wages and their proper treatment by their masters; but the real object was exploitation for the benefit of the corregidor. In four months he received somewhat more than two hundred and fifty thousand ounces of silver, which the *encomenderos* thought should have tempered his avarice. Therefore, at the end of this period, they presented to him a vigorous protest against the further prosecution of his plan. Corrión, the corregidor, refused to modify his procedure, and there arose a contest that promised to develop into a civil war. Don Julian de Cupide proposed that his Indians should not be presented, and when a messenger arrived to enjoin compliance with the order, Don Julian killed him and threw

⁹ Quesada, *Cronicas Potosinas*, I, 392.

his body into the street. Then followed a fight at the house of Don Julian, in which Corrión was wounded. Later he fled to Chuquisaca, and instituted criminal proceedings against Don Julian and his followers. But these brought little satisfaction to either party, and the *corregidor*, drawn back to Potosi by his great financial opportunities, was finally assassinated.

The state of affairs in Potosi showed the need of reform. In 1568 one Ordaz, as treasurer and royal judge, arrived, commissioned to examine the condition of the administration and make such improvements as were necessary. As the chronicler presents him, he does not appear especially attractive. "He was tall, thin, with a high forehead and little hair, an aquiline nose, a big mouth, and thin pale lips. He was, in spite of his leanness, one of those who often commit the sin of gluttony. A glutton, garrulous, and arrogant, he had the capital defect of an irritable temper, which surely did not make him very agreeable in intimate association. His appearance was, moreover, rough and dry. He always spoke dogmatically, and could not bear contradiction, an evident proof of bad habits in childhood and a vicious education. He dressed in black velvet, with the cape and sword of the *hidalgo*, with a white and well-fitting collar. His emaciated figure and his penetrating look had something analogous to the appearance of a bird of prey lying in wait for its prize." His first two decrees related to the order and form of collecting the royal fifths and to regulating the work of the Indians. Afterwards he increased the *alcabala* from two to six per cent. Then there was trouble. The merchants resolved not to comply with the decree, alleging that the royal authorities had previously fixed the rate, and that the increase which violated their interests was unreasonable and unjust. They also enumerated extensive contributions to the public funds; but Ordaz was not persuaded. He was only irritated, and informed them that if they did not pay the six per cent., he would

impose double that amount as a penalty. Then, if they still refused, he would declare them disloyal and embezzlers of the royal funds, and would exile them from the city. The reply of the merchants did not indicate any disposition to give up their position. "Señor Licenciado, Your Honor is unjust, and we are disposed to give twelve millions which we have in clothing and money, in order to have the pleasure of taking the life of your honor with a thousand stabs. Consider yourself warned and be prepared."

Ordaz was advised to settle the matter by compromising with the merchants. But he was in no mood to take this course. He assembled a hundred Spaniards and four hundred Indians and proceeded to the houses where the merchants were gathered and prepared for resistance. On the arrival of the forces of Ordaz, the merchants prepared for the conflict, occupying the tops of the houses and such rooms as would enable them to discharge their weapons upon the enemy through the windows. But before the fight was over it became a hand-to-hand engagement with swords and spears. The forces of Ordaz were routed and scattered, while Ordaz himself was caught and dragged by the hair to the plaza, where his clothes were stripped off and his rawboned form was beaten with clubs. At this stage of the negotiations a number of priests and friars appeared and asked that the life of the unfortunate man might be spared. They carried him away dressed only in his shirt, amid the shouts and derision of the populace. When he had recovered from the beating he had received, he went back to Chuquisaca, and sent to the authorities at Lima an account of what had happened.¹⁰

When the messenger sent by Ordaz returned, he brought instructions from the superior authority in Lima to the audiencia and the corregidor. Under these instructions the audiencia and the corregidor were to carry out the decrees that had been issued with respect to the merchants of Po-

¹⁰ Quesada, *Cronicas Potosinas*, I, 421-429.

tosí. The merchants in the meantime had not been expecting a peaceful settlement. Many of them had retired to the agreeable and fruitful valleys of Mataka, where, in contrast with the desolate region of Potosí, were to be found in abundance the products of temperate and semi-tropical lands. Here they gathered arms, and prepared to make war on the local government, which they considered unjust and oppressive. In April, 1569, they found an additional excuse for their attitude in the arrival of General Avendaño, who had been appointed corregidor of the district embracing the Imperial City. He was commissioned to administer justice, promote the good government of the Indians of the *repartimientos*, who worked in the mines, and to introduce such reforms as were indispensable. He arrived at Potosí attended by twenty horsemen and some of his friends. Whatever favorable reputation he brought was soon smirched by his "contemning the nobles and his abusive treatment of the lower classes." Almost immediately on taking up the duties of his office he caused the arrest of a large number of persons for having been implicated in former uprisings. These arrests and the subsequent confiscation of property caused a notable increase in the ranks of the insurgents in the valleys of Mataka, who began active hostilities by interrupting the communication between the city and the neighboring valleys, from which the supplies for the city had been drawn. Owing to this interruption the inhabitants of Potosí began almost immediately to experience the scarcity and want of a besieged city. The merchants, on the other hand, were abundantly provided with money, food, and arms, and the force at their command, counting Spaniards, Indians, and negroes, embraced somewhat more than five hundred men. The troops gathered in the city went out to meet them, but in the hand-to-hand battle that ensued the merchants were victorious, and continued to dominate the approaches to Potosí. Hoping to put an end to the conflict by the removal of Avendaño,

they sent agents into the city to assassinate him, who broke into his house and killed one or two members of his household; but Avendaño escaped by jumping out of a window into another street. They shot at him, but failed to kill him. He was, however, seriously wounded by his fall, and was afterwards a miserable hunchbacked cripple, instead of the dashing and gallant official who had come to govern the city, and who had been a central figure in this episode in the unquiet life of the region.

In 1572, the viceroy, Don Francisco de Toledo, visited Potosi. He came to study the conditions with the view of issuing such decrees as would promote the peace and prosperity of the city. Fifteen days were given over to the celebration of this important event; and then, after having given some attention to the condition of the mines, he turned to the task of improving the appearance of the city. It had been built without regard to any systematic plan; and it had become necessary to broaden and straighten the streets and to form a central plaza. Provision was also made for the construction of important public buildings, such as the prison, the city hall, and the mint. Not the least of his improvements was the introduction of the use of mercury in reducing the silver ore, with the purpose of avoiding the losses that had attended the method borrowed from the Indians, and hitherto employed. In the ordinances which he issued relating to the affairs of the city, he confirmed the *repartimientos* of the Indians. Whatever beneficent design may have been entertained in constructing this system, it became here as elsewhere an oppressive form of tyranny.

A city of one hundred and twenty thousand inhabitants was not properly equipped in the sixteenth century without its traditions of miracles and its wonder-working figures. Toledo gave his assistance in this matter also. He examined the box which contained the *Santo Cristo de la Vera Cruz de Potosi*, as it had been deposited at the entrance of the church, and was persuaded that it was "a divine

gift, a holy relic, with which no one should concern himself except with profound veneration." And thus the city became possessed of a miraculous image, before which sinners were said to tremble and to repent of their sins. The Franciscan fathers sometimes cut its beard, but it grew again. They combed it every year after a procession, and distributed the hairs that came out among the faithful, but still its hair never grew thin. In the belief of the viceroy, "the *Santo Cristo* was a gift sent by angels to protect the city, and to support those who pray with faith, or turn away from sin."¹¹

That there was need of repentance in a large number of cases appears to be evident even from the meager information which the chroniclers have given us. Glimpses of lives that would have been improved by a moral awakening may be had in the gay gallants, the rich miners, and the unscrupulous gamblers who made up the circle of Doña Clara or the company that was attracted by the beauty, the wit, and the gayety of Claudia. Claudia was of the world worldly. "She was versatile, light-hearted, and amused herself in awakening passions and desires, only to break the idol of to-day on the altar of the idol of to-morrow." But at last she fell under a spell like that which she had been accustomed to exercise over others, and conceived a profound and serious passion for a distinguished official in the royal service. But the ambition of Claudia had overleaped itself, and she found herself in the position of a woman scorned. Then she determined to destroy the confidence of the official in his faithful and devoted wife. Here is the argument of the tragedy that followed. Claudia sent an anonymous letter to him while he was in Cuzco in the performance of official duties. He returned to Potosi to free himself from the doubt that tormented him. On the evening of his arrival he was made to see persons dressed as gentlemen of rank, in costumes furnished by Claudia, coming from his wife's apartments, and was then unaware

¹¹ Quesada, *Cronicas Potosinas*, II, 16-17.

that these persons were servants in disguise. What was expected to follow did follow: anger that would not reason, murder, and at last, when it was too late, a revelation of the whole series of events as a scheme arranged by Claudia to remove the person whom she vainly fancied was the only obstacle to the realization of her ambition.

The temporary prominence attained by a Doña Clara or a Claudia was due to the large number of homeless adventurers in the population, to the relatively small number of European women, and to the very limited influence exercised by wives and mothers, either in the home or in society in general. In a community kept turbulent by the passions of greed and avarice, and by expectations of extraordinary wealth, homely pleasures and homely virtues appeared too tame and colorless to be attractive. The women who broke down the barriers that surrounded the narrow life of the household, who threw virtue and all the forms of social restraint to the winds, and who spent their gains in personal adornment and luxurious living did not want for admirers and champions in the brief periods of their worldly glory. But a notable phase of the society supercharged with violent emotions was a series of horrible crimes, in which women had an active part. Jealousy, vengeance, and the desire to redress a wrong were effective motives to acts in which the hands of women were often smirched with blood.

In this society, agitated and torn by conflicting passions, there was only a feeble undertone of unworldliness. Men and women suffered here the ordinary ills of human existence, disappointment, loss of property, treachery of pretended friends; and a few sought to escape from these ills by retiring behind the walls of religious houses. But the great majority of the inhabitants were not woman-hearted. The civil wars that raged in Peru brought individual evils as well as public disaster. But in these early decades, the Spanish colonist manifested a virility that commends him to those who admire the heroic qualities of men.

THE SCHOOLS OF COLONIAL CHILE.

It is affirmed that Gonzalo de Segovia, exiled from Peru for participation in the insurrection of Gonzalo Pizarro, was the first schoolmaster in Chile; but it does not appear that he had many pupils, for the Spanish settlement in Chile at the time of his arrival was merely a military camp. For the first fourteen years there were only a few women in the settlement besides the Indians, and almost all of the children were mestizos.

Teachers are referred to in the records of Santiago for the last quarter of the sixteenth century. It was urged that one, Salinas, should be excused from going to the war against the Araucanians on the ground that "the city needed him to teach the children of its inhabitants to read and write."¹

In 1588, Diego Serrano was mentined as a teacher of children, and about the same time Pedro de Padilla had a

¹ Medina, *La Instruccion Publica en Chile*, XX; *Historiadores de Chile*, XVIII, 47. The work of Medina on Public Instruction consists of two parts. The first part is composed principally of letters, reports, and decrees which are connected with a sufficient number of paragraphs to make a fairly complete narrative. The second part is made up entirely of documents referring to the establishment of various grades of schools in Chile, covering the period from 1610 to 1738. The earliest documents in the second part of this collection relate to the foundation of the university of the Dominicans of Santiago, and the latest is the decree which constitutes the charter of the royal university of San Felipe.

school "in a house near the plaza of the city."² In 1615, Juan de Oropesa petitioned the cabildo for authority to establish a primary school. A few months later the corregidor of the capital ordered that Oropesa's school should be closed, and that the pupils should attend the school which the Jesuits had established. Subsequently Oropesa was permitted to open a second school, and a license was also granted to Torres Padilla; but by the middle of 1621 both of these schools had ceased to exist. The municipal authorities then sought to supply the need of instruction, and to this end ordered Padilla to reopen his school within eight days, or suffer the penalty of a heavy fine. But this arbitrary command does not appear to have produced the desired result. The cabildo finally escaped from its difficulties by commissioning Pedro Lisperguer to make provision for the required instruction. Later the cabildo was disposed not only to support primary schools but also to aid in the organization of instruction in Latin. In carrying out its designs with respect to the maintenance of schools the cabildo was embarrassed by lack of funds.

The first teacher of Chile mentioned as belonging to the secular clergy was Juan Blas, a mestizo, who was engaged in teaching as early as 1578, and to him "belongs the glory of having been the first teacher of Latin in Santiago."³ He had studied Arts and Theology in Lima, and was ordained a priest about 1576. The fact that he was a mestizo provoked opposition to him, but his opponents were soon relieved, for he died in 1590.

A feature of the early years of instruction in Chile was the establishment of a seminary for the education of priests who might serve as missionaries to the Indians and be placed in charge of the inferior curacies. At first it was only a project imperfectly carried out, and the seminary was closed in 1593. Ten years later, largely through the influence of Juan Perez de Espinosa it was revived and

² *Historiadores de Chile*, XIX, 196.

³ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, XL.

given a proper and permanent organization, under the control of the secular clergy.

The several orders of the regular clergy also made important contributions to the means of instruction. Friars of the order of Merced established a school in connection with their monastery in Santiago. This school embraced courses in Theology and Philosophy, which were open to persons not belonging to the order. Under the circumstances of this isolated colonial society it was difficult to maintain either among the students or the teachers an interest in the affairs of education. The indifference of both parties with reference to the work of the school may be inferred from the great amount of time given up to vacations, and from the frequent absences of the instructors at the hours appointed for their lectures. The higher authorities of the order continued to manifest their interest in instruction, and moved by this interest they made frequent attempts to correct these abuses.

The Franciscans paid not less attention to education than the Mercedarios. It is affirmed by their chronicler that studies in Arts and Philosophy flourished in their monastery at Santiago in the middle of the seventeenth century. There were professors of Latin, Philosophy, and Theology, and not only members of the monastery but also other persons were admitted to the instruction given by them.

In the middle of the seventeenth century there were three hundred and seven persons in the schools of all grades in Santiago, and the town had at this time about five thousand inhabitants. The numbers of the Spaniards in the other districts, or *corregimientos*, ranged from one hundred, in the district of Melipilla, to seven hundred in that of Serena. These were chiefly soldiers and adventurers, and many of them were illiterate. Such a population had naturally little interest in education, and spent little of its force in establishing schools. In the absence of means of instruction in Chile, some of the richest and most enterprising

of the inhabitants sent their sons to Lima; and this practice was continued into the eighteenth century.

There were, moreover, in the colony few books for any use. There were not enough for the services of the cathedral; the number of missals and breviaries was insufficient for the needs of the friars of the monasteries; and the royal audiencias found it for a time impossible either in Lima or elsewhere to obtain the books containing the royal decrees that constituted the basis of the administration. The work of the few schools already established was greatly embarrassed, as were also all other efforts contributing to colonial progress, by the large number of recognized holidays, which numbered one hundred and fifty-nine out of the three hundred and sixty-five days of the year.

In the last half of the seventeenth century Mariana de Cordova left to the Franciscans an important legacy for the foundation of a college, and Maria de Viera gave a valuable tract of land at Santiago, a part of which was sold for an endowment, while the rest was retained as a site for the institution. The president of Chile and the bishop petitioned the king to concede to the Franciscans a license to found a college near the great monastery, for studies in Arts and Theology, where persons might be trained to be confessors and preachers of the holy gospel. In reply, the queen regent, in the minority of Charles II, asked for further information and the opinion of the president and the audiencia as to the desirability of the proposed college. On the basis of the information and the opinions received affirming the utility of the institution which the Franciscans desired to establish, the king granted the required license. The correspondence on this subject lasted fifteen years, from the date of the donation, in 1664, to the concession of the royal license, in 1679. The organic law of the college, which was adopted in 1680, remained in force until 1732, when it was amended in a manner to promote a better administration and more rapid progress in the studies. The college was finally opened with five professors and five students.

Besides this institution, the Franciscans maintained two other schools in their monasteries. The examinations were held every four months. The answers were written, and the results were certified as good, medium, or bad. Those who had achieved only the third grade were required to be re-examined after four months, and by a second failure they were prohibited from continuing their studies. The library of the college was collected and supported by funds contributed by several provinces of the order, each province contributing annually two hundred dollars. The books were expected to be accessible and the librarian present one hour in the morning, from eight to nine o'clock, and one hour in the afternoon, from three to four. The members of the order could take out books on leaving a receipt for them, and could keep them one month.

The Dominicans arrived in Chile somewhat later than the Mercedarios and the Franciscans. Towards the end of the sixteenth century Friar Cristobal Nuñez, on behalf of the order, petitioned the king for license to establish in the monastery of the Dominicans an university, whose graduates might enjoy all the rights and distinctions that had been granted to the graduates of the university that had been founded in Lima. In replying to this petition, March 1, 1589, the king asked to be informed as to what advantage would accrue from the establishment of the proposed university, or if any inconveniences would result from its foundation. This inquiry meant that if the request set forth in the petition were ever granted, it would be only after years of delay. In the meantime provision was made for teaching Latin in the monastery. The salary of the teacher who was appointed for this purpose appears to have been expected from subscriptions at first, but later by royal decree it was ordered that it should be paid for a period of four years from the royal treasury in Lima. But here new difficulties arose in the inability of the monastery to secure the execution of this decree. The instruction was, however, continued, and later an effort was made to have the order

revived, which had imposed upon the royal officials the obligation to pay the salary. It was proposed that they should pay the salary of the instructor not only for the future but also for the four years past when it had been expected from the royal treasury. Yet in spite of these difficulties the services of the teacher were continued, and in 1595, to the teaching of Latin in the monastery there was added instruction in the Arts, Philosophy, and Theology.⁴

A few years later it was determined to send one of the friars, Hernando Maxía, to Spain, commissioned to solicit assistance from the king, to recruit friars, and to obtain a license for founding an university in the monastery of Rosario in Santiago. At this time action by Spanish authorities or by the authorities of the church concerning the Spanish colonies was taken only after long delay and after opportunity, at least, for mature deliberation. The privilege sought by Maxía and those who followed him on behalf of the Dominicans of Chile was finally granted in 1619.⁵ The university authorized by this grant was destined to be in a large measure eclipsed in a short time by the more efficient instruction of the Jesuits. This superior efficiency was recognized by the Pope; for while in 1627 he ordered that degrees granted by the Dominicans and the Jesuits should be valid only in America, he annulled this decree in 1634 with respect to the Jesuits, ordering at the same time that the degrees granted by the Jesuit colleges in America should be recognized everywhere. This was clearly an exercise of papal influence in favor of the Jesuits, and was not merely an important hindrance to the progress of the

⁴ The first instructor in these subjects was Friar Cristobal Valdespino, who was born in Jerez de la Frontera in 1570. He began his studies in the *Colegio de la Asuncion* which the Jesuits maintained in Cordova in Spain. He went to Chile in 1596, in company with other members of the order, and was appointed by royal decree missionary to the Indians. He was elected prior of the monastery, and soon after, in 1598, became provincial, but resigned this office at the end of the year, continuing, however, his work as instructor.

⁵ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, Documentos, No. 1.

Dominican university, but also made it more than ever difficult for that institution to maintain the standing which it had in the beginning.

The Jesuits arrived in Santiago April 12, 1593. Within six weeks after this date they had purchased a house, and taken up the work of their mission. Devoted, according to Olivares, "to youth and the education of children, they appointed one day in the week when the children of the schools might come to their *colegio*; they came with their crosses decorated, and repeating their prayers. Here the Christian doctrine was taught and explained to them by the questions and answers of the catechism. They were also taught to sing certain songs in praise of the Divine, in order to drive out of their mouths other profane songs which corrupted their innocent manners. This exercise having been concluded, they returned as they had come, delighted when they had received a prize for having responded well."⁶ This course was continued until the Jesuits had established a school for reading and writing where all might come and receive instruction without cost. This instruction was later extended by introducing a course in Latin. The first teacher of this course was Juan de Olivares, who began his instruction in 1595. This was followed by the addition of a course in the Arts, which was attended not only by residents of Santiago, but also by members of the other orders. A few years later, in 1608, a professorship of Theology was established. During the following years, instruction by the Jesuits in Santiago suffered embarrassing changes, particularly after the founding of the university of Cordova, in 1613, to which students were transferred from Santiago. Finally, in 1623, the bull of Gregory XV. was received in Chile. This permitted the Jesuits to found public universities in the Philippines, in New Grenada, in Tucuman, in Rio de la Plata, and in Santiago de Chile, and in the other provinces and cities of the Indies, where there was no provision for general studies, and where the sites of the pro-

⁶ *Historia de la Compañía*, 24

posed universities were two hundred miles from universities already established. The license from the king provided, moreover, that the students of the college, or university, organized under it, having complied with the customary conditions, should receive the degree of bachelor, licenciado, or doctor from the hands of the bishop or the ecclesiastical cabildo.⁷ With the advantages enjoyed under the royal concession, and by means of the large donations made to the order from time to time, the Jesuits were not only able to carry on the work of the university, but also to maintain seminaries for the special training of persons for their missionary and educational enterprises.

With the arrival of the bull of Gregory XV. in Santiago a new question arose. The rector of the university, Rodrigo Vasquez, presented the bull to the audiencia in order that the university might have the formal approval of that body. It was found, however, that the document lacked certain necessary signatures of certification, and on this ground the audiencia decreed that the university might continue its instruction, but that it must abstain from giving degrees until the bull should be presented with the requisite signatures.

This delay led the Dominicans to petition to have it proclaimed that they had an university already founded. They expected that by obtaining such a declaration first the pretensions of the other party would be defeated. The result of the petition was a decree authorizing the *padres* of Santo Domingo to maintain an university. At length the bull in favor of the Jesuits was returned from Lima with the proper certificates; this did not bring about peace between the two orders, but on the contrary intensified the conflict. Each party sought to prevent the other from exercising the right to confer degrees. Nevertheless instruction was continued at both universities, but that given by the Jesuits was generally preferred and was attended by the larger number of students. In the meantime arguments and a judicial controversy engaged the attention of both orders.

⁷ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, Documents, 63-66, 67.

“The case of the Jesuits against the Dominicans concerning studies was a mere reproduction of other similar cases that arose in Manila and Quito.”⁸

The Augustinians established themselves in Chile somewhat later than the other orders. Their monastery was founded in 1595, but it is not clear at what time their first school was opened. Much apparently reliable testimony, however, indicates that the Augustinians “from the date of their foundation had studies in Latin, the Arts, and Theology, as well for members of their order as for all those who wished to go to their monasteries.”⁹

It is easy to understand, when we know that the other religious orders had opened their schools, that there could not be many students who would take the courses of the Augustinians, particularly when it is added that the place itself which was occupied by the order was the lower part of the houses of Riberos that had not yet been made habitable after they had been burned.¹⁰ But at this stage Andres de Elosu appeared, and through his capacity for organization reduced the studies of the monastery, by 1615, to a certain systematic order. The Jesuit historian, Olivares, calls Elosu “one of the most learned, serious, and zealous priests this province of Chile has had, and it was he who gave form to literary studies in his monastery.”¹¹ The organization given to instruction in the school of the Augustinian monastery was further developed by the friar, Baltasar Pérez de Espinosa. Still the Augustinians continued to suffer the disadvantages of not having the power to confer degrees; and this disadvantage appeared especially conspicuous when their prospects were compared with those of the Dominicans and the Jesuits. All students were quite naturally disposed to go where at the expiration of a certain term of study they might legitimately present themselves as

⁸ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, CCXXXIX.

⁹ *Carta de la Real Audiencia al Rey*, Feb. 10, 1634, quoted by Medina.

¹⁰ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, CCXLIX.

¹¹ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, CCXLIX.

candidates for one or another academic degree. The early educational institutions of Santiago that were able to confer academic degrees, derived this power from the king, who usually made this concession on the basis of information derived from the audiencia, and with the advice of the Council of the Indies.

In view of their want of power to confer degrees, the Augustinians petitioned for authority to create an university in their monastery. The king sent this petition to the audiencia of Chile, and asked that body to inform him as to what advantages or inconveniences would accrue from the foundation of the proposed institution. When finally the king made his reply to the petitioners, it was unfavorable to the project of the friars, who were thus compelled to confine their efforts to a less ambitious task. In spite of the subsequent foundation of a college with the title of San Ildefonso de los Reyes, the educational branch of the monastery fell into a serious decline, attended by lamentable consequences for the preaching and ceremonies of the church. A large factor in the demoralization of the instruction, as well as of all of the affairs of the community, was the earthquake of 1647, which laid the city in ruins and cut off the revenues of the monastery.

A certain revival, or a reorganization, of studies was effected somewhat later by Friar Augustine Carrillo de Ojeda; and the funds required to carry out Ojeda's ideas were obtained through a donation made by Doña Mariana de Cordova y Aguilera, in 1659. The donation of Doña Mariana consisted of several blocks of land in Santiago with a large house, a vineyard, ten slaves, and a large quantity of jewelry, and was designed for the establishment of a college under the title of Santo Tomás de Villanueva. For this proposed institution a charter was sought that would convey "all the privileges of any other university;" and would provide that those students who might take the courses in the proposed college would have an opportunity to receive by royal authority any academic degree up to that

of Doctor of Theology. The king refused to grant this petition; whereupon Ojeda speaking for the Augustinians, requested that there might be granted to the principal monastery of his order the privileges of an university and of general studies, so that those persons who were there instructed might be graduated in the faculties of Arts and Theology.

Having received this request, the king, as on other occasions, avoided the necessity of making a decision immediately by asking the audiencia of Chile for information.¹² When finally a decision was rendered, it appears, as in many other cases, to have been a denial of the request of the Augustinians. As the validity of the donation depended on the establishment of the college within six years, the friars feared that, in view of the difficulties they encountered in attempting to carry out their plans, the property would revert to the donor. In order, therefore, to avoid this loss, a rector of the contemplated college was appointed, who would assume active duties in case the college should be established. But at the expiration of six years the proposed college had not been established. Nevertheless the studies of the principal monastery were transferred to the edifice on the land embraced in the Doña Mariana's donation; and the college of San Miguel Arcángel was substituted for the proposed college of Santo Tomás de Villanueva. Towards the end of the eighteenth century this college became the college of Nuestra Señora del Carmen.

An early attempt to organize instruction in Chile outside of Santiago was made in the city of Imperial. It was here proposed to establish a seminary for ecclesiastical studies, as well as an university, and the king's reply to the request for authority was dated January 26, 1568. This reply was in the usual form of a demand for information, addressed to the audiencia. It was found that the

¹² The memorial of Ojeda on this subject and the king's reply, addressed to the audiencia, are printed in Medina, *Instrucción Pública*, pp. CCLXX, CCLXXI.

conditions did not warrant the establishment of an university, but in the course of time a seminary was organized. Somewhat later this seminary was transformed into "a school that was attended by all the youth of the bishopric of Concepcion to study Philosophy and Theology."¹³ By a royal order of 1697, provision was made for a professorship of the Araucanian language; and a similar professorship was established at the same time in Santiago. These foundations were designed for the instruction of missionaries to the Araucanian Indians, who, from time to time, were sent from Spain. Even before the foundation of this school, the monasteries had given a little elementary instruction in their houses. The earliest positive notice we have of such instruction in Concepcion refers to the teaching of the Jesuits. A noteworthy practice of the *colegio*, or school, that grew out of the seminary, was that once every week, when the weather permitted, the pupils "went out under the direction of the master of the school or some other priest, singing the *doctrina* through the streets, which they repeated in the form of a dialogue, concluding the walk with an explanation of some point of Christian doctrine, or with a moral exhortation."¹⁴

When the Jesuits were expelled in 1767, the school which they had established and the seminary were united and became the college of San Carlos. The new institution practically monopolized the instruction given in Concepcion, since that offered in the monasteries was unimportant.

Among the other towns of Chile, Serena, Valparaiso, and Copiapó were the only ones in which, in the colonial period, provision was made for teaching even reading and writing. The Franciscans opened the first primary school in Serena, as they were the first of the orders to establish themselves in that town. The Jesuits came a little later, after the cabildo of Serena had petitioned the king to permit them to establish a school there. The beginnings of this school

¹³ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, CCCVII.

¹⁴ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, CCCXVI.

belong to the decade between 1670 and 1680. Serena had then about seventy houses, three-fourths of which were miserable straw huts, and less than ten thousand inhabitants. The town had already been ruined by an earthquake, and plundered by pirates.

The first school in Valparaiso was founded by an Italian Jesuit, Antonio María Fanelli. In Copiapó each of the three orders, the Franciscans, the Mercedarios, and the Jesuits, made certain provisions for primary instruction.

The provision made, through the professorships established in Concepcion and Santiago, for teaching the Araucanian language, was without effect, since no one came to be taught, and for this reason it was found desirable to abandon the project for giving such instruction in the schools as would fit missionaries to preach in the Araucanian language. It was found, moreover, that the Indians learned Spanish readily, and that this language was better adapted to convey the doctrines of the church than a language that had come into existence among semi-savages, who had always been ignorant of many of the conceptions which the church wished to give them. To render the Araucanian language fit to convey ecclesiastical doctrines many new words would be necessary, and the Indians would have had quite as much difficulty in understanding these as the words already in use in Spanish. It was, therefore, determined to establish schools for teaching the Indians Spanish, instead of pursuing the hopeless task of trying to prepare missionaries to preach in Araucanian. Experience in other parts of America led the Spaniards to a similar resolution with respect to their missionary work among the Indians. They came gradually to the opinion, which is no longer debatable, that in order to civilize the savage, it is necessary to give him a language of civilization. In keeping with this view, a royal decree of May 30, 1691, provided that in the Indian towns there should be schools, one for boys and one for girls, where the Indians might be taught Spanish. But when the small number of the inhabitants did not permit

the maintenance of two schools, both sexes should be taught together. Although this decree was issued with special reference to Peru and New Grenada, it was found desirable to apply it to Chile. "The condition of the Indians was such that it was not only necessary to teach the Spanish language to those who had recently been brought into subjection, and to assign salaries to teachers, but also to provide means of support for the boys who attended the schools."¹⁵ Just before the close of the seventeenth century, Charles II. sent ten Franciscans and forty Jesuits to Chile to carry on the educational and religious work among the Indians. They arrived in Santiago in May, 1699. About the same time, by a decree directed to the audiencia, the king provided for the creation of a council of missions. This body, when organized, was composed of the oldest member of the cabildo of Santiago, the bishop and dean of the cathedral, the royal officials, and two ecclesiastics who were familiar with the work that had been done among the Indians. This decree provided, moreover, that "there should be founded a *colegio seminario* for the education of the sons of the Indian caciques," and that instruction in this school should be in the hands of the Jesuits, who should teach reading, writing, arithmetic, Latin, and morals. The government of the school was committed to the council of missions, which was required to frame for the institution a constitution and the necessary regulations. This decree was brought to Chile in 1698, and after some discussion it was determined to establish the *colegio seminario* at Chillan. When the three Jesuits, who were to have charge of the instruction, arrived in Chillan, they found that only mean and inadequate quarters had been provided for their accommodation and for the school.

The most serious problem was not that involved in the foundation of the school, but that of getting the pupils

¹⁵ Don Tomás Marin de Poveda, President of Chile, to the king of Spain, June 2, 1696; printed in Medina *Instruccion Publica*, CCCXXX.

for whom provision had been made. Don Pedro Riquelme, who as a child had been a captive among the Indians, was commissioned to go into their territory and ask the chiefs to send their sons to be educated by the Spaniards. Some of the chiefs received this proposition with great disfavor; and the suggestion that their sons might be taught to read and write and even to become priests awakened no enthusiasm in the minds of any of them. The pride and conservatism of the Indians led them to oppose the project of having their sons taught to read and write if thereby the younger generation were to be caused to forget the traditions of their people, or to regard their ancestors with less respect. Without learning to read and write, the caciques affirmed, they had known how to defend themselves, their liberties and the customs of their people. It was only with the greatest difficulty that any of the sons of the caciques were persuaded to go to the school. When the authorities of the *colegio seminario* found it to be practically impossible to assemble from the families of the Araucanian chiefs the sixteen pupils for whom provision had been made, President Ibañez sent a captain to the region east of the Andes to recruit pupils. The captain succeeded, and brought back seven intrants, but, as the Jesuit historian Olivares observed, "God knows by what means." The impossibility of attracting the sons of the chiefs, for whom the school had been established, was only one of the difficulties encountered. The income designated by the king did not continue to be available, and the institution fell into financial embarrassment. Then came a revival of Araucanian hostility towards the Spaniards; and in 1723 it became clear that the school had failed; not, however, without leaving in the mind of the Spaniard the hope that by some similar process these vigorous barbarians would sometime be civilized and brought into the church.

The schools of Chile in the early decades usually occupied quarters in or near the center of the town, the

schoolrooms opening directly on the street. Pedro de Padilla's school in Santiago was on the street at present called Ahumada, only half a block from the principal plaza, while the rooms of the Jesuits' school in Concepcion opened on the plaza itself. The furniture was of the rudest kind. Sometimes there were wooden benches, but "in certain instances seats for the children were entirely wanting, and for this reason they had to remain standing or squatting."¹⁶ There were no maps or blackboards on the walls, but sometimes two or three prints of saints. No general regulations governing teaching and discipline appear to have been issued with exclusive reference to the schools of Chile, but it may be supposed that the rules issued by Benito Juárez de Gil, in 1598, for the teachers of reading, writing, and arithmetic in Lima, fairly represented the ideas entertained in Chile concerning the conduct of schools. This document shows how much more attention was given to practices and ceremonies imposed by the church than to acquiring knowledge of subjects on which secular instruction lays stress.

It is hardly possible to classify the schools below the university as primary and secondary, for in all of them much of the work was elementary, the teaching of pupils to read and write. In those cases where the pupils lived in a building or in buildings belonging to the school, they were kept under the strict supervision of one of the members of a religious order or brotherhood, whose principal function was to keep them out of crime, and teach them the practices and doctrines of the church.

The universities gave three degrees: that of bachelor of arts; that of licentiate of arts; and that of doctor. The degree of bachelor was given after the candidate had studied Logic and Metaphysics two years, and passed an examination before five members of the university. The degree of licentiate was given after a successful examination held at the end of the third year of study.

¹⁶ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, CCCXL.

For the degree of doctor a longer residence was necessary, and the candidate was required to give evidence of extensive reading in scholastic philosophy and mediæval theology. The curriculum of the university of the Jesuits in Santiago was similar to that of the universities maintained by this order in Córdoba, Bogotá, and Manila.¹⁷

In the Jesuit and Dominican universities, the rector's power was limited to establishing and arranging the courses of instruction, and conferring degrees; "but he was without any jurisdiction whatever over the graduates."¹⁸ Although the universities did not differ from one another greatly with respect to organization, they stood for somewhat different doctrines. The Dominicans followed Thomas Aquinas, while the Jesuits were Molinists, taking the *Concordia liberi arbitrii* of Luis de Molina as their guide.¹⁹

Although the Dominicans and the Jesuits had established schools empowered to confer degrees, there were some persons who thought the need of instruction was not fully satisfied. The character and scope of the teaching in each of these institutions were in a large measure determined by the special purposes of the controlling order. There arose, therefore, the idea of an university with less exclusive aims. The bishop of Imperial, Antonio de San Miguel, gave early expression to this idea, and Juan Pérez de Espinosa, bishop of Santiago, wrote to the king advocating the founding in Chile of a royal university. He affirmed that such an university would be important, as it would attract students from the provinces of Tucuman and Rio de la Plata, and make it unnecessary for young men to go from Chile to Lima for instruction.²⁰ But in view of the poverty of the colony, the small number

¹⁷ Medina, *Instrucción Publica*, CCCLVI-CCCLXIII; see Garro.

¹⁸ Medina, CCCLXIII.

¹⁹ Medina, CCCLXIV.

²⁰ Letter to the king, March 20, 1602; see Medina, CCCLXXVIII.

of inhabitants, and the constant war with the Araucanians, it was difficult to make the projected university appear as an immediate necessity. The authorities of Spain, having granted charters to two universities in Chile, were persuaded that through them ample provision might be made for the education of the Chileans.

But in the beginning of the eighteenth century it was observed that neither the Jesuits nor the Dominicans gave the instruction required in law and medicine, so that those who went to the schools of Lima had a distinct advantage over the Chileans who could not conveniently meet the expenses of the journey and of residence in that city. Moreover, during the one hundred years following the first suggestion of a royal university by the bishops of Imperial and Santiago, the population of Chile had increased; the colony had made progress in wealth; its attention was not wholly taken up by Araucanian wars; and many persons saw the need of offering the youth of the colony opportunities comparable with those furnished by the schools of Lima. The project to found an university was, therefore, brought before the cabildo of Santiago in December, 1713. One of the alcaldes, Francisco Ruiz de Berecedo,²¹ presented the subject in an extensive address, and urged the establishment of an university under the royal patronage. He advocated that for this purpose there should be annually set aside in perpetuity from the funds of the royal treasury the sum of five thousand two hundred dollars to erect and maintain a royal university, which should bear the name of Saint Philip, the apostle, and be an eternal memorial to Philip V. The cabildo, having heard this address, agreed unanimously that a letter should be sent to the king, urging him to issue a decree creating the proposed university and setting aside from the royal treasury the sum named for its support. This meeting of the cabildo was held December 2, 1713.

²¹ For documents relating to Francisco Ruiz de Berecedo, see Medina, CCCLXXXVI-CCCCI.

During the next twenty years the authorities of Chile and the king were in correspondence with reference to the establishment of a royal university. Important among the representations to the king and the Council of the Indies was that made by the authorized agent of the cabildo of Santiago, who had been sent to Madrid. This was Don Tomás de Azúa.²² The communication of Tomás de Azúa was directed to the Council of the Indies. This body had already in its possession a large number of documents from Chile dealing with the foundation of the proposed university; and on the basis furnished by these communications, and on the report of its attorney, the Council formed its final opinion, which was delivered to the king under date of April 12, 1736. A little more than two years later the decree establishing a royal university was issued, July 28, 1738. One hundred and thirty-six years had passed since the first communication from Chile on this subject was sent to the king. The action was not rapid on the Spanish colonial stage.

The royal decree of 1738 was the charter of the university. In two long paragraphs it set forth the need of an university in Chile and the conditions under which it should be established; and in a final paragraph the king made the formal grant: "I concede and give a license for the foundation, erection, and establishment of the proposed university in the before-mentioned city of Santiago of the kingdom of Chile, and I command my governor and captain general, royal audiencia, secular and ecclesiastical cabildos, and royal officials of the already mentioned city of Santiago, and other ministers and persons of the said kingdom, that knowing this my royal resolution they render their assistance for its most exact execution without permitting any alteration whatsoever in the plan and rule with which it is my will the foundation of the university should be carried out in the said city of Santiago; and this despatch shall be observed by the keepers of the ac-

²² See Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, CCCCXXIII-CCCCXXX.

counts of my Council of the Indies, and by the royal officials of the already mentioned city of Santiago de Chile."²³ The university thus established was maintained until 1843, when it was superseded by the University of Chile.

In the last half of the eighteenth century the cities of Chile had funds which they might use for the support of public schools. Many of those that were founded during this period made provision for erecting schoolhouses and paying teachers. In some of the villages a school was supported by certain special imposts or rents. The salaries of the most highly paid teachers of Santiago seldom, if ever, exceeded two hundred and fifty dollars a year. This amount was sometimes augmented by fees paid by some of the pupils. These fees were not demanded from those pupils who were thought to be unable to pay them; and with regard to this requirement, the majority of the inhabitants were counted among the poor.

Towards the end of the century four groups, or grades, of pupils were recognized. These were the *Minimos*, the *Minores*, the *Mayores*, and the students of Latin. The first two groups were not widely separated from one another, and they were taught to read, to write, and to recite prayers. These two primary groups at any given time embraced the majority of the pupils in the schools. In the class of the *Mayores*, to which comparatively few were promoted, grammar, the elements of arithmetic, catechism, and writing constituted the curriculum. The students studying Latin formed the fourth class. There were very few of them; in Santiago, in 1803, there was only one school where Latin was taught; and in the provinces persons wishing this more advanced instruction had to make arrangements to receive it privately.

The majority of the teachers were members of either the secular or regular clergy. The certificates entitling

²³ Medina, *Instruccion Publica*, Documentos, No. XX. The report of the attorney of the Council of the Indies and the opinions of that body concerning the foundation of a royal university in Chile are printed in this volume by Medina, Nos. XVII-XIX.

them to teach were issued by the captain general of Chile, and their work was subject to the supervision of a director general of schools, who was usually the rector, or one of the professors, of the University of San Felipe. "The respect of the youth for their teacher was so great that it could be compared only with that which they had for their fathers. On meeting a teacher in the street, the pupil respectfully stepped down from the sidewalk with his hat in his hand, and saluted him in passing with the expression, 'May God protect your grace.'"²⁴

The teacher had two prominent assistants, one called the *Emperor* and the other the *General*, one of whom sat on either side of him in the schoolroom. "The Emperor was the second in the school after the teacher; he took the teacher's place in his absence, and had all the pupils under his care, punishing the delinquents, teaching their lessons to those who were backward, and serving as intermediary between the teacher and his pupils." He was, moreover, generally elected by the pupils themselves for a period of one year. He had charge of the lessons of the pupils, corrected their papers, imposed such punishments as he thought they deserved; but from such punishments there was an appeal to the teacher. The second assistant, called the *General*, was appointed by the teacher, also for one year. He exercised special supervision over the younger children in the school. In some schools he recited the prayers which were to be repeated by the rest of the pupils. He led the singing, and began the reading exercises. There were certain other pupils who acted as assistants: the *Captains*, who called the roll; the *Pasantes*, who heard the lessons of the more backward pupils when the class was too large to be conducted by the teacher; the *ensign*, who was the standard bearer of the school; and the *Fiscal*, whose functions more nearly corresponded to those of an executioner than to those of an attorney. He was generally the strongest boy in the school, and his principal business in

²⁴ José Manuel Frontaura Arana, *Las Escuelas Publicas de Chile á fines de la era colonial*, 9.

his office was to hold the delinquents while they were being flogged. He was naturally detested by the other boys.

The number of pupils charged with general duties in relation to the affairs of the school was so great as to suggest that the teacher might have considered himself to a great extent relieved from responsibility; for besides those already mentioned there were many others, among whom were the *Libreros*, who took care of the books and papers of the pupils, and mended their pens; the *Escoleros*, who swept the schoolroom; the *Sacristan*, who took care of the altar, when there was one in the schoolhouse; and the *Veedores*, who watched the conduct of the other pupils both in and out of the schoolroom.

The hours of the school were from eight to eleven in the morning and from two to five in the afternoon. The undemocratic spirit of Spanish colonial society made itself manifest in the school. To quote Don José Zapiola, "the school was divided into two sections, not according to the degree of advancement of the pupils, nor the character of their studies, but according to the social category to which the child belonged. The most distinguished in this sense occupied the two sides of the room nearest the teacher, who had his seat at the front of the room. Those less favored by fortune had places also on both sides, farther on than those of the first class."²⁵ Another manifestation of this spirit was the absolute exclusion of negroes and sambos from the ranks of the pupils. In 1804, a criminal charge was brought against a teacher for having a little negro in his school, with the result that the negro was expelled and the teacher was suspended for one year. The teacher was accustomed to apply the title of *Don* to the boys of the first class, and their parents paid a certain monthly contribution to the teacher as tuition, while the education of the others was gratuitous. One observes a recognition of Spanish dignity in the rule that no pupil in addressing a fellow-pupil should use the term *tu* or *vos*, but only *usted*, and

²⁵ *Recuerdos de treinta años*, quoted by Frontaura Arana, 17; Frontaura Arana, 11-18.

that whoever applied a nickname to another pupil would be severely punished.

Among the pupils themselves there were two parties, called *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, who were rivals in their sports; and sometimes this rivalry led them to engage in lively battles with stones, which tended to terrorize the neighborhood. These conflicts produced a certain physical discipline, or hardening, which was increased by the frequent and severe punishments to which the pupils were subjected. These were so frequent that the office of *fiscal* in the school was in no sense a sinecure. These two parties, or *bandas*, were also recognized in certain mental contests, that were known as *remates*, or that took their names from the days of the week on which they were held, as *mercolinas* and *sabatinas*. In these contests the pupils asked one another questions on the various subjects which they had studied in the schools. The *sabatinas* were held in public, as affirmed by the general director of schools, "in order to enlighten the people and the street urchins and make them comprehend the disgrace of ignorance and stimulate them to study."²⁶

The difference between the poor and the rich pupils was also observed in the practice of furnishing the former with whatever articles were necessary for their work in the school, while the latter were required to purchase them. The teachers sent annually to the governor of the province, or to the *cabildo*, a requisition for such supplies as would be needed during the year.²⁷

²⁶ See Frontaura Arana, 22.

²⁷ The following is a list of articles furnished annually to the Royal School at Osorno:

4 Doz. Alphabetical Charts, @ 7 reales.....	\$ 3—4.
4 Doz. Primers, @ 30 reales a dozen.....	15
12 Copies of "Art de Estudiar", @ 5 reales.....	7—4.
4 Books on other subjects, @ \$1.....	4
1 Ream of Paper.....	14
6 Pautas (for lining paper), @ \$2.....	12
42 Samples for use in writing, @ an average of one real and a half.....	7—7.
Transportation to Valparaiso and from there to Osorno.....	2—4.
Total.....	\$66—3.

Learning the letters from the charts was an especially noisy process, for the pupils called their names together in a loud voice, and the uproar which they caused could be heard throughout the whole length of the street. From the charts the pupils passed on to the elementary reader, which contained religious proverbs, anecdotes, and short stories full of moral and social instruction, together with certain prayers from the catechism. Pupils who had used the elementary reader were afterwards advanced to the reading class properly so called. Here they read aloud by turns, the "general" beginning, and because of the lack of books, the one used by the "general" was passed from hand to hand down the whole class. As the members of the class had no books in which they might follow the reader, the teacher found it difficult to keep them attentive, and every now and then he halted the reader and asked some apparently inattentive pupil what was the last word the reader had uttered. If the person questioned could not tell, he was punished, and then the reading was continued.²⁸

The results of instruction in writing in the colonial schools were noteworthy, perhaps more noteworthy than those achieved in any other department. The pupils were first taught to form the letters, and then the practice in writing words was made at the same time an exercise in spelling. The study of the catechism was begun on the pupil's entrance into the school, even before he had been taught to read and write. Besides prayers and certain points of Christian doctrine, he was taught the forms of

²⁸ The following are some of the books most commonly used for reading:

El catecismo, by Ripaldá.

El compendio histórico de la religión, by Pintón.

El compendio de la historia de España, by Duchesne.

La clave historial, by Padre Enrique Flores.

El niño instruido en la divina palabra, by Friar Manuel de San José.

El catecismo, by Fleuri.

Los diálogos de Desiderio y Electo.

La guía de pecadores, by Friar Luis de Granada.

La curiosa filosofía, by Padre Nieremberg.

Diferencia entre lo temporal y eterno, by Padre Nieremberg.

procedure at mass, not only those observed by the assistant, but also the procedure of the priest. As much publicity as possible was given to this phase of instruction, and knowledge of these things was often the subject of the public contests called *remates*. Questions in arithmetic also furnished subjects for these contests among the pupils. The teacher questioned them as they sat in a row, and when one answered a question which others had failed to answer he went up to, or towards, the head of the class. In some schools this exercise was held on Thursday, and lasted about an hour. The pupil who was at the head of the class at the close of this period retained his position until deprived of it by some contestant the following week.

The teaching of Latin occupied a position midway between the instruction of the primary schools and that of the universities, but, as already suggested, it was followed by only a few students. To be qualified to teach Latin one had to have a special certificate, which was granted only after a careful examination. In the schools of the monasteries there were usually courses of instruction in Latin, which lasted three or more years.

The books used in the schools by the pupils were carefully examined by the proper authorities "to avoid the impression of false or evil ideas at an age in which they become indelible, and exert an influence on the whole of the later life." This examination of the text-books became necessary because of the entire lack of uniformity among those used by the different members of the school; and this condition of affairs arose from the absence of facilities for printing in Chile, and the difficulty of getting books from any source. Before 1812 only a very little printing had been done in Chile, and this was unimportant.

The tenth article of the decree of Charles III., dated July 11, 1771, touched on the subject of text-books for the schools, and affirmed that the proper selection of books to be used by the children in learning to read would contribute much to the attainment of the desired end; that hitherto

pious fables, badly constructed stories, or injudicious devotional writings, without purity of language or well-founded maxims, have tended to deprave the taste of the children and accustom them to improper forms of speech, to a mischievous credulousness, and to many evils of grave import with respect to their whole life, especially in the case of those persons who do not advance or improve their education with other studies: wherefore the king ordered, that, besides the small elementary catechism of the diocese, the instruction in the schools should be carried on by the use of the *Compendio historico de la Religion*, of Pintón, the *Catecismo histórico*, of Fleuri, and some other compendium of the history of the nation, which may be designated respectively by the *corregidores*, as the heads of the districts, in agreement with, or under the advice of, properly informed persons; attention being given to the works of this last class, with which the schools of the districts in question may be easily supplied, and in which the curiosity of the children will be interested, and from which they will not receive the distaste and ideas which other kinds of works produce during their tender years.²⁹

Towards the close of the colonial period many complaints reached the captain general concerning the schools of Santiago. It was alleged that the teachers were cruel, that the schoolrooms were in a neglected state, and that the pupils derived no profit from the instruction. In view of this evidence of popular dissatisfaction, the president and captain general, Luis Muñoz de Guzman, commissioned Manuel de Irigoyen, a member of the audiencia, to visit all the schools of the capital for the purpose of investigating the condition of their quarters and the character of their teaching. The visits of the commissioner were made unannounced, and he often found the pupils entirely neglected by their teacher. The report of this inquiry as it appears among the documents published by Frontaura Arana does not give evidence of a very thorough examination. The

²⁹ Barros Arana, *Historia jenerale de Chile*, VIII, 488.

first part of it gives the names of the schools visited, the number of pupils enrolled, the number present, and the number absent, also the names of the teachers. The number of absences was not unusually large. In the second part of this report, the commissioner called attention to "the want of accommodations for the pupils in all of the schools, the extraordinary lack of cleanliness, so that some of them appeared more like stables than schoolhouses for instruction; and in one of them he noted that there was a negro among the pupils."⁸⁰ Of the nine schools visited, seven were of the primary grade, or for *minores*, and they had respectively one hundred and twenty-seven, eighty-seven, seventy-five, fifty-seven, thirty-three, sixteen, and four pupils. The school for *mayores* had nine pupils, and the Latin school twenty. This visit and report did not embrace certain schools that were not dependent on the municipality. The most important of the schools not investigated were that of *Santo Tomás de Aquino*, maintained by the Dominican monastery, and the Franciscan school of *San Buenaventura*. A complete list of the schools of Santiago would include, at least, five other schools for *mayores*, and a primary school in each parish, kept by the priest or his assistant, or by some other ecclesiastic appointed by them.

But the best school in Chile, in the opinion of the governmental inspector, was the Latin school of Juan Antonio Gonzalez. This, like all of the schools, except those established for Indians, was for boys and young men. At this time in Chile no public provision had been made for the education of girls. Frontaura Arana repudiates, however, the idea that Chilean women were ignorant, and affirms that they had all the education they needed in order to enable them to perform their part well in the society to which they belonged. "There were," he says, "no public schools for girls known during the colonial period; it is not true, however, that, for lack of public schools, they remained without any education. In the majority of the convents

⁸⁰ *Las Escuelas Públicas de Chile*, 53.

of the capital, a large number of girls were educated who were destined to figure later in cultivated society. It is, however, unquestionably true that this education was confined to the elements of knowledge, to certain ideas of adornment and to religious instruction; but it is not less certain that these were the only items of knowledge necessary for a young woman destined to live in the retirement of her family, caring for her house and her children."⁸¹

From his visit in 1795, Vancouver derived the impression that in Santiago the education of the women was to such an extent neglected that among them were only a few who knew how to read and write. Against this view the champions of Chilean women cite the large number of signatures of women, which appear in the records of the audiencia and the other tribunals. At the same time they admit that there were no institutions where girls could receive instruction gratuitously; and as the convents could receive only a very limited number of the girls and young women of the colony, it follows inevitably that the majority of women in Chile, as in the other Spanish colonies, were practically without such education as is acquired in the schools.

The expulsion of the Jesuits, in 1767, produced an important crisis in the affairs of education in Chile. Their schools had maintained a higher educational standard, and a more strict discipline than most of the other schools. On account of the large number of pupils who attended them, it has been said "that, by the middle of the eighteenth century the Jesuits had monopolized in Chile the teaching of the youth."⁸² The fact that they had schools in all of the important towns, and that the most distinguished writers on Chilean affairs were Jesuits, constitutes a sufficient indication of the preëminent influence which that order exerted on the intellectual life of colonial Chile. Moreover, the Jesuits had maintained missions among the Indians, and

⁸¹ *Escuelas Publicas de Chile*, 42.

⁸² Frontaura Arana, 148.

had carried their teaching to the remotest corners of inhospitable Araucania. With their expulsion their whole system of instruction and civilizing agencies that had been constructed with untold labor and patience was destroyed at a single blow. The property which they had gathered and transformed into material instruments for the prosecution of their educational and religious work was confiscated by the government, but it became in a very large measure useless, because there were no competent men available to take the places of those who had been withdrawn. Through this act, therefore, the best schools which Chile had were destroyed, and the efforts of the civil authorities to construct a new system, or extend the public schools already in existence, were halting and inefficient, and sometimes attended with great negligence, if not dishonesty; as when the cabildo of Santiago, having agreed to pay Friar Julian del Rosario an annual salary of two hundred and seventy dollars, made it impossible for him to collect it at the time designated in the agreement, and obliged him always to appeal to the supreme government of the colony.

The affairs of San Felipe el Real illustrate some of the effects of the expulsion. This town was founded in 1740, and three years later the Jesuits opened a school there, which received important donations, and during twenty-five years furnished practically all the facilities for education accessible to the inhabitants of the district. After the departure of the Jesuits the municipality controlled the property, and offered annually the sum of one hundred dollars for the maintenance of the school; but this was entirely inadequate, and for a period of twenty years after the expulsion the school was closed. A similar turn of affairs was observed in other cities. Valparaiso furnishes another illustration. From the time of the establishment of the Jesuits in that city by Antonio Maria Fanelli and Antonio Salvá, in 1724, to their departure, in 1768, primary public instruction there remained exclusively in the hands of that order, except as two or three ecclesiastics took charge of

the children of certain families to teach them to read, write, and pray, and to give them instruction in the simplest operations of arithmetic. Although the Dominicans received certain privileges with respect to the property confiscated from the Jesuits of Valparaiso, yet the result of the expulsion here, as well as in San Felipe, Copiapó, and other places, was to close the Jesuit school and thus to abolish completely the most efficient instruction in Chile.

The feeble attempts by the civil government to establish schools in the places where the Jesuit schools had been closed show to what a hopeless and helpless state the government had fallen. At every step it leaned on the king and the council of the Indies, and the petitions presented to those authorities had to wait months and sometimes years for an answer. If one adds to this delay the infrequency of communication between Spain and America he may see clearly why decades passed before the losses due to the expulsion of the Jesuits were repaired.

FRANCISCO DE AGUIRRE, A MINOR CONQUISTADOR.

In the history of the Spanish conquest and settlement of America, as that history is known in England and the United States, a few characters appear especially prominent, but the names of the conquerors have scarcely received the recognition they deserve. The names of Cortes, Pizarro, and Valdivia stand for great undertakings; but an important light may be thrown on the nature and conduct of these undertakings by considering the parts played by some of the minor actors. The life of Francisco de Aguirre is a case in point. Aguirre was born in 1500, in the city of Talavera de la Reina, an oasis in the desert of Old Castile. The town was also the birth-place of Mariana, the historian; and, in later times, in July, 1809, it was the scene of the battle of the English-Spanish forces under Wellington and the French forces under Jourdan, Victor, and Joseph Buonaparte.

Aguirre's family claimed the distinction of nobility, and had sufficient property to maintain itself in a manner befitting its pretensions. He attained a degree of cultivation superior to that possessed by most of his later companions in America. Like many of the prominent youth of his time, he adopted the profession of a soldier and joined the forces of Charles V. in Italy. He was with the victorious army when Francis I. was defeated, and the king himself was

made a prisoner. In the sacking of Rome Aguirre distinguished himself by his successful efforts to stay the barbarities which his company proposed to perpetrate. A little later we find him married, retired from the army, and serving, by appointment of Charles V., as *corregidor* of his native city. Here his five children were born; and these years in Talavera de la Reina appear to have been a period of calm in an otherwise stormy existence. But in the course of time stories of the adventurers who had gone to America became household tales in Spain; and they carried their disturbing influence even to the stagnant country towns. Cultivating his paternal estate appeared to Aguirre a mean and fruitless occupation, while his mind was inflamed with visions of the wealth and glory to be achieved beyond the sea. He was thirty-three years old, full of both mental and physical vigor, and conscious that his knowledge of military affairs would enable him to win distinction. Leaving behind his young wife and four of his small children, he took the eldest, a boy of six years, and embarked for America in 1533. He went, as he wrote many years later, "not naked as others are accustomed to come, but with a reasonable establishment of aides, an extensive equipment and arms, and a certain number of servants and friends."¹ He arrived in Peru a short time after Pizarro had spoiled the Inca's kingdom and murdered Atahualpa. The population of the country was still aghast at the crime. From Cajamarca Pizarro had led his little army southward, and in November, 1533, had taken possession of Cuzco. Shortly after the occupation of the Inca's capital, Francisco de Aguirre joined Pizarro's forces, thus adding to the support of the conqueror a man of military skill and experience. The forces of Pizarro were further increased, in August, 1534, by the survivors of Alvarado's troops, who remained in Peru after the return of that leader to Guatemala. All these and more were needed as soon as the Indians recovered

¹ Letter of Francisco de Aguirre to the Viceroy Don Francisco de Toledo, October 8, 1569.

from their temporary astonishment and stupefaction over the audacity and barbarity of the invaders. Cuzco and Trujillo and the newly founded capital of Lima were besieged, and there were uprisings in all quarters. But the serious danger from the Indian insurrections passed with the arrival of reinforcements from Guatemala and Panama, and the return of Almagro and his force of five hundred men from Chile. Almagro's return was, however, followed by hostilities between the rival leaders, arising out of their conflicting claims to the city of Cuzco. These hostilities finally culminated in the overthrow of Almagro at the battle of Las Salinas and his subsequent execution.

The victory of Pizarro left him in possession of the ancient capital and practically master of the Inca's dominions. Clothed with this extensive power, his attention was immediately directed to further explorations into the undiscovered country. The eastern side of the Andes with the rich plains and the extensive forests beyond were an unknown region. To the south lay the high and broken table-land of Upper Peru, and farther on toward the southeast the inhospitable wilderness of the Gran Chaco. The most important of the numerous expeditions organized at this time was that directed to the land of the Chunchos, about the rivers Madre de Dios, Marmoré, and Madera. This was under the command of Captain Pedro de Candia, and consisted of three hundred Spaniards, chiefly soldiers who had served under Almagro, and ten thousand Indians as carriers of provisions and equipment. The hardships encountered on this expedition may be inferred from a survey of the feeble and emaciated remnant that returned to the shore of Lake Titicaca after a fruitless journey of seven hundred leagues. All of the Indians and negroes had perished; only eighty of the three hundred Spanish soldiers had survived; and most of the horses and dogs had been consumed as food.

During this period Aguirre remained in Cuzco in the service of Pizarro; but a little later we find both Captain

Aguirre and Captain Valdivia taking part in an expedition to the valley of Cochabamba. As a result of this expedition the Indians of Cochabamba were brought into submission, and the tact displayed by Aguirre in this undertaking caused his military abilities to be recognized. His relation to Pizarro at this time, aside from the personal attachment which he had for his superior, was similar to that of a feudal vassal to his overlord. He provided his own horses, his arms, his aides, and servants and received no salary. His expenses were met with funds brought from Spain, while some of the other leaders spent in their expeditions their parts of the booty of the conquest. This booty was the source of the funds employed by Captain Pedro de Candia in the expedition into the territory of the Chunchos beyond the Andes.

After the founding of the city of La Plata, in 1538, Charcas, the central part of modern Bolivia, was governed by Diego de Rojas. A little later Rojas was appointed by Pizarro to command the exploring expedition to the Gran Chaco, inhabited by the Chiriguanos, and Aguirre succeeded him in the governorship of Charcas. In this office there fell to him the task of completing the conquest or pacification of the Indians of his territory. He lived at La Plata, and sent small detachments of soldiers to put down the different uprisings as they appeared from time to time. In this difficult undertaking he was able to maintain order and discipline among the troops, who after the battle of Las Salinas were divided into more or less hostile groups.

The expedition to the Gran Chaco was not more successful than that which Captain Candia had led into the territory of the Chunchos. Rojas was obliged to send to Aguirre for assistance, but was in so far more fortunate than Candia that he was able to save the lives of his soldiers. After a year of profitless sacrifice, he returned to Cuzco, in 1540, to make a report concerning his expedition to the governor of Peru. The hardships, the privations, the dangers of starvation, which the Spanish soldiers encountered, did not

cause them to hesitate to enter upon any new expedition. When, therefore, it was announced that Valdivia was to lead a company of soldiers and settlers across the deserts of Atacama and Tarapacá to Chile, the project seemed as attractive to these hardened pioneers as if they had never faced fever and starvation in the swamps and wilderness of the Chaco.

When Valdivia was designated as the leader of an expedition to Chile, a new field of adventure seemed to be open to Aguirre. These two soldiers, Aguirre and Valdivia, had been friends since they fought together in the Italian campaigns. Pizarro had given Valdivia jurisdiction over a part of the territory granted by the king to Almagro. Valdivia left Cuzco in the last part of January, 1540, and his route led through Puno, Arequipa, Arica, and Tarapacá. At various points in this journey several soldiers had joined the little troop, but on arriving at Tarapacá the whole force amounted to only twenty men, besides the Indians who served him as carriers. While in Tarapacá, however, this company was increased by the addition of sixty Spaniards who had come over the cordillera under the command of Captain Juan Bohón. The greater part of these had served under Rojas, and had been scattered after that leader's unfortunate expedition. These and others who were added during the two months' stay at Tarapacá raised the number to one hundred and twenty-six. From Tarapacá, which Valdivia left in June, 1540, the way led over long stretches of absolutely sterile deserts: first to the well of Tamentica, then across the brackish stream of Loa to Calama, and beyond to the little valley of Chiu-Chiu. Having established a temporary camp in this valley, Valdivia, accompanied by ten soldiers, went on to explore in person the oasis of San Pedro, or Atacama la Grande, thirty leagues beyond Chiu-Chiu. He wished to find a place that offered conditions favorable for a long halt, and for the support and recuperation of his followers. In this he was successful, for at the end of his journey he discovered a little stream

of delicious water, which was bordered with rich vegetation. Not less agreeable was finding here his friend and former companion in arms, Francisco de Aguirre.

After the disastrous expedition to the region of the Chiriguanos, and the departure of Rojas for Lima, Aguirre had remained in Upper Peru in command of a small detachment of twenty-five soldiers. The knowledge that had been gained through the expeditions to the Chunchos and the Chiriguanos discouraged, for the time being, any further exploration in the country inhabited by these tribes. There was then nothing in view more attractive than the expedition to Chile; and as Aguirre received no remuneration for services which he was rendering, he determined to leave the Charcas and join the followers of Valdivia. He took with him twenty-five soldiers, passed through Tupiza, crossed the Andes, following in some part the route of Almagro, and finally joined Valdivia at the oasis of Atacama la Grande. He immediately enrolled his soldiers in the forces of Valdivia, and placed himself under the command of that leader; but by reason of the long and friendly acquaintance of these two officers the position of Aguirre was not like that of an ordinary military subordinate. He stood by the side of Valdivia, charged with the most difficult as well as the most honorable commissions of the expedition. Valdivia was, however, the sole head of the company, and his authority was undisputed. This was especially true after he had degraded Sancho de Hoz, who had attempted to assassinate him, and had caused Juan Ruiz to be executed after he had been detected in spreading dissatisfaction among the soldiers and in trying to persuade them to desert.

Largely through the foresight and efforts of Aguirre, sufficient food for both men and animals had been gathered to warrant entering upon the last and most dangerous stage of the journey, the five hundred miles of desert between Copiapó and their camp at Atacama la Grande. On this part of the journey camps for the night were determined by the few places where there were little wells or springs,

which furnished usually only a limited quantity of water, and that sometimes of a very poor quality. There was not much danger of departing from the proper course, for it was marked by the skeletons of Indians and animals that had perished on the way in attempting to cross the desert. But this expedition had the good fortune to reach the fertile valley of Copiapó in September without losing a soldier or any of the horses. A few of the Indians, however, succumbed to the fatigues of the march, and died on the desert. On arriving at Copiapó, the expedition consisted of one hundred and fifty Spaniards. Here Valdivia caused the flag of Spain to be raised; made a formal declaration of taking possession before the notary of the expedition; and performed all the ceremonies incident to planting Spanish authority in a new country.

During the three months spent here, from the middle of September to the middle of December, the Spaniards were frequently attacked by the Indians, who remembered the treatment they had received at the hands of Almagro.

The next stage of the journey brought Valdivia and his followers to the site of the present city of Santiago. A plan was made for the town, and one of the squares was set apart for the plaza. Provision was made on two sides of the plaza for the church and the house of the governor. The lots on the other two sides were taken by the principal captains, those on the east falling to Francisco de Aguirre. For several months after having established the plan of the city the Spaniards went on with their city-building free from any disturbance from the Indians. Valdivia created a *cabildo*, or the traditional governing body of a municipality. This government was installed on the 7th of March, 1541, and Aguirre became the first *alcalde*. In order that Valdivia might exercise independent authority, and not be regarded as merely a lieutenant of Pizarro, he was elected governor by the *cabildo*, and in this capacity was held to be head of the colony, and directly subject to the king of Spain. Aguirre continued to be a resident of Santiago for nine

years, and during this period he was the first *alcalde* in the years 1541, 1545, and 1549, and a *regidor*, or member of the council, for the years 1542, 1544, 1546, and 1547. During this time he was, moreover, charged with important commissions or trusts. He was made public administrator, and also *factor real*, or treasurer in charge of the funds belonging to the crown,—such funds, for example, as the royal fifths paid from the product of the mines.

The peace which attended the beginning of the town was not long continued. Six months later the Indians rose and made war on the invaders. Lighted brands were thrown upon the grass roofs of the little wooden houses, and all the buildings, except the quarters for the soldiers, were destroyed. These were defended by Aguirre, who came out of the fight severely wounded. The new houses that were constructed after the first had been burned, were built of adobes, and the roofs were covered with tiles. The Indians continued for a short time to be a source of disturbance, and Aguirre often led out a troop of Spanish soldiers to make war on them. The punishment which he inflicted was sometimes severe, for he was a warrior who fought for results and not merely for the sake of the game. The arrival of seventy mounted men as recruits from Peru, under Alonso de Monroy, removed all doubts from the Spaniards as to their ability to defend themselves. A little later Aguirre, at the head of a strong garrison, was stationed in the province of Itata to prevent the Indians from passing northward. This was in 1543, and explains the absence of his name from the list of the members of the *cabildo* for that year.

As soon as peace was established, Valdivia proceeded to distribute the lands of the region among the most important of his followers, thus introducing here that form of feudalism which became general throughout the Spanish colonies, known as the system of *encomiendas*, the holder of the fief being called the *encomendero*. The *encomendero* was the feudal lord over a valley or some other considerable tract

of the country, and of the Indians who inhabited it. In accordance with the terms of his grant, he was to be prepared for war, furnishing his own horses and arms. He was expected to keep the roads and bridges in repair, and to care for the moral and religious instruction of the Indians of his territory. In this distribution, Aguirre was among the most favored, inasmuch as he received a certain territory near Santiago, and another tract farther away occupied by more Indians.

In spite of their nominal position as feudal lords, the Spaniards led, in these early years, a mean and narrow existence. They were isolated; little or no information came to them from Peru or Spain; they had given up their hopes of suddenly acquiring great wealth by plundering another Inca kingdom; and they were compelled to seek their maintenance in agriculture.

In 1546 Valdivia returned to Peru, leaving Francisco de Villagrán as acting governor. An intercepted letter, asking the assistance of a person in Santiago, showed Villagrán that Sancho de Hoz had come from his retirement in the country, and had prepared a revolt to overthrow the government. A consultation in the house of Aguirre between Aguirre and Villagrán, in view of the former murderous attempt of Sancho de Hoz, left no doubt in the mind of either as to what action should be taken; and while they were here an officer brought in Sancho de Hoz as a prisoner. When Villagrán showed him the letter, the prisoner begged for mercy, and asked to be thrown upon a desert island where he might do penance for his sins. The rest may be told in the words of the notary, Luis de Cartagena:

“Francisco de Villagrán called Juan Gómez, the high constable, who was there in the patio of the house, and ordered him to take Pedro Sancho de Hoz and put him in a room of the house and cut off his head; and thus the high constable took Pedro Sancho, and a negro slave who was called there, and made him tie the prisoner’s hands behind his back and told him to cut off the prisoner’s head.

“The negro was disturbed, and not having a knife or anything else with which he could cut it off, the constable took his sword which he carried at his belt, and gave it to the slave, with which the slave cut off the head of Pedro Sancho de Hoz. Then they took him to the plaza, and Francisco de Villagrán commanded that the crime should be proclaimed by the voice of the crier saying: This is the justice which is ordered by His Majesty and the very excellent Señor Francisco de Villagrán, lieutenant governor and superior judge of these provinces of Chile, to this revolutionist and mutineer against the service of His Majesty.”²

This summary justice put an end to the mutiny. It ended, moreover, the pretensions of Sancho de Hoz to share the leadership in the colony with Valdivia. The other important subject that occupied the Spaniards in Chile during the absence of Valdivia was the hostilities of the Indians in the northern provinces. A troop of Spanish soldiers under Juan Bohón was cut down in December, 1548, Bohón alone being taken alive, and he was afterwards killed with great cruelty. Not long after this event the Indians attacked and burned the town of Serena, killing all the inhabitants but two Spaniards. When Villagrán went to restore order in this region, Aguirre was placed at the head of the government of Santiago. It was feared that in the uprising, which threatened to be general throughout the country, the weakened colony would be overwhelmed and utterly annihilated. While the inhabitants were thus depressed in spirit, their hopes were suddenly revived by the news that Valdivia had arrived in Valparaiso, returning from Peru after an absence of a year and a half, and that he had brought with him three hundred soldiers. Valdivia had, moreover, during this long visit in Peru, secured through Gasca the royal confirmation of his title as Governor of Chile. Immediately after he landed, his efforts were directed to subduing the natives of the north, and establishing a city in place of the Serena that had been

² Quoted by Lezaeta, in *El Conquistador Francisco de Aguirre*, 75.

burned; and for this undertaking he selected Francisco de Aguirre. A few days later he confirmed the encomiendas that had been granted to Aguirre in the valley of Mapocho and in the valley of Cachapoal, in 1544; and in addition he conferred upon him the fiefs of Copiapó and Coquimbo. The former had been made vacant by the death of Bohón, and the latter had been held by Valdivia. Aguirre thus became the founder of the permanent city of Serena; and he received the position and title of lieutenant governor.

The task which Aguirre had to face appeared to be both difficult and dangerous. The Indians had killed the considerable force under the command of Bohón, even to the last man, as well as the Indian auxiliaries who had come with the soldiers from Peru; they had swept out of existence the town of Serena and all of its inhabitants; and, rendered bolder by their successes, they had made the reconquest of that region appear like a perilous undertaking. When, therefore, Aguirre left Santiago, in August, 1549, with only thirty men, the expedition seemed to those not involved in it like a foolhardy adventure. He was attacked by the Indians while on the journey, but his resistance and furious onslaughts on the enemy spread terror among them. He selected a site for the new city, organized a government for it, left there the bulk of his force as a garrison, and, with a little band of only eleven men, started on a tour of "pacification" through the country. He evidently wished to show the natives some of the consequences they might expect from a murderous uprising. "For six months he traversed the extensive regions of Coquimbo and Copiapó, making on the Indians a war of surprises and horrible punishments, which spread a panic among them. He rushed upon them in their most secluded haunts at the moment when they least suspected it, and, having put to the sword those he met defending themselves, shut up in their straw huts as prisoners men, women, and children, and immediately set fire to their habitations, thus causing the miserable wretches to perish in the

most horrible tortures."³ Aguirre's progress through the valleys left desolation in its track. The sentiment of horror which it awakened was somewhat tempered at the time by the recollection of the barbarities which, a few months before, the Indians had inflicted on Bohón and his followers, and on the inhabitants of Serena. The surviving natives were impressed with the fact that it was advisable to maintain peace, at least as long as Aguirre remained in the country. "After these events," to quote Lazaeta, "the northern part of Chile was definitely pacified in such a manner that the Spaniards might travel in all directions without any fear whatsoever."⁴

The Indians were not merely pacified; they became submissive to their new masters, worked in the mines and on the cultivated lands, and through their labor the northern settlement attained a marked degree of prosperity. But in 1552, Aguirre was called away to a new undertaking. Valdivia appointed him governor of Tucuman. The immediate reason for this appointment was the information which he had received that the town of Barco had been founded by Nuñez de Prado, and that this town lay within the limits of his jurisdiction. Under this appointment Aguirre was to be "Captain General and Governor of the said city of Barco and La Serena and their territories and the other cities that had been founded, or that you may found in that region, within the limits of my grant."⁵

The difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of soldiers and the material for a successful colony caused the expedition to Tucuman to be put off until 1552, and the intervening year, spent in Serena, enabled Aguirre to put his affairs there in order, and to reap the advantage of the extraordinary productiveness of the mines and the cultivated lands, which made him, to use the words of a contemporary, "the

³ Lazaeta, 90; see Medina, *C. de D. I.*, X, 57.

⁴ *El Conquistador*, Francisco de Aguirre, 92.

⁵ Decree appointing Aguirre Governor of Tucuman, printed by Lazaeta, 94-96.

richest and most important man of the city, and highly esteemed by all the inhabitants of the kingdom, as being an excellent and liberal man, and a man desirous of living in a grand style."⁶ "His signorial mansion at Serena was in reality a fortress solidly defended in order that it might serve as a bulwark for the Spaniards against the attacks of the Indians."⁷ Serena became his home, to which he often returned from expeditions and the performance of official duties elsewhere. It was now seventeen years since he had left Spain, and his family still remained in Talavera de la Reina.

Before the arrival of Aguirre in Tucuman very little progress had been made in colonizing any part of the territory now occupied by the Argentine Republic. The survivors of the Spaniards who had come with Pedro de Mendoza had abandoned their undertaking at Buenos Aires in 1540, and the earlier explorers had left no permanent settlements. In 1549, Pedro de la Gasca appointed Juan Nuñez de Prado to take possession of the province of Tucuman. In going to establish himself at his new post, Nuñez de Prado passed through the valleys of Tupiza, Jujuy, and Chicoana, and fixed upon a site that might serve as the seat of his government. This was near the river Escaba, somewhat west of the place where the city of Santiago del Estero was subsequently built. He gave the name of Barco to the town which he founded, thinking thereby to do honor to Barco de Avila in Spain, the birth-place of Pedro de la Gasca. Here he built a fort, gathered recruits from some of the settlements of Upper Peru, and made preparations to "pacify and convert" the Indians. The attack made by some of the followers of Prado on the troops of Villagrán who was passing through this region on the way to Chile, was an unpromising beginning. It introduced hostilities between the settlers of Chile and the newly arrived inhabitants of Tucuman. Valdivia regarded the establishment

⁶ Mariño de Lobera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 78.

⁷ Lezaeta, 102.

of Prado in Tucuman as an encroachment, and appointed Aguirre to take possession of that province. Aguirre, still holding the governorship of northern Chile, made great preparations for an expedition against Barco. By the eighth of November, 1552, he was ready to begin his march across the Andes, and in December he was at Barco. He took possession of the settlement in the absence of Nuñez de Prado, and on Prado's return to Barco he took him prisoner and sent him to Chile. Certain followers of Nuñez de Prado were also taken and sent to Lima. In this way the province of Tucuman passed under the authority of the new governor, and thus fell within the jurisdiction of the Chilean government. This change brought to the colony the energetic administration of Aguirre to supplant the stupid and blundering conduct of Nuñez de Prado. The site of Barco was abandoned, and the town of Santiago del Estero was founded, which thus became the first permanent settlement within the limits of the present Argentine Republic. Many documents relating to the coming of Aguirre give expression to the satisfaction of the colonists with the interest, zeal, and judgment displayed by Aguirre in their behalf.

In view of the large expenditures which he had made from his own funds in planting and maintaining the colony, and the approval of his administration which the colonists had expressed, it was natural that he should be moved by the aspiration to be independent of Valdivia and to be brought as governor of Tucuman directly under the king. Therefore, in a letter to Charles V., December 23, 1553, he recalled to the mind of the monarch the twenty years of service which he had given to the conquest of Peru and Cuzco; the colonization of the Charcas, which he had ruled and governed for two years under the command of the Marquis of Pizarro; the mines he had discovered; the conquest and pacification of Chile; and, finally, the maintenance of the province of Tucuman, where he then was; in all of which he had expended a large amount of his own money;

and in consequence he asked the emperor to bestow upon him Tucuman with the other favors which the emperor was accustomed to confer upon his loyal vassals.⁸

Aguirre had been at the head of affairs about a year and a half when messengers from Chile brought to him news of the death of Valdivia. They brought also letters from Aguirre's friends in Chile, suggesting that he should assume the office made vacant by the death of Valdivia. This suggestion was based on the fact that Valdivia's will named the persons to whom, in order, the office should descend. These were Jerónimo de Alderete, Francisco de Aguirre, and Francisco de Villagrán. Alderete was then in Spain, and the authority seemed to fall very naturally to Aguirre. But there were other persons who had become candidates. Among these Villagrán was supported by the cabildo of Concepcion, and Rodrigo de Quiroga was temporarily favored by the cabildo of Santiago; but later the cabildo of Santiago made it known that it would exercise the supreme authority until the arrival of instructions from the audiencia of Peru. When Aguirre reached Serena, in April, 1554, he found the condition of affairs in Chile in great confusion. The towns held antagonistic views respecting the headship of the government, and the Araucanians, given new confidence by their victory over Valdivia's forces, had become more restless and more determined in their hostility. But in spite of the action of the cabildos of Concepcion and Santiago, Aguirre was disposed to insist on his right to the succession, and consequently sent a communication to the cabildo of Santiago, requesting that body to recognize him as governor of Chile. The cabildo, however, stood by its determination to receive neither Aguirre nor any other person, except under orders from the king. In the meantime Aguirre and Villagrán maintained armed forces, in order that each might avoid the danger of being surprised by the other. It was then proposed that the contentions of the two leaders should be submitted to arbitration, a proposition

⁸ Lezaeta, 124.

which Villagrán was willing to accept, but which was rejected by Aguirre on the ground that his right was complete. The practical decision in the case was that the cabildo should carry on the government temporarily, and that if the audiencia of Lima should not appoint a person within a period of seven months, Villagrán should be recognized as governor of Chile. Aguirre, however, was not disposed to give up his pretensions, and made a peremptory demand that the cabildo should recognize him as the governor. Knowing the energy and ability of Aguirre as a leader, the inhabitants of Santiago were seriously alarmed by his ultimatum, and immediately began preparations for resistance. During this agitation a messenger arrived from Lima, announcing that the revolutionist Girón had been defeated and had fled toward the south, and requesting Aguirre to prevent him from entering Tucuman or Chile. Aguirre naturally regarded this as a compliment, and fancied that a way would be immediately opened to the attainment of the object of his ambition. While the inhabitants of Chile were thus divided into antagonistic factions, and the colony was without a generally recognized head, the government of Peru was in such a state as to render it incapable of furnishing any effective assistance. The vacancy in the post of viceroy left public matters in charge of the audiencia, and this body in relation to executive work suffered the usual infirmities of a collegiate executive. It hesitated to make a positive decision concerning the government of Chile. Francisco de Riberos was in Lima urging the claims of Villagrán; Diego Sanchez Moreles was the representative and advocate of Aguirre: but neither party seemed to make any progress in advocating the interests of its chief. Finally, however, in order to avert the impending civil war in Chile, the audiencia issued a decree that annulled the part of Valdivia's will which referred to his successor, and ordered that both Aguirre and Villagrán should disband their troops, and that the state of affairs which prevailed at the time of the death of Valdivia should be maintained. A final provision of this

decree was that the alcaldes of the cities should carry on the government and the administration of justice in their respective jurisdictions until the king should appoint a new governor. This decision, when it was finally read in Santiago, satisfied nobody. On July 10, 1555, it was made public with great ceremony in an assembly in the church of Serena. Aguirre accepted it, renounced his claim to the governorship of Chile, and retired to private life. Thus relieved from his public duties in Chile, he turned his attention to his mines and his extensive lands in the valleys of Coquimbo and Copiapó. He retained, however, his control over the affairs of Tucuman, maintaining there a deputy, to whom from time to time he sent supplies, soldiers, and whatever was necessary to promote the welfare of the colony. The vast revenues of his Chilean possessions were expended in this service.

After much solicitation Nuñez de Prado secured a decree from the audiencia providing for his reinstatement as governor of Tucuman; but this was ineffective, and Prado died in 1556. In the meantime Aguirre and Villagrán continued to entertain hopes of obtaining favor with the superior powers, and of securing promotion to the governorship of Chile. At the same time they entertained a common fear that they might both be superseded by a person sent from Spain or Peru; and what they feared came to pass when the king appointed Jerónimo de Alderete to be the successor of Valdivia. For the period between the appointment and the arrival of Alderete, Villagrán obtained from the audiencia an appointment which gave him temporary control of the public affairs of the colony. Aguirre was not able to bear with equanimity this triumph of his rival. He refused to recognize Villagrán's authority, and carried the cabildo of Serena with him into rebellion. The attitude assumed by Aguirre led Villagrán to move against Serena with an armed force. The town was taken without resistance, but Aguirre retired out of reach toward the north, and continued his refusal to submit to his former rival. At this

stage of the contest information was received that Alderete had died at Panama, and that the viceroy, on January 29, 1557, had appointed his son, Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza, to be the governor of Chile. By the appointment of this beardless youth, the hopes and ambitions of the two leaders were defeated.

The conduct of Hurtado de Mendoza toward Aguirre was marked with deceit and hypocrisy. Soon after the arrival of the new governor at the port of Coquimbo, Aguirre went on board Mendoza's ship, and was received with military music and a salute from the artillery; and Mendoza made to him the hypocritical announcement: "What greatly relieved the pain which my father, the viceroy, suffered in parting from me in order to send me on this expedition, was the knowledge that I would find in this country a person of experience and mature judgment from whom in all matters relating to the service of the king I should be able to receive counsel and advice." But in spite of the apparently friendly attitude of Mendoza, it was clear that he regarded the presence of Aguirre in Chile as a hindrance to the execution of his plans. Aguirre was, therefore, invited by the governor to join a hunting party near the coast, and was there arrested and taken to a ship lying at anchor in the port of Coquimbo. This action was entirely unexpected by Aguirre, and he was given no time or opportunity to make any arrangements with respect to his extensive business affairs. A little later Villagrán was also arrested, taken to Valparaiso, conducted by sea to Coquimbo, and there placed on the ship that was to take both these old conquistadores to Lima. Their ship cast anchor off Callao, January 21, 1557. Aguirre and Villagrán were retained as prisoners at Lima, and the treatment which they had received at the hands of the governor of Chile, and that which they now received at the hands of the viceroy, was such as to cause these officials to be condemned by the whole population of Peru. And Philip II. was moved by it to inflict a severe punishment upon the viceroy and his son. But

Aguirre, although compelled to bear the burden and humiliation of a long trial, had the satisfaction of gathering about him his wife, his two daughters, and his younger son, who had recently arrived from Spain after a separation of twenty-three years.

In a letter to the king dated April 6, 1558, Aguirre set forth the grievances he had suffered under the viceroy and the governor of Chile, and enumerated the services he had rendered to the king during the twenty-three years of his residence in America. At the same time he begged that his property might be restored to him, and that the sums which he had expended in the king's service might be paid to him from the funds in the royal treasury.

After the close of the fruitless trial, the viceroy found pretexts for retaining Aguirre in Lima. The real reason for his detention was the fear that his presence in Chile would hinder the execution of the governor's plans. But finally, in the middle of 1559, he was permitted to return to Serena with his family. He had been taken away without having opportunity to put his affairs in order, and he now returned to find that during the two years of his absence his rights had been invaded, much of his property having fallen into strange hands, and that it would require some time to re-establish his control. Beyond caring for his estate, Aguirre's only ambition at this time was to be reinstated as governor of Tucuman. In the meantime, Philip II. had appointed the Count of Nieva viceroy in place of the Marquis of Cañete; and Villagrán, through the influence of his friends and advocates in Spain, obtained for himself the post of Chile. The energetic action of Philip II. in dismissing Hurtado de Mendoza naturally brought to Aguirre a certain measure of satisfaction; but this was counterbalanced by the appointment of his ancient rival. Although without office, he continued to live in northern Chile like a feudal baron. He had regained possession of his fortress-like houses and his extensive lands, and the manorial independence which he enjoyed made him virtually the governor

of this northern region. "All his pretensions," Juan de Herrera wrote to the king, "indicate a desire to govern and not to obey;" and his attitude toward the *alcaldes* showed his determination to make his will recognized as the dominant force in the communities of that region. The sons of Aguirre were not disposed to be more subservient than their father. Francisco de Villagrán's troubled rule came to an end with his death in 1563, and his cousin, Pedro de Villagrán, became *interim* governor.

The connection of Tucuman with Chile had been attended with serious inconveniences, not the least of which arose out of the great distance, and the barrier of the Andes, which separated them. The inhabitants thought that many of these inconveniences would be set aside by withdrawing the province from its political union with Chile, and bringing it within the jurisdiction of the *audiencia* of Charcas. This was provisionally decreed in 1562, and Francisco de Aguirre was appointed, for the second time, governor of Tucuman.

In August, 1563, Philip II. approved the viceroy's decree separating Tucuman from Chile, and confirmed the appointment of Aguirre as governor. Thus, while Villagrán was approaching the end of his triumph over his rival, Aguirre was preparing to enter the governorship of Tucuman, now made independent of Chile by a decree of the king. When Aguirre received official information of his appointment, he was living on his Chilean estate, where for seven months after his return from Lima he had been leading the life of a feudal landlord. It was the season in which the passes of the mountains were closed, and Aguirre had to postpone taking possession of his province until the return of spring. The intervening months were spent in enlisting a little troop of soldiers, and making other preparations for his expedition. In November, 1563, Aguirre began his journey over the mountains, taking with him his family and a considerable number of other relatives and friends. He now proposed to establish himself permanently in Tucuman, which

at this time was called Nueva Inglaterra, or New England. Cuyo, with the newly founded cities of Mendoza and San Juan, continued for yet two centuries to be united with Chile. However, the prospect of practically absolute rule over the vast region, still dominated from the capital of Tucuman, was sufficient to assuage Aguirre's hitherto disappointed ambition.

The state of the colony on the arrival of Aguirre was deplorable. The administration of the preceding governors who had been sent from Chile was unsatisfactory. The Indians had reduced the smaller towns to masses of charred ruins, and, made bold by their victories, were in revolt throughout the province. They were even besieging Santiago del Estero, in which the Spaniards from the region round about had taken refuge.

The early events of Aguirre's administration led Lope Garcia de Castro, the governor of Upper Peru, to send an expedition to Santiago del Estero. The avowed object of the expedition was the pacification of the Indian tribes south of Tarija. Captain Martin de Almendras was the leader, and Captain Jerónimo de Alanis was the second in command. The march toward Tucuman was begun in September, 1565. The Indians about Santiago del Estero were in revolt, but they laid aside their hostility on the arrival of the forces of Almendras. Alanis was in command when the expedition reached Santiago del Estero. He spent about two months here; on returning to Upper Peru he turned over to Aguirre the bulk of his troops and supplies. He found the plans of the governor worthy of commendation, and his report to his superior concerning the general results of the expedition was rather favorable than prejudicial to Aguirre.

The rest of Aguirre's career was marked by severe afflictions, which appeared to proceed in great part from the enmity of Pedro Ramirez de Quiñones, president of the audiencia of Charcas. While returning from a campaign which he had made toward the south, the soldiers whom he

had received from Alanis mutinied, the leaders affirming at first that they were acting under the orders of the president of the audiencia, and later that they took this step by order of the Inquisition. What gave ground for accepting one or both of these affirmations as true, was the fact that the expedition of Almendras and Alanis was attended by Jerónimo de Holguin and the ecclesiastic, Julian Martinez, the purposes of both of whom were somewhat mysterious. They were suspected of seeking to undermine Aguirre and to prepare for his overthrow by the president of the audiencia. The mutineers took Aguirre prisoner, carried him to Santiago del Estero, and finally to La Plata (Chiquisaca), where he was tried for heresy.

In the accusation on which Aguirre was tried, it was affirmed that he believed faith was sufficient for salvation; that it was not necessary to hear mass, but only to commend one's self to God in contrition of spirit; that he had said he had not much confidence in prayer, since he had known a man who had prayed much and had remained in hell, and an apostate who had gone to heaven; that if there were a blacksmith and a priest in a commonwealth, and he had to banish one or the other of them, he would prefer to banish the priest; and that he had absolved the Indians so that they might work on feast-days. The accusation set forth a long list of other remarks attributed to the governor, indicating his unwillingness to acknowledge the claims of the clergy, and showing little respect for their pretensions.⁹ At La Plata he was obliged to wait while the business of his trial was carried through the slow processes of the Inquisition. The bishop, who was authorized to pronounce the decision in this case, was in Lima, and everything seemed to contribute to delay, so that, as Aguirre observed with bitterness, "what might have been finished in an hour, was made to detain me about three years, and subject me to an expense of thirty thousand dollars."

⁹ A part of this document is printed by Medina in his *Inquisición en Chile*, I, 115.

In his view, the judges who caused these delays were not judges, but tyrants, who wished to stir up the country rather than to serve the king. Finally, when it was not possible to prolong the delay, the delegates of the bishop pronounced the governor's sentence, which in its essential part was as follows :

“Having considered the records and merits of this case, and all other things touching it which it was necessary to consider, we decide, that, for the offense which stands against him, we ought to condemn him and do condemn him to two years imprisonment over and above what he has had, which we declare to have been just and given as punishment : and besides, we condemn him, after he shall have been released from the prison where he is at present, and taken to the city of Santiago del Estero, province of Tucuman, to hear high mass on the first or second Sunday in the parochial church, in person, standing uncovered from the beginning to the end of it, with a lighted candle in his hand, and at the time of the offertory he shall repeat the propositions which he acknowledges in a loud voice, so that those who may be in the church may be able to hear him, and he shall declare them in the form and manner in which they shall be given to him, written and signed by the ordinary and by his notary ; and he shall say this on account of the liberty which he has had and taken as governor and supreme judge of that province ; and with arrogance and temerity, he said and affirmed the aforesaid propositions in ignorance, which have scandalized with his bad example those who may be edified by the humility, obedience, and reverence which he has for the Holy Mother Church : this penance is imposed upon him, that he shall send to the ordinary of this bishopric testimony of the *Vicario* in the said city of Santiago, by the first person who leaves for that kingdom, under the order that in case he shall not do this nor send this evidence, he shall be proceeded against as one proceeds against an impenitent person. Moreover, we impose upon him a fine of fifteen hundred dollars of standard silver, to be applied in the fol-

lowing manner: seven hundred and fifty dollars to aid in paying for vestments of brocade which this Holy Church has purchased, and the other seven hundred and fifty dollars for the expenses of justice, at the disposal of the ordinary. Furthermore, we condemn him to give to the parochial church of Santiago del Estero a bell which shall weigh more than fifty pounds. Furthermore, we condemn him to pay the costs of this case, the appraisal of which is reserved to the ordinary; all of which shall be observed, complied with, and paid before he is released from the prison where he is now confined; and after he shall have complied with this and made payment, we command him to absolve himself from any censure and excommunication under which he has fallen on account of the proceedings in this case; and we command him to redeem from sequestration whatever property may have been sequestered in the course of this case."¹⁰

This sentence was subsequently modified so as to provide for the reading of the retraction, or abjuration, by the vicar general, instead of by Aguirre. In this manner the abjuration was offered on the first of April, 1569, in the city of La Plata.¹¹

When Aguirre returned to his province in October, 1559, to take up the duties of his office for the third time, he found it in a sleepy and unprogressive state. Among the

¹⁰ The delegates of the bishop who rendered this decision were Fernando Palacio Alvarado, archdeacon, provisor, and vicar general of the bishopric; the licenciado, Baltasar de Villalobos; Friar Marcos Xufre, guardian of the Franciscan monastery at La Plata; and Bartolomé Alonso, vicar of the Imperial city of Potosi. The text of the decision is found in Medina's *Historia de la Inquisición en Chile*, I, 118-121; *Documentos inéditos*, XXV, 373-376.

¹¹ The retraction, or abjuration, was a carefully written document of seventeen hundred words; see Medina's *Inquisición en Chile*, I, 122-128. Friar Domingo Santo Tomás, under whose authority this trial was held, was born in Seville, and went to Peru in the early days of the conquest. He was appointed prior of the monastery of Rosario in Lima in 1545; vicar general, in 1552; and provincial, in 1553. In 1560 he caused to be printed in Valladolid a *Gramatica, or Arte de la lengua general de los indios de los reynos del Peru*. This was the first book written on the Quichua language. He had been made a bishop before the beginning of the trial of Aguirre, and during this trial he was in Lima to attend the second of the councils held in that city.

inhabitants there were only about two hundred Europeans. Some of these were at Santiago del Estero, some on the farms or cattle ranges, and others at recently established towns. They had few or no facilities for commercial intercourse with places that might demand their products, or from which they could obtain needed articles; and in this isolation of the frontier they had fallen into a stagnant and semi-barbarous state of existence. During the imprisonment of Aguirre in Chuquisaca, Diego Pacheco had acted as provisional governor. When Aguirre resumed his duties, he banished from the province all persons who had been involved in the movement for his arrest in 1556, and the decree of expulsion provided that they should not return except under penalty of death. He hurled his reproaches against everybody concerned in his imprisonment and trial, and, if one may judge from his measures for personal defence, he expected only hostility in return. He constructed for himself a house like a fort, mounted on it a cannon brought from Chile, collected provisions that might support him during a seige, and organized a guard to defend himself and his capital against enroachments by his enemies. Under these circumstances, a large number of persons, friends of preceding governors and supporters of Aguirre's enemies in Chuquisaca, naturally conspired to effect his ruin; and the newly established Tribunal of the Inquisition was thought to furnish an effective instrument. Accusations in great numbers were sent to the office of the Inquisition, and in the autumn of 1570, Aguirre was arrested, and taken to the capital. The long overland journey, lasting about seven months, including delays by the way, was in itself a severe undertaking for a man of over seventy years. He was placed in the prison of the Inquisition at Lima, in May, 1571.

The charge against Aguirre included a variety of items: he had said he was the vicar general in the spiritual as well as in the temporal sphere, and that he did not fear excommunication; he had permitted his pages to eat meat in lent;

he had struck a priest; he had believed in the efficacy of certain incantations in relieving one from, or curing, disease; he had affirmed the pope could not excommunicate him; he had maintained that mass celebrated by a certain vicar was valueless, that the mass was not necessary, for God considered only the heart, and that the tithes and first fruits paid to the vicar should be paid to him as vicar general in both spiritual and temporal matters. These, and a few other equally important charges, together with a few items added by Cerezuola, formed the basis of the action against the governor.

The trial itself had its principal motive in temporal rather than spiritual interests; and in it the viceroy made use of the Tribunal to effect the removal of Aguirre from his position as governor of Tucuman. The proceedings against Aguirre lasted about five years, and as a result of the trial he was removed from the government of Tucuman. As Medina says: "Old, disillusioned, broken in health, and without income, he retired to the city of Serena, which he had founded. In the meantime he had lost three of his four sons, a son-in-law, a brother, and three nephews, all of whom had died in the service of the king; and after having spent in the royal service, as he said, more than three hundred thousand dollars, he found himself in such want and with so many debts that 'he was not able to appear before His Majesty to ask for grace and compensation for his many services and expenses.'"¹²

One of the penalties imposed upon Aguirre was that of perpetual exile from the province of Tucuman. He was now seventy-six years old, and he may not be supposed to have had any very strong desire to return to scenes which had been associated with defeated expectations, persistent hostility, and losses of property. He went back to Chile to occupy his house in Serena, from which he had been absent thirteen years, and his principal care henceforth was to put

¹² *Inquisición en Chile*, I, 257.

his estates in such a condition that they might furnish support for his family. The northern, as well as the southern settlements of Chile, appeared to be in a state of stagnation or decay. Serena was "a miserable village, in which resided seven *encomenderos*, from eighty to one hundred Spaniards, and eight hundred Indians who paid tribute." The southern part of Chile was embroiled in the hopeless war with the Araucanians. The fields went uncultivated, and the population was declining and the soldiers deserting. Santiago was inhabited at this time "only by old men, invalids, women, and children."¹⁸ The last warlike adventure of Aguirre was to defeat and drive back to their ship a company of Drake's pirates, who had sacked Valparaiso, and who had landed to repeat the exploit with Serena. This was in December, 1578.

His remaining days were devoted to the care of his lands and his mines; but near the end he still felt the weight of his numerous debts, and appealed to the king for relief. The king's reply, however, came too late. Aguirre died in 1581. The attention of the Chilean chroniclers was not now directed toward Serena, but to the Araucanian war; and for this reason the day of the old warrior's death passed unnoted.

Francisco de Aguirre was not as conspicuous a figure in the history of Spanish colonization as many of his contemporaries. He had some of those defects which are attributed to many of them. He was uncompromising, ambitious, and at times cruel. But he was loyal in friendship, courageous in all relations of life, and had a higher degree of cultivation than most of his associates.

¹⁸ Lezaeta, 245.

THE SPANISH-PORTUGUESE TREATY OF 1750.

The little town of Colonia del Sacramento has played an important role in the history of the southwestern part of America. Its possession was contested by the Spanish and Portuguese almost from its foundation. Each nation sought to found its claim on the treaty of Tordesillas. In the hands of Portugal it was the center of an extensive contraband trade which stimulated the growth of Buenos Aires and threatened to diminish the profits of the traders of Lima.

The restrictions imposed on trade with Buenos Aires by Spain incited other nations to seek to take advantage of this market, sometimes by smuggling, sometimes by other means. In 1652, twenty-two Dutch and English vessels entered the port, carrying a license from Don John of Austria, illegitimate son of Philip IV., who was at that time governor of Flanders. Although Don John was subordinate to the king of Spain, and in granting this license violated the established policy of the Spanish monarchy, yet neither the governor of the colony nor the people had any good reason for refusing to profit by this trade.

The Portuguese, whose territory in this region adjoined that of the Spanish, had excellent opportunities for smuggling. They were, moreover, prominent on the sea, and they had an important and increasing trade with their own ports in this part of the world. But the Portuguese

were not the initiators of all the scandals of the border. A Spanish governor permitted the Portuguese to capture and enslave seventy thousand Guarani Indians, who had been rendered subject to Spain, and who regarded the Spanish officials as their protectors. The consideration that determined the action of the Spanish governor in this case appears to have been the opportunity to share the gains arising from the services of these Indians. In contrast to this pusillanimous conduct of Governor Céspedes Xeray stand the efforts of the Jesuits to organize the Guaranis for self-defense against the encroachments of the Portuguese.

Two circumstances rendered the Portuguese bold and aggressive: one was the weakness and demoralization of Spain under Charles II.; the other was the attitude of England as the protector of Portugal's commercial and maritime interests. With a sense of security thus established, they persisted in advancing their boundary and in making commercial incursions into Spain's territory; and they were attracted to the latter undertaking by the high prices caused in the Spanish colonies by Spain's restrictive commercial policy. An instance of this territorial aggression was their occupation of the eastern coast of the Rio de la Plata, and the foundation of Colonia del Sacramento, opposite Buenos Aires, in 1679.

Other European powers, England, France, Holland, found in this act of Portugal an advantage for themselves, since Colonia would furnish them a place of secure deposit for their wares, and a base for contraband trade with the Spanish colonial markets. In view of the fact that the Portuguese court supported this encroachment and settlement on territory claimed by Spain, the governor of Rio de la Plata had little hope of maintaining his rights by negotiation, and consequently resorted to force. He captured the Portuguese commander, Lobo, and all his garrison, caused the fortifications of Colonia to be destroyed, and transported the prisoners with their arms and artillery to Buenos Aires. But the protests of Portugal, supported

by England and France, cowed the government of Spain. In spite of the energy displayed in maintaining the rights of Spain, Governor Gorro was recalled, and appointed governor of Chile. But before entering upon the duties of his new office, Gorro was obliged to suffer the humiliation of being detained in Cordova at the request of the Portuguese government; and Spain, wishing to avoid further conflict, entered into a treaty with Portugal, which not only annulled all the advantages that might have been derived from the taking of Colonia, but also obliged Spain to restore that settlement to Portugal. This was for Spain an unpropitious beginning of a long controversy.

By the treaty of 1701, Colonia was formally ceded to Portugal, but in the war of the Spanish Succession, Portugal took the side of England against France and Spain, and, for this reason, the viceroy of Peru, then governing all of Spain's South American possessions, assumed that he was not bound by the treaty, and ordered the governor of Rio de la Plata to mobilize his forces and take possession of the post. Under the command of Captain García Ros, the Spanish forces laid siege to Colonia on October 17, 1704, and the Portuguese garrison, finding they were unable to withstand the attacking party, took to their boats and fled. The artillery and the munitions of war fell into the hands of the victors.

Philip V. had very little knowledge of America and apparently no appreciation of the importance of Colonia. When, therefore, the English, still having in mind the commercial opportunities which the possession of the place offered, urged that, in spite of the Spanish victory, it should be given up to the Portuguese, the king of Spain assented, and this cession was confirmed by the treaty of Utrecht. The sixth article of this treaty provided, "That His Catholic Majesty ceded forever and in perpetuity the Plaza de la Colonia with the territory necessary for its defense and security, to His Majesty the king of Portugal and to his successors by whatever line and right they might come

to occupy the throne, without this cession in any case and for any reason being able to be invalidated."

With the growth of Colonia its Portuguese authorities sought to extend its dominion along the coast of the Rio de la Plata in both directions. They strengthened the fortifications, and gathered such means of defense as seemed to make it impregnable for any force that could be organized in this part of Spain's dominions. "They drove away the Spanish farmers and laborers under the pretext that they had taken without right the land on which they were established."¹ Complaints made to the king of Spain concerning the action of the Portuguese finally persuaded him to direct the governor of Rio de la Plata to attack and demolish Colonia. The first attempt of the governor having failed, the Spanish government prepared to employ a force that would be successful. But at this point the king of Spain was induced to take a new view of the situation. England was determined to unite with Holland and the enemies of Spain, and to continue her support of Portugal. The Spanish king's efforts were, moreover, paralyzed in this state of things by the thought that the influence of his enemies might cause him to lose his hold on the Two Sicilies. In the meantime the Portuguese went on adding new strength to their fortress of Colonia, and the English made use of it in carrying on the slave trade.

Finally, in 1750, by the treaty of Madrid, an attempt was made not only to settle the controversy about Colonia, but also to fix the boundary, or line of demarcation, between the Spanish and Portuguese possessions. This treaty declared that for the future it itself should be the only basis and rule for determining the limits of the Portuguese and Spanish dominions in America and Asia; that it should set aside and abolish whatever rights had been asserted on the basis of the bull of Alexander VI. and the treaties of Tordesillas, Lisbon, and Madrid, or of any other treaties, conventions, or promises; and that all future transactions

¹ Lopez, *Historia de la Republica Argentina*, I, 221.

with reference to the boundaries of these dominions should not make use of other treaties or agreements, but should refer to the prescriptions of this treaty as the invariable rule to be adopted without controversy.

The line of demarcation established by the treaty of 1750 began on the south at the mouth of the little stream that rises at the foot of the mount of Castillos Grandes. From this point it proceeded in a straight line to the highest peak of the mountains, then along the summit to the sources of the Rio Negro, and continued to the sources of the Ibicuy. From the point where it touched the Ibicuy, the line followed that river to its junction with the Uruguay, and up the Uruguay to the river Pepirí, or Pequirí, which empties into the Uruguay from the west. It then ascended the river Pepirí to its principal source, whence it proceeded along the highest ground to the head of the first stream flowing into the Yguazú. It followed this stream, and then the Yguazú, to the junction of the latter with the Paraná, ascending the Paraná to the mouth of the Iguerey, and then the Iguerey to its source. From this point it led along the highest ground as far as the first stream that empties into the Paraguay, and thence the Paraguay became the boundary to the mouth of the Jaurú. From the mouth of the Jaurú to the south bank of the Guaporé opposite the mouth of the Sararé the boundary was a straight line. From the point where this line reached the Guaporé, the boundary followed that stream to the Mamoré, and then down the Mamoré and the Madeira half way from the mouth of the Mamoré to the mouth of the Madeira. It then ran westward to the Javary, and followed that river to the Amazon and down the Amazon to the western mouth of the Yapurá, and up that river to the ridge of the Cordillera between the Amazon and the Orinoco, and finally eastward along the highest land as far as the territory of the contracting parties extended in this direction.

By the thirteenth article of this treaty Portugal ceded Colonia to the crown of Spain; and, in the following article,

Spain formally ceded to Portugal any and all lands that had been occupied by Spain or to which Spain held a title and which by this treaty were declared to belong to Portugal. The territory involved in this cession embraced seven of the Indian villages, or reductions, established by the Jesuits in Paraguay on the east of the Uruguay River. The missionaries of these reductions were required to withdraw, to take with them their furniture and effects, and also the Indian inhabitants of the reductions. These seven reductions with their houses and lands, their churches and other buildings, were transferred to the crown of Portugal.

Provision having been made for the determination of the boundary line, elaborate and strict regulations were established with respect to trade and travel across the border, providing a policy of non-intercourse. The treaty also provided for a board of commissioners to fix practically the line of demarcation.²

Neither the Spaniards nor the Portuguese were especially interested in the provisions of the treaty relating to the boundary in the interior, uninhabited part of the continent; but the cession of the seven Jesuit reductions to the Portuguese attracted the interested attention of everybody concerned. The Indians objected emphatically to the transfer of their lands and houses to their enemies, and raised the question of the possibility of resisting the execution of the treaty. They even found it difficult to believe that the king had ordered their removal. This is seen in their appeal to Governor Andonaegui, as presented by Dobrizhoffer. The form of the appeal may have been given by a Jesuit, but the later attitude of the Indians indicates that the document presented their sentiments: "Neither we nor our fathers have ever offended the king or ever attacked the Spanish settlements. How, then, innocent as we are, can we believe that the best of princes would condemn us to banishment? Our fathers, our forefathers, our brethren,

² Calvo, *Coleccion completa de los tratados de la America Latina*, II, 241-260; the treaty to determine the instructions for the board of commissioners is printed in Calvo's collection, II, 261-277.

have fought under the king's banner, often against the Portuguese, often against the savages: who can tell how many of them have fallen in battle, or before the walls of Nova Colonia, so often besieged! We ourselves can show in our scars the proofs of our fidelity and our courage. We have ever had it at heart to extend the limits of the Spanish empire, and to defend it against all enemies; nor have we ever been sparing of our blood, or of our lives. Will then the Catholic king requite these services by the bitter punishment of expelling us from our native land, our churches, our homes and fields and fair inheritance? This is beyond all belief. By the royal letters of Philip V., which, according to his own injunctions, were read to us from the pulpits, we were exhorted never to suffer the Portuguese to approach our borders, because they were his enemies and ours. Now we are told that the king will have us yield up to these very Portuguese this wide and fertile territory, which the kings of Spain, and God and Nature have given us, and which for a whole century we have tilled with the sweat of our brows. Can any one be persuaded that Ferdinand the son should enjoin us to do that which was so frequently forbidden by his father Philip? But if time and change have indeed brought about such friendship between old enemies that the Spaniards are desirous to gratify the Portuguese, there are ample tracts of country to spare, and let those be given them. What! Shall we resign our towns to the Portuguese—the Portuguese—by whose ancestors so many hundred thousands of ours have been slaughtered, or carried away into cruel slavery in Brazil? This is as intolerable to us as it is incredible that it should be required. When, the Holy Gospel in our hand, we promised and vowed fidelity to God and the king of Spain, his priests and governors promised to us on his part, friendship and perpetual protection; and now we are commanded to give up our country! Is it to be believed that the promises, and faith, and friendship of the Spaniards, can be of so little stability?"

It is not to be doubted that the Jesuits opposed the treaty of 1750 from the beginning. They could not reasonably be expected to assume any other attitude toward it, since it proposed to destroy in a considerable territory the results of their labors which had been continued for more than a hundred years. But they repudiated the charge that they had instigated or provoked the uprising,³ a charge that later inquiries have found to be without foundation.

In the interval of two years between the signing of the treaty and the arrival of the commissioners appointed to mark the boundary, the Jesuits of Paraguay addressed a memorial to the audiencia of Charcas, protesting particularly against the transfer of the seven reductions to Portugal and the removal of the inhabitants. A similar protest was presented to the audiencia of Lima. A copy of this memorial was forwarded by the viceroy to the king of Spain, and a second copy was transmitted to the governor of Buenos Aires, with instructions that it should be delivered to the commissioners. Subsequent events do not indicate that these protests exercised any important influence on the conduct of the allies. They were based, however, on the almost unanimous belief of the priests in charge of the reductions that it would be impossible to carry out those provisions of the treaty which required the Indians to abandon their homes and fields for uncultivated and unoccupied lands that might be assigned to them. In spite of the prevalence of this belief, the Provincial instructed the Jesuits of the reductions in question to urge their followers to obedience; at the same time, in writing to the king, he pointed out the obstacles to the removal of the people.

These seven reductions were inhabited by about thirty thousand Guaranis. These inhabitants were "not fresh from the woods, or half reclaimed, and therefore willing to revert to a savage state, and capable of enduring its ex-

³ Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones*, I, 17-29; Bauza, II, 144-148.

posure, hardships and privations; but born as their fathers and grandfathers had been, in easy servitude, and bred up in the comforts of regular domestic life. These persons with their wives and their children, their sick and their aged, their horses and their sheep and their oxen, were to turn out, like the children of Israel from Egypt into the wilderness, not to escape from bondage, but in obedience to one of the most tyrannical commands that were ever issued in the recklessness of unfeeling power."⁴

The commissioners appointed to fix the line of demarcation were the Marquis Valdelirios and José Iturriaga for Spain, and Gomes Freyre de Andrade and Antonio Robin de Maura for Portugal. They were accompanied by a number of engineers and geographers. Valdelirios and his assistants arrived at Montevideo in January, 1752, accompanied by Luis Altamirano, delegate of the general of the Jesuits, and his companion, Padre Rafael de Cordova. Padre José Barrera was especially conspicuous among the persons whose opinions had to be considered by the commissioners. He was the Provincial of Paraguay, having previously held a similar position in Peru. He suggested that since the treaty of limits had been formed without knowledge of the difficulties to be encountered in its execution, it ought not to be considered a crime in the eyes of the king to solicit delay; and that the only way to bring about the emigration of the Indians of the seven reductions was not to make undue haste, or to substitute violence for gentleness and persuasion. He affirmed, moreover, that as the Indians had the advantage of numbers and a knowledge of the country, it was possible they might defeat the united forces of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, thus making it more difficult to subdue them, especially since there was good ground for believing that neither the force of reason nor of arms would lead the Indians to abandon their towns.

Places were selected to which it was proposed to remove the Indians from the seven reductions, but at this point an

⁴ Southey, *History of Brazil*, III, 448.

obstacle appeared in the unwillingness of the Indians to move to the sites selected for them. They had been aroused by learning of their proposed expatriation, and agents were sent to persuade and pacify them. The agents found in most of the towns complete unanimity on the part of the Indians in opposition to removal; and Padre Fernández, especially charged with duties in this connection, wrote to the governor of Buenos Aires that the difficulties which had presented themselves could be overcome only by the sword.

Both Spain and Portugal were interested in the execution of the treaty, and representatives of the two nations met on the island of Martín García to make arrangements for uniting their forces for this purpose. In March, 1754, a second conference was held at the same place to adopt final resolutions for proceeding with force against the inhabitants of the reductions who had assumed an attitude of rebellion. These resolutions provided that Gomes Freyre should join his troops and attack the pueblo of San Ángel, while Andonaegui with another force should move against the pueblo of San Nicolás. Some of the Indians had at first been disposed to migrate peaceably, but the known unwillingness of others to leave their towns incited nearly the whole Indian population to resistance. In view of this state of things, the Jesuits sought to have the removal of the Indians postponed for three years, hoping within that period to bring the controversy to a peaceful conclusion. The immediate removal demanded by the Spaniards gave the Indians no opportunity to provide for their convenience and support at the places where they were requested to settle. Moreover, the sites selected for their new towns were in some cases swamps or other unhealthful districts, and entirely unfit for dwellings, while others were exposed to invasion by hostile Indians. The Guaranis naturally objected to leaving the places where they and their families had spent decades, and where their houses were already built and their fields cultivated; and the attitude which they assumed toward those who would compel them to with-

draw clearly indicated that a peaceful execution of the treaty was impossible.

On the 21st of May, 1754, Governor Andonaegui began to move his troops toward the missions. The unfavorable season and the lack of proper supplies caused many of his soldiers to desert. On the 3d of October, he encountered a force of three hundred Indians from Yapeyú and La Cruz. When asked why they had come out under arms, they replied that they had come to defend the lands of the missions. Then, for the third time, they were summoned to obey the king, and were informed that in case of refusal they would be treated as declared enemies. This information did not terrify them, for they appeared in front of the enemy's camp, waved their banners and standards, and hurled insults at the Spaniards. It was clear that they were prepared for active hostilities and Andonaegui had to accept the challenge.

The clash which followed this first encounter brought disaster to the Indians. They are reported to have lost two hundred and thirty killed, while nearly all of the survivors were made prisoners. The reported loss of the Spaniards was one captain killed, and three sergeants and twenty-four men wounded. During these events, Gomes Freyre was moving his troops from Rio Pardo toward the scene of disturbance. His force consisted of between sixteen hundred and seventeen hundred men, including soldiers and peons, with ten pieces of artillery. On the 12th of November, he received a message from Andonaegui, informing him of the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, and indicating the necessity of Freyre's return to his encampment at Rio Pardo. The retirement of the Spaniards encouraged the Indians to make more effective preparations for defense; and in the meantime other tribes, particularly the Charrúas, were beginning to make a common cause with them.

After the withdrawal of the Portuguese, the Indians assumed the offensive, and invaded and laid waste the territory almost to the camp of the enemy. The indecisive

campaign was followed by a truce, November 18, 1754, during the continuance of which each party was required to keep within its own borders. The Jesuits made use of the occasion to extend their influence. The withdrawal of the European forces made current an exaggerated idea of the strength of the reductions; for the misfortunes of Andonaegui and his troops were due rather to the rigors of the season and the lack of supplies than to any effective opposition offered by the Indians. Nevertheless, the refusal of the Indians to hand over their villages and their lands to the Portuguese, and the reports of the hostilities, stimulated the imaginations and credulity of the inhabitants of Europe; and the enemies of the Jesuits embraced the occasion to construct a remarkable web of stories. They affirmed that the Jesuits had built up a powerful state, whose soldiers had overthrown in battle the combined forces of Spain and Portugal; they had plunged into this conflict with the desire to make themselves independent; they had crowned one Nicholas Ñanguirú as their king; and had taken other steps to make manifest their sovereignty. These tales were widely believed; Ferdinand VI, was influenced by them to such an extent that he came to regard the Jesuits not only with lack of confidence, but even with repulsion; he dismissed his confessor, who was a Jesuit, and affirmed his belief that the Jesuits were the authors of the revolt of the Indians.⁵

For the next campaign Governor Viana, of Montevideo, was made second in command, and he was commissioned personally to visit Gomes Freyre, in order to inform him of the preparations that had been made on the part of the Spaniards. The Spanish troops entered upon this campaign on the 4th of December, 1755, with the design of uniting with the Portuguese troops at Aceguá; but on the 6th of January, 1756, Viana received a message informing him that the Portuguese general would meet him near the

⁵ Bauza, *Historia de la Dominacion Española en el Uruguay*, II, 114.

Rio Negro, and on the 16th of January the two forces were brought together at the appointed place. Five days later the two armies began their march toward the missions.

Extravagant rumors reached the Spanish and Portuguese leaders concerning the number of men the reductions were ready to put into the field. These rumors affirmed that there was an army of five thousand men equipped for the campaign, while, in fact, all the troops ready for action did not exceed three hundred. But when the threatened towns learned that the united forces were advancing, they were greatly alarmed, and sent messengers in all directions to arouse the inhabitants. Thirteen hundred and fifty men were gathered in a few days, but they were poorly equipped and inefficiently armed. Of these, San Miguel sent four hundred; San Angel, two hundred; San Lorenzo, fifty; San Luis, one hundred and fifty; San Nicolas, two hundred; San Juan, one hundred and fifty; and La Concepcion, two hundred. These were the seven reductions that had determined to resist the allied powers of Spain and Portugal. Their ignorant and untrained leaders gave little promise of success. Knowing of the approach of the troops, the Indians sent a messenger to inquire with what permission the European soldiers were invading their territory. Viana replied that they needed no license, only the permission of the king, in whose name the captain-general of this province appeared; and this intelligence should immediately lead them to come and acknowledge obedience; but if they did not wish to do this, they would expose themselves to all the rigors of war. In reply, the Indians affirmed that they recognized only their liberty, which they had received from God, and also the lands dependent on the town of San Miguel, which only God and no other could take from them; and in view of this state of things, they insisted that the Spaniards should not advance farther. They were, however, informed that the allies would continue their march: whereupon the Indians took leave with the remark that they would meet on the road.

Not long afterward there was a clash between a body of Indians and a detachment of the Spanish-Portuguese forces, in which eight Indians were killed, while Viana lost two killed and two wounded. Among the Indians killed was the cacique Sepee. One of the papers found on Sepee's body was a proclamation, or message, containing a protest against the action of the allies. "We do not wish the coming of Gomes Freyre," it affirmed, "for he and his followers are those who, through the work of the devil, hold us in such abhorrence: this Gomes Freyre is the author of many disturbances, and it is he who operates so wickedly, deceiving the king; and for this reason we do not wish to receive him. We have failed in nothing in the service of our good king; whenever it has occupied us, we have complied with his commands with our whole will, and in proof of this we have repeatedly risked our lives and poured out our blood in obedience to his orders. Why does he not give Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Corrientes, or Paraguay to the Portuguese, instead of the towns of the poor Indians, who are commanded to leave their houses, churches, and finally whatever they have and God has given them?" This simple protest came like a plea of the dead chief in behalf of his people, but it had no power to stay the ruthless advance of the allies.

On the death of Sepee, Nicholas Ñanguirú was put in his place. This was the person referred to in Europe as *Nicholas I., King of Paraguay and Emperor of the Mamelucos*. He was in reality a person of very limited ability; his single accomplishment was a little skill in playing the violin.

In his *Account of the Abipones*, Martin Dobrizhoffer, who was a Jesuit missionary in Paraguay, and a contemporary of Nicholas Ñanguirú, refers to the stories about the "King of Paraguay." "About the beginning of the disturbances," he says, "one Joseph, corregidor of San Miguel, was elected general of their forces against the Portuguese. This Joseph, an active and courageous man, behaved like a

good soldier but an execrable general, for he was as ignorant of military tactics as I am of the black art. On his falling in a chance skirmish, Nicholas Ñanguirú, many years corregidor of the town of Concepcion, succeeded. Under his conduct the war was poorly carried on; and the affairs of the Uruguayans gradually declining, the seven towns were delivered up to the royal forces." . . . "This is that celebrated Nicholas Ñanguirú," Dobrizhoffer continues, "whom the Europeans called the king of Paraguay, whilst Paraguay itself had not an inkling of the matter. At the very time when the feigned majesty of the king of Paraguay employed every mouth and press in Europe, I saw this Nicholas Ñanguirú, with naked feet, and garments after the Indian fashion, sometimes driving cattle before the shambles, sometimes chopping wood in the market-place; and when I considered him and his occupation, could hardly refrain from laughter."⁶

Continuing their march, the allied forces encountered a considerable body of Indians on the morning of the 10th of February. After the officers had held a council, the troops were ordered to prepare for battle. The Spanish troops were placed on the right, and the Portuguese on the left. In the rear, arranged in four columns, were the two hundred carts containing the baggage and the equipment. The line was finally extended along the base of the hill, Kaibate, the enemy being within clear range. The forces brought into this action by the Spanish and Portuguese have been estimated at two thousand five hundred men. In the battle which ensued the Spaniards lost three killed and ten wounded. Among the latter was Andonaegui. The Portuguese lost one killed and thirty wounded. By reason of their ineffective weapons and lack of military skill, the Indians were seriously handicapped, and suffered an overwhelming defeat. The number of killed on their side has been variously estimated, the estimates ranging from six hundred to fifteen hundred and eleven. Bauza adopts the

⁶ Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones*, I, 27, 28.

highest number, with one hundred and fifty-four prisoners.

The effect of this encounter was to break the resistance of the Indians. They had lost their principal chiefs, Sepee and Nanguirú, and after this crushing blow they had no competent leaders, even if they had had the spirit to continue the contest. Their depressed state is indicated by the fact that the allied forces met no opposition in their forward movement after the battle. Yet their way led through a forest and an unknown mountainous region, where a comparatively small troop of Indians familiar with the country could have set an effective obstacle to their further progress. Having entered the territory of the reductions, they had several skirmishes with the Indians, and on the 17th of May, 1756, they entered the town of San Miguel.

On entering the town, Viana, the Spanish commander, is said to have been surprised at its excellent appearance, and to have exclaimed: "And this is one of the towns which we are commanded to turn over to the Portuguese? The authorities at Madrid must be crazy to destroy a town which has no rival among all those of Paraguay." On the arrival of the invaders, the inhabitants of San Miguel took flight, abandoned their property, and spread the panic to other towns through which they passed.

That some of the inhabitants of the reductions considered their cause hopeless is indicated by the fact that the authorities of the town of San Juan presented themselves at the camp of the allies, and acknowledged to Andonaegui their complete submission.⁷ Andonaegui pointed out to them the serious consequences that would result from any indication of further insubordination. It was expected that San Lorenzo would follow the example of San Juan, but as no message of submission was received, Andonaegui detailed Viana and eight hundred men to take possession of the town. Setting out on the 19th of May, Viana entered the town at dawn the following morning, surprising the inhabitants, and made a number of them prisoners, among whom were

⁷ Bauza, II, 136.

the priests Limp, Unger, and Henis. Padre Henis, examined before Viana, made a vigorous reply to the charges that were brought against him. "These pueblos," he said, "have cost the king nothing; we have conquered them ourselves with the crucifix in the hand. His Majesty cannot hand them over to the Portuguese; and if I had been in Madrid, I could have given him such information that this surrender would not have been undertaken."⁸ The positive attitude assumed by Padre Henis called forth only a reprimand from Viana. The priests were, however, set at liberty, and measures were taken to preserve public order, and to cause the Spanish commander's authority to be recognized.

At this point Andonaegui wrote to the priests and cabildos of the towns that had not submitted, called their attention to the example of San Juan, and suggested that they should bind themselves to maintain obedience. This communication had the desired effect. All the cabildos and corregidores presented themselves, took the oath of fidelity, and were then despatched to their several reductions. They understood then that their cause was lost, and that it only remained for them to gather themselves together and prepare for emigration. The priests, Balda and Henis, were ordered to direct the march of the Indians. But not all of the Indians were disposed to accept the fate of exiles with resignation. Some fled to the forests to resume the lawless life of savages. Progress toward a final settlement of the affairs of the reductions was, moreover, interrupted by doubts as to the outcome of negotiations in Madrid. Valdelirios expected another general would be sent to replace Andonaegui, and that new instructions would be issued with reference to the transfer of the reductions. Events half accomplished awaited the conclusion of diplomatic maneuvers.

In November, 1756, the expected general, Don Pedro Ceballos, arrived. He came with a body of one thousand men, who were for the greater part foreigners and vaga-

⁸ *Relacion de los servicios de Viana*, MS., quoted by Bauza, II, 136.

bonds. The tales that had been circulated in Europe concerning Emperor Nicholas and the possibility of the defeat of the Spanish and Portuguese forces had made a profound impression on Ceballos, but he was soon undeceived by his newly acquired knowledge of the actual state of affairs. In January, 1757, he arrived at the Missions, and the superior of the Jesuits went out to receive him. "At San Borja a platform was erected in front of the church, and Ceballos, surrounded by the Marquis of Valdelirios and the principal Spanish leaders, received the declarations of the multitude that no one was opposed to the Jesuits."⁹ This somewhat theatrical ceremony had no great significance, except as a formal presentation of the new commander of the forces. After this event Andonaegui and Viana departed for Buenos Aires, the former *en route* to Spain, and the latter proceeding to resume the duties of his office as governor of Montevideo.

Neither the government of Spain nor that of Portugal was now disposed to carry the boundary question to a practical settlement. Portugal had already spent fifteen million dollars on the undertaking, and the destruction of Lisbon by the earthquake in 1755 had discouraged all foreign enterprises; while in Spain the death of Queen Barbara and the illness of the king had paralyzed all the agencies of the government. The commissioners who had been charged to effect the transfer and establish the new boundary were no longer zealous in the execution of their task; and the Jesuits, after all their wretched experiences, were recalled to take charge of the reductions.¹⁰

Other evidence that the Spaniards no longer regarded themselves as hostile to the Indians of the Missions may be discovered in the fact that in order to be prepared to resist any possible future attacks by the Indians of the Chaco, Ceballos placed the inhabitants of the reductions on a war footing, requiring military service from all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and sixty.

⁹ Bauza, II, 141.

¹⁰ Bauza, II, 141, 142.

“Thus ended,” to quote Francisco Bauza, “this famous campaign of the Missions, in which the Spaniards fought bravely to promote the interests of the Portuguese, encountering hardships and dangers for the purpose of carrying out a boundary treaty that dismembered their territory and undermined their military and political power on American soil. In few undertakings have the officers and ministers of the king shown a more vigorous tenacity; and would they had employed it for our good rather than, as it was, for the limitation of our territorial extension and of our natural advantage. Money, soldiers, diplomatic intrigues, insults and threats against every opponent, entreaties, cruelties, promises, were alternative means brought to bear to execute the boundary treaty, without attaining anything else, after seven years of aggression and turmoil, than their withdrawal from the negotiations, disgusted among themselves, and returning affairs to their previous condition.”¹¹

In the last years of the decade there was no prospect of reviving the interest of the contracting parties in the treaty of 1750. The treaty itself represented a laudable attempt on the part of Spain and Portugal to establish a line of demarcation between the lands of their American colonies, but it was formed in ignorance of the conditions that were to be affected by it, and the attempt to execute it brought satisfaction to nobody.

In 1759, Charles III. brought a large measure of force and intelligence to the Spanish government. He found that the treaty had few or no supporters in either nation. Portugal was convinced that Colonia was more valuable than the seven reductions; and the court of Spain had already anticipations of a time when both Colonia and the Missions would be counted among its possessions. Ten years had brought about a marked change in the attitude of the two nations toward one another. Neither government wished the treaty to stand; and, in 1761, an agreement was reached by which the treaty and all the agreements based on it were

¹¹ *Hist. de la Dominacion Española en el Uruguay*, II, 142, 143.

annulled. This agreement was the treaty of 1761, which declared that all the treaties, pacts, and agreements made between the two governments before 1750 should remain in full force and vigor from the date of this last document forward.¹²

¹² The principal article of the treaty of February 12, 1761, is as follows: "Artículo I. El sobredicho tratado de límites de Asia y América entre las dos coronas, firmado en Madrid en 13 de enero de 1750, con todos los otros tratados ó convenciones que en consecuencia de él se fueron celebrado para arreglar las instrucciones de los respectivos comisarios que hasta ahora se han empleado en las demarcaciones de los referidos límites, y todo lo acordado en virtud de ellas, se dan y que dan en fuerza del presente por cancelados, casados y anulados como si nunca hubiesen existido ni hubiesen sido ejecutados; y todas las cosas pertenecientes a los límites de América y Asia se restituyen á los términos de los tratados, pactos y convenciones que habian sido celebrados entre las dos coronas contratantes ántes del referido año de 1750; de forma que solo estos tratados, pactos y convenciones celebrados ántes del año de 1750 quedan de aquí adelante en su fuerza y vigor."—Calvo, II, 350.

THE REMOVAL OF THE JESUITS FROM RIO DE LA PLATA AND CHILE.

In 1766 the king of Spain appointed Francisco de Paula Bucareli y Ursúa governor of Rio de la Plata, the provinces which ten years later were organized as a vice-royalty. The next year Charles III. issued a decree expelling the Jesuits from Spain and all Spanish possessions in America. The decree, called the *Real Decreto de Ejecucion*, was in the following terms: "Having accepted the opinion of the members of my Royal Council in Extraordinary, which met on the 29th of last January for consultation concerning past occurrences and concerning matters which persons of the highest character have reported to me; moved by very grave causes relative to the obligation under which I find myself placed of maintaining my people in subordination, tranquility, and justice, and other urgent, just, and necessary reasons, which I reserve in my royal mind; making use of the supreme economical authority, which the Almighty has placed in my hands for the protection of my vassals, and the respect of my crown: I have ordered that the Jesuits be expelled from all my dominions of Spain, the Indies, the Philippine Islands, and other adjacent regions, as well priests as coadjutors or lay-brothers, who may have made the first profession, and the novices, who may wish to follow them; and that all the properties of the Society in my dominions be taken; and for the uniform execution

of this decree throughout these dominions I give you full and exclusive authority; and that you may form the necessary instructions and orders, according to your best judgment, and what you may think the most effective, expeditious, and peaceful method for carrying out these instructions and orders. And I wish that not only the magistrates and superior tribunals of these kingdoms may execute your mandates punctually, but that the same understanding may be entertained concerning those which you may direct to the viceroys, presidents, audiencias, governors, corregidores, alcaldes mayores, and any other magistrates of those kingdoms and provinces; and that in response to their respective requests, all troops, militia or civilian, shall render the necessary assistance, without any delay or evasion, under pain of the delinquent's falling under my royal indignation; and I charge the provincials, presidents, rectors, and other superiors of the Society of Jesus to accept these provisions punctually, and in carrying them out the Jesuits shall be treated with the greatest regard, attention, honesty, and assistance, so that in every respect the action taken may be in conformity with my sovereign intentions. You will keep this in mind for its exact fulfillment, as I very confidently expect from your zeal, activity, and love of my royal service; and to this end you will give the necessary orders and instructions, accompanying them with copies of my royal decree, which being signed by you shall be given the same faith and credit as the original."¹

This decree, bearing the king's rubric, and dated February 27, 1767, was sent to the Count of Aranda, then president of the Council.

With authority conferred by this decree Aranda issued instructions for the removal of the Jesuits from the dominions of the Indies and the Philippine Islands. These instructions were dated March 1, 1767, and conveyed to the

¹ *Colección General de las providencias hasta aquí tomadas por el gobierno sobre el estrañamiento y ocupacion de temporalidades de los regulares de la Compañía, que existían en los dominios de S. M. de España, Indios, e Islas Filipinas.* Madrid, 1767, 1, 2.

viceroy, presidents, and governors the same power that had been bestowed upon Aranda by the royal decree. They made the officials concerned responsible for the execution of the decree, and provided means for conducting the affairs of the missions after the departure of the Jesuits. By these instructions, moreover, the specific directions contained in the instructions of the same date, issued for removing the Jesuits from Spain, were made applicable in the Indies and the Philippine Islands in so far as the circumstances of those countries permitted.

No one has hitherto made an entirely satisfactory exposition of the influences which moved the king to take this action, but it was naturally suggested to him that his royal prestige might be lessened by the increasing wealth, power, and presumption of the society. Clement XIII. wished to know the reasons for the expulsion, but to his inquiry the king replied: "In order to keep from the world a great scandal, I shall conceal in my breast the abominable machination which has been the motive of this severity. Your Holiness must believe me on my word: the security and repose of my existence require of me the most absolute silence on this subject."²

On the 20th of March, 1767, Aranda issued a circular letter, enclosing the royal decree of expulsion and detailed instructions for carrying out this decree. These documents were addressed to the magistrates in all the places where the Jesuits had houses. The recipients were required not to open them until a certain fixed day in the future, and in the meantime to communicate to no one the fact that they had been received. It was required that the officers charged with the execution of the royal decree should be assisted by the army, and that care should be exercised to take possession of the houses and colleges of the Jesuits in the early morning and under such conditions as would leave no opportunity for any member of the order to escape. The archives,

² See Bauza, *Historia de la Dominacion Española en el Uruguay*, II. 191.

✓ the libraries, and all kinds of property, except the very few personal effects which the members of the order might retain, should be seized and turned over to the state. To Bucareli, governor of Rio de la Plata, came not only his commission, but also orders to be transmitted to the governor of Chile, the president of the audiencia of Charcas, and the viceroy of Peru.

The night that had been set apart for arresting the Jesuits of Buenos Aires was made almost insupportable by a storm of hail and wind and rain, so that Governor Bucareli, the troops, and all persons who were expected to assist in the undertaking were obliged to remain in the fort from midnight until half past two in the morning. At this hour a company of soldiers was sent to the college of St. Ignatius, commonly known as *Colegio Grande*. The soldiers were accompanied by the governor's secretary, Juan de Berlanga, who was the head of this expedition, and by three assistants. Having entered, they gathered together the thirty-six Jesuits found at the college, and read to them the king's order for their expulsion. The prisoners were kept for eight hours in the apartment of the rector, and were then conducted through the streets, guarded by the troops, to the suburbs near the college of St. Elmo. While the Jesuits were being taken from the *Colegio Grande*, another commission, supported by a company of soldiers, appeared at the college of St. Elmo, and took the eight inmates who were subject to expulsion, and held them imprisoned with those who had been brought from the other institution.

Early in the morning of July 13, Bucareli published an edict at Buenos Aires, in which he gave notice of the action that had been taken under the royal decree, and ordered that no one, under pain of death, should communicate with the Jesuits in any manner whatsoever, or censure the decree or the measures taken in carrying it out. By the same decree it was also ordered that all persons owing the *padres* anything, or holding anything that belonged to them, should present themselves before the governor within three

days and declare their indebtedness and the articles which they held.

This unexpected act on the part of the governor and his agents startled the inhabitants of the city; and the closing of the Jesuit church disturbed especially those who had been accustomed to resort to it for worship or confession. The order prohibiting communication between the people and the prisoners was not strictly obeyed, and the governor wrote to the chief of the guard, charging him under no pretext to permit this order to be violated, and requesting him to examine the *padres* one by one and take away from them any paper, ink, pens, or other means of communicating with their friends or adherents in the city.

Montevideo was the first city to learn of the arrest and imprisonment of the Jesuits in Buenos Aires. Travelers arriving from the capital brought information of the execution of the royal decree in that city; and on the 5th of July, an attempt was made in Montevideo to transport the books of the Jesuit library to some other place, apparently to avoid the necessity of turning them over to the government. This plan was, however, defeated, and the next morning the four Jesuits in the city were arrested. Three of them were sent immediately to Buenos Aires, but the superior was held to assist in making out an inventory of the property that was to be confiscated.

A week later, at four o'clock in the morning of July 13, the troops surrounded the Jesuit college of Santa Fé. The officers charged with the execution of the decree of expulsion then rang the bell and called for the rector, and on his appearance they arrested him, together with the porter. The invading party at once distributed themselves throughout the edifice, and gradually gathered all the occupants together and locked them in the refectory. Jesuit writers are naturally disposed to emphasize the commotion made by the inhabitants of the towns when they learned of the action of the officers in carrying out the king's orders. In this case it is reported that "all the people were excited when

they learned what had happened in the college. A large number of persons assembled in the plaza; some hooted, others wept, and gave themselves over to grief in a manner to excite compassion; while others, having retired to their houses on account of the horror caused by this outrage, bewailed the fate of the Jesuits in secret."³

In the afternoon the Jesuits were taken from the college, and, on the same day, after an examination of their effects, they were driven in carriages out of the city. They were held in an open field within sight of the city for a whole day while preparations were made for their transportation to Buenos Aires. On this journey the soldiers were charged to prevent any communication between them and either the inhabitants of the city or of the country through which they passed. Santa Fé contributed to the contingent already at Buenos Aires five priests, one student, and five coadjutors. The rector and the procurador remained for the time being to assist in closing up the affairs of the college.

In contemplating the removal of the Jesuits from Cordova, Bucareli feared that, on account of their number and importance, certain difficulties might arise if the undertaking were left to the officials of the province or of the city. He, therefore, entrusted the task to Major Fernando Fabro, appointed by him and sent from Buenos Aires, accompanied by a detachment of eighty soldiers. It was between three and four o'clock on the morning of the 12th of July when Fabro called at the door of the Colegio Maximo, and asked for the rector. Here, as at other places, the porter was told that the rector was wanted to attend a dying man. When the rector, accompanied by another priest reached the door, they saw that the college was surrounded by soldiers. All the priests were then required to get up, in order that they might hear a communication from the king. They were conducted to the refectory, which they found already occupied by a large number of soldiers, and here a notary read the

³ *Coleccion de Libros y Documentos referentes á la Historia de America* vii., 76.

decree of expulsion and confiscation. The priests of the seminary of Monserrat were at the same time aroused and brought to the refectory of the college, where the whole assembly was locked in. Mattresses were brought in for the night, and were placed on the floor, on the tables, under the tables, on chairs, wherever space could be found, yet there were not enough to accommodate the one hundred and thirty Jesuits who were crowded together in this single room. For the day the mattresses were piled up in order to afford standing room and to give the prisoners an opportunity to move about.

For ten days the Jesuits of Cordova were kept in these narrow quarters. On the 22d of July it was announced to them that the time had come for them to depart. Fabro took leave of them and turned them over to Captain Antonio Bobadilla. At nine o'clock in the evening they were conducted from the refectory to the vehicles gathered for their transportation. They took with them only their clothing and their breviaries, and at midnight began their long journey to the port of Ensenada. When they halted for the first night nine miles from the city, they found themselves surrounded by a considerable number of the residents of Cordova, who had come out of the city to take leave of them. Some of these followed the train four or five days.

The thirty-four carts laden with deposed priests, escorted by forty soldiers, and attended by drivers and camp-followers, constituted a considerable caravan that moved over the monotonous plain day after day for nearly a month towards the capital and its adjacent port. The caravan did not enter Buenos Aires, but passed on to Ensenada, leaving the city on the left, four or five miles from the line of march. Two days after their arrival at the port, the Jesuits were embarked, August 20, on the ship *La Venus*.

After Cordova, other cities farther away from Buenos Aires sent their quotas of deposed priests to be added to those already at the capital awaiting transportation to Europe. Fifteen were taken from Corrientes. The distance

of Asuncion and the known inclination of the governor of Paraguay to favor the Jesuits left uncertain the result in case he had to be trusted with the execution of the royal decree. The king, therefore, appointed two persons to assist the governor, who were known to be hostile to the designs of the Jesuits; their hostility, however, did not prevent them from upholding Governor Morphy in his considerate and humane treatment of the sixteen persons found in the college at Asuncion, who were liable to expulsion under the royal decree. The prisoners were held for three weeks before preparations were complete for their voyage down the river, which was finally begun on the 19th of August.

The college at Tarija was still farther away from the port. It was in a district which was dependent on the audiencia of Charcas, but which belonged to the Jesuit province of Paraguay. The execution of the royal decree there was under the direction of Victorino Martinez de Tineo, the interim president of the audiencia. The persons marked for exile, twelve or fourteen in number, were started on their long journey of twelve hundred miles within twenty-four hours after their arrest, but they were detained a few miles from Tarija from the 24th of August until the 1st of September. Padre Asúa died on the way; the rest of the company reached Buenos Aires on the 27th of December, after an overland journey that lasted nearly four months. Gradually, in the course of the last half of the year, the Jesuits were brought to Buenos Aires from their outlying posts, from Salta, Tucuman, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, and Rioja. They were brought also from the towns of Cuyo.

Only a month before the publication of the decree of expulsion, a license was granted in Spain which authorized the taking of eighty Jesuit missionaries to America. It is not to be supposed that the plan of banishing the Jesuits was conceived and matured after the granting of this license; it is probable, on the contrary, that wishing to keep the project of expulsion secret, the king was willing to let

events take their normal or undisturbed course until the arrival of the day for executing the decree. Jesuit missionaries were allowed to embark for America when it was known that they would be arrested and sent back to Europe as soon as they landed. Those who embarked in the *San Fernando* in January were buffeted by the winds and waves for seven months, and arrived at Montevideo on the 26th of July, 1767. Six of them had died after they left Spain, and the remaining thirty-six, exhausted by the want of food and the other hardships of the voyage, came into port signaling for assistance. Their requests were, however, disregarded; and the next day La Rosa, the governor of the province, accompanied by a troop of soldiers, appeared on the vessel, and, having assembled all of the Jesuits on deck, informed them of the decree of expulsion. At the time of this visit, a letter from Bucareli to La Rosa was on its way from Buenos Aires to Montevideo, ordering that in case the Jesuits arrived from Europe they should not under any conditions be allowed to land; but they should be conducted at once to Ensenada, transferred to the frigate, *La Venus*, and returned to Spain. This message did not arrive until the Jesuits had been taken from the ship and shut up in the narrow quarters formerly occupied by the priests who had been sent to Buenos Aires. It is somewhat difficult to determine whether this was a more or less fortunate turn in the affairs of the prisoners than would have been that which Bucareli's order proposed. Towards the end of August, twenty of those who had arrived in July were sent to Ensenada; seven others who were ill were retained some weeks longer in Montevideo, and were dispatched for Buenos Aires on the 17th of November; but they were overtaken by a violent storm and all were drowned.

Before the end of September a large number of the deposed Jesuits had been brought together in Buenos Aires. Some of them had been waiting nearly three months for the completion of preparations for their transportation.

224
 Counting those who had recently arrived on the *San Fernando* and those who had been taken from posts in the interior of the country, the whole number amounted to two hundred and twenty-four. Of these *La Venus* carried one hundred and fifty, while the rest were distributed among the *San Esteban*, *El Pájaro*, *La Catalana*, and *El Principe*. This little fleet sailed from the port of Ensenada on the 29th of September. Its destination was the port of Santa María in the bay of Cadiz. *La Venus* arrived January 7, 1768; *El Pájaro*, January 9; *La Catalana*, January 17; *San Esteban*, February 17; and *El Principe*, March 9. At Santa María the exiles were lodged in the *Hospicio de Misiones*, a house that had belonged to the Jesuits, and that had been occupied by missionaries awaiting opportunity to sail to América. But Santa María was only a halting place, and the prisoners were destined to be passed on to Italian territory. Finding themselves here in the home-country after their experiences in the New World, some of them sought permission to remain by making known their desire to leave the service of the Society. But this was not an acceptable excuse, and they were informed by the minister in charge of the expulsion that it would be necessary for them to go to Italy to obtain their secularization from the pope.

On the 15th of June the exiles sailed for the island of Corsica, where were already assembled Jesuits banished from the Peninsula; but they were permitted to remain here only from the first to the thirty-first of August, when by order of the French they were obliged to abandon the island. After an unsuccessful attempt to settle in the republic of Genoa, they were finally conducted to the States of the Church, where they found a permanent abiding place.

The Jesuits constituting the first contingent sent to Europe from the port of Buenos Aires were taken from the colleges in the towns and cities. There remained the missionaries of the Chaco and Chiquitos, and those who had established themselves among the Guarani Indians in

Paraguay. In the Chaco there were fifteen missions, or reductions. The action of the officers of the government in arresting the Jesuits of the colleges was known in the reductions before any official communication had reached them. The first effect of this information on the Indians was to inspire them with a desire to abandon the missions and return to their life in the forests. At first some of the missionaries hoped that the decree of expulsion would not be applied to them, but that they would be allowed to remain on account of their influence over the Indians. But this hope did not last long; for Sergeant Major Francisco de Andino soon brought the news that the missionaries were to be taken from the reductions and transported to Buenos Aires. When the Indians received this information, they were greatly disturbed, and renewed their determination to abandon their settlements. They were persuaded with great difficulty to return, and were so thoroughly enraged, as Padre Pauke observed, that, "if I with the help of God and the reasons which He put into my mouth had not succeeded in appeasing my Indians and persuading them to bear their grief, in a short time the city of Santa Fé would have been razed to the ground."

In removing the Jesuits, the commissioner and his assistants turned the missions over to persons who did not belong to the Society. They made a careful inventory of the property, the bulk of which consisted of various classes of animals that had been able to support themselves by grazing on the lands about the reduction. In making the inventory, they found very little money, for in the isolation of the reductions most of the economic transactions had been effected by barter. The six missionaries from San Xavier, San Pedro, and Concepcion were conducted first to Santa Fé, but they were held outside of the city while arrangements were made for transporting them to Buenos Aires. This last stage of the journey lasted from the 6th of September to the 4th of October, and on their arrival they were confined in the quarters formerly occupied by the Jesuits

who had been sent to Europe. The procedure that was observed in the first reductions, from which the Jesuits were removed, was followed in the others, until each was deprived of its leaders. In all cases the Indians saw the departure of their priests with regret, which often found expression in signs of profound grief.

At Buenos Aires the Jesuits remained imprisoned for several months, suffering not only serious physical hardships but also the grief less easily endured of humiliation and disappointed hopes. Towards the end of March, 1768, the frigate *Esmeralda* arrived from Spain, and on the 6th of May she set sail for the return voyage, having on board one hundred and fifty-one Jesuits. This was the second expedition from this port, and what the exiles suffered can be only imperfectly imagined, even when we think of the crowded condition of the ship and the very inadequate preparations that had been made for the long journey, lasting from the 6th of May to the 22d of August, when they arrived at the port of Santa María. From this port the Germans among the deposed priests were sent to their native country, while the rest were transported directly to Italy, without being subjected to the disagreeable vicissitudes experienced by the members of the first expedition.

There were ten reductions in the territory of the Chiquitos, a region which now forms the southeastern part of Bolivia. The execution of the decree of expulsion was not entrusted to Governor Bucareli, but to the president of the royal audiencia of Charcas. The troops appointed to assist in this undertaking were placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Martinez, who at that time had his headquarters in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and his special mission here was to resist the encroachments of the Portuguese. But in arresting the priests it was not found necessary to use the troops, for the Jesuits were willing to promise obedience to the order of the king. They proposed to make no resistance, and even suggested that the soldiers should be kept away from the reductions, lest their presence should make an unfavorable impression on the neophytes.

A party of thirteen priests was despatched on the 2d of November; another party of six on the 28th of December; and on the 2d of April, 1768, the rest of the missionaries of the Chiquitos followed their companions to Buenos Aires, or to Spain by some other route. Among the priests of these reductions there were several whose age and infirmities seemed to render it impossible for them to make the long journey without fatal consequences. The commissioner, therefore, wrote to the president of the audiencia for authority to allow them to remain in the country of the Chiquitos until the end of their lives, which was apparently not far off. This request was denied on the ground that the proposed action would be contrary to the royal instructions which prohibited any member of the Society from remaining in the reductions, even on account of age or infirmity. One of those for whom this privilege was sought was Padre Chomé. When the request made by the commissioner had been denied, Chomé was taken from his bed, placed in a hammock, and carried by two strong Indians from San Xavier sixty leagues to Santa Cruz de la Sierra; then for a distance of a hundred leagues to Cochabamba; and finally over the desert and the rough and dangerous paths of the cordillera to Oruro, where his power of endurance failed completely, and he died on the 7th of September, 1768.

Another who was thought unable to endure the hardship of the journey to Spain was Padre Messner. The first stage of his journey was from his post to Santa Cruz de la Sierra, one hundred and twelve leagues. Messner reached Santa Cruz de la Sierra rather dead than alive, and had to wait here five months for the snow to disappear from the mountains. The continuance of the journey from this point, over the mountains and across the bleak and barren plateau, was exhausting even to a person in robust health, and was almost more than one could stand who was burdened with illness and old age. It was, moreover, rendered more fatiguing by the determination of the conductor of the expedition to push on as rapidly as possible, whatever might be

the state of the way. On the mountains between Oruro and Tacna, the aged priest asked that he might be allowed to halt and rest. His petition was not granted, but a man was detailed to walk by the side of his horse and hold him, in order that he might not fall from his saddle. They had, however, advanced only a short distance in this way when the aide found that the priest was dead. Another priest whose course was almost run was Padre Pallozzi. He was taken over nearly the same route as the others to Arica; then from Arica to Callao and Panama; and on arriving at Porto Bello he found himself exhausted, and died there December 21, 1768. And yet, the commissioner who ordered these things was frequently accused of being a partisan of the Jesuits, and too lenient to perform properly the duties of his post.

By the middle of May, 1768, the Jesuits had been despatched from all the stations in the provinces of Rio de la Plata, except from the celebrated Misiones of the Guaranis in Paraguay. The reports that had been circulated, representing these reductions as usurpers of powers which belonged properly to the king, and as in rebellion against the authority of the sovereign, led the governor to proceed with great caution. He summoned the Provincial to Buenos Aires, but later countermanded the order, and requested him to return to Yapeyú from Bojada, the present city of Paraná. He also requested that the Indian corregidor of each of the thirty reductions should be sent to the capital, accompanied by thirty of the principal caciques. These sixty influential Indians were detained about a year in Buenos Aires, and it was apparently desired that they should hold and express views that would justify the contemplated action with respect to the reductions. When it was supposed that they had been sufficiently turned against the Jesuits, they were induced to write a joint letter to the king, showing their enthusiasm for the governor, and expressing their thanks for their prospective relief from slavery. It has been suggested that they would probably

not have manifested such satisfaction with the governor if they had known that they were held as hostages for the peaceful conduct of the Indians they represented.

The governor delayed the execution of the decree of expulsion for about a year, and during this time the corregidores were induced to write other letters to the Indians of their reductions, with a view of creating a prejudice among them against the priests. The position of the Jesuits during this period was sufficiently difficult even without the intrigues of the authorities at Buenos Aires; for it was known that they were to be removed, and this knowledge tended to destroy their prestige with the Indians. They felt compelled, however, to counsel the Indians to submit to the proposed action of the government, which everybody knew was hostile to the system of the missions.

Besides the time required for carefully preparing for the change, the difficulty of obtaining secular priests as substitutes for the Jesuits, was another reason for the delay. Finally, on the 24th of May, Governor Bucareli left Buenos Aires, proceeding to Misiones to provide for the removal of the Jesuits. He made extensive military preparations for overcoming any resistance that might appear on the part of the Indians; but these preparations were proved by the events to have been unnecessary. On the 15th of July he arrived within a league of Yapeyú, and sent a commissioner to the reduction to bring the decree of expulsion officially to the attention of the provincial and any other Jesuits who might be there. The commissioner in this instance was Dr. Antonio Aldao, who had acted in the same capacity in expelling the Jesuits from Cordova. The ordinary procedure was observed here, including a notification in the prescribed form, the taking of an inventory of all the property belonging to the reduction, or pueblo, the church as well as the workshops and the warehouses. The objects contained in the church were turned over to the new priest, and the other items of property were put in charge of an administrator, one being appointed for each

of the pueblos from which the Jesuits were removed. During these events Bucareli remained a short distance from the pueblo, wishing to enter only after the departure of the Jesuits. "Finally, he entered the pueblo with all the ostentation possible, and remained there ten days, seeking to please the Indians and gain their confidence."⁴

78 / From Yapeyú, the first of the reductions, or pueblos, in which the decree of expulsion was executed, the process was carried to each of the other pueblos, and by the 22d of August they had all been occupied and the new masters installed. The number of Jesuits deposed in these thirty pueblos and sent down to Buenos Aires was seventy-eight. After their arrival in the capital, they were held imprisoned until they were despatched for Spain, on the 8th of December. The voyage lasted four months, and on the 7th of April, 1769, they reached Cadiz, and a little later were transferred to the port of Santa María. In Santa María they were confined in the house of the Augustinians and the hospital of San Juan, and they remained there somewhat more than a year. During this period the provincial, Padre Manuel Vergara, was added to the long list of those who died going into exile. In all the province of Paraguay only one Jesuit remained. He was Padre Segismundo Aperger, who was left there because he could not be removed, since he was confined to his bed, burdened with the weight of nearly ninety years, paralyzed and moribund.

One of the problems of the expulsion of the Jesuits was to find where they would be received and permitted to remain. The attempts to establish them in Corsica and Genoa were unsuccessful, and it was finally decided that they should be taken to the papal states. In making this decision Charles III., it is said, pretended to rule the states of the supreme pontiff with the same authority as that which he exercised in his own dominions. Thus, without soliciting beforehand the consent of the pope, or giving notice of his intention, he sent to the papal states the six thousand Spanish subjects whom he had expelled from Spain and the

⁴ *Coleccion de Libros y Documentos* vii., 212.

American colonies, ordering his captains to disembark them at ports of these states. By the royal ordinance of April 2, 1767, he, moreover, declared that if any Jesuit should leave the states of the church, the pension that had been assigned to him would be discontinued.⁵ The papal states were thus their prison, but the authorities of the church were not pleased to be made their keepers. Their view was that if the Jesuits were innocent of any offense, there existed no ground for expelling them as pernicious; if they were bad, one might not assume that the pope should punish them, but that they ought to have been punished in the dominions of the king.⁶

On the arrival of the Jesuits, it was not thought advisable to incorporate them in the established organization, but to assign them to the provinces of Emilia and Romagna, where they might be maintained without great inconvenience. Those from Paraguay were sent to the cities of Faenza, Ravenna, and Brisighella. At Faenza they received special attention from the priests of the Jesuit college in that city; and some of them accepted an invitation from Count Cantoni to occupy a house owned by him in the country.

Before the end of 1769, all of the banished Spanish Jesuits found themselves in the northern part of the papal states, and here some of them attempted to reorganize the instruction which had been interrupted in America by their expulsion. The source of their support, aside from the donations received, was a small pension of about a hundred dollars a year, paid by the Spanish government from the property of the Jesuits that had been confiscated. But all their resources were inadequate for their proper maintenance, so that, as it was said, if they clothed themselves, there was nothing left for food; and if they ate, there was nothing left for clothing.

Those persons among the exiles who turned their attention to instruction found pupils without going outside their

⁵ *Coleccion de Libros y Documentos*, vii., 242.

⁶ *Coleccion de Libros y Documentos*, vii., 243.

own ranks; for a considerable number of novices had followed their superiors. They had refused to accept the conditions under which they might have remained in America. These conditions were embraced in the instructions of Aranda to the commissioners charged with carrying out the decree of expulsion. The tenth section of these instructions provided that if any novices were found in the novitiates, or houses, who had not already taken their religious vows, they should be immediately removed in order that they might have no communication with the rest, and should be taken to a private house, where they might enjoy full liberty, have knowledge of the perpetual expatriation that had been imposed upon the members of the Society, and decide freely according to their inclinations, without being influenced by the commissioner, whether to return to secular life or accept the fate of the exiles. But they were made to understand that in going with those who were expelled they would receive no pension, and their expatriation would be perpetual. The government was evidently desirous of having the novices abandon their plan to enter the order of the Jesuits; but the youths, with the zeal of new converts, were not easily moved, and, for the larger part, went with their teachers to Italy, and here under the newly organized instruction had an opportunity to continue their studies.

One of the consequences of the removal of the Jesuits from Rio de la Plata was to deprive the world of much information concerning the early events of that region. Some manuscripts were lost and others were never written that would have been written if the members of the Society had been permitted to continue their work undisturbed. Still a small number of the exiles maintained an interest in subjects connected with the country of their earlier labors. Among these there were four noteworthy foreigners, men not of Spanish stock. Martin Dobrizhoffer, an Austrian, went to Paraguay in 1748, and was a missionary among the Guaranis eleven years, and among the Abipones for seven years. At Vienna he wrote a *History of the Abipones*, which

was published in Latin in 1784. It was subsequently translated into German, and in 1822 an abridged translation in English was published in London. Florian Pauke went to Paraguay with Father Dobrizhoffer in 1748. He was a missionary in the Chaco for fifteen years. An extract from his writings was published in Vienna in 1829, called *Pater Florian Pauke's Reise*. In 1870 practically the whole of his manuscript was published with the title of *Pater Florian Paucke, ein Jesuit in Paraguay*. Thomas Falkner, an Englishman born in Manchester in 1707, arrived in Paraguay in 1732. He returned to England after his expulsion from Rio de la Plata, and in 1774 published *A Description of Patagonia and the Adjoining Parts of South America*. Other manuscripts by him related to anatomy and the natural history of America. The fourth of this group was Ladislaus Orosz, an Hungarian. In 1727, at the age of thirty, he went to Rio de la Plata, taught Philosophy and Theology in Cordova, and, after his expulsion, returned to his native province of Tyrnau, where he died in 1773. Two principal manuscripts are ascribed to him. The first was *Decades quatuor virorum illustrium Paraquariae*. This was printed in Tyrnau in 1759, and made a folio volume of five hundred and fifty-two pages. The other work was called *Decades quatuor aliae virorum illustrium Paraquariae*, and was probably never printed.⁷

There is a longer list of writers among the exiles who had been sent to America from the Peninsula, or who were born in America. The most important of these were the Padres Cardiel, Quiroga, Jolio, Peramás, Muriel, Sanchez, Labrador, Guevara, and Juarez. The more important of their contributions are Cardiel's *Breve relacion de las Misiones Guaranies*; Quinoga's *Diario* of his journeys; Jolio's *Saggio sulla storia naturale della provincia del Gran Ciaco*; Peramás's *Vidas de varones ilustres* and *Annus patiens*, the latter consisting of a diary of the journey of

⁷ Pablo Hernandez writes of these two works as "obras que deben contener preciosas noticias, y son, sin embargo, enteramente desconocidas." See *Coleccion de Libros y Documentos*, vii., 305.

the exiles from Cordova; Labrador's *Viajes* and *Historia de los regiones del Rio de la Plata*; Juarez's *Historia eclesiastica del Virreinato de Buenos Aires*, and his *Historia natural* of the same region; Guevara's *Historia del Paraguay, Rio de la Plata y Tucuman*. A few of these works have been printed, but the bulk of them either exist in manuscript or have been lost.

Another consequence of the expulsion of the Jesuits was the interruption of an interesting experiment in controlling savages. Many experiments made with this end in view have underestimated the conservative force of the traditions of savage life, and consequently overestimated the capability of the savage for immediate improvement, or progress towards civilization. Persons making this mistake are disposed to condemn the plan of the Jesuits, because its ideal for the condition of the Indian was not sufficiently high; whereas a large number of the projects of civilized society for improving the condition of savages have produced unsatisfactory results largely because they have required too great immediate changes in the status of the uncivilized man. The Indian in the territory of the United States was doomed by the fact that we provided no way for a slow rise from savagism; practically his only alternatives were either to accept the Englishman's standard of civilization or to move on and disappear with the wilderness. He was not able to avail himself of the first of these alternatives, and the second, under the circumstances, was his inevitable fate.

The great merit of the Jesuits' plan in Paraguay was that it made no considerable change in the Indian's condition; it aimed simply to give him a settled life and regular activity, a sufficiently long first step upward. In a thousand years of this slow process was apparently the only prospect of counteracting the Indian's inheritance of barbarism, and bringing him to the status of civilized man. The expulsion of the Jesuits brought to naught this experiment of a superior race entering, in isolation, upon the systematic tute-

lage of an inferior race. In time of continuance the experiment fell far short of the necessary thousand years, and for this reason all opinions concerning what might have been its result are more or less speculative.

The official who was sent to Chile by Bucareli to carry to the governor the king's decree of expulsion and Aranda's instructions, arrived at Santiago on the 7th of August, 1767. Guill y Gonzaga, the governor, was embarrassed by the orders which these papers contained. "Weak in character, ill, fanatically devoted to the church, a decided partisan of the Jesuits, among whom he had sought his confessor and spiritual counsellor, he was nevertheless obliged to carry out against them a rigid and severe order which antagonized his beliefs and his most firmly grounded sentiments."⁸ The governor was authorized, in case the Jesuits should offer resistance, to use such force as might be necessary to procure an immediate execution of the decree. Although knowledge of the orders of the king and of the instructions of Aranda was kept from the people, yet when it was seen that the troops were preparing for action a rumor became current that they were to be used against the Jesuits. Precautions were also taken to prevent the Jesuits from escaping from the country. Sentinels were placed in the passes of the Andes, and the two ships in the harbor of Valparaiso were ordered not to leave port without the governor's permission; and the governor sent sealed instructions to his subordinates throughout the colony. These instructions were not to be opened before a prescribed date. The 26th of August, a few hours before dawn, was the time fixed for carrying out the decree of expulsion in all parts of Chile. The first house of the Jesuits visited in Santiago by Juan de Balmaseda, acting as commissioner for the government, was the *Colegio Maximo de San Miguel*, which occupied the present site of the palace of Congress. Sentinels were placed at all of the doors, and the commissioner then presented himself at the principal entrance, gave three

⁸ Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, vi., 268.

heavy strokes on the door, and ordered in the name of the king that the door should be opened without delay. The rector of the college, Francisco de Madariaga, received the commissioner respectfully, offered no opposition to the execution of the royal order, and immediately called all the other officers of the college to assemble in the chapel. There were eighty-two of them. The decree of expulsion having been read, the rector handed to Balmaseda the keys of the house, which gave him access to all the property, books and papers of the college. In the course of the forenoon the Jesuits from the other establishments in the city and from neighboring estates arrived and were added to those who at the college had already been placed under arrest. Soldiers were stationed not only in the streets about the building, but they guarded also the several entrances, and in the building itself kept watch at the doors of the apartments occupied by the rector and the other members of the order.

At other points in Chile where there were Jesuits, the royal decree was carried out with the same severity and at practically the same hour. From the northern and the southern districts, during the next few weeks, the Jesuits were taken to Valparaiso, and held there under guard awaiting transportation to Europe. The fourteen members of the order and three coadjutors in the province of Cuyo, as already indicated, were sent to Buenos Aires to be added to those gathered there from the provinces of Rio de la Plata. Although the removal of the Jesuits from their places in Chile caused serious regrets and lamentations among a very large part of the inhabitants, yet no resistance was made to the authorities commissioned to execute the king's decree.

The first step in this remarkable undertaking was to arrest the Jesuits of Chile and to bring them into the hands of the governmental authorities. It then devolved upon the governor to find some means of transporting them to Europe. The governor's first project was to make use of a vessel, *El Rosario*, then lying in the harbor of Valparaiso;

but on account of difficulties raised by the owner, this plan had to be abandoned. Finally, by a letter from the viceroy of Peru, the governor was informed that a warship, *El Peruano*, would arrive at Valparaiso at the end of October, and that Jesuits might be embarked on this vessel and taken around Cape Horn to their destination. In the meantime the task of assembling the exiles at the port remained to be completed. In Santiago there were one hundred marked for deportation. At two o'clock on the morning of the 23d of October, these, under the direction of the corregidor, Luis Manuel de Zañartu, were marched through the dark and silent streets of the city to the suburbs, where horses had been brought together for their use on the journey to the coast. They arrived in Valparaiso after a ride of eight days. Here they found themselves united with other members of the order, who had been brought in from other parts of Chile, making in all a company of about three hundred persons. A few of the Jesuits of Santiago had been left in the city on account of age and sickness, and seven had escaped on the journey to Valparaiso.

The ship, *El Peruano*, expected at the end of October, did not arrive in Valparaiso until the 30th of November. There were on board five hundred persons, of whom one hundred and eighty-one were Jesuits expelled from Peru. The order of the viceroy provided that the ship should not remain at Valparaiso more than three days for embarking the Jesuits of Chile. But it was found to be necessary to remain in port for a much longer period. The vessel needed repairs; about one hundred of the Jesuits brought from Peru had not suitable clothing, and a new supply had to be obtained in Chile; and the food provided for the voyage was inadequate and unfit for use. It was found, moreover, that the ship could receive only a few persons in addition to those who had embarked on it at Callao. Five of those who had arrived from the north had to be left at Valparaiso on account of serious illness, and place was found for only twenty-four of the three hundred Jesuits in Chile. The

rest were left in Valparaiso; and early in January, 1768, *El Peruano* set sail on her long voyage to Europe. One of those left behind wrote: "We flattered ourselves always with the hope that the king would again regard us with favor, and permit us to remain in our former state; we prayed without ceasing; we directed ourselves now to the Holy Virgin, now to our blessed founder and to other saints. But our prayers were not heard. As there was no other Spanish ship in the port, we were embarked at the beginning of Lent in three Chilean vessels and taken to Lima."⁹ Those who had been left at different points in Chile for various reasons, were in the course of the following months deported, so that in 1772 the governor was able to report to Aranda that no Jesuit remained within the limits of the territory under his jurisdiction. Of those who were sent from Chile to Lima, one hundred and twenty were shipped to Italy by way of Cape Horn, and the rest went by way of Panama. The exiles from Chile, as well as those from Rio de la Plata, received from the Spanish crown an annual pension of one hundred dollars, under conditions similar to those that had been imposed upon Jesuits expelled from other parts of Spanish territory.

⁹ Quoted by Barros Arana, vi., 285.

THE SERFS OF CHILE AND THEIR EMANCIPATION.

Spain's plan of colonizing America, in contrast with that of England, involved the adoption of the Indians as a constituent part of Spanish-American society. In the execution of this plan it was natural that ideas prevailing in Europe, with respect to the relation of social classes to one another, should be carried to the New World. A form of feudalism became, therefore, practically inevitable. The Indian's lack of the knowledge and cultivation required for independence in civilized society marked him either for disappearance, as under the English regime, or for serfdom or slavery under Spanish rule. The system of *encomiendas* was adopted to secure the domination of the Spaniards, on the one hand, and the subjection of the Indians on the other; and the Indians were held as vassals, while their Spanish superiors were known as *feudatarios*, or *comendadores*. On assuming authority as an *encomendero* over his vassals, the Spaniard took an oath,¹ in which he swore "to be a faithful and loyal vassal to our lord the king and to his successors in these and his other kingdoms, and to place himself under the royal standard whenever he might be summoned, and to defend it even to the sacrifice of his

¹ Oath of Don Alonso Campofrio de Carvajal on taking possession of the *encomienda* of La Ligua; see Amunátegui Solar, *Las Encomiendas de Indígenas en Chile*, Santiago, 1909, I, 70; also, *Mayorazgos e Títulos de Castilla*, III, 398.

life, doing all that which a good and loyal vassal of his Majesty is obliged to do.”

The main purpose of the feudal system in Chile, however, was not to provide the king with a body of loyal warriors, as in the case of European feudalism, and as implied in the oath; but rather by this means to take possession of territory, subjecting the natives to obedience and employing them to construct houses and fortifications, to cultivate the land, to exploit mines, and to render all kinds of service within the colony.²

In Europe the vassal belonged to the same race as his feudal lord, but in America he was of an alien and subjugated race. The sentiment of racial kinship helped at times to ameliorate the fate of the European vassal; but in America the gulf which separated the two classes was so wide that the hardships or sufferings of the members of the lower class awakened in their masters, except in rare cases, no sentiments of sympathy or compassion. In establishing the system in America, it was designed that the fiefs should not be perpetually hereditary, as in Europe, but that the Indians should be bound for a specified number of generations. In practice, however, the law involving this provision was ignored, and the feudalism of Chile, and of Spanish South America generally, tended in this respect to assume the European form. A period of two lives was an ordinary term of a royal grant, or of an *encomienda*; but grants for three, four, five, or even nine generations were not uncommon, and the essential characteristics of the feudal relation were continued indefinitely.

The work in which the Indian dependents were employed is sufficiently revealed by the nature of the industries in the early decades of the colonies. Santiago was the most important early center of European civilization in Chile. Serena was prosperous in the beginning, but later it suffered much from incursions of pirates. Concepción became prominent as the headquarters of the forces sent against the

² *Ibid.*, I, 73.

Araucanians, but after the death of Valdivia it was temporarily abandoned. In and about Santiago were developed the beginnings of Chile's industrial life, which was devoted chiefly to providing food and clothing, constructing houses, and repairing arms. Here at the foot of San Lucia was built the first mill. Here were made tiles and adobes for the roofs and walls of houses that were erected after the original buildings, which were covered with grass or straw, had been burned.

In the course of time the industries requiring more experience and skill than the Indians could readily acquire were generally conducted by persons who came from Europe. Conspicuous among the early manufacturers was Jerónimo Molina. In connection with an Italian named Anton Galan, he established a mill for making cloth. Another person engaged in a similar undertaking was Juan Jufre. The laborers in these establishments, and in those for making pottery, were chiefly Indians. The early success of the cloth mills was in large part due to the skill and facility which the Indian operators acquired. Their economic advantage was based on the fact that their products had an extended market. In spite of the prohibition of intercolonial trade, cloth from Chile was sent to Panama, Cartagena, and all the towns of Tierra Firme, as well as to Tucuman, Buenos Aires, and even to Brazil. In the last half of the sixteenth century central Chile had several establishments for making cordage, some part of which at least was used in equipping the ships that were built at some of the southern ports, for defense and for trading along the coast.

The need of communicating with Peru by sea led to the beginning of ship-building in Chile. Antonio Nuñez began the construction of ships as early as 1554. He had acquired extensive landed estates near Santiago and Valparaiso, and established a shipyard at Concon. He built the first warehouses at Valparaiso, and carried on trade with Peru in his own ships. He organized the fishing

industry, and secured certain privileges with respect to supplying fish to the city of Santiago. But the industry which especially attracted the Spaniards, and excited their zeal was placer mining for gold. It is possible that the accounts given by some of the early chroniclers concerning the amount of gold obtained are greatly exaggerated; but a distinguished Chilean writer has reached the conclusion that this was the most productive industry of the colony, and that it was made so by the gratuitous and indefatigable labor of the natives.

In this as in all other industries the Spaniards had, under the law of *encomiendas*, complete control over the labor of the Indians, and both men and women were obliged to work at this form of mining; and wherever the relation provided for by this law existed, it may be inferred from the fact itself that there would be abuses by the superiors, and cruelties of which the inferiors would be the victims. The king of Spain apparently foresaw that evils would arise under the system of *encomiendas*, and, before the conquest of South America, provided by law that the Indians should be well treated by the *encomenderos*. Some of these provisions were: 1, that no Indian should become the bearer of burdens, either willingly or unwillingly, with pay or without it; 2, that no *encomendero* should have in his house, for his service or for other purpose, Indians from the towns of the *repartimiento*; 3, that no person should employ the Indians for carrying goods from the seaports to any town, and if they might be willing to undertake this work they should not be permitted to do it; 4, that the provision prohibiting the enslaving of the Indians should be observed and carried out; 5, that the *encomenderos* should not employ the Indians of their *repartimientos* at the times when the Indians might wish to prepare their land and plant their crops; 6, that those who employed Indians in their mines should provide priests to teach them the Christian doctrine, and to celebrate mass for them on Sundays and holidays; 7, that they should not

take the Indians from their districts, even if the Indians might be willing to be transferred.

This law was violated from the beginning. The order relating to slavery was so far disregarded that the Indians whose services were profitable were in reality slaves, whatever they might be called. From the beginning, moreover, the Indians were employed as carriers, as if they were beasts of burden, carrying goods in all directions, and especially over the bad trail between Santiago and the port of Valparaiso. Disregarding the decree, the encomendero employed in his personal service all the Indians of his repartimiento, old and young, and often under conditions more unfavorable than those of slavery.

A still worse evil appeared in the encomendero's practice of renting his Indians to persons who had need of their labor. This practice was specifically condemned by royal order, but, like many other commands issued with reference to affairs in America, this order had but little effect. In spite of the illegal character of the transaction, persons did not hesitate to make a record of it in their wills.³

The law prohibiting the taking of Indians from their districts not having proved effective, a later decree, signed at Talavera in 1541, ordered that the Indians should not be transferred, even within their own country, from the cold region where they had been born, to the hot region, or from the hot to the cold districts.⁴ In founding Santiago, there was a direct violation of the rule which this decree sought to enforce. The Indians who had occupied the site of the existing city of Santiago were removed to other lands. Some of them were taken by Francisco de Aguirre to Serena to be employed in his placer mines.

³ Doña Marina Ortiz de Gaete's will furnishes an instance: "Item, declaro que tiene Juan de Azócar, vecino de este ciudad, once indios de mi encomienda, alquilados por un año, en cien pesos de buen oro, i cien fanegas de trigo, i cincuenta de maiz o lo que fuese, i cincuenta de cebada, i veinte carneros, de los cuales declaro me ha dado los diez. Mando se averigüe, i que se cobre del dicho Juan de Azócar todo lo sobredicho."—Medina, *Documentos Inéditos*, X, 338.

⁴ Encinas, *Provisiones, cédulas, etc.*, IV., 280-281.

It was admitted both in Spain and America that the bulk of the manual labor in the Spanish colonies, both in mining and agriculture, was to be performed by Indians. While mining was largely absorbing the attention of the colonists, an effort was made to fix by law the period during which the Indians might be employed, the design of this legislation being to release them from work in the mines for such a term as might be needed for the cultivation of the land on which they depended for their support. The period of work in the mines was called the *demora*, and lasted six or eight months, usually embracing the winter months, on account of the lack of water in the summer. In Chile, in 1555, the *demora* ended at the beginning of October. In that year the cabildo of Santiago fixed a penalty of five hundred dollars for continuing the work in the mines beyond this period. But avarice often prevailed over law.

It was in the mines, even when the work was not continued beyond eight months in the year, that the Indians suffered their greatest hardships. They were crowded together in great numbers, and worked from week to week and from month to month standing knee-deep in water throughout the coldest season of the year. "Encomendero Rodrigo de Quiroga," to quote an old chronicle, "had six hundred Indians of his repartimiento in the mines, half of them men and the other half women, all from fifteen to twenty-five years of age, and all employed in washing for gold during eight months of the year, on account of having no water in the four other summer months."⁵ In 1553, Francisco de Victoria, writing to the Council of the Indies, affirms that at the mines "there is neither Christianity nor charity, and the abominations cry to heaven. Each encomendero puts into the mines his Indians, men and women, old and young, without giving them any rest or more food during the eight months of the year in which they work than a pint of maize a day; and the person who does not produce the quantity of gold which is required of him,

⁵ *Historiadores de Chile*, VI, 75.

receives blows with a club or lashes, and if any one hides a grain of gold he is punished by cutting off his nose and ears and exposing them nailed to a pole."⁶

The cruelties imposed upon the Indians in the mines and the manufacturing establishments could not continue indefinitely without calling forth voices of protest. At the same time the large interests which the Spaniards had in the various means of exploitation made it certain that the existing profitable practices would be stoutly defended.

In the train of García Hurtado de Mendoza, on his expedition to take possession of the governorship of Chile, there were three priests, the Dominican friar, Jil Gonzalez, Juan Gallegos, and the licentiate Vallejo. Before they left Peru, Gonzalez was known for his zeal in behalf of the Indians, and he continued his propaganda in their favor as soon as he arrived in Chile. He wished to persuade the governor to put off his campaign against the Araucanians, and enter into negotiations with them. He wished to persuade him, moreover, in the meantime to liberate the Indians from the severe service imposed upon them by the *encomenderos*. Gallegos, on the other hand, counselled war and the immediate execution of Mendoza's policy. The young governor, then only twenty-two, was eager for conquest and the distinction of a successful campaign, and was fully determined to follow the course advocated by Gallegos. At Serena he allowed the debate to proceed publicly concerning the merits or demerits of the proposed war. After they had advanced farther towards the south, the governor and the two priests held a conference, which ended in a noisy controversy. Mendoza held that it would be advisable to subjugate the Indians at once, to make war on them before they could fortify themselves; and he claimed that, by this means fewer would be killed than in a campaign undertaken after long delay. Gallegos supported the views of the governor as consistent with the teachings of Saint Thomas. A noteworthy feature of this

⁶ Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, I, 412.

series of events was that a priest was allowed to harrangue the officers and soldiers in opposition to the plans which the governor had determined to carry out.

Gonzalez was finally permitted to retire, and after this event the dominant influences in the forces at the front were not such as to favor a considerate treatment of the Indians, either of those who were still unsubdued or of those who had been brought into subjection to *encomenderos*. In Santiago Gonzalez continued his public protests against the cruelty of the Spaniards; and the opposition which he aroused threatened the support of the monastery which he had founded. For the purpose of correcting some of the observed abuses, royal decrees were published which provided that in those cases where it was permitted to use the Indians as carriers, their burden should never exceed fifty pounds; that the *encomenderos* should not employ more than a fifth part of their Indians in the mines; and that the Indians should receive, free from all obligations, the sixth part of the gold produced.

The feudalism of Chile was scarcely established before a movement was instituted to emancipate the subjugated class; and the later history of the system is the history of a controversy between the interested *encomenderos* and the humanitarian champions of the serfs. The report of Santillan, after his investigations, indicate his views of what should be done to improve the status of the Indians under the *encomenderos*. In order to secure the payment of the sixth of the gold which belonged to the Indians, and its proper investment for their profit, it was considered advisable that there should be appointed in Santiago and in Serena two persons, one by the *cabildo* and the other by the *justicia mayor*, who in agreement with the *encomenderos* and priests of the *encomienda*, should invest the gold in clothing, wool, cattle, and other things of which the natives might have need. The cattle thus acquired should be placed under the care of the *encomenderos*, after they had been publicly registered, and the *encomendero* should ren-

der an account of the animals that had been delivered to him and of their increase. In order to prevent the encomenderos from diverting to their own advantage the gold taken from the mines, without paying the royal fifth, and the sixth due to the Indians, it was provided that all the gold mined should be immediately taken to the existing mints of the country; that the Spaniards might not form contracts among themselves for the payment of unminted gold; and that the merchants alone should be authorized to make sales to the natives payable in gold dust to the amount of ten dollars. Under these regulations proposed by Santillan, the encomenderos were to be permitted to employ bands of negroes in washing for gold; and the Indians were to be allowed to wash for gold on their own account, and they might also cultivate certain tracts of land in company with the encomenderos, who should furnish plows and allow the Indians a third part of the crop.⁷

The encomenderos naturally resented these and all other attempts to subject their treatment of the Indians to restrictive regulations. Juan Jufre employed Indians in his mill without wages. The Indians who worked in the ropewalk of Juan Bautista Pastene received no compensation for their labor. The proposed regulations of Santillan found more favor with the Council of the Indies than with the audiencia of Lima. The Council ordered Mendoza's successor, Governor Villagrán, to cause the established regulations to be carried out, and at the same time appointed a commission consisting of Villagrán, the bishop of Santiago, and two priests to report on the advantages and disadvantages that would be produced in the country by the execution of the ordinances of Santillan. The Council, moreover, ordered the new governor to oblige the encomenderos to employ negroes in the gold mines. But this order could not be carried out on account of the lack of negroes and the poverty of those persons who were expected to purchase them.

⁷ Amunátegui Solar, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 185-187.

Neither the royal decrees, nor the orders of the governors, nor the rules of Santillan put an end to the abuses of the encomenderos in their treatment of the Indians. The main reason for the ineffectiveness of these orders and rules was their revolutionary character as judged from the viewpoint of the society that was establishing itself in the Spanish colonies. The dependence and practical slavery of the Indians constituted the vital feature of this society. This relation was involved in the ideal under which Spanish-American society came into existence. The Spanish settlers had not come, like the settlers in New England, to form a complete society by themselves, but rather to be one social class, a dominating class, while the Indians were expected to constitute another class, a class in some form of subjection.

At the beginning of 1562, the treasury of Spain had great need of funds, and to secure them the king proposed to have the encomiendas converted into fiefs in perpetuity, the holders of which should make to the crown contributions proportionate to the rights they were to acquire. The views of the cabildos of the principal towns were sought concerning the proposed change; and in reply they affirmed the advisability of giving perpetuity to the system. The governor of Chile, however, reported to Lima that it would not be desirable to make the change until the following year, 1563. But in the meantime the governor died, and the proposed plan was indefinitely postponed.

The most important results of the agitation for setting aside the hardships and cruelties imposed upon the Indians by the encomenderos was the series of rules published by Pedro de Villagrán, completing or supplementing those that had been previously issued by Santillan. These rules present the ideas of those persons who aimed to remove the abuses of the system of encomiendas:

“1. Henceforth, the *demora* shall be only for six months. In the jurisdictions of Santiago and Serena, embracing the cities of Mendoza and San Juan, gold shall not be mined,

except in March, April, May, June, July, and August; and in the other parts of the country in November, December, January, February, March, and April.

"2. The rule according a sixth of the gold to the Indians shall be re-established in all its force, as also the guarantees ordered by Santillan in their favor.

"3. In view of the evil results of the mingling of the negroes with the Indians in the work of mining, the introduction of negroes as inspectors in the repartimientos shall be prohibited; the penalty being that the encomenderos, for the first violation of the rule, shall pay, for the benefit of the Indians, one hundred dollars in gold, and for the second two hundred dollars. Besides, each of the negroes shall receive a hundred lashes. For the third offense, the encomenderos shall lose their slaves, and shall be deprived of their repartimientos for three years.

"4. The protector of the Indians, and the priest appointed for the purpose of teaching them the Christian doctrine, shall use the product of the sixths in acquiring sheep for their wards; and, before an officer of the court, shall turn these animals over to the encomenderos, who shall be obliged to render an account annually of the state of the flock.

"5. This account shall be received by the protector and the priest 'both together, and not the one without the other.' The same protector and priest were authorized to distribute among the Indians as many sheep as they thought advisable.

"6. The protector and the priest shall make effective the responsibility of the encomenderos whenever they become delinquent, and even take from them the care of the flock, and commit it to proper persons without prejudice to the institution of judicial proceedings in the case against the delinquents.

"7. The protector and the priest shall visit together every six months the repartimientos of the district committed to their care, and shall inform themselves concerning

the treatment accorded to the Indians, and concerning the execution of the laws, and send a detailed report to the governor, to the end that justice may be done.

“8. In each district there shall be appointed a protector and a priest. The protector shall be selected by the governor of Chile from persons of strictly Christian character; and the priest shall be the superior of the monastery of Saint Francis, or, indeed, some other Franciscan designated by the order, in case there shall be a local establishment of the order, or, in the absence of any such establishment, then the parish priest, or a priest of prestige of another order than the Franciscan, until this order shall be established in the district.

“9. The protector shall be given a salary fixed by the governor, which shall be paid by halves by the Indians and by the encomenderos, although it shall by preference be deducted from the product of the penalties established by this law.

“10. Annually an account shall be taken of the manner in which the protectors shall have performed their duties, and they shall be punished if found delinquent.

“11. In the first visit of each year the protector and the priest shall form, in connection with the encomendero, a list of the Indians of the repartimiento.”

The regulations of Pedro de Villagrán, the main features of which are presented in the foregoing, were expected to bring relief to the Indians at several points. The *demora* was reduced from eight to six months; the negroes were no longer to be employed as foremen, or inspectors; and the number of protectors was increased. An obstacle to the execution of these rules was found in the fact that they ran counter to the plans and interests of the encomenderos. Through the increase of their flocks the Indians were nominally advancing to a position of greater advantage; but the Dominican friar, Gonzalez, scoffed at the idea that the Indians derived any real advantage from this source. If, as he assumed, “the wool and the flesh belonged to the

encomenderos," the Indians were in reality owners only in name. Moreover, as opposed to the powerful encomenderos, the protectors found it practically impossible to perform their proper functions in an impartial manner.

Another difficulty in the way of a proper execution of the laws relating to the Indians, was found in the disposition of the governors to ignore the decrees of their predecessors. When Quiroga became governor in 1565, he practically annulled the rules of Pedro de Villagrán, and consequently those of Santillan. The governors, in their war with the Araucanians, had need of the support which the encomenderos were in a position either to give or to withhold. This circumstance naturally led the governors to overlook certain abuses which, under an impartial judgment, they would have tried to correct. In some cases where fines were imposed, the encomenderos appealed to a higher authority, with the result that no decision was rendered.

The Araucanian war, always a present danger, sometimes taxed to their limit the resources of the colony; and the king as well as the colonial authorities sought by all possible means to weaken the enemy. Philip II. favored sending the captured Araucanians as exiles to Peru. Governor Quiroga, however, held that those taken in war should be transferred to the jurisdictions of Santiago and Serena, to be employed in the mines. This plan was ultimately approved by the king. In the campaign of 1577, Governor Quiroga captured several hundred Indians, and in the following year he wrote to the king concerning his treatment of the prisoners as follows:

"I issued a decree, in which I commanded that there should be executed on these Indian prisoners the sentence of death which I had pronounced on them and the other rebels, which penalty I then ordered suspended; and in the meantime I ordered that these prisoners should be taken to the city of Serena, and that there one foot of each of them should be cut off, and they should be employed in the works

of the gold mines, in order to contribute to the expenses of the war, and that the chiefs should be taken to the viceroy of Peru."⁸

Gregorio Sanchez was commissioned to govern the Indians who had been taken to the mines from the southern frontier. In March, 1578, he wrote to Toledo, the viceroy of Peru, and gave some account of his stewardship:

"The governor," he wrote, "has commanded me to take in charge and govern the Indians whom he exiled to this city of Serena; and their earnings which may constitute a contribution to the great expenses of the war; and, although his lordship had ordered their feet to be cut off, he has modified this to that which might appear to me, as having the knowledge of one present, as the most fitting for the service of His Majesty, and, indeed, for the Indians. When the Indians had arrived at this city, some of them wished to run away; and six or seven of them were taken and hanged, and the feet of fifty others were cut off."⁹

The disposition of the encomenderos to disregard the rules already proposed and to make an unwarranted use of their power over the Indians led to the attempt to substitute a fixed tribute for personal service. Governor Martin Ruiz de Gamboa, the successor of Quiroga, urged this reform, and was supported by the bishop of Santiago and some of the friars. The protectors of the Indians, on the other hand, instead of defending the Indians, united with the encomenderos to exploit them.

The rule respecting tribute to be paid by the Indians as published by Governor Gamboa, in 1580, provided that each Indian between the ages of seventeen and fifty should pay the sum of seven dollars, and grain, fish, fowls, or sheep to the value of two dollars, making the total annual payment nine dollars. Long accustomed to the service of the Indians without the obligation of payment, the Spaniards resisted the execution of this measure, which recognized to

⁸ Amunátegui Solar, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 235.

⁹ Printed in Amunátegui Solar, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 236-237.

some extent the freedom of the Indian and his right to compensation for his services. In this, Gamboa had taken a position which could be maintained only after some centuries of progress; and in the meantime the encomenderos used all their influence to support their ideas and their practices. In complete control of the cabildos of the municipalities, the will of the encomenderos was likely to prevail. Supporting their views, a commission was sent to Peru to petition the royal audiencia of Lima to annul the rule of Gamboa. This tribunal, however, refused to make the required decision, and referred the petition to the Council of the Indies.

The encomenderos had apparently anticipated the action of the audiencia of Lima; for even before that body had referred the petition to the Council, they had instructed Ramiríañez Bravo de Saravia to defend their cause in Spain. While this question was under discussion the king appointed Alonso de Sotomayor to be governor of Chile. Whether through his friendly intercourse with Saravia, or through independent investigations, Sotomayor appears to have left Spain already opposed to the innovations of Gamboa; and in Chile he was intimately associated with Louis Lopez de Azócar, also a determined opponent of Gamboa's reforms. The influences proceeding from these and other sources were sufficient to cause the regulations of Gamboa to be abolished. The *demora* of eight months was re-established, and the Indians were continued in their miserable condition of bondage, from which, in fact, they had been given no practical relief under any of the projected changes. The sixth part of the gold mined, which was nominally set apart for the Indian, never became his in reality; and the cattle and sheep, which were said to belong to him, had no existence, except as an indistinguishable and, for him, an unrealizable part of the property of the encomendero. In one respect, however, the Indians of 1585 were better served than those of twenty-five or thirty years

earlier; there were more priests essaying to teach them the Christian doctrines.

But the efforts of Sotomayor were not limited to providing religious instruction. He appointed his brother, Luis de Sotomayor, protector general of all the Indians of the country; and, in 1589, he appointed Martin de Zamora administrator general and defender of the Indians in the province of Santiago. With these appointments were set aside the previously existing protectors, who appear to have been, at least in many cases, unfaithful to the trust reposed in them. In making more tolerable the condition of the Indians employed in the mines, the governor was moved by an intelligent interest, not only in the Indians but also in the *ecomenderos*. By making more satisfactory regulations for the workers, he hoped that the incomes of the *encomenderos* might be increased, and that thereby they would be enabled to render him more efficient assistance in his campaigns and other undertakings.

Under the conditions then existing, the *encomenderos* were unable to offer the governor any very important support; and the authorities of Spain as well as of the viceroyalty of Peru refused to give the needed assistance. Sotomayor's successor, Martin García de Oñez y Loyola, turned his attention to relieving the Indians from their tyrannical masters. Still, it is to be noted that the salaries of the general administrator and the protector of the Indians were paid from the sixth of the gold mined and other property that nominally belonged to the Indians. The fact that what was said to be a possession of the Indians could be taken without their consent for the payment of political functionaries, would seem to indicate that their rights of property were of the flimsiest sort. In fact, with the progress of the Araucanian war, and the capture and sale of the Indians, the idea that the native was a person with rights tended gradually to disappear, and the idea that he was merely a chattel, to be more widely entertained. "The territory of the bishopric of Imperial had been converted into an

immense fair for the sale of human beings, where the soldiers became rich by the sale of the Araucanians, and where the encomenderos and residents of Santiago and Serena sought household servants, and renewed the personnel of their encomiendas."¹⁰ The personal interests and avarice of the Spaniards, and not the voice of the church or the designs of reformers were at this time giving direction to the course of social affairs, and determining the relation of the invaders to the natives.

But there came a change in the affairs of the Araucanians; victory gave them courage for new victories; and in the course of a few years, they overthrew and laid waste the cities of Arauco, Santa Cruz, Valdivia, Imperial, Angol, Villarica, and Osorno. The remaining cities of central and northern Chile at this time, the first decade of the seventeenth century, were of little importance. Serena had only forty-six houses; Santiago, the capital, had two hundred; Chillan, fifty-two; Concepcion, seventy-six; and Castro, twelve. About three-fourths of the houses in each city were little more than rude huts, with grass or straw roofs; while one-fourth had roofs of tiles. The center of the colony's affairs was evidently not the cities, but in the encomiendas, many of which were the antecedents of the great estates of modern Chile. These produced the wealth of the colony, and the encomenderos, the lords of the soil, constituted the dominant social and political element in the country. Rules touching their affairs were not likely to be carried out, except with their consent.

In spite of great practical difficulties, efforts were made from time to time to abolish the personal service of the Indians, to dissolve their feudal obligation, or reduce it to the payment of an annual fee, or tribute. The count of Monterey, when Viceroy of Peru in the first decade of the seventeenth century, appointed a commission, consisting of Juan de Villela, member of the audiencia, Doctor Acuña, *alcalde de corte*, Governor García Ramon, and two Jesuit

¹⁰ Amunátegui Solar, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 287.

priests, Luis de Valdivia and Francisca Coello. After certain inquiries, this commission reported the following recommendations:

"1. That all personal service should be abolished; 2, that the holders of repartimientos and Indians bound to personal service might avail themselves of the work of the Indians for two years, during which time they might be able to gather voluntary laborers; 3, that during this period all work in the mines should be suspended, and there should be paid to the Indians elsewhere engaged a daily wage fixed beforehand for their labor; 4, that a new rule respecting tribute should be published; 5, that the Indian prisoners held as slaves should be liberated, but the three hundred held in Lima should remain until the end of the war; 6, that negotiations should be had with the view of introducing negroes to replace the Indians."¹¹

These recommendations received the enthusiastic support of the viceroy, and he ordered Governor García Ramon to carry them out. But it was found to be practically impossible to do this in Chile; for the Mapuche Indians of the encomiendas were averse to all kinds of work, and the encomenderos resisted all attempts to give them liberty; and at the end of the viceroy's reign the emancipation of the Indians of the encomiendas and peace with the Araucanians were apparently as far off as ever.

The two Jesuits who had helped to frame these recommendations, and who gave them their unqualified support, found their position inconsistent with the practice of the Jesuit institutions that were receiving forced service from the Indians. The conduct of these institutions in this respect was, moreover, inconsistent with the principles of the order, and it seemed to those in authority advisable to set an example of emancipation before urging emancipation on others. In keeping with this view, Diego de Torres, provincial of the Jesuits in Chile, issued an order liberating the Indians who had continued to render personal service

¹¹ Amunátegui Solar, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 317-318.

to the college of San Miguel. They were given land for cultivation, cattle, and sufficient free time for work on their own account. They were to receive compensation for their labor on the days when they were employed by the Jesuits. This order was to take effect in 1608. Its complicated details were not fully understood by the Indians, and it is affirmed that the liberty granted was only nominal, and that the order had no other force than that of a promise to treat the Indians paternally, and to remunerate them fairly for their services. Yet this action of the Jesuits produced, if not alarm, at least a very disagreeable impression on the encomenderos, whose ill-will for the time being was turned against the Jesuits.¹²

The antagonism of the encomenderos, however, did not prevent the spread of an opinion in favor of reform. When the audiencia was established in Chile in 1609, the judges were instructed to abolish the personal service of the Indians; and in the beginning the members of the audiencia devoted more attention to this subject than to any other. But the passionate advocacy of reforms encountered an equally passionate opposition. The Jesuits, the bishop of Santiago, and a few of the encomenderos were ranged against the majority of the encomenderos, the cabildo of Santiago, and García Ramon, the governor of Chile. In order that the audiencia might be in a position to act wisely, a general meeting was called to enable it to consult with all parties interested. The discussion was long, but no agreement was reached. In the deliberations of the audiencia, after that body had learned the different views entertained concerning the question at issue, the opinion favoring the

¹² The antagonism between the Jesuits and the encomenderos existed elsewhere: "The encomenderos of Mendoza, Salta, Tucuman, and Cordova broke completely with the Jesuits, who preached against the slavery of the Indians, denouncing the corruption and cruelty of their masters. From this time the encomenderos separated themselves from all relations with the priests; with their families and servants, they deserted the churches where were proclaimed doctrines subversive of their interests, and suspended the contributions with which they had helped to support the Jesuit order."—Manuel R. García, in *Revista del Río de la Plata*, I, 377.

maintenance of personal service triumphed, the judges holding that they had not only to defend the Indians, but also to secure the wellbeing of the colony as a whole.

The reaction against the movement for emancipation appeared to be complete when Philip III. imposed slavery upon all Araucanians taken in war. The king's decree of slavery was opposed to the views of Governor García Ramon, and was not issued in Chile until after the governor's death, when it was published by his successor, Luis Merlo de la Fuente, on the 20th of August, 1610.

This decree was naturally acceptable to the *encomenderos*, since it furnished them a prospect of increasing the number of dependents on their *encomiendas*. But a little later this prospect was obscured by the announcement of a new policy respecting the Araucanians. This policy, first suggested by Juan de Villela, of the *audiencia* of Lima, involved a strictly defensive war on a specified line of the southern frontier, which was the river Biobio; and the defense of this line was to furnish protection to central Chile. It involved, moreover, the plan of a peaceful conquest of the Araucanians.

The decree establishing the new policy was issued in March 1612. Military operations were to be defensive, but the soldiers were to be maintained armed and equipped, and in such numbers as might be necessary. Christian doctrine should be carried to the Indians by Jesuit priests; and the Jesuit, Luis de Valdivia, as *visitador general* of the province of Chile, was commissioned to act with the governor in securing a proper execution and observance of this order. The previously published royal decree respecting the slavery of Indians taken in war was suspended; and the penalty of death was decreed for soldiers or officers who should pass beyond the line of defense. This decree also announced the abolition of personal service, and the establishment of a system of pecuniary tribute.¹⁸

The publication of this decree produced a serious state

¹⁸ Rosales, *Historia Jeneral del Reino de Chile*, II, 527-544.

of agitation and indignation throughout Chile. The soldiers and the encomenderos were especially affected. For the soldiers it substituted the stagnant life of garrisons for a life of adventure, plundering, the capture and sale of Indians, and all the license incident to warfare on a savage frontier. The encomenderos saw in the depletion and ultimate loss of their dependents, the destruction of their wealth, or their prospects of wealth, and the overthrow of the economic system, on which at this early period the society of Chile rested. The attempts made to execute the provisions of the decree abolishing personal service encountered an insurmountable obstacle in the impossibility of procuring voluntary laborers for the fields. In this connection appeared the perennial demand for the introduction of negroes; but neither the government nor individual persons were in a position to comply with this demand; and the plan for substituting a pecuniary tribute for personal service seemed still far from accomplishment in 1620.

In spite of this and all previous regulations, the encomenderos were generally disposed to consider their interests as their guide of action. Luis de Valdivia was, however, persuaded that the new policy might be maintained by an effective law. Towards the end of the second decade he appeared in Lima, where, as he affirmed, the viceroy "heard him for more than four months."¹⁴ There was then formed a body of elaborate regulations which were signed on the 28th of March, 1620, by the prince of Esquilache, who was at that time the viceroy of Peru. A month later Valdivia left Callao for Spain. He went to report to Philip III. on the state of affairs in Chile, and to secure the royal confirmation of the Esquilachean regulations. The following provisions reveal the general character of these regulations:

1. The obligatory personal service of the Indians was abolished, and the Indians were declared to be free, except those who were more than ten and a half years old and who

¹⁴ Amunátegui Solar, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 409.

were taken in offensive war two months after the publication of these regulations; these should be held as slaves.

2. Neither the Indans living south of the garrisoned frontier nor those living in the Spanish camps of Biobio should be subject to encomenderos. All other Indians in Chile between the ages of eighteen and fifty should be subject to encomenderos and pay a tribute.

3. The amount of this tribute was different in different places. The amount generally stipulated was ten dollars, seven and a half for the encomendero, a dollar and a half for the priest, half a dollar for the corregidor, and half a dollar for the protector.

4. Work in the mines was prohibited, but the Indians might pay their tribute in agricultural labor, at a rate of wage fixed by ordinance.

5. Only a third of the Indians of an *encomienda* should be required to work in any given year. The other two-thirds might rest, or work for themselves, or work for others for hire. In case the encomendero did not wish to employ all of the third part of his Indians, he might rent the balance to another person, or to other persons.

6. The Indians of the *repartimientos* were required to live in reductions, or *pueblos*. Each reduction, or Indian pueblo, should have a league of land for cultivation or for buildings, and the encomendero should not pasture the land within a specified distance of the reduction.

7. The Indians having trades, such as carpenters, tailors, and shoemakers, should be exempt from service in the *mita*, but mere apprentices should not enjoy this exemption. Such skilled workmen might pay their tribute in money.

8. The Indians residing on the estates in the country, called in Chile *inquilinos*, were required to work on the estate one hundred and sixty days in the year. The owner of the estate should furnish them a piece of land, on which they might raise maize, barley, wheat, and vegetables; and he should lend them the oxen and implements necessary in

their work of cultivation. The wage of these *inquilinos* should be a real a day, and this after the deduction of the tribute should be paid in clothing and the products of the estate.

9. The Indians working as domestic servants should be treated as free persons. The encomendero was obliged to furnish them food and quarters, and to provide for them when they were sick. After deducting the tribute, these persons should be paid an annual salary, ranging from twelve to sixteen dollars, which should be paid in clothing. But the Indians in domestic service might not be rented to other masters.

10. The corregidores should make an exact list of the Indians. For every two hundred Indians paying tribute, there should be established a curacy, and the Indians should be taught the catechism; and the curate should be required to keep a record of baptisms. And the Indians of each parish should be required to build a church with materials furnished by the owners of the neighboring estates.

Although the encomenderos found the regulations of Esquilache more favorable to their interests than the rules established by Governor Gamboa, they nevertheless opposed their execution. They objected to the prohibition of slavery; to the suppression of forced labor in the mines; to the limitation of the number of days in the year, on which the Indians would be required to work in the fields; to the privilege granted to the Indians to live in their reductions; and to the proposed domiciliary visits of the corregidores, who might liberate the Indians, if they were ill-treated by their masters.

But no policy was continued long. Governor Osoreo de Ulloa, as indicated in an ordinance issued September 8, 1622, held views that were in general favorable to the encomenderos. He suspended the provisions under which the Indians were to be prohibited from working in the mines, and ordered that they might be employed in these

undertakings with the permission of the governor. He revoked also the regulations respecting laborers skilled in the trades, and ordered that all the artisans of the *encomiendas* should serve in the *mita*. But these and other changes in the regulations of the viceroy were to have force only until the king should determine otherwise.

Several months before the date of this ordinance by Governor Osoreo de Ulloa, Philip IV. had approved the regulations of Esquilache, but with extensive modifications. One of these changes was a reduction of two dollars in the amount of the tribute. Another was the re-establishment of slavery in certain specified cases. But neither the regulations of Esquilache nor the royal decree based on them received the obedience of those to whom they were directed. In fact, the regulations decreed by Philip IV. were not known to the *audiencia* of Chile for three years after the date of their approval by the king; and, having no adequate support among the persons most influential in Chile, they were practically suspended.¹⁵ Subsequently other regulations were formed and issued, but neither the earlier nor the later determined the actual relations that existed between the *encomenderos* and their dependents. The *encomenderos* constituted the most powerful class in the colony, and their interests determined a practice which became customary, and thus too thoroughly grounded to be set aside even by a decree of the king, or, much less, by an ordinance of a viceroy or a governor.

It is noteworthy that in this controversy, lasting through many decades, the will of the king, even when expressed in the solemn form of a royal decree, had very little influence in shaping the course of events respecting the *encomiendas* of Chile. The king wished to have the Indians gathered into towns or villages, and to be under no obligation to render personal service to the *encomenderos*. In this he was supported by the most influential members of the church in Chile. But the royal will could not prevail

¹⁵ Gay, *Historia de Chile*, II, 351-352.

against the opposition of the encomenderos. In 1662 the decree which required the Indians to live in towns was confirmed by a decree of similar purport, but with very little effect. The Indian towns that had been established were declining; and the majority of the Indians in the conquered part of Chile lived on the estates of the encomenderos.

The main argument of the king was that in the towns the Indians could be given more effective religious instruction than elsewhere. The encomenderos, on the other hand, held that the Indians had not acquired a degree of civilization sufficient to enable them to live independently in towns or villages; that their experience and knowledge were inadequate to enable them to maintain themselves successfully in a society where the relations between the individual members were determined entirely by contract; and that, as there were no other laborers, the maintenance of the existing order was necessary to the preservation of the Spaniards, and, consequently, to the preservation of civilized life in Chile.

In spite of the enormous sums drawn from America, the royal treasury of Spain was always in need of increased revenues. For some time the king had viewed with covetous eye the advantages which the encomenderos had derived from their subjects, and, by a decree of July 20, 1720, he ordered that all unoccupied encomiendas in America, and those held by persons whose titles had not been confirmed, and those that might become vacant in the future, should be made tributary to the royal treasury.

This decree was designed especially to convert the tribute paid by the Indians of Mexico and Peru into a source of revenue for the crown. Its reference to Chile was unimportant, for in that colony the law requiring tribute from the Indians had only a very imperfect application. Moreover, the decree itself provided that in the encomiendas where the Indians rendered personal service, no change should be effected; and in Chile, in spite of scores of decrees

and efforts of all sorts for reform, the system of personal service remained largely unmodified. But a few months later, in December of the same year, a new decree was issued, designed to put an end to the involuntary personal service hitherto rendered by the Indians to the encomenderos. This naturally produced a commotion among the encomenderos; but the cabildo of Santiago was still faithful, or rather was still controlled by the encomenderos, and caused a protest against the proposed action to be sent to the king. Then the governor of Chile, Gabriel Cano de Amonte, urged the audiencia to inform the king of the results that would follow the execution of this decree; but the audiencia took the ground that as the will of the sovereign was clearly manifest, there was no reason for delay. While, therefore, the governor was in Concepcion, in September, 1722, the audiencia, applying the royal decree, declared forfeited all vacant encomiendas, with the provision that their incomes should be turned into the royal treasury.

This action appeared to involve, on the part of the audiencia, a clear usurpation of the governor's prerogatives; but later the governor pointed out to the king the evil consequences that would flow from an abolition of the rights of the encomenderos, and the king was apparently moved by the governor's statement; for in July, 1724, he decided "that the Chilean encomiendas should not be incorporated in the crown, as it has been ordered."

Towards the close of the eighteenth century, the enlightenment which effected important social changes in Europe, became manifest also in Chile. Don Ambrosio O'Higgins was its chief exponent. The evils of the system of personal service, as they appeared in Chile, had made a profound impression on him. The high regard in which he was held by the king of Spain enabled him to persuade that monarch of the desirability of bringing about a complete reform of the relations that had existed between the Indians and the encomenderos. The result was the decree of June 10, 1791,

which ordered that all the encomiendas of Chile should be incorporated in the crown. The circumstances at last made this possible. The large increase of free laborers in the colony during the previous decades furnished a class ready to take up the work of the released vassals, without other inducement than the prospect of receiving wages, and without causing any serious social disturbance. After the abolition of the old system, the attention of the government was turned to the regulation of the tribute, which was now to be paid by the Indians into the royal treasury.

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