



ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RUSSIAN HISTORY

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

RUSSIAN HISTORY



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Encyclopedia of Russian History

James R. Millar

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
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Winston Churchill's well-known description of Russia as a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" has been widely quoted because it has seemed so apt to Western observers. The Cyrillic alphabet appears mysterious to the uninitiated, as does the odd system of dual dates for key historical events. Russia is huge and geographically remote, with over one hundred ethnic groups and as many languages. Historically, Russia stood on the margin of Europe proper, and Russian society experienced the Renaissance and the Reformation, which shaped modern Europe, only partially and belatedly.

Physical distance and prolonged isolation from Europe would be sufficient to enhance and promote a distinctive Russian culture. Russians have themselves debated whether they are more European, or more Asian, or instead a unique Slavic civilization destined to provide the world with a "third" way. Nikolai Gogol, one of Russia's earliest and most original writers, expressed this messianic view in his novel *Dead Souls*, where he offered a speeding troika, a carriage drawn by three horses, as a metaphor for Russia:

Russia, are you not speeding along like a fiery matchless troika? Beneath you the road is smoke, the bridges thunder, and everything is left far behind. At your passage the onlooker stops amazed as by a divine miracle. . . . Russia, where are you flying? Answer me! There is no answer. The bells are tinkling and filling the air with their wonderful pealing; the air is torn and thundering as it turns to wind; everything on earth comes flying past and, looking askance at her, other peoples and states move aside and make way.

The *Encyclopedia of Russian History* is designed to help dispel the mystery of Russia. It is the first encyclopedia in the English language to comprehend the entirety of Russian history, from ancient Rus to the most recent events in post-Soviet Russia. It is not aimed primarily at specialists in the area but at general readers, students, and scholars who are curious about Russia, have historical events, dates, and persons they wish to explore or papers to write on the widely varying topics and individuals contained herein. Contributors include top scholars in history, Russian studies, military history, economics, social science, literature, philosophy, music, and art history. The 1,500 entries have been composed by over 500 scholars from 16 countries. All were instructed to "historize" their entries, thereby placing them in the larger context of Russian history. Each entry is signed and fea-

A decorative horizontal flourish with intricate, repeating geometric and floral patterns in a light gray color, spanning the width of the page.

PREFACE

tures carefully chosen cross references to related entries as well as a bibliography of print and Internet sources as suggested additional readings. The four volumes contain over 300 black and white maps and photographs illustrating the text, and each volume contains color inserts portraying the beauty and scope of Russian peoples, art, and architecture, as well as important military and political pictorials. Entries are arranged alphabetically, and the first volume includes a topical outline that organizes articles by broad categories, thereby offering teachers and students alike an informed map of Russian history. A comprehensive subject index offers yet another entry point for the set, encouraging readers to explore the four volumes in greater depth.

The encyclopedia is the product of recent scholarship. Russian studies began as a significant field of study in the United States and Europe only during the Soviet era. Although a small number of scholars were active before World War II, particularly in England, the field began to grow in the United States with the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s. When the Soviet Union launched the first earth satellite, Sputnik, in 1957, a concern for national security became a driving force for development of Russian area studies. All fields grew especially rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, for it was recognized that study of the contemporary Soviet social system would require in-depth knowledge of the language, history, and culture of Russia. In the United States, for example, both the federal government and private foundations such as the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment funded graduate Russian studies on an almost “crash” basis. Whereas the Russian Institute of Columbia University and the Russian Research Center at Harvard dominated the field initially, by the end of the 1960s all major research institutions had Russian studies programs and were producing new Ph.D.s in the field. In fact, most of the scholars who have ever received Ph.D.s in the various fields of Russian history, social science, arts, and so forth, are still active scholars. The field of Russian-Soviet studies now has better coverage and higher quality than ever. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union ended the ideological constraints that communism had placed on scholarly publication, allowing scholarship to blossom in post-Soviet Russia as well. Researchers now have unprecedented access to archival and other historical materials—and to the Russian people as well. The editors and I have been fortunate, therefore, to be able to select as our contributors—the most outstanding scholars not

only in the United States, but also in Britain, Europe, and Russia. Twenty years ago it would not have been possible to produce such a balanced, high quality, and comprehensive encyclopedia. The last five decades or so of intensive scholarship have greatly increased our knowledge and understanding of Russian history.

RUSSIAN HISTORY

As one views the length and breadth of the Russian historical experience certain continuities and recurring patterns stand out. Autocracy, for example, has ancient and strong roots in Russian history. For most of its history, Russia was led by all-powerful tsars, such as Peter the Great or Nicholas I, who served willingly as autocrats, seemingly conscious of the difficulties inherent in ruling so large and diverse a country. Even those tsars who sought to modify the autocracy, such as Alexander II, who emancipated the serfs, reversed course when confronted with revolutionary or nihilist opponents. Soviet communism lapsed into autocracy under Josef Stalin, who was perhaps the most complete autocrat since Peter the Great. More recently, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, appears to be tolerating a drift back toward autocracy in reaction to the democratic impulses of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. He seems to relish comparison of his rule to that of Peter the Great.

With the exception of the years under Soviet communism, Orthodoxy has been autocracy’s twin. Historically, the Russian Orthodox Church has successfully resisted attempts to separate church and state and has offered support and justification for autocracy in return. Consequently, the church and state have not welcomed religious diversity or promoted tolerance. Judaism, Catholicism, and other Christian denominations, Islam, and other religious faiths have suffered persecution and restrictions over the years. The Soviet era differed only in that all religions were persecuted in the name of official atheism. The long-term trend has apparently reasserted itself as the growing strength of the Russian Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet years has featured renewed attempts to exclude religious competition.

Territorial expansion has characterized the development of Russia from the earliest days, usually through warfare and hostile partitions. The Great Northern War brought Russia to the Baltic coast, while the wars of the nineteenth century expanded Russia’s power into Central Asia. Expan-

sion under the tsars included annexing territories occupied by settled peoples, as in Ukraine, Poland, and Finland, and also by nomadic tribes, as in Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The outcome of World War II extended Moscow's reach into Eastern Europe, and during the Cold War Russia supported regimes in Afghanistan, Cuba, and insurgent movements in Central America and Africa.

The process of empire-building brought more than 120 ethnic and national groups under Russian rule. It was a costly exercise requiring a large standing army. Russification versus promoting local languages and cultures in these territories was a recurring issue under tsars and commissars alike, and it remains an issue today in the Russian Federation. The collapse first of the Soviet empire in East-Central Europe in 1988–1989 and then of the USSR itself in 1991 caused an equivalent contraction in Moscow's power and undermined the economy as well. Consequently, although Russia's leaders have sought to maintain and even increase influence in what only Russians call the "near abroad," that is the former republics of the USSR, the empire has shrunk to its smallest extent since the eighteenth century, and the Russia Federation's influence in its former republics, not to mention Eastern and Central Europe, has been severely constrained by a lack of funds as well as by local nationalist feelings.

Successful modernization of Europe has been viewed by Russians as either a possible model for Russia's development or as a threat to her distinctive, peculiar social, political and economic institutions. From Russia's vantagepoint on the periphery of Europe, to modernize has meant to Westernize, with all the political and economic baggage that that implies. Periodically, Russia's leaders have opened the "door" to Europe, as Peter the Great put it, only to have it closed or restricted by those who have sought to maintain and foster Russia's unique civilization and its messianic mission in world history. In one form or another there has been a recurring struggle since the time of Peter the Great between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers, and this was even true during the Soviet era. Lenin and Trotsky and the Old Bolsheviks thought they were opening Russia to a global communist system. Stalin closed it tightly and created an autarkic economy. Nikita Khrushchev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin opened Russia once again to the West, ultimately with catastrophic consequences for the empire. It has been difficult, however, to overcome the pull of the "Russian idea," and post-Soviet development

policies have been undercut by an ambiguous commitment to democratization and marketization.

These issues, autocracy, Orthodoxy, territorial expansionism, modernization, and cultural uniqueness, have appeared, disappeared, and reappeared throughout Russian history. Western and Russian historians have argued at length about the strength, significance, and permanence of these themes, and the articles contained in this encyclopedia explore these issues as impartially and objectively as possible.

There is no question, however, about the unique, unparalleled contributions of Russian culture to art, music, literature, philosophy, and science. Where would we be without Glinka, Mussorgsky, Tchaikovsky, Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Rublev, Mendeleev, Sakharov and the many, many other artists, thinkers, and scientists that Russia's citizens of all nationalities have produced? The editors and I hope that the reader will use this encyclopedia to sample the richness of Russian history and be induced to explore Russian culture in depth.

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA PROJECT

When Macmillan Reference USA approached me seeking an editor in chief for a projected *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, I realized that if I could persuade the best scholars in the field to serve as Associate Editors and on an Editorial Board, and if we could persuade other top scholars to write entries, the experience would be educational and highly worthwhile. I also realized that it would necessarily be a "labor of love" for all involved. Participating scholars would have to believe in the intrinsic value of the project. I first approached Dr. Ann Robertson, who was serving as Managing Editor of my journal, *Problems of Post-Communism*, to see whether she would be willing to contribute her outstanding editorial skills as well as her expertise in political science to work closely with me as Senior Associate Editor on the encyclopedia. Next I approached Professor Nicholas Riasanovsky of University of California at Berkeley. As the leading historian of Russia and director of innumerable Ph.D. dissertations in the field, Professor Riasanovsky represented the keystone in the construction of the editorial committee. I knew that his name would assure other scholars of the serious academic nature of the project. I was soon able to recruit an

awesome set of associate editors: Daniel Kaiser of Grinnell College, Louise McReynolds of the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Donald Raleigh of the University of North Carolina, and Ronald Suny of the University of Chicago. With their assistance we recruited an equally outstanding Advisory Board.

Below are very brief biographies of the distinguished members on the Editorial Board:

Editor in Chief James R. Millar (Ph.D. Cornell University) is professor of economics and international affairs at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the George Washington University. His primary areas of research are Soviet/Russian economic history and economics of the transition.

Daniel H. Kaiser (Ph.D. University of Chicago) is professor of history at Grinnell College in Iowa. His academic specialty is history and family life in early modern Russia.

Louise McReynolds (Ph.D. University of Chicago) is professor of history at the University of Hawaii. She specializes in Russian intellectual history and cultural studies.

Donald J. Raleigh (Ph.D. Indiana University) is professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. His research specialization is twentieth-century Russian and Soviet history and the Russian civil war.

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky (D.Phil. Oxford University) is professor emeritus of history at the University of California at Berkeley. He is the author of *A History of Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, sixth edition, 1999).

Ann E. Robertson (Ph.D. George Washington University) is managing editor of the journal *Problems of Post-Communism*, National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. She specializes in post-Soviet political science.

Ronald Grigor Suny (Ph.D. Columbia University, 1968) is professor of political science at the University of Chicago. His research specialty is comparative politics and Russian history with special attention to non-Russian peoples.

The editorial board assembled at George Washington University in January 2001 to plan the encyclopedia. The topics we identified eventually totaled 1,500 entries. We decided to create basic article categories in an attempt to capture the range and scope of over 1,000 years of Russian history

and culture. As a result, articles in the Encyclopedia describe:

- Historical Events
- Documents, Declarations, or Treaties
- Military Campaigns or Battles
- The Arts, Literature, Philosophy, or Science
- Economic Developments or Strategies
- Ethnic Groups
- Geographical Regions
- Political or Territorial Units (Cities, Regions, Government Ministries)
- Countries Prominent in Russian History
- Government Policies or Programs
- Organizations, Movements, or Political Parties
- Influential Individuals
- Basic Terms or Phrases

Over the next few months members of the editorial board wrote scope statements and identified word lengths (ranging from 250 to 5,000 words) for the articles in their segment of the table of contents. Our goal was to produce four volumes and one million words, a quota we easily could have exceeded. After authors were commissioned and assignments completed, each article was read by the appropriate member of the Editorial Board and by the Editor in Chief for final approval. Macmillan Reference staff has edited the entries for clarity, consistency, and style.

A number of transliteration systems exist for presenting Russian proper names and terms in the English language. As the main audience for the encyclopedia is not expected to be familiar with the Russian language, strict adherence to any one system could appear artificial and intimidating. The editors decided to use standard American spelling of well-known proper names as they would appear in the *New York Times* (e.g., Boris Yeltsin, not Boris El'tsin). In all other cases transliterations conform to the conventions established by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names. Within this system we made a few exceptions: ligatures, soft signs, and hard signs are omitted; names ending in "-ii," "-yi," or "-yy" are shortened to "-y"; and names of tsars and saints have been Anglicized, as Peter the Great and Saint Basil, not Petr and Vasily. The editors believe that this modified system for transliteration will be more readable and understandable than the alternatives.

Dates in Russian history can be somewhat confusing because tsarist Russia continued to use "Old Style" (O.S.) dates, based on the Julian calendar, up to the 1917 Revolution. In 1917 the Julian calen-

dar was 13 days behind the Gregorian, which had been used in Europe since 1582. The Bolsheviks adopted New Style (N.S.) dates. Thus, the October 25th Revolution was celebrated on November 7th.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank James Goldgeier, director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies of The George Washington University for institutional support and personal encouragement. The staff of the Institute, especially Vedrana Hadzialic and Jennifer Sieck, have efficiently and cheerfully helped advance this project in many ways.

Leah Markowitz ably served as research assistant in the early phases of the project.

Jill Lectka, Director of Publishing Operations and Joe Clements, Senior Editor for Macmillan Reference USA, and their staff, have simply been superb in providing the managerial, editorial, and promotional support for the creation of the *Encyclopedia of Russian History*. They have been tactful but persistent in encouraging the editors and contributors to meet deadlines and make any necessary editorial changes. Brian Kinsey initiated the project in 2001 and Shawn Corridor joined the editorial team in the spring of 2003 to supervise final author corrections and entry preparation. We have been fortunate to have such outstanding professionals working with us.

JAMES R. MILLAR
EDITOR IN CHIEF

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AUCCTU	All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
agitprop	agitational propaganda
APR	Agrarian Party of Russia
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
b.	born
Cadets	Constitutional Democrats
CC	Central Committee
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
Cheka	All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
d.	died
DMR	Dniester Moldovan Republic
DPR	Democratic Party of Russia
EU	European Union
FNPR	Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GKO	State Defense Committee
Glavlit	Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs
GNP	Gross National Product
Gosbank	State Bank
Goskomstat	State Statistics Committee
Gosplan	State Plan
Gulag	Main Administration of Prison Camps
GUM	State Universal Store
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KGB	Committee of State Security
kolkhoz	collective farm
KRO	Congress of Russian Communities
LDPR	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP	New Economic Policy
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
OGPU	Combined State Political Directorate
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries



ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

OVR	Fatherland-All Russia	sovnarkhozy	regional economic councils
r.	ruled	Sovnarkom	Council of People's Commissars
RAPP	Russian Association of Proletarian Writers	SPS	Union of Right Forces
RIK	Regional Electoral Commission	SRs	Socialist Revolutionaries
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic	START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties	TASS	Soviet Telegraphic Agency (news service)
samizdat	self-publishing (underground, unofficial publishing)	TIK	Territorial Electoral Commission
Sberbank	Savings Bank of Russia	TsIK	Central Electoral Commission
sovkhoz	Soviet farm (state-owned farm)	UN	United Nations
		U.S.	United States
		USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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*This topical outline was compiled by the editors
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ABKHAZIANS

Abkhazians call themselves Apswa (plural Ap-swaa). Abkhazia (capital: Sukhum/Aqw'a) comprises 8,700 square kilometers (between lat. 43°35'–42°27' N and long. 40°–42°08' E) bordering the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Mingrelia, and Svanetia. The early Soviets' drive to eradicate illiteracy saw Abkhaz attain literary status; like Circassian and Ubykh (extinct since 1992), Abkhaz is a northwest Caucasian language. Christianity arrived two centuries before its official introduction under Justinian sixth century. Sunni Islam spread with Ottoman Turkish influence from around 1500. Traditional paganism has never entirely disappeared, making adherence to either major religion relatively superficial, although within Abkhazia most Abkhazians are nominally Christian.

Life revolves around the extended family, morality (including respect for elders) being essentially determined by the dictates of custom (*ak'abz*) and an ever-present sense of "Abkhazianness" (*ap-swara*). Local nobility fostered their offspring among the peasantry to cement societal relations—only captured foreigners served as slaves. English visitor James Bell noted in the 1830s that Abkhazians rendered this concept by their ethnonym for "Mingrelian" (*agərwa*). Milk-brotherhood was another social bond, symbolic establishment of which between two warring families could end vendettas.

A semi-tropical climate with abundant water resources, forests, and mountain-pasturage dictated an economy based on animal husbandry, timber, and agriculture, with fruit, viticulture, and millet (yielding to maize in the nineteenth century) playing dominant roles; tea and tobacco gained importance in the twentieth century. Greece, Rome, Persia, Lazica, Byzantium, Genoa, Turkey, Russia, and Georgia have all influenced Abkhazian history. In the 780s Prince Leon II took advantage of Byzantium's weakness to incorporate within his Abkhazian Kingdom most of western Georgia, this whole territory being styled "Abkhazia" until 975 when Bagrat' III, inheriting Abkhazia maternally and Iberia (eastern Georgia) paternally, became first monarch of a united Georgia. This medieval kingdom disintegrated during the Mongol depredations (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries), and part of Abkhazia's population (the Abazinians, who speak the divergent Abaza dialect and today number around 35,000) settled in the north Caucasus. The Chachbas





An Abkhaz Army soldier stands in front of an armored personnel carrier in Kodori Gorge, October 2001. © RELUTERS
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controlled Abkhazia, the Dadianis controlled Mingrelia, vying for dominance in the border regions; the current frontier along the River Ingur dates from the 1680s.

Abkhazia became a Russian protectorate in 1810 but governed its own affairs until 1864 when, in the wake of imperial Russia's crushing of North Caucasian resistance (1864) and again after the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War, most Abkhazians (along with most Circassians and all the Ubykhs) migrated to Ottoman lands. Soviet power was established in 1921; this Abkhazian SSR was recognized by Georgia, the two then contracting a treaty-alliance that lasted until Abkhazia's 1931 demotion to an "autonomous republic" within Georgia. The Stalin years were characterized by forced (largely Mingrelian) immigration and suppression of the language and culture in an attempted Georgianization.

Post-Soviet Georgian nationalism led to war in August 1992. Abkhazian victory in September 1993 resulted in the mass flight of most of the local Mingrelian population, numerically the largest

group in prewar Abkhazia. The conflict remained unresolved as of the early twenty-first century. Abkhazia declared independence in October 1999 but remains unrecognized. There are roughly 100,000 Abkhazians in Abkhazia (or ex-Soviet territories) and up to 500,000 across the Near East, predominantly in Turkey, where the language is neither taught nor written.

See also: CAUCASUS; CHERKESS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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B. GEORGE HEWITT

ABORTION POLICY

The Soviet Union was the first country in the world to legalize abortion, but its goal was to protect women's health and promote motherhood, not to advance women's rights.

Abortion was a criminal offense punishable by exile or long prison sentences before the Bolshevik Revolution. As part of its effort to reform Russian society, the Soviet government legalized abortion in a decree issued November 18, 1920. Supporters of the decree believed legal abortions were a necessary evil to prevent women from turning to dangerous and unsanitary back-alley abortions. Their goal was not to protect a woman's individual reproductive rights, but to preserve the health of the mother for the common good. Furthermore, the legalization only applied to abortions performed by trained medical personnel, and in 1924 a system was established that prioritized access to legal abortions according to class position and social vulnerability (unemployed and unmarried working women topped the list).

In 1936, the state recriminalized abortion in an attempt to increase the birth rate and to emphasize the value of motherhood. Although the policy shift temporarily reduced the number of abortions, in the long term repression failed to have the desired effect and abortion rates increased. Abortion was again legalized in 1955 on the premise that women had become sufficiently aware of the importance of their maternal roles. Despite the changes over time, Soviet abortion policy consistently focused on protecting women's health and encouraging motherhood. A lack of alternative methods of contraception, however, ensured that Soviet women relied on abortion as their primary means to control reproduction throughout the Soviet period.

See also: FAMILY CODE OF 1926; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

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SHARON A. KOWALSKY

ACADEMY OF ARTS

The idea of founding an Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg was first mooted by Peter the Great, but it was not until 1757, primarily on the initiative of Ivan Shuvalov, that the project was realized. Shuvalov, its first president, commissioned a large, neoclassical edifice on the banks of the Neva to house the institution, and in 1764 Catherine II gave it its first charter, based on that of the Académie de Peinture et de Sculpture, which had been established in Paris in 1648. Following the French example, the Academy developed a system of instruction in painting, sculpture, architecture, and the decorative arts that emphasized the study of old masters and the antique, and which prioritized subjects of historical significance. However, the Academy was not created primarily to fulfill state commissions, as had been the case in France, but aimed instead to professionalize practice in the visual arts. Students followed a regimented system, and all graduates who fulfilled the program were entitled to fourteenth rank in the civil service Table of Ranks. Those who won the major gold medal

competition were also granted the opportunity to study abroad for three to six years with a travel scholarship from the Academy. Students were required to complete regular assignments, which, along with the Academy's growing collection of casts, copies, and original works by western European artists, formed an invaluable teaching resource.

In the nineteenth century, the role of the Academy changed as its activities became increasingly harnessed to state interests. Beginning in 1802, national monuments could only be erected with the approval of the Academy; this had the effect of casting it in the role of an official arbiter of taste. Nicholas I then took an active interest in the Academy's affairs, appointing his favorites as professors and pronouncing on the direction that he felt the work of its students should follow. This growing association between the Academy and the court culminated with the appointment of Nicholas's son-in-law Maximilian, Duke of Leuchtenberg, as president in 1843, after which the institution was continually headed by a member of the imperial family.

By this time, the Academy was being criticized for the rigidity of its training program, particularly since the Moscow School of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture, though partially dependent on the Academy's program, actively supported new trends in art. Opposition came to a head in 1863, when fourteen students led by the painter Ivan Kramskoy requested permission to choose their own subject for the annual gold medal competition. When this was refused, thirteen of them left, working initially in a commune known as the Artel. Subsequently they joined the Association of Traveling Art Exhibitions, a group of realist artists that dominated the artistic scene for the next twenty years. The Academy attempted to counter this threat by launching its own travelling exhibitions in 1886, and in 1893 effected a partial rapprochement with some of the realists, who joined its teaching staff. However, its position of authority had been irredeemably undermined. In the Soviet era, the Academy encompassed teaching institutes in various cities, including the Repin Institute in the original building in St. Petersburg. It became a bastion of Socialist Realism in the 1930s and 1940s, but it has since regained its status as a respected center for the study and practice of the fine arts.

See also: EDUCATION; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS; SOCIALIST REALISM

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ROSALIND P. BLAKESLEY

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Advised first by the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz and then by his student Cristian Wolff, Peter the Great founded the Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences in 1725 on the model of the Paris and Berlin institutions of the same kind. All initial members of the new Academy were foreigners. The most outstanding member of the fledgling institution was Leonhard Euler, who in a short time was widely acclaimed as Europe's leading mathematician. He was credited as the founder of a strong mathematical tradition in Russia.

The new Academy was assigned two tasks: to initiate systematic work on the latest developments in science and to train the first Russian scientists. Small and fluid, the training component of the Academy became known as the first Russian secular institution of higher education. Mikhail Vasilievich Lomonosov was the first Russian scientist to become a member of the Academy and was living proof of Russia's readiness to enter the challenging world of advanced science.

Catherine II relied on the Academie Francaise as a model for the Imperial Russian Academy founded in 1783 with the primary task of improving the Russian literary language and preparing a Russian grammar and dictionary. Close relations between the two institutions were facilitated by the fact that a large number of the country's leading scholars belonged to both academies. At this time, the Academy of Sciences increased appreciably the volume of its publications presented in the Russian language.

In the eighteenth century, all presidents of the Academy of Sciences were aristocrats with close ties to the royal family but no interest in scholarship. In 1803, Alexander I granted the Academy a new charter that limited the choice of candidates for presidency to individuals with proven affinity with scientific scholarship. It also granted the Academy extended autonomy in administering its work and choosing individual and group research topics.


Despite the unceasing threats to academic autonomy during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855), the Academy recorded substantial progress in contributions to science. Among the most eminent academicians were Karl von Baer, the founder of modern embryology; Frederick G. W. Struve, who not only founded the Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory but made it one of the world's leading institutions of its kind; and Mikhail Vasilievich Ostrogradsky, who was credited by James Clerk Maxwell with contributing to the mathematical apparatus of electromagnetic theory.

For a long time, the foreign members of the Academy formed a community isolated from Russia's social and cultural dynamics. By the 1830s they manifested concrete and multiple signs of expanding and intensifying their Russian connections. Now they contributed articles on scientific themes to popular journals, gave lectures to organized groups, and took part in founding such naturalist societies as the Russian Geographical Society, fashioned on the model of similar organizations in the West. The publications of the Mineralogical Society and the Russian Geographical Society added to the list of scientific journals appealing to the growing public interest in science.

In 1841 the Academy underwent a drastic organizational change: It absorbed the Imperial Russian Academy and made it one of its three departments. This move not only broadened the scholarly concerns of the Academy of Sciences but also strengthened the Russian share of membership. The Natural Science Departments continued to be dominated by foreign members.

The era of Nicholas I ended on a sour note: Overreacting to the revolutionary waves in Western Europe in 1848, the government made it illegal for young Russians to attend Western universities in search of advanced scientific training. The Academy, which traditionally supervised the selection for foreign training, lost one of its prized functions. The government also abrogated Paragraph 33 of the 1836 charter, which stipulated that "scholarly books and journals, subscribed to by the Academy or full members of the Academy are not subject to censorship."

Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1855 and 1856 created an atmosphere favoring liberal reforms of a large magnitude in both the political system and social relations. The emancipation of the serfs topped the list of changes that earned the 1860s the title of "The Epoch of Great Reforms."



Scientists monitor the control desk at the Academy of Sciences Atomic Electric Station. © HULTON ARCHIVE

The restive intelligentsia viewed science and its critical spirit as the safest path to lifting Russia on the scale of social, political, and economic progress.

Among the new members of the Academy were several Russians whose scholarly reputations were firmly established in and outside Russia. The mathematician Pafnuty Lvovich Chebyshev's contributions to number and probability theories made a strong impression on the Paris Academy of Sciences, which elected him an *associé étranger*. In addition to his many other contributions to chemistry, Nikolai Nikolayevich Zinin reduced aniline from nitrobenzene; this introduced the industrial production of paints. The historian Sergei Mikhailovich Soloviev, elected a member of the Academy in 1871, was deeply involved in writing his multivolume *History of Russia since Ancient Times*, a grand synthesis of the nation's political, social, and cultural developments.

The Academy established closer contact with university professors by allowing more space in its journals for their contributions. It also improved its public image through intensive involvement in

the national festivities commemorating the centennial of Lomonosov's death. On this occasion it published a number of books covering the multiple sides of Lomonosov's scientific and literary activities. After the celebrations, Peter Pekarsky, a member of the Academy, wrote a two-volume history of his institution, based exclusively on the archival material and casting penetrating light on the early history of Russian science. For the first time, a Russian was appointed permanent secretary of the Academy, and annual reports were presented in the Russian language. The use of the Russian language in the Academy's publications increased by the establishment of the journal *Zapiski (Memoirs)*.

In the early 1880s, the Academy became a target of public attacks provoked by its refusal to elect Dmitry Ivanovich Mendeleev, the discoverer of the periodic law of elements, to its membership. The Academy was now referred to as a "German institution" and the novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky went so far as to suggest the establishment of a Free Russian Academy supported by private endowments. The Mendeleev incident helped bring an

end to inviting foreign scholars to fill the vacant positions in the Academy.

All distinguished university professors, the new members of the Academy provided a significant index of rapidly advancing Russian scholarship. At the end of the nineteenth century, the growing fields of science were represented by the neurophysiologist and expert on conditioned reflexes Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, the first Russian recipient of the Nobel Prize; the mathematicians Andrei Andreyevich Markov and Alexander Mikhailovich Lyapunov, who raised the theory of probability to new heights; Alexei Nikolayevich Krylov, an expert in naval architecture and the translator of Newton's *Principia*; and Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukovsky, a pioneer in aerodynamics.

The Academy welcomed the February Revolution in 1917, which brought an end to the autocratic system. The academician Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky was the moving spirit behind the law abolishing the multi-ramified system of censorship in all phases of written expression. The Academy acquired a new name—the Russian Academy of Sciences—and the geologist Alexander Petrovich Karpinsky became the first elected president. The organization of the first research institutes heralded the appearance of research focused on the burning questions of modern science. They quickly became the primary units of the Academy. The first institute concentrated on the use of physical methods in chemical analysis.

At the end of Imperial Russia, the Academy had forty-one full members. It had one of the country's richest libraries, several museums, and a small number of underequipped laboratories. A solid majority of academicians worked in the humanities and the social sciences. This distribution was reversed under the Soviet system. The academicians were supported by a staff of specialists in individual fields and laboratory technicians.

The Bolshevik victory in October 1917 brought two instant changes affecting the Academy. The new government reintroduced censorship that in some respects was more comprehensive and rigid than that of the tsarist era. It took some time, however, for the new system of censorship to become an effective system of ideological control, in part because of persisting ambiguity in the definition of its tasks.

The new government acted quickly and resolutely in founding the Socialist Academy (in 1923 renamed the Communist Academy) with the pri-

mary task of preparing dialectical materialism—the Marxist philosophy of science—to serve as an ideological clearinghouse for scientific ideas. Its task was also to create the theoretical base of the social sciences and the humanities. The efficiency of the Socialist Academy, intended to be a competitor to the “conservative” Academy of Sciences, was drastically reduced by deep disagreements among Marxist theorists in interpreting the revolutionary waves in modern science. At this time, the Bolshevik government was not ready to engineer drastic changes in the Academy of Sciences.

In 1925 the government gave financial support to the Academy of Sciences to celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of its founding, an event attended by a large contingent of Western scientists. Now renamed the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the institution received the first government recognition as the country's supreme scientific body. The next year, the Academy was given a new charter—the first since 1836—which made it an institution open to activities by such “public organizations” as the trade unions and proliferating Communist associations. The new charter abolished the traditional privilege of academicians to be the sole authority in selecting candidates for new members of the Academy.

The process of making the Academy a typical Soviet institution was generally completed in 1929, with Stalin now at the helm of the government and the Communist Party. The first large-scale election of new members included a group of Marxists. Dialectical materialism was proclaimed the only philosophy admitted in the Academy—and in the country—and loyalty to the Communist Party (the so-called *partynost*, or “partyiness”) prescribed behavior. A group of leading historians and an eminent mathematician were exiled to provincial towns.

At the same time, the government approved the Academy's proposal to admit students to work for higher degrees and to acquire research experience. Upon completion of their studies, most of these students were absorbed by the Academy's research staff. Some advanced to the rank of full members of the Academy.

The history of the Academy in the Stalin era (1929–1953) has two dominant characteristics. On the one hand, the Soviet government made vast financial investments in building the Academy into a gigantic network of institutes and laboratories, concentrating on both scientific research and train-

ing new cadres of scientists. On the other hand, Stalin encouraged and patronized Marxist philosophers in their mounting attacks on the leaders of the scientific community accused of violating the norms of Marxist theory. In the years of Stalin's reign of terror in the late 1930s, a long line of Academy personnel landed in political prisons, from which many did not return.

In 1936 the government abolished the Communist Academy and transferred its members to the Academy of Sciences, where they became part of the newly founded Department of Philosophy, the center of an intensified crusade against "idealism" in both Western and Soviet science. For a long time, "physical idealism," as manifested in quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, was the main target of Marxist attacks.

Even in the peak years of Stalinist oppression, the Academy's physicists—led by Abram Fyodorovich Ioffe, Vladimir Alexandrovich Fock, and Igor Yevgenievich Tamm—made bold efforts to resist philosophical interference with their science. Their basic arguments were that Marxist philosophers were not familiar with modern physics and were guilty of misinterpreting Marxist theory. At a later date, Nikolai Nikolayevich Semenov, a Nobel laureate, stated publicly that only by ignoring Marxist philosophers were the physicists able to add fresh ideas to their science. More general criticism of Marxist interference with science came from the academicians Ivan Petrovich Pavlov and Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky: They opposed the monopolistic position of Marxist philosophy.

Physics and biology were the main scientific arena of Stalinist efforts to establish full ideological control over scientific thought. The two sciences, however, did not undergo the same treatment. In physics, Stalin encouraged Marxist philosophers to engage in relentless attacks on the residues of "idealism" in quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, but refrained from interfering with the ongoing work in physics laboratories.

The situation in biology was radically different. Here, Stalin not only encouraged a sustained ideological attack on genetics and its underlying "bourgeois" philosophy but played a decisive role in outlawing this science and abolishing its laboratories. Academicians Peter Leonidovich Kapitsa and Igor E. Tamm, experienced warriors against Stalinist adverse interference with the professional work of scientists, were among the leading scholars whose sustained criticism swayed the govern-

ment ten years after Stalin's death to abandon its stand against modern genetics.

The process of the de-Stalinization of the Academy began soon after Stalin's death in 1953. By the mid-1960s, there was no science in the outside world that was not recognized and closely followed in the Soviet Union. The Academy played the leading role in reestablishing sociology and the rich national tradition in social psychology dominated by the internationally recognized legacy of Lev Semenovich Vygotsky. At the same time, Marxist philosophers were encouraged to explore paths to a reconciliation with leading Western philosophies of science and to search for "the kernels of truth" in "bourgeois" thought.

In the meantime, the Academy continued to grow at a rapid pace. In 1957 it established a string of research institutes in Novosibirsk—known as the Siberian Department or Akademgorodok (Academic Campus)—concentrating, among other activities, on the branches of mathematics related to the ongoing computer revolution, the latest developments in molecular biology, and the new methodological requirements of the social sciences, particularly economics. In 1971 the Department had forty-four research institutes, fifty laboratories, and a research staff of 5,600. It also supported a new university known for its high academic standards. A new complex of research institutes in nuclear physics was established in Dubna, and another group of institutes engaged in physico-chemical approaches to biological studies was built in Pushkino. A scientific center engaged in geophysical studies was established in 1964 in Krasnaya Pakhta. The scientific center in Noginsk concentrated on physical chemistry. The Academy also helped in guiding and coordinating the work of the Union-Republican academies.

In 1974 the Academy had 237 full members and 439 corresponding members. In the same year the professional staff of the Academy numbered 39,354, including 29,726 with higher academic degrees. The Academy published 132 journals, a few intended to reach the general reading public. It continued the tradition of publishing collections of essays celebrating important events in national history or commemorating major contributors to science. One of the last and most memorable collections, published in 1979, marked the centennial of Einstein's birth.

The Academy produced voluminous literature on its own history. The Soviet period of the Acad-

emy was presented in a glowing light with no place for a critical analysis of the underlying philosophy and internal organization of this gigantic institution. In 1991, with the dismemberment of the Soviet union, the name of the Russian Academy of Sciences was again made official. The new Academy brought an end to the monopoly of a single philosophy of science.

See also: CENSORSHIP; COMMUNIST ACADEMY; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY; UNIVERSITIES

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ALEXANDER VUCINICH

ADMINISTRATION FOR ORGANIZED RECRUITMENT

The Administration for Organized Recruitment (Russian acronym, Orgnabor) was a labor recruitment agency that existed in the USSR from 1931. Its essential feature was that the recruiting organization, not the potential employee, initiated the recruitment process. In the 1930s it was mainly concerned with the recruitment of peasants for seasonal and permanent work in nonagricultural jobs.

During the New Economic Policy (NEP) the USSR had high unemployment, and relied on labor exchanges to bring supply and demand for labor into balance. It also had substantial numbers of peasants migrating to the towns in search of work, and substantial numbers of these peasants found seasonal employment away from their villages. With the abolition of unemployment in 1930, it was thought that there would be no further need for market economy instruments such as labor exchanges.

Given the huge demand for labor in industry and construction, and the collectivization of agriculture, it nonetheless became necessary to establish a procedure for recruiting peasants from collective farms. Hence the creation, in 1931, of a new type

of recruitment for the rapidly growing construction and industrial sectors: organized recruitment. In this new system, state-owned enterprises or administrative organizations such as the People's Commissariats recruited a number of workers for regular or seasonal work by entering into an agreement with a collective farm, group of collective farms, or rural area.

The Administration for Organized Recruitment offered a planned, socialist mechanism for placing workers where they were most needed, and was intended to replace the traditional practice of recruitment from among those peasants who happened to turn up at the factory gate. In many cases the new recruits were promised much better employment conditions than actually existed, which was one of the reasons for the high rate at which the newly recruited workers left their jobs.

According to official statistics, 3.6 million people were recruited by Orgnabor in 1932, an average of 2.6 million per year between 1933 and 1937, 1.7 million in 1938, and 2.2 million in 1939. For many of the peasants concerned, the process was essentially an economic conscription. After 1946 the role of organized recruitment declined. In this later period, organized recruitment often concerned urban workers recruited for coal mining, construction, and as lumberjacks. In 1946 organized recruitment recruited 2.2 million people (mainly to coal mining, textiles, industrial and military construction, and forestry). Between 1947 and 1950, an average of about 0.6 million people were recruited per year, mainly to industrial and military construction, coal mining, and forestry. Organized recruitment remained at about 0.6 million per year between 1951 and 1955, but fell to only 0.1 million per year between 1966 and 1970.

The administrative framework for organized recruitment varied. In the 1930s there were commissions for organized recruitment, but between 1953 and 1956, republican administrations (in the RSFSR and Ukraine chief administrations) for organized recruitment. In the late Soviet period organized recruitment was mainly administered by regional or local authorities. The program of organized recruitment experienced numerous problems, however, and was never the predominant form of labor recruitment in the USSR. Decisions by individual workers as to where they wanted to work were always more important.

See also: COLLECTIVE FARM; LABOR; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; SOVNARKOM

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MICHAEL ELLMAN

ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY

The term *militiary administration* was used to identify both the techniques and system of state agencies involved in the management of the armed forces.

Russian writers long distinguished between the agencies for military command and those for administration (management), and Soviet theorists added a distinction between those providing leadership of the armed forces as such, and those for overall leadership of the country's defense. Whereas the latter involves participation by the political leadership in decision making, the former deal with the military professionals' implementing of the resulting policies. And if the lines between command and management, and between the two types of leadership, sometimes blur in modern conditions, this was commonplace in the premodern periods of Russia's history.

The Kievan Rus *druzhina*—the warband surrounding a prince—provided an ad hoc administration to the ruler, a core around which a militia of commoners rallied and, in battle, the professional commanders for the commoners. When Rus splintered into local "appanages" in the late 1000s, the *druzhina*'s primitive administrative functions were absorbed by the *puty* (offices) of a princeling's *dvor*, or "court," while selected boyars, the descendants of the warband members, joined him in his *duma* (council) in peacetime and helped provide military leadership in wartime. Thus all command and military administrative functions remained concentrated in the ruler's person, with no distinction between them or, indeed, between the civil and military spheres of state life.

This system served Moscow's grand dukes during the Mongol period. But as their realm expanded and became increasingly centralized, a reorganization was clearly necessary, especially after Ivan III (1462–1505) began creating an army based on a mounted *dvoryane* (gentry) militia, whose members served in return for *pomestie* land grants (or fiefs). The state's more complex administrative needs were met by the creation of *prikazy* (chanceries), headed by civil servant *dyaki* (state secretaries). Of the *prikazy*, the *Razryad* most closely approximated a war ministry, but a host of others had specialized military (e.g., armaments, fortifications) or mixed civil-military (e.g., medical, communications) functions. The boyar aristocracy continued to advise their increasingly autocratic masters in the *duma* and to provide commanders for his armies or "hosts." But the *mestnichestvo* (system of places), which aimed at preserving the social status of the boyar clans, also dictated assignment to military posts. Consequently, while Muscovite military administration initially gained in efficiency, wartime appointments to field armies often reflected social rather than military prowess. This problem finally was resolved by the destruction of the boyars' genealogical records in 1682. Yet by that time the piecemeal reforms introduced by Romanov rulers after 1613 had brought the continuous creation of new, specialized *prikazy* that left the expanded but fragmented administrative system badly in need of modernization and another radical overhaul.

This was provided by Peter I (r. 1689–1725), who founded both the modern Russian Empire and the Imperial Army. He created a European-style regular or standing army (and navy), based on conscription, to fight Sweden (1700–1721). "Leadership of defense" remained concentrated in the ruler and a series of military-court agencies, but in 1718 Peter assigned "leadership the armed forces" to a ramified central administration headed by the Military and Admiralty Colleges, each headed by a president and board, with provincial governors overseeing the local agencies. Despite bureaucratic inefficiency and constant modification, this system remained in place until Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) replaced it with more streamlined ministries, headed by ministers, in 1802. Those for the army and navy now led the armed forces. The two ministers helped lead defense as members of a Council of Ministers, which worked with the State Council and other military-court bodies in peacetime, while an Imperial General Headquarters (*Stavka*) directed the armies in wartime. This system again

was streamlined by Alexander II (r. 1856–1881) and his war minister, Dmitry Milyutin. After 1864 his War Ministry comprised numerous specialized administrations or directorates, developed a professional General Staff, and headed a number of geographically and administratively defined, local military districts. But as before, overall leadership of defense was provided by the emperor and his court agencies. This situation remained in place even after the creation of a State Duma in 1905–1906, and seemingly ended only with the 1917 revolutions. Yet despite changes in terminology, a similar system reemerged during the civil war (1918–1921), after which the new Soviet Union recreated the network of territorial administrative-military districts, headed by People's Commissariats (after 1945, Ministries) which, aided by a powerful General Staff, led the army and fleet. Instead of an emperor and his court, leadership in defense again was provided by some sort of peacetime Defense Council (or wartime Stavka), now dominated by the Communist Party's leader through the Central Committee's Secretariat and Politburo.

See also: COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; SOVNARKOM; STAVKA

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DAVID R. JONES

ADMIRALTY

From the beginning, St. Petersburg's docks and associated administrative building, collectively known as the Admiralty, had been an essential part of the city's existence. The shipyard was built by

Peter the Great in 1704, and in the 1730s Ivan Korobov added the central gate and golden spire. By 1806 plans submitted by Andreian Zakharov for reconstruction of the large, and by then, decrepit complex had been approved. Zakharov had attended the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg and studied extensively in France and Italy. Although he died in 1811, long before the completion of the building in 1823, no significant changes were made in his design.

In reconstructing Korobov's partially destroyed Admiralty, Zakharov expanded the length of the facade from 300 meters to 375. In addition there were two perpendicular wings almost half that long extending to the river. From the perspective of the Neva River, the complex consisted of two p-shaped buildings, one within the other. The inner building served the Admiralty dockyard, which it enclosed on three sides, while the outer contained



The gilded Admiralty Tower rises above St. Petersburg. © CUCHI WHITE/CORBIS

administrative offices. The Admiralty end-blocks, facing the Neva River, are among the most successful neoclassical attempts to achieve a geometric purity of structure.

The main facade, overlooking a large square (now a park), is marked in the center by a grand arch, flanked by statues of nymphs supporting a globe, sculpted by Feodosy Shchedrin. Above the arch, a sculpted frieze portrays Neptune handing Peter the Great the trident, symbol of power over the seas. The corners of the central tower support statues of Alexander the Great, Ajax, Achilles, and Pyrrhus. The tower culminates in a spire resting on an Ionic peristyle, the cornice of which supports twenty-eight allegorical and mythological statues representing the seasons, the elements, and the winds.

The remarkable power of the Admiralty building derives from Zakharov's ability to create visual accents for an immensely long facade. The simplicity of the surfaces provided the ideal background for large, rusticated arches and high-relief sculpture, thus converting a prosaic structure into a noble monument.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; ST. PETERSBURG

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WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

ADYGE

The Adyge are the titular nationality of the Republic of Adygeia in the Russian Federation, which lies along the foothills of the northwestern Caucasus Range. In Soviet times, this was an autonomous okrug (district) within Krasnodar Krai, with its capital city of Maikop. The Adyge number 22 percent of the republic, which has 541,000 inhabitants, the remainder being largely Russians. There are considerable Adyge communities living just outside the republic in the Krasnodar Krai. The Adyge are primarily engaged in agriculture and forestry. Health resorts are also an important source of employment and revenue, as is tourism.

The Adyge belong to the same ethnolinguistic family as the Cherkess and the Kabardians, who live in neighboring republics, and they speak various dialects of Western Circassian. Soviet nationalities policies established these three groups as separate peoples and languages, but historical memory and linguistic affinity, as well as post-Soviet ethnic politics, perpetuate notions of ethnic continuity. An important element in this has been the contacts, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, with Adyge living in Turkey, Syria, Israel, Jordan, West Europe, and the United States. These are the descendants of migrants who left for the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. In the 1990s, a number of Adyge families from the diaspora migrated back and settled in Maikop, but integration remains somewhat fraught with social and legal problems.

The Adyge are Muslim, although other religious influences, including Greek Orthodox Christianity and indigenous beliefs and rituals, can be discerned in cultural practices. As elsewhere, the Soviet state discouraged Islamic practice and identity among the Adyge, but supported cultural nation-building. In the post-Soviet period, the wars in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and Chechnya (1994–1997; 1999–2000) greatly affected Adyge politics, causing the Russian state to intermittently infuse the republic with resources to prevent the spreading of conflict. In another development, the Shapsoug, who belong to the same ethno-linguistic group and live on the Black Sea shores near the town of Sochi, are lobbying Moscow for their own administrative unit, and for political linkages with the Adygeia Republic.

See also: ABKHAZIANS; CAUCASUS; CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SHAMIL

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SETENEY SHAMI

ADZHUBEI, ALEXEI IVANOVICH

(1924–1992), Nikita Khrushchev's son-in-law, and a leading Soviet journalist.

Alexei Adzhubei met Rada Khrushcheva at Moscow State University in 1947 and married her in August 1949, when Khrushchev was party boss of Ukraine. Adzhubei became chief editor of *Komsomolskaya pravda* in 1957 and then, in 1959, of the Soviet government newspaper, *Izvestiya*. In 1961 he was named a member of the party Central Committee. In addition, Adzhubei was a member of Khrushchev's "Press Group," which edited the leader's speeches. He served as an informal adviser to his father-in-law on matters ranging from culture to foreign policy, and he accompanied Khrushchev on trips abroad including the United States (1959), Southeast Asia (1960), Paris (1960), and Austria (1961).

Under Adzhubei, *Komsomolskaya pravda* sharply increased its circulation by adding feature articles and photographs, while *Izvestiya* reduced the amount of predictable political boiler plate, printed more letters from readers, and published boldly anti-Stalinist works such as Alexander Tvardovsky's poem, "Tyorkin in the Other World." In time, Adzhubei began acting as an unofficial emissary for Khrushchev, meeting with foreign leaders such as U.S. president John F. Kennedy and Pope John XXIII, sounding out their views, reporting back to his father-in-law, and writing up his interviews in *Izvestiya*.

Thanks to his special position, Adzhubei was cultivated by other Soviet leaders, including some who eventually conspired to oust Khrushchev. When Khrushchev fell from power in October 1964, Adzhubei was denied the right to write under his own name and forced to live in obscurity until he was rehabilitated during the era of perestroika and glasnost in the late 1980s.

See also: IZVESTIYA; JOURNALISM; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; PRAVDA

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WILLIAM TAUBMAN

AEROFLOT

Aeroflot, literally "air fleet," is the common name for the state airline of the Soviet Union. It was operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. The airline was founded in 1928 as Dobroflot and was reorganized into Aeroflot in 1932. During Soviet times, Aeroflot was the world's largest airline, with about 15 percent of all civil air traffic. The first ever nonstop transpolar flight (from Moscow to the United States in 1933) on the ANT-25 aircraft operated by Valery Chkalov, Georgy Baidukov, and Alexander Belyakov was a landmark in the history of the aviation. Aeroflot introduced commercial jet plane service on September 15, 1956, on a flight from Moscow to Irkutsk. Aeroflot developed the world's first supersonic airliner, the TU-144. Its maiden flight took place on December 31, 1968, two months ahead of the Concorde. Regular supersonic cargo flights began in late 1975 and passenger flights in 1977. Supersonic service was suspended in 1978, after 102 flights.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Aeroflot was reorganized by the June 1992 resolution of the government of Russian Federation, becoming Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines. Another government resolution appointed Valery Okulov as its first general director in May 1997. Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines is a joint-stock company, with 51 percent of the stock owned by the government as of 2002 and the remaining 49 percent belonging to the employees. With over fourteen thousand employees, as of 2002 Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines was the world's fourth largest commercial airline; with flights to 140 destinations in 94 countries, it provided 70 percent of all the international air transport performed by Russian airlines, and had 151 representatives abroad, as well as branches in the Russian Federation in Novosibirsk,

Khabarovsk, and St. Petersburg. The company's fleet consisted in 2002 of 111 airplanes, including two Boeing-767-300s, eight Airbuses A-310-300, six long-range Iluyshin-96-300s, eighteen Iluyshin-76TD cargo planes and one cargo DC-10/30F, and other jets, illustrating the diversification of aircraft in the post-Soviet period.

See also: AVIATION

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PAUL R. GREGORY

AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH

Afghanistan has played a key role in the foreign policy history of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. During the nineteenth century, Russian and British intelligence and government officials vied for influence in the region, with the final delineation of spheres of influence being the Amu Darya river—north of that was considered Russian and south of that was British. During the Bolshevik Revolution and civil war, opposition forces in Central Asia used Afghanistan as a base of operation against Red Army units. Indeed, Afghanistan was a haven, and then a transit route, for those wanting to escape the Soviet Union at this time.

After a series of treaties, Afghanistan became a neutral neighbor for the Soviet Union and relations focused largely on trade and economic development. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet involvement in Afghanistan increased. Soviet assistance was almost equally divided between economic and military forms. Between 1956 and 1978, the Soviet Union gave \$2.51 billion in aid to Afghanistan, compared to U.S. assistance of only \$533 million. This was part of a larger Soviet strategy to increase their presence in South Asia, as the United States was seen as being more influential in Iran and Pakistan. Equally important, although commercial ties always remained modest, the Soviet Union used this relationship as a “positive example” for the rest of the developing world.

The Saur Revolution in April 1978 radically changed the Soviet presence in the region, as the new leaders—first Nur Muhammed Taraki and

then Hafizulla Amin—debated the extent to which they wanted outside powers involved in the country. The leadership in Moscow feared that the Afghan government under Amin was going to drift out of the Soviet Union's orbit, and began to put pressure on it to remain a loyal ally. Finally, as a measure to ensure full subordination, the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Amin was killed in the ensuing conflict, to be replaced by Babrak Karmal in 1980.

The Brezhnev administration claimed that it sent troops into Afghanistan to help the current leadership stabilize the country. Within months, Soviet bases were established in a number of cities in the country and Afghanistan was effectively under Soviet occupation. Many states in the international community condemned the invasion and a majority of Western states boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow as a sign of protest.

Within two years, opposition groups—often based on tribal or clan affiliations—began to increase their resistance efforts against the Soviet occupiers. Known collectively as the Mujahedeen, the opposition fought both Soviet units and those of the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan army. Although the Mujahedeen fared poorly in the opening campaigns, increased training and support from outside powers, especially the United States, helped turn things around. By the mid-1980s, it was apparent that the Soviet Union was bogged down in a guerrilla war that wore down both troop numbers and morale.

By 1984, Soviet citizens were beginning to get frustrated with this “endless war.” The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the following year signaled a new phase in the conduct of the war, as he acknowledged that the Soviet Union ought to look at a way to end their participation in the conflict. Over the next two years, United Nations-mediated negotiations took place, which resulted in a peace settlement and the Soviet withdrawal from the country. The government was finally admitting casualty figures, which became difficult as fighting intensified in 1985 and 1986. By this time, there were between 90,000 and 104,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan at any one time.

It was not until early 1989 that the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan. In all, the ten-year Afghan War cost the Soviet Union more than 15,000 killed and more than 460,000 wounded or incapacitated due to illnesses contracted while serving in the country (this was an amazing 73 percent of all forces

that served in the country). Such casualties severely damaged the country's international reputation and internal morale. During this period of glasnost by the Gorbachev administration, it was commonplace for Soviet citizens to criticize the government's war effort and the effect it had on returning veterans, the "Afghantsy." Indeed, many observers compared the Soviet experience in Afghanistan with that of the United States in Vietnam.

For the first several years after the Soviet withdrawal, the government of Najibullah, the Soviet-sponsored leader of Afghanistan who succeeded Babrak Karmal, was able to maintain power. However, by 1992, the Mujahedeen forces ousted him and set up their own provisional government. These groups no longer had a single unifying cause (the removal of Soviet forces) to keep them together, and a civil war ensued. This lasted until 1996, at which time the Taliban were able to wrest control of most of the country.

As a result of the United States-led "coalition of the willing" attacks in 2001–2002, Russia ironically became a more active player in the region. Following the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States, Afghanistan quickly came under attack for its support of that terrorist organization and its unwillingness to hand over top al-Qaeda officials. By the beginning of 2002, supportive of the U.S. effort, Afghanistan has been more active in assisting what it sees as the defense of its southern borders.

For more than two decades, Afghanistan has remained a security problem for the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia will undoubtedly continue to place importance on remaining politically involved in future developments in that country, although given its somber experience in the 1980s, it is doubtful that Russia will develop a military or security presence in the country any time soon.

The Afghans are likewise mistrustful of Russian influences in the country. Even in the early twenty-first century, Afghanistan continued to feel the effects of the Soviet campaign in the country. As expected, U.S. troops toppled the Taliban regime and were in the process of establishing a more representative regime in Kabul. Russia, for its part, had seen 1.5 million Afghans killed in the ten-year war, most of whom were civilians. In addition, millions more citizens became refugees in Iran and Pakistan. Finally, hundreds of thousands of landmines remained in place to cause injuries and death on a near-daily basis. On a broader level, the economic

and social disruption caused by the war, and the subsequent civil war and Taliban rule, had resulted in a country completely in ruins.

Perhaps most telling for contemporary Russia is the fact that Afghanistan symbolizes defeat on several levels. It was a failed effort to export socialism to a neighboring state; it was a failure of the Soviet army to defeat an insurgency; it was a failure of confidence by the population in the political leadership; and it was a failure for the economy, as the war created a drain on an already-troubled economy.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID, ILICH; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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ROGER KANGAS

AGANBEGYAN, ABEL GEZEVIKH

(b. 1932), leading Soviet economist and organizer of economic research.

Academician Abel Gezevich Aganbegyan began his professional career as a labor economist and was

an active member of the group of mathematical economists that emerged in the USSR in the 1960s. He was the Director of the Institute of Economics and the Organization of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk (1966–1985) and the creator and first editor of the lively journal *EKO* for many years the best economics journal in the USSR. In 1985 he returned to Moscow and was an important economic adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev. Aganbegyan seems to have played a major role in promoting the ill-fated acceleration (*uskorenienie*) program of 1985–1986. Intended to speed up the national economic rate of growth, the policy mainly resulted in destabilizing the economy by sharply increasing investment in projects without any short-run returns. Aganbegyan was also involved in the preparation of the economic reform announced by Gorbachev in June 1987. This reform did not achieve its objectives but did contribute to the financial crisis and economic destabilization of 1989–1991. In 1990, Gorbachev requested that he produce a compromise economic program out of the rival Five-Hundred-Day Plan of Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky on the one hand, and the government program of Leonid Abalkin and Nikolai Ryzhkov on the other. During perestroika Aganbegyan became rector of the Academy of the National Economy. He established a consulting firm and founded a bank, of which he served as CEO for five years, then honorary president. A property development deal he made with an Italian firm was a failure, leaving behind a half-finished building.

See also: FIVE-HUNDRED-DAY PLAN; PERESTROIKA

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MICHAEL ELLMAN

AGITPROP

Agitprop, the agitation (speech) and propaganda (print, film, and visual art) section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was established in August of 1920, under the direction of R. Katanian to coordinate the propaganda work of all Soviet institutions. Agitprop was originally divided

into five subsections, the two most important being the agitation subsection, which directed propaganda campaigns and supervised local press, and the political education subsection, which developed curriculum for Party schools. The three remaining subsections were concerned with publishing Central Committee works, addressing problems with the distribution of propaganda in literature, and coordinating work among the parties of the national minorities. Agitprop, whose activities reached their fullest height during the Stalinist era, was one of the most important Central Committee sections by 1946. The role of Agitprop during the Brezhnev years and beyond included overseeing publishing, television, radio, and sports, directing agitation and propaganda work, guiding political education within the Party, and conducting cultural work with trade unions.

Agitprop techniques, based on the political education of the immediate postrevolutionary period, were basically solidified in the 1920s. Early Agitprop in the cities included parades, spectacles, monumental sculpture, posters, kiosks, films, and agit-stations, located at major railroad stations, which had libraries of propaganda material, lecture halls, and theaters. These varied activities continued throughout the Soviet period. Agitation and propaganda were taken to the countryside during the civil war by agit-trains and agit-ships, a unique Bolshevik method for the political education of rural citizens and front-line troops. These modern conveyances functioned like moving posters with exterior decorations of heroic figures and folk art motifs accompanied by simple slogans. The trains and ships brought revolutionary leaflets, agitators, newsreels, and *agitki* (short propaganda films), among other items. Agit-trains were reinstated during World War II to convey propaganda to forces at the front. After the civil war, and throughout the Soviet period, propaganda continued to be exported to the countryside via radio, traveling exhibitions, posters, literature, and film. Agitprop, like other Central Committee departments, had become relatively stable in its organization by 1948, and remained so until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; HIGHER PARTY SCHOOLS

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K. ANDREA RUSNOCK

AGRARIAN PARTY OF RUSSIA

The Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) was established on February 26, 1993, on the initiative of the parliamentary fraction Agrarian Union, the Agrarian Union of Russia, the *profsoyuz* (trade union) of workers of the agro-industrial complex, and the All-Russian Congress of Kolkhozes. Its chair was Mikhail Lapshin, elected a couple weeks earlier as the vice-chair of the restored Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). In the 1993 elections, the APR list, headed by the leader of the Agrarian fraction Mikhail Lapshin, *profsoyuz* leader Alexander Davydov, and vice-premier Alexander Zaveryukha, received 4.3 million votes (8.0%, fifth place) and twenty-one mandates in the federal district; sixteen candidates won in single-mandate districts. In 1995 the Agrarians entered the elections with a similar makeup, but a significant portion of the left-wing electorate consolidated around the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and as a result, the Agrarians' list only won 2.6 million votes (3.8%). In the single-mandate districts, the agrarians brought forth twenty candidates; this allowed them to form their own delegate group, with the addition of delegates from the CPRF dedicated to this task. In the 1999 elections, the APR leadership split over the issue of bloc formation. The majority, with chair Lapshin in the lead, joined the bloc Fatherland-All Russia (OVR); the others, including the leader of the parliamentary fraction Nikolai Kharintonov, went on the CPRF list. As a result of OVR's low results, Lapshin's supporters were unsuccessful in forming their group, and the communists with single-mandate candidates created the Agro-Industrial Group with Kharitonov at the head.

In the regional elections, the APR entered in coalition with the CPRF, and had several serious victories to its credit, including the election of APR leader Lapshin as head of the small Republic of Altai, and head of the Agrarian Union Vasily Starodubtsev as governor in the industrial Tula Oblast (twice).

At the time of registration in May 2002, the APR declared 42,000 members and fifty-five re-

gional branches. While lacking potential as a self-sufficient entity, the APR was quite attractive to the Communist Party, and to the "ruling party," by virtue of the provincial infrastructure, the popularity of the name, and the influence on the rural electorate, traditionally sympathetic toward the left.

On the threshold of the 2003 elections, a struggle for control of the APR arose between the leftist Kharitonovtsy (Kharitonov was the head of the Agro-Industrial Union) and the pro-government Gordeyevtsy (Alexei Gordeyev was the leader of the Russian Agrarian Movement, founded in 2002), both sides trying to put an end to Lapshin's extended leadership.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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NIKOLAI PETROV

AGRARIAN REFORMS

The concept of agrarian reform refers to changes implemented in the agricultural economy, changes designed broadly to improve agricultural performance and notably to contribute to the process of economic growth and economic development. The concept of reform implies changes to an existing system or policies, though the interpretation of change and the precise boundaries of the agricultural sector are general and broad. Thus characterized, agrarian reform has been a continuing and important component of the Russian economic experience. Moreover, the nature of agrarian reform has been closely associated with the differing stages of Russian economic development and with the role envisioned for the agrarian economy in the process of industrialization and modernization.

Russia has been an agrarian economy since its beginnings. For this reason, changes in the agrarian economy have been central to any discussion of economic growth and economic development in Russia. Beginning in the era of serfdom and the existence of a premodern agriculture, the focus has been on the nature of agrarian reform necessary to contribute to modernization.

The nature of agrarian reform necessarily depends heavily on the time period considered. In the Russian case, a convenient turning point is 1861, the date of the Emancipation Act, the purpose of which was to eliminate serfdom. Prior to this date, the Russian rural economy was feudal in character, with serfs bound to their landlords, communal landholding, and periodic redistribution of land plots.

Although the Emancipation Act was judicial more than economic in character, it nevertheless introduced a long period of agrarian reform through the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. During this period, there was gradual reallocation of land, although preservation of the village (*mir*) as a communal form of local decision making limited the extent to which the modernization of agriculture could take place. Peasant mobility was limited, a major reason for political instability in the early 1900s and the implementation of the Stolypin reforms, a series of changes designed to break the communal system, to change land usage, and to introduce individual peasant farming.

The agrarian reform, prior to the Bolshevik revolution, has been the subject of controversy. The traditional agrarian crisis view has supported a negative view of the Russian rural economy, while the revisionist view argues that output and structural changes during the late tsarist era were directionally important for the ultimate development of a modern agricultural sector.

It is perhaps ironic that by the 1920s and the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the rural economy would again be at the forefront of attention. Specifically, the focus would be the potential role of agriculture in Soviet economic development. After extensive discussion and experimentation during the NEP, Stalin forcibly changed the institutional arrangements on Soviet agriculture beginning in 1928. The introduction of the collective farms (the *kolkhoz*), the state farms (the *sovkhoz*) and the private subsidiary sector fundamentally changed the manner in which agriculture was organized. Markets were replaced by state control.

Although these changes remained in effect through the end of the Soviet era, there were important changes made in the rural economy during the Soviet years. In effect, there was a continuing search for optimal organizational arrangements. This search led to important changes in the mechanization of agriculture (especially the introduction of the Machine Tractor Stations), the nature of land use (amalgamation of farms seeking scale advantages and the conversion of collective to state farms) and the relations between the state and the farm units in terms of deliveries, financing, and the like. Most important, in the latter years of the Soviet era, the focus became agro-industrial integration, an effort to reap the benefits of Western "agri-business" types of arrangements for production and marketing of agricultural products.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the era of socialist agriculture and socialist agricultural policies came to an end. Much less attention was paid to the rural economy; it was not central to the Russian approach to transition, and yet agrarian reform was once again on the agenda. Throughout the 1990s, the emphasis has been the creation of a corporate (share) structure in farms and the conversion of these farms to various forms of private equity arrangements. However, given the very slow emergence of land reform, and specifically the slow development of a land market in Russia, fundamental change in the Russian rural economy continues to be at best very slow.

See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; FREE ECONOMIC SOCIETY; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY PEASANT ECONOMY; SERFDOM

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ROBERT C. STUART

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is that sector of an economy concerned with the production of food and food products both for domestic use, in (industrial) production and (household) consumption, and for export to external markets. Although it is often difficult to define



Peasants sift grain in the village of Shari, 560 miles east of Moscow. © 2002 GETTY IMAGES

the sectoral boundaries of agriculture with precision, agriculture is critical to the process of economic growth and economic development. Less developed economies are typically primarily agricultural in terms of output and resource usage and, appropriately, focus on institutions and policies that encourage the modernization of agriculture as a sector to support the growth of industry and services.

As economic growth and development occur, the relative importance of the major producing sectors changes, usually with a declining relative importance for agriculture and a growing relative importance of industry and services. This means that, in the early stages of economic development, agriculture is an important sector in which productivity growth sustains the growth of output. This process involves the substitution of capital for labor and changes the role of agriculture itself as economic growth and development proceed.

In the Russian case, the agricultural sector has always been surrounded by controversy. The rea-

sons for this controversy are best understood within the context of the individual periods of Russian and Soviet economic growth and development, although there are common threads throughout. Not only are policies and institutions important, but ideology has played a major if not always constructive role in this essential sector.

Prior to the legal end of serfdom in 1861, the Russian rural economy was organized on a communal basis (the *mir*). The premodern agriculture under this feudal-manorial system was characterized by limited mechanization, archaic modes of land usage, and the limited development of human capital.

With the formal end of serfdom in Russia and the emergence of significant economic growth after 1880, attention focused on the extent to which a modern agriculture (emerging market institutions, market policies, investment in both human and physical capital, and so forth) was emerging in Russia and could therefore serve as the underpinning of industrialization. From an ideological

perspective, this would mean the development of capitalism. Two major schools of thought, the agrarian crisis view and the revisionist view, address this issue in different ways. The agrarian crisis view argues that backwardness was sustained prior to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, while the revisionist view sees significantly greater change in the agricultural and other sectors. These interpretations have both been important for our understanding of the level of economic development in 1917, the ideological options available to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and the subsequent discussions regarding agriculture during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period.

The second important era in which agriculture became controversial in Russia is the NEP of the 1920s and its termination through mass collectivization. While the role of agriculture in Russian economic development was an issue of major importance in the 1920s, the implementation of collectivization by Josef Stalin in the late 1920s radically changed the institutional arrangements: It attempted to create a mechanism to support rapid industrialization, while at the same time imposing the ideology of collectivism. It has been argued that, from a strategic point of view, the policies and institutions established did not in fact finance Soviet industrialization. Worse, it has also been argued that the legacy of these institutions and related policies, and especially their manner of implementation, led to serious negative long-term consequences for the necessary but unachieved long-term growth of agricultural productivity. In these respects, collectivization has been viewed, in broad perspective, as a mistake.

The third important era for Russian agriculture is the post-collectivization experience through the end of the 1980s. In spite of continuing attention to and controversy surrounding agriculture in this era, it is agreed that agricultural productivity declined from the 1950s through the 1980s to such a degree that significant grain imports became necessary beginning in the 1960s. Thus agriculture became increasingly expensive (an effect of poor productivity performance) and was artificially sustained by large state subsidies. From a structural point of view, agriculture in this era failed in the sense that agricultural productivity change could not support necessary structural change, a legacy that would await the reformers of the transition era.

Finally, when the Soviet system collapsed and Russia faced economic transition to capitalism, agri-

culture as a sector was largely neglected. Whereas it was commonly predicted that agriculture would be a leading sector in transition economies, this was not the case in Russia. From a twenty-first-century perspective, it is evident that during transition agriculture has been a low-priority sector, one in which institutional change has been at best modest. Although markets have emerged and trade patterns have changed, the most fundamental element of market agriculture, namely the pursuit of private property rights along with appropriate institutional support, remains controversial and elusive.

See also: AGRARIAN REFORMS; COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; COUNTRY ESTATES; ECONOMIC GROWTH, IMPERIAL; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PEASANT ECONOMY; SERFDOM; SOVKHOZ

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AIGUN, TREATY OF

The Treaty of Aigun (May 28, 1858) granted the expanding Russian Empire vast new territories in eastern Siberia at the expense of China, which had entered upon a period of decline. In the late 1840s, after more than a century of stable relations with China, governed by the Treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1728), Russia renewed its eastward expansion under the leadership of Nikolai Muraviev, the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, and Count E. V. Putiatin and General Nikolai Ignatiev, both of whom were diplomatic envoys. The three men shared a vision of Russia as a Pacific power, and operated as quasi-independent agents of an imperial state in this era before modern transportation and communications.

In the early 1850s, Russia sent a naval flotilla down the Amur River, established military settlements along its northern bank, and ignored Chinese protests. Focused on suppressing the Taiping rebellion that threatened the dynasty's hold on power, Chinese officials greatly feared Russian military

power, the strength of which they overestimated. When they failed to persuade the Russians to withdraw from territories they considered part of their own domain, the Chinese had no choice but to negotiate with Muraviev, who had threatened them with war.

In accordance with Muraviev's demands, the Treaty of Aigun established the Russo-Chinese boundary along the Amur, from the Argun River in the west to the Sea of Okhotsk in the east. Russia was accorded navigation rights on the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari rivers along with China, but third countries were excluded, as Muraviev feared encroachment by the British Navy. Trade, which had been previously been restricted to one point along the border, was now permitted along its entire length. China viewed the Treaty of Aigun as a temporary concession to Russian military pressure, but Muraviev and St. Petersburg correctly understood it as a giant step in Russia's rise as an Asia-Pacific power.

See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; MURAVIEV, NIKITA

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STEVEN I. LEVINE

AJARS

In 1913 Josef Stalin posed the question, "What is to be done with the Mingrelians, Abkhazians, Adjarians, Svanetians, Lezghians, and so forth, who speak different languages but do not possess a literature of their own?" Of the Ajars, however, who call themselves Ach'areli (plural Ach'arlebi), he more accurately observed, two paragraphs later, that they were a people "who speak the Georgian language but whose culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of Islam."

The Ajarian Autonomous Republic was established on July 16, 1921, as a result of Turkey ceding Batumi to Georgia, along with territory to its north, in accordance with the terms of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of March 16, 1921. Ajaria (capital: Batumi) occupies 2,900 square kilometers in southwestern Georgia and borders the provinces of Guria, Meskheta, and (predominantly Armenian) Dzhavakheti; the Black Sea; and Turkey (Lazistan and the old Georgian region of Shavsheti). The last Soviet census (1989) showed 324,806 Ajar residents, constituting 82.8 percent of the autonomous republic's population. The local dialect suggests both Laz and Turkish influence—Islam was introduced here and in other border regions to the east by the Ottoman Turks. Ajarians share with the Abkhazians, some of whom settled the area in late-tsarist times, a subtropical microclimate with similar agriculture, although Ajaria held first place in the USSR for precipitation, with sea-facing slopes experiencing an annual rainfall of 2,500–2,800 millimeters.

When Stalin deported to Central Asia the neighboring Meskhians (usually called "Meskhetaian Turks," though their precise ethnicity is disputed), Hemshins (Islamicized Armenians), and other Muslim peoples in the northern Caucasus in 1943 and 1944, the Ajars escaped this fate. The regional leader, Aslan Abashidze, appointed by Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia in the dying years of Soviet rule, managed, in the turmoil that followed Georgia's 1991 independence, to turn Ajaria into a personal fiefdom to the extent that central government writ was (as of January 2002) no longer running in what had by then effectively become an undeclared but de facto independent state.

See also: CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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B. GEORGE HEWITT

AKAYEV, ASKAR AKAYEVICH

(b. 1944), president of Kyrgyzstan who served in that post throughout the country's first decade of independence.

Askar Akayev was born in the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic (Kyrgyzia) and earned a doctor of sciences degree at the Leningrad Precision Mechanics and Optics Institute. He returned to Kyrgyzia in 1972, assuming a teaching post at the Politechnical Institute in Frunze (now Bishkek). He authored more than one hundred scientific works and articles on mathematics and computers, and in 1989 became president of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences. He also served as a department head for the Central Committee of the Kyrgyz Communist Party.

As the Soviet Union began to break apart, he was elected to the presidency of the republic in 1990 by the republic's legislature, and in 1991 Kyrgyzstan gained independence and Akayev was elected president in a popular election. In contrast to other post-Soviet states in Central Asia, whose leaders retained their power from Soviet times, Kyrgyzstan made an attempt to break with the Soviet past. In his first years in office, Akayev won international acclaim as a backer of political and economic liberalization, aiming to turn his country into the "Switzerland of Central Asia." Akayev was reelected president in 1995 and in 2000. In the mid-1990s, however, some called his democratic credentials into question as he launched campaigns against journalists, imprisoned political opponents, and pushed through constitutional amendments to augment the powers of the presidency. In 2000 elections he won 75 percent of the vote, but observers claimed these elections were marred by fraud. Throughout 2002 and 2003, he was the target of protesters in Kyrgyzstan, who blamed him for chronic corruption and mounting economic difficulties. Nonetheless, in February 2003 he won approval of more changes to the constitution that enhanced his powers still further and won support in a referendum to confirm his term of office until December 2005. After these events, critics charged that he had become much like the Central Asian dictators.

While in office, Akayev has tried to assure inter-ethnic harmony in the country (30% of the population is ethnically Uzbek) and cracked down on small groups of Islamic militants. He has maintained good relations with Russia, and in 2001 of-



Kyrgyzstan president Askar Akayev. COURTESY OF THE EMBASSY OF KYRGYZSTAN

fered air bases and other support to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan.

See also: KYRGYZSTAN AND KYRGYZ; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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PAUL J. KUBICEK

AKHMATOVA, ANNA ANDREYEVNA

(1889–1966), leading Russian poet of the twentieth century; member of the Acmeist group.

Anna Akhmatova (Anna Andreyevna Gorenko) was born on June 23, 1889, near Odessa, and grew

up in Tsarskoye Selo, the imperial summer residence, where Pushkin had attended the Lyceum. She studied law in Kiev, then literature in St. Petersburg. She married poet Nikolai Stepanovich Gumilev in 1910, and the couple visited western Europe on their honeymoon. She made a return visit to Paris in 1911, and Amedeo Modigliani, still an unknown artist at the time, painted sixteen portraits of her.

In 1912, Akhmatova published her first collection of poetry, *Večer (Evening)*, and gave birth to her son Lev. The clarity, simplicity, and vivid details of her poetry amazed her contemporaries. For instance, in 1934, Marina Tsvetaeva praised Akhmatova's "Poem of the Last Meeting," extolling the lines "I slipped my left-hand glove/Onto my right hand" as "unique, unrepeatabe, inimitable."

Also in 1912, Gumilev founded the Poets' Guild, a group whose opposition to the Symbolists led to the name "Acmeist," from the Greek *akme*, "perfection." The Acmeists, including Gumilev, Akhmatova, and Osip Mandelstam, advocated simplicity, clarity, and precision over the vagueness and otherworldliness of the Symbolists.

Akhmatova's marriage with Gumilev was unhappy and ended in divorce. Her second collection, *Chetki (Rosary)*, published in 1914, revolves around the decline of the relationship, her sense of repentance, and her identity as a poet. In her following collections, *Belaya Staya (White Flock)*, 1917), *Podorozhnik (Plantain)*, 1921), and *Anno Domini* (1922), Akhmatova assumed the role of poetic witness, responding to the chaos, poverty, and oppression surrounding the Revolution and civil war.

In 1921, Gumilev was charged with conspiracy and executed. None of Akhmatova's work was published in the Soviet Union between 1923 and 1940. Yet, unlike many of her contemporaries, Akhmatova refused to emigrate. Her view of emigration is reflected in her 1922 poem from *Anno Domini*, "I am not one of those who left the land."

Between 1935 and 1940 Akhmatova wrote the long poem *Requiem*, a lyrical masterpiece. Dedicated to the victims of Josef Stalin's terror, and largely a maternal response to her son Lev's arrest and imprisonment in 1937, it recalls the Symbolists in its use of religious allegory, but maintains directness and simplicity. Akhmatova's next long poem, the complex, dense, polyphonic *Poema bez geroya (Poem without a Hero)*, 1943) interprets the suicide of poet and officer Vsevolod Knyazev as a sign of the times.

Some critics place it alongside *Requiem* as her finest work; others see it as the beginning of Akhmatova's poetic decline.

At the outbreak of World War II, Stalin briefly relaxed his stance toward writers, and Akhmatova was published selectively. In 1946, however, Andrei Zhdanov, secretary of the Central Committee, denounced her and expelled her from the Writers' Union. In 1949, her son Lev was arrested again and exiled to Siberia. In a desperate and futile effort to secure his release, Akhmatova wrote a number of poems in praise of Stalin. She later requested the exclusion of these poems from her collected work.

After Stalin's death, Akhmatova was slowly "rehabilitated." Publication of her work, including her essays and translations, resumed. She received international recognition, including an honorary degree from Oxford in 1965. She died on March 5, 1966, and is remembered as one of Russia's most revered poets.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GUMILEV, LEV NIKOLAYEVICH; GUMILEV, NIKOLAI STEPANOVICH; INTELLIGENTSIA; MANDELSTAM, OSIP EMILIEVICH; PURGES, THE GREAT

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DIANA SENECHAL

AKHROMEYEV, SERGEI FYODOROVICH

(1923–1991), chief of the Soviet General Staff and first deputy minister of defense (1984–1988) and national security advisor to President Mikhail Gorbachev (1988–1991).

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev played a key role in ending the Cold War and the negotiation of key arms control agreements: the INF (Inter-Mediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty (1987) and the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty (1990) between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization member states. He also oversaw the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to Admiral William Crowe, his American counterpart, "He was a communist, a patriot and a soldier." Dedicated to the rejuvenation of the Soviet system, Akhromeyev found that perestroika had unleashed deep conflicts within the USSR and undermined the system's legitimacy. After playing a part in the unsuccessful coup of August 1991, he committed suicide in his Kremlin office.

Born in 1923, Akhromeyev belonged to that cohort upon whom the burden of World War II fell most heavily. The war shaped both his career as a professional soldier and his understanding of the external threat to the Soviet regime. He enrolled in a naval school in Leningrad in 1940 and was in that city when the German invasion began. He served as an officer of naval infantry in 1942 at Stalingrad and fought with the Red Army from the Volga to Berlin. Akhromeyev advanced during the war to battalion command and joined the Communist Party in 1943.

In the postwar years Akhromeyev rose to prominence in the Soviet Armed Forces and General Staff. In 1952 he graduated from the Military Academy of the Armor Forces. In 1967 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Thereafter, he held senior staff positions and served as head of a main directorate of the General Staff from 1974 to 1977 and then as first deputy chief of the General Staff from 1979 to 1984. As Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's deputy, Akhromeyev sought to recast the Soviet Armed Forces to meet the challenge of the revolution in military affairs, which involved the application of automated troop control, electronic warfare, and precision strikes to modern combined arms combat.

See also: AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; ARMS CONTROL; AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; COLD WAR; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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JACOB W. KIPP

AKHUNDOV, MIRZA FATH ALI

(1812–1878), celebrated Azerbaijani author, playwright, philosopher, and founder of modern literary criticism, who acquired fame primarily as the writer of European-inspired plays in the Azeri-Turkish language.

Akhundov was born in Shaki (Nukha), Azerbaijan, and initially was tutored for the Islamic clergy by his uncle Haji Alaksar. However, as a young man he gained an appreciation for the arts, especially literature. An encounter with famed Azerbaijani lyricist and philosopher Mirza Shafi Vazeh in 1832 is said to have profoundly influenced his career as a writer. In 1834, he relocated to Tbilisi, Georgia, where he worked as a translator in the Chancellery of the Viceroy of the Caucasus. Here he was further influenced in his social and political views through his acquaintance with exiled Russian intellectuals, including Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky.

Akhundov's first published work was entitled "Oriental Poem" (1837), inspired by the death of famous Russian poet Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin. However, his first significant literary activity emerged in the 1850s, through a series of comedies that satirized the flaws and absurdities of contemporary society, largely born of ignorance and superstition. These comedies were highly praised in international literary circles, and Akhundov was affectionately dubbed "The Tatar Moliere." In 1859 Akhundov published his famous novel *The Deceived Stars*, thus laying the groundwork for realistic prose, providing models for a new genre in Azeri and Iranian literature.

In his later work, such as *Three Letters of the Indian Prince Kamal al Dogleh to His Friend, Iranian Prince Jalal al Dogleh*, Akhundov's writing evolved

from benign satire to acerbic social commentary. At this stage, he demonstrated the typical leanings of the nineteenth-century intelligentsia toward the Enlightenment movement and its associated principles of education, political reform, and secularism. Akhundov's secular views, a by-product of his agnostic beliefs, stemmed from disillusionment with his earlier studies in theology. He perceived Islam's hold on all facets of society as an obstruction to learning. Although assaulting traditional institutions was seemingly his stock in trade, his biting satires were usually leavened with a message of optimism for the future. According to Tadeusz Swietochowski, noted scholar of Russian history, Akhundov believed that "the purpose of dramatic art was to improve peoples' morals" and that the "theater was the appropriate vehicle for conveying the message to a largely illiterate public."

See also: AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF

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GREGORY TWYMAN

AKKERMAN, CONVENTION OF

By the mid-1820s, the Balkans and the Black Sea basin festered with unresolved problems and differences, including recurring cycles both of popular insurrection and Turkish repression and of various Russian claims and Turkish counterclaims. Most blatantly, in violation of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), Turkish troops had occupied the Danubian principalities, and the Porte had encroached on Serbian territorial possessions and autonomy. On March 17, 1826, Tsar Nicholas I issued an ultimatum demanding Turkish adherence to the Bucharest agreement, withdrawal of Turkish troops from Wallachia and Moldavia, and entry via plenipotentiaries into substantive negotiations. An overextended and weakened Sultan Mahmud

agreed to negotiations beginning in July 1826 at Akkerman on the Dniester estuary.

On October 7, 1826, the two sides agreed to the Akkerman Convention, the terms of which affirmed and extended the conditions of the earlier Bucharest Treaty. Accordingly, Turkey transferred to Russia several settlements on the Caucasus littoral of the Black Sea and agreed to Russian-approved boundaries on the Danube. Within eighteen months, Turkey was to settle claims against it by Russian subjects, permit Russian commercial vessels free use of Turkish territorial waters, and grant Russian merchants unhindered trade in Turkish territory. Within six months, Turkey was to reestablish autonomy within the Danubian principalities, with assurances that the rulers (*hospodars*) would come only from the local aristocracy and that their replacements would be subject to Russian approval. Strict limitations were imposed on Turkish police forces. Similarly, Serbia reverted to autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire. Alienated provinces were restored to Serbian administration, and all taxes on Serbians were to be combined into a single levy. In long-term perspective, the Akkerman Convention strengthened Russia's hand in the Balkans, more strongly identified Russia as the protector of Balkan Slavs, and further contributed to Ottoman Turkish decline.

See also: BUCHAREST, TREATY OF; SERBIA, RELATIONS WITH; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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BRUCE W. MENNING

AKSAKOV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH

(1823–1886), Slavophile and Panslav ideologue and journalist.

Son of the famous theater critic Sergei Timofeyevich Aksakov, Ivan Aksakov received his early education at home in the religious, patriotic, and literary atmosphere of the Aksakov family in Moscow. He attended the Imperial School of Ju-

risprudence in St. Petersburg, graduating in 1842. After a nine-year career in government service, Aksakov resigned to devote himself to the study of Russian popular life and the propagation of his Slavophile view of it. Troubles with the censorship plagued his early journalistic ventures: *Moskovsky sbornik* (*Moscow Miscellany*) (1852, 1856) and *Russkaya beseda* (*Russian Conversation*); his newspaper, *Parus* (*Sail*), was shut down in 1859 because of Aksakov's outspoken defense of free speech.

In his newspapers *Den* (*Day*) and *Moskva* (*Moscow*), Aksakov largely supported the reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, but his nationalism became increasingly strident, as the historical and critical publicism of the early Slavophiles gave way, in the freer atmosphere of the time, to simpler and more chauvinistic forms of nationalism, often directed at Poles, Germans, and Jews. In 1875 Aksakov became president of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee, in which capacity he pressed passionately for a more aggressive Russian policy in the Balkans and promoted the creation of Russian volunteer forces to fight with the Serbs. He was devastated when the European powers forced Russia to moderate its Balkan gains in 1878. "Today," Aksakov told the Slavic Benevolent Committee, "we are burying Russian glory, Russian honor, and Russian conscience."

In the 1880s Aksakov's chauvinism became more virulent. In his final journal, *Rus* (*Old Russia*), he alleged that he had discovered a worldwide Jewish conspiracy with headquarters in Paris. Aksakov's increasing xenophobia has embarrassed Russians (and foreigners) attracted to the more courageous and generous aspects of his work, but the enormous crowds at his funeral suggest that his name was still a potent force among significant segments of the Russian public at the time of his death.

See also: AKSAKOV, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH; JOURNALISM; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; PANSLAVISM; SLAVOPHILES

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ABBOTT GLEASON

AKSAKOV, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH

(1817–1860), Slavophile ideologue and journalist.

Konstantin Aksakov was a member of one of the most famous literary families in nineteenth-century Russia. His father was the well-known theater critic and memoirist Sergei Aksakov; his brother, Ivan Aksakov, was an important publicist in the 1860s and 1870s.

During his university years in the early 1830s, Konstantin Aksakov was a member of the Stankevich Circle, along with Mikhail Bakunin and Vissarion Belinsky. He underwent a period of apprenticeship to Hegel, but, like several other Slavophiles, was most influenced by his immediate family circle, which was the source of the communal values he was to espouse and the dramatic division in his thought between private and public.

Toward the end of the 1830s Aksakov drew close to Yuri Samarin, and both of them fell under the direct influence of Alexei Khomyakov. Aksakov's Hegelianism proved a passing phase; he evolved into the most determinedly utopian and ideologically minded of all the early Slavophiles. A passionate critic of statist historical interpretations, Aksakov viewed Russian history as marked by a unique relationship between the state and what he called "the land" (*zemlya*). At one level the division referred simply to the allegedly limited jurisdiction of state power in pre-Petrine Russia over Russian society. At another level "the land" signified the timeless religious and moral truth of Christianity, while the state, however necessary for the preservation of "the land," was external, soulless, and coercive. The Russian peasant's communal existence had to be protected from the contagion of politics. Behind Aksakov's static "Christian people's utopia" lay the romantic hatred of social and political rationalism, a passion that animated all the early Slavophiles. Aksakov died suddenly in the Ionian Islands in the midst of a rare European trip.

See also: AKSAKOV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH; KHOMYAKOV, ALEXEI STEPANOVICH; SLAVOPHILES

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ABBOTT GLEASON

ALASH ORDA

Alash Orda is the autonomous Kazakh government established by the liberal-nationalist Alash party in December 1917. Alash was the mythical ancestor of the Kazakhs, and Alash Orda (Horde of Alash) long served as their traditional battle cry. His name was adopted by the Kazakh nationalist journal, *Alash*, that was published by secularist Kazakh intellectuals for twenty-two issues, from November 26, 1916, to May 25, 1917. Alash Orda then was taken as the name of a political party founded in March 1917 by a group of moderate, upper-class Kazakh nationalists. Among others, they included Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, Ahmed Baytursun, Mir Yakub Dulatov, Oldes Omerov, Magzhan Zhumabayev, H. Dosmohammedov, Mohammedzhan Tynyshbayev, and Abdul Hamid Zhuzhdybayev. Initially, the party's program resembled that of the Russian Constitutional-Democrats (Kadets), but with a strong admixture of Russian Menshevik (Social Democrat) and Socialist-Revolutionary (SR) ideas. Despite later Soviet charges, it was relatively progressive on social issues and demanded the creation of an autonomous Kazakh region. This program was propagated in the newspaper *Qazaq (Kazakh)*, published in Orenburg. The paper had a circulation of about eight thousand until it was closed by the Communists in March 1918.

After March 1917, Alash Orda's leaders dominated Kazakh politics. They convened a Second All-Kirgiz (Kazakh) Congress in Orenburg from December 18 through December 26, 1917. On December 23, this congress proclaimed the autonomy of the Kazakh steppes under two Alash Orda governments. One, centered at the village of Zhambeitu and encompassing the western region, was headed by Dosmohammedov. The second, headed by Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, governed the eastern re-

gion from Semipalatinsk. Both began as strongly anti-Communist and supported the anti-Soviet forces that were rallying around the Russian Constituent Assembly (Komuch): the Orenburg Cossacks and the Bashkirs of Zeki Velidi Togan. In time, however, the harsh minority policies of Siberia's White Russian leader, Admiral Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak, alienated the Kazakh leaders. Alash Orda's leaders then sought to achieve their goals by an alignment with Moscow. Accepting Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze's November 1919 promise of amnesty, most Kazakh leaders recognized Soviet power on December 10, 1919. After further negotiations, the Kirgiz Revolutionary Committee (Revkom) formally abolished Alash Orda's institutional network in March 1920. Many Alash leaders then joined the Communist Party and worked for Soviet Kazakhstan, only to perish during Stalin's purges of the 1930s. After 1990 the name "Alash" reappeared, but as the title of a small Kazakh pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic party and its journal.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

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DAVID R. JONES

ALASKA

Alaska is the largest state in the United States, equal to one-fifth of the country's continental land mass. Situated in the extreme northwestern region of North America, it is separated from Russian Asia by the Bering Strait (51 miles; 82 kilometers). Commonly nicknamed "The Last Frontier" or "Land of the Midnight Sun," the state's official name derives from an Aleut word meaning "great land" or "that which the sea breaks against." Alaska is replete with high-walled fjords and majestic mountains, with slow-moving glaciers and still-active volcanoes. The state is also home to Eskimos and the Aleut and Athabaskan Indians, as well as about fourteen thousand Tlingit, Tshimshian, and Haida



Cartoon ridiculing the U.S. decision to purchase Alaska from Russia. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

people—comprising about 16 percent of the Alaskan population. (The term *Eskimo* is used for Alaskan natives, while *Inuit* is used for Eskimos living in Canada.) Inupiat and Yupik are the two main Eskimo groups. While the Inupiat speak Inupiaq and reside in the north and northwest parts of Alaska, the Yupik speak Yupik and live in the south and southwest. Juneau is the state's capital, but Anchorage is the largest city.

The first Russians to come to the Alaskan mainland and the Aleutian Islands were Alexei Chirikov (a Russian naval captain) and Vitus Bering (a Dane working for the Russians), who arrived in 1741. Tsar Peter the Great (1672–1725) encouraged the explorers, eager to gain the fur trade of Alaska and the markets of China. Hence, for half a century thereafter, intrepid frontiersmen and fur traders (*promyshlenniki*) ranged from the Kurile Islands to southeastern Alaska, often exploiting native seafaring skills to mine the rich supply of sea otter and seal pelts for the lucrative China trade. In 1784, one of these brave adventurers, Grigory Shelekhov (1747–1795), established the first colony in Alaska, encouraged by Tsarina Catherine II (the Great) (1729–1796).

Missionaries soon followed the traders, beginning in 1794, aiming to convert souls to Christianity. The beneficial role of the Russian missions in Alaska is only beginning to be fully appreciated. Undoubtedly, some Russian imperialists used the missionary enterprise as an instrument in their own endeavors. However, as recently discovered documents in the U.S. Library of Congress show, the selfless work of some Russian Orthodox priests, such as Metropolitan Innokenty Veniaminov (1797–1879), not only promoted harmonious relations between Russians and Alaskans, but preserved the culture and languages of the Native Alaskans.

Diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States, which began in 1808, were relatively cordial in the early 1800s. They were unhampered by the Monroe Doctrine, which warned that the American continent was no territory for future European colonization. Tsar Alexander I admired the American republic, and agreed in April 1824 to restrict Russia's claims on the America continent to Alaska. American statesmen had attempted several times between 1834 and 1867 to purchase Alaska from Russia. On March 23, 1867, the expansion-

ist-minded Secretary of State William H. Seward met with Russian minister to Washington Baron Edouard de Stoeckl and agreed on a price of \$7,200,000. This translated into about 2.5 cents per acre for 586,400 square miles of territory, twice the size of Texas. Overextended geographically, the Russians were happy at the time to release the burden. However, the discovery of gold in 1896 and of the largest oil field in North America (near Prudhoe Bay) in 1968 may have caused second thoughts.

See also: BERING, VITUS JONASSEN; DEZHNEV, SEMEN IVANOVICH; NORTHERN PEOPLES; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

ALBANIANS, CAUCASIAN

Albanians are an ancient people of southeastern Caucasia who originally inhabited the area of the modern republic of Azerbaijan north of the River Kur. In the late fourth century they acquired from Armenia the territory that now comprises the southern half of the republic. According to the Greek geographer Strabo (died c. 20 C.E.), the Albanians were a federation of twenty-six tribes, each originally having its own king, but by his time united under a single ruler. The people's name for themselves is unknown, but the Greeks and Romans called their country Albania. The original capital of Albania was the city of Cabala or Cabalaca, north of the River Kur. In the fifth century, however, the capital was transferred to Partaw (now Barda), located south of the river.

According to tradition, the Albanians converted to Christianity early in the fourth century. It is more likely, however, that this occurred in the early fifth century, when St. Mesrob Mashtots, inventor of the Armenian alphabet, devised one for the Albanians. Evidence of this alphabet was lost until

1938, when it was identified in an Armenian manuscript. All surviving Albanian literature was written in, not translated into, Armenian.

The Persians terminated the Albanian monarchy in about 510, after which the country was ruled by an oligarchy of local princes that was headed by the Mihranid prince of Gardman. In 624, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius appointed the head of the Mihrani family as presiding prince of Albania. When the country was conquered by the Arabs in the seventh century and the last of the Mihranid presiding princes was assassinated in 822, the Albanian polity began to break up. Thereafter, the title "king of Albania" was claimed by one or another dynasty in Armenia or Georgia until well into the Mongol period. The city of Partaw was destroyed by Rus pirates in 944.

The Albanians had their own church and its own catholicos, or supreme patriarch, who was subordinate to the patriarch of Armenia. The Albanian church endured until 1830, when it was suppressed after the Russian conquest. The Albanian ethnic group appears to survive as the Udins, a people living in northwestern Azerbaijan. Their Northeast Caucasian language (laced with Armenian) is classified as a member of the Lesguian group. Some Udins are Muslim; the rest belong to the Armenian Church.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS

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ROBERT H. HEWSEN

ALCOHOLISM

Swedish researcher Magnus Huss first used the term "alcoholism" in 1849 to describe a variety of physical symptoms associated with drunkenness. By the 1860s, Russian medical experts built on

Huss's theories, relying on models of alcoholism developed in French and German universities to conduct laboratory studies on the effects of alcohol on the body and mind. They adopted the term "alcoholism" (*alkogolizm*) as opposed to "drunkenness" (*pyanstvo*) to connote the phenomenon of disease, and determined that it mainly afflicted the lower classes.

In 1896, at the urging of the Swiss-born physician and temperance advocate E. F. Erisman, the Twelfth International Congress of Physicians in Moscow established a special division on alcoholism as a medical problem. Within a year the Kazan Temperance Society established the first hospital for alcoholics in Kazan. In 1897, physician and temperance advocate A. M. Korovin founded a private hospital for alcoholics in Moscow, and in 1898 the Trusteeships of Popular Temperance opened an outpatient clinic.

That same year, growing public concern over alcoholism led to the creation of the Special Commission on Alcoholism and the Means for Combating It. Headed by psychiatrist N. M. Nizhegorodtsev, the ninety-five members of the commission included physicians, psychiatrists, temperance advocates, academics, civil servants, a few clergy, and two government representatives. Classifying alcoholism as a mental illness, members of the commission blamed widespread alcoholism on the tsarist government, which relied heavily on liquor revenues and refused to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the lower classes.

Although they accepted the definition of alcoholism as a disease, professionals could not agree on exactly what it was, what caused it, or how to cure it. These were topics of heated debate, and they could not be seriously discussed without critical analysis of the government's social and economic policies. Hence, the range of opinions expressed in professional discourse over alcoholism reflected the fragmentation of middle-class ideologies near the end of the imperial period: the abstract civic values of liberalism and modernization as borrowed from the West; a powerful and persistent model of custodial statehood; and a pervasive culture of collectivism.

With the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, definitions of alcoholism changed. Seeking Marxist interpretations for most social ills, Soviet health practitioners defined alcoholism as a petit bourgeois phenomenon, a holdover from the tsarist past. Working from the premise that illness could only

be understood in its social context, they determined that alcoholism was a social disease influenced by factors such as illiteracy, poverty, and poor living conditions. In 1926 the director of the State Institute for Social Hygiene, A. V. Molkov, opened a department, headed by E. I. Deichman, for the sole purpose of studying alcoholism as a social disease. Within four years, however, the department was closed and the institute disbanded. By placing blame for alcoholism on social causes, Molkov, Deichman, and others were, in effect, criticizing the state's social policies—a dangerous position in the Stalinist 1930s.

In 1933 Josef Stalin announced that success was being achieved in the construction of socialism in the USSR; therefore, it was no longer plagued by petit bourgeois problems such as alcoholism. For the next fifty-two years, alcoholism did not officially exist in the Soviet Union. Consequently, all public discussion of alcoholism ended until 1985, when Mikhail S. Gorbachev launched a nationwide but ill-fated temperance campaign.

See also: ALCOHOL MONOPOLY; VODKA

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KATE TRANSCHER

ALCOHOL MONOPOLY

Ever since the last quarter of the fifteenth century, Moscovite princes have exercised control over the production and sale of vodka. In 1553 Ivan IV (the Terrible) rewarded some of his administrative elite (*oprichnina*) for loyal service with the concession of owning *kabaks* or taverns. Even so, these tavern owners had to pay a fee for such concessions. Under Boris Godunov (1598–1605), the state exerted

greater control over vodka, a monopoly that was codified in the 1649 Ulozhenie (code of laws).

Disputes over the succession to the throne at the end of the seventeenth century loosened state control over vodka, but Peter I (the Great, r. 1682–1725) reasserted strict control over the state monopoly. Catherine II (the Great, r. 1762–1796) allowed the gentry to sell vodka to the state. Since the state did not have sufficient administrators to collect revenue from sales, merchants were allowed to purchase concessions that entitled them to a monopoly of vodka sales in a given area for a specified period of time. For this concession, merchants paid the state a fixed amount that was based on their anticipated sales. These tax-farmers (*otkupshchiki*) assured the state of steady revenue. The percentage of total revenue derived from vodka sales increased from 11 percent in 1724 to 30 percent in 1795. Between 1798 and 1825, Tsars Paul I and Alexander I attempted to restore a state monopoly, but gentry and merchants, who profited from the tax-farming system, resisted their attempts.

Under the tax-farming system, prices for vodka could be set high and the quality of the product was sometimes questionable. Complaining of adulteration and price gouging, some people in the late 1850s boycotted buying vodka and sacked distilleries. As part of the great reforms that accompanied the emancipation of the serfs, the tax-farming system was abolished in 1863, to be replaced by an excise system. By the late 1890s, it was estimated that about one-third of the excise taxes never reached the state treasury due to fraud.

Alexander III called for the establishment of a state vodka monopoly (*vinnaia monopoliiia*) in order to curb drunkenness. In 1893 his minister of finances, Sergei Witte, presented to the State Council a proposal for the establishment of the state vodka monopoly. He argued that if the state became the sole purchaser and seller of all spirits produced for the internal market, it could regulate the quality of vodka, as well as limit sales so that people would learn to drink in a regular but moderate fashion. Witte insisted that the monopoly was an attempt to reform the drinking habits of people and not to increase revenue. The result, however, was that the sale of vodka became the single greatest source of state revenue and also one of the largest industries in Russia. By 1902, when the state monopoly had taken hold, the state garnered 341 million rubles; by 1911, the sum reached 594 million.

By 1914, vodka revenue comprised one-third of the state's income.

Established in 1894, the monopoly took effect in the eastern provinces of Orenburg, Perm, Samara, and Ufa in 1896. By July 1896, it was introduced in the southwest, to the provinces of Bessarabia, Volynia, Podolia, Kherson, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Tavrida, and Ekaterinoslav. Seven provinces in Belarus and Lithuania had the monopoly by 1897, followed by ten provinces in the Kingdom of Poland and in St. Petersburg, spreading to cover all of European Russia and western Siberia by 1902 and a large part of eastern Siberia by 1904. The goal was to close down the taverns and restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages to state liquor stores. Restaurants would be allowed to serve alcoholic beverages, but state employees in government shops would handle most of the trade. The introduction of the monopoly caused a great deal of financial loss for tavern owners, many of whom were Jews. Because the state vodka was inexpensive and of uniformly pure quality, sales soared. Bootleggers, often women, bought vodka from state stores and resold it when the stores were closed.

In 1895 the state created a temperance society, the Guardianship of Public Sobriety (*Popechitel'stvo o narodnoi trezvosti*), in part to demonstrate its interest in encouraging moderation in the consumption of alcohol. Composed primarily of government officials, with dignitaries as honorary members, the Guardianship received a small percentage of the vodka revenues from the state; these funds were intended for use in promoting moderation in drink. Most of the limited sums were used to produce entertainments, thus founding popular theater in Russia. Only a small amount was used for clinics to treat alcoholics. Private temperance societies harshly criticized the Guardianship for promoting moderation rather than strict abstinence, accusing it of hypocrisy and futility.

With the mobilization of troops in August 1914, Nicholas II declared a prohibition on the consumption of vodka for the duration of the war. At first alcoholism was reduced, but peasants soon began to produce moonshine (*samogon*) on a massive scale. This moonshine, together with the lethal use of alcoholic substitutes, took its toll. The use of scarce grain for profitable moonshine also exacerbated food shortages in the cities. In St. Petersburg, food riots contributed to the abdication of Nicholas in February 1917.

The new Bolshevik regime was a strict adherent to prohibition until 1924, when prohibition was relaxed. A full state monopoly of vodka was reinstated in August 1925, largely for fiscal reasons. While Stalin officially discouraged drunkenness, in 1930 he gave orders to maximize vodka production in the middle of his First Five-Year Plan for rapid industrialization.

The Soviet state maintained a monopoly on vodka. As soon as Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, he began a major drive to eliminate alcoholism, primarily by limiting the hours and venues for the sale of vodka. This aggressive campaign contributed to Gorbachev's unpopularity. After he launched his anti-alcohol drive, the Soviet government annually lost between 8 and 11 billion rubles (equivalent to 13 to 17 billion U.S. dollars, at the 1990 exchange rate) in liquor tax revenue. After Gorbachev's fall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the state vodka monopoly was abolished in May 1992.

Boris Yeltsin attempted to reinstate the monopoly in June 1993, but by that time floods of cheap vodka had been imported and many domestic factories had gone out of business. Although President Vladimir Putin issued an order in February 1996 acknowledging that Yeltsin's attempt to reestablish the vodka monopoly in 1993 had failed, he has also tried to control and expand domestic production and sales of vodka. The tax code of January 1, 1999 imposed only a 5 percent excise tax on vodka in order to stimulate domestic consumption. By buying large numbers of shares in vodka distilleries, controlling their management, and attacking criminal elements in the business, Putin has attempted to reestablish state control over vodka.

See also: ALCOHOLISM; TAXES; VODKA; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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PATRICIA HERLIHY

ALEXANDER I

(1777–1825), emperor of Russia from 1801–1825, son of Emperor Paul I and Maria Fyodorovna, grandson of Empress Catherine the Great.

CHILDHOOD AND EDUCATION

When Alexander was a few months old, Catherine removed him from the care of his parents and brought him to her court, where she closely oversaw his education and upbringing. Together with his brother Konstantin Pavlovich, born in 1779, Alexander grew up amid the French cultural influences, numerous sexual intrigues, and enlightened political ideas of Catherine's court. Catherine placed General Nikolai Ivanovich Saltykov in charge of Alexander's education when he was six years old. Alexander's religious education was entrusted to Andrei Samborsky, a Russian Orthodox priest who had lived in England, dressed like an Englishman, and scandalized Russian conservatives with his progressive ways. The most influential of Alexander's tutors was Frederick Cesar LaHarpe, a prominent Swiss of republican principles who knew nothing of Russia. Alexander learned French, history, and political theory from LaHarpe. Through LaHarpe Alexander became acquainted with liberal political ideas of republican government, reform, and enlightened monarchy.

In sharp contrast to the formative influences on Alexander emanating from his grandmother's court were the influences of Gatchina, the court of Alexander's parents. Alexander and Konstantin regularly visited their parents and eight younger siblings at Gatchina, where militarism and Prussian influence were dominant. Clothing and hair styles differed between the two courts, as did the entire tone of life. While Catherine's court was dominated by endless social extravaganzas and discussion of ideas, Paul's court focused on the minutiae of military drills and parade ground performance.



Tsar Alexander I. © MICHAEL NICHOLSON/CORBIS

The atmosphere of Gatchina was set by Paul's sudden bursts of rage and by a coarse barracks mentality.

Alexander's early life was made more complicated by the fact that Catherine, the present empress, and Paul, the future emperor, hated each other. Alexander was required to pass between these two courts and laugh at the insults which each of these powerful personages hurled at the other, while always remaining mindful of the fact that one presently held his fate in her hands and the other would determine his fate in the future. This complex situation may have contributed to Alexander's internal contradictions, indecisiveness, and dissimulation as an adult.

ALEXANDER'S MARRIED LIFE

When Alexander was fifteen, Catherine arranged a marriage for him with fourteen-year-old Princess Louisa of Baden (the future Empress Elizabeth) who took the name Elizabeth Alexeyevna when she converted to Russian Orthodoxy prior to the marriage. Although Alexander's youth prevented him from developing a passionate attachment to his wife, they became confidants and maintained a luke-

warm relationship for the rest of their lives. Their relationship endured Alexander's long-term liaison with his mistress, Maria Naryshkina, his flirtations with a number of noblewomen throughout Europe, and rumors of an affair between Alexander's wife, Elizabeth, and his close friend and advisor, Adam Czartoryski. Czartoryski was reputed to be the father of the daughter born in 1799 to Elizabeth. Alexander and Elizabeth had no children who survived infancy.

THE REIGN AND DEATH OF PAUL

In November 1796, a few weeks before Alexander's nineteenth birthday, Empress Catherine died. There is some evidence that Catherine intended to bypass her son Paul and name Alexander as her heir. However, no such official proclamation was made during Catherine's lifetime, and Paul became the new emperor of Russia. Paul almost immediately began alienating the major power groups within Russia. He alienated liberal-minded Russians by imposing censorship and closing private printing presses. He alienated the military by switching to Prussian-style uniforms, bypassing respected commanders, and issuing arbitrary commands. He alienated merchants and gentry by disrupting trade with Britain and thus hurting the Russian economy. Finally, he alienated the nobility by arbitrarily disgracing prominent noblemen and by ordering part of the Russian army to march to India. Not surprisingly, by March 1801 a plot had been hatched to remove Paul from the throne. The chief conspirators were Count Peter Pahlen, who was governor-general of St. Petersburg, General Leonty Bennigsen, and Platon Zubov—Empress Catherine's last lover—along with his two brothers, Nicholas and Valerian. Alexander was aware of the conspiracy but believed, or told himself that he believed, that Paul would be forced to abdicate but would not be killed. Paul was killed in the scuffle of the takeover. On March 12, 1801, Alexander, accompanied by a burden of remorse and guilt for patricide that accompanied him for the rest of his life, became Emperor Alexander I.

REFORM ATTEMPTS

Alexander's reign began with a burst of reforms and the hope for a substantial overhaul of Russian government and society. Alexander revoked the sentences of about twelve thousand people sentenced to prison or exile by Emperor Paul; he eased restrictions on foreign travel, reopened private printing houses, and lessened censorship. Four of

Alexander's most liberal friends formed a Secret Committee to help the young emperor plan sweeping reforms for Russia. The committee consisted of Prince Adam Czartoryski, Count Paul Stroganov, Count Victor Kochubei, and Nikolai Novosiltsev. During the first few years of his reign, Alexander improved the status of the Senate, reorganized the government into eight departments, and established new universities at Dorpat, Kazan, Kharkov, and Vilna. He also increased funding for secondary schools. Alexander did not, however, end serfdom or grant Russia a constitution. This series of reforms was brought to an end by Russian involvement in the Napoleonic Wars.

In 1807, following the Treaty of Tilsit, Mikhail Speransky became Alexander's assistant, and emphasis was again placed on reform. With Speransky's guidance, Alexander created an advisory Council of State. Speransky was also responsible for an elementary school reform law, a law requiring applicants for the higher ranks of state service to take a written examination, and reforms in taxation. In addition, Speransky created a proposal for reorganizing local government and for creating a national legislative assembly. Speransky's reforms aroused a storm of criticism from Russian conservatives, especially members of the imperial family. Alexander dismissed Speransky in 1812 just prior to resuming the war against Napoleon. In his place Alexander chose Alexei Arakcheyev, an advisor with a much different outlook, to assist him for the remainder of his reign.

NAPOLEONIC WARS

The most momentous event of Alexander's reign was Russia's involvement in the Napoleonic Wars. Alexander began his reign by proclaiming Russian neutrality in the European conflict. However, during 1804 Russian public opinion became increasingly anti-French as a result of an incident in Baden—the homeland of Empress Elizabeth. The Duc d'Enghien, a member of the French royal family, was kidnapped from Baden, taken to France, and executed by the French government. Alexander and the Russian court were outraged by this act. The following year the Third Coalition was formed by Britain, Russia, and Austria. On December 2, 1805, Napoleon defeated a combined Russian and Austrian army at the Battle of Austerlitz. The Russians suffered approximately 26,000 casualties. After two major losses by their Prussian ally, the Russians were again resoundingly defeated at the Battle of Friedland in June 1807. This

battle resulted in about 15,000 Russian casualties in one day. Following the defeat at Friedland, the Russians sued for peace.

The terms of the resulting Treaty of Tilsit were worked out by Alexander and Napoleon while they met on a raft anchored in the Nieman River. According to the agreement, Russia and France became allies, and Russia agreed to participate in the Continental System, Napoleon's blockade of British trade. A secondary Franco-Prussian treaty, also agreed upon at Tilsit, reduced Prussian territory, but perhaps saved Prussia. The Treaty of Tilsit was extremely unpopular with the Russian nobility, who suffered economically from the loss of exports to Britain. In addition, Russian and French foreign policy aims differed over the Near East, the Balkans, and Poland.

By June 1812, the Tilsit agreement had broken down, and Napoleon's army invaded Russia. Initially, the Russian forces were under the command of General Barclay de Tolley. The Russians suffered several defeats, including the loss of the city of Smolensk, as Napoleon's forces moved deeper into Russia. Alexander then gave command of the Russian army to Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov. Kutuzov continued the policy of trading space for time and keeping the Russian army just out of reach of Napoleon's forces. Finally, under pressure from Russian public opinion, which was critical of the continuous retreats, Kutuzov took a stand on September 7, 1812, at the village of Borodino, west of Moscow. The ensuing Battle of Borodino was one of the epic battles of European history. Napoleon's forces numbering about 130,000, faced about 120,000 Russian troops. During the one-day battle some 42,000 Russian casualties occurred, with about 58,000 casualties among the Napoleonic forces. Each side claimed victory, although the Russian forces retreated and allowed Napoleon to enter Moscow unchallenged.

Napoleon believed that the occupation of Moscow would bring an end to the war with Russia. Instead, Napoleon's forces entered the city to find that most of Moscow's inhabitants had fled and that Alexander refused to negotiate. To make matters worse, a few hours after the Napoleonic army arrived in Moscow, numerous fires broke out in the city, causing perhaps three-quarters of the city's structures to burn down. Responsibility for the burning of Moscow has been disputed. Napoleon apparently believed that the fires were set on the orders of Count Fyodor Rostopchin, the governor-general of the city. The Russian public, on

the other hand, blamed careless French looters. The burning of Moscow had the effect of creating a swell of Russian patriotism and solidifying the determination of the Russians to resist Napoleon's forces.

After little more than a month in occupation, faced with insufficient food and shelter, Napoleon abandoned the burned-out shell of Moscow and retreated westward. The Russian army was able to maneuver the Napoleonic forces into retreating along the same route by which they had entered Russia, thus ensuring that there would be little or no fodder available for the horses and a shortage of supplies for the men. The shortage of provisions, combined with the onslaught of winter and continued harassment by Cossacks and peasant guerillas, resulted in the destruction of Napoleon's army without Kutuzov subjecting the Russian troops to another pitched battle.

Alexander insisted upon continuing the war after the last French troops had left Russian soil. A new coalition was formed among Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Their combined forces defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813. By March 1814, Russian troops were in Paris. Alexander played a central role in the diplomatic negotiations that determined the form of the Bourbon restoration in France and the initial disposition of Napoleon on Elba. Alexander was also a key figure at the Congress of Vienna where the boundaries of the European states were redrawn.

HOLY ALLIANCE AND MYSTICISM

In September 1815, Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed the Holy Alliance at Alexander's urging. The Holy Alliance envisioned a Europe in which Christian principles would form the basis for international relations. Although the Holy Alliance had no practical effect, it provides a picture of Alexander's state of mind at that time.

Alexander had been a religious skeptic since his days as a student of Samborsky and LaHarpe. However, in November 1812, Alexander joined the Russian Bible Society headed by his friend Prince Alexander Golitsyn. The Russian Bible Society sought to translate and distribute Russian language scriptures. During 1814 Empress Elizabeth introduced Alexander to the mystic Johann Jung-Stilling. However, Alexander's immersion into mysticism began in earnest when he met Livonian Baroness Julie von Krudener in 1815. The height of her influence occurred in September 1815, when

Alexander staged a massive review of Russian troops on the plain of Vertus in France. As part of the ceremony, seven altars were erected and a Te Deum was celebrated. The Holy Alliance was signed a few weeks later. Alexander lost interest in von Krudener when he returned to Russia late in 1815.

MILITARY COLONIES AND LATTER YEARS

Alexander relied increasingly on Arakcheyev to oversee the day-to-day business of running the Russian empire. Arakcheyev's notable, though dubious, achievement was the creation of military colonies. The military colonies were an experiment in regimented agriculture. The underlying idea was to create a military reserve by organizing villages of peasant-soldiers who would be ready to fight when needed but who would also be self-supporting. The peasants were to wear uniforms, live precisely regimented lives in identical cottages, and farm their fields with parade ground precision. Individual preference was not taken into consideration when marriage partners were selected, and women were ordered to bear one child per year. Brutal penalties deterred deviations from the rules.

The last years of Alexander's reign were marred by uprisings in Arakcheyev's military colonies and the rebellion of the Semenovsky Regiment. Alexander's government became increasingly repressive. Censorship was intensified, tighter control was placed over the universities, and landlords were given more power over the fate of their serfs. Under the influence of Archimandrite Photius, Alexander moved away from mysticism and closer to the Russian Orthodox Church. Masonic lodges were closed, and the Russian Bible Society was blocked from its goal of distributing Bibles in Russian. The reign which had begun with the hope of liberal reforms had moved full circle and ended as a bastion of repression.

In the fall of 1825 Alexander accompanied Empress Elizabeth to Taganrog when her doctors ordered her to leave St. Petersburg and move to a warmer climate. Alexander became ill on October 27 while touring the Crimea. He died on December 1, 1825, in Taganrog. Although Alexander's body was returned to St. Petersburg for burial, the closed casket gave rise to rumors that Alexander had not died. A legend developed that a Siberian holy man by the name of Fyodor Kuzmich was Alexander living incognito.

See also: CATHERINE II; ELIZABETH; HOLY ALLIANCE; NAPOLEON I; PAUL I; SPERANSKY, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH

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JEAN K. BERGER

ALEXANDER II

(1818–1881), tsar and emperor of Russia from 1855 to 1881.

Alexander Nicholayevich Romanov is largely remembered for two events—his decision to emancipate the serfs and his assassination at the hands of revolutionaries. That the same tsar who finally ended serfdom in Russia would become the only tsar to be assassinated by political terrorists illustrates the turbulence of his time and its contradictions.

EDUCATION AND THE GREAT REFORMS

Alexander was born in Moscow on April 17, 1818, the oldest son of Nicholas I. His education, unlike that of his father, prepared him for his eventual role as tsar from an early age. Initially his upbringing consisted primarily of military matters. Nicholas had his son named the head of a hussar regiment when Alexander was a few days old, and he received promotions throughout childhood. When he was six, Captain K. K. Merder, the head of a Moscow military school, became his first tutor. Merder was a career army man who combined a love for the military with a compassion for others. Both qualities attracted the tsarevich and shaped his outlook. Alexander also received instruction from Vasily Zhukovsky, the famous poet, who crafted a plan for education that stressed virtue and enlightenment. The young tsarevich



Alexander II, the Tsar Liberator. © ARCHIVE PHOTOS, 530 WEST 25TH STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10001.

made journeys throughout the Russian Empire and in Europe, and in 1837 he became the first emperor to visit Siberia, where he even met with Decembrists and petitioned his father to improve their conditions. During his trip to Europe in 1838 Alexander fell in love with a princess from the small German state of Hesse-Darmstadt. Although Nicholas I desired a better match for his son, Alexander married Maria Alexandrova in April 1841. They would have eight children, two of whom died young. Their third child, Alexander, was born in 1845 and eventually became the heir.

Nicholas I included his son in both the symbolic and practical aspects of governing. Nicholas had not received training for his role and believed that he was unprepared for the responsibilities of a Russian autocrat. He did not want Alexander to have a similar experience, and he included his son in the frequent parades, military spectacles, and other symbolic aspects central to the Nicholavan political system. Alexander loved these events and he took pleasure in participating at the numerous exercises held by Nicholas I. In several important respects, this military culture shaped Alexander's beliefs about ruling Russia.

Alexander also became a member of imperial councils, supervised the operation of military schools, and even presided over State Council meetings when his father could not. In 1846, Nicholas named Alexander chairman of the Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs, where the tsarevich demonstrated support of the existing socio-political order. In short, Alexander grew up in a system that stressed the necessity of an autocrat for governing Russia and he learned to worship his father from an early age. His education and training gave no indication of the momentous decisions he would make as tsar.

Few would have predicated the circumstances in which Alexander became emperor. Nicholas I died in 1855 amidst the disastrous Crimean War. Russia's eventual loss was evident by the time of Nicholas's death, and the defeat did much to undermine the entire Nicholaven system and its ideology of Official Nationality. Alexander had absorbed his father's belief in the autocracy, but he was forced by the circumstances of war to adopt policies that would fundamentally change Russia and its political system.

Alexander became emperor on February 19, 1855, a day that would reappear again during the course of his reign. His coronation as Russian Emperor took place in Moscow on August 26, 1856. Between these two dates Alexander grappled with the ongoing war, which went from bad to worse. Sevastopol, the fortified city in the Crimea that became the defining site of the war, fell on September 9, 1855. Alexander began peace negotiations and signed the resulting Treaty of Paris on March 30, 1856. Russia lost its naval rights in the Black Sea in addition to 500,000 soldiers lost fighting the war. The prestige of the Russian army, which had acquired almost mythical status since 1812, dissipated with defeat. The events of the first year of his reign forced Alexander's hand—Crimea had demonstrated the necessity for reform, and Alexander acted.

Immediately after the war, Alexander uttered the most famous words of his reign when he answered a group of Moscow nobles in 1856 who asked about his intention to free the serfs: "I cannot tell you that I totally oppose this; we live in an era in which this must eventually happen. I believe that you are of the same opinion as I; therefore, it will be much better if this takes place from above than from below." Alexander's words speak volumes about the way in which the tsar conceived of reform—it was a necessity, but it was better to

enact change within the autocratic system. This blend of reform-mindedness with a simultaneous commitment to autocracy became the hallmark of the era that followed. Once he had decided on reform, Alexander II relied on the advice of his ministers and bureaucracies. Nevertheless, Alexander did much to end serfdom in Russia, an act his predecessors had failed to enact.

The process of emancipation was a complicated and controversial affair. It began in 1856, when Alexander II formed a secret committee to elicit proposals for the reform and did not end until 1861, when the emancipation decree was issued on February 19. In between these two dates Alexander dealt with a great deal of debate, opposition, and compromise. Emancipation affected twenty million serfs and nearly thirty million state peasants, or 8 percent of the Russian population. By contrast, four million slaves were freed in the United States in 1863. Although the end result did not fully satisfy anyone, a fundamental break had been made in the economy and society of Russia. Even Alexander Herzen, who had labeled Nicholas I as a "snake that strangled Russia," exclaimed: "Thou hast conquered, Galilean!" Because of Alexander's role, he became known as the Tsar-Liberator.

Once emancipation had been completed, Alexander proceeded to approve further reforms, often referred to by historians as the Great Reforms. The tsar himself did not participate as much in the changes that came after 1861, but Alexander appointed the men who would be responsible for drafting reforms and gave the final approval on the changes. Between 1864 and 1874 Alexander promulgated a new local government reform (creating the *zemstvo*), a new judicial reform, educational reforms, a relaxed censorship law, and a new military law. All were carried out in the new spirit of *glasnost*, or "giving voice," that Alexander advocated. The tsar relied on officials who had been trained during his father's years on the throne, and thus the reforms are also associated with the names of Nicholas Milyutin, Petr Valuev, Dmitry Milyutin, and other "enlightened bureaucrats." Additionally, Russians from all walks of life debated the reforms and their specifics in an atmosphere that contrasted starkly with Nicholas I's Russia.

This new spirit brought with it a multitude of reactions and opinions. Alexander, a committed autocrat throughout the reform era, had to deal with rebellions and revolutionaries almost immediately after launching his reforms. These reactions were

a natural product of the more relaxed era and of the policies Alexander advocated, even if he did not foresee all of their consequences. In particular, Alexander's decision to reform Russia helped to fuel a revolt in Poland, then a part of the Russian Empire. Polish nationalism in 1863 led to a Warsaw rebellion that demanded more freedoms. In the face of this opposition, Alexander reacted in the same manner as his father, brutally suppressing the revolt. Unlike his father, however, Alexander did not embark on a policy of Russification in other areas of the Empire, and even allowed the Finnish parliament to meet again in 1863 as a reward for loyalty to the empire.

At home, the reform era only served to embolden Russians who wanted the country to engage in more radical changes. The educated public in the 1850s and 1860s openly debated the details of the Great Reforms and found many of them wanting. As a result of his policies, Alexander helped to spawn a politically radical movement that called for an end to autocracy. A group that called itself "Land and Liberty" formed in Russia's universities and called for a more violent and total revolution among the Russian peasantry. A similar group known as the Organization made calls for radical change at the same time. On April 6, 1866, a member of this group, Dmitry Karakazov, fired six times at Alexander while he walked in the Summer Garden but spectacularly missed. Although the reform era was not officially over, 1866 marked a watershed in the life of Alexander II and his country. The tsar did not stay committed to the path of reform while the opposition that the era had unleashed only grew.

LATER YEARS

Alexander had let loose the forces that eventually killed him, but between 1866 and 1881 Russia experienced many more significant changes. Karakazov's attempt on Alexander's life came during a period of domestic turmoil for Alexander. The year before, the tsar's eldest son, Nicholas, died at the age of twenty-two. Three months after the assassination attempt, Alexander began an affair with an eighteen-year-old princess, Ekaterina Dolgorukaia, which lasted for the remainder of his life (he later married her). Responding to the growing revolutionary movement, Alexander increased the powers of the Third Section, the notorious secret police formed by Nicholas I. The reform era and the initial spirit associated with it had changed irrevocably by 1866 even if it had not run its course.



Tsar Alexander II. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

Alexander began to concentrate on his role as emperor during the late 1860s and 1870s. In particular, he engaged in empire building and eventually warfare. He oversaw the Russian conquest of Central Asia that brought Turkestan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Khiva, and Kokand under Russian control. The gains in Central Asia came with a diplomatic cost, however. Expansion so near to the borders of India ensured that England looked on with increasing alarm at Russian imperialism, and during this period a "cold war" developed between the two powers.

Russia also pursued a more aggressive stance toward the Ottoman Empire, in part fueled by the rise of pan-Slavism at home. When Orthodox subjects rebelled against Turkey in 1875, numerous Russians called on the tsar to aid their fellow Slavs. Alexander, reluctant at first, eventually gave in to public opinion, particularly after Ottoman forces in 1876 slaughtered nearly thirty thousand Bulgarians who had come to aid the insurgents. Russia declared war on April 12, 1877. Although Russia experienced some difficulty in defeating the Turks, particularly at the fortress of Plevna, the

war was presented to the Russian public as an attempt to liberate Orthodox subjects from Muslim oppression. Alexander's image as liberator featured prominently in the popular prints, press reports, and other accounts of the war. When Russian forces took Plevna in December 1877, they began a march to Istanbul that brought them to the gates of the Turkish capital. In the Caucasus, the final act took place on February 19, 1878, when Russian forces "liberated" the Turkish city of Erzerum. Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of San Stefano in March, which guaranteed massive Russian gains in the region. Alexander once more appeared to fulfill the role of Tsar-Liberator.

Alarmed by these developments, the European powers, including Russia's Prussian and Austrian allies, held an international conference in Berlin. Alexander saw most of his gains whittled away in an effort to prevent Russian hegemony in the Balkans. The resulting confusions helped to sow the seeds for the origins of World War I, but also provoked widespread disillusionment in Russia. Alexander considered the Berlin Treaty to be the worst moment in his career.

Alexander's domestic troubles only increased after 1878. The revolutionaries had not given up their opposition to the progress and scope of reform, and many Russian radicals began to focus their attention on the autocracy as the major impediment to future changes. A new Land and Freedom group emerged in the 1870s that called for all land to be given to the peasants and for a government that listened to "the will of the people." By the end of the decade, the organization had split into two groups. The Black Repartition focused on the land question, while the People's Will sought to establish a new political system in Russia by assassinating the tsar. After numerous attempts, they succeeded in their quest on March 1, 1881. As Alexander rode near the Catherine Canal, a bomb went off near the tsar's carriage, injuring several people. Alexander stepped out to inspect the damage when a second bomb landed at his feet and exploded. He was carried to the Winter Palace, where he died from massive blood loss.

Ironically, or perhaps fittingly, Alexander II was on his way to discuss the possibility of establishing a national assembly and a new constitution. This final reform would not be completed, and Alexander's era ended with him. The tsar's son and grandson, the future Alexander III and Nicholas II, were at the deathbed, and the sight of the autocrat

dying as a result of his reforms would shape their respective rules. As Larissa Zakharova has concluded, the act of March 1 initiated the bloody trail to Russia's tragic twentieth century. Alexander II's tragedy became Russia's.

See also: BERLIN, CONGRESS OF; BLACK REPARTITION; CRIMEAN WAR; EMANCIPATION ACT; NICHOLAS I; PARIS, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF 1856; PEOPLE'S WILL, THE; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; SERFDOM; ZEMSTVO

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STEPHEN M. NORRIS

ALEXANDER III

(1845–1894), Alexander Alexandrovich, emperor of Russia from March 1, 1881 to October 20, 1894.

The second son of Alexander Nikolayevich (Alexander II), the heir to the Russian throne, the future Alexander III was born in the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg in February 1845. He was one of six brothers and was educated alongside Nicholas (b. 1843) who, after the death of Nicholas I in 1855, became the heir to the throne. One of the most im-

portant parts of their education was schooling in military matters. This was especially important for Alexander, who was expected to occupy his time with the army and never to have to undertake anything other than ceremonial duties. His situation changed dramatically in 1865 when Nicholas died from meningitis and Alexander became heir to his father, Alexander II. The prospect of the twenty-year-old Alexander becoming emperor horrified his tutors. He had been a dogged pupil, displaying no great spark of intelligence, and had shown no real maturity during his studies. But after his brother's death, a major effort was made to enhance Alexander's education to prepare him properly to become emperor. His contemporaries commented on his honesty and decency, but they also noted Alexander's obstinacy and his reluctance to change his mind. For Alexander himself, his marriage in 1866 to the Danish princess Dagmar was more important than education. She had been engaged to his brother Nicholas before his death, and marriage to Alexander was seen by both sides as an "alliance," rather than being a love-match. But the marriage turned out to be extremely happy and Maria Fyodorovna (as his wife was known in Russia) became an important support to her husband. Alexander was devoted to his family and enjoyed being with his five children: Nicholas (b.1868), George (b. 1871), Xenia (b. 1875), Mikhail (b. 1878), and Olga (b. 1882).

An assassination attempt on Alexander II in 1866 brought home to the new heir to the throne the gravity of his status. He did not relish the prospect of becoming emperor, but nevertheless engaged in the official duties that were required of him with determination and interest. While his father was implementing the Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, the heir to the throne was developing views that conflicted fundamentally with those of Alexander II. The young Alexander believed firmly in the dominance of the Russian autocracy and was deeply opposed to any attempt to weaken the autocrat's grip on the country. He was especially keen to see Russian interests prevail across the empire and wanted severe treatment for national minority groups, such as the Poles, that tried to assert their autonomy. These views were reinforced by Alexander's experience of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. He argued strongly in favor of Russian intervention in support of the Slav population of the Ottoman Empire and fought alongside Russian troops. The war strengthened his belief in the danger of weak



Tsar Alexander III. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS

authority and this was especially relevant to Russia itself at the end of the 1870s. Terrorist activity was increasing and Alexander wrote in his diary of the "horrible and disgusting years" that Russia was going through. There were repeated attempts on the emperor's life and, in March 1881, terrorists from the People's Will group threw a bomb at Alexander II and succeeded in killing him. The emperor died, horribly injured, in the arms of his wife and son.

The assassination of the Tsar-Liberator confirmed the new Alexander III in his deeply conservative views. He moved very swiftly to distance himself from the policies and ethos of his father. The new emperor showed no mercy toward his father's killers, rejecting all appeals for clemency for them. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, legislation was introduced giving the government wide use of emergency powers. At the time of his death, Alexander II had been about to approve the establishment of a national consultative assembly, but the new emperor very quickly made it clear that he would not permit limitations on autocratic rule, and the project was abandoned. The new emperor and his family moved out of St.

Petersburg to live in the palace at Gatchina, a grim fortress-like building associated with Paul I. It was clear that the whole tone of Alexander III's reign was to be different. Instead of the European-orientated reforms of Alexander II, the new emperor was determined to follow the "Russian path," which he understood to be a forceful autocracy, proudly national in its actions and with the Orthodox Church providing a link between emperor and the people. Many of Alexander II's ministers and advisers were rapidly removed from office and were replaced by men with impeccable conservative credentials. Prime amongst them were Konstantin Pobedonostsev, officially only procurator-general of the Holy Synod (the lay official who governed the Orthodox Church), but who played a key role in guiding policy across a wide range of areas, and Dmitry Tolstoy, minister of internal affairs for most of the 1880s. The non-Russian nationalities of the empire were subjected to cultural and administrative Russification. This was especially fierce in the Baltic provinces of the empire, where the use of the Russian language was made compulsory in the courts and in local government and where the local German-speaking university was compelled to provide teaching in Russian. This approach also included encouraging non-Orthodox peoples to convert to the Orthodox religion, sometimes by offering them incentives in the form of land grants. In Poland, most education had to be provided in Russian and the Roman Catholic Church could only exist under considerable restrictions.

Alexander III and his ministers also tried to claw back some elements of the Great Reforms of the 1860s that had seemed to set Russia on the path toward a more open political system. The post of justice of the peace, established by the legal reform of 1864, was abolished in most of Russia in 1889 and its legal functions transferred to the new post of land captain. This official had very wide powers over the peasantry and was intended to strengthen the hold that the government had over its rural population. The land captain became a much-disliked figure in much of peasant Russia. The government also limited the powers of the zemstvos that had been established in the 1860s. These elected local councils had been given responsibility for the provision of many local services and "zemstvo liberalism" had become a thorn in the side of the autocracy, as some local councils had pressed for the principle of representative government to be extended to national government. Alexander III acted to narrow the franchise for zemstvo elections and

to restrict the amount of taxation that the zemstvo could levy. These moves were intended to neuter the zemstvo and reduce the influence they could have on the population, but Alexander never dared go so far as to actually abolish the local councils. This typified the problems facing Alexander III. While he wanted to return to the traditional ethos of Russian autocracy, he was forced to recognize that, in practical terms, he could not turn the clock back. The reforms of the 1860s had become so firmly embedded in Russian society that they could not simply be undone. All that the emperor could do was to ensure that the iron fist of autocracy was wielded as effectively as possible.

Some of Alexander's policies made matters more difficult for the autocracy. At the end of the 1880s, the government's economic policies became oriented toward stimulating industrial growth. A major part in this was played by Sergei Witte, who had made his career in the railway industry before coming to work in government, and who became minister of finance in 1892. Witte deeply admired Alexander III and believed that Russia could be both an autocracy and a successful industrial power. The government, however, failed to recognize the social and political consequences of the industrial boom that Russia enjoyed during the 1890s and the new industrial working class began to flex its muscles and to demand better working conditions and political change. The emperor also had a personal interest in Russia's foreign policy. His Danish wife helped him develop an instinctive distrust of Germany and the 1880s witnessed Russia's gradual disengagement from its traditional alliance with Germany and Austria. There were important economic reasons for Russia's new diplomatic direction: Industrial growth required investment from abroad and the most promising source of capital was France. In 1894 Russia and France signed an alliance that was to be significant both for its part in stimulating Russian industry and for the way in which it began the reshaping of Europe's diplomatic map as the continent began to divide into the two groups that would sit on opposite sides during World War I. Alexander III did not live long enough to see the results of his work. Despite his large frame and apparent strength, he developed kidney disease and died at the age of forty-nine in October 1894.

See also: AUTOCRACY; ALEXANDER II; INDUSTRIALIZATION; NICHOLAS I; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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PETER WALDRON

See also: GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; IVAN I; METROPOLITAN; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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MARTIN DIMNIK

ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH

(1301–1339), prince of Tver and grand prince of Vladimir.

Alexander Mikhailovich was the second son of Michael Yaroslavich. In 1326, after Khan Uzbek had executed Alexander's elder brother Dmitry, Alexander became prince of Tver and received the patent for the grand princely throne of Vladimir. The Novgorodians also welcomed him as their prince. The following year Uzbek sent his cousin Chol-Khan to Tver, but the latter's oppressive measures incited the citizens to revolt. Other towns joined them in massacring Tatar agents, troops, and merchants. In 1328 the khan therefore punished Alexander for the revolt of his subjects by making his rival for Vladimir, Ivan I Danilovich "Kalita" of Moscow, grand prince. The khan also gave him a large Tatar force with which he devastated Tver. Alexander sought refuge in Novgorod but on this occasion the townspeople turned him away. He fled to Pskov where the citizens, who were seeking independence from Novgorod, invited him to be their prince and refused to hand him over to the khan. Kalita, who was determined to destroy Tver as a political rival, had Metropolitan Feognost excommunicate Alexander and the people of Pskov. In 1329 Alexander fled to Lithuania in order to free Pskov from the Church's ban. But after some two years he returned to Pskov, where he ruled until 1337. In that year the khan summoned him to the Golden Horde and reinstated him in Tver. Subsequently many boyars deserted him and fled to Moscow to help Kalita fight for the grand princely throne. In 1339 the khan summoned Alexander to Saray and executed him on October 22nd or 28th of that year. After Alexander's death, Tver declined in importance, and the prince of Moscow became the most powerful ruler in northeast Russia.

ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH

(1220–1263), known as Alexander Nevsky, prince of Novgorod, grand prince of Vladimir, grand prince of Kiev, and progenitor of the princes of Moscow.

Born around 1220, Alexander was the grandson of Vsevolod Yurevich "Big Nest." Between the years 1228 and 1233 he and his elder brother, Fyodor, ruled Novgorod in the name of their father Yaroslav of Pereyaslavl Zalesky. After Fyodor's death in 1233, Alexander's younger brother Andrei helped him to expand Novgorod's lands and to increase the prince's control over the town. In 1238 the Tatars invaded Suzdalia but bypassed Novgorod. Nevertheless, the town's expansion into the neighboring Finnish lands was challenged by the Swedes and by German Knights (the Order of Livonian Swordbearers, joined later by the Teutonic Order). In 1240, when the Swedes marched against Novgorod, Alexander and a small force confronted the enemy at the river Neva and routed them. He thereby secured Novgorod's outlet to the Baltic Sea and earned the sobriquet "Nevsky" (of the Neva). After his brilliant victory, he quarreled with the Novgorodians and withdrew to Pereyaslavl Zalesky. But less than a year later the Germans seized Pskov and threatened Novgorod's commerce, therewith forcing the citizens to bring back Nevsky on his terms. He arrived in 1241 and began reclaiming Novgorod's lost territories, including neighboring Pskov. He confronted the main force of Teutonic Knights on the frozen Lake Chud (Lake Peypus) where, on April 5, 1242, he defeated them in the famous "battle on the ice." The next year the Knights and the Novgorodians concluded peace. This allowed Nevsky to continue asserting Novgorod's jurisdiction over the Finns and to wage war against the encroaching Lithuanians.

After his father died in 1246, Nevsky visited Khan Batu in Saray who sent him to the Great Khan at Karakorum in Mongolia. He came home in 1249 as the grand prince of Kiev and of all Rus, including Novgorod, to which he returned. However, his younger brother Andrei received the patrimonial domain of Vladimir on the Klyazma. After Nevsky visited the Golden Horde in 1252, the khan sent a punitive force against Andrei because he had rebelled against the khan. The Tatars drove him out of Vladimir. Nevsky succeeded him and gained jurisdiction over Suzdalia and Novgorod. Because he was a subservient vassal, the khan let him centralize his control over the other towns of Suzdalia. He also served the khan faithfully by suppressing opposition to the khan's policies, with the help of the Tatar army. Nevertheless, after the citizens of many towns rebelled against the Tatar census takers, Nevsky interceded, evidently successfully, on behalf of his people. In 1262, on his fourth visit to the Golden Horde, he fell ill. While returning home he became a monk and died at Gorodets on the Volga on November 14, 1263.

Although Nevsky's valor was generally admired, his collaboration with the Tatars was criticized by his contemporaries and by historians. Metropolitan Cyril, however, exonerated the prince in his "Life of Alexander Nevsky," and the church canonized him during the reign of Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible).

See also: ANDREI YAROSLAVICH; BATU; GOLDEN HORDE; IVAN IV; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VSEVOLOD III

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MARTIN DIMNIK

ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA

(1872–1918), wife of Tsar Nicholas II and last empress of Russia.

Alexandra Fedorovna Romanova was at the center of the political drama that led to the down-

fall of the Russian monarchy in 1917. A princess of the grand duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt in Germany and granddaughter of England's Queen Victoria, she lost her mother and younger sister to diphtheria when she was still a child, and she responded to this loss by turning inward. This tendency toward isolation intensified after her 1894 marriage to Nicholas, when her principles came into conflict with the reality of Russian court life. Scandalized by the seeming decadence of the aristocracy, she withdrew from society, eliciting the scorn of the Russian social elite.

Alexandra dedicated most of her time to her four daughters (Olga, Tatiana, Maria, and Anastasia) and her son, Alexei, who was born in 1904. Soon after the birth of this long-awaited male heir to the throne, it was discovered that Alexei had hemophilia. His illness became Alexandra's primary concern. Grigory Yefimovich Rasputin, a self-styled holy man, managed to stop Alexei's bleeding and thus became important to the royal family. Rasputin's closeness to the ruling family led to speculation about his influence over political decisions and to disdain for the royal family among the educated layers of society. With the start of World War I, which pitted Russia against Germany, Alexandra's German background further contributed to her unpopularity. Many accused her of heading a German faction in the government. Although these charges were groundless, they served to undermine the authority of the monarchy, thus helping pave the way for the February Revolution of 1917. The Bolsheviks brutally murdered the entire royal family in July 1918.

The negative image of Alexandra shaped by her detractors has given way to more objective, though not always dispassionate, accounts of her life. She is most often portrayed as a tragic figure and as a dedicated wife and mother. In 1981, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad canonized Alexandra, along with her family, for accepting death with faith in God and humility, and the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church followed suit in 2000.

See also: ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH; NICHOLAS II; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH; ROMANOV DYNASTY

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NICHOLAS GANSON

ALEXANDROV, GRIGORY ALEXANDROVICH

(1903–1983), pseudonym of Grigory A. Mormonenko, Soviet film director.

The leading director of musical comedies in the Stalin era, Alexandrov began his artistic career as a costume and set designer for a provincial opera company. By 1921, he was a member of the Proletkult theater in Moscow, where he met Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein. Alexandrov served as assistant director on all of Eisenstein's silent films and took part in an ill-fated trip to Hollywood and Mexico, which lasted from 1929 to 1932 and ended in Eisenstein's disgrace and the entourage's forced return home.

After this debacle, Alexandrov found it prudent to strike out on his own as a film director. By returning to his artistic roots in musical theater, he found a way to work successfully within the strictures of Socialist Realism by adapting the conventions of the Hollywood musical comedy to Soviet realities. His films from this era were *The Jolly Fellows* (1934), *The Circus* (1936), *Volga, Volga* (1938), and *The Shining Path* (1940), all of which enjoyed great popularity with Soviet audiences at a time when entertainment was sorely needed. Central to the success of these movies were the cheerful songs by composer Isaak Dunaevsky's and the comedic talents of Liubov Orlova, Alexandrov's leading lady and wife.

Alexandrov was a great favorite of Stalin's, and was named People's Artist of the USSR in 1948, the country's highest award for artistic achievement. Although Alexandrov continued to direct feature films until 1960, his most notable post-war venture was the Cold War classic, *Meeting on the Elba* (1949). This film was quite a departure from his oeuvre of the 1930s. Alexandrov's final two projects were tributes. He honored the mentor of his youth by restoring and reconstructing the fragments of Eisenstein's *Que Viva Mexico!* (1979), and he commemorated his wife's life and art in *Liubov Orlova* (1983).

See also: EISENSTEIN, SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH; MOTION PICTURES; ORLOVA, LYUBOV PETROVNA; PROLETKULT; SOCIALIST REALISM

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DENISE J. YOUNGBLOOD

ALEXEI I, PATRIARCH

(1877–1970), patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church from January 31, 1945, to April 17, 1970.

Sergei Vladimirovich Simansky took monastic vows in 1902. He served as rector in several seminaries and was subsequently made a bishop. He became metropolitan in Leningrad in 1933 and endured the German siege of that city during World War II. According to eyewitness accounts of his situation in 1937, he anticipated arrest at any moment, for virtually all of his fellow priests had been seized by then. He celebrated the liturgy with the only deacon left in Leningrad, and even that coreligionist soon died. During the siege of the city he lived on the edge of starvation. The members of the cathedral choir were dying around him, and the choirmaster himself died in the middle of a church service. Alexei himself barely had the strength to clear a path to the cathedral through the snow in winter.

Under war-time pressures, Stalin permitted the election of a patriarch, but the one chosen soon died. Alexei was elected in January 1945. He reopened a few seminaries and convents and consecrated some new bishops. Of the parishes that were still functioning at the time, most were in territories that had been recently annexed or reoccupied by the USSR. In fact, one could travel a thousand kilometers on the Trans-Siberian Railroad without passing a single working church. The later anti-religious campaign of communist general secretary Nikita Khrushchev resulted in the closing of almost half of those churches still functioning in the 1950s.

Alexei reached out to Orthodox religious communities abroad. He was active in the World Peace movement, supporting Soviet positions. The Russian Church joined the World Council of Churches, and Alexei cultivated good relations with Western Protestants. He was criticized for his cooperation with the Soviet regime, but no doubt believed that

collaboration was necessary for the church's survival.

See also: LENIGRAD, SIEGE OF; PATRIARCHATE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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NATHANIEL DAVIS

ALEXEI II, PATRIARCH

(b. 1929), secular name Alexei Mikhailovich Ridiger, primate of the Russian Orthodox Church (1990–).

Born in Tallinn, of Russian and Baltic German extraction, Alexei graduated from the Leningrad Theological Seminary in 1949 and was ordained in 1950. In 1961 he was consecrated bishop of Estonia, and later appointed chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate (1964). In 1986 he became metropolitan of Leningrad, and was elected patriarch on June 7, 1990.

From his election to early 2003, over 13,000 parishes and 460 monasteries were established. A decade after his enthronement, nearly three-quarters of Russians considered themselves members of the church (although only 6% were active churchgoers), and the patriarch enjoyed high approval ratings as the perceived spokesman for Russia's spiritual traditions.

Alexei, a former USSR people's deputy, envisioned a partnership between church and state to promote morality and the popular welfare. He met regularly with government officials to discuss policy, and signed agreements with ministries detailing plans for church-state cooperation in fields such as education. His archpastoral blessing of Boris Yeltsin after his 1991 election began a relationship between patriarch and president that continued under Vladimir Putin. Alexei saw the church as essential for preserving civil peace in society, and used his position to promote dialogue among various parties, gaining much credibility after trying to mediate the 1993 standoff between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet.

Alexei's leadership was not without controversy. Some have voiced concerns that the church was too concerned with institutional status at the expense of pursuing genuine spiritual revival. Busi-

ness ventures designed to raise funds for a cash-strapped church were called into question. Alexei was criticized for his role in promoting the 1997 legislation On Religious Freedom which placed limitations on the rights of nontraditional faiths. Allegations surfaced about KGB collaboration (under the codename Drozdov), something he consistently denied. He justified his Soviet-era conduct (one CPSU document described him as "most loyal") as necessary to keep churches from closing down. Defenders note that he was removed as chancellor after appealing to Mikhail Gorbachev to reintroduce religious values into Soviet society.

Alexei was outspoken in his determination to preserve the Moscow Patriarchate as a unified entity, eschewing the creation of independent churches in the former Soviet republics. Although most parishes in Ukraine remained affiliated to Moscow, two other Orthodox jurisdictions competed for the allegiance of the faithful. When the Estonian government turned to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to restore a church administration independent of Moscow's authority, Alexei briefly broke communion with him (1996), but agreed to a settlement creating two jurisdictions in Estonia.

The patriarch worked to preserve a balance between liberal and conservative views within the church. The Jubilee Bishops' Council (2000) ratified a comprehensive social doctrine that laid out positions on many issues ranging from politics (offering a qualified endorsement of democracy) to bioethics. Compromises on other contentious questions (participation in the ecumenical movement, the canonization of Nicholas II, and so forth) were also reached. In the end, the council reaffirmed Alexei's vision that the church should emerge as a leading and influential institution in post-Soviet Russian society.

See also: PATRIARCHATE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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NIKOLAS K. GVOSDEV

ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH

(1629–1676), the second Romanov tsar (r. 1645–1676) and the most significant figure in Russian history between the period of anarchy known as the “Time of Troubles” (*smutnoye vremya*) and the accession of his son, Peter I (the Great).

The reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich was notable for a codification of Russian law that was to remain the standard until the nineteenth century, for the acquisition of Kiev and eastern Ukraine from Poland-Lithuania, and for church reforms. Alexei also laid the foundations for the modernization of the army, introduced elements of Western culture to the court, and, despite a series of wars and rebellions, strengthened the autocracy and the authority of central government. He anticipated directions his son Peter would take: He substituted ability and service for hereditary and precedent as qualifications for appointments and promotions; engaged Dutch shipwrights to lay down the first Russian flotilla (for service in the Caspian); and introduced other forms of Western technology and engaged many military and civil experts from the West. Not all of his initiatives succeeded, however. His attempt to seize the Baltic port of Riga was thwarted by the Swedes, and his flotilla based at Astrakhan was burned by rebels. Nevertheless Russia emerged as a great European power in his reign.

REPUTATION AND ITS ORIGINS

Despite his importance, Alexei’s reputation stands low in the estimation of historians. Earlier works, by Slavophiles, religious traditionalists, and those nostalgic for the old Russian values, depict him as pious, caring, ceremonious, occasionally angry, yet essentially spiritual, distracted from politics and policy-making. Vladimir Soloviev concluded that he was indecisive, afraid of confrontation, even sly. Vasily Klyuchevsky, Sergei Platonov, and most later historians, Russian and Western, also conclude that he was weak, dominated by favorites. This erroneous view derives from several sources: from the Petrine legend created by Peter’s acolytes and successors; from his soubriquet *tishaysheyshy*, the diplomatic title *Serenissimus* (Most Serene Highness), which was taken out of context to mean “quietest,” “gentlest,” and, metaphorically, even “most underhanded”; from the fact that the surviving papers from Alexei’s Private Office papers were not published until the first decades of the twentieth century (even though registered in the



Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich holding symbols of Russian state power. THE ART ARCHIVE/RUSSIAN HISTORICAL MUSEUM MOSCOW/DAGLI ORTI

early eighteenth century by order of Peter himself) and were ignored by most historians thereafter.

EDUCATION AND FORMATION

Alexei was brought up as a prince and educated as a future ruler. In 1633 an experienced minister, Boris Ivanovich Morozov, soon to be promoted to the highest rank (boyar), and to membership of the tsar’s Council (*duma*), was given charge of the boy. He chose the tsarevich’s tutors, provided an entourage for him of about twenty boys of good family who were to wait on and play with him. The brightest of these, including Artamon Matveyev, who was to serve him as a minister, were also to share his lessons. Miniature weapons and a model ship figured prominently among his toys. Leisure included tobogganing and fencing, backgammon and chess.

The tsarevich’s formal lessons began at the age of five with reading. Writing was introduced at seven, and music (church cantillation) at eight. Alexei also memorized prayers, learned Psalms and

the Acts of the Apostles, and read Bible stories (chiefly Old Testament). Exemplary models were commended to him: the learned St. Abraham, the Patriotic St. Sergius, St. Alexis, who was credited with bringing stability to the Russian land, and the young Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible), conqueror of the Tatar khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia.

At nine his education became more secular and practical, as his tutors were seconded from government offices rather than the clergy. Morozov himself could explain the governmental machine, finance, and elements of statecraft. Books on mathematics, hydraulics, gunnery, foreign affairs, cosmography, and geography were borrowed from government departments. From the age of ten, Alexei was an unseen witness of the reception of ambassadors from east and west. At thirteen he made his first public appearance, sitting on an ivory throne beside his father at a formal reception; and thereafter he played a very visible role. This familiarized him with some of his future duties; it also reinforced his right to rule. The Romanov dynasty was new. Alexei would be the first to succeed. Hence the urgency, when his ailing father died in July 1645, with which oaths of loyalty were extracted from every courtier, bureaucrat, and soldier. Even so, the reign was to be difficult.

FIRST YEARS AS TSAR

Morozov headed the new government, taking personal charge of key departments; the coronation was fixed for November 1645 (late September O.S.), and a new program was drawn up, including army modernization and financial, administrative, and legal reform. The young tsar's chief interest, however, was church reform. There were three reasons for giving this priority:

1. In Russia, as in the later Roman Empire, church and state were mutually supportive. The church acted as the ideological arm of the state, proclaimed its orders, helped administer rural areas, and provided prisons, welfare services, and resources when the state called for them.
2. Since Russia was the richest, most powerful state in the Orthodox communion, large Orthodox populations in neighboring Poland, which was Catholic, looked to it for support, and many churchmen in the Ottoman sphere, including the Balkans, came to Moscow for financial support and were therefore receptive to Moscow's political influence. This gave the church some clout in foreign affairs. However,

since Russian liturgical practice differed from that of other communities, Alexei thought it important to reform the liturgy to conform to the best Greek practice. (In doing so he was to take erroneous advice, but this was discovered too late.)

3. The rapid exploitation of Siberia had made up most of the economic damage of the Time of Troubles, but the legacy of social and moral dislocation was still evident. A program similar to that which the Hapsburg rulers had mounted in Central Europe to combat Protestantism and other forms of dissent had to be implemented if the increasingly militant Catholicism of Poland was to be countered, and pagan practices, still rife in Russia's countryside, stamped out.

The Moscow riots of 1648 underscored the urgency. The trigger was a tax on salt that, ironically, had only recently been rescinded, but as the movement grew, demands broadened. Alexei confronted the crowd twice, promising redress and pleading for Morozov's life. Morozov was spirited away to the safety of a distant monastery, but the mob lynched two senior officials, looted many houses, and started fires. Some of the musketeer guards (*streltsy*) sympathized with the crowd, and seditious rumors spread to the effect that the tsar was merely a creature of his advisers. Alexei had to undertake to redress grievances and call an Assembly of the Land (*zemskii sobor*) before order could be restored (and the Musketeer Corps purged).

The outcome was a law code (*Ulozhenie*) in 1649, which updated and consolidated the laws of Russia, recorded common law practices, and included elements of Roman Law and the Lithuanian Statute as well as Russian secular and canon law. Alexei was patently acquainted with its content, and he would subsequently refer to its principles, such as justice (the administration of the law) being "equal for all."

PATRIARCH NIKON AND THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

In April 1652 when the Russian primate, Patriarch Joseph, died, Alexei had already decided on his successor. He had met Nikon, now in his early fifties and an impressive six feet, five inches tall, seven years before. He had since installed him as abbot of a Moscow monastery in his gift and thereafter met him regularly. He had subsequently proposed him

to the metropolitan see of Novgorod, the second most senior position in the Russian church. However, Nikon insisted on conditions for accepting nomination as patriarch. His demand that the tsar obey him in all matters relating to the church's spiritual authority was not as unacceptable as might appear. Nikon had to impose discipline on laity and clergy alike, and the tsar felt a duty to give a lead, to demonstrate that patriarch and tsar were working in symphony. But Nikon's second demand was more difficult.

One way to improve observance and conformity was to create new saints and transfer their remains to Moscow in gripping public ceremonies. The new saints included two patriarchs who had suffered during the Polish intervention: Job, who had been imprisoned by the False Dmitry, and Hermogen, who had been starved to death by the Poles in 1612. But Nikon also insisted that the former metropolitan Philip, strangled on Tsar Ivan's orders, be canonized and that Alexei express contrition in public for Ivan's sin. Though Ivan was patently unbalanced in his later years, he was a model for Alexei, who set out to pursue Ivan's strategic objectives.

The "Prayer Letter" Alexei eventually gave Nikon to read aloud over Philip's grave at Solovka was cleverly ambivalent. Often interpreted as a submission by the tsar to the church, it asserts that the acknowledgement of Ivan's sin has earned him forgiveness, and is, in effect, a rehabilitation of Ivan. Nikon was duly installed as patriarch. The reforms went ahead.

WAR WITH POLAND-LITHUANIA

When the war over Ukraine began in 1654, Alexei joined his troops on campaign, leaving Nikon to act as regent in Moscow in his absence. The city of Smolensk was retaken, and Khmelnytsky, leader of the Ukrainian Cossack insurgents, whom Moscow had been supplying for some time, made formal submission to the tsar's representative. Glittering success also attended the 1655 campaign. Operations were unaffected by an outbreak of bubonic plague in Moscow, with which Nikon coped efficiently. Most of Lithuania, including its capital Vilnius, fell to Russian troops that summer. This opened the road to the Baltic, and in 1656 the army moved on to besiege the Swedish port of Riga. But Riga held out, there was a Polish resurgence, and part of the Ukrainian elite abandoned their allegiance to the tsar. The war was to drag on for an-

other decade, bringing chaos to Ukraine and mounting costs to Moscow. It also occasioned the breach with Nikon.

To consolidate his rule of Ukrainian and Belarus territory, formerly under Poland, Alexei urgently needed to fill the vacant metropolitan see of Kiev. The last incumbent had died in 1657 (the same year as Khmelnytsky) but Nikon refused to sanction the appointment, arguing that Kiev came under the jurisdiction of the superior see of Constantinople. The tsar made his disapproval public. Nikon relinquished his duties but refused to resign, and the matter remained unresolved until 1666 when Nikon was impeached by a synod attended by the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, the tsar acting as prosecutor. The synod found against Nikon and deposed him, but endorsed his liturgical reforms, which were unpopular with Avvakum and other Old Believers. However, Nikon had been set up as a scapegoat for the unpopular measures against Old Belief. Although Alexei failed to persuade Avvakum to conform, he retained the rebellious archpriest's respect. The church was to remain at an uneasy peace for the remainder of the reign.

Reforms occasioned by the demands of war included three significant developments.

1. *The formation of the tsar's Private Office.* Staffed by able young bureaucrats, it kept the tsar closely and confidentially informed, intervened at the tsar's behest in both government and church affairs, and supervised the conduct of the war, when necessary overriding generals, ministers, and provincial governors. Those who served in the Office often went on to occupy the highest posts; several entered the Duma. The Private Office became an effective instrument for personal, autocratic rule.
2. It hastened *military modernization.* The tsar regularly engaged foreign officers to drill Russian servicemen in the latest Western methods. Weaponry and artillery were improved and their production expanded. By the end of the reign, except for the traditional cavalry (still useful for steppe warfare), the army had been transformed. Aside from the crack musketeer guards, commanded by Artamon Matveyev, the musketeer corps was sidelined, and "regiments of new formation" became the core of the army.
3. Though *the war provided economic stimulus*, especially to mining, metallurgy, and textiles, it also occasioned insoluble financial problems.

With expenditure soaring above income, and being short of specie, Alexei sanctioned the issue of copper coins instead of silver. Ukrainian servicemen, finding their pay would not buy them necessities of life, became rebellious; and, as inflation increased, dismay and anger infected the cities. A crowd from Moscow reached the tsar at his summer palace at Kolomenskoye. The rising was ruthlessly suppressed, but in 1663 the copper coinage was withdrawn, though other financial demands were to be made of the people.

ECONOMIC POLICY

Alexei was never to solve the fiscal problem, although he did adopt some positive economic policies. He improved productivity on his own estates; encouraged peasants to take profitable initiatives; sponsored trading expeditions to farthest Siberia, China, and India; protected the profitable trade with Persia; established a glass factory, encouraged prospectors, and brought in Western manufacturers as well as experts in military technology; and in 1667 introduced a new trade statute designed to protect Russian merchants from foreign competitors and from intrusive officialdom. Yet he also encouraged transit trade within Russia, helping develop a common Russian market.

The year 1667, which saw the condemnation of Nikon, also saw the conclusion, at Andrusovo, of the long war with Poland. Under its terms Russia kept all Ukraine east of the Dnieper River and temporary control of Kiev (which soon became permanent). This was a huge accretion of territory, providing a launching pad for future expansion both westward and to the south. The cost had been heavy, but Poland had suffered more. Broken as a great power, it ceased to be a threat to Russia. Alexei had ensured that neither the hereditary nobility nor the church would impede the free exercise of autocratic, centralizing power.

Both strategic policy and church reform directed Moscow's attention westward. Alexei became interested in acquiring the crown of Catholic Poland and his eldest surviving son, Tsarevich Alexei, was taught Polish and Latin. The boy's tutor, Simeon Polotsky, who was also the court poet, had been brought to Moscow with other bearers of Western learning and culture from occupied Belarus and Ukraine. Insulated from the mass of Russians, their influence was confined to court. Similarly, foreign servicemen and experts were confined to Moscow's Foreign Suburb when off duty.

Nevertheless they were the basis of Russia's Westernization; and the tsar chose his second wife, Natalia Naryshkina, from the suburb. Their child, Peter, was to be reviled as the son of Nikon. But as Wuchter's portrait of Alexei demonstrates, he was clearly Peter's father, and in spirit as well as genetically.

Through his policies of modernization, his church reforms, his introduction of Ukrainian learning (and hence elements of Catholic learning), Alexei had, wittingly and unwittingly, pierced Russia's isolationism. But he was not to see all the fruits of this work. Worn down by three decades of political and military crises for which as autocrat he bore sole responsibility, Alexei died of renal and heart disease on January 29, 1676.

See also: IVAN IV; LAW CODE OF 1649; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MOROZOV, BORIS IVANONVICH; NIKON, PATRIARCH; PETER I; ROMANOV DYNASTY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; THIRTEEN YEARS' WAR; TIME OF TROUBLES

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PHILIP LONGWORTH

ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH

(1904–1918), last of the Romanov dynasty of Russia.

Alexei Nikolayevich Romanov was the only son of Tsar Nicholas II and Empress Alexandra and the youngest member of Russia's last royal family. The Romanovs' elation over the birth of an heir to the throne quickly turned to worry, when doctors diagnosed Alexei with hemophilia, a hereditary disorder preventing the proper clotting of blood. Despite bouts of severe physical pain, Alexei was a happy and mischievous boy. Nonetheless, the unpredictable ebbs and flows in his condition dictated the mood of the tightly knit royal family. When Alexei was not well, melancholy reigned in the Romanov home.



Tsarevich Alexei Nikolayevich, age 11, and his mother, Tsarina Alexandra Fedorovna. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

After the doctors admitted that they could find no way to ease the boy's suffering, Empress Alexandra turned to a Siberian peasant and self-styled holy man, Grigory Yefimovich Rasputin. Rasputin somehow managed to temporarily stop Alexei's hemorrhaging, thus gaining the trust of the tsar's family. Believing Rasputin to be their son's benefactor and clinging to hope for Alexei's recovery, Nicholas and Alexandra rejected rumors of the mysterious peasant's debauched lifestyle.

Their patronage of Rasputin caused outrage in court circles and educated society, which contributed to the declining authority of the monarchy and its eventual collapse in 1917.

In July 1918, just days before his fourteenth birthday, Alexei was murdered, along with his parents, four sisters, and several royal servants, by a Bolshevik firing squad. In 1981, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad canonized Alexei, along with the rest of the royal family, for accepting

death with faith in God and humility. The Moscow Patriarchate canonized the royal family in 2000.

See also: ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA; NICHOLAS II; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH; ROMANOVA, ANASTASIA NIKOLAYEVNA; ROMANOV DYNASTY

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NICHOLAS GANSON

ALEXEI PETROVICH

(1690–1718), tsarevich, son of Emperor Peter I of Russia and his first wife Yevdokia Lopukhina.

Peter raised Alexei as his heir, making him study a modern curriculum with foreign tutors and taking him to visit battlefields and naval displays to teach him to “love everything that contributes to the glory and honor of the fatherland.” When Alexei was in his twenties, Peter entrusted him with important duties on the home front in the war against Sweden. Peter’s correspondence reveals little affection for Alexei, who in turn felt intimidated by his demanding and unconciliatory father (Peter had banished Alexei’s mother in 1699). Alexei was intelligent, devout, often sick, and indifferent to military affairs. In 1712 Peter married him off to the German princess Charlotte of Wolfenbüttel, whom he quickly abandoned for a peasant mistress. After the birth of Alexei’s son Peter (the future Peter II) in 1715, Peter accused Alexei of neglecting the common good and threatened to disinherit him: “Better a worthy stranger [on the throne] than my own unworthy son.” Under increasing pressure, in 1716 Alexei fled and took refuge with the Habsburg emperor, but in 1718 Peter lured him back home with the promise of a pardon, then disinherited him and demanded that he reveal all his “accomplices” in a plot to assassinate his father and seize the throne. Evidence emerged that Alexei hated Peter’s cherished projects and that some Russians from elite circles viewed him as an alternative. Tried by a special tribunal, Alexei confessed to treason under torture and was condemned to death, dying two days later following further torture. His fate and the witch hunt unleashed by his trial have disturbed even ardent admirers of Peter, who was willing to sacrifice his son for rea-

sons of state. Soviet historians dismissed Alexei as a traitor, but he has been viewed more sympathetically since the 1990s.

See also: PETER I; PETER II

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LINDSEY HUGHES

ALEXEYEV, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH

(1857–1918), Imperial Russian general staff officer, commander, Stavka chief of staff and White Army leader.

General-Adjutant Mikhail Alexeyev was born in Vyazma, the son of a noncommissioned officer who had fought at Sevastopol in the Crimean War, then attained officer rank. Alexeyev completed the Moscow Junker School (1876) and the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff (1890). He taught at the latter between 1898 and the Russo-Japanese War, in which he served at Sandepu and Mukden as chief of staff for the Third Manchurian Army. A believer in limited monarchy, Alexeyev rose in 1908 to become acting quartermaster general of the General Staff, then served from 1908 to 1912 as chief of staff of the Kiev Military District. Until 1911, Alexeyev continued to advise War Minister Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov on war planning. Alexeyev’s General Plan of Actions subsequently became a precursor for Mobilization Schedule 19A, the foundation for Russia’s entry into World War I. Alexeyev began the war as chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, then commanded the Northwestern Front in 1915 during its successful but costly withdrawal from the Polish salient.

As Stavka chief of staff for Tsar Nicholas II after August 1915, Alekseyev functioned as *de facto* supreme commander, but was tainted in 1916 by the ill-conceived Naroch operation and by failure to support the more successful Brusilov Offensive. While maintaining contact with the liberal opposition, he left Stavka in December 1916 for reasons of health, then returned in March to June 1917 as

supreme commander. An ardent anti-Bolshevik between the two Russian revolutions of 1917, he fought against the disintegration of the army, even agreeing to serve temporarily as the army's commander-in-chief after the Kornilov Affair of September 1917. Following the Bolshevik coup of November 1917, Alexeyev and Lavr Georgievich Kornilov became the military nucleus around which a White counterrevolutionary movement in the Don and Kuban organized the Volunteer Army. Alexeyev's death in October 1918 at Yekaterinodar deprived the Whites of perhaps their most talented commander and planner. He left the legacy of a keen military professional who consistently rendered impressive service as commander and staff officer under extraordinarily challenging military and political circumstances.

See also: KORNILOV AFFAIR; NICHOLAS II; STAVKA; WHITE ARMY; WORLD WAR I

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OLEG R. AIRAPETOV

ALIYEV, HEIDAR

(b. 1923), Soviet Azerbaijani statesman, president of Azerbaijan (1993–).

Heidar Alirza Oglu Aliyev was born in Nakhichevan, Azerbaijani SSR. Aliyev studied architecture and history in Baku. In 1944 he joined the KGB of Soviet Azerbaijan and became its director in 1967. In 1969 Aliyev became first secretary of the Communist Party (thus effective leader) of Soviet Azerbaijan. In 1982 he was invited to Moscow as a full member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He also served as a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for twenty years.

Following Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power, Aliyev was forced to resign from his positions in the Party in 1986 and in the government in 1987. Aliyev resigned from the CPSU in July 1990 citing, among other reasons, his objections to the use of the Soviet army units against demonstrators in Baku earlier that year. He returned to

Nakhichevan, where he relaunched his career as the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhichevan and deputy chairman of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet. In 1993 he was asked by the embattled President Abulfaz Elchibey of independent Azerbaijan to return to Baku. By October 1993 Aliyev was elected president of Azerbaijan. He was reelected in 1998.

Aliyev's main priority as leader of independent Azerbaijan was to secure domestic stability and effective control and exploitation of the country's hydrocarbon resources. Aliyev was able to neutralize unruly elements that threatened internal peace, as well as others who could challenge him politically, while pursuing a policy of selective political and economic liberalization.

In foreign affairs Aliyev adopted a supple and pragmatic approach. He moderated his predecessor's excessively pro-Turkish, anti-Russian, and anti-Iranian policies. Aliyev used the country's hydrocarbon resources to increase Azerbaijan's international stature and, working closely with Georgia, secured the West's political support to balance Russia's influence.

Aliyev's initial policy of continuing military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh war caused further territorial losses to Armenian forces as well as a new wave of internally displaced persons. In 1994 he agreed to a cease-fire. Aliyev has supported the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's mediation efforts for a permanent solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as direct negotiations.

His administration continues to be plagued by charges of authoritarianism, widespread corruption, and tampering with elections. Eight years into his administration, Aliyev's main challenges—the problems of Karabakh, of succession, and of securing new major routes for the export of Caspian hydrocarbon resources—remain largely unresolved.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN

ALLIED INTERVENTION

The Russian Revolution of 1917, occurring in the third year of World War I, initially inspired great hopes in the countries engaged in the brutal struggle against the Central Powers that was exacting so terrible a carnage and so enormous a financial drain. The prospect of a new ally, the United States, seemed bright, since a war without the Romanov autocracy as an ally could now be claimed to be truly one of democracy against the old order of Europe, of which Russia had been one of the bastions. Unfortunately, Russia was already severely weakened by the war, both on the battlefield and on the home front. It was left to the United States to provide direct aid and a moral presence, but time was running out, and opposition to the war, with its huge human sacrifices and economic burdens, was a persistent trend in the new "democratic" Russia. The inability of the Provisional Government, headed by Alexander Kerensky, to deal with the situation led to a victory of the left wing of the revolution in the form of a Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917.

This created a dilemma for the Allies, because the Bolsheviks were largely committed to ending the war. If the new Soviet government withdrew from the war, considerable German military forces would be shifted from the Eastern Front to the Western Front in 1918, thus nullifying the mounting American presence there. Opinion was sharply divided on a course of action. Some Allied agents in Russia believed that Bolshevik leaders could be persuaded to delay a peace or even to continue a military effort in return for desperately needed aid. Others advocated direct military intervention to maintain an Eastern Front, especially because of evidence that some units of the old Russian army remained intact and committed to continuing the war. American and British representatives in Russia, such as Raymond Robins and Robert Bruce Lockhart, campaigned for the former course, while influential political leaders urged direct military intervention, some maintaining that an American force of 100,000, could not only maintain a viable Eastern Front but also destroy the "communist threat."

The crisis came in March 1918 with the Soviet government's negotiation of terms for a peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. Since there had been no forthright pledge of assistance, Vladimir Lenin felt that ratification of the treaty was necessary, but about the same time, due to deteriorating conditions in the major ports that contained large amounts of Allied supplies for Russia, detachments of marines from Allied warships in the harbors landed to safeguard personnel and reestablish order in the old port of Archangel on the White Sea, in the new one of Murmansk in March 1918, and at Vladivostok on the Pacific in April. Doing anything more at the time was precluded by the concentration of available men and supplies on the Western Front to stem a surprisingly successful German offensive. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave Germany access to a large part of the Russian Empire and to valuable military supplies, much of Allied origin. Moreover, a large number of liberated German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war were able to return to combat in the West or control large areas of Russia, such as Siberia.

With the German offensive in the West stopped, but the Russian situation continuing to deteriorate, the Allies considered a more substantial military intervention. President Woodrow Wilson was reluctant to interfere in another country's affairs, especially because it might result in dividing the old Russian Empire and its resources among the other Allies. But, in the interests of Allied harmony (and their commitment to a future League of Nations), he agreed in July 1918 to send American forces to northern Russia and Siberia. About 4,600 American troops, dubbed the Polar Bears, arrived in Murmansk and Archangel in August 1918, accompanied by a slightly larger British force and smaller Allied units (a total of about 12,000). The expeditionary force was under British command, much resented by the Americans throughout the campaign. Its mission was to protect the supplies in the ports, but also to secure lines of communication by water and rail into the interior. The latter resulted in a number of skirmishes with Red Army units during the winter of 1918 to 1919 and several casualties (though the influenza epidemic would claim many more). This intervention on Russian territory was supported by much of the local population, which was represented by a non-Bolshevik but socialist soviet at Archangel, thus complicating the question of what kind of Russia the Allied forces were fighting for. The end of the war challenged the legitimacy of an Allied inter-

vention and provoked opposition among the troops there and at home.

The opening of a Second Russian Front in Siberia was rather different, since it involved a more substantial American expeditionary force (around 9,000) under its own command and a much larger Japanese army of approximately 70,000, along with 4,000 Canadians and token "colonial" units of French, Italian, Chinese, and British. Their ill-defined mission was to assist the transfer to the Western Front of a Czecho-Slovak Legion consisting of 60,000 former prisoners-of-war who supported the Allies, to protect munitions in and around Vladivostok, and to guard against one another's imperialist ambitions. On the long way to the Western Front, the Czech Legion managed to seize most of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to prevent released German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war in the area from forming a "German front" in Siberia; and to provide aid to what at first seemed a viable anti-Bolshevik government centered in Omsk under the leadership of Admiral Alexander Kolchak. For the United States, limiting Japanese ambitions for a more permanent occupation was a major factor. In any event, the American commander, General William S. Graves, was under strict orders from Washington not only to avoid coming under the control of the larger Japanese army, but also to desist from direct hostility with any Russian military units, of which there were several of various political orientations. Most of the Allied expeditionary force remained in the vicinity of Vladivostok and at a few points along the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian railroads until the decision to withdraw in May–June 1919.

Another commitment of men, supplies, and financial assistance came to the south of Russia but only late in 1918, when the end of war allowed passage through the Straits into the Black Sea. The catalyst here was the existence of substantial White armies under Anton Denikin and his successor, General Peter Wrangel. In the spring and summer campaigns of 1919, these forces won control of extensive territory from the Bolsheviks with the support of about 60,000 French troops (mostly Senegalese and Algerians), smaller detachments of British soldiers with naval support, and an American destroyer squadron on the Black Sea. Divided command, low morale, vague political objectives, the skill and superiority of the Red Army, and, finally, Allied reluctance to provide major aid doomed their efforts. This "crusade" came to a dismal end in late 1920. Besides a direct but limited

military presence in Russia, the interventionist powers provided financing, a misleading sense of permanent political and economic commitment to the White opposition, but also medical and food relief for large areas of the former Russian Empire.

Allied intervention in Russia was doomed from the beginning by the small forces committed, their unclear mission and divided command, the low morale of the Allied soldiers and their Russian clients, the end of the war of which it was a part, and the superiority of Soviet military forces and management. Throughout, it seemed to many that the Allied interventionists were on the wrong side, defending those who wanted either to restore the old order or break up Russia into dependent states. To many Americans, for instance, the Japanese posed more of a threat to Siberia than did the Bolsheviks. In the aftermath, genuinely anti-Bolshevik Russians felt betrayed by the failure of the Allies to destroy their enemy, while the new Soviet power was born with an ingrained sense of hostility to the interventionist states, marking what could be claimed as the beginnings of the Cold War. An immediate tragedy was the exodus of desperate refugees from the former Russian Empire through the Black Sea and into Manchuria and China, seeking assistance from erstwhile allies who had failed to save the world for democracy.

See also: BREST-LITOVSK PEACE; SIBERIA; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH; WHITE ARMY; WORLD WAR I

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NORMAN E. SAUL

ALLILUYEVA, SVETLANA IOSIFOVNA

(b. 1926), daughter of Soviet general secretary Josef Stalin and his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva.

The daughter of an old Georgian revolutionary friend, Sergo Alliluyev, Nadezhda Alliluyeva was sixteen when Stalin married her on March 24, 1919. In addition to Svetlana Iosifovna, she had one son in 1919, Vasily. Svetlana also had an older half-brother Yakov (Jacob), the son of Stalin's first wife, Yekaterina Svanidze, a simple peasant girl, whom he married in June 1904 at the age of 25, but who died on April 10, 1907.

Nadezhda Alliluyeva's death in 1932, apparently a suicide following a quarrel with Stalin, deeply affected both her husband and her daughter. Morose, Stalin withdrew from Party comrades with whom he had socialized with his wife. Some believe her suicide contributed to his paranoid distrust of others.

Svetlana was twenty-seven when Georgy Malenkov summoned her to Blizhny, the nickname for Stalin's dacha at Kuntsevo, just outside of Moscow. In her first book, *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (1967), she poignantly described Stalin's three-day death from a brain hemorrhage. "The last hours were nothing but a slow strangulation. The death agony was horrible. He literally choked to death as we watched." Although she had lived apart from Stalin, who had always been "very remote" from her, she nevertheless experienced a "welling up of strong, contradictory emotions" and a "release from a burden that had been weighing on [her] heart and mind." After her father's death, Svetlana taught and translated texts in the Soviet Union. In late 1966, while in India to deposit the ashes of her late husband Brajesh Singh, she asked Ambassador Chester Bowles in the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India, for permission to defect to the United States.

She left a grown son (Josef) and daughter (Katie) from two earlier marriages in the Soviet Union. Svetlana's defection caused an international sensation. "I could not continue the same useless life which I had for fourteen years," she told reporters on March 9, 1967. Settling in Locust Valley, New York, she wrote the abovementioned memoir describing the deaths of her two parents, and a second one two years later (*Only One Year*), in which she described her decision to defect. Upon becoming a U.S. citizen, she married an American architect, William Peters, in 1970 and had a daughter by him. After separating from Peters, she returned to the Soviet Union in 1984 and settled in Tbilisi. She again left the USSR in 1986 and returned to the United States, but then settled in England during the 1990s.

See also: STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

ALMANAC *See* FEMINISM.

ALTAI

The Altai people comprise an amalgamation of Turkic tribes who reside in the Altai Mountains and the Kuznetsk Alatau. Their origins lie with the earliest Turkic tribes (Uighurs, Kypchak-Kimaks, Yenisey Kyrgyz, Oguz, and others). In 550 C.E., the Tugyu Turks settled in the Altai Mountains along the headwaters of the Ob River and in the foothills of the Kuznetsk Alatau, where around 900 C.E. they formed the Kimak Tribal Union with the Kypchak

Turks. From this union sprang the ethnonyms Kumanda, Teleut, and Telengit.

In the seventh century, the Telengit lived with another would-be Altai tribe, the Telesy, on the Tunlo River in Mongolia, whence they both migrated to Tyva. By the eighth century they had gravitated to the Altai Mountains and eastern Kazakhstan. The Russians arrived in the 1700s and proceeded to sedentarize many of the nomadic Altai. The Soviet government gave the Altai nominal recognition with the establishment of the Gorno-Altai (Oiro) Autonomous Oblast in 1922. In 1991 it became the Altai Republic.

In 1989 there were 70,800 Altai worldwide, 69,400 in Russia alone, and 59,100 in the Altai Republic. A few lived in Central Asia. The internal divisions among the Altai are distinguished ethnographically and dialectically. The northern group comprises the Tubulars who live on the left-bank of the Biya River and on the shores of Lake Teletskoye, the Chelkans who live along the Lebed River, and the Kumandas who live along the middle course of the Biya. Each of these tribes speaks an Altai dialect that belongs to the Eastern division of the Ural-Altai language family. The southern groups, including the Altai-Kizhi, Telengits, Telesy, and Teleuts, live in the Katun River Basin and speak an Altai dialect closely related to the Kyrgyz language.

Although the ethnogenesis of the southern Altai took place among the Oiro Mongols, consolidation of the northern groups and overall consolidation between the northern and southern Altai has been difficult. The Teleuts, for example, have long considered themselves distinctive and have sought separate recognition. In 1868 the Altai Church Mission tried, but failed, to establish an Altai written language based on Teleut, using the Cyrillic alphabet. In 1922, the Soviets succeeded in creating an Altai literary language, and, since 1930, the Altais have had their own publishing house.

In spite of internal differences, Altai societies share certain general traits. They are highly patriarchal, for example: Women do domestic work, whereas men herd horses and dairy cows. Since the 1750s, most Altai have been Russian Orthodox, but a minority practices Lamaism and some practice shamanism.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ETHNOGRAPHY, RUSSIAN AND SOVIET; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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VICTOR L. MOTE

ALTYN

Monetary unit used in Russia from the last quarter of the fourteenth century until the eighteenth century.

The altyn's first use was directly connected with the appearance of the denga, another monetary unit and coin that came into existence at the same time. Six dengi (pl.) equaled one altyn. The word *altyn* was a lexicological borrowing into Russian from Mongol, meaning "six." From its origins, the altyn was mainly used in the central and eastern lands of Russia (Moscow, Ryazan, Tver), but spread to the lands of Novgorod and Pskov by the early sixteenth century. In the early eighteenth century, the altyn became synonymous with a silver coin that equaled about three kopeks.

See also: DENGA; GRIVNA; KOPECK; RUBLE

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

AMALRIK, ANDREI ALEXEYEVICH

(1938–1980), Russian political activist, dissident, publicist, playwright, exiled to Siberia from 1965 to 1966 and imprisoned in labor camps from 1970 to 1976.

Born in Moscow, Amalrik studied history at Moscow University; he was expelled in 1963 for a paper featuring unorthodox views on Kievan Rus. Amalrik wrote several absurdist plays such as *Moya tetya zhivet v Volokolamske* (My Aunt Lives in Volokolamsk), *Vostok-Zapad* (East-West), and *Nos! Nos? No-s!* (The Nose! The Nose? The No-se!), the

latter referring to Gogol's famous short story. In 1965, Amalrik was arrested for lacking official employment ("parasitism") and charges that his—yet unpublished—plays were "anti-Soviet and pornographic."

Exiled to Siberia for two and a half years, he was released in 1966 and subsequently described his experiences in *Nezhelannoye puteshestvie v Sibir* (Involuntary Journey to Siberia, 1970). Amalrik's essay *Prosushchestvuyet li Sovetsky Soyuz do 1984 goda?* (Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?), an astute and prophetic analysis of Soviet society's dim prospects for the future, brought him worldwide fame. It was completed in 1969, published the same year by the Herzen Foundation in Amsterdam, and translated into many languages. As a result, Amalrik was put on trial and sentenced to three years in Siberian camps, with another three years added in 1973. Protests in the West led to a commutation of the sentence from hard labor to exile and ultimately to permission to leave the Soviet Union in 1976. In the West, Amalrik was involved in numerous human rights initiatives.

In 1980, Amalrik died in a car crash in Guadalajara, Spain. He was legally rehabilitated in 1991.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT

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PETER ROLLBERG

AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION

As World War I ended, the United States helped many countries around the world recover from the effects of war through the American Relief Administration (ARA). Herbert Hoover headed the ARA and had opened numerous missions in Europe by 1919. The primary goal of the ARA was to provide food relief, but it also provided medical aid, relocation services, and much else. The ARA attempted to open a mission in Russia in 1919 and 1920, but they were unsuccessful because the Bolsheviks suspected that the Americans had intervened in the Russian Civil War. However, after the

horrible famine of the winter of 1920 and 1921, and after writer Maxim Gorky petitioned Vladimir Lenin to provide relief, the new Soviet government recognized the need for the ARA in Russia. By the summer of 1921, the ARA director for Europe, Walter Lyman Brown, and Soviet assistant commissar of foreign affairs Maxim Litvinov reached an agreement for an ARA mission in Russia. One of the primary concerns for the Soviets was the potential for American political activity in Russia. Brown assured Litvinov that their mission was solely to save as many lives as possible, and he appointed Colonel William N. Haskell to head the ARA in Russia.

The ARA opened kitchens in Petrograd and Moscow by September 1921, serving tens of thousands of children. The ARA spread into smaller cities and rural areas over the next several months, but in several places faced opposition from local village leaders and Communist Party officials. Most rural local committees consisted of a teacher and two or three other members who would serve the food to the children from the local schools. This fed the children, paid and fed the teacher, and continued some measure of education. In addition to feeding programs, the ARA employed thousands of starving and unemployed Russians to unload, transport, and distribute food to the most famine-stricken areas. The ARA also established a medical division that furnished medical supplies for hospitals, provided treatments to tens of thousands of people, and conducted sanitation inspections. It was estimated that the ARA provided about eight million vaccinations between 1921 and 1923.

By the summer of 1922, disputes within the ARA administration in the United States and between the ARA and the Soviet government placed the mission's future in doubt. Hoover and Haskell disagreed about the duration and tactics of the mission in Russia. In September 1922, the chairman of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee, Lev Kamenev, announced that the ARA was no longer needed, despite the reports that showed many areas in worse condition than before. Over the next few months, the Soviet government urged the ARA to limit its operations, even though about two million children were added to those eligible for relief in 1922. Several leading Bolsheviks had taken a stronger anti-American stance during the course of the ARA operations, and Lenin was less integrally involved because of illness. The ARA was gradually marginalized and officially disbanded in July 1923, after nearly two years of work. The Soviet gov-



Villagers in Vaselienka, Samara, kneel in thanks to American Relief Administration inspector George N. McClintock.

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ernment took over feeding its own starving and undernourished population, while also trying to dispel the positive impression the ARA had left among the Russian population.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FAMINE OF 1921–1922; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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WILLIAM BENTON WHISENHUNT

ANARCHISM

Anarchism, derived from the Greek word meaning “without rule,” rose to prominence in the nineteenth century and reached well into the twentieth century as a significant political force in Europe and Russia. Anarchists sought the overthrow of all forms of political rule in the name of a new society of voluntary federations of cooperative associations or syndicates. Anarchism also fought Marxism for revolutionary leadership.

Russian anarchism, in particular, inspired anarchist movements in Russia and Europe. Three Russians were progenitors of modern anarchism: Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin (1814–1876), Petr Alexeyevich Kropotkin (1842–1921), and Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy (1828–1910). The three, however, were contrasting personalities, each taking different slants on anarchist doctrine. Bakunin

was ever the firebrand of revolutionary violence in word and deed; Kropotkin the philosophical and scientific propounder of a society based on cooperation and mutual aid; and Tolstoy the proponent of a Christ-inspired anarchism of nonviolence and nonresistance to evil in the sense of not answering another's evil with evil.

Despite the wide intellectual influence of Kropotkin and Tolstoy, Bakunin epitomized the strategy of violence to end all political power. Bakunin put the brand on anarchism as a doctrine of violence.

Kropotkin's followers objected to anarchist factions in Russia that turned to violence and terrorism as their characteristic mode of operation. Among the names they assumed were the Black Banner Bearers, Anarchist Underground, Syndicalists, Makhayevists (followers of Makhaysky), and the Makhnovists (followers of Makhno in the Ukraine).

In the wake of the 1917 revolution, Kropotkin returned to Russia from exile in Europe with high hopes for an anarchist future. Vladimir Lenin's Bolsheviks soon dashed them. His funeral in 1921 was the last occasion in which the black flag of anarchism was raised in public in Sovietized Russia. The new regime executed anarchist leaders and destroyed their organizations.

See also: BAKUNIN, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH; KROPOTKIN, PETR ALEXEYEVICH; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH

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CARL A. LINDEN

ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

(d. 1304), prince of Gorodets and grand prince of Vladimir (1294–1304).

Andrei Alexandrovich's father, Alexander Yaroslavich "Nevsky," gave him Gorodets; after his uncle, Grand Prince Vasily Yaroslavich, died, he also received Kostroma. In 1277, when Andrei's elder brother, Grand Prince Dmitry, went to Novgorod, Andrei ingratiated himself to Khan Mangu Temir by campaigning with him in the Caucasus. In 1281 Andrei visited the Golden Horde, and Khan Tuda Mangu gave him troops to evict Dmitry from

Vladimir. Andrei deposed his brother, but in 1282, after learning that Dmitry had returned from abroad and was assembling an army in his town of Pereyasavl Zalessky, he was forced to ask the khan in Saray for reinforcements. Dmitry, meanwhile, solicited auxiliaries from Nogay, a rival khan, and defeated Andrei. The latter remained hostile. In 1293 he visited the Golden Horde again, and the khan despatched an army, which invaded Suzdalia and forced Dmitry to abdicate. After Dmitry died in 1294, Andrei became the grand prince of Vladimir. Soon afterward, a coalition of princes challenged his claim to Dmitry's Pereyasavl. In 1296 all the princes met in Vladimir and, after refusing to give Pereyasavl to Andrei, concluded a fragile agreement. Thus, in 1299, when the Germans intensified their attacks against the Novgorodians, Andrei refused to send them help because he feared that if he did, the other princes would attack him. In 1300 they rejected his claim to Pereyasavl at another meeting. Three years later, after appealing to the khan and failing yet again to get the town, he capitulated. Andrei died in Gorodets on July 27, 1304.

See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; GOLDEN HORDE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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MARTIN DIMNIK

ANDREI YAROSLAVICH

(d. 1264), grand prince of Vladimir (1249–1252) and progenitor of the princes of Suzdal.

The third son of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and grandson of Vsevolod Yurevich "Big Nest," Andrei Yaroslavich survived the Tatar invasion of Suzdalia in 1238. Three years later the Novgorodians rejected him as their prince, but on April 5, 1242, he assisted his elder brother Alexander Yar "Nevsky" in defeating the Teutonic Knights at the famous "battle on the ice" on Lake Chud (Lake Peypus). There is no clear information about Andrei's activities after their father died and their uncle Svyatoslav occupied Vladimir in 1247. Andrei may

have usurped Vladimir. In any case, he and Alexander went to Saray separately, evidently to settle the question of succession to Vladimir. But Khan Baty sent them to Mongolia, to the Great Khan in Karakorum. They returned in 1249, Alexander as the grand prince of Kiev and of all Rus, and Andrei as the grand prince of their patrimonial domain of Vladimir. In 1252 Andrei defiantly refused to visit Saray to renew his patent for Vladimir with the new great khan, Mongke, but Alexander went, evidently to obtain that patent for himself. The khan sent troops against Andrei, and they defeated him at Pereyaslavl Zalesky. After he fled to the Swedes, Alexander occupied Vladimir. Later, in 1255, Andrei returned to Suzdalia and was reconciled with Alexander, who gave him Suzdal and other towns. In 1258 he submissively accompanied Alexander to Saray, and in 1259 helped him enforce Tatar tax collecting in Novgorod. Andrei died in Suzdal in 1264.

See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; BATU; GOLDEN HORDE; VSEVOLOD III

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MARTIN DIMNIK

ANDREI YUREVICH

(c. 1112–1174), known as Andrei Yurevich "Bogolyubsky," prince of Suzdalia (Rostov, Suzdal, and Vladimir).

Although historians disagree on Andrei Yurevich's objectives, it is established that he defended the traditional order of succession to Kiev but chose to live in his patrimony of Vladimir, whose political, economic, cultural, and ecclesiastical importance he attempted to raise above that of Kiev.

In 1149 Andrei's father, Yuri Vladimirovich "Dolgoruky," gave him Vyshgorod, located north of Kiev, and then transferred him to Turov, Pinsk, and Peresopnitsa. Two years later Andrei returned to Suzdalia. In 1155 Yuri gave him Vyshgorod once again, but Andrei returned soon afterward to Vladimir on the Klyazma. After Yuri died in Kiev

in 1157, the citizens of Rostov, Suzdal, and Vladimir chose Andrei as their prince. He had autocratic ambitions for Suzdalia and, according to some, for all of Rus. He weakened the power of the *veche* (popular assembly), treated boyars like vassals, and, in 1161, evicted his brothers and two nephews from Suzdalia. Moreover, he spurned the powerful boyars of Rostov and Suzdal by making the smaller town of Vladimir his capital. He lived at nearby Bogolyubovo, after which he obtained his sobriquet "Bogolyubsky." He beautified Vladimir by building its Assumption Cathedral, its Golden Gates modeled on those of Kiev, his palace at Bogolyubovo, and the Church of the Intercession of Our Lady on the river Nerl. He successfully expanded his domains into the lands of the Volga Bulgars and asserted his influence over Murom and Ryazan. However, Andrei failed to create an independent metropolitanate in Vladimir.

In 1167 Rostislav Mstislavich of Kiev died, and Andrei became the senior and most eligible of the Monomashichi (descendants of Vladimir Monomakh, reign 1113–1125) to rule Kiev. Mstislav Izyaslavich of Volyn preempted Andrei's bid for Kiev and appointed his son to Novgorod. Andrei saw Mstislav's actions as a violation of the traditional order of succession to Kiev and as a challenge to his own interests in Novgorod. Thus in 1169 he sent a large coalition of princes to evict Mstislav. They fulfilled their mission and plundered Kiev in the process. Some historians argue that this event marked a turning point in the history of Rus; Kiev's capture signaled its decline and Andrei's attempt to subordinate it to Vladimir. Others argue that Andrei sought to recover the Kievan throne for the rightful Monomashich claimants because Kiev was the capital of the land, thereby affirming its importance even after it was plundered.

Andrei broke tradition by not occupying Kiev in person. He appointed his brother, Gleb, to rule it in his stead. Even though Andrei was able to summon troops from Suzdalia, Novgorod, Murom, Ryazan, Polotsk, and Smolensk, he failed to assert his control over Kiev. Its citizens evidently poisoned Gleb. In 1173 Andrei ordered the Rostislavichi (descendants of Rostislav Mstislavich of Smolensk) to vacate Kiev, but later they succeeded in evicting his lieutenants and taking them captive. Andrei organized a second campaign with Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich of Chernigov, to whom he agreed to cede control of Kiev, but the coalition failed to take the city. While Andrei was waiting to receive approval from Svyatoslav to hand over Kiev to the

Rostislavichi, his boyars murdered him on June 29, 1174.

See also: BOYAR; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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MARTIN DIMNIK

ANDREYEV, LEONID NIKOLAYEVICH

(1871–1919), Russian prose writer, playwright, and publicist whose works, internationally acclaimed in his lifetime, are infused with humanistic protest against social oppression and humiliation.

Born on August 21, 1871, in the town of Oryol (Orel), Leonid Nikolayevich Andreyev studied law at St. Petersburg University and briefly practiced as a lawyer. A volume of stories, published in 1901 by Maxim Gorky's "Znanie" enterprise, made him famous. After the death of his first wife in 1906 and the violent oppression of the anti-autocratic mutinies that occurred between 1905 and 1907, Andreyev entered a period of deep resignation, abandoning radical leftist ideas but failing to develop viable alternatives. His political confusion resonated with the liberal intelligentsia, for whose he became the most fashionable of authors in the 1910s.

In Andreyev's narratives, crass images of irrationality and hysteria are often blended with crude melodrama, yet they also reveal persistent social sensitivities. Thus, the short story "Krasnyi smekh" ("Red Laughter," 1904) depicts the horror of war, whereas "Rasskaz o semi poveshennykh" ("The Seven Who Were Hanged," 1908) attacks capital punishment while idealizing political terrorism. Andreyev's plays, closely associated with Symbolism, caused scandals and enjoyed huge popularity. His unfinished novel *Dnevnik Satany* (*Satan's Diary*, 1918) was inspired by the death of U.S. million-

aire Alfred Vanderbilt on the *Lusitania* in 1915, and seeks to convey the doom of bourgeois society.

In addition to his writing, Andreyev was also an accomplished color photographer and painter. He displayed pro-Russian patriotism in World War I, but welcomed the February Revolution of 1917. Later that year, he radically opposed the Bolshevik coup and emigrated to Finland. In his last essay, "S.O.S." (1919), he called upon the president of the United States to intervene in Russia militarily. Andreyev died on September 12th of that same year.

See also: GORKY, MAXIM; SILVER AGE

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PETER ROLLBERG

ANDREYEVA, NINA ALEXANDROVNA

(b. 1938), teacher, author, political activist, and social critic.

Born on October 12, 1938, in Leningrad, Nina Alexandrovna Andreyeva joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1966, and became a teacher of chemistry at the Leningrad Technical Institute in 1973. A self-styled Stalinist and devotee of political order, she wrote an essay that defended many aspects of the Stalinist system, assailed reformists' efforts to provide a more accurate picture of the history of the USSR, and implied that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and his closest supporters were not real communists. Her essay "I Cannot Forsake My Principles" was published in the orthodox newspaper *Sovetskaia Rossiya* at a time when Gorbachev and Alexander Nikolayevich Yakovlev were abroad, and cited (without attribution) an orthodox report by the secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, in February 1988. Officials in the ideological department of the Central Committee evidently edited her original letter, and Ligachev reportedly ordered its dissemination throughout the party. Ligachev repeatedly denied responsibility for its publication.

Orthodox party officials applauded the essay, whereas members of the liberal intelligentsia feared

that it represented a major defeat for the intellectual freedom supported by the general secretary. Gorbachev subsequently revealed that many members of the Politburo seemed to share Andreyeva's views, and that he had to browbeat them into approving the publication of an official rejoinder. The published response appeared in *Pravda* on April 5, 1988, and was not nearly as forceful as its authors have claimed. In the aftermath of this discussion, the General Secretary at least temporarily tightened his own control over the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The entire episode may have contributed to his decision to reform the Secretariat in the fall of 1988.

Andreyeva subsequently played a leadership role in the formation of orthodox communist organizations. She headed the organizing committee of the Bolshevik Platform of the CPSU that "expelled" Gorbachev from the party in September 1991. In November 1991, she became the general secretary of the small but militant All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In October 1993, the party was temporarily suspended along with fifteen other organizations after President Yeltsin's repression of the attempted coup against his regime. In May 1995 she was stripped of her post as the head of the St. Petersburg Central Committee of the party for "lack of revolutionary activity."

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; LIGACHEV, YEGOR KUZMICH

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JONATHAN HARRIS

ANDROPOV, YURI VLADIMIROVICH

(1914–1984), general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1982–1984).

Yuri Andropov was born on June 15, 1914, in the southern Russian region of Stavropol. He rose rapidly through the ranks of the Young Communist League (Komsomol). During World War II he



Official portrait of Yuri Andropov, CPSU general secretary, 1982–1984. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

worked with the partisan movement in Karelia, and after the war he became second secretary of the regional Party organization. He was transferred to the Party apparatus in Moscow in 1951 and was the ambassador to Hungary at the time of the Soviet invasion in 1956. He played a key role in encouraging the invasion.

In 1957 Andropov returned to Moscow to become head of the Central Committee's Bloc Relations Department. There he inherited a group of some of the most progressive thinkers of the Brezhnev era, many of the leading advocates for change who were working within the system. This contributed later to Andropov's reputation as a progressive thinker. He continued to oversee relations with other communist countries after he was promoted to Central Committee secretary in 1962. In 1967 he was appointed the head of the Committee on State Security (KGB) and a candidate member of

the ruling Politburo. He was promoted to the rank of full Politburo member in 1971. As the head of the KGB, Andropov led active efforts against dissidents at home and enhanced the KGB collection efforts abroad. To be in a better position to succeed Leonid Brezhnev, Andropov gave up the chairmanship of the KGB in May 1982 and returned to the Central Committee as a senior member of the Secretariat. His chief rival in the succession struggle was Konstantin Chernenko, who was being actively promoted by Brezhnev. However, Chernenko lacked Andropov's broad experience, and when Brezhnev died in November 1982, Andropov was elected general secretary by a plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In June 1983 he was elected chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet—the head of state.

When Andropov was elevated to the head of the Party, there were great hopes that he would end the stagnation that had characterized the Brezhnev years and that he would reinvigorate the Party and its policies. From his years as head of the KGB, Andropov had an excellent perspective on the depth of the problems facing the Soviet Union. There was also an active effort to promote his image as a progressive thinker. During his very brief tenure as Party leader, Andropov was able to begin diverging from the norms of the Brezhnev era. This was a time of rapid personnel turnover. In addition to making key changes in the top Party leadership, he replaced a large number of ministers and regional party leaders with younger leaders. Most important, Andropov actively advanced the career of the youngest member of the Politburo, Agriculture Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, giving him broad authority and experience in the Party that helped pave the way for his ascent to Party leadership. All signs indicate that Andropov was hoping to make Gorbachev his successor.

Andropov's brief tenure was not sufficient to make a similar impact on policy. While he was much more open than Brezhnev in recognizing the country's problems, particularly in the economic sphere, Andropov was cautious by nature and did not come to office with any plan for tackling them. He did, however, begin a serious discussion of the need for economic reform, spoke positively about economic innovation in Eastern Europe, and began to take some cautious steps to improve the situation. His regime is best remembered for the discipline campaign: an effort to enforce worker discipline, punishing workers who did not report for duty on time or were drinking on the job. He

also introduced other minor reforms aimed at improving productivity. Andropov began to tackle the problem of corruption at higher levels and expelled two members of the Central Committee who had been close associates of Brezhnev. He also introduced somewhat greater openness in Party affairs, publishing accounts of the weekly Politburo meetings and deliberations of the CPSU plenum. These measures, together with his personnel moves, created a positive sense of cautious change, as well as a hope that the Soviet leadership would start to address the problems facing the country, now that it was aware of them. Probably the most notable event of Andropov's tenure was the accidental shooting down by the Soviet military of a Korean Airlines plane that strayed into Soviet airspace in the Far East in September 1983.

The contest to succeed Andropov appears to have been the main preoccupation of the party leadership following his election. Only three months into his tenure, Andropov's health began to deteriorate sharply as a result of serious kidney problems, and he was regularly on dialysis for the rest of his life. He dropped out of sight in August 1983 and did not appear again in public. He died in February 1984. Andropov was not in office long enough for his protégé, Gorbachev, to gain the upper hand in the succession struggle, and he was succeeded by seventy-two-year-old Konstantin Chernenko, who was closely associated with the status quo of the Brezhnev era.

See also: CHERNENKO, KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH; GENERAL SECRETARY; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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MARC D. ZLOTNIK

ANDRUSOVO, PEACE OF

The Peace of Andrusovo (1667) concluded a thirteen-year period of conflict between Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, and Sweden, known as the Thirteen Year's War (1654–1667). It marked the end of Poland-Lithuania's attempts at eastward expansion, and divided the Ukraine into Polish (right

bank) and Russian (left bank) spheres of influence on either side of the Dnieper River. The treaty allowed Muscovy to maintain temporary hold over the two key cities of Smolensk (thirteen and a half years) and Kiev (two years); but Muscovy defied those provisions and retained these cities permanently, paying only a token indemnity to the Poles. The agreement at Andrusovo, though originally intended to be provisional, was confirmed by the so-called "Eternal Peace" of 1686. Thus, the treaty marked Muscovy's ascendance over Poland-Lithuania in the region.

The Peace of Andrusovo is significant in that it defined relations between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania for much of the remainder of the century. Subsequent treaties extended, clarified, or confirmed the 1667 Peace of Andrusovo. Largely because of this treaty, Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania developed a mutual defensive stance against the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire in the south. It also affected how the two nations defined other aspects of their relationship, such as the status of Kiev, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and of Orthodox populations in Polish-held territories.

The creation of Polish and Russian spheres of influence had a far-reaching impact on their subject populations. The Poles pursued a policy of Polonization of Belarus, forbidding the use of the Belarussian language, and restricting the political involvement of the Orthodox believers. The Russians limited the power of the hetmans and returned the practice of serfdom to the Left Bank region. The divided Ukrainians sought to gain advantage by playing Muscovy, Poland, and the Ottomans against one another, with the result that continuous warfare reduced their population and destroyed their lands. Still, the division remained in effect and contributed to Muscovy's predominance.

See also: MUSCOVY; POLAND; THIRTEEN YEAR'S WAR

W. M. REGER IV

ANNA IVANOVNA

(1693–1740), empress of Russia (1730–1740).

Anna Ivanovna was a daughter of Peter the Great's half-brother and co-ruler Ivan V. When Peter's young grandson, Peter II, died unexpectedly the Romanov male line came to an end. The Supreme Privy Council faced the problem of deciding to

which of the five female pretenders the Russian crown was to be passed.

Two powerful aristocratic families, the Golitsyns and Dolgorukys, dominated the Council. They hoped to limit the powers of the autocratic monarch, a plan that required a docile and passive figure on the throne. Anna seemed to fit their needs perfectly. She was a widow in near impoverishment, wishing to escape her difficult circumstances in Courland (Latvia). The Council believed that given her essentially weak character and probable gratitude toward the Council for the offer of the crown, she would prove malleable enough to accept restrictions on her power. In a signed document Anna agreed not to make any decisions on war or peace, taxes, promotions, deprivation of titles and property, remarrying, appointment of an heir, or spending of state revenues without approval of the Supreme Privy Council. The Council had in effect executed a *coup d'état*. Real power had moved from the autocrat to the oligarchy in the Council.

As word began to spread about these conditions, lesser nobles began to form opposition against the Golitsyn and Dolgoruky conditions. These lesser nobles, dependent on the monarch for their positions, privileges, and material well-being, preferred the absolute power of a monarch, believed to be above petty personal interests, to what they considered to be the despotism of a small clique of aristocratic families.

Anna entered Moscow on February 15, 1730. Taking advantage of the opposition among the nobles and Imperial Guards to the limiting of her power, at an audience she tore up the document she had signed after accepting petitions asking her to reclaim her autocratic power. Some historians regard this as a lost opportunity for Russia to break from its autocratic past. They believe that the granting of legal rights to the nobility as a whole would have led to dramatic changes in the sociopolitical structure, thereby removing many obstacles created by the autocratic system to Russia's further economic and political development.

In return for their support against the Council, these nobles pressed Anna for concessions and privileges that she eventually granted. She repealed the 1714 Law on Primogeniture, shortened military service, allowed entrance for nobles into the military at officer rank and gave them more control over their serfs. These moves represented the beginning of an upgrading of the Russian nobility's status.

Anna had little inclination for ruling, preferring gossip, trivia, and matchmaking. Her lover from Courland, Count Ernst-Johann Biron, exercised a decisive influence on her. The great resentment Russians felt towards him and the other foreigners Anna placed in key posts and to whom she granted much patronage became a leitmotiv of her reign. This resentment, which continued after her reign, had other roots as well. As Russian identity among the upper classes began to solidify, the influx of foreigners, whose expertise was regarded as important for modernization, came to be seen as an affront to Russian dignity. The damaged belief in Russian superiority, combined with the frequently bad behaviour of foreigners, added to the complexity of this problem.

Anna took several steps to consolidate her rule. She founded the powerful Izmailovsky Guards, whose head was a former lover. The intelligence service was reestablished, providing an effective mechanism for surveillance and control over society. Finally, in order to bypass the Supreme Privy Council, in 1731 Anna established a Cabinet of Ministers, which in reality governed the Empire. This was not a limitation on the autocratic power, since Anna willingly granted these powers to the Cabinet of Ministers and was able to take them back at will.

Anna's foreign policy reinforced the general line set by Peter and thereby set the tone for Russian foreign policy for the rest of the century. With Austria she fought the War of Polish Succession (1733–1735) to prevent the resurgence of French influence in Poland and to promote the election of a pro-Russian king, thereby adding to the security of the Empire's western borders. Continuing Russia's push southward to the Black Sea, Anna with Austrian support declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The war ended in 1739 with the defeat of the Crimean khanate, Russia's regaining of Azov, and the understanding that St. Petersburg would deal decisively with rivals on Russia's Black Sea coast. Anna failed, however, to gain the right to maintain a Russian fleet in the Black Sea, a recurring issue in Imperial Russian history. The policy of working with Austria in regard to Poland and the Ottoman Empire was adopted by Catherine II.

Anna died on October 7, 1740.

See also: AUTOCRACY; CABINET OF MINISTERS, IMPERIAL; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; PETER I; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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ZHAND P. SHAKIBI

ANTHONY KHRAPOVITSKY, METROPOLITAN

(1863–1936), metropolitan of Kiev, theologian, church reformer, and leader of the Russian Orthodox Church in exile after the Russian revolution.

Through early study of Dostoyevsky and Slavophilism, Anthony became convinced that faith and philosophy were closely intertwined. His *Psychological Data in Favor of Free Will and Moral Responsibility* (1887) extended this earlier insight, established his reputation as a theologian, and inspired many young men to become monastic missionaries so as to combat the rebellious ideas current in society and to relieve human suffering.

To build the Kingdom of God in society, Anthony believed, the church must be free from dependence on the state (although he always remained a staunch monarchist in politics). In August 1917 he advanced his ideas on church reform at a council (sobor) of the Russian church. He argued that the church should be governed at the top by a patriarch and a council of bishops, a structure favored by many bishops in attendance. For a time it looked as if the council would elect Anthony as patriarch. In the first round of balloting, he was the most popular of the three finalists for the patriarchal office. However, the final selection by drawing lots resulted in the selection of Tikhon (Bellavin).

In the confused political and religious turmoil in Ukraine during the last months of German occupation (World War I), Anthony became metropolitan of Kiev. During the civil war, he supported the losing side and was forced to leave Russia for a life of exile, first in Constantinople, then at Srem-

ski Karlovci in Yugoslavia. In 1920, as senior among the bishops who had left Russia, he took the lead in creating a Higher Church Administration and a Synod of the Russian Church in Constantinople. The next year, he convened a council in Yugoslavia that declared the new Synod as the central church authority in emigration, expressed its desire to see a restoration of monarchy in Russia, and proclaimed Anthony as "Vice Regent of the All-Russian Patriarch." The new organization declared unconditional loyalty to Patriarch Tikhon, but came to fear that the patriarch was acting on behalf of the Communist government in Russia. In the two years following Patriarch Tikhon's death in 1925, Anthony broke off relations with the Moscow patriarchate and declared the Synodal church in Yugoslavia to be the sole heir of the historic Orthodox church in Russia. His followers expected him to be elected patriarch of this fully autonomous church that claimed jurisdiction over the entire Russian diaspora. Such a claim caused a rupture in relations with Metropolitan Evlogy, whom Patriarch Tikhon had placed in charge of the Russian parishes in western Europe. Eventually, in 1931, the ecumenical patriarch Vasilios III intervened and permitted Evlogy to place the exarchate of the Russian church in western Europe under Constantinople's jurisdiction. Anthony's influence in the Orthodox emigration diminished thereafter.

See also: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; TIKHON, PATRIARCH

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ANTHONY VADKOVSKY, METROPOLITAN

(1846–1912), metropolitan of St. Petersburg, moderate church reformer.

Anthony began his career at the Kazan Theological Academy as a scholar and editor of the academy's widely read journal *Orthodox Interlocutor* (*Pravoslavny sobesednik*). His scholarly life ended abruptly with the sudden illness and death of his wife and two children. He became a monk, thereby

contributing to the notable revival in the 1880s of the "learned monasticism" that had characterized the church hierarchy in Russia before the Great Reforms of the 1860s.

Anthony soon became rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and bishop of Vyborg, vicar to the metropolitan of St. Petersburg. Some of Anthony's favorite students at the academy subsequently became prominent churchmen: Sergei Stragorodsky, the future leader of the Russian church during the communist era, and Anthony Khrapovitsky, Sergei's rival and leader of the Russian church in exile after 1920. While promoting monasticism, Anthony also sought to reform the monasteries, particularly those whose economic activities harmed the material welfare of the parish clergy. The parish clergy, he felt, must be accorded a more secure livelihood if they were to rescue the church's failing parishes. Anthony used his influence as bishop to advance these reforms. In 1892 Anthony became the archbishop of a newly created Finnish diocese aimed at encouraging Russian patriotic feeling and devotion to the Russian Orthodox Church among the Finnish Orthodox population.

When the revolutionary disturbances in 1905 generated a new law on religious toleration, Anthony, as ranking member of the Holy Synod, entered the broader struggle for church reform. He argued that the new law put the church at a disadvantage because other religious faiths were freed from state interference in their internal affairs in a way not permitted to Orthodoxy. These sentiments, transmitted to Nicholas II by Sergei Witte, chairman of the Council of Ministers, decisively advanced the popular reform movement that culminated in an all-Russian council (*sobor*) of the church and reestablishment of the patriarchate after the fall of the Russian monarchy in 1917. At the same time, fearing that the church might be swept into a political maelstrom, he warned against clerical participation in the newly forming political parties of post-1905 Russia. During these years, Anthony courageously, if ultimately unsuccessfully, resisted the harmful influence of Rasputin in church affairs, and there is some evidence to suggest that he tried to intervene personally with Nicholas II in order to quell Rasputin's potential influence on the Tsarevich Alexis. Following Anthony's death in 1912, Rasputin's influence in the Holy Synod grew rapidly.

See also: HOLY SYNOD; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (usually referred to as "the ABM Treaty") was signed by U.S. president Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow on May 26, 1972. It entered into force on October 3, 1972. Under its terms, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit sharply both development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses in order to constrain the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons and to enhance the stability of the strategic balance. The ABM Treaty was the principal achievement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which also produced an Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive missiles, pending negotiation of a more comprehensive treaty limiting such weapons. The ABM Treaty was of indefinite duration, although it could be amended by mutual agreement and either party could withdraw at any time on six months' notice.

The ABM Treaty was the centerpiece of the Nixon–Brezhnev Moscow summit of 1972, and the SALT negotiation was seen as the icebreaker for a broader political détente, as well as a stabilizing element in strategic arms control. Strategic arms control and the ABM Treaty enjoyed wide support for most of the next two decades. This was true despite the prolonged and ultimately inconclusive efforts to reach agreement on a SALT II treaty on offensive arms.

By the time Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, American concerns over the strategic balance had risen. In 1983 President Reagan announced a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to develop strate-

gic antiballistic missile defense systems. Deployment, and even testing and development, of such a system would have required radical revision or abrogation of the ABM Treaty. In 1985 the Reagan administration announced a unilateral revised interpretation of the ABM Treaty loosening restrictions on testing new ABM technologies. This revised "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty was highly controversial and was never applied to actual testing; in 1994 it was officially repudiated by the Clinton administration. The SDI program greatly increased expenditures on U.S. ballistic missile defense research and development, but it did not lead to a deployable system.

In the 1990s and afterward, following the end of the Cold War and agreed reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms, the United States renewed its pursuit of ballistic missile defense. On December 15, 2001, President George W. Bush officially gave notice that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in six months. Discussions had been held with the Russians on possible amendments to the treaty, but the United States decided that it wished an open slate for development and deployment decisions and opted to withdraw.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty thus had a thirty-year life. The ABM Treaty alone had been unable to restrain a buildup in strategic offensive arms in the 1970s and 1980s, and it was less needed in the post–Cold War world, although many in the United States (and the Western allies, Russia, and China) had urged its retention. In any event, the ABM Treaty did contribute to greater certainty of mutual nuclear deterrence for nearly two decades of the Cold War, and even the fact of its successful negotiation had borne witness to the ability of the nuclear superpowers, even as adversaries, to agree on such a measure to reduce the dangers of the nuclear confrontation.

See also: ARMS CONTROL; COLD WAR; STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, and joined by Italy on November 6, 1937. Disguised as an effort to combat the influence of the Communist International (Comintern), the treaty was intended to serve as a military alliance aimed at the Soviet Union. In reality, the treaty did not result in any coordinated German-Japanese military action, but instead became the foundation for growing distrust and betrayal between the two fascist allies themselves.

The text of the treaty was brief and to the point. It asserted that the Communist International was a threat to world peace and that the signatories planned to “keep each other informed concerning the activities” of the Comintern and cooperate in their mutual defense, and invited other nations to join their efforts. A Supplementary Protocol empowered Germany and Japan to “take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad work” for the Comintern, authorizing repressive measures against members of the Communist Party in Germany, Japan, or countries under their influence. Finally, both promised not to sign a separate agreement with the Soviet Union without the other being informed. Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji, the Japanese ambassador to Germany, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, German ambassador to London, signed the treaty. It went into force immediately and was valid for five years.

The Anti-Comintern Pact threatened the USSR and seemed to be one more aspect of Germany’s aggressive policy. Nevertheless, the German and Japanese military staffs did not coordinate their actions, and each country pursued its own interests irrespective of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

In 1939, while the Soviet army was defeating the Japanese military in Manchuria along the Mongolian border, Ribbentrop traveled to Moscow and negotiated the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, leaving the Japanese out of these deliberations. Japan could not trust Hitler. In 1941, again without notice, Germany invaded the USSR. Japan de-

clared not to assist its ally in the Anti-Comintern Pact and eventually attacked the United States instead of the USSR.

See also: COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; WORLD WAR II

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ANTI-PARTY GROUP

The Anti-Party Group, so called by Nikita Khrushchev, whom it tried to oust from power in June 1957, was neither opposed to the Communist Party nor really a group. Rather, it consisted of three of Khrushchev’s main rivals in the party leadership, Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich, themselves hardly united except in their wish to oust Khrushchev, plus a diverse set of allies who supported them at the last minute: titular head of state Klimenty Voroshilov; chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin; central economic administrators Mikhail Pervukhin and Maxim Saburov; and Dmitry Shepilov, Khrushchev’s protégé whom he had recently promoted to foreign minister.

When Josef Stalin died in March 1953, Malenkov seemed the heir apparent, but Molotov also appeared to be a contender for supreme power. Khrushchev joined with both of them to bring down secret police chief Lavrenty Beria, who was arrested in June 1953 and executed in December. Khrushchev turned next against Malenkov, who was demoted from prime minister to minister of electrification in February 1955, and then against Molotov, who was soon dropped as foreign minister. However, both Malenkov and Molotov were allowed to remain full members of the Party Presidium, leaving them in position to seek revenge against Khrushchev.

The logic of power in the Kremlin, in which there was no formalized procedure for determining leadership succession, largely accounted for this struggle. So did certain policy differences: Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov were particularly dismayed by Khrushchev's "secret speech" attacking Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, as well as by the de-Stalinization process he began in domestic and foreign policy. Malenkov had seemed more open to reform during his stint as prime minister, but although his and Khrushchev's skills could have complemented each other, personal animosity drove them apart. Despite choosing Bulganin to replace Malenkov as prime minister, Khrushchev disdained Bulganin. Perukhin and Saburov felt threatened by Khrushchev's proposed reorganization of economic administration, which jeopardized their jobs. Shepilov probably betrayed his patron because he thought Khrushchev was bound to lose.

Including seven full members of the Presidium, the plotters constituted a majority. When they moved against Khrushchev on June 18, 1957, they counted on the Presidium's practice of appointing its own leader, leaving the Party Central Committee to rubber-stamp the result. Instead, however, Khrushchev insisted that Central Committee itself, in which his supporters dominated, decide the issue. While Khrushchev and his enemies quarreled, the KGB (Committee on State Security) and the military ferried Central Committee members to Moscow for a plenum that took place from June 22 to 28.

Khrushchev's opponents had no chance once the plenum began. Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were subjected to a barrage of charges about their complicity in Stalin's terror, including details about Stalinist crimes that were not fully publicized until the late 1980s. Following the plenum, Molotov was exiled to Outer Mongolia as Soviet ambassador, Malenkov to northern Kazakhstan to direct a hydroelectric station, Kaganovich to a potash works in Perm Province, and Shepilov to head the Kyrgyz Institute of Economics. So as not to reveal how many had opposed him, Khrushchev delayed his punishment of the rest of the Anti-Party Group: Bulganin remained prime minister until 1958; Voroshilov was not deposed as head of state until 1960. After the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, in which Khrushchev intensified his all-out attack on Stalin and Stalinism, Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were expelled from the Communist Party.

See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; MALENKOV, GEORGY MAXIMILYANOVICH; MOLOTOV VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH

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ANTONOV UPRISING

The Antonov Uprising (1920–1921) was a large, well-organized peasant revolt in the Tambov province of Central Russia. Part of the Green Movement, the uprising threatened Communist power in 1921 and was a major reason for the abandonment of War Communism.

Alexander Antonov (1889–1922) was a Socialist Revolutionary (SR) whom the February Revolution rescued from a long prison sentence for robbing railroad station ticket offices. He returned to Tambov province in 1917 to become a district police official under the Provisional Government. He left this post in April 1918 and went underground, organizing an armed guerrilla group to resist the new Communist government.

Increasingly severe food-procurement and conscription policies, along with a drought, pushed Tambov peasants into a spontaneous rebellion against the Communist government in August 1920. Seizing the opportunity, Antonov put himself at the head of the rebellion. He organized a territorially-based army divided into regiments, which he recruited from the many local World War I and civil war veterans. Local socialists created a strong network of local committees (STK—*soiuz trudovogo krestian'stva*, Union of the Working Peasantry) that created an alternative, noncommunist government in the province. While they fought the Communist government, they did have wider plans. Their program (which survives in various versions) called for an end to civil war, the convening of a freely

elected Constituent Assembly, land to the peasants, and workers' control of industry.

Initial attempts to suppress this rebellion were failures. The few troops in the province were unreliable, and often went over to the insurgents. By spring 1921 the insurgents controlled much of the countryside, had halted grain procurement, and threatened rail communications through the province. The central government responded with reforms and repression. Forced grain procurement and conscription were curtailed, removing the greatest irritants to the peasantry. The end of the Polish-Russian war enabled the Communist government to move fifty thousand troops to the province, including crack cavalry brigades, automobile detachments, airplanes, and artillery. By the end of July 1921 the insurgency was crushed. Its regiments were run to ground and annihilated by the larger, better-armed Red Army forces. The Cheka rooted out the STKs and shot or exiled thousands of insurgents. Antonov himself remained at large for another year, but died in a Cheka ambush on June 24, 1922.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; GREEN MOVEMENT; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; WAR COMMUNISM

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APPANAGE ERA

Most historians since the nineteenth century—Russian, Soviet, and Western—have used the phrase "appanage era" to designate the period between the collapse of Kievan Russia and the emergence of a centralized Russian state. It is dated from the Mongol conquest of Kievan Russia between 1237 and 1240 to either the accession of Ivan III (1462) or Basil III (1505), or to the beginning of the reign of Ivan IV (1533). It was characterized by the emergence of a multiplicity of independent principalities (*udeli* or appanages). Princes treated appanage holdings as private property, conveying them to their heirs by wills that divided the lands

between all their sons. This practice meant that holdings were increasingly fragmented in each generation. As the principalities were weakened, internal conflict escalated and external attacks came not only from the Mongols, but also from Lithuanians, Germans, Poles, and Swedes. This tumultuous situation ended only as Moscow fashioned an autocracy capable of "gathering the Russian lands."

In the later twentieth century, a new interpretation of the age emerged. New, broadly based archeological evidence refuted the traditional view that Kiev itself was in economic decline from the mid-twelfth century, and suggested instead a general economic expansion. The new interpretation proposes that the eleven or twelve appanages that developed between 1150 and 1240 represented a rational division of labor and delegation of authority within the Rurikid dynasty, and that they were designed to respond to economic and political expansion. It maintains that the principalities should be understood as components of a dynastic realm, not as private property. As proof, it offers detailed evidence to argue that the frequent wars of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were fought to defend the principle of lateral succession developed in the Kievan period. It argues at length that this principle continued to underlie succession decisions and legitimacy issues to one degree or another during much of the Mongol period, and remained important as late as the civil wars of the second quarter of the fifteenth century. The interpretation also set a new initial date for the era—the mid 1100s—which has become increasingly accepted by scholars in the field, and a number of new publications since the late 1980s minimize the use of the term "appanage era," but most still retain much of the traditional interpretation associated with it.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; RURIKID DYNASTY

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APPARAT

An informal term used to describe a part or the whole of a bureaucratic structure, such as the Communist Party.

The literal translation of *apparat* is apparatus. The Bolsheviks began as an underground movement, and, to survive, the party machine demanded solidarity and discipline. Members were known as *apparatchiki*, that is, men of the apparat, or as *komitechiki*, members of the underground committees. As time passed, the term came to refer to any part, or the whole, of the Soviet bureaucratic system. It was frequently used in later years as a term of denigration and contempt, as was the term *apparatchik*.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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APRIL THESES

Vladimir Ilich Lenin's "April Theses" was one of the most influential and important documents of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik history. The main ideas of Lenin's April Theses were first delivered in speeches immediately after his arrival in Petrograd on April 16, 1917, and then formalized in a newspaper article ("The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution") in the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* on April 20. The Theses refused any support for the Provisional Government, attacked the Petrograd soviet (council) leadership's policy of cooperation with the Provisional Government, and declared that the soviets should be the basis for a new, revolutionary government. This latter position soon aligned the Bolsheviks with popular sentiment, which by summer was demanding "all power to the soviets," that is, a government based on the soviets. The Theses also called for immediate radical social and economic reforms and for transforming the international war into civil war. Although Lenin's theses were too radical for the optimistic and cooperative mood of April, they positioned the Bolsheviks to benefit from the discontentment and disillusionment that summer and fall

as the Provisional Government failed to solve the war, economic, and other issues. Lenin's April Theses also called for a Bolshevik party congress to revise the party program and to change the party name to communist. Lenin's ideas initially shocked most Bolsheviks as much as other political leaders, but Lenin soon brought the Bolshevik Party to accept them. The Theses, especially those calling for immediate passage into the next stage of revolution and a soviet-based government, significantly redefined Bolshevism.

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; SOVIET

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REX A. WADE

ARCHITECTURE

The architecture of medieval Rus, initially influenced by Byzantine architecture, developed a distinct set of styles between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. As Moscow established its dominance and as contacts with western European culture increased in the late fifteenth century, Russian motifs began to blend with Western ones. By the eighteenth century the design of Russia's public buildings followed Western styles. Rapid social change at the turn of the twentieth century and the establishment of Soviet power after 1917 generated new bursts of architectural experimentation.

MEDIEVAL AND MUSCOVITE

ARCHITECTURE (C. 1000–1700)

Little is known of pre-Christian architecture among the eastern Slavs, but with the acceptance of Christianity by Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev in 988, the construction of masonry churches spread throughout Rus. The largest and most complex of

these early churches was Kiev's Cathedral of Divine Wisdom (1037–1050s), commissioned by Prince Yaroslav the Wise and built with the direction of Greek masters. The interior contained extensive mosaics as well as frescoes. Other major churches of this period include the Sophia Cathedral in Novgorod (1045–1052), the Cathedral of the Transfiguration of the Savior in Chernigov (1031–1050s), and the Cathedral of the Dormition at the Kiev Cave Monastery (1073–1078; destroyed in 1941).

Regardless of size, the churches adhered to a plan known as the "inscribed cross": a cuboid structure with a dome marking the intersection of the main aisles. The dome was elevated on a cylinder supported by the four main piers. The facades usually culminated in curved gables known as *zakomary*.

In addition to Kiev, Novgorod, and neighboring cities, the third center of architecture in pre-Mongol Rus was the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, whose limestone churches were distinguished by carved decoration and precision of design. Grand Prince Yury Dolgoruky commissioned the first of these churches, such as the Transfiguration in Pereslavl-Zalessky (1152–1157). His son Andrei Bogolyubsky began the great era of limestone building in this area with the Cathedral of the Dormition in Vladimir (1158–1160); his palace church at Bogolyubovo (1158–1165) of which only fragments remain; and the Church of the Intercession on the Nerl (1165). His successor, Vsevolod III, enlarged the Dormition Cathedral (1185–1189) and built the Cathedral of St. Dmitry in Vladimir (1194–1197), whose upper tier is covered with elaborate carving representing Biblical and secular motifs.

After the Mongol invasion of 1237–1241, church construction sharply declined; but by the middle of the fourteenth century, masonry construction revived, particularly in Novgorod, with the support of wealthy merchants and neighborhood craft guilds. The Church of St. Theodore Stratilates on the Brook (1360–1361) and the Church of Transfiguration on Elijah Street (1374; frescoes by Theophanes the Greek) exemplified a distinct local style with steeply pitched roofs. Moscow also enjoyed an architectural revival in the construction of limestone churches, but not until the last quarter of the fifteenth century did the major churches of the Kremlin take shape under the direction of Italian masters imported by Ivan III.

During the sixteenth century, Moscow's brick churches displayed boldly inventive designs, also

with Italian influence. The culmination of this period occurs in the most famous of Russian churches, the Intercession on the Moat, popularly known as Basil the Blessed (1555–1561). Built on what later became known as Red Square, in celebration of Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, the structure consists of a central tent tower surrounded by eight tower churches. The latter part of the sixteenth century also witnessed the building of major brick fortresses, most notably the citadel at Smolensk (1595–1602) by Fyodor Kon. With the restoration of order after the Time of Troubles (1605–1612), the building of brick churches occurred on an unprecedented scale, especially during the reign of Alexei (1645–1676).

THE IMPERIAL PERIOD (C. 1700–1917)

The assimilation of Western architectural styles, which had begun in the late seventeenth century, increased radically during the reign of Peter I (1682–1725). In 1703 Peter founded St. Petersburg, which became the Russian capital in 1711. Western European architects Jean Baptiste Le Blond (1679–1719) and Domenico Trezzini (1670–1734) submitted plans for its development. At this stage Petersburg's architecture owed much to the northern European baroque, particularly in Sweden and Holland. The stuccoed brick walls of the city's baroque buildings were painted, with white trim for window surrounds and other details. Bartolomeo Francesco Rastrelli (1700–1771) defined the high baroque style during the reigns of Anna (1730–1740) and Elizabeth (1741–1762). Among his major projects are the Stroganov Palace (1752–1754), the final version of the Winter Palace (1754–1764), and the Smolny Convent with its Resurrection Cathedral (1748–1764). In addition Rastrelli greatly enlarged the existing imperial palaces at Peterhof (1746–1752) and Tsarskoye Selo (1748–1756).

During the reign of Catherine the Great (1762–1796), imperial architecture moved from the baroque to neoclassicism. With the support of Catherine, a constellation of architects endowed the city during the second half of the eighteenth century with a grandeur inspired by classical Rome. Charles Cameron (ca. 1740–1812), the leading proponent of neoclassicism, designed the palace at the imperial estate of Pavlovsk (1780–1796), a gift from Catherine to her son Grand Duke Paul. Andrei Voronikhin (1759–1814) created a still more obvious example of the Roman influence in his Cathedral of the Kazan Mother of God (1801–1811),

with its sweeping colonnade reminiscent of the Basilica of Saint Peter in Rome.

The reign of Alexander I (1801–1825) witnessed a new campaign to create an interconnecting system of architectural ensembles and public space throughout the center of Petersburg. The rebuilding of the Admiralty (1806–1823) by Andreyan Zakharov (1761–1811) reaffirmed that structure and its spire as dominant elements in the city plan. The culmination of the imperial design fell to Carlo Rossi (1776–1849), who created four major ensembles, including the General Staff Building and Arch (1819–1829), facing Palace Square. Neoclassicism in Moscow appeared primarily in houses and other institutions built by the nobility and wealthy merchants. Of particular note are mansions and churches designed by Matvei Kazakov (1738–1812).

During the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855), classical unity in Petersburg yielded to eclectic styles and innovations in construction engineering, both of which are evident in the final version of St. Isaac's Cathedral (1818–1858) by Auguste Montferrand (1786–1858). Of special significance was the Russo-Byzantine style, supported by Nicholas I and implemented by Constantine Thon (1794–1881), builder of the Great Kremlin Palace (1838–1849). The major work in this style was Ton's Church of Christ the Redeemer (1837–1883; destroyed in 1931 and rebuilt in the 1990s), created as a memorial to Russian valor in the 1812 war.

By the 1870s there arose a new national style based on decorative elements from sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Muscovy as well as on motifs from folk art and traditional wooden architecture. Major examples of the Russian style in Moscow include the Historical Museum (1874–1883), built on the north side of Red Square to a design by Vladimir Shervud (1833–1897); the Moscow City Duma (1890–1892) by Dmitry Chichagov (1835–1894); and the Upper Trading Rows (1889–1893) by Alexander Pomerantsev (1848–1918), assisted by the construction engineer Vladimir Shukhov (1853–1939). In Petersburg the Russian style was used by Alfred Parland (1845–1892) for the Church of the Resurrection of the Savior "on the Blood" (1883–1907).

The "new style," or *style moderne*, that arose in Russian architecture at the turn of the century emphasized the innovative use of materials such as glass, iron, and glazed brick in functional yet

highly aesthetic designs. The style flourished in Moscow primarily, where its leading practitioner was Fyodor Shekhtel (1859–1926), architect for patrons among Moscow's entrepreneurial elite, such as the Ryabushinskys. In Petersburg the *style moderne* appeared primarily in the design of apartment buildings. In contrast to their American contemporaries, Russian architects did not design large buildings with steel frames, but became experts at the use of reinforced concrete construction.

SOVIET ARCHITECTURE (1917–1991)

The economic chaos engendered in Russia by World War I proved catastrophic for building activity, and the ensuing revolution and civil war brought architecture to a standstill. With the recovery of the economy in the 1920s, bold new designs—often utopian in concept—brought Russia to the attention of modern architects throughout the world. Constructivism, the most productive modernist movement, included architects such as Moisei Ginzburg (1892–1946), Ilya Golosov (1883–1945), Grigory Barkhin (1880–1969), and the Vesnin brothers: Leonid (1880–1933), Viktor (1882–1950), and Alexander (1883–1959). Their designs, primarily in Moscow, set a standard for functional design in administrative and apartment buildings, as well as social institutions such as workers' clubs. Another modernist active during the same period, but not a part of Constructivism, was Konstantin Stepanovich Melnikov (1890–1974), known for his bold designs for exposition pavilions and workers' clubs.

During the 1930s more conservative trends asserted themselves, as designs inspired by classical, Renaissance, and historical models received the party's approval. After World War II architectural design became still more firmly locked in traditional, often highly ornate eclectic styles, epitomized by the postwar skyscrapers in Moscow and other Soviet cities. After 1953 pressing social needs, particularly in housing, led to a return to functionalism, heavily dependent on standardized designs and prefabricated components. With the demise of the communist system in Russia, the revival of private practice in architecture seems likely to change the face of the profession, even as new problems arise in zoning and resource allocation.

WOODEN ARCHITECTURE

Throughout Russian history wood has been used for almost every type of construction, from churches and fortress walls to peasant dwellings and grand

country villas. Fire and rot have destroyed most wooden structures from the distant past, and there is no extensive evidence that wooden structures appeared before the late sixteenth century. Yet the basic forms of wooden architecture are presumably rooted in age-old traditions. Remarkable for their construction logic, wooden churches also display elaborate configurations. One example is the Church of the Transfiguration at Kizhi (1714), whose pyramid of recessed levels supports twenty-two cupolas. Although such structures achieved great height, the church interior was usually limited by a much lower ceiling. Log houses also ranged from simple dwellings to large three-story structures peculiar to the far north, with space for the family as well as shelter for livestock during the winter. Wooden housing is still used extensively, not only in the Russian countryside, but also in provincial cities (particularly in Siberia and the Far East), where the houses often have plank siding and carved decorative elements.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; MOSCOW; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; ST. PETERSBURG

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WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

ARCHIVES

Research access to and knowledge about archives in the Russian Federation since 1991 have been key factors in the opening of historical and cultural inquiry in what had previously been a predominantly closed society. Yet the opening of archives would have had much less impact on society and history had it not been for the central attention given to archives under Soviet rule. And Russian archives

would hardly be so rich in the early twenty-first century had it not been for the early manuscript repositories in the church and the long tradition of preserving the records of government and society in Russian lands. For example, the “Tsar’s Archive” of the sixteenth century paralleled archives of the government boards (*prikazy*) of the Muscovite state. Peter the Great’s General Regulation of 1720 decreed systematic management of state records. During the late nineteenth century, the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice became the most important historical archive. Before the revolutions of 1917, however, most recent and current records were maintained by state agencies themselves, such as the various ministries, paralleled, for example, by the archive of the Holy Synod, the governing body of the Orthodox Church. The Imperial Archeographic Commission, provincial archival commissions, the Academy of Sciences, major libraries, and museums likewise contributed to the growth of archives and rich manuscript collections.

The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 had as revolutionary an impact on archives as it did on most other aspects of society and culture, and stands as the single most important turning point in the history of Russian archives. To be sure, the turmoil of the revolution and civil war years brought considerable disruption, and indeed destruction, to the archival and manuscript legacy. Yet it brought with it the most highly centralized state archival system and the most highly state-directed principles of preservation and management of documentary records that the world had ever seen. Deeply grounded in historical theory and committed to its own orthodoxy of historical interpretation, Marxism-Leninism as an ideology gave both extensive philosophical justification and crucial political importance to documentary control. As the highly centralized political system established firm rule over of state and society, the now famous archival decree of Vladimir Lenin (June 1, 1918) initiated total reorganization and state control of the entire archival legacy of the Russian Empire.

One of the most significant Soviet innovations was the formation of the so-called State Archival Fond (*Gosudarstvennyi arkhivnyi fond*—GAF), a legal entity extending state proprietorship to all archival records regardless of their institutional or private origin. With nationalization, this theoretical and legal structure also extended state custody and control to all current records produced by cur-

rent agencies of state and society. Subsequently a parallel Archival Fond of the Communist Party emerged with proprietorship and custody of Party records.

A second innovation was the establishment of a centralized state agency charged with the management of the State Archival Fond, enabling the centralization, standardization, and planning that characterized Soviet archival development. Indicative of the importance that Stalin attributed to control of archives and their utilization, from 1938 through 1960 the Main Archival Administration of the USSR (Glavarkhiv SSSR) was under the Commissariat and later (after 1946), Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD, MVD). Subsequently it was responsible directly to the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

A third innovation saw the organization of a network of archival repositories, although with substantial reorganizations during the decades of Soviet rule. A series of central state archives of the USSR paralleled central state archives for the union republics, with a hierarchical network of regional archives, all controlled and adopting standardized organizational and methodological guidelines dictated by Glavarkhiv in Moscow. Strict disposal and retention schedules regulated what went into the archives. A parallel network of Communist Party archives emerged. Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained separate, as did those of the security services and other specialized repositories ranging from geological data to Gosfilmofond for feature films. The Academy of Sciences maintained its own archival network, and archival materials in libraries and museums remained under their own controlling agencies.

Public research availability of the nation's documentary legacy was severely restricted during the Soviet era, although there was a brief thaw after 1956, and more significant research possibilities starting in the Gorbachev era of glasnost after the mid-1980s. But while limited public access to archives was a hallmark of the regime, so was the preservation and control of the nation's documentary legacy in all spheres.

In many ways, those three Soviet innovations continue to characterize the archival system in the Russian Federation, with the most notable innovation of more openness and public accessibility. Already in the summer of 1991, a presidential decree nationalized the archival legacy of the Communist

Party, to the extent that the newly reorganized state archival system was actually broader than its Soviet predecessor. The Soviet-era Glavarkhiv was replaced by the Archival Service of the Russian Federation (Rosarkhiv, initially Roskomarkhiv). Russia's first archival law, the Basic Legislature of the Russian Federation on the Archival Fond of the Russian Federation and Archives, enacted in July 1993, extended the concept of a state "Archival Fond." Although it also provided for a "non-State" component to comprise records of non-governmental, commercial, religious, and other societal agencies, it did not permit re-privatization of holdings nationalized during the Soviet period. Nor did it provide for the apportionment of archival records and manuscript materials gathered in central Soviet repositories from the union republics that after 1991 emerged as independent countries. The latter all remained legally part of the new Russian "Archival Fond."

In most cases, the actual archival repositories that developed during the Soviet era continue to exist, although almost all of their names have changed, with some combined or reorganized. As heir to Soviet-period predecessors, fourteen central state archives constitute the main repositories for governmental (and former Communist Party) records in different historical, military, and economic categories, along with separate repositories for literature and art, sound recordings, documentary films, and photographs, as well as technical and engineering documentation. As a second category of central archives, a number of federal agencies still have the right to retain their own records, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs, and the security services. Municipal archives in Moscow and St. Petersburg comprise a third category. As there were in the Soviet period, there are also many archival repositories in institutes and libraries under the Russian Academy of Sciences, and libraries and museums under the Ministry of Culture and other agencies. The extensive network of regional state (including former Communist Party) archives for each and every subject administrative-territorial unit of the Russian Federation, all of which have considerable more autonomy from Moscow than had been the case before 1991.

The most important distinction between Russian archives in the early twenty-first century and those under Soviet rule is the principle of openness and general public accessibility. Significantly, such openness extends to the information sphere, whereby

published directories now identify all major repositories and their reference systems. New archival guides and specialized finding aids reveal the holdings of many important archives (many with foreign subsidies). And since 1997, information about an increasing number of archives is publicly available in both Russian and English-language versions on the Internet.

Complaints abound about continued restrictions in sensitive areas, such as the contemporary archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the security services. Declassification has been all too slow in many areas, including more recent Communist Party records, and new laws governing state secrets often limit the otherwise proclaimed openness. Yet often the most serious research complaints stem from economic causes—closures due to leaking roofs or lack of heat, slow delivery time, and high copying fees. While Russia has opened its archives to the world, there have been more dangers of loss due to inadequate support for physical facilities and professional staff, leading to commercialization and higher service charges, because the new federal government has had less ideological and political cause than its Soviet predecessors to subsidize new buildings, physical preservation, and information resources adequately for the archival heritage of the nation.

See also: CENSORSHIP; NATIONAL LIBRARY OF RUSSIA; RUSSIAN STATE LIBRARY; SMOLENSK ARCHIVE

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PATRICIA KENNEDY GRIMSTED

ARMAND, INESSA

(1874–1920), née Elisabeth Stefan, revolutionary and feminist, first head of the *zhenotdel*, the women's section of the Communist Party.

Born in France, Inessa Armand came to Russia as a child when her parents died and her aunt took a job as governess in the wealthy Armand merchant family. At age nineteen she married Alexander Armand, who was to support her and her numerous Bolshevik undertakings throughout his life. In 1899 she became involved in the Moscow Society for Improving the Lot of Women, a philanthropic organization devoted to assisting prostitutes and other poor women. By 1900 she was president of the society and working hard to create a Sunday school for working women.

In 1903, disillusioned with philanthropic work, she joined the Social Democratic Party and became active in revolutionary propaganda work. In exile in Europe from 1909 to 1917, with a brief illegal return to Russia, she helped Vladimir Lenin establish a party school at Longjumeau, France, in 1911; she taught there herself. When Russian women workers gained the right to vote and be elected to factory committees in 1912, Armand, Nadezhda Krupskaya, and others persuaded Lenin to create a special journal *Rabotnitsa (Woman Worker)*. Although Armand and other editors insisted that women workers were not making special demands separate from those of men, they did recognize the importance of writing about women's health and safety issues in the factories.

During World War I Armand was one of Lenin's and the party's principal delegates to international socialist conferences, especially those of women protesting the war. In April 1917 Armand returned to Petrograd with Lenin and Krupskaya. Soon she was made a member of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Provincial Soviet and of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VtsIK), as well as chair of the Moscow Provincial economic council. Her crowning achievement, however, was her role in founding the women's section of the Communist Party, the *zhenotdel*.

In that role she worked on problems as diverse as supporting legislation legalizing abortion, combating prostitution, creating special sections for the protection of mothers and infants in the Health Commissariat, working with the trade unions, and developing agitation methods for peasant women. In all of these, Armand advocated the creation of

special methods for work among women, given women's historical backwardness and the prejudices of many men towards women's increased participation in the workforce and in society.

However, Armand's tenure as director of the *zhenotdel* was short-lived. On September 24, 1920, while on leave in the Caucasus, she succumbed to cholera and died.

See also: FEMINISM; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; ZHENOTDEL

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ELIZABETH A. WOOD

ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS

Armenia is a landlocked, mountainous plateau that rises to an average of 3,000 to 7,000 feet (914 to 2,134 meters) above sea level. It extends to the Anatolian plateau in the west, the Iranian plateau in the southwest, the plains of the South Caucasus in the north, and the Karadagh Mountains and the Moghan Steppe in the south and southeast. The Armenian highlands stretch roughly between longitudes 37° and 48.5° east, and 38° and 41° north latitudes, with a total area of some 150,000 square miles (388,500 square kilometers). In present-day terms, historic Armenia comprises most of eastern Turkey, the northeastern corner of Iran, parts of the Azerbaijan and Georgian Republics, as well as the entire territory of the Armenian Republic.

GEOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, AND CLIMATE

The Kur (Kura) and Arax (Araxes) Rivers separate the Armenian highlands in the east from the lowlands that adjoin the Caspian Sea. The Pontus Mountains, which connect to the Lesser Caucasus mountain chain, separate Armenia from the Black Sea and Georgia and form the region's northern boundary. The Taurus Mountains, which join the upper Zagros Mountains and the Iranian Plateau, form the southern boundary of Armenia and separate it from Syria, Kurdistan, and Iran. The western boundary of Armenia has generally been between the western Euphrates River and the northern stretch of the Anti-Taurus Mountains. Armenians also established communities east of the Kur as far as the Caspian Sea, and states west of the Euphrates as far as Cilicia on the Mediterranean Sea.

Lying on the Anatolian fault, the Armenian plateau is subject to seismic tremors. Major earthquakes have been recorded there since the ninth century, some of which have destroyed entire cities. The most recent earthquake in the region, occurring on December 7, 1988, killed some 25,000 people and leveled numerous communities.

Some fifty million years ago, the geological structure of Armenia underwent many changes, creating great mountains and high, now-inactive, volcanic peaks throughout the plateau. The larger peaks of Mount Ararat (16,946 feet; 5,279 meters), Mount Sipan (14,540 feet; 4,432 meters), and Mount Aragats (13,410 feet; 4,087 meters), and the smaller peaks of Mount Ararat (12,839 feet; 3,913 meters), and Mount Bingol (10,770 feet; 3,283 meters), from which the Arax and the Euphrates Rivers originate, are some examples. Tufa, limestone, basalt, quartz, and obsidian form the main composition of the terrain. The mountains also contain abundant deposits of mineral ores, including copper, iron, zinc, lead, silver, and gold. There are also large deposits of salt, borax, and obsidian, as well as volcanic tufa stone, which is used for construction.

Armenia's mountains give rise to numerous rivers, practically all unnavigable, which have created deep gorges, ravines, and waterfalls. The longest is the Arax River, which starts in the mountains of western Armenia, joins the Kur River, then empties into the Caspian Sea. The Arax flows through the plain of Ararat, which is the site of the major Armenian cities. Another important river is the Euphrates, which splits into western and

eastern branches. Both branches flow westward, then turn south toward Mesopotamia. The Euphrates was the ancient boundary dividing what became Lesser and Greater Armenia. The Kur and the Tigris and their tributaries flow briefly through Armenia. Two other rivers, the Akhurian, a tributary of the Arax, and the Hrazdan, which flows from Lake Sevan, provide water to an otherwise parched and rocky landscape devoid of forests.

A number of lakes are situated in the Armenian highlands, the deepest and most important of which is Lake Van in present-day Turkey. Van's waters are charged with borax, and hence undrinkable. Lake Sevan is the highest in elevation, lying some 6,300 feet (1,917 meters) above sea level. It is found in the present-day Armenian Republic.

Armenia lies in the temperate zone and has a variety of climates. In general, winters are long and can be severe, while summers are usually short and very hot. Some of the plains, because of their lower altitudes, are better suited for agriculture, and have fostered population centers throughout the centuries. The variety of temperatures has enabled the land to support a great diversity of flora and fauna common to western Asia and Transcaucasia. The generally dry Armenian climate has necessitated artificial irrigation throughout history. The soil, which is volcanic, is quite fertile and, with sufficient water, is capable of intensive farming. Farming is prevalent in the lower altitudes, while sheep and goat herding dominates the highlands.

Although Armenians have been known as artisans and merchants, the majority of Armenians, until modern times, were engaged primarily in agriculture. In addition to cereal crops, Armenia grew vegetables, various oil seeds, and especially fruit. Armenian fruit has been famous from ancient times, with the pomegranate and apricot, referred to by the Romans as the Armenian plum, being the most renowned.

THE EARLIEST ARMENIANS

According to legend, the Armenians are the descendants of Japheth, a son of Noah, who settled in the Ararat valley. This legend places the Armenians in a prominent position within the Biblical tradition. In this tradition, the Armenians, as the descendants of Noah (the "second Adam") are like the Jews, chosen and blessed by God. Greek historians, writing centuries after the appearance of the Armenians in their homeland, have left other ex-



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planations of the origins of the Armenian people. Two of the most quoted versions are provided by Herodotus, the fifth century B.C.E. historian, and Strabo, the geographer and historian writing at the end of the first century B.C.E. According to Herodotus, the Armenians had originally lived in Thrace, from where they crossed into Phrygia, in Asia Minor. They first settled in Phrygia, and then gradually moved west of the Euphrates River to what became Armenia. Their language resembled that of the Phrygians, while their names and dress was close to the Medes.

According to Strabo, the Armenians came from two directions: one group from the west, or Phrygia; and the other from the south, or the Zagros region. In other words, according to the ancient Greeks, the Armenians were not the original in-

habitants of the region. They appear to have arrived sometime between the Phrygian migration to Asia Minor that followed the collapse of the Hittite Empire in the thirteenth century B.C.E., and the Cimmerian invasion of the Kingdom of Urartu (existed ca. 900–590 B.C.E.) in the eighth century B.C.E. In 782 B.C.E., the Urartian king, Argishti I, built the fortress-city of Erebuni (present-day Erevan, capital of Armenia). The decline of Urartu enabled the Armenians to establish themselves as the primary occupants of the region. Xenophon, who passed through Armenia in 401 B.C.E., recorded that, by his time, the Armenians had absorbed most of the local inhabitants.

THE LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE

Modern archeological finds in the Caucasus and Anatolia have presented sketchy and incomplete evidence of the possible origins of the Armenians. Until the 1980s, scholars unanimously agreed that the Armenians were an Indo-European group who either came into the area with the proto-Iranians from the Aral Sea region, or arrived from the Balkans with the Phrygians after the fall of the Hittites. Some scholars maintain that *Hay* or *Hai* (pronounced *high*), the Armenian word for “Armenian,” is derived from *Hai-yos* (Hattian). Hence, it is argued, the Armenians adopted the name of that empire as their own during their migration over Hittite lands. Others maintain that the Armeno-Phrygians crossed into Asia Minor, took the name *Muskhi*, and concentrated in the Arme-Shupria region east of the Euphrates River, where non-Indo-European words became part of their vocabulary. They stayed in the region until the Cimero-Scythian invasions altered the power structure. The Armenians then managed to consolidate their rule over Urartu and, in time, assimilated most of its original inhabitants to form the Armenian nation. According to this theory, the names designating Armenia and Armenians derive from the Perso-Greek: *Arme-Shupria*.

More recent scholarship offers yet another possibility—that the Armenians were not later immigrants, but were among the original inhabitants of the region. Although this notion gained some credibility since the mid-1980s, there remain a number of unresolved questions: What was the spoken language of the early Armenians? Are the Armenians members of a non-Indo-European, Caucasian-speaking group who later adopted an Indo-European dialect, or are they, as many believe, one of the native Indo-European speaking groups? A

number of linguists maintain that the Armenians, whom they identify with the Hayasa, together with the Hurrians, Kassites, and others, were indigenous Anatolian or Caucasian people who lived in the region until the arrival of the Indo-Europeans. The Armenians adopted some of the vocabulary of these Indo-European arrivals. This theory explains why Armenian is a unique branch of the Indo-European language tree and may well explain the origin of the word *Hayastan* (“Armenia” in the Armenian language). As evidence, these scholars point to Hurrian suffixes, the absence of gender, and other linguistic data. Archeologists add that the images of Armenians on a number of sixth-century Persian monuments depict physical features similar to those of other people of the Caucasus.

Other scholars, also relying on linguistic evidence, believe that Indo-European languages may have originated in the Caucasus and that the Armenians, as a result of pressure from large empires such as the Hittite and Assyrian, merged with neighboring tribes and adopted some of the Semitic and Kartvelian vocabulary and legends. They eventually formed a federation called *Nairi*, which became part of the united state of Urartu. The decline and fall of Urartu enabled the Armenian component to achieve predominance and, by the sixth century B.C.E., establish a separate entity, which the Greeks and Persians, the new major powers of the ancient world, called Armenia.

Further linguistic and archeological studies may one day explain the exact origins of the Indo-Europeans and that of the Armenian people. As of the early twenty-first century, Western historians maintain that Armenians arrived from Thrace and Phrygia, while academics from Armenia argue in favor of the more nationalistic explanation; that is, Armenians are the native inhabitants of historic Armenia.

CENTURIES OF CONQUERORS

Located between East and West, Armenians from the very beginning were frequently subject to invasions and conquest. The Armenians adopted features of other civilizations, but managed to maintain their own unique culture. Following the demise of Urartu, Armenia was controlled by the Medes, and soon after became part of the Achaemenid Empire of Persia. The word Armenia is first mentioned as *Armina* on the Behistun Rock, in the Zagros Mountains of Iran, which was inscribed by Darius I in about 520 B.C.E. Armenia formed one of the Per-

sian satrapies governed by the Ervandids (Orontids). Alexander the Great's conquest of Persia enabled the Ervandids to become autonomous and to resist the Seleucids. The Roman defeat of the Seleucids in 190 B.C.E. encouraged Artahses, a general of the Ervandids, to take over the land and establish the first Armenian dynasty, the Artashesid (Artaxiad). in 189 B.C.E.

The Artashesids faced Rome to the west and Parthia to the east. During the first century B.C.E., when both powers were otherwise engaged, Armenia, with the help of Pontus, managed to extend its territory and for a short time, under Tigranes the Great, had an empire stretching from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. By the first century of the common era, however, the first Armenian dynasty came to an end, and Armenia fell under successive Roman and Parthian rule. The struggle between Rome and Parthia to install their own government in Armenia was finally settled by the peace of Rhandaia, in 64 C.E. The brother of the Persian king became king of Armenia, but had to travel to Rome and receive his crown from Nero. Originally Parthian, the Arsakids (Arsacids) became a distinctly Armenian dynasty. During their four-century rule, Armenia became the first state to adopt Christianity and developed its own, unique alphabet.

The accession of the Sasanids in Persia posed new problems for Armenia. The Sasanids sought a revival of the first Persian Empire. They eradicated Hellenism and established Zoroastrianism as a state religion. The Sasanids not only attacked Armenia, but also fought Rome. By 387, the two powers partitioned Armenia. Four decades later, the second Armenian dynasty came to an end. Another partition occurred between Persia and the eastern Roman Byzantine empire (Byzantium) in 591. Armenia was ruled by local magnates who answered to Persian or Byzantine governors. Despite all this, Armenians not only maintained their national character, but also produced major historical and religious works and translations. Their church separated itself from Rome and Constantinople and assumed a national character under its supreme patriarch, the *catholicos*.

The advent of Islam and the arrival of the Arabs had a major impact on Armenia. The Arabs soon accepted a new Armenian dynasty, the Bagratids, who ruled parts of Armenia from 885 to 1045. Cities, trade, and architecture revived, and a branch of the Bagratids established the Georgian Bagratid house, which ruled parts of Georgia until the nine-

teenth century. The Bagratids, the last Armenian kingdom in historic Armenia, finally succumbed to the Byzantines, who under the Macedonian dynasty had experienced a revival and incorporated Armenia into their empire. By destroying the Armenian buffer zone, however, the Byzantines had to face the Seljuk Turks. In 1071, the Turks defeated the Byzantines in the battle of Manzikert and entered Armenia.

The Turkish invasion differed in one significant respect from all other previous invasions of Armenia: The Turkish nomads remained in Armenia and settled on the land. During the next four centuries, the Seljuk and the Ottoman Turks started the Turkification of Anatolia. The Armenians and Greeks slowly lost their dominance and became a minority. Emigration, war, and forced conversions depleted the Anatolian and Transcaucasian Christian population. Mountainous Karabagh, Siunik (Zangezur), Zeitun, and Sasun peoples, and a few other pockets of settlement were the only regions where an Armenian nobility and military leaders kept a semblance of autonomy. The rest of the Armenian population, mostly peasants, lived under Turkish or Kurdish rule. A number of Armenian military leaders who had left for Byzantium settled in Cilicia. The arrival of the Crusaders enabled these Armenians to establish a kingdom in 1199. This kingdom became a center of east-west trade and, thanks to the Mongol campaigns against the Muslims, lasted until 1375, when the Egyptian Mamluks overrun the region. From then until 1918, historic Armenia was first divided between the Persians and Ottomans, and then between the Ottomans and Russians. Although Armenian diasporas were established in western Europe, South Asia, and Africa, the largest and most influential communities rose in the major cities of the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires.

ARMENIANS IN TURKEY AND RUSSIA

Following the Russian conquest of Transcaucasia, the Armenians in Russia adopted Western ideas and began their national and political revival. Soon after, the Armenians in Turkey also began a cultural renaissance. Armenians in Baku and Tiflis (Tbilisi) wielded economic power, and Armenians in Moscow and St. Petersburg associated with government officials. Armenian political parties emerged in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Beginning as reformist groups in Van (Turkey), the Armenians soon began to copy the programs of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and the Russian Populists (*Narodniks*), the Hnchakian Social Democratic

Party, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnaktsutian*).

Armenian political activities angered both the Russians and the Turks. The Russians issued a decree in 1903 which confiscated the property of the Armenian Church. They arrested and executed some leaders and began a general Russification program. The Armenian armed response and the 1905 revolution abrogated the decree. Meanwhile, the Turkish sultan Abdul-Hamid II ordered Armenian massacres from 1895 to 1896. Armenian hopes were raised when, in 1908, the Young Turks overthrew the sultan and promised a state where all citizens would be equal. Unfortunately, the Young Turks became increasingly nationalistic. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, combined with chauvinism and social Darwinism, eroded the Armeno-Turkish cooperation. The defeat of the Turkish army in the winter campaign of 1914 and 1915 gave them the excuse to rid Turkish Armenia of its Armenian population. Some 1.5 million Armenians perished in the first genocide of the twentieth century. The small number of survivors, mostly women and children, managed to reach Syria or Russia.

The Russian revolution and civil war initially established a Transcaucasian Federated Republic in 1918. On May 26 of that year, however, Georgia, under German protection, pulled out of the federation. Azerbaijan, under Turkish protection, followed the next day. On May 28, Armenia was forced to declare its independence. The small, backward, and mountainous territory of Yerevan Gubernya housed the new nation. Yerevan, with a population of thirty thousand, was one-tenth the size of Tiflis or Baku. It had no administrative, economic, or political structure. The affluent Armenians all lived outside the borders of the new republic. A government composed of Dashnak party members controlled the new state.

Armenia was immediately attacked by Turkey, but resisted long enough for World War I to end. The republic also had border disputes over historic Armenian enclaves that had ended up as parts of Georgian and Azerbaijani republics. Despite a blockade, terrible economic and public health problems, and starvation, the Armenians hoped that the Allied promises for the restoration of historic Armenia would be carried out. The Allies, however, had their own agenda, embodied in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Armenia was forgotten in the peace conferences that divided parts of the Ottoman Empire between the French and the British. Although

the United States, led by President Woodrow Wilson, tried its best to help Armenia, the American mandate did not materialize. Armenia was invaded by both republican Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), and by the Bolsheviks. In December 1920, it became a Soviet state.

ARMENIA UNDER THE SOVIETS

Bolshevik rule began harshly for Armenia. Armenian political leaders were either arrested or fled to Iran. Not only did Karabagh and Ganja remain part of Azerbaijan, but Nakhichevan, which had always been part of Persian and Russian Armenia, together with the adjoining district of Sharur, was handed over to Azerbaijan as well. The Armenian regions of Akhalkalaki remained part of Georgia. Armenian regions of Kars and Ardahan, captured by Russia in 1878, were returned to Turkey. As a final slap, Mt. Ararat, which had never been part of Turkish Armenia, was given to Turkey. Armenia thus became the junior member of the Soviet Transcaucasian Federation.

The history of Soviet Armenia paralleled that of the Soviet Union. Armenians experienced the harshness of war communism, and breathed a sigh of relief during the years of New Economic Policy (NEP). Mountainous Karabakh, with its predominantly Armenian population, was accorded autonomy within Azerbaijan. Nakhichevan, separated from Azerbaijan by Zangezur, remained part of the constituent republic of Azerbaijan, but as an autonomous republic.

The task of the Armenian communists was to build a new Armenia that would attract immigrants from Tiflis, Baku, and Russia and thus compete with the large Armenian diaspora. Modernization meant urbanization. The small, dusty town of Yerevan was transformed into a large city that, by 1990, had more than one million inhabitants. Armenia, which had had primarily an agricultural economy, was transformed into an industrial region. Antireligious propaganda was strong, and women were encouraged to break the male domination of society. Ancient traditions were ignored and the new order praised. The idea of *ko-renizatsiia* (indigenization) enabled Armenian communists to defend Armenian national aspirations within the communist mold. Like their counterparts in other national republics, Armenian leaders were purged by Josef Stalin and Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria between 1936 and 1938. Beria installed his protege, Grigor Arutiunov, who ruled Armenia until 1953.

The so-called Thaw begun under Nikita Khrushchev (1953–1964) benefited Armenia. Anastas Mikoyan came to Armenia to rehabilitate a number of Armenian authors and to signal the end of the Stalin era. After 1956, therefore, Armenians built new cadre of national leaders and were empowered to run their local ministries. For the next thirty-five years, Armenia was ruled by only four heads of state. Armenian industrial output surpassed that of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Seventy percent of Armenians lived in urban centers, and more than 80 percent had a secondary education or higher, making them one of the best educated groups in the USSR, along with the Jews and ethnic Russians.

Armenians vastly outnumbered all other ethnic groups living in their republic, comprising 98 percent of the population. Ironically, however, Armenians also had the largest numbers living outside their republic. More than 1.5 million lived in the other Soviet republics, and more than 2.5 million had participated in the diaspora. After the Jews, Armenians were the most dispersed people in the USSR. A million lived in Georgia and Azerbaijan alone.

The two decades of the Leonid Brezhnev era were years of benign neglect that enabled the Armenian elite to become more independent and nationalistic in character. Removed from the governing elite, Armenian dissident factions emerged to demand major changes. They even managed to remove the Armenian Communist chief, Anton Kochinian, on charges of corruption, and replaced him with a new leader, Karen Demirjian. Ironically, much of the dissent was not directed against the Russians, but against the Turks and the Azeris. Russia was viewed as a traditional friend, the one power that could redress the wrongs of the past and reinstate Armenia's lost lands. Since Armenian nationalism did not threaten the USSR, the Armenians were permitted, within reason, to flourish. The fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian genocide (1965) was commemorated in Armenia and a monument to the victims was erected. The status of Karabakh was openly discussed. Armenian protests shelved the idea, proposed during the 1978 revision of the Constitution of the USSR, of making Russian the official language of all republics.

Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika had a major impact on Armenia. Russia anticipated problems in the Ukraine and the Baltic states, but no one predicted the great eruption of Armenian nationalism, primarily over Karabakh. On Febru-

ary 28, 1988, the Karabakh Soviet passed a resolution for the transference of Karabakh to Armenia. Gigantic peaceful demonstrations followed in Yerevan. The Azeris reacted by carrying out pogroms against the Armenians in Azerbaijan. Gorbachev's inaction soured Russo-Armenian relations, and dissident leaders, known as the Karabakh Committee, gained credibility with the public.

In May 1988, Demirjian was replaced by Suren Harutiunian, who promised to take the Karabakh issue to the Supreme Soviet. Moscow rejected the transfer, and a crackdown began in Karabakh and Yerevan. The terrible earthquake of December 7, 1988, Moscow's inept handling of the crisis, and Azeri attacks upon Karabakh resulted in something extraordinary. Armenians, the most pro-Russian of all ethnic groups, demanded independence. Harutiunian resigned, and after declaring its intent to separate from the USSR, the Armenian National Movement, under the leadership of Levon Ter-Petrossian, a member of the Karabakh Committee, assumed power in Armenia. On September 21, 1991, the Armenian parliament unanimously declared a sovereign state outside the Soviet Union and two days later, on September 23, Armenia declared its independence.

INDEPENDENT, POST-SOVIET ARMENIA

On October 16, 1991, barely a month after independence, Armenians went to the polls. Levon Ter-Petrossian, representing the Armenian National Movement (ANM), won 83 percent of the vote. Neither the Dashnaks nor the Communists could accept their defeat and, ironically, they found common cause against Levon Ter-Petrossian's government.

Receiving a clear mandate did not mean that the government of Levon Ter-Petrossian would be free from internal or external pressures. The major internal problem was the virtual blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan, exacerbated by the plight of the hundreds of thousands of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and the earthquake zone. Other domestic issues involved the implementation of free-market reforms, the establishment of democratic governmental structures, and the privatization of land. The external concerns involved future relations with Russia, Turkey, Georgia, and Iran. The immediate concern, however, was the conflict with Azerbaijan over mountainous Karabakh and the political uncertainties in Georgia, which contained 400,000 Armenians.

Ter-Petrossian attempted to assure Turkey that Armenia had no territorial claims against it and

that it desired neighborly diplomatic and economic relations. Rather than espousing an ideologically dogmatic and biased outlook, Armenia was to have a pragmatic and flexible foreign policy. In the long run, however, Armenian efforts to establish political and economic relations with Turkey did not materialize. The Turks not only maintained their blockade of Armenia, but also insisted that the issue of Karabakh had to be resolved before anything else could be discussed. The Azeri blockade had resulted in food and fuel shortages and, since 1989, had virtually halted supplies for earthquake reconstruction. The closing down of the Medzamor Nuclear Energy Plant in 1989 meant that Armenian citizens, including the many refugees, would have to face many difficult winters.

The presidential election of 1996 was marred by accusations of fraud. A broad coalition supported Vazgen Manoukian, the candidate of the National Democratic Union, but the election results gave Ter-Petrosian a victory with 51 percent of the vote. The opposition accused the ruling party of massive frauds in the counting of the ballots. Foreign observers cited some irregularities, but concluded that these did not significantly affect the outcome. Continued rallies, riots, and some shootings resulted in arrests and the ban on all public gatherings for a short time. By early 1998, a major split over Karabakh had occurred between Levon Ter-Petrosian and members of his own cabinet. Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, Defense Minister Vazgen Sargisian, and the Interior and National Security Minister Serge Sargisian joined forces against the president, who was forced to resign. Kocharian succeeded him.

The parliamentary elections of May 1999 reshaped the balance of power. The Unity Coalition, led by Vazgen Sargisian, and the People's Party of Armenia, led by Karen Demirjian, won the elections and left Kocharian without any control over the parliamentary majority. Sargisian became prime minister, and Demirjian became the speaker of Parliament. They removed Serge Sargisian, a Karabakhi and Kocharian's closest ally, from his post of minister of the interior. Karen Demirjian, meanwhile, became the speaker of Parliament. But on October 27, five assassins entered the building of the National Assembly of Armenia and killed Sargisian and Demirjian, as well as two deputy speakers, two ministers, and four deputies. With the government in the hands of Kocharian, the economy at a standstill, and the Karabakh conflict unresolved, Armenians by the tens of thousands voted with their feet and emigrated from the country.

See also: ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS; DASHNAKTSUTIUN; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NAGORNO-KARABAKH; TER-PETROSSIAN, LEVON

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GEORGE A. BOURNOUTIAN

ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH

The Armenian Apostolic Church has a long and ancient history. Its received tradition remembers the apostolic preaching of Saint Bartholomew and Saint Thaddeus among the Armenians of Edessa and sur-

rounding territories. It is likely that there were Armenian Christians from early times, such that Saint Gregory the Illuminator, in the fourth century, who worked among people who had previous contact with Christianity. The Armenian Church celebrates the year 301 as the time when Gregory converted King Trdat. The king, in turn, made Christianity the state religion. There is disagreement among scholars about this date. It should also be remembered that the idea of Christianity as state religion was an innovation at that time.

Events of the fifth century were critical to the making of a distinctively Armenian Christian culture and identity. The foremost of these was the invention of the Armenian alphabet by the monk Mesrob Mashtots and his community. Translations of scripture, commentaries, liturgy, theology, and histories were made. Greek and Syriac literature were important sources. In addition, the fifth century witnessed the first flowering of original Armenian literature. An example is Eznik Koghbatsi's doctrinal work, *Refutation of the Sects*. The Battle of Avarayr in 451 against Persia, although a defeat for the Armenians under Vartan, has been remembered as critical for winning the Armenians the right to practice their Christian belief.

The fact that the Armenians eventually rejected the Christology of the Council of Chalcedon (451) has defined their communion with the Oriental Orthodox churches and their schism from the Orthodox churches that grew out of Constantinople (that is, the Orthodox churches of the Greeks, Georgians, and Russians, among others). The dispute concerned the way in which the natures of Christ were properly described. The Armenian Church believed that the language of Chalcedon, defining the person of Jesus Christ as "in two natures," destroyed the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ.

Throughout much of its history, the Armenian Orthodox Church has been an instrument of the Armenian nation's survival. The head of the church, called catholicos, has been located in various Armenian cities, often in the center of political power. In the early twenty-first century the supreme catholicos is located in the city of Echmiadzin, near the Armenian capital, Yerevan. Another catholicos, descended from the leaders of Sis in Cilicia, is located in Lebanon. During the existence of Cilician Armenia (from the eleventh to fourteenth centuries), when Crusaders were present in the Middle East, the Armenian Church had close ties

with Rome. Nerses Shnorhali, known as "the Graceful" (1102–1173), was an important catholicos of this period.

The Armenian Church played a significant role in the succession of Muslim empires in which its faithful were located. Because some of these were divided according to religious affiliation, the leaders of the Armenian were, in fact, also politically responsible for their communities. The Armenian Church was greatly affected by two phenomenon in the twentieth century: the genocide in Turkey, in which 1.5 million died, and the Sovietization of eastern Armenia, which ushered in seven decades of official atheism. The genocide essentially destroyed the church in Turkey, where only a remnant remains. It has also profoundly affected the way in which the Armenian Church approaches the idea of suffering in this world.

The church thrived in many parts of the Armenian diaspora, and is regaining its strength in newly independent Armenia. In the post-Soviet period, the church has struggled to define itself in society, having to overcome the decades of persecution and neglect, as well as making adjustments in a political culture in which it is favored but must still coexist in an officially pluralistic society.

The liturgy of the Armenian Church (the eucharistic service is called *patarag*) with Syriac and Greek roots, has been vastly enriched by the hymnody of Armenian writers. Contact with Rome has also been important in this context. Armenians, preserving an ancient Eastern tradition, celebrate Christmas and Epiphany together on January 6.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; ORTHODOXY; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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PAUL CREGO

ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION

See DASHNAKTSUTIUN.

ARMORY

The Armory (*Oruzheinaia palata*) was a Muscovite state department that organized the production of arms, icons, and other objects for the tsars and their household; later it became a museum.

An Armory chancery (*prikaz*) was established in the Moscow Kremlin at the beginning of the sixteenth century to supervise the production and storage of the tsars' personal weapons and other objects, such as saddles and banners. By the middle of the seventeenth century, it encompassed a complex of studios, including the Gold and Silver Workshops and the Armory Chamber itself, which employed teams of craftsmen to produce a wide variety of artwork and artifacts and also stored and maintained items for the palace's ceremonial and liturgical use and for distribution as gifts. The chancery commanded considerable funds and a large administrative staff, presided over by such



Partial view of the Kremlin Armory in Moscow. © WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS

leading boyars as Bogdan Khitrovo, who was director of the Armory from 1654 to 1680, during which time it emerged as a virtual academy of arts.

From the 1640s onward, the Armory had dedicated studios for icon painting and, beginning in 1683, for nonreligious painting. Its most influential artist was Simon Ushakov (1626–1686), whose images demonstrate a mixture of traditional compositions and more naturalistic use of light, shade, and perspective. Characteristic examples include his icons “The Planting of the Tree of the Muscovite Realm” (1668) and “Old Testament Trinity” (1671). He also made charts and engravings and painted portraits. The development of portrait painting from life by artists such as Ivan Bezmin and Bogdan Saltanov was one of the Armory's most striking innovations, although surviving works show the influence of older conventions of Byzantine imperial portraits and Polish “parsuna” portraits, rather than contemporary Western trends. Teams of Armory artists also restored and painted frescoes in the Kremlin cathedrals and the royal residences: for example, in the cathedrals of the Dormition (1632–1643) and Archangel (1652).

Russian Armory artists worked alongside foreign personnel, including many from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who specialized in woodcarving, carpentry, and ceramics. Other foreigners worked as gunsmiths and clock- and instrument-makers. A handful of painters from western Europe encouraged the development of oil painting on canvas and introduced new Biblical and historical subjects into the artistic repertoire. By the late 1680s secular painters began to predominate: Armory employment rolls for 1687–1688 record twenty-seven icon painters and forty secular painters. Nonreligious painting assignments included making maps, charts, prints and banners, and decorating all manner of objects, from painted Easter eggs and chess sets to children's toys. Under the influence of Peter I (r. 1682–1725) and his circle, in the 1690s artists were called upon to undertake new projects, such as decorating the ships of Peter's new navy and constructing triumphal arches. In the early eighteenth century Peter transferred many Armory craftsmen to St. Petersburg, and by 1711 the institution was virtually dissolved, surviving only as a museum and treasury. From 1844 to 1851 the architect Karl Ton designed the present classical building, which houses and displays Muscovite and Imperial Russian regalia and treasures, vestments, carriages, gifts from foreign delegations, saddles, and other items.

See also: CATHEDRAL OF THE ARCHANGEL; CATHEDRAL OF THE DORMITION; ICONS; KREMLIN; PETER I; USHAKOV, SIMON FYODOROVICH

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LINDSEY HUGHES

ARMS CONTROL

Russia's governments—tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet—have often championed arms limitation. Power and propaganda considerations as well as ideals lay behind Russian and Soviet proposals. Because Russia and the USSR usually lagged behind its Western adversaries in military technology and economic strength, Russian leaders often called for banning new weapons or abolishing those they did not yet possess. Russia sought to bring the weapons of all countries to the same qualitative level. If that happened, Russia's large size would permit it to field larger armies than its rivals. By contrast, the United States often led the world in military technology and economic strength. Accordingly, U.S. diplomats often called for freezing the existing military balance of power so that the United States could maintain its advantages. Such measures, if implemented, would often have put Russia at a disadvantage.

FUNDAMENTAL BARRIERS

TO DISARMAMENT

Besides its large size, Russia had the advantage of secrecy. Both tsars and commissars exploited the closed nature of their society to hide weaknesses and assets. With its open society, the United States had fewer secrets to protect, so it advocated arms treaties that permitted onsite inspection. The usual pattern was that the United States wanted inspection first; disarmament later. The Soviets wanted disarmament first; inspection later, if ever.

Language differences magnified these difficulties. While English has just one word for disarmament, Russian has two, and thus distinguishes between voluntary and coerced disarmament. Voluntary disarmament, as the outcome of self-

restraint or negotiation, is *razoruzhenie*, whereas disarmament by force is *obezoruzhit*. Vladimir Ilich Lenin, however, believed that *razoruzhenie* was a pacifist illusion. The task of revolutionaries, he argued, was to disarm its enemies by force. Soviet diplomats began calling for wide-scale disarmament in 1922. They said that Western calls for "arms limitation"—not full *razoruzhenie*—masked the impossibility for capitalist regimes to disarm voluntarily. Soviet ideologists averred that capitalists needed arms to repress their proletariat, to fight each other, and to attack the socialist fatherland.

Seeking a more neutral term, Western diplomats in the 1950s and 1960s called for "arms control," a term that included limits, reductions, and increases, as well as the abolition of arms. But *kontrol* in Russian means only verification, counting, or checking. Soviet diplomats said "arms control" signified a Western quest to inspect (and count) arms, but not a willingness actually to disarm. After years of debate, Soviet negotiators came to accept the term as meaning "control over armaments," rather than simply a "count of armaments." In 1987, when the USSR and United States finally signed a major disarmament agreement, President Ronald Reagan put the then-prevailing philosophy into words, saying: "*Veriat no proveriat*" (trust, but verify).

THE MAKING OF ARMS POLICY

A variety of ideals shaped tsarist and Soviet policy. Alexander I wanted a Holy Alliance to maintain peace after the Napoleonic wars. Like Alexander I, Nicholas II wanted to be seen as a great pacifist, and summoned two peace conferences at The Hague in an effort to achieve that end. Lenin, however, believed that "disarmament" was a mere slogan, meant only to deceive the masses into believing that peace was attainable without the overthrow of capitalism. When Lenin's regime proposed disarmament in 1922, its deep aim was to expose capitalist hypocrisy and demonstrate the need for revolution. From the late 1920s until his death in 1953, Stalin also used disarmament mainly as a propaganda tool.

Nuclear weapons changed everything. The Kremlin, under Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, recognized that nuclear war could wipe out communist as well as noncommunist countries. Whereas Lenin and Stalin derided "bourgeois pacifists" in the West, the Soviet government under Khrushchev believed it must avoid nuclear war at all costs. Sobered by the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation, Khrushchev's regime

admonished the Chinese Communists in 1963: "The atomic bomb does not respect the class principle."

Nuclear weapons also gave Moscow confidence that it could deter an attack. The USSR tested a nuclear bomb in 1953, and a thermonuclear device in 1953. By 1954, the Kremlin had planes capable of delivering Soviet bombs to America. In 1957 the USSR tested the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), leading Khrushchev to claim the Soviet factories were producing ICBMs "like sausages." He tried to exploit the apparent Soviet lead in missiles to extract Western concessions in Germany.

By 1962, increased production in the United States had reversed the so-called missile gap. By 1972 the United States had also produced a warhead gap, as it placed multiple warheads on ICBMs and submarine missiles. Still, by 1972 each nuclear superpower had overkill capability: more than enough weapons to absorb a first-strike and still destroy the attacker. Having ousted Khrushchev in 1964, Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the first strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT I) with President Richard Nixon in 1972 and a second accord (SALT II) with President Jimmy Carter in 1979. Each treaty essentially sought to freeze the Soviet-U.S. competition in strategic weapons—meaning weapons that could reach the other country. SALT I was ratified by both sides, but SALT II was not. The United States balked because the treaty enshrined some Soviet advantages in "heavy" missiles and because the USSR had just invaded Afghanistan.

The 1972 accords included severe limits on antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses. Both Moscow and Washington recognized that each was hostage to the other's restraint. Displeased by this situation, President Ronald Reagan sponsored a Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI, also called Star Wars) research program meant to give the United States a shield against incoming missiles. If the United States had such a shield, however, this would weaken the deterrent value of Soviet armaments. The Soviets protested Reagan's program, but at the same time it secretly tried to expand the small ABM system it was allowed by the 1972 treaty.

NEW TIMES, NEW THINKING

When Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as top Soviet leader in 1985, he advocated "new thinking" premised on the need for mutual security in an interdependent world. Be-

tween the two great powers, he said, security could only be "mutual." Gorbachev said Soviet policy should proceed not from a class perspective, but from an "all-human" one.

Gorbachev's commitments to arms control were less tactical and more strategic than his predecessors—more dedicated to balanced solutions that accommodated the interests of both sides of the debate. In contrast, Khrushchev often portrayed his "peaceful coexistence" policy as a tool in the struggle to defeat capitalist imperialism, and Brezhnev demanded "coequal security" with the United States. Gorbachev, on the other hand, initiated or agreed to a series of moves to slow or reverse the arms competition:

- a unilateral moratorium on underground nuclear testing from 1985 to 1987, with acceptance of U.S. scientists and seismic equipment near Soviet nuclear test sites in Kazakhstan
- agreement in 1987 to the INF treaty, requiring the USSR to remove more warheads and to destroy more intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles than the United States (after which Reagan reiterated "*veriat no proveriat*")
- opening to U.S. visitors in September 1987 a partially completed Soviet radar station that, had it become operational, would probably have violated the 1972 limitations on ABM defenses
- a pledge in December 1988 to cut unilaterally Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks, and 800 aircraft
- withdrawing Soviet forces from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989
- supporting arrangements to end regional conflicts in Cambodia, southern Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East
- acceptance in 1990 of a Final Settlement with Respect to Germany setting 1994 as the deadline for Soviet troop withdrawal from Germany
- in 1990 a Soviet-U.S. agreement to reduce their chemical weapons stocks to no more than 5,000 tons each.

All members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in 1990. It limited each alliance to 20,000 battle tanks and artillery pieces, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. In 1991, however, members of the Warsaw Pact agreed to abolish their alliance. Soon, Soviet troops withdrew from Poland,



U.S. president Richard Nixon and Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev sign the SALT I Treaty in Moscow, 1972. © WALLY McNAMEE/CORBIS

Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Trying to compensate for unexpected weaknesses, the USSR tried to reclassify some military units to exempt them from the CFE limits. NATO objected, but Soviet power was shrinking and minor exemptions such as these mattered little.

In 1991 Gorbachev and U.S. president George Herbert Walker Bush signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). It obliged Washington and Moscow within seven years to cut their forces by more than one-third to sixteen hundred strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, submarine missiles, heavy bombers) and six thousand warheads. When the USSR dissolved later that year, the Russian Federation (RF) took the Soviet Union's place in START and other arms control regimes. START I became legally binding in 1994, and each party began steps to meet the ceilings set for seven years hence, in 2001.

In September 1991, after an attempted coup against Gorbachev in the previous August, President Bush announced the unilateral elimination of some 24,000 U.S. nuclear warheads and asked the USSR to respond in kind. Gorbachev announced unilateral cuts in Soviet weapons that matched or exceeded the U.S. initiative. He also took Soviet

strategic bombers off alert, announced the deactivation of 503 ICBMs covered by START, and made preparations to remove all short-range nuclear weapons from Soviet ships, submarines, and land-based naval aircraft.

POST-SOVIET COMPLICATIONS

In November 1990 the U.S. Senate had voted \$500 million of the Pentagon budget to help the USSR dismantle its nuclear weapons. In December 1991, however, the USSR ceased to exist. Its treaty rights and duties were then inherited by the Russian Federation (RF). However, Soviet-era weapons remained not just in Russia but also in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. These three governments agreed, however, to return the nuclear warheads to Russia. The United States helped fund and reward disarmament in all four republics.

President Bush and RF President Boris Yeltsin in 1993 signed another treaty, START II, requiring each side to cut its arsenal by 2003 to no more than 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads. The parties also agreed that ICBMs could have only one warhead each, and that no more than half the allowed warheads could be deployed on submarines. START II was approved by the U.S. Senate in 1996, but

the RF legislature ratified it only on condition that the United States stand by the ABM treaty. As a result, START II never became law. Confronted by the expansion of NATO eastward and by deteriorating Russian conventional forces, Russian military doctrine changed in the mid-1990s to allow Moscow “first use of nuclear arms” even against a conventional attack.

Ignoring RF objections, NATO invited three former Soviet allies to join NATO in 1999 and three more in 2002, plus three former Soviet republics, plus Slovenia. The Western governments argued that this expansion was aimed at promoting democracy and posed no threat to Russia. The RF received a consultative voice in NATO. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America, Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush found themselves aligned against terrorism. Putin focused on improving Russia’s ties with the West and said little about NATO.

The RF and U.S. presidents signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in May 2002. Bush wanted to reduce U.S. strategic weapons to the level needed for a “credible deterrent,” but preferred to do so without a binding treaty. Putin also wanted to cut these forces but demanded a formal contract. Bush agreed to sign a treaty, but it was just three pages long, with extremely flexible commitments. START I, by contrast, ran to more than seven hundred pages.

SORT required each side to reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, with a target date of December 31, 2012. At the insistence of the United States, the warheads did not have to be destroyed and could be stored for possible reassembly. Nor did SORT ban multiple warheads—an option that had been left open because START II had never become law. SORT established no verification procedures, but could piggyback on the START I verification regime until December 2009, when the START inspection system would shut down. Putin signed SORT even though Moscow objected to Bush’s decision, announced in 2001, to abrogate the ABM treaty. Bush wanted to build a national defense system, and Putin could not stop him.

See also: COLD WAR; REYKJAVIK SUMMIT; STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES; STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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WALTER C. CLEMENS JR.

ARTEK

The first, largest, and most prestigious Soviet Young Pioneer camp, Artek began life in 1925 as a children’s sanatorium, created on the Black Sea’s Crimean shore near Suuk-Su on the initiative of Old Bolshevik Zinovy Soloviev, vice-commissar for public health. Most of the early campers came for medical treatment. Soon, however, a trip to Artek became a reward for Pioneers who played an exemplary role in various Stalinist campaigns. In 1930 the camp became a year-round facility; in 1936 the government gave it the buildings of a nearby tsarist-era sanatorium. During World War II, the camp was evacuated to the Altai. In 1952 Artek instituted an international session each summer, in which children from socialist countries, as well as “democratic children’s movements” elsewhere, mingled with Soviet campers. In 1958, during Khrushchev’s campaign to rationalize the bureaucracy, Artek was transferred from the health ministry to the Komsomol and officially became a school of Pioneering. The next year, architects and

engineers began redesigning the camp, replacing the old buildings with prefabricated structures based on an innovative combinatory system. The largest resort complex ever built exclusively for children, this New Artek, nearly the size of New York City's Central Park and with a staff of about 3,000, hosted tens of thousands of children annually. It was a workshop for teachers and adult Pioneer leaders, a training ground for the country's future elite, and a font of propaganda about the USSR's solicitousness for children. After 1991, Artek, now in Ukraine, became a private facility.

See also: COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

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JONATHAN D. WALLACE

ARTICLE 6 OF 1977 CONSTITUTION

Article 6 of the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution established the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the sole legitimate political party in the country. The Party was declared to be the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations and public organizations," and it imparted a "planned, systematic, and theoretically substantiated character" to the struggle for the victory of communism.

As Gorbachev's reforms of *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and *demokratizatsiya* unfolded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, interest groups became increasingly active, and proto-political parties began to organize. Pressures built to revoke Article 6. Bowing to these pressures and with Gorbachev's acquiescence, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies voted in February 1990 to amend Article 6 to remove the reference to the Party's "leading role" and prohibitions against forming competing parties. The amended Article 6 read: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union [and] other political parties, as well as trade union, youth, and other public organizations and mass movements, participate in shaping the policies of the Soviet state and in run-

ning state and public affairs through their representatives elected to the soviets of people's deputies and in other ways." Article 7 was also amended to specify that all parties must operate according to the law, while Article 51 was altered to insure all citizens the right to unite in political parties and public organizations.

Within months of the Congress's action amending Article 6, fledgling political parties began to register themselves. Within one year, more than one hundred political parties had gained official recognition. The proliferation of political parties itself became problematic as reformers sought to establish stable democratic governing institutions and voters were presented with a bewildering array of choices of parties and candidates in national, regional, and local elections.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1977; DEMOCRATIZATION

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GORDON B. SMITH

ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND

Assembly of the Land is the usual translation of the Russian *Zemsky sobor*, a nineteenth-century term for a proto-parliamentary institution that was summoned irregularly between 1564 and 1653. One of the problems of studying the Assembly of the Land is defining it. The contemporary definition was *sobor*, which means "assembly" and could refer to any group of people anywhere, such as a church council or even an assembly of military people. Loosely defined, *sobor* could include almost any street-corner gathering in Muscovy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it will be defined more strictly here as an assemblage called by the tsar and having both an upper and a lower chamber.

Some Soviet scholars, such as Lev Cherepnin, advocated the loose definition of *sobor*, by which he discussed fifty-seven assemblies between 1549 and 1683, thereby supporting the claim that Muscovy

was an “estate-representative monarchy” not much different from contemporary central and western European states.

The great Russian historian Vasily Klyuchevsky initiated the view that the Assembly of the Land should be seen in terms of a sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century reality. In the former period the Assembly of the Land was definitely a consultative body called by the tsar when he needed advice. Delegates were rounded up from men who happened to be in Moscow for some reason, such as the start of a military campaign. After the collapse of the country in the Time of Troubles, the Assembly of the Land retained its former advisory functions, but delegates (especially to the lower chamber) sometimes were directly elected to voice the concerns of their constituents.

The earliest ancestor of the Assembly of the Land was an assemblage (*sobor*) of military figures convoked on the eve of Moscow’s invasion of Novgorod in 1471. The purpose was presumably to advise Grand Prince Ivan III about tactics for the campaign. No one claims that this was a real Assembly of the Land, but it was a *sobor* and had military linkages, as did many of the later real Assemblies of the Land.

Advice was one of the major functions of the Assembly of the Land. This role became critical after the abolition of the feeding system of provincial administration in 1556. The feeding system’s governors (*namestniki*, *kormlenshchiki*) served on rotation in the provinces for terms of three years. While in the provinces, they represented Moscow in matters such as tax collection and the holding of trials. While in the countryside “feeding,” these officials were expected to skim enough off from their receipts to support them when they returned to Moscow. When they were not on duty in the provinces, they were in the capital Moscow and could be summoned by the tsar and his officials to gain relatively fresh information about the condition of the provinces: for instance, whether the country could afford to go to war, whether the army was willing to fight, and so forth. With the abolition of the feeding system, this source of information was lost. Thus it is not accidental that in 1566 (June 25–July 5), during the period of the Livonian War (1558–1583) when the fighting had begun to go badly for the Muscovites, the government rounded up and sought the advice of people who happened to be in Moscow. They were grouped into two chambers: The upper chamber typically

consisted of members of the upper service class (the Moscow military elite cavalrymen) and the top members of the church, while the lower chamber consisted of members of the middle service class (the provincial cavalry) and the townsmen. The government presumed that these people understood the fundamentals of the country: whether sufficient wealth and income existed to continue the war and whether the cavalry was able to continue fighting.

Summary records of the first Assembly of the Land still exist and have been published. Its members advised the government that the country was able to continue the war, that there was no need to pursue peace with the Rzeczpospolita. They also gratuitously criticized Ivan the Terrible’s paranoid Oprichnina (1565–1572), Ivan’s mad debauch that divided Muscovy into two parts, the Oprichnina (run by Ivan himself) and the Zemshchina (run by the seven leading boyars). Ivan’s servitors in the Oprichnina, called oprichniki, looted and otherwise destroyed nearly all the possessions they were given. The criticism aroused Ivan to fury and led him to launch a second, ferocious hunt for “enemies.” Thus the first Assembly of the Land conveyed the two basic messages to the government that were to be constants throughout the institution’s history: First, the Assembly was a quick and relatively inexpensive way to determine the country’s condition; second, the assembled Russians might well do things that the government would have preferred not be done. When the consequences of the latter outweighed the value of the former, the institution was doomed.

The next real Assembly of the Land occurred in 1598 (February and March, July and August) for the purpose of electing Boris Godunov as tsar on the expiration of the seven-century-old Rurikid dynasty. This election was probably rigged by Boris, who had been ruling during the reign of Fyodor Ivanovich (1584–1598); nevertheless, the members of the Assembly, all government agents in one way or another, properly advised the government (Boris) that he (Boris, again) should be the new tsar.

During the Time of Troubles sundry meetings were held in 1605–1606 and in 1610, 1611, and 1612; these, by loose definitions, have been called Assemblies of the Land, but they really were not. In 1613, however, a real Assembly of the Land was convoked to choose Mikhail Fyodorovich as the new tsar, the first tsar of the Romanov dynasty,

which lasted until the February Revolution of 1917. The cossacks constituted a new element in the lower chamber.

Some scholars, holding to a loose definition, allege that, after the election of Mikhail, Assemblies of the Land met annually from 1614 to 1617 to deal with taxes (especially so-called fifth taxes, 20% levies of all wealth) needed to pay military forces to drive out the Poles and Swedes. The tsar's father, Patriarch Filaret, returned to Moscow from Polish captivity in 1619 and began to take command of the Muscovite government and to restore the Muscovite state. Delegates were elected in September 1619 to attend to the restoration of the Muscovite state, especially the revitalization of the tax system and the issue of getting tax-exempt individuals back on the tax rolls. A Petitions Chancellery was established to receive complaints from the populace.

The Smolensk War (1632–1634) provoked the assembling of people to discuss both the beginning of the war and its ending, as well as taxes to pay for it. On neither occasion were delegates elected; the 1634 session was called on January 28 and met the next day. Cossacks seized Azov (Azak) at the mouth of the Don River from the Crimean Tatars in 1637, and there may have been meetings about that in 1637 and again in 1639 (on July 19). Unquestionably unelected men, in Moscow for court sessions, were convoked for several days in January 1642 to discuss Azov, whence the cossacks were ordered to withdraw out of fear of provoking Turkey, with whom the Russians were unable and unwilling to go to war. Some historians allege that there was an Assembly in 1645 after the death of Mikhail, but others point out that contemporaries alleged that his successor Alexei was illegitimate because he had not been elected. The latter perspective seems correct because there was no Assembly of the Land in 1645.

The most significant Assembly of the Land was the one taking place from October 1, 1648, to January 29, 1649, convoked to discuss the Odoyevsky Commission's draft of the new Law Code of 1649, the *Sobornoe ulozhenie*. This Assembly, organized following riots in Moscow and a dozen other towns in June 1648 demanding governmental reforms, was a true two-chambered assembly with delegates in the lower chamber from 120 towns or more. Evidence survives about contested elections in several places. Although the records of the meetings were probably deliberately destroyed because the

government did not like what eventuated, the identity of most of the delegates is known. Most of them signed the *Ulozhenie*, and most of them submitted petitions for compensation afterward. The demands of the delegates were met in the new law code: the enserfment of the peasantry; the granting of monopolies on trade, manufacturing, and the ownership of urban property to the legally stratified townsmen; and a reigning in and further secularization of the church. This marked the beginning of the end of a proto-parliamentary institution in Russia. The government saw firsthand what could happen when the delegates got their way, which occasionally ran contrary to what the ruling elite desired. In 1653 the government convoked another assembly, about which very little is known, on the issue of going to war to annex Ukraine. That was the last such meeting.

For about ninety years, Assemblies of the Land dealt with issues of war and peace, taxation, succession to the throne, and law. When the 1648–1649 session got out of hand, the government resolved to do without the Assemblies, having realized that its new system of central chancelleries could provide all the information it needed to make rational decisions.

See also: GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; LAW CODE OF 1649; LIVONIAN WAR; OPRICHNINA; SMOLENSK WAR; TIME OF TROUBLES

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ASSORTMENT PLANS

Assortment plans were state-generated documents that specified the composition of output to be produced by Soviet enterprises. Each year a comprehensive plan document, the *techpromfinplan* (the technical, industrial, and financial plan) was issued, containing approximately one hundred targets that

Soviet businesses were legally required to achieve. This annual enterprise plan was part of a five-year plan that established the long-term objectives of central planners.

The most important component of the annual plan sent to enterprises involved the production plan, which disaggregated annual production targets into their component parts, breaking them out in terms of both volume and value goals. The assortment plans also incorporated demand conditions set by consumers or firms, as identified by planners. For example, a shoe factory would be given an aggregate output target—the total number of units of footwear to produce in a given year. The assortment plan then specified the type of footwear to be produced: the number of children's and adults' shoes, the number of men's and women's shoes, the number of shoes with buckles and ties, the number of brown and black leather shoes, and so forth. Planners constructed the assortment plan to capture demographic characteristics as well as to reflect the tastes and preferences of Soviet consumers. Similarly, the assortment plan component of the *techpromfinplan* sent to a steel-pipe manufacturing plant would identify the quantities of pipes of different dimensions and types, based on the needs of firms which would ultimately use the pipe.

Typically, Soviet managers gave less priority to fulfilling the assortment plan than to the overall quantity of production, because fulfilling the aggregate output plan targets formed the basis for the bonus payment. Adjustments made within the assortment plan enabled managers to fulfill quantity targets even when materials did not arrive in a timely fashion or in sufficient quantity. For example, managers could "overproduce" children's shoes relative to adults' shoes, if leather was in short supply, thereby generating a shortage in adult footwear relative to the needs of the population. This practice of adjusting quantities within the assortment plan imposed higher costs when steel pipes and other producer goods were involved, because producing three-inch pipe instead of the requisite six-inch pipe obliged recipient firms to reconfigure or adapt their equipment to fit the wrong-sized pipe.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; FIVE-YEAR PLANS

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ASTRAKHAN, KHANATE OF

The Khanate of Astrakhan was a tribal union of Sunni Muslim pastoral nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples, located in the lower Volga region, with the capital of Astrakhan (Citracan) situated at the confluence of the river into the Caspian Sea. Traditionally, it is believed that the khanate of Astrakhan was formed sometime in the mid-1400s (certainly by 1466), when the tribe seceded from the Golden (or Great) Horde, probably under Mahmud Khan (died c. 1466). Many scholars attribute the foundation of the khanate to Qasim I (1466–1490), perhaps Mahmud Khan's son. However, a recent study argues that the khanate was formed only after 1502. Specifically, from the 1450s to the 1470s, Astrakhan was one of the centers of the Great Horde and after the destruction of Saray (the old capital), not earlier than the 1480s, became its new capital. Astrakhan continued to be the capital of the Great Horde until its collapse in 1502 at the hands of the Crimean Khanate and, thereafter, remained its political heir in the form of the Astrakhan Khanate. There was no change of dynasty, nor was there any internal structural transformation to the state. The only major difference with its predecessor is that its borders were probably smaller.

The peoples of the Astrakhan Khanate mostly retained their nomadic lifestyles as they seasonally migrated in north–south directions in search of grasslands for their livestock, reaching as far north as the southern borders of Muscovy. Due to the small territory it occupied, the khanate did not have sufficient lands for grazing large numbers of animals and sustaining large human resources. For these reasons, the khanate was relatively weak militarily and prone to political interference in its affairs from its more powerful neighbors, including the successor Mongol khanates and Muscovy. The khanate also offered little by way of natural resources, aside from salt, fish, and hides.

Astrakhan, while a busy, wealthy, and large port city in the early Mongol era, fell into relative neglect after its destruction by Tamerlane in around 1391, as noted by Barbaro (d. 1494). Other Western visitors to Astrakhan, such as Contarini (1473) and Jenkinson (1558), noted the paucity of trade

coming through the city, despite the presence of Russian, Tatar, Persian, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian merchants. Both Contarini and Afanasy Nikitin, the latter a Russian merchant from Tver who traveled to India via Astrakhan sometime between 1468 and 1471, noted instability in the steppe near Astrakhan, general danger, and excessive tariffs (more properly, extortion payments) imposed on merchants. However, their travel through the khanate shows that while the trans-Volga-Caspian-Central Asian trade may have declined, because of the ideal location of the city of Astrakhan at key crossroads, international commerce continued to function. Although the volume and frequency of this trade is difficult to determine, Contarini relates that “a great many Tartar merchants” traveled in a caravan to Muscovy along with an annual embassy sent by the Astrakhan khans and brought along with them Iranian silks and fustian that they exchanged for furs, saddles, swords, bridles, and other items. With Ivan IV’s (r. 1533–1584) conquest and incorporation of the Astrakhan Khanate into Muscovy in 1556, coupled with his annexation of the Kazan Khanate in 1552, the entire course of the Volga with its Astrakhan link into the Caspian Sea came under Moscow’s direct control. Thereafter, trade via Astrakhan as well as Muscovite commerce with Persia, Central Asia, China, and India flourished.

See also: CRIMEAN KHANATE; GOLDEN HORDE; NOGAI

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

ATOMIC ENERGY


The Soviet Union had an extensive atomic energy program. The program included the use of isotopes as tracers for agricultural research and as ionizing sources for food irradiation, extensive applications in medicine, so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, and an ambitious effort to build scores of reactors to produce electrical energy. Under the regime of Josef Stalin, the military side of atomic energy was significantly more developed than its civilian ap-

plication. Scientists and workers were gathered into closed cities to build the first Soviet atomic bomb, detonated in 1949, and to design and assemble tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. It is not certain what percentage of the nuclear program was civilian and what percentage was military, but it is clear that the military needs predominated during the Cold War. It is also difficult to draw a line between military and civilian programs. Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev made the peaceful atom a centerpiece of their economic development programs. The peaceful atom found expression in art and music, on stamps and lapel pins, and even in literary works. For instance, the Exhibition of the Achievements of the Socialist Economy (VDNKh) had a large hall devoted to atomic energy. However, even when the technology was ostensibly dedicated to peaceful goals, there were often military interests at stake as well. For example, Soviet scientists conducted 120 peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for excavation, dam construction, and other purposes that were connected with the 1963 ban against atmospheric testing of nuclear devices.

COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS

Atomic energy was a prominent fixture of the Cold War, as part of competition with the United States for military superiority and for economic and ideological influence. In a propaganda coup in 1954, Soviet officials announced the opening of the Obninsk five-thousand kilowatt reactor, the first station to provide electrical energy for peaceful purposes (it remained open and operational until 2002). Over the next three decades, each subsequent Soviet achievement received extensive media coverage. Soviet scientists actively participated in the Geneva Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. The first, in 1956, enabled Soviet physicists to appear as equals of their American and European counterparts.

The conferences were crucial in allowing Soviet physicists to participate in the broader scientific community, an opportunity that had been denied them during the Stalin era because of its extreme commitment to secrecy. At conferences, scientists from the USSR could enter into serious discussions with their international colleagues, and these interactions often eased Cold War tensions. For instance, Igor Kurchatov, the head of the atomic bomb project, spent the last years of his life promoting peaceful nuclear programs and sought a test ban treaty of some sort.



Workers monitor an experiment at the Akademgorodok nuclear physics laboratory in 1966. © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

Soviet engineers developed five major kinds of nuclear reactors. One design focused on compactness, and was intended to be used for propulsion, especially for submarines. The USSR also employed compact reactors on aircraft carriers, container ships, freighters, and icebreakers, such as the icebreaker *Lenin*, which was launched in 1959. Scientists also worked on reactor propulsion for rockets and jets, and nuclear power packs for satellites. There were several prototype land-based models, including the TES-3, built in Obninsk, that could be moved on railroad flatbed cars or on tank treads. In the 1990s, Russian nuclear engineers designed a barge-based, floating nuclear unit for use in the Far North and Far East.

There was also an extensive breeder reactor program. The most common type was the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR). Breeder reactors are so called because they use “fast” neutrons from fissile uranium (U235) to transmute non-fissile U238 into plutonium (Pu239). The plutonium

can then be used to power other breeder reactors, or as fuel for nuclear weapons. Breeder reactors are highly complex. They have a liquid metal, usually sodium, coolant, which must be kept separate from the water used for power generation, because the sodium will burst into flame when mixed with water.

The physicists A. I. Leipunsky and O. D. Kazachkovsky established the LMFBR program in 1949, over the years building a series of increasingly powerful experimental reactors. In the late 1960s, they built the BOR-60 with the hope that it would double (or breed) plutonium every eight years. Like its predecessors and subsequent models, the BR-60 had an extended operational lifespan, but also required long periods of repair time because of pump breakdowns, ruptured fuel assemblies, sodium leaks, and fires.

Leipunsky and Kazachko were determined to build industrial prototype reactors as well. In 1979 they built the BN-350 on the Mangyshlak Peninsula on the shore of the Caspian Sea. The reactor

provided both electrical energy and desalinated 120,000 cubic meters of water daily for the burgeoning petrochemical industry. At Beloiarsk they built a 600 megawatt model (the BN-600), followed by an 800 megawatt model (the BN-800), and aimed to create a network of 1,600 megawatt LMFBRs that would be capable of producing plutonium sufficient for all military and civilian ends. Cost overruns and accidents left the program weakened, however.

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

AND PROBLEMS

The mainstay of the Soviet (and Russian) atomic energy effort has been the development of 440 and 1,000 megawatt pressurized water reactors, known by the Russian designation as VVER reactors. Also important were the channel-graphite reactors (RBMK in Russian), such as the one built at Chernobyl. The USSR supported the diffusion of VVERs beyond its borders, especially into Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria), and two 1,500 MW RBMKs in Lithuania. The VVERs have been largely reliable by Soviet standards, although the first generation facilities lack any containment buildings or other safety equipment that has become standard in the West.

Reactors had to include more expensive containment design features if they were to be competitive in Western markets, as when the USSR sold its VVER-440s to Finland. In an effort to reduce costs, speed construction, and limit chances for worker error in the field, the nuclear industry built the Atom mash Factory in Volgograd on the lower Volga River. Atom mash was intended to construct eight reactor pressure vessels and associated equipment annually by 1983. The massive factory required the investment of millions of rubles and employed tens of thousands of workers. Yet it never operated as intended, producing only three vessels in all before one wall of the main foundry collapsed.

RBMKs have been even more problematic. Anatoly Alexandrov, later the president of the Academy of Sciences and Kurchatov's successor, pushed the RBMK reactor. Their advantages are that they continue to operate during constant refueling, theoretically could be built in sizes up to 2,400 megawatts (forecast, not built), and produce plutonium, which is coveted by military planners. Yet they use ordinary factory structures and have no containment whatsoever. On the other hand, they have suffered from premature aging. Worse still,

the RBMK is highly unstable at low power, an inherent fault that contributed to the Chernobyl disaster. The flagship of the RBMK is the Leningrad station, with four units built between 1973 and 1984. In 2002 the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) announced plans to attempt to prolong the operational lives of these four reactors and to build another two units on the site. This continues the Soviet practice of building reactors in close proximity to populated areas and industrial centers in so-called parks that have been designed to share equipment and thus to keep costs down.

Initially, the public enthusiastically embraced atomic energy as a symbol of Soviet scientific prowess and cultural achievement. However, the inherent weaknesses of the RBMK and the dangers of the mindset of Soviet engineers who believed in the perfectibility of their technology and the desirability of unlimited reactor construction became painfully clear at Chernobyl in April 1986. As a result of an experiment that was poorly designed and even more poorly carried out, the Chernobyl facility's unit four (of four operating, with six others planned) exploded, spewing roughly 120 million curies of radioactivity into the atmosphere. This led to a fire that killed thirty-one firefighters outright, and required the evacuation of all people within a thirty-kilometer radius of the station. Soviet officials hesitated to announce the extent of the crisis at Chernobyl for several days after the event. This hesitation revealed that Mikhail Gorbachev himself was unsure how far to pursue his policy of glasnost ("openness") and seriously damaged the public image of the atomic energy program.

A major research program centered on controlled thermonuclear synthesis, or fusion. Andrei Sakharov and Igor Tamm developed the idea for the electromagnetic containment of a plasma in a toroid-shaped reactor at millions of degrees temperature. The plasma would fuse two lighter elements into a heavier one, releasing tremendous amounts of energy that could then be used to generate electricity. This model has come to be known throughout the world by its Russian name, *tokamak*, and has been the most successful fusion device developed by the end of the twentieth century. Soviet scientists remained world leaders in this field, with programs at institutes in Leningrad, Kharkiv, Akademgorodok, Moscow, and elsewhere. Cost efficiency has been a problem however. Since the program commenced in the early 1950s, it has yet to achieve the break-even point where the cost to operate fusion devices has been offset by the

returns gained through energy production. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev suggested a Soviet-American alliance in fusion research to President Ronald Reagan at their Geneva summit.

PROGRAM LEGACIES

One of the legacies of atomic energy in the USSR has been the production of thousands of tons and millions of gallons of high- and low-level radioactive waste. The waste has been stored haphazardly, often in open areas, and for a number of years the Soviets dumped waste, including spent reactor vessels, into the world's oceans. The waste has been spreading throughout the world's ecosystems for decades. There have been a series of disasters connected with waste disposal, including the explosion of a waste dump at Kyshtym in 1957, a disaster at Lake Karachai in 1953, and several others. As of 2002, Russia faced financial and technical difficulties in complying with international agreements regarding the disposal of radioactive waste and in destroying obsolete military equipment such as decommissioned nuclear submarines. The human and environmental costs of the Soviet atomic energy program thus remain extremely high. In spite of this, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has established plans to expand the nuclear enterprise significantly by the year 2020, with the construction of up to forty additional reactors and the diffusion of floating nuclear power stations.

See also: CHERNOBYL; COLD WAR

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PAUL R. JOSEPHSON

AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH

The August 1991 Putsch (August 19–August 21) was a hard-line communist attempt to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev, triggering the collapse of the USSR.

On the morning of August 19, 1991, Soviet state television suddenly and ominously switched to playing classical music, a programming change

that usually preceded a significant political announcement. Soviet vice president Gennady Yanayev issued a statement that President Mikhail Gorbachev had been removed for health reasons and that he, as vice president, was now acting president. In reality, Gorbachev was under house arrest at his vacation home in Foros. Yanayev and seven other hard-line communists, under the rubric of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, had seized power to prevent a major reorganization of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's policies of glasnost, democratization, and perestroika had set in motion a process of reconfiguring the relationship between the central party-state and the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR. Glasnost, for example, had resulted in the publication of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact's secret protocols, revealing that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had been illegally annexed by Moscow. While these three republics sought outright independence from the Soviet Union, other republics issued decrees announcing their intent to take more control over their local political and economic affairs. This parade-of-sovereignties gained momentum when Boris Yeltsin declared the sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in June 1990.

Gorbachev and the Communist Party initially tried to control the restructuring process. On April 26, 1990, the Supreme Soviet adopted the law, "On the Delineation of Powers Between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation," to redefine center-periphery relations. The newly established Federation Council, consisting of Gorbachev and leaders of the fifteen republics, announced on June 12, 1990, that a completely new union treaty was needed to clarify the changing authority structure of the country. Four separate Union treaties were drafted in 1990 and 1991. Critically, Gorbachev primarily negotiated with the elected presidents of the republics, not the republic Party leaders, a move that would alarm die-hard communists in the months to come. Gorbachev's two closest allies in the reform process, Eduard Shevardnadze and Alexander Yakovlev, began to warn that a reactionary coup was imminent.

After many rounds of negotiation and a popular referendum, a final draft was issued on June 17, 1991, and a signing ceremony was announced for August 20. The treaty created a Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics and tacitly acknowledged that the six republics absent from the negotiations

(Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova) were free to enter or decline this new political union. Gorbachev departed for vacation in the Crimea on August 4.

However, key Soviet leaders feared the new treaty would mean the end of the great Soviet state—and their own power. Plans had already been drawn up and were implemented once Gorbachev had left Moscow. The plotters' "Appeal to the Soviet People" was full of warnings about the imminent demise of the USSR, and court documents and testimony have since revealed that the desire to preserve the Union was a direct precipitant of the coup. The eight-man Emergency Committee represented the traditional bastions of power in the Soviet system. They included: Gennady Yanayev (USSR vice president), Valentin Pavlov (prime minister), Vladimir Kryuchkov (head of the KGB), Dimitri Yazov (minister of defense), Boris Pugo (minister of interior), Alexander Tizyakov (head of the Association of State Enterprises), Oleg Baklanov (head of the military-industrial complex and deputy chair of the Defense Council), and Vasil Starodubsev (chair of the Soviet farmers' union). Although Yanayev was the reluctant public face of the Committee, Kryuchkov was the real architect. Key leaders such as parliamentary speaker Anatoly Lukyanov and Gorbachev's long-time chief of staff Valery Boldin supported the Committee, although they were not formal members. In the end, the coup was thwarted by its planners' incompetence, popular resistance, and Russian Republic (RSFSR) president Boris Yeltsin.

On Monday, August 19, the Emergency Committee dispatched troops to key positions around Moscow, shut down all independent media outposts, banned all non-Communist political organizations, and proclaimed a state of emergency. They failed to shut off telephones, e-mail, and fax machines, however, and the independent media merely went underground.

Inexplicably, the Emergency Committee did not arrest Boris Yeltsin, who had become the popularly elected president of the Russian Republic only two months earlier. Yeltsin, at his dacha outside Moscow, was soon joined by key leaders of Russia, including Prime Minister Ivan Silayev, parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, Leningrad mayor Anatoly Sobchak, Moscow deputy mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and General Konstantin Kobets, chair of the Russian parliament's military affairs committee.



A soldier stands guard on a tank in Red Square as the coup begins to collapse. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

The Russian leaders drafted their own appeal, "To the Citizens of Russia," and then dispersed. Although the KGB's elite Alpha unit had surrounded the dacha, they did not move to arrest Yeltsin and company. In hindsight, participants have attributed this critical error to internal bickering among Alpha commanders or the lack of a direct order from the Emergency Committee. Whatever the explanation, Yeltsin slipped away and immediately went to the Russian parliament building, known as the White House. Climbing atop one of the tanks surrounding the White House, Yeltsin denounced the coup as illegal, read his appeal, and called for a general strike. He also declared that military and police forces on Russian territory now reported to him. Yeltsin's team began circulating alternative news reports, faxing them out to Western media for broadcast back into the USSR. Soon Muscovites began to heed Yeltsin's call to defend democracy.



Boris Yeltsin rallies Muscovites to resist the hard-line coup attempt in August 1991. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

Tens of thousands of Russian citizens assembled outside the White House, constructing barricades out of trees, trolley cars, building materials, even old bathtubs, to hold off an expected attack by Soviet troops. But instead of attacking on Monday, troops from the Tamanskaya Division switched sides to defend the White House, turning their turrets away from the building.

Outside Moscow, the reaction was mixed. Many local leaders hastened to support the Emergency Committee. Republics with noncommunist leaders, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan, immediately denounced the coup. Iraq and Libya backed the plotters, while Western leaders cautiously observed events unfold. United States diplomats had issued three separate coup warnings to Gorbachev that summer, but President George H. W. Bush was initially reluctant to back the maverick Yeltsin.

That evening, Acting President Yanayev held a press conference that was a public-relations disaster. His quivering hands, constant sniffing, and stilted delivery suggested his lack of conviction—

or his inebriation. Reporters laughed at his lame answers about the day's events. From the outset, the Emergency Committee inspired little fear.

On Tuesday, August 20, citizens continued to gather at the White House. Students, private security firms, priests, and grandmothers defended the building, organized by veterans of the Afghanistan war. Yeltsin emerged to rally the crowd. Waving Russia's pre-communist flag, he exhorted citizens to ignore decrees from the Emergency Committee. Members of the Russian and Western media entered the White House and provided eyewitness reports. Some 250 RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputies alternately holed up with Yeltsin or went into the crowds to convert Soviet soldiers to their cause. Pro-democracy figures such as Eduard Shevardnadze, Yelena Bonner, and Mstislav Rostropovich addressed the crowd.

Defying a curfew and drenching rain, people stayed at the barricades Tuesday night. When troops began to stir just after midnight, the crowds tried to halt them, shouting "Shame! Shame!" Three civilians, Volodya Usov, Dima Komar, and Ilya

Krichevsky, were killed in the confusion, becoming the coup's martyrs. No further advance was made on the White House, as military and KGB troops refused to fire on their countrymen.

The Emergency Committee effectively surrendered at 10:00 A.M. on Wednesday, August 21. As the troops withdrew, two competing delegations raced to reach Gorbachev first. One group, consisting of Baklanov, Kryuchkov, Tizyakov, and Yazov, primarily wanted to plead their case to Gorbachev and avoid arrest. Yeltsin's group, led by Russian vice president Alexander Rutskoi and Prime Minister Silayev, wanted to assure Gorbachev's safety. They took Western media and Russian security forces with them. Yeltsin's team arrived first, and Gorbachev had the other group arrested immediately upon arrival. Gorbachev and his family flew back to Moscow, arriving in the early hours of Thursday. However, the people had sided with Yeltsin, not Gorbachev, and power began to shift accordingly.

Gorbachev was slow to read the new mood among his populace. He believed a new union treaty was still possible, praised Lenin and socialism upon his return, and hesitated to resign from the Communist Party. Meanwhile, people took to the streets, tearing down statues of Lenin, hammers and sickles, and even the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky outside KGB headquarters, the organization he had founded. Lenin's Mausoleum closed indefinitely. At an August 23 session of the Russian parliament, members jeered at Gorbachev, then forced him to fire his entire cabinet. Yeltsin compelled a stunned Gorbachev to read aloud the minutes of an August 19 meeting of the coup plotters. Yeltsin then banned the Party from Russian territory. On August 24, Gorbachev resigned as Party general secretary, turned its assets over to parliament, and curbed its activities in the dwindling USSR. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, and Latvia declared their independence, followed by Moldova.

Seven members of the Emergency Committee were arrested immediately following the coup's collapse. Interior Minister Pugo committed suicide. In the immediate aftermath of the putsch, staff at the Central Committee headquarters destroyed thousands of documents. The Russian Duma amnestied the plotters in February 1994, and several were elected to that institution.

The degree of Gorbachev's complicity in the putsch remains a source of controversy. The KGB placed him under arrest on Sunday evening, August 18, after he refused to resign. Gorbachev in-

sists that he was isolated, betrayed, and fearful for his life. Lukyanov and Yanayev, however, insist that Gorbachev was in on the plans from the beginning and merely waiting to gauge popular reaction. History is still being written on this key event in Russian politics.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; KRYUCHKOV, VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH; PUGO, BORIS KARLOVICH; UNION TREATY; YAZOV, DMITRY TIMOFEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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AUSTERLITZ, BATTLE OF

The Battle of Austerlitz, which occurred on December 2, 1805, was the climactic battle of the War of the Third Coalition (August–December 1805). Having forced an Austrian army to surrender at Ulm in September, Napoleon then chased the Russian army of Mikhail Ilarionovich Kutuzov from the Austrian border on the River Inn to Moravia. There Kutuzov's army linked up with reinforcements from Russia and Tsar Alexander I joined his troops. Also known as the Battle of the Three Emperors, because Napoleon, Emperor Franz of Austria, and Alexander I were all present on the field, Austerlitz was a crushing French victory that sealed the fate of the Third Coalition (Russia, Austria, Great Britain, Naples, and Sweden).

Napoleon's forces were inferior to those of the coalition, so the French emperor developed a ruse. Having initially seized the dominant Pratzen Heights in the middle of the battlefield, he withdrew from that position, feigning weakness, in order to entice the allies to attack his right flank. When they did so, Napoleon's forces retook the

Pratzen Heights, where Kutuzov and Alexander himself urged their troops to resist, and then surrounded the remnants of the allied army, inflicting approximately 30 percent casualties on the Russian and Austrian troops.

The victory was so one-sided that Alexander withdrew his army from the campaign altogether, retreating rapidly back to Russian Poland. His departure compelled Emperor Franz to sue for peace, resulting in the lopsided Treaty of Pressburg (1806), that formally ended the war and dissolved the coalition. Although little studied by Russians and Austrians (for reasons of national pride), Austerlitz elsewhere became the paradigm of decisive battles in the nineteenth century, and generals across the continent and even in the United States sought to emulate Napoleon's accomplishment.

See also: ALEXANDER I; KUTUZOV, MIKHAIL ILARIONOVICH; NAPOLEON I

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FREDERICK W. KAGAN

AUSTRIA, RELATIONS WITH

As they gained control of the Russian lands during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the princes of Moscow became a factor in international relations. An Austrian nobleman, Sigismund von Herberstein, twice led embassies from the Habsburg Holy Roman emperor to Basil III (1505–1533) in Moscow. Herberstein's *Rerum moscoviticarum commentarii* (Notes on Muscovite Affairs, 1549) helped shape European attitudes to Russia for generations. More sustained relations between Austria and Russia began during the reign of Peter the Great (1689–1725), who made the Russian Empire a permanent force in the European balance of power.

Austria maintained an alliance with Russia for most of the eighteenth century, because its rival, France, was seeking aid from Russia's neighbors Poland and Turkey. Austria and Russia prevented Stanislaw Leszczyński, a French-supported candi-

date to the Polish throne, from unseating the Saxon dynasty in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1735). Russia supported Maria Theresa's claim to the inheritance of her father, Emperor Charles VI, in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Year's War (1756–1763).

Austria and Russia joined with Prussia in the First Partition of Poland (1772), a cynical but effective attempt to preserve regional equilibrium by compensating the three powers at Poland's expense. Austria then supported Empress Catherine II's ambitions in the Balkans, but, concerned by the threat of the French Revolution, withdrew from the war with Turkey in 1791. While Austria was preoccupied with France, Russia and Prussia cooperated in the Second Partition of Poland (1793), but Austria joined them in the Third Partition following Kosciuszko's revolt (1795).

During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Russia and Austria were allies in the War of the Second Coalition (1798–1801, Russia withdrew in 1799) and the War of the Third Coalition (1805–1807). French victories forced Austria to make an alliance with Napoleon, sending troops to join his invasion of Russia in 1812. When the invasion failed, however, Austria joined Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain in the final coalition that defeated Napoleon in 1814 and occupied Paris.

Following the Congress of Vienna (1815), Austria signed Alexander I's Holy Alliance, and the two states generally cooperated to support the conservative order and prevent revolution. Nicholas I (1825–1855) sent a Russian army to help Austria defeat the Hungarian bid for independence in 1849. This was poorly repaid by Austria's malevolent neutrality during the Crimean War (1853–1856).

After the unification of Italy and Germany, Austria turned its ambitions exclusively to the Balkans, where it clashed with Russia. The Balkan crises in 1875 to 1878 and in 1885 destroyed Otto von Bismarck's Three Emperors' League. Subsequent Austro-Russian success at keeping the Balkans "on ice" ended after Russia's disastrous war with Japan in 1904 to 1905. As Russia turned from the Far East to a more active Balkan policy, Austria in 1908 annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina (occupied since the Congress of Berlin in 1878), leaving Serbia bitter and Russia humiliated. Russia responded by encouraging Balkan cooperation to thwart further Austrian penetration, but instead the Balkan League turned on Turkey in two wars in 1912 and 1913. At the peace conference in Lon-

don in 1913, Austria blocked Serbian access to the Adriatic, again to Russia's chagrin.

This accumulation of tension set the stage for the assassination of the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914, touching off World War I. Austria was determined to punish Serbia for the assassination. Russia's support for Serbia drew in Germany, Austria's ally. The German war plan called for an attack on France, Russia's ally since the 1890s, before Russia could mobilize. The attack, through neutral Belgium, provoked Great Britain's entry. During the war, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires both collapsed.

The empire's diminished successor, the Republic of Austria, and the Soviet Union did not enjoy significant relations between the wars. Absorbed into Hitler's Germany in 1938, Austria regained its independence after World War II because the Allies had decided in 1943 to treat it as liberated, not enemy, territory. Nevertheless, Austria was occupied in four zones, with Vienna, also divided, located in the Soviet zone. On the fault line of the developing Cold War, Austria emerged united, neutral, and free of Soviet domination when the State Treaty was signed in 1955. Vienna was often a site for international meetings, such as the summit between Nikita S. Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy in 1961, prior to the Berlin and Cuban crises. Austria's entry into the European Union ended its neutrality and placed its relations with Russia on a new footing as part of Russia's relationship with the EU.

See also: BALKAN WARS; COLD WAR; CRIMEAN WAR; POLAND; SEVEN YEARS' WAR; THREE EMPERORS' LEAGUE; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF; WORLD WAR I

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HUGH LECAINE AGNEW

AUTOCRACY

Autocracy was the form of government in Russia until 1905 when, in theory, a constitutional monarchy was established. The Russian autocratic order can date its origins to the rise of Moscow during the Mongol occupation. The official conception of the autocracy stressed that all political power and legitimacy emanated from the autocrat, who claimed to be God's representative on earth. According to Russia's Fundamental Laws of 1832, "The All-Russian Emperor is an autocratic and unlimited monarch." He had the ability to overcome society more easily than most of his counterparts to the west of Russia simply because the tenets of autocratic thought did not accept the notion that the monarch should consult social groups or other forms of organized societal elements, and institutional constraints on monarchical power did not exist.

One of the justifications for autocracy was its perceived position as being above all classes. It was portrayed as the ideal arbiter between the various self-interested groups in society, ensuring that exploitation did not take place between them and implementing supreme truth and justice. In addition, autocracy was stressed as Russia's prime and unique historical force, pushing the country towards greatness and providing for national unity in a multi-ethnic empire and internal stability. The emergence of Russia as an empire and a great European power symbolized for many the autocracy's achievements.

At the base of autocratic ideology was the idea of a strong union between the people and the autocratic tsar, whose paternalistic image was stressed. While carrying the title of autocrat, he was also known as the "little father" who protected his people from the bureaucracy and worked for their ultimate benefit. There is considerable debate over the extent to which the Soviet political system, and specifically Stalinism, was rooted in this heritage of autocracy.

The autocracy was dependent on the character and modus operandi of the autocrat. As the coordinating pivot of the entire system, he determined

the autocracy's actions and reactions. If the autocrat failed to ensure a degree of harmony and unity among the highest servants of the state, or could not fulfil this role and refused to support a minister to act as the coordinating point of the government, he contributed greatly to disorder and paralysis within the autocracy. This scenario was played out during the reign of the last emperor, Nicholas II.

The educated upper classes did not believe that the autocracy was without some constraints. These, however, were not legal, but moral, and based on history, culture, religion, and tradition. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, debate over the future of autocracy increased. The Decembrist Revolt of 1825 was the first sign of open dissatisfaction with autocracy. Forced to embark on a policy of modernization in the middle of the nineteenth century, the autocracy struggled to deal with its consequences. By the end of the nineteenth century, the autocracy was seen more as an obstacle than a positive force. After the Revolution of 1905, the tsar was still called autocratic, but a parliamentary system now existed. Autocracy's ultimate failure to incorporate to any sufficient degree the greatly enlarged educated and working classes, a step which would have in theory put an end to autocracy, became of the major causes of the collapse of the monarchy.

See also: DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; LIBERALISM; REVOLUTION OF 1905; TOTALITARIANISM; TSAR, TSARINA

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AVARS

The Avars are one of the many people of the Dagestan Republic of the Russian Federation. Numbering

496,077 within Dagestan at the 1989 Soviet census, they formed 28 percent of this republic's population. This made them the largest ethnic group in Dagestan (the Dargins were second, with 15.8 percent), but still far from a majority. There were a total of 600,989 Avars in the Soviet Union in 1989. Of this total, 97 percent spoke Avar as their first language. Nearly 61 percent, a significant number of the adults, claimed fluency in Russian as a second language.

The Avar language is a member of the Avaro-Andi-Dido group of the Northeast Caucasian family of languages. In Soviet times this would have made them a part of the larger Ibero-Caucasian family, a classification now seen as a remnant of Soviet *druzhba narodov* politics. It is written in a modified Cyrillic alphabet that was introduced in 1937. A Latin alphabet had been used previously, from 1928 to 1937. Before that an Arabic script was used. A modest number of books have been published in Avar. From 1984 to 1985, fifty-eight titles were published. Being without their own eponymous ethnic jurisdiction, the Avars were less privileged in this category than the Abkhaz, for example, whose jurisdiction was the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). With only one-sixth of the population of the Avars, the Abkhazians nonetheless published some 149 books in their language in the same period.

The most prominent leader of Caucasian resistance against the encroachment of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century was an Avar man named Shamil. Curiously, his power base was centered not among his own people, but among the Chechens immediately to the west.

In the delicate multiethnic balance of Dagestani politics, the Avars have occupied a preeminent, if not a dominant, status, especially in the post-Soviet period. The Avar language is often spoken by members of other ethnic groups within the Dagestan Republic as a means of gaining access to power structures. One of the disputes in Dagestan involves the Chechens. Part of the Chechen Republic's territory that had been absorbed by Dagestan after the Chechen deportation in 1944 was never returned. Avars occupied some of this territory, and the return of Chechens seeking their land has resulted in ongoing conflict.

The ethnogenesis of the Avars is often linked to the people of the same name who appeared with the Hunnic invasions of late antiquity. These Avars original from East Central Asia with other Turkic-

speaking peoples, and so the connection with a people speaking a vastly different language is difficult to make.

See also: CAUCASUS; DAGESTAN DARGINS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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PAUL CREGO

AVIATION

Defined as the science and practice of powered, heavier-than-air flight, aviation made its first great strides in the early twentieth century, after decades of flights in lighter-than-air gliders and balloons had been achieved in several countries. As acknowledged in reference books worldwide, including those of Soviet Russia, the first successful flight of an airplane was performed one hundred years ago by Orville and Wilbur Wright on December 17, 1903. Throughout the nineteenth century, however, designers and engineers in many countries were working on plans for powered human flight.

In Russia, Sergi Alexeyevich Chaplygin (1869–1942) and Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukovsky (1847–1921) made major contributions in their study of aerodynamics, founding a world-famous school in St. Petersburg, Russia. In 1881, Alexander Fyodorovich Mozhaisky (1823–1890) received a patent for a propeller-driven, table-shaped airplane powered by a steam engine, which crashed on take-off in 1885. From 1909 to 1914, however, Russia made significant strides in airplane design. Progress included several successful test flights of innovative aircraft. For instance, the Russian aircraft designer Yakov M. Gakkel (1874–1945) achieved worldwide attention among aviation experts for developing a single-seat, motor-powered biplane that attracted world attention among aviation experts. In 1910, Boris N. Yuriev (1889–1957) designed one of the world's first helicopters, which were known in aviation's earlier days as autogyros.

A major breakthrough in world aviation occurred in 1913, with the development of the four-motored heavy Russian aircraft, the *Ilya Muromets*. This huge airplane far outstripped all other planes of its time for its size, range, and load-carrying capability. Russian ice- and hydroplane development was also outstanding in the years 1915 and 1916. One of the world famous Russian aircraft designers of this period, and the one who built the *Muromets*, was Igor Ivanovich Sikorsky (1889–1972), who emigrated to the United States in 1919 and established a well-known aircraft factory there in 1923.

Before and during World War I, Russian military aircraft technical schools and aviation clubs blossomed. In the war, the Russians deployed thirty-nine air squadrons totaling 263 aircraft, all bearing a distinctive circular white, blue, and red insignia on their wings. With the coming to power of the Communists in late 1917, Lenin and Stalin, who stressed the importance of military production and an offensive strategy, strongly supported the development of the Red Air Force. Civilian planes, too, were built, for what became the world's largest airline, Aeroflot.

By the time of World War II, the Soviets had made significant strides in the development of all types of military aircraft, including fighters and bombers, gliders and transport planes, for both the Red Army and Red Navy. By the time of the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941, various types of Soviet aircraft possessed equal or superior specifications compared to the planes available to their Nazi German counterparts. This achievement was possible not only because of the long, pre-revolutionary Russian and postrevolutionary Soviet experience in designing and building aircraft and participating in international air shows. Progress in this field also stemmed from Soviet strategic planning, which called for offensive air-ground support in land battle.

During World War II, such aircraft as the Shturmoviks, Ilyushins, and Polikarpovs became world famous in the war, as did a number of male and female Soviet war aces. With the coming of jet-powered and supersonic aircraft in the 1950s and beyond, the Soviets continued their quest for air supremacy, and again showed their prowess in aviation.

See also: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

ALBERT L. WEEKS

AVVAKUM PETROVICH

(1620–1682), one of the founders of what came to be called Old Belief.

Avvakum was a leading figure in the opposition to Patriarch Nikon and the program of church reform he directed. Nikon's removal from his post did not placate Avvakum. He continued to agitate against the program of church reform and its supporters until his execution.

Avvakum was born on November 20, 1620, to a priest and his wife in the village of Grigorovo in the Nizhny Novgorod district. In 1638 he married Anastasia Markovna, the daughter of a local blacksmith. She was a devoted wife and true companion to Avvakum until his death. Following in the footsteps of his father, Avvakum entered the secular clergy. In 1642 he was made a deacon at a village church in the Nizhny Novgorod district. Two years later he was ordained a priest.

Avvakum was appalled by the ignorance, disorderliness, and impiety of popular religious practices and early in his career manifested a zeal for reform. By 1647 Avvakum was associated with the Zealots of Piety, a Moscow-based group led by Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich's confessor, the archpriest of the Annunciation Cathedral, Stefan Vonifatiev. Avvakum's enthusiasm for religious and moral reform was not matched by that of his provincial parishioners and soon brought him into conflict with the local authorities. His house was burned, and he was compelled to flee with his family to Moscow. There he found refuge with Stefan Vonifatiev. Avvakum returned to his parish in the Nizhny Novgorod district to continue his work, but by 1652 was obliged to flee to Moscow again. Avvakum soon was assigned to Yurevets-Povol'sky and elevated to archpriest, but by the end of 1652 he was back in Moscow, serving at the Kazan Cathedral with Ivan Neronov, a man Avvakum recognized as his mentor.

Avvakum was an ardent supporter of religious and spiritual reform, but not of the liturgical reforms advocated by other members of the Zealots of Piety. In early 1653 Avvakum joined Neronov and others in protest against some changes and simplifications made in the Psalter, recently printed under the direction of Patriarch Nikon. Vocal and adamant in opposition, Ivan Neronov was arrested on August 4, 1653. The arrest of Avvakum and other supporters followed on August 13. Thanks to the personal intervention of the tsar, Avvakum

escaped defrocking and exile to a monastery. Instead he and his family were transferred to the distant and less desirable post of Tobolsk in Siberia, where he served as archpriest until the end of July 1655. In Tobolsk, despite the support and protection of Governor Vasily Ivanovich Khilkov and Archbishop Simeon, Avvakum's abrasive approach ignited conflict and contention. In 1656, to remove him from the scene of contention, the tsar ordered Avvakum to accompany an expeditionary force led by Commander Afanasy Pashkov, intended to pacify and bring Christianity to the native tribes of northern Siberia. The assignment was not a success. Avvakum's religious zeal alienated many of the soldiers and enraged the commander. In his *Life*, Avvakum vividly recounted the multiple humiliations and torments inflicted upon him by Pashkov. In 1657 Pashkov sent a petition to Moscow, ostensibly written by several of the soldiers, accusing Avvakum and his supporters of fomenting rebellion and requesting that the archpriest be condemned to death. Once again, Avvakum's friends in high places came to his aid. Archbishop Simeon of Tobolsk intervened, and in 1658 Pashkov was replaced as commander of the expedition.

In the spring of 1661 Avvakum was directed to return to Moscow with his family. Difficulties along the way and a stop in Ustiug Veliky slowed the journey. The family did not arrive in Moscow until the beginning of 1664. Much had changed. In 1658 Patriarch Nikon had quarreled with the tsar and abandoned the patriarchal throne. The unprecedented act caused consternation and confusion, but it did not shake the commitment to church reform, including liturgical reform. The tsar and his closest associates received Avvakum graciously. The zealous archpriest met and conversed with the leading figures behind the continuing reform program, including Simeon Polotsky and Epifany Slavinetsky. He debated changes introduced into the rituals by the new liturgical books with Fyodor Rtishchev, arguing that, among other things, the sign of the cross must be made with three fingers, rather than two. The three-fingered sign of the cross would become a visible symbol for those who opposed the so-called Nikonian reforms. Further, Avvakum challenged the assertions of Rtishchev and others that "rhetoric, dialectic, and philosophy" had a role to play in religious understanding. In this period, Avvakum was even offered a post as corrector (*spravshchik*) at the Printing Office, the center of activity for the revision and printing of the new church service books and other religious works.

If such efforts were intended to mollify Avvakum, bring him back into the circle of reformers, and gain his talents for the ongoing process of church reform, they failed. Avvakum remained intransigent in his opposition to all changes introduced in the religious rituals and in the printed service books, petitioning the tsar to intervene and preaching his dissident views publicly. In this same period he became the confessor to the noblewoman Feodosia Morozova and her sister, Princess Yevdokia Urusova, convincing them of the correctness of his position. Both sisters accepted Avvakum's views and in 1675 suffered martyrdom rather than recant.

In August 1664 Avvakum and his family once again were dispatched into exile in Siberia, arriving in Mezen at the end of the year. A year later, Avvakum was recalled to Moscow to appear before a church council (1666). At this important council Nikon officially was removed as patriarch, but the reform program itself was affirmed. Those who actively opposed the reforms, including the revised service books, were tried. Some, such as Ivan Neronov, recanted. Others, led by Avvakum, stood firm. Following the council, Avvakum was defrocked, placed under church ban, and imprisoned in chains in a monastery. Subsequent attempts to persuade him to repent failed. In August 1667, Avvakum and his supporters were sentenced to exile in Pustozersk in the remote north. Two of Avvakum's friends and supporters, Lazar and Epifany, also exiled, had their tongues cut out; Avvakum was spared this punishment. By the end of the year the prisoners reached their destination.

Exile and prison did not deter Avvakum from indefatigably petitioning the tsar and communicating with his followers. In the 1670s repression of religious dissidents increased. Avvakum, his family, and the small band of prisoner-exiles in Pustozersk were subjected to new afflictions. Moreover, the colony increased with the addition of those seized after the suppression in 1676 of a rebellion at the Solovetsky monastery, ostensibly against the new service books. In the meantime, religious dissenters incited disturbances in Moscow and other towns and villages. Frustrated in all attempts to silence the dissidents, in 1682 the church council transferred jurisdiction to the secular authorities. An investigation was ordered, and on April 14, 1682, Avvakum was burned at the stake, "for great slander against the tsar's household."

Avvakum is remembered primarily as a founding father of the movement known in English as Old Belief, a schismatic movement that assumed a coherent shape and a growing following from the beginning of the eighteenth century. In Avvakum's lifetime, however, he was engaged in a relatively esoteric dispute with other educated members of the clerical and lay elites. He attracted a circle of devoted disciples and supporters, but not a mass following. His position as one of the founding fathers of Old Belief rests on the lasting influence of his writings, which were collected, copied, and disseminated. Avvakum was a prolific writer of petitions to the tsar, letters of advice and exhortation to his acquaintances, sermons, polemical tracts, and pamphlets. All contributed to the shape of Old Belief as an evolving movement. An important example of Avvakum's dogmatic and polemical work is *The Book of Denunciation, or the Eternal Gospels* (c. 1676). Written by Avvakum as part of a dispute with one of his disciples, this tract clarified his position on several dogmatic issues. This work continued to be a focal point of criticism for spokesmen of the official church into the early eighteenth century.

In addition to their religious significance, Avvakum's writings are of considerable interest to linguists and literary historians. His writing style was forceful and dramatic. He juxtaposed great erudition with penetrating direct observation and mixed the tonalities and phraseology of the popular spoken Russian of his day with the traditional ornate and formal rhetorical style. Perhaps Avvakum's best-known work is his autobiographical *Life*. Three versions were written between 1672 and 1676. Of the two later versions, the copies written by Avvakum himself, along with numerous others, are preserved. Building on traditional genres such as hagiography, sermons, chronicles, folktales, and others, Avvakum created not only a new genre, but a new mentality that, according to some scholars, manifests the seeds of modern individual self-consciousness.

See also: NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVERS; ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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CATHY J. POTTER

AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS

The Republic of Azerbaijan is a country located in the Caucasus region of west Asia. Azerbaijan has a total area of 86,600 square kilometers and shares borders with the Russian Federation in the north (284 kilometers), Georgia to the northwest (322 kilometers), Armenia on the west (566 kilometers), Iran to the south (432 kilometers), and the Caspian Sea on the east (800 kilometers). Geographically, Azerbaijan is considered part of the Middle East. However, it is a border country and not part of the heartland. This borderland quality has had a profound impact on the country's history.

From the time of ancient Media (eighth to seventh century B.C.E.) and the Achaemenid (Persian) period, Azerbaijan has mainly shared its history with Iran. In 300 B.C.E., Alexander the Great conquered the Achaemenid Kingdom, retaining Persian satraps to govern as his forces advanced eastward. According to one account, the name Azerbaijan is derived from the name of Alexander's original satrap, Atropatanes. Another explanation traces the origin of the name to the Persian word for fire keepers, "Azerbaycan." This is in reference to the fires burning in local Zoroastrian temples, fed by abundant sources of crude oil.

Azerbaijan maintained its Iranian character even after its subjugation by the Arabs in the mid-seventh century and the conversion to Islam. During the eleventh century, the migrations of Oghuz tribes under the Seljuk Turks settled into the region. These Turkic-speaking newcomers merged with the original population so that over time, the Persian language was supplanted by a Turkic dialect that eventually developed into a distinct Azeri–Turkish language.

Under Shah Ismail (1501–1524), first among the Safavid line of rule, the Shiasect of Islam be-

came the "official and compulsory religion of the state" (Cleveland, p. 58), and remains the majority faith in Azerbaijan in the early twenty-first century. When the two hundred-year Safavid Dynasty ended in 1722, indigenous tribal chieftains filled the void. Their independent territories took the form of khanates (principalities). The tribal nature of these khanates brought political fragmentation and eventually facilitated conquest by Russia. Russia's interest in the region was primarily driven by the strategic value of the Caucasian isthmus. Russian military activities have been recorded as early as Peter the Great's abortive Persian expedition to secure a route to the Indian Ocean (1722). However, penetrations into Persian territory were more successful under Catherine II (1763–1796).

Russo-Iranian warfare continued into the nineteenth century, ending with the Treaty of Turkmanchai (February 10, 1828). As a result, Azerbaijan was split along the Araxes (Aras) River with the majority of the population remaining in Iran. This frontier across Iran was laid for strategic purposes, providing Russia with a military avenue of approach into Iran while outflanking rival Ottoman Turkey.

The Turkmanchai settlement also had far-reaching economic consequences. With Russia as the established hegemon, exploitation of Azerbaijan's substantial petroleum resources increased rapidly after 1859.

Over time, haphazard drilling and extraction led to a decline in oil production. By 1905 Azerbaijan ceased to be a major supplier to world energy markets. In 1918, with the great powers preoccupied by World War I and Russia in the throes of revolution, Azerbaijan proclaimed its independence on May 28, 1918. However, the independent Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan lasted only two years before Bolshevik forces invaded and overthrew the nascent government.

With its new status as a Soviet republic, Azerbaijan experienced the same transition as other parts of the Soviet Union that included an industrialization process focused on the needs of the state, collectivization of agriculture, political repression, and the Great Purges.

During World War II, Azerbaijan's strategic importance was again underscored when the Transcaucasian isthmus became an objective of Nazi Germany's offensive. Hitler hoped to cut Allied supply lines from their sources in the Persian Gulf.

Azerbaijan was also coveted as a valuable fuel source for the German military. This operation was thwarted by the battle of Stalingrad.

Azerbaijan was also the scene of an early Cold War confrontation. On March 4, 1946, Soviet Army brigades deployed into Azerbaijan. The United States perceived this provocation as the first step in a Soviet strategy to penetrate the Middle East. In the face of shrewd Iranian diplomacy backed by Western resolve, the Soviet forces withdrew, averting an international crisis.

The limitations of the Soviet command economy coupled with the Western strategy of containment contributed to political and economic stagnation, especially in the last decades of the Soviet regime. A rekindled nationalism ignited by an outbreak of ethnic violence occurred in 1988 when neighboring Armenia voiced its claim to the district of Karabakh. As violence escalated, a national emergency ensued and new political groups, such as the People's Front of Azerbaijan emerged to challenge the predominant Communist Party of Azerbaijan (CPAz) upon the dissolution of the USSR. On August 30, 1991, Azerbaijan, once again became an independent republic.

However, the early years of independence were marred by political instability, exacerbated by the ongoing Karabakh conflict. The hostilities contributed to the fall of several administrations in the fledgling government with a favorable solution to the conflict taking precedence over the achievement of key political and economic reforms. On October 3, 1993, Heidar Aliyev, a former Communist Party secretary, filled the power vacuum. Signing a tentative cease-fire agreement with Armenia over the Karabakh conflict allowed him to concentrate reform efforts in Azerbaijan's government and economy.

In the early twenty-first century, the Republic of Azerbaijan is a secular democracy with a government based on a separation of powers among its three branches. The executive power is vested with the president, who serves as head of state, bearing ultimate responsibilities for domestic and foreign matters. The president of the republic also serves as the commander in chief of the armed forces and is elected for a term of five years with the provision to serve a maximum of two consecutive terms. The legislative power is executed by the National Parliament (Milli Majlis), a unicameral body consisting of 125 members. The Parlia-



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ment holds two regular sessions—the spring session (February 10–May 31) and the fall session (September 30–December 30).

The judicial branch includes a Supreme Court, an economic court, and a constitutional court. The president, subject to approval by the parliament, nominates the judges in these three courts.

Azerbaijan's economy has been slow to emerge from its Soviet era structuring and decay. The *CIA World Fact Book* (2002) indicates that the agricultural sector employs the largest segment of the working population at 41 percent. Recognizing the significance of the petroleum industry in stimulating the economy, the Azerbaijani government has promoted investment from abroad to modernize its deteriorated energy sector. A main export pipeline

from the capital, Baku, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan will facilitate transport of oil to Western markets.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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GREGORY TWYMAN

BABEL, ISAAC EMMANUYELOVICH

(1894–1940), regarded as one of the finest writers of fiction of the twentieth century.

Babel was born to a middle-class Jewish family in Odessa. Though nonobservant, he remained interested in Jewish culture—he translated Shalom Aleichem—and Jewish identity became a central interest of his art. Odessa was a vibrant port city, without a heritage of serfdom, more cosmopolitan than was the custom in Russia. Babel saw it as fertile ground for a southern school of Russian literature—sunny, muscular, centered on sensuous experience, free of the metaphysical yearnings and somber seriousness of the Russian tradition. French literature attracted him. He had a Flaubertian dedication to his craft; Maupassant’s skill in depicting the surface of things was a model. Babel’s playful side is most evident in his first cycle of short stories, *The Odessa Tales* (1921–1924). But an age of war, revolution, and terror demanded sterner stuff. Babel responded with his tragic *Red Cavalry* (1923–1925) and his study of the complexities of growing up Jewish, *The Story of My Dovecot* (1925–1931).

Babel was sympathetic to the aims of the Russian Revolution and served it in several capacities, including a stint as translator for the secret police (Cheka). For a long time he enjoyed the benefits and celebrity of a Soviet writer, though he eventually became a victim of Soviet terror. In 1920 he signed on as correspondent with the First Cavalry Army, a leading unit of the Reds in the civil war, at the time engaged in battle with Poland. His summer with this largely Cossack army gave him the material for his great book of revolution and war.

Success brought pressures to conform. With the ascendancy of Josef Stalin and the mobilization of society commencing with the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), writers could no longer feel safe pursuing their private visions as long as they avoided criticism of communist rule. They were now expected to produce work useful to the state. Babel made abortive attempts to conform but mostly sought the safety of seclusion and silence. As he said at the First Congress of Soviet Writers: “I have so much respect for [the reader] that I am struck dumb.” Nevertheless, he produced some outstanding work in the thirties, including “Guy de Maupassant” (1932) and “Di Grasso” (1937)—two parables of the life of the artist. He was arrested as a spy on May 15, 1939. Like millions of



innocent men and women, he fell victim to Soviet tyranny; he was shot on January 27 of the following year.

Babel wrote many fine stories and several interesting plays. Among his best work are his cycles. *The Odessa Tales* treat a crew of Damon Runyon-like gangsters and their cohorts of the Jewish ghetto of Moldavanka. They are not clothed in realism's ordinary dress but in the colorful garments of romance or the crazy garb of comedy. The stories are designed to charm, not move the reader, though their rejection of Jewish resignation to suffering is a common theme for Babel. The four tales comprising *The Story of My Dovecot* have greater depth. They tell of the breaking away of a Jewish boy from his highly pressured home—the father is compensating for the indignities wrought by anti-Semitism. *Red Cavalry* is a masterpiece. It weaves its complex ways between irreconcilable antagonisms—of constancy and change, action and culture, revolution and tradition—to offer an image of the tragic character of human life.

See also: PURGES, THE GREAT

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MILTON EHRE

used by the peasants to oppose state policy, and sometimes led to the temporary dissolution of newly formed collective farms. Their frequent use in the winter of 1929–1930 likely played a role in the party leadership's decision to slow the pace of collectivization in March 1930.

The gendered aspect of *babi bunty* was very important. The Bolsheviks considered peasant women to be an especially backward social group, one incapable of organized political action. They believed that *babi bunty* were incited by kulaks and other anti-Soviet elements, who were manipulating the women. Because of this belief, the Bolsheviks responded with propaganda instead of force. Peasant men who resisted Soviet policies during this period, on the other hand, were treated with great violence. The peasants' recognition that participants in *babi bunty* would be treated leniently made these actions a favored form of resistance to collectivization. Although *babi bunty* only slowed the collectivization process, their frequency likely played a role in the state's decision eventually to grant peasants some concessions, such as the right for each family to retain one cow.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; KULAKS

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BRIAN KASSOF

BABI BUNTY

A set of actions used by peasant women to resist collectivization between 1928 and 1932.

It derives from the words *baba*, a pejorative term describing uncultured peasant women, and *bunt*, a spontaneous demonstration or protest. *Babi bunty* encompassed a range of actions intended to disrupt collectivization, including interrupting village meetings, harassing Soviet officials, and reclaiming seed, livestock, or household goods that previously had been seized by the collective farm. These actions were among the more effective means

BABI YAR MASSACRE *See* WORLD WAR II.

BAIKAL-AMUR MAGISTRAL RAILWAY

Traversing eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, the Baikal-Amur Magistral Railway (BAM) runs north of and parallel to the Trans-Siberian Railway. The "BAM Zone," the term used to describe the territory crossed by the railroad, includes regions within the watersheds of Lake Baikal and the Amur River, the latter of which forms a major part of the Russian border with China. An area crisscrossed by

a number of formidable rivers, the BAM Zone presented seismic, climatic, and epidemiological challenges to builders from the 1930s until the early 1990s.

The Soviet government conceived of BAM as a second railway link (the Trans-Siberian Railway being the first) to the Pacific Ocean that would improve transportation and communications between the European and Asian sectors of the USSR. The initial BAM project was built from Komsomolsk on the Amur River to Sovetskaya (now known as Imperatorskaya) Gavan on the Pacific coast by labor camp and prisoner-of-war labor from 1932 to 1941 and again from 1945 to 1953, when it was abandoned in March of that year after Stalin's death.

In March 1974, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed that the construction of a new and much longer BAM project would fall to the Young Communist League, known as the Komsomol. In Brezhnev's mind, experience on what the state heralded as the "Path to the Future" would instill a sense of inclusion among the Soviet Union's younger generations. In addition, the USSR undertook the new BAM to bolster Soviet trade with the dynamic economies of East Asia and to secure an alternative route between the nation's European and Asian sectors in the event that the Trans-Siberian Railway was seized by China. At its height, BAM involved more than 500,000 Komsomol members who severely damaged the ecology of the BAM Zone while expending some 15 to 20 billion dollars in a highly wasteful and inefficient endeavor that reinforced the inadequacies of Soviet-style state socialism among BAM's young constructors.

In October 1984, a golden spike was hammered into place in a ceremony that marked the official completion of the "Project of the Century." In reality, however, only one-third of BAM's 2,305-mile-long track was fully operational by the early 1990s, although the railroad was declared complete in 1991. BAM remains one of the Russian Federation's least profitable railways.

See also: COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS; RAILWAYS; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

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BAKATIN, VADIM VIKTOROVICH

(b. 1937), Russian and Soviet political and Communist Party figure, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, 1988–1990; last chairman of KGB, 1991; first chairman of Inter-Republic Security Service from 1991.

Vadim Bakatin was born in Kemerovo Oblast. Educated at the Novosibirsk Construction Engineering Institute, he worked as an engineer in construction in Kemerovo from the early 1960s until the early 1970s. He joined the Communist Party in 1964 and in the mid-1970s served as a local party official, rising to the position of Secretary of the Kemerovo Oblast Committee in 1977. Bakatin attended the High Party School and in 1985 joined the Inspectorate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In 1986 he served on the Central Committee. After brief service as First Secretary of the Kemerovo Oblast Committee, Bakatin was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs in 1988, and he served in that post until 1990. In 1991 he was an unsuccessful candidate for the presidency of Russia, warning about the dangers of overly rapid reform. Campaigning in May 1991 he stated that "Making capitalism out of socialism is like making eggs out of an omelette." Bakatin opposed the August 1991 coup attempt and then was appointed director of the KGB. He undertook the purge of the KGB senior leadership that had supported Vladimir Kryuchkov, the former director and coup plotter. With the collapse of Soviet power in the fall of 1991, Bakatin oversaw the breakup of the KGB and then briefly served as the first chairman of the Inter-Republic Security Service. In 1992 he published a personal memoir of his role in the break-up of the KGB under the title, *Izbavlenie ot KGB: Vremya - sobytiya - lyudi* (Deliverance from the KGB: The time, the events, the people). Later he went into business and became the director of the Baring Vostok Capital Partners, a direct investment company. He remained loyal to Mikhail Gorbachev and has spoken favorably of his efforts at reform.

See also: STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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BAKHTIN, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH

(1895–1975), considered to be Russia's greatest literary theoreticians, whose work has had an important influence, in Russia and abroad, on several other fields in the social sciences and humanities.

Born in Orel into a cultured bourgeois family, Bakhtin earned a degree in classics and philology. During the Civil War, he moved to Nevel, where he worked as a schoolteacher and participated in study circles, and later moved to Vitebsk. In 1924 Bakhtin and his wife moved back to Leningrad, but he found it difficult to obtain steady employment. He was arrested in 1929 and charged with participation in the underground Russian church, but managed nevertheless to live most of the 1930s and 1940s in productive obscurity, publishing regularly. He and his work were rediscovered during the 1950s, and over the years his writings have continued to influence the development of philology, linguistics, sociology, and social anthropology, to name just a few related disciplines.

Many of Bakhtin's contemporary systematizers of Russian thought sought to discover laws of society or history and to formulate models designed to explain everything. Bakhtin, however, sought to show that there could be no such comprehensive system. In this sense he set himself against the main currents of European social thought since the seventeenth century, and especially against the traditional Russian intelligentsia. Drawing upon literary sources, he tried to create pictures of self and society that contained, as an intrinsic element, what he called surprisingness. In his view, no matter how much one knows of a person, one does not know everything and cannot unfailingly predict the future (even in theory). Instead, he argued, there is always a surplus of humanness, and this is what makes each person unique. Like Fyodor Dostoyevsky,

Leo Tolstoy before 1880, and Anton Chekhov, Bakhtin belongs to the great anti-tradition of Russian thought that, unlike the dominant groups of the intelligentsia, denied that any system could explain, much less redeem, reality.

In his earliest work, Bakhtin developed various models of self and the other, and attempted to develop an approach to ethics. He believed that ethics could not be a matter of applying abstract rules to particular situations, but comes instead from careful observation and direct participation in ultimately unrepeatable circumstances. He argued that through a reliance on rules and ideology, rather than really engaging oneself with a given situation, one is using an alibi and, thus, abdicating responsibility. He countered this approach by saying that, in life, there is no alibi.

As an enemy of all comprehensive theories, Bakhtin opposed formalism and structuralism, although he learned a good deal from them. Basically, he accepted the usefulness of certain formal approaches and methods employed by these theoretical schools, but insisted that human purposefulness and intentionality lay behind these formal models. Unlike the formalists and structuralists, he developed a theory of language and the psyche that was based on the concrete utterance (what people actually say), and on open-ended dialogue. This latter is perhaps the most famous of the concepts he introduced.

Bakhtin developed a theory of polyphony, which he elaborated in his book on Dostoyevsky (1929). With this theory, he tries to show how an author deliberately creates without knowing what his or her characters will do next, and, in so doing, the author also creates a palpable image of true freedom. Bakhtin equated that freedom to that which is enjoyed by God, who did not foresee the outcome of the creatures made by God. In taking this stance, he argued against the determinists or predestinarians, for he believed that people are truly free and ever-surprising, if they are as the polyphonic novel represents them.

Bakhtin's work on the novel during the 1930s and 1940s is justly renowned. It is certainly his most durable contribution to semiotics. He identifies how novelistic language works; how the self and plot are tied to concepts of time and becoming; and how elements of a parodic (or carnivalistic) spirit have infused the novel's essence. This theory, as well as in theories of culture that he developed during the 1950s, emphasized dialogue,

temporal openness, surprisingness, the uniqueness selfhood, and fundamental principles of ethical responsibility.

See also: CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH

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GARY SAUL MORSON

BAKU

Baku is the capital of Azerbaijan and a major port on the Caspian Sea. The city was first taken by Peter I in the 1710s and held for two decades. The entire region of Caucasia was conquered by Russian forces in a war against Iran in the 1800s and confirmed by the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan.

Baku has meant two things to Russia: oil and strikes. The former has had the more enduring significance. The Baku oil fields were the object of Russian desire since the occupation by Peter I. Significant output began only with drilling in the 1870s. The oil rush of the last third of the nineteenth century brought thousands of Russian peasants to the Baku region to work in the oil fields. By the imperial census of 1897, the Russians were nearly as numerous as the native Azerbaijani Turks (approximately 37,400 to 40,000). By the 1903 city census, the Russians outnumbered them (57,000 to 44,000). Other national groups came to Baku. Armenians were a small but economically powerful minority with long-established communities, mostly involved in trade. Iranian Azerbaijanis crossed the border in large numbers. They were

part of the same ethnic and religious group, speaking the same language as did the local residents. There were also communities of Georgians, Jews, Germans, and peoples from the Caucasus Mountains. Europeans arrived as investors, engineers, and skilled technicians. By 1900, Baku had a telephone system, European-style buildings, and an active City Council (Duma). It had a relatively high crime rate and a reputation akin to that of the Wild West in North America.

In the dangerous conditions of the oil fields, a labor movement emerged around the turn of the century. The Russian Social Democrats regarded Baku's activity as an alarm bell for the strike movement across the southern part of the empire. Baku provided a training ground for such future luminaries as Grigory Ordzhonikidze and Josef Stalin. For a time under Menshevik leadership, the Baku Committee of the party permitted the formation of a special party only for the Muslim workers, the Hummet. Class solidarity usually broke down along national lines, however, and the violence occasionally led to arson in the oil fields. In 1918 a Bolshevik-led government, known as the Baku Commune, ran the city briefly before the city fell to the invading Turkish army. Baku was the capital of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan (1918–1920) and, from April 1920 to 1991, of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan.

Although Baku's oil was largely depleted by the 1920s, the city was a target of Nazi advances in World War II. The Soviet Gosplan invested very little in the oil industry in Baku after the war and left its infrastructure to languish.

In the post-Soviet period, offshore drilling has taken the place of the old wells as a prize for foreign investors. Russia has tried, again, to maintain access to the oil and has fought proposals by Azerbaijan and foreign oil companies that seek to route the oil around Russian pipelines and Black Sea ports.

See also: AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS

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AUDREY ALTSTADT

BAKUNIN, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH

(1814–1876), world-famous revolutionary and one of the founders of Russian anarchism and revolutionary populism.

Although born into a nobleman's family, Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin was hostile toward the tsarist system and the traditional socioeconomic and political order. An extreme materialist, he was bitterly antireligious and saw organized religion as oppressing people.

Despite his revolutionary passion, Bakunin, as a contemporary Western philosophical encyclopedia puts it, "was learned, intelligent, and philosophically reflective." By contrast, a Soviet-period philosophical dictionary describes Bakunin as a "revolutionary-adventurer [who] blindly believed in the socialist instincts of the masses and in the inexhaustibility of their spontaneous revolutionary feeling, especially as found among the peasantry and *lumpen*-proletariat."

The "reign of freedom," Bakunin insisted, could come for the masses and for everyone only after the liquidation of the status quo of traditional bourgeois society and the state. Bakunin soon fell out with the Marxists, with whom he had originally been tenuously allied in the First International in Geneva. He denounced the Marxist teaching of the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat in order to usher in the new order of socialism. He also disagreed with those Russian revolutionists who advocated terrorism and various forms of postrevolutionary authoritarianism and dictatorship, such as the Russian Jacobins. "Every act of official authority," Bakunin once wrote, "necessarily awakens within the masses a rebellious feeling, a legitimate counterreaction."

In a letter to the 1860s revolutionary terrorist Sergei Geradievich Nechayev, Bakunin once wrote: "You said that all men should follow your revolutionary catechism, that the abandonment of self and renunciation of personal needs and desires, all feelings, all attachments and links should become a normal state of affairs, the everyday condition of all humanity. Out of that cruel renunciation and extreme fanaticism you now wish to make this a general principle applicable to the whole community. You want crazy things, impossible things, the total negation of nature, man, and society!" Here Bakunin seemed to be renouncing his own, earlier brief leanings toward authoritarianism before adopting his anarchist philosophy.

For Bakunin, government of any kind, like religion, is oppressive. The church, he said, is a "heavenly tavern in which people try to forget about their daily grind." In order for people to gain freedom, religion and the state must be swept away along with all forms of "power over the people." Their place will be taken by a "free federation" of agricultural and industrial cooperative associations in which science reigns.

Bakunin spent much of his life abroad. He emigrated from Russia in 1840 to live in central and western Europe. There he formed close ties with other famous Russian émigrés, such as Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Ogarev.

Bakunin's relations with the First International and Karl Marx were stormy. Resenting Marx's high-handedness and authoritarian political ideology, Bakunin was finally expelled from the communist world organization in 1870. Soon after this, his *The State and Anarchy* was published in several languages. In this work, in quasi-Hegelian terms, he describes the historical process by which mankind evolves from "bestiality" to freedom.

See also: ANARCHISM; HERZEN, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH; NECHAYEV, SERGEI GERADIEVICH; POPULISM

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

BALAKLAVA, BATTLE OF

On October 25, 1854, Prince A. S. Menshikov, commander of Russian ground forces in Crimea, launched an attack on the British supply base at Balaklava to divert an allied attack on Sevastopol. The battlefield overlooked the Crimean Uplands, which dropped steeply onto the Plain of Balaklava. The plain was divided into two valleys by the Causeway Heights, occupied by a series of Turkish-held redoubts.

The British cavalry was camped at the foot of the escarpment. The Russians, led by Prince R. R. Liprandi, captured four redoubts at dawn on October 25. Although the British Commander, Lord Raglan, had a commanding view, he was short of infantry. Russian hussars advancing toward Balaklava were driven off by his only infantry regiment. Another large Russian cavalry force was driven off by the British Heavy Brigade, leaving the battle stalled. When the Russians began to remove captured guns from the redoubts, Raglan, still lacking infantry reinforcements, ordered the cavalry to stop them.

In error, the 661-strong Light Brigade under Lord Cardigan advanced down the valley toward the main Russian batteries. British troopers came under fire from fifty-four cannons to the front and on both flanks. Reaching the guns at a charge, the brigade drove off the Russian cavalry before retreating slowly back to their starting line, having suffered grievous losses: 118 killed, 127 wounded, and 45 taken prisoner. This astonishing display of cool courage demoralized the Russians. Total battle casualties included 540 Russians killed and wounded; 360 British, 38 French, and 260 Turks. It was little more than a skirmish in the much larger war.

See also: CRIMEAN WAR

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ANDREW LAMBERT

BALALAIKA

The balalaika is one of a family of Eurasian musical instruments with long necks, few strings, and a playing technique based on rapid strumming with the index finger. First mentioned in written records in 1688 in Moscow, the balalaika existed in various forms with triangular and oval bodies, differing numbers of strings, and movable tied-on string frets, and was mainly used for playing dance tunes.

The traditional balalaika's popularity may have peaked in the last decades of the eighteenth century, when foreign travelers reported seeing one in every home, although as numerous references in the works of Leo Tolstoy, Nikolai Gogol, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and others attest, it remained in widespread if diminishing use during the nineteenth century. Most closely associated with the Russians, the instrument, likely a borrowing from the Tatars, was used to a lesser extent by Ukrainians, Gypsies, Belarussians, and other ethnic groups.

The modern balalaika originated from the work of Vasily Andreyev (1861–1918), who in the 1880s created a standardized, three-string chromatic triangular-bodied instrument with fixed metal frets and other innovations. Andreyev went on to develop the concept of the balalaika orchestra consisting of instruments of various sizes, for which he later reconstructed the long-forgotten *domra*, a favorite instrument of the *skomorokhi*, or minstrels.

The modern balalaika is a hybrid phenomenon incorporating elements of folk, popular, and art or classical music and is widely taught from music school through conservatory. In addition to its use in traditional-instrument orchestras and ensembles, the balalaika's repertoire includes pieces with piano and other chamber works, a number of concertos with symphony orchestra, and occasional appearances in opera. A vanishing contemporary village folk tradition, while possibly preserving some pre-Andreyev elements, utilizes mass-produced balalaikas played with a pick. Throughout much of its history the instrument has been used as a symbol of Russian traditional culture.

See also: FOLK MUSIC; MUSIC


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SERGE ROGOSIN

BALKAN WARS

Following the Bosnian crisis of 1908 to 1909 and the formal annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, Russia abandoned its policy of reaching a *modus vivendi* with Vienna on the Balkans. Weakened by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905 and the Revolution of 1905, it now sought a



Residents of Gumurdjina, Macedonia, drive away invading Bulgarians, c. 1913. © MARY EVANS PICTURE LIBRARY

defensive alliance with Serbia and Bulgaria as a way to regain influence in the region. Although the diplomatic discussions that ensued were not intended to further the already fractious nature of Balkan rivalries, events soon ran counter to Russia's intentions.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 had sought to revitalize the Ottoman Empire but instead hastened its dismemberment. In 1911 the Italian annexation of Tripoli laid bare the weakness of the Turks, and the remaining Ottoman holdings in Europe suddenly became inviting targets for the states in the region. With Russian encouragement, Serbia and Bulgaria joined in a pact in March 1912, the genesis of a new Balkan League. Two months later Albania revolted and called upon Europe for support. That same month, May 1912, Bulgaria and Greece entered into an alliance, and in October, Montenegro joined the partnership.

What Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazonov saw as an alliance to counter Austro-Hungarian in-

fluence in the Balkans was now a league bent upon war. The March pact between Serbia and Bulgaria had already presaged the conflict by calling for the partition of Macedonia. Reports of impending war in the Balkans during the summer and fall of 1912, and also of a belief that Russia would come to the aid of its Slavic brethren, led Sazonov to inform Sofia and Belgrade that theirs was a defensive alliance. Nonetheless, by autumn public sentiment in southeastern Europe left the Balkan allies little choice.

On October 8, 1912, Montenegro attacked Turkey. On October 17 Serbia and Bulgaria joined the conflict, followed two days later by Greece. The Balkan armies quickly defeated the Turks. Bulgarian forces reached the outskirts of Istanbul, and in May 1913 the Treaty of London brought the First Balkan War to a close. The peace did not last long, however, as the creation of a new Albanian state and quarrels among the victors over the spoils in Macedonia led to embitterment, especially on the part of Sofia, which felt cheated out of its Macedonian claims.

On the night of June 29–30, 1913, one month following the peace treaty, Bulgarian troops moved into the north-central part of Macedonia. The other members of the coalition, joined by Romania and, ironically, the Turks, joined in the counterattack. Bulgaria was quickly defeated and, by the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913, was forced to cede most of what it had gained in Macedonia during the First Balkan War. In addition, the Ottoman Empire regained much of eastern Thrace, which it had lost only months earlier. Romania's share of the spoils was the southern Dobrudja.

Serbia was the principal victor in the Balkan Wars, gaining the lion's share of Macedonia as well as Kosovo. Bulgaria was the loser. In many respects, Russia lost as well because the continuing instability in the Balkans undermined its need for peace in the region, a situation clearly demonstrated by the events of the summer of 1914.

See also: ALBANIANS, CAUCASIAN; BUCHAREST, TREATY OF; BULGARIA, RELATIONS WITH; GREECE, RELATIONS WITH; MONTENEGRO, RELATIONS WITH; SERBIA, RELATIONS WITH; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH; YUGOSLAVIA, RELATIONS WITH

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BALKARS

The Balkars are a small ethnic group in the northwest Caucasus. They are one of the titular nationalities of the autonomous Karbardino-Balkar Republic in the Russian Federation. In the 1989 Soviet Census, they numbered 85,126. Of that number, 93 percent considered Balkar to be their native language, while 78 percent considered themselves fluent in Russian as a second language. This means that nearly all adults spoke Russian to some extent.

The Balkar language is essentially identical to the Karachay language, spoken in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic. This split is an example of the way in which some languages were fractured into smaller groups for the sake of creating smaller ethnic identities. The Karachay-Balkar language itself is a member of the Ponto-Caspian group of western Turkic languages. Other languages closely related are Kumyk in Dagestan, Karaim in Lithuania, and the Judeo-Crimean Tatar language of Uzbekistan.

Following the general pattern of alphabet politics in the Soviet Union, Balkar was written with an Arabic script until 1924, from 1924 to 1937 with a Latin alphabet, and finally from 1937 to the present in a modified Cyrillic. A modest number of books were published in Balkar during the Soviet period. From 1984 to 1985, for example, fifty-eight titles were published. This is a reasonable number in the Soviet context for the size of their group and for sharing an ethnic jurisdiction. This number is higher than some of the Dagestani peoples who had larger populations, but no jurisdiction of their own.

The Balkar people, as Turks, find themselves surrounded by Circassians and their close neighbors in the northwest Caucasus. They are linguistically a remnant of Turkish groups who migrated along the Eurasian steppe. Historically, in addition to the disruptions of the nineteenth-century Russian conquest of the Caucasus, the Balkars were one of the peoples who suffered deportation at the end of World War II for their alleged collaboration with the Nazis. They were allowed to return in the

1950s, but only after experiencing a significant diminution of their population. The alienation of exile has been compounded by the ongoing difficulty of returning to territory that had, in the meantime, been occupied by outsiders. Post-Soviet ethnic conflict has followed along these contours.

See also: CAUCASUS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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PAUL CREGO

BALLET

The origins of the Russian ballet, like those of most other Western art forms, can be traced to eighteenth-century St. Petersburg, where Empress Anna Ivanovna established the first dancing school in Russia in 1738. This school, whose descendant is the present-day Academy of Russian Ballet, was headed by a series of European dancing masters, the first of whom was Jean-Baptiste Landé.

By the 1740s, Empress Elizabeth employed three balletmasters. The continued presence of ballet in Russia was assured by Catherine II, who established a Directorate of Imperial Theaters in 1766, saw to the construction of St. Petersburg's Bolshoi Theater in 1783, and incorporated Landé's school into the Imperial Theater School she founded in 1779.

The tenure of French balletmaster Charles-Louis Didelot (1767–1837) in St. Petersburg (1801–1831) marked the first flowering of the national ballet. The syllabus of the imperial school began to assume its present-day form under Didelot, and his use of stage machinery anticipated the exploitation of stage effects to create atmosphere and build audiences for the ballet across Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. After Didelot's departure, Jules Perrot led the Petersburg ballet from 1848 to 1859. Arthur Saint-Léon succeeded Perrot and choreographed in St. Petersburg until 1869.



Dancers from the Kirov Ballet in St. Petersburg perform on stage in the 1990s. © BOB KRIST/CORBIS

Russian ballet began to assume its familiar form during the decades of Marius Petipa's (1818–1910) work in the Imperial Theaters. Petipa came to Petersburg as a dancer in 1847, and became balletmaster in 1862. The ballets Petipa choreographed in Russia functioned as a choreographic response to nineteenth-century grand opera; they featured as many as five acts with numerous scene changes. If Perrot is identified primarily with the development of narrative in Russian ballet, and Saint-Léon could be accused of overemphasizing the ballet's *divertissement* at the expense of the story line, Petipa combined the two trends to make a dance spectacle with plots as complex as their choreography. The ballets Petipa staged in St. Petersburg still serve as cornerstones of the classical ballet repertory: *Sleeping Beauty* (1890), *Swan Lake* (1895) (with Lev Ivanov), *Raymonda* (1898), *Le Corsaire* (1869), *Don Quixote* (1869), and *La Bayadère* (1877).

The distinctive features of nineteenth-century dance represent developments of the Russian school of dancing under Petipa's leadership. The new focus on the female dancer was the result of recent developments in point technique, which allowed the ballerina not only to rise up on the tips of her toes, but to remain posed there, and eventually to dance on them. Petipa's choreography emphasizes two nearly opposite facets of the new technique that these technical advances afforded: first, the long supported adagio, in which the woman is supported and turned on point by her partner; second, the brilliant allegro variations (solos) Petipa created for his ballerinas, to exploit the steel toes of this new breed of female dancer.

The work of two ballet reformers characterize the late- and post-Petipa era. Alexander Gorsky became the chief choreographer of Moscow's Bolshoi Theater in 1899 and attempted to imbue the ballet with greater realism along the lines of the dramas of Konstantin Stanislavsky's Moscow Art Theater. Gorsky's ballets featured greater cohesion of design elements (sets and costumes) and an unprecedented attention to detail. In Petersburg, Michel Fokine fell under the spell of dancer Isadora Duncan and theater director Vsevolod Meyerhold. Influenced by the free dance of the former, and by the latter's experiments in stylized symbolist theater, Fokine pioneered a new type of ballet: typically a one-act work without the perceived expressive confines of nineteenth-century mime and standard ballet steps.

Fokine and his famed collaborators, Vaslav Nijinsky and Anna Pavlova, achieved their greatest fame in Europe as charter members of Sergei Diaghilev's *Ballets Russes*, which debuted in Paris in 1909. Fokine's ballets (*Les Sylphides*, *Petrushka*, *Spectre de la Rose*) were the sensations of the early Diaghilev season. The Diaghilev ballet not only announced the Russian ballet's arrival to the European avant-garde, but also the beginning of a rift that would widen during the Soviet period: the rise of a Russian émigré ballet community that included many important choreographers, dancers, composers, and visual artists, working outside Russia.

The 1917 revolution posed serious problems for the former Imperial Theaters, and not least to the ballet, which was widely perceived as the bauble of the nation's theater bureaucracy and former rulers. Nonetheless, the foment that surrounded attempts to revolutionize Russian theater in the years following the October Revolution had limited impact on the ballet. With most important Russian

choreographers, dancers, and pedagogues already working outside of Russia in the 1920s (Fokine, George Balanchine, Vaslav Nijinsky, Bronislava Nijinska, Anna Pavlova, and Tamara Karsavina, to name a few), experimentation in the young Soviet ballet was borne of necessity.

The October Revolution and the subsequent shift of power, both political and cultural, to Moscow, led to the emergence of Moscow's Bolshoi Ballet. The company that had long occupied a distinct second place to the Petersburg troupe now took center stage—a position it would hold until the breakup of the Soviet Union. The creative leadership of the company had traditionally been imported from Petersburg, but in the Soviet period, so would many of its star dancers (Marina Semyonova, Galina Ulanova).

A new genre of realistic ballets was born in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and dominated Soviet dance theater well into the 1950s. The *drambalet*, shorthand for dramatic ballet, reconciled the ballet's tendency to abstraction (and resulting lack of ideological content) to the new need for easily understandable narrative. The creative impotence of Soviet ballet in the post-Stalin era reflected the general malaise of the so-called period of stagnation of the Brezhnev years. When Russian companies dramatically increased the pace of moneymaking Western tours in the 1980s, it became clear that the treasure-chest of Russian classic ballets had long ago been plundered, with little new choreography of interest to refill it. As the history of the two companies would suggest, the loss of Soviet power resulted in the speedy demotion of the Moscow troupe and the rise of a post-Soviet Petersburg ballet.

See also: BOLSHOI THEATER; DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH; NIJINSKY, VASLAV FOMICH; PAVLOVA, ANNA MATVEYEVNA

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TIM SCHOLL

BALTIC FLEET

The Baltic Fleet, which controls the Kronstadt and Baltiysk naval bases, is headquartered in Kaliningrad Oblast (formerly called Königsberg), a region that once formed part of East Prussia. Today Kaliningrad is a Russian enclave completely cut off from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland (now a NATO member). Thus, although the fleet is defended by a naval infantry brigade, its location is potentially the most vulnerable of the major Russian naval fleets. While the Baltiysk naval base is located on Kaliningrad's Baltic Sea coast to the west, the Kronstadt base is situated on Kotlin Island in the Gulf of Finland, about 29 kilometers (18 miles) northwest of St. Petersburg. The naval base occupies one half of the island, which is about 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) long and 2 kilometers (1.25 miles) wide. Mutinies at Kronstadt took place in 1825 and 1882 and played a part in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. In March 1921, a revolt of the sailors, steadfastly loyal to the Bolsheviks during the revolution, precipitated Vladimir Lenin's New Economic Policy. Kronstadt sailors also played a major role in World War II in the defense of St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) against the Germans.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania deprived the new Russian state of key bases on the Baltic Sea. The 15,000-square-kilometer (5,800-square-mile) Kaliningrad Oblast between Poland and Lithuania remained as the fleet's only ice-free naval outlet to the Baltic Sea. One of the first steps taken in the late 1990s to reform the Baltic Fleet was to incorporate air defense units into the Baltic Fleet structure. A second step was to restructure ground and coastal troops on the Baltic Fleet units. As of 2000, these forces consisted of the Moscow-Minsk Proletarian Division, a Marine Brigade, Coastal Rocket Units, and a number of bases at which arms and equipment were kept. The Baltic Fleet did not include any strategic-missile submarines, but as of mid-1997 it included thirty-two major surface

combatants (three cruisers, three destroyers, and twenty-six frigates), more than 230 other surface vessels, roughly two hundred naval aircraft, nine tactical submarines, and a brigade of naval infantry.

As of mid-2000 the Baltic Fleet included about one hundred combat ships of various types, and the fleet's Sea Aviation Group units were equipped with a total of 112 aircraft. Operational forces as of 1996 included nine submarines, twenty-three principal surface combatants (three cruisers, two destroyers, and eighteen frigates), and approximately sixty-five smaller vessels. The Baltic Fleet included one brigade of naval infantry and two regiments of coastal defense artillery. The air arm of the Baltic Fleet included 195 combat aircraft organized into five regiments and a number of other fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Generally, armed forces comparable in size to the entire Polish army have been stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast.

In 1993 pressure for autonomy from the Russian Federation increased. Seventy-eight percent of the population (about 900,000) is Russian. Some claimed that, although Königsberg was awarded to the Soviet Union under the Potsdam Accord in 1945, the Russian Federation held no legal title to the enclave. Polish critics and others claimed that the garrison should be reduced to a level of reasonable sufficiency. Since Poland was admitted to NATO in 1999, however, Russian nationalists have argued that Kaliningrad is a vital outpost at a time when Russia is menaced by Poland or even Lithuania, if that country is also admitted to NATO.

See also: KRONSTADT UPRISING; MILITARY, POST-SOVIET

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET

In the Soviet economy, the role of money was basically passive: Planning was primarily in physical quantities. Therefore, the banking system lacked most of the tasks it has in market economy.

Money circulation was strictly divided into two separate spheres. Households lived in a cash economy, facing mostly fixed-price markets for consumer goods and labor. Inside the state sector, enterprises could legally use only noncash, monetary transfers through a banking system closely controlled by the planners, for transactions with other enterprises. Wages were paid out by a bank representative, and retail outlets were tightly supervised.

The banking system basically consisted of a single state bank (Gosbank), which combined the roles of a central bank and a commercial bank. Such an arrangement is often called a monobank. Gosbank had no autonomy, but was basically a financial control agency under the Council of Ministers. As a central bank, Gosbank created narrow money (cash in circulation outside the state sector) by authorizing companies to pay wages in accordance with accepted wage bills. If government expenditure exceeded government revenue, and sufficient household savings were not available to cover the budget deficit, state sector wage bills still had to be paid, which would contribute to imbalance in the consumer goods markets. This was probably the case at least toward the end of the Soviet period, though the relation between the state budget, Gosbank, and money supply was among the best-kept secrets in the USSR. Gosbank also managed the currency reserves of the country.

As a commercial bank, Gosbank issued short-term credit to enterprises for working capital. Household savings were first kept by a formally separate Savings Bank, which was incorporated into the Gosbank in 1963. Household savings were an important source of finance for the state. Gosbank also controlled Stroibank, the bank for financing state investment, and Vneshekonombank, the bank for foreign trade. There were also several Soviet-owned banks abroad. In the perestroika period, the number of specialized formally independent banks increased, but no competition between them was allowed. The emergence of cooperative banks in 1988 and afterward had a key role in the informal privatization of the Soviet economy and the emergence of a market-based banking system.

The key role of the Soviet banking system was in controlling plan fulfillment. The financial plan was an essential component of enterprise planning. All legal inter-enterprise payments had to go through Gosbank, which only authorized payments that were supported by a relevant plan document. Thus the banking system was primarily a control agency. This also meant that money was not a binding constraint on enterprises: Any plan-based transactions were authorized by Gosbank. The banking system thus facilitated a soft budget constraint to enterprises: The availability of finance did not constrain production or investment.

See also: GOSBANK; STROIBANK

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PEKKA SUITELA

BANKING SYSTEM, TSARIST

From the time of Emancipation onward, Russian banks developed into the most important financial intermediaries of the empire. They performed the classic banking functions of collecting savings from the population and allocating loans to creditworthy borrowers. Initially Russian banks reflected the backwardness of the economy and society in many ways. The economy was still predominantly rural, and mining and manufacturing enterprises competed for resources with the government's needs for war finance and infrastructure and the nobility's hunger for loans. Commercial honesty was often unreliable, and therefore bankers had to be cautious in making loans to strangers, even for the short term.

Russian banks were more specialized than banks elsewhere. At the center was the State Bank (*Gosudarstvenny Bank*), established in 1860 to replace the more primitive State Commercial Bank (founded in 1817) and informal arrangements among merchants and industrialists. It stabilized

the ruble's foreign exchange value, issued paper currency, and accepted deposits from the treasury, whose tax sources were mostly seasonal. Because the government remained in deficit through the 1880s, in spite of the efforts of Finance Minister Mikhail von Reutern, the State Bank also accommodated the treasury with loans of cash. The State Bank helped further Russian interests in China and Persia. As time went on, it served as lender of last resort of the emerging private banks. When they experienced illiquidity as a result of unexpected withdrawals, the State Bank discounted their notes and securities so the private bankers could pay depositors. Such episodes were common during the recession of 1900–1902. Besides these central banking functions, the State Bank did some ordinary lending, discreetly favoring government projects such as railroad lines, ports, and grain elevators, as well as some private engineering, textile, and sugar ventures. For instance, the State Bank bought shares of the Baltic Ironworks on the premise that such firms, albeit private, had state significance.

The tsar's government also sponsored Savings Banks, which were frequently attached to post offices. These institutions expanded their urban branches during the 1860s and their rural outposts two decades later. They accepted interest-bearing accounts from small savers and invested in mortgages or government loans, notably for railroads.

Most Russian lending up to 1914 was backed by land mortgages, the most secure collateral at this time of rising land prices. Both the Peasants' Land Bank (founded 1882–1883) and the Nobility Bank (1885) made such loans to the rural classes by issuing bonds to the public with government guarantees of their interest payments. In addition to these banks, a large number of credit cooperatives made small loans to peasants and artisans.

Private commercial banks were the last to emerge in Russia. The founders of the main Moscow banks were textile manufacturers, while the directors of the St. Petersburg banks were often retired officials, financiers, or rich landowners. By 1875 there were thirty banks in St. Petersburg and Moscow; by 1914 the capital had 567 banks and Moscow had 153. In 1875 the five major banks had total assets of only 247 million rubles; by 1914 they would increase that figure nearly tenfold. Like all other Russian banks, private and joint-stock banks were subject to strict regulation by the Ministry of Finance, but after 1894 statutes were liberalized, and state funds were put at their disposal. Dealing at first with short-term commercial paper

for business working capital, they gradually began to lend for mortgages on urban land and industrial projects. They also offered checking accounts to business customers, thereby reducing transaction costs over this vast empire. With interregional deliveries to make over long distances in difficult conditions, manufacturers might have to wait months for payments from merchants, who themselves had widely separated customers. For all of them short-term credit was crucial, as cash payments were inconvenient.

Instead of the British-type commercial banks typical of Moscow, which continued to deal in short-term loans, St. Petersburg's banks increasingly resembled the universal bank model typical of Germany. They helped float securities for urban improvements, mines, and other private enterprises against bonds and other securities as collateral without government guarantees. They also opened accounts secured by preferred shares with first call on dividends for investors who formerly might have demanded only fixed-interest obligations for their portfolios. The largest of the joint-stock banks attracted foreign capital, particularly from France and Belgium, as well as from the State Bank. Some of the larger heavy industrial projects so financed were profitable, like the South Russian Dniepr Metallurgical Company, but many others were overpromoted. According to Olga Crisp's calculation, based on data from Pavel Vasilievich Ol', foreigners held 45 percent of the total capital of the ten largest joint-stock banks by 1916.

As in central Europe, each large bank had special client companies on whose managing boards the bankers sat. They facilitated discounting of the affiliates' bills and marketing of their common stock. For example, Alexander Putilov, chairman of the famous Russo-Asiatic Bank, was also head of the Putilov engineering company, the historically famous Lena Goldfields Company, the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Company, and the Moscow-Kazan railways, and director of at least three petroleum companies. About 80 percent of the Russo-Asiatic Bank's equity capital was French-owned. The Azov-Don Bank, based in St. Petersburg after 1903, was heavily involved in coal, sugar, cement, and steel enterprises. The International Bank, heavily involved in shipbuilding, was 40 percent German-owned. Occasionally these banks helped reorganize and recapitalize failing enterprises, thus extending their ownership control.

While demand for credit from private businessmen increased during the 1890s, the great ef-

florescence of tsarist banking came with the boom following the war and revolutions of 1904 to 1906. By 1913 there were more than one thousand private and joint-stock banks in the country, still mostly in the capitals, Warsaw, Odessa, and Baku. Securities held by the Russian public more than tripled between 1907 and World War I. Lending was increasingly for heavy industry and the highly profitable consumer goods industries, although the latter could often rely on retained profits. The role of the government thus declined as the main organ of capital accumulation to be replaced by the banks, as Alexander Gerschenkron has remarked.

As happened elsewhere, the Russian banks became somewhat more concentrated. In 1900 the six biggest commercial banks controlled 47 percent of deposits and other liabilities. By 1913 that share had risen to 55 percent. Marxists such as Vladimir Lenin believed concentration of finance capital, and these big capitalists' underwriting of the cartels, would bring on revolution. It seems highly doubtful that this would have happened in absence of war, however. In any case, all the tsarist banks were nationalized by the Bolsheviks in 1917.

See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST; FOREIGN TRADE; INDUSTRIALIZATION

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

BANYA

A Russian steam sauna or bathhouse, which served as the primary form of hygiene and was consid-

ered a source of great pleasure and a cure of maladies.

According to the seventeenth-century account of Adam Olearius, "in all towns and villages, they have many public and private baths, in which they [the Russians] may often be found." Because it was warm and had an abundant water supply, the banya also served as a place for childbearing. While the word *banya* is a Latin borrowing (from *banea*), the traditional Russian banya had Finno-Ugrian origins. The earliest written source to mention banya dates to the eleventh century and is made in connection to Novgorod. Archaeologists have also unearthed wooden bani (pl.) dating to the same period in the city. Masonry bani, built according to Byzantine traditions, were known in the southern Rus lands (in Pereyaslavl and Kiev) dating to the late eleventh century.

Medieval and modern accounts all agree about the practice of washing in the banya. After exposing the body to high-heat vapors, and consequently heavily perspired, people lashed their bodies with bundles of young tree branches (usually of birch) that had been soaked in boiling water, thus providing a massaging effect and anointing the skin with oils from the leaves. Following this, people often immersed themselves in cold water or snow and, thereafter, proceeded to wash with soap and water. Traditionally, bani in Russia were either private or public. Both types can still be found in Russia. Despite attempts by the Russian government (e.g., *Stoglav* of 1551, Elizabeth in 1743, and Catherine II in 1783) to separate women from men in the public bani, some city bani remained unisex as late as the early nineteenth century. The only separation of the sexes that occurred in these bani was in the dressing rooms.

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

BARANNIKOV, VIKTOR PAVLOVICH

(1940–1995), minister of internal affairs of the USSR; minister of internal affairs, minister of security.

Born in Primorsky Krai of the Soviet Far East, Barannikov joined the militia organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1961. A graduate of the Higher School of the Militia, he rose to prominence under President Boris Yeltsin and was appointed minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in September 1990, a post he held until August 1991. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful August coup in 1991, he was appointed minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union. After the end of the Soviet Union, Barannikov was appointed director-general of the Federal Security Agency of the Russian Republic in December 1991 and held that post briefly until he was appointed minister of security and head of the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service of the Russian Republic in January 1992. He held that post until July 1993, when he broke with Yeltsin over the emerging struggle between the president and the Russian parliament. In October 1993 he was arrested as one of the conspirators of the White House revolt against Yeltsin. Barannikov was freed from prison in 1994 by an act of the State Duma and died of a heart attack in 1995. Barannikov held the rank of General of the Army in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

See also: OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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JACOB W. KIPP

BARONE, ENRICO

(1859–1924), Italian soldier, politician, and economist with strong mathematical training.

Enrico Barone was a contemporary and interlocutor of both Leon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto, best known for his careful formulation of the equilibrium system that would have to be solved by central planners in a socialist economy. Published in 1908 as "Il Ministro della Produzione nello Stato Collettivista" in the journal *Giornale delgi Economisti*, and reprinted in English in F. A. Hayek's edited volume, *Collectivist Economic Planning*, his formulation provided an analytic foundation for arguments supporting the feasibility of socialist calculation, socialist central planning, and ultimately "market socialism." In it he provided a Walrasian (general equilibrium) system of equations whose solutions would resolve the valuation and coordination quandary for socialist central planners—a system of economic rationality without markets for production inputs and capital. Socialist economists such as Oscar Lange, Fred Taylor, and Maurice Dobb, have taken this as a refutation of Ludwig von Mises's critique of the possibility of economic rationality under socialist planning. In particular, it is argued that his formulation shows how modern high-speed multiprocessor computing can be used to find optimal scarcity valuations and prices for all products and assets in an economy, thereby allowing rational formulation of an economic plan by social planners.

Barone also contributed to general equilibrium theory by showing Walras how to incorporate variable production techniques into his equilibrium system of equations (the Walrasian system). This contributed to the development of marginal productivity theory, a central part of neoclassical economic analysis. Finally, he made notable contribution to the economics of taxation in his three studies of public finance in 1912.

See also: COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY; MARKET SOCIALISM; SOCIALISM

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RICHARD E. ERICSON

BARSHCHINA

Labor dues; corvée.

Barshchina referred to unpaid labor dues (corvée) owed by a peasant to his lord, most commonly la-

bor on the land. It may have emerged in Russia in the Kievan period, but most Western scholars maintain it developed in the late fifteenth century, as similar labor forms emerged in most east European countries. Associated with direct production for markets by large, especially lay, estates, it first became important in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It survived in somewhat modified form at least into the 1880s.

Barshchina varied according to location and time period. By the last third of the eighteenth century, it was increasingly associated with the rich black soils of the seven Central Agricultural provinces south of Moscow. Only 45 percent of the serfs were subject to labor service in the thirteen nonblack soil provinces, where soils were poor and the climate harsh, but the rate was 74 percent in the Central Agricultural Region. By the middle of the nineteenth century, labor dues were at their highest in Ukraine and New Russia, where 97 to 99.9 percent of the male serfs owed barshchina to produce grain for the European market.

In the nineteenth century, the typical obligation apparently slowly rose to three or four days per week in regions where the dues were heaviest, although during the harvest six-day weeks could be required. Viewed as an inefficient form of labor, landlords began to attempt to require specific labor tasks instead of days worked. Peasants considered it far more onerous than *obrok* (rents in kind or in money), because it put them directly under the control of the steward or landlord.

See also: OBROK; PEASANTRY; SERFDOM

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ELVIRA M. WILBUR

BARSOV, ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH

(1921–1991), Soviet economist.

Alexander Alexandrovich Barsov (b. Shparlinsky) served in World War II in frontline intelligence as a military interpreter and translator and was awarded a number of decorations. From 1965 to 1989 he was a senior researcher at the Institute of

Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Author of a number of publications, he was best known for his 1969 book *Balans stoimostnykh obmenov mezhdru gorodom i derevnei* (The Balance of Payments between the Town and the Countryside), in which he argues against the assumption, widespread in the West, that the huge increase in investment in the USSR in the First Five-Year Plan had been financed by an increase in unequal exchange between town and countryside. The underlying statistical basis for his argument was the Soviet national accounts for the period from 1928 to 1930—a landmark in the history of national income accounting. These were then unpublished archival documents.

According to Barsov, there was unequal exchange between agriculture and industry during the First Five-Year Plan, but this unequal exchange did not increase. Hence the resources for the huge increase in investment in the First Five-Year Plan were not provided by an increase in the agricultural surplus. Barsov's work directed attention to the fall in urban real wages as a source of investment resources. In addition, it led to increased recognition of the interdependence of the agricultural and industrial sectors. It also led to a lively debate in the West about the economics of collectivization.

See also: AGRICULTURE; FIVE-YEAR PLANS; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

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MICHAEL ELLMAN

BARYATINSKY, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH

(1815–1879), Viceroy of the Caucasus.

Prince Alexander Ivanovich Baryatinsky, a close friend of Tsar Alexander II (1855–1881) from childhood, was appointed Viceroy (*namestnik*) of the Caucasus in August 1856. This exalted office gave him military and political command of both the mountainous North Caucasus and the lands to the south bordering on Iran and the Ottoman Empire. A courageous veteran of Caucasian wars and former chief of staff to a previous viceroy, Prince Mikhail Vorontsov, Baryatinsky had grandiose ambitions for the Caucasus. He wrote to the tsar, "Russia had become for Asia what Western Europe had represented for so long in Russia—the source and bearer of the world's most advanced civilization. A model administration in the Caucasus would serve as a showcase of Russian colonial policy."

Baryatinsky saw himself as a pacifier (the war with the rebel Shamil still raged in the north) and a modernizer, continuing the civilizing mission of Vorontsov. He was a supporter of the tsar's program for peasant emancipation and negotiated skillfully with the Georgian nobility to convince them to arrange for the liberation of their serfs. But the program of reforms met resistance, not only from Georgian nobles, but from peasants as well, who wanted greater freedom, and Baryatinsky resorted to military repression.

During his years in office the Caucasian wars were brought to an end, and the relations between Georgian nobles and peasants were brought into line with Russian norms. He corresponded with the tsar on military and civilian matters and enjoyed close relations with his sovereign. His health suffered in the next few years, and he asked to be relieved of his post. In 1863 the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich became Viceroy. The legacy of the first three viceroys was peace and security in the Caucasus and the effective binding of the Georgian nobility to the Russian autocracy as loyal, privileged servants.

See also: CAUCAUS; COLONIALISM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

BASHKORTOSTAN AND BASHKIRS

Bashkortostan is a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, located between the Middle Volga and the Ural mountains, with its capital at Ufa. The Bashkirs are the official indigenous nationality of the republic, although they made up only 21.9 percent of its population in 1989 (compared to 39.3 percent Russians and 28.4 percent Tatars). There were 1,449,157 Bashkirs in the former Soviet Union in 1989, with close to 60 percent (863,808) living in Bashkortostan proper and most of the remainder in neighboring provinces. The Bashkir language belongs to the Kipchak group of the Turkic language family. Despite some modest efforts around the turn of the twentieth century, Bashkir was developed as a literary language only after 1917. The Arabic script was used until Latinization in 1929, followed by adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet in 1939. Most Bashkirs are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi legal school.

Throughout history the hills and plains of Bashkortostan have been closely linked to the great Eurasian steppe to the south. Successive settlement by Finns, Ugrians, Sarmatians, Alans, Magyars, and Turkic Bulgars had already created a complex situation before the arrival of the Turkic *badzhgard* and *burdzhan* nomadic unions of Pechenegs in the ninth century c.e. At this point these groups began to coalesce into a nomadic tribal confederation headed by the Turkic Bashkirs (*bashkort*). Later arrivals of Oguz and Kipchak Turks further Turkified the early Bashkir people.

By the sixteenth century, Bashkirs were dependent variously on the Kazan Khanate to the west, the Khanate of Siberia to the east, and the Nogai khans to the south. Constriction of migration routes had forced many Bashkirs to limit their nomadizing to summer months and to turn toward hunting, beekeeping, and in some places agriculture. In 1557 several Bashkir groups acknowledged Russian suzerainty, seeking protection from the Nogai khans. Subsequent years saw gradual expansion of Russian control over other Bashkir tribes, imposition of a tax (*yasak*) in fur, construction of Russian defensive lines to repel nomadic incursions, and infiltration of Bashkir lands by Russian peasants and other peoples fleeing serfdom and taxation. The years from the mid-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth centuries saw five major Bashkir revolts against Russian rule, usually directed against both peasant settlement and high Russian taxes. In addition, Bashkirs participated

with other discontented peoples of the region in Emelian Pugachev's great rebellion (1773–1775).

Like many native peoples in the Russian Empire, nomadic Bashkirs belonged to a specific estate category with particular privileges and responsibilities. Bashkirs were relatively privileged compared to other natives in the region, with lower tax rates and (theoretically) a guarantee to the land they had held when they joined the empire. In 1798 Russian authorities gave new content to Bashkir identity by establishing the Bashkir-Meshcheriak Host (later simply Bashkir Host), an irregular military force modeled on the Cossacks. Male Bashkirs were required to serve in units apportioned among twelve self-governing cantons. The Bashkir Host was abolished during the Great Reforms (1863), but it later served as a symbol of Bashkir independence. In the late nineteenth century, a vast increase in Russian settlement and occupation of Bashkir lands and expansion of mining and metallurgy concerns in the Urals rapidly and traumatically accelerated processes of Bashkir sedentarization. In the closing decades of the century the local Russian press debated whether the Bashkirs were dying out.

During the Russian Revolution, Bashkirs unexpectedly emerged as one of the most activist peoples in the empire. The expectation of many Tatars that Bashkirs would assimilate into the emerging Tatar nation, the Tatar and later Soviet plans for a large territorial republic that would integrate Bashkortostan with Tatarstan, and the increasingly violent confrontations between Bashkirs and Russian settlers encouraged Bashkir activism and separatism in 1917 and 1918. Ahmed Zeki Validov (known as Togan in his later Turkish exile) led a nationalist movement that sought to establish a Bashkir republic even while Red and White armies battled back and forth across the region and Bashkirs fought Russian settlers. The Bashkir republic was established by treaty between the Soviet government and Validov's group in 1919. In 1922 the republic was expanded to include most of the former Ufa province, bringing in the large numbers of Russians and Tatars that now outnumber the Bashkirs in their own republic.

Soviet rule brought many contradictions to Bashkortostan and the Bashkirs. Famine in 1921 and 1922, accompanied by banditry and rebellion, was barely overcome before the trauma of collectivization, crash industrialization, and the emergence of Josef Stalin's police state. Outright statements of nationalist sentiment were long taboo. Yet the Soviet government oversaw the de-

velopment of Bashkir written language, literature, historiography, and other cultural forms that solidified Bashkir identity and may have prevented its submergence in a larger Tatar or Turkic identity. Suspicion of some Tatars that the Bashkir nation is a recent and relatively artificial creation of the Soviet state rather than an old and authentic nation challenged the legitimacy of the Republic of Bashkortostan itself and often underlay post-Soviet debates between Bashkirs and Tatars over the treatment of Tatars in Bashkortostan.

See also: ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; TOGAN, AHMED ZEKI VALIDOV

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DANIEL E. SCHAFER

BASIL I

(1371–1425), grand prince of Vladimir and Moscow (from 1389).

The eldest son and successor to grand prince Dmitry Ivanovich ("Donskoi"), Basil assumed the power as the obedient servant of Khan Tokhtamysh. In 1392, when the latter was engaged in the war with emir Timur and needed financial resources, Basil visited the Horde and bought patents for the principalities of Nizhny Novgorod, Murom, Gorodets, Tarusa, and Meshchera. Using his armed force and the khan's support, Basil I seized Nizhny Novgorod. But Suzdalian princes did not give up, and the struggle for Nizhny Novgorod was resumed in the 1410s.

In 1397 Basil attempted to annex the Dvina land (in the valley of the Northern Dvina River), a

province of Great Novgorod. In order to gain the support of the inhabitants, Basil gave a special charter to this land, but his rule there did not last long. In 1498 the Novgorodians recovered their province.

In the 1390s, Basil I entered into alliance with the mighty duke of Lithuania, Vytautas (in 1391 Basil married his daughter, Sophia). The Muscovite prince allowed his ally and father-in-law to conquer Vyazma (1403) and Smolensk (1404); only when Vytautas marched on Pskov (1406) did Basil I declare war on Lithuania. However, during this war (1406–1408) no decisive battles took place. Peaceful relations with Lithuania were restored (1408), and later in his testament (1423) Basil I entrusted his minor son and heir, Basil II, to the protection of Vytautas.

After the final defeat of Tokhtamysh by Timur (1395), Basil I broke relations with the Golden Horde and stopped paying tribute. In 1408 Moscow suffered a severe blow from emir Edigey, the ruler of the Horde, who besieged the capital for three weeks, and, having taken an indemnity of three thousand rubles, withdrew, ravaging the land and leading away thousands of captives. Basil I made no attempt to face the enemy: He retired to Kostroma and waited there for the invasion to pass.

One of consequences of Edigey's raid was that Suzdalian princes recovered Nizhny Novgorod (c. 1410), and only in 1414 did Basil I manage to recapture this city.

It is characteristic of Basil's relations with the Tartars that he did not acknowledge the power of Edigey, who was not a Chingizid; but as soon as the legitimate khan Jelal-ad-din (son of Tokhtamysh) seized power in the Horde (1412), Basil immediately paid him a visit and resumed the payment of tribute.

For the lack of evidence, the last decade of Basil's I rule remains obscure. For the same reason, it is hardly possible to assess his personality. As Robert Crummey aptly remarked, Basil I "is a shadowy figure. The sources on his long reign give us little sense of his character, except to hint that he was a cautious and indecisive man" (p. 62).

See also: BASIL II; DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; YARLYK

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MIKHAIL M. KROM

BASIL II

(1415–1462), grand prince of Moscow from 1425 to 1462 (with intervals).

Basil II, third son and successor to Basil I (two elder sons of the latter died in childhood), ascended the Muscovite throne at the age of ten. Until he attained his majority, three persons shared the real power: his mother Sophia (the daughter of Vitautas, the grand prince of Lithuania), metropolitan Photius, and a boyar, Ivan Vsevolozhsky. In 1425 the intercession of Photius stopped the outbreak of dynastic war: When Basil's uncle Yuri Dmitrievich, the prince of Galich and Zvenigorod, laid claim to the grand-princely throne, the metropolitan made Yuri reconcile with his nephew. Basil II also owed much to Vsevolozhsky. When in 1431 the dispute over the Muscovite throne was transferred to the Golden Horde, this boyar managed to obtain the judgment of the khan favorable to Basil II.

Basil's first actions on his own were far less successful. In spring 1433 he could not stop his uncle Yuri's march on Moscow, and in the battle at Klazma River on April 25 Basil was completely defeated. Yuri seized grand-princely power, and only his unexpected death on June 5, 1434, allowed Basil II to supersede this strong rival.

Having grown up in the atmosphere of dynastic war, Basil II became suspicious and ruthless: He ordered the blinding of Vsevolozhsky, suspecting him of contacts with prince Yuri's party. In 1436, having captured his rebellious cousin Basil the Cross-Eyed, Basil II also had him blinded. Later, the same means of political elimination was applied to Basil II.

The mid-1440s were the most troublesome years in Basil's life. On July 7, 1445, in the battle at Kamenka River (near Suzdal), the Kazan Tatars defeated his army; he was wounded and captured. Having gotten this news, his cousin Dmitry Shemyaka proclaimed himself the grand prince of Moscow. Only in October 1445 was Basil II released (on condition of paying a huge ransom) and returned to Moscow. Shemyaka fled but was prompt

enough to organize a broad opposition to the grand prince, spreading rumors about the commitments undertaken by Basil II in captivity. As a result of a conspiracy, in February 1446 Shemyaka occupied Moscow, and Basil II was captured in the Trinity monastery (where he went for prayers) and blinded. Though exiled to Uglich (later to Vologda), the blind prince in February 1447 managed to return to Moscow as a victor.

The causes of Basil's II final victory are open to debate. Alexander Zimin, the author of the most detailed account of his reign (1991), maintained that Basil was "a nobody" and that the victory of the blind prince was entirely due to his loyal servicemen. This social explanation seems highly probable, but the personal role of Basil II in the events should not be neglected. Though he lacked the abilities of a military leader, his courage, persistence, and devotion to his cause must be taken into account.

See also: BASIL I; BASIL III; CIVIL WAR OF 1425–1450; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; METROPOLITAN

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MIKHAIL M. KROM

BASIL III

(1479–1533), grand prince of Moscow, sovereign of all Russia (since 1505), the eldest son of Ivan III and Sophia Paleologue.

Basil III continued the policy of his father in unifying Russian lands; under his rule, the last semi-autonomous polities, such as Pskov (1510), Ryazan (c. 1521), and Novgorod Seversk (1522), lost the remainder of their independence and were incorporated into the Russian state. Basil's reprisals against Pskov resemble that of Ivan III against Great Novgorod: The Pskov veche (assembly) was abolished, three hundred families of townspeople were evicted from the city, and their homes were occupied by servicemen and merchants from Muscovy. The only important difference is that, unlike his father, Basil III

did not need to resort to military force: The Pskov inhabitants bemoaned their fate but made no attempt to resist.

An Austrian diplomat, Sigismund von Herberstein, who visited Moscow twice (in 1517 and 1526) and left a detailed and reliable account of Muscovite affairs in the reign of Basil III, noted that “in the sway which he holds over his people, [the grand prince] surpasses the monarchs of the whole world . . .” (Herberstein, 1851, 1:30). Herberstein was especially impressed by the tight control that Basil III had over the nobility, including his own brothers. This system of permanent surveillance included special oaths of loyalty, encouraging denunciations, and inflicting political disgrace upon anyone suspected of disloyalty. Those who dared criticize the grand prince’s policy underwent harsh punishment, like Ivan Bersen-Beklemishev, who was executed in 1525.

Several factors contributed to Basil III’s ability to control the aristocratic elite. First, the composition of the elite changed dramatically during his reign due to numerous princely families from annexed Lithuanian lands who now entered Muscovite service. The growing tensions between the newcomers and hereditary Muscovite servitors precluded any possibility of united aristocratic opposition to the power of the grand prince. Second, Basil III relied on an increasing corps of state secretaries (*dyaki* and *podyachie*), and trusted upstarts, like the majordomo of Tver, Ivan Yurevich Shigona Podzhogin. Thus, the growth of bureaucracy and autocracy went hand in hand.

In foreign policy as well as in domestic affairs, Basil III followed in the footsteps of his father, Ivan III, though with less success. In the west, he tried to tear away from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania its frontier territories inhabited by east Slavic Orthodox populations. In two wars with Lithuania (1507–1508, 1512–1522) his only though important prize was the city of Smolensk (1514).

In the east, Basil’s major concern was to pacify or subjugate the bellicose khanate of Kazan on the Middle Volga, a splinter of the Golden Horde. In 1519 he managed to put on Kazan throne his vassal, Shah-Ali. But this achievement of Muscovite diplomacy irritated another Moslem polity, the Crimean khanate. In 1521 the khan of Crimea, Mohammed-Girey, invaded Russia. His unexpected raid threw the whole country into a panic. No defensive measures were taken, and the khan without hindrance reached the outskirts of Moscow.

Then the Tartars withdrew, looting towns and villages on their way and carrying off thousands of captives.

Basil III married twice. His first wife, Solomonia, descended from the Muscovite boyar family of Saburov. When, after twenty years of conjugal life, no child was born, the grand prince forced Solomonia to take the veil and confined her to a convent (1525). In spite of opposition among the clergy and courtiers caused by this divorce, Basil III married again (1526); his new choice was Elena, the daughter of a Lithuanian émigré to Muscovy, prince Basil Glinsky. Four years later this marriage produced a long-awaited heir, son Ivan (future tsar Ivan IV the Terrible).

Basil III contributed significantly to building autocracy in Russia, but his unexpected death in December 1533 revealed the implicit weakness of this system: With a three-year-old heir on the throne, the country inevitably entered a period of political crisis.

See also: CRIMEAN KHANATE; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; IVAN III; IVAN IV; KAZAN; PALEOLOGUE, SOPHIA; SUDEBNIK OF 1497

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MIKHAIL M. KROM

BASMACHIS

The Basmachi were anti-Soviet rebels in Turkestan between the Russian Revolution and the early 1930s. The term, derived from the Turkic word *basmak* (to attack or raid), connotes banditry and was originally a pejorative term used by Russians. Soviet scholarship characterized the Basmachi as mere brigands and counterrevolutionaries in the pay of British imperialists. Émigré memoirs and many scholarly works characterize the movement as a struggle for national liberation against a colonial power, although the extent to which participants overcame localism and factionalism is unclear. The Russian war in Afghanistan from 1979 to

1989 and subsequent events have renewed interest in the Basmachi rebels and given their struggle broader resonance.

The military humiliation and massacres that accompanied Russian conquest and occupation of Central Asia from the 1860s to the 1880s were still living memories in the region as Russia moved toward the revolution. Tsarist policies enforced cotton cultivation at the expense of food crops, permitted Russians to settle on nomadic grazing land, and encouraged the building of railroads and textile mills. All this contributed to dissatisfaction and fueled several major revolts, most notably at Andijan in 1898.

Some scholars date the Basmachi revolt to 1916, when rebellion broke out in Tashkent and elsewhere in Central Asia in opposition to the first nonvoluntary conscription of Central Asians into the Russian army. Despite the imposition of martial law, summary executions, and arming of Russian settlers, this revolt still simmered when the Bolshevik revolution broke out in 1917. Russian settlers completely dominated the Tashkent Soviet and other local soviets, so that Soviet power was largely identified as Russian power and fueled continued intercommunal violence. The Soviet destruction of the Muslim-led autonomous government in Kokand (February 1918) and of the Emirate of Bukhara (September 1920) also encouraged recruitment for the Basmachi movement. At their height in 1920 through 1922, some sources claim that the rebels had twenty to thirty thousand men under arms, controlled the Ferghana valley and most of Tajikistan, and enjoyed widespread popularity among the indigenous non-Russian population.

The Basmachi rebellion was never a unified movement. Lack of organization, conflicting agendas, and internal divisions complicated efforts to coordinate military operations against Soviet forces. Some secular intellectuals joined the movement (Jadid reformers, Young Bukharans, populist socialists), though Mustafa Chokay and other prominent figures kept their distance. Islamic ulama and traditional rulers such as the Emir of Bukhara played significant roles. However, the backbone of the movement seems to have been local village and clan leaders and in many cases actual brigands who terrorized Russians and Muslims alike. The most famous participant was the mercurial Enver Pasha, former Ottoman minister of war, who joined the Basmachis in October 1921 and tried to direct it toward a pan-Turkic and pan-

Islamic vision before his death in a skirmish with Russian forces in July 1922.

The Soviet campaign against the Basmachi was largely successful by 1924, although some groups remained active in mountainous border regions near Afghanistan until the early 1930s. The Soviets benefited from a better armed and more disciplined military force; they also learned to deploy Tatar and Central Asian soldiers so the army would not appear solely Russian. Concessions encouraged defections from Basmachi ranks: The Soviets co-opted Central Asians into state institutions, reopened closed markets, promised land reform, granted food and tax relief, relaxed anti-Islamic measures, and generally promoted the return of stability and prosperity under the New Economic Policy reforms. Eventually, Russian cultivation of good relations with Afghanistan denied the Basmachis a cross-border refuge.

See also: AFGHANSTAN, RELATIONS WITH; CENTRAL ASIA; FERGHANA VALLEY; ISLAM; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

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DANIEL E. SCHAFER

BATU

(c. 1206-1255), Mongol prince, the second son of Genghis Khan's eldest son Jochi.

Batu commanded the army that conquered the northeastern Rus principalities (1237-1238) and

subsequently that conquered the southern Rus principalities and invaded eastern Europe (1240–1241). Batu was the first khan to rule in the Khanate of Qipchaq (Ulus of Jochi; desht-i-Qipchaq), which he is credited with having founded. His father, Jochi, to whom the lands had been granted “as far as Mongol hooves trod” in the western part of the Mongol Empire (i.e., west of the Irtysh River), died before ruling there. Batu is also credited with building the city of Sarai (Old Sarai, Sarai-Batu) on the Akhtuba channel of the lower Volga River.

Batu was present at the *quriltai* (assembly) that chose Ögödei as qaghan (grand khan) in 1229 and most likely also at the *quriltai* of 1234, which planned the campaign against the Qipchaqs, as well as the *quriltai* of 1237, which planned the campaign against the Rus principalities and eastern Europe. Disagreements over Batu’s leadership developed during the campaigns in Rus and eastern Europe (1237–1241). Güyüg, a son of Ögödei, and Büri, a grandson of Chaghadai, challenged Batu’s authority, possibly on the basis of the questionable legitimacy of Batu’s father. When Qaghan Ögödei died in 1241, Batu opposed and apparently managed to delay the elevation of Güyüg to become qaghan until 1246. Claiming ill health, Batu refused to attend any *quriltais*. His presence at the *quriltai* was needed to give legitimacy to Ögödei’s successor because, after Chaghadai’s death in 1242, Batu was considered a senior-ranking member of the Chinghissids. When Güyüg was declared qaghan by a *quriltai* despite Batu’s absence (although Batu was ostensibly represented by his five brothers), he mounted a campaign against Batu but died on the way to Batu’s ulus in 1248.

This time Batu succeeded in getting a *quriltai* of 1251 to select his own candidate, Möngke, who was the son of Tolui (Chinghis Khan’s youngest son). Batu had apparently reached agreement with Sorghaqtani, the widow of Tolui, thus forming an alliance of Jochids and Toluids against the Ögödeids. Möngke and Batu then launched a joint attack on the Ögödeids and their supporters, the Chaghadaids. As a result of Batu’s role in elevating Möngke to qaghan and in helping him to consolidate his hold on that position, Batu had a relatively free hand in ruling his own khanate.

A sky worshiper, Batu followed a policy of religious toleration, but seems not to have been pleased by the conversion of his brother Berke to Islam, for, according to William of Rubruck, Batu

changed Berke’s yurt to the eastern part of the Khanate beyond the Volga River to reduce his contacts with Muslims, which he thought harmful. The Mongol and Turkic sources refer to Batu as *sain*, which means “good” or “wise,” and in the Rus sources before c. 1448, Batu is depicted as a powerful tsar to whom the Rus princes had to pay obeisance. After 1448, the Russian sources increasingly depict Batu as a cruel plunderer and enslaver of the Rus land.

See also: GOLDEN HORDE

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DONALD OSTROWSKI

BAUER, YEVGENY FRANTSEVICH

(1865–1917), film director.

Yevgeny Bauer was the most original and important film director in prerevolutionary Russian cinema. In addition to directing, he frequently wrote, designed, and shot his films.

Bauer was born into an artistic family and graduated from the Moscow College of Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture. He worked as a theater artist and set designer before making films. Soon after going to work for the Khanzhonkov studio, he became their best-paid director with an alleged salary of 40,000 rubles. His life came to an early end in 1917: While preparing for an acting

role near Yalta, he broke his leg in a fall, caught pneumonia, and died.

Bauer's films rank among the best early cinema melodramas, comedies, and psychological thrillers. His greatest films complicate melodramatic conventions to tell stories about people caught amid the cultural changes and political instability of the late-tsarist era. Bauer also specialized in the neo-Gothic psychological drama, exploring the dreams and obsessions of urban middle-class characters in an increasingly commercialized world. Typical Bauer characters search futilely for love and meaning in a chaotic world, in which adults lack authority and moral leadership and young people are willful, egocentric, and morally adrift.

Bauer delighted in inventing new ways for the film camera to tell stories. His experiments with camera movement, lighting, and set design created complex three-dimensional spaces. He employed furniture, architecture, fashionable clothing, special effects, and layers of gauzy curtains to animate the social world in which his characters lived and to penetrate the psychological worlds that contained their private visions. He used lighting particularly effectively to enhance the beauty and talent of his actors and the drama of a scene.

His films include *Twilight of a Woman's Soul* (1913), *Child of the Big City* (1914), *Daydreams* (1915), *The Dying Swan* (1916), *A Life for a Life* (1916), and *To Happiness* (1917).

See also: MOTION PICTURES

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JOAN NEUBERGER

BAZAROV, VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH

(1874–1939), Marxist philosopher and economist.

Born Vladimir Alexandrovich Rudnev in Tula and educated at Moscow University, Vladimir Bazarov (his chosen pseudonym) joined the Bolsheviks in 1904 and produced a Russian translation of *Capital* between 1907 and 1909. Before 1917 his most important works were philosophical, and his key associate was Alexander Bogdanov; after 1917 his most important contributions were economic, and his key associate was Vladimir Groman. Attacked by Vladimir Lenin in 1908 as an idealist and for criticizing Georgy Plekhanov's materialism, in fact Bazarov was of positivist philosophical persuasion. After 1900, Bogdanov and Bazarov had attempted to defend their interpretation of Marx against the Legal Marxist revisionists. Instead of the neo-Kantian notion that the individual person must always be treated as an end, never solely as a means, Bazarov championed the collectivist ideal and the proletarian-class perspective, the fusion of human souls as the supreme outcome of communism. Even so Lenin labeled Bazarov a "Machist."

After the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, Bazarov became a leading Gosplan (State Planning Commission) commentator on the restoration process occurring in the Soviet economy and on the principles of drafting perspective plans as the first specification of the general plan. He advocated a combination of two methods of planning, one teleological (focusing on ultimate goals), the other genetic (focusing on existing trends), the former predominating in industry, the latter in agriculture. Bazarov analyzed cyclical and secular economic development using models imported from natural science, namely wave mechanics and chemical equilibrium, and he warned of a tendency toward relative underproduction in Soviet-type economies. He also proposed criteria for optimal plans and methods for estimating the structure of consumer demand. Bazarov was arrested in 1930 and bracketed with Menshevik wreckers.

See also: GOSPLAN

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VINCENT BARNETT

BEARD TAX

The beard tax is the best known of a series of measures enacted by Tsar Peter I to transform and regulate the appearance of his subjects. As early as 1698 the tsar ordered many of his prominent courtiers to shave their beards, and in 1699 he began to mandate the wearing of European fashions at court functions. In subsequent years a series of regulations ordered various groups to adopt German (i.e., European) dress. In 1705 decrees were issued prohibiting the buying, selling, and wearing of Russian dress by courtiers, state servitors, and townspeople. In the same year the wearing of beards, which was favored by Orthodox doctrine, was prohibited and the beard tax was instituted. With the exception of the Orthodox clergy, anyone who wanted to wear a beard was ordered to pay a special tax and obtain a token (*znak*) from government officials. Although no extensive studies have examined the implementation of the beard tax and related decrees, the fact that they had to be repeated upon subsequent occasions would indicate that compliance was far from universal. Old Believers (Orthodox Church members who rejected reforms in ritual and practice) were disproportionately affected by the beard tax and they alone were ordered by law to wear old-style Russian dress (to separate them from the mainstream of society). The beard tax was never a major component of state revenue, and by the reign of Catherine II even the regulations on Old Believers began to be relaxed.

See also: OLD BELIEVERS; PETER I; TAXES

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BRIAN BOECK

BEDNYAKI

A traditional Russian term denoting a poor peasant household, one without enough land or capital to support itself without hiring out family members to work on neighbors' fields.

During the Black Repartition, which occurred during the revolutionary events of 1917 and 1918, Russian peasants seized land owned by noble and absentee landlords and the more substantial peasants, some of whom had consolidated holdings during the Stolypin reforms of 1906–1914. Thus the number of peasant holdings increased markedly, and the size of the average plot declined. Many villages returned to the scattered strips and primitive tools characteristic of tsarist times. Use of the wooden plow, sickle, or scythe were common among the poorer peasants. These subsistence agriculturists typically had one cow or draft animal, along with a small wooden house and naturally had little or nothing to sell in the market. Many poor peasants had been proletarian *otkhodniki* (migrants) or soldiers before and during the war, but the economic collapse forced them to return to their ancestral villages. The village community (*obshchina* or *mir*) resumed its authority over the timing of agricultural tasks and occasional repartition. Hence the Bolshevik Revolution constituted a social and economic retrogression in the countryside.

Considering their economic plight, the *bednyaki*, along with the landless *batraki*, were expected to be rural allies of the proletariat. According to Bolshevik thinking in the period of War Communism and the New Economic Policy, these lower classes would support the government's policy and would eventually be absorbed into collective or communal farms. Those middle peasants (*serednyaki*) with slightly more land and productive capital were expected to tolerate Bolshevik policy only, while the so-called kulaks would oppose it. In reality the various peasant strata lacked any strong class lines or reliable political orientation.

See also: BLACK REPARTITION; KULAKS; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PEASANTRY; SEREDNYAKI; WAR COMMUNISM

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

BELARUS AND BELARUSIANS

Bounded by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine, Belarus is an independent country of about the size of Kansas. In 2000 its population was about 10.5 million. Over the course of its



Belarus, 1992. © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

history, this territory has been of part of Kievan Rus, the Grand Principality of Lithuania, Poland-Lithuania, the Russian Empire, interwar Poland (western Belarus only), and the Soviet Union.

The origin of the name Belarus is obscure. Its territory, encompassing much of the drainage systems of the Pripyat River and upper reaches of the Nieman, Western Dvina, and Dnieper Rivers, comprises the medieval Polotsk and Turov principalities, with the addition of the western lands of Smolensk and Chernigov around Mogilev and Gomel, but minus the territory south of Pinsk.

Some specialists consider the forests and swamps of southwestern Belarus part of the original homeland of Slavic speakers and possibly the Indo-Europeans. Baltic speakers inhabited much of Belarus before Slavic speakers migrated there after 500 C.E. Around 900 the Slavic Dregovich and Radmichi inhabited the eastern half of Belarus,

while Baltic Iatvingians dwelled in the northwest. Specialists' opinions differ as to when and where a distinct Belarusian language and people formed and the degree to which they represent a Baltic and eastern Slavic mixture.

Around 980 Polotsk was under a separate Varangian prince, the non-Riurikid Rogvolod, whom Vladimir of Novgorod slew en route to seizing Kiev. Vladimir's son Iziaslav, by Rogvolod's daughter Ragneda, founded there the first lasting Rus territorial subdynasty, and the latter's son and grandson, Briachislav and Vseslav Briachislavich (d. 1101), built up Polotsk. Vseslav's granddaughter St. Evfrosynia founded a noted convent there.

In the 1100s Polotsk split into subprincipalities and by 1200 Volhynia controlled the Brest region, while Germans were eliminating Polotsk's traditional loose overlordship over the tribes of modern Latvia. In the early 1200s the Smolensk princes spearheaded commercial agreements with the Baltic Germans and Gotland Swedes, which included Vitebsk and Polotsk.

By the mid-1200s, Lithuanian princes—some Orthodox Christians, some pagans controlled—Polotsk, Novogrudok, and nearby towns. With the pagan Lithuanian absorption of all the former Polotsk and Turov lands in the 1300s, the surviving local Rus princes transformed into territorial aristocrats. Rus institutions spread into ethnic Lithuania, and Rus became the domestic chancery language of the ethnically mixed realm. For about half of the fourteenth century, a separate Western Rus metropolitanate was located in Novogrudok. Minsk grew in importance at this time near the divide between the Nieman and Dnieper watersheds. The Orthodox Lithuanian prince Andrei of Polotsk (d. 1399) fought at Kulikovo against Mamai in 1380.

The 1385 Polish-Lithuanian dynastic Union of Krevo (in western Belarus) privileged nobles who converted to Catholicism. After a civil war in the 1430s, the local Orthodox Rus nobility obtained these same, Polish-inspired rights, but Orthodox prelates never acquired the same political privileges as their Catholic counterparts. Starting with Brest in 1390, several Rus towns obtained a form of Neumarkt-Magdeburg, the most prevalent form of medieval autonomous city law to spread into east-central Europe. After the misfired Church Union of Florence of 1439, Moscow's authority split with the metropolitanate of Kiev, which retained the dioceses in Belarus.

With the dynastic union, some Rus acquired a genuine Western education, and Rus writers created a set of Lithuanian chronicles with a legendary foundation of the leading families and the realm. Jewish culture flourished, and some holy scripture and other Jewish books were translated directly from Hebrew into the local Rus dialect. In 1517 Frantishek Skoryna of Polotsk initiated systematic Kirillic and Slavic printing with his Gospels.

During the 1500s, with growing estate agriculture, a form of serfdom binding peasants to the land with about two days of labor dues per week became the dominant peasant status, but the Rus-language First Lithuanian Statute of 1529 was one of the most advanced law codes in Europe at that time. Moscow's occupation of Polotsk in 1563 led to the stronger Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin in 1569, whereby Lithuania transferred its Ukrainian lands to Poland, but retained the Belarusian territories. The brilliant, Orthodox-turned-Catholic Leo Sapieha (Leu Sapega) compiled the Rus-language Third Lithuanian Statute in 1588, which remained in use for more than two centuries. He also organized the renowned state archive or *Metrika*.

Under the impact of the Protestant Reformation, the Lithuanian Radvilas (Radzivil) family turned their central Belarusian fortress town of Nesvizh into a center of Calvinist learning and printing, but with the arrival of the Counter Reformation, Nesvizh became a Roman Catholic stronghold. Jesuits founded schools there and in six other Belarusian towns and helped cause the polonization of the local Rus nobility.

In 1596 the Polish crown, but not the Sejm (parliament), tried to force the Church Union of Brest on the Orthodox in 1596, creating at first an Eastern Rite Uniate hierarchy without many faithful, and leaving most of the faithful without a hierarchy. Over the course of time, however, the Uniate Church grew and a Catholic-influenced Uniate Basilian Order of monks took over the great monasteries in Belarus. In 1623 angry Vitebsk Orthodox murdered their fanatic Uniate bishop Iosafat Kunchvich, who had confiscated their churches and monasteries, and the crown responded with mass executions. In 1634 the Orthodox Church regained its legality but not much property. Some talented Orthodox clerics, such as Simeon Polotsky (1629–1680), made splendid careers in Moscow. A 1697 decree banned the use of Rus in official state documents. By the late eighteenth century, the Uniate Church was far stronger than the Orthodox in

Belarus and in the western regions many commoners had become Roman Catholic.

Belarusians constituted perhaps one-eighth of the insurgents in the mid-seventeenth century who rebelled against the serfdom and Catholic-Uniate privileges in Poland-Lithuania, but then suffered heavily from the Muscovite invasions in 1654–1655 and 1659. Ethnic Belarus urban life declined, and Jews, despite some heavy losses in the uprisings, became more prominent in many towns. Brest, however, lost its regional cultural preeminence among the Litvak Jews to Vilnius in Lithuania.

The Belarus lands suffered again during the Great Northern War, especially during the period from 1706 to 1708, due to the Swedish-Russian fighting there. Later in the eighteenth century the economy recovered, stimulated by domestic and international markets and led by enlightened estate management and manufactures.

Polish-language serf theaters appeared in 1745, and Poland's educational reforms of 1773 established an ascending network, with divisional schools in Brest, Grodno, and Novogrudok, and a university in Vilnius. Several Belarusians were active in the Polish Enlightenment.

The three-stage annexation of Belarus by Russia during the partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) had profound effects. The emperors respected Polish culture and educational and religious institutions only until the Polish uprising of 1830–1831. Subsequently, cooperative Belarusians played a major role in weakening Catholicism, suppressing the Uniate Church, restoring Orthodoxy and Russianizing education, as well as publishing historical documents and doing normal administrative work.

Though not a main center of heavy industry, Belarus shared in the Russian Empire's social and economic development in the nineteenth century and had many small enterprises.

Belarusian national consciousness developed relatively late. Polish and Polish-language intellectuals promoted the idea of a separate, non-Russian, Belarusian (or White Ruthenian) folk. After Belarusians did not support Poles in the 1863–1864 uprising, interested Russians became more sympathetic to the notion of Belarusians as a distinct provincial group and started to collect local folklore. Genuine Belarusian-language literature started only in the 1880s. Circles of Belarusian students and intellectuals in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Dorpat, and other university cities sprung up in the

1890s. Only after the Revolution of 1905 was publication in Belarusian legalized. Hramada, the socialist and largest Belarusian political organization, could not compete with the more developed Russian, Polish, and Jewish parties or elect a delegate to any of the four Dumas.

The German advances and defeat in World War I and the Russian Revolution and Civil War stimulated a dozen competing projects for reorganizing Belarus, including a restoration of a federated prepartition Lithuania and/or Poland. The revived Poland and Communist Russia divided Belarus in 1921, the eastern portion becoming the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) of the USSR in 1923–1924. In western Belarus, Polish authorities favored polonization, suppressing a variety of national and autonomist strivings. The BSSR authorities, including Russians there, at first promoted belarusianization of domestic life, and national, cultural, and educational institutions grew apace, including a university and academy of sciences in the capital Minsk. However, the rhythms of interwar Soviet development—New Economic Policy, collectivization, five-year plans, bloody purges, and reorientation to a Russian-language—dominated all-union patriotism—affected the BSSR.

The Soviet-German Pact of 1939 and World War II brought a quick unification of an expanded BSSR, a harsh Nazi occupation and requisition of labor, the extermination of most Belarusian Jews, widespread partisan activity, and the total death of maybe a million inhabitants—about one eighth of the population. Allied diplomacy resulted in the BSSR (and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) acquiring a separate seat in the United Nations General Assembly in 1945.

The BSSR also followed the rhythm of postwar Soviet developments, becoming heavily industrialized with its own specialty tractors and heavy-duty trucks, as well as a variety of other basic goods. The country achieved virtual universal literacy, but the Russian language and culture predominated in the cities and in higher education. Due to prevailing winds, Belarus suffered heavily from the Chernobyl explosion in 1986.

The BSSR played a secondary role in reform and national movements leading to the end of the USSR and an independent Belarus. Its first leader, Stanislav Shushkevich tried to balance between Russia and the West, but lost the 1994 presidential election to the Alexander Lukashenko, who proved adept in using referendum tactics and police measures to establish an authoritarian regime with a neo-Soviet orienta-

tion, and perpetuate his power. Dependence on Russian energy resources and markets have cemented close ties, but plans for a state union with Russia have faltered over Russian demands that Belarus liberalize its economy and Lukashenko's insistence that Belarus be an equal partner.

See also: CHERNOBYL; JEWS; LITHUANIA AND LITHUANIANS; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; ORTHODOXY; POLAND; POLISH REBELLION OF 1863; UNIATE CHURCH; UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

BELINSKY, VISSARION GRIGORIEVICH

(1811–1848), Russian literary critic whose framework of aesthetic judgment influenced Russian and Soviet critical standards for almost two centuries; he established a symbiotic relationship between the writer and the critic whose creative interaction he considered a tool of societal self-exploration.

Belinsky's father was a navy physician, his mother a sailor's daughter, making the future critic a *raznochinets* (person of mixed class background). He was born in the fortress of Sveaborg (today Suomenlinna, Finland) and spent his childhood in the town of Chembar (Penza region), where his father worked as a district doctor. Belinsky enrolled at Moscow University in 1829 but was expelled in 1832 due to frail health and a reputation as a troublemaker. Often on the verge of poverty and dependent on the support of devoted friends, Belinsky became a critic for Nikolai Ivanovich Nadezhdin's journals, *Telescope* and *Molva*, in 1834. His extensive debut, *Literaturnye mechtaniya: Elegiya v proze* (Literary Daydreams: An Elegy in Prose), consisted of ten chapters. At this stage, Belinsky's understanding of literature featured a lofty idealism inspired by Friedrich Schiller, as well as the notion of popular spirit (*narodnost*), which signified the necessity of the "idea of the people" in any work of art. This concept was adopted from the German

Volkstuemlichkeit that was developed by Johann Gottfried Herder and Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling.

Belinsky's participation, since 1833, in Nikolai Vladimirovich Stankevich's Moscow Hegelian circle, as well as his close friendship with Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin, had by 1837 caused him to make a radical move toward an unconditional acceptance of all reality as reasonable. However, Belinsky's habitual tendency toward extremes turned his interpretation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's dialectic rationalism into a passive acceptance of everything that exists, even serfdom and the tsarist system. Such fatalism became evident in Belinsky's surveys and reviews for Andrei Alexandrovich Kraevsky's journal *Otechestvennye zapiski* (Notes of the fatherland), the criticism department of which he headed since 1839. Subsequently, in the early 1840s, a more balanced synthesis of utopian aspirations and realistic norms emerged in Belinsky's views, as evidenced by his contributions for Nikolai Alexeyevich Nekrasov's and Ivan Ivanovich Panaev's *Sovremennik* (Contemporary), a journal that had hired him in 1846.

Belinsky met all leading Russian authors of his day, from Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin and Mikhail Yurievich Lermontov to Ivan Andreyevich Krylov and Ivan Sergeyevich Turgenev, befriending and deeply influencing many of them. In 1846, he coined the critical term *Natural School*, thereby providing a group of writers with direction and a platform for self-identification. Even those who did not share his strong liberal persuasions were in awe of his personal integrity, honesty, and selflessness. Belinsky's passionate, uncompromising nature caused clashes that gave rise to major intellectual debates. For example, in his famous letter to Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol, written on July 15, 1847, the critic took this once so admired writer to task for his mysticism and conservatism; the letter then circulated widely, in hundreds of illegal copies.

In his last years, Belinsky attempted to create a theory of literary genres and general philosophical definitions of the essence and function of art. After his early death from tuberculosis, his name became synonymous with dogmatism and anti-aesthetic utilitarianism. Yet this reputation is largely undeserved; for it resulted from the critic's canonization by liberal and Marxist ideologues. Still, from his earliest works Belinsky did betray a certain disposition toward simplification and systematization at any cost, often reducing complex entities to binary concepts (e.g., the classic opposition of form versus content). Indeed, Belinsky de-

voted little time to matters of literary language, rarely engaging in detailed textual analysis. However, his theories and their evolution, too, were simplified, both by his Soviet epigones and their Western antagonists.

Belinsky has undoubtedly shaped many views of Russian literature that remain prevalent, including a canon of authors and masterpieces. For example, it was he who defended Lermontov's 1840 novel, *Geroi nashego vremeni* (Hero of Our Time), as a daringly innovative work and who recognized Fyodor Dostoyevsky's supreme talent. (At the same time, he ranked Walter Scott and George Sand higher than Pushkin). Belinsky, the first major professional Russian literary critic, stood at the cradle of Russia's literary-centric culture, with its supreme social and ethical demands. His ascetic persona and quest for martyrdom became archetypal for the Russian intelligentsia's sense of mission. Lastly, Belinsky defined the ideal image of the Russian writer as secular prophet, whose duty is to respond to the people's aspirations and point them toward a better future.

See also: DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILIEVICH; INTELLIGENTSIA; KRYLOV, IVAN ANDREYEVICH; LERMONTOV, MIKHAIL YURIEVICH; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; TURGENEV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH

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PETER ROLLBERG

BELOVEZH ACCORDS

This treaty, also known as the Minsk Agreement, brought about the end of the Soviet Union. It was concluded on December 8, 1991, by President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus Stanislav Shushkevich, who met secretly in a resort in Belovezhaska Pushcha, just outside of Brest, Belarus. According to most reports, the three leaders had no common consensus on the future of the Soviet Union prior to the meeting, but, once

they assembled, they decided to shelve plans to preserve some sort of reformed Soviet state, as preferred by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, and instead pressed for its dissolution. In the days that followed, Gorbachev would try in vain to preserve the USSR, but there was little mass or elite support for its continued existence, at least in these three republics.

The treaty noted that “the USSR has ceased to exist as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality” and stated that the activities of bodies of the former USSR would be henceforth discontinued. Its drafters asserted the authority to do this by noting that Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus were the three surviving original founders of the Soviet state in 1922. In its stead, these three republics agreed to form a new organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was designed to foster a variety of forms of economic, political, social, and military cooperation. Specifically, the accords guaranteed equal rights and freedoms to all residing in those states, provided for the protection of ethnic and linguistic minorities, recognized each state’s borders, emphasized the need for arms control, preserved a united military command and common military-strategic space, and pledged cooperation on the Chernobyl disaster. Later that December, eight more former Soviet republics would join the CIS, and by December 25, 1991, the Soviet flag was at last removed from the top of the Kremlin.

No participant has produced a definitive and detailed account of the meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, and the accords remain the subject of some controversy, particularly in Russia. At the time of its signing, the agreement was widely celebrated, with only five deputies in the Russian legislature voting against its ratification, and Ukraine adding twelve reservations to its ratification, directed toward weakening any sort of new union or commonwealth. However, over the course of time, many, especially in Russia and Belarus, have disputed the right of the three leaders to conclude this treaty and have lamented the lack of open debate and popular input into its conclusion. In March 1996, the Russian Duma voted overwhelmingly to annul it, and this action led many to fear possible Russian attempts to reestablish the Soviet Union or some other form of authority over other republics. Moreover, in the 1990s the accord began to lose popularity among the Russian population, which, public opinion polls repeatedly revealed, began to regret the breakup of the Soviet Union.

See also: COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES;
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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PAUL J. KUBICEK

BELY, ANDREI

(1880–1934), symbolist poet, novelist, essayist.

Andrei Bely was born Boris Nikolayevich Bugayev on October 26, 1880, in Moscow. His father, Nikolai Bugayev, was a professor of mathematics at Moscow University and a renowned scholar; his mother, Alexandra, was dedicated to music, poetry, and theater. This dichotomy was to influence and torment Boris throughout his life: He would resist both parents’ influences while continually seeking syntheses of disparate subjects.

At age fifteen, Boris met the intellectually gifted Soloviev family. Vladimir Soloviev was a philosopher, poet, theologian, and historian whose concept of the “Eternal Feminine” in the form of “Sophia, the Divine Wisdom” became central to Symbolist thought. Vladimir’s younger brother Mikhail took Boris under his wing, encouraging him as a writer and introducing him to Vladimir Soloviev’s metaphysical system.

From 1899 to 1906 Boris studied science, then philosophy at Moscow University. However, his absorption in his writing and independent research interfered with his formal studies. Restless and erratic, he took interest in all subjects and confined himself to none. His idiosyncratic writing style derives in part from his passionate, undisciplined approach to knowledge, a quality that would later

be deemed decadent by socialist critics, including Leon Trotsky.

Mikhail Soloviev applauded Boris's early literary endeavors and suggested the pseudonym Andrei Bely ("Andrew the White"). Bely's four *Symphonies* (1902–1908) combine poetry, music, and prose. Bely's first poetry collection, *Gold in Azure* (*Zoloto v lazuri*, 1904), uses rhythms of folk poetry and metrical innovations. Like Alexander Blok and other Symbolists, Bely saw himself as a herald of a new era. The poems of *Gold in Azure* are rapturous in mood and rich in magical, mythical imagery. Bely's next poetry collections move into murkier territory: *Ashes* (*Pepel*, 1909) expresses disillusionment with the 1905 revolution, while *Urn* (*Urna*, 1909) reflects his affair with Blok's wife, Lyubov, which caused hostility, even threats of duels, between the two poets.

Bely followed his first novel, *The Silver Dove* (*Serebryany golub*, 1909), with *Petersburg* (1916), which Vladimir Nabokov considered one of the four greatest novels of the twentieth century (*Strong Opinions*, 1973). It concerns a terrorist plot to be performed by Nikolai Apollonovich against his father, Senator Apollon Apollonovich Ableukhov. The novel's nonsensical dialogue, ellipses, exclamations, and surprising twists of plot, while influenced by Nikolai Gogol and akin to the work of the Futurists, take Russian prose in an unprecedented direction. The novel's main character is Petersburg itself, which "proclaims forcefully that it exists."

While writing *Petersburg*, Bely found a new spiritual guide in Rudolf Steiner, whose theory of anthroposophy—the idea that each individual, through training, may access his subconscious knowledge of a spiritual realm—would inform Bely's next novel, the autobiographical *Kitten Letayev* (*Kotik Letayev*, 1917–1918).

Like other Symbolists, Bely welcomed the October Revolution of 1917. He moved to Berlin in 1921, but returned in 1923 to a hostile literary climate. Bely tried to make room for himself in the new era by combining Marxism with anthroposophy, but to no avail.

A prolific and influential critic, Bely wrote more than three hundred essays, four volumes of memoirs, and numerous critical works, including his famous *Symbolism* (1910), which paved the way for Formalism, and *The Art of Gogol* (*Masterstvo Gogolya*, 1934). He died of arterial sclerosis on August 1, 1934.

See also: BLOK, ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH; SILVER AGE; SOLOVIEV, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH

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DIANA SENECHAL

BERDYAYEV, NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH

(1874–1948), philosopher.

Nikolai Berdyayev, a scion of the landed gentry, was born on an estate near Kiev. The Russian philosopher best known in the West, he moved from Marxism to Kantian Idealism to a Christian existentialism meshed with leftist political views. A lifelong opponent of bourgeois society and bourgeois values, in emigration he called capitalism and communism equally unchristian.

As a leader in the religious and philosophical renaissance of the early twentieth century, he decried the atheism and dogmatism of the revolutionary intelligentsia, while also polemicizing against the otherworldliness and passivity enjoined by historical Christianity. He believed that a Third Testament would supersede the Old and the New Testaments.

Expelled from Russia by the Bolshevik government in late 1922, in 1924 he settled near Paris and played an active role in émigré and French intellectual and cultural life. His books were translated into many languages. His critique of the revolutionary intelligentsia and his articulation of the Russian idea had a profound impact on late Soviet and post-Soviet thought.

Berdyayev's philosophy is anthroposophic, personalistic, subjective, and eschatological. He emphasized the supreme value of the person, opposed all forms of objectification, and exalted a freedom

unconstrained by norms or laws, including the laws of nature. Rejecting all dogmas, orthodoxies, systems, and institutions, and all forms of determinism, he linked freedom with creativity, which he considered man's true vocation, and taught that man is a co-creator with God. By "man" he meant men; he regarded "woman" as "generative but not creative." He interpreted the Bolshevik Revolution as part of a pan-European crisis, the imminent end of the civilization that began in the Renaissance, and looked forward to a period he called the new middle ages.

The literature on Berdyayev is extensive and varied. Some authors exalt him as a philosopher of freedom, others emphasize his utopianism, and still others consider him a heretic.

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BERNICE GLATZER ROSENTHAL

BERIA, LAVRENTI PAVLOVICH

(1899–1953), Soviet politician and police official, chief of the NKVD 1938–1946.

Born in Merkheuli, a village in the Georgian Republic, Lavrenti Beria enrolled in the Baku Polytechnic for Mechanical Construction in 1915 and graduated four years later. Meanwhile, after joining the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in March 1917, he participated in the Russian Revolution as an underground soldier and counterintelligence agent in the Caucasus. Beria's career with the Soviet secret police began in early 1921, when the ruling Bolsheviks assigned him to the notorious Cheka (Extraordinary Commission for Fighting Revolution and Sabotage) in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. As a deputy to the ruthless Cheka chief in that republic, Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, Beria engaged in bloody reprisals against the opponents of Bolshevik rule, even drawing criticism from some Caucasian Bolshevik leaders for the violent methods he used. By late 1922, with the anti-

Bolshevik rebels in Azerbaijan subdued, Beria was transferred to Georgia, where there were still serious challenges to the Soviet regime. He assumed the post of deputy chairman of the Georgian Cheka, throwing himself into the job of fighting political dissent among his fellow Georgians. Beria's influence grew as the political police played an increasing role in Georgian politics. His career was successful because he helped to engineer the defeat of the national communists, who wanted Georgia to retain some form of independence from Moscow, and the consequent victory of those who favored strong centralized control by the Bolsheviks.

By 1926 Beria had risen to the post of chairman of the Georgian GPU (State Political Administration, the successor organization to the Cheka). Beria was the consummate Soviet politician. His political fortunes were furthered not only by his effectiveness in using the secret police to enforce Soviet rule, but also by his ability to win favor with Soviet party leader Josef Stalin, a Georgian by nationality, by playing on Stalin's suspicions of the native Georgian party leadership. Having extended his influence into the party apparatus, Beria was elected in 1931 to the post of first secretary of the Georgian party apparatus, a remarkable achievement for a man of only thirty-two years. Henceforth Beria would continue to ingratiate himself with Stalin by furthering Stalin's personality cult in Georgia. In 1935 Beria published a lengthy treatise, *On the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia*, which greatly exaggerated Stalin's role in the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus before 1917. The book was serialized in the major party newspaper, Pravda, and made Beria a figure of national stature.

When Stalin embarked on his policy of terrorizing the party and the country through his bloody purges of the Communist Party apparatus from 1936 through 1938, Beria was a willing accomplice. In Georgia alone, thousands perished at the hands of the secret police, and thousands more were condemned to prisons and labor camps, as part of a nationwide Stalinist vendetta against the Soviet people. Although many party leaders perished in the purges, Beria emerged unscathed, and in 1938 Stalin rewarded him with the post of head of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, as the secret police was then called) in Moscow. After carrying out a full-scale purge of the NKVD leadership, Beria brought in his associates from the party and police in Georgia to fill the top NKVD posts, thereby creating an extensive power base in

the NKVD and increasing his political influence in the Kremlin.

After the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Beria, as a deputy Soviet premier, oversaw the enormous job of evacuating defense industries from western regions and converting peacetime industry to war production. He drew upon the NKVD's vast forced labor empire, under the Main Administration of Corrective Labor Colonies, or gulag, to produce weapons and ammunition for the Red Army, as well as to mine coal and metals and construct railway lines. The NKVD was also responsible for internal security, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence, and its thousands of border and internal troops performed rear security functions. Under Beria's direct supervision, NKVD troops deported to Siberia hundreds of thousands of non-Russian nationals within the Soviet Union who were suspected of disloyalty to the regime.

By the war's end, Beria had earned a reputation as a ruthless but highly effective administrator. Stalin made him a full member of the party's ruling Politburo in 1946 and placed him in charge of developing the Soviet atomic bomb in 1945. Although Beria relinquished his post as head of the NKVD in early 1946, his protégés were still in charge, and he continued to oversee the police and intelligence apparatus as a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria threw himself into work on the bomb, enlisting top Soviet scientists, ensuring the availability of raw materials like uranium, and using secret intelligence on atomic bomb production in the West. As a result of his efforts, the Soviets surprised the West by successfully producing and testing their first atomic bomb (plutonium) in August 1949.

Although Beria was one of Stalin's closest advisors, he nonetheless fell victim to Stalin's intense paranoia in the early 1950s and suffered a series of attacks on his fiefdom in Georgia and in the secret police. Had it not been for Stalin's sudden death in March 1953, Beria might have been removed from power altogether. Instead Beria formed an alliance with Georgy Malenkov, who became party first secretary, and took direct control of the police and intelligence apparatus (known at this time as the MVD). He also embarked on a series of liberal initiatives aimed at reversing many of Stalin's policies. The changes he introduced were so bold and far-reaching that they alarmed his colleagues, in particular Nikita Khrushchev, who aspired to become the Soviet leader. A bitter power struggle en-



Lavrenti Beria led Stalin's purges until Nikita Khrushchev ordered his execution in 1953. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

sued, and Beria was outmaneuvered by Khrushchev, who managed to have Beria arrested in June 1953. Charged with high treason, Beria was executed in December 1953, along with six others. Although Beria was best known for being a ruthless police administrator and a loyal follower of Stalin, archival materials released in 1990s have made it clear that Beria's role went far beyond this and that he was one of the most influential politicians of the Soviet period.

See also: GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; GULAG; PURGES, THE GREAT; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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AMY KNIGHT

BERING, VITUS JONASSEN

(1681–1741), Russian explorer of Danish descent.

Vitus Bering was the captain-commander of two expeditions exploring the relative positions of the coasts of Siberia and North America. Bringing back the valuable sea otter and other pelts from the islands of the North Pacific to Siberia, the second of these expeditions sparked the fur rush that resulted in the Russian conquest of the Commander and Aleutian Islands and, eventually, all of Alaska, which was claimed by the Russian Empire until it was sold to the United States in 1867.

On the first expedition, which sailed in 1728 from the coast of Kamchatka northward well into the Arctic Ocean, passed through what is now known as the Bering Strait, and discovered St. Lawrence Island and the Diomed Islands, Bering did not sight the coast of North America; but he was convinced that Asia and North America were not joined by land. However, when Bering arrived in St. Petersburg, his critics at the Admiralty found the results of his exploration inconclusive, and a second expedition was ordered.

On the second expedition, Bering, commanding the *St. Peter*, and his second officer, Alexei Chirikov, commanding the *St. Paul*, left the Kamchatka coast together; but their ships lost sight of each other in the Pacific Ocean. Consequently, Chirikov's party sighted the coast of southeast Alaska (apparently anchoring off of Cape Addington, around latitude 58°28'), and Bering's party sighted Mt. St. Elias several days later, both in July 1741. On the return voyage the two ships separately sighted and explored a few of the Aleutian Islands. Chirikov's party returned successfully to the Siberian shore, but Bering's wrecked on what today is known as Bering Island, where Bering and nineteen of his men died. The survivors built a small boat out of the wreckage and sailed successfully for Kamchatka the following year.

See also: ALASKA; CHIRIKOV, ALEXEI ILICH

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ILYA VINKOVETSKY

BERLIN, BATTLE OF *See* WORLD WAR II.**BERLIN BLOCKADE**

In 1945 the victorious World War II allies—the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union divided Germany into four occupation zones, an arrangement that was reflected in the division of Berlin, as the national capital, into four sectors. Despite these divisions, the country was supposed to be treated as a single economic unit by the Allied Control Council, and an Allied Kommandatura (governing council) was likewise supposed to manage affairs in Berlin.

For a variety of political and economic reasons, these aims never came close to realization. In January 1948 the Soviets bitterly criticized Anglo-American moves to combat the economic paralysis of the country by integrating the Western zones of Germany into the Western Bloc, and in March the Soviet delegation walked out of the control council, which was never to meet again. This meant that any chance of a four-power agreement on a desperately needed currency reform had vanished. On March 31 the Soviet military government announced that for so-called administrative reasons Soviet officials would henceforth inspect passengers and baggage on trains from the West bound for Berlin, which was wholly surrounded by what would become East Germany—which was at this point occupied by the Soviet Union—and the Russians went on to clamp restrictions on freight service and river traffic.

On June 18, matters took a new turn when, abandoning attempts to reach agreement with the Russians on steps to combat the soaring German inflation, the Western powers introduced their new deutsche mark into their zones. Fearing the impact of the D-mark on their Eastern-zone currency, the Soviets introduced their own new mark, and on the same day (June 23) they cut off electricity to the Western zones and stopped all deliveries of coal, food, milk, and other supplies. The next day all traffic, land and water, between West Berlin and the West came to a stop—the blockade was now complete—and the Soviets declared that the Western powers no longer had any rights in the administration of Berlin.

Rejecting a proposal by General Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. commander in Germany, to send an armed

highway convoy to Berlin, his superiors in Washington decided to react to the Soviet pressure not by force or by abandoning Berlin but by mounting an attempt to supply the city by air. Nobody saw this as more than a temporary effort to be tried while Allied representatives negotiated with the Russians to solve the overall problem. By July 20, however, the airlift was bringing in about six times as much cargo daily as had been the case three weeks earlier, and the people of the city, supporting the effort, were drawing their belts tight.

When Josef Stalin told the Western ambassadors in Moscow in a meeting in August that he had no intention of forcing the Allies out of Berlin, he was simply indulging in an exercise in disinformation. On March 26 he had told the Soviet Zone Communist leader, Wilhelm Pieck, that the Soviets and their German dependents should try to ensure victory in the coming municipal election by expelling the Allies from the city. This discussion made it plain that the currency issue was only one of the motives behind the establishment of the blockade.

By November the airlift, under the expert management of Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, had become an established success, bringing in 4,000 tons a day regardless of the weather, and early in 1949 the Soviets began to backpedal. On April 26 the Soviet press agency TASS announced that the government would lift the blockade if the Western powers would simultaneously abandon their countermeasures (one important economic factor among these countermeasures had been the toll taken by the embargo placed on a range of exports from the East) and would agree to convene a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss all issues relating to Germany. At 12:01 A.M. on May 12 the blockade came to its end.

The status quo ante did not return to Berlin. With the Communist coup in Prague in February, the passage of the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan) in March, and the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the year 1948 proved to be the turning point in the development of the Cold War. The year 1949 would see the creation of two Germanys, East and West; until the end of the Cold War four decades later, Berlin would exist as two cities, with two governments.

See also: COLD WAR; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; WORLD WAR II

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THOMAS PARRISH

BERLIN, CONGRESS OF

The diplomatic conclusion to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and postwar crisis.

Before the war, Russian diplomats promised Austria-Hungary that no “large, compact Slavic or other state” would result from the expected reorganization of the Balkans, and that Russia would allow Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent Montenegro from acquiring a seaport in return for Russia’s reacquisition of Southern Bessarabia and annexation of Batum (Reichstadt, July 1876; Budapest, April 1877). Russian councils, however, were divided. Court factions and generals backed the more ambitious ambassador to Istanbul, Nikolai P. Ignatiev, over Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov and Russia’s cautious envoys in Vienna and London, Yevgeny Novikov and Peter Shuvalov.

The initial bilateral Treaty of San Stefano, forced upon Istanbul in March 1878, followed Ignatiev’s line. It stipulated a large Bulgaria with an Aegean coast and an indefinite occupation by fifty thousand Russian troops until the Bulgarians established their own army. In addition, it called for an enlarged Montenegro with the three small Adriatic ports she had occupied; a less enlarged Serbia with most of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar divided between the two Serbian states; and the Russian acquisition of Batum and most of Turkish Armenia east of Erzerum down to Bayazid, as well as Southern Bessarabia, in place of most of the huge indemnity assessed at 1.4 billion rubles.

As the Turks expected, both the British, who had already sent a naval squadron inside the Sea of Marmora, and the Austro-Hungarians objected, as did the Serbians and Romanians, who felt cheated. Russia’s weak financial situation (the ruble had fallen 40%) rendered war with Britain unthinkable, so Gorchakov agreed with the Austro-Hungarian proposal for a Berlin congress under Otto von Bismarck’s leadership to settle outstanding issues. Shuvalov worked out the essential compromises in

London before the congress met, and joined Pavel P. Oubril, the ambassador to Berlin, and the now senior Gorchakov as Russia's delegates there.

The congress was a resounding success for the British led by Benjamin Disraeli, whose threats to leave ("waiting train" tactics) forced a division of Bulgaria into three parts—only the northern one being truly autonomous under Russian tutelage with far fewer Russia troops there—and made Russia limit its acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, while he stood by London's separate arrangements with Istanbul regarding the Straits and Cyprus. Shuvalov did salvage the port of Varna for autonomous Bulgaria and one Adriatic port for Montenegro, as well as Southern Bessarabia, Kars, Ardahan, and Batum (nominally an open port) for Russia.

The Treaty of Berlin, signed by Britain, France, and Germany, as well as Russia, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, achieved a tenuous Balkan peace lasting thirty-four years, but left Serbian and Russian nationalists seething—a catalyst for the secret Austro-German Dual Alliance of 1879 and mounting German distrust of Russia. Russia and Austria-Hungary dared agree on the latter's eventual annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina only by a secret agreement (1881), which caused a storm when implemented in 1908. The southern Balkan settlement collapsed in 1885, when Bulgarians on their own, in defiance of the Russians, united the southern third with the north.

See also: BALKAN WARS; GORCHAKOV, ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; SAN STEFANO, TREATY OF

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

BERLIN, CONVENTION OF

Concluded June 18, 1881, this Convention of Berlin recreated the Three Emperors' League between the Great Powers: Austria-Hungary, Germany, and

Russia. Each power pledged to remain neutral if one of the signatories were to become involved in a war with another Great Power. The closing of the Straits to all warships was reconfirmed. A separate protocol recognized Austria's right to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina (an option exercised in 1908) and reiterated the Bulgarian territorial settlement imposed by the 1878 Congress of Berlin.

The treaty reflected Otto von Bismarck's strategy of keeping France isolated following the Franco-Prussian war, in part by binding Russia to Germany. The Russian government viewed the convention as a necessary evil to give Russia a period of peace on its western frontiers, to counter the Austro-German alliance, and to avoid a repetition of 1878, when a coalition of other Great Powers had prevented Russia from fully exploiting its victory over Turkey. A December 1879 Foreign Ministry conference chaired by Minister Nikolai Karlovich Giers concluded that a nonaggression pact with Vienna and Berlin was absolutely essential to obtain "the repose of which [Russia] has the most imperious need." Faced with growing internal social unrest and the need to slash military spending, Russia could not afford renewed military competition.

Alexander III renewed the alliance in 1884, but it expired in 1887. The convention failed to provide any mechanism for regulating Austro-Russian rivalries in the Balkans, especially because Germany was unable to function as an honest broker between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Nor was Russia inclined to permanently accept a status quo predicated on its post-1878 weakness. Bismarck concluded a nonaggression pact (the Reinsurance Treaty) when the convention lapsed, but Germany abrogated this agreement in 1890 when Bismarck was retired. This paved the way for the 1894 Franco-Russian alliance.

See also: GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; THREE EMPERORS' LEAGUE

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NIKOLAS GVOSDEV

BESCHESTIE

The practice of compensation for a humiliating insult or dishonor.

Beschestie meant “dishonor” in early modern Russia and referred both to humiliating insult and to the amount of compensation awarded to victims of insult. There is ample evidence in law codes in other East Slavic societies (Kievan Rus, Novgorod, Pskov) before the fifteenth century for the principle of compensation for humiliating insult, but this term and legal norms for defense of honor were first systematized in the Grand Principality of Muscovy. The major Muscovite law codes of 1550, 1589, and 1649 cite *beschestie* specifically and provide schedules of compensation for dishonor.

Beschestie was socially inclusive (applying to all social ranks) but also socially hierarchical (the amount of compensation was determined by social status). In the most detailed account in the Law Code of 1649, compensation for insult between individuals in the lowest social ranks was a simple, paltry fine. As the social rank of litigants rose, fines rose; and for the very highly placed, physical punishment was levied on the offender in addition to a high fine. At the same time, dishonor litigation provided protection for all social ranks, from the highest secular and clerical ranks to slaves, serfs, and (in the 1589 *sudebnik*) witches and minstrels.

Muscovite laws do not define honor; its content has to be reconstructed from complaints in litigations. Insult to honor in practice was primarily verbal; most physical assault was litigated separately. But those forms of physical assault considered humiliating (such as pulling a man’s beard, or uncovering a woman’s hair by knocking off her headdress) were deemed dishonor. Dishonoring verbal insults included accusations of criminal behavior or of disloyalty to the tsar, aspersions on sexual probity or religious faith, insults to an individual’s station in life, no matter how lowly, and insults to their heritage and kinsmen. Women played a pivotal role in this code of social values: Their behavior reflected on family honor, and thus their dishonor compensation was reckoned higher than men’s. A wife, for example, received twice her husband’s dishonor compensation, while an unmarried daughter received four times.

Litigations show that men and women in all social ranks litigated for dishonor, even non-Russians and non-Orthodox. Judges took dishonor suits seriously, and were concerned primarily not

with the truth of an allegation, but whether an insulting phrase was uttered or a humiliating assault carried out. People could use dishonor litigation to pursue quarrels and vendettas, but overall the practice of defense of honor probably worked to enhance social stability by protecting individual and family dignity. Most broadly, the consciousness of honor constituted a form of social integration across the empire, although limited by the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of Muscovy.

Case law on dishonor litigations survives only sparsely from the late sixteenth century, but the number of recorded suits rose steadily in the seventeenth century, even accounting for accidents of document survival. In the eighteenth century, terminology changed (*obida* and *oskorblenie* came to replace *beschestie* for “insult”), but the consciousness of personal honor and the right to litigate to defend it endured into the Imperial period.

See also: BOYAR; LAW CODE OF 1649; MESTNICHESTVO; OKOLNICHY

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NANCY SHIELDS KOLLMANN

BESPRIZORNYE *See* HOMELESS CHILDREN.

BESSARABIA

The region of Bessarabia lies between the Prut and Dniester Rivers and constitutes the rump of what is today the Republic of Moldavia. Although the historical region of Bessarabia stretched to the coast of the Black Sea, southeastern Bessarabia is presently incorporated in Ukraine.

The region formed part of the broader Principality of Moldavia, which first emerged as a distinct area of rule in the fourteenth century. This territory was brought into the Ottoman sphere of influence in 1538, following conquests led by Süleyman the Magnificent. The region was allowed a measure of self-government until 1711, when

Constantinople appointed Greek-speaking *phanariots* to govern the region more directly.

The first clear, political separation between Bessarabia and western Moldavia (now incorporated into Romania) came with the Russian occupation of Bessarabia in 1806. This move precipitated a six-year war, after which the victorious Russian Tsar Alexander I was able to formally annex the land between the Prut and Dniester Rivers from the Ottoman Empire.

After a short period of relative autonomy from Moscow, Bessarabia underwent a process of Russification, and the use of the Romanian language was barred from official use. The 1871 shift in Bessarabia's status from that of imperial *oblast* to Russian *rayon* saw further restrictions on cultural and political autonomy in the region.

Due to significant immigration following the annexation of 1812, Bessarabia had become culturally cosmopolitan by the end of the nineteenth century. However, the region was an economic backwater; literacy remained very low and, despite the presence of some small-scale industry in the region's capital—Chişinău—the area remained largely agricultural.

The collapse of tsarist rule during World War I enabled elites drawn from the Bessarabian military to act on growing nationalist sentiments by declaring full autonomy for the region in November 1917. Romanian forces capitalized further on the confused state of rule in Bessarabia and moved in to occupy the territories lost to Russia in 1812. A vote by the newly formed Bessarabian National Council saw the region formally unite with Romania on March 27, 1918.

During the interwar period, Bessarabia formed the eastern flank of Greater Romania. This period was characterized by an acceleration of public works, which combined with agricultural reform to stabilize the region's economy. However, the significant minority populations (Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Turks) suffered under Romanian rule and were denied basic cultural rights, such as education in their native tongues.

The clandestine carve-up of Europe planned under the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939 implied that Germany had no interest in Bessarabia. This afforded the Soviet Union an opportunity to retake the region. In June 1940 the Soviet government issued an ultimatum to Romanian King Carol II, demanding that Bessarabia and northern Bukovina be

brought under Soviet control. Although Carol II acquiesced in this demand, Romania's alliance with Germany during World War II saw the land return to Romanian hands. Control was again returned to the Soviet Union following the collapse of the Axis. The six counties of Bessarabia were then merged with the Transnistrian region, east of the Dniester, to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Although Bessarabia dominated Soviet Moldavia geographically and demographically, communist elites from the Transnistrian region enjoyed the majority of political weight in the republic, due to their membership in the Soviet community since 1917 and the presence of a significant pro-Russian, Slavic minority. With Soviet industrial development concentrated in Transnistria, a growing socioeconomic divide emerged between this region and Bessarabia.

The collapse of Soviet rule and declaration of Moldavian independence in 1991 was followed shortly thereafter by a declaration of Transnistrian independence from the Republic of Moldavia. Although unrecognized, Transnistria remains tacitly independent in the early twenty-first century, leaving Bessarabia as the sole region under the control of the government of the Republic of Moldavia.

See also: MOLDOVA AND MOLDOVANS; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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JOHN GLEDHILL

BESTUZHEV-RYUMIN, ALEXEI PETROVICH

(1693–1766), count, chancellor, diplomat, statesman.

Second son of a Muscovite noble family, Alexei Bestuzhev-Ryumin went abroad in 1708 with his older brother, Mikhail Petrovich (1688–1760), to study at the Danish noble academy and transferred to Berlin in 1710. Before diplomatic service in 1712 at the Congress of Utrecht, he concentrated on foreign languages, traveled in Europe, and presumably had a Muscovite education befitting offspring

of an eminent father, Count Pyotr Mikhailovich Bestuzhev-Ryumin (1664–1743). With Tsar Peter's permission he joined Hanover's foreign service in 1713, visited England in connection with George I's selection as king, and returned to Russia to announce the new British sovereign. Bestuzhev-Ryumin then spent four years in England. From 1717 he served the court of dowager Duchess Anna Ivanovna of Courland without pay for two years under his father. In 1721 he became minister-resident to the Danish court, where he followed Peter I's rivalry with George I of England, Denmark's competition with Holstein, and celebration of the peace ending Russo-Swedish hostilities, and received a miniature of Peter with diamonds that he proudly wore thereafter. He also helped develop a nerve- tonic known as "Bestucheff's drops"; the formula sold several times until published by Catherine II in 1780.

In the years after Peter I's death, Bestuzhev-Ryumin occupied diplomatic posts in northern Europe. At Kiel he discovered a copy of Catherine I's testament supporting the Duke of Holstein's rights to the Russian throne; for this he received the Order of Saint Alexander Nevsky. He cultivated favor with Anna Ivanovna's new regime, the empress serving as godmother to his three sons. He had married Anna Yekaterina Böttiger (d. 1762), daughter of the Russian envoy to Hamburg. As Countess Bestuzheva-Ryumina she became court mistress in 1748, accompanied her husband into exile in 1758, and was buried at the old Lutheran church in Moscow.

Bestuzhev-Ryumin returned to Petersburg in 1740 and was promoted to actual privy councillor, named a cabinet minister, and awarded the Polish Order of the White Eagle. He apparently supported Ernst Johann Biron's brief regency and, although sentenced to be quartered after the regent's overthrow, he survived with the loss of all privileges and property before exile. Reinstated five months later, Bestuzhev-Ryumin assisted Elizabeth's coup of December 1741 by composing the manifesto that proclaimed her reign. He was made senator and vice chancellor of foreign affairs and received his predecessor Andrei Osterman's house in Moscow, back salary, and 6,000 rubles per year. At Elizabeth's coronation in the spring of 1742 he joined father and brother as counts of the Russian Empire. Bestuzhev-Ryumin reached the pinnacle of power with promotion to chancellor in 1744 and count of the Holy Roman Empire, with an annual salary of 7,000 rubles and estates with 4,225 male serfs.

He likewise received pensions and loans from foreign powers, Britain in particular.

Bestuzhev-Ryumin pursued a policy against Prussia and France while cultivating the maritime powers of Britain, Holland, and Denmark. He intervened in dynastic politics, too, initially opposing Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst as consort for crown prince Peter Fyodorovich. When the Seven Years' War scrambled European international politics, Bestuzhev-Ryumin pressed a militantly anti-Prussian policy while countering French intrigues and secretly conspiring with Grand Princess Catherine to seize power in the event of Elizabeth's sudden death. These involvements resulted in his arrest for treason in February 1758. He managed to warn Catherine and escaped death although banished to his estate of Goretovo, where his wife died on January 5, 1762, the same day Elizabeth expired. Peter III did not pardon him, but Catherine did, although she did not name any chancellor.

Bestuzhev-Ryumin returned to court in July 1762 and regained honors and property, the Holstein Order of Saint Anna, and an annual pension of 20,000 rubles. He twice proposed to proclaim Catherine "the Great," but she declined the honor and soon cooled to his anti-Prussian views and quarreled with his sole surviving son, Andrei, whose death in 1768 ended the male line. Bestuzhev-Ryumin's long and tumultuous career in high politics resulted in ambivalent assessments. The German soldier Manstein praised his industry while predicting his final downfall and denouncing despotic power, arrogance, avarice, dissolute lifestyle, treacherous character, and vindictiveness. In final exile and late in life Bestuzhev-Ryumin turned to religion.

See also: CATHERINE I; CATHERINE II; ELIZABETH

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BIRCHBARK CHARTERS

Birchbark documents constitute the most significant set of early Rus written sources to have been discovered since 1950, when the first such document was discovered by archaeologists in Novgorod. As of the early twenty-first century, the total number of Novgorodian documents was close to one thousand. Smaller quantities of birchbark documents have also been unearthed in Staraya Russa, Smolensk, Pskov, Vitebsk, Mstislavl, Torzhok, Tver, Zvenigorod in Galicia, and Moscow. Besides being of fundamental importance to the study of early Rus writing itself, and to the study of early Rus language, the birchbark documents shed new light on a wide range of historical issues, including social and family relations, commerce and trade, taxation, law, and administration. They provide direct insight into the lives and concerns of groups of people who are underrepresented in traditional written sources: the non-princely, non-ecclesiastical urban elites (though churchmen and princes do figure in the birchbark documents as well); women; and to some extent even sections of the peasantry.

Birchbark was the available, cheap, disposable writing material in the forests of Rus. Paper was virtually unknown before the fourteenth century, and manuscript books were written on parchment (treated animal skins), which was relatively expensive to procure and cumbersome to prepare. The typical birchbark document consists of a single piece of the material (just one birchbark book—made from three folded leaves—has been discovered). The letters were not written in ink but incised in the soft surface with a pointed stylus of metal, wood, or bone. Hundreds of such styluses turn up in excavations, suggesting that this type of writing was even more widespread than the extant documents might suggest. It has become conventional to refer to them as Novgorod birchbark documents, but there is no reason to suppose that their production and use was in fact a specifically or predominantly Novgorodian speciality. The preponderance of Novgorodian discoveries is due in part to the intensity of Novgorodian archaeological investigation, but in part also to the favorable conditions for birchbark survival, because organic materials are preserved almost indefinitely in the saturated, anaerobic (oxygen-free) Novgorodian mud.

Few, if any, of the birchbark documents can be dated with absolute precision. However, approxi-

mate datings to within two or three decades can often be supplied by means of dendrochronology by fixing the location of their discovery in relation to the chronological scale produced by the study of the tree rings on the logs that formed Novgorod's roads. In addition, birchbark paleography (the study of the shapes of letters) has now developed to the extent that it, too, can be used to indicate relative chronology. A small number of the birchbark documents probably date from the first half of the eleventh century and are thus among the oldest known specimens of East Slav writing, but the vast majority of the documents date from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries.

The language of the birchbark documents was at first something of a puzzle. The spelling, grammar, and, to some extent, the vocabulary differ in some respects from the presumed norms of correct writing on parchment. This discrepancy was initially attributed to the presumed insufficient education and resulting semiliteracy of the writers. However, it is now clear that birchbark linguistic deviations from parchment norms are not random errors. Indeed, in most cases they are not errors at all. Birchbark literacy is consistent with its own conventions, and the documents reflect a vibrant and functional urban literacy with a strong local vernacular accent. The birchbark documents therefore add a vital new dimension to our understanding of the history of the Russian language.

The contents of the birchbark documents are remarkably varied. Many of them are concerned with money or (especially among the later letters) property. These range from brief lists of private debtors—just a sequence of names and the sums they owe—to fairly systematic registers of tax or tribute obligations from a village or region. Sometimes payment is a matter of dispute, and the documents reveal much about the processes of conflict resolution, whether informal (through family and associates) or formal (through judicial process and administrative enforcement). Although birchbark was mainly for ephemeral communication, not designed for official use, a few of the documents appear to contain drafts of texts whose official versions were destined for parchment, such as testaments for the disposal of property. Among the later documents are even found formal petitions sent from outlying settlements to their urban-dwelling lords. Yet it would be misleading to characterize the birchbark documents as merely a form of unsystematic unofficial business and financial archive. Their delight, for the modern researcher,

lies in their apparent randomness, in the serendipitous, unexpected nature of their contents: love letters, fragments of folksy wisdom, amuletic incantations, family squabbles, childish doodles, drafts of designs for icons, a correspondence between nuns, practice alphabets, prayers. Each fresh season produces novelties, and even after more than half a century of discoveries there is no reason to suppose that birchbark is close to exhausting its capacity to surprise, and to add continually to the understanding of early Rus history.

At the end of the fifteenth century the continuous tradition of regular writing on birchbark came to an end. No contemporary commentator mentions this, so the reasons are subject to speculation. Perhaps the birchbark simply lost out in competition with paper, as a less fragile and more adaptable material. Or perhaps there were also structural factors, such as the spread of bureaucratic administration, which expanded the market for paper and pushed down its price while highlighting the comparative crudity of the traditional local alternative. Whatever the explanation for its demise, the age of birchbark literacy, in a country where written sources in general are notoriously scarce, has provided researchers with an expanding body of writing unique in medieval Europe.

See also: NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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SIMON FRANKLIN

BIROBIDZHAN

Beginning in 1928 the Soviet Union set aside a territory the size of Belgium for Jewish settlement, located some five thousand miles east of Moscow along the Soviet-Chinese border near Khabarovsk. Believing that Soviet Jewry, like other national minorities, deserved a territorial homeland, the regime decided to create a Jewish enclave that would become the Jewish Autonomous Region in 1934 and is popularly known as Birobidzhan, the region's capital city. The Soviet leadership hoped that Birobidzhan would serve as an alternative to Palestine by fostering the development of a secular, Jewish culture rooted in socialist principles. Yiddish, and not Hebrew, was intended to serve as the bedrock of a proletarian Soviet Jewish culture and community. Birobidzhan would promote the national-cultural consolidation of Soviet Jewry. The establishment of Birobidzhan was the first instance of an officially acknowledged Jewish national territory since ancient times.

During Birobidzhan's first decade of existence, the study of Yiddish was obligatory in all schools; along with Russian, Yiddish had been made an official language of the region. Consequently, all government and party documents appeared in both Russian and Yiddish. In addition, a Jewish theater and a library with a sizable Judaica collection were established. In 1935 the local authorities decreed that all government documents had to appear in both Yiddish and Russian. Many left-wing Jews and pro-Soviet organizations in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere closely followed events in Birobidzhan; many sent money and machinery, while perhaps one thousand to two thousand Jews decided to move to the purported Soviet Zion during in the 1930s.

Despite efforts to encourage Jews to resettle in the region during the first decade of its existence and again for a few years after the end of World War II, the Birobidzhan experiment failed dismally. Not only did the region fail to attract many Jews because of its remoteness from the center of Jewish population, but the harsh conditions kept significant numbers of Jews from migrating. By 1939 just less than 18,000 of the region's approximately 109,000 inhabitants were Jews. Soviet Jews were more inclined to move to one of the major cities of the western Soviet Union, such as Minsk, Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow, or Odessa, than to uproot themselves to the marshes of Birobidzhan,

where there were limited educational and job opportunities. Moreover, the Kremlin's attitude toward Jews turned hostile by the time of the Great Purges of 1936–1938, when the regime clamped down on Jewish settlement. The government closed almost all the Yiddish schools in the region, dismantled agencies dealing with Jewish resettlement, shut down many cultural and social Jewish institutions, and promoted the cultural assimilation of Jews. While retaining Yiddish as an official language and maintaining the fiction that Birobidzhan embodied the national and cultural aspirations of Soviet Jewry, the regime nonetheless stifled the emergence of Jewish culture and society.

In the wake of World War II, the Kremlin revived in 1946 and 1947 Jewish migration to Birobidzhan and resuscitated Yiddish culture. But the emergence of government-sponsored anti-Semitism during the last years of Josef Stalin's life destroyed any hope that Birobidzhan would develop into the center of Soviet Jewish life. Still, Yiddish remains one of the official languages of the region to this day, and since the early 1930s a Yiddish newspaper, one of the few of its kind, has been published continuously, except when World War II disrupted publication for several years. Indeed, in the early 1990s the offices of the KGB displayed plaques in both Russian and Yiddish, as did all other government buildings, despite the fact that Jews numbered no more than several thousand out of a total population of more than 200,000. Even fewer Jewish inhabitants knew Yiddish, and even fewer know it today. Nevertheless, Birobidzhan's continued existence is a curious legacy of Soviet nationality policy.

See also: JEWS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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ROBERT WEINBERG

BIRON, ERNST JOHANN

(1690–1772), count, duke of Courland, regent of Russia, imperial favorite, alleged kingpin of the dark era of foreign dominance, or *Bironovshchina*, a term invented long afterwards.

Of Baltic German origins, Ernst Johann Biron (von Bühren or Bieren) rose through court service to Anna Ivanovna in her capacity as the widowed duchess of Courland after 1711 and then as empress of Russia (1730–1740). One of three sons and five daughters, Biron gained status by marriage (c. 1723) to Benigna Gotlib Trott von Treyden (1703–1782) and by court service at Mitau. The couple had two sons, Peter (1724–1800) and Karl (1728–1801), and one daughter, Hedvig (1727–1796). Upon Anna Ivanovna's accession in 1730, Biron became grand chamberlain and count of the Holy Roman Empire, his wife became lady-in-waiting, and his brothers Karl (1684–1746) and Gustav (1700–1746) entered the Russian army. Although elected Duke of Courland in 1737, Biron rarely visited it, instead supervising the court stables and a training school in St. Petersburg. He was reputed to address people like horses, and horses like people. He also patronized visiting theatrical troupes.

Biron allegedly dominated Empress Anna emotionally. She took up horseback riding to spend more time with him, whereas he supposedly tried to marry a son into the ruling family. When the empress collapsed on October 16, 1740, and died twelve days later, Biron reluctantly became regent for infant Ivan VI. As regent he tried to conciliate the Brunswick heirs (Anna Leopoldovna and her family) with an annual allowance of 200,000 rubles and an additional 50,000 to Princess Yelizaveta Petrovna. On the night of October 18/19, 1740, Biron and his wife were roughly arrested by troops under Field Marshal Burkhard von Münnich and imprisoned for interrogation. The accusations against Biron included insulting the Brunswick family, defrauding the treasury, and offending officials. Eventually he admitted insulting the Brunswick family but denied threatening to bring Peter of Holstein, another Romanov heir, to Russia. Sentenced on April 25, 1741, with explicit parallel to the usurper Boris Godunov, Biron avoided

death by quartering, and the entire family was exiled to Siberia. They all arrived at Pelym in November, but were partially pardoned in 1742 by Empress Elizabeth, who allowed their transfer to Yaroslavl. Peter III permitted Biron's return to court, and Catherine II restored him in Courland, visiting him at Mitau in 1764. Aged and ill, Biron ceded the duchy to his son Peter in 1769; he died on December 18, 1772. Biron's career exemplifies some vagaries behind the rise and fall of aristocratic families enmeshed in the dynastic politics of early modern Russia. He is now seen as more victim than victimizer.

See also: ANNA IVANOVNA

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JOHN T. ALEXANDER

BLACK EARTH

The black earths, or mollisols (Seventh Approximation), are the richest soils on the planet. Known as *chernozems* in the Russian language (*chernaya*, meaning "black," and *zemlya*, meaning "earth"), they are found in semiarid grasslands, or steppes, which are wedged between arid deserts and humid forests. In the Soviet successor states, black earths stretch west to east from Moldavia and Volynopodolia in western Ukraine to the Russian North Caucasus and deep into Siberia as a steadily narrowing wedge to Irkutsk near Lake Baikal. Transitional between areas with a soil moisture surplus (forests) and areas with a conspicuous soil moisture deficit (deserts), grassland soils are only slightly leached during sporadic thunderstorms. The relative lack of precipitation ensures that solubles like calcium (Ca), sodium (Na), potassium (K), and magnesium (Mg) are accessible to the uppermost humus layer (horizon) of the soil. The A-horizon consists of grass litter and extensive root systems that draw on a thick black to chestnut-brown humus zone that is rich in ionized colloids and natural fertility. The underlying B-horizon of-

ten possesses nodules of calcium carbonate, which during frequent droughts rises to the A-horizon through capillary action. Windblown silts known as loess further enrich chernozems by imparting a loamy soil texture.

Chernozems form in areas of cold winters and hot summers that are conducive to rapid evaporation. The resultant imbalance encourages the capillary rise of soluble nutrients from the B- to the A-horizon. Grasses thrive in these conditions, but their matted root systems create a sod that could not be breached by early wooden plows. Accordingly, until the invention of the steel-tipped plow in the 1800s, settlers considered grasslands useless. Requiring irrigation, the black earths now make up the great commercial grain belts.

See also: AGRICULTURE; CLIMATE; GEOGRAPHY

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VICTOR L. MOTE

BLACK HUNDRED

The Black Hundred was a far-right monarchist movement that emerged during the 1905 Revolution in an effort to defend the autocracy against increasing civil unrest. Some Black Hundred groups were composed of upper-class officials and nobles who concentrated on lobbying the tsar and the government to resist demands for liberal reform. A more radical tendency was prevalent among right-wing lower- and middle-class urban elements such as shopkeepers, merchants, and workers, who staged pogroms against Jews and attacked perceived revolutionaries.

The movement grew rapidly with the creation of the main Black Hundred organization, the Union of the Russian People (URP; *Soyuz russkogo naroda*). This group was formed by the physician Alexander Dubrovin after continuing unrest forced the tsar to issue the October Manifesto, which conceded most basic civil liberties and provided for power sharing with an elected Duma. The URP subsumed many other monarchist organizations and smaller pogrom groupings and succeeded in uniting upper-class nobles, middle-class professionals, and lower-class workers in a common organization. Although

estimates of the URP's membership vary widely, it probably totaled several hundred thousand at its peak from late 1905 to 1907.

The URP propagated its ideology through its newspaper, *Russkoye Znamya* (The Russian banner). Coarsening the ideas of previous generations of pan-Slavs and Slavophiles, the URP mixed Russian chauvinism with virulent anti-Semitism, hostility to the intelligentsia and capitalism, and die-hard support for the autocracy. The fight against revolutionaries was always a paramount task, relegating international issues to a relatively unimportant role. The URP's anti-Semitic message drew the most support in Russia's western provinces of the Pale of Settlement, where many Jews resided.

Under Dubrovin's direction, the URP headquarters in St. Petersburg created a paramilitary force that assassinated two Jewish-born Duma members from the liberal Kadet Party, Mikhail Gertsenshtein and Grigory Iollos, and undertook a failed attempt to kill former finance minister Sergei Witte. Local branches also formed paramilitary forces that engaged in violent crimes like pogroms. In cities like Odessa, the state used URP groups as a virtual auxiliary police force to help fight revolutionaries in the streets.

The URP was vehemently opposed to the First Duma, which was dominated by socialists and liberals. It nevertheless organized a campaign and got a handful of deputies elected to the Second Duma. The election of a loyalist majority to the Third Duma thanks to a change in the electoral law caused the Black Hundred movement to begin fracturing. URP Vice President Vladimir Purishkevich, who now accepted the Duma, formed a rival organization due to personal and ideological conflicts with Dubrovin, who still opposed the Duma. In 1910 Dubrovin was driven from his own organization by Duma member Nikolai Markov, who gained control of the URP, forcing Dubrovin to form his own splinter group. The schisms cost the Black Hundred much of its power and influence. Membership declined from 1908, although the various factions were kept afloat by substantial subsidies from various state organs, especially from the Internal Affairs Ministry. Public knowledge of these subsidies and their refusal to countenance criticism of the tsar gave Black Hundred leaders the reputation of being government lackeys, even though they often bitterly condemned the government and the bureaucracy for displaying insufficient vigor in fighting revolutionaries.

After 1908 the Black Hundred was mostly active in fighting for right-wing causes in the political arena. Members were key agitators for the anti-Semitic prosecution of the Mendel Beilis case, and Purishkevich gained a final bit of notoriety for the movement when he helped kill Grigory Rasputin, the royal family's spiritual advisor whom Purishkevich believed to be discrediting the tsar. The Black Hundred lost its *raison d'être* when the autocracy was overthrown. Black Hundred branches immediately closed, and some were burnt down. Markov went into hiding and later emigrated to Germany, where he worked with the budding far-right movement there. The Bolsheviks shot Dubrovin after they seized power, while Purishkevich, the only Black Hundred leader to stay politically active in Russia after the February Revolution, died from typhus in 1920 while agitating for the White armies.

See also: DUMA; JEWS; REVOLUTION OF 1905

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JACK LANGER

BLACK MARKET

A black market was a major structural feature of the Soviet economy throughout the communist era. Having emerged during World War I in response to the regulation of prices and supplies, the black market burgeoned after the Bolshevik seizure of power. In 1918–1919, the Bolsheviks' radical vision of socialism as an economy without capitalists or market mechanisms led to the closure of virtually all private shops. Until their re-legalization in 1921, in connection with the New Economic Policy, the distribution system consisted of a vast, bu-

reaucratized, socialized network of state and cooperative outlets, and an equally vast underground trade.

In subsequent decades, the black market reflected the general condition of the economy. Through the early 1950s, staple foods, clothes, and other necessities predominated. World War II marked the zenith of this tendency, as the urban population was forced to sell off surplus possessions on the black market in order to purchase supplementary food. As survival-threatening crises receded, the array of goods sold on the black market widened to reflect the rising expectations of Soviet consumers. By the 1980s, observers noted the prevalence of such items as automobile spare parts, imported blue jeans, rock-and-roll records, and home decor. Foreign currency (especially U.S. dollars) was also the object of black-market transactions throughout the postwar period, with underground exchange rates for foreign bills greatly exceeding the official rate.

Three factors complicate assessments of the black market. First, a black market by definition eludes data collection and reporting. Quantitative estimates of its aggregate role in the Soviet economy thus necessarily remain speculative.

Second, the Soviet Union's unstable legal environment makes it difficult to track changes over time. The basic juridical rubric for the black market was speculation (buying and reselling goods with the intention of making a profit), which was outlawed in every Soviet criminal code. It was applied sparingly and rather arbitrarily during the New Economic Policy, but Josef Stalin's renewed assault on the private sector in the late 1920s created pressures for a formal redefinition. The law of August 22, 1932, mandated a five-year labor-camp sentence for speculation, including petty sales, but it failed to standardize prosecution, which exhibited the campaign character (extreme fluctuations in prosecution rates) typical of the criminal justice system as a whole. The law was finally softened in 1957 through the redefinition of petty speculation as a noncriminal offense, and then through the reduced prison sentence for criminal speculation in the 1960 RSFSR Criminal Code.

Third, the black market's parameters are blurred by the fact that some private transactions remained legal. Through at least the 1950s, most black-market sales took place at outdoor markets or bazaars. The primary function of these venues, from an official point of view, was to enable farm-

ers to sell surplus produce after all delivery obligations had been met. Their secondary function, however, was to provide a space where any citizens could hawk used clothes and surplus possessions, and where registered artisans could sell certain kinds of handmade goods. These transactions, which eventually came to include the private provision of services, included many shadings of legality. Aron Katsenelinboigen accordingly argued that the Soviet economy should be thought of in terms of a spectrum of colored markets, and not just black versus red.

In sum, the black market was a product of regulated prices, shortages, and geographical disparities in the availability of goods, as well as a legal system that criminalized most private transactions.

See also: SECOND ECONOMY

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JULIE HESSLER

BLACK REPARTITION

To Russian peasants, black repartition (*cherny poredel*) meant the long-anticipated seizure and redistribution of all nonpeasant lands (those held by the gentry, townspeople, the Crown, etc.) by and among the peasants who lived near them. Most peasants desired such a land settlement and exercised it whenever government power weakened, giving them the opportunity. Examples of black repartitions abound in the revolutions of 1905–1906 and especially in 1917–1918. Peasants placed so much priority on seizure of land and permanent expulsion of nonpeasants from the countryside that they often destroyed valuable farm equipment, animals, and buildings in the process.

The term was also claimed by a short-lived Russian Populist revolutionary group, Land and Freedom, the first Populist group, which appeared in the wake of the 1873–1874 Going to the People movement. In October 1879 it foundered on doctrinal issues and broke into two groups. The larger one, called People's Will, focused on a revolutionary terror campaign to bring down the autocracy and spark a socialist revolution. The smaller group, Black Repartition, preferred a path of gradualism

and propaganda to develop a revolutionary consciousness among the people. Just as hostile to the autocracy as People's Will, Black Repartition did not think that a terror campaign could succeed, because merely changing political institutions (if that were possible) would mean nothing without an accompanying social revolution.

Black Repartition's doubts were proved right when the People's Will terror campaign, culminating in the assassination of Emperor Alexander II on March 1 1881, led not to a revolution but instead to popular revulsion toward and severe police repression of all revolutionary groups. These included Black Repartition, which fell apart in Russia as most of its members were arrested and its printing press seized. By the autumn of 1881, Black Repartition had ceased to exist in Russia. Only a few leaders (Georgy Plekhanov, Vera Zasulich, and Pavel Axelrod) escaped abroad to Switzerland. There Black Repartition's leaders turned from doctrinaire populism to Marxist socialism and formed the first Russian Marxist organization, Emancipation of Labor.

Neither Black Repartition nor Emancipation of Labor had significant influence over the small revolutionary movement inside of Russia in the 1880s, though Emancipation of Labor participated as the Russian representatives to the socialist Second International. Isolated in Switzerland, Black Repartition was ill-equipped to build the revolutionary consciousness among workers that they had deemed essential to a real revolution. Their leaders were important, however, in the formation of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party at the turn of the century.

See also: LAND AND FREEDOM PARTY; MARXISM; PEASANT ECONOMY; PEOPLE'S WILL, THE; SECOND ECONOMY; TERRORISM

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A. DELANO DUGARM

BLACK SEA FLEET

The Black Sea Fleet came into being in 1783, when naval units were formed in the Bay of Akhtiar (and from 1784 at Sevastopol) to serve in the Sea of Azov and in wars against Turkey. During the Crimean War (1853–1856) it fought several naval battles, and its sailors were deployed on land in the defense of Sevastopol. The Paris Peace Conference in 1856 allowed Russia to have naval units in the Black Sea, a right expanded by the 1871 London Conference. At the start of World War I, the Black Sea Fleet consisted of five battleships, two cruisers, seventeen destroyers, and a number of auxiliary vessels; during the conflict it engaged in several actions against the Germans and Turks.

The fleet also became a center of revolutionary activity. In 1904 socialist cells were organized among its sailors, and this led to the mutiny on the battleship *Potemkin* the following year. In December 1917 Bolsheviks and other factions were active among the sailors. In May 1920 units that had sided with the Bolsheviks were organized as the Black Sea and Azov naval units, both of which took part in the fighting against Peter Wrangel's White forces. The Tenth Party Congress in 1921 decided to form a fleet in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov using two repaired destroyers and five escort vessels. Over the years these were substantially reinforced by the addition of larger ships and naval aviation. On January 11, 1935, the Council of People's Commissars combined the Azov and Black Sea units to form a new Black Sea Fleet. The Great Terror took a heavy toll among naval officers, and all of the fleet's commanders were purged. In January 1938, I. S. Iumashev was appointed commander, only to be replaced by F. S. Oktiabrsky in August 1939.

At the start of World War II the fleet had one battleship, six cruisers, seventeen destroyers, and numerous cutters, minelayers, mine sweepers, torpedo boats, and auxiliary vessels. It also had 625 aircraft. The Luftwaffe, operating with little opposition in the early days of the war, destroyed many Soviet ships and port facilities, but nonetheless the Black Sea Fleet managed to evacuate Odessa and Sevastopol. Overall, however, the performance of the Red Army in the Crimea in 1941 and 1942 was a succession of defeats at the hands of an outnumbered and outgunned enemy. During October and November 1941, Vice Admiral G. I. Levchenko commanded the defense of the Crimea, but in December he was arrested and sentenced to ten years

(later released). When German forces advanced into the Caucasus, the Black Sea Fleet landed troops behind their lines at Novorossiysk, an inconclusive battle glorified when Leonid Brezhnev was in power because of his participation as a political officer. In 1943, with the German defeat at Stalingrad and retreat from the Caucasus, the navy conducted another landing at Kerch, which also failed. In May 1943 Oktiabrsky was replaced by L. A. Vladimirsky, but he was reinstated in March 1944 and continued as commander until November 1948. In 1944 and 1945, the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Flotilla supported the Red Army's offensive operations in southeastern Europe.

Beginning in the 1950s, the Black Sea Fleet began to receive new ships and was a major component of the Soviet advance into the Mediterranean and the third world, but its buildup was marred by an explosion on the *Novorossiysk* in October 1955, the greatest peacetime disaster in the history of the Soviet Navy, which cost the commander in chief of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, his job. The buildup, which even included the introduction of aircraft carriers, continued until the breakup of the Soviet Union. After 1991 both Russia and Ukraine claimed ownership of the fleet. An agreement on May 28, 1997, gave Russia the more modern ships and a twenty-year lease on the Sevastopol naval base. The Black Sea Fleet is now a shadow of its once-proud self, decaying along with other Russian military assets.

See also: CRIMEAN WAR; POTEKIN MUTINY; PURGES, THE GREAT; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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MICHAEL PARRISH

BLAT

The use of personal influence to obtain something of value.

Blat, common slang in Soviet times, comes from an older Russian expression, *blatnoy zhargon*, “thieves’ talk”, which accompanied misdemeanors. For example, an industrial *tolkach* (“pusher” or expeditor) might use *blat* to obtain a necessary part or material without a planned allocation order (*naryad*). This could be better than waiting for essential supplies through formal channels, because the monthly and yearly plans had deadlines for fulfillment. One way of accommodating a friendly pusher would be to declare perfectly good output “rejects,” which could be legally sold without an allocation order. Use of *blat* would be more likely if the receiving enterprise were producing a low-priority consumer good. A citizen might also employ *blat* to secure a larger apartment in a favorable location.

Generally speaking, use of *blat* implied a reciprocal obligation in the future, but it could involve a gift of a bottle of vodka or small bribe. *Blat* usually functioned between friends or relations; one hesitated to deal with complete strangers because these transactions were illegal and penalties could be severe. With taut planning, when goods and apartments were always short, a popular folk saying was “*Blat* is higher than Stalin!” Such informal arrangements were vital to offset the many gaps of Soviet planning and to allow managers to fulfill their plans and citizens to survive and live with some comfort. In many cases, then, *blat* may be said to have been functional for the totalitarian order, even if somewhat illicit. On the other hand, it also detracted from the competitive advantage the system’s directors wished to give to important production, which was subject to stringent control.

See also: BLACK MARKET

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

BLOCH, JAN

(1836–1902), Jewish-Polish born industrialist, banker, railroad magnate, and adviser to the Russian Ministry of Finance; author of *Future War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations* (1898).

Jan Bloch, also known as Jean de Bloch and Ivan Stanislavovich Bliokh, was born in Radom, in the kingdom of Poland, to Jewish parents. He converted to Calvinism in the 1850s and to Catholicism upon his marriage into a prominent banking family of Warsaw. Bloch made his fortune in the railway boom of the 1860s, when he funded the construction of rail lines in southwest Russia. He was a strong advocate of liberal reform.

Bloch addressed the technical, economic, and political aspects of modern, industrial war. He combined a detailed analysis of military technology and the changes it was bringing to the battlefield with a strategic-operational assessment of the role of railroads, and concluded that defense would dominate the offense, making impossible a single, decisive battle. Maneuver would give way to firepower and positional warfare. Indecision, when coupled with the capacity of modern economies to generate war materials for the front, would turn a general European war into a protracted and bloody conflict. Modern war in this form would lead to social crisis and revolution. Bloch concluded that a general European war would be so destructive that statesmen would be prudent enough to avoid unleashing one.

Bloch's pacifism was not utopian, but rather was founded upon pragmatism and pessimism. Behind Bloch's analysis of future war stood several decades of sustained study of railroads and their impact on the national economy, national finances, and the study of the so-called Jewish question and modern anti-Semitism. Moreover, his research work rested upon a methodology that was distinctly modern and interdisciplinary, involving the collective research of specialists in a research institute. Bloch's practical influence on the government of Nicholas II was limited and short-lived, culminating in a call for a European disarmament conference. Bloch opposed any military adventure in the Far East. He died in 1902, before the Russo-Japanese War provided a warning of political and military things to come.

See also: MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RAILWAYS

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JACOB W. KIPP

BLOK, ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH

(1880–1921), poet, playwright, essayist.

Alexander Blok, one of Russia's greatest poets and a key figure in the Symbolist movement, was born in St. Petersburg in 1880, into an aristocratic family of German and Russian descent. His father was a professor of law at the University of Warsaw and a talented musician; his mother, a poet and translator. Blok's parents separated shortly after his birth; he spent his childhood with his maternal grandfather, botanist Andrei Beketov, until his mother obtained legal divorce in 1889, remarried, and brought Blok with her into her new apartment. Blok wrote verse from his early childhood on, but his serious poetry began around age eighteen. He studied law without success at the University of Petersburg, transferred to the Historical-Philosophical Division, and received his degree in 1906.

As a young writer, Blok made the acquaintance of Symbolist poets, including Vladimir Soloviev and Andrei Bely. His first poetry collection *Stikhi o prekrasnoy dame* (Verses on a beautiful lady) was published in 1904. Inspired by a mystical experience and his relationship with Lyubov Mendeleyeva, daughter of the famous chemist, whom he married in 1903, the poems, resonant with Romantic influence, depict a woman both earthly and divine, praised and summoned by the poet. Despite the sublime character of these poems, there are early signs of rupture and disturbance; the supplicatory tone itself borders on despair.

Blok followed his first collection with the lyric drama *Balaganchik* (The fair show booth), staged in 1906, and his second poetry collection, *Nechayannaya radost* (Inadvertent joy, 1907). These propelled him to fame. From there he continued to write prolifically, developing a distinctly tumultuous and sonorous style and influencing his contemporaries profoundly. His unfinished verse epic *Vozmezdie* (Retribution, 1910–1921), occasioned by the death of his father, chronicles his family history as an allegory of Russia's eventual spiritual resurrection; the cycle *Na pole Kulikovom* (On the field of kulikovo, 1908), celebrates Russia's victory

in 1380 over the Mongol Tatars. Yet, despite the spiritual optimism of both works, their lyrical heights coincide with expressions of despair.

Blok supported the 1917 Revolution, perceiving it as a spiritual event, a step toward a transformed Christian world. Yet his twelve-part poem *Dvenadtsat* (The twelve, 1918) suggests deep ambivalence. Among the most complex and controversial of Blok's works, it mixes voices and idioms (slogans, war cries, laments, wry remarks) without resolving the discord. The shifts of rhythm and diction, the mimicry of sounds, and the punctuation of the verse with diverse exclamations overwhelm the Christian motif.

Blok's disillusionment with the Soviet bureaucracy and censorship is suggested in his fierce and eloquent essay "On the Poet's Calling" (1921), at one level a short treatise on Alexander Pushkin, at another level, a discussion of the conflict between the poet ("son of harmony") and the "mob" (*chern*). The poet's calling, according to Blok, is to create form (cosmos) out of raw sound (chaos); this goal is opposed by the mob—the officials and bureaucrats, those committed to everyday vanities.

Blok died in 1921 from a mysterious (possibly venereal) disease, in a state of malnutrition, despair, heavy drinking, and mental illness. His work continued to be published in the Soviet Union after his death, with a marked discrepancy between official and unofficial interpretations.

See also: PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; SILVER AGE

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DIANA SENECHAL

BLOODY SUNDAY

On January 22, 1905, a peaceful demonstration of workers in St. Petersburg was dispersed by troops with considerable loss of life. The event triggered the 1905 Revolution.

The demonstration was organized by the Assembly of Russian Factory and Mill Workers of St. Petersburg, a labor organization patronized initially by police authorities and led by an Orthodox priest, Father Georgy Gapon. When four members of the Assembly were fired from the giant Putilov Works just before Christmas, the Assembly felt its very existence threatened and decided to resort to the desperate means of an illegal strike. The Putilov Works was struck on the January 16, but by January 20 the entire city of St. Petersburg was paralyzed by the strike. All eleven branches of the Assembly became perpetual meeting places for the strikers. There was much discussion about the workers presenting a petition to Nicholas II, outlining their grievances. At a meeting with some of his lieutenants, Gapon asked if they should not take their petition directly to the tsar himself. The idea was enthusiastically supported and spread like wildfire. When the petition was finished, copies of "The Most Humble and Loyal Address" were sent to important ministers and the tsar. The address was to be delivered at 2 P.M. on Sunday at the Winter Palace Square.

Before the fateful day, the branches of the Assembly held continuous meetings; the petition was read, and workers cried, fell on their knees, and swore to die for their cause. Wound up by the oratory, they were determined to reach the Palace Square. The Minister of the Interior, not realizing the seriousness of the situation, assured Nicholas II that matters were under control and that he was completely confident a show of force would be sufficient to stop the demonstration.

Each branch made its own arrangement to arrive at the Square by 2 P.M. Members of the farthest branch departed in the early morning hours. The largest procession came from the main branch at the Putilov Works, and was led by Gapon. Efforts were made to give it a religious appearance: Religious paraphernalia, icons, and portraits of tsars were carried at the head of the procession. Shortly after eleven o'clock the immense crowd began to move, singing prayers and the national anthem just as church bells were announcing the end of services. The crowd moved along the main thoroughfare toward the Narva Triumphal Arch, where the road across the river was blocked by troops. The commander tried to disperse the crowd with cavalry; then the bugle sounded a warning, followed by a warning volley over the crowd. This seemed only to encourage workers; they closed ranks and, singing louder, began to run at the

troops. Soldiers lowered their rifles and began shooting at the crowd. Most of the casualties that day occurred during this procession. Similar events unfolded in several other locations. In some areas the crowds were dispersed without the use of firearms; in others, workers were allowed to pass on their own. On one bridge the officer said he could not let them cross but did not stop workers from crossing on the ice below the bridge.

Despite the shootings, many workers reached the Square, where the Guards barred their way. In the crowd were many survivors of earlier shootings; many were wounded, but all anxiously awaited the appointed hour. The hour came and nothing happened. As the demonstrators were becoming unruly, the commander of the Guards decided to disperse them. A volley was fired near Alexander Garden. The crowd was pushed onto Nevsky Prospect, where some officials in uniforms and policemen were attacked. Troops tried to clear the area, and more shots were fired.

In Russia and abroad, there was universal revulsion at the shooting of peaceful demonstrators. The authorities themselves were shocked; nobody had wanted what happened. The press reported thousands killed, but the official count eventually listed 130 killed, including a policeman. Bloody Sunday, as it became known, began the Revolution of 1905.

See also: GAPON, GEORGY APOLLONOVICH; REVOLUTION OF 1905

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WALTER SABLINSKY

BOBRIKOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(1839–1904) governor general of the Grand Duchy of Finland and Russian nationalist.

Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrikov has left a lasting imprint on the collective memory of the Finns as the personification of the oppressive Russification policies toward national minorities. Originally Bo-

brikov, chief of staff of the St. Petersburg military district, was appointed governor general of the Grand Duchy of Finland in August 1898 to bring about closer integration of the separate Finnish army with the Russian armed forces. The new Conscription Act, drafted by the Russian General Staff, not only aroused strong protests in Finland but even failed to receive the sanction of the Russian State Council in 1901. Bobrikov then appealed directly to Nicholas II who ordered, according to Bobrikov's wishes, the total abolition of the Finnish army. Immediately after assuming his duties, the strongly nationalist Bobrikov also changed some Finnish symbols and procedural matters that in his view boosted the "false idea of the separateness of the borderland." In the same vein, Bobrikov made the Finnish Senate and the central administration adopt the Russian language. He also initiated both the abolition of the Finnish tariff and monetary institutions and the governmental supervision of the university. Furthermore, he envisioned but did not accomplish the spreading of the Russian language to local administration, the thorough inspection of the textbooks used in Finnish schools, and the introduction of the autocratic system in Finland. Bobrikov faced opposition in Finland in the form of demonstration and strikes, but he largely succeeded in splitting the opposition by skillfully manipulating it, imposing strict censorship, and strongly curtailing the right of free speech and assembly. To combat emerging activist groups, Bobrikov sought and achieved dictatorial rights in 1903. By that time his original supporters, Minister of War Alexei Kuropatkin and the Minister of the Interior Vyacheslav Plehve, had already shown some weariness of the harsh methods Bobrikov invariably used when dealing with the Finns. Finnish activists had made plans to assassinate Bobrikov but were preempted by an individual malcontent on June 16, 1904.

See also: FINLAND; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; RUSSIFICATION

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TUOMO POLVINEN

BOGOLYUBSKY, ANDREI YAROSLAVICH

See ANDREI YAROSLAVICH.

BOLOTNIKOV, IVAN ISAYEVICH

(c. 1565–1608), outstanding rebel military leader during Russia's Time of Troubles.

Ivan Bolotnikov led the so-called Bolotnikov rebellion (1606–1607) against Tsar Vasily Shuisky. That rebellion was the largest and most powerful uprising in Russian history prior to the twentieth century and has often been compared to the rebellions led by Stepan Razin and Emelian Pugachev. For several generations, scholars erroneously claimed that the Bolotnikov rebellion was a social revolution against serfdom led by a radical former slave, Ivan Bolotnikov. In fact, the rebellion was not a social revolution; serfs did not actively participate in it, and rebel goals never included the abolition of serfdom. Instead, Bolotnikov led rebel forces loyal to Tsar Dmitry against the usurper Tsar Vasily Shuisky. Wrongly believing that Dmitry had escaped Shuisky's assassins, the rebels essentially renewed the civil war that had brought Tsar Dmitry to power. Bolotnikov's forces came from all social classes, and the uprising against Shuisky quickly spread from southwestern Russia to cover half the country.

Little is known about Bolotnikov. In the late sixteenth century, he apparently served the tsar as a cavalryman but fell on hard times and indentured himself to a rich aristocrat as an elite military slave. He later fled to the southern frontier and joined the Volga or Don cossacks. Bolotnikov was eventually captured by Crimean Tatars and sold into slavery; he spent several years working on a Turkish ship before Germans liberated him. On his way back to Russia, he passed through Poland, where he heard about Shuisky's *coup d'état*. Bolotnikov made his way to Sambor (home of Marina Mniszech), where a man claiming to be Tsar Dmitry interviewed him. "Tsar Dmitry" (Mikhail Molchanov) appointed Bolotnikov commander-in-chief of all rebel forces struggling against Shuisky.

Sometime during the summer of 1606, Bolotnikov arrived in Putivl (headquarters of the rebellion in Tsar Dmitry's name), took command of a rebel army, and began marching toward Moscow. He defeated Shuisky's rapidly retreating forces, and town after town welcomed Bolotnikov as a hero. During the siege of Moscow (late fall 1606), however, rivalry between Bolotnikov and another rebel commander, Istoma Pashkov, led to Pashkov's betrayal of the rebels during a decisive battle on December 2, 1606. Forced to break off the siege, Bolotnikov retreated in good order to Kaluga,

where his skillful defense of the fortress frustrated all efforts by Shuisky's commanders to capture the town. After breaking up the siege of Kaluga, Bolotnikov led his men to stone-walled Tula to link up with other rebel forces. Soon Tula came under siege, but once again Bolotnikov's skill and energy frustrated his enemies. Eventually, Tsar Vasily's army built a dam below Tula and flooded the town, forcing the rebels to surrender on October 10, 1607.

Bolotnikov managed to negotiate good terms for the rebels. He gave himself up, but his men (with their weapons) were allowed to go free. Many of them immediately rejoined the civil war against Shuisky by entering the service of the second False Dmitry. Bolotnikov was taken in chains to Moscow as a trophy of Tsar Vasily's victory over the rebels. He was then transferred to Kargopol in north Russia, where he was blinded and drowned in early 1608. So great was his reputation that even some of Shuisky's supporters privately criticized the tsar for executing the brilliant rebel leader.

See also: DMITRY, FALSE; MNISZECH, MARINA; PUGACHEV, EMELIAN IVANOVICH; SERFDOM; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH; SLAVERY; TIME OF TROUBLES

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CHESTER DUNNING

BOLSHEVISM

Bolshevism was a dissenting movement within Russian Marxism before World War I that became the founding political party of the Soviet Union. The Russian word *bolshevik* means literally a person in the majority, as opposed to *menshevik*, a person in the minority. These words originated at

the second party congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP) that convened in 1903 in Brussels, then London. The dominant figure in the Bolshevik faction of the RSDWP was Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov (1872–1924), more commonly known by his revolutionary name, Lenin.

Marxism was a radical ideology that predicted a revolution by the working classes that would seize power from the capitalist class, or bourgeoisie. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 indeed precipitated a revolution, but the Romanov autocracy of Tsar Nicholas II survived by a combination of reform and repression. The RSDWP originally focused its efforts on the urban working classes in Russia, but Lenin and the Bolsheviks ultimately triumphed because they recognized the need to appeal to the poor peasantry as well.

Bolsheviks were divided between educated intellectuals and factory workers. Some became professional revolutionaries. Others became leaders of the labor movement and strikers in industrial workplaces. The professional revolutionaries favored an illegal conspiracy to seize power, tracing their roots to the Jacobins of the French Revolution and the Populist terrorists of the 1870s in Russia. The working-class Social Democrats favored a revolution that would benefit workers and their families, not intellectuals seeking power.

Russian Social Democrats were inspired by the spontaneous unrest that occurred in Russia in 1905—strikes, peasant violence, and demands for a constitution and a parliament. Neither Bolsheviks nor Mensheviks played a leading role that year. The October Manifesto issued by the tsar promised a constitutional system with an elected parliament, or Duma. After these concessions, the government combined peasant land reform with bloody police repression to quiet the countryside.

After 1905, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks faced new choices. Should they participate in a bourgeois parliament such as the Duma? Or should they boycott its elections and recall their deputies? Should they focus on legal means of achieving power through the system? Or should they engage in illegal actions such as terror, bank robberies, and strikes? Should they limit themselves to the working classes in the towns? Or should they look for support in the peasantry as well?

The Bolsheviks were particularly attentive to the orthodox Marxism of Karl Kautsky in Germany and the radical syndicalism of Georges Sorel and others in France and Italy. Orthodox Marxists

feared any revision of Karl Marx's ideas in favor of reform rather than revolution. The syndicalists believed in forming trade unions and convincing workers to believe in a future general strike. After 1905, the Bolsheviks were deeply divided between those who, like Lenin, claimed to be following Marxist scientific orthodoxy, and those who, like Alexander Bogdanov, believed Marxism was not a set of truths, but a set of useful myths that workers might be convinced to believe. Lenin, in his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (1909), attacked Bogdanov's relativism.

The Bolsheviks fought over who should control the party faction's money and RSDWP schools for workers and revolutionaries in Paris, Bologna, and Capri. Lenin's followers in European exile argued with Bogdanov's followers inside Russia. Although the Bolshevik journal was called *Pravda* (Truth), the Bolsheviks by 1914 were a shrinking group of alienated intellectuals who could agree on little except for their old feud with the Mensheviks, who maintained better ties with factory workers.

When World War I broke out in 1914, there was no great general strike. Russian socialists were divided among defensists who patriotically supported their government at war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, and pacifists who wanted to end the war. Lenin wanted the war transformed into a revolution and civil war, then a workers' revolution. But most Russian socialists, exiled either in Europe or Siberia, hardly affected the war effort.

In 1917 the February Revolution surprised both the government and the revolutionaries. Nicholas II abdicated. A liberal Provisional Government shared power with radical workers' councils, known as *soviets*, that sprang up in the factories, farms, and army units. Returning from exile, Lenin and the Bolsheviks proclaimed war against the Provisional Government. As the unpopular great war dragged on, the Bolshevik program of workers' revolution and land reform gained them majorities in the soviets. By October, the Bolshevik-dominated soviets easily took power in the major cities from the weakened Provisional Government.

The Bolshevik Revolution did not end the dispute between Lenin and the other Bolsheviks. Bogdanov led a proletarian culture movement popular among the masses for a few years. Leon Trotsky became a popular and independent leader of the new Red Army. And Josef Stalin quietly worked to cre-

ate a single-party dictatorship that exiled or killed its enemies. By 1924 the Bolsheviks had become a party in their own right, first the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1918, and then the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1924. Ultimately the Bolsheviks led a massive and violent program of industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and purges that made the Soviet Union as autocratic and unpopular as its imperial predecessor.

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; COMMUNISM; MENSHEVIKS; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY

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ROBERT C. WILLIAMS

BOLSHOI THEATER

Moscow's Bolshoi ("grand") Theater became a kind of national theater and showcase for Russian opera and ballet in the Soviet period. The original Bolshoi Theater opened in 1825, although historians trace the theater's lineage through a series of private theaters operating in Moscow as early as 1776. The Bolshoi Theater stands on the site of the last of



The Bolshoi Theater in Moscow, home to the acclaimed Bolshoi ballet and opera companies. © STEVE VIDLER/SUPERSTOCK

these, which burned in 1805. The drama, opera, and ballet troupes of these older, private Moscow theaters were combined to create the Moscow Imperial Theaters the following year. One year after the drama troupe moved to a new home (the Maly ["small"] Theater) in 1824, the opera and ballet troupes took up residence in the newly constructed Bolshoi Theater. That theater burned in 1853. The present theater opened three years later, retaining the old name.

Moscow's Bolshoi Theater functioned as a poor relation to the better-funded, national stage of St. Petersburg's Maryinsky Theater until the Soviet era. Italian and Russian opera troupes coexisted in the rebuilt house in the nineteenth century, though Russian opera held a distinctly second place, and the theater witnessed few noteworthy premieres of Russian operas. The ballet repertory likewise consisted mostly of restaged works from the repertory of the St. Petersburg ballet. Marius Petipa's 1869 *Don Quixote* furnishes the rare exception. When Peter Tchaikovsky's *Swan Lake* debuted in the Bolshoi Theater in 1877, it was considered a flop (and was reworked in St. Petersburg in 1894 and 1895). The opera's fortunes rose slightly when Sergei Rachmaninoff became its chief conductor from 1904 to 1906. Rachmaninoff debuted two of his own operas in the theater, which then featured such outstanding singers as Fyodor Chalyapin, Leonid Sobinov, and Antonina Nezhdanova.

The Bolshoi Theater became a showcase of Soviet operatic and balletic talent in the Stalin era. Dancers and choreographers from St. Petersburg were transferred to Moscow, much as the repertory had once been. A highly dramatic, athletic style evolved in the ballet in the post-World War II period, as the ballet school began to produce home-grown stars. Dancers such as Maya Pliset-skaya and Vladimir Vasiliev achieved worldwide renown touring the world in new vehicles in the years of the post-Stalin Thaw, though the company's balletmasters and repertory continued to be imported from Leningrad. The opera followed a similar strategy, mostly restaging works that had premiered successfully elsewhere. None of the operas of Dmitri Shostakovich or Sergei Prokofiev had their premieres in the Bolshoi, for example. Instead, the opera specialized in monumental productions of the nineteenth-century Russian repertory, though singers such as Galina Vishnevskaya, Irina Arkhipova, Elena Obraztsova, and Vladimir Atlantov established international careers in them.

The prestige of both the Bolshoi's opera and ballet fell precipitously in the first post-Soviet decade. The era of glasnost revealed that productions, performers, and the theater's management were out of step with the theatrical mainstream of Europe and North America as once-generous state subsidies dwindled. As the theater approached artistic and financial bankruptcy, the Bolshoi ceded its place as a national institution to the more western-oriented Maryinsky Theater in St. Petersburg.

See also: BALLET; DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH; NIJINSKY, VASLAV FOMICH; OPERA; PAVLOVA, ANNA MATVEYEVNA; RACHMANINOV, SERGEI VASILIEVICH; THEATER

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TIM SCHOLL

BONNER, YELENA GEORGIEVNA

(b. 1923), human rights activist and widow of dissident Andrei Sakharov; recipient of the National Endowment for Democracy's 1995 Democracy Award.

Yelena Bonner grew up among the elite of the Communist Party. Her mother, Ruth Bonner, joined the party in 1924. Her stepfather, Gevork Alikhanov, was a secretary of the Communist International. Bonner's childhood ended abruptly with the arrests of her stepfather and mother in 1937. She finished high school in Leningrad and volunteered as a nurse during World War II. After the war, Bonner attended medical school and worked as a pediatrician.

Bonner met physicist and political dissident Andrei Sakharov in 1970, at the trial of human rights activists in Kaluga. They married in 1972. Bonner devoted herself to Sakharov, representing him at the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in 1975. After Sakharov's exile to Gorky in 1980, Bonner became his sole link to Moscow and the West, until her

own exile in 1984. In December 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev invited the couple to return to Moscow.

Since Sakharov's death in 1989, Bonner has emerged as an outspoken and admired advocate of democracy in Russia. She joined the defenders of the Russian parliament during the attempted coup of August 1991. She withdrew her support of Boris Yeltsin to protest the war in Chechnya, which she condemned as a return to totalitarianism. Accepting the 2000 Hannah Arendt Award, Bonner denounced President Vladimir Putin's unlimited power, the state's expanding control over the mass media, its anti-Semitism, and "the de facto genocide of the Chechen people."

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH

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LISA A. KIRSCHENBAUM

BOOK OF DEGREES

The *Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy* is the first narrative history of the Russian land. The massive text filling some 780 manuscript leaves composed between 1556 and 1563 is one among various ambitious literary projects initiated by Metropolitan Macarius, archbishop of Moscow and head of the Russian church during the reign of Ivan the Terrible as tsar (1547–1584). Ivan, whose Moscow-based ancestors had ruthlessly appropriated vast tracts of territory for their domain, encouraged writers to craft defenses of his legitimacy. Churchmen responded with a version of the dynasty's history conveying their own perspective on the country's future course. Conflating chronicles, saints' lives, and legends, the book traces the ancestry of the Moscow princes in seventeen steps or degrees from Augustus Caesar and highlights the noble deeds of each ruler from Grand Prince Vladimir I (980–1015) to Tsar Ivan. The book's purpose was not just to praise the tsar. The larger aim of its writers was to portray the Muscovite state as a divinely protected empire whose rulers would flourish as long as they obeyed God's com-

mandments, listened to the metropolitans, and supported the interests of the church.

The *Book of Degrees* is a work of both historiographical and literary significance. As an exercise in historiography, its scope and ideology are comparable to ninth-century compilations of Frankish history glorifying the line of the Carolingian rulers. Like the Carolingian historians, its authors define their country as the "new Israel." By so doing, they legitimize members of a lesser princely clan whose founders had neither political nor dynastic claims to power, but who wished to be treated as the equals of the Byzantine emperors. Elite political circles accepted the book's representations as authoritative proof of the rulers' imperial descent. The portraits of the Moscow princes as champions of their faith commanded no less authority for the church. Lives, newly composed for the book, depicting rulers as saints equal to the apostles or as wonder-workers, served as testimony for the canonization of some Moscow princes and members of their families.

As a literary work, the *Book of Degrees* marks a critical turning point between the predominantly monastic, fragmentary medieval writings and early modern narrative prose. Entries culled from annalistic compilations (primarily the Nikon, Voskresensk, and Sophia chronicles) and saints' lives supplied its building blocks, but the book transcends traditional generic categories and has no single literary model. Guided by the priest Andrei (Metropolitan Afanasy), writers unified their materials in a systematic way, fashioning fragments into expansive tales and integrating each tale into a progressively unfolding story of a tsardom whose course was steered by divine providence. A preface sets forth the book's theological premises in terms of metaphors serving as figures or types for Russia's historical course: the tree (linking the genealogical tree of the rulers, the Jesse Tree, and the tree in King Nebuchadnezzar's prophetic dream); the ladder (a conflation of Jacob's ladder and St. John Climacus's divine ladder of perfection); and water (baptism). Readers are directed to a detailed table of contents, the first of its kind, which sets forth the book's unique design and permits individual chapters to be swiftly located. Comparison of the three earliest surviving copies of the text (the Chudov, Tomsk, and Volkov copies, all dated in the 1560s), shows how original entries were altered, supplemented, and sometimes shifted from their initial textual positions by the editors to support their ideological interests.

The book's value as an authoritative source and a statement of the nation's identity was recognized by Peter the Great, who in 1716 ordered a synopsis to be used for his own planned, but never executed, history of Russia. Because of the book's importance for the canon, the Russian Academy commissioned a printed edition in 1771. As the first cohesive narrative of national history, the *Book of Degrees* served as a model for subsequent histories of Russia and as a sourcebook for mythological and artistic reconstructions of an idealized past.

See also: CHRONICLES; IVAN IV; MAKARY; MUSCOVY

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GAIL LENHOFF

BORETSKAYA, MARFA IVANOVNA

Charismatic leader of the Novgorodian resistance to Muscovite domination in the 1470s.

Marfa Boretskaya ("Marfa Posadnitsa") was born into the politically prominent Loshinsky family, and married Isaac Andreyevich Boretsky, a wealthy boyar, who served as mayor (*posadnik*) of Novgorod from 1438 to 1439 and in 1453. She bore two sons, Dmitry and Fyodor. Marfa was widowed in the 1460s but remained one of the wealthiest individuals in Novgorod who owned slaves and sizable estates. Peasants on her lands to the north of Novgorod engaged in fishing, fur hunting, livestock raising, and salt boiling. Her southern estates produced edible grains and flax.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, the relations between the principalities of Moscow and Novgorod, long strained by chronic disputes over trade, taxes, and legal jurisdiction, intensified into overt hostilities. The campaign of 1471 was purportedly undertaken by Ivan III as a response to the efforts of a party of Novgorodian boyars to ally themselves with King Casimir of Lithuania. Marfa

is accused in an anonymous essay, preserved in a single copy of the Sophia First Chronicle, of plotting to marry the Lithuanian nobleman Michael Olelkovich and rule Novgorod with him under the sovereignty of the Lithuanian king. The Cathedral of St. Sophia, seat of the archbishops and emblem of Novgorodian independence, would have thereby come under Catholic jurisdiction. No other sources corroborate these charges against Marfa, although her son Dmitry, who served as mayor during 1470 and 1471, fought against Moscow in the decisive Battle of Shelon (July 14, 1471) and was executed at the order of Ivan III on July 24, 1471. Her other son Fyodor has also been identified with the pro-Lithuanian faction in Novgorod. The evidence for his activity is ambiguous. Nevertheless, he was arrested in 1476 and exiled to Murom, where he died that same year. Following the final campaign of 1478, Ivan III ordered that Muscovite governors be introduced into Novgorod and that the landowning elite be evicted and resettled. On February 7, 1478, Marfa was arrested. Her property was confiscated, and she was exiled. The date of her death is not known.

See also: CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, NOVGOROD; IVAN III; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; POSADNIK

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GAIL LENHOFF

BORODINO, BATTLE OF

Borodino was the climactic battle of the Campaign of 1812, which took place on September 7. Napoleon had invaded Russia hoping to force a battle near the frontier, but he pursued when the Russian armies retreated. His efforts to force a decisive battle at Smolensk having failed, Napoleon decided to advance toward Moscow, hoping to force the Russian army, now under the command of Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, to stand and fight. Pressed hard by Tsar Alexander to do so, Kutuzov selected the field near the small village of Borodino, some seventy miles west of Moscow, for the battle. He concentrated his force, divided into two armies under the command of Generals Peter Bagration and

Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, and constructed field fortifications in preparation for the fight.

Napoleon eagerly seized upon Kutuzov's stand and prepared for battle. Napoleon's normal practice would have been to try to turn one of the flanks of the Russian army, which Kutuzov had fortified. Mindful of the Russians' retreat from Smolensk when he had tried a similar maneuver, Napoleon rejected this approach in favor of a frontal assault. The extremely bloody battle that ensued centered around French attempts to seize and hold Kutuzov's field fortifications, especially the Rayevsky Redoubt. The battle was a stalemate militarily, although Kutuzov decided to abandon the field during the night, continuing his retreat to Moscow.

Borodino was effectively a victory for the Russians and a turning point in the campaign. Napoleon sought to destroy the Russian army on the battlefield and failed. Kutuzov had aimed only to preserve his army as an effective fighting force, and he succeeded. Napoleon's subsequent seizure of Moscow turned out to be insufficient to overcome the devastating attrition his army had suffered. Russia's losses were, nevertheless, very high, and included Bagration, wounded on the field, who died from an infection two weeks later.

See also: FRENCH WAR OF 1812; KUTUZOV, MIKHAIL ILARIONOVICH; NAPOLEON I

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FREDERICK W. KAGAN

BOROTBISTY

"Fighters" (full name: Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, or Communist-Borotbisty), a short-lived Ukrainian radical socialist party, which played an important role in the revolutionary events in Ukraine from 1918 to 1920.

Originally the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, the Borotbisty, who derived their name from the party's weekly, *Borotba* (Struggle), took control of the Central Committee in May 1918 and formally dissolved their parent party. While supporting the Soviet political order, the Borotbisty advocated Ukrainian autonomy and

the existence of an independent Ukrainian army. Although the Borotbisty never had a well-developed organizational structure, the party enjoyed popularity among the poor Ukrainian peasantry. After Bolshevik troops took control of Ukraine in early 1919, Vladimir Lenin sought to quell peasant discontent by including some Borotbisty in the Ukrainian Soviet government. However, as the White and Ukrainian nationalist armies forced the Bolsheviks to retreat, in August 1919 the Borotbisty, together with the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (Independentists), formed the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and requested admission to the Communist International as a separate party, without success. Although the Bolsheviks were uneasy about the Borotbist national communist stance, the two parties collaborated again during the Red Army offensive in Ukraine in early 1920. At its height, the Borotbist membership may have reached fifteen thousand. In March 1920 the Kremlin pressured the Borotbisty into dissolving their party and joining the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was the Ukrainian branch of the Bolshevik party. The Borotbist leadership agreed to the dissolution with the understanding that this was the only way to preserve a separate Ukrainian Soviet republic. During the early 1920s some former Borotbisty, such as Hryhory Hrynko and Olexandr Shumsky, occupied important positions in the Soviet Ukrainian party leadership and government. Shumsky rose to prominence after 1923 as a leader of the Ukrainization drive, although by the end of the decade he was criticized for his national deviation. During the 1930s most former Borotbisty, including Panas Lyubchenko, who had risen to the position of the head of the republican government, fell victim to the Stalinist terror. Among the very few survivors was the celebrated filmmaker Olexandr (Alexander) Dovzhenko.

See also: UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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SERHY YEKELCHYK

BOYAR

In the broadest sense, every privileged landowner could be called a boyar; in a narrower sense, the term refers to a senior member of a prince's retinue during the tenth through thirteenth centuries, and marked the highest court rank during the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. The word *boyar* probably stems from a Turkic word meaning "rich" or "distinguished." Coming from a mixed social and ethnic background, boyars served a prince, but they had the right to change their master, and enjoyed full authority over their private lands.

The relationship between a prince and his boyars varied across the regions. In the twelfth to fifteenth centuries, boyars acquired considerable political power in some principalities ruled by members of the Ryurikid dynasty and in Novgorod, where they formed the governing elite. In the Moscow and Tver principalities, boyars acknowledged the sovereignty of the prince and cultivated hereditary service relations with him. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the rank of boyar became the highest rung in the Muscovite court hierarchy. It was reserved for members of elite families and was linked with responsible political, military, and administrative appointments.

During the seventeenth century, the rank of boyar became open to more courtiers, due to the growing size of the court, and it gradually disappeared under Peter the Great. It is often assumed that all boyars were members of the tsar's council, the so-called Boyar Duma, and thereby directed the political process. This assumption led some historians to assume that Muscovy was a boyar oligarchy, where boyars as a social group effectively ran the state. However, there was always a hierarchy among the boyars: A few boyars were close advisors to the tsar, while most acted as high-ranking servitors of the sovereign.

See also: BOYAR DUMA; MUSCOVY; OKOLNICHY

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SERGEI BOGATYREV

BOYAR DUMA

Boyar Duma is a scholarly term used to describe the royal council or the upper strata of the ruling elite in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries. The term *duma* often appears in the sources with the meaning "advice," "counsel," or "a council." The influential Romantic historian Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin first used the combination "boyar duma" (*boyarskaya дума*), which is never encountered in the sources.

East Slavic medieval political culture, which relied heavily on scripture, morally obligated every worthy prince to discuss all weighty matters with his advisers. In the tenth through fifteenth centuries, princes often discussed political, military, and administrative issues with other members of the ruling family, senior members of their armed retinue, household officials, church leaders, and local community leaders. The balance of power between the ruler and his counselors, as well as the format and place of their meetings, varied depending on the circumstances. The Muscovite tsars adopted the tradition of consulting with their closest entourage, continuing to do so even during periods of political turmoil, like the Oprichnina and the Time of Troubles. The 1550 Legal Code refers to the tradition of consultation, but there were no written laws regulating the practice of such consultations or limiting the authority of the ruler in favor of his advisers in judicial terms.

The growing social and administrative complexity of the Muscovite state during the sixteenth century resulted in the increasing inclusion of distinguished foreign servitors, high-ranking cavalrymen, and top-level officials at meetings with the tsar. The sources describe the practice of consultations by inconsistently using various terms, including *duma*. From the mid-sixteenth century, the term *blizhnyaya дума* (privy duma) appears in the documents more regularly.

The state school of nineteenth-century Russian historiography interpreted the tradition of consultations between the ruler and his advisers in formal, legal terms. Historians linked the appearance of a clearly structured council, which they termed the boyar duma, with the formation of the court rank system during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was assumed that the boyar duma included all people holding the upper court ranks of boyar, okolnichy, counselor cavalryman (*dumny dvoryanin*), and counselor secretary (*dumny dyak*).

Students of law treated the boyar *duma* as a state institution by focusing on its functions and competence.

The artificial concept of the boyar *duma* as a group of people entitled to sit on the council because of their status became a basis for various interpretations of the character of the pre-Petrine state and its politics. Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky pioneered this trend by describing the boyar *duma* as “the fly-wheel that set in motion the entire mechanism of government.” Klyuchevsky’s concept of the boyar *duma* was developed in the numerous prosopographical and anthropological studies of the Muscovite elite. Vasily Ivanovich Sergeevich questioned the concept of the boyar *duma*, observing that there is no documentary evidence of participation of all holders of the upper court ranks in consultations with the ruler. In line with this approach, other scholars shift their emphasis in the study of the practice of consultations from the court ranks of the sovereign’s advisers to the cultural background of this practice.

See also: BOYAR; MUSCOVY; OPRICHNINA; TIME OF TROUBLES

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SERGEI BOGATYREV

BRAZAUSKAS, ALGIRDAS

(b. 1932), Lithuanian political leader.

Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas emerged as a major public figure in the Soviet Union in 1988. A member of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) since 1976, a member of the party’s *biuro* (equivalent of Politburo) since



Lithuanian Communist Party leader Algirdas Brazauskas led his republic’s break from Moscow in 1991. © STEPHAN FERRY/LIAISON. GETTY IMAGES.

1977, and by training an engineer, he had been a specialist in construction and economic planning. In 1988 he won note as a party leader who dared to appear on a public platform with the leaders of the reformist Movement for Perestroika (Sajudis) in Lithuania. He became a popular figure, and in October, with the approval of both Moscow and Sajudis leaders, he replaced Ringaudas Songaila as the party’s First Secretary.

In his work as First Secretary of the LCP from 1988 to 1990, Brazauskas became a model for reformers in other republics throughout the Soviet Union. He pursued a moderate program for decentralizing the Soviet system, attempting to loosen Moscow’s control of Lithuania step by step. In this he had to strike a balance between party leaders in Moscow who demanded tighter controls in Lithuania and rival Lithuanians who demanded a sharp

break with Moscow. He experienced sharp criticism from both sides for being too lenient toward the other, yet he remained a popular figure within Lithuania.

Brazauskas presided over the dismantling of the Soviet system in Lithuania. In 1988 and 1989, as First Secretary of the LCP, he held the highest reins of political power in the republic, although he held no post in the republic's government. In December 1989, the Lithuanian parliament ended the Communist Party's supraconstitutional authority in the republic. Then the LCP separated itself from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In January 1990 Brazauskas took the post of president of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Lithuania's parliament. After new elections in February and March 1990 returned a noncommunist majority, Vytautas Landsbergis became the president of the parliament, and Brazauskas lost the reins of power, although he still led the LCP and became deputy prime minister. The Lithuanian government had replaced the party as the seat of power in the republic.

During the Soviet blockade of Lithuania in 1990, Brazauskas headed a special commission that planned the most efficient use of Lithuania's limited energy resources. In January 1991 he resigned as deputy prime minister and remained in the opposition until the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP), the successor to the LCP in independent Lithuania, won the parliamentary elections in the fall of 1992. After serving briefly as president of the parliament, in February 1993, he was elected president of the Republic. As president he could have no party affiliation, and he accordingly withdrew from the LDLP. At the conclusion of his five-year presidential term in 1998, he retired from politics, but in 2000, still a popular figure, he returned, organizing a coalition of leftist parties that won a plurality of seats in parliamentary elections. In 2001 he assumed the post of Lithuanian prime minister.

See also: LITHUANIA AND LITHUANIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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ALFRED ERICH SENN

BREST-LITOVSK PEACE

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russian and Imperial Russia, signed in March of 1918, ended Russia's involvement in World War I.

In the brief eight months of its existence, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was labeled an obscene, shameful, and dictated peace by various members of the Soviet government that signed it. Since then, it has been condemned by Western and Soviet historians alike. Under threat of a renewed German military advance, Russia agreed to give up 780,000 square kilometers of territory, fifty-six million people, one-third of its railway network, 73 percent of its iron ore production, and 89 percent of its coal supply. What remained of the former Russian empire now approximated the boundaries of sixteenth-century Muscovy.

An onerous separate peace with an imperialist power was far from what the Soviet regime had hoped to achieve by promulgating Vladimir Lenin's Decree on Peace within hours of the October Revolution. This decree, which appealed to all the peoples and governments at war to lay down their arms in an immediate general peace without annexations or indemnities, was to the Bolsheviks both a political and a practical necessity. Not only had Bolshevik promises of peace to war-weary workers, peasants, and soldiers enabled the party to come to power—but the Russian army was on the verge of collapse after years of defeat by Germany. The Allies' refusal to acknowledge this appeal for a general peace forced the Bolsheviks and their partners in the new Soviet government, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), to begin negotiations with the Central Powers.

The German-Soviet armistice signed at German divisional headquarters in Brest-Litovsk in mid-December was only a short-term triumph for the Bolshevik-Left SR government. When negotiations for a formal treaty commenced at the end of the month, the German representatives shocked the inexperienced Russians by demanding the cession of areas already occupied by the German army: Poland, Lithuania, and western Latvia. Debates raged within the Bolshevik Party and the government over a suitable response. Many Left SRs and a minority of Bolsheviks (the Left Communists) argued that Russia should reject these terms and fight a revolutionary war against German imperialism. Leon Trotsky proposed a solution of "neither war nor peace," whereas Lenin insisted that the government accept the German terms to gain a "breathing space" for

exhausted Russia. Trotsky's formula prevailed in Petrograd, but after Trotsky announced it at Brest-Litovsk, the Germans resumed the war and advanced toward Petrograd. With Lenin threatening to resign, the Soviet government reluctantly bowed to Germany's demands, which now became even more punitive, adding the cession of Ukraine, Finland, and all of the Baltic provinces. Soviet representatives signed the treaty while demonstratively refusing to read it; the fourth Soviet Congress of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies ratified it, signifying the immense popular opposition to continuing the war. The Left SRs, however, withdrew from the government in protest.

The Brest-Litovsk peace exacerbated the civil war that had begun when the Bolshevik Party came to power in Petrograd in October 1917. The SRs, the dominant party in the Constituent Assembly dissolved by the Soviet government in December 1917, declared an armed struggle against Germany and the Bolsheviks in May 1918. In July 1918 the Left SRs attempted to break the treaty and reignite the war with Germany by assassinating the German ambassador. Various Russian liberal, conservative, and militarist groups received Allied support for their ongoing war against the Bolshevik regime. Thus the effects of the Brest-Litovsk peace continued long past its abrogation by the Soviet government when Germany surrendered to the Allies in November 1918.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; WORLD WAR I

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SALLY A. BONIECE

BREZHNEV CONSTITUTION *See* CONSTITUTION OF 1977.

BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

Although in its immediate sense a riposte to the international condemnation of the invasion of

Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the “Brezhnev Doctrine” was the culmination of the long evolution of a conception of sovereignty in Soviet ideology. At its core was the restatement of a long-standing insistence on the right of the USSR to intervene in a satellite's internal political developments should there be any reason to fear for the future of communist rule in that state.

Linked to the name of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev, because of its encapsulation in a speech he read in Warsaw on November 13, 1968, the doctrine had already been expounded by ideologue Sergei Kovalev in *Pravda* on September 26, 1968, and, before the invasion, by Soviet commentators critical of the Czechoslovak reforms. It resembled in most respects the defense of the invasion of Hungary in 1956, and included aspects of earlier justifications of hegemony dating to the immediate postwar period and the 1930s.

Sovereignty continued to be interpreted in two regards: first, as the right to demand that the non-communist world, including organizations such as the United Nations, respect Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and second, as permitting the USSR's satellites to determine domestic policy only within the narrow bounds of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Any breach of those parameters would justify military intervention by members of the Warsaw Pact and the removal even of leaders who had come to power in the ways that the Soviet political model would consider legitimate.

The elements of the Brezhnev Doctrine reflecting the exigencies of the late 1960s were the intensified insistence on ideological uniformity in the face of a steady drift to revisionism in West European communist organizations as well as factions of ruling parties, and on bloc unity before venturing a less confrontational coexistence with the West. Preoccupied with protecting the Soviet sphere against external challenges and internal fissures, the Brezhnev Doctrine lacked the ambitious, more expansionist tone of earlier conceptions of sovereignty.

Although not officially overturned until Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze radically reconceptualized foreign policy in the late 1980s, the future of the Brezhnev Doctrine was already in doubt when the USSR decided not to invade Poland in December 1980, after the emergence of the independent trade union, Solidarity. The debates in the Politburo at that time revealed a shift

in the thinking of even some of its more hawkish members toward a discourse of Soviet national interest in place of the traditional socialist internationalism.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, INVASION OF

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
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KIERAN WILLIAMS

BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH

(1906–1982), leading political figure since the early 1960s, rising to Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and leader of the ruling Politburo.



Leonid Brezhnev waves to the crowd during his visit to the White House in June 1973. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

Leonid Illich ("Lyonya") Brezhnev's rise in Soviet politics was slow but sure. He was Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party from 1964, and after April 1966 he took the office of General Secretary. His tenure as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet spanned 1961 to 1963 and from 1977 to 1982. Brezhnev led the ruling Politburo from October 1964, after organizing the ouster of Nikita S. Khushchev, until his death. Although Brezhnev's ultimate successor, the reformer Mikhail S. Gorbachev, would accuse him of presiding over an era of stagnation (*zastoi*, literally a standstill) in the Soviet Union's economic development and political progress, many Russians remember his era as a "golden age" (*zolotoi vek*) when living standards steadily improved. This was the result of his policy of borrowing from the West, combined with the twofold doubling of world oil prices and a deliberate decision after 1971 to reallocate production in favor of consumer products and foods. Together with Brezhnev's policy of vainly trying to achieve military superiority over every possible combination of foreign rivals and the growing corruption that he deliberately encouraged, the reallocation from industrial goods to consumption and agriculture did in fact lead to a slowing of the expansion of output that Soviet leaders deemed to constitute economic growth. It was this slowdown that lent credibility to Gorbachev's later charge of stagnation.

EARLY CAREER

Brezhnev was born on December 19, 1906, in the east Ukrainian steel town of Kamenskoe, later renamed Dneprodzerzhinsk. His grandfather and father had migrated there from an agricultural village in Kursk province, hoping to find work in the local steel mill. Unlike some of his later Politburo colleagues, who joined the Red Army at age fourteen, Brezhnev evidently played no role in the civil war. At the time of collectivization, having trained in Kursk as a land surveyor, he was working in the Urals where there were few peasant villages to collectivize. In 1931 he abruptly returned to his home city, where he enrolled in a metallurgical institute, joined the Communist Party, and accepted low-level political assignments. Completing his studies in 1935, he trained as a tank officer for one year in eastern Siberia, only to return again to Dneprodzerzhinsk. Often accounted a member of the generation whose political careers were launched when the purges of 1937 and 1938 vacated so many high posts in the Communist Party, Brezhnev received only minor appointments. By 1939 he was no more

than a provincial official, supervising the press and party schooling, and he transferred the next year to oversee conversion of the province's industry to armaments production. The German invasion in June 1941 interrupted that uncompleted task, and within a month Brezhnev had been reassigned to the regular army as a political officer. With the rank of colonel, he was charged with keeping track of party enrollments and organizing the troops. Many years later, well into his tenure as General Secretary, efforts were made to glorify him as a war hero, primarily by praising him for regularly visiting the troops at the front; however, he never actually took much part in combat.

Following the war he was recommended to Nikita S. Khrushchev, whom Josef Stalin had assigned to administer the Ukraine as Communist Party chief. Khrushchev presumably approved Brezhnev's assignments, first as Party administrator of the minor Zaporozhe province and later of the more important Dnepropetrovsk province. Although Brezhnev would later claim that Stalin himself had found fault with his work in Dnepropetrovsk, Khrushchev seems to have regarded Brezhnev as an effective troubleshooter and persuaded Stalin to put Brezhnev in charge of the lagging party organization in neighboring Moldavia in 1950. Brezhnev did well enough that he was chosen for membership in the Central Committee, and then inducted into its Presidium, as the ruling Politburo was renamed when Stalin decided to greatly expand its membership. (This expansion, apparently, was the first move in a plan to purge its senior members). But Stalin's death in March 1953 canceled whatever plans he may have harbored. In that same month, Brezhnev was summarily transferred back to the armed forces, where he spent another year supervising political lectures, this time in the navy. Although his postwar political career was temporarily derailed, he had gained the opportunity to form bonds with a number of officials who would take over ranking posts when he became General Secretary. Moreover, his reassignment to the Ministry of Defense enabled him to make additional connections with top military commanders.

Khrushchev's success in the power struggle unleashed by Stalin's death enabled the First Secretary to recall Brezhnev from military duty in 1954. Brezhnev was sent to Kazakhstan to take charge of selecting the Communist Party officials who would execute Khrushchev's plan to turn the so-called Virgin Lands into a massive producer of grain crops. Within eighteen months Brezhnev took the

place of his initial superior and successfully led the transformation of the Virgin Lands. This record, combined perhaps with Brezhnev's previous experience, moved Khrushchev to return Brezhnev to Moscow in June 1957 as the Communist Party's overseer of the new strategic missile program and other defense activities. While Brezhnev could claim some credit for the successful launch of Sputnik in October 1957, he had supervised only the last stages of that program. He did not manage to prevent the failure of the initial intercontinental ballistic missile program, on which Khrushchev had placed such high hopes. By 1960 Brezhnev had been shoved aside from overseer of defense matters to the ceremonial position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, where for the first time he came into extensive contact with officials of foreign governments, particularly in what was then becoming known as the Third World. A stroke suffered by his rival, Frol R. Kozlov, enabled Brezhnev to return to the more powerful post of Secretary of the Central Committee, where Khrushchev regarded him as his informal number two man.

LEADER OF THE POLITBURO, 1964–1982

It was Brezhnev who organized the insider coup against his longtime patron, Khrushchev, spending some six months calling party officials from his country seat at Zavidovo and delicately sounding them out on their attitudes toward the removal of the First Secretary. Khrushchev quickly learned about the brewing conspiracy; but the failures of his strategic rocketry, agricultural, and ambitious housing programs, as well as dissatisfaction with his reorganizations of Party and government, had undermined Khrushchev's authority among Soviet officials. The Leningrad official, Kozlov, on whom Khrushchev had relied as a counterweight to Brezhnev, did not recover from his illness. Khrushchev was thus unable to mount any effective resistance when Brezhnev decided to convene the Central Committee in October 1964 to endorse Khrushchev's removal. Brezhnev did not overplay his own hand, taking only the post of First Secretary for himself and gaining rival Alexei N. Kosygin's consent to Khrushchev's ouster by allowing him to assume Khrushchev's post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers (head of the economy).

The contest between Brezhnev and Kosygin for ascendancy dominated Soviet politics over the next period. As a dictatorship, the Soviet regime could not engender the loyalty of the general populace by allowing citizens to reject candidates for the

exercise of power; in other words, it could not let them vote meaningfully. Thus, how to sustain popular allegiance was a recurrent topic of discussion among Soviet leaders, both in public and in private. In the public discussion, Brezhnev took the conventional Soviet stance that the Communist Party could count on the allegiance of workers if it continued its record of heroic accomplishment manifested in the past by the overthrow of tsarism, the industrialization of a backward country, and victory over Germany. He proposed two new heroic accomplishments that the leadership under his guidance should pursue: the transformation of Soviet agriculture through investment in modern technology, and the building of a military power second to none. Kosygin, by contrast, argued that workers would respond to individual incentives in the form of rewards for hard work. These incentives were to be made available by an increase in the production of consumer goods, to be achieved by economic reforms that would decentralize the decision-making process from Moscow ministries to local enterprises, and, not coincidentally, freeing those enterprises from the control of local party secretaries assigned to supervise industrial activity, as Brezhnev had done in his early career.

The contest between these competing visions took almost four years to resolve. Although Kosygin blundered early by interpreting the outcome of the 1964 U.S. presidential election as a sign of American restraint in the Vietnam conflict, Brezhnev equally blundered by underestimating the difficulty, or more likely impossibility, of resolving the Sino-Soviet split. Kosygin sought to protect economic reforms similar to the one he proposed for the Soviet Union, then in progress in the five East European states controlled by the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia, economic reforms suddenly brought about political changes at the top of the Communist Party, impelling its new leader, Alexander Dubcek, to begin retreating from the party's monopoly of power. Brezhnev took advantage of this emergency to align himself with military commanders pressing for the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the restoration of an orthodox communist dictatorship. Introduction of a large Soviet army enabled Czechoslovak communists, working under Brezhnev's personal direction, to remove reformers from power, and the replacement of leaders in Poland and East Germany ended economic reforms there as well. By 1971 proponents of economic reform in Moscow became discouraged by the evident signs of Kosygin's inability to protect adherents of their views, and Brezhnev emerged

for the first time as the clear victor in the Soviet power struggle.

According to George Breslauer (1982), Brezhnev used his victory not only to assert his own policy priorities but to incorporate selected variants of Kosygin's proposals into his own programs, both at home and abroad. At home he emerged as a champion of improving standards of living not only by increasing food supplies but also by expanding the assortment and availability of consumer goods. Abroad he now emerged as the architect of U.S.-Soviet cooperation under the name of relaxation of international tensions, known in the West as the policy of *détente*. Yet Brezhnev represented each of these new initiatives as compatible with sustaining his earlier commitments to a vast expansion of agricultural output and military might, as well as to continuing support for Third World governments hostile to the United States. His rejection of Kosygin's decentralization proposals did nothing to address the growing complexity of managing an expanding economy from a single central office.

Although the policy of *détente* and the doubling of world oil prices in 1973 and again by the end of the decade made it financially possible for Brezhnev to juggle the competing demands of agriculture, defense, and the consumer sector, there was not enough left over to sustain industrial expansion, which slowed markedly in the last years of his leadership. As the crucial criterion by which communist officials had become accustomed to judging their own success, the slowdown in industrial expansion undermined the self-confidence of the Soviet elite. Brezhnev's policy of cadre stability—gaining support from Communist Party officials by securing them in their positions—developed a gerontocracy that blocked the upward career mobility by which the loyalty of officials had been purchased since Stalin instituted this arrangement in the 1930s. Brezhnev therefore made opportunities available for corruption, bribe-taking, and misuse of official position at all levels of the government, appointing his son-in-law as chief of the national criminal police to assure that these activities would not be investigated. His encouragement of corruption rewarded officials during his lifetime, but it also further sapped their collective morale, and made some of them responsive to the proposals for change by his ultimate successor, Mikhail Gorbachev.

In foreign policy his initially successful policy of *détente* foundered as his military buildup lent

persuasiveness to objections from American conservatives. Soviet backing for the 1973 attack on Israel and for armed takeovers in Africa discredited the U.S. public's faith in the sincerity of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions. By 1979 the effort to occupy Afghanistan, in a reprise of the Czechoslovak action, landed the Soviet army in a war it proved incapable of winning while compelling President Jimmy Carter to abandon arms control negotiations and to withdraw from the Moscow Olympics. In the summer of 1980 Polish strikers formed the movement known as Solidarity, demonstrating to Soviet officials that Brezhnev had bet wrongly on the combination of military expansion, improved food supplies, and increases in the availability of consumer goods to secure the allegiance of workers in communist-ruled states.

Under the strain of personal responsibility for preserving the Soviet order, Brezhnev's health deteriorated rapidly after the middle 1970s. In 1976 he briefly suffered actual clinical death before being resuscitated; as a result, he was constantly accompanied by modern resuscitation technology bought from the West (which had to be used more than once). Ill health made Brezhnev lethargic; it is unclear, however, what even a more energetic leader could have done to solve the Soviet Union's problems. Despite Brezhnev's torpor, his colleagues within the Politburo and his loyalists, whom he had placed in key posts throughout the apex of the Soviet party and state, continued to see their personal fortunes tied to his leadership. He remained in power until a final illness, which is thought to have been brought on by exposure to inclement weather during the 1982 celebration of the October Revolution anniversary.

LATER REAPPRAISAL

For Gorbachev and his adherents, Brezhnev came to personify everything that was wrong with the Soviet regime. The popularity of Gorbachev's program among Western specialists, and the interest generated by the new leader's dynamism after the boring stasis of Brezhnev's later years, precluded a reappraisal of Brezhnev's career until 2002, when a group of younger scholars picked up on Brezhnev's growing popularity among certain members of the Russian population. These people remembered with fondness Brezhnev's alleviation of their or their parents' poverty, a relief made all the more striking by the extreme impoverishment experienced by many in the post-Soviet era. This reassessment may appear unwarranted to those who

prize political liberty above marginal increments in material consumption.

See also: BREZHNEV DOCTRINE; CONSTITUTION OF 1977; DÉTENTE; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; KOSYGIN, ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH; POLITBURO

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RICHARD D. ANDERSON JR.

BRODSKY, JOSEPH ALEXANDROVICH

(1940–1996), poet, translator.

Joseph Alexandrovich Brodsky left school at the age of fifteen, and worked in many professions, including factory worker, morgue worker, and ship's boiler, as well as assisting on geological expeditions. During his early years, Brodsky studied foreign languages (English and Polish). His first foray into poetry occurred in 1957 when Brodsky became acquainted with the famous Russian poet Anna Akhmatova, who praised the creativity of the budding poet. In the 1960s Brodsky worked on translating, into Russian, poetry of Bulgarian, Czech, English, Estonian, Georgian, Greek, Italian, Lithuanian, Dutch, Polish, Serbian-Croatian, and Spanish origins. His translations opened the works of authors such as Tom Stoppard, Thomas Wentslowa, Wisten Oden, and Cheslaw Milosh to Russian readers; John Donne, Andrew Marwell, and Ewrypid were newly translated.

On February 12, 1964, Brodsky was arrested and charged with parasitism and sentenced to five years deportation. In 1965, after serving eighteen months in a labor camp in northern Russia, protests in the USSR and abroad prompted his return from exile.

During the summer of 1972, Brodsky emigrated to the United States and became a citizen in 1980. Before his departure from the Soviet Union, he published eleven poems during the period from 1962 to 1972.

By the 1960s Brodsky was still relatively unknown in the West. "Cause of Brodsky" found scant exposure on the pages of the emigrant press (*Russkaya mysl*, *Grani*, *Wozdushnye Puti*, *Posev*, etc.). Brodsky's first collection of poems was released by the Ardis publishing house in 1972. Throughout the 1970s Brodsky collaborated as a literary critic and essay writer in the *New Yorker* and the *New York Review of Books*, and gained a wider readership in the United States.

Brodsky taught at several colleges and universities, including Columbia University and Mount Holyoke College. In 1987 he won the Nobel prize for literature. He served as Poet Laureate of the United States from 1991 to 1992.

Brodsky died in 1996 of a heart attack in his Brooklyn apartment.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; INTELLIGENTSIA

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MARIA EITINGUINA

BRUCE, JAMES DAVID

(1669–1735), one of Peter the Great's closest advisers.

A man of many *métiers*, James David Bruce ("Yakov Vilimovich Bruce") served Russia over the course of his lifetime as general, statesman, diplomat, and scholar. Bruce participated in both the Crimean and Azov expeditions. In 1698 he traveled to Great Britain, where he studied several subjects, including Isaac Newton's then-avant-garde philosophy of optics (i.e., that light itself is a heterogeneous mixture of differently refrangible rays) and gravity (i.e., that celestial bodies follow the laws of dynamics and universal gravitation). Upon return to Russia, Bruce enthusiastically established the first observatory in his native country.

In 1700, at the age of thirty-one, Bruce achieved the rank of major general and commanded forces in the Great Northern War against Sweden. After a humiliating defeat by the Swedes near Narva on November 19, 1700, after which Peter reputedly wept, Peter vowed to improve his army and defeat Sweden in the future. He concluded that a modern army needed a disciplined infantry equipped with the latest artillery (rifles). This infantry was supposed to advance while firing and then charge with fixed bayonets. (The Russian army had consisted mostly of cavalry, its officer corps composed of foreign mercenaries.)

Bruce was one of the new trainers Peter employed to improve the quality of the Russian army. On July 8, 1709, Russian artillery defeated Charles's army and sent it into retreat. That year Bruce was awarded the Order of St. Andrew for his decisive role in reforming artillery as master of ordnance in the Great Northern War. In 1712 and 1713 Bruce headed the allied artillery of Russia, Denmark, and Poland-Saxony in Pomerania and Holstein. In 1717 he became a senator and president of Colleges of Mines and Manufacture. He was also placed in charge of Moscow print and St. Petersburg mint. As first minister plenipotentiary at the Aland and Nystad congresses, Bruce negotiated and signed the Russian peace treaty with Sweden in 1721, the same year he became count of the Russian Empire. He retired in 1726 with the rank of field marshal.

Bruce corresponded with Jacobite kinsmen and took pride in his Scottish ancestry. He owned a library of books in fourteen languages and was known by many as the most enlightened man in Russia.

See also: GREAT NORTHERN WAR; PETER I

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

BRUSILOV, ALEXEI ALEXEYEVICH

(1853–1926), Russian and Soviet military figure, World War I field commander.

Born in Tiflis (Tbilisi), Alexei Alexeyevich Brusilov entered military service in 1871, graduated from the Corps of Pages in 1872, and completed the Cavalry Officers School in 1883. As a dragoon officer during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, he fought with distinction in the Trans-Caucasus. Between 1883 and 1906 he served continuously at the Cavalry School, eventually becoming its commandant. Although he did not attend the General Staff Academy or serve in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), he rose during the period from 1906 to 1914 to repeated command assignments, including two postings as a corps commander. At the outset of World War I his Eighth Army won important successes during its advance into Galicia and the Carpathians. Between May and July of 1916, Brusilov's Southwestern Front conducted one of the most significant ground offensives of World War I, in which his troops broke through the Austro-Hungarian defenses to occupy broad expanses of Volynia, Galicia, and Bukovina.

As supreme commander (May–July 1917) of the Russian armies after the February Revolution, Brusilov presided over the ill-fated summer offensive of 1917. After the October Revolution, unlike many of his colleagues, he refused to join the counterrevolutionary cause. Instead, at the outset of the war with Poland in 1920, he entered the Red Army, serving the new Soviet regime in various military capacities (including inspector general of

cavalry) until his death. A consummate cavalryman and a flexible military professional, Brusilov saw his primary career obligation as patriotic service to his country, whether tsarist or revolutionary.

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; WORLD WAR I

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BRUCE W. MENNING

BRYUSOV, VALERY YAKOVLEVICH

(1873–1924), poet, novelist, playwright, critic, translator.

Born in Moscow, Valery Bryusov was an early proponent of Symbolism in Russia. As editor of the almanac *Russkie Simvolisty* (Russian symbolists, 1894–1895), Bryusov presented the first articulation of the tenets of Modernism in Russia. Bryusov's poetry in this almanac illustrated the points set forth in the declarations, with elements of decadence, synaesthetic imagery, and Symbolist motifs.

In 1899 Sergei Polyakov invited Bryusov to participate in the founding of the Skorpion Publishing House. In addition to publishing the works of leading Symbolists, Skorpion Publishing House in 1904 sponsored the literary journal *Vesy* (The scales), which became the leading forum for writers of that time. By 1906 Bryusov became increasingly critical of writers and poets with whom he disagreed, instituting a vitriolic polemic against the proponents of mystical anarchism and the so-called younger generation of Symbolists, especially those involved with the journal *Zolotoye runo* (The golden fleece).

In the 1910s Bryusov continued to work in all aspects of artistic culture, writing plays, a novel, and literary criticism, and engaging the Futurists in a lively debate on poetry. In 1913 Bryusov wrote a book of poems under the pseudonym Nelli, combining an ironic life story of a tragic poet with experimental, Futurist-inspired poems. The ironic mystification met with consternation and derision by the Futurists.

Bryusov was an enthusiastic supporter of the Russian Revolution, believing it to be a transformative event in history. Bryusov became a member of the Communist Party in 1920 and was active in Narkompros (The People's Commissariat for Enlightenment), serving as head of its printing and library divisions. In 1921 Bryusov organized the Higher Institute of Literature and Art and was the director until his death.

See also: FUTURISM; SILVER AGE

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MARK KONECNY

BUCHAREST, TREATY OF

The Treaty of Bucharest brought the Turkish war of 1806–1812 to an end. Having advanced the Russian frontier to the Dniester River in 1792, Catherine the Great intended to include Moldavia and Wallachia within a Dacian Kingdom under one of her favorites. The immediate occasion for the war, however, were the intrigues of Napoleon's ambassador at Constantinople, General Horace Sebastiani, who dismissed two pro-Russian princes in violation of protective rights obtained by the tsar in 1802. Catherine's grandson Alexander I opened hostilities in 1806 when sixty thousand men, initially led by General Mikhail Kamensky and later by Mikhail Kutuzov, crossed the Danube. This campaign proved desultory, even though in 1807 a Russian administration replaced the Greek Princes nominated by the Turks. When Napoleon met Tsar Alexander I at Tilsit (1807) and later at Erfurt (1808) to partition the Ottoman Empire, the former was willing to concede control of both principalities to Russia but was unwilling to give up Constantinople, the ultimate prize the French emperor had sought. In consequence, the good relations between the two emperors deteriorated. When it became apparent that Napoleon was planning a coalition for an invasion of Russia in 1812, the tsar, unwilling to fight Turks and French on two fronts, sent a delegation under General Count Alexander de Langeron, General Joseph Fonton, and the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, Count Andrei

Italinsky, to negotiate with the Turks in Bucharest. The latter were represented by the Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha, the Chief Interpreter (Drogman) Mehmed Said Galid Effendi, and his colleague Demetrius Moruzi. They met at the inn of a wealthy Armenian Mirzaian Manuc. The talks were confrontational: the Turks unwilling to cede one inch of territory, the Russians demanding the whole province of Moldavia. In the end, Sir Stratford Canning, a young English diplomat who replaced the vacationing English ambassador Sir Robert Adair, made a diplomatic debut that earned him a brilliant career on the eve of the Crimean War. He argued that the Turks lacked the resources to continue the war, while the Russians needed the troops of Admiral Pavel Chichagov (taking over Kutuzov's command) who returned to Russia to face the Napoleonic onslaught. In the end, Canning cited an obscure article of the Treaty of Tilsit (article 12) negotiated by the Russian Chancellor Peter Rumyantsev as an acceptable compensation. This territory, misnamed by the Russians "Bessarabia" (a name derived from the first Romanian princely dynasty of Wallachia, which controlled only Moldavia's southern tier), advanced the Russian frontier from the Dniester to the Pruth and the northern mouth of the Danube (Kilia). This represented a gain of 500,000 people of various ethnic stock, 45,000 kilometers, five fortresses, and 685 villages. By sacrificing the coveted prize of both principalities and withdrawing the army from Turkey, the tsar was able to confront Napoleon on a single front. This, according to General Langeron, made a difference at the battle of Borodino (1812).

Not content at having saved most of the Moldo-Wallachian provinces, the Turks, who had no legal right to a territory over which they exercised *de jure* suzerainty, vented their frustration by hacking their chief interpreter Moruzi to pieces and hanging his head at the Seraglio. From a Romanian standpoint, the cession of Bessarabia to Russia in 1812 marked a permanent estrangement in Russo-Romanian relations, which continued in the early twenty-first century with the creation of a Moldavian Republic within the Russian Commonwealth.

See also: ROMANIA, RELATIONS WITH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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RADU R. FLORESCU

BUDENNY, SEMEON MIKHAILOVICH

(1883–1973), marshal of the Soviet Union.

Born near Rostov-on-Don to non-Cossack parents, Budenny served in Cossack regiments during the Russo-Japanese War and in World War I (receiving four St. George's Crosses for bravery as a noncommissioned officer). Having joined the Bolsheviks in 1918 and being an accomplished horseman, he organized cavalry detachments around Tsaritsyn during the civil war before creating and commanding the legendary First Cavalry Army in actions against the Whites and the Poles. From 1924 to 1937 he served as Inspector of Cavalry, reaching the exalted rank of marshal in 1935. He actively helped purge the Red Army in 1937, as commander of Moscow military district, but the Nazi invasion revealed him to be completely out of his depth in modern, mechanized warfare. As commander-in-chief of the South-West Direction of the Red Army in Ukraine and Bessarabia, Budenny was largely responsible for the disastrous loss of Kiev in August 1941. Probably only his closeness to Josef Stalin and Kliment Voroshilov (a legacy of his civil war service at Tsaritsyn/Stalingrad) saved him from execution. Instead, he was removed from frontline posts in September 1941, becoming commander of cavalry in 1943 and deputy minister of agriculture, in charge of horse breeding. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1952. Virtually uneducated but with enormous charisma (and even more enormous moustaches), Budenny became a folklore figure, a decorative accoutrement to the grey men of the postwar Soviet leadership, and a museum piece. Present at all parades and state occasions, bedecked with medals and orders, he was a living relic of the heroic days of the Civil War. Several thousand streets, settlements, and collective farms were named in his honor, as was a breed of Russian horses. He lived out his last years quietly in Moscow, pursuing equestrian interests.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; COSSACKS; WORLD WAR II

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JONATHAN D. SMELE

BUKHARA

Established in the sixteenth century, the Bukharan khanate maintained commercial and diplomatic contact with Russia. Territorial conflicts with neighboring Khiva and Kokand prevented formation of a united front against Russia's encroachment in the mid-nineteenth century.

War from 1866 to 1868 ended with Russia's occupation of the middle Zarafshan River valley, including Samarkand, and the grant of trading privileges to Russian merchants. The 1873 treaty opened the Amu Darya to Russian ships; pledged the emir to extradite fugitive Russians and abolish the slave trade; and ceded Samarkand, leaving Russia in control of the water supply of the lower Zarafshan, including that of the capital.

Bukhara as a Russian protectorate was slightly larger than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with a population of two and a half to three million. Urban residents comprised 10 to 14 percent of the total; the largest town was the capital, with population of 70,000 to 100,000. The dominant ethnic group was the Uzbeks (55–60%), followed by the Tajiks (30%) and the Turkmen (5–10%). Bukhara was ruled by an hereditary autocratic emir. Muzaffar ad-Din (1860–1885) was succeeded by his son Abd al-Ahad (1885–1910) and the latter's son Alim (1910–1920).

In reducing Bukhara to a wholly dependent but internally self-governing polity, Russia aimed to acquire a stable frontier in Central Asia, to prevent Britain alone from filling the political vacuum between the two empires, and to avoid the burdens of direct rule. This policy succeeded for half a century. After 1868 no emir contemplated using his army against his protector; in 1873 Britain and Russia recognized the Amu Darya as separating a Russian sphere of influence (Bukhara) from a British sphere (Afghanistan); and the emirs maintained sufficient domestic order.

Russia's impact increased over the years. In the mid-1880s Bukhara's capital was connected by telegraph with Tashkent; a Russian political agency was established; and the Central Asian Railroad was built across the khanate. In the latter part of the 1880s three Russian urban enclaves, and a fourth at the turn of the century, were established; by the eve of World War I they contained from thirty-five to forty thousand civilians and soldiers. In 1895 the khanate was included in Russia's customs frontier, and Russian troops and customs officials were stationed along the border with Afghanistan.

Russo-Bukharan trade increased sixfold from the coming of the railroad to 1913. Production of cotton, which represented three-fourths of the value of Bukhara's exports to Russia, expanded two and a half times between the mid-1880s and the early 1890s, grew slowly thereafter, but doubled during World War I. Unlike Turkestan, the khanate remained self-sufficient in foodstuffs.

After the fall of the tsarist regime, Emir Alim resisted pressure for reforms from the Provisional Government and the Bukharan Djadids (modernizers). With the Bolsheviks in control of the railroad, the Russian enclaves, and the water supply of his capital from December 1917, the emir maintained strained but correct relations with the Soviet government during the Russian civil war.

In the late summer of 1920 the Red Army overthrew Alim. A Bukharan People's Soviet Republic, led by Djadids, was proclaimed. Russia renounced its former rights, privileges, and property in Bukhara, but controlled the latter's military and economic affairs. The Djadids were purged in 1923, and the following year the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic was divided along ethnic lines between the newly formed Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; KHIVA; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; TURKMENISTAN AND TURKMEN; UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS

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SEYMOUR BECKER

BUKHARIN, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(1888–1938), old Bolshevik economist and theoretician who was ousted as a Rightist in 1929 and executed in 1938 for treason after a show trial.

The son of Moscow schoolteachers, raised in the spirit of the Russian intelligentsia, Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin was a broadly educated and humanist intellectual. Radicalized as a high school student during the 1905 Revolution, he was drawn to the Bolshevik faction, which he formally joined in 1906. He enrolled at Moscow University in 1907 to study economics, but academics took second place to party activity. He rose rapidly in the Moscow Bolshevik organization, was arrested several times, and in 1911 fled abroad, where he remained until 1917. These six years of emigration strengthened Bukharin's internationalism; he matured as a Marxist theorist and writer and became known as a radical voice in the Bolshevik party. After a year in Germany, he went to Krakow in 1912 to meet Vladimir Lenin, who invited him to write for the party's publications. Bukharin settled in Vienna, where he studied and drafted several theoretical works. Expelled to Switzerland at the beginning of World War I, he supported Lenin's radical antiwar platform, continuing his activities in Scandinavia and then New York City.

When revolution broke out in Russia in early 1917, Bukharin hastened home. Arriving in May, he immediately took a leading role in the Moscow Bolshevik organization, which was dominated by young radicals. His militant stance brought him close to Lenin. In July 1917 he was elected a full member of the Central Committee, and in December he was appointed editor of the party newspaper, *Pravda*. Bukharin opposed the peace negotiations with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk and headed the Left Communists who called for a revolutionary war against capitalism; later he also opposed Lenin's view that state capitalism would be a step forward for Russia. In mid-1918, ending his opposition, he resumed his party positions as the burgeoning civil war led to war communism and rebellion by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. In 1919, when a five-man Politburo was formally established, Bukharin became one of three candidate members and also became deputy chairman of the newly established Comintern. Serving in various capacities during the civil war, Bukharin also published extensively: including *Imperialism and World Economy* (1918), the popularizing and militant *ABC of Communism* (1920, with Yevgeny Preobrazhen-

sky); *Economics of the Transition Period* (1920), which celebrated the statization of the economy under War Communism but also began to explore how to build a socialist society after the revolution; and *Historical Materialism* (1921), a major analysis of Marxism in the twentieth century.

After Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy in 1921, debate swirled around the question of the relative importance that should be accorded industry and agriculture to achieve economic development within the framework of a socialist economy. Leon Trotsky and the Left Opposition favored rapid industrialization at the expense of agriculture, in what Preobrazhensky termed “primitive socialist accumulation.” Bukharin, disavowing the illusions of War Communism, emphasized the need to find an evolutionary path to socialism based on a strong alliance with Russia’s peasant majority and invoked Lenin’s last writings to legitimize this position. He argued that forcibly appropriating agricultural surpluses would ultimately lead to the disintegration of agriculture because peasants would no longer have an incentive to produce. While agreeing that industrialization was absolutely critical for the construction of socialism, he favored a gradual approach. Bukharin’s path to socialism relied upon a growing consumer market, possible only if there were private merchants to contribute to the growth of domestic trade. He argued for policies that would produce balanced growth at a moderate tempo, speaking of growing into socialism through exchange.

In the mid-1920s Bukharin aligned himself with the Stalinist majority against the Left, becoming a full member of the Politburo in 1924, and played a major role in the government. He was the architect of the pro-peasant policies introduced in 1925 and urged peasants to “enrich yourselves,” a phrase that would later be used against him. As editor of *Pravda* and other party publications, and a member of the Institute of Red Professors, Bukharin moved easily in the world of NEP intellectuals and artists and authored government policies favoring artistic freedom. He became head of the Comintern in 1926 after the ouster of Grigory Zinoviev and saw the collapse of his policy of cooperation with the Chinese Nationalists. In the same period, Bukharin strongly attacked the Left Opposition and helped achieve its total ouster from power in the fall of 1927.

Bukharin supported the 1927 decision of the Fifteenth Party Congress to adopt a five-year plan for Soviet industrialization, but he and the gradualist



Communist leader Nikolai Bukharin in London, June 1931.

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policies he advocated fell victim to the radical and violent way Josef Stalin carried out the plan. Bukharin opposed Stalin’s harsh measures against the peasants after the amount of grain marketed fell off sharply. In September he published “Notes of an Economist,” criticizing efforts to inflate the industrial goals of the plan and defending the idea of balanced growth; it is impossible, he said, “to build today’s factories with tomorrow’s bricks.” Stalin and his allies counterattacked, labeling Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Mikhail Tomsky the “Right Opposition.” His power already undercut by the end of 1928, Bukharin was removed formally from the Politburo, the Comintern, and editorship of *Pravda* during 1929 and systematically vilified. In limbo for the next four years after half-hearted recantations, horrified by the destruction visited on the peasantry by collectivization, he served as research director for the Supreme Economic Council and its successor and wrote extensively on culture and science. In the era of partial moderation from 1934 to 1936, Bukharin became editor of the government newspaper, *Izvestiya*, participated in the commission to prepare a new Soviet constitution, and wrote about the danger of fascism in Europe.

The Great Purges ended the domestic truce. Bukharin was arrested in February 1937. In March 1938, along with the Right Opposition, he was tried for treason and counterrevolution in the last great show trial, the Trial of the Twenty-One, where he was the star defendant. Bukharin confessed to the charges against him, probably to save his young wife Anna Larina and their son Yuri (born 1934), and he was executed immediately. In the Khrushchev years, Bukharin came to symbolize an alternative, non-Stalinist path of development for the Soviet Union. He was rehabilitated in 1988, and Larina made public his last written work, a letter to future party leaders, that she had preserved by memory during years of imprisonment.

See also: LEFT OPPOSITION; LEFT SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PURGES, THE GREAT; WAR COMMUNISM

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BUKOVINA

Bukovina is a region that straddles north-central Romania and southwestern Ukraine. First records

of the region date back to the fourteenth century, when the whole territory was a constituent part of the Moldovan Principality.

From 1504, the region was drawn under indirect Ottoman rule. However, following the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774, the Hapsburg Empire annexed the region, in accordance with the 1775 Convention of Constantinople.

During the initial stages of Austrian rule, Bukovina's population expanded rapidly. The region's reputation for religious toleration and relaxed feudal obligations saw a wave of German, Polish, Hungarian, Ukrainian, and Romanian immigrants flood into the area.

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the aftermath of World War I gave rise to a brief period of dispute concerning rights to the region, with both Romania and briefly independent Ukraine claiming sovereignty. The Treaty of Saint Germain awarded the territory to a newly enlarged Romania.

Control over the region shifted following the enactment of the clandestine Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, as the Soviet Union seized northern Bukovina (to the Sereth River) on June 29, 1940. This move precipitated an exodus of the region's German settlers.

Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 saw the whole territory temporarily revert to Romania. Bukovina's sizable Jewish population suffered during this period. However, the region was retaken by advancing Soviet troops, and in September 1944 northern Bukovina was officially incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

After a period of territorial stability under Communist rule, focus on the area returned during the 1990s. With an estimated 135,000 ethnic Romanians living in Ukrainian Bukovina, tentative calls were made by the Romanian government for a reversion to territorial arrangements that had existed prior to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The Ukrainian government's unwillingness to engage Romanian demands meant the issue initially reached a stasis. However, Romania's application to join NATO forced a resolution of the dispute and, as such, a 1997 treaty mutually recognized the territorial integrity of the two states.

See also: MOLDOVA AND MOLDOVANS; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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JOHN GLEDHILL

BULGAKOV, MIKHAIL AFANASIEVICH

(1891–1940), twentieth-century novelist, journalist, short story writer, and playwright; author of internationally acclaimed novel *Master and Margarita*.

Mikhail Afanasievich Bulgakov was born in Kiev. He graduated from the Kiev University Medical School in 1916 and married Tatiana Lappa, his first of three wives. He practiced medicine in provincial villages, then in Kiev, where he witnessed the outbreak of the Russian Civil War and struggled with morphine addiction. In 1920 he abandoned medicine for a writing career and moved to Vladikavkaz, Caucasus, where he wrote feuilletons and studied theater.

Bulgakov moved to Moscow in 1921. There his troubles with censorship began. His satirical (patently science fiction) novel *Heart of a Dog* (*Sobache serdtse*) was deemed unpublishable. His play *Days of the Turbins* (*Dni Turbinykh*), based on his autobiographical novel *White Guard* (*Belaya Gvardiya*), premiered in 1926 and was banned after its 289th performance (although it supposedly numbered among Josef Stalin's favorite plays). Subsequent plays were banned much earlier in the production process. His short story "Morphine" (1927) was his last publication in his lifetime. In 1930 he wrote a long letter (his second) to the Soviet government requesting permission to emigrate. He received in response a telephone call from Stalin, who offered him an assignment as assistant producer at the Moscow Art Theater. Although not subjected to forced labor or confinement, Bulgakov hardly enjoyed privilege. His work remained unpublished and unperformed. His attempts to appease the censors by tackling relatively safe subjects (historical fiction and adaptations) proved futile.

Bulgakov's novel *Master and Margarita* was written between 1928 and 1940. Resonant with the influence of Nikolai Gogol, it concerns the Devil, who, disguised as a professor, travels to Moscow to wreak havoc. This exuberantly irreverent work

swirls with fierce wit, narrative inventiveness, and a myriad of historical, literary, and religious references.

Bulgakov's last play, *Batum* (1939), written in honor of Stalin's sixtieth jubilee, was banned. Bulgakov died of kidney disease in 1940.

See also: GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILIEVICH; MOSCOW ART THEATER; THEATER

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DIANA SENECHAL

BULGAKOV, SERGEI NIKOLAYEVICH

(1871–1944), political economist, philosopher, and theologian, whose life and intellectual evolution were punctuated by sharp breaks and shifts in worldview.

Sergei Bulgakov was born into the clerical estate. His father was a rural clergyman in Livny (Orël province); his mother, of gentry background. Like Nikolai Chernyshevsky and Nikolai Dobrolyubov a generation earlier, Bulgakov lost his faith at age fourteen and transferred from the seminary to the secular gymnasium at Elets, and then to Moscow University, where he studied political economy. His book *On Markets in Capitalist Conditions of Production* (1897) established him, together with Nikolai Berdyayev, Peter Struve, and Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, as one of Russia's foremost Legal Marxists. While researching his doctoral thesis ("Capitalism in Agriculture") in Europe, Bulgakov experienced a spiritual crisis, breaking down in pious tears before Raphael's canvas of the Sistine Madonna in Dresden. Upon his return to Russia, he spearheaded the movement from Marxism to idealism (including among others Berdyayev, Semen Frank, and Struve). Over the next twenty years he became a key participant in the seminal collections

of articles—*Problems of Idealism* (1902), *Landmarks* (1909), *From the Depths* (1918)—that charted the collective spiritual evolution of an important segment of the Russian intelligentsia. Bulgakov's idealism translated into political involvement in the Union of Liberation (founded in Switzerland in 1903) and included the drafting of the Cadet (Constitutional Democrat) party's agrarian program. During the Revolution of 1905, Bulgakov founded a small but intellectually sophisticated Christian Socialist party and was elected to the Second Duma.

Like his fellow liberals and radicals, Bulgakov experienced severe disappointment following Peter Stolypin's June 3 coup, formulated in his article in *Vekhi*, criticizing the intelligentsia. But by 1912 he had regained his sense of direction, finally completing his doctoral dissertation in a completely new tone. *Philosophy of Economy: The World as Household* (translated into English for the first time in 2000) is a work of social theory, and fully part of the "revolt against positivism" (H. Stuart Hughes) characteristic of European social thought in the period from 1890 to 1920. The book established Bulgakov's prominence as a thinker of the Russian Silver Age. In *Philosophy of Economy* and his next major work, *The Unfading Light* (1917), Bulgakov became a religious philosopher, bringing the insights of Orthodox Christianity, and particularly the concept of Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, to bear on problems of human dignity and economic activity.

Following the February Revolution, Bulgakov became a delegate to the All-Russian Council of the Orthodox Church; in 1918 he was ordained as a priest. Bulgakov was among the two hundred or so intellectuals Vladimir Lenin ordered shipped out of the new Soviet Union, across the Black Sea to Istanbul, in 1922. In his "second life," first in Prague and then in Paris, Bulgakov became arguably the twentieth century's greatest Orthodox theologian, crafting two theological trilogies modeled on the pattern of the liturgy: the "major" (e.g., *Agnets Bozhy*) and the "minor." Bulgakov was founder and dean of the St. Sergius Theological Academy in Paris and active in the ecumenical movement, including the Brotherhood of St. Alban's and St. Sergius and the Russian Christian Student Movement. Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, became a unifying principle in his writing, even leading to the development of a doctrine known as Sophiology. A tragic controversy over Sophia erupted in 1935; Bulgakov's views were condemned by both the Soviet Orthodox Church and the Synod of the Orthodox Church

in Exile in Czechoslovakia. Bulgakov's final work was a commentary on the Apocalypse of St. John the Divine. In 1944 he died of throat cancer in Paris.

Banned for seventy years in the Soviet Union, the writings of Bulgakov and his fellow Silver Age philosophers experienced a resurgence of popularity beginning in 1989.

See also: BERDYAYEV, NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH; CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; SILVER AGE

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CATHERINE EVTUHOV

BULGANIN, NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH

(1895–1975), political and military leader.

Nikolai Bulganin was a marshal of the Red Army who rose to the position of Soviet Prime Minister (1955–1958) under Nikita Khrushchev. Bulganin made his career mainly as a security and military official, but he was also an urban administrator. As mayor of Moscow (1931–1937) at a time when the capital was undergoing rapid expansion, he collaborated closely with Khrushchev in the construction of such enduring symbols of Stalinist urbanization as the Moscow metro. Bulganin's career benefited from the purges (1937–1938). Despite his lack of military training, Josef Stalin actively promoted him as a party commissar to oversee the military. He eventually joined Stalin's war cabinet in 1944. In 1947 he succeeded Stalin as minister for the armed forces and was promoted to marshal. A year later he joined the Politburo. Shortly after Stalin's death (1953), he was appointed minister of defense. In the ensuing political confrontation with secret police chief Lavrenti Beria, Bulganin sided with his friend Khrushchev, ensuring the military's loyalty. Bulganin's subsequent support for Khrushchev against Georgy Malenkov, who was advocating reduced spending on heavy industry, led to Bulganin's appointment as prime minister. In this post he actively supported Khrushchev's attempts to defuse

tensions with the West, over both Germany, and Yugoslavia. But he always played second fiddle to party boss Khrushchev. A year after Bulganin sided with the Stalinist Anti-Party Group against Khrushchev (1957), he was dismissed as both prime minister and marshal. Relegated to a minor economic post, he subsequently retired in 1960.

See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

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ROGER D. MARKWICK

BULGARIANS

The Bulgarians, or Bulgars, belonged to the Turco-Altaic language group and originated from western Siberia, along the valley of the Irtysh River. During the first and second centuries C.E. they migrated in the direction of eastern Europe and settled in the region north of the Caucasus. There, the proto-Bulgarians mingled with local native tribes of Iranian origin, whose cultural achievements and social hierarchy had a substantial impact on their further development. The proto-Bulgarians were called Bulgars for the first time by a Roman chronographer in 354. During the seventh century, they merged with the Slavic tribes inhabiting the territory bordering the Black Sea, between Romania and Turkey, in southeastern Europe, which is present-day Bulgaria.

The Bulgarians took over the newcomers' Slavic language. The Turkish conquest of Bulgaria in 1396 hampered the development of the Bulgarian language for several centuries, but after the Bulgarians achieved independence in 1878, a modern literary language based on the vernacular emerged. Modern Bulgarian, which is generally said to date from the sixteenth century, borrowed words from Greek, Turkish, Russian, French, and German. Although it resembles Slavic languages, Bulgarian has a definite article and has almost completely dropped the numerous case forms of the noun. It uses position and prepositions (like English) to indicate grammatical relationships in a sentence instead of using cases (like Russian).

Once an independent kingdom, Bulgaria was dominated by the communist Party from 1946 until 1990, when a multiparty system was adopted. During the communist period, when Bulgaria was under the control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the once dominant agricultural sector was overtaken by manufacturing. After World War II, all industrial enterprises were nationalized and operated under a series of five-year economic plans, modeled after the Soviet system, with financial aid from the USSR. Bulgaria enjoyed one of the most prosperous economies of the Soviet bloc. The transition from the old command economy to a democratic, market-oriented economy, initiated after the collapse of the communist regime, has been slow. Mass privatization of state-owned industry was sluggish, although privatization of small-scale industry, particularly in the retail and service sectors, accelerated. Under communism, Bulgarians became accustomed to free health services, but Bulgaria's post-communist governments have not had the financial resources to maintain these services. In 2003, 52 percent of the population was employed in services, 36 percent in industry, and 12 percent in agriculture. Most Bulgarians (85%) are Bulgarian Orthodox, while 13 percent are Muslim, 0.8 percent are Jewish, 0.5 percent are Roman Catholic, and 0.2 percent are Uniate Catholic. The remainder, about 0.5 percent, are of Protestant, Gregorian-Armenian, and other faiths.

See also: ALTAI; BULGARIA, RELATIONS WITH; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; TATARSTAN AND TATARS

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

BULGARIA, RELATIONS WITH

Relations between Russia and Bulgaria are marked by their closeness in alphabet, language, culture,

and religion. Between the tenth and eighteenth centuries both nations used a literary language that had emerged originally in Bulgaria together with the Cyrillic alphabet. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, Bulgarian Orthodox culture served as the foundation of Russia's nascent culture and polity (reinforced by a second wave of Bulgarian influences in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), whereas the Russian variant of the common cultural tradition played a crucial role in the renaissance of Bulgarian culture and language in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. From the beginning of modern Bulgarian education in the 1830s, Russian language and literature have had a solid presence in the Bulgarian school curriculum, and the concomitant impact of Russian culture and ideas has dramatically influenced key developments in Bulgarian history, such as the emergence of nationalism, liberalism, and constitutionalism in the nineteenth century, and of communism, forced collectivization and industrialization, and a glasnost-inspired pro-democracy movement in the twentieth.

Political relations can be traced back to Bulgaria's triangular relationship with Kiev and Constantinople in the ninth to eleventh centuries. Bulgaria's repeated loss of independence and the fragmentation of Rus made contacts episodic until the rise of the Russian Empire and its many wars with Turkey in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the war of 1877 to 1878, Russia liberated Bulgaria from Turkish rule and laid the foundations of its state institutions. Mounting bilateral disagreements led to the severing of diplomatic relations in 1886. Bulgaria's *de facto* independence was recognized by Russia in 1896, after the failure of a protracted campaign of military conspiracies and assassinations backed by Alexander III. Until 1912 Bulgaria maneuvered between the Balkan policies of Austria-Hungary and Russia. In 1912 it entered into an alliance with Serbia and Greece under Russian tutelage. This alliance won the First Balkan War against Turkey, but disagreement between the allies led to the Second Balkan War in 1913, which ended in Bulgaria's defeat and the decline of Russian influence in Sofia. When Bulgaria entered War World I by attacking Serbia in September 1915, Russia declared war on Bulgaria and its fleet bombarded Varna. In 1916 Russian and Romanian troops opened a new front against Bulgaria but were defeated. In March 1918 Russia signed a peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers, including Bulgaria.

Bulgaria's defeat by the entente in September 1918 led to radicalization and the rise of Bolshevik influence. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was formed in 1919 as a section of the Comintern. In 1923 the Comintern prompted the unprepared BCP to start an uprising, which ended in defeat, reprisals, and the banning of the party. Bulgaria established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1934; until then relations had been tense because of Moscow's encouragement of BCP subversion, which culminated in a spectacular explosion in a Sofia cathedral in April 1925, with 123 dead and several hundred wounded. Bilateral relations improved markedly after the conclusion of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact in 1939. In November and December 1940, the USSR attempted to gain German and Bulgarian consent for the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Soviet security sphere, but by that time Bulgaria had effectively joined the German-led coalition. Friction over Bulgaria was one of the reasons behind Hitler's decision to attack the USSR in 1941. Bulgaria served as a supply base for the German army, but was officially neutral in the Soviet-German war and diplomatic relations were preserved. Between 1941 and 1944, with the help of the BCP and noncommunist Bulgarian Rusophiles, the USSR engaged in a relentless espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla campaign against Bulgaria. In September 1944 the USSR declared war shortly after the formation of a pro-Western government in Sofia, and Soviet troops advanced unopposed while a BCP-controlled putsch overthrew the government. The Bulgarian army was mobilized to fight German troops as part of the Soviet war effort, while the BCP killed and imprisoned thousands of its opponents in an attempt to cleanse the country of potential anti-Soviet elements.

When Soviet troops left Bulgaria in 1947 the country had already become a one-party state. Its security services and army, foreign and internal politics, economy, and culture were dominated by Soviet advisers. Every facet of Bulgarian society was forcibly reshaped along Russian-Soviet lines. Destalinization after 1953 led to some relaxation of Soviet controls. While the other satellites all attempted to move away from the Soviet model, Bulgaria came to be perceived as the closest Soviet ally. Under the rule of Todor Zhivkov (1954–1989), the Bulgarian elite enjoyed unique and unparalleled access to Soviet decision-making institutions, Soviet resources, and Soviet society in general. Compared with other European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Bul-

garian economy had grown most dependent on the Soviet, with the USSR accounting for more than half of overall Bulgarian trade throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

Glasnost gave a major boost to the creation of a small but vocal pro-democracy movement in Bulgaria in 1988 and 1989. In November 1989 Zhivkov was removed with Soviet connivance, which ushered in the era of multiparty politics in Bulgaria.

After the collapse of the COMECON, the Warsaw Pact, and the USSR in 1991, bilateral trade was limited largely to Russian oil and gas exports to Bulgaria, and political contacts became episodic. Boris Yeltsin visited Bulgaria in August 1992, and Vladimir Putin did so in March 2003.

See also: BALKAN WARS; BULGARIANS; COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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KYRIL DREZOV

BUND, JEWISH

The term *Bund* is an abbreviation of *der algemeyner yidisher arbeter bund in rusland un poyln* and refers to the General Jewish Labor Union in Russia and Poland (after 1901 the name added Lithuania to Poland and Russia). Founded in Vilna in 1897 by a group of Jewish Social Democrats, it was one of the forces behind the establishment of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP) in Minsk

in 1898. The Bund was an integral part of the RSDWP in the Russian Empire until it split from the party in 1903, rejoining it in 1906. The Bund pioneered Jewish political activism in the Russian Empire, while making important contributions to the development of a modern, secular Jewish culture in eastern Europe.

The movement originated among russified Jewish intellectuals, the Vilna Group, who were well-grounded in the theories of social democracy circulating in the Russian Empire—including Poland—in the 1890s. As convinced and enthusiastic cosmopolitans, they did not seek to create a specifically Jewish movement. Nor were the masses of Jewish artisans seen as a suitable substitute for an industrial proletariat. Nonetheless, on the Russian model, a few activists founded circles that sought to provide a general and political education for artisans, and to transform them into revolutionary activists. In 1894 the publication of two influential pamphlets, Shmuel Gozhansky's *Letter to Agitators* and Arkady Kremer's *On Agitation*, marked a major change in strategy, a move to mass agitation and the pursuit of specific economic goals. Given that the vernacular language of 97 percent of Jews in the Russian Empire was Yiddish, the move to mass agitation also marked a permanent commitment to the use and development of that language. The movement proved successful at attracting members by engaging in practical work, such as the creation of strike funds and self-help bodies, and publication of a Yiddish-language press and agitational materials. Over time the Bund ideology developed an emphasis on the importance of Yiddish as a central element in Jewish secular culture.

The Bund was formed in 1897 to unite scattered Jewish Social Democratic groups throughout the Pale of Settlement. It combined a central political organization led by professional revolutionaries and a mass movement directed to economic and political change. The organization produced a number of outstanding revolutionary leaders such as John Mill, Vladimir Medem, and Yuli Martov. In 1898 Bund members were major participants in the foundation of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party. At this meeting the Bund was granted full autonomy as to the geographical area of its activities, and a free hand to deal with the unique problems of the Jewish working class. This autonomy was ostensibly the cause of the split of the Bund from the RSDWP in 1903; in fact, criticism of the Bund's position was only a tactical maneuver on the part of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, in his effort to impose his ideological

agenda upon the RSDWP. There was thus no serious obstacle to the readmission of the Bund to the party in 1906.

One of the most successful elements of the Social Democratic movement in the Russian Empire (in terms of numbers and organizational abilities), the Bund was active in the creation of self-defense groups to resist pogroms. Its commitment to Yiddish did much to foster the development of Yiddish language, literature, and culture. The Bund developed a program that called for Jewish cultural autonomy in a democratic Russian Empire. After 1905 the Bund had to compete with a broad variety of Jewish political activities, including various forms of Zionism, which it sharply opposed. In October 1917 the Bund joined other moderate socialists to oppose the Bolshevik seizure of power, but the outbreak of pogroms in 1918 led many Bundists to welcome the protective role of the Red Army in the Pale. Bundists were a principle source of personnel recruited to the task of bringing the revolution to the Jewish street, through work in the Jewish Sections of the party and the state. The Bund was formally merged with the Russian Communist Party in 1921, while remaining a significant political force outside the Soviet Union, particularly in interwar Poland and the United States.

See also: JEWS; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY

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JOHN D. KLIER

BUNIN, IVAN ALEXEYEVICH

(1870–1953), poet and a master of prose fiction; the first Russian to win the Nobel prize for literature (1933).

Ivan Alexeyevich Bunin was the scion of an ancient aristocratic family from the heartland of Old Russia, the fertile countryside south of Moscow that produced so many writers from the gentry, among them Turgenev and Tolstoy. Much of his early fiction depicts the decline of the class he was born into. The celebratory tone of “Antonov’s Apples” (1900) makes it exceptional. However, it is purely commemorative, a song of praise for a way of life that has passed away. A lyric apprehension of nature is a central feature of Bunin’s art. Without religious faith or political commitment, he finds sustenance in a pantheistic attitude or in aristocratic stoicism. *The Village* (1909–1910), a naturalistic portrait, is more typically grim. Its subject is the barbarity and backwardness of Russian provincial life. “Dry Valley” (1911) is one of the supreme masterpieces of modern fiction. In this haunting novella Bunin’s lyrical reverie attains mythic and tragic resonance. Experience is filtered through layers of memory to evoke an image of the patriarchal estate of Old Russia as a landscape of violence and ruin.

Bunin fled Russia after the Revolution. He settled in Paris but traveled much. Separated from the Russian countryside he knows so intimately, he tends to become abstract—as in his exotic Eastern tales and much of his work in emigration. “Gentleman from San Francisco” is a masterpiece of his international style. A work of cold, jewel-like beauty, it may be read as a satire of bourgeois civilization or an allegory of the vanity of human ambition in the face of death—a favorite theme of Bunin’s, especially in his later years.

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MILTON EHRE

BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMIC

Each of the fifteen union republics had its own state apparatus, which paralleled that of the USSR as a whole. Although there was an elected government (the Supreme Soviet), the USSR Council of Ministers (*Sovet Ministrov SSSR*) conducted the business of gov-

ernment and constituted the highest oversight and executive body of the Soviet economic bureaucracy. It was composed of industrial ministers, chairmen of various state committees, and chairmen of agencies with ministerial status. The chairman of the Council occupied the most powerful position in the state apparatus, in effect the position of prime minister. At various stages of Soviet history, the head of the Communist Party of the USSR and the head of the state were the same person, but this was not always the case. The Council of Ministers was responsible for the enactment of the economic policies of the Communist Party by the state bureaucracy. The Council of Ministers was the main source of economic legislation; it coordinated and directed the activities of the state committees and the ministries, and supervised national economic planning, state budget, and credit and currency systems. It was authorized to reverse the decisions of ministries and make and execute the key resource-allocation decisions of the Soviet economy.

State economic committees were subordinated to the Council of Ministries of the USSR in the vast Soviet economic bureaucracy. Gosplan SSSR (the state planning committee) was the most important such agency, followed by more than forty state committees and agencies with ministerial status involved in economic affairs. Gosplan was subdivided into industrial departments, such as coal, ferrous metals, and machinery, and also had summary departments, such as finance, dealing with functions that crossed functional bodies. Gosplan was primarily responsible for executing the directives of the Council of Ministries and preparing annual operational plans for the industrial ministries with the participation of the latter. In addition, Gosplan was charged with the preparation of long-term (five-year) plans and longer-term perspective plans, which had more operational significance for investment planning. Gosplan had considerable responsibilities concerning supply planning and distribution of production (supplies) among ministries; it also arbitrated disputes among ministries or state committees and dealt with the problem of regional coordination.

Other state economic committees can be divided into three groups: Gosstab SSSR (the State Committee for Material Technical Supply), the financial state committees, and other functional state committees. Gosstab SSSR assisted Gosplan with the allocation of key material inputs (funded goods) to the ministries. The reforms of Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin of 1965 assumed, among other things, the assignment to Gosstab of the responsibility for the

allocation of producer goods. The ministerial supply organizations that had dominated the rationing of funded goods largely disappeared. The tasks of Gosstab included honing the operational details for detailed assortments of funded goods according to the general allocations outlined by Gosplan. Gosstab acted as an executive arm of Gosplan in matters of supply planning by maintaining actual warehouses and distribution points from which ministries drew materials. Gosstab applied itself to the creation of a wholesale trade system based on direct contracts between suppliers and users. By the late 1970s Gosstab handled only one-half of the value of rationed goods. Despite reform efforts, markets for producer goods failed to emerge, and the traditional system of material supplies and balances continued to function.

Two financial state committees, the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank (Gosbank), worked directly with enterprises, unlike other economic ministries. The Ministry of Finance monitored the use of credit by enterprises (working with the ministries), and was responsible for collections of revenues for the budget. At the local level, Ministry of Finance officials were interested primarily in collecting profit taxes, fixed payments, and capital charges from enterprises. The ministry played an important role in limiting managerial staff positions in state bureaucratic organizations and monitored compliance. Its responsibility for the development and execution of the state budget authorized the Ministry of Finance to give an independent opinion on the correspondence of economic plans to party economic policy—a right that Gosplan did not have.

Banking services were provided by Gosbank. This bank combined the services of a central bank and a commercial bank, but due to the absence of credit and capital markets Gosbank did not perform some traditional banking functions (open market operations, commercial paper transactions, and so forth). The major functions performed by Gosbank were to make short-term loans for working capital (supply of credits in accordance with credit requirements planned by the Ministry of Finance), to oversee enterprise plan fulfillment, to create money, and to monitor payments to the population as a center for all accounts. Therefore, Gosbank acted as the Finance Ministry's agent by booking the payments of taxes and fees to the state budget through Gosbank accounts while monitoring the flow of wage payments and credit through the economy.

The third group consisted of the State Committee on Prices (*Goskomsen*), the State Committee

on Labor and Wages (*Goskomtrud*), the State Committee on Science and Technology (*Goskomtekhnik*), the State Committee on Construction (*Gosstroy*), and the State Committee on Standards (*Goskomstandart*). These committees worked primarily in setting rules and establishing norms to be observed by the ministries and their subordinate enterprises. For those goods whose prices were to be set centrally, the State Committee on Prices set the prices; for other goods, it established rules for price setting by individual ministries. The State Committee on Labor and Wages established staffing norms and spelled out the rules of compensation and pay. The State Committee on Science and Technology set norms for scientific work and collaborated with Gosplan on science policy. The State Committee on Construction set standards for documenting construction projects and assisted Gosplan in site and project selection. The State Committee on Standards established rules for judging quality standards.

The main function of state committees was the generation of information useful to the Council of Ministries and Gosplan in making planning decisions. Their information on norms, technology, and quality standards gave Gosplan independent data useful for the evaluation of ministry requests. The rules developed by functional state committees helped the Council of Ministries and Gosplan to constrain the activities of the industrial ministries in order to limit their opportunistic behavior.

See also: COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY; GOSBANK; GOSPLAN; MINISTRIES, ECONOMIC

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PAUL R. GREGORY

BURYATS

The Buryats, originally a nomadic herding people of Mongolian stock, live in the South-central region of Siberia, in the territory bordering Mongolia, with Lake Baikal on its western border and Yablonovy Ridge to the east.

The Buryats are one of the nationality groups that was recognized by Soviet authorities and had an autonomous republic of its own, along with the Yakuts, the Ossetians, the Komi, Tuvinians, Kalmyks, and Karelians. Of the five republics located east of the Ural Mountains in Asian Russia, four—Buryatia, Gorno-Altay, Khakassia, and Tuva—extend along Russia's southern border with Mongolia. After the changes of the immediate post-Soviet years, the Buryat Republic, or Buryatia (formerly the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, or ASSR), continues to exist in the Russian Federation and is recognized in the Russian constitution passed in 1993. Besides the republics, the constitution recognizes ten autonomous regions, whose status, like that of the republics, is based on the presence of one or two ethnic groups. One of these regions is Aga Buryat, in which Buryats make up 55 percent of the population; the rest are Russians.

One of the largest ethnic groups in Siberia, the Buryats number well over one million in the early twenty-first century. In 1994 the population of the republic was about 1.1 million, of which more than one-third lived in the capital city, Ulan-Ude, which lies at the junction of the Uda and Selenga Rivers. Other cities in Buryatia include Babushkin, Kyakhta, and Zakamensk. All are situated by key rivers, including Barguzin, Upper Angara, and Vitim. Occupying 351,300 square kilometers (135,600 square miles), Buryatia has a continental climate and mountainous terrain, with nearly 70 percent of the region covered by forests.

Contrary to popular belief, Buryatia, and Siberia in general, is not a frozen wasteland year-round. The Siberian winter extends from November to March. In fact, the Siberian flag contains the colors green and white in equal horizontal proportions, with the green representing the Siberian taiga (the largest forest in the world) and the white representing the snow of winter. This taiga shelters vast amounts of minerals, plants, and wildlife, some of which are quite rare and valuable. Along with huge hydroelectric reserves, Buryatia possesses rich stores of bauxite, coal, gold, iron ore, uranium, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, tungsten, lignite, graphite, shales, mercury, tin, and rare earth minerals. The main industries derive from coal extraction, timber harvesting, textiles, sugar refining (from beets), engineering (including locomotive building and boat repairs), and food processing (mostly wheat and vegetables, such as potatoes).

The peoples of Siberia fall into three major ethno-linguistic groups: Altaic, Uralic, and Paleo-Siberian. The Buryats are one of the Altaic peoples, speakers of Turkic languages widely distributed in the middle Volga, the southern Ural Mountains, the North Caucasus, and above the Arctic Circle. Buryatia is the center of Buddhism in Russia. In fact, it is a place where three religions coexist peacefully: shamanism, Buddhism, and Orthodoxy. The Siberian region even gave rise to the languages from which the term shaman is derived. Shamanism is a belief in unseen gods, demons, and ancestral spirits responsive only to priests (shamans) with magical and healing powers.

The Buryats have not always been a part of Russia. From 1625 to 1627, the Russian Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich (first of the Romanov dynasty) sent an expedition to explore the Bratskaya land. This first boat expedition, underestimating the ferocity of the Angara River's rapids, never completed the journey, but nevertheless word spread that Buryat farmers were eager to trade. Later that century, the Russians—in search of wealth, furs, and gold—annexed and colonized the area. Some Buryats, dissatisfied with the proposed tsarist rule, fled to Mongolia, only to return to their native country saying, "Mongolia's Khan beheads culprits, but the Russian Tsar just flogs them. Let us become subjects of the Russian Tsar." In 1923 the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was founded, which consisted of the land on which Buryats lived. Fourteen years later, in 1937, Buryat was forced to split into three parts: the Buryat-Mongol ASSR, and the Irkutsk and the Chita provinces. That population division remains in the post-Soviet era. During the 1970s Soviet authorities forbade Buryats from teaching the Buryat language in schools. In 1996 the Russian Parliament finally passed a bill concerning the nationalities policy of the Russian Federation, allowing the Buryat language and native customs to be taught and preserved.

See also: ALTAI; KALMYKS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SIBERIA; TUVA AND TUVINIANS

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BUTASHEVICH-PETRASHEVSKY, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH

(1821–1866), Russian revolutionary democrat and political organizer.

A graduate of St. Petersburg University Law Department and a clerk at the Foreign Ministry, Mikhail Butashevich-Petrashevsky founded (in 1844) and headed a clandestine society of educated youth, from moderate to radical, that were opposed to Tsarism and serfdom. The "Petrashevskians" (*petrashevtsy*) held gatherings at his home on Fridays; their members included Fyodor Dostoyevsky, then an upstart story writer, and a future nationalist thinker Nikolai Danilevsky. Petrashevskians engaged in the study of Western democratic and socialist thought, in particular, the works of Charles Fourier, French utopian socialist and advocate of reorganizing society into a federation of grassroots communes (*falanstères*). Petrashevsky apparently organized a falanstère in his own estate, although it was subsequently destroyed by peasants. Petrashevskians authored and published two issues of *The Pocket Dictionary of Foreign Words* (1846, 1849) that included explanations for a number of terms from the "revolutionary" lexicon and was later used against them as incriminating evidence. They also disseminated the *Letter of Belinsky to Gogol* that was banned in Russia. Their circle is viewed as Russia's closest reflection of the revolutionary movements of 1848 in Western and Central Europe. In 1849, with the onset of political repression in Russia after the revolutions in Europe had been crushed, Petrashevsky was arrested together with other members of his circle. Most of them, except himself, pleaded guilty of anti-government activities, and all were sentenced to death, but the sentence was revoked by Nicholas I; the announcement was made at the last moment at the scene of the execution. For Petrashevsky, death penalty was replaced by a lifetime sentence to forced labor in a penal colony in Eastern Siberia. In 1856 he declined the pardon offered by Alexander II to political prisoners as part of the general amnesty.

See also: DANILEVSKY, NIKOLAI YAKOVLEVICH; DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; PETRASHEVTSY

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DMITRI GLINSKI

BYLINA

Oral epic song type.

The term *bylina* is a nineteenth-century scholarly innovation, although it is found with a different meaning (“true happening”) in the *Lay of Igor’s Campaign* and *Zadonshchina*. Folksingers generally called any such songs *starina* or *starinka* (song of olden times). Known first from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the bylinas were mainly collected in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth. They had survived on the margins of the Russian state: in the north, the Urals, parts of Siberia, and among cossacks in the south. Since true epics are relatively scarce in world folklore, the Russian repertoire is significant. It is also notable for its relative brevity (typically a few hundred lines) and native subjects and heroes.

Epic composition of some kind probably was practiced in early medieval times, as witness literary reflections in the *Lay of Igor’s Campaign*, *Zadonshchina*, passages of the *Destruction of Ryazan*, and the tale of Kozhemyaka in the *Primary Chronicle*. The first two of these would seem to indicate that epic singing started in princely courts and was performed by professional bards. But the bylina known to researchers it was performed by peasant singers of tales, both men and women. Most of the surviving examples are set in Kievan Rus in the time of a Prince Vladimir (unclear which one), often with the heroes anachronistically fighting Tatar armies, and this suggests that the songs originated in later centuries when Kiev as capital was only a vague memory and circumstances could be confused with those of the Tatar Yoke. Attempts have been made to attach certain of the exploits to historical events, but this remains doubtful. Rather, it seems that bylinas are fictions reflecting wish fulfillment pervasive in Russian folklore; with superhuman strength and prowess, native heroes always win against the steppe enemies, turning history upside down.

Being improvisational, performances differ according to the talents and tastes of performers. It is believed that early practitioners were professionals who chanted to the accompaniment of a stringed instrument, the *gusli*. In modern times the bylinas were often spoken or sung (the latter especially by cossacks). The bylina’s metrical principle is accentual: a fixed number of strong stresses (three or two) per line, usually with the last stress on the third from last syllable (marking the end of the line) and often with the first stress coming on the third syllable of the line. The number of weak syllables between stresses varies. Conventionally, extra syllables and words might be inserted in order to get the desired spacing of stresses.

Approximately one hundred subjects of the bylina are known. Scholars categorize the epic songs either chronologically (old and new) or by region (Kievan and Novgorodian). The older heroes (Volkh, Svyatogor) are called that because they appear to be connected with ancient myths. Characteristic Kievan heroes (bogatyrs) are Ilya Muromets, Dobrynya Nikitich, and Alyosha Popovich, while Dyuk Stepanovich is an aristocratic dandy and Sukhman a rare tragic hero. The few bylinas from Novgorod (Sadko, Vasily Buslayev) reflect the commercial interests of that merchant republic of the North.

Related to the bylinas as epic compositions are the so-called historical songs and spiritual songs.

See also: FOLK MUSIC; FOLKLORE; HISTORICAL SONGS; LAY OF IGOR’S CAMPAIGN; MUSIC; SKAZ; ZADONSHCHINA

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NORMAN W. INGHAM

BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF

Toward the end of the tenth century—the conventional date is 988—Prince Vladimir Svyatoslavich of Kiev made Christianity the official religion of his people, the Rus. In choosing his faith, he also had to choose between its two institutional structures—that of the Western (Latin) Church under the au-

thority of the pope in Rome, and that of the Eastern (Greek) Church under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople (Byzantium). Although the two churches were not formally in opposition at the time—the Great Schism occurred in 1054—nevertheless they had grown apart over the centuries, and each had developed its own distinctive features. Vladimir chose the Byzantine version, a decision with consequences at many levels. However, the nature and extent of Russia's Byzantine heritage has been controversial. Some have argued that, since Christianity was imported into Rus from Byzantium, the culture that grew therefrom cannot be said to have been merely influenced by Byzantium: it simply was Byzantine, a local development from and within the broader Byzantine tradition. Others, by contrast, stress the active nature of cultural borrowing—namely, the adoption and adaptation of selected elements of Byzantine culture to serve local needs and hence to develop a native culture that, while indebted to Byzantium in superficial aspects of form, was indigenous in substance and essence. Such are the crude extremes. The more productive discussion lies in the nuances between the two.

For seven hundred years from the official Conversion, high-status cultural expression among the East Slavs of Rus and then of Muscovy was almost entirely limited to the celebration, affirmation, and exposition of Christianity, and hence was almost entirely limited to the appropriate forms inherited—directly or indirectly—from Byzantium. In painting this was the age of the icon: not really art in the modern sense (as the product of an individual artist's imaginative creativity), but a devotional image, a true and correct likeness according to the approved prototypes. In architecture, public spaces were dominated by churches, whose basic design—most commonly a cross-in-square or domed cross layout—was Byzantine in origin. As for writing, 90 percent or more of all that was written, copied, and disseminated was ultimately derived from Church Slavonic texts translated from Greek. Over time, cultural production in all these media could of course acquire local features—in the development and composition of the full-height iconostasis, for example, or in the elaboration of roof-tiers, the onion-shaped dome, or in the robust styles of native chronicles—and local perceptions of such cultural production could vary widely. Overall, however, the Byzantine links were explicit, and Byzantium remained the acknowledged source of authoritative example and precedent.

A Byzantine churchman visiting Rus would thus have found part of the surroundings familiar; but still he would not have felt entirely at home. Outside the explicitly ecclesiastical, the Rus reception of Byzantine culture was more patchy. For example, Byzantium itself maintained a tradition of classical Greek learning, but there is little or no sign of any Rus interest in this before the late seventeenth century. Byzantium possessed a large corpus of written law. Church law (canon law) was in principal accepted by Rus together with Christianity, but in practice could be assimilated only gradually and partially through accommodation to local custom, while Byzantine civil law (derived from Roman law) seems to have made not made an impact. The Rus did not, therefore, accept Byzantine culture as a complete package. The borrowing was partial, selective, and thus in a sense non-Byzantine.

The continuing Rus reception of Byzantine culture in the later Middle Ages is somewhat paradoxical: as the visual elements (e.g., styles of painting and building) became progressively diluted through local developments, so the non-visual elements (e.g., ideas, ideology) were more assiduously adopted into official culture. The Muscovite State of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was more Byzantine in its structures than any of the earlier Rus principalities, in that it was a relatively unitary empire headed by an autocrat supported by a growing administrative bureaucracy. Moreover, since the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, it was self-consciously the only surviving Orthodox empire and thus could be projected as Byzantium's successor. Emblems of this new status were woven into the fabric of Muscovite self-presentation: in the formal adoption of the title of tsar for the ruler; in the establishment of a patriarchate in place of the old metropolitanate; in the construction of imperial genealogies linking the Muscovite dynasty with Imperial Rome; in tales of the transfer of imperial regalia from Byzantium to ancient Kiev; and in the articulation of the notion that Moscow was—in world-historical terms—the "third Rome."

Ostensibly the reforms of Peter the Great brought about a decisive break. Peter's new capital was a radical statement of non-Byzantinism in the physical environment, and Western Europe became the new model for prestigious cultural production, whether in architecture and painting or in writing, printing, performing, and philosophizing. The Church continued to produce icons and profess the

ancient faith, but it no longer enjoyed its virtual monopoly of the high-status media. However, does this necessarily mean that the Byzantine component of Russian culture disappeared? Perhaps, and perhaps not. The question of the Byzantine legacy in post-Petrine Russia is periodically controversial. Some have regarded Russian Byzantinism as a feature only of the remote past, while others have seen it as pervasive even after Peter (whether in true Russian spirituality or, by contrast, in the long continuation of autocratic, authoritarian theocratic forms of government). Such, once more, are the two poles of a debate that can have no objective resolution, since the terms of reference are more ideological than historical. Yet through such debates Russia's Byzantine heritage remains very much alive, at least as an issue for discussion, after more than a thousand years.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; ORTHODOXY; PETER I

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SIMON FRANKLIN

CABARET

Cabaret came late to Russia, but once the French, German, and Swiss culture spread eastward in the first decade of the twentieth century, a uniquely Russian form took root, later influencing European cabarets. While Russian theater is internationally renowned—as just the names Chekhov and Stanislavsky confirm—the theatrical presentations in cabarets are less so, despite the brilliance of the poets and performers involved.

The French word *cabaret* originally meant two things: a plebeian pub or wine-house, and a type of tray that held a variety of different foods or drinks. By its generic meaning a cabaret is an intimate night spot where audiences enjoy alcoholic drinks while listening to singers and stand-up comics. While sophisticates quibble over precise definitions, most will agree on the cabaret's essential elements. A cabaret is performed usually in a small room where the audience sits around small tables, and where stars and tyros alike face no restrictions on the type of music or genre or combinations thereof, can experiment with *avant-garde* material never before performed, and can “personally” interact with the audience. The cabaret removes the “fourth wall” between artist and audience, thus heightening the synergy between the two. Rodolphe Salis—a failed artist turned tavern keeper—established the first *cabaret artistique* called *Le Chat Noir* (*The Black Cat*) in Paris, where writers, artists, and composers could entertain each other with their latest poems and songs in a Montmartre pub.

Cabarets soon mushroomed across Europe, its Swiss and Austrian varieties influencing Russian artists directly. Russian emigrés performed, for example, in balalaika bands at the Café Voltaire, founded by Hugo Ball in 1916 in Zürich, Switzerland. The influence of Vienna-based cabarets such as *Die Fledermaus* (*The Bat*) is reflected in the name of the first Russia cabaret: “Bat.”

This tiny theater was opened on February 29, 1908, by Nikita Baliev, an actor with the Moscow Art Theater (MKhAT) in tune with the prevailing mood in Russia. In the years following the revolution of 1905, Russian intellectual life shifted from the insulated world of the *salon* to the zesty world of the cabaret, the *balagan* (show), and the circus. New political and social concerns compelled the theater to bring art to the masses. Operating perhaps as the *alter ego*—or, in Freudian terms, the *id*—of MkhAT, the “Bat” served as a night spot for



actors to unwind after performances, mocking the seriousness of Stanislavsky's method. This cabaret originated from the traditional "cabbage parties" (*kapustniki*) preceding Lent (which in imperial Russia involved a period of forced abstinence both from theatrical diversion as well as voluntary abstinence from meat). Housed in a cellar near Red Square, the "Bat" had by 1915 become the focal point of Moscow night life and remained so until its closure in 1919.

While the format of the Russian cabaret—a confined stage in a small restaurant providing amusement through variety sequences—owed much to Western models, the uniqueness of the shows can be attributed to the individuality of Nikita Baliev and indigenous Russian folk culture. In one show entitled *Life's Metamorphoses*, Baliev installed red lamps under the tables that blinked in time with the music. In another show, he asked everyone to sing "Akh, akh, ekh, im!"—to impersonate someone sneezing. As Teffi (pseudonym of Nadezhda Buchinskaya), a composer for the "Bat" recalled, "Everything was the invention of one man—Nikita Baliev. He asserted his individuality so totally that assistants would only hinder him. He was a real sorcerer."

The Russian cabaret also flourished due to its links with the conventions of the indigenous folk theater—the *balagan*, the *skomorokhi* (traveling buffoons), and the *narodnoye gulyanie* (popular promenading). It incorporated the folk theater's elements—clowning, quick repartee, the *plyaska* (Russian dance), and brisk sequence of numbers. Baliev employed key writers and producers, including Leonid Andreyev, Andrei Bely, Valery Bryusov, Sergei Gorodetsky, Alexei Tolstoy, Vasily Luzhsky, Vsevolod Meyerhold, Ivan Moskvina, Boris Sadovskoi, and Tatiana Shchepkina-Kupernik. Famous artists performed at the "Bat," including Fyodor Chalyapin, Leonid Sobinov, and Konstantin Stanislavsky. In 1916–1918 Kasian Goleizovsky, the great Constructivist balletmaster of the 1920s, directed performances.

Like most visionaries ahead of their time in the Soviet Union, however, Baliev was arrested. When released in 1919 after five days of confinement, he fled to Paris with the renamed *Chauve-Souris* ("bat" in French), which toured Europe and the United States extensively. In 1922 the Baliev Company moved to New York, where Baliev entertained enthusiastic audiences until his death in 1936. Baliev and the "Bat" inspired many imitations, most no-

tably the "Blue Bird" (*Der Blaue Vogel*), founded in Berlin by the actor Yasha Yuzhny in 1920.

See also: CIRCUS; FOLK MUSIC; STANISLAVSKY, KONSTANTIN; THEATER

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CABINET OF MINISTERS, IMPERIAL

Often called the Council of Ministers, this body was convened by Alexander II in 1857 to coordinate legislative proposals from individual ministers. It was chaired by the tsar himself and met irregularly thereafter to consider various of Alexander II's "Great Reforms." In 1881, he submitted to it Count Loris-Melikov's plan for semiconstitutional government, but revolutionaries assassinated the tsar before action could be taken. His successor, Alexander III, determined to reestablish full autocratic rule, did not convene the council, and it played no significant role in the early years of Nicholas II's reign.

Early in the Revolution of 1905 reformers persuaded Nicholas II to revive the Council of Ministers. From February to August 1905 it worked on various projects for administrative and constitutional change. On October 19, two days after publication of the October Manifesto, an imperial decree established a much revamped Council of Ministers, which was structured along lines recommended by Count Sergei Witte, principal architect of the manifesto and its accompanying reforms. The tsar retained the right to name ministers of war, the navy,

foreign affairs, and the imperial court, but a new council chairman appointed, subject to the tsar's approval, the remaining ministers and was empowered to coordinate and supervise the activities of all ministries. The reorganized council was to meet regularly and to review all legislative proposals before their submission to the proposed Duma. Although it resembled a Western-style cabinet in some respects, the new Council of Ministers was not responsible to the about-to-be-formed legislative body and remained heavily dependent on the tsar's support.

Moreover, Count Witte, as council chairman or prime minister, was unable to implement fully the new structure. Several ministers continued to report directly to the tsar. Nevertheless, the council survived Witte's dismissal by Nicholas II in spring 1906, and its power was soon broadened to include consideration of legislation when the Duma was not in session. The Council of Ministers remained the chief executive organ under the tsar until his overthrow in the February Revolution of 1917.

See also: ALEXANDER II; ALEXANDER III; GREAT REFORMS; NICHOLAS II; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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CABINET OF MINISTERS, SOVIET

The Cabinet of Ministers was the institutional successor to the Council of Ministers, the chief policy-making body of the Soviet government. It existed for only a brief period during the chaotic final year of Communist rule.

In the late Soviet period, the Council of Ministers had grown into an unwieldy executive body with well over one hundred members, who sat atop a bureaucratic phalanx of government agencies. Moreover, the Council of Ministers, having voted to reject the Five-Hundred Day Plan, had emerged as a political obstacle to Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to reform the centrally planned economy.

In October 1990, the revitalized Supreme Soviet granted President Mikhail Gorbachev extra legislative powers to undertake a transition to a market economy. In November 1990, as part of a larger package of political institutional reforms, the Council of Ministers was dissolved by order of the Supreme Soviet, and the Cabinet of Ministers was created in its place. The Cabinet of Ministers was smaller than its predecessor and more focused on economic policy. The body was directly subordinate to the president, who nominated its chairman and initiated legislation with the consent of the Supreme Soviet. The first and only chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers was Valentin Pavlov, a politically conservative former finance minister.

As events turned radical in 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers began to act independently from President Gorbachev in an effort to stabilize and secure the Soviet regime. In March, the cabinet issued a ban on public demonstrations in Moscow; this order was promptly defied by the Russian democratic movement. In the summer, the Cabinet of Ministers became entangled in a power struggle with President Gorbachev over control of the economic policy agenda. Finally, Prime Minister Pavlov and the cabinet allied with the ill-fated August coup. In response, Russian President Boris Yeltsin demanded the dismissal of the mutinous ministers. In September, Gorbachev was forced to comply and sacked his entire government. The Cabinet of Ministers was replaced by an interim body, the Inter-Republican Economic Committee, which itself ceased to exist following the Soviet collapse in December 1991.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PAVLOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH

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CADETS *See* CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

CADRES POLICY

The term *cadres policy* refers to the selection and training of key CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) personnel. Its importance is indicated by the famous phrase used by Stalin in 1935,

"Cadres decide everything." Generally speaking, cadres were selected in theory according to their degree of loyalty to the CPSU and their efficiency in performing the tasks assigned to them. The appointment of cadres at a senior level in the CPSU hierarchy was made or confirmed by the cadres department of the appropriate Party committee. Scholars have raised questions about the degree to which the cadres selected at any given time by the Soviet leadership were "representative" of the population as a whole or of the constituency that they represented. Other issues raised include the extent to which cadres were adequately trained or had the appropriate expertise. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the mid-1980s, accusations were being made that many key Party members, who constituted the leadership at all levels within the CPSU structure, had become corrupt during Leonid Brezhnev's era of stagnation. Hence a new cadres policy was necessary in order to weed out the careerists and replace them with others worthy of acting as a genuine cadre to ensure that the interests of the Party, society, and the people coincided. This led to widespread anti-corruption campaigns against the Party from 1986 onward throughout the former USSR. Famous examples include the arrest of seven Uzbek regional first secretaries in March 1988 and the trial of Brezhnev's son-in-law, Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, the former Interior Minister, in 1989.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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CALENDAR

In Russia, the calendar has been used not only to mark the passage of time, but also to reinforce ideological and theological positions. Until January 31, 1918, Russia used the Julian calendar, while Europe used the Gregorian calendar. As a result, Russian dates lagged behind those associated with contemporary events. In the nineteenth century, Russia

was twelve days behind, or later than, the West; in the twentieth century it was thirteen days behind. Because of the difference in calendars, the Revolution of October 25, 1917, was commemorated on November 7. To minimize confusion, Russian writers would indicate their dating system by adding the abbreviation "O.S." (Old Style) or "N.S." (New Style) to their letters, documents, and diary entries.

The Julian Calendar has its origins with Julius Caesar and came into use in 45 B.C.E. The Julian Calendar, however, rounded the number of days in a year (365 days, 6 hours), an arithmetic convenience that eventually accumulated a significant discrepancy with astronomical readings (365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes, 46 seconds). To remedy this difference, Pope Gregory XIII introduced a more accurate system, the Gregorian Calendar, in 1582.

During these years Russia had used the Byzantine calendar, which numbered the years from the creation of the world, not the birth of Christ, and began each new year on September 1. (According to this system, the year 7208 began on September 1, 1699.) As part of his Westernization plan, Peter the Great studied alternative systems. Although the Gregorian Calendar was becoming predominant in Catholic Europe at the time, Peter chose to retain the Julian system of counting days and months, not wanting Orthodox Russia to be tainted by the "Catholic" Gregorian system. But he introduced the numbering of years from the birth of Christ. Russia's new calendar started on January 1, 1700, not September 1. Opponents protested that Peter had changed "God's Time" by beginning another new century, for Russians had celebrated the year 7000 eight years earlier.

Russians also used calendars to select names for their children. The Russian Orthodox Church assigned each saint its own specific feast day, and calendars were routinely printed with that information, along with other appropriate names. During the imperial era, parents would often choose their child's name based on the saints designated for the birth date.

Russia continued to use the Julian calendar until 1918, when the Bolshevik government made the switch to the Gregorian system. The Russian Orthodox Church, however, continued to use the Julian system, making Russian Christmas fall on January 7. The Bolsheviks eliminated some confusion by making New Year's Day, January 1, a major secular holiday, complete with Christmas-like traditions such as decorated evergreen trees and a kindly Grandfather Frost who gives presents to

children. Christmas was again celebrated in the post-communist era, in both December and January, but New Year's remained a popular holiday.

See also: OLD STYLE

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CANTONISTS

The cantonist system in the Russian Empire evolved from bureaucratic attempts to combine a solution to two unrelated problems: welfare provision for the families of common soldiers and sailors, and the dearth of trained personnel to meet the multifarious needs of the modernizing imperial state. The evolution of this category was part of the development of social estates (*sosloviia*) in Russia, where membership was tied to service obligations.

The recruitment of peasant men into the Russian armed forces frequently plunged their wives (the *soldatka*) and children into destitution. The state sought to remedy this situation by creating the category of "soldiers' children" (*soldatskie deti*) in 1719. These children were removed from the status of serfs, and assigned to the "military domain," with the expectation that they would eventually serve in the military. Before beginning active service, they were assigned to schools and training institutions attached to military garrisons in order to receive an education of use to the armed forces. The training was provided for children between the ages of seven and fifteen, with an additional three years of advanced training for pupils who proved to be especially talented. They were educated in basic literacy before being given specialized artisan training, musical, or medical instruction, or the numerous other skills required by the military. The most able were given advanced training in fields such as engineering and architecture. Some children resided with their parents while receiving schooling, others were dispatched to training courses far away from home. Upon completion of their education, the soldiers' children were assigned to the military or other branches of state service. Upon completion of their term of service, which ranged from fifteen to twenty-five years, they were given the status of state peasants, or were allowed to choose an appropriate branch of state service.

The garrison schools were permitted to admit, as a welfare measure, the children of other groups, such as impoverished gentry. In 1798 the schools were renamed the "Military Orphanage" (*VoennoSirotskie Otdeleniya*), with 16,400 students. In 1805, the students were renamed "cantonists" (*kantonisty*), and reorganized into battalions. In 1824, the schools were placed under the supervision of the Department of Military Colonies, then headed by Count Alexei Arakcheyev. The cantonist system continued to grow, and to admit diverse social elements under Nicholas I. In 1856, Alexander II freed cantonists from the military domain, and the schools were gradually phased out.

The cantonist system never fulfilled its objectives. Its welfare obligations overwhelmed resources, and it never found training space for more than a tenth of the eligible children. The cantonist battalions themselves became notorious as "stick academies," marked by brutality and child abuse, high mortality rates, and ineffective educational methods. The bureaucracy failed to adequately oversee the category of soldiers' children, who were often hidden in other social estates.

In 1827, the legislation obliging Jews in the Pale of Settlement to provide military recruits permitted communities to provide children for the cantonist battalions in lieu of adult recruits. The fate of these Jewish cantonists was especially harsh. Children were immediately removed from their parents, and often were subjected to brutal measures designed to convert them to Russian Orthodoxy. The provision of child recruits by the Jewish leadership did much to fatally undermine their authority within the community.

See also: EDUCATION; JEWS; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA

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JOHN D. KLIER

CAPITALISM

Max Weber offered a value-free definition of modern capitalism: an economic system based on rational accounting for business, separate from the

personal finances of an individual or family; a free market open to persons of any social status; the application of advanced technology, especially in large enterprises that required significant amounts of invested capital; a legal system providing equal treatment under the law, without arbitrary exceptions, and ensuring protection of the right of private property; a flexible labor market free of impediments to social mobility, such as slavery and serfdom, and of legal and institutional restrictions, such as minimum-wage laws and labor unions; and the public sale of shares to amass significant amounts of investment capital. Although no economy in world history has ever attained perfection in any of these six dimensions, social science can determine the extent to which economic institutions in a given geographical and historical situation approached this abstract "ideal type."

The institutions of modern capitalism—corporations, exchanges, and trade associations—evolved in Europe from the High Middle Ages (1000–1300) onward. Corporations eventually appeared in the Russian Empire in the reign of Peter I, and by the late nineteenth century the tsarist government had permitted the establishment of exchanges and trade associations. However, the vast size of the country, its location on the eastern periphery of Europe, the low level of urbanization, the persistence of serfdom until 1861, and the late introduction of railroads and steamship lines slowed the diffusion of capitalist institutions throughout the country.

The autocratic government, which had survived for centuries by wringing service obligations from every stratum of society, viewed capitalist enterprise with ambivalence. Although it recognized the military benefits of large-scale industrial activity and welcomed the new source of taxation represented by capitalist enterprise, it refused to establish legal norms, such as the protection of property rights and equality before the law, that would have legitimized the free play of market forces and encouraged long-term, rational calculation. As Finance Minister Yegor F. Kankrin wrote in March 1836: "It is better to reject ten companies that fall short of perfection than to allow one to bring harm to the public and the enterprise itself." Every emperor from Peter I onward regarded the principle of a state based on the rule of law (*Rechtsstaat*; in Russian, *pravovoye gosudarstvo*) as a fatal threat to autocratic power and to the integrity of the unity of the multinational Russian Empire.

The relatively weak development of capitalist institutions in Russia, their geographical concentration in the largest cities of the empire, and the prominence of foreigners and members of minority ethnic groups (Germans, Poles, Armenians, and Jews, in that order) in corporate enterprises led many tsarist bureaucrats, peasants, workers, and members of the intelligentsia to resent capitalism as an alien force. Accordingly, much of the anticapitalist rhetoric of radical parties in the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 reflected traditional Russian xenophobia as much as the socialist ideology.

See also: GUILDS; MERCHANTS; NATIONALISM IN THE TSARIST EMPIRE; RUSSIA COMPANY

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CARPATHO-RUSYNS

Carpatho-Rusyns (also known as Ruthenians or by the regional names Lemkos and Rusnaks) come from an area in the geographical center of the European continent. Their homeland, Carpathian Rus (Ruthenia), is located on the southern and northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains where the borders of Ukraine, Slovakia, and Poland meet. From the sixth and seventh centuries onward, Carpatho-Rusyns lived as a stateless people: first in the kingdoms of Hungary and Poland; then from the late eighteenth century to 1918 in the Austro-Hungarian Empire; from 1919 to 1939 in Czechoslovakia and Poland; during World War II in Hungary, Slovakia, and Nazi Germany; and from 1945 to 1989 in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Since the Revolution of 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union, most resided in Ukraine, Slovakia, and Poland, with smaller numbers in neigh-

boring Romania, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; in the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia; and in nearby eastern Croatia.

As a stateless people, Carpatho-Rusyns had to struggle to be recognized as a distinct group and to be accorded rights such as education in their own East Slavic language and preservation of their culture. As of the early twenty-first century, and in contrast to all other countries where Carpatho-Rusyns live, Ukraine did not recognize Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct group but rather simply as a branch of Ukrainians, and their language a dialect of Ukrainian.

It was only during the Soviet period (1945–1991) that the majority of Carpatho-Rusyns, that is, those in Ukraine’s Transcarpathian oblast, found themselves within the same state as Russians. It was also during this period that Russians from other parts of the Soviet Union emigrated to Transcarpathia where by the end of the Soviet era they numbered 49,500 (1989).

Reciprocal relations between Rusyns and Russians date from at least the early seventeenth century, when Church Slavonic religious books printed in Moscow and other cities under Russian imperial rule were sought by churches in Carpathian Rus. From the last decade of the eighteenth century several Carpatho-Rusyns were invited to the Russian Empire, including Mikhail Baludyansky, the first rector of St. Petersburg University; Ivan Orlai, chief physician to the tsarist court; and Yuri Venelin, Slavist and founder of Bulgarian studies in Russia. In the nineteenth century Russian panslavists showed increasing interest in the plight of “Russians beyond our borders,” that is, the Rusyns of Galicia and northeastern Hungary. Russian scholars and publicists (Nikolai Nadezhdin, Mikhail Pogodin, Vladimir Lamansky, Ivan Filevich, Alexei L. Petrov, Fyodor F. Aristov, among others) either traveled to Carpathian Rus or wrote about its culture, history, and plight under “foreign” Austro-Hungarian rule. On the eve of World War I, a Galician Russian Benevolent Society was created in St. Petersburg, and a Carpatho-Russian Liberation Society in Kiev, with the goal to assist the cultural and religious needs of the Carpatho-Rusyn population, as well as to keep the tsarist government informed about local conditions should the Russian Empire in the future be able to extend its borders up to and beyond the Carpathian Mountains.

The Carpatho-Rusyn secular and clerical intelligentsia was particularly supportive of contacts

with tsarist Russia. From the outset of the national awakening that began in full force after 1848, many Rusyn leaders actually believed that their people formed a branch of the Russian nationality, that their East Slavic speech represented dialects of Russian, and that literary Russian should be taught in Rusyn schools and used in publications intended for the group. The pro-Russian, or Russophile, trend in Carpatho-Rusyn national life was to continue at least until the 1950s. During the century after 1848, several Carpatho-Rusyn writers published their poetry and prose in Russian, all the while claiming they were a branch of the Russian nationality. Belorussian émigrés, including the “grandmother of the Russian Revolution” Yekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya and several Orthodox priests and hierarchs, settled in Carpatho-Rus during the 1920s and 1930s and helped to strengthen the local Russophile orientation. In turn, Carpatho-Rusyns who were sympathetic to Orthodoxy looked to tsarist Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church for assistance. Beginning in the 1890s a “return to Orthodoxy” movement had begun among Carpatho-Rusyn Greek Catholics/Uniates, and the new converts welcomed funds from the Russian Empire and training in tsarist seminaries before the Revolution and in Russian émigré religious institutions in central Europe after World War I.

Despite the decline of the Russophile national orientation among Carpatho-Rusyns during the second half of the twentieth century, some activists in the post-1989 Rusyn national movement, especially among Orthodox adherents, continued to look toward Russia as a source of moral support. This was reciprocated in part through organizations like the Society of Friends of Carpathian Rus established in Moscow in 1999.

See also: NATION AND NATIONALITY; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; PANSLAVISM; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SLAVOPHILES; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI

CATHEDRAL OF CHRIST THE SAVIOR

The Church of Christ the Savior has a three-phase history: construction, demolition, and reconstruction. In 1812, after the defeat of Napoleon's invading armies in the Fatherland War, Tsar Alexander I decreed that a church in the name of Christ the Savior be built in Moscow as a symbol of gratitude to God for the salvation of Russia from its foes. Early plans called for a church to be built on Sparrow Hills, but due to unsteady ground at the original location, Nicholas I designated a new site near the Kremlin in 1827. Construction of the church was completed under Alexander II, and the cathedral was consecrated in 1883, during the reign of Alexander III. Some of Russia's most prominent nineteenth-century artists and architects worked to bring the project to fruition.

Josef Stalin's Politburo decided to destroy the cathedral and replace it with an enormous Palace of Soviets, topped with a statue of Vladimir Lenin that would dwarf the United States' Statue of Liberty. In December 1931, the Church of Christ the Savior was lined with explosives and demolished; however, plans for the construction of a Palace of Soviets were never realized. The foundation became a huge, green swimming pool. The destruction of the Church of Christ the Savior followed in the spirit of the revolutionary iconoclasm of the late 1910s and early 1920s, when the Bolsheviks toppled symbols of old Russia. But the demolition of the cathedral was also part of an unprecedented alteration of Moscow's landscape, which included the destruction of other churches and the building of the Moscow Metro, overseen by First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee Lazar Kaganovich.

The process of resurrecting the demolished cathedral began in 1990 with an appeal from the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Russian government, requesting that permission be granted to rebuild the church on its original site. This project, headed by Patriarch Alexei II and Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, was completed in 1996, and the Church of Christ the Savior was consecrated in 2000.

See also: ALEXEI II, PATRIARCH; KAGANOVICH, LAZAR MOYSEYEVICH; LUZHOV, YURI MIKHAILOVICH; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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NICHOLAS GANSON

CATHEDRAL OF ST. BASIL

Located on Red Square, Moscow, the Cathedral of the Intercession on the Moat (the official name of the cathedral) was built for Tsar Ivan IV (1532–1584) between 1555 and 1561 to commemorate his capture of the Tatar stronghold of Kazan, which capitulated after a long siege on October 1 (O.S.) 1552, the feast of the Intercession or Protective Veil (*Pokrov*) of the Mother of God, the protector of the Russian land. The original red brick structure incor-



The colorful onion domes of St. Basil's Cathedral dominate Red Square. © CHARLES O'REAR/CORBIS

porated nine churches, mainly dedicated to feast days associated with the Kazan campaign. Construction began in 1555, but little else is known about the building process as few contemporary documents survive. Not until 1896 were the names of architects Barma and Posnik (also known as Barma and Posnik Yakovlev) discovered. The story that Tsar Ivan had them blinded after they completed their work—to prevent them from building something better for his enemies—is a legend. The church acquired its popular name after the addition in 1588 of a tenth chapel at the eastern end to house the relics of the holy fool St. Basil (Vasily) the Blessed.

The cathedral comprises the central “tent” church of the Intercession, which is surrounded by four octagonal pillar chapels dedicated to the Entry into Jerusalem (west), Saints Kiprian and Ustinia (north), the Holy Trinity (east), and St. Nicholas Velikoretsky (south). There are also four smaller rectangular chapels: St. Gregory of Armenia (northwest), St. Barlaam Khutynsky (southwest), St. Alexander Svirsky (southeast), and the Three Patriarchs (northeast). The remarkable regularity of the ground plan had led to the theory that it was based upon precise architectural drawings, rare in Muscovy, while the irregularly shaped towers were constructed by rule of thumb. They look even more varied when viewed from the outside, as a result of cupolas of different shapes and colors. The building as a whole is unique, though certain elements can be found in earlier Moscow churches (for example, the Ascension at Kolomenskoye [1532] and John the Baptist at Dyakovo [1547]).

The cathedral’s architecture, bizarre to Western eyes, is often attributed to Ivan IV, known as Ivan the Terrible. In fact, the inspiration almost certainly came from the head of the church, Metropolitan Macarius (or Makary), who created a complex sacred landscape to celebrate Muscovy’s status as both a global and a Christian empire: New Rome and New Jerusalem. It was a memorial-monument, to be viewed from the outside, often a focal point for open-air rituals (e.g., the Palm Sunday procession from the Kremlin), but unsuitable for congregational worship. Always a site for popular devotion, it fell into disfavor among the elite in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when Classical tastes branded its architecture “barbaric.” In 1812 Napoleon at first mistook it for a mosque and ordered its destruction. Its fortunes were reversed with the nineteenth-century taste for the Muscovite Revival or “Neo-Russian” style. It survived shelling in 1918, and in 1927 it opened as a museum. The

story that Stalin planned to demolish it may be apocryphal. In the 1990s it was reopened for worship but continued to function chiefly as a museum, probably the best known of all Russian buildings.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; IVAN IV; KREMLIN

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LINDSEY HUGHES

CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, KIEV

The Cathedral of St. Sophia, also known in the Orthodox tradition as “Divine Wisdom,” is one of the



The Cathedral of St. Sophia’s in Kiev contains numerous ornate frescoes and mosaics. © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

great churches of Eastern Christendom. Despite debate about the beginning date of its construction, there is general consensus that the work began in 1037 on the order of grand prince Yaroslav of Kiev and was completed in the 1050s. Although the exterior of the cathedral has been modified by reconstruction in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (it had fallen into ruin after the Mongol invasion in 1240), excavations in the 1930s, as well as the study of possible designs, have furnished what is considered a definitive version of the original. In its basic parts, the plan of Kiev's St. Sophia conforms to the cross-domed model. Each of its five aisles has an apse with an altar in the east. The central aisle, from the west entrance to the east, is twice the width of the flanking aisles. This proportion is repeated in the transept aisle that defines the cathedral's main north-south axis.

The focal point of the exterior is the main cupola, elevated on a high cylinder ("drum") over the central crossing and surrounded by twelve cupolas arranged in descending order. The thick *opus mixtum* walls (composed of narrow brick and a mortar of lime and crushed brick) are flanked by two arcaded galleries on the north, south, and west facades, and by choir galleries on the interior. Thus the elevated windows of the cylinders beneath the cupolas are the main source of natural light for the interior space. The interior walls of the main cupola and apse are richly decorated with mosaics. The rest of the interior walls contain frescoes that portray saints as well as members of Yaroslav's family.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, NOVGOROD; KIEVAN RUS; ORTHODOXY; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, NOVGOROD

The oldest and most imposing surviving monument in Novgorod is the Cathedral of St. Sophia (also known in the Orthodox tradition as "Divine Wis-



Bronze doors at the church of St. Sophia at Novgorod.

dom"), built between 1045 and 1050 and located in the *detinets* (citadel) on the west bank of the Volkhov River. The cathedral was commissioned by the prince of Novgorod, Vladimir Yaroslavich; by his father, Yaroslav the Wise (whose own Sophia Cathedral in Kiev was entering its final construction phase); and by Archbishop Luka of Novgorod. Because masonry construction was largely unknown in Novgorod before the middle of the eleventh century, a cathedral of such size and complexity could only have been constructed under the supervision of imported master builders, presumably from Kiev. The basic material for the construction of the walls and the piers, however, was obtained in the Novgorod: fieldstone and undressed blocks of limestone set in a mortar of crushed brick and lime.

The cathedral has five aisles for the main structure, with enclosed galleries attached to the north, west, and south facades. The Novgorod Sophia is smaller than its Kievan counterpart, yet the two

cathedrals are of approximately the same height. Therein lies an explanation for the much sharper sense of vertical development in the Novgorod cathedral.

Novgorod chronicles indicate that the interior was painted with frescoes over a period of several decades. Fragments of eleventh-century work have been uncovered, as well as early twelfth-century frescoes. Most of the original painting of the interior has long since vanished under centuries of renovations. Although small areas of the interior had mosaic decorations, there were no mosaics comparable to those in Kiev. The exterior facade above the west portal also displays frescoes, but the most distinctive element is the portal itself, with its magnificent bronze Sigtuna Doors, produced in Magdeburg in the 1050s and taken from the Varangian fortress of Sigtuna by Novgorod raiders in 1117.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, KIEV; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VLADIMIR YAROSLAVICH; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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CATHEDRAL OF THE ARCHANGEL

The Cathedral of the Archangel Mikhail, in the Moscow Kremlin, served as the mausoleum of the Muscovite grand princes and tsars until the end of the seventeenth century. The present building (built 1505–1509) was commissioned by Tsar Ivan III (reigned 1462–1505) to replace a fourteenth-century church. The architect was Alvise Lamberti de Montagnano, an Italian sculptor from Venice, known in Russia as Alevizo the New. His design combined a traditional Russian Orthodox five-domed structure with Renaissance decorative features such as pilasters with Corinthian capitals and scallop-shell motifs, which influenced later Russian architects. The cathedral contains the tombs of most of the Muscovite grand princes and tsars from Ivan I (reigned 1325–1341) to Ivan V (reigned

1682–1696), forty-six in all. In addition, shrines contain the relics of St. Dmitry (son of Ivan IV, died 1591) and St. Mikhail of Chernigov (d. 1246). Ivan IV (r. 1533–1584) is buried behind the iconostasis. The present bronze casings were added to the seventeenth-century sarcophagi in 1906. The frescoes on walls, ceilings, and pillars, mainly dating from the mid-seventeenth century, include iconic images of Russian princes and tsars and relate the military exploits of the warrior Archangel Mikhail, keeper of the gates of heaven. His icon was commissioned to celebrate the Russian victory at Kulikovo Pole in 1380. The cycle celebrates Moscow's rulers as successors to the kings of Israel, as God's representatives fighting evil on earth, and as patrons of Russia's ruling dynasty in heaven.

From the 1720s onward, Peter I's Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul in St. Petersburg became the new imperial mausoleum. Of the later Romanovs, only Peter II (r. 1727–1730) was buried in the Cathedral of the Archangel. However, the imperial family continued to pay their respects at their ancestors' tombs after coronations and on other major state occasions.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; CATHEDRAL OF ST. BASIL; CATHEDRAL OF THE DORMITION; KREMLIN.

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CATHEDRAL OF THE DORMITION

The first Kremlin Dormition cathedral, a simple one-domed masonry structure, was built by Prince Ivan I Danilovich of Moscow in 1327 as the seat of the head of the Russian Orthodox church, Metropolitan Peter. In 1472 Metropolitan Filipp of Moscow decided to replace the old church, laying the foundation stone with Grand Prince Ivan III (r. 1462–1505), but in 1474 the new building was destroyed by an earth tremor before it was completed. Ivan then hired the Italian architect Aristotele Fioravanti, ordering him to model his church on the thirteenth-century Dormition cathedral in Vladimir, in the belief that the prototype was designed by Mary

herself. Fioravanti took the traditional five-domed structure, rounded bays, and decorative arcading, but added Renaissance proportions and engineering, “according to his own cunning skill,” as a chronicle related, “not in the manner of Muscovite builders.” The church became the model for a number of other important cathedral and monastery churches, for example in the Novodevichy convent and the Trinity–St. Sergius monastery.

The first frescoes were painted in 1481 to 1515 and restored several times “in the old manner” in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. The complex cycles allude to the unity of the Russian land, the celebration of its saints and the history of the cathedral itself, as well as the life and veneration of Christ and the Mother of God. The icons on the lower tier of the iconostasis (altar screen), the most famous of which was the twelfth-century Byzantine “Vladimir” icon of the Mother of God, also referred to the gathering of the Russian lands and the transfer of sacred authority to Moscow from Jerusalem, Byzantium, and Kiev, as did the so-called Throne of Monomachus, made for Ivan IV in 1551, the carvings on which depict scenes of the Byzantine emperor Constantine IX Monomachus presenting imperial regalia to Prince Vladimir of Kiev (1113–1125).

In February 1498 the cathedral saw Ivan III’s grandson Dmitry crowned as heir. From 1547, when Ivan IV was crowned there, it was the venue for the coronations of all the Russian tsars and, from the eighteenth century, the emperors and empresses. It also saw the investitures and most of the burials of the metropolitans and patriarchs, up to and including the last patriarch Adrian (died 1700). Major repair work followed damage caused by the Poles in 1612 and Napoleon’s men in 1812. The cathedral was particularly revered by Nicholas II, in preparation for whose coronation in 1896 a major restoration was carried out. Late tsarist official guides to the cathedral underlined the belief that the formation of the Russian Empire was sanctioned by God and symbolized in the cathedral’s history and its holy objects (e.g. a piece of the robe of Our Lord and a nail from the Cross). In Soviet times it became a museum, but since the 1990s it has been used intermittently for important services.

See also: IVAN I; IVAN III; IVAN IV; NICHOLAS II

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CATHERINE I

(c. 1686–1727) Yekaterina Akexeyevna, born Martha Skavronska(ya), the second wife of Peter I and empress of Russia from February 8, 1725 to May 17, 1727.

Martha Skavronskaya’s background, nationality, and original religious affiliation are still subject to debate. She encountered the Russian army in Livonia in the summer of 1702, when she was working as a servant, and apparently became the mistress first of a field marshal, then of Peter I’s favorite, Alexander Menshikov, then of Peter himself. By 1704 she was an established fixture in the royal entourage. There were unconfirmed rumors of a secret marriage in 1707, but only in 1711, prior to his departure for war against Turkey, did Peter make Catherine his consort. Their public wedding took place in February 1712 in St. Petersburg. The marriage was deplored by traditionalists, because Peter’s first wife was still alive and Catherine was a foreigner. It is unclear precisely when she converted to Orthodoxy and took the name Catherine.

Catherine established her own patronage networks at court, where she was closely allied with Menshikov, arranging the marriages of elite women, interceding with Peter on behalf of petitioners, and dispensing charity. Peter provided her with a western-style court and in 1714 introduced the Order of St. Catherine for distinguished women and made her the first recipient, in recognition of her courage at the Battle of Pruth in 1711. In May 1724, in a lavish ceremony in the Moscow Kremlin, he crowned her as his consort. In November, however, relations were soured by the arrest and execution of Catherine’s chamberlain Willem Mons on charges of corruption, who was also reputed to be her lover. Despite issuing a new Law on Succession (1722), Peter died in 1725 without naming a successor. It suited many leading men to assume that Catherine would have been his choice. Her supporters argued that not only would she rule in Peter’s spirit, but she had actually been “created” by him. She was the all-loving Mother, caring for orphaned Russia. Such rhetoric won the support of the guards.

Catherine's was a remarkable success story. Not only did she manage, with Peter's help, to invent a new identity as empress-consort, but her short reign also illustrates how the autocracy could continue to operate successfully under an undistinguished female ruler. Her gender proved to be an advantage, for the last thing the men close to the throne wanted was another Peter. The new six-man Supreme Privy Council under Menshikov dismantled some of Peter's unsuccessful experiments in provincial government, downsized the army and navy, and reduced the poll tax. In 1726 an alliance with Austria formed the cornerstone of Russian diplomacy for decades to come. Peter's plans for an Academy of Sciences were implemented, and western culture remained central for the elite.

Catherine bore Peter probably ten children in all, but only two survived into adulthood, Anna (1708–1729) and Elizabeth (1709–1762). Catherine would have preferred to nominate one of them as her successor, but Menshikov persuaded her to name Peter's grandson, who succeeded her as Peter II in May 1727.

See also: MENSHIKOV, ALEXANDER DANILOVICH; PETER I; PETER II

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LINDSEY HUGHES

CATHERINE II

(1729–1796) Yekaterina Alexeyevna or "Catherine the Great," Empress of Russia from 1762–1796.

Recognized worldwide as a historical figure, Catherine the Great earned legendary status for three centuries. Her political ambition prompted the overthrow and subsequent murder of her husband, Emperor Peter III (1728–1762). Whatever her actual complicity, his death branded her an accessory after the fact. Thus she labored to build legitimacy as autocratrix (independent ruler) of the expansive Russian Empire. When her reign proved long, extravagant praise of her character and im-

pect overshadowed accusation. An outsider adept at charming Russian society, she projects a powerful presence in history. Most associate her with all significant events and trends in Russia's expanding world role. Though she always rejected the appellation "the Great," it endured.

Catherine fostered positive concepts of her life by composing multiple autobiographical portrayals over five decades. None of the different drafts treated her reign directly, but all implicitly justified her fitness to rule. Various versions have been translated and often reissued to reach audiences worldwide. Ironically, the first published version was issued in 1859 by Russian radicals in London to embarrass the Romanov dynasty. Trilingual in German, French, and Russian, Catherine spelled badly but read, wrote, spoke, and dictated easily and voluminously. Keen intelligence, prodigious memory, broad knowledge, and wit enlivened her conversational skill.

Born on April 21, 1729, in Stettin, Prussia, of Germanic parentage, the first daughter of Prince Christian August of Anhalt-Zerbst (1690–1747) and Princess Johanna Elizabeth of Holstein-Gottorp (1712–1760), Sophia Augusta Fredericka combined precocious physical, social, and intellectual traits with great energy and inquisitiveness. A home education through governesses and tutors enabled her by age ten to read voraciously and to converse incessantly with relatives and acquaintances at home and at other German courts that her assertive mother visited. At the court of Holstein-Gottorp in 1739 she met a second cousin, Prince Karl Peter Ulrich, the orphaned grandson of Peter the Great who was brought to Russia in 1742 by his childless aunt, Empress Elizabeth; renamed Peter Fedorovich; and proclaimed heir apparent. Backed by Frederick the Great of Prussia, Sophia followed Peter to Russia in 1744, where she was converted to Orthodoxy and renamed Catherine. Their marriage in 1745 granted her access to the Russian throne. She was to supply a male heir—a daunting task in view of Peter's unstable personality, weak health, probable sterility, and impotence. When five years brought no pregnancy, Catherine was advised to beget an heir with a married Russian courtier, Sergei Saltykov (1726–1785). After two miscarriages she gave birth to Paul Petrovich on October 1, 1754. Presumably fathered by Saltykov, the baby was raised by Empress Elizabeth. Thenceforth Catherine enjoyed greater freedom to engage in court politics and romantic intrigue. In 1757 she bore a daughter by Polish aristocrat Stanislaus



Empress Catherine II in Russian costume. THE ART ARCHIVE/RUSSIAN HISTORICAL MUSEUM MOSCOW/DAGLI ORTI (A)

Poniatowski that only lived sixteen months. During her husband's short-lived reign in 1762 she gave birth to another son, Alexei Bobrinskoy, by Russian aristocrat Grigory Orlov.

Catherine quickly absorbed Russian culture. She mastered the language, customs, and history of the empire. An instinctive politician, she cultivated friendships among the court elite and select foreigners such as Sir Charles Hanbury Williams (who lent her money and political advice). Her certainty that factional alignments would change abruptly upon Elizabeth's death (as foretold by the exile of Chancellor Alexei Bestuzhev-Ryumin in 1758, the banishment abroad of Stanislaus Poniatowski, and her husband's hostility) fueled her motivation to form new alliances. When Elizabeth died suddenly on January 5, 1762, Catherine was pregnant by Orlov. Their partisans were unprepared to contest the throne with the new emperor, Peter III, who undermined his own authority, alienating the Guards regiments, the Orthodox Church, and Russian patriots, through inept policies such as his withdrawal from war against Prussia and declara-

tion of war on Denmark. Peter rarely saw Catherine or Paul, whose succession rights as wife and son were jeopardized as Peter delayed his coronation and flaunted his mistress, Yelizaveta Vorontsova, older sister of Catherine's young married friend, Princess Yekaterina Dashkova.

Peter III was deposed on July 9, 1762, when Catherine "fled" from suburban Peterhof to St. Petersburg to be proclaimed empress by the Guards and the Senate. While under house arrest at Ropsha, he was later strangled to death by noblemen conspiring to ensure Catherine's sovereign power. This "revolution" was justified as a defense of Russian civil and ecclesiastical institutions, prevention of war, and redemption of national honor. Catherine never admitted complicity in the death of Peter III which was officially blamed on "hemorrhoidal colic" a cover-up ridiculed abroad by British writer Horace Walpole. Walpole scorned "this Fury of the North," predicting Paul's assassination, and referring to Catherine as "Simiramis, murderess-queen of ancient times"—charges that incited other scurrilous attacks.

Catherine quickly consolidated the new regime by rewarding partisans, recalling Bestuzhev-Ryumin and other friends from exile, and ordering coronation preparations in Moscow, where she was crowned on October 3, 1762 amid ceremonies that lasted months. Determined to rule by herself, Catherine declined to name a chancellor, refused to marry Grigory Orlov, and ignored Paul's rights as he was underage. Her style of governance was cautiously consultative, pragmatic, and "hands-on," with a Germanic sense of duty and strong aversion to wasting time. Aware of the fragility of her allegedly absolute authority, she avoided acting like a despot. She perused the whole spectrum of state policies, reviewed policies of immigration and reorganization of church estates, established a new central administration of public health, and set up a new commission to rebuild St. Petersburg and Moscow. Count Nikita Panin, a former diplomat and Paul's "governor," assumed the supervision of foreign affairs, and in 1764 Prince Alexander Vyazemsky became procurator-general of the Senate, with broad jurisdiction over domestic affairs, particularly finances and the secret political police.

Catherine's reign may be variously subdivided, depending on the sphere of activity considered. One simplistic scheme breaks it into halves: reform before 1775, and reaction afterward. But this overlooks continuities spanning the entire era and ig-

nores the varying periodizations for foreign affairs, education, and culture. Another approach conceives of her reign as a series of crises. A ruler of wide interests, she dealt simultaneously with diverse matters. The first decade witnessed her mania for legislation and pursuit of an active foreign policy that, in alliance with Prussia from 1764, led to intervention in Poland-Lithuania. This alliance led to pressures on Poland and spilled over into war with the Ottoman Empire which in turn yielded unforeseen complications in the great plague of 1770–1771 and the Pugachev Revolt of 1773–1774. The latter focused public attention on serfdom, which Catherine privately despised while recognizing that it could not be easily changed.

Catherine's government followed a general policy of cultivating public confidence in aspirations to lead Russia toward full and equal membership in Europe. Drawing on the published advice of German cameralist thinkers and corresponding regularly with Voltaire, Diderot, Grimm, and other philosophers, she promoted administrative efficiency and uniformity, economic advance and fiscal growth, and "enlightenment" through expanded educational facilities, cultural activities, and religious tolerance. She expanded the Senate in 1762 and 1763, bolstered the office of procurator-general in 1763 and 1764, and incorporated Ukraine into the empire by abolishing the hetmanate in 1764. The Legislative Commission of 1767–1768 assembled several hundred delegates from all free social groups to assist in recodification of the laws on the basis of recent European social theory as borrowed from Montesquieu and others and outlined in Catherine's *Great Instruction* of 1767—enlightened guidelines translated into many other languages. To stimulate the economy, foreign immigrants were invited in 1763, grain exports were sanctioned in 1764, the Free Economic Society was established in 1765, and a commission on commerce formulated a new tariff in 1766. She also secularized ecclesiastical estates in 1764, founded the Smolny Institute for the education of young women, and eased restrictions on religious schismatics. New public health policies were championed as she underwent inoculation against smallpox in 1768 by Dr. Thomas Dimsdale and then provided the procedure free to the public. Yet her attempts to contain the horrific plague of 1770–1771 could not prevent some 100,000 deaths, triggering bloody riots in Moscow.

The most literate ruler in Russian history, Catherine constantly patronized cultural pursuits,

especially a flurry of satirical journals and comedies published anonymously with her significant participation. Later comedies attacked Freemasonry. In 1768 she founded the Society for the Translation of Foreign Books into Russian, superseded in 1782 by the Russian Academy, which sponsored a comprehensive dictionary between 1788 and 1796. Most strikingly, she founded the Hermitage, a museum annex to the Winter Palace, to house burgeoning collections of European paintings and other kinds of art. To lighten the burdens of rule, Catherine attended frequent social gatherings, including regular "Court Days" (receptions for a diverse public), visits to the theater, huge festivals like St. Petersburg's Grand Carousel of 1766, and select informal gatherings where titles and ranks were ignored.

To embrace the great Petrine legacy, Catherine sponsored a gigantic neoclassical equestrian statue of Peter the Great on Senate Square, "The Bronze Horseman" as the poet Pushkin dubbed it, publicly unveiled in 1782. Dismayed by Peter's brutal militarism and coercive cultural innovations, she saw herself as perfecting his achievements with a lighter touch. Thus Ivan Betskoy, a prominent dignitary of the period, lauded them both in 1767 by stating that Peter the Great created people in Russia but Catherine endowed them with souls. In neoclassical imagery Catherine was often depicted as Minerva. Her "building mania" involved neo-Gothic palaces and gardens, and with Scottish architect Charles Cameron she added a neoclassical wing to the Catherine Palace at Tsarskoye Selo and the nearby Pavlovsk Palace for Paul and his second wife, Maria Fyodorovna, who provided many grandchildren, the males raised directly by the empress.

Through travel Catherine demonstrated vigor in exploring the empire. In June 1763 she returned from Moscow to St. Petersburg, then traveled the next summer to Estland and Livland. She rushed back because of an attempted coup by a disgruntled Ukrainian officer, Vasily Mirovich, to free the imprisoned Ivan VI (1740–1764). Acting on secret orders, guards killed the prisoner before he could be freed. After a speedy trial Mirovich was beheaded on September 26, 1764, and his supporters were beaten and exiled.

While Catherine quickly quashed such inept plots, she worried more about rumors that Peter III was alive and eager to regain power. Some dozen impostors cropped up in remote locales, but all



Empress Catherine II. © HULTON ARCHIVE

were apprehended, imprisoned, or exiled. In 1772 and 1773, amid war with the Ottoman Empire, did fugitive cossack Emelian Pugachev rally the Yaik cossacks under Peter III's banner in a regional rebellion that attracted thousands of motley followers. When Pugachev burned Kazan in 1774, Catherine contemplated defending Moscow in person, but the victorious end of the Russo-Turkish War soon dissuaded her. Upon capture Pugachev underwent repeated interrogation before execution in Moscow on January 21, 1775, in Catherine's demonstrative absence. This embarrassment was overshadowed by elaborate celebrations in Moscow of victory over Pugachev and the Turks, the Peace of Kuchuk-Kainardji of 1774.

Russia's soaring international prestige was further affirmed by the month-long visit of King Gustavus III of Sweden in the summer of 1777 and by Russia's joint mediation of the war of the Bavarian Succession in the Peace of Teschen of May 1779, which made Russia a guarantor of the Holy Roman Empire. Catherine's meeting with Emperor-King Joseph II of Austria at Mogilev in May 1780 led one year later to a secret Russo-Austrian alliance against the Ottoman Empire, the notorious "Greek Project" that foresaw Catherine's grandson

Konstantin on the throne of a reconstituted Byzantine Empire. In 1781 Catherine engineered the Armed Neutrality of 1781, a league of northern naval powers to oppose British infringement of the commercial rights of neutrals amid the conflicts ending the American revolution.

In 1774 Catherine rearranged her personal life and the imperial leadership by promoting the flamboyant Grigory Potemkin, a well-educated noble and supporter of her coup. Installed as official favorite, he dominated St. Petersburg politics as political partner and probable husband until his death in 1791. He assisted with legislation that spawned the Provincial Reform beginning in 1775, the Police Code for towns in 1782, and charters to the nobility and the towns in 1785. A charter for the state peasantry remained in draft form, as did reforms of the Senate.

In charge of the armed forces, settlement, and fortification of New Russia (Ukraine), Potemkin masterminded annexation of the Crimea in 1783 and the Tauride Tour of 1787, an extravagant cavalcade that provoked renewed Russo-Turkish war in August 1787. In alliance with Austria, and despite unforeseen war with Sweden in 1788 and 1790 and troubles in revolutionary France in 1789, Potemkin coordinated campaigns that confirmed Russian triumph and territorial gains in the treaty of Jassy (1792). The last years of Catherine's life saw another triumph of Russian arms in the second and third partitions of Poland and the preparation of expeditionary forces against Persia and France. Internal repercussions of foreign pressures involved the arrest and exile of Alexander Radishchev in 1790 and Nikolay Novikov in 1792, both noblemen charged with publications violating censorship rules in propagating revolutionary and Freemason sentiments.

The death of Potemkin and Vyazemsky left voids in Catherine's government that a new young favorite, Platon Zubov, could not bridge. Her declining health and growing estrangement from Paul insistently raised succession concerns and rumors that she would prevent Paul's accession. Catherine's sudden death on November 16, 1796, from apoplexy inaugurated his reign. Paul's efforts at reversing Catherine's policies backfired, regenerating fond memories that inspired a bogus "Testament of Catherine the Great" later used by aristocratic conspirators to overthrow and murder Paul and replace him with Alexander, Catherine's beloved grandson.

See also: BESTUZHEV-RYUMIN, ALEXIS; INSTRUCTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF CATHERINE II; PETER III; ORLOV, GRIGORY; POTEMKIN, GRIGORY; PUGACHEV, EMILIAN; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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JOHN T. ALEXANDER

CATHERINE THE GREAT See CATHERINE II.

CATHOLICISM

The Roman Catholic Church established ties to the Russian lands from their earliest history but played only a marginal role. The first significant encounter came during the Time of Troubles, when the Catholic associations of pretenders and Polish interventionists triggered intense popular hostility toward the "Latins" and a hiatus in Russian-Catholic relations. Only in the last quarter of the seventeenth century did Muscovy, in pursuit of allies against the Turks, resume ties to Rome. Peter the Great went significantly further, permitting the construction of the first Catholic church in Moscow

(1691) and the presence of various Catholic orders (including Jesuits).

But a significant Catholic presence only commenced with the first Polish partition of 1772, when the Russian Empire acquired substantial numbers of Catholic subjects. Despite initial tensions (chiefly over claims by the Russian government to oversee Catholic administration), relations improved markedly under emperors Paul (r. 1796–1801) and Alexander I (r. 1801–1825), when Catholic—especially Jesuit—influences at court were extraordinarily strong.

Thereafter, however, relations proved extremely tempestuous. One factor was the coercive conversion of Uniates or Eastern Catholics (that is, Catholics practicing Eastern Rites), who were "re-united" with the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1839 and 1875) and forbidden to practice Catholic rites. The second factor was Catholic involvement in the Polish uprisings of 1830–1831 and 1863; subsequent government measures to Russify and repress the Poles served only to reinforce their Catholic identity and resolve. Hence Catholicism remained a force to be reckoned with: By the 1890s, it had 11.5 million adherents (9.13% of the population), making it the third largest religious group in the Russian Empire. It maintained some 4,400 churches (2,400 in seven Polish dioceses; 2,000 in five dioceses in the Russian Empire proper). The 1905 revolution forced the regime to declare religious tolerance (the manifesto of April 17, 1905); with conversion from Russian Orthodoxy decriminalized, huge numbers declared themselves Catholic (233,000 in 1905–1909 alone).

The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, however, brought decades of devastating repression. The Catholic Church refused to accept Bolshevik nationalization of its property and the requirement that the laity, not clergy, register and assume responsibility for churches. The conflict culminated in the Bolshevik campaign to confiscate church valuables in 1922 and 1923 and a famous show trial that ended with the execution of a leading prelate. That was but a prelude to the 1930s, when massive purges and repression eliminated all but two Catholic churches by 1939. Although World War II brought an increase in Catholic churches (mainly through the annexation of new territories), the regime remained highly suspicious of Catholicism, especially in a republic like Lithuania, where ethnicity and Catholicism coalesced into abiding dissent.

The “new thinking” of Mikhail Gorbachev included the reestablishment of relations with the Vatican in 1988 and relaxation of pressure on the Catholic church in the USSR. The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 turned the main bastions of Catholicism (i.e., Lithuania) into independent republics, but left a substantial number of Catholics in the Russian Federation (1.3 million according to Vatican estimates). To minister to them more effectively, Rome, in February 2002, elevated its four “apostolic administrations” to the status of “dioceses,” serving some 600,000 parishioners in 212 registered churches and 300 small, informal communities.

See also: LITHUANIA AND LITHUANIANS; ORTHODOXY; POLAND; RELIGION; UNIATE CHURCH

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GREGORY L. FREEZE

CAUCASIAN WARS

Russian contacts, both diplomatic and military, with the Caucasus region began during the rule of Ivan IV in the sixteenth century. However, only much later, during the reign of Catherine II in the late eighteenth century, did Russian economic and military power permit sustained, active involvement. Catherine appointed Prince Grigory Potemkin Russia's first viceroy of the Caucasus in 1785, although the actual extent of Russian control reached only as far south as Mozdok and Vladikavkaz. Meanwhile, military campaigns guided by Potemkin and General Alexander Suvorov penetrated far along the Caspian and Black Sea coasts. Russian intrusion energized hostility among much of the predominantly Muslim populace of the northern Caucasus, culminating in the proclamation of a “holy war” by Shaykh Mansur, a fiery resistance leader. Despite military collaboration with the Turks and Crimean Tatars, Mansur was captured by Russian forces at Anapa in 1791. At the time of the Empress' death in 1796, the so-called Caucasian Line, a sequence of forts and outposts tracing the

Kuban and Terek Rivers, marked the practical limits of Russian authority.

Meanwhile, it was Russia's relationship with the small Christian kingdom of Georgia that set the stage for protracted warfare in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century. Pressed militarily by its powerful Muslim neighbors to the south, Persia and Ottoman Turkey, Georgia sought the military protection of Russia. In 1799, just four years after a Persian army sacked the capital of Tiflis, Georgy XII asked the tsar to accept Georgia into the Russian Empire. The official annexation of Georgia occurred in 1801 under Tsar Alexander I.

The acquisition of Georgia created a geopolitical anomaly that all but assured further fighting in the Caucasus. By 1813, following war with Persia, Russia was firmly positioned in the middle of the region with territorial claims spanning from the Caspian to the Black Sea. However, most of the heavily Muslim north central Caucasus was unreconciled to Russian domination. In a practical sense, Georgia constituted an island of Russian power in the so-called Transcaucasus whose lines of communications to the old Caucasian Line were ever precarious. Soon Dagestan, Chechnya, and Avaria in the east and the Kuban River basin in the west emerged as major bastions of popular resistance. Particularly in the interior of the country, among the thick forests and rugged mountains of the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, the terrain as well as throngs of able guerrilla warriors posed a formidable military obstacle. As in any such unconventional conflict, Russia had to stretch its resources both to protect friendly populations and prosecute a complex political-military struggle against a determined opposition. To secure areas under imperial authority, the Russians established a loose cordon of fortified points around the mountains. This, however, proved insufficient to prevent hostile raids. Meanwhile, the Russian effort to subjugate the resistance, widely known as the “mountaineers” or *gortsy*, required the ever increasing application of armed force. In the view of General Aleksei Petrovich Ermolov, commander of the Caucasus, the mountains constituted a great fortress, difficult to either storm or besiege.

Roughly speaking, the Russian subjugation of the mountaineer resistance is divisible into three stages. From 1801 to 1832, Russia's campaigns were sporadic, owing in part to the distraction of intermittent warfare with Persia, Turkey, Sweden, and France. In addition, the threat to Russian rule



View of Caucasus Mountains from Mount Elbrus. © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

in the Caucasus did not for several decades appear extremely serious. This situation changed in the early 1830s as the resistance assumed increasingly religious overtones. In 1834, a capable and charismatic resistance leader emerged in the person of Shamil, an Avar who headed a spiritual movement described by the Russians as “muridism” (derived from the term *murid*, meaning disciple). Combining religious appeal with military and administrative savvy, Shamil forged an alliance of mountain tribes that fundamentally transformed the character of the war.

Although the true center of Shamil’s strength lay in the mountains of eastern Dagestan, his power was equally dependent upon the support of the Chechen tribes inhabiting the forested slopes and foothills between Georgia and the Terek River. Also important to the eastern resistance were the Lezghian tribes along the fringes of the Caucasian range. Because it was not strongly linked to Shamil, the Russians were less concerned in the short term with resistance in the western Caucasus (the southern Kuban and Black Sea coast), and formally

treated that area as a separate military theater from 1821.

From the early 1830s, the Russians relied increasingly on large, conventional campaigns in an effort to shatter Shamil’s resistance in a single campaign. This strategy did not produce the desired results. Although the tsar’s columns proved repeatedly that they could march deep into the rugged interior of the region to assault and capture virtually any rebel position, Shamil’s forces would not stand still long enough to risk total defeat. Moreover, upon retreating from the mountains, where it was impossible to supply Russian armies for more than a few weeks, Russian forces suffered repeated ambushes and loss of prestige. The last such attempt was the nearly disastrous expedition of 1845. Under the command of the new Viceroy of the Caucasus, Prince Mikhail Vorontsov, a force of about eighteen thousand, including one thousand native militiamen, drove deep into the mountains and stormed a fiercely defended fort at Dargo. Yet, the mountaineers managed to evade total destruction by melting away into the surrounding forests.

Upon their return from the mountains, Russian troops suffered incessant harassment by unseen snipers and were cut off from resupply. Only the arrival of a relief column prevented a complete debacle, but the invaders endured more than three thousand casualties during the campaign.

Finally, in 1846, Russian strategy changed to reflect a more patient and methodical *modus operandi*. Russia refocused its efforts on limited, achievable objectives with the overall intent of gradually reducing the territory under Shamil's influence. The advent of the Crimean War disrupted Russian progress as the diversion of Russian regiments to fighting the Turks served once again to encourage popular resistance. However, with the conclusion of that war in 1856, the empire resolved to finish its increasingly tiresome struggle for dominion over the Caucasus by massing its strength in the region for the first time.

To accomplish this, the new viceroy, General Alexander I. Baryatinsky, retained control of forces assumed committed against Turkey in the Caucasian theater. With approximately 250,000 soldiers at his disposal, Baryatinsky was able to apply relentless pressure against multiple objectives by mounting separate but converging campaigns. He was ably served in this endeavor by Dmitry Mil'yutin, the future War Minister, as chief of staff. Both men were veterans of fighting in the Caucasus and understood the necessity to separate the resistance from the general population. They ruthlessly achieved this end by systematically clearing and burning forests, destroying villages, and forcibly resettling entire tribes, thereby progressively denying Shamil access to critical resources. Following the fall of Shamil's key stronghold at Veden in 1859, the Russians captured the resistance leader himself at Gunib. Then, having gained success in the east, Russian forces liquidated remaining opposition in the west during the next several years. Ultimately, as many as half a million Moslem tribesmen, above all Cherkes in the west, were relocated from their ancestral lands.

See also: BARYATINSKY, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH; CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MILYUTIN, DMITRY ALEXEYEVICH; SHAMIL; VORONTSOV, MIKHAIL SEMENOVICH

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ROBERT F. BAUMANN

CAUCASUS

The Caucasus region is a relatively compact area centered on the Caucasus Mountains. The foothills to the north and some of the steppe connected to them form a northern border, while the southern border can be defined by the extent of the Armenian plateau. The Black Sea in the west and the Caspian Sea in the east form natural boundaries in those directions. It is a territory of immense ethnic, linguistic, and national diversity, and it is currently spread over the territory of four sovereign nations.

The Caucasus region has long been known for the diversity of its peoples. Pliny the Younger in the first century, writing in his *Natural History* (Book VI.4.16), cited an earlier observer, Timosthenes, to the effect that three hundred different tribes with their own languages lived in the Caucasus area, and that Romans in the city of Dioscurias, encompassing land now in the Abkhaz city of Sukhumi, had employed a staff of 130 translators in order for business to be carried out.

The relative remoteness of the Caucasus from the Greek and Roman lands led to erroneous ideas concerning its location, not to mention exotic claims for its people. Some thought that the mountains extended far enough to the east that they joined with the Himalayas in India. The Caucasus was the scene of the legendary Prometheus' captivity, the goal of Jason's Argonauts in their quest for the Golden Fleece, and the homeland of the famous and fantastic fighting women known as Amazons. When Pompey invaded the region, he was said to have wanted to see the mountain where Prometheus had been chained.

The main Caucasus range is often considered part of the boundary that separates the state of mind that is Europe from that of Asia, despite aspirations of people to the south to be a part of Europe. The highest peak is Mount Elbrus at 18,510 feet (5,642 meters), making it the highest in Eu-

rope; other prominent summits include Kazbek (Qazbegi) in Georgia at 16,558 feet (5,047 meters). The lands to the south are protected by the barrier they form against the cold northern winds, to the point that lands along the Black Sea coast, although at latitudes above 40° N, possess a subtropical climate.

To the north of the Caucasus range is the Eurasian steppe, which stretches far to the east and west; it has been the route of countless invasions. To the south are a variety of lesser mountain ranges, plateaus, and plains—an area that has also been a crossroads of military and economic intercourse—Persians from the east, various Greco-Roman states from the west, and Semitic cultures from the south have interacted with the peoples of the South Caucasus.

There are a variety of climates in this region due to the steep gradient in elevation from sea level to mountain peak. Glaciers are nestled at the tops of the mountains only a couple hundred miles from citrus and tea plantations. Fast-moving rivers course along this gradient. By and large, the mountain rivers, cutting steep gorges, for example, the Pankisi in eastern Georgia and the Kodori in Abkhazia, are not navigable, but there are rivers to the south and north—such as the Mtkvari (Kura), which starts in Turkey and flows through Georgia and Azerbaijan to the Caspian Sea, and the Terek to the north, which flows also to the Caspian—that have been important water highways throughout human history. The mountains hold mineral resources such as coal and manganese. The Caucasus is near the oil resources of the Caspian Sea and pipelines run to, or are planned for, the north and south of the mountains.

There is great potential for promoting a prosperous tourist industry. Alpine skiing, pristine mountain lakes, white-water rafting, and the breathtaking scenery of snow-capped mountains juxtaposed with fertile plains are all available to the visitor, and the hospitality of the many peoples of the region, when they are not fighting among themselves, is the stuff of story and legend.

The region, formerly contained within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, is in the early twenty-first century spread over four nations: the Russian Federation to the north; and the three republics of the South Caucasus, also known as Transcaucasia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The Russian part of this area is divided into several ethnic jurisdictions: Adygea, Karachay-Cherkessia,

Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan.

The Northwest Caucasian languages include Abkhazian, spoken in Georgia, and Abaza, Adyghe (or Circassian), and Kabardian in Russia.

Balkar-Karachay is a Turkic language, as is Kumyk of Dagestan. These languages were left behind as Turkic peoples moved along the steppes from Central Asia.

The Ossetes speak an Iranian language, as do the Judeo-Tats of Dagestan. The Tats have the added distinction of being Jews in the midst of a predominantly Muslim territory; many of them reside in Israel.

The Ingush and Chechen languages are fairly closely related and are collectively known as Vainakh languages. They might have been considered one language, but Soviet-era language policy often encouraged a fragmentation in linguistic definition. At the same time, languages that had little or no written expression before the twentieth century were given alphabets and encouraged—principally, of course, to be instruments of communist propaganda. Such was the case with many of the languages of the Caucasus, the two major exceptions being Armenian and Georgian with alphabets dating from the fifth century.

The languages of Dagestan to the southeast are divided into a long list of small groups, including Aghul, Akhvakh, Andi, Archi, Avar, Bagvalal, Bezhta, Botlikh, Chamalal, Dargwa, Dido, Ghodoberi, Hinukh, Hunzib, Karata, Khvarshi, Lak, Lezgi, Rutul, Tabassaran, Tindi, and Tsakhur.

Georgia is also divided by the ethnic autonomies of Abkhazia, Ajra, and South Ossetia; and a number of Georgian and other ethnicities reside in the mountainous regions: the Svanetians to the west, speaking a Kartvelian language related to Georgian; the Khevsurs to the west, speaking a dialect of Georgian; Bats, a small group speaking a Vainakh tongue related to Chechen and Ingush; and the Khists, who are related to the Chechens and who occupy the Pankisi Gorge.

The ethnic and linguistic diversity described by Timosthenes and Pliny in antiquity, continues to be a fact of life in the Caucasus. It is a source of wonder, but also of conflict, as boundaries have continued slowly to shift back and forth over the millennia, but with a greater frequency in the past two centuries, as the Russian Empire appeared to

claim this territory as its own. The spread of Russia southward was not always by military means, and in the case of the Caucasus, the military was preceded by the gradual migration of Cossacks, except along the Caspian coast, where Peter the Great led incursion early in the eighteenth century. Their collective societies lived at the edge of Russian territory and its legalities; in the eighteenth century they began to come into closer contact with the peoples of the Caucasus. Occasional violent conflict turned eventually into organized warfare.

The wars in the Caucasus throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries seem to defy any logical reference to a benefit that the Russians may have gained from holding on to the land. The great authors of nineteenth-century Russia have left a vast collection of poetry, short stories, and novels that have the ambiguous heroics of war in the Caucasus as part of their plot. One of the most famous is Leo Tolstoy's novella *Hadji Murad*, set in the central Caucasus. Its prologue, in which the narrator utterly destroys a beautiful yellow flower while attempting to pick it, should be required reading for any who study the Caucasus.

Some of the conflict between Russia and the natives of the Caucasus has traditionally been defined across confessional lines. The North Caucasian peoples were converted to Islam, although some, such as the Abkhaz, have been less intense in their assimilation of that faith. The wars in the nineteenth century came to have religious meaning for both sides, especially with the leadership of the Imam Shamil, from the Avar people of Daghestan, who led the Chechens and others until his capture in 1856. His defeat, and Russia's eventual "pacification" of the region, was followed by a massive migration, not altogether voluntary, of North Caucasian peoples to the Ottoman Empire. Slavs, Georgians, and others often filled the "empty spaces" left behind, adding to the potential for ethnic conflict in later times.

The chaos of Revolution in 1917 was greatly felt in the Caucasus, with Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan all experiencing short periods of independence. The North Caucasian peoples attempted to form a Confederation of Mountain Peoples. All of these, pressed by foreign intervention, as well as White and Red Russian Armies, fell to the Bolsheviks. The shifting realities of ethnic jurisdictions in the Caucasus region is its own study of nationalities policy in the Soviet Union, with the most tragic chapter being written toward the end of World War II when entire groups were forced into

exile, including Ingush and Chechens, and several smaller groups. Although allowed back in the 1950s, these deportations are part of the fuel that has fed the fire of revolt and conflict in the Caucasus during the post-Soviet period.

See also: ABKHAZIANS; ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; DAGESTAN; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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PAUL CREGO

CAVES MONASTERY

One of the oldest and most important East Slavic monasteries, the Kievan Caves Monastery is located in the southern part of Kiev along the Dnieper River. Its name derives from the tunnels and caves that served first as cells for monks and later as burial crypts. According to the *Primary Chronicle*, the monastery was founded by Saint Anthony of the Caves (died c. 1073) in 1051 after his return from Mount Athos in Greece, where he was tonsured. Anthony's pious life attracted a number of followers, and soon he appointed Varlaam, the son of an influential boyar, as abbot and secluded himself in a nearby cave. In 1062 Varlaam left to lead the St. Demetrius monastery, and the brethren chose Theodosius to replace him. The monastery grew steadily under Theodosius's guidance, and in an attempt to provide an orderly life for the monks, he introduced the Byzantine rule of Theodore of Studion (759–826). Despite the strong coenobitic nature of this rule, which required a common life under the strict guidance of the abbot, the way of life described in the *Primary Chronicle* at the time of Theodosius's death in 1074 is more idiorrhythmic,

in that each monk was left to develop his own method of monastic practice. A hallmark of caves monasticism in the Kievan period was the claim, often repeated in the sources, that the Caves was a monastery founded not by princes or rulers, but through tears, fasting, prayer, and vigils. As a spiritual center, the monastery was a major source of bishops and missionaries in pre-Mongol Rus.

The Caves Monastery was also the center of cultural life in Kievan Rus. *The Primary Chronicle* has been traditionally ascribed to Nestor, a monk of the Caves Monastery writing at the end of the eleventh century, who also wrote the *Life of Theodosius* and the life of the slain princes Boris and Gleb. In addition, the monastery is the setting of the *Kievan Caves Patericon*, a thirteenth-century compilation of stories about caves monks, which was reworked and later reprinted until the nineteenth century.

Theodosius's successors undertook a major building campaign that continued with some minor setbacks until the invasion of the Mongols, who sacked Kiev and destroyed the monastery under Batu Khan in 1240. The monastery began to flourish once again in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries under Lithuanian rule. By the sixteenth century the Caves had become quite wealthy, although as a citadel of Orthodoxy it still faced some major challenges. After the Treaty of Lublin, which combined Poland and Lithuania, and the Treaty of Brest, which created the Eastern Rite Catholic Uniate Church (1596), there was pressure to subject the monastery to the Uniate metropolitan of Kiev. Only strong resistance by the Caves monks reversed this process. With the acquisition of Kiev by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the monastery and the see of Kiev were placed under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow. The Caves was the first (1598), and one of only four monasteries in Russia to be given the special designation *lavra*, which signified a particularly large and influential monastery. The monastery was an important center of Orthodox spirituality until 1926, when it was made a museum by the Soviet government. It was restored to the Orthodox Church in 1988.

See also: KIEVEN CAVES PATERICON; KIEVEN RUS

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DAVID K. PRESTEL

CAVIAR

Of the twenty-six species of sturgeon found in the world, those most valued are the four that dwell in the Caspian Sea, including, from largest to smallest in size, the beluga (*Huso huso*), the osetra or Russian sturgeon (*Acipenser gueldenstaedti*), the sevruga or stellate (*Acipenser stellatus*), and the sterlet (*Acipenser ruthenus*). Each is appreciated for the quality and flavor of its roe (fish eggs), otherwise known as caviar (*ikra*). Although they vary in the intensity of their saltiness and flavor, all Caspian caviars have a subtle, buttery taste. Because of the damage induced by the Volga River's cascade of hydroelectric dams, which originally were built without fish ladders for anadromous fish such as the Caspian sturgeons, and subsequent overfishing in the sea itself, the populations of the Caspian sturgeons have plummeted since 1960. Thus connoisseurs have recommended that caviar lovers redirect their palates to the roe of more abundant fish species, such as the cheaper, but tasty American sturgeon, until the Caspian stocks can rebound. With the major decline of their numbers in the Caspian Sea, sevruga and osetra are being farmed in ponds in Europe.

Belugas, which produce the best and most expensive caviar, are the largest freshwater fish in the world, typically weighing more than one ton, measuring 27 feet (9 meters) long, and living for 150 years. The largest on record weighed 4,350 pounds (1,973 kilograms). Beluga eggs are large, bluish gray, and slightly sweet. The caviar is best when it is fresh.

Osetra sturgeon measure up to 9 feet (3 meters) in length and weigh up to 90 pounds (200 kilograms). Osetra caviar is brown in color and stronger in flavor than beluga caviar.

The sevruga sturgeon is smaller still, and yields the smallest eggs. Sevruga caviar possesses the strongest flavor of all the caviars. Because of this, it is cheaper than beluga or osetra, but still quite good.

The exceedingly rare sterlet is the smallest of the Caspian sturgeons, measuring a little under 50 inches (2 meters) long, weighing 7 pounds (16 kilograms), and living on average to the age of 22 years. Sterlet, or imperial, caviar was once the most prized fish roe of all. The eggs are small-grained and golden in color. Valued also as a food species, the sterlet has been fished almost to extinction.

See also: FOOD

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VICTOR L. MOTE

CENSORSHIP

Censorship informally began in Russia when the regime acquired the realm's first printing press about 1560, a century after the invention of movable type. From then until the late 1600s successive tsars confined the use of that press, and the few more imported, to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Peter I (r. 1682–1725) expanded his government's monopoly to include secular publishing when, in 1702, he founded Russia's first newspaper *The St. Petersburg Bulletin* to promote himself and his programs. In 1720, having added the Senate and Academy of Sciences as official publishers, he required the ecclesiastical college to approve in advance every book printed in Russia, a censorship role that he passed the next year to the newly-created Holy Synod. Synod authority over secular publishing ended in 1750 when Empress Elizabeth (r. 1741–1762) gave the Academy of Sciences the right to censor its publications, as she did Moscow University at its founding in 1755.

When Catherine II (r. 1762–1796) finally made private ownership and use of printing presses legal in 1783, her decree governing "free publishing" banned published words against "the laws of God and the state" or of a "clearly-seditious" nature. The police would henceforth supervise "free" presses and

serve as preliminary censors. Alarmed by the French Revolution, Catherine ended her reign by closing private presses and by opening new censorship offices in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Still, Catherine's reign marked a stage in widening limits on the publishing of periodicals and books in Russia.

Sharing Catherine II's early belief in private publishing, Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) reinstated private presses, along with a preliminary censorship system. He set its rules in 1804 in Russia's first, brief censorship statute, a major reform designed to make the exercise of state power more predictable and rational. Napoleon's invasion in 1812, however, caused Alexander I to tighten censorship and to embrace the intense religiosity that spread during the war. Because the tsar resumed peacetime rule as a religious mystic, his choice to head his new Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and Education in 1817 was the president of the Russian Bible Society, A. N. Golitsyn, a zealot who used his role as chief censor to promote his religious views and to disseminate Bibles. Repeated complaints from high officials of the Russian Orthodox Church persuaded the Emperor to dismiss Golitsyn in 1824, the year before Alexander I died.

At the very outset of his reign, Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) had to put down the Decembrist revolt led by gentry liberals. Blaming alien Western beliefs for discontent, the new tsar resolved to permeate society with Russian ideals and to prove, through paternalistic rule and controlled publishing that autocracy itself was inherently right for Russia.

Nicholas I in June 1826 issued his secular censorship law of June 1826 as a means to "direct public opinion into agreeing with present political circumstances and the views of the government." No less than 230 articles (five times the forty-six in the 1804 law) detailed procedures and made the author, not the censor, responsible should a duly censored text prove unacceptable once published (reversing the 1804 law).

Bowing to criticism among his officials, Nicholas named a new drafting committee and signed a substantially more liberal, but still sweeping, law of April 1828 to govern all works of "Literature, Science, and Art" (under it, responsibility again fell on the approving censor). A Foreign Censorship Committee had to publish monthly a list of the foreign works it had banned. Issued at the same time was a new ecclesiastical censorship statute that confirmed the Holy Synod's right—through censors

chosen from ecclesiastical academies—to ban any book, work of art, ceremony, musical composition, or performance contrary to precepts of the Orthodox Church.

Nicholas also made censors of his new political police, the Third Section. To counter clandestine printing of illegal works and lax censorship of legal ones, he secretly ordered his special police to look for and report anything “inclined to the spread of atheism or which reflects in the artist or writer violations of the obligations of loyal subjects.” One year after the French and Belgian Revolutions of 1830, Nicholas I put down the Polish rebellion. Building on popular support, the tsar in 1833 prescribed a system of ideas—so-called “Official Nationality”—to guide his subjects and his officials, including censors.

With respect to the state’s granting licenses for private periodicals, the tsar himself approved or rejected applications, with the result that the mere forty-two private periodicals that circulated in 1825 had, by 1841, modestly increased to sixty. (Small readerships also forced a number of licensed periodicals to close for lack of profits.) As for books, limited statistics that begin with 1837 show that secular censors in that year approved more titles (838) than in 1845 (804) and 1846 (810), such numbers being minuscule compared to book production in Europe.

Although limits on publishing under Nicholas I from 1825 to 1855 were the most invasive in Imperial history, brilliant writers such as Ivan Turgenev, Nikolai Gogol, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Leo Tolstoy won censors’ approval under Nicholas I.

Assuming power in the last stages of the humiliating Crimean War, Alexander II (r. 1855–1881) blamed that debacle on Russia’s backwardness and the archaic enserfment of 40 million peasants. To promote their liberation, in 1857 he lifted the *de facto* ban on publishing proposals for liberation.

On the heels of decreeing Emancipation in February 1861, Alexander II committed to reform of censorship and thirteen months later in March, 1862, ended preliminary censorship for all scientific, academic, and official publications. Then followed, five months after the 1864 judicial reform, the decree of April 6, 1865 to give “relief and convenience to the national press.” Included as transitional for uncensored publications was a system of warnings that could lead to suspensions and closures for any showing a “dangerous orientation.”

Freed from censorship—but only in St. Petersburg and Moscow—were all periodicals, translated books of 320 pages or more, and original books of 160 pages or more. (Short books were not freed, given their greater potential to do harm.) A big change was the statute’s subjecting to judicial prosecution anyone responsible for criminal content in a freed publication.

In December 1866, the State Council declared that full freedom to publish would “take shape under the influence of a series of judicial decisions.” During the next decade, as mounting terrorism made the tsar wary of public opinion, the government all but abandoned press-related trials. New measures against the press included profit-cutting limits on street sales and commercial advertisements. Whereas officials used the warning system from 1865 through 1869 to suspend merely ten freed periodicals, they suspended twenty-seven from 1875 through 1879. On the other hand, the number of active journals rose from twelve in 1865 to twenty in 1879; of newspapers, from forty-one in 1865 to sixty-two in 1879.

That trend reversed after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, because Alexander III (r. 1881–1894) repressed publishing. As one means, he created a Supreme Commission on Press Affairs in 1882 to silence not just “dangerous” periodicals but also, through temporary banishment from journalism, their editors and publishers. The Commission imposed closure, its harshest penalty, seven times from 1881 to 1889—a period when the overall number of journals and newspapers declined just over 22 and 11 percentage points, respectively.

Given the seeming containment of terrorism by 1890, an easing of restrictions let the number of journals and newspapers rise; and the total stood once more at the 1881 level when Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) acceded to the throne. Ten years later, during the 1905 Revolution, civil disobedience in printing plants effectively ended state controls that included censorship. In October, following a government decree that no printing plant could operate if it bypassed press regulations, the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workmen’s Deputies ordered members of the Printers’ Union to refuse to work for plant owners who complied.

Not only did Nicholas II issue his Manifesto of October 17, 1905 to promise imminent freedom of expression and other reforms, but he also ordered his new prime minister, Sergei I. Witte, to draft

legislation to effect such changes. New rules for periodicals resulted on November 24, 1905. In issuing them, the tsar claimed to have shifted wholly to judicial controls and thereby to have granted “one of the fundamental freedoms.” Promised new rules on book publishing took effect on April 26, 1906, and they allowed most books simultaneously to reach the public and the governing Committee on Press Affairs. Excepted were works of fewer than seventeen pages (censors had to approve them at least two days before publication), and those from seventeen to eighty pages (censors had to screen them a week in advance). The new rules let officials close an indicted publication pending what could be protracted adjudication.

Book-related trials in the remainder of 1906 mounted to an all-time high of 223, with 175 convictions. Those persons found criminally responsible for circulating or attempting to circulate a work ruled illegal mainly suffered fines, not imprisonment; for the main aim of the government was judicially to identify criminal content and to keep it from the public. Because the publishing industry became so large in the next decade, the tsarist regime found it almost impossible to limit printed opinion. By 1914, Russian citizens enjoyed freedom of expression very nearly equal to Western levels.

War with the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires in 1914 caused the tsar to impose military censorship on private publishing. Then followed the heightening domestic turmoil that culminated in the 1917 revolution, ending Imperial Russia and a relatively free press; for Lenin and his Bolsheviks, who seized power in November, so well knew the power of the printed word that they eliminated privately-controlled publishing companies. Vladimir Nabokov, Russian-American novelist and memoirist, provides a measure of the change in this summation: “Under the Tsars (despite the inept and barbarous character of their rule) a freedom-loving Russian had incomparably more possibility and means of expressing himself than at any time during Vladimir Lenin’s and Josef Stalin’s regime. He was protected by law. There were fearless and independent judges in Russia.” Following Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin bested all rivals to emerge as the leader of the Party by the next year. Under him in 1936, the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made clear that publishing was to achieve the objectives of the socialist order as determined by the Communist Party. Harsh penalties awaited violators of laws against “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.”

Enforcing limits on the printed word—and all cultural and artistic expression—was maintained by means of a vast censorship apparatus known as Glavlit (the Chief Administration for the Protection of State Secrets) and only official institutions published newspapers (e.g., the Communist Party published *Pravda*). Each publishing house answered to the State Committee for Publishing, Printing, and the Book Trade. Party authorities approved all editors and publishers of newspapers, magazines, and journals.

After Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev began his eight-year dominance (1956–1964) as first secretary, and his effort to “de-Stalinize” the USSR brought his famous but short-lived “thaw” in censorship, especially with respect to literary and scholarly journals and the newspaper *Izvestiia*. Direct criticisms of the founding principles of the state or of system of government remained illegal, however, until 1986 when Mikhail S. Gorbachev, as general secretary, liberalized publishing practices under the term *glasnost*.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GLASNOST; GLAVLIT; GO-SIZDAT; INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM; NEWSPAPERS

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CHARLES A. RUIID

CENTRAL ASIA

The notion of “Central Asia” for Russia was the result of a gradual, often haphazard advance south-

ward during the country's history. The region has been called different terms in the past and it was not until the twentieth century that one saw the term "Central Asia and Kazakhstan" noted. Politically, it still is often restricted to the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. However, from a cultural perspective, "Central Asia" often encompasses a broader territorial range, that includes Afghanistan, Xinjiang (China), and the Northwest Territories of Pakistan.

Historically, Central Asia has often been called the last colonial holding of the Russian Empire, a possession acquired during the famed "Great Game" struggle with the British Empire. The region of what is today Kazakhstan was incorporated into the Russian empire as early as the eighteenth century, when the Tsarist government signed treaties with the various nomadic hordes that controlled the vast swaths of steppe territory. The purpose of these agreements was to allow Russian agricultural settlements to develop and, more important, to permit a secure trade route to the Russian holdings in eastern Siberia and the Far East. Indeed, the cities that currently exist in southern Russia and northern Kazakhstan—Orenburg, Omsk, Tomsk, Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar—were initially developed as "fortress towns" to protect the fur trade to and from the Far East.

Farther south, the conquest took more time. Early Russian forays into Central Asia took place in the sixteenth century, when Muscovy traders established contacts with the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva. However, relations were minimal for the next two centuries. It was not until the 1800s that tensions along the southern border prompted Russian military units to step up their activities. On one hand, the regional khanates were accused of kidnapping Russian settlers farther north and selling them into slavery. More significantly, Russia found itself in competition with the British Empire over control of the larger region between their empires south of Russia and north of India.

Consequently, Russian military units methodically captured one city after another in the 1850s and 1860s, with the fall of Tashkent and Bukhara in 1865 and 1868, respectively, being key events. By the 1870s, the region was either under direct Russian rule or controlled by two Russian protectorates—Bukhara and Khiva. While there were periodic anti-Russian revolts, none were significant enough to threaten stability in the region.

Central Asia was important to Russia for several reasons. First, it became a core supplier of raw materials. Not only were food and livestock important commodities in the region, but so were exportable industrial products. Minerals, coal, and timber from the northern parts of the region and cotton from the central and southern parts were integrated into the Russian economy. In particular, the shortage of cotton on the international market caused by the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) prompted Russian officials to expand cotton production in Central Asia for domestic use and for international trade purposes.

Second, Central Asia was strategically important. As noted, Russia found it was competing with Great Britain over South Asian possessions in what was often dubbed "the Great Game." As Russia expanded its control over the steppes of Kazakhstan and into the settled regions of Turkestan, attention was directed southward. It was not until the negotiated border agreement of 1895 that Russia and Great Britain came to terms with their respective holdings in Asia-Russian territory being what is today "Central Asia," and British territory being the regions of Pakistan and India. Afghanistan was seen as a "neutral buffer state," albeit under British influence.

Within the Russian-controlled region of Central Asia, major settlements in the north included the strategic Orenburg, Pavlodar, and Semipalatinsk. Further south, the cities of Vernyy, Pishpek, and Tashkent were critical. Some of these cities, such as Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva, were ancient cities with large indigenous populations. Others were Russian-dominated settlements. Railway lines connected all of these cities by the early twentieth century, making it easier for Russians to travel through the region.

The Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War were periods of great turmoil in Central Asia. It was not until 1922 that the Red Army forces under General Frunze were able to quell all significant opposition to the regime—both "White Army" forces and nationalist movements representing indigenous groups. The last "Basmachi" incursion into Central Asia took place in 1936, by which time the region was firmly in Soviet hands.

Throughout the Soviet period, Central Asia remained a source of raw materials. A more sinister usage of Central Asia for the Soviet state was the creation of detention camps within the Gulag system. Located in the western regions of Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—around the Aral Sea—these camps held thousands of political prisoners through the 1980s. In addition, Central Asia remained a “destination of exile” for other political dissidents who were forced to move from Russia proper. Indeed, this “tradition” predated the Soviet era. Under Josef Stalin, entire ethnic groups were deported to Central Asia, especially in the 1940s. Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Volga German, and others were sent to Central Asia as they were suspected of being Nazi sympathizers during World War II. Koreans that traditionally lived in the Soviet Union near the Korean peninsula were also deported to Central Asia in the 1950s. It was not until the 1980s that many of these peoples were able to return to their native lands.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the independent states of Central Asia have remained important to Russia. For much of the 1990s, indeed, Russian leaders considered it part of their “Near Abroad.” Even in the early twenty-first century, there is a sense that Central Asia is part of the Russian national security interest region. Trade relations, although decreasing since the Soviet era, remain significant. Energy transfer routes often pass through Russia and many communication links are still northward. There is also a cultural link that is somewhat important to Russia. Several million Russians continue to live in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. While this was often deemed a source of potential conflict, it is more the case that Russians living in Central Asia will become less attached to Russia proper as time passes.

One interesting trend that has taken place since the early 1990s is the change in nomenclature in the region. In Turkmenistan, for example, the city of Krasnovodsk has been renamed Turkmenbashi (after the current Turkmen president). In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, there have been some changes of names for mountains (Pik Somoni instead of Pik Kommunizm in Tajikistan) and regions (“wiloyat” instead of “oblast”). One finds the most significant name changes in Kazakhstan. Semipalatinsk has been renamed Semey, Alma-Ata has been renamed Almaty, and Ak-mola has been renamed Astana, to name a few. This sort of “cosmetic change” is important in the development of regional identities and is expected to continue. In addition, the use of Russian language and the Cyrillic alphabet are decreasing, further noting a cultural distancing from Russia.

Ultimately, Central Asia remains important to Russia, but in a limited way. Central Asian countries have increased their ties to other countries, such as China, Turkey, and the United States. In addition, as energy exports from Central Asia increase, Russia will find itself sharing influence in the region.

See also: BASMACHIS; COLONIAL EXPANSION; GULAG; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; ISLAM; KYRGYZSTAN AND KYRGYZ; NEAR ABROAD; TAJIKISTAN AND TAJIKS; TURKENISTAN AND TURKMEN; UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS

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ROGER KANGAS

CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is the highest monetary authority in the Russian Federation. It sets

and carries out Russian monetary policy, supervises the commercial banking system, and maintains the payments system. In addition, it holds majority ownership in Vneshtorgbank (Russia's state-controlled foreign trade bank) and Sberbank (the state savings bank). The Russian Constitution (ratified in December 1993) and the "Revised Law on the Central Bank" (passed in April 1995, modifying the 1990 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic "Law on the Central Bank") jointly provide the legal basis for its activities. Both the constitution and the revised law grant the CBR a high degree of formal independence from the government. While scholars disagree over the extent of the CBR's actual political independence during the post-communist transition, all concur that its policies played a pivotal role in Russian economic development.

The Russian Republic founded the CBR in July 1990, and Georgy Matyukhin, an academic, became its first director. This occurred in the context of a fierce sovereignty battle between the Soviet central government led by Mikhail Gorbachev and the Russian republic government led by Boris Yeltsin. Russian authorities transformed a branch of the State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank) into the CBR in an attempt to gain local control over Russian monetary and banking affairs. Both the Soviet and Russian governments subsequently took numerous steps to increase the influence of their respective central banks, and this so-called "war of the banks" represented one of the first efforts by a republic-level institution to pull away from the center. The struggle ended with the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. On January 1, 1992, the CBR took over the rest of Gosbank's resources in Russia, and Gosbank officially ceased to exist.

In April 1992, the CBR leadership passed from Matyukhin to former Gosbank director Viktor Gerashchenko. Numerous controversial incidents characterized Gerashchenko's first tenure as CBR head (1992–1994), such as the July 1992 decision to wipe out mutually accrued debt among Russian enterprises, thereby formally ending Russia's flirtation with "shock therapy"; the surprise introduction of a new Russian currency in July 1993; and Gerashchenko's support for the Russian parliament after Yeltsin's September 1993 decision to disband it. Gerashchenko lost his job in November 1994 as a consequence of the ruble's exchange rate collapse on "Black Tuesday" (October 11). His deputy Tatiana Paramonova served as acting CBR director until November 1995, when the Russian

Duma confirmed former acting finance minister and commercial banker Sergei Dubinin as CBR head. Dubinin was forced out after the massive Russian financial crisis of August 1998, which many blamed on CBR policy. Gerashchenko replaced Dubinin and enjoyed a second stormy tenure at the CBR until his resignation in March 2002. The Duma confirmed Russia's deputy finance minister, Sergei Ignatiev, as the new director shortly thereafter.

See also: BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; GOSBANK; SBERBANK.

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CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Central Committee was one of the central institutions in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), along with the Politburo, Secretariat, party congress, Central Auditing Commission, and Party Control Committee. Given the political system's centralist, monolithic aspirations, these central institutions bore heavy responsibilities. One of the Central Committee's main functions was to elect all Party leaders, including members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee. The Committee—whose members included powerful people in the Communist Party—met every six months in plenary session to approve decisions by the top levels of the party.

The Central Committee was also considered to be the highest organ of the party between congresses (the period known as the *sozyv*). According

to the party rules (*Ustav*), the Central Committee was supposed to “direct all the activities of the party and the local party organs, carry out the recruitment and the assignment of leading cadres, direct the work of the central governmental and social organizations of the workers, create various organs, institutions, and enterprises of the party and supervise their activities, name the editorial staff of central newspapers and journals working under its auspices, disburse funds of the party budget and verify their accounting.”

However, the Central Committee was large; in 1989, for example, it consisted of more than three hundred members. In actuality then, there were two Central Committees. One of them was the body of elected representatives of the Communist Party. The other was the name used in documents produced for and by any number of smaller Central Committee bodies, from the Politburo to the temporary commissions. Thus, the decrees of the Central Committee were seldom prepared by that body. Instead, the Politburo often initiated, discussed, and finalized them.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; POLITBURO; SECRETARIAT

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were elected as its first members. There was also a network of subordinate local control commissions. During 1921–1922, the Commission was harshly criticized for its part in suppressing factions within the party. On Vladimir Lenin’s initiative, the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 expanded the Commission and unified it with the corresponding state control agency Rabkrin (People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ And Peasants’ Inspection). V. V. Kuibyshev, a loyal supporter of General Secretary Josef Stalin, was appointed to head the new joint institution. Meeting in Joint Plenums with the Party’s Central Committee, the Commission henceforth played a major role in formulating policy both on internal party organization and general governmental affairs. In 1927 Grigory K. Ordzhonikidze took over leadership of the unified control agency. The Commission proved a highly effective tool in Stalin’s consolidation of power, gathering information on support for rival leaders among the party’s membership and later conducting disciplinary proceedings and extensive purges to root out oppositionists. Together with Rabkrin, it also played a major role in initiating and supervising economic policy during industrialization. In November 1930, A. A. Andreyev succeeded as head of the party–state control agency. In October 1931 he was replaced by J. E. Rudzutak. Both agencies were dissolved by the Seventeenth Party Congress (January–February 1934), which created a new Commission of Party Control, subordinated to the Central Committee.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; RABKRIN

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NICK BARON

CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION

The Central Control Commission was the agency of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) responsible for supervising party administration and discipline between 1920 and 1934.

The Ninth Party Congress established the Commission in September 1920 to oversee the party’s organization and membership, in particular to act against the growth of bureaucratism. F. E. Dzerzhinskii, E. A. Preobrazhinskii and M. K. Muralov

CENTRAL STATISTICAL AGENCY

The Central Statistical Agency of the Soviet Union and now Russia has had many different names. The latest is Goskomstat Rossiiskovo Federatsii (State Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation). The origins of the institution date from July 25, 1918, when the Council of People’s Commissars decreed the creation of an integrated entity called the

Central Statistical Agency (*Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie* [TsSU]) under its jurisdiction. The first director was Pavel Ilich Popov. Late in the 1920s TsSU operated as an independent people's commissariat, but was abolished at the beginning of 1930. Its functions were transferred to the state planning agency (Gosplan), operating under the name TsUNKhU. Later, on August 10, 1948, TsSU was separated from Gosplan, once again becoming a fully independent organ, this time attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. The journal *Vestnik statistiki* was inaugurated at this time, and TsSU began publishing its documents through *Gosstatizdat*. Goskomstat RF's Economic and Statistical Research Institute was created in 1963 under the name Research Institute for Computer Based Forecasting. The main computing center started soon thereafter in 1967. TsSU was transformed into the Gosudarstvennii Komitet SSSR po statistik (Goskomstat SSSR) in 1987.

The quality and reliability of Goskomstat's work has always been controversial among economists East and West. A consensus arose during the Cold War that the statistics were sufficiently accurate to support valid judgments about growth and international comparisons, but this appraisal later appeared misguided. Goskomstat's data showed Soviet GDP and per capita consumption growth exceeding that of the United States through 1988, a claim inconsistent with the USSR's internal collapse.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; GOSPLAN; POPOV, PAVEL ILICH

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STEVEN ROSEFIELDE

CHAADAYEV, PETER YAKOVLEVICH

(1794–1856), Muscovite philosopher and social critic.

Peter Yakovlevich Chaadayev is most famous for the publication of his "First Philosophical Letter" in 1836 in the journal *Telescope*, which shockingly provoked the subsequent debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers. The Russian intellectual Alexander Herzen declared Chaadayev's letter to be "a shot that rang out in the dark night" that "shook all thinking Russians." Count Benkendorf, chief of the Third Section (the secret police) under Tsar Nicholas I, considered Chaadayev's work to be that of a madman, and so Nicholas I had Chaadayev officially declared insane and ordered that all copies of the *Telescope* journal be confiscated. Chaadayev was placed under house arrest for about a year. The government ordered him to never publish anything again.

Chaadayev had written his "First Philosophical Letter Addressed to a Lady" as part of a series of eight "Philosophical Letters" not in Russian but in French, which he considered to be "the language of Europe." However, the editors of the journal *Telescope* published only the first letter in a comparatively weak Russian translation. Chaadayev designed his "Philosophical Letters" as a criticism of the history of Russian culture in general, and the effects of religious institutions in his country. He idealized the history and influence of the Roman Catholic Church, in order to point up the shortcomings of the Russian Orthodox Church. In particular, he lashed out at Russian serfdom and autocracy. He declared that Russians had made no impact upon world culture. Russia had no important past or present; it belonged neither to the East nor the West. He worried about the malignant growth of contemporary Russian nationalistic propaganda, which might lead Russians to construct some foolish past "golden age" or "retrospective utopia." In such a case, Russians would not take advantage of their unique cultural situation, and their cultural history might only serve as an example to others of what not to do.

Most Russians know Chaadayev simply as "a friend of Alexander Pushkin," or as a pro-Catholic ideologue. In fact, he did remain Pushkin's friend until the poet's death in 1837, but he never became a Roman Catholic. Chaadayev remained Russian Orthodox all of his life. In 1837 Chaadayev wrote his "Apologia of a Madman," an ironic claim that

Russia did indeed have a genuine history but only since the time of Peter the Great. Despite the fact that Russians had no "golden age" to fall back on, they should retain the ability to submit to outside cultural forces and thus have a potentially great future.

After 1836 Chaadayev continued to write articles on cultural and political issues "for the desk drawer." Chaadayev defies categorization; he was not a typical Russian Westernizer due to his idiosyncratic interest in religion; nor was he a Slavophile, even though he offered a possible messianic role for Russia in the future. He had no direct followers, aside from his "nephew" and amanuensis, Mikhail Zhikharev, who scrupulously preserved Chaadayev's manuscripts and tried to get some of them published after Chaadayev's death. Chaadayev's lasting heritage was to remind Russian intellectuals to evaluate any of Russia's supposed cultural achievements in comparison with those of the West.

See also: PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; SLAVOPHILES; WESTERNIZERS

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CHAGALL, MARC

(1887–1985), (Mark Zakharovich Shagal), artist.

Marc Chagall was born in Vitebsk, Russia (now in Belarus), a major center of Jewish culture. In 1906 he attended Yehuda Pen's School of Drawing and Painting in Vitebsk, moving to St. Petersburg

the next year. Over the next three years, he attended art classes at Nikolai Roerich's Society for the Encouragement of the Arts and at Savely Zeidenberg's private art academy. He also studied under Mstislav Dobuzhinsky at Elizaveta Zvantseva's art school. In 1910 Chagall left for Paris and settled in the Russian artist colony, La Ruche, in Montmartre. After the opening of his first personal exhibition at the gallery Der Sturm in Berlin in 1914, Chagall made a trip to Russia; the outbreak of World War I made a return to Paris impossible.

Chagall was an enthusiastic supporter of the Russian Revolution and was made the first Commissar for Fine Arts in Vitebsk in 1917. He formed the Vitebsk Popular Art School in 1919 and invited Dobuzhinsky, El Lissitzky, Pen, and Ivan Puni (Jean Pougny) to join the faculty. At the same time, Vera Yermolayeva, also teaching at the school, invited Kazimir Malevich to become a member of the staff. Malevich and his followers formed the Unovis (Affirmers of the New Art) group, devoted to Suprematism and essentially hostile to Chagall's leadership. In 1920, after a power struggle, Chagall resigned his directorship and moved to Moscow, where he worked in the Moscow State Yiddish Theater and the Habimah Theater as a set designer and muralist.

Growing increasingly disenchanted with the turmoil of the new communist state, he left Russia in 1922, immigrating to Berlin. After a year, he returned to Paris to find that many of the paintings he had left there were missing. However, he was still able in 1924 to mount his first major retrospective at the Galerie Barbazanges-Hoderbart. He moved to the United States in 1941, fleeing Nazi occupation, returning in 1948.

See also: KANDINSKY, VASSILY VASSILIEVICH; MALEVICH, KAZIMIR SEVERINOVICH

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MARK KONECNY

CHANCELLERY SYSTEM

From the 1470s, new demands (Novgorod's annexation, service and land registration, diplomacy) impinged upon the Muscovite court; its few literate officials multiplied and specialized. Embryonic offices between the 1530s and 1550s evolved into departments, "chancelleries" (*izby*, later *prikazy*), generating their own desiderata, becoming a significant (even dominating) element in Muscovite government—shaping the court and autocracy. From the 1530s to 1700, the "chancellery system" (*prikaznaia sistema*) became a full-fledged early modern state bureaucracy, in some ways more developed than its European counterparts, with differentiated offices and a professional administrative staff. It did not contend with estates, incorporated towns, ecclesiastical institutions, or parliamentary organs.

Warfare was the primary impetus to the chancellery system; its personnel and documentary language were nonecclesiastical, unlike those of medieval Europe. Chancellery parlance (*prikaznoi yazyk*) was basically standard Middle Russian, with some Mongol-Tatar fiscal and diplomatic terminology and very few Latinate words.

The chancelleries' primary interests were military affairs, diplomacy, taxation, and justice; education and social welfare virtually were absent. Seventy-six percent (117) of the chancelleries handled civil administration, 12 percent (18) royal court affairs, 8 percent (12) the tsar's personal matters; and 4 percent (6) the Patriarchate. Tsars and their cliques fashioned new bureaus at the start of a reign, and became acculturated to bureaucratic norms.

The authorities refurbished chancelleries as needed. One hundred thirty-six (90%) of the 153 chancelleries operated during the 1600s. While Ivan IV's military administrative, tax, provincial administrative, and justice reforms caused the chancelleries to flourish, his *Oprichnina* temporarily inflicted harm. Its separate chancelleries suffered a fate similar to that of the regular state (*Zemshchina*) bureaus; in 1570 he murdered the state secretaries and clerks of both after 1572, new military, financial, and judicial chancelleries appeared; the chancellery system broadened its control over the countryside. The Time of Troubles bludgeoned this system as rival throne claimants divided administrators. Moscow lost countryside control; the Poles shut down the chancelleries.

Mikhail Fyodorovich's first years witnessed many new court chancelleries, temporary military chancelleries, and *ad hoc* social grievance bodies (e.g., against dominance by unduly powerful individuals ["strong people"] and tax exemptions for magnates, well-to-do merchants, and monasteries). *Dyak* (clerk) corruption and bribery were conspicuous in the 1630s and 1640s; Alexei Mikhailovich's later reign and the 1649 *Ulozhenie* (Law Code) dampened these excesses.

Alexei's adviser Boris Morozov created several military chancelleries. Fyodor Alexeyevich's gifted courtiers Yuri Dolgoruky and Ilya Miloslavsky engendered financial and publication chancelleries and the May and November 1680 financial- and military-administrative reforms. They streamlined chancelleries by merging subordinate chancelleries into the Military (*Razryad*) and Foreign Affairs (*posolsky prikaz*) Chancelleries and the Chancellery of the Grand Treasury (*prikaz bolshoi kazny*)—the culmination of bureaucratic pyramiding from the 1590s. The 1682 Musketeers' Revolt partially unraveled the 1680 measures. Before 1700, Peter I's regime created six chancelleries; three of them inaugurated the Petrine navy. Peter then dismantled the chancelleries; other institutions, culminating in the colleges, replaced them.

The Kremlin enclosed most chancelleries. They housed tribunal hearings, clerks' writing tables, and document storage. Bigger chancelleries (Military, Foreign Affairs, Service Land [*pomestny prikaz*]) had separate buildings.

Historians have exaggerated in criticizing the Muscovite bureaucracy for its numerous offices and interference in one another's jurisdiction. Red-tape (*volokita*) aside, all knew where to go, though they might petition tribunals many times. Chancelleries of the realm possessed five hierarchies: The Military Chancellery, during interims of no major wars (when it manipulated all chancelleries), directed all military-related chancelleries; the Foreign Affairs Chancellery oversaw territorial chancelleries governing recently annexed non-Russian lands; the Chancellery of the Grand Revenue (*prikaz bolshogo prikhotoda*), supervised Northern Russian tax collection chancelleries (*cheti, chetverti*); the Chancellery of the Grand Court (*prikaz bolshogo dvortsa*) controlled the ill-understood royal court chancelleries; and the Patriarch's Service Chancellery (*patriarshy razryad*) oversaw five bureaus in the Patriarchate.

Nine chancelleries existed in the 1550s, 26 in the 1580s, 35 in the first decade of the 1600s, 57

in the 1610s; and 68 in the 1620s. Sizes of chancelleries varied enormously. The *pomestnyi prikaz* multiplied its staff the most: by 12 in 60 years, from 36 clerks in 1626 to 446 clerks in 1686. The *Razryad* reached 125, and the *posolskii prikaz* 40 clerks; temporary chancelleries (*sysknye prikazy*) had as few as 1 or 2.

At least 24 chancelleries (15%) functioned over a century. Under Romanov rule, 102 bureaus (75%) existed either 20 years or less (at least 80 years), highlighting Muscovite leadership's short-term versatility and perennial "matters of state" preoccupations. Mean chancellery longevity was 33 years, 84 years the median.

Chancellery jurisdiction was territorial or functional: one region, (e.g., Siberia) or one pan-territorial function (e.g., felony administration, collection of prisoner-of-war ransom monies). Larger chancelleries, for division of labor, had territorial or functional "desks" (*stoly*). The 1600s *razryad* had up to 12. Desks could be subdivided into *povytia* (sections).

Muscovy had no serious Roman law tradition. Chancellery officials' scribal virtuosity and ability to plan macro-operations (e.g., fortified lines, fortress construction, land surveys, tax assessment) were impressive, though they lacked the education of European chambers' lawyers and jurists, Ottoman *kapi-kulu* administrators, and Chinese dynastic bureaucrats. Monasteries mostly handled charity (alms and sick relief). Starting in the early 1700s, the state supported education and social welfare.

All chancellery officials from boyar to clerk took rigorous oaths (e.g., personal behavioral issues, secrecy). The chancellery work force was steeply hierarchical. Tribunals (sing. *sudya* or judge) of 2 to 6 men (usually 4) heard court trial cases and decided other business. Counselor state secretary (*dumny dyak*) was the highest, professional tribunal rank. Boyars and *okolnichie*, administrative nonprofessionals, infiltrated tribunals from 1600, subverting joint decision making. Solo decision making by the chief chancellery tribunal director became *de jure* in 1680.

Duma tribunal members by the 1690s garnered at the expense of the *dyak* and *podyachy* a greater share of cash salary entitlements (*oklady*) than in the 1620s. Those of boyars and *okolnichie* ranged between 265 and 1,200 rubles (617-ruble mean), and 300 and 760 rubles (385-ruble mean). War-

dens, bailiffs, watchmen, guards, furnace-men, and janitors were chancellery staff.

Prerevolutionary historiography described the evolution and structure of the chancelleries, their employees, and social interaction. Soviet historiography until the 1950s and 1960s neglected Muscovite administrative history in favor of topics explicitly related to class conflict.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; DYAK; IVAN IV; KREMLIN; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; OKOLNICHY; OPRICHNINA; PATRIARCHATE; PODYACHY; TIME OF TROUBLES

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CHAPAYEV, VASILY IVANOVICH

(1887–1919), soldier and Russian civil war hero.

Were it not for the eponymous novel and movie, historians would not likely have remembered the name of Chapayev, the unlettered commander of the Red Army's Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division during the Russian Civil War. He was instrumental in defeating Alexander Kolchak's "White" forces in the summer of 1919, but was killed in the action.

Dmitry Furmanov, the Chapayev brigade's political commissar, published a thinly-fictionalized memoir about Chapayev in 1923. A proto-Socialist Realist novel, *Chapayev* was an immediate best-seller and turned Chapayev into an overnight hero. Furmanov's book spawned a veritable "Chapayev industry" of songs, games, and jokes. Although *Chapayev* was still in print a decade after its publication and selling well, there can be little doubt that the immense popularity of the 1934 movie *Chapayev* extended the legend's life.

Made by two unknown directors, Georgy Vasiliev and Sergei Vasiliev, *Chapayev* debuted on November 7, 1934, on the seventeenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Reputed to be Stalin's favorite movie, *Chapayev* was also the biggest box-office hit of the 1930s, selling over 50 million tickets in a five-year period. Even foreign critics and émigré audiences loved the movie, which starred Boris Babochkin as the brash commander.

Regardless of what the historic Chapayev was "really" like as man and hero, on the printed page and on the screen, he was an antidote to the dreariness and conformity of Soviet life. Furmanov was not a particularly gifted writer. His novella is plainly written and disjointed. The "Vasilyev Brothers" were competent directors but no more than that. Their movie is a rather primitive example of the early sound film. As many critics have noted, Chapayev is an archetypal "cowboy," a free spirit who supports revolution, but in his own way. The paradox is that Chapayev is an unruly model for "homo Sovieticus," especially with the emphasis on man-as-machine in the 1930s. It is important to remember, however, that for Stalin, Chapayev was the perfect hero—a dead one.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; MOTION PICTURES; SOCIALIST REALISM

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DENISE J. YOUNGBLOOD

CHAPBOOK LITERATURE

Chapbook literature (*Lubochnaya literatura, narodnaya literatura*) refers to inexpensive books produced for lower-class readers, which were often associated with Moscow's Nikolsky Market, center of the chapbook industry in late imperial Russia.

The proliferation of chapbook literature in nineteenth-century Russia was linked to the steady rise of literacy after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the appearance of a mass market for affordable reading material. As had earlier been the case in Britain, France, and the German states, the

growth of the reading public in Russia was paralleled by the expansion of the commercial publishing industry, which produced increasing numbers of titles intended mainly for newly literate lower-class readers. In the first half of the nineteenth century, chapbook publishing was centered in St. Petersburg, but in the second half of the century, the most successful chapbook publishers were the Moscow firms of Sytin, Morozov, Kholmushin, Shaparov, and Abramov. By 1887 over three million copies of 336 chapbook titles were published, and more than 21 million copies of 2,028 titles in 1914. The chapbooks were usually written by people of peasant or lower-class origins, and sold by city hawkers or rural itinerant peddlers.

Folktales, chivalrous tales, spiritual and didactic works, historical fiction, war stories, and stories about merchants were the predominant subjects of commercial chapbooks for most of the nineteenth century, but by the beginning of the twentieth century, stories about crime, romance, and science accounted for a large share of the chapbook market. Lurid tales of criminal exploits were extremely popular, featuring heroes such as the bandit Vasily Churkin or the pickpocket "Light-fingered Sonka." Sonka eventually migrated from the pages of the chapbooks to the silver screen, becoming the heroine of a movie serial. Other stories celebrated individual success in achieving material wealth through education and hard work. Serial detective stories of foreign origin or inspiration, especially those recounting the thrilling adventures of the American detectives Nat Pinkerton and Nick Carter, enjoyed tremendous success in the late 1900s.

Many Russian intellectuals were dismayed at the popularity of the commercial chapbooks, which they viewed as expressions of a degenerate urban culture that was corrupting the hearts and minds of the Russian peasantry. Some, like Leo Tolstoy, tried to combat the chapbooks by producing a special "people's literature," others by publishing low-priced works from the contemporary literary canon. Literacy committees and zemstvos also produced cheap editions of belles lettres and popular science. The most successful commercial chapbook publisher, Ivan Sytin, began printing works by Tolstoy and other literary figures for a mass readership in 1884. The Orthodox Church, while condemning the harmful influence of the commercial chapbooks, published inexpensive editions of saints' lives, prayer books, the scriptures, religious stories, and even some works by secular authors. The state also subsidized the

publication of religious, moralistic, and patriotic literature for soldiers and the common people.

Chapbooks, like other publications, were subject to censorship in tsarist Russia. Although the state was concerned about the potentially subversive impact of commercial chapbooks on the common people, there was never a special censorship of publications intended to be read by the lower classes. The state did, however, impose restrictions on the titles that were available in libraries and reading rooms for the common people, or that could be read to popular audiences. Most restrictions were relaxed after the 1905 Revolution, when the preliminary censorship of publications was abolished.

During World War I, commercial publishers, with the encouragement of the state, produced chapbooks glorifying the exploits of Russian soldiers. After the February Revolution brought an end to the tsarist autocracy, there was a brief upsurge of often lascivious stories about Rasputin and the imperial family. Following the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks nationalized the commercial publishing houses and suppressed the chapbooks as part of their effort to transform popular tastes.

See also: CENSORSHIP; LUBOK.

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E. ANTHONY SWIFT

CHARSKAYA, LYDIA ALEXEYEVNA

(1875–1937); pseudonym of Lydia Alexeyevna Churilova; Russian novelist, poet, and actress.

Lydia Charskaya worked as an actress at the Alexandrinsky Theater from 1898 to 1924. Between 1901 and 1916 she published about eighty books, several of which became bestsellers, the most popular of which was *Princess Dzhavakha* (*Knyazhna Dzhavakha*, 1903).

The novels fall into four general categories: "institute" stories that take place in boarding schools for elite girls; historical novels about women; "autobiographical" novels that follow the heroine from boarding school to a career; and detective and adventure stories. The main theme throughout most of these stories is friendship among girls; the heroines generally are independent girls and women who seek adventure or some sort of diversion from the routine of everyday life. Later critics have commented that these characteristics account in large part for the books' wide popularity among young girls in early twentieth-century Russia.

Charskaya's reputation began to fade after 1912 when the critic Kornei Chukovsky published an article in which he wrote that her books were formulaic, repetitious, and excessive with respect to female emotions. She ceased publishing in 1916, and in 1920 Narkompros (People's Commissariat of Enlightenment) included her work on the list of "banned" books. From 1924 until her death in 1937 she lived in poverty, supported mostly by loyal friends. Throughout the Soviet period her work was regarded with disdain, although ample evidence exists that young girls continued secretly to read her books, at least through the 1930s. During the late 1980s and 1990s Charskaya's work enjoyed a revival in Russia, as several of her books appeared in new editions.

See also: CHUKOVSKY, KORNEI IVANOVICH

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ELIZABETH JONES HEMENWAY

CHARTER OF THE CITIES

The Charter of the Cities (Charter on the Rights and Benefits for the Towns of the Russian Empire) was

issued by Catherine the Great on April 21, 1785, together with the Charter to the Nobility; its importance is suggested by the fact that the date was Catherine's birthday. Also composed, but never issued, was a Charter for State Peasants. All three charters are parallel in structure, down to individual articles, indicating that they were intended as a single body of legislation establishing definitions, duties, rights, and privileges for three important legal estates.

The Charter has 178 articles, of which article 123 comprises an Artisans' Regulation of 117 articles. Building on earlier laws on urban administration, the Charter instituted an urban corporation comprising six categories of inhabitants: (1) owners of immovable property (houses, shops, land); (2) merchants in three guilds (delineated by self-declared capital); (3) artisans in craft corporations; (4) merchants from other towns or governments; (5) "eminent" citizens (by education, wealth, or public service); and (6) long-time residents unqualified for other categories but earning a living in town. There are detailed instructions for establishing eligibility and compiling registries of all these groups.

Each category elected representatives to a town council and a single delegate to a six-man council that administered affairs between plenary assemblies of the larger body. Towns were given limited rights to raise taxes, although little was said in general about finances.

The Charter applied especially to St. Petersburg and Moscow, less so to small towns often lacking all six categories. Still it was instituted, at least on paper, in the more than four hundred towns in the empire. The Charter was replaced by a command structure of municipal administration by Emperor Paul (1797), but reinstated by Alexander I (1802). As an example of grand principles applied across the board without regard to local circumstances, the Charter remained a poorly functioning basis for urban administration until 1870, when replaced by the reform of Alexander II.

See also: CATHERINE II; CHARTER OF THE NOBILITY

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GEORGE E. MUNRO

CHARTER OF THE NOBILITY

The Charter of the Nobility (often referred to as The Charter to the Nobility) was issued by Catherine the Great in 1785. The Charter should not be seen as an isolated document. Rather it is the product of a broad legislative and administrative agenda. Related documents that link the Charter are those that formed the Legislative Commission of 1767, the actual Statute of Local Administration of 1775, and the Charter to the Towns (also called Charter of the Cities) of 1785.

The eighteenth century in Russia, as in Europe, saw substantial advancement in the power, wealth, and prestige of the nobility. In Russia, this impetus came after 1725, the year of Peter the Great's death. Through various means, including personal dictate and the Table of Ranks (1722), Peter was able to enforce considerable adherence to the practice of two things he deemed necessary: compulsory state service and advancement by merit, not lineage. His death signified that the nobility would immediately begin to reclaim its privileges.

This process united the Russian nobility despite its disparate makeup. By 1762, when Peter III was on the throne, just prior to Catherine the Great's accession, a law was passed emancipating the nobles from compulsory service to the state. Catherine's rule (1762-1796) was decidedly pro-aristocracy. Whether the measures she undertook were seen in the context of modernizing Russian administration or in advancing reform, they were not detrimental to the nobility's agenda. The aristocrats were in the ascendancy, Catherine was a supreme pragmatist, and the state was satisfied with being able to partially regularize the affairs of its principal class. Specialists often point out that this regularization led to a semblance of the rule of law in an autocratic state. Specific rights and duties were clearly defined. When one looks at the actual Charter of the Nobility, one sees what appears to be an extension of rights.

Isabel de Madariaga (1990) accurately breaks down the rights by category. In terms of personal rights, the Charter guaranteed the nobles trial by their peers, no corporal punishment, freedom from the poll tax, freedom from compulsory army duty, the right to travel abroad, and the right to enter foreign service. (This is a partial list.) Property rights were enhanced by allowing the nobles to exploit their mineral and forest resources. Manufacturing on their own land was permitted and the right to

purchase serfs was reinforced. As for corporate rights, the nobility's rights of assembly were solidified and they were given the privilege of directly petitioning the empress. Historically, the upper nobility exercised this right anyway, whether it was written or not.

The Charter clearly was not a new concession to the nobility. But it consolidated numerous conditions and prerogatives. It is important to observe that serious advancement in power and prestige was still linked to government service.

The principal effects of the Charter are not always precisely traceable since so many varied elements intersected. Yet, it is safe to say that the aristocracy's role in local and regional affairs was magnified. The central government's apparatus for these political functions could thus be partially trimmed. Some authors indicate a potential distancing between the central and provincial governments. It is not clear how much administrative unification or cohesion resulted at either level of government because of the Charter's promulgation.

See also: CATHERINE II; CHARTER OF THE CITIES; PETER I

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NICKOLAS LUPININ

CHASTUSHKA

A very popular modern Russian folk lyrical miniature or short song performed solo or by a chorus in a monothematic style.

Deriving from the Russian word *chasto* meaning "rapid," the *chastushka* is very simple in structure, usually consisting of four-line stanzas that are repetitively sung at a rapid tempo. It had its origins in simple and repetitive rhythmic peasant songs, usually based on folk sayings and proverbs and performed as overtures to dance music cycles. The advent of the balalaika (a two- and later three-string musical instrument) in the eighteenth cen-

tury, which was mainly used to accompany dance performances, helped to crystallize the *chastushka* into a new musical genre sometime at the turn of the nineteenth century. From the mid-nineteenth century, the harmonica came to play an increasingly important role as an accompanying instrument and soon became the standard. Today, *chastushki* are of four main types: the four- and six-line lyrical, satirical (sometimes obscene), etc. accompanied choral songs; dance songs; paradoxical and fable songs; and two-line "suffering" or lamentation songs. The satirical *chastushki* have been the most common, in large part because of their amusing and didactic nature as well as their use in expressing socio-political thoughts of the day. The growing social and political grievances, particularly after the Great Reforms of 1861 and industrialization, were commonly expressed in these *chastushki* that satirized the tsarist regime, the nobles, and the Church. In this way, the *chastushka* became a vehicle for venting the growing frustration of the peasants and industrial workers. Its peasant origins and simple structure made the *chastushka* a very attractive form of spreading Soviet propaganda and engineering a new "socially and politically conscious" Soviet citizen after the Revolutions of 1917.

See also: FOLK MUSIC

ROMAN K. KOVALEV

CHAYANOV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH

(1888–1937), pseudonym Ivan Kremnev, theoretician of the peasant family farm, leading chair of agricultural economics in Soviet Russia in the 1920s.

Born in Moscow, Alexander Chayanov entered the famous Moscow Agricultural Institute in 1906 (known as the Petrovsky Agricultural Academy from 1917 to 1923 and as the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy since 1923) and graduated with a diploma in agricultural economics in 1911. Appointed associate professor in 1913, he became full professor and chair of the agricultural organization in 1918, and worked at the academy until his arrest in 1930. In 1919 he was appointed director of the Seminar of Agricultural Economy. In 1922 this institution became the Research Institute for Agricultural Economics and Politics. As director, Chayanov gathered an illustrious body of re-

searchers. Often traveling abroad from 1911 onward, he became an internationally recognized specialist in his field, forming a network of correspondence in more than sixty countries. Chayanov actively participated in the Russian cooperative movement, filling leading positions during World War I and after the Revolution. From 1917 onward, he also took part in shaping agricultural policy, drafting plans for agricultural development at the Peoples Commissariat for Agriculture and the State Planning Commission.

Accused of being the head of the "Toiling Peasant Party," Chayanov was arrested in 1930. Only in 1987 did details of his further fate become known. Although the planned show trial never took place, he was sentenced to five years in prison in 1931 and exiled to Kazakhstan. Released due to his poor state of health, Chayanov worked from 1933 to 1935 in the Kazakh Agricultural Institute in Alma-Ata, teaching statistics. In connection with the show trial against Bukharin, he was newly arrested in March 1937, sentenced to death October 3, 1937, and shot the same day in Alma-Ata.

Belonging to the "neopopulist tradition," in the 1920s Chayanov became the most eminent theoretician of its Organization and Production School of Agricultural Doctrine. His fundamental work, *Peasant Farm Organization* (1925), was published in an earlier form in 1923 in Berlin. Emphasizing the viability of peasant agriculture and its ability to survive, he posited a special economic behavior of peasant households that relied almost exclusively on the labor of family members. Unlike the capitalist enterprise, the peasant family worked for a living, not for a profit, thus the degree of "self-exploitation" was determined not by capitalist criteria but by a hedonic calculus. He envisioned the modernization of traditional small farming not as part of capitalist or socialist development, but as part of a peasant process of raising the technical level of agricultural production through agricultural extension work and cooperative organization. His vision of a future peasant Russia is described in his utopian novel *Journey of My Brother Alexei to the Land of Peasant Utopia* (1920). This work later became instrumental in his downfall. His studies on the optimal size of agricultural enterprises are of interest even today. Chayanov's theory of the peasant mode of production challenged the Marxist interpretation of differentiation of the peasantry into classes by positing the idea of a cyclical mobility based on the peasant family life cycle.

Chayanov's ideas have survived him. His work after his arrest was rediscovered in the West in the mid-1960s. His pioneering study of the family labor farm now claimed the attention of agricultural sociologists, anthropologists, and ethnologists working on developing countries where the peasant economy remains a predominant factor. In spite of the problematic nature of part of his work, it is generally seen as an important contribution to the development of the theory of peasant economy.

See also: AGRICULTURE; PEASANT ECONOMY

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STEPHAN MERL

CHEBRIKOV, VIKTOR MIKHAILOVICH

(b. 1923), Soviet party and police official; head of the KGB from 1982 to 1988.

Born in Ukraine, Viktor Chebrikov, an ethnic Russian, served at the Soviet front during World War II as a battalion commander. He became a member of the Communist Party in 1944 and earned a higher degree in engineering at the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute after the war. In 1951 Chebrikov moved from engineering into full-time party work and served in various party administrative posts in the Ukrainian city and region of Dnepropetrovsk, rising to become second secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Obkom (regional party committee) in 1964. In 1967 Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev, a native of Dnepropetrovsk, appointed Chebrikov to the post of head of personnel for the KGB (Committee of State Security) the Soviet security and intelligence apparatus. In 1968 Chebrikov became a deputy chairman of the KGB,

and in early 1982 first deputy chairman, serving under Yuri Andropov. A Brezhnev loyalist, Chebrikov was elected to full membership in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party at the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in 1981. In December 1982, with Andropov having succeeded Brezhnev as party leader, Chernenko took over as chairman of the KGB. He served in this post for the next six years, becoming a full member of the Politburo in 1985, where he remained until party leader Mikhail Gorbachev edged him out in October 1988. Chebrikov moved back into the party apparatus, serving as party secretary responsible for police and legal affairs, but his political conservatism put him at odds with Gorbachev, who had embarked on a program of far-reaching reforms, including limitations on the powers of the KGB. Chebrikov represented the Brezhnevite old guard of the Soviet bureaucracy, and although he apparently favored some sort of economic restructuring to increase the efficiency of the Soviet economy, he was not an advocate of any democratic political reforms. Less than a year later, in September 1989, Chebrikov was abruptly dismissed from his party post; from there he faded into obscurity.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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AMY KNIGHT

CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS

The Chechens, who call themselves *noxchii* (singular *noxchi* or *noxchuo*) and their land *Noxchiin moxk* ("Chechen land"), are the largest indigenous nationality of the North Caucasus. They speak a language of the Nakh-Daghestanian, or East Caucasian language family that is native to the Caucasus, and have lived in or near their present locations for millennia.

DEMOGRAPHY AND CUSTOMS

Chechnya is a small territory of about 5,000 sq. mi. (13,000 sq. km.) corresponding to about 85

percent of the historical Chechen lands (the rest is in today's Daghestan), with some non-Chechen steppe land added in the north. The lower North Caucasus foothills and adjacent plain including the capital city of Grozny (*Soelzha-ghaala* "Sunzha City" in Chechen, a name still much in use despite its official renaming to Djohar in 1996) are the most densely populated part of Chechnya. The Chechens numbered just over a million in mid-2000 according to a Danish Refugee Council census. Somewhat over half of the world's Chechens live in Chechnya; most of the others are scattered throughout Russia, several tens of thousands live in Kazakhstan and nearby, and a few tens of thousands in Jordan, Turkey, and Syria.

The ethnonym *noxchii* is the self-designation of all speakers of Chechen on the north slope of the Caucasus Mountains but not of the Chechen-speaking Kisti on the south slope in Georgia. Though the Chechens and the neighboring Ingush have separate languages, national identities, and ethnonyms, they recognize an overarching ethnic unity (which also includes the Kisti) that they call *vai naax*, or "our people." Chechen and Ingush are distinct languages and not mutually intelligible, but because of widespread passive bilingualism the two languages make up a single speech community in which each person speaks his or her own language and understands the other. Chechens recognize a larger supranational ethnic and political identity of *laamanxoi* ("mountain people") that includes all the indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus.

In the nineteenth century, Chechen society consisted of about 130 patrilineal exogamous clans (Chechen *taipa*), most of which fell into one or another of nine clan confederations or tribes (Chechen *tuqam*), each of which had its own dialect. The Noxchmaxxoi (or Ichkerians) of the central and eastern foothills were the largest and most powerful. The confederations had some mutual economic and defense obligations, and as Chechen resistance to Russian conquest solidified in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the other confederations began to take on the ethnonym *noxchi* on which the name of the Noxchmaxxoi is based. The charismatic resistance leaders were Muslims, and one result of the war was solidification of a Chechen national consciousness with Sufi-based Sunni Islam as one of its components. The social and religious functions of clans are by now diminished, although the great majority of Chechens still observe clan exogamy. Islam was actively practiced throughout the Soviet period.

Prior to the Russian conquest, Chechen society was prosperous and egalitarian, with no social distinctions other than earned wealth and earned honor. There was no government, though the society was ruled by a strong and uniform code of law. Penalties were set by respected elders, and fines were collected or death penalties carried out by the victim or the offended family. (The misnomers “blood feud,” “vendetta,” and “vengeance” are commonly used of this decentralized system.) Traditional justice has served the Chechens through the Soviet and post-Soviet periods whenever civil justice has failed to function.

Chechen social interaction is based on principles of honor, chivalry, hospitality, and respect, and on formality between certain individuals and families. Relations within the family are close and warm, but in public or when guests are present younger brothers are formal in the presence of older brothers and all are formal in the presence of their father. Behavior of men toward women, whether formal or not, is always chivalrous. Unlike some Muslim societies, Chechen women are and always have been free to associate with men in public, hold positions of responsibility in all lines of work, supervise men at work, and so on, but chivalry is strictly observed and creates social distance between men and women. An individual’s social standing depends largely on how well he or she shows respect and extends hospitality to others.

From the middle ages to the sixteenth or seventeenth century, Chechen families of means built five-story defense towers and two-story dwelling compounds of stone in highland villages, usually one tower per village. Today, each tower is associated with a clan that traces its origin to that village, and each highland village is (or was until deportations in the Soviet era) inhabited by one clan that owns communal fields and pastures, a cemetery, and (prior to the conversion to Islam) one or more shrines. The majority of Chechen clans have such highland roots; a few lowland clans do not, and these are generally assimilated clans originally of other nationalities.

The Chechen highlands, though the center of clan and pre-Muslim religious identity, supported a limited population and therefore traditional Chechen society was vertically distributed, with highlanders (herders) and lowlanders (grain farmers) economically dependent on each other. In cold periods such as the Little Ice Age (middle ages to mid-nineteenth century), highland farming became marginal and downhill movement increased. The



Chechen women flee the village of Assinovskaya for neighboring Ingushetia, December 1999. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS

late middle ages were a time of intensification in the forested foothills of Chechnya, when foothill towns were founded, ethnic identity as *noxchi* began to spread through the foothills, and the lowlands became the wealthier and culturally prestigious part of the society. The peak of the Little Ice Age coincided with the beginning of the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the Chechen economy was destroyed as the lowlanders were expelled, their lands seized, and at least half of the lowland population slaughtered or deported to the Ottoman Empire (the Chechens of Jordan, Turkey, and Syria are descendants of these and postwar deportees).

HISTORY, TREATIES, EXTERNAL RELATIONS

In 1859 Imam Shamil, leader of the fierce Dagestani-Chechen resistance to Russian conquest, surrendered to the Russian forces. No nation or government surrendered, and in particular the Chechens did not surrender (and indeed had no government that



A Russian soldier aims his machine gun during Russia's second war with Chechnya. © AFP/CORBIS

could have surrendered) and have essentially never considered themselves legitimately part of Russia. Their best land was seized and given to Cossack or Russian settlers, and perhaps half of their surviving population was deported or coerced or deceived into emigrating to the Ottoman Empire. A large Chechen uprising in 1877–78 was put down by Russian military force. A North Caucasus state, the Mountain Republic, including Chechnya, formed in 1917 and declared its independence in 1918. Individual North Caucasian groups, including the Chechens, fought against the Whites in the Russian civil war. In 1920 the Red Army occupied the North Caucasus lowlands but then oppressed the population and a yearlong war in Chechnya and Daghestan ensued. A Soviet Mountain Republic (the North Caucasus minus Daghestan) in 1921 recognized the Soviet government on the latter's promise (via nationalities commissar Josef Stalin) of religious and internal-political autonomy. But in 1922 the Bolsheviks attacked Chechnya (to "pacify" it), removed it from the Mountain Republic, and in 1924 "liquidated" the rest of the Republic. In 1925

there was another bloody "pacification" of Chechnya. In a 1929 Chechen rebellion against collectivization, the leaders created a provisional government and presented formal demands to the Soviet government, which officially promised Chechen autonomy but attacked again soon after. Probably at least thirty thousand Chechens were killed in purges connected with collectivization. In 1936 Chechnya was merged with Ingushetia into a hybrid Chechen-Ingush ASSR. In 1944 the entire Chechen and Ingush population was deported and the ASSR "liquidated." They were "rehabilitated" in 1956 and the ASSR reinstated in 1957. In 1991 Chechnya declared independence and Ingushetia separated off. The 1994–1996 Russian-Chechen War was initiated in part to prevent Chechnya's secession. The 1997 Khasavyurt treaty after the war promised Russian withdrawal from and noninterference in Chechnya, a decision on independence after five years, and Russian aid in rebuilding the devastated country. (The wording implies Chechen independence; e.g. "The agreement on the fundamentals of relations between Russian Federation

and the Chechen Republic being determined in accordance with generally recognized norms of international law shall be reached prior to December 31, 2001.”) This is the first treaty the Chechens have made as a nation. They honored it; Russia did not, but diverted aid funds, supported radical Islamists and militants, began planning to invade Chechnya in early 1999, and did so on a pretext in late 1999, initiating a destructive war designed to solidify political power in Moscow but otherwise still incompletely understood.

The Chechen demographic losses of the twentieth century are: 1920–1921 Red Army invasion, nearly 2 percent of the population killed; collectivization in 1931, more than 8 percent; 1937 purges, more than 8 percent; mass deportation in 1944, 22 percent killed in the deportation process and another 24 percent dead of starvation and cold in the first two or three years afterward; 1994–1996 Russian-Chechen War, between 2 percent and 10 percent (figures vary), mostly civilians; a similar figure for the second Russian-Chechen War, begun in 1999; conservative total well over 60 percent. In the early twenty-first century many Chechens are war refugees or otherwise displaced. The overarching cause has probably been Russian official hate dating back to the nineteenth century when the Chechens were the largest and most visible of the groups resisting Russian conquest, fueled by continued Chechen nonassimilation and resistance. Besides many civilian deaths and refugees the two wars have brought numerous violations of Chechen human rights by Russian forces, destruction of the economy and infrastructure of Chechnya, open prejudice and violence against southern peoples across Russia, and a small but conspicuous radical Islamist movement in Chechnya.

See also: CAUCASIAN WAR; CAUCASUS; DEPORTATIONS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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JOHANNA NICHOLS

CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH

(1860–1904), short-story writer and dramatist.

Anton Pavlovich Chekhov was the author of several hundred works of short fiction and of several plays that are among the most important and influential dramatic works of the twentieth century. He was also a noted public figure who in his opinions and actions often challenged notions that were dominant in Russian social thought of the time.

Chekhov was born the grandson of a serf, who had purchased his freedom prior to the emancipation of the serfs, and the son of a shop owner in the Black Sea port of Taganrog, a town with a very diverse population. He received his primary and secondary education there, first in the parish school of the local Greek church, and from 1868 in the Taganrog Gymnasium, where his religion instructor, a Russian Orthodox priest, introduced his students to works of Russian and European literature. In 1876 his father declared bankruptcy, and the family moved to Moscow to avoid creditors. Chekhov remained in Taganrog to finish at the Gymnasium. During this period, he apparently read literature intensively in the Taganrog public library and began to write works of both fiction and drama. In 1879 Chekhov completed the Gymnasium, joined his family in Moscow, and began study in the medical department of Moscow University.



Novelist and playwright Anton Chekhov. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

Chekhov later credited his medical education with instilling in him a respect for objective observation and attention to individual circumstances. While in medical school, at the suggestion of his elder brother Alexander, a journalist, Chekhov began to contribute to the so-called satirical journals, weekly periodicals that appealed primarily to lower-class urban readers with a mix of drawings, humorous sketches, and other brief entertainment items. By the time Chekhov finished his medical courses in 1884, he was already established as a successful writer for the satirical journals and was the primary support for his parents and siblings. Although Chekhov never entirely abandoned medicine, by the mid-1880s he devoted his efforts mainly to his career as a writer, gradually gaining access to increasingly serious (and better-paying) newspapers and journals, most notably in *New Times*, published by the influential newspaper magnate Alexei Suvorin, and then in various "thick journals." Chekhov first appeared in a thick journal in 1888 with his long story "The Steppe," published in the Populist journal *Northern Herald*. From that point on, Chekhov received increasing renown as the most significant, if problematic, author of

his generation. Through his objectivity and techniques of economy and implication, as well as the increasing seriousness and complexity of his themes, Chekhov emerged as a founder of the modern short story and one of the most influential practitioners of the form. Such works as "Sleepy," "The Steppe," "The Name-Day Party" (all 1888), "A Boring Story" (1889), "The Duel" (1891), "The Student" (1894), "My Life" (1896), and "The Lady with a Lapdog" (1899) rank among the greatest achievements of short fiction.

In drama, after hits with several one-act farces but mediocre success with serious full-length plays, Chekhov emerged as an innovator in drama with the first of his four major plays, *The Seagull* (1895). Although the first production in Petersburg in 1896 continued Chekhov's string of theatrical failures, a new production by the newly formed Moscow Art Theater in 1898, based on new principles of staging and acting, won belated recognition as a new departure in drama. Subsequent Moscow Art Theater productions of *Uncle Vanya* (staged 1899), *Three Sisters* (1901), and *The Cherry Orchard* (1904) solidified Chekhov's reputation as a master of a new type of drama and led to the worldwide influence of his plays and of Moscow Art Theater techniques. In addition, Chekhov's association with the Moscow Art Theater led to his marriage to one of the theater's actresses, Olga Leonardovna Knipper, in 1901.

In addition to his strictly literary activity, Chekhov also was engaged in a number of the social issues of his day. For instance, he assisted schools and libraries in his hometown of Taganrog, Melikhovo (the village near his estate), and Yalta, and served as a district medical officer during a cholera outbreak while he was living at Melikhovo. He also initiated practical programs for famine relief during a crop failure in 1891 and 1892. Earlier, in 1890, he undertook the arduous journey across Siberia to the island of Sakhalin, which served at the time as a Russian penal colony. There Chekhov conducted a detailed sociological survey of the population and eventually published his observation as a book-length study of the island and its inhabitants, *The Island of Sakhalin* (1895), a work that eventually brought about amelioration of penal conditions. Most famously, Chekhov broke with his longtime friend, patron, and editor Suvorin over Suvorin's support of Alfred Dreyfus's conviction for espionage in France and opposed the anti-Semitic stance taken by Suvorin's paper *New Times*.

From the 1880s until his death, Chekhov suffered from tuberculosis, a disease that necessitated his move in 1898 from a small estate (purchased in 1892) outside Moscow to the milder climate of Yalta in the Crimea. He also spent time on the French Riviera. Finally in 1904 he went to Germany in search of treatment and died in Badenweiler in southern Germany in July of that year.

See also: MOSCOW ART THEATER; SUVORIN, ALEXEI SERGEYEVICH; THICK JOURNALS

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ANDREW R. DURKIN

CHERKESS

The Cherkess are one of the two titular nationalities of the north Caucasian Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia in the Russian Federation. In the Soviet period this area underwent several administrative reorganizations but was then established as an autonomous oblast (province) within the Stavropol Krai. The capital is Cherkessk and was founded in 1804. The Cherkess form only about 10 percent of the oblast's population, which numbers 436,000 and 62 percent of whom make their livings in agriculture, animal husbandry, and bee-keeping. Health resorts are also an important local source of employment and revenue here, as it is in most of the North-West Caucasian region.

The Cherkess belong to the same ethnolinguistic family as the Adyge and the Kabardians, who live in neighboring republics, and they speak a subdialect of Kabardian, or "Eastern Circassian." Soviet nationalities policies established these three groups as separate "peoples" and languages, but historical memory and linguistic affinity, as well as post-Soviet ethnic politics, perpetuate notions of ethnic continuity. An important element in this has been the contacts, since the break-up of the Soviet

Union, with Circassians living in Turkey, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Western Europe, and the United States. These are mostly the descendents of migrants who left for the Ottoman Empire in the mid- and late nineteenth century after the completion of the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. The long and painful process of conquest firmly established "the idea of Circassians" as "noble savages" in the Russian imagination.

The Cherkess are Muslims, but other religious influences can be discerned in their cultural practices, including Greek Orthodox Christianity and indigenous beliefs and rituals. The Soviet state discouraged the practice of Islam and the perpetuation of Muslim identity among the Cherkess, but it supported cultural nation-building. In the post-Soviet period, interethnic tensions were clearly apparent in the republic's presidential elections. However, Islamic movements, generally termed "Wahhabism," are in less evidence among the Cherkess than with other groups in the North Caucasus. The wars in Abkhazia (from 1992 to 1993) and Chechnya (1994–1997; 1999–2000) have also affected Cherkess sympathies and politics, causing the Russian state to intermittently infuse the North West Caucasus republics with resources to prevent the spreading of conflict.

See also: ADYGE; CAUCASUS; KABARDIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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SETENEY SHAMI

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH

(1911–1985), general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1983–1985).

Konstantin Chernenko was born on September 24, 1911, in a village in the Krasnoyarsk region of Russia. He spent his entire career in the party and worked his way up the ranks in the field of agitation and propaganda. In 1948 he became the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department in the new Republic of Moldavia. There he got to know the future party leader Leonid Brezhnev, who became the republic's first secretary in 1950. Chernenko rode Brezhnev's coattails to the pinnacle of Soviet power. After Brezhnev became a Central Committee secretary, he brought Chernenko to Moscow in 1956 to work in the party apparatus. When Brezhnev became the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1960, he appointed Chernenko the head of its secretariat. After Brezhnev became General Secretary, Chernenko became the head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) General Department in 1965, a Central Committee secretary in 1976, a candidate member of the Politburo in 1977, and a full member of the Politburo in 1978. In the Secretariat Chernenko oversaw its administration and controlled the paper flow within the party.

At the end of his life, Brezhnev was actively advancing Chernenko to be his successor. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chernenko was given a broader role in the party and a higher profile than any of the other contenders: He traveled frequently with Brezhnev and published numerous books and articles. In an apparent effort to show that he would pay attention to the growing pressures for reform of the Soviet system, Chernenko started an active campaign for paying more attention to citizens' letters to the leadership. He also stressed the importance of public opinion and the need for greater party democracy. He warned that dangers similar to those that arose from Poland's Solidarity movement could happen in the Soviet Union if public opinion was ignored. However, his experience in the party remained very limited, and he never held a position of independent authority.

When Brezhnev died in November 1982, Chernenko was passed over, and the party turned to the more experienced Yuri Andropov as its new leader. However, when Andropov died a little over a year later in February 1984, the party chose the seventy-two-year-old Chernenko as its leader. This was a last desperate effort by the sclerotic Brezh-

nev generation to hold on to power and block the election of Mikhail Gorbachev, who was Chernenko's chief rival for the job and had been advanced by Andropov. As had become the practice after Brezhnev became party leader, Chernenko also served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the head of state.

Chernenko served only thirteen months as party leader. During the last few months he was ill, and he rarely appeared in public. This was primarily a period of marking time, and little of note happened in domestic or foreign policy during his tenure. The rapid pace of personnel changes that had begun under Andropov ground to a halt, as did the few modest policy initiatives of his predecessor. Mikhail Gorbachev's active role during this period was marked by intense political maneuvering to succeed the frail Chernenko. When Chernenko died in March 1985, the torch was passed to the next generation with the selection of Gorbachev as his successor.

See also: AGITPROP; BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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MARC D. ZLOTNIK

CHERNOBYL

The disaster at Chernobyl (Ukrainian spelling: Chornobyl) on April 26, 1986 occurred as a result of an experiment on how long safety equipment would function during shutdown at the fourth reactor unit at Ukraine's first and largest nuclear power station. The operators had dismantled safety mechanisms at the reactor to prevent its automatic shutdown, but this reactor type (a graphite-moderated Soviet RBMK) became unstable if operated at low power. An operator error caused a power surge that blew the roof off the reactor unit, releasing the contents of the reactor into the atmosphere for a period of about twelve days.

The accident contaminated an area of about 100,000 square miles. This area encompassed about 20 percent of the territory of Belarus; about


8 percent of Ukraine; and about 0.5-1.0 percent of the Russian Federation. Altogether the area is approximately the size of the state of Kentucky or of Scotland and Northern Ireland combined. The most serious radioactive elements to be disseminated by the accident were Iodine-131, Cesium-137, and Strontium-90. The authorities contained the graphite fire with sand and boron, and coal miners constructed a shelf underneath it to prevent it from falling into the water table.

After the accident, about 135,000 people were evacuated from settlements around the reactor, including the town of Pripyat (population 45,000), the home of the plant workers and their families, and the town of Chernobyl (population 10,000), though the latter remained the center of the cleanup operations for several years. The initial evacuation zone was a 30-kilometer (about 18.6 miles) radius around the destroyed reactor unit. After the spring of 1989 the authorities published maps to show that radioactive fallout had been much more extensive, and approximately 250,000 people subsequently moved to new homes.

Though the Soviet authorities did not release accurate information about the accident, and classified the health data, under international pressure they sent a team of experts to a meeting of the IAEA (The International Atomic Energy Agency) in August 1986, which revealed some of the causes of the accident. The IAEA in turn was allowed to play a key role in improving the safety of Soviet RBMK reactors, though it did not demand the closure of the plant until 1994. A trial of Chernobyl managers took place in 1987, and the plant director and chief engineer received sentences of hard labor, ten and five years respectively.

Chernobyl remains shrouded in controversy as to its immediate and long-term effects. The initial explosion and graphite fire killed thirty-one operators, firemen, and first-aid workers and saw several thousand hospitalized. Over the summer of 1986 up until 1990, it also caused high casualties among cleanup workers. According to statistics from the Ukrainian government, more than 12,000 "liquidators" died, the majority of which were young men between the ages of twenty and forty. A figure of 125,000 deaths issued by the Ukrainian ministry of health in 1996 appears to include all subsequent deaths, natural or otherwise, of those living in the contaminated zone of Ukraine.

According to specialists from the WHO (World Health Organization) the most discernible health im-



An aerial view of the Chernobyl complex shows the shattered reactor facility. A/P WIDE WORLD. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

pact of the high levels of radiation in the affected territories has been the dramatic rise in thyroid gland cancer among children. In Belarus, for example, a 1994 study noted that congenital defects in the areas with a cesium content of the soil of one-five curies per square kilometer have doubled since 1986, while in areas with more than fifteen curies, the rise has been more than eight times the norm.

Among liquidators and especially among evacuees, studies have demonstrated a discernible and alarming rise in morbidity since Chernobyl when compared to the general population. This applies particularly to circulatory and digestive diseases, and to respiratory problems. Less certain is the concept referred to as "Chernobyl AIDS," the rise of which may reflect more attention to medical problems, better access to health care, or psychological fears and tension among the population living in contaminated zones. Rises in children's diabetes and anemia are evident, and again appear much higher

in irradiated zones. The connection between these problems and the rise in radiation content of the soil have yet to be determined.

To date, the rates of leukemia and lymphoma—though they have risen since the accident—remain within the European average, though in the upper seventy-fifth percentile. One difficulty here is the unreliability or sheer lack of reporting in the 1970s. The induction period for leukemia is four to fifteen years, thus it appears premature to state, as some authorities have, that Chernobyl will not result in higher rates of leukemia.

As for thyroid cancer, its development has been sudden and rapid. As of 2003 about 2,000 children in Belarus and Ukraine have contracted the disease and it is expected to reach its peak in 2005. One WHO specialist has estimated that the illness may affect one child in ten living in the irradiated zones in the summer of 1986; hence ultimate totals could reach as high as 10,000. Though the mortality rate from this form of cancer among children is only about 10 percent, this still indicates an additional 1,000 deaths in the future. Moreover, this form of cancer is highly aggressive and can spread rapidly if not operated on. The correlation between thyroid gland cancer and radioactive fallout appears clear and is not negated by any medical authorities.

After pressure from the countries of the G7, Ukraine first imposed a moratorium on any new nuclear reactors (lifted in 1995) and then closed down the Chernobyl station at the end of the year 2000. The key issue at Chernobyl remains the construction and funding of a new roof over the destroyed reactor, the so-called sarcophagus. The current structure, which contains some twenty tons of radioactive fuel and dust, is cracking and is not expected to last more than ten years. There are fears of the release of radioactive dust within the confines of the station and beyond should the structure collapse.

It is fair to say that the dangers presented by former Soviet nuclear power stations in 2003 exceed those of a decade earlier. In the meantime, some 3.5 million people continue to live in contaminated zones. From a necessary panacea, evacuation of those living in zones with high soil contamination today has become an unpopular and slow-moving process. Elderly people in particular have returned to their homes in some areas.

See also: ATOMIC ENERGY; BELARUS AND BELARUSIANS; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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DAVID R. MARPLES

CHERNOMYRDIN, VIKTOR STEPANOVICH

(b. 1938), prime minister of the Russian Federation from December 1992 to March 1998.

Trained in western Siberia as an engineer and later an economist, Viktor Chernomyrdin alternated between working as a communist party official who monitored industrial enterprises and actually running such enterprises in the gas industry. From 1978 he worked in the heavy industry department of the party's central apparatus in Moscow, before becoming minister for the oil and gas industries in 1985. In 1989 he was a pioneer in turning part of his ministry into the state-owned gas company Gazprom. He was the first chairman of the board, and oversaw and benefited from its partial privatization.

In 1990 he ran for the newly formed Russian Republic (RSFSR) Congress of People's Deputies, but lost. In May 1992 President Yeltsin appointed him a deputy prime minister of the newly independent Russian Federation. In December, following an advisory vote of the Congress in which he finished second, a politically besieged Yeltsin made him prime minister. Although a typical Soviet official in most respects, Chernomyrdin gradually adapted to free market processes. His concern not to move too precipitately on economic reform enabled him, with his powers of conciliation and compromise, to appease the communists in some measure throughout the 1990s. They looked to him to moderate the radicalism of the "shock therapist" wing of the government.

In the regime crisis of fall 1993, when, violating the Constitution, Yeltsin dispersed the parlia-



Viktor Chernomyrdin speaks to journalists after the Duma rejected Yeltsin's attempts to reappoint him prime minister in 1998. © SACHA ORLOV/GETTY IMAGES

ment by military force amid much bloodshed, Chernomyrdin supported Yeltsin without wavering. His reputation suffered as a result of both this and his poor handling of the financial crisis of October 1994 (Black Tuesday). Nonetheless, in April 1995 he founded the first avowedly pro-government political party, "Our Home is Russia", which was covertly funded by Gazprom. This was designed to create a reliable, pro-Yeltsin bloc in the parliament elected in December 1995. However, although Chernomyrdin predicted that it would win almost a third of the 450 seats, in the event it got only 55, gaining the support of a mere 10.1 percent of voters. Apart from the fact that he was a weak leader, it had suffered from public allegations by prominent figures that his earlier leadership of Gazprom had enabled him to accumulate personal wealth of some five billion dollars. Apparently his denials did not convince many voters. Later, the public documentation of massive corruption in his government did not evoke even pro forma denials.

In March 1998 Yeltsin dismissed him without explanation, only to nominate him as acting prime minister the following August. However, the parliament twice refused to confirm him, seeing him

as one of the individuals most responsible for the financial collapse of that month. So the floundering president withdrew his nomination. However, Yeltsin named him the next spring as his special representative to work with NATO on resolving the Yugoslav crisis over Kosovo.

In 1999 and 2000 Chernomyrdin chaired the Gazprom Council of Directors, and from 1999 to 2001 he was a parliamentary deputy for the pro-Kremlin party Unity. In 2001 President Putin made him ambassador to Ukraine. Here he supervised a creeping Russian takeover of the Ukrainian gas industry that stemmed from Ukraine's inability to finance its massive gas imports from Russia.

See also: ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; OUR HOME IS RUSSIA PARTY; PRIVATIZATION; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER REDDAWAY

CHERNOV, VIKTOR MIKHAILOVICH

(1873–1952), pseudonyms: 'Ia. Vechev', 'Gardenin', 'V. Lenuar'; leading theorist and activist of the Socialist Revolutionary Party.

Viktor Chernov was born into a noble family in Samara province. He studied at the Saratov gymnasium, but was transferred to the Derpt gymnasium in Estonia as a result of his revolutionary activity. In 1892 Chernov joined the law faculty at Moscow University, where he was active in the radical student movement. He was first arrested in April 1894 and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress for six months. Chernov was exiled to Kamyshin in 1895, but was transferred to Saratov and then to Tambov because of poor health. He married Anastasia Nikolaevna Sletova in 1898. In the same year, he organized the influential "Brotherhood for the Defense of People's Rights" in Tambov, a revolutionary peasants' organisation.

In 1899 Chernov left Russia, and for the next six years he worked for the revolutionary cause in exile. He joined the newly formed Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1901, and from 1903 he was a central committee member. His role in the party was predominantly as a political theorist and writer. He formulated the party's philosophy around a blending of Marxist and Populist ideas, propounding that Russia's communal system offered a "third way" to the development of socialism. He reluctantly supported the use of terror as a means of advancing the revolutionary cause.

Chernov returned to St. Petersburg in October 1905, and proposed that the party follow a moderate line, suspending terrorist activity and opposing further strike action. In July 1906 he again left Russia, this time for Finland. He continued his revolutionary work abroad, not returning to Russia until April 1917. Chernov joined the first coalition Provisional Government as Minister for Agriculture in May 1917, despite misgivings about socialist participation in the Provisional Government. His three months in government raised popular expectations about an imminent land settlement, but his tenure as minister was marked by impotency. The Provisional Government refused to sanction his radical proposals for reform of land use.

Chernov struggled to hold the fractured Socialist Revolutionary Party together, and stepped down from the Central Committee in September 1917. He was made president of the Constituent Assembly, and after the Constituent Assembly's dissolution, was a key figure in leftist anti-Bolshevik organizations, including the *Komuch*. He believed that the Socialist Revolutionary Party needed to form a "third front" in the civil war period, fighting for democracy against both the Bolsheviks and the Whites. He left Russia in 1920, and was a passionate contributor to the emigré anti-Bolshevik movement until his death in 1952 in New York. Chernov was a gifted intellectual and theorist who ultimately lacked the ruthless single-mindedness required of a revolutionary political leader.

See also: SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES

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SARAH BADCOCK

CHERNUKHA

Pessimistic neo-naturalism and muckraking during and after glasnost.

Chernukha is a slang term popularized in the late 1980s, used to describe a tendency toward unrelenting negativity and pessimism both in the arts and in the mass media. Derived from the Russian word for "black" (*cherny*), *chernukha* began as a perestroika phenomenon, a rejection of the enforced optimism of official Soviet culture. It arose simultaneously in three particular areas: "serious" fiction (published in "thick" journals such as *Novy mir*), film, and investigative reporting. One of the hallmarks of Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost was the open discussion of the misery and violence that was a part of everyday Soviet life, transforming the form and content of the nation's news coverage. In journalism, *chernukha* was most clearly incarnated in Alexander Nevzorov's evening television program "600 Seconds," which exposed the Soviet viewing audience to some of its first glimpses into the lives of prostitutes and gangsters, never shying away from images of graphic violence.

In literature and film, *chernukha* refers to the naturalistic depiction of and obsession with bodily functions, sexuality, and often sadistic violence, usually at the expense of more traditional Russian themes, such as emotion and compassion. The most famous examples of artistic *chernukha* include Sergei Kaledin's 1987 novel *The Humble Cemetery*, which tells a story about gravediggers in Moscow, and Vasilii Pichul's 1988 *Little Vera*, a film about a dysfunctional family, complete with alcoholics, knife fights, arrests, and virtually nonstop shouting. Also emblematic was Stanislav Govorukhin's 1990 documentary *This Is No Way to Live*, whose very title sums up the general critical thrust of *chernukha* in the glasnost era.

Often condemned by critics across the ideological spectrum as "immoral," *chernukha* actually played an important part in the shift in values and in the ideological struggles concerning the country's legacy and future course. Intentionally or not,

artists, writers, and journalists responded to Gorbachev's call for "openness" with works that exposed the long-repressed underside of Soviet life: the misery of the communal apartment, the daily lives of homeless alcoholics, and the hypocrisy of established authority figures. One of the most prominent themes in the chernukha of the 1980s was Soviet youth, particularly in film and on stage: the new generation was repeatedly depicted as mercantile, hedonistic, and bereft of any moral compass. Yet even if these young people were presented in a fashion calculated to provoke the audience's outrage, blame was almost always attributed to the older generations: to the parents who failed to provide a model worth emulating, and to the system itself, which reduced all human relations to a question of survival and dominance.

Though chernukha was initially a breath of fresh air after decades of sanitized news and entertainment, by the post-Soviet era the majority of the purveyors of "highbrow" culture began to reject it in favor of postmodern playfulness or a return to sentimentality. By contrast, variations on chernukha are still a crucial part of Russian popular culture, from the daily news magazines devoted to violent crime and horrible accidents, to the action films and novels where sadistic violence and rape are taken for granted. Though these forms of entertainment are distant from the ideological struggles that helped spawn the phenomenon in the 1980s, they show that the aesthetic of chernukha is still very much a part of the post-Soviet landscape.

See also: GLASNOST; MOTION PICTURES; PERESTROIKA; TELEVISION AND RADIOS; THICK JOURNALS

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ELIOT BORENSTEIN

CHERNYSHEV, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH

(1786–1857), minister of war for Nicholas I, 1826–1852.

Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev was born on January 10, 1786, entered the Russian army at

the age of fifteen, and advanced rapidly through the ranks, participating in all of Russia's campaigns against Napoleon. During the Tilsit Period (1807–1812) Alexander I sent Chernyshev to Napoleon to serve as a channel of communications. Napoleon took a liking to Chernyshev and undertook to lecture him in the finer points of war, information that Chernyshev duly brought back to Alexander before the outbreak of hostilities. In November 1812, Chernyshev became an adjutant-general, and commanded various Cossack detachments in the campaigns of 1812 to 1815. In 1819, Chernyshev became a member of the committee Alexander established to reform the organization and legal structures of the Don Cossack host.

Nicholas I promoted Chernyshev to the rank of general-of-cavalry and appointed him minister of war in 1826. From that position, Chernyshev played the leading role in devising and implementing a major reform of the Russian military administration between 1831 and 1836. This reform abolished the position of chief of the main staff and unified control over the entire military administration in the person of the war minister. Chernyshev also presided over the first successful codification of Russian military law, completed in 1838 with the assistance of Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky. In 1841, Chernyshev was created a prince.

The bases of the enormous mobilization that supported Russia's efforts in the Crimean War, as well as the support of those troops, were largely established by Chernyshev's reforms. The fundamental military structure developed by those reforms, furthermore, especially the predominance of the War Ministry as opposed to a General Staff, remained the basic organization of the Russian Imperial Army down to the collapse of the empire, and continues to serve as the basic structure of the Russian Federation's armed forces. Chernyshev died on June 20, 1857.

See also: ALEXANDER I; COSSACKS; MILITARY REFORMS; NICHOLAS I

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FREDERICK W. KAGAN

CHERNYSHEVSKY, NIKOLAI GAVRILOVICH

(1828–1889), Russian radical journalist, writer, literary critic, and thinker.

Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky was the son of an Orthodox priest. From 1842 to 1845 he attended the theological seminary in Saratov, and in 1850 he graduated from the Department of History and Philology of the University of St. Petersburg. Chernyshevsky was a polyglot; he knew eight foreign languages. As a student Chernyshevsky impressed his professors with his distinguished knowledge in literature and linguistics, and they predicted that he would have a bright academic career.

After two years of teaching in Saratov from 1851 to 1853, Chernyshevsky returned to St. Petersburg. There Chernyshevsky began to write for the popular journals *Otechestvennye Zapiski* (*Annals of the Fatherland*) and *Sovremennik* (*Contemporary*). In 1859 he became editor in chief of *Sovremennik*. There he published his *Ocherki gogolevskogo perioda russkoi literatury* (*Essays on the Gogolian Period in Russian Literature*), “his first and most important contribution to literary criticism” according to Eugene Lampert (1965, p. 110). Soon Chernyshevsky became very popular among radical youth and was called a “prophet of the young generation” (Irina Paperno, 1988).

However, Chernyshevsky was not satisfied with only doing journalist work; he attempted to continue his academic career and prepared his dissertation, “The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality” (1855). This dissertation presented a doctrine about the superiority of reality over art. He believed that nothing could be more beautiful than that which exists in reality; as he wrote, “Beauty is life.” According to Chernyshevsky, art should be a “text-book of life.” He rejected “art for art’s sake.” However, the Academic Board of the University of St. Petersburg did not share Chernyshevsky’s views on art and did not approve his dissertation. According to T. Pecherskaya, Chernyshevsky said that his dissertation was his interpretation of the ideas of the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, but the conservative Academic Board could not understand him.

After his unsuccessful attempt to pursue an academic career, Chernyshevsky continued his journalistic work and published many essays on art, literature, philosophy, and radical socialist thought. He was a materialist and followed the

ideas of German philosophers of the early and mid-nineteenth century. Chernyshevsky propounded radical ideas in his essays and criticized the emancipation of serfs by the government from the radical point of view. He believed that the liberation of the serfs without land was inadequate and mockingly cruel to the peasants. Francis B. Randall (*N. G. Chernyshevskii*, 1967, preface) wrote that Chernyshevsky called himself a “socialist” but took his doctrine “not from Marx but from the French radicals of the decades before the revolution of 1848.” Chernyshevsky believed in the peasant commune as the germ of the future socialist society and called for a peasant revolution in his publications. Fearing Chernyshevsky’s growing influence, the government closed *Contemporary* in 1861 and put its editor under secret police surveillance. In July 1862 Chernyshevsky was arrested and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg. During his two years of imprisonment from 1862 to 1864, when Chernyshevsky waited for his sentence, he wrote his most famous novel *What Is to Be Done?* and several other works of fiction. In the novel *What Is to Be Done?* Chernyshevsky described the life of a new type of people, who lived by their own labor and led a new kind of family life, where the enlightened woman was a man’s lifelong companion. The novel popularized the ideas of women’s equality and “cooperative socialism”; it depicted the future society as a society of equality and happiness for all. This novel was a synthesis of Chernyshevsky’s sociopolitical, philosophical, and ethical views. The novel became very popular among the radical youth. Aside from the ideas it contained, this work was not a great literary achievement. Lampert (op. cit., p. 224) states that Chernyshevsky “wrote his novel on a fairly low imaginative plane.” All his heroes speak with the same voice, men and women alike. Chernyshevsky himself did not have any delusions about his literary talent. He wrote his wife from Siberia: “I have not a trace of artistic talent . . . and all [the novel’s] merit consists merely in its truthfulness” (Lampert, op. cit., p. 223).

In spite of the lack of direct evidence of Chernyshevsky’s participation as a member in the revolutionary organizations, he was condemned to fourteen (later reduced to seven) years of forced labor, followed by lifelong exile in Siberia. According to Lampert, “the government had come to realize the extent of Chernyshevsky’s influence on the younger generation; it knew what his views were, and it had taken fright.” The government consid-

ered Chernyshevsky's ideas a danger to the existing order.

On May 19, 1864, the ceremony of "civil execution" was performed on Chernyshevsky in the center of St. Petersburg in Mytninskaya Square. "After sentence has been read out he was forced to kneel, a sword was broken over his head and he was then set in a pillory by a chain," wrote Alexei Suvorin (Lampert, *op. cit.*, p. 130). However, instead the reaction of condemnation anticipated by the authorities, the big crowd stood silent. Then somebody from the crowd threw a bunch of flowers at Chernyshevsky's feet.

Chernyshevsky spent more than twenty-five years in prison, forced labor, and exile. During this time he continued to write fiction, essays, and philosophical works (the most famous of his philosophical works was *The Nature of Human Knowledge*). The last years of his life he devoted to the translation of Georg Weber's *Universal History*. Chernyshevsky refused to ask the authorities for "imperial mercy" even when they encouraged him to do so. Chernyshevsky believed that he was innocent and thus did not need be forgiven by the government. Chernyshevsky's fortitude brought him respect even from among his opponents. The respect for Chernyshevsky and deep sympathy for his misfortune was expressed by the Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky.

Chernyshevsky received permission from the authorities to return to his native city of Saratov only four months before his death. Government persecution fueled the image of Chernyshevsky as a "revolutionary saint." His works were denied publication in Russia until the first Russian revolution in 1905. However, the novels and essays of Chernyshevsky were spread around the country illegally, often in handwritten copies. His novel *What Is to Be Done?* became a table book of several generations of Russian radical youth. This novel was considered a classic of Russian literature in Soviet times. After the collapse of the socialist system, people lost interest in the pro-socialist ideas and works of Chernyshevsky. He died on October 29, 1989.

See also: DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; JOURNALISM; SOCIALISM; WHAT IS TO BE DONE

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VICTORIA KHITERER

CHERVONETS

A gold-backed currency introduced by the Soviet government in 1922 as part of the New Economic Policy (NEP).

The Soviet Union did not possess a stable currency at the end of the civil war, and the government realized that it could not achieve its ambitious economic development plans without first solving this pressing monetary problem. Accordingly, a Sovnarkom decree of October 11, 1922, authorized the Soviet state bank to issue the chervonets bank note as the equivalent of the prerevolutionary ten-ruble gold coin (7.74232 grams of pure gold). This legislation required at least 25 percent of *chervontsy* (plural) to be backed by precious metals and hard currency. The first paper *chervontsy* appeared in December 1922, and in 1923 the state bank (Gosbank) also began issuing gold chervonets coins (primarily for use in foreign trade). The chervonets circulated alongside the rapidly depreciating *sovznak* ("Soviet note") ruble until February 1924, when the state bank began to withdraw the *sovznak* ruble from circulation and established the chervonets as the country's sole legal tender, equal to ten "new" rubles. Through the 1920s, the chervonets was officially quoted on foreign exchanges. However, this attempt to maintain a "hard" Soviet currency was controversial almost from its inception and quickly ended along with the NEP itself. On June 9, 1926, the government passed a resolution forbidding the export of Soviet currency abroad, and in February 1930 Soviet currency was withdrawn from foreign exchanges, and private exchanges of foreign currency for *chervontsy* were banned.

See also: NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; RUBLE

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JULIET JOHNSON

CHESME, BATTLE OF

The battle of Chesme ("fountain" in Turkish) was fought on the night of July 5–6, 1770 between a Russian squadron under the command of Count Aleksei Grigoryevich Orlov and an Ottoman fleet under Hassan Bey at Chesme bay on the western Anatolian Mediterranean coast. Orlov had nine ships of the line, three frigates, a bomb ship, and a number of smaller vessels under his command. Ottoman forces numbered sixteen line ships, six frigates, six xebecs, thirteen galleys, and thirty-two galliots. Orlov's plan was to send in vessels to attack the tightly clustered Ottoman squadron at anchor in the bay. On the evening of June 26, Orlov sent a detachment of four line ships, two frigates, a bomb ship, and four fire ships under the command of Captain S.K. Greig into the anchorage. A fire ship under the command of Lieutenant Il'in soon set an Ottoman 84-gun line ship alight, and the fire soon spread to other vessels. In total numbers the destruction was the greatest naval victory in the days of sail; the Ottomans lost fifteen line ships, six frigates and about fifty smaller vessels. About ten thousand Ottoman sailors died in the battle, and the Russians captured a number of Ottoman ships, including five galleys and the frigate *Rodos-60*. Empress Catherine the Great awarded Orlov the title of "Count Chesmensky" for his participation in the victory. The strategic result for Russia was command of the sea in the Aegean during the remainder of its war with the Ottoman Empire. When a peace treaty was signed at Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, the Ottoman Empire recognized Russian claims to represent Christian interests in the empire.

See also: CATHERINE II; ORLOV, GRIGORY GRIGORIEVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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JOHN C. K. DALY

CHICHERIN, GEORGY VASILIEVICH

(1872–1936), revolutionary and diplomat.

Georgy Chicherin was born on November 12, 1872, in Karaul, Tambov Province, into an aristocratic family of declining fortunes. He studied in the history and philology faculty at St. Petersburg University. After graduation, he worked in the archives department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Disillusioned with the Romanov regime, Chicherin fled to Western Europe in 1904, spending the next fourteen years immersed in socialist émigré politics. He belonged to the Menshevik wing of Russian socialism, but his strong opposition to World War I aligned him with Vladimir Lenin and his Bolshevik faction.

Returning to Russia in January 1918, Chicherin joined the Bolshevik Party and soon was appointed commissar of Foreign Affairs. He was uniquely qualified for the post, possessing a thorough knowledge of diplomatic history, experience in the tsarist Foreign Ministry, command of several foreign languages, familiarity with European conditions, and considerable negotiating experience from his days in the fractious émigré community. Blockaded by the Allies during the period of Civil War and foreign intervention in Russia, Chicherin used radio and the press to create a novel diplomacy of propaganda. Bolshevik appeals to the governments and peoples of the West for fair treatment of Soviet Russia were mixed with revolutionary calls to overthrow those same imperialist regimes.

The failure of the Bolshevik Revolution to spread abroad convinced Chicherin that a new period of capitalist stabilization had begun. He led the diplomatic component of the USSR's New Economic Policy (NEP), seeking peaceful relationships with the great powers as well as foreign trade, technology, loans, and investment. Chicherin coined the term "peaceful coexistence" to characterize this new era of temporary accommodation with the capitalist world.

Chicherin's major diplomatic successes were the 1921 Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty and, with Germany, the 1922 Rapallo Treaty and 1925 Berlin Treaty. He saw strong political, economic, and even military ties with Germany as the key to preventing a European-wide anti-Soviet alliance of capitalist powers. He also fought tirelessly against the League of Nations because he saw it as the framework for an anti-Soviet coalition. In the 1920s the USSR received full diplomatic recognition from all the great powers, except

the United States. These successes were offset by a number of failures. The USSR was unable to secure sufficient financial and technological assistance from the West. Britain and France continued to manifest undisguised hostility toward Moscow, causing Kremlin leaders to fear renewed armed intervention against Soviet Russia. Germany moved closer to the Anglo-French camp by signing the Locarno Accords in 1925 and joining the League of Nations.

Chicherin saw opportunities in the national-liberation movements in Asia. Support for anti-colonial struggles, he hoped, would sap the strength of the imperialist powers.

Chicherin was never a significant figure in Kremlin politics, though he was elected to the Party's Central Committee in 1925. He played a significant role in foreign policy formulation because Lenin greatly valued his knowledge, experience, and abilities. After Lenin's incapacitating stroke in 1922, Chicherin began to lose influence, and was eclipsed gradually by his deputy, Maxim Litvinov. A combination of Chicherin's estrangement from the Stalinist elite and his increasingly poor health virtually eliminated his role in foreign affairs after 1928. He was replaced by Litvinov as foreign commissar in 1930 and lived on a pension until his death, of natural causes, in 1936.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; LITVINOV, MAXIM MAXIMOVICH; RAPALLO, TREATY OF

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TEDDY J. ULDRICKS

CHINA, RELATIONS WITH

From the mid-nineteenth century to the present, one of the core problems in Russian foreign policy has been how to manage relations with China. A vast Eurasian land power, Russia adjoins China, its giant neighbor to the south, along the sparsely populated territories of eastern Siberia and the Maritime Province. Further to the west, the buffer states of Mongolia and Kazakhstan lie between Russia and China. For most of the past century and a half, Russia enjoyed a significant power advantage vis-à-vis China in military and economic terms. The

world recognized Russia as one of the great powers. Meanwhile, China, weakened by domestic turmoil and foreign imperialism, experienced the successive traumas of dynastic collapse, civil wars, revolution, and radical communism. More recently, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the balance of power between the two countries has shifted in favor of China. In the short term, a diminished post-Communist Russia, shorn of its Central Asian territories as well as its western borderlands, has worked out an amicable relationship with China. In the longer term, however, Russian policymakers, like their tsarist and Soviet predecessors, will continue to confront the question of whether an increasingly powerful China is friend, foe, or changeling.

FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO 1917

Russian-Chinese relations date from the seventeenth century. Russia's eastward expansion at the time was driven by a spirit of adventure, the quest for profits in the fur trade, and the dream of state aggrandizement. Unruly bands of freebooting Cossacks led by Russian adventurers such as Yerofei Khabarov established initial contacts along the Amur River with tribal dependents of China's ruling Qing dynasty. Conflicts that flared up within an as-yet-undefined frontier area came to the attention of Chinese officials, who viewed the Russians as the latest in a long series of armed aggressors from Central Asia. Meanwhile, early Russian diplomatic missions to Beijing, intended to promote commerce and to gauge the strength of the Chinese Empire, ran afoul of China's elaborate court ritual that the Russians neither understood nor respected. The Russian exaction of tribute from tribal peoples whom the Qing considered their dependents, and the encroachment of armed Russian settlements along the Amur, led to military clashes between Russian and Chinese forces in the 1680s. In 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first modern international treaty between China and a European country, began to define a boundary between the two empires and established rules for regulating commercial intercourse. The Treaty of Kiakhta in 1728 readjusted the commercial relationship, further defined the border, and granted Russia permission to build an Orthodox church in Beijing, which became the nucleus of Russian sinology. Thereafter, relations stabilized for the next century on the basis of equality, reciprocity, limited commerce, and peace along the border.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Russia seized the opportunity afforded by the decline of the Qing dynasty to expand its eastern territories at China's expense. Its ultimate objective was to bolster its status as a European great power by playing an imperial role in East Asia. Nikolai Muraviev, the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, was the most prominent of the new generation of empire builders who were determined to make Russia a Pacific power. Combining the threat of force with skillful diplomacy and blandishments, Muraviev and his peers imposed upon China the Treaties of Aigun (1858), Peking (1860), and Tarbagatai (1864), which added 665,000 square miles (1,722,342 square kilometers) to the Russian Empire in Central Asia, eastern Siberia, and the Maritime Province. In 1896 Russian officials bribed and bullied China to grant permission to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria (Northeast China), to connect the Trans-Siberian Railway with Vladivostok, Russia's major port on the Pacific Ocean. Russian occupation of Manchuria in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion, an antiforeign Chinese nativist movement, and growing tension with imperial rival Japan over Manchuria and Korea, led to the Russo-Japanese War and Russia's humiliating defeat. With the Rising Sun ascendant, Russian influence in China was restricted to northern Manchuria and the Central Asian borderlands.

SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS,

1917–1991

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had a profound and lasting impact upon Russian-Chinese relations. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912, China dissolved into civil war and chaos. A small but determined band of revolutionary Chinese intellectuals, disillusioned with Western liberal democracy, discovered in Russian Bolshevism a template for political action. Desiring to revive China and promote revolutionary social transformation, they responded to Bolshevik appeals by organizing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921 and joining the Communist International (Comintern), which ordered the fledgling CCP into alliance with the Chinese Nationalists led by Sun Yat-sen. Moscow dispatched veteran revolutionary Mikhail Borodin and hundreds of military and political advisers to China in the early 1920s to guide the Chinese revolutionary movement to victory. The Comintern dictated strategy and tactics to the CCP. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen's successor, severed his alliance with the CCP, slaughtered tens of thousands of com-

munists, and expelled all the Soviet advisers. The revolutionary project lay in ruins.

Meanwhile, playing a complicated game, Bolshevik Russia and, after 1924, the Soviet Union, successfully maneuvered to retain the imperial gains tsarist Russia had wrested from China in the preceding century. In other words, the Soviet Union simultaneously pursued both statist and revolutionary goals vis-à-vis China. Under its new leader, Mao Zedong, the CCP continued to look toward Moscow for ideological and political guidance while pursuing its own path to power.

On July 7, 1937, Japan's creeping aggression against China escalated into a full-scale war. To deflect the threat of Japanese attack against Siberia and the Maritime Province, the USSR provided Chiang Kai-shek substantial military and financial aid in his lonely war of resistance against Japan. Soviet military advisers were attached to Chiang's armies, and Soviet pilots defended Chinese cities against Japanese attack. In 1941, however, Moscow signed a neutrality treaty with Tokyo, and Soviet aid to China dried up.

The renewed civil war in China (1946–1949) that followed hard upon victory in World War II culminated in the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Although suspicious of Mao Zedong, the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin quickly extended diplomatic recognition to the new communist government and, after intensive negotiations, signed a thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950, with the PRC. Mao Zedong proclaimed that the Soviet Union provided a model of socialism for China to emulate. Thousands of Soviet civilian and military experts flooded into China while tens of thousands of Chinese students studied in the USSR and the East European satellite states.

Within a few years, however, a combination of Soviet high-handedness, Chinese suspicion, and differences over international political strategy eroded the bonds of Sino-Soviet friendship. Beijing challenged Moscow's leadership of international communism, claimed huge chunks of Russian territory, and condemned the USSR as a "social imperialist" state. In 1969, fighting broke out along the contested eastern and central Asian borders, and a large-scale war loomed but did not materialize. The Sino-Soviet Cold War gradually dissipated in the 1980s as new leaders came to power in Moscow



Mao Zedong escorts Nikita Khrushchev to the airport, following celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic of China in 1959. © SOVFOTO/EASTFOTO

and Beijing. During Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's summit in Beijing in May 1989, the two countries proclaimed a new era of amity.

AFTER THE FALL

Post-communist Russia suffered a sharp decline in economic and political power just as China was enjoying its greatest period of economic growth that translated into military power and international influence. Yet the two countries soon found common cause in their opposition to the exercise of unilateral American global power. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin in 1996 proclaimed a new Russian-Chinese strategic partnership that was largely rhetorical. By that time the border issue between the two countries had been basically settled, and stability restored to the relationship. However, Russians in eastern

Siberia and the Maritime Province objected to an influx of Chinese illegal migrants and traders whose presence, they said, constituted a growing threat to Russia's hold over territories acquired only in the mid-nineteenth century. Levels of Russian-Chinese trade remained quite modest, although Russia became a main supplier of advanced military technology to the newly affluent Chinese who could now afford to pay. Within Russia debate continued over the question of whether China could be trusted as a friendly neighbor or whether growing Chinese power would eventually turn north and seek to reassert dormant historical claims against a weakened Russian state.

In cultural terms, Russian influence upon China peaked in the early to mid-twentieth century, but receded thereafter, leaving very little residue except among the older generation of Chinese who

remember the brief era of Sino-Soviet friendship in the 1950s. Chinese influence upon Russian culture is also considerably less than it is in other Western countries, particularly the United States. Racist and condescending attitudes are present on both sides of the relationship along with genuine admiration and understanding of each society's cultural achievements on the part of educated Russian and Chinese elites.

See also: ALGUN TREATY OF; CENTRAL ASIA; COLD WAR; COLONIAL EXPANSION; COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; FAR EASTERN REGION; JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH; KARAKHAN DECLARATION; NERCHINSK, TREATY OF; SIBERIA; PEKING, TREATY OF

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STEVEN I. LEVINE

CHIRIKOV, ALEXZEI ILICH

(1703–1748), naval officer and explorer.

An instructor at St. Petersburg's Naval Academy, Alexei Ilich Chirikov was selected in 1725 to be one of two assistants to Vitus Bering, recently appointed by Peter the Great to travel to Kamchatka and, from there, determine whether Asia and America were united.

Bering's first Kamchatka expedition (1728–1730) was criticized for not having proven conclusively that Asia and America were not physically linked. Indeed, Chirikov had disagreed with Bering on the question of when the expedition should turn back, arguing that further exploration was needed. In response, Bering proposed an ambitious series of voyages and surveys that, together, became the Great Northern Expedition. Bering undertook a second survey of Russia's northeasternmost waters. His second-in-command was Chirikov.

In the summer of 1740, Bering's ships, the *St. Peter* and *St. Paul*—captained by Bering and Chirikov, respectively—set sail for Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. From there, the ships departed in June 1741. Shortly after, the ships separated and never reestablished contact. The crew of the *St. Peter* sighted Alaska in July, then wintered on the isle now called Bering Island. Bering himself perished; the survivors returned to Petropavlovsk in the fall of 1742.

In July 1741, Chirikov and the crew of the *St. Paul* discovered Alaska's Alexander Archipelago. Short of food and fresh water, the *St. Paul* returned to Kamchatka in October 1741, having lost eight sailors. The following May, Chirikov sailed east again, searching for Bering and his crew. Unfortunately, the *St. Paul* sailed past Bering Island. In June, after exploring the Aleutians, Chirikov turned back once more. In August 1742, Chirikov sailed into Petropavlovsk—only a few days before the survivors of the *St. Peter* voyage returned.

For his participation in the Great Northern Expedition, Chirikov was promoted to the rank of captain-commander in 1745. In 1746 he helped to compile new Pacific maps, based on data the Expedition had gathered.

See also: BERING, VITUS JONASSEN

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JOHN MCCANNON

CHKALOV, VALERY PAVLOVICH

(1904–1938), test pilot and polar aviator.

Born in the Volga town of Vasilevo (now Chkalovsk), Valery Pavlovich Chkalov went on to become the USSR's most famous aviator of the 1930s. Hailed as the "Greatest Pilot of Our Times" and named a Hero of the Soviet Union, Chkalov, often referred to as the "Russian Lindbergh," remains one of the Stalinist era's greatest and best-loved celebrities.

A teenaged Chkalov became an aviation mechanic during the Russian Civil War. He qualified as a pilot by the age of seventeen and joined the air force, where he gained a reputation as a skilled but overly daring flier. Chkalov's rashness caught up with him in 1929, when he caused an accident that killed another pilot. He was reprimanded and briefly discharged. Chkalov returned to the air force in 1930 but resigned in 1933 to work as a test pilot for designer Nikolai Polikarpov.

During the mid-1930s, Chkalov turned to long-distance flying and polar aviation, where he achieved his greatest renown. With Georgy Baidukov as copilot and Alexander Belyakov as navigator, Chkalov set an unofficial world record for distance flying in July 1936, by flying from Moscow to Udd Island, off the coast of Kamchatka. On June 18, 1937, the same team gained international fame by flying from Moscow to Vancouver, Washington, crossing over the North Pole along the way. This was an official world record, and even though it was broken the following month by Mikhail Gromov (who also flew to America over the North Pole), Chkalov's bluff, hearty charm made him the most admired of "Stalin's falcons," the hero-pilots featured so prominently in the propaganda of the 1930s.

Chkalov died on December 15, 1938, testing a prototype of the Polikarpov I-180. He was given a hero's funeral and buried in the Kremlin Wall. Rumors have persisted since Chkalov's death that he was somehow killed on Stalin's orders. Chkalov's family and several prominent journalists have come out in support of this theory, but no concrete proof has emerged to link Stalin with Chkalov's death.

See also: AVIATION

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JOHN MCCANNON

CHKHEIDZE, NIKOLAI SEMENOVICH

(1864–1926), revolutionary activist.

Born into a Georgian noble family in the west Georgian district of Imereti, Nikolai, or "Karlo" as he was better known, Semenovich went on to become a prominent figure in the Georgian social democratic movement and the RSDLP (the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party). He played a central role in the February revolution in Russia. His revolutionary career began with his expulsion from Odessa University (now in Ukraine) for participation in a student demonstration. On his return to Georgia, he became involved in local Marxist activities in the west Georgian town of Batumi. Prominent in the 1905 revolution in Georgia, and active in the local social democratic press, in 1907 he was elected as Georgian deputy to the Third State Duma (Russian imperial parliament). He led the RSDLP faction in the Third and Fourth Dumas where he was threatened with expulsion a number of times. He led the faction in refusing to vote war credits to the Russian government in 1914.

Chkheidze made a name for himself as a great orator and was extraordinarily popular among Russian workers. It was no surprise that in February 1917 he was elected the first Chairman of the Petrograd (St. Petersburg) Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet. Given the Soviet's powerful role in the revolution, Chkheidze was a key figure in Russian government policy during 1917. A menshevik, he became increasingly disillusioned with the path of Russian politics, as well as the ineffectiveness of his own Menshevik colleagues and the provisional government. On the eve of the October Revolution in 1917, Karlo returned to Georgia where he became, in 1918, Chairman of the Transcaucasian Seim (parliament). From 1919 to 1921, he was a member of the Georgian Constituent Assembly. After the Red Army invasion of Georgia in February of 1921, Karlo was forced into exile in Paris. He left behind two of his elder daughters; his only son had died in 1917. Unable to bear the petty politics of emigré life, he committed suicide in 1926.

See also: GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MENSHEVIKS

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STEPHEN JONES

CHRISTIANIZATION

Christianization was the acceptance of Christianity (in its Eastern Orthodox form) by the political elite of the early Rus principalities and its imposition upon the rest of the population at the end of the tenth century.

The most influential decision in the process of Christianization was made by Saint Vladimir Svyatoslavich, Prince of Kiev (r. 978–1015), to adopt Christianity and forcibly baptize those under his rule in the Dnieper River. His conversion is traditionally associated with the year 988 because the account of it in the Russian Primary Chronicle is recorded under that year, but sources point to either 987 or 989 instead.

This decision by Prince Vladimir was the result of a process of heightened activity by missionary monks and priests from Byzantium among the Slavs as well as increased military, diplomatic, and trade contact between the Rus and Constantinople from the mid-ninth century onward. Shortly after the Muslim invasion stripped much of the eastern provinces from the empire, the Church in Constantinople began to attempt to balance the losses in the east with gains in the north. Such activity brought the Byzantine Church into competition with the Roman Church, which also was active in converting pagan Slavic peoples. The evidence for increased trade between Constantinople and Rus at this time comes both from the Rus Primary Chronicle and from archaeological evidence, such as greater numbers of Byzantine coins found in Rus coin hoards dating from around 970 onward (although Islamic dirhams and silver ingots remained the main monetary medium of exchange throughout this period).

Christianity appeared among the Rus before Vladimir's conversion. The first evidence found for it is from Photios, Patriarch of Constantinople (r. 858–867), who mentions that within a few years after the Rus attack on Constantinople in 860, some Rus converted to Christianity. In addition, Theophanes Continuatus tells us that an archbishop sent by Patriarch Ignatius (r. 847–858, 867–877) was received by the Rus in 876. In the tenth century, three significant occurrences preceded Vladimir's conversion. First, in 911, negotiations in Constantinople over a treaty between the Greeks and the Rus allowed the Greek churchmen an opportunity to tell the Rus envoys about Christianity. Second,

the treaty of 944 between the Rus and Greeks informs us that some Christians were among the Rus envoys. Finally, Princess Olga, the regent for her son Svyatoslav, traveled from Kiev to Constantinople in the 950s and converted to Christianity at that time.

The Russian Primary Chronicle has traditionally been the main source regarding the decision by Vladimir to convert, but now the scholarly consensus is that most of the account appearing in the chronicle is a later invention. The chronicle's account is a compilation of four conversion stories tied loosely together. Three of these stories are similar to, and borrow from, stories told about the conversion of previous rulers in other countries, and thus can be considered literary commonplaces. One of the stories, however, finds independent confirmation in other sources of the time and may provide more reliable information.

In the first story, missionaries from Islam, Judaism, Western Christianity, and Eastern Christianity come to Kiev to convince Vladimir to convert to their particular religion. The most persuasive of these missionaries is a Greek philosopher who exegetically summarizes the Old and New Testaments and shows the prince an icon of the Last Judgment. But Vladimir decides "yet to wait a little." In the second story, Vladimir sends ten "good and wise men" to each of the major neighboring religions. The emissaries are most impressed with what they see in Constantinople—in particular, the sublime church architecture and the beauty of the church service—yet Vladimir continues to wait. In the third story, Vladimir captures the Crimean city of Kherson, after making a vow he will convert to Christianity if successful, and demands the sister of the Byzantine emperor in marriage, but he still does not convert. In the fourth story, Vladimir goes blind in Kherson. Anna (the sister of the Byzantine emperor), who has arrived to marry Vladimir, tells him that when he is baptized he will have his sight restored; he then allows himself to be baptized and is cured of the affliction.

Of these four stories, only the third story, concerning the capture of Kherson, has much value for trying to determine the events of 988–989. In combination with contemporary Arabic, Armenian, and Byzantine sources, historians can create this context for the Primary Chronicle's third story: Following a successful revolt by the Bulgarians and their defeat of the imperial army in August 986, the Byzantine general Bardas Phokas rose up

against the Emperor Basil II (r. 976–1025) in September 987 in Asia Minor. Vladimir, in return for providing six thousand troops directly to the empire and for taking action in the Crimea against those who supported the rebels, was promised by the emperor his sister Anna in marriage, provided Vladimir converted to Christianity. Some scholars think it was at this point (in 987) that Vladimir was baptized. The army of Bardas Phokas was defeated at Abydos on April 13, 989, and Vladimir's capture of Kherson most likely occurred following that event, in the late spring or early summer of the same year. If we accept the contention of the compiler of the *Rus Primary Chronicle*, then Vladimir's conversion occurred in Kherson shortly after Anna's arrival. The baptism of the residents of Kiev in the Dnieper River would then have happened later that summer.

Arguing against a 989 date are three sources. The first is the *Prayer to Vladimir*, which states Vladimir captured Kherson in the third year, and died in the twenty-eighth year, of his conversion, thus dating his baptism to 987 and placing it presumably in Kiev. Interestingly, the *Prayer* is found together with a composition, the *Life of Vladimir*, that indicates he was baptized only after he took Kherson. Neither composition is found in a manuscript copy earlier than the fifteenth century, and their authorship is unknown. The second source dating Vladimir's conversion to 987 is the *Tale and Passion and Encomium of the Holy Martyrs Boris and Gleb*, which, like the *Prayer*, states Vladimir died in the twenty-eighth year after his baptism. The third source (or, at least, three of its nineteen extant manuscript copies), the *Reading about the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-sufferers Boris and Gleb*, attributed to an eleventh-century monk, Nestor, provides the date 987 for Vladimir's baptism. In order to resolve this apparent contradiction in the source evidence, some historians have suggested that 987 represents the year Vladimir began his period as a catechumen and 989 represents the year he was formally baptized.

The status of the early Rus Church dating from Vladimir's acceptance of Christianity until 1037 has been a question in the historiography, whether Rus constituted a metropolitanate on its own (with the metropolitan residing either in Kiev or Pereslav) or was subordinate to another metropolitanate such as that of Ohrid, or whether it occupied an autonomous status directly under the patriarch of Constantinople with an archbishop as its head.

That question has been decided in favor of Rus having its own metropolitan in Kiev from the beginning. After the rapid conversion, well-established existing pagan rituals and practices survived, especially in rural areas, for centuries. Such residual paganism existing side-by-side with Christian rituals and practices has been described as a special phenomenon called *dvoyeverie* ("dual belief"), but no solid evidence exists that paganism was any more prevalent here than in other areas of Eurasia that converted to Christianity so precipitously.

The conversion of Rus by Vladimir led to the formulation of a Christian religious culture in Rus based on that of the Eastern Church. It also saw the introduction of writing (including an alphabet based on the Greek alphabet), literature (most of it being translations from the Greek), monastic communities, Byzantine-style art and architecture, and Byzantine Church law. Along with Scandinavian, steppe, and indigenous Slavic elements, this Byzantine influence contributed significantly to the cultural, political, and social amalgamation that constituted the early Rus principalities.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; OLGA; VLADIMIR, ST.

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DONALD OSTROWSKI

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

The Chronicle of Current Events (Khronika tekushchikh sobyty) was a clandestine periodical of Soviet dissent. It reported on the activities of dissidents seeking to

expand the sphere of civil freedom and political expression. It appeared at irregular intervals from 1968 to 1983.

The *Chronicle* was put together in Moscow by anonymous editors drawing on a network of informants throughout the Soviet Union. It was produced by *samizdat* ("self-publishing") techniques. Typewritten texts with multiple carbon copies were compiled, the recipients of which retyped additional copies and passed them along in chain-letter fashion. The *Chronicle* documented the views of the dissidents, reported on their arrests and trials, and described their treatment in prisons, labor camps, and mental asylums.

The compilers of the *Chronicle*, like most of the civil liberties activists, came from the educated, professional stratum of Soviet society. The *Chronicle* contained reports not only on their efforts, but on the activities of national minorities and religious groups as well. These included, among others, the campaign of the Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland in the Crimea, from which they had been deported in World War II; the efforts of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel; and the demands of Lithuanian Catholics, Ukrainian Uniates, and Baptists for religious freedom. Thus the *Chronicle* drew together hitherto isolated individuals and groups in an informal nationwide organization.

Though forced to publish by conspiratorial methods, the *Chronicle* was committed to the rule of law. It publicized repressive actions by the authorities and called on the government to observe the provisions of Soviet law and international agreements that guaranteed freedom of speech and association and other human rights. It served as an information and communication center for the dissident movement and linked its disparate strands. The publication's existence was always precarious, however, and it was ultimately suppressed.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; JOURNALISM; SAMIZDAT

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MARSHALL S. SHATZ

CHRONICLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR

The *Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR* was a journal devoted to the Soviet dissident movement. It was published in New York in English and Russian editions. Forty-eight issues appeared from 1972 to 1983. It was similar in nature to the *Chronicle of Current Events*, a *samizdat* ("self-published," meaning clandestine) periodical compiled by dissidents within the Soviet Union, which was subject to suppression by the Soviet authorities.

The editor of the *Chronicle of Human Rights* was Valery Chalidze, who had been a rights activist in Moscow. Allowed to travel to the United States in 1972, he was deprived of his Soviet citizenship and could not return home.

The *Chronicle* reflected a juridical approach to Soviet dissent, reporting the Soviet government's violations of its own laws in suppressing free expression. It documented arrests and trials of dissidents, conditions in the labor camps and mental asylums where some dissidents were held, and repression of movements defending the rights of national and religious minorities, among other topics. Citing Soviet laws, the Constitution of the USSR, and international covenants to which the Soviet Union was a party, the *Chronicle* sought to persuade the Soviet government to uphold its own guarantees of civil liberties.

For ten years the *Chronicle of Human Rights* gave dissidents a voice the Soviet authorities could not silence. By exposing repressive governmental actions that would otherwise not have come to light, it anticipated the policy of glasnost, or openness, which Mikhail Gorbachev introduced in the late 1980s.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; SAMIZDAT

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MARSHALL S. SHATZ

CHRONICLES

Annalistic histories serve as important primary sources for the pre-Petrine period. The earliest chronicle written in Kiev begins with highlights of world history based on the Old and New Testaments (the divisions of the earth into tribes, the story of Christ and his disciples), followed by traditional tales on the founding, first rulers, and Christianization of the Rus lands. Chronologically ordered records organized in yearly entries (hence the Russian title *letopis*, commonly translated as “annal” or “chronicle”) include documents, hagiographical narratives, reports on occurrences of significance for the state and the church; births, illnesses, and deaths of prominent persons; accounts of military and political conflicts; construction of fortifications, palaces, and churches; and notes on meteorological phenomena and wonders. As appanage principalities and ecclesiastical establishments acquired the resources for scriptoria, they initiated new chronicle compilations that borrowed from earlier annals, but devoted special attention to concerns of their own time and locality. Compendious chronicles produced in the central Muscovite scriptorium of the metropolitans include extended hagiographical narratives, correspondence, reports of church councils, details of protocol, and descriptions of important ceremonies involving princes and high-ranking hierarchs.

The editor of a chronicle constructed his compilation (*svod*) from an archive of earlier texts, editing and supplementing them as necessary. Because some sources have not survived and compilations are usually not clearly marked by titles, the origins, sources, and genealogical relationships of chronicles must be reconstructed on the basis of internal evidence, paleographical analysis, and synoptic comparison. Alexei Shakhmatov created the methodological foundations of chronicle scholarship. Shakhmatov’s hypotheses, continually revised during his lifetime and still indispensable, were corrected and refined by his successors, chief among them historians Mikhail D. Priselkov and Arseny N. Nasonov. Iakov S. Lur’e greatly contributed to our understanding of chronicle writing in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Boris Kloss has done important codicological analysis on Muscovite compilations. Alexei Gippius and Alexander Bobrov have continued to research Novgorodian compilations. The evolving views of these chronicle scholars, and their ongoing differences, are registered in the critical apparatus of the contin-

uing series known as the *Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles* (*Polnoye sobranie russkikh letopisei*), founded in 1846 by the Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences, and in entries for individual chronicles in the multivolume *Slovar knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi*.

Among the most important sources for historians of the period from the founding of Rus through the fourteenth century are the Laurentian Codex (containing the earliest surviving copy of the Kievan Primary Chronicle), copied for Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal in 1377; the Hypatian Codex (containing a Kievan thirteenth-century chronicle and a Galician Volynian compilation, copied in the fifteenth century); and the Novgorod First Chronicle, surviving in several versions: the oldest version (*starshy izvod*) covering up to the mid-fourteenth century and a younger version, preserved in fifteenth-century copies, adding records from the second half of the fourteenth century through the beginning of the fifteenth century.

Two fifteenth-century annals associated with Novgorod’s St. Sophia Cathedral (*Novgorodsko-Sofytsky svod*) but relatively neutral toward the Moscow princes (who were fighting dynastic wars among themselves) were compiled during the 1430s and 1440s. The Sophia First Chronicle, surviving in an early version (*starshy izvod*), preserved in the Karamzin and Obolensky copies, ends in the year 1418. A later version, whose earliest witness is the Balzerov manuscript (late fifteenth century), offers sporadic coverage of historical events up to the year 1471; the Tsarsky copy, dating from the beginning of the sixteenth century, extends to the year 1508. The Novgorod Fourth Chronicle also survives in several versions. The earliest version ends in the year 1437. The later version covers events to the year 1447 (the Frolov copy), extending to 1477 in the Stroyev and Synodal copies. Important primary sources on fifteenth-century Muscovy are the Rogozhsky Chronicle, represented in a single mid-fifteenth-century codex covering the period to 1412; the Simeonov Chronicle, represented in a single sixteenth-century copy covering the period to 1493; and the Uvarov Codex, a sixteenth-century manuscript, extending to the year 1492. The Typography Chronicle contains many entries representing the views of the influential Rostov bishops from the period between 1424 and 1481. The Yermolin Chronicle, connected by Lur’e to the “politically independent” Kirillov-Belozero Monastery, provides some unique details

passed over in mainstream chronicles for the period from 1460 to 1472.

In the sixteenth century, chronicle writing proliferated. The most important compilations were composed in the scriptorium of the Moscow metropolitans and convey their special interests as well as certain biases of the Moscow grand princes. The Sophia Second Chronicle, surviving in manuscripts from the early- and mid-sixteenth century, covers the period between 1398 and 1518. The Nikon Chronicle, compiled in the scriptorium of Moscow Metropolitan Daniel (r. 1522–1539) by 1529, covers the period up to 1520 and lays the foundation for all subsequent chronicles of the sixteenth century. The Voskresenk Chronicle, a key Muscovite source surviving in thirteen copies, was compiled between 1542 and 1544 and contains a number of articles sympathetic to the Shuisky family. These chronicles served as the primary annalistic sources for the first Muscovite narrative history, the *Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy*, compiled between 1556 and 1563. The Illustrated Compilation (*litsevoy letopisny svod*), the most extensive medieval Russian chronicle, consists of ten codices with over 16,000 miniature illustrations. Commissioned (and, some believe, edited) by Ivan the Terrible, the Illustrated Compilation was prepared in the capital of his “state within a state” (*oprichnina*), Alexandrovskaya sloboda. Kloss dates its compilation between 1568 and 1576, Alexander Amosov from the late 1570s to the beginning of the 1580s. Among the most valuable seventeenth-century annals are the *Novy letopisets*, surviving in many copies and covering the period from the end of Ivan IV’s reign to 1630; the Novgorod Third Chronicle, surviving in two versions and providing unique coverage of seventeenth-century Novgorodian affairs to 1676; and the Piskarev Codex, which, compiled by an annalist connected with the powerful Golitsyn clan, covers the period up to the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich (r. 1645–1676).

See also: BOOK OF DEGREES; PRIMARY CHRONICLE

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GAIL LENHOFF

CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH

(b. 1955), reform economist and official in Yeltsin government.

Anatoly Borisovich Chubais was born in 1955. In 1977 he graduated from an engineering-economic institute in Leningrad, and in 1983 he defended a thesis on management problems. His early career was linked to the democratic movement in Leningrad. Following the failed coup in August 1991 (against Mikhail Gorbachev), he resigned his membership in the Communist Party.

As one of the most prominent of Russia’s “young reform economists,” in November 1991 he was appointed to serve as chairman of the Russian State Property Committee. From that post he would lead and influence the Russian program of mass privatization, personally favoring the use of special privatization vouchers and privatization via auctions. In 1993 he was also elected to the Russian Duma, representing the liberal party Russia’s Choice.

Following a series of scandals in relation to various privatization deals, in January 1996 Chubais was fired from his post. A month later, however, he returned to the national stage to serve as campaign manager for Boris Yeltsin’s reelection campaign. From there he proceeded to the influential post of head of the presidential administration.

In March 1997 Chubais capped his political career by being appointed first deputy prime minister in charge of the economy, a post that he would hold until March 1998, when Yeltsin chose to dismiss the entire government.

Throughout his various posts in government, Chubais became known as one of the most competent but also one of the most controversial of the reformers. While his popularity in Western business and policy circles seemed to guarantee appointments to prominent posts, his standing with the general population and with the political opposition inside his own country was very poor.

In April 1998 Chubais was appointed to serve as chief executive officer of the Russian power giant Unified Energy Systems (UES). Like his role in government, his way of running UES was surrounded by controversy, earning him much praise but also much criticism.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; LIBERALISM; PRIVATIZATION; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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STEFAN HEDLUND

CHUIKOV, VASILY IVANOVICH

(1900–1982), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1955), twice Hero of the Soviet Union, and Red Army commander renowned during World War II for his stoic and ruthless defense of Stalingrad and vital role in the capture of Berlin.

Josef Stalin routinely employed Vasily Chuikov as a “shock commander” in the most difficult sectors of the front. A regimental commander during the Russian civil war, Chuikov graduated from the Frunze Academy (1925) and the Red Army’s Academy of Motorization and Mechanization (1936).

Elevated to command the 9th Army after its notorious defeat during the Soviet–Finnish War (1939–1940), on Stalin’s orders Chuikov executed all commanders, commissars, and officers involved in the defeat. After serving as attaché to China (1939–1942), Chuikov commanded the 64th Army during the bitter fighting en route to Stalingrad and, later, the 62nd Army in its bloody and tenacious defense of the ruined city, for which his army earned the designation “8th Guards.” Chuikov commanded the Eighth Guards Army from 1943 through the war’s end, fighting in all major battles in the Ukraine and Poland, and spearheading the final Red Army drive on Berlin in April 1945. After the war Chuikov served successively as commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Kiev Military District, and the Soviet Ground Forces; Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR; and Chief of the USSR’s Civil Defense. After his retirement in 1972, Chuikov authored seven memoirs related to his military exploits.

See also: WORLD WAR II

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DAVID M. GLANTZ

CHUKCHI

The Chukchi, one of Russia’s “Northern Peoples,” live in the northeast extreme of Russia. Most (80%) of the approximately fifteen thousand Chukchi live within the Chukchi Autonomous District; small numbers also reside in Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and Koryak Autonomous District. Historically, two general groups were recognized: inland and coastal Chukchi. Inland Chukchi herded domestic reindeer, amassing up to several thousands per (rich) family. Reindeer herding required a nomadic lifestyle: herders lived in tents and moved continuously to avoid pasture degradation. Men herded, hunted, and fished, while women gathered plant foods, sewed, cooked, and moved camp. The sociopolitical unit of the inland Chukchi was the herding camp, consisting of four to five families.

Coastal Chukchi depended on marine mammals for their subsistence, and lived in settled villages. Within villages whaling crews constituted important sociopolitical units. Coastal and inland Chukchi interacted, trading for desired products (e.g. marine mammal fat and hides, reindeer hides).

The Chukchi language is part of the Chukchi-Kamachatkan group of Paleo-Asiatic languages, and is most closely related to Koryak. Perhaps its most interesting attribute is the gender specific pronunciation: women replace the “r” sound with a “ts” sound. Animism characterized Chukchi cosmology. Both men and women served as shamans who mediated with the spirits who guided the animal world and other realms.

Nonnative people—Russian explorers and traders, followed by American traders—began to penetrate Chukchi space in the seventeenth century. The Russians claimed the territory but were unable to subdue it, due to fierce Chukchi resistance. Eventually (1778), the Tsarist government signed a peace treaty with the Chukchi. It was the Soviets who brought massive change, imposing new economic forms on the Chukchi, wresting decision making from them and attempting to settle the nomadic population. Some coastal villages were annihilated and their populations moved to larger centers. Meanwhile the Chukchi homeland underwent extensive mineral exploitation, accompanied by massive immigration. In 1930, natives constituted 96 percent of the population; by 1970 the number was reduced to 13 percent. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of northern subsidies, many nonnatives have left. The Chukchi have established a local organization to

fight for increased rights, and are attempting to revivify their traditional activities, but they are plagued by high levels of unemployment, high mortality, declining reindeer herds, antiwhaling campaigns, and a moribund local economy.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NORTHERN PEOPLES

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GAIL A. FONDAHL

CHUKOVSKAYA, LYDIA KORNEYEVNA

(1907–1996), novelist, editor, memoirist, dissident, daughter of writer and critic Kornei Chukovsky.

Born in St. Petersburg, Lydia Chukovskaya studied literature at the Institute of the History of Art. She worked as apprentice editor to Samuil Marshak at the children's literature section of the Leningrad State Publishing House from 1927 until the section was shut down during the purges of the 1930s.

Chukovskaya became one of the most powerful writers to emerge from the Stalinist experience. Chukovskaya's husband, Matvei Petrovich Bronshtein, died in Stalin's purges. Written clandestinely during the winter of 1939 to 1940 and finally published in the Soviet Union in 1988, Chukovskaya's first novel, *Sof'ia Petrovna*, tells the story of a mother who loses her only son in the purges. Chukovskaya's second novel, *Going Under (Spusk pod vodu)* similarly features a female protagonist traumatized by Stalinist repression.

Chukovskaya preserved and edited literary treasures. She saved some of Anna Akhmatova's poems by committing them to memory. Chukovskaya kept a journal of her meetings with her friend during the purges and published *Notes on Anna*

Akhmatova (Zapiski ob Anne Akhmatovoi), a two-volume account of their conversations. In 1960 she published a collection of essays on the art of editing entitled *In the Editor's Workshop (V laboratorii redaktora)*.

Over time, Chukovskaya became active in the dissident movement. Her efforts on behalf of Joseph Brodsky, Andrei Sinyavsky, Yuly Daniel, Andrei Sakharov, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn led to her expulsion from the Union of Soviet Writers in 1974, which she chronicled in *The Process of Expulsion (Protsess iskliucheniia)*.

During her final years, she eulogized her father in *To the Memory of Childhood (Pamiati detstva)* and established a museum at the Chukovsky dacha in Peredelkino, outside Moscow.

See also: CHUKOVSKY, KORNEI IVANOVICH

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JACQUELINE M. OLICH

CHUKOVSKY, KORNEI IVANOVICH

(1882–1969); pseudonym of Nikolai Vasilevich Korneichukov; best known as author of children's fairy tales and poetry; also a journalist, translator, editor, and literary critic and scholar.

Kornei Chukovsky grew up in Odessa, where he began his career in 1901 as a correspondent for *Odesskie novosti (Odessa News)*. He spent 1903–1904 in London, where he immersed himself in British and American literature. Returning to Russia, he settled in St. Petersburg and wrote literary criticism for the journal *Vesy (Scales)*, although his satirical publication *Signal* led to his arrest and brief detention. In 1907 he published a translation of Walt Whitman's verse and translated the works of many other English-language writers after 1918. Until the mid-1920s, Chukovsky also wrote numerous books of literary criticism. In 1914 he completed *Poetry of the Coming Democracy*, which for political reasons was not published until 1918. Chukovsky was also the foremost authority on Nikolai Nekrasov, writing approximately eighty publications on the poet and editing the 1926 edition of Nekrasov's collected works.

During the 1920s Chukovsky turned to writing children's literature as a "safe" genre. His first tale *Krokodil* (*The Crocodile*) had been published in 1917, and between 1923 and 1926 he wrote a number of others. Although his tales were widely published and very popular, the author came under attack from writers and educators, including Nadezhda Krupskaya, who called *The Crocodile* "a bourgeois fog." Chukovsky's children's stories were forbidden and, with the exceptions of two new stories in the 1930s, not republished until after Stalin's death. Chukovsky's response to this critique was *Malenkie deti* (*Little Children*, 1928; *From Two to Five* in later editions), a study of children's language, games, and creativity.

While Chukovsky himself did not directly experience persecution during the 1930s, he knew many, such as his son-in-law, who did. Chukovsky worked tirelessly to help those who suffered, writing letters and petitions on their behalf. In 1962, toward the end of his life, he received the Lenin Prize and was awarded an honorary doctor of letters from Oxford University.

See also: CHUKOVSKAYA, LYDIA KORNEYEVNA; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA; NEKRASOV, NIKOLAI ALEXEYEVICH

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ELIZABETH JONES HEMENWAY

CHURCH COUNCIL

In the Orthodox Church, councils (in Greek, *synodos*; in Russian, *sobor*) are the highest form of ecclesiastical authority, the most important of which are the seven ecumenical councils that were held between the years 325 and 787. Since 1500 the Russian Church has convened several "local" or national councils (*pomestnye sobory*), which apply

specifically to the Russian Church itself. Ultimate authority for decision-making at these councils has rested in the hands of the bishops, although, in the twentieth century, clergy and laity have participated in a consultative role with varying degrees of power. Since the rise of Muscovite Russia, the local councils have taken place in Moscow or just northeast of it at the Trinity Monastery in Sergiev Posad (known as Zagorsk during the Soviet period).

The Council of 1503 confronted the conflicting positions of two monastics who were subsequently both glorified by the Church as saints. Joseph of Volotsk advocated the establishment of cenobitic monasteries (in which monks lived in common, sharing everything), church landholdings, and the active involvement of monks in the world. Nil Sorsky promoted a monasticism that separated itself from the world; monks, he thought, should live as hermits and earn income from their own labor. Although the debates between the possessors and nonpossessors, as their two points of view are known respectively, amounted to a difference in emphasis, not of absolute opposition, the Council of 1503 rejected Nil's positions. As a result, sixteenth-century monastic landholding and wealth increased. The assembly also condemned the Judaizer movement as a heresy.

The Council of 1666–1667 was convened amidst Tsar Alexei's efforts to deal with the reforms of the outspoken Patriarch Nikon. With Patriarchs Paissy of Alexandria and Macarius of Antioch in attendance, the assembly endorsed Nikon's reforms of ritual and service books, yet deposed Nikon himself for his attempts to attain supreme authority over the tsar. The Council called for increasing the number of bishops, closing the state's Monastery Office, and restoring the bishops' authority over the clergy; the state resisted such changes in order to preserve its own power. The Council sought to curtail the unregulated recognition of saints and of miracle-working relics, reduced the number of saints' days that were national feasts, and called for a skeptical attitude when considering the validity of "holy fools."

The Council of 1682, convened during the reign of Tsar Theodore, considered questions and proposals that had been raised at the Council of 1666–1667, including the addition of ten dioceses to the existing thirteen. Since only one new diocese had been added, the expansion of ecclesiastical administration still remained an issue. Other decisions concerned the behavior of clergy and the regulation of church services and veneration of relics.

The Council of 1917–1918 represented the culmination of an early-twentieth-century church reform movement. After the February Revolution, it attempted to reconstruct church-state relations in cooperation with and anticipation of the proposed political transformation of Russia through the Constituent Assembly. It also contended with the rise of nationalist movements and Soviet power. The Council had been much anticipated in 1906 but, due to fears of political unrest, had been postponed by Tsar Nicholas II. Its delegates consisted of 265 clerics (bishops, priests, and monks) and 299 laymen; although the assembly's plenary sessions were thereby dominated numerically by non-episcopal members (a departure from tradition), no decree was made official until approved by the Council's episcopal conference, which met in secret session. The Council restored the Moscow Patriarchate to replace the Synodal higher church administration instituted by Peter the Great; decentralized authority in diocesan administration to create an ecclesiastical system more responsive to the needs of clergy and laity; and reformed the parish, which became a legal entity empowered to carry out many decisions on its own. The Council also considered a host of issues concerning church discipline. The Bolsheviks' disestablishment of the institutional church made it difficult or impossible to carry out the Council's decrees. In 1918 the delegates focused increasingly on preserving the church rather than reforming it.

The Council of January 31–February 2, 1945, was convened at the behest of the Soviet government and broke with church tradition and the decrees of the 1917–1918 Council in many ways. Held primarily to elect a new patriarch to succeed Patriarch Sergius, the Council selected Alexei, the sole candidate proposed for the position. Consisting of 46 bishops, 87 priests, and 37 laymen, the Council created a centralized authority in the hands of the patriarch, at the expense of Synodal, diocesan, and parish authority.

The Council of May 30–June 2, 1971, was attended by 236 delegates, including a bishop, priest, and layman from each diocese and guests from outside Russia. The Council elected Metropolitan Pimen as patriarch to replace Alexei, who had died in April 1970, and lifted the seventeenth-century excommunication of the Old Believers. It confirmed the parish reforms of the 1961 Council of Bishops, which had given power to executive committees to control finances, thereby undermining the authority of priests and bishops. The Council also ap-

proved the granting of autocephaly (independence) to Orthodox Churches in America, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as autonomy (self-rule) to Churches in Japan and Finland.

The Church convened the Council of June 6–9, 1988, during the millennium anniversary of the baptism of Rus in 988. The assembly glorified (canonized) nine saints: Grand Prince Dmitry Donskoy, Andrei Rublev, Maximus the Greek, Metropolitan of Moscow Macarius (1482–1563), Paisy Velichkovsky, Xenia of Petersburg, Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov, Amvrosy of Optina, and Bishop Theofan the Recluse. The Council promulgated a new statute on church administration, which called for a local council to be convened every five years and a bishops' council every two years. It also overturned the parish decrees of the 1961 Bishops' Council by strengthening the position of the priest in the parish, making his signature necessary for all parish council documents and establishing him as chairman of the parish council.

See also: HOLY SYNOD; PATRIARCHATE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SAINTS

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GEORGE T. KOSAR

CHURCH COUNCIL, HUNDRED CHAPTERS

The Hundred Chapters Church Council (known to Russians as the *Stoglav*) was convened in Moscow in February 1551 by Tsar Ivan IV and Metropolitan Makary, and was attended by representatives of the boyar council, nine bishops, and numerous abbots, priors, and priests. The council's purpose was to regulate the church's relationship to the state, reform its internal life, strengthen the authority of the bishops, and eradicate non-Christian folk customs from among the populace. It would not introduce anything new but would purify the Russian church of irregularities.

No complete record of the council's resolutions has survived, but a partial account was preserved in a book (the *Stoglav*) divided into one hundred chapters, from which the council takes its name. Ivan opened the proceedings with a speech in which he confessed his sins and called for national repentance, then asked the council to approve his new law code of 1550 and the statute charters designed to abolish corruption in provincial administration. After this the tsar presented a list of questions, apparently compiled with the help of Metropolitan Makary and the priest Sylvester, relating to deficiencies in church life and heresy among the people, and called on the council to recommend remedies.

By May 1551 the Hundred Chapters Council had completed its deliberations. Ivan's new law code and statute charters were confirmed, but the proposed secularization of church lands for military tenure and subordination of clerics to secular jurisdiction were categorically rejected. When the tsar confirmed the inviolability of church possessions, the bishops compromised by agreeing to limits on the increase of ecclesiastical property. Moreover, the financial privileges of monasteries were reduced, and no new tax-free monastic settlements were to be founded in towns without the tsar's approval, thereby increasing crown tax revenues. The council called for many irregularities in church life to be corrected. Among other things, drunkenness among the clergy was to be eradicated, parish priests were to be better educated, and priests and laity alike were to be protected against rapacious episcopal tax collectors. "Pagan" and foreign practices popular among the laity were prohibited, such as minstrels playing at weddings and the shaving of beards.

The council's decisions made it possible to standardize religious books, rituals, and icon painting and protected the church's possessions and judicial rights against state encroachment. The bishops increased their judicial authority over the monasteries, and likewise extended their supervision of the parish clergy by appointing a network of priest elders. Some of the council's resolutions were not implemented, however, and others proved to be unsuccessful. The series of decrees issued in 1551 throughout the Russian state calling for the purification of religious life had to be regularly reissued, which suggests that the corrections were not enforced and abuses were not extirpated. Despite council demands for upgraded clerical education, there is no evidence of improvement until the second half of the seventeenth century. Alcoholism continued to be a problem, and extortion by tax collectors was never fully eradicated. Attempts to purify the Christianity of the people appear to have failed, and many superstitious practices listed by the council survived until the early twentieth century. The attempt to reform the laity's behavior was impeded by the fact that parish priests were responsible for carrying it out but were not given the education, assistance, or means of enforcement that would have made this possible.

The Hundred Chapters Council affirmed the traditional Byzantine principle of "symphony" (i.e., cooperation) between church and state, yet the proceedings exemplify the ongoing power struggle between Russia's religious and secular authorities. As a historical document, the *Stoglav* casts a unique light on the cultural life of early modern Russia and on the character of Ivan IV. Alongside the *Nomocanon* (a collection of Byzantine ecclesiastical law), it became a fundamental manual of church law until the mid-seventeenth century, when Patriarch Nikon of Moscow reversed some of its decisions on minor religious rituals. Nikon's opponents maintained that the old rituals were correct and that the decisions of the Hundred Chapters council had canonical authority. The ensuing disagreement became one of the chief causes of the schism of the Russian Church.

See also: IVAN IV; NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVERS

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DEBRA A. COULTER

CHUVASH

The Chuvash (self-name *chavash*) are an indigenous people of the middle Volga basin. According to the 1989 census there were 1.8 million Chuvash in the former Soviet Union. The greatest concentration (906,922) lived in the Chuvash Republic on the west bank of the Volga river between its tributaries the Sura and Sviaga, with most of the remainder living in adjacent republics and provinces. Chuvash made up 67.8 percent of the population of Chuvashia in 1989, with Russians accounting for 26.7 percent.

The ethnonym *chavash* first appears in Russian sources in 1508, so early Chuvash history is not entirely clear. Scholars agree that today's Chuvash are descendants of at least three groups: Turkic Bulgar tribes who arrived on the Volga in the seventh century from the Caucasus-Azov region; the closely-related Suvars (suvaz, perhaps the origin of *chavash*) who migrated from the Caucasus in the eighth century; and Finno-Ugric tribes who inhabited Chuvashia before the Turkic settlement. The Bulgar state dominated the region from the tenth century until conquest by the Mongols in 1236. Chuvash were ruled by the Golden Horde in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, then by the Kazan Khanate from the 1440s, and were finally incorporated in the Muscovite state in 1551.

The Chuvash speak a Turkic language that preserves many archaic elements of Old Bulgar and is largely incomprehensible to speakers of other Turkic dialects. Early Chuvash was written with Turkic runes, supplanted by the Arabic alphabet during the time of the Bulgar state. A new Chuvash script

based on the Cyrillic alphabet emerged in the eighteenth century. The first Chuvash grammar, which used this script, was published in 1769. The Chuvash educator Ivan Yakovlev developed a new Chuvash alphabet in 1871. The first Chuvash newspaper, *Khypar* (News), appeared in 1906.

Early Chuvash animism was influenced by Zoroastrianism, Judaism (via the Khazars), and Islam. Chuvash honored fire, water, sun, and earth, and believed in a variety of good and evil spirits. By the middle of the eighteenth century, most Chuvash had converted to Russian Orthodox Christianity under the influence of Russian settlers and missionaries. However, some who lived among Tatar populations converted to Islam and assimilated to Tatar culture and language. Today's Chuvash are predominantly Orthodox Christians, though pagan beliefs survive in scattered settlements.

The second half of the nineteenth century brought significant economic changes, as Chuvash peasants left their villages for railway employment, lumbering and factory work in the Urals, mining in the Donbas, and migrant agricultural labor. Urbanization began in this period and accelerated in the twentieth century, although in 1989 less than half (49.8 percent) of the Chuvash in the Russian Federation lived in cities.

During the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chuvash leaders demonstrated interest in joining the Idel-Ural (Volga-Ural) state proposed by Tatar politicians as a counterbalance to Russian hegemony in the region, and later (March 1918) agreed to join the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic. After this project fell victim to the conflicts of the civil war, the Soviet government formed a Chuvash Autonomous Region (1920), later upgraded to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1925). Chuvash leaders declared their republic an SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic, or union republic) in 1990 and renamed it the Chuvash Republic in 1992. Important organizations active since the late Soviet years include the Chuvash Party of National Rebirth, the Chuvash National Congress, and the Chuvash Social-Cultural Center. The Chuvash Republic is a signatory to the March 31, 1992, treaty that created the Russian Federation.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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DANIEL E. SCHAFER

CIMMERIANS

Cimmerians are a nomadic, Iranian-speaking peoples who occupied the North Pontic steppe zone from the Don to the Danube, with their center in the Crimea. Their culture and civilization flourished between about 1000 and 800 B.C.E. Pastoralists had inhabited the North Pontic region since approximately 4000 B.C.E., or some three thousand years prior to the advent of the Cimmerians, but the latter were the first to be mentioned by name in the written sources, and so they were sometimes (inaccurately) seen by historians as the earliest nomadic peoples of southern Russia.

It is not clear whether the term "Cimmerian" represented an ethnic group or simply designated any Iranian-speaking equestrian nomads inhabiting the North Pontic area. There is also no consensus on the origins of these peoples. However, it is most likely that the Cimmerians evolved out of the sedentary Srubnaia ("Timber-Grave") archaeological culture of the second millennium B.C.E. after they took up a pastoral way of life in the steppe. There are reasons to believe that the Cimmerians can be connected to the Belozersk culture, which some scholars believe is derived from the late Srubnaia culture. By about 800 B.C.E., the Cimmerians were supplanted by the Scythians, a closely akin Iranian-speaking nomadic group that arrived in the area and absorbed some of the former into their tribal confederation while expelling the rest. Some Cimmerian tribes who were ejected from the North Pontic steppe zone moved southeast through Transcaucasia into Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia, which they raided for about twenty years.

See also: CRIMEA

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

CIRCASSIANS *See* CHERKESS.

CIRCUS

Circus was first introduced in Russia in 1793 by Charles Hughes of the Royal Circus of London. Established on a permanent basis in 1853, Russian circus was dominated by foreigners in the early years, such as the Salomanskys of Berlin in Moscow and the Cinizellis of Italy in St. Petersburg. Circuses traveled around with tents, but stationary circuses were also built in largely populated areas in Russia. Stationary circuses are more profitable and can also be active during inclement weather. During Soviet times there were about seventy stationary circuses and about forty remain in Russia in the early twenty-first century.

Circus in Russia has deep roots in the rich Russian cultural traditions, but circus performances in Russia are also known for their social comedies. Circus clowns in prerevolutionary Russia created satirical skits about landowners and merchants. The famous Durov brothers, Anatoly and Vladimir, a clown pair whose underlying purpose with their social comedies was to fight the oppressive tsarist regime, mastered this form. The Durov brothers were also animal tamers who developed the well-known Durov method of humane animal care and training.

The satirical nature of the circus and its appeal as a form of mass entertainment translated well into the Soviet world of popular culture. Intellectuals attacked the circus in the wake of the 1917 Revolution and labeled it an institution of superstition, animal cruelty, and vulgarity. Others noted that the circus offered an alternative mode of presenting historical and political themes through satirical clowning. The circus was nationalized in 1919 and the Commissariat of Enlightenment created a new department for it within its theater section. During the civil war the circus was turned to revolutionary uses, and later during World War II circus performers expressed patriotic feelings by staging victorious battles and honoring Russia's wartime allies.

The circus survived the Bolshevik cultural revolution well as circus acts already had a tradition of conveying political messages. In addition to political preaching, Soviet circus successfully mixed comedy and clowning with moralizing. During the

Nikita Khrushchev years, popular routines addressed child upbringing, warned against foreign fashion, excessive drinking, *stilyagi*, and other social menaces. Circus continued to amuse Soviet citizens into the Leonid Brezhnev era, focusing on popular acts such as acrobatics, high wire, dancing bears, Cossack riders, and clowning. Clowns remained the greatest stars of the Russian circus.

Although tiring to the Soviet audience, Russian circus was conservative and continued to present internationally acclaimed ethnic variety shows well into the 1980s. With perestroika the circus abandoned the standard Soviet elements of the circus, such as folk culture, appraisal of World War II heroism, and politics. In the early twenty-first century, pop music and skits devoid of political or moral preaching draw huge crowds as the professionalism of Russian circus artists is widely acclaimed. With changing times, Russian circus has reinvented itself and continues to be a valued form of entertainment in Russia.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION

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RÓSA MAGNÚSDÓTTIR

CIVIC UNION

The Civic Union was a political movement active in 1992 and 1993, intended to represent the interests of state-owned enterprises and their managers and employees. It was a bloc of several parties and extraparliamentary organizations. One of its leaders was Vice President Alexander Rutskoy; another was Arkady Volsky, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Its activities were a reaction against the economic policies of the Yegor Gaidar government (1991–1992).

Russian governments in the Boris Yeltsin era, in accordance with mainstream Western economics, aimed at financial stabilization, specifically of

the price level. The Civic Union was more interested in real stabilization: namely, stabilization of output levels. It primarily aimed to halt, and then reverse, the sharp fall in production and living standards that took place between 1989 and 1992.

Unlike the Gaidar government, the Civic Union, worried about the possible negative consequences of privatization, did not consider it a high priority, and believed that any privatization of large enterprises should adhere to the Soviet tradition of safeguarding the rights of employees.

With respect to liberalization, the Civic Union saw advantages in the partial reintroduction of some elements of the old economic mechanism (state orders, the provision of goods in kind, price controls, and wage controls). For the Gaidar team, the Civic Union's position on this issue exposed its "reactionary essence" and made it "dangerous" for the future of Russia.

In agriculture, during the winter of 1991–1992, the Gaidar government tried to carry out a quick decollectivization policy, ignoring the needs and interests of this remaining large-scale sector. The Civic Union, on the other hand, argued for continued financial support for large-scale agriculture (the former collective and state farms).

The Civic Union played an important role in the emergence of a democratic system in Russia by providing a constitutional channel for criticism of the unpopular economic policies of the Gaidar government. It contributed to undermining them and forcing Gaidar himself from office in December 1992. However, it failed on the whole to provide direction and leadership for government economic policy. The growing political tension of 1993 and the increased privatization of the economy led to the disappearance of the Civic Union.

See also: ECONOMY, CURRENT; PRIVATIZATION

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MICHAEL ELLMAN

CIVIL WAR OF 1425–1450

The Civil War of 1425–1450 was a major formative event in Russian history, the impact of which was evident well into the Soviet period. It began as a dynastic controversy, the sole major civil war in the Moscow princely line (the Danilovichi) until that time. This was only one of the ninety major civil wars in Russia between 1228 and 1462. Moscow's other major rivals for hegemony over the East European plain (especially Tver) were constantly destroying themselves in civil wars, whereas Moscow had a single line of unchallenged rulers between 1300 and 1425. If it would be fair to say that Moscow's ultimate triumph as East Slavic hegemon was determined already in the 1390s, then in the political sphere the civil war of 1425–1450 was almost irrelevant in the long run. In the social sphere, however, the civil war set the ball rolling toward serfdom and, by 1649, to a legally stratified, near-caste society that essentially lasted until the 1950s, when the Soviets finally issued peasants internal passports, putting an end to the serf element of collectivized agriculture. For this reason an understanding of the civil war is both interesting and important.

Muscovite grand prince Basil I died in 1425. Surviving him were his ten-year-old son, who became Basil II, and three brothers, Pyotr (d. 1428), Andrei (d. 1432), and Yuri (d. 1434). The general (but not universal) Muscovite practice had been for succession to be vertical, from father to son—a system of limited primogeniture, one of the strengths of the Danilovichi. The issue was complicated by contradictory wills. Dmitry Donskoy had willed the realm to Basil I, then to his next son Yuri—all before Basil II was born. Later, Basil I's will of 1423 passed power to his son.

In 1425 Basil II was only a nominal ruler. Real power was in the hands of the boyars, head of the church Metropolitan Foty, and Basil's mother, Sofia Vitovtovna (daughter of the ruler of Lithuania). This group was opposed by Basil's uncle, Yuri Dmitrievich, appanage prince of Zvenigorod and Galich, who would have been the legitimate heir under the archaic system of lateral succession. While he lived, he was regularly raising armies in Galich in an attempt to seize the throne in Moscow. His brother Andrei, prince of Beloozero, conspired with Yuri to keep their nephew off the throne. Three years of war and plundering ended in 1428,

when Yuri gave up his pretensions to the throne. Warfare continued, however, as Basil II and Yuri continued to fight over the escheated Dmitrov appanage of Peter, who died in 1428 without heirs. In 1432 the Mongol Khan gave the patent (*yarlyk*) to Basil, who was installed as ruler of All Rus in Moscow, which henceforth became the capital of Russia. The khan awarded Dmitrov to Yuri; Dmitrov was then seized by Basil's troops. A temporary calm ensued.

In 1433 Basil II married Maria Yaroslavna, sister of the prince of Serpukhov-Brovsk. In an apparent gesture of clan harmony, Basil's cousins, the sons of Yuri of Galich, Basil Yurievich (Kosoi, d. 1448) and Dmitry Yurievich Shemyaka (poisoned in 1453) attended the wedding. A third son, Dmitry Krasny (d. 1441) was absent. Basil Yurievich wore a gem-studded golden belt, which was alleged to be part of the grand princely regalia that had been stolen from Dmitry Donskoy. Sofia Vitovtovna took the belt, the keystone of subsequent Russian history, from Basil Yurievich, who then with his brother fled to their father Yuri's estate in Galich. Yuri rounded up his army, defeated Basil II, took Moscow, and proclaimed himself grand prince. Basil rounded up an army, and Yuri surrendered Moscow without a fight. Then Yuri rounded up his forces and those of his three sons and defeated Basil II at Rostov, and Basil fled to Novgorod. Yuri took Moscow, but died. This should have ended the civil war, but it was continued by his sons, who had no "legitimate" claims to the throne whatsoever. Basil Yurievich seized the throne and was crowned. His two brothers, Dmitry Krasny and Dmitry Shemyaka, opposed him and joined Basil II, and Basil Yurievich fled. He and his army looted everything along the way, as was the practice throughout the civil war. Then civil war spread throughout nearly all of northeastern Rus. In 1436 Basil Yurievich was captured and blinded, hence his nickname "Kosoi" ("squint"). Dmitry Shemyaka took over leadership of the rebels. The Mongol-Tatars joined the fray, plundering and burning everything in their wake. On July 7, 1445, they captured Basil II, and a week later they burned the Kremlin. Shemyaka wanted Basil II turned over to him, but the Tatars freed him for an enormous ransom, 200,000 silver rubles, in October. The taxes raised to pay the ransom caused further chaos and population dislocation.

This led to the third and worst period of the civil war. Shemyaka and his allies continuously fought Basil II and sacked every place they visited.

Basil II was seized by his enemies at the Trinity Sergiev monastery and blinded (henceforth called *temny*—"the dark"). While this was going on, Shemyaka seized Moscow and became grand prince in 1446. The treasury was looted, and the peasants, even more oppressed than they had been, fled further. Crops were destroyed by the marauding armies, and starvation ensued. Grain was scarce in Novgorod for a decade. Shemyaka, condemned as an oathbreaker by the church, was soon driven out of Moscow. He continued the war for several years in the North (Ustiug, Vologda), then fled to Novgorod, where he was poisoned by his cook, an agent of Basil II.

The Venetian diplomat, merchant, and traveler Josaphat Barbaro observed that Russia was a desert. In an attempt to assure repayment of peasant debts, a few monasteries persuaded rulers to issue laws prohibiting peasant debtors from moving at any time other than around St. George's Day (November 26)—after the harvest, the best time to collect debts. This initiated the enserfment of the Russian peasantry.

See also: BASIL I; BASIL II; BOYARS; DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH; KREMLIN

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RICHARD HELLIE

CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922

The most decisive chapter of the Russian Revolution, the civil war raged between October 1917 and 1922. The traumatic experience of civil war served as a defining moment for the new Soviet state by embedding itself into both the people's and the state's outlook and behavior.

The origins of the Russian civil war can be found in the discrediting of the tsarist government that took place before World War I; in the social

divisions that shaped politics before and during the Revolution of 1917; and in the Bolshevik leadership's belief in the importance of civil war, in the imminence of world revolution, and in the acceptability of applying coercion in setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat. Although historians disagree over when the civil war began, dating the event to the October Revolution of 1917 makes sense, because that is how contemporaries understood it. Moreover, armed opposition to the new Bolshevik government, the Council of People's Commissars (*Sovnarkom*), arose immediately after October when officers of the Imperial Army, Mikhail Alexeyev, Lavr Kornilov, Anton Denikin, Alexei Kaledin, and others, formed the first counterforce known as the Volunteer Army, based in southern Russia.

During the civil war the Bolsheviks, or Reds (renamed "communists" in 1918), waged war against the Whites. A term used loosely to refer to all factions that battled against the Bolsheviks, the Whites were a more diverse group than the Bolshevik label of "counterrevolution" suggests. Those who represented the country's business and land-owning elite did tend to express monarchist sentiments. In addition, Cossack military units that had enjoyed self-government and other privileges likewise held conservative political views. But many White officers opposed the autocracy and even harbored reformist beliefs.

Much more complicated were the Bolsheviks' relations with Russia's moderate socialists, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), and with both parties' numerous offshoots, who wished to establish a government that would include all socialist parties. The internecine struggle within the socialist camp persisted throughout the civil war, and flared up after the Bolsheviks routed the Whites in 1920. Fearing a White victory, the moderate socialists complicated this scenario by throwing their support behind the Reds at critical junctures. Moreover, left-wing factions within these parties allied themselves with the Bolsheviks. For instance, until mid-1918 the Bolsheviks stayed afloat in part owing to the support of the Left SRs, who broke from their parent party following the October Revolution of 1917 to join the Bolsheviks.

In some locales the Bolshevik-Left SR coalition even weathered the controversy over the Brest-Litovsk Peace with Germany, signed in March 1918, which otherwise sundered the alliance with the Left SRs, who withdrew from the Lenin

government in protest. The peace ceded eastern Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and Ukraine to Germany, as well as Transcaucasia to Turkey, in return for an end to hostilities. Ratifying the treaty sparked heated debate within the Communist Party, especially among the so-called Left Communists led by Nikolai Bukharin who backed the idea of a revolutionary war against Germany. Later, from September 1918 until October 1920, renegade Left SRs formed a new party called the Revolutionary Communists (RCs), who participated in a ruling coalition with the Bolsheviks in many Volga provinces and the Urals. The Bolshevik attitude toward the socialist groups that supported the Reds reflected the overall strength of Soviet power at any given time. When vulnerable, the Bolsheviks welcomed their socialist allies; otherwise the Bolsheviks sought to manipulate them through a process of co-optation amid repression.

Political opposition to the Bolsheviks became more resolved after they closed down the Constituent Assembly in January 1918. Elected just days after the October Revolution, the assembly was slated to determine Russia's political future. Although Lenin did not dare cancel the elections, he had no reservations about dispensing with the assembly after the SRs and related populist parties won a plurality of just under half of the votes cast. Capturing roughly a quarter of the popular vote, the Bolsheviks fared best in the cities and within the armed forces. Recognizing the need for a military force more formidable than the worker Red Guards who had backed the Bolsheviks' bid for power in October, Lenin established the Red Army under Leon Trotsky shortly after dispersing the Constituent Assembly. Trotsky recruited ex-tsarist officers to command the Reds, appointing political commissars to all units to monitor such officers and the ideological education of recruits. That spring, support for the Bolsheviks within the proletariat began to erode as the Mensheviks made a comeback.

This early phase of the civil war ended with a spate of armed conflicts in Russian towns along the Volga in May and June 1918 between Bolshevik-run soviets (councils) and Czechoslovak legionnaires. Prisoners of war from the Austro-Hungarian armies, the legionnaires had agreed to be transported across Siberia and from there to the Western front in order to join the Allies in the fight to defeat the Central Powers. The Czechoslovaks' clash with the Soviet government emboldened the SR op-

position to set up an anti-Bolshevik government, the Committee to Save the Constituent Assembly, *Komuch*, in the Volga city of Samara in June 1918. Many delegates elected to the Constituent Assembly congregated there before the city fell to the Bolsheviks that November. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks expelled Mensheviks and SRs from local soviets, while the Kadets convened in the Siberian city of Omsk in June 1918 to establish a Provisional Siberian Government (PSG). The rivalry between Samara and Omsk resulted in the last attempt to form from below a national force to oppose Bolshevism, a state conference that met in Ufa in September and set up a five-member Directory after its French revolutionary namesake. But in November the military removed the socialists and installed Admiral Kolchak in power. Remaining official leader of the White movement until defeat forced him to resign in early 1920, he kept his headquarters in Siberia.

Although its role is often exaggerated, international ("Allied") intervention bolstered the White cause and fuelled Bolshevik paranoia, providing "evidence" for the party's depictions of the Whites as traitorous agents of imperialist foreign powers. Dispatching troops to Russia to secure military supplies needed in the war against Germany, the Allies deepened their involvement as they came to see Bolsheviks as a hostile force that promoted world revolution, renounced the tsarist government's debts, and violated Russia's commitment to its allies by concluding a separate peace with Germany. Allied intervention on behalf of the Whites became more active with the end of World War I in November 1918, when the British, French, Japanese, Americans, and other powers sent troops to Russian ports and rail junctures. Revolutionary stirrings in Germany, the founding of the Third Communist International in Moscow in March 1919, and the establishment of a soviet republic in Hungary at roughly the same time heightened the Allies' fears of a Red menace. Yet the Allied governments could not justify intervention in Russia to their own war-weary people. Lacking a common purpose and resolve, and often suspicious of one another, the Allies extended only half-hearted support to the Whites, whom they left in the lurch by withdrawing from Russia in 1919 and 1920—except for the Japanese who kept troops in Siberia for several more years.

Both Reds and Whites turned increasingly to terror in the second half of 1918, utilizing it as a substitute for popular support. Calls to overthrow Soviet power, followed by the assassination of the



White Russian troops advance through Siberia on horseback in 1919. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

German ambassador in July, which the Bolsheviks depicted as the start of a Left SR uprising designed to undercut the Brest-Litovsk Peace, provided the Bolsheviks with an excuse to repress their one-time radical populist allies and to undermine the Left SRs' popularity in the villages. Moreover, with Lenin's knowledge, Tsar Nicholas II and his family were executed on July 16, 1918. Following an attempt on Lenin's life on August 30, the Bolsheviks unleashed the Red Terror, a ruthless campaign aimed at eliminating political opponents within the civilian population. The Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage (Cheka), set up in December 1917 under Felix Dzerzhinsky, carried out the Red Terror. Seeking to reverse social revolution, the Whites savagely waged their own ideological war that justified the use of terror to avenge those wronged by the revolution. Putting to death communists and their

sympathizers, and massacring Jews in Ukraine and elsewhere, the Whites were determined to sweep the "Germano-Bolsheviks" from power.

The Whites posed a more serious threat to the Red republic after the Allies defeated Germany in late 1918 and decided to back the Whites' cause. Soon, the Whites engaged the Reds along four fronts: southern Russia, western Siberia, northern Russia, and the Baltic region. Until their rout in 1920, White forces controlled much of Siberia and southern Russia, while the Reds, who moved their capital to Moscow in March 1918, clung desperately to the Russian heartland. The Whites' ambitious three-pronged attack against Moscow in March 1919 most likely decided the military outcome of their war against the Reds. Despite their initial success, the Whites went down in defeat that November, after which their routed forces replaced

General Denikin with Petr Wrangel, the most competent of all of the White officers. Coinciding with an invasion of Russia by forces of the newly resurrected Polish state, the Whites opened one final offensive in the spring of 1920. When Red forces overcame Wrangel's army in November, he and his troops evacuated Russia by sea from the Crimea. In the meantime, the Bolsheviks' conflict with the Poles ended in stalemate; the belligerent parties signed an armistice in October 1920, followed by the Treaty of Riga in 1921, which transferred parts of Ukraine and Belorussia to Poland.

Apart from their military encounters with the Whites, the Bolsheviks also had to contend with a front behind their own lines because of the appeal of rival socialist parties and because Bolshevik economic policies alienated much of the working class and drove the peasantry to rise up against the requisitioning of grain and related measures. Known subsequently as war communism, the series of ad hoc policies designed to prosecute the war and to experiment with socialist economic principles was characterized by centralization, state ownership, compulsion, the extraction of surpluses—especially requisitioning of grain, forced location of labor, and a distribution system that rhetorically privileged the toiling classes. Despite the popularity of Bolshevik land reform, which placed all land in the hands of peasants, requisitioning and other measures carried out in 1919 with shocking brutality drove the peasantry into the opposition. The effect of Bolshevik economic policies on the starving and dying cities as well as the party's violations of the political promises of 1917 also turned workers anti-Bolshevik by civil war's end.

Studies tapping long-closed Russian archives underscore the vast scale of workers' strikes and violent peasant rebellions known collectively as the Green movement throughout Russia in early 1921. The enormity of the opposition convinced the communists to replace war communism with the New Economic Policy (NEP), which swapped the hated grain requisitioning with a tax in kind and restored some legal private economic activity. The necessity of this shift in policy from stick to carrot was made clear when, in early March 1921, sailors of the Kronstadt naval fortress rose up against the Bolsheviks whom they had helped bring to power. Demanding the restoration of Soviet democracy without communists, the sailors met with brutal repression that the party's top leaders sanctioned. Although most historians view the Kronstadt uprising, worker disturbances, the peasant move-

ment, and the introduction of the NEP as the last acts of the civil war, after which the party mopped up remaining pockets of opposition in the borderlands, the famine of 1921 can be said to mark the real conclusion to the conflict, for it helped to keep the Bolsheviks in power by robbing the population of initiative. Holding the country in its grip until late 1923, the famine took an estimated five million lives; millions more would have perished without relief provided by foreign agencies such as the British Save the Children Fund and the American Relief Administration.

Moreover, the Bolshevik Party took advantage of mass starvation to end its stalemate with the Orthodox Church. Believing that a materialistic worldview needed to replace religion, the Bolsheviks had forced through a separation of church and state in 1917 and removed schools from church supervision. Once famine hit hard, the party leadership promoted the cause of Orthodox clergy loyal to Soviet power, so-called red priests, or renovationists, who supported the party's determination to use church valuables to finance famine relief. Party leaders allied with the renovationists out of expediency: They had every intention of eventually discarding them when they were no longer needed.

The defeat of the Whites, the end of the war with Poland, and famine made it possible for the Lenin government to focus on regaining breakaway territories in Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Siberia, and elsewhere, where issues of nationalism, ethnicity, religion, class, foreign intervention, and differing levels of economic development and ways of life complicated local civil wars. Russians had composed approximately 50 percent of the tsarist empire's multinational population in which more than a hundred languages were spoken. An increasingly contradictory and even repressive tsarist nationality policies had given rise to numerous grievances among the non-Russian population, but only a minority of intellectuals in the outlying areas before World War I had championed the emergence of independent states. The Revolution of 1917, however, gave impetus to national movements as the provisional government struggled to maintain its authority in the face of potent new challenges from some of the country's minorities.

In January 1918 the Commissariat of Nationalities headed by Joseph Stalin confirmed the Soviet government's support of self-determination of the country's minorities, and characterized the new state as a Federation of Soviet Republics. The first

Soviet constitution of July 1918 reiterated these claims, without specifying the nature of federalism. The cost of survival, however, made it necessary to be pragmatic and flexible. For this reason, Lenin soon made it clear that the interests of socialism were more important than the right of self-determination.

Indeed, by 1918 independent states had arisen on the Soviet periphery. Fostered by intellectuals and politicians, local nationalisms tended to develop into political movements with popular support in territories most affected by industrial development. Often, however, class and ethnic conflicts became entangled as these territories turned into major battlefields of the civil war and arenas of foreign intervention.

For instance, Ukraine, where the activities of peasant rebel Nestor Makhno obscured the intertwining hostilities among Reds, Whites, Germans, and Poles, changed hands frequently. Under the black flag of anarchism, Makhno first formed a loose alliance with the communists, but then battled against Red and White alike until Red forces crushed his Insurgent Army in 1920. In the Caucasus, Georgian Mensheviks, Armenian Dashnaks, and Azeri Musavat established popular regimes in 1917 that attempted a short-lived experiment at federalism in 1918 before hostilities between and within the groups surfaced, leaving them to turn to foreign protectors. By 1922 the Red Army had retaken these territories, as well as the mountain regions of the northern Caucasus, where they fought against religious leaders and stiff guerrilla resistance. In Central Asia the Bolsheviks faced stubborn opposition from armed Islamic guerrillas, *basmachi*, who resisted the Bolshevik takeover until 1923. The Bolsheviks' victory over these break-away territories led to the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 1922. Smaller than its predecessor, the new Soviet state had lost part of Bessarabia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as part of Ukraine, Belorussia, and Armenia. Granting statehood within the framework of the Russian state to those territories it had recaptured, the Soviet government set up a federation, a centralized, multiethnic, anti-imperial, socialist state.

In accounting for the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, historians have emphasized the relative discipline, self-sacrifice, and centralized nature of the Bolshevik Party; the party's control over the Russian heartland and its resources; the military

and political weaknesses of the Whites, who, concentrated on the periphery, relied on Allied bullets and misunderstood the relationship between social policy and military success; the local nature of peasant opposition; the inability of the Bolsheviks' opponents to overcome their differences; the tentative nature of Allied intervention; the effectiveness of Bolshevik propaganda and terror; and, during the initial stage of the conflict, the support of workers and the neutrality of peasants. In defeating the Whites, the Bolsheviks had survived the civil war, but the crisis of early March 1921 suggests that mass discontent with party policies would have continued to fuel the conflict if the party had not ushered in the NEP and if the famine had not broken out.

The Russian civil war caused wide-scale devastation; economic ruin; loss of an estimated seven to eight million people, of whom more than five million were civilian casualties of fighting, repression, and disease; the emigration of an estimated one to two million others; and approximately five million deaths caused by the famine of 1921–1923. Moreover, the civil war destroyed much of the country's infrastructure, producing a steep decline in the standard of living as industrial production fell to less than 30 percent of the pre-1914 level and the amount of land under cultivation decreased sharply. The civil war also brought about deurbanization, created a transient problem of enormous proportions, militarized civilian life, and turned towns into breeding grounds for diseases. Furthermore, war communism strengthened the authoritarian streak in Russian political culture and contributed to the consolidation of a one-party state as the population turned its attention to honing basic survival strategies.

The price of survival was the temporary naturalization of economic life, famine, and the entrenchment of a black market and a system of privileges for party members. While the sheer enormity of the convulsion brought about a primitivization of the entire social system, it was not simply a matter of regression, but also of new structuring, which focused on the necessities of physical survival. The social fabric absorbed those everyday practices that had been mediated or modified in these extreme circumstances of political chaos and economic collapse, as the desire to survive and to withdraw from public life created problems that proved difficult to solve and undermined subsequent state efforts to reconfigure society. In

this regard the civil war represented a formative, even defining experience for the Soviet state.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; BREST-LITOVSK PEACE; FAMINE OF 1921-1922; GREEN MOVEMENT; KOLCHAK, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH; LEFT SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MENHSHEVIKS; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; RED GUARDS; RED TERROR; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; SOVNARKOM; WAR COMMUNISM; WHITE ARMY

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DONALD J. RALEIGH

CLASSICISM *See* NEO-CLASSICISM.

CLASS SYSTEM

When the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, they did so in the name of Russia's proletariat and to a lesser extent the "toiling masses" of peasants who made up the vast majority of the population. The Bolsheviks' aim—to overthrow the rule of capital (the bourgeoisie) and establish a socialist society—was to be achieved via a "dictatorship of the proletariat." The dictatorship was enshrined in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918, which disenfranchised large property owners, the clergy, and former tsarist officials and gave urban-based voters the advantage over peasants in elections to all-Russian soviet congresses. Ironically, during the civil war, much of Soviet society was declassed: the old privileged classes were expropriated, industrial workers returned to the countryside or were recruited into the Red Army, and millions of other citizens were uprooted and lost their social moorings.

In the course of the 1920s, during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), social structures began to resolidify as industrial production and trade expanded. Those whose occupation defined them as workers, and those who could authenticate their social origins in the working class, received privileged access to housing, higher education, health and pension benefits, and perhaps most important of all, party membership. But the upheavals of the First Five-Year Plan years (1928–1932) uprooted millions once again, as whole classes (so-called NEPmen, kulaks, and remnants of the urban bourgeoisie) were "liquidated." Cities and construction sites were overwhelmed with peasant migrants fleeing collectivization, and hundreds of thousands of others were resettled in remote regions of the country or sent to labor camps.

The social structure that emerged from these upheavals was officially characterized as consisting of two classes: one of workers (essentially industrial wage earners and state farm workers) and collective farmers, the other a "stratum" consisting of the intelligentsia. This putative class system remained virtually unchanged throughout the remaining decades of the Soviet Union's existence. In reality, a complex hierarchy, reminiscent of tsarist Russia's estate (*soslovie*) system, developed,

involving highly differentiated access to the state's goods and services. At the top of the Soviet pecking order stood the party elite and other recipients of the Kremlin emolument (*kremlovka*). Next came those who appeared on the party's *nomenklatura*: high military and state officials, People's Artists, Stalin-prize-winning scientists, academicians, writers, and other members of the cultural, scientific-technical, and managerial elites. Lower-level officials—the police, teachers, junior military officers, engineers, and state and collective farm bureaucracies—enjoyed certain privileges, as did outstanding workers (*Stakhanovites* in the 1930s and 1940s, innovators, and “advanced workers” from the 1950s onward). Collective farmers, who were denied the right to internal passports until the mid-1970s, occupied perhaps the lowest rung in the class hierarchy, with the obvious exception of prisoners and inmates of labor camps and colonies.

Cutting across this system were such factors as political geography (capital cities vs. provincial towns; towns vs. villages) and the strategic significance of the enterprise or institute to which one was attached. Scientists living in such closed facilities as Dubna and Akademgorodok enjoyed a particularly high standard of living. The entire structure was mitigated by petitioning, but also by informal connections based on kinship or friendship, exchanges of favors, and other semi-legal transactions that were very much a part of quotidian reality during the Soviet Union's “mature” stage.

See also: FIVE-YEAR PLANS; INTELLIGENTSIA; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; SOSLOVIE

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
CLIMATE

There are five climates in Russia. The Polar climate hugs the Arctic coast and yields a 60-day growing season, with July and August averaging temperatures over freezing. Tundra vegetation prevails.

South of the tundra, blanketing two-thirds of Russia, is the Subarctic climate with its brief cool summers and harsh cold, mostly dry, winters. With a growing season of sixty to ninety days, the dominant vegetation is taiga (northern coniferous forest), 90 percent of which is underlain by permafrost. In European Russia and Western Siberia, the Subarctic climate merges southward with the Humid Continental Warm-to-Cool Summer climate. Here the winters become less harsh, although much snowier, and the summers become longer and warmer. Growing seasons reach 90 to 120 days, and the vegetation is a temperate mixed forest that joins the broadleaf forests and grasslands to the south. Along the Lower Volga and in the North Caucasus, the climate becomes sub-humid. Here summers become equal to winters, a Semiarid Continental climate prevails, the growing season reaches 120 to 160 days, and grassland, or steppe, vegetation dominates. Particular to Russia's “breadbasket,” a terrain with rich black loams, this climate suffers from insufficient precipitation. A tiny strip of Arid Continental climate fringes the Russian shoreline of the Caspian Sea. With hot, dry summers and rather cold, shorter winters, this climate yields a 160- to 200-day growing season. A true desert, it reflects a severe soil-moisture deficit.

Russia's massive landmass, northerly location, and flat-to-rolling terrain dramatically influence these climates. Because three-fourths of Russia is more than 250 miles (400 kilometers) away from a largely frozen sea, the climates are continental, not maritime. Continental climates exhibit wide ranges of temperature (the difference between the warmest and coldest monthly averages) and low average annual precipitation that peaks in summer instead of spring. Climatic harshness increases from west to east as the moderating influence of the warm North Atlantic Ocean decreases. St. Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland has a 45° F (25° C) difference between the July and January mean temperatures and 19 inches (48 centimeters) of annual precipitation. Yakutsk in Eastern Siberia contrasts with a 112° F (65° C) range of temperature and only 4 inches (10 centimeters) of precipitation.

Russia's high-latitude position enhances continentality. Nine-tenths of the country is north of 50° N Latitude. Moscow is in the latitude of Edmonton, Alberta; St. Petersburg equates with Anchorage, Alaska. Russia thus resembles Canada in climate more than it does the United States. High-latitude countries like Russia and Canada suffer low-angle (less-intense) sunlight and short grow-



SOURCE: Courtesy of the author.

ing seasons that range from 60 days in the Arctic to 200 days along the Caspian shore.

Low relief also augments the negative effects on Russia's climates. Three-fourths of Russia's terrain lies at elevations lower than 1,500 feet (450 meters) above sea level. This further diminishes the opportunities for rain and snow because there is less friction to cause orographic lifting. The country's open western border, uninterrupted except for the low Ural Mountains, permits Atlantic winds and air masses to penetrate as far east as the Yenisey River. In winter, these air masses bring moderation and relatively heavy snow to many parts of the European lowlands and Western Siberia. Meanwhile, a semi-permanent high-pressure cell (the Asiatic Maximum) blankets Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. This huge high-pressure ridge forces the Atlantic air to flow northward into the Arctic and southward against the southern mountains. Consequently, little snow or wind affects the Siberian interior in winter. The exceptions are found along the east coast (Kamchatka, the Kurils, and Maritime province).

As the Eurasian continent heats faster in summer than the oceans, the pressure cells shift position: Low pressure dominates the continents and high pressure prevails over the oceans. Moist air masses flow onto the land, bringing summer thunderstorms. The heaviest rains come later in summer from west to east, often occurring in the harvest seasons in Western Siberia. In the Russian Far East, the summer monsoon yields more than 75 percent of the region's average annual precipitation. Pacific typhoons often harry Kamchatka, the Kurils, and Sakhalin Island.

Winter temperatures plunge from west to east. Along Moscow's 55th parallel, average January temperatures fall from a high of 22° F (–6° C) in Kaliningrad to 14° F (–10° C) in the capital to 7° F (–14° C) in Kazan to –6° F (–20° C) in Tomsk. Along the same latitude in the Russian Far East, the temperatures reach low averages of –29° F (–35° C). Northeast Siberia experiences the lowest average winter temperatures outside of Antarctica: –50° F (–45° C), with one-time minima of –90° F (–69° C).

In July, the averages cool with higher latitudes. Thus, the Caspian desert experiences averages of near 80° F (25° C), whereas the Arctic tundra records means of 40° F (5° C). Moscow averages 65° F (19° C) in July.

See also: GEOGRAPHY

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VICTOR L. MOTE

CODE OF PRECEDENCE See MESTNICHESTVO.

COLD WAR

The term *Cold War* refers to the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States that lasted from roughly 1945 to 1990. The term predates the Cold War itself, but it was first widely popularized after World War II by the journalist Walter Lippmann in his commentaries in *The New York Herald Tribune*.

Two features of the Cold War distinguished it from other periods in modern history: (1) a fundamental clash of ideologies (Marxism-Leninism versus liberal democracy); and (2) a highly stratified global power structure in which the United States and the Soviet Union were regarded as "superpowers" that were preeminent over—and in a separate class from—all other countries.

THE STALIN ERA

During the first eight years after World War II, the Cold War on the Soviet side was identified with the personality of Josef Stalin. Many historians have singled out Stalin as the individual most responsible for the onset of the Cold War. Even before the Cold War began, Stalin launched a massive program of espionage in the West, seeking to plant spies and sympathizers in the upper levels of Western governments. Although almost all documents about this program are still sealed in the Russian archives, materials released in the 1990s reveal that in the United States alone, at least 498 individuals actively worked as spies or couriers for Soviet intelligence agencies in the 1930s and early 1940s.

In the closing months of World War II, when the Soviet Union gained increasing dominance over Nazi Germany, Stalin relied on Soviet troops to oc-

copy vast swathes of territory in East-Central Europe. The establishment of Soviet military hegemony in the eastern half of Europe, and the sweeping political changes that followed, were perhaps the single most important precipitant of the Cold War.

The extreme repression that Stalin practiced at home, and the pervasive suspicion and intolerance that he displayed toward his colleagues and aides, carried over into his policy vis-à-vis the West. Stalin's unchallenged dictatorial authority within the Soviet Union gave him enormous leeway to formulate Soviet foreign policy as he saw fit. The huge losses inflicted by Germany on the Soviet Union after Adolf Hitler abandoned the Nazi-Soviet pact and attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941—a pact that Stalin had upheld even after he received numerous intelligence warnings that a German attack was imminent—made Stalin all the more unwilling to trust or seek a genuine compromise with Western countries after World War II. Having been humiliated once, he was determined not to let down his guard again.

Stalin's mistrustful outlook was evident not only in his relations with Western leaders, but also in his dealings with fellow communists. During the civil war in China after World War II, Stalin kept his distance from the Chinese communist leader, Mao Zedong. Although the Soviet Union provided crucial support for the Chinese Communists during the climactic phase of the civil war in 1949, Stalin never felt particularly close to Mao either then or afterward. In the period before the Korean War in June 1950, Stalin did his best to outflank Mao, giving the Chinese leader little choice but to go along with the decision to start the war.

Despite Stalin's wariness of Mao, the Chinese communists deeply admired the Soviet Union and sought to forge a close alliance with Moscow. From February 1950, when the two countries signed a mutual security treaty, until Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviet Union and China cooperated on a wide range of issues, including military operations during the Korean War. On the rare occasions when the two countries diverged in their views, China deferred to the Soviet Union.

In Eastern Europe, Stalin also tended to be distrustful of indigenous communist leaders, and he gave them only the most tenuous leeway. At Stalin's behest, the communist parties in Eastern Europe gradually solidified their hold through the determined use of what the Hungarian communist

party leader Mátyás Rákosi called "salami tactics." By the spring of 1948, "People's Democracies" were in place throughout the region, ready to embark on Stalinist policies of social transformation.

Stalin's unwillingness to tolerate dissent was especially clear in his policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, which had been one of the staunchest postwar allies of the Soviet Union. In June 1948, Soviet leaders publicly denounced Yugoslavia and expelled it from the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), set up in 1947 to unite European communist parties under Moscow's leadership. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift, which had developed behind the scenes for several months and had finally reached the breaking point in March 1948, appears to have stemmed from both substantive disagreements and political maneuvering. The chief problem was that Stalin had declined to give the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, any leeway in diverging from Soviet preferences in the Balkans and in policy toward the West. When Tito demurred, Stalin sought an abject capitulation from Yugoslavia as an example to the other East European countries of the unwavering obedience that was expected.

In the end, however, Stalin's approach was highly counterproductive. Neither economic pressure nor military threats were sufficient to compel Tito to back down, and efforts to provoke a high-level coup against Tito failed when the Yugoslav leader liquidated his pro-Soviet rivals within the Yugoslav Communist Party. A military operation against Yugoslavia would have been logistically difficult (traversing mountains with an army that was already overstretched in Europe), but one of Stalin's top aides, Nikita Khrushchev, later said he was "absolutely sure that if the Soviet Union had had a common border with Yugoslavia, Stalin would have intervened militarily." Plans for a full-scale military operation were indeed prepared, but the vigorous U.S. military response to North Korea's incursion into South Korea in June 1950 helped dispel any lingering notion Stalin may have had of sending troops into Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Union thus was forced to accept a breach in its East European sphere and the strategic loss of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea. Most important of all, the split with Yugoslavia raised concern about the effects elsewhere in the region if "Titoism" were allowed to spread. To preclude further such challenges to Soviet control, Stalin instructed the East European states to carry out new purges and show trials to

remove any officials who might have hoped to seek greater independence. Although the process took a particularly violent form in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the anti-Titoist campaign exacted a heavy toll all over the Soviet bloc.

Despite the loss of Yugoslavia, Soviet influence in East-Central Europe came under no further threat during Stalin's last years. From 1947 through the early 1950s, the East-Central European states embarked on crash industrialization and collectivization programs, causing vast social upheaval yet also leading to rapid short-term economic growth. Stalin relied on the presence of Soviet troops, a tightly woven network of security forces, the wholesale penetration of the East European governments and armies by Soviet agents, the use of mass purges and political terror, and the unifying threat of renewed German militarism to ensure that regimes loyal to Moscow remained in power. By the early 1950s, Stalin had established a degree of control over East-Central Europe to which his successors could only aspire.

The Soviet leader had thus achieved two remarkable feats in the first several years after World War II: He had solidified a Communist bloc in Europe, and he had established a firm Sino-Soviet alliance, which proved crucial during the Korean War. These twin accomplishments marked the high point of the Cold War for the Soviet Union.

CHANGES AFTER STALIN

Soon after Stalin's death in 1953, his successors began moving away from some of the cardinal precepts of Stalin's policies. In the spring of 1953, Soviet foreign policy underwent a number of significant changes, which cumulatively might have led to a far-reaching abatement of the Cold War, including a settlement in Germany. As it turned out, no such settlement proved feasible. In the early summer of 1953, uprisings in East Germany, which were quelled by the Soviet Army and the latest twists in the post-Stalin succession struggle in Moscow, notably the arrest and denunciation of the former secret police chief, Lavrenti Beria, induced Soviet leaders to slow down the pace of change both at home and abroad. Although the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a ceasefire in the Korean War in July 1953, the prospects for radical change in Europe never panned out.

Despite the continued standoff, Stalin's death did permit the intensity of the Cold War to diminish. The period from mid-1953 through the fall of

1956 was a time of great fluidity in international politics. The United States and the Soviet Union achieved a settlement with regard to Indochina at the Geneva Conference in July 1954 and signed the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955, bringing an end to a decade-long military occupation of Austria. The Soviet Union also mended its relationship with Yugoslavia, an effort that culminated in Nikita Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia in May 1955. U.S.-Soviet relations improved considerably during this period; this was symbolized by a meeting in Geneva between Khrushchev and President Dwight Eisenhower in July 1955 that prompted both sides to build on the "spirit of Geneva."

Within the Soviet Union as well, considerable leeway for reform emerged, offering hope that Soviet ideology might evolve in a more benign direction. At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, Khrushchev launched a "de-Stalinization" campaign by delivering a "secret speech" in which he not only denounced many of the crimes and excesses committed by Stalin, but also promised to adopt policies that would move away from Stalinism both at home and abroad.

The condemnation of Stalin stirred a good deal of social ferment and political dissent throughout the Soviet bloc, particularly in Poland and Hungary, where social and political unrest grew rapidly in the summer of 1956. Although the Soviet-Polish crisis was resolved peacefully, Soviet troops intervened in Hungary to overthrow the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy and to crush all popular resistance. The fighting in Hungary resulted in the deaths of some 2,502 Hungarians and 720 Soviet troops as well as serious injuries to 19,226 Hungarians and 1,540 Soviet soldiers. Within days, however, the Soviet forces had crushed the last pockets of resistance and had installed a pro-Soviet government under János Kádár to set about "normalizing" the country.

By reestablishing military control over Hungary and by exposing—more dramatically than the suppression of the East German uprising in June 1953 had—the emptiness of the "roll-back" and "liberation" rhetoric in the West, the Soviet invasion in November 1956 stemmed any further loss of Soviet power in East-Central Europe. Shortly after the invasion, Khrushchev acknowledged that U.S.-Soviet relations were likely to deteriorate for a considerable time, but he said he was more than ready to accept this tradeoff in order to "prove to

the West that [the Soviet Union is] strong and resolute" while "the West is weak and divided."

U.S. officials, for their part, were even more aware than they had been during the East German uprising of the limits on their options in Eastern Europe. Senior members of the Eisenhower administration conceded that the most they could do in the future was "to encourage peaceful evolutionary changes" in the region, and they warned that the United States must avoid conveying the impression "either directly or by implication . . . that American military help will be forthcoming" to anti-Communist forces. Any lingering U.S. hopes of directly challenging Moscow's sphere of influence in East-Central Europe thus effectively ended.

**THE KHRUSHCHEV INTERLUDE:
EAST-WEST CRISES AND THE
SINO-SOVIET RIFT**

The Soviet invasion of Hungary coincided with another East-West crisis—a crisis over Suez, which began in July 1956 when President Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company. The French, British, and U.S. governments tried to persuade (and then coerce) Nasser to reverse his decision, but their efforts proved of no avail. In late October 1956, Israeli forces moved into Suez in an operation that was broadly coordinated with Britain and France. The following day, French and British forces joined the Israeli incursions. Soviet leaders mistakenly assumed that the United States would support its British and French allies. The Soviet decision to intervene in Hungary was based in part on this erroneous assumption, and it also was facilitated by the perception that a military crackdown would incur less international criticism if it occurred while much of the world's attention was distracted by events in the Middle East.

As it turned out, the Eisenhower administration sided against the British and French and helped compel the foreign troops to pull out of Egypt. The U.S. and Soviet governments experienced considerable friction during the crisis (especially when Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin made veiled nuclear threats against the French and British), but their stances were largely compatible. The U.S. decision to oppose the French and British proved to be a turning point for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949 to help cement ties between Western Europe and the United

States against the common Soviet threat. Although NATO continued to be a robust military-political organization all through the Cold War, the French and British governments knew after the Suez crisis that they could not automatically count on U.S. support during crises even when the Soviet Union was directly involved.

In these various ways, the events of October–November 1956 reinforced Cold War alignments on the Soviet side (by halting any further loss of Soviet control in East-Central Europe) but loosened them somewhat on the Western side, as fissures within NATO gradually emerged. The Warsaw Pact—the Soviet-led alliance with the East European countries that was set up in mid-1955—was still largely a paper organization and remained so until the early 1960s, but the invasion of Hungary kept the alliance intact. In the West, by contrast, relations within NATO were more strained than before as a result of the Suez crisis.

A number of other East-West crises erupted in the late 1950s, notably the Quemoy-Matsu offshore islands dispute between communist China and the United States in 1958 and the periodic Berlin crises from 1958 through 1962. Serious though these events were, they were soon overshadowed by a schism within the communist world. The Soviet Union and China, which had been staunch allies during the Stalin era, came into bitter conflict less than a decade after Stalin's death. The split between the two communist powers, stemming in part from genuine policy and ideological differences and in part from a personal clash between Khrushchev and Mao, developed behind the scenes in the late 1950s. The dispute intensified in June 1959 when the Soviet Union abruptly terminated its secret nuclear weapons cooperation agreement with China. Khrushchev's highly publicized visit to the United States in September 1959 further antagonized the Chinese, and a last-ditch meeting between Khrushchev and Mao in Beijing right after Khrushchev's tour of the United States failed to resolve the differences between the two sides. From then on, Sino-Soviet relations steadily deteriorated. The Soviet Union and China vied with one another for the backing of foreign Communist parties, including those long affiliated with Moscow.

The spillover from the Sino-Soviet conflict into East-Central Europe was evident almost immediately. In late 1960 and early 1961 the Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, openly aligned his country



U.S. Army tanks, foreground, and Soviet Army tanks, opposite, face each other at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin, October 28, 1961. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

with China, a decision that caused alarm in Moscow. The loss of Albania marked the second time since 1945 that the Soviet sphere of influence in East-Central Europe had been breached. Even worse from Moscow's perspective, Soviet leaders soon discovered that China was secretly attempting to induce other East-Central European countries to follow Albania's lead. China's efforts bore little fruit in the end, but Soviet leaders obviously could not be sure of that at the time. The very fact that China sought to foment discord within the Soviet bloc was enough to spark consternation in Moscow.

The emergence of the Sino-Soviet split, the attempts by China to lure away one or more of the

East-Central European countries, the competition by Moscow and Beijing for influence among non-ruling Communist parties, and the assistance given by China to the Communist governments in North Vietnam and North Korea complicated the bipolar nature of the Cold War, but did not fundamentally change it. International politics continued to revolve mainly around an intense conflict between two broad groups: (1) the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, and (2) the United States and its NATO and East Asian allies. The fissures within these two camps, salient as they may have been, did not eliminate or even diminish the confrontation between the Communist East and the democratic West. Individual countries within each bloc acquired greater leverage and room for maneuver, but the U.S.-Soviet divide was still the primary basis for world politics.

THE EARLY 1960S: A LULL IN THE COLD WAR

The intensity of the Cold War escalated in the early 1960s with the arrival of a new U.S. administration headed by John F. Kennedy that was determined to resolve two volatile issues in East-West relations: the status of Cuba, which had aligned itself with the Soviet Union after Communist insurgents led by Fidel Castro seized power in 1959; and the status of Berlin. These issues gave rise to a succession of crises in the early 1960s, beginning with the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and continuing through the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. At the Bay of Pigs, a U.S.-sponsored invading force of Cuban exiles was soundly rebuffed, and Castro remained in power. But the Kennedy administration continued to pursue a number of top-secret programs to destabilize the Castro government and get rid of the Cuban leader.

Khrushchev, for his part, sought to force matters on Berlin. The showdown that ensued in the late summer and fall of 1961 nearly brought U.S. and Soviet military forces into direct conflict. In late October 1961, Soviet leaders mistakenly assumed that U.S. tanks deployed at Checkpoint Charlie (the main border point along the Berlin divide) were preparing to move into East Berlin, and they sent ten Soviet tanks to counter the incursion. Although Khrushchev and Kennedy managed to defuse the crisis by privately agreeing that the Soviet forces would be withdrawn first, the status of Berlin remained a sore point.

The confrontation over Berlin was followed a year later by the Cuban missile crisis. In the late

spring of 1962, Soviet leaders approved plans for a secret deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. In the summer and early fall of 1962, the Soviet General Staff oversaw a secret operation to install dozens of missiles and support equipment in Cuba, to deploy some 42,000 Soviet combat forces to the island to protect the missiles, and to send nuclear warheads to Cuba for storage and possible deployment. Operation Anadyr proceeded smoothly until mid-October 1962, when U.S. intelligence analysts reported to Kennedy that an American U-2 reconnaissance flight had detected Soviet missile sites under construction in Cuba. Based on this disclosure, Kennedy made a dramatic speech on October 22 revealing the presence of the missiles and demanding that they be removed.

In a dramatic standoff over the next several days, officials on both sides feared that war would ensue, possibly leading to a devastating nuclear exchange. This fear, as much as anything else, spurred both Kennedy and Khrushchev to do their utmost to find a peaceful way out. As the crisis neared its breaking point, the two sides arrived at a settlement that provided for the withdrawal of all Soviet medium-range missiles from Cuba and a pledge by the United States that it would not invade Cuba. In addition, Kennedy secretly promised that U.S. Jupiter missiles based in Turkey would be removed within “four to five months.” This secret offer was not publicly disclosed until many years later, but the agreement that was made public in late October 1962 sparked enormous relief around the world.

The dangers of the Cuban missile crisis prompted efforts by both sides to ensure that future crises would not come as close to a nuclear war. Communications between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the crisis had been extremely difficult at times and had posed the risk of misunderstandings that might have proven fatal. To help alleviate this problem, the two countries signed the Hot Line Agreement in June 1963, which marked the first successful attempt by the two countries to achieve a bilateral document that would reduce the danger of an unintended nuclear war.

The joint memorandum establishing the Hot Line was symbolic of a wider improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations that began soon after the Cuban missile crisis was resolved. Although neither side intended to make any radical changes in its policies, both leaders looked for areas of agreement that might be feasible in the near term. One consequence of this new flexibility was the signing of the Lim-

ited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in August 1963, an agreement that Kennedy had strongly promoted in his June 1963 speech. Negotiations on the test ban had dragged on since the 1950s, but in the new climate of 1963 a number of stumbling blocks were resolved. The resulting agreement permitted the two countries to continue testing nuclear weapons underground, but it prohibited explosions in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space.

THE RISE AND FALL OF DÉTENTE

This burst of activity in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis reduced the intensity of the Cold War, but the two core features of the Cold War—the fundamental ideological conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism, and the military preeminence of the two superpowers—were left intact through the early to mid-1980s. So long as the conditions underlying the bipolar confrontation remained in place, the Cold War continued both in Europe and elsewhere.

A number of important developments complicated the situation at the same time. The sharp deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s, culminating in border clashes in 1969, intensified the earlier disarray within the communist world and paved the way for a momentous rapprochement between the United States and China in the 1970s. The situation within the communist world also was complicated by the rise of what became known as “Eurocommunism” in the 1970s. In several West European countries, notably Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, communist parties either had long been or were becoming politically influential. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, several of these parties (the French party was a notable exception) sought to distance themselves from Moscow. This latest fissure within the world communist movement eroded Soviet influence in Western Europe and significantly altered the complexion of West European politics.

The Cold War was also affected—though not drastically—by the rise of East-West détente. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union significantly improved, leading to the conclusion of strategic arms control accords and bilateral trade agreements. The U.S.-Soviet détente was accompanied by a related but separate Soviet-West European détente, spurred on by the Ostpolitik of West Germany. A series of multilateral and bilateral

agreements regarding Berlin and Germany in the early 1970s, and the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, symbolized the spirit of the new European détente. Even after the U.S.-Soviet détente began to fray in the mid- to late 1970s, the Soviet-West European rapprochement stayed largely on track.

The growing fissures within the Eastern bloc and the rise of East-West détente introduced important new elements to the global scene, but they did not fundamentally change the nature of the Cold War or the structure of the international system. Even when détente was at its height, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Cold War politics intruded into far-flung regions of the globe. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which brought an end to the "Prague Spring," demonstrated the limits of what could be changed in East-Central Europe. Soviet leaders were not about to tolerate a major disruption of the Warsaw Pact or to accept far-reaching political changes that would undercut the stability of the Communist bloc. Similarly, the Vietnam War, which embroiled hundreds of thousands of American troops from 1965 through 1975, is incomprehensible except in a Cold War context.

In the 1970s as well, many events were driven by the Cold War. U.S.-Soviet wrangling in the Middle East in October 1973, and even more the confrontations over Angola in 1975–1976 and Ethiopia in 1977–1978, were among the consequences. Soviet gains in the Third World in the 1970s, coming on the heels of the American defeat in Vietnam, were depicted by Soviet leaders as a "shift in the correlation of forces" that would increasingly favor Moscow. Many American officials and commentators voiced pessimism about the erosion of U.S. influence and the declining capacity of the United States to contain Soviet power.

In the late 1970s, U.S.-Soviet relations took a sharp turn for the worse. This trend was the product of a number of events, including human rights violations in the Soviet Union, domestic political maneuvering in the United States, tensions over Soviet gains in the Horn of Africa, NATO's decision in December 1979 to station new nuclear missiles in Western Europe to offset the Soviet Union's recent deployments of SS-20 missiles, and above all the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979. Acrimonious exchanges between the two sides intensified.

THE ENDGAME

The collapse of the U.S.-Soviet détente in the late 1970s left no doubt about the staying power of the Cold War. One of the reasons that Ronald Reagan won the U.S. presidency in 1980 is that he was perceived as a stronger leader at a time of heightened U.S.-Soviet antagonism. Although the renewed tensions of the early 1980s did not spark a crisis as intense as those in the early 1950s and early 1960s, the hostility between the two sides was acute, and the rhetoric became inflammatory enough to spark a brief war scare in 1983.

Even before Reagan was elected, the outbreak of a political and economic crisis in Poland in the summer of 1980, giving rise to the independent trade union known as "Solidarity," created a potential flashpoint in U.S.-Soviet relations. The relentless demand of Soviet leaders that the Polish authorities crush Solidarity and all other "anti-socialist" elements, demonstrated once again the limits of what could be changed in Eastern Europe. Under continued pressure, the Polish leader, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, successfully imposed martial law in Poland in December 1981, arresting thousands of Solidarity activists and banning the organization. Jaruzelski's "internal solution" precluded any test of Moscow's restraint and helped prevent any further disruption in Soviet-East European relations over the next several years.

Even if the Polish crisis had never arisen, East-West tensions over numerous other matters would have increased sharply in the early 1980s. Recriminations about the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, and the rise of antinuclear movements in Western Europe and the United States, dominated East-West relations in the early 1980s. The deployment of NATO's missiles on schedule in late 1983 and 1984 helped defuse popular opposition in the West to the INF, but the episode highlighted the growing role of public opinion and mass movements in Cold War politics.

Much the same was true about the effect of antinuclear sentiment on the Reagan administration's programs to modernize U.S. strategic nuclear forces and its subsequent plans to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). These efforts, and the rhetoric that surrounded them, sparked dismay not only among Western antinuclear activists, but also in Moscow. For a brief while, Soviet leaders even worried that the Reagan administration might be considering a surprise nuclear strike. In the United States, however, public pressure and the rise

of a nuclear freeze movement induced the Reagan administration to reconsider its earlier aversion to nuclear arms control. Although political uncertainty in Moscow in the first half of the 1980s made it difficult to resume arms control talks or to diminish bilateral tensions, the Reagan administration was far more intent on pursuing arms control by the mid-1980s than it had been earlier.

This change of heart in Washington, while important, was almost inconsequential compared to the extraordinary developments in Moscow in the latter half of the 1980s. The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 was soon followed by broad political reforms and a gradual reassessment of the basic premises of Soviet foreign policy. Over time, the new thinking in Soviet foreign policy became more radical. The test of Gorbachev's approach came in 1989, when peaceful transformations in Poland and Hungary brought noncommunist rulers to power. Gorbachev not only tolerated, but actively encouraged this development. The orthodox communist regimes in East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania did their best to stave off the tide of reform, but a series of upheavals in October–December 1989 brought the downfall of the four orthodox regimes.

The remarkable series of events following Gorbachev's ascendance, culminating in the largely peaceful revolutions of 1989, marked the true end of the Cold War. Soviet military power was still enormous in 1989, and in that sense the Soviet Union was still a superpower alongside the United States. However, Gorbachev and his aides did away with the other condition that was needed to sustain the Cold War: the ideological divide. By reassessing, recasting, and ultimately abandoning the core precepts of Marxism–Leninism, Gorbachev and his aides enabled changes to occur in Europe that eviscerated the Cold War structure. The Soviet leader's decision to accept and even facilitate the peaceful transformation of Eastern Europe undid Stalin's pernicious legacy.

See also: ARMS CONTROL; CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; DÉTENTE; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; KOREAN WAR; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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COLLECTIVE FARM

The collective farm (kolkhoz) was introduced in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s by Josef Stalin, who was implementing the controversial process



Combine harvesters at Urozhai Collective Farm in Bashkortosan. © TASS/Sovfoto

of collectivization. The collective farm, along with the state farm (*sovkhoz*) and the private subsidiary sector, were the basic organizational arrangements for Soviet agricultural production, and survived, albeit with changes, through the end of the Soviet era.

The concept of a collective or cooperative model for the organization of production did not originate in the Soviet Union. However, during the 1920s there was discussion of and experimentation with varying approaches to cooperative farming differing largely in the nature of membership, the form of organization, and the internal rules governing production and distribution.

In theory, the collective farm was a cooperative (the *kolkhoz* charter was introduced in 1935) based upon what was termed “*kolkhoz-cooperative*” property, ideologically inferior to state property used in the *sovkhoz*. Entry into and exit from a *kolkhoz* was theoretically voluntary, though in fact the process of collectivization was forcible, and departure all but impossible. Decision making (notably election of the chair) was to be conducted through participation of the collective farm members. Participants (peasants) were to be rewarded

with a residual share of net income rather than a contractual wage. In practice, the collective farm differed significantly from these principles. The dominant framework for decision making was a party-approved chair, and discussion in collective farm meetings was perfunctory. Party control was sustained by the local party organization through the *nomenklatura* (appointment) system and also through the discipline of the Machine Tractors Stations (MTS). Payment to peasants on the collective farm was made according to the labor day unit (*trudoden*), which was divided into the residual after the state extracted compulsory deliveries of product at low fixed prices. As collective farm members were not entitled to internal passports, their geographical mobility was limited. Unlike the *sovkhoz*, the *kolkhoz* was not a budget-financed organization. Accordingly, the state exercised significant power over living levels in the countryside by requiring compulsory deliveries of product. Peasants on collective farms were entitled to hold a limited number of animals and cultivate a small plot of land.

By the early 1940s there were roughly 235,000 collective farms in existence averaging 3,500 acres

per farm, accounting for some 80 percent of total sown area in agriculture. After World War II a program of amalgamation and also of conversion to state farms was implemented along with a continuing program of agroindustrial integration. As a result, the number of collective farms declined to approximately 27,000 by 1988, with an average size of 22,000 acres, together accounting for 44 percent of sown area. By the end of the 1980s, the differences between kolkhozes and sovkhozes were minimal.

During the transition era of the 1990s, change in Russian agriculture has been very slow. Collective farms have for the most part been converted to a corporate structure, but operational changes have been few, and a significant land market remains to be achieved.

See also: AGRICULTURE; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; PEASANT ECONOMY; SOVKHOZ

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contracts. Although the state moved away from the pervasive application of the principle of collective responsibility in the eighteenth century, it was still used in certain situations such as military conscription and collection of delinquent taxes. Even after the Great Reforms, local police officials retained the right to hold large peasant communes collectively responsible for major tax arrears as a measure of last resort. Although theoretically state officials could inventory and sell individual holdings to cover communal arrears, in practice this occurred infrequently. In Soviet legal procedures collectives could be called upon to monitor and vouch for their members, and individuals accused of committing minor legal infractions could be handed over to a collective for corrective measures as an alternative to incarceration.

See also: GREAT REFORMS

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COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

Collective or mutual responsibility (*krugovaia poruka*), often reinforced through legal guarantees or surety bonds.

It is first documented in the medieval period in an expanded version of the *Russkaya Pravda* that mandated that certain communities would be collectively responsible for apprehending murderers or paying fines to the prince. In the Muscovite period collective responsibility was frequently invoked to make communities collectively responsible for the actions and financial obligations of their members. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, state officials shifted much of the responsibility for apprehending criminals and preempting misdeeds to groups that could monitor and discipline their members. Surety in the form of financial and legal accountability was frequently demanded by the state from groups to insure that their individual members would not shirk legal obligations or responsibilities such as appearing in court, performing services for the state, or meeting the terms of

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

The introduction of the collective farm (kolkhoz) into the Soviet countryside began in the late 1920s and was substantially completed by the mid-1930s. The collectivization of Soviet agriculture, along with the introduction of state ownership (nationalization) and national economic planning (replacing markets as a mechanism of resource allocation), formed the dominant framework of the Soviet economic system, a set of institutions and related policies that remained in place until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Lenin attempted to introduce change in the Soviet agricultural sector, and especially to exert state control, through methods such as the extraction of grain from the rural economy by force (the *prodrazverstka*). This was the first attempt under Soviet rule to change both the institutional arrangements governing interaction between the agrarian and industrial sectors (the market) and the terms of trade between the state and the rural economy. The impact of these arrangements resulted in a significant

decline in agricultural output during the period of war communism.

Following the collapse of war communism, the peasant economy predominated during the New Economic Policy (NEP). The relationship between the rural economy and the urban industrial economy was characterized by alliance (*smytchka*), although the issue of the rural economy and its role in socialist industrialization remained controversial. Events such as the Scissors Crisis brought these issues to the fore. In addition, the potential contribution of agriculture to the process of economic development was a major issue in the great industrialization debate.

In 1929 Josef Stalin initiated the process of collectivization, arguing that a "grain crisis" (peasant withholding of grain) could effectively limit the pace of Soviet industrialization. Collectivization was intended to introduce socialist organizational arrangements into the countryside, and to change fundamentally the nature of the relationship between the rural and urban (industrial) sectors of the Soviet economy. Markets were to be eliminated, and state control was to prevail.

The organizational arrangements in the countryside were fundamentally changed, the relations between the state and the rural economy were altered, and the socialist ideology served as the framework for the decision to collectivize. The process and outcome of collectivization remain controversial to the present time.

Why has collectivization been so controversial? First, the process of collectivization was forcible and violent, resulting in substantial destruction of physical capital (e.g., animal herds) and the reduction of peasant morale, as peasants resisted the state-driven creation of collective farms. Second, the kolkhoz as an organization incorporated socialist elements into the rural economy. It was also viewed as a mechanism through which state and party power could be used to change the terms of trade in favor of the city, to eliminate markets, and, specifically, to extract grain from the countryside on terms favorable to the state. The collective farm was, in theory, a cooperative form of organization through which the state could extract grain, leaving a residual for peasant consumption. The mechanism of payment for labor, the labor day (*trudoden*), facilitated this process. Third, peasant resistance to the creation of the collective farms was cast largely within an ideological framework. Thus resistance to collectivization, in whatever form, was blamed largely upon

the wealthy peasants (kulaks). Fourth, the institutions and policies resulting from the collectivization process, even with significant modifications over time, have been blamed for the poor record of agricultural performance in the Soviet Union. In addition to the costs associated with the initial means of implementation, the collective farms lacked sufficient means of finance and were unable to provide appropriate incentives to stimulate the necessary growth of agricultural productivity.

Thus collectivization replaced markets with state controls and, in so doing, used a process and instituted a set of organizational arrangements ultimately deemed to be detrimental to the long-term growth of the agricultural economy in the Soviet Union.

See also: AGRICULTURE; COLLECTIVE FARM; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; PEASANT ECONOMY; SOVKHOZ

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COLONIAL EXPANSION

In 1300 Moscow was the capital of a very small, undistinguished principality whose destiny was almost certainly beyond anyone's imaginings at the time: by 1991, it would control more than one-sixth of the earth's landed surface. This expansion was achieved by many means, ranging from marital alliances and purchase to military conquest and signed treaties.

Moscow was already in control of a multiracial, multiethnic region in 1300. The primordial inhabitants were Finnic. Much later Balts moved in, and then around 1100 Slavs migrated to the region, some from the south (from Kievan Rus), perhaps the majority from the west, the area of Bohemia. In 1328 the Russian Orthodox Church established its headquarters in Moscow, giving stability to the Moscow principality at crucial junctures and helping legitimize its annexation of other, primarily Eastern Slavic, principalities. Much of the Muscovite expansion was nearly bloodless, as elites

in other principalities chose to join the elite in Moscow over liquidation or marginalization in small principalities. After 1450 Moscow's rivals became more formidable, especially the Republic of Novgorod in the northwest, with its vast lands in the Russian North (annexed as the result of military campaigns in 1471 and 1478); the eastern entrepot of the Hansa League, at the time perhaps the major fur supplier to much of Eurasia; and Lithuania, the largest state in Europe in the mid-fifteenth century. Moscow unleashed its army against Lithuania and by 1514 had annexed much of its territory (sometimes known as "West Russia").

In the mid-sixteenth century Muscovy pursued colonial expansion full force. In 1552 the Tatar Khanate of Kazan was annexed, and in 1556, after a dash down the Volga, the Tatar Khanate of Astrakhan was conquered. Although Muscovy controlled numerous regions from 1300 onward, the annexations of the 1550s converted Muscovy into a truly multinational empire. Both moves were made for security concerns, only marginally (at best) for economic reasons.

The conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan made it possible for the Russians to move farther east, first into the Urals, then into Siberia. There the Muscovite expansion began to take on hues resembling Western European colonial expansion into the New World and Asia. A pivotal figure was Ermak Timofeyev syn (i.e., son of the commoner Timofei; had Ermak's father been of noble origin, then his patronymic would have been Timofeevich), a cossack ataman who at the end of the 1570s or the beginning of the 1580s (the precise date is unknown) campaigned into Siberia and initiated the destruction of the Tatar Siberian Khanate. Once the Siberian Khanate was annexed, the path was open through Siberia to the Pacific. The Russians garrisoned strategic points and began to collect tribute (primarily in furs, especially sables) from the Siberian natives. Colonial expansion in many parts of the world was not profitable, because administrative costs ate up whatever gains from trade there may have been. In Siberia, however, the opposite has been true for more than four centuries. The conquest, pacification, and continuing administrative costs were low there, while the remittances to Moscow and St. Petersburg in the form of furs, gold and other precious metals, diamonds, timber, and, more recently, oil and gas were all profitable. If one includes the Urals, developed between the reign of Peter the Great and 1800, the trans-Volga push was very profitable for Russia.

The colonists who settled Eurasia between the Urals and the Pacific were certainly among the most motley ever assembled. Leading the pack were cossacks and other adventurers. They were followed by fur traders and perhaps trappers. Government officials and garrison troops were next. They were followed by peasants fleeing serfdom, then by exiles from the center. Even as late as the last years of the Soviet Union, permanent residents of Siberia volunteered aloud their disgust over the fact that Moscow used their land as a dumping ground for criminal and political exiles. In the eighteenth century landlords claimed huge tracts in Siberia and moved all of their peasants from Old Russia to the new lands. Probably the last wave were Soviet professionals who responded to quadruple wages to settle in mineral-rich but climatically unfriendly regions of Siberia.

Moscow's push south of the Oka into the steppe was at least initially a defensive measure. The Crimean Tatars sacked Moscow in 1571 and its suburbs in 1591, and they regularly "harvested" tens of thousands of Slavs into captivity for sale into the world slave trade out of Keefe across the Black Sea. To put a stop to these continuous depredations, the Muscovites paid annual tributes to the Crimeans that were never sufficient, mounted patrols along the southern frontier, and began the process of walling it off from the steppe to keep the nomads from penetrating Eastern Slavdom. A series of fortified lines were built in the steppe, until the Crimean Khanate was surrounded and then finally annexed in 1783. What began as a security measure turned into a great economic boon for Russia. Most of the area annexed was chernozem soil, prairie soil a yard thick that proved to be the richest soil in Europe. The western part of this area had been Ukraine, which was annexed in 1654. The eastern part of the steppe was uninhabited because of continuous Tatar depredations. Once it was secure, it was settled primarily by Russian farmers hoping to improve on their yields from the pitiful podzol soils north of the Oka. This colonization gave the Russians access to the sixty-thousand-square-kilometer Donbass, one of late Russia's and the USSR's major fuel and metallurgical regions. The homeland of the Great Russians, the Volga-Oka mesopotamia, is almost totally lacking in useful minerals and suitable soil and weather for productive agriculture—all of which were supplied by the colonization of Ukraine and Siberia.

One of Russia's good fortunes was that generally it was able to pick its colonization-annexation

targets one at a time. Peter the Great in 1703 annexed the Neva delta, which became the site of the future capital, St. Petersburg, and gave Russia direct access to Baltic and Atlantic seaports of tremendous value during the next three centuries. The next target to the west was Poland, which was divided into three partitions (among Russia, Austria, and Prussia). The first partition, in 1772, involved primarily lands that once had been East Slavic, but the second (1793) and third (1795) engorged West Slavic territories, including the capital of Poland itself, Warsaw. This strategic move netted Russia more intimate access to the rest of Europe, but otherwise gave the Russians nothing but trouble: the enduring hatred of the Poles, rebellions by Poles against Russian hegemony, and dissent by Russians who opposed the annexation of Poland.

After the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian Empire moved against the Caucasus. This move led to the horror of the Caucasian War, which dragged on from 1817 to 1864. Control over the Caucasus had been contested for centuries among the Persians, the Byzantines, the Ottomans, and the Russians. There, Christianity and Islam met head to head. The Islamic Chechens were among the first peoples attacked in 1817, an event that reverberates to this day. The Armenian and Georgian Christians looked to the Russians to save them from Islamic conquest. The Russians ultimately won, but at tremendous cost and for little real gain.

In 1864 Russia turned its attention to Central Asia. Between then and 1895 it defeated and annexed to the Russian Empire the weak khanates of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva. Central Asia was inhabited by primarily Turkic nomads. Silk was the main product manufactured there that the Russians wanted, as well as access via commercial transportation to Balkh, Afghanistan, and India further south. In Soviet times Uzbekistan was foolishly converted into the cotton basket of the USSR at the cost of drying up the Syr Daria and Amu Daria rivers and the Aral Sea, leaching the soil, and converting the region into a toxic dust bowl.

Russia was successful in its colonial empire building efforts because of the weakness and disorganization of its opponents. Areas such as Poland, the Caucasus, and Central Asia benefited Russia little, whereas St. Petersburg, Siberia, and left-bank Ukraine were profit centers for Russia and for the USSR.

See also: DEMOGRAPHY; EMPIRE, USSR AS; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA

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
COLONIALISM

Colonialism is a type of imperial domination of the non-Russian peoples who inhabited the southern and eastern borderlands of the Russian Empire and who subsequently fell under the control of the Soviet Union. It refers specifically to policies to spread Western civilization (a "civilizing mission") among peoples in those territories, and to integrate them into the imperial state and economy. It extends as well to the colonization by Russian and Ukrainian peasant settlers of lands inhabited by pastoral nomadic tribes.

COLONIZATION

The Russian Empire's southern and eastern borderlands became its colonial territories. Russian expansion onto the plains of Eurasia had by the middle of the eighteenth century brought within the boundaries of the empire all the lands south to the Caucasus Mountains and to the deserts of Turkestan, and east to the Pacific Ocean. Much of the area consisted of vast plains (the "steppe") once dominated by confederations of nomadic tribes, who became the subjects of imperial rule and the empire's first colonized peoples. The grasslands where they grazed their flocks along the lower Volga River and in southern Russia (the Ukraine) attracted peasants from European Russia seeking new farmland.

The imperial government encouraged this southward movement of the Russian population (most of whom were serfs owned by noble landlords). Occasionally nomadic tribes fought to re-



A greedy octopus represents Russia's expanding influence in 1877. © CORBIS

tain their lands. Prolonged resistance came first from the Bashkirs, Turkic peoples whose tribes occupied lands east of the Volga and along the Ural Mountains. During the eighteenth century many clans joined in raids on the intruders and battled against Russian troops. They joined in the massive Pugachev uprising of 1772 to 1774 alongside Cossacks and rebellious Russians. But in the end Russian armed forces invariably defeated the rebels.

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Russia's borders of the empire shifted further southeastward into Eurasian lands, bringing an increasingly diverse population into the empire. Peoples in these borderlands spoke many different languages, mostly of Turkic origin; practiced a wide variety of religions, with the Islamic faith the most widespread; and followed their own time-honored customs and social practices. Russia was becoming a multiethnic, multireligious empire.

THE IMPERIAL CIVILIZING MISSION

In the reign of Empress Catherine II (r. 1762–1796), the empire's leadership began to experiment with new approaches to govern these peoples. These policies drew upon Enlightenment concepts of government that redefined the object of colonial conquests. They became the basis of Russian colonialism. Previously, the Russian state had extended to the princes and nobles of newly conquered eastern territories the chance to collaborate in imperial rule. It had required their conversion to Orthodox Christianity, and had periodically encouraged Orthodox missionaries to conduct campaigns of mass conversion, if necessary by force. Before Catherine II's time, the state had made no concerted effort to alter the social, economic, and cultural practices of the peoples on its southern and eastern borders. This authoritarian method of borderland rule demanded only obedience from the native populations.

In the late eighteenth century, some educated Russians began to argue that their empire, which they believed a civilized Western land, had the duty to spread civilization, as they understood it, to its backward peoples. They had two principal objectives. By spreading Russian culture, legal practices, and opportunities for economic enrichment, the empire could hope to recruit a progressive group from these peoples who would become willing collaborators in Russian domination. Equally important was their belief that Russia's own historical development made the spread of its newly acquired Western culture among "savage" peoples a moral obligation.

Catherine II herself traveled among the empire's eastern peoples at the beginning of her reign. Impressed by what she described as the "differences of peoples, customs, and even ideas" in Asian land, she looked for new ways to win the loyalty of the population. Encouragement of trade, education, and religious toleration appeared to her desirable and useful tools to strengthen the bonds between these colonial peoples and their imperial rulers. These goals suggested practical guidelines by which she and her advisers could build their empire on modern political foundations. These also confirmed in their eyes the legitimacy of their imperial domination of backward peoples.

Catherine II shared the Enlightenment conviction that reason, not religious faith, lay at the core of enlightened government. She did not abandon the policy of maintaining Orthodox Christianity as the state religion of the empire, but ended forced conversion of Muslim peoples to Christianity. In 1773, she formally accorded religious toleration to Islam. Her successors on the imperial throne maintained this fundamental right, which proved a valuable means of maintaining peaceful relations with the empire's growing Muslim population. They encouraged the conversion to Christianity of peoples holding to animist beliefs, for they believed that their duty was to favor the spread of Christianity. They also promoted the commercial exploitation of colonial resources and the increased sale of Russian manufactured goods in their colonial territories. The Western colonialists' slogan of "Commerce and Christianity" described one important aspect to Russia's civilizing mission. Self-interest as well as the belief in spreading the benefits of Western civilization provided the ideological basis for Russian colonialism. This new policy never fully supplanted the old practices of authoritarian rule and discrimination against non-Russians,

which had strong defenders among army officers on the borderlands. But it, too, enjoyed powerful backing in the highest government circles. In the nineteenth century, their vision of an imperial civilizing mission brought Russia into the ranks of great Western empires.

COMMERCE AND CHRISTIANITY IN COLONIAL ALASKA

Alaska was the first area where Russian colonialism guided imperial rule. In the late eighteenth century Russian trappers had appeared there, having crossed the Pacific Ocean along the Aleutian Islands from Siberia in their hunt for fur-bearing sea mammals. The sea otter, whose fur was so highly prized that it was called "soft gold," was their chosen prey. They forced native peoples skilled at the dangerous craft of hunting at sea (mainly Aleutian tribesmen) to trap the animals, whose range extended from the Aleutians along the Alaskan coast and down to California. In 1800, the Russian government created a special colonial administration, the Russian-American Company, to take charge of "the Russian colonies in America." Its main tasks were to expand the commercially profitable fur-gathering activities, and to spread Orthodox Christianity and Russian culture among the subject peoples of this vast territory.

"Commerce and Christianity" defined the Russian Empire's objectives there. It operated in a manner somewhat similar to that of the British Hudson's Bay Company, also established in colonial North America. And like other overseas colonies of European empires, the Russians exploited Alaska's valuable resources (killing off almost all the sea otters), in the process confronting periodic revolts from their subject peoples. Faced with these difficulties, the Russian government finally abandoned its distant colony, too expensive and too distant to retain. In 1867, it sold the entire territory to the United States.

COLONIAL TURKESTAN AND IMPERIAL CITIZENSHIP

In seeking to create a unified, modern state, the Russian Empire moved toward establishing a common citizenship for the peoples in its multiethnic, multireligious borderlands in the late nineteenth century. It began this effort in 1860s and 1870s, at the time when it freed its peasant serf population from conditions of virtual slavery to its nobility. Reformers in the government conceived of an empire founded on a sort of imperial citizen-

ship, extended to former serfs and to native peoples.

That was the period of the empire's last major colonial expansion, when its military forces conquered a large part of Central Asia. The settled and nomadic populations of Turkestan (as the area was then called) spoke Turkic languages and were faithful Muslims who looked to the Ottoman Empire, not Russia, for cultural and religious leadership. The Russian colonial administration was deeply divided on the proper treatment of their unwilling new subjects. Some preferred to rely on the old policies of authoritarian rule, restrictions of the Muslim religion, and the encouragement of Russian colonization. Others took their inspiration from Catherine II's colonialist policies. The latter argued for progressive colonial policies including religious toleration of Islam, respect for the ethnic customs and moral practices of Turkestan's peoples, and the development of new crops (especially cotton) and commercial trade with Russia. They hoped that, as the powerful Minister of Finance Sergei Witte argued in 1900, full equality of rights with other subjects, freedom in the conduct of their religious needs, and non-intervention in their private lives, would ensure the unification of the Russian state.

This progressive colonialist program was notable by according (in theory) "equality of rights" to these imperial subjects. Colonial officials of this persuasion believed that they could extend, within their autocratic state, a sort of imperial citizenship to all the colonial peoples. They withheld, however, the full implementation of this reform until these peoples were "ready," that is, proved themselves loyal, patriotic subjects of the emperor-tsar. Opposition to their policy came from influential civilian leaders who judged that the state's need to support Russian peasants colonizing Turkestan territories had to come first. Their reckless decision led to the seizure from nomadic tribes of vast regions of Turkestan given to the peasant pioneers. Colonization meant violating the right of these subjects to the use of their land, which led directly to the Turkestan uprising of 1916. Coming before the 1917 revolution, this rebellion revealed that the empire's colonialist policies had failed to unify its peoples.

ORIENTALISM IN THE CAUCASUS REGION


To the end of the empire's existence, colonialism rested on the assumption of Russian cultural su-

periority and often expressed itself in disdain for colonial peoples. Yet not all of these subject groups were treated with equal disregard. In the territories of the Caucasus Mountains (between the Black and Caspian Seas), imperial rule won the support of some peoples, but faced repeated revolts from others. Resistance came especially from Muslim mountain tribes, who bitterly opposed domination by this Christian state. They sustained a half-century war until their defeat in the 1860s, when many were forced into exile or emigrated willingly to the Ottoman Empire. The conquest of the region produced an abundance of heroic tales of exotic adventures pitting valorous Russians against barbaric, cruel, and courageous enemies. These tales created enduring images of "oriental" peoples, sometimes admired for their "noble savagery" but usually disparaged for their alleged moral and cultural decadence.

Russian colonialism had a powerful impact on the population there. The Christian peoples (Georgians and Armenians) of the region found particular benefits from the empire's economic and cultural policies. Armenians created profitable commercial enterprises in the growing towns and cities of the Caucasus region, and were joined by large numbers of Armenian migrants from surrounding Muslim states. Some Georgians used the empire's cultural window on modern Western culture to create their own national literature and history. These quickly became tools in the Georgians' nationalist oppositional movement. In the Muslim lands along the Caspian Sea where Azeri Turks lived, investors from Russia and Europe developed the rich oil deposits into one of the first major sources of petroleum for the European economy, a source of immense profit to them. The port of Baku became a boomtown, where unskilled Azeri laborers worked in the dangerous oil fields. They formed a colonial proletariat living among Russian officials and capitalists, and Armenian merchants and traders. The new colonial cities such as Baku were deeply divided both socially and ethnically, and became places in the early twentieth century of riots and bloodshed provoked by the hostility among these peoples. Nationalist opposition to empire and ethnic conflict among its peoples were both products of Russian colonialism.

COLONIALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

The fall of the empire in 1917 ended Russian colonialism as a publicly defended ideal and policy. The triumph of the communist revolutionary



By 1914, the Russian Empire controlled more than one-sixth of the Earth's landed surface. XNR PRODUCTIONS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF THE GALE GROUP

movement in most of the lands once a part of the empire put in place a new political order, called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The communist leaders of the new Soviet state preached the Marxist-Leninist program for human progress. They persecuted all religious movements, and denounced imperialism and colonialism, in Russia as elsewhere in the Western world. Their promise was liberation of all colonial peoples. But they did not permit their own peoples, previously in the empire's colonial lands, to escape their domination. Their idea of "colonial liberation" consisted of organizing these peoples into discreet ethno-territorial units by drawing territorial borders for every distinct people. The biggest of these received their own national republics. Each of these nations of the Soviet Union had its own political leaders and its own language and culture, but the "union" to which they belonged remained under the domina-

tion of the Communist Party, itself controlled from party headquarters in the Kremlin in Moscow.

The empire's eastern peoples experienced a new, communist civilizing mission, which proclaimed the greatest good for backward peoples to be working-class liberation, national culture, and rapid economic development under state control. Colonization reappeared as well when, in the 1950s and 1960s, millions of settlers from European areas moved into Siberia and regions of Central Asia to cultivate, in enormous state-run farms, most of the remaining lands of the nomadic peoples. Colonialism within the lands of the former Russian Empire did not disappear until the Soviet Union in its turn collapsed in 1991.

See also: CATHERINE II; CAUCASUS; CHRISTIANITY, COLONIAL EXPANSION; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF THE;

NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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DANIEL BROWER

COMINFORM See COMMUNIST INFORMATION BUREAU.

COMINTERN See COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY

The term *command administrative economy*, or often *administrative command economic system*, was adopted in the late 1980s as a descriptive category for the Soviet type of economic system. Throughout its history, the Soviet Union had a mobilization economy, focused on rapid industrial expansion and growth and the development of economic and military power, under the direction of the Communist Party and its leadership. This command administrative economy evolved from the experiences of earlier Soviet attempts to develop a viable socialist alternative to the capitalist market system that prevailed in the developed Western

world. Thus it was built on the lessons of the non-monetized pure “command economy” of Leninist War Communism (1918–1921), Lenin’s experiment with markets under the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1921–1927), Josef Stalin’s “great Socialist Offensive” (1928–1941), war mobilization (1941–1945) and recovery (1946–1955), and the Khrushchevian experiment with regional decentralization of economic planning and administration (1957–1962). This economic system reached its maturity in the period of Brezhnev’s rule (1965–1982), following the rollback of the Kosygin reforms of 1967–1972. It provides a concise summary of the nature of the economic system of “Developed Socialism” under Brezhnev, against which the radical economic reforms of perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev were directed.

The concept of the command administrative economy is an elaboration of the analysis of the command economy, introduced to the study of the Soviet Union by Gregory Grossman in his seminal (1963) article, “Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy.” The term became common in the economic reform debates of the late Soviet period, even in the Soviet Union itself, particularly after its use by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, at the reform Party Plenums of January and June 1987, in his critique of the functioning of the Soviet economic system. The term highlights the fact that in such an economic system, most economic activity involves the administrative elaboration and implementation of commands from superior authorities in an administrative hierarchy, with unauthorized initiative subject to punishment.

The defining feature of such an economic system is the subordination of virtually all economic activity to state authority. That authority was represented in the Soviet Union by the sole legitimate political body, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which necessarily then assumed a leading, indeed determining, role in all legitimate economic activity. This authority was realized through a vast administrative hierarchy responsible for turning the general objectives and wishes of the Party and its leadership into operational plans and detailed implementing instructions, and then overseeing and enforcing their implementation to the extent possible. This involved centralized planning that produced five-year developmental framework plans and one-year operational directive plans containing detailed commands mandatory for implementation

by all subordinate organizations. These plans were elaborated in increasing detail as they were allocated down the hierarchy, eventually becoming direct specific commands to individual firms, farms, stores, and other economic organizations.

The task of directive-based centralized planning in this system was made feasible by aggregation at higher levels and by the delegation of elaboration of details of the plan to subordinate levels in the administrative hierarchy. Thus administrative organs at each level of the hierarchy (central, republic, regional, local, and operational [e.g., firm, farm, etc.]) were responsible for planning, supervision, and enforcement, and engaged in active bargaining with other levels in the hierarchy to develop an agreed plan of activity that in general met the needs and desires of the highest authorities. The result of this administrative process bore the force of law and was not subject to legitimate alteration or deviation by subordinate units, although higher authorities did have the power to alter or reallocate the assignments of their subordinates.

To work properly, this system of administratively enforced implementation of commands requires limiting the discretion and alternatives available to subordinates. Thus the system, within the areas of activity directly controlled by the state, was essentially demonetized. Although money was used as a unit of account and measure of activity, it ceased to be a legitimate bearer of options in the state sectors; it failed to possess that fundamental and defining characteristic of “moneyness”—a universal command over goods and services. Rather it played a passive role of aggregating and measuring the flow of economic activity, while plans and their subsequent allocation documents determined the ability to acquire goods and services within the state sector. Similarly, prices in the command administrative economy failed to reflect marginal valuations, but rather became aggregation weights for the planning and enforcement of the production and distribution of heterogeneous products in a given planned category of activity. Thus in the logic of the command administrative economy, money and prices become mere accounting tools, allowing the administrative hierarchy to monitor, verify, and enforce commanded performance.

The command administrative system in the Soviet Union controlled the overwhelming share of all productive activity. But the experience of war communism, and the repeated attempts to mobilize and inspire workers and intellectuals to work

toward the objectives of the Soviet Party and State, showed that the detailed planning and administration of commands were rather ineffective in dealing with the consumption, career, and work-choice decisions of individuals and households. The variety and variability of needs and desires proved too vast to be effectively managed by directive central planning and administrative enforcement, except in extreme (wartime) circumstances. Thus money was used to provide individual incentives and rewards, realizable through markets for consumer goods and services and the choice of job and profession, subject to qualification constraints. But prices and wages were still extensively controlled, and the cash money allowed in these markets was strictly segmented from, and nonconvertible with, the accounting funds used for measuring transactions in the state production and distribution sectors. This created serious microeconomic disequilibria in these markets, stimulating the development of active underground economies that extended the influence of money into the state sector and reallocated product from intended planned purposes to those of agents with control over cash.

The command administrative economy proved quite effective at forcing rapid industrialization and urbanization in the Soviet Union. It was effective at mobilizing human and material resources in the pursuit of large-scale, quantifiable goals. The building of large industrial objects, the opening of vast and inhospitable resource areas to economic exploitation, and the building and maintenance of military forces second to none were all facilitated by the system’s ability to mobilize resources and focus them on achieving desired objects regardless of the cost. Moreover, the system proved quite adept at copying and adapting new technologies and even industries from the Western market economies. Yet these very abilities, and the absence of any valuation feedback through markets and prices, rendered the operation of the system extremely costly and wasteful of resources, both human and material.

Without the ability to make fine trade-offs, to innovate and to adjust to changing details and circumstances largely unobservable to those with the authority in the system to act, the command administrative economy grew increasingly inefficient and wasteful of resources as the economy and its complexity grew. This became more obvious, even to the rulers of the system, as microeconomic disequilibria, unfinished construction, unusable inventories, and disruptions of the “sellers’ market,”

together with a burgeoning second economy (Grossman, 1977), grew with increasing rapidity through the 1970s and 1980s. These consequences, together with the repeated failure of partial and incremental reforms to improve the situation and a growing gap in technology from the levels of the developed West, inspired the radical economic, and indeed political, reforms of Mikhail S. Gorbachev that soon afterward brought an end to the Soviet Union and its command administrative economy.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; MARKET SOCIALISM

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RICHARD E. ERICSON

COMMANDING HEIGHTS OF THE ECONOMY

As a result of peasant and military revolts in 1920 and early 1921, Vladimir I. Lenin was forced to reverse the extreme policies of War Communism in favor of a temporary expedient, the mixed economy of the New Economic Plan (NEP). The Bolshevik Tenth Party Congress (March 1921) adopted a tax in kind on the peasantry to replace confiscations. The Congress also permitted leasing smaller nationalized workshops back to private individuals, provided they hired no more than ten or twenty workers. But the Bolsheviks retained in state hands

most large-scale industry in the fuel and metallurgical sectors, mines, and military plants, along with all banking, railroads, and foreign trade. These were to constitute the "commanding heights," which were supposed to control and guide the rest of the economy under Soviet power. They were provided subsidies from the budget to pay for wages and supplies. Many of the industrial enterprises were soon organized into trusts or syndicates under the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) for operational supervision, though many rehired former managers and experts ("bourgeois specialists") deemed to be loyal to the new regime. By 1922 more than 90 percent of industrial output still came from these nationalized plants, mines, and transportation facilities. By 1928 industrial output had recovered the levels achieved in 1913, but further expansion would depend on new net investments, for which the state budget would be the only significant source, for the "commanding heights" did not generate sufficient profits.

See also: NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; WAR COMMUNISM

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

COMMISSAR

Soviet government official.

"Commissar" was the title given to the bureaucratic leaders of the Soviet Union, used from 1917 to 1946. The title and rank of commissar was also given to the military-political officers serving with the Red Army during World War II. Also known as People's Commissars, they were the heads of the various people's commissariats (of health, justice, education, internal affairs, and so forth), the central bureaucratic organizations that governed the Russian Republic and the Soviet Union. The commissars were also the members of the Soviet of People's Commissars (*Sovet narodnykh komissarov*—*Sovnarkom*, or SNK), the central organ of state power that coordinated government decisions in the Soviet republics and among the commissariats when the USSR Supreme Soviet was not in session. In 1946, when the commissariats were renamed ministries, the commissars became ministers, and the SNK became the Council of Ministers.

See also: COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; SUPREME SOVIET

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SHARON A. KOWALSKY

COMMITTEE FOR THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

The Committee for Operational Management of the National Economy (COME) and a parallel body, the Interrepublican Economic Committee (IEC), were created in the wake of the failed coup of August 1991, in a vain bid to coordinate economic policy across the territory of the Soviet Union. They were trying to pick up the functions of the government of the USSR, which had disintegrated after the coup. COME was headed by Ivan Silaev, a former deputy prime minister in the Soviet government (1985–1990) who had been appointed by Boris Yeltsin in June 1990 as prime minister of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. Silaev struggled to maintain food supplies and deal with Soviet debt obligations, while Yeltsin's reform team, led by Yegor Gaidar, was preparing a radical reform program. Silaev resigned as Russian prime minister on September 27, 1991, after being accused of trying to empower the COME at the expense of the Russian Federation (for example, by taking control over energy supplies). Silaev then became acting prime minister of the Soviet Union—a country that had de facto ceased to exist. Together with Grigory Yavlinsky he worked on a treaty on economic cooperation between the republics, but encountered hostility from the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and government. He tried to salvage some of the ministries of the Soviet government, whose forty thousand employees were still sitting in Moscow. The COME and IEC were founded on the assumption that some elements of the unified Soviet economic management system would be preserved, but this proved erroneous. Over the course of 1991 all republican governments had progressively ceased to cooperate with federal economic agencies, refusing to pay taxes and ignoring policy directives, and this trend accelerated after the failed

August coup. By the end of 1991 all the republics had declared their complete independence and the COME and IEC were closed down. In the future, economic ties between the newly independent states would be conducted on a bilateral basis without any central coordinating agency such as COME.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; YAVLINSKY, GRIGORY ALEXEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

PETER RUTLAND

COMMITTEE OF SOLDIERS' MOTHERS

The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia (CSMR) was organized in 1989 at a time when glasnost and perestroika had led to greater information about the abuses within the Soviet military and its conscript system and created opportunities for the actions of nongovernmental organizations. In 1989 the mothers of 300 student-conscripts protested against their draft and lobbied successfully to change the conscription law to allow student deferments. Their successes include the granting of deferments and the early return of 180,000 students from the army to finish their studies. The Committee was also involved in seeking to end abuses in barracks life, especially the bullying of junior conscripts (*dedovshchina*), and in promoting the transition from a conscript system to a volunteer military. The CSMR has worked to expose human rights violations within the military, given legal and material assistance to the families of dead servicemen, consulted on legislation affecting military service, and published research on service-related deaths in the military. It operates hostels in Moscow for AWOL soldiers.

The CSMR actively protested the First Chechen War (1994–1996) and in March 1995 organized the "March for Compassion" from Moscow to Grozny. The March drew attention to the horrific violations of human rights by both sides and sought to draw support from Chechen mothers opposed to the war. Media attention to these efforts, as well as efforts to secure the release of Russian prisoners of war, won broad international praise for the CSMR. In 1995 the committee received the Sean MacBride Peace Prize from the International Peace Bureau and was nominated in the same year for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Between 1996 and 1999, the CSMR continued to lobby the Russian parliament for legislation to protect the rights of servicemen, reform the military, rehabilitate veterans of regional conflicts, and provide support to the families of dead servicemen. It also supported the efforts of deserters to secure amnesty through the military prosecutor's office.

The CSMR has continued its efforts to support the rights of soldiers and their families during the Second Chechen War (September 1999–) but with much more limited success and less public support.

See also: CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; CIVIL SOCIETY, DEVELOPMENT OF; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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JACOB W. KIPP

COMMITTEES OF THE VILLAGE POOR

Committees of the Village Poor (*komitety derevenskoy bednoty* or *kombedy* in Russian) were peasant organizations created by the Bolshevik government in 1918 to procure grain and create a revolutionary counterweight to the traditional peasant commune.

Bolshevik ideologists viewed peasant communities as divided between a small minority of rich kulaks and a majority of poor peasants. The kulaks controlled local soviets and traditional peasant communes, hoarded grain, and hired poor peasants to till their extensive lands. The *kombedy*, selected by poor peasants, would break this power, distributing food and consumer goods to the rural poor and assisting in expropriating grain from the kulaks for delivery to the city. With their knowledge of local conditions, they would be far more effective at finding hidden grain than food-supply detachments from the city.

In practice, the committees failed to fulfill the hopes communist leaders had for them. Peasants made no firm distinction between the village soviet, the village commune, and the committee of the rural poor, and the committee was rarely more

responsive to central control than the first two had been. Food supply officials complained that the *kombedy* focused too little attention on procuring grain and pursued local interests at the expense of the state. Most grain gathered by the *kombedy* was redistributed within the peasant community. Some committees used their powers to rob fellow peasants or to settle old scores. Bringing the revolution to the countryside did not result in more bread for the city.

Attempts to requisition grain by force, deprivations of the *kombedy*, and an ill-timed attempt at conscription led to uprisings throughout central Russia in November 1918. While Red Army detachments quickly suppressed the poorly organized peasant groups, the 6th Congress of Soviets decided to eliminate the Committees of the Village Poor in November 1918. It ordered new elections to local soviets in which kulaks would not participate. These new, more reliable soviets would replace the committees. This process was little more than a face-saving gesture, as the new soviets were no more pliable than the institutions they replaced. Communist government retreated to the cities, and the only influence it had over rural society was exercised by armed grain-procurement and recruitment detachments.

The *kombedy* experiment failed to create a rural government that was responsive to the center, and failed to procure significant amounts of grain. It did mobilize thousands of peasants to join the Communist Party (including Brezhnev-era ideologue Mikhail Suslov), but without creating a significant Party presence in the countryside. Ambitious, energetic rural party members moved to the cities or joined the Red Army, while most of the members remaining in the villages were soon purged for inactivity.

See also: AGRICULTURE; COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

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A. DELANO DUGARM

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established on December 8, 1991, in the Belovezh Accords, which also brought an end to the Soviet Union. These accords were signed by leaders from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and on December 21, 1991, in the Almaty Declaration and Protocol to these accords, eight additional states (Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) confirmed their intention to join the CIS and accept the demise of the Soviet state. Georgia joined the CIS in December 1993, bringing total membership to twelve states (the Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia never joined). The organization had several goals, including coordination of members' foreign and security policies, development of a common economic space, fostering human rights and inter-ethnic concord, maintenance of the military assets of the former USSR, creation of shared transportation and communications networks, environmental security, regulation of migration policy, and efforts to combat organized crime. The CIS had a variety of institutions through which it attempted to accomplish these goals: Council of Heads of State, Council of Heads of Government, Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Defense Ministers, an inter-parliamentary assembly, Executive Committee, Anti-Terrorism Task Force, and the Interstate Economic Committee of the Economic Union.

Although in a sense the CIS was designed to replace the Soviet Union, it was not and is not a separate state or country. Rather, the CIS is an international organization designed to promote cooperation among its members in a variety of fields. Its headquarters are in Minsk, Belarus. Over the years, its members have signed dozens of treaties and agreements, and some hoped that it would ultimately promote the dynamic development of ties among the newly independent post-Soviet states. By the late 1990s, however, the CIS lost most of its momentum and was victimized by internal rifts, becoming, according to some observers, largely irrelevant and powerless.

From its beginning, the CIS had two main purposes. The first was to promote what was called a "civilized divorce" among the former Soviet states. Many feared the breakup of the Soviet Union would lead to political and economic chaos, if not outright conflict over borders. The earliest agreements of the

CIS, which provided for recognition of borders, protection of ethnic minorities, maintenance of a unified military command, economic cooperation, and periodic meetings of state leaders, arguably helped to maintain some semblance of order in the region, although one should note that the region did suffer some serious conflicts (e.g., war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and civil conflicts in Tajikistan, Moldova, and Georgia).

The second purpose of the CIS was to promote integration among the newly independent states. On this score, the CIS had not succeeded. The main reason is that while all parties had a common interest in peacefully dismantling the old order, there has been no consensus among these states as to what (if anything) should replace the Soviet state. Moreover, the need to develop national political and economic systems took precedence in many states, dampening enthusiasm for any project of reintegration. CIS members have also been free to sign or not sign agreements as they see fit, creating a hodgepodge of treaties and obligations among CIS states.

One of the clearest failures of the CIS has been on the economic front. Although the member states pledged cooperation, things began to break down early on. By 1993, the ruble zone collapsed, with each state issuing its own currency. In 1993 and 1994, eleven CIS states ratified a Treaty on an Economic Union (Ukraine joined as an associate member). A free-trade zone was proposed in 1994, but by 2002 it still had not yet been fully established. In 1996 four states (Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) created a Customs Union, but others refused to join. All these efforts were designed to increase trade, but, due to a number of factors, trade among CIS countries has lagged behind targeted figures. More broadly speaking, economic cooperation has suffered because states had adopted economic reforms and programs with little regard for the CIS and have put more emphasis on redirecting their trade to neighboring European or Asian states.

Cooperation in military matters fared little better. The 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security was ratified by a mere six states. While CIS peacekeeping troops were deployed to Tajikistan and Abkhazia (a region of Georgia), critics viewed these efforts as Russian attempts to maintain a sphere of influence in these states. As a "Monroeski Doctrine" took hold in Moscow, which asserted special rights for Russia on post-Soviet territory,

and Russia used its control over energy pipelines to put pressure on other states, there was a backlash by several states against Russia, which weakened the CIS. After September 11, 2001, the CIS created bodies to help combat terrorism, and some hoped that this might bring new life to the organization.

See also: BELOVEZH ACCORDS; RUBLE ZONE

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PAUL J. KUBICEK

COMMUNISM

In its broadest meaning communism describes a society in which all its members jointly (communally) own its resources and in which the society's wealth and products are distributed equally to everyone. The term has been applied to premodern social and political constructs, such as communal societies propounded in Plato's *Republic* and in Thomas More's *Utopia*; to proposals of some radicals in the French Revolution of 1787; and to ideal communities advocated by nineteenth-century reformers such as Charles Fourier and Robert Owen, but none of these systems corresponded fully with the principles of communism.

Most often, communism designates the ultimate good society espoused by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in their *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 and the ideas and Soviet system in twentieth-century Russia associated with Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. The latter usage is a misnomer: Neither Lenin nor later Soviet leaders ever claimed that communism had been established in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, they willingly adopted the label, since it furthered their revolutionary and propagandistic purposes. As a result, in general discussion and writing, the Soviet state and its post-World War II offshoots in Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba

were generally called "communist." Correspondingly, leaders of the Soviet Union, of other similarly constituted states, and of revolutionary parties worldwide that adhered to Marxist-Leninist doctrine were known as "communists."

MARX'S VIEW OF COMMUNISM

More accurately, however, communism signifies only the very last step in the historical process and the ultimate and highly desirable goal of human development as outlined in Marx's economic, social, and political philosophy. Influenced by egalitarian ideas current in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, Marx was outraged by what he saw as the unjust nature of the economic system spawned by the Industrial Revolution, which he called capitalism. Marx and Engels portrayed history as determined inevitably by "scientific" laws, which divided human social evolution into five broad stages: "gentilism," sometimes referred to as "primitive communism," with individuals living in clans and holding property in common; "slavery" based on slave labor; "feudalism" dependent on serf labor; "capitalism," in which entrepreneurs or capitalists exploited workers (the proletariat) and controlled the government; and "socialism," with public ownership replacing private capital and the emergence of a classless society providing justice, equity and freedom for all. Since conflict and class struggle, the mechanism for social change, would not exist in this new order, socialism would be the final stage of history and the highest level of human development.

Marx noted, however, that socialism would have two phases: the lower phase, also known as "socialism," and a higher phase, "communism." The latter would be the ultimate good society benefiting all mankind. In the lower, socialist phase, the whole society would own its productive forces, or the economy, but work would still be valued and paid differentially and distribution of the society's goods and wealth would not yet be equal. To reach the higher, communist phase, two requirements had to be met. First, the productive forces of society, restricted by the capitalists in a vain attempt to prop up their profits, would be liberated, and the economy, hugely expanded by modern scientific and technological inputs, would become capable of producing "a superabundance of goods." This enormous output would permit everyone to have whatever they needed. Second, in counterbalance, an individual's needs would be limited and sensible, because society would develop, through



Young communists salute as they pass Lenin's tomb on May Day. © HULTON ARCHIVE

education and by example, "a new-type socialist person." Reoriented individuals would desire only what was truly necessary to sustain life, eschewing ostentation and waste. They would also contribute to the socialist society altruistically, applying their work and varied talents to the common welfare. With the superabundance of goods and the new socialist individual, society could then be organized on the principle: "from each according to his ability; to each according to his needs." Thus, communism would mark an end to coercion, want, and inequality.

LENIN AND COMMUNISM

Circulating in tsarist Russia by the 1880s, Marx's views were adopted by Vladimir Lenin, who soon led the Bolsheviks, a Marxist-oriented revolutionary party. Lenin linked his effort in Russia to the global spread of capitalism, which he labeled "im-

perialism," and counted on aid from successful workers' revolutions in Europe to help the Russian proletariat achieve socialism. He was dismayed, therefore, when, after the "imperialist" World War I broke out, most European workers and their Marxist leaders chose patriotism over revolution and backed their own national governments in the war.

Many Marxists in Russia also rallied to support the tsarist war effort. Determined to keep his party in control after the Bolsheviks came to power in November 1917 and to discredit other Russian Marxist revolutionaries, Lenin in 1918 changed the name of the Bolsheviks to the Russian Communist Party, and a year later he founded an international revolutionary organization called the Communist International. These actions were taken to broaden the appeal of the Bolshevik Revolution and to distinguish Lenin and his followers from other Marx-

ian socialists in Russia and throughout the world, whom he considered insufficiently revolutionary, if not collaborators with the hated imperialists.

Lenin added little to Marx's sketchy ideas on the characteristics of communism, once mentioning cooperatives as a possible organizational basis for the future and another time referring to "accounting and control" and "the administration of things" as keys to establishing a truly communist society. Stalin proclaimed in the 1930s that the Soviet Union had achieved the lower phase, socialism, of Marx's fifth stage of history, and after World War II Soviet theoreticians added that Soviet society had entered "the transition to communism." But what communism would actually look like remained vague, except for speculation about free transportation, state-run boarding schools, and communal eating.

THE DISCARDING OF COMMUNISM

In the 1980s, as the weaknesses of the Soviet economy and system became apparent, the appeal of communism, so closely linked to the Soviet experience, dimmed. In 1989 and 1991, when socialist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed, many observers declared that communism was dead. Although nominally communist systems still existed in North Korea, China, Vietnam, and Cuba, even these governments made concessions to nonsocialist economic activity. Moreover, none of these regimes argued that it had achieved communism, or even that it was nearing the ultimate good society envisaged by Marx.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; ENGELS, FRIEDRICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MARXISM; SOCIALISM

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COMMUNIST ACADEMY

The Communist Academy (Akademiya kommunisticheskaya) was founded on June 25, 1918, by order of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Known until 1924 as the Socialist Academy, this institution was designed to rival the nearly 200-year-old Academy of Sciences. Indeed, although it was formally established "from above" by government decree, the Communist Academy also answered calls "from below" from the radical wing of the Russian intelligentsia, which had lobbied for an alternative to the conservative Academy of Sciences since the 1880s.

The Communist Academy served to coordinate communist higher education and research alongside the Institute of Red Professors and the Commissariat of the Enlightenment. It consisted of a number of institutes devoted to subjects ranging from philosophy, history, literature, and the natural sciences to economics, socialist construction, and international relations and development. It also boasted a number of specialized sections and commissions, as well as an array of societies revolving around groups such as the Militant Materialist Dialecticians, Marxist Historians, Marxist Orientalists, and Marxist Biologists.

Structurally reminiscent of the older Academy of Sciences, the Communist Academy supplanted its rival's apolitical "bourgeois" approach to science and scholarship with an explicitly political agenda grounded in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, there was a fairly explicit division of labor between the two, with the Communist Academy attempting to monopolize the most important areas in the social and natural sciences and ceding only experimental, abstract work to the Academy of Sciences (along with arcane subjects like archeology and the study of antiquity). Scarcity of resources and the frequent overlapping of scholarly research, however, kept the two institutions in a state of fierce competition for much of the 1920s.

A bastion of party power in science and higher education, the Communist Academy was nevertheless symbiotically linked to the Academy of Sciences. In essence, the Communist Academy thrived as long as its rival was able to preserve its semi-autonomous, apolitical status. But by 1928, the Academy of Sciences—the longest-lasting of the powerful NEP-era bourgeois institutions—found itself under attack. In an effort to bring the Academy of Sciences under state control, the party leadership ordered the institution

to elect Marxist scholars as academicians. Then, during the radical years of the cultural revolution (1928–1932), the Academy of Sciences was terrorized by official harassment and wave after wave of arrests and dismissals, which ultimately forced the institution to adopt a more conformist line. This process was completed in 1934 when the newly cowed Academy of Sciences was uprooted from its historical habitat in Leningrad and moved to Moscow to work alongside the Communist Academy.

Although these changes broke the resistance of the Academy of Sciences, they undermined the very *raison d'être* of the Communist Academy. After all, once the Academy of Sciences had begun to employ Marxist-trained scholars and produce at least nominally Marxist scholarship, it became difficult to justify the continued existence of the Communist Academy. Within two years, the latter institution was subsumed into the newly Sovietized Academy of Sciences by government decree on February 8, 1936.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; EDUCATION; INSTITUTE OF RED PROFESSORS; MARXISM

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DAVID BRANDENBERGER

COMMUNIST BLOC

Countries after the end of World War II (i.e., after August 1945), which became linked by adherence to the ideology and practice of communism, as developed by Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin and their successors in the Soviet Union.

Before the collapse of the USSR, some of the countries within it were also informally known as the Soviet bloc. Their official name was *Sodruzhestvo sotsialisticheskikh gosudarstv* (Commonwealth of Socialist Countries), for not even the USSR claimed that it had reached the communist stage after socialism. Lenin and his associates, most notably Leon Trotsky and Grigory Zinoviev, had

vainly tried to spread communism throughout the world after the successful October, or Bolshevik, Revolution in Soviet Russia, despite the short-lived communist regime of Bela Kun in Hungary (March–August 1919). The Communist International, or Comintern, in Moscow (March 1919–June 1943), which was dominated by leaders of the Russian Communist Party, helped to train communist revolutionaries from all over the world. They became leaders of their countries in East Central and Southeastern Europe and in Asia after World War II. International links were then provided by the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform (September 1947–April 1956), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (January 1949–June 1991) and the Warsaw Pact (May 1955–July 1991). At the height of its largest extent under Stalin (late 1940s, early 1950s), the communist bloc comprised more than a billion people or one-third of the world's population. In Europe, there was the USSR itself, with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania having been incorporated after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 23, 1939); the German Democratic Republic; Poland; Czechoslovakia; Hungary; Romania; Bulgaria; Yugoslavia; and Albania. In Asia, the Bloc included: Cambodia (Kampuchea), China (People's Republic of China), Laos, Mongolia, South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), and Vietnam (North Vietnam only from 1946–1975, then all of Vietnam). In America, Cuba joined the Bloc after the Fidel Castro Revolution of January 1959. In Africa, Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, and Mozambique linked up in the 1960s.

Did Marxist-Leninist socialism advance modernization in the communist bloc, or would modernization have occurred anyway and without the increase in authoritarianism and the use of terror? Zbigniew Brzezinski criticized in *The Grand Failure* "the dogmatic grand oversimplification inherent in the communist claim to a unique grasp of all truth and in the communist quest for a total monopoly of power." Arguably, total monopoly of power presupposed the use of terror, which, as Merle Fainsod put in his *How Russia Is Ruled*, "[was] the linchpin of modern totalitarianism." Stephane Courtois and others implicitly extended Fainsod's insight to the entire communist bloc. When, in the interest of reforms and modernization, Stalin's successor Nikita S. Khrushchev and, even more, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, restricted the use of terror within the USSR and police violence and military intervention in the communist bloc, the bloc began disintegrating in the 1960s and broke apart completely between

1989 and 1991, after the semi-free elections in Poland in June 1989 and the establishment in September 1989 of the first Polish government after World War II that was not dominated by communists from the Polish United Workers' Party.

It is also arguable whether U.S. and Western policy of containment and coexistence helped more to break up the already reforming and modernizing USSR, the key state in the communist bloc, or whether it was U.S. President Ronald Reagan's policy of military containment through rearmament that led to the political transformation and demise of the USSR. Reagan's political war, in turn, was based on U.S. President Jimmy Carter's support of Soviet dissidents.

Finally, it remains to be seen whether Vladimir V. Putin, who was elected president of Russia in March 2000 and whose formative experience had been the breakdown of communist authority in East Germany in 1989, will succeed in attempting to reassert Russia's great power status, particularly in the territory of the former USSR. Russia's weak economy and Western diplomacy may prevent reestablishment of Russia's influence over portions of the old communist bloc.

See also: COMINTERN; WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION,

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COMMUNIST INFORMATION BUREAU

The Communist Information Bureau was an organization, usually known as the Cominform, created by Stalin in 1947 ostensibly for the purpose of exchanging information among the communist parties of Europe. Actually, the Cominform served two purposes: 1) to solidify relationships among the communist parties of Eastern Europe as tools of Soviet foreign policy; 2) to act as a device for dealing with Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The organization's full name was the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, sometimes known by its Russian abbreviation, Informburo.

Following World War II, one of Stalin's primary foreign policy goals for Eastern Europe was to establish friendly (i.e., subservient) states in Eastern Europe as a buffer against a potentially revived Germany. Whereas the western allies did not disagree with that goal in principle, they did find the Soviet Union's revolutionary rhetoric and its aggressive policies in Poland and the Balkans unacceptable, even frightening, as they began to establish their own vision of a liberal world system. In 1947 the British decided to pull back from the international commitments that had characterized their imperial history, and the United States stepped into the breach. Citing the apparent division of the world into two camps, a free one based on "individual liberty" and an unfree one based on "terror and oppression," President Harry Truman endorsed what later became called the policy of containment, that is, limiting communism to those countries where it already existed. Shortly thereafter, the United States introduced the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe.

In the summer of 1947, largely in response to these western initiatives, Stalin had Wladyslaw

Gomulka, head of the Polish Workers Party, invite the representatives of Communist parties of nine European countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, and Italy) to the Polish resort of Szklarska Poreba for a "private conference . . . to exchange information on the situation in the various countries" and perhaps to create a journal. Actually, as documents made available in the 1990s show, Stalin intended to create a mechanism for subordinating the activities of the other parties to Soviet aims.

The main speech at the conference, which convened on September 22, was made by Andrei Zhdanov, second only to Stalin in the Soviet hierarchy. In an aggressive and strongly-worded talk, Zhdanov restated the "two-camp" notion, but this time with the democratic camp (the USSR and its allies) consisting of those "antifascist" countries that had "broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development," and the imperialist camp (the U.S. and its allies) consisting of countries that relied on "reactionary, anti-democratic forces." Zhdanov characterized "America's aspirations to world supremacy" as "highly reminiscent of the reckless program . . . of the fascist aggressors," the Hitlerites. Stalin gave the Yugoslav party pride of place at the conference by permitting its representatives to be the harshest critics of the other parties, particularly the French and Italian, which recently had been dropped from their coalition governments. He added to Yugoslavia's prestige by making Belgrade the location of the editorial offices of the new Cominform monthly (later biweekly) publication entitled *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*

It is not clear whether Stalin was rewarding the Yugoslavs at Sklarska Poreba or setting them up. But in the winter and spring of 1948, a serious controversy arose between the Yugoslav party and Stalin that led to an exchange of messages. At one point the Yugoslavs stated that "no matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case, love his own country less." This was exactly what Stalin could not abide. The second meeting of the Cominform, which took place in Bucharest in June 1948, therefore expelled Yugoslavia from the fraternal brotherhood of socialist states (i.e., the Soviet bloc). Because the events leading up to this expulsion had been strictly secret, this expulsion produced a great sensation in Europe and the world. It put a shocked Yugoslavia on a path toward an independent style of self-managed socialism, while at the same time opening a vicious

campaign against alleged "Titoism" in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

The Cominform, now excluding Yugoslavia, met only one more time, in November 1949 in Hungary. This meeting was devoted primarily to the "anti-Titoist" campaign. Stalin's death in 1953 and the changes in Soviet policy that ensued made the organization increasingly obsolete. Khrushchev decided in 1956 to restore good relations with Yugoslavia, and the Cominform was dissolved on April 17 of that year.

See also: STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; YUGOSLAVIA, RELATIONS WITH; ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

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
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GALE STOKES

COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Communist International was an organization of communist parties devoted to hastening socialist revolution. During World War I, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin condemned the Second International, a loose coalition of socialist parties, because most of its leaders had voted for war credits and supported the war. He dubbed them traitors to Marxism and the proletariat, and thereafter urged creating a new international, a Third or Communist International, which would lead the world's workers to socialism.

The founding Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 was the first step toward realizing Lenin's dream. That Congress did little more than announce the birth of the Comintern—"a unified world Communist Party, specific sections of which were parties active in each country"—and its basic principles. Delegates to the Second Congress in 1920 adopted the Twenty-One Points, which defined membership rules. Certain points deserve note. Each party seeking Comintern affiliation had to remove reformists from its ranks, purge its membership periodically, and adhere to the principles of democratic centralism. Those prin-



General Staff of the Communist International, July 1917. © UNDERWOOD&UNDERWOOD/CORBIS

ciples applied within member parties as well as to each party's relation to the Comintern. All decisions made by Comintern congresses and the Comintern Executive Committee (ECCI) were binding on member parties.

The Comintern's primary function was to identify and enact the proper strategies and tactics to promote international socialist revolution. During its existence, it enacted several policies to achieve that goal. Until 1921, it advocated the united front policy, the goals of which were to win workers away from Social Democratic and radical parties and to seize power in their respective countries. A belief in inevitable revolution drove this policy. But in 1921 the prospects for revolution ebbed, and the Comintern adopted a more flexible set of united front tactics, which allowed for conditional cooperation with Social Democratic parties, preserving the goal of extending Communist Party influence among workers.

At its Sixth Congress in 1928, the Comintern adopted a hard-line policy when it dubbed Social Democrats and reform socialists the main enemy and "social fascists." Any collaboration with "social fascists" became unthinkable. The Comintern urged workers and unions to reject and destroy Social Democrats. Known as the Third Period, this policy proved disastrous.

The Seventh Congress in 1935 rejected this policy and resolved that fascism was the primary enemy. It required member parties to drop their attacks on reformists and to forge broad antifascist coalitions. This policy, the Popular Front, lifted the Comintern's fortunes. Its call for a broad-based, antifascist struggle won many supporters worldwide. Popular Front coalition governments came to power in France and Spain in 1936. The Popular Front's victory in Spain triggered the Spanish Civil War, during which the Comintern organized the International Brigades, a ragtag

army of international volunteers who flocked there to fight fascism.

Following the Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, the Comintern abandoned its antifascist policy and announced that communists should not support the imperialist war in Europe. After the Nazi invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941, Comintern policy changed again, calling for antifascist activities to defend the USSR. In 1943, on Josef Stalin's orders, the Comintern disbanded.

Although the Comintern was a collective of fraternal communist parties, the Communist Party (CPSU) wielded unrivalled influence. It did so because it was the only communist party to have seized power, it had organized the Comintern, and it provided the Comintern and member parties with political, organizational, and financial assistance. The Twenty–One Points reflected the CPSU's organizational and operative principles. Party leaders prepared many of the Comintern's major decisions and often decided which tactics and strategies the Comintern would pursue and whom to remove from and appoint to the leadership bodies of the Comintern and fraternal parties.

By the late 1920s the CPSU's values and behaviors had infused the Comintern. A variety of factors accounted for this. Within the ECCI apparatus there were CPSU committees. The removal of those who opposed the party or Comintern line hastened the process. In the 1920s the ECCI removed the followers of Leon Trotsky and Grigory Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern from 1919 to 1926, and later the followers of Nikolai Bukharin, Zinoviev's successor, for their opposition to party policy.

Nonetheless, the Comintern was an international political institution and therefore possessed some distinctive characteristics. Most members of the ECCI and its apparatus were foreigners; representatives from abroad routinely participated in Comintern activities. The ECCI was responsible for fraternal parties, each of which was assigned to a national or regional section in the ECCI; many members of these parties lived in the USSR.

The Comintern, therefore, existed in two worlds: in the USSR, the socialist world; and in the international arena, the capitalist world. Within the USSR, its roles were to elaborate policies to strengthen the international communist movement, to defend Soviet foreign and domestic policies, and to cooperate with the appropriate party and Soviet offices. In

the capitalist world, the Comintern guided and directed Communist parties, helped to build their organizational structures, educated party members in Marxism–Leninism, and demanded that its followers defend the USSR's policies and leaders.

To manage its various activities, the Comintern had a substantial bureaucracy. Formally, Comintern congresses, held in 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1924, 1928, and 1935, determined its policies. In reality, the congresses approved the policies and nominees put forth by the CPSU delegation and the ECCI. Congresses elected the ECCI, which implemented and interpreted policies between congresses. Within the ECCI apparatus, departments provided the ECCI's leaders with information about the fraternal parties; functional departments attended to routine operations.

Given the Comintern's activities abroad, it cooperated with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and with military intelligence and security organs. Originally relations among them provided for some measure of administrative autonomy. But from the mid-1920s cooperation between the Comintern and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, security organs, and the military intelligence services deepened.

Although the Popular Front raised the Comintern's international reputation, within the USSR domestic pressures placed it in a vulnerable political position. From the mid-1930s anxieties about foreign threats, a growing spy scare, and fears that foreign agents held CPSU party cards meant that vigilant police and party leaders increasingly scrutinized the Comintern. When mass repression erupted in 1937, Comintern workers and members of fraternal parties living in the USSR were often victims. By 1939 the Comintern apparatus lacked many essential personnel. Although it was not disbanded until 1943, the repression of 1937 and 1938 destroyed the Comintern's ability to function and its reputation abroad.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; PARTY CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES; POPULAR FRONT POLICY; ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH

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COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii), or CPRF, descended from the short-lived Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (CP RSFSR). This was formed as an anti-perestroika organization within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1990. Boris Yeltsin suspended it for its tacit support of the August 1991 coup and banned it on November 6, 1991. A group of CP RSFSR leaders headed by its First Secretary Valentin Kuptsov successfully achieved the partial repeal of the ban in the Russian Constitutional Court in November 1992, and the party reconstituted itself in February 1993 as the CPRF. Gennady Zyuganov became party chair at the party's refoundation as the candidate most likely to unite differing party trends.

The party was modeled on the template of the CPSU as a communist mass party, from primary party organizations (PPOs) in eighty-eight of Russia's regions, up to a 159-member Central Committee representing divisional leaders, a ruling seventeen-person presidium, and a number of deputy chairmen below Zyuganov. Internally, it operated on a relaxed form of hierarchical Leninist discipline known as "democratic centralism."

The CPRF's financial support incited much controversy. Officially it relied on membership sub-

Table 1.

CPRF election results		
Election	Vote share	Parliamentary seats
Dec. 1993 Duma	12.4	47
Dec. 1995 Duma	22.3	157
1996 presidential first round (Zyuganov)	32.0	-
1996 presidential second round (Zyuganov)	40.3	-
Dec. 1999 Duma	24.3	113
2000 presidential (Zyuganov)	29.2	-

SOURCE: Courtesy of the author.

scriptions and the voluntary work of its membership of some 550,000, but the donations of sympathetic "red businessmen," the material resources of the State Duma, and perhaps even former CPSU funds played a role. Increasingly, as the main opposition party, the CPRF attracted the lobbying of Russia's chief financial-industrial groups such as Gazprom and YUKOS, and, in late 2002, Boris Berезovsky caused a scandal by offering the party material support.

The party's internal composition was no less disputed. Although it was publicly unified, and possessed a consolidated leadership *troika* based around leader Zyuganov and deputy chairmen Kuptsov (in charge of the party's bureaucracy and finances) and Ivan Melnikov, observers identified horizontal and vertical cleavages throughout the party. In terms of the former, Zyuganov's "statist-patriotic communists," who espoused a Great Russian nationalistic position, were the party trend most influential publicly. "Marxist reformers" such as Kuptsov and Melnikov, who espoused an anti-bureaucratic Marxism, were less visible, owing to their vulnerability to allegations of "Gorbachevism." Much of the party professed the more orthodox communist "Marxist-Leninist modernizer" viewpoint. Moreover, whilst the parliamentary leadership was relatively pragmatic, the party's lower ranks were progressively more inclined to traditionalist militancy.

The CPRF program was adopted in January 1995 and only cosmetically modified thereafter. Though there were many concessions made to Russian cultural exceptionalism, the program committed the party to "developing Marxism-Leninism"

and a three-stage transition to a classless society with concessions to parliamentary methods and private ownership seen as temporary. The program was strongly anti-capitalist, promising the socialization of property led by the working class, while also promising the replacement of the 1993 "Yeltsin" constitution with a Soviet-style parliamentary republic, and the "voluntary" resurrection of the USSR. In public proclamations and electoral platforms (usually aimed at alliance with a "national-patriotic bloc"), the party was progressively more moderate, promising a mixed economy, not mentioning programmatic aims such as nationalization, and drawing on populist patriotism and social democracy. The contradictions between public and party faces were controversial within and outside the party.

The party became a significant electoral force in the 1993 Duma election, and by 1995 its greater visibility and organization, along with a deteriorating socio-economic climate, allowed it to become Russia's leading party and parliamentary group. This was confirmed by regional victories between 1996 and 1997, and by the December 1999 parliamentary elections, although better campaigning by pro-government competitors contributed to a loss of Duma seats. The party mobilized a stable electorate, particularly in the rural southern "red belt," but its inability to appeal to many younger urban voters limited its success. Though leader Zyuganov contested the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections (as a national-patriotic candidate), unfriendly media coverage reinforced this trend.

The CPRF was consistently critical of the post-1991 political system and governing elite, particularly liberal figures such as Yeltsin. It was an "anti-system" party in its rejection of many post-1991 political values and institutions, and was often regarded as anti-democratic. However, between 1995 and 1999 it increasingly became a "semi-loyal opposition," selectively supportive of more nationalist or socially orientated policies, notably contributing two ministers to the government of Yevgeny Primakov (September 1998–May 1999). Its failed 1999 attempt to impeach Yeltsin initiated a decline in influence. It was politically marginalized in Vladimir Putin's first presidential term and in April 2002 suffered a schism. Duma chairman Gennady Seleznyov and his supporters were expelled for forming the competitor socialist movement "Russia," although the CPRF's organizational and electoral support was little affected.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH; ZYUGANOV, GENNADY ANDREYEVICH

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LUKE MARCH

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the ruling Party in the Soviet Union and, therefore, its most important political institution. The Party experienced a number of name changes during its history from its foundation in 1898 until the dissolution of the USSR and the banning of the Party in 1991: Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) (March 1898–March 1918), Russian Communist Party (RCP) (March 1918–December 1925), All-Union Communist Party (AUCP) (Bolsheviks) (December 1925–October 1952), and Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (October 1952–1991). There were two chief phases in the Party's life: pre-1917, when it was a revolutionary organization seeking the overthrow of the tsarist regime, and after the October Revolution, when it was the ruling Party.

AS REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION

The party formally was founded at a congress in Minsk in March 1898, but because most delegates were arrested soon after, the party did not take on a substantial form until its second congress in

Brussels and London in July–August 1903. From the beginning, the party was split on two major dimensions. First, because of the activities of the tsarist police, the party could not be a legal entity within Russia, with the result that most of the leaders remained in exile abroad until 1917 while “undergrounders” worked to build the party structure inside Russia. Contacts between these two groups were not easy, with the principal channels between them being the party press, and irregular Party meetings. The second major split within the Party was divisions among the leaders at the top of the Party structure. Such divisions were frequent occurrences, arising over a combination of personal ambitions and differences over strategy and tactics. The most important of these divisions was between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and began in 1902; despite various attempts to patch it up, the division remained an important factor in Party life until the Mensheviks were banned in 1918.

There was little to distinguish the RSDLP from the range of other parties, cliques, and shadowy organizations that constituted the Russian revolutionary movement at this time. Ultimately what was to differentiate the Party from its competitors and give it an edge in 1917 was the single-mindedness and drive of the person who was generally acknowledged as the leader of the Bolsheviks, Vladimir Ilich Lenin. When the tsarist regime disintegrated in February 1917 and Lenin returned to Russia in April, he set about radicalizing the Party’s stance from that which had been established by the underground leaders who had come to the fore in his absence, including Josef Stalin, Lev Kamenev and Vyacheslav Molotov. This culminated in the decision in September by the Party’s Central Committee to seize power. This they did in October. While the decision to seize power was supported by large numbers of rank-and-file Party members and supporters, it was also opposed by significant elements within the party, including among its leaders (Grigory Zinoviev and Kamenev). The Party was not a tightly disciplined instrument of revolution, but a much looser organization that was able to take advantage of the chaotic conditions late in 1917 to seize power in the capital. Local Party organizations set about replicating this feat throughout the country, but their rule was not to be secure for some years.

AS RULING PARTY

Having claimed power, the Party now set about consolidating it. In its first three years, the Party

banned all other political parties, thereby instituting the single-party state; eliminated independent press organs; sought to institute a radical economic policy (war communism), which would have abolished the basis of independent economic activity; and, principally through the civil war, expanded the geographical area under its control. The failure of war communism forced the Party into a concession, the New Economic Policy, which in turn was replaced by the high-level centralization of economic life through agricultural collectivization and forced pace industrialization beginning in the late 1920s. Throughout this period, too, discipline was consolidated within the party.

In the early years of its rule, the Party was characterized by a continuation of the division and differences within the elite that had been characteristic of the prepower period. All aspects of the Party’s life came under vigorous debate within leading Party circles. However, during Vladimir Lenin’s lifetime, all of these debates ended with the victory of the position that he espoused. Following his death, the maneuvering between different groups of Party leaders for the succession saw conflict between a group around Stalin and, successively, Leon Trotsky, the Left Opposition, the United Opposition, and the Right Opposition. In all cases, Stalin and his supporters were victorious. With the defeat of the Right Opposition in 1929, Stalin emerged as Party leader. He consolidated his position during the 1930s, especially through the Terror of 1936 to 1938, emerging as the *vozhd*, or unquestioned leader of the party and the people. This process of a shift from the collective leadership of the Lenin years to the personal dictatorship of Stalin had direct implications for the Party. In the initial years of power, leading Party organs were real arenas of debate and conflict, and although Lenin manipulated Party organs, the principal basis upon which he was victorious in inner-party conflict was his ability to persuade sufficient members to support the position he advocated. With Stalin’s personal dictatorship, party organs ceased to be the scene of open political debate and instead became stylized assemblies for the laudation of Stalin. While this was not as much the case at the level of the Politburo, even here the cut and thrust of debate was blunted by the personal dominance of Stalin. In this sense, the party’s leading organs were in danger of atrophy.

This process of a shift from a situation in which open conflict and debate was the norm to one in which adherence to strict orthodoxy and the absence of public debate prevailed has been the



Stalin likely faked this photograph of himself at Lenin's summer retreat to suggest his closeness with the Soviet leader.

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subject of much debate among scholars. The orthodoxy was for long the view that the emergence of Stalin and the assertion of his personal control was a direct, some even said inevitable, result of the organizational principles and practices that stemmed from Lenin. Lenin was seen to have established a highly authoritarian political structure, said to be symbolized by the principles contained in his 1901 pamphlet entitled "What Is to Be Done?" and the resolution of the Tenth Congress in 1921, entitled "On Party Unity," which closed down discussion and made personal dictatorship highly likely. Alternatively, others argue that a Stalin figure was not inevitable, that there were a number of other possible lines of development available to the party, and that a series of conjunctural developments (including the personality of Stalin) were central to the outcome that emerged. Certainly the authoritarian legacy left by Lenin may have increased the chances of such an outcome, especially in a situation of danger and underdevelopment like that faced by the Bolsheviks, but it was not inevitable. The balance of opinion now favors the second position.

Under Stalin, the party's leading organs were not active bodies; they met when he decided they would meet rather than according to a set timetable, and they exercised little independent initiative. During World War II, important decisions were more often made in the State Defense Committee than in Party bodies, and in the initial seven years of the postwar period, informal groups of leaders organized by Stalin dominated national policy making. When Stalin died, the Party's leading organs became rejuvenated, and for the remainder of the life of the Party, generally they met as scheduled and made most important decisions. At no time during these last almost four decades were these institutions arenas of public contestation, although the publication of some of the Central Committee proceedings under Khrushchev and Gorbachev did provide some sense that there were real differences being aired in some Party forums at some times. Particularly under Gorbachev, and especially from the beginning of 1987, leading Party bodies were often the scene of significant differences of opinion within the elite, with the result that, at least in this regard, leading elite organs returned to something like their Leninist forebears. The return to this situation of a divided elite playing out some of their politics in the leading organs of the Party was one factor contributing to the demise of the USSR and, with it, the CPSU.

Following the attempted putsch in 1991, which discredited the Party even more widely in the people's eyes than it had been in the years leading up to it (see below), General Secretary Gorbachev resigned from the Party and Russian president Boris Yeltsin banned it on the territory of Russia. Although this blanket ban was later overturned in the Constitutional Court, the reversal could not save the CPSU; it was, however, a life giver to the Party's chief successor, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

PARTY STRUCTURE

The lowest level of Party organization was the Primary Party organization (PPO), until 1934 called a cell. This was the body that every party member joined. Such an organization had to be established in any institution where there were three Communist Party members. Consequently there were PPOs organized in every institution in the USSR; every factory, farm, university, school, shop, organizational division in the armed forces had their own PPO comprising the members of the Party who worked in that institution. The PPO was thus

the principal representative of the Party throughout the institutional structure of the USSR. The structure of the PPO differed depending upon the size, but all PPOs were to meet regularly and involve the Party membership in Party and public life. In 1986, there were 440,363 PPOs.

Above the PPO, the Party structure followed the administrative structure of the Soviet state. Each republic of the USSR had its own republican-level Party organization, except the RSFSR, which, until 1990, was served by the national Soviet-level. Between the republican and PPO levels, there was a hierarchy of Party organizations shadowing the administrative divisions of the country (e.g., region, city, district). At each of these levels there was an assembly, called a conference (congress at the republican level), with the membership notionally elected by the assembly of the level next down; district bodies were elected by the PPOs. The conference at each level would meet at set times, designed to enable it to elect delegates to the conference at the next level. The timing of these was thus set at the national level by the regularity of national congresses. At each level, the conference/congress would elect a committee that, in turn, would elect a bureau. This structure was also to be found at the national, Soviet level.

At the national level, the congress was held annually until the mid-1920s, at which time the frequency and regularity decreased; there were congresses in 1930, 1934, 1939, and 1952. From the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961, congresses occurred every five years. During the early period Party conferences were also often held. These were national-level meetings, usually smaller and with less authority than the congress, but they, too, became much less frequent after the 1920s; the eighteenth conference was held in 1941 and the nineteenth in 1988. The congress was formally the sovereign body of the Party. It adopted resolutions that constituted the Party's policy on particular issues, and it elected its executive body, the Central Committee (CC), to run the Party in the period between congresses. It also formed the central auditing apparatus, responsible for keeping a check on Party finances and procedures, and until 1939 the Party control apparatus, which exercised disciplinary functions. In practice, after the 1920s the congress was too big to debate issues (there were some five thousand delegates at the last, the Twenty-Eighth Congress held in 1990) and in any case that was not its function. Under Stalin it had been transformed from an assembly in which vigorous de-

bate occurred into a tame body that did little except hear reports and ritually vote to confirm them. Even the voting for membership of the CC was nothing more than ratifying a list handed down by the leadership.

The CC began as a relatively small body. In 1922, there were twenty-seven full and nineteen candidate members, but by 1986 this had grown to 307 full and 170 candidate members, so this body, too, became too big to act as an effective forum for the discussion of ideas, although like the congress, discussion was no longer its function after Stalin gained power. Generally CC plena were held twice per year, with each meeting devoted to a particular area of concern, such as agriculture, ideology, industrial development, education, and so forth. The proceedings were stylized and standardized, with usually the Party general secretary presenting a keynote report and then other speakers presenting set-piece speeches. There was no real debate, merely a presentation of views that rarely provided evidence of much difference between the speakers, or at least of much difference from the position taken by the general secretary. This model was, however, disrupted under Gorbachev when, particularly toward the end of the period, such meetings could see quite significant criticism of the general secretary and the course he was following. The CC formed a series of standing executive organs: the Politburo, Secretariat, until 1952 the Orgburo, and from 1939 the central control apparatus; from 1966, the CC formally elected the general secretary. As with the congress election of the CC, election of these bodies simply constituted the formal ratification of lists of candidates passed down by the leadership. Membership of the CC was of two sorts: full and candidate, with the former having the vote while the latter did not.

The most important of the bodies elected by the CC were the Politburo (1952–1966 the Presidium) and the Secretariat. Simply put, these were respectively the political decision-making center of the Party and the organization that was meant to ensure that those decisions were carried out. The Politburo was a small body, divided like the CC into full and candidate members. It generally had up to twenty members, although nonmembers were often present when something pertaining to their area of responsibility was being discussed. The Politburo met weekly and was the body in which all of the most important decisions were meant to be made. The CC also elected people called CC secretaries who, collectively, formed the Secretariat.

Each secretary had a particular sphere of responsibility, and to assist them in this task they had at their disposal departments of varying sizes. These departments were organized not only so that they could administer the Party's internal affairs (e.g., departments for personnel and ideology), but also so that they could shadow the Soviet government; so, for example, there could be departments for agriculture, industry, and foreign affairs. The personnel within those departments constituted the central machinery of the Party. Some secretaries were generally members of the Politburo, and the leading secretary, the general secretary (1953–1966 the first secretary), was acknowledged as the leader of the Party.

It is clear from the above that the electoral principle was central to the Party's formal procedures with each level being elected by those below. However in practice, electoral democracy was little more than a formality throughout most of the Party's life. From early in the Party's life, this principle was undermined by what was to become the chief power axis in the Party, the nomenklatura system. The nomenklatura was first regularized in 1923. Its essence was a list of responsible positions that needed to be filled and another list (or lists) of names of people who were thought to be competent to fill them. Committees at each level of the Party had their own list of positions to be filled and people who could fill them, but by far the biggest list and the one containing all of the crucial positions was lodged in the Party's central organs. Originally justified as a way of ensuring competence and loyalty in the uncertain times of the regime's early years, under Stalin's control it became a weapon of political conflict, enabling him to fill Party bodies with his supporters. This sort of political loyalty remained a consideration in the operation of the nomenklatura throughout its life, but in terms of running the Party, its importance lay in the power it gave to the leadership to fill positions throughout the structure with people acceptable to them. Thus, when elective positions had to be filled, the nomination would come down from above and Party members would ratify it. Only under Gorbachev was there an attempt to change this system and introduce real competition for Party posts, although even then the changes he sought to make had their limitations.

This power over personnel, and therefore power over people's careers, was a crucial mechanism for maintaining loyalty and orthodoxy and for dis-

couraging heterodox and independent thought. It was consistent with the principle that, from 1906, officially governed discussion in the Party, "democratic centralism." Democratic centralism as originally envisaged provided for full and free discussion of an issue until a decision was reached, and then all were expected to fall in behind that decision and support it regardless of their own personal views about it. The problem with this principle is that, in a situation like the mid-late 1920s where the political leadership was keen to close down discussion, it could announce a decision and then invoke the principle to prevent any debate from taking place. This could be backed up by the exercise of Party discipline. Party members found guilty of breaching Party rules were subject to discipline procedures that could include expulsion from the Party and, in the 1930s, loss of life. In the Soviet Union expulsion from the Party was a significant penalty because it could lead to the person losing his job and housing, making it very difficult to survive.

Formally the Party was governed by a set of rules. These rules prescribed the formal structures and processes of Party life. They were adopted by Party congresses and constituted the effective constitution of the Party. Over the Party's life the rules were changed and modified on a large number of occasions, and although they were an expression of the formal rather than the actual way in which the Party worked, they were not a complete fiction. They did prescribe the rhythms of Party life, when congresses were to be held and so forth, and for much of the Party's existence these formal aspects were adhered to. But the rules do not give an accurate picture of the internal dynamics of the Party; they were formal and legitimizing rather than normative.

PARTY IDEOLOGY

The Party was formally guided by an ideology, a structure of ideas that purports to explain the course of historical development and thereby gives the follower the capacity to make decisions consistent with that understanding. This is a basis for legitimacy since it constitutes the claim to be able to make appropriate decisions for the furtherance of the common aim. Arising from Marxism, which constituted the core of the Soviet ideological belief system, that aim was the achievement of communism. Thus the Party seized power in 1917 in the name of achieving the communist utopia. During its life, the Party continually based itself on its

claimed adherence to those ideological tenets, variously called Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and Leninism at different times. The content of that ideology also underwent modification and change over time. The role of ideology is complex. Ideally it should enthuse its believers and persuade them to commit to the achievement of the ultimate ends, and there clearly were very many people for whom the ideology acted in this way. However, there were also many less enthusiastic members, and their numbers grew markedly during the last three decades of the regime's life. These people were cynical of the ideology and its claims, and rather than being true believers hid their lack of belief in a stance of public commitment. For the Soviet system, the ideology was central to its own conception of legitimacy, and for this to remain unimpaired it was important that even if people did not believe, they should not be able openly to proclaim this. This is one of the major reasons why all dissent was harshly dealt with.

The ideology was related to the Party's activities through the Party program. This was a document that purported to lay out the long-term aims of the Party. Party programs were adopted in 1919, 1961, and 1986; the attempt to adopt a new program in 1990 failed because there was too much disagreement, although a draft was adopted for discussion by the CC in June 1991 just before the attempted coup. The 1961 program, adopted at the height of Khrushchev's enthusiasm for the great leap into communism, was the most optimistic of these documents, envisaging the imminent approach of communism within the USSR. But all programs should be seen much more as a set of ideals rather than a specific guide to policy, because in none of them was there a clear indication of policy lines that the political leadership then followed. But the programs were an important stone in the basis of the Party's ideologically based quest for legitimacy.

PARTY FUNCTIONS

According to the 1977 State Constitution, the Party was the "leading and guiding force" of Soviet society, and it, in fact, played this role from the founding of the Soviet state in 1917. In essence, this meant that the Party was the institution in which all major decisions about all aspects of life were to be made. In theory, this is why there were Party bodies in all collectives within Soviet society and

why the Party shadowed the state structure at all levels; if an issue was coming up in a non-Party body, the corresponding Party organ could meet and make a decision that its members, subject to Party discipline and therefore bound to implement that decision, could carry into the non-Party forum. However, in practice, because at all levels all of the chief figures were Party members, separate Party and non-Party meetings were not always needed. Party members were the dominant figures, and, through them, the Party dominated the decision-making process.

This was most important at the central level, where the Party Politburo was the chief decision-making body in the country. It made decisions on all of the major issues of national policy, and, as a result of Party discipline, these decisions were carried forward by Party members at all levels in the institutions within which they worked. In this way, the Party constituted not just the chief decision-making organization, but also the major means of ensuring the enforcement of central decisions. The Party played a crucial role in the way the system as a whole functioned; as both a decision-making organ and the organization that was ultimately responsible for ensuring that policy was carried out by state and other organizations, it was the key to the way the system functioned.

The omnipresence of Party organizations also enabled it to exercise significant control functions throughout society. Through its members, the Party was able to maintain a watching brief on what went on in all parts of Soviet society. One of the tasks of Party members, more important in the early years than later, was to act as the Party's eyes and ears to ensure that any manifestations of oppositionist sentiment were nipped in the bud. The reverse side of this control function was that of education. In principle, this remained a key responsibility of Party organizations and members at all levels, the education of non-Party members in the ethos of the Party and the principles for which it stood. Ideally Party members and organizations were meant to proselytize the Party's ideology and its message, but more realistically they were expected to act as models of appropriate behavior to their non-Party peers. In this sense, the Party was a major educative actor in Soviet society, projecting an idealized image of how good communists should behave and thereby playing a part in the socialization of the Soviet populace with the accepted values.

The all-pervasive nature of the Party plus the highly centralized personnel system means that the Party was the most important element in the staffing of the whole Soviet system. The *nomenklatura* extended not simply to Party posts, but to all of the leading posts in all of the major institutions of the society. In other words, Party bodies determined who would fill the leading posts in all parts of the Soviet system. The Party was therefore the single most important determinant of the filling of all offices throughout the Soviet Union. In this way the Party not only controlled the filling of office, but was also the primary agent of recruitment in the USSR; no one could gain leading office without approval at higher levels of the Party.

It is clear that the Party was the leading institution in the USSR: it made the most important decisions, it ensured that those decisions were carried out, it selected all leading office-bearers, and it played a significant educational/socialization role in the society. Its control was not complete, because it could never overcome both personal idiosyncrasy and the constraints stemming from the combination of large distances and communication deficiencies, but it was probably the most extensive experienced in any political system.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP

The Party was never a body that one could join at a whim; members had to be nominated, their backgrounds checked and, once they had been admitted, serve a candidate stage before being accepted into full membership. In the early years, class background was crucial for entry, but from 1939 the formal preference given to members of the working class was dropped and people were admitted regardless of the class to which they belonged; from 1961, the Party was officially a Party of "all the people." Members were always a minority within Soviet society. In 1986, before membership began to plummet in the late 1980s, there were 18,309,693 full and 728,253 candidate members, constituting 9.7 percent of the adult population. The Party remained heavily male; in 1986 only 28.8 percent of members were women. Members were subject to Party discipline, had to attend regular Party meetings, obey all Party instructions, pay membership dues, and continually conduct themselves according to the rules of the Party and the principles of what it meant to be a good communist. While the tasks were not onerous for non-office bearers, at various times they did impinge on individuals'

lives. This was especially the case if someone became subject to Party discipline, when such an entry on someone's personnel file could have significant future consequences for career advancement; being expelled from the Party was worse than never having been a member.

Party members generally gained few advantages over non-Party citizens. Officeholders were more fortunate in this regard. Just as there was a graduated scale of the power to fill office, there was a similar scale regarding access to privileges and to goods that were not widely available. In a deficit economy like that of the Soviet Union, access to scarce goods was a real bonus, and those who held official positions gained such access. The level and range of availability differed according to the level of position one occupied, but because all of the leading positions were determined by the Party, it was the Party that determined who got access to such goods. The Party was thus the key to access to privilege in the Soviet Union.

PARTY FUNDING

Officially, the Party was funded through the membership dues that all members paid and the revenues generated by sale of the Party's publications. However it is clear that, from the time of the Party's ascension to power, such dues were substantially supplemented by funds from the state. The amount of money that was transferred across in this way is unclear, but it was substantial. The Party owned property in all cities and towns in the Soviet Union, paid salaries to its employees, funded a range of publications, made provision for its own daily functioning, and funded sister parties and movements abroad. The annual budget far exceeded the amount of money brought in through fees and publications. The difference was covered by money obtained from the state. As the Soviet Union fell during the late 1980s to the early 1990s, much of this money was secreted abroad, its whereabouts as uncertain as the dimensions of the Party's real annual budget.

The Party's financial dependence on the state and the way in which it was intertwined with the state at all levels led many to argue that it was not really a political party but more a state organ. There is much to this argument, but it was neither coterminous with the state nor reducible to it. It was the first of the sort of organization that became common during the twentieth century, the ruling single party. As such, the CPSU was the prototype for which many would emulate.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; KAMENEV, LEV BORISOVICH; LEFT OPPOSITION; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MARXISM; MOLOTOV, VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH; NOMENKLATURA; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; POLITBURO; RIGHT OPPOSITION; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH; UNITED OPPOSITION; WAR COMMUNISM

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GRAEME GILL

COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

The Communist Youth Organization (Komsomol) was the major vehicle of political education and mobilization for Soviet youth. Founded in November 1918, and disbanded in 1991, the All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth was one of a series of Soviet institutions dedicated to educating and regulating Soviet citizens at every life stage—the Little Octobrists, the Young Pioneers (ten to fourteen), the Komsomol (fourteen to mid-twenties), and the Communist Party.

The Komsomol was founded as an elite and “self-standing” organization of communist youth. Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s the Komsomol was gradually transformed from a select organization of activist proletarian youth into a mass organization subservient to Party policy. By March 1926, there were approximately 1.75 million young people in the Komsomol; more than half of the working-class youth in Leningrad and Moscow were members. A few years later, the Komsomol was almost twice the size of the Party. Nonetheless, as of 1936, still only about 10 percent of eli-

gible youth belonged to the Communist Youth League. In response, and at Josef Stalin’s direction, the Komsomol was formally relegated this same year to the role of a propaganda and education organization open to almost all youth regardless of class background. By 1985, the year Mikhail Gorbachev acceded to general secretary, the Komsomol reported that it had 42 million members between the ages of fourteen and twenty-seven.

Young people joined the Komsomol for many different reasons. In the first decades of Soviet power, the Komsomol provided a community of peers for urban youth, especially as all other youth groups—the Boy Scouts, religious youth organizations—were suppressed. Komsomol clubs in factories, schools, and institutes of higher education organized sports activities, drama groups, and concerts, as well as literacy and antidrinking campaigns. The Komsomol offered a new identity as well as new opportunities; some young people experienced the exhilaration of the Revolution, the struggle of Civil War, and the rapid industrialization of the Stalin era, with a sense of great personal involvement. Like joining the Party, becoming a member of the Komsomol could also confer economic and political benefits. It helped pave the way to eventual Party membership, and Komsomol members were often awarded important political and agitational positions. The Komsomol was not equally relevant or available to everybody, however. Proletariat males were at the top of the ladder of Bolshevik virtue, while peasants, students, and women of all classes were on lower rungs. Women of all classes made up just 20 percent of the Komsomol in 1926. Although their numbers increased throughout the Soviet period, they remained underrepresented in leadership positions.

The energetic participation of some Komsomol members in the dramatic industrialization and collectivization campaigns of the early 1930s did not protect either the rank-and-file or the Komsomol elite from the purges. In 1937 and 1938, the entire Komsomol bureau was purged and the first secretary, Alexander Kosarev, was executed along with several others. During World War II, the Komsomol was deeply involved in patriotic campaigns and was effective in this period of national defense at attracting members and encouraging enthusiastic response to patriotic propaganda. The war was the final high point of the Komsomol, however. After the war, the Komsomol was increasingly trapped between the Party’s demands for political conformism and young people’s increasingly diverse



Young Pioneers march on Red Square. © AFP/CORBIS

and internationally informed desires for relevance and for entertainment. The conservatism of the Komsomol was reflected in the aging of its leadership. In 1920, the median age of a delegate to a Komsomol Congress was twenty. In 1954, it was twenty-seven. By the years of stagnation (the period of Leonid Brezhnev's leadership) the Communist Youth League was mired in bureaucracy and corruption, and unable to remake itself; it had become a mass membership organization to which few truly wanted to belong, but many felt they needed to join in order to advance professionally and politically. The Komsomol's irrelevance to a changing Soviet Union was even more evident during the transition to Mikhail Gorbachev's presidency. The Communist Youth League lost millions of members per year (1.5 million in 1986, 2.5 million in 1987) and disbanded itself at a final Komsomol Congress in September 1991.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; EDUCATION

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ANNE E. GORSUCH

CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES

The Congress of People's Deputies was a legislative structure introduced in the Soviet Union by CPSU

(Communist Party of the Soviet Union) general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Its purpose was to expand elective representation in policy debate and decision making, while leaving final power at the disposal of the top party leadership. The USSR Congress of People's Deputies lasted only from 1989 until 1991. It nevertheless marked an important step in the opening of the Soviet system to competitive electoral politics. A Congress of People's Deputies for the Russian Republic (RSFSR) was also established, but it lasted only from 1990 to 1993.

Under Gorbachev's model, the new USSR Congress of People's Deputies replaced the USSR Supreme Soviet. The old Supreme Soviet had 1,500 deputies, 750 elected in ordinary territorial districts based on equal population, and 750 elected in "national-territorial" districts representing the ethnic territorial subdivisions of the country. To these the new congress added another 750 deputies elected directly from existing recognized "public organizations" such as the CPSU, the trade unions, and the Academy of Sciences, with quotas set for each organization.

The congress elected a smaller full-time Supreme Soviet from among its 2,250 members. This inner parliament had 542 members divided into two chambers of equal size and functioned like a democratic parliament, debating and voting on laws. Most of its organizational and agenda decisions were made, however, by its Presidium. The Presidium structure was a carryover from the old regime, where it had effectively controlled the Supreme Soviet through its large full-time staff. The Presidium and its chair continued to direct the congress and Supreme Soviet into the Gorbachev period as well.

The March 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies proved to be a turning point in the Gorbachev era. The elections stimulated a surge of popular participation in politics, often directed against the Soviet regime itself. Many senior Communist Party officials who ran for election as deputies were defeated. The elections brought a new wave of democratic and nationalist political leaders into politics. Boris Yeltsin, for example, won a landslide victory from an at-large seat in Moscow. When the First Congress convened in May 1989, the televised proceedings, featuring stirring speeches by famous personalities such as Andrei Sakharov, riveted the public. Soon it became clear that the congress was too large and unstructured to be an effective forum for decision making, but it did give a platform to many politicians and ideas. Moreover, the Supreme Soviet that it elected

enacted some significant legislation on such topics as freedom of religion and the press, judicial reform, and local government. A system of competitive political caucuses emerged.

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Congress of People's Deputies formed in 1990. Like the USSR congress, the RSFSR congress elected a Supreme Soviet to serve as a full-time parliament. Yeltsin was initially elected as chair, but left parliament when he was elected president of RSFSR a year later. An intense power struggle between president and parliament followed. Ultimately, in September and October 1993, Yeltsin forcibly dissolved the congress and Supreme Soviet. The new constitution approved by national referendum in December 1993 replaced the congress and Supreme Soviet with a bicameral Federal Assembly.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PRESIDIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET

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THOMAS F. REMINGTON

CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNITIES

The Congress of Russian Communities (Kongress Russkikh Obshchin, or KRO), an offshoot of the Union for the Rebirth of Russia, was founded in 1993 by Dmitry Rogozin as the International Congress of Russian Communities for the representation of Russian and Russian-speaking residents of the "nearby foreign lands." It brought together Russian communities and sociopolitical organizations in the national republics of the Russian Federation and in the former republics of the USSR. In the fall of 1994 the Russian KRO was founded for participation in state Duma elections. Later, in January 1995, the electoral bloc of the KRO was

renamed the sociopolitical movement Congress of Russian Communities. Yuri Skokov was elected chair of the National Council. A former secretary of the Security Council (1992–1993), he had once been close to Yeltsin, but fell out with him later. Dmitry Rogozin was elected chair of the Executive Committee. KRO leaders included such famous figures as Stanislav Govorukhin, Yegor Stroyev, Nikita Moiseyev, Viktor Ilyukhin, Sergei Glaziev, and Konstantin Zatulin.

In the 1995 Duma elections, the KRO, enticing the disgraced and highly popular general Alexander Lebed into the second place on its list of candidates (Skokov was first, and Glaziev third), won 3 million votes and almost reached the required threshold to gain a seat (4.3 percent). The KRO program, a mix of statism and patriotic values, impressed many, but its figurehead was not a brave general, rather an unknown apparatchik. Of the ninety candidates proposed by the KRO in single-mandate districts, only five were elected into the Duma, including Lebed and three candidates of Chelyabinsk Oblast, where the KRO collaborated with the Movement for the Rebirth of the Urals and the former governor Petr Sumin. Later, in 1997, Rogozin, now the sole head of the KRO, entered the Duma by-elections with the slogan “We are Russians! God is with us!” His platform included “the fusion of immemorial Russian values with the attainment of advanced technology”; “a federal, lawful, democratic government”; and a “highly effective and socially oriented market economy.” At the beginning of the 1999 Duma electoral campaigns, along with a few little-known political movements, the KRO constituted the organizational basis for Yuri Luzhkov’s Fatherland movement. As the latter gained influence, the KRO and its leader were edged out of key positions, and they left Fatherland in the summer of 1999. As a result, the KRO entered the elections along with the movement of Yuri Boldyrev and suffered a fiasco, winning only 400,000 votes (0.6 percent). Rogozin was re-elected by his majority district, entered the pro-government People’s Deputy group, and headed the Duma committee on international affairs.

An extraordinary session of the KRO elected Glaziev chair; he was at the time cochair of the National Patriotic Front of Russia (NPSR). It was announced that the KRO would not participate in upcoming Duma elections, so as not to promote the “further division” of patriotic forces, but was willing to “act as an organizer of a patriotic coalition.”

See also: LEBED, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH

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NIKOLAI PETROV

CONSISTORY

The consistory was main diocesan administrative and judicial organ in the Russian Orthodox Church from the eighteenth century to the early twentieth. The 1721 *Spiritual Regulation* of Peter I marked a new period in the history of the administrative life of the Orthodox Church. Although the *Regulation* did not refer specifically to a consistory, nineteenth-century Russian church historians cited Clause 5 in the section pertaining to bishops as pointing to the eventual consistory. Diocesan administration changed only gradually in the eighteenth century. In many ways it came to mirror the provincial government administration, as well as the collegial organization of the church’s higher administrative body, the Holy Synod. Although the consistory can be seen as part of the modern institutional church, nineteenth-century churchmen often associated it with an ancient form of church government (a council of presbyters) described in the writings of such early Christians as Ignatius of Antioch, Cyprian of Carthage and Ambrose of Milan.

During the early decades of the eighteenth century, diocesan boards were referred to by various names. A 1744 directive called for a uniform name—“consistory”—for all such diocesan boards. An 1832 directive reiterated this directive for the Kiev, Chernigov, and Kishinev dioceses. The responsibilities and rules governing the consistory were finally standardized in 1841. This statute was revised in 1883 and remained in effect until 1918.

Consistories were organized into two parts: a collegial board (usually three to five members;

more if local circumstances demanded) and a chancery office. The management of the consistory's day-to-day business fell to a chancery office staffed by lay clerks and overseen by a secretary. At first, members of the consistory's board were drawn mostly from the monastic clergy. By 1768, that trend was reversed, and a 1797 directive instructed that at least half of the consistory's members be chosen from among married parish priests. Deacons were not eligible to serve on consistory boards. In theory, the bishop presided over the consistory, and no decision could be put forward without his ratification. In practice, however, the issue of authority was not always so clear. For instance, the diocesan bishop nominated members for the board, but the Holy Synod confirmed them. Similarly, while responsible to the bishop, the secretary was nominated by the ober-procurator and confirmed by members of the Holy Synod.

The consistory oversaw a wide range of affairs. These included the growth and preservation of the Orthodox faith (and the teaching and preaching that helped to achieve these ends); liturgical schedules; the maintenance and decoration of churches; the recommendation of candidates for clerical positions; the dissemination of episcopal and synodal directives; and the collection of records from parishes. As an ecclesiastical court, the consistory was concerned with certain issues relating to marriage and divorce; birth, baptismal and death records; crimes and misdemeanors involving clergy; complaints against clergy for negligence in their liturgical or pastoral responsibilities; and disputes among clergy over the use of church property. Although the consistory's judicial concerns lay primarily with clergy, laity became involved when the issue of penance (*epitemiya*) arose.

The chancery processed numerous requests, petitions, and reports by dividing them among various "tables." Members of the consistory's board were assigned to oversee these tables but, in practice, preparing a case for presentation and resolution depended largely on lay clerks. Once cases were ready for review, members of the board, at least in theory, were supposed to review and decide on them collectively. The secretary oversaw the decision-making process and helped to resolve cases that members could not decide unanimously. The diocesan bishop was to review and ratify all decisions.

The consistory became a subject of debate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Churchmen often complained that the consistory's

formalism and lack of efficiency caused ill relations between parish clergy and laity on the one hand and the diocesan administration on the other. Churchmen were also concerned about the bureaucratic quality with which serious issues of Christian life were often decided, with seemingly no attention to scripture or canon law. Low pay for consistory employees did not help matters, and complaints of bribes were not uncommon. Evaluations of the consistory were determined in large part by the evaluator's perspective and understanding of episcopal authority, the relationship between the central, diocesan, and even more regional church administrations, and the involvement of laity in the management of diocesan affairs. Most churchmen maintained that the consistory's judicial and administrative functions should be separated and independently overseen, as they had been in the civil sphere since 1864. In 1918, the All-Russian Church Council carried out sweeping church administrative reforms, and the consistory ceased to exist. In its place, the Council established a separate local diocesan court, a diocesan council and a diocesan assembly.

See also: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH.

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CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which opened and closed on January 5, 1918, was elected to draft a constitution for the new Russian state. Prior to 1917, most oppositionist parties agreed that a democratically elected assembly should determine Russia's political future. Just after the February Revolution, State Duma and Petrograd Soviet

leaders who created the Provisional Government specifically tasked it with prompt elections to the Constituent Assembly. During 1917, virtually all political parties indicated their intention to participate in them and to abide by the results. Still, moderate Provisional Government ministers, fearing the results of democratic elections and preoccupied with the war, postponed the elections, undercutting the government's legitimacy and precipitating a shift of support to radicals. By the early fall of 1917, Bolshevik, Left Socialist Revolutionary (Left SR), and other supporters of "soviet power" and an "all-socialist government" proclaimed that only the Provisional Government's overthrow would bring about the Constituent Assembly, still viewed as final arbiter of Russia's fate.

The elections, with over 60 percent voter participation, occurred on November 12, 1917, after the overthrow of the Provisional Government, seemingly fulfilling the radicals' predictions. The elections awarded the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) a huge vote from the empire's peasants. The Bolsheviks did well among urban laboring populations and soldiers at the fronts, whereas the liberal Constitutional Democrats received support from educated and prosperous middle classes. Far rightist parties did poorly, as did the formerly popular Mensheviks. Overall, the SRs and their Ukrainian, Armenian, and other ethnic allies received more than 50 percent of the votes cast, as opposed to the Bolsheviks' 25 percent. In response, the Bolsheviks and Left SRs alleged that the SR Central Committee had undercut Left SR representation by placing moderate SRs on party candidate lists.

The Constituent Assembly, with its effective SR majority, met on January 5 in Petrograd and elected the SR leader Victor Chernov as chair. After lengthy deliberations and the withdrawal of the Bolshevik and Left SR factions, the Leninist government declared the session closed and placed guards around the locked building. Thus ingloriously ended Russia's most democratic electoral experiment until the 1990s. Presumably, the assembly would have written a constitution in a socialist and democratic spirit. Although some Petrograd workers demonstrated in support of the Constituent Assembly (and were dispersed by deadly fire), the nation's population responded weakly. This passive reaction reflected in part a common misunderstanding of the assembly as a government in competition with the still popular Soviet government. Many SR delegates withdrew to the Volga region, where, by the late summer of

1918, they formed a government in Samara, which they hoped would be based upon a quorum of Constituent Assembly delegates. Like other attempts by moderates during 1918 at state-building, this fledgling government, an alternative to the Communist regime in Moscow, was crushed between the militarily predominant Red and White extremes. Viewed by some as a footnote in the creation of the new socialist state, and by others as the end of democracy for the Russian Revolution, the Constituent Assembly's demise was a perplexing tragedy.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

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CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The Constitutional Court was established in July 1991, prior to the breakup of the USSR. The Court was to be made up of fifteen judges, elected by the parliament for a limited life term (until age sixty-five). However, the parliament could agree on only thirteen of the nominees; leaving the other two seats vacant. Modeled on the constitutional courts of Western Europe, especially the German Federal Constitutional Court, it is the only body empowered to review constitutional questions.

Initially, the Constitutional Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Valery Zorkin, carefully screened the cases it heard, thus attempting to avoid sharp clashes with either the parliament or the president. However, by 1993, Zorkin and several other justices had aligned themselves with the parliament against President Yeltsin. On October 17, 1993, two weeks after his security forces clashed with rioting protestors at the White House (Russia's parliament building), President Yeltsin issued a decree suspending the Constitutional Court pending the adoption of a new constitution.

The Constitution of 1993 and a new "Law on the Constitutional Court" of July 21, 1994, enlarged the court to nineteen members. Under this new legislation, judges were to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Federation Council. In order to handle the rapidly increasing caseload, the new law permitted the court to consider multiple cases simultaneously. Under the provisions of the new law, judges no longer served for life; rather they have twelve-year terms. Retirement was made mandatory at the age of seventy.

The Constitutional Court is charged with ruling on the constitutionality of federal laws, presidential enactments, republic constitutions, regional charters, international treaties, and republic, regional and local legislative and executive acts. The court also has the responsibility to resolve jurisdictional disputes between state and legislative bodies at the federal and lower levels.

Access to the Court is relatively unrestricted; most cases require no previous hearing. After hearing oral arguments from interested parties, the judges retire to draft opinions (and, more rarely, dissenting options). Rendering a decision is a slow process, often taking two to four weeks. Decisions of the court are final and not subject to appeal. Although the Court agrees to hear only a small portion of all cases filed, it issues many determinations (*opredeleniya*) that, although falling short of official decisions, attempt to revolve disputes by referring to previously rendered decisions.

In contrast to the previous court, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation initially focused on cases involving the rights of the individual. In the period from 1995 to 1996, more than 70 percent of the cases considered by the court dealt with individual rights, while only 12 percent dealt with separation of powers and 17.6 percent dealt with questions of federalism. The court appeared to be directing its attention to types of cases that would bolster its legitimacy and solidify its place in the judicial system, while avoiding conflicts with other branches of government and with the powerful regional governors.

With the election of President Vladimir Putin in early 2000, the Constitutional Court adopted a more assertive role again, especially in cases relating to Russia's federal relations. The Constitutional Court ruled that the constitutions of several republics violated the Basic Law of the Russian Federation, forcing them to revise their constitutions to bring them into line with the federal constitution. In contrast, the Court has, with a few notable

exceptions, prudently avoided clashing with the President. The future legitimacy and credibility of the Court will depend on its adroitness in avoiding damaging confrontations with powerful state officials in which it cannot prevail, while still rendering meaningful decisions that uphold the primacy of constitutional principles.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; REFERENDUM OF DECEMBER 1993

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CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The liberal Constitutional Democratic Party, or Party of People's Freedom (known as the Cadets, from the initials of its name), was Russia's largest political party before 1917. Founded in October 1905, the party's basic goals were embodied in its name: transformation of Russia into a constitutional, rule-of-law state and democratization of the political and social order. Its program called for civil rights for all citizens, including freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and person; full equality of all before the law; a legislative body elected by equal, direct, universal suffrage (female as well as male); separation of church and state; and greater local self-government. The program also contained important social provisions, including labor protections and the right to unionize and strike, mandatory health insurance and state-funded old age pensions, a progressive income tax, and a state land fund to address peasant land hunger.

At its height, in 1905 and 1906, the Constitutional Democrats had approximately 100,000 members and 346 local party organizations, and was strongest in larger urban areas. Prominent leaders included Peter Struve, Ivan Petrunkevich, Prince Dmitry Shakhovskoy, Vladimir Nabokov, Maxim Vinaver, Andrei Shingarev, and the party head, Paul Miliukov. The composition of the Cadets

was diverse, consisting of educated professionals (professors, lawyers, doctors, engineers), low-level white-collar workers and teachers, petty traders, artisans, shop clerks, and some workers and peasants. The party's commitment to cultural self-determination for minorities was attractive to elements of the empire's large non-Russian population, particularly Ukrainians, Jews, and Armenians. Thanks to their relative indifference to economic development, the Cadets attracted few of the so-called big bourgeoisie.

The Constitutional Democrats enjoyed their greatest success in March 1906 in Russia's first-ever national elections, from which they emerged as the largest party in the First Duma with 179 seats. Mutual lack of trust and cooperation between government and Duma resulted in a speedy dissolution, in July 1906. The Cadets again won the largest number of deputies in the elections to the Second Duma, although fiercer competition from socialists reduced their seats to one hundred. Despite liberal efforts to make the Second Duma productive and less provocative, the lower house was dissolved on June 3, 1907. The government simultaneously issued a restrictive new electoral law that disenfranchised many liberal voters, reducing the Cadets in the Third and Fourth Dumas to around fifty-five deputies.

Over the next seven years the party endured government harassment, shrinking membership, and the defeat of most of its reform bills. World War I helped restore the party's fortunes, as the Cadets wholeheartedly supported the war effort and played a leading role in the Union of Cities and other relief organizations. In the summer of 1915, the Cadets helped orchestrate the Progressive Bloc, a broad, reformist coalition in the Duma that sought to restore public confidence in the war effort.

The Constitutional Democrats enthusiastically welcomed the February 1917 revolution and helped establish the first Provisional Government, in which they held five portfolios; party membership burgeoned. Their newfound popularity quickly waned, however, due to their continued support for the unpopular war and related insistence on postponing social reforms. Determined opponents of the Bolsheviks, the liberal Cadets were the first party outlawed by the new Soviet government, in December 1917, despite their having won only 2 million of the 41.6 million votes cast in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Much of the

party leadership joined the anti-Bolshevik movement; after the Red victory in the Civil War, many Cadets emigrated to Europe, where they reconstituted the party organizations and debated how to end Bolshevik rule in Russia. The Constitutional Democratic Party split into two separate organizations over this issue in Paris in July 1921; it formally ceased to exist in 1924.

See also: CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY; DUMA; MILYUKOV, PAVEL NIKOLAYEVICH; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

MELISSA K. STOCKDALE

CONSTITUTION OF 1918

Adopted on July 10, 1918, amid violent civil war, the Soviet Constitution of 1918, the first charter of the new Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), was described by Vladimir Lenin as a "revolutionary" document. It was, he said, unlike any constitution drafted by a nation-state. Nor was it derived, he noted, from any traditional Russian or Western juristic principles.

Unlike the three Soviet constitutions to follow (in 1924, 1936, and 1977), the 1918 constitution included the candid statement that absolute power resides in the "dictatorship of the proletariat," as embodied in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and as specifically derived from the concept of socialist dictatorship developed in Karl Marx's major work, *The Critique of the Gotha Program*. The proletarian dictatorship is described in Soviet ideology as "power not limited by any laws." Although the constitution was proclaimed the "fundamental law of the Soviet State," the constitution was by no means seen as the only source of legal norms. The CPSU(b) Program and the decrees and orders of the Party Central Committee likewise were fully normative. So were decrees issued by the Council of People's Commissars.

Soviet constitutions thus reflected the fact that the Soviet state, the "superstructure" erected upon the economic "base," was the political expression of exclusive, one-party rule by the CPSU(b). Subsequent constitutions omitted specific reference to this dictatorship. Instead, they acknowledged, as did explicitly the last constitution of 1977, that the Communist Party was the "leading core" of all political and social organizations.

Other parts of the 1918 charter differed radically from previous or later constitutions of other states throughout the world. For instance, the 1918 constitution laid out the fundamental ideological goals of the Communist Party. One such goal was the building of a socialist society. Another was the promotion of world revolution. This wording was imitated in the charters of Soviet republics annexed into the union, which was officially proclaimed as the USSR in 1924.

The national legislative body established under the constitution was known as the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, described as the “supreme organ of power,” despite the fact that most key legislation originated in the CPSU(b) bills presented to the congress were almost always passed and enacted unanimously. Moreover, the constitutionally empowered Central Executive Committee, that is, the perpetually meeting executive organ of the congress, was empowered, through its Presidium, to issue major decrees during the long interims between annual (later, less frequent) sessions of the more than two thousand-member plenary congress. Another governing body, the Council of People’s Commissars, whose chairman was head of the government, or premier, likewise had the constitutional power to issue decrees.

In the congress served deputies of workers, peasants, and soldiers chosen and elected on single-list, nonsecret ballots from the provinces and other, smaller political-administrative areas of the RSFSR. In practice, the Congress of Soviets, like the USSR Supreme Soviet to follow as established in subsequent constitutions, became a “rubber-stamp,” or pseudo-parliament whose powers were purely formal.

The first Soviet constitution of 1918 contained no formal listing of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Yet when the rights were eventually itemized in the 1936 constitution, the condition was inserted that the expression of all such rights by the populace must be “in accordance with” the principles laid down by the Communist Party. Constitutions in all sixteen (later fifteen) republics contained this provision, which, in effect, narrowed the expression of traditional civil rights.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922

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CONSTITUTION OF 1936

The Soviet Constitution of 1936, also known as the “Stalin Constitution,” was approved by the Eighth Congress of Soviets and became law on December 5, 1936. This Constitution remained in force until 1977 when Leonid Brezhnev based his new “Brezhnev Constitution” on the 1936 document. At Josef Stalin’s urging, the Central Committee of the Communist Party had proposed to the Seventh Congress of Soviets in February 1935 that the 1924 Constitution be changed to reflect the profound transformations in Soviet society wrought by the First Five Year Plan (1928–1932). According to the Soviet government, the main goals of the new constitution were to reflect the successful attainment of socialism in the USSR, to institute universal suffrage, and to grant basic civil rights to the entire Soviet population. Former class enemies such as the nobility, the bourgeoisie, priests, and so-called rich peasants or “kulaks” would now be incorporated into Soviet life as equal citizens with full civil rights. The constitution affirmed that “socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production . . . shall constitute the economic foundation of the USSR,” though it did allow “the small-scale private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their personal labor”; private ownership of small plots of land, houses, and domestic property; and inheritance of private property. The document expanded the state’s role in providing social welfare by guaranteeing the right to work, free secondary education, and medical aid for all toilers and by furnishing social insurance and paid vacations for industrial and white-collar workers. The constitution also reorganized the Soviet government based on direct elections and reshaped the federal structure of the Soviet Union.

In a marked departure from previous Soviet political practice, a draft constitution was circulated beginning in June 1936, and the population was invited to take part in a “nationwide” discussion to propose changes. Throughout the summer and fall of 1936, the Soviet government put

extensive pressure on local officials to organize collective discussions of the draft. Soviet figures claim that as many as seventy-five million people, or 80 percent of the adult population, took part in these discussions. In spite of the dangers of speaking out, the population actively criticized certain aspects of the draft constitution, such as the privileged status of workers in comparison to peasants. Many also protested the granting of equal rights to former class enemies. After polling citizens on their views, the government largely ignored the opinions gathered. Few of the changes proposed by the Soviet population made it into the final version of the constitution.

Given the repressive political climate throughout the 1930s, one of the most striking aspects of the Stalin Constitution is the explicit enumeration of the civil rights of the individual. The constitution guaranteed “universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot” and created new legislative bodies at the all-union, republican, and local levels. The new Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the supreme soviets of the union republics, and various local soviets were all to be directly elected. Paradoxically, the government let loose a barrage of publicity informing citizens about the candidates for the Supreme Soviet elections in December 1937, despite the fact that each district ballot had only one candidate, who had been chosen in advance by Party and government officials. The constitution also guaranteed Soviet citizens equal rights irrespective of gender, nationality, or race; freedom of religious worship (but not religious propaganda); freedom of assembly; freedom of association; freedom of the press; and inviolability of person and of the home (Articles 122–128, 134). These extensive guarantees remained only on paper, however, as the Soviet government trampled on the civil rights of its citizens through censorship, persecution because of religion and nationality, and widespread illegal arrests and executions.

The transformations in the federal structure of the Soviet Union brought about by the Stalin Constitution were more substantive. The constitution named eleven territories (Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Azerbaijan, Georgian, Armenian, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz) as union republics and granted other ethnic territories the status of autonomous republics and regions. This administrative structure created a hierarchy of nationalities that gave some groups more privileges than others. The constitution also enumerated a new division of powers between all-union and republican institutions. There is a scholarly consen-

sus that the constitution represented a move toward greater political centralization at the expense of the Soviet republics.

Analysts have sharply diverging views of the importance of the Stalin Constitution. Because of the egregious failure of the Soviet government to respect the civil rights it guaranteed in the constitution, most critics from the 1930s onward have dismissed the constitution as mere propaganda or window-dressing intended to woo Western European allies in the popular front against Fascism. In the early 1990s, a new interpretation (Getty) suggested that the constitution, and the elections that followed in 1937, were a genuine but abortive attempt to democratize the Soviet Union. According to this view, the constitution was both an attempt to tighten political control over the vast Soviet territory and a potential turn toward democracy that Stalin ultimately decided not to take. Stalin’s political intentions and the reasons behind the cancellation of contested elections in late 1937 after several months of preparations for them may never be known, but the remarkably contradictory nature of the document and the disjuncture between Soviet law and life are undeniable.

Scholars writing in the late 1990s have argued that the constitution, despite its many contradictions, should not be dismissed as mere propaganda (Davies; Petrone). They suggest that the constitution introduced Soviet citizens to a new political language and opened up spaces for the discussion of such issues as justice, equality, and civil rights. This political language offered Soviet citizens new ways to articulate demands and means to negotiate with state authorities. While the promulgation of democratic ideals may have provided citizens with ways of envisioning alternatives to Soviet political structures, these alternatives were crushed by the intense repression of the late 1930s.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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CONSTITUTION OF 1977

The 1977 USSR Constitution was a curious mixture of fact and fiction. It gave a correct description of the formal government structure of the USSR and correctly noted in Article Six: "The guiding and directing force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system, state, and societal organizations is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." At the same time, it contained a purely illusory set of promises of basic human rights and the fundamentally false statement that the Communist Party "exists for the people and serves the people." This "Brezhnev" Constitution, adopted when Leonid Brezhnev was General Secretary of the Communist Party, replaced the 1936 "Stalin" Constitution. It did not bring any significant immediate changes in the Soviet system. However, under Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s, radical changes began to occur in the USSR, and the 1977 Constitution was amended to advance these changes. As the USSR disintegrated in 1990 and 1991, the constitution lost its practical importance. On December 25, 1991, the USSR was formally dissolved, thus ending the story of the 1977 Constitution.

The opening chapter of the constitution was devoted to the political system. It accurately affirmed the superiority of the Communist Party. But it incorrectly stated that "all bodies of state power are elective from the lowest to the highest." In fact, all important positions were filled by orders from the Communist Party. And it misled when it said that the Soviet state protects "the rights and freedoms of citizens." The next chapter gave a generally accurate description of the economic system based on state ownership and state planning. The following chapter on social development and culture correctly noted the state's role in providing public health and edu-

cation services. However, it failed to note that the economic system provided for extraordinary privileges for members of the Communist Party elite. The chapter misinformed when it said, "the development of professional art and of the artistic creativeness of the people is encouraged in every way," since in fact only creative works that met the narrow tastes of the party leadership were encouraged.

The chapter on basic rights pointed out economic rights that were to a large extent implemented and civil rights that existed only on paper. The economic rights included rights to full employment, education, medical care, housing, and pensions. The political rights included a right to vote that was in fact meaningless because the Communist Party allowed only one candidate for each position, and a right to free speech that was mocked in practice by the sending of dissidents to labor camps and psychiatric institutions. The remaining chapters provided a relatively accurate description of the formal governmental structures of the USSR, though, of course, these structures were all subject to the leading role of the Communist Party as stated in Article Six of the Constitution. Even these chapters contained gross omissions and outright untruths. The provisions on elections did not mention that the party only allowed one candidate to run for each position. The provisions on the Supreme Soviet did not mention that it was controlled so as always to rubber-stamp unanimously anything that had party approval. The provisions on the courts did not mention that judges were expected to obey telephoned instructions from party officials.

Mikhail Gorbachev engineered major amendments in 1988, 1989, and 1990, which reflected and hastened the decline of Communist Party dictatorship. The 1988 amendments provided for relatively free elections to a newly created Congress of People's Deputies, though the election constituencies were structured to favor the Communist Party. Further amendments in 1989 and 1990 abolished the special Constitutional position of the Communist Party, legalized competing political parties, restructured the electoral system to be fully democratic, and created the post of president. Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen president by the Soviet parliament. A constitutional amendment provided that future presidents should be chosen by popular election, but the Soviet Union dissolved before such an election could be held. Also during the period 1988-1990, under Gorbachev's leadership, restrictions on private businesses were swiftly abolished. The constitution was amended to legalize

private business. In the area of civil rights and human rights, Gorbachev greatly liberalized the Soviet system. An amendment to the constitution created a Committee on Constitutional Review empowered to examine legislation for conformity to the constitution. During its brief existence, the committee found unconstitutional a number of the worst features of the Soviet system, such as secret legislation and restrictions on freedom of movement.

See also: ARTICLE 6 OF 1977 CONSTITUTION; BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH

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CONSTITUTION OF 1993

The Constitution of the Russian Federation was enacted on December 12, 1993 by a public plebiscite. With the breakup of the USSR in late 1991, Russia needed a new constitution to enshrine the democratic values of post-communist Russian society and to establish the legal foundations for its governing institutions.

The Constitution was the product of a three-year struggle between President Boris Yeltsin and his parliament. Throughout the period 1991 through 1993, various draft constitutions circulated. Some allocated the majority of power to a new parliament, while others favored a strong presidential system. Sharp differences also erupted between proponents of a strong central government, versus

those who favored the devolution of power to the constituent republics and regions. Finally, the process by which a new constitution would be approved was not clear; some favored the convening of a constitutional congress, while others favored a referendum. The inability to resolve these issues resulted in a stalemate that led to Yeltsin's dissolution of the parliament and attack on the White House (Russia's parliament building) in October 1993.

Once ratified in December 1993, the Constitution established a strong presidential republic; some describe it as a superpresidential system. The Congress of People's Deputies was replaced with a bicameral (two-chamber) Federal Assembly. The upper chamber, the Federation Council, has 178 members—two from each of the eighty-nine republics and regions that comprise the Russian Federation. The Federation Council confirms appointments to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, authorizes the use of armed forces outside Russia, and considers legislation coming from the lower chamber on the budget, taxes and currency matters, international treaties, and domestic policies.

The lower chamber, the State Duma, is comprised of 450 deputies, one half elected by a plurality in each constituency and the other half from party lists on a proportional basis. The Duma confirms nominations for Prime Minister; can pass a bill of "lack of confidence" in the government and, if such a bill is passed twice in a three-month period, can force the president to announce the resignation of the government or dissolve the Duma itself. It also confirms and dismisses the chairman of the Central Bank, Accounting Chamber, and Commissioner on Human Rights; declares amnesties; and adopts federal legislation.

The President, elected to a maximum of two four-year terms, appoints the Prime Minister, subject to consent of the Duma. The President also names other members of the government, as well as the chair of the Central Bank, judges of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court, and the Procurator-General. The President has primary responsibility for foreign and defense policy and chairs the Security Council.

The President may dismiss the government without consultation or consent of the Duma. The President can call for a national referendum and can issue decrees that are binding, so long as they are not in conflict with federal law or the constitution. The President can veto legislation, which requires

a two-third vote of both houses to be overridden. Under certain circumstances, the President also has the power to dissolve the parliament and force new elections.

The 1993 Constitution establishes federal supremacy over “the subjects” of the Russian Federation. The President has the power to suspend acts of executive officials in the regions and republics. Although Article 72 mentions broad policy areas that are considered “joint federal-regional jurisdiction,” it is the President who mediates disputes between federal and regional governments. No powers or policy matters are designated as exclusively the domain of the subjects of the federation. Despite its flaws, the Constitution of the Russian Federation gained widespread acceptance and provided much needed stability as the country endured wrenching political, economic, and social changes in the decade 1994–2003.

See also: FEDERAL ASSEMBLY; REFERENDUM OF DECEMBER 1993

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GORDON B. SMITH

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Influenced by cubism and futurism, constructivism had its roots in the abstract geometric constructions of Vladimir Tatlin. In 1920 the sculptors Antoine Pevsner and Naum Gabo joined Tatlin in the publication of the Realist Manifesto, from which the name constructivism was derived. Like the Futurists, they admired the machine and technology, functionalism, and modern industrial materials. Within architecture the constructivists stressed that form should be determined in the process of construction by the utilitarian aim of the building and the natural characteristics of the building materials. They grouped around the “Union of Contemporary Architects” (OSA) led by the Vesnin brothers

(Alexander, Viktor, and Leonid) and Moisei Ginzburg and its journal *Sovremennaya arkhitektura* (*Contemporary Architecture*). They argued that the construction of a new environment was not simply a matter of art or technology but entailed rebuilding culture from the bottom up. History had entered into a new creative cycle, and in that period of youth, utilitarian and constructive aspects of style were of paramount importance, and aesthetic simplicity and organizational logic must determine the new style.

This in no way signaled the demise of aesthetic emotion, rather its transformation under the influence of modern economics, technology, and the machine. Ginzburg developed what became known as the Functional Method, whereby the functional requirements of a structure, such as the “diagram of movement,” within the building and the siting of individual living units within a structure, were given priority in spatial composition. To achieve the desired goal, adherents used the pavilion method, which divided a complex into blocks according to their intended use and linked these units by walkways or bridges to satisfy the entire ensemble’s ultimate social function as a work of art. Ginzburg put his theory to best use in a housing complex designed and built between 1928 and 1930 for *Narkomfin* (the People’s Commissariat of Finance) on Novinsky Boulevard, now House 25, Tchaikovsky Street.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION; FUTURISM.

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HUGH D. HUDSON JR.

CONTROL FIGURES

Kontrol'nyi tsyfri, or control figures, were originally the preliminary plan targets prepared by the State Planning Commission (Gosplan, established 1921) in 1925–1926. Soon thereafter these targets were coordinated with the mandatory annual plans of the Supreme Council of the National Economy

(VSNKh) and with the associated material balances, which theoretically provided the necessary inputs to produce the obligatory outputs. From early on and throughout the Soviet period, the control figures were approved by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, usually in the summer prior to the plan year. (From 1957 to 1964 regional economic councils also had some role in plan formulation.) Prospective plans were usually expressed in percentage increases from the previously achieved level and published in the main newspapers as ranges for the current five-year and yearly plans. Often these priority targets for around a dozen important commodities were expressed in physical units, such as tons or number of vehicles, but where that was not reasonable, the target was in value terms. Supposedly, the annual control figures were coordinated with the five-year plan then in effect and other directives of the Party and Council of Ministers.

During the five-year plan era the control figures were elaborated by ministries and chief administrations (*glavki*) for approximately two hundred to three hundred product groups and disaggregated into still more groups and passed down to the ministries (commissariats) and from there to the enterprises. Simultaneously the superior agencies would estimate the correct data to achieve these targets, often by applying established input-output norms to the targets. The subordinate enterprises would then request necessary supplies of labor, capital, and intermediate inputs such as energy, ores, and parts. Their requests, routinely exaggerated, would be pared down at the *glavk*, ministry, or Gosplan levels according to the authorities' best estimates of necessary minima. Some bargaining would occur at this stage, too. Finally, early in the fall, Gosplan would endeavor to form a feasible national plan close to the original control figures. The eventual directive plan could have as many as sixty thousand separate headings. Usually, the sheer complexity of the task, unavoidable delays, and insufficient information meant that the legally binding enterprise plan (*techpromfinplan*) was neither consistent nor optimal from the planners' point of view, not to mention the needs of the population at large.

See also: FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GOSPLAN; TECHPROMFINPLAN

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CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, after less than two years of negotiation, by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement to the United Nations in December 1988 of unilateral Soviet force reductions had presented a challenge to NATO. Negotiations on conventional forces thus began in Vienna in March, 1989.

The Soviet leadership sought to reduce the threat of new western weapons and operational concepts, to create a "breathing space" for internal economic and social restructuring, and to divert manpower and resources to the country's economy. Both superpowers wanted to eliminate capabilities for initiating surprise attacks and large-scale offensive actions. The treaty mandated the reduction to equal levels of NATO and WTO forces from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains across five categories of weapons: armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters and tanks. The WTO nations were expected to make the largest cuts, given their numerical superiority. The treaty also provided for an advanced verification regime, including intrusive on-site verification and data exchanges.

The collapse of the USSR and Warsaw Pact in the period 1990–1991 presented problems, however. East European members of the WTO were unilaterally demanding the withdrawal of Soviet forces from their soil. Western critics argued that by focusing on bloc-to-bloc negotiations at a time like this, NATO was constraining itself unnecessarily. The USSR seemed hesitant to complete the CFE agreement, since the WTO hardly constituted a credible bloc. Meanwhile, the Soviet successor states were loath to see their future military forces constrained by a treaty signed by the former regime. Nevertheless, by January 1992, all agreed to ratify the CFE treaty, and three years later, the par-

ties had eliminated some fifty thousand weapons and withdrawn fifteen thousand more.

The CFE treaty was later modified in November 1999, upon Russia's request. As late as 2003, NATO was continuing to press Moscow to reduce the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), and artillery it deployed in its northern and southern "flank" regions, namely Moldova and Georgia, which border Europe and the Black Sea. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was monitoring Russia's compliance with the CFE treaty.

See also: NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

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and were thus placed on an equal footing with state enterprises. No longer was the size of a cooperative or the amount of its assets limited. Cooperatives could now engage in any economic activity, except for those prohibited by law. Financial arrangements also moved in a new direction. Shares in a business could be issued. There was no limit on income, the size of which could be based either on one's financial contribution to the cooperative or on the amount of work one performed there. Cooperatives still had to be registered by local authorities, but these administrative organs no longer had the right of approval or disapproval of its activities. Cooperatives were made formally independent of the state sector, and the latter was forbidden to give compulsory state orders to cooperatives. Cooperatives were given the right to form joint ventures with foreign companies. In essence, the Law made cooperatives indistinguishable from capitalist enterprises.

See also: CAPITALISM; ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; LIBERALISM; PERESTROIKA

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COOPERATIVES, LAW ON

The Law on Cooperatives (hereafter the Law) was adopted in May 1988 to offer greater clarity about the direction of private economic activity during the early period of perestroika. This was necessitated by the fact that the earlier Law on Individual Labor Activity, which went into effect in May 1987 as the first step toward creating a legal private sector, was ambiguous as well as limited in its provisions for privatization. Private economic activity, embodied in organizations called "cooperatives," quickly evolved beyond the provisions of the 1987 Law, and the new Law was intended to reflect the reality of the growing cooperative movement.

In general, the Law liberalized the way in which cooperatives operated. The legal basis for private enterprise was changed, and cooperatives were accorded the status of "basic units" in the economy

COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES

Cooperative societies, as distinguished from the peasant commune and *arteli* (cooperative associations) of peasant migrant laborers, were seen by the liberal and socialist intelligentsia of the mid-nineteenth century as devices to protect the laboring classes from exploitation and empower them (cf. Chernyshevsky's *What Is to Be Done?*). The famine of 1891–1892 and the subsequent intensification of industrial development led the educated classes and some government agencies to foster the growth of cooperatives, although bureaucratic restrictions persisted. The movement burgeoned between the Revolution of 1905 and World War I, with a tenfold increase in the number of cooperative societies, which handled roughly 7 percent

of consumer goods sales by 1914. The main types were urban consumer cooperatives, concerned principally with retail and wholesale trade, and agricultural credit cooperatives, whose primary purpose was to make short-term loans to members. There were also some producer associations, most notably butter cooperatives of Northern Russia and Western Siberia, and artisanal cooperatives. During World War I, cooperatives increased by another 60 percent, helping to produce goods for the war effort and cushion consumers against inflation.

After 1917, Bolshevik policy alternated between tolerating cooperatives as voluntary organizations and making them into quasi-state organs. During war communism, cooperatives became adjuncts of the Commissariat of Supply, to which producers and consumers were required to belong. Agricultural producer cooperatives were few and weak, but valued by the Soviet regime as precursors of collective farming. During the New Economic Policy (NEP), the Communist Party allowed cooperatives to resume their function as voluntary organizations, and Lenin singled them out as the means to lead peasants to socialism. By 1926 and 1927, with the state supporting them as an alternative to private entrepreneurs, cooperatives accounted for as much as half of consumer trade, and a fifth of handicraft and small-scale industrial production. All this ended in 1929 and 1930, when voluntary cooperatives were eliminated during industrialization and collectivization. Although cooperatives nominally persisted, with the *kolkhoz* defined as an *artel* in the 1934 Model Charter, in fact they had lost their independent status and once again became channels for state-imposed economic activity.

With the rise of *perestroika* under Mikhail Gorbachev, cooperatives took on renewed importance, emerging in the late-1980s as a principal structure for private economic activity. On April 1, 1990, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were more than 185,000 operating cooperatives employing almost 4.4 million people.

See also: COLLECTIVE FARMS; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PEASANT ECONOMY; PERESTROIKA; WAR COMMUNISM

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COPPER RIOTS

The Copper Riots (*Medny bunt*) were a series of riots in Moscow in the summer of 1662 in protest against an economic crisis caused by the use of an inflationary copper currency.

The financial demands of the Thirteen Years' War against Poland-Lithuania forced the Russian government to abandon its silver currency in the first year of the war. In addition to debasing the silver ruble, the government introduced a new copper ruble at an artificial 1:1 exchange rate vis-à-vis the old currency. The government assessed its levies in silver while using the copper currency to dispense its own obligations. Only silver currency could be used in foreign trade. Four mints produced small copper coins after 1655, and the total output of copper money clearly exceeded the initial emission of 4 million rubles severalfold.

The unpopular currency reform was followed by other calamities: a devastating cholera epidemic in 1654 and 1655 and disastrous harvests from 1656 to 1658. A two-year campaign against Sweden from 1656 to 1658 failed in its central objective of gaining access to the Baltic. The initially successful campaigns against the Commonwealth turned into a Russian retreat in the years 1659 to 1661. In order to finance the growing military demands, the government imposed extraordinary levies that further increased the pressures facing the population. In addition to several regional levies, a 10 percent tax on townsmen in 1654 was followed by a 20 percent levy in 1662.

By the early 1660s, inflation got out of control, leading to a breakdown of market-driven distribution. A system of parallel silver and copper prices came into existence, and severe shortages of many foodstuffs became commonplace. Counterfeiting was widespread, and rumors circulated about government involvement. Ultimately, there was a flight from money, and the government was forced increasingly to collect taxes in kind.

The growing discontent, which had generated a flood of petitions to the tsar, burst into the open

on July 25, 1662. Following a meeting by discontented townsmen in response to the new 20 percent levy, some four to five thousand people assembled in Red Square to hear merchants and soldiers voice their grievances against speculators. Some degree of organization had preceded the event, although no key group of instigators was identified. During the days leading up to the event, various "proclamations" (*vorovskie listy*) from various parts of the country circulated in the capital. The proclamations singled out various members of the political and economic elite as "traitors," with especially damning criticism directed at the Miloslavskys, Fyodor Rtishchev, Bogdan Khitrovo, Dementy Bashmakov, Vasily Shorin, and Semeon Zadorin. The "traitors" were accused of counterfeiting and pro-Polish sentiments.

Military detachments in the Kremlin failed to respond to the gathering, and some soldiers from their ranks even joined the demonstrators. After a three-hour gathering, the crowd marched on the tsar's residence in Kolomenskoye with a petition that the speculators and counterfeiters be handed over and punished. In addition, the crowds called for lower taxes. After leading boyars failed to appease the crowd, the tsar agreed to address them. Having received a petition, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich gave a conciliatory speech, in which he promised to reduce the tax burden and investigate the demonstrators' grievances.

In the meantime, a riot broke out in Moscow, and many demonstrators attacked the warehouses of prosperous merchants, especially those belonging to the family of the *gost* (privileged merchant) Vasily Shorin. Shorin's son was captured by the rioters and forced to "confess" his father's guilt. Another crowd of five thousand departed for Kolomenskoye, meeting with the members of the earlier crowd along the way. The gates of the tsar's residence were locked, and six to seven thousand troops massed around the royal residence. The demonstrators demanded that "guilty" boyars be handed over and, failing that, threatened to storm the palace. In response, the tsar ordered the troops to attack, an operation that led to some 900 deaths. At the same time, 225 alleged organizers of the events were arrested in Moscow. Eighteen of those arrested were hanged the following day, a measure that succeeded in restoring calm after a day of rioting. An official investigation was ordered into the events. In the course of a month, large numbers of people were arrested, with several tortured and executed or exiled.

The riots, in spite of their limited duration, appear to have strengthened the government in its resolve to reform the bankrupt monetary system. In order to make possible a return to a silver standard, in 1662 the government collected extraordinary taxes and monopolized for a year the exportation of six key export commodities: potash, hemp, yuft leather, tallow, sable furs, and white ash. A total of 1.4 million copper rubles was spent on requisitioning these goods, and while most of these sold quickly, some remained on the market until 1676. Russia returned to a silver standard in May 1663.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; ECONOMY, TSARIST; TAXES; THIRTEEN YEARS' WAR

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CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

Corporal punishment, a form of criminal punishment usually involving public torture of convicts, began in ancient times and existed in Russia until 1904. It was known in Kievan Rus, but limited to certain groups. From the late thirteenth century onward, corporal punishment was applied more widely and used against individuals of any social group without exclusion. It is believed that this broader application arose under the influence of the Tartar and Mongolian conquerors, who freely practiced corporal punishment. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as a consequence of the total enslavement of the population to the state, corporal punishment came into extensive use and peaked in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. All known methods of corporal punishment were employed and applied in full view of the public. For speaking disrespectfully of the tsar or speaking in an obscene manner in a church, the convicted offender's tongue was cut out; for attempting to kill one's master, a hand was cut off; for forgery and thievery, fingers were cut off; for brigandage, rebellion, and perjury, the nose or ears were cut off. Criminals were branded so that they could be easily identified. During the reign of Peter I, the

more dangerous criminals had their nostrils slit; less dangerous criminals had their foreheads branded with the letter “V,” for *vor* (criminal). In addition to sentences involving the mutilation of limbs, other painful punishments were meted out: flogging with the knout for the most serious crimes; beating with sticks or the lash for less serious crimes; or, in the case of soldiers, forcing the offender to run the gauntlet. Minors and adults found guilty of less serious offenses were beaten with birch rods. The number of blows began at 500 or more and sometimes extended to infinity—which for all practical purposes meant beating a person to death.

Until the beginning of the eighteenth century, corporal punishment was applied to all classes within the population equally. But in the eighteenth century, the privileged estates successfully sought the repeal of corporal punishment against them. Motivating their opposition was the growing opinion that corporal punishment was a disgrace for those on whom it was imposed. For instance, a soldier who had undergone corporal punishment was unable to become an officer. As a result of this opposition from privileged groups, members of the nobility, distinguished citizens (*pochetnye grazhdane*), and merchants of the first and second guilds were exempted from corporal punishment in the imperial charters of 1785. The clergy was granted the same privilege in 1803, as later were members of other social estates—provided they had an education. However, beating with birch rods remained common until the 1860s as a form of punishment for students in elementary and secondary schools, even though children from the privileged social estates predominated in the latter.

Over time, the severity of sentences was eased, and some forms of punishment were even abolished. For instance, the use of the knout ended in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The knout was the most deadly means of corporal punishment; an experienced executioner could kill a person with three blows. The 1845 Code of Punishments established the upper limit for sentences using the lash and birch rods to 100 blows. Exceptions for the sick and the elderly were under way, as were additional measures to protect the health of individuals undergoing punishment as much as possible. For instance, sentences would not be carried out in extremely cold and windy conditions. Beginning in 1851, a physician was present at the scene of corporal punishment. From 1863

on, corporal punishment was greatly curtailed. Women were entirely exempted. Men were subject to it in only five cases stipulated by law: (1) District courts (*volostnye sudy*) were permitted to sentence peasants to up to twenty blows of the lash, a sentence that earlier had been considered appropriate only for children. (2) With the permission of the governor of the province, prisoners were allowed to be punished with up to 100 blows of the birch rod for various violations of the established order. (3) Those serving sentences of hard labor in exile and those in exile as penal settlers could receive between 100 and 300 blows of the birch rod for various violations. (4) Those serving sentences of hard labor in exile who committed an additional crime could receive up to 100 blows of the lash. (5) Those serving on vessels at sea could be punished with up to five blows of the whip, and apprentices could be given between five and ten blows of the birch rod.

Not until 1903 were all forms of corporal punishment abolished for those serving sentences of exile at hard labor or sentences of exile as penal settlers. The following year, corporal punishment was officially abolished for all peasants, soldiers, sailors, and other categories of the population.

See also: LEGAL SYSTEMS

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BORIS N. MIRONOV

CORPORATION, RUSSIAN

The Russian government chartered the first company, a whaling and fishing enterprise, in 1704.

Although Peter I encouraged the formation of trading companies based on the European model, early Russian companies engaged primarily in fishing, textile production, or mining. The Russian-American Company, formed in 1799, expired in 1868, a year after the United States purchased Alaska.

Limited liability, crucial to corporate enterprise, received legislative sanction in 1805 and 1807. A law promulgated on December 6, 1836, defined the general characteristics and functions of corporations. Each corporate charter (*ustav*) took the form of a law published in the *Complete Collection of Laws* or its supplement from 1863 onward, the *Collection of Statutes and Decrees of the Government*. The government occasionally considered replacing the concessionary system with one permitting incorporation by registration, but it never implemented this reform.

Bureaucratic regimentation and tutelage kept the number of corporations relatively low: 68 in 1847, 186 in 1869, 433 in 1874, 614 in 1892, 1,354 in 1905, and 2,167, plus 262 foreign companies, in 1914 (Owen). Another 1,239 companies were founded between 1914 and 1916. In November 1917, 2,727 Russian and 232 foreign corporations were in operation. Banks, railroads, steamship lines, mines, and machine plants generally maintained their corporate headquarters in major cities, so that, despite the introduction of modern technology by large corporations in the half-century before World War I, most of the population of the Russian Empire considered the corporation an alien form of economic enterprise.

See also: CAPITALISM; GUILDS

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THOMAS C. OWEN

COSMOPOLITANISM

Although in English “cosmopolitan” means a citizen of the world or a person who has no permanent home, “cosmopolitanism” in the Soviet Union meant a rejection of Russian and Soviet values. However, after the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, “cosmopolitanism” became a code word

for “Jewish” and marked a period of lethal state anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union designed to eliminate Yiddish culture, Jewish intellectuals, “nationalists,” and Zionists. After permitting greater freedoms during the war, the Soviet regime in 1945 tried to reimpose control in face of a new Cold War. “Cosmopolitanism” became a “reactionary bourgeois ideology” more akin to capitalism than communism. Artists and intellectuals came under attack for subservience to the West and for not expressing adequate Soviet/Russian patriotism.

During the 1920s “cosmopolitanism” had been synonymous with “internationalism,” one of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. However, in the 1930s the regime turned toward Russian nationalism, and cosmopolitanism became more closely associated with capitalism—the antithesis of communism. Before 1948, culture chief Andrei Zhdanov led condemnation of many intellectuals for favorable portrayals of Western culture without mentioning the grand achievements of the Soviet experiment. In literature, architecture, biology, philosophy, and many other disciplines, the regime singled out people for “kowtowing” to the West and not showing adequate patriotism. In biology, for example, this led to the rejection of modern genetics, and reaction in many other disciplines was likewise destructive. Apart from enforcing intellectual conformity, “cosmopolitanism” engulfed internationalists and Jews charged with bourgeois nationalism, such as members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC), who raised money, awareness, and support abroad during World War II.

In early 1949, a *Pravda* article railed against an “unpatriotic group of theater critics,” signaling the first attempt to assign collective, rather than individual, guilt for not sufficiently glorifying the Soviet system. Because most of the critics named were Jewish, this is often noted as the beginning of the anti-Semitic stage of the antic cosmopolitan campaign. Articles soon followed about “rootless cosmopolitans” and “passportless wanderers,” which clearly referred to the Jewish diaspora outside the new state of Israel. Jews and other cosmopolitans, according to these press attacks, were isolated and/or hostile to Russian and Soviet culture and traditions. The unspoken assumption was that cosmopolitans, because they were allegedly unpatriotic, would not be loyal when the Cold War turned into an armed conflict.

The antic cosmopolitan campaign destroyed the careers and lives of many of the Soviet Union’s intellectual elites and separated Soviet culture and

learning from much of the rest of the world. When combined with the campaign against “bourgeois nationalists,” both assimilated Jewish intellectuals and Yiddish culture suffered irreparable harm. For example, when the JAC collected information on wartime atrocities against the Jews, it led to charges of nationalism. Moreover, contact with Jewish groups abroad and calls for a Jewish homeland in Crimea and contact with foreigners were “unpatriotic” and brought charges of treason. In short, doing the regime’s bidding in World War II led to the imprisonment, execution, and silencing of many of the Soviet Union’s leading Jewish artists and intellectuals between 1949 and 1953 after the JAC was closed in 1948. Moreover, many JAC members were executed in August 1952 in what has been called the Night of the Murdered Poets. The investigation into the activities of these JAC members seems to have been the prelude to the Doctor’s Plot, which aimed at the execution of many Jews and physicians in 1953. The trials and executions were aborted after Josef Stalin’s death in March 1953.

See also: SLAVOPHILES; WESTERNIZERS; ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

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KARL D. QUALLS

COSSACKS

The word *Cossack* (Russian *kazak*) is probably Turkic in origin, and the term dates to medieval times, when it was used to denote wanderers or freebooters of varying Slavic and non-Slavic origins who lived off raids on the Eurasian steppe and jealously guarded their independence. By the fifteenth

century, the term was increasingly applied to a mixture of freemen and fugitives who had fled the serfdom of Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy to live in the seams between encroaching Slavic settlement and receding remnants of the Golden Horde. From these beginnings two distinct traditions gradually emerged to figure in the evolution of the various Cossack groupings in later Russian and Ukrainian history. One tradition witnessed the transformation of these frontiersmen into military servitors, who, in exchange for compensation and various rights and privileges, agreed to discharge mounted military service, usually on the fringes of advancing Slavic colonization. These servitors came to be called “town Cossacks,” and their duties included mounted reconnaissance and defense against nomadic and Tatar incursion.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Cossacks of this type in what is now Ukraine appeared often in Polish military service. They also fought stubbornly to retain their autonomy and status as freemen, for which reason in 1654 they sought protection from the Muscovite tsar. However, their autonomous status and sometimes even their existence proved ephemeral, as Muscovite and Imperial Russian rulers gradually either absorbed, abolished, or transplanted various service-obligated Cossack groupings, including the Ukrainians.

A second and related tradition produced the more famous “free Cossack” communities. Like their service brethren, the roots of the free Cossacks lay largely with various wayward Russian and Ukrainian peasants (and town Cossacks) who combined with other migrants of mixed ethnic origins to settle in the open steppe beyond any recognizable state frontiers. They formed what the historian Robert H. McNeill has called “interstitial polities,” autonomous military societies that occupied the great river valleys of the Pontic steppe. Free Cossack communities began to appear in the fifteenth century, and by the mid-sixteenth century, they numbered six distinct groupings, including most prominently the Cossacks of the Don Host (*voisko*) and the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian *Sich*. Living by their wits and warrior skills off the land and its adjoining waters, these free Cossacks plundered traditional Islamic enemies and Orthodox allies alike. However, like their service-obligated brethren, the free Cossacks gradually came to serve as Muscovite allies, fielding light cavalry for tsarist campaigns, pressing Slavic colonization farther into the Pontic steppe, then into the Caucasus and Siberia. Although the free Cossacks formed bul-



Cossacks on the march, 1914. © HULTON-DELITSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

works against invasion from the south and east, they were also sensitive to infringements of their rights and privileges as free men. From the time of Stepan Razin's revolt in 1670–1671 until the rising of Yemelian Pugachev in 1772–1775, they periodically reacted explosively to encroachments against their status and freebooting lifestyle.

The service and free Cossack traditions gradually merged during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the former free Cossack groupings were either abolished (e.g., the Zaporozhian *Sich* in 1775) or brought under the complete control (e.g., the Don Host also in 1775) of imperial St. Petersburg. A series of imperial military administrators from Grigory Alexandrovich Potemkin through Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev imposed measures that regularized Cossack military service, subordinated local governing institutions to imperial control and supervision, and integrated local elites into the ranks of the Russian nobility. Regardless of origin, by the time of the Crimean War in 1854–1856, all Cossacks had been transformed into a closed military

estate (*sosloviye*) subject to mandatory mounted military service in exchange for collective title to their lands and superficial reaffirmation of traditional rights and privileges. During the Great Reform Era, War Minister Dmitry Alexeyevich Milyutin toyed briefly with the idea of abolishing the Cossacks, then imposed measures to further regularize their governance and military service. The blunt fact was that the Russian army needed cavalry, and the Cossack population base of 2.5 million enabled them to satisfy approximately 50 percent of the empire's cavalry requirements. Consequently, the Cossacks became an anachronism in an age of smokeless powder weaponry and mass cadre and conscript armies.

Reforms notwithstanding, by the beginning of the twentieth century, many traditional Cossack groupings hovered on the verge of crisis, thanks to a heavy burden of military service, overcrowding in communal holdings, alienation of land by the Cossack nobility, and an influx of non-Cossack population. The revolutions of 1917 and the ensuing Russian Civil War seriously divided the Cossacks,

with a majority supporting the White movement, while a stubborn minority espoused revolutionary causes. Following Bolshevik victory, many Cossacks fled abroad, while those who stayed were persecuted, gradually disappearing during collectivization as an identifiable group. During World War II, the Red Army resurrected Cossack formations, while the *Wehrmacht*, operating under the fiction that Cossacks were non-Slavic peoples, recruited its own Cossack formations from prisoners of war and dissidents of various stripes. Neither variety had much in common with their earlier namesakes, save perhaps either remote parentage or territorial affinity. The same assertion held true for various Cossack-like groupings that sprang up in trouble spots around the periphery of the Russian Federation following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

See also: CAUCASUS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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BRUCE W. MENNING

COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The decision to establish the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as COMECON and the CMEA, was announced in a joint commu-

niqué issued by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union in January 1949. Albania joined in February 1949; East Germany in 1950; Mongolia in 1962; Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam in 1978. Albania ceased participation in 1961.

COMECON members were united by their commitment to Marxism–Leninism, Soviet-style central planning, and economic development. COMECON served as an organizational counterweight first to the Marshall Plan and then to the European Iron and Steel Community and its successor, the European Economic Community.

COMECON was effectively directed by a group outside its formal organization, the Conference of First Secretaries of Communist and Workers' Parties and of the Heads of Government of COMECON Member Countries. The Soviet Union dominated COMECON. From 1949 to 1953, Stalin used COMECON primarily to redirect member trade from outside COMECON to within COMECON and to promote substitution of domestic production for imports from outside COMECON. The COMECON economic integration function was stepped up in 1956, the year of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, with the establishment of eight standing commissions, each planning for a different economic sector across the member countries. Notable real achievements included partial unification of electric power grids across East European members, coordination of rail and river transport in Eastern Europe, and the construction of the Friendship pipeline to deliver Siberian oil to Eastern Europe. In 1971 COMECON initiated a compromise Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration as a counterweight to integration within the European Economic Community. COMECON continued planning various integration and coordination efforts through the 1970s and 1980s. In 1985–1986 these efforts culminated in the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress to the Year 2000. With the loss of Soviet control over its East European trading partners, COMECON tried to survive as a purely coordinating body but was finally formally disbanded in June 1991.

COMECON's impact on Russia was largely economic. Russia was the largest republic among the Soviet Union's fifteen republics. The Soviet Union was the dominant member of COMECON. The strategic purpose of COMECON was to tie Eastern Europe economically to the Soviet Union. COMECON trade became largely bilateral with the Soviet Union, mostly Russia, supplying raw materials, no-

tably oil, to Eastern Europe in return for manufactured goods, notably machinery and equipment. This is the opposite of the trade flow between historically dominant countries and their colonies and dependents. The historical norm is for raw materials to flow from the colonies and dependents to the dominant center, which exports advanced manufactures and services in return. The comparative advantage for Russia within COMECON was, however, as a raw material and fuel exporter. Russia's loss was that it received in return shoddy and obsolescent COMECON machinery and equipment rather than Western machinery with Western technology embedded in it. The Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress to the Year 2000 was only one effort to remedy this problem. Russia also lost out on its potential gains from OPEC's increase in the price of oil beginning in 1973.

COMECON trade was conducted in "transferable rubles," basically a bookkeeping unit good only to buy imports from other COMECON partners. However, most purchases and their prices were bilaterally negotiated between the COMECON trade partners. So, the real value of a country's transferable ruble balance was indeterminate. Russian oil was sold by the Soviet Union to COMECON partners for transferable rubles. OPEC dramatically increased the dollar value of oil exports beginning in 1973. In 1975 COMECON agreed that the transferable ruble price of oil be indexed to the global dollar price, specifically the moving average for the past three years in 1975 and the past five years for every year thereafter. Thus, the prices of Soviet oil exports to COMECON lagged the global price rises through the late 1970s. Only when global oil prices dropped in the early 1980s did the transferable ruble price of Soviet oil catch up. Overall, the Soviet Union paid for its East European "empire" by selling its raw inputs, especially oil, for less than world market prices and by receiving less technologically advanced manufactured goods in return. Much of this cost was borne by Russia.

See also: ELECTRICITY GRID; EMPIRE, USSR AS; FOREIGN TRADE

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DANIEL R. KAZMER

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, IMPERIAL *See* CABINET OF MINISTERS, IMPERIAL.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET

In 1946, Sovnarkom—Sovet Ministrov, the government of the USSR—was renamed the Council of Ministers to bring the USSR into line with practice in other great powers. Josef Stalin remained as chairperson until 1953. He was followed by Georgy Malenkov until 1955; then Nikolai Bulganin until 1958; Nikita Khrushchev, from 1958 to 1964; Alexei Kosygin, 1964–1980; Nikolai Tikhonov, 1980–1985; and Nikolai Ryzhkov, 1985–1990. Membership of the Council of Ministers consisted of the chairperson, first deputy chairperson, deputy chairpersons, ministers of the USSR and chairpersons of State Committees of the USSR. Chairpersons of Councils of Ministers of Union republics were ex officio members of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Under the 1977 constitution membership could also include "the heads of other organs and organizations of the USSR." This allowed the chairperson of the Central Council of Trade Unions or the first secretary of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) to serve on the Council of Ministers. The first Council of Ministers formed under this constitution comprised 109 members.

Ministries and State Committees, as with the commissariats in Sovnarkom, were of two varieties: "union-republican," which functioned through parallel apparatuses in identically named republican ministries, and "all-union," which worked by direct control of institutions in the republics or through organs in the republics directly subordinate to the USSR minister. Groups of related ministries were supervised by senior Party leaders serving as deputy chairpersons of the Council of Ministers. In the early postwar years the tendency toward subdivision of

ministries, apparent in Sovnarkom during the 1930s, continued until 1948, but it was then followed by a period of amalgamation until 1949, and more modest expansion until 1953. Immediately after Stalin's death membership of the Council of Ministers was reduced from eighty-six to fifty-five, groups of economic ministries being amalgamated, but this was only temporary, and by the end of 1954 membership had increased again to seventy-six and continued to increase more slowly from that time.

Theoretically responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, with membership supposedly decided by that institution, but in reality by the Politburo, the Council of Ministers was empowered to deal with all matters of state administration of the USSR outside the competence of the Supreme Soviet, issuing decrees and ordinances and verifying their execution. According to the 1936 and 1977 Constitutions, the Council of Ministers was responsible for direction of the national economy and economic development; social and cultural development, including science and technology; the state budget; planning; defense, state security; general direction of the armed forces; foreign policy; foreign trade and economic; and cultural and scientific cooperation with foreign countries.

By a law of 1978, meetings of the Council of Ministers were to be convened every three months and sessions of its Presidium "regularly (when the need arises)." This institution, created in 1953, consisting of the chairperson, first deputy chairperson and deputy chairpersons of the Council of Ministers, functioned only intermittently until 1978. Often described in Western literature as an "inner cabinet," it then became primarily responsible for the directions of economic affairs.

See also: BULGANIN, NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH; BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMIC; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYVICH; KOSYGIN, ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH; SOVNARKOM; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; STATE COMMITTEES

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DEREK WATSON

COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS *See* SOVNARKOM.

COUNTERREFORMS

The Counterreforms of the 1880s and 1890s refer to the body of domestic policies adopted under Tsar Alexander III as an ideological response and reaction to the transformations of the earlier Great Reforms undertaken by so-called "enlightened" bureaucrats with the tacit approval of the assassinated Tsar Alexander II. They were also a response to radicalism growing out of the reform milieu. The conservatives believed the Empire was threatened. Whereas the Great Reforms of the period 1855–1881 in the broadest sense intended to renovate the body politic and instill new principles of self-government, rule of law, citizenship, and even to introduce at the very end a veiled form of elite representation in the legislative process, the counterreforms of the new Tsar and his conservative advisers within and outside the bureaucracy aimed to reverse such changes and to reassert traditional autocracy and nationhood and the more manageable and corporatist society organized by legal estates. Immediately after Alexander II's assassination in March 1881, the new government moved quickly to remove Loris-Melikov and remaining reformers from the government. On April 29, 1881, the Tsar declared that Russia would always remain an autocracy. The reform era was over.

The counterreforms were ushered in by the laws on state order and the pacification of society of August 14, 1881. These laws, sponsored by Minister of Internal Affairs, N. P. Ignat'ev, provided for two types of martial law (condition of safeguard and extraordinary safeguard) that gave the police and administration enhanced powers above and beyond those residing in the new judicial system. These decrees remained in force until just days before the February Revolution of 1917. On August 27, 1882, the government introduced "temporary rules on the press," which gave more censorship power to the administration. Minister of Internal Affairs D. A. Tolstoy then introduced a new University Statute on August 23, 1884. This effectively repealed university corporate autonomy and bureaucratized the administration of higher education. It also placed limits on higher education for women. Finally a cluster of three major acts placed new administrative restrictions on the institutions of self-government, the zemstvos and town dumas. These laws of June 12, 1890 (zemstvo) and June 11, 1892 (town дума) changed the electoral laws to favor the gentry in the case of the zemstvos and large property owners in the cities. Many recent

voters in town and countryside alike were disenfranchised. In addition new bureaucratic instances were established to shore up administrative control over self-government. This would call forth opposition in the form of a zemstvo movement that would be instrumental in the 1905 Revolution. Perhaps most symbolic of all the counterreforms was the notorious act of July 12, 1889 that created the Land Captains (*zemskie nachal'niki*). These were appointed government officials in the countryside who combined administrative, police, and judicial authority. The aim was once again administrative control, this time over the relatively new peasant institutions and indeed over peasant life in the broadest sense. Control rather than building a new society from the grassroots was the central point of these counterreforms. The counterreforms and their supporting ideology extended into the reign of Nicholas II, making it that much more difficult for the regime to solve its social and political problems. They in fact made revolution more likely. The counterreforms co-existed uneasily with more forward-looking economic policies even during the reign of Alexander III.

See also: ALEXANDER III, NICHOLAS II

DANIEL ORLOVSKY

COUNTRY ESTATES

Country estates, some dating back to the fifteenth century, originated as land grants from the crown to trusted servitors. The Russian empire expanded rapidly, particularly in the eighteenth century, and along with it the estate network, which ultimately stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Crimean Peninsula, and from the Duchy of Warsaw to the Ural Mountains. During the estate's golden age from the reign of Catherine II to the War of 1812, wealthy nobles who had retired from state service built thousands of magnificent houses, most in neoclassical style, surrounded by elegant formal gardens and expansive landscape parks.

Until the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, estates were private principdoms (owned exclusively by nobles) supported by involuntary labor. Thus in some respects the pre-emancipation estate was comparable to the plantation of the American south. Its uniqueness lay in its scores of highly trained serf craftsmen and artists, some of whom founded dynasties of acclaimed artists. Very

wealthy landowners took pride in having at hand accomplished architects and painters, musicians, actors, and dancers for entertainment, and cabinetmakers, gilders, embroiderers, lace-makers and other skilled craftsmen who produced all the luxury items they needed. Hence the greatest estates, in addition to being economic centers, were also culturally self-contained worlds that facilitated the rapid development of Russian culture.

Estates also served as important places of inspiration and creativity for Russia's most renowned authors, painters, and composers. For the intellectual and artistic elite, country estates were Arcadian retreats, places of refuge from the constraints of city life. Alexander Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*, Ivan Turgenev's *A Sportsman's Sketches* and *Fathers and Sons*, Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, and Pyotr Tchaikovsky's *1812 Overture* are among the many Russian masterpieces composed on a country estate.

After 1861 many small estate owners, unable to survive the loss of their unpaid labor, sold their holdings (a situation memorialized in Anton Chekhov's *The Cherry Orchard*). On larger estates a system similar to sharecropping was devised; these estates retained their economic strength until the revolution. Up to World War I Russia exported tons of grains and other agricultural products produced on thousands of country estates. In non-black-earth (non-chernozem) regions, enterprises on estates such as Khmelita (*Smolensk guberniya*), exporting prize-winning cheeses, Glubokoye (*Pskov guberniya*), producing wooden lanterns sold in England, and Polotnyany Zavod (*Kaluga guberniya*), which manufactured the linen paper used for Russian currency, also contributed to the economy.

The Bolshevik revolution destroyed the country estate, and with it much of the provincial economic and cultural infrastructure. Some estate houses have survived as orphanages, sanitariums, institutes, or spas. In the 1970s certain demolished estates associated with famous cultural figures (such as Pushkin's Mikhailovskoye and Turgenev's Spasskoye-Lutovinovo) were rebuilt. A few museum estates such as Kuskovo and Ostankino in Moscow and the battered manor houses of the Crimea still offer tourists a glimpse of Russia's pre-Revolutionary estate splendor.

See also: PEASANTRY; SERFDOM; SLAVERY

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PRISCILLA ROOSEVELT

COURT, HIGH ARBITRATION

The High Arbitration Court is at the top of the system of arbitration courts. These courts were originally created in the Soviet period as informal tribunals to resolve problems in implementing economic plans. In the post-communist era they have been reorganized into a system of courts with exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits among businesses and between businesses and government agencies. While for historical reasons they are called "arbitration" courts, in fact they are formal state courts with compulsory jurisdiction and have nothing to do with private arbitration of disputes.

The structure of the courts is governed by the 1995 Constitutional Law on Arbitration Courts. Beneath the High Arbitration Court there are ten appellate courts, each with jurisdiction over a separate large area of the country, and numerous trial courts. The High Arbitration Court is responsible for the management of the entire arbitration court system. Procedural rules are provided by the 2002 Arbitration Procedure Code. Cases are heard in the first instance in the trial court. Either party may then appeal to an appellate instance within the trial court, and may further appeal to the appropriate appellate court. There is no right to appeal to the High Arbitration Court; rather, review by the High Arbitration Court is discretionary with the Court. The High Arbitration Court has original jurisdiction over two types of cases: (1) those concerning the legality of acts of the Federation Council, the State Duma, the president, or the government; and (2) economic disputes between the Russian Federation and one of its eighty-nine subjects. The High Arbitration Court also has, and frequently exercises, the power to issue explanations on matters of judicial practice, for the guidance of the lower courts, lawyers, and the public. The Court also publishes many of its decisions in individual cases on the Internet.

See also: COURT, SUPREME; LEGAL SYSTEMS.

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PETER B. MAGGS

COURT, SUPREME

The Supreme Court is "the highest judicial body for civil, criminal, administrative and other cases falling within the jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction" under Article 126 of the Russian Constitution. The courts of general jurisdiction hear all cases except: (1) lawsuits among businesses and between businesses and government agencies, which are heard by the Arbitration Court system; and (2) certain Constitutional issues, which are heard by the Constitutional Court. Beneath the Supreme Court are the highest courts of each of the eighty-nine subjects of the Russian Federation and the military courts. Beneath the courts of the subjects of the Russian Federation are a large number of district courts. Still lower in the hierarchy are Justice of the Peace Courts, which deal with relatively unimportant cases. The court structure and the relations between the courts are governed by the 1996 Constitutional Law on the Judicial System of the Russian Federation. Procedural rules are provided by the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code and the 2002 Civil Procedure Code.

The Supreme Court has separate divisions for civil cases, criminal cases, and military cases. It has a President and a Presidium consisting of several high officers of the court. It also has a plenary session in which all the judges meet together. The Judicial Department of the Supreme Court handles the administration of all the courts of general jurisdiction. Most cases are heard by the Supreme Court on appeal from or petition for review of lower court decisions. Because the court sits in separate divisions and has a large number of judges, it is able to review a very large number of lower court cases. However, a few very important cases

are heard by the Court in first instance. There is a mechanism for an appeal of these decisions to a higher level of the Supreme Court itself. The plenary session of the Court also has the power to issue interpretations of the law for the guidance of the lower courts. The interpretations and many other Court decisions are published at its web site. As the result of easy availability of these interpretations and decisions, lawyers are increasingly studying and citing Supreme Court rulings.

The Supreme Court has in some cases refused to apply statute laws on the basis that they contradicted the Constitution. Gradually, however, its policy changed. When in doubt on the constitutionality of a law, the Supreme Court has typically referred the question to the Constitutional Court. However, the Supreme Court frequently hears cases concerning the conformity of administrative regulations to the Constitution and laws, and frequently invalidates such regulations. The Supreme Court of the twenty-first century is very different from the Supreme Court of the Soviet period, even though the court structure is little changed. In the Soviet period the Court was subservient to the Party authorities. The court did not control judicial administration, which was managed by the Ministry of Justice. It did cite the Constitution, but never refused to apply a law on the basis of the Constitution alone.

See also: COURT, HIGH ARBITRATION; LEGAL SYSTEMS.

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PETER B. MAGGS

CRIMEA

Russian hegemony was established over the Crimea region in 1783 when the Tsarist empire destroyed the Crimean Tatar state. By the second half of the nineteenth century the Crimean population had de-

clined to 200,000, of which half were Tatars. This proportion continued to decline as Slav migration to the region continued in the next century through industrialization, the building of the Black Sea Fleet, and tourism. By the 1897 and 1926 censuses the Tatar share of the population had declined to 34 and 26 percent respectively.

During the civil war of 1917–1922, Crimea was claimed by the independent Ukrainian state, which obtained it under the terms of the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty. But Crimea was also the scene of conflict between the Whites and Bolsheviks. In October 1921 Crimea was included within the Russian Federation (RSFSR) as an autonomous republic with two cities (Sevastopol and Evpatoria) under all-union jurisdiction.

Crimea's ethnic composition changed in May 1944 when nearly 200,000 Tatars and 60,000 other minorities were deported to Central Asia. It is estimated that up to 40 percent of the Tatars died during the deportation. A year later Crimean autonomy was formally abolished, and the peninsula was downgraded to the status of oblast (region) of the Russian Federation. All vestiges of Tatar influence were eradicated.

Crimea's status was again changed in 1954 when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred it to the Ukrainian SSR. It remained an oblast until 1991, when a popularly supported referendum restored its status to an autonomous republic within Ukraine. Tatars began to return to Crimea in the Gorbachev era, but they still only accounted for 15 percent of the population, with the remainder of the population divided between Russians (two-thirds) and russified Ukrainians.

The status of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet stationed on the peninsula, were the object of acrimonious dispute between Ukraine and Russia in the post-Soviet era. The Russian parliament repeatedly voted to demand that Ukraine return both Crimea and Sevastopol. Furthermore, the parliament argued that legally they were Russian territory and that Russia, as the successor state to the USSR, had the right to inherit Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet.

This dispute was not resolved until May 1997, when Ukraine and Russia signed a treaty that recognized each other's borders. The treaty was quickly ratified by the Ukrainian parliament (*Rada*), but both houses of the Russian parliament

only ratified it after intense lobbying from Ukraine in October 1998 and February 1999.

The resolution of the question of the ownership of Crimea and Sevastopol between 1997 and 1999 also assisted in the division of the Black Sea Fleet. Russia inherited 80 percent of the fleet and obtained basing rights scheduled to expire in 2017. The situation was also stabilized by Crimea's adoption in October 1998 of a constitution that for the first time recognized Ukraine's sovereignty.

Within Crimea the Tatars have been able to mobilize large demonstrations, but their small size has prevented them from having any significant influence on the peninsula's politics. Between 1991 and 1993 the former communist leadership of Crimea, led by Mykola Bagrov, attempted to obtain significant concessions from Kiev in an attempt to maximize Crimea's autonomy. This autonomist line was replaced by a pro-Russian secessionist movement that was the most influential political force between 1993 and 1994; its leader Yuri Meshkov was elected Crimean president in January 1994. The secessionist movement collapsed between 1994 and 1995 due to internal quarrels, lack of substantial Russian assistance, and Ukrainian economic, political, and military pressure. The institution of a Crimean presidency was abolished in March 1995. From 1998 to 2002 the peninsula was led by Communists, who controlled the local parliament, and pro-Ukrainian presidential centrists in the regional government. In the 2002 elections the Communists lost their majority in the local parliament, and it, like the regional government, came under the control of pro-Ukrainian presidential centrists.

See also: BLACK SEA FLEET; CRIMEAN KHANATE; CRIMEAN TATARS; CRIMEAN WAR; SEVASTOPOL; TATARSTAN AND TATARS; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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CRIMEAN KHANATE

One of the surviving political elements of the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate comprised all of the Crimean peninsula, except for the southern and western coast, which was a province of the Ottoman Empire after 1475 (Kefe Eyalet), and survived until 1783 when it was annexed by the Russian Empire. The Khanate's ruling dynasty, the Girays, established its residence and "capital" in the valley of Bahçe Saray, from which it ruled most of the peninsula, and conducted relations with the Ottomans in the south.

Among the early Crimean khans, most important were Mengli Giray I (1467–1476 and 1478–1515), who is considered the "founder" of the Khanate; Sahib Giray I (1532–1551), who competed with Ivan IV for control of Kazan and Astrakhan, and lost; and Devlet Giray I (1551–1577), who led a campaign against Moscow. It was Mengli Giray who used Italian architects to build the large khan's palace and the important Zincirli Medrese in Bahçe Saray and, through patronizing artists and writers, establishing the khanate as a Sunni Muslim cultural center.

The khanate had a special relationship with the Ottoman Empire. Never Ottoman subjects, the Khanate's Giray dynasty was considered the crucial link between the Ottomans and the Mongols, particularly Ghenghis Khan. Had the Ottoman dynasty died out, the next Ottoman sultan would have been selected from the Giray family. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Girays often provided military support for Ottoman campaigns, in Hungary and in Iran. Crimean mounted archers were considered by the Ottomans to be among the most reliable and effective elements of their armies.

So far as the Russians were concerned, the most important feature of the khanate was the latter's dependence on raiding Muscovite lands for economic benefit. Crimean Tatars frequently "harvested the steppe" and brought Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish peasants to Crimea for sale. Slave markets operated in Kefe and Gozleve, where merchants from the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Egypt purchased Slavic slaves for export. Several raids reached as far as Moscow itself. Slave market tax records indicate that more than a million were sold in Crimea in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Eighteenth-century Russian governments tried to bring an end to these raids. An invasion of Crimea in 1736 succeeded in destroying much of the khanate's capital Bahçesaray, including the palace, though the Russian army soon abandoned that effort. The Girays were able to rebuild much of the city over the next ten years.

It was left to Catherine II to bring an end the khanate, in 1783. Russian victories over the Ottomans resulted in, first, the Treaty of Karasu Bazaar between Russia and the Khanate in November 1772, followed by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1774. Karasu Bazaar established an "alliance and eternal friendship" between the khanate and Russia; the second cut all ties between the khanate and the Ottoman Empire.

For nine years, Catherine II worked with the last Crimean Khan, Şahin Giray, in an experiment in "independence," implementing some of her "enlightened" political ideas in a Muslim, Tatar society. Recognizing failure in this venture, Catherine annexed the khanate and the rest of the Crimean peninsula to the empire in 1783.

See also: CATHERINE II; CRIMEAN TATARS; GOLDEN HORDE; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE

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CRIMEAN TATARS

A Turkic people who settled the Crimean peninsula over the two hundred years after Batu Khan's conquest, the Tatars of the Crimea came from Central Asia and Anatolia. By 1450, almost the whole of the peninsula north of the coastal mountains was Tatar land. The Tartat language was a combination of the Turkish of the Anatolian Seljuks and the Chagatay Turkic of the Tatar rulers of the Volga region, though by the end of the fifteenth century, Crimean Tatar was a dialect different from both.

In the fifteenth century, the Crimean Tatars established a state (khanate) and a ruling dynasty (Giray) with its political center first in Solhat and later in Bahçesaray. This khanate was closely associated with the Ottoman Empire to the south, though it retained its sovereignty. No Ottoman officials exercised authority within the lands of these Tatars. Crimean Tatar authors wrote histories and chronicles that emphasized distinctions between Tatars and other Turkic peoples, including the Ottomans.

As the Crimean Tatar economy depended on the slave trade and raids into Russian and other Slavic lands, it was inevitable that Russia would strive to gain dominance over the peninsula. But it was only in the eighteenth century that Russia had sufficient power to defeat, and, ultimately, annex the peninsula and incorporate the remaining Tatars into their empire. The annexation took place in 1783.

Russian domination put enormous pressures on the Tatars—causing many to emigrate to the Balkans and Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. One of the Tatar intellectuals, Ismail Bey Gaspirali, tried to establish an educational system for the Tatars that would allow them to survive, as Tatars and as Muslims, within the Russian Empire. He had substantial influence over other Turkic Muslims within the empire, an influence that spread also to Turkish intellectuals in Istanbul.

Throughout the nineteenth century the Russian government encouraged Russian and Ukrainian peasants to settle on the peninsula, placing ever greater pressures on the Tatar population. Although the Revolution of 1917 promised some relief to the Tatars, with the emergence of "national communism" in non-Russian lands, the Tatar intellectual and political elites were destroyed during the Stalinist purges.

The German occupation of Crimea after 1941 produced some Crimean Tatar collaboration, though no greater proportion of Tatars fought against the USSR than did Ukrainians or Belorussians. Nevertheless, the entire Crimean Tatar nationality was collectively punished in 1944, and deported en masse to Central Asia, primarily Uzbekistan. In the 1950s, Crimea was assigned to the Ukrainian SSR, at the three hundredth anniversary of Ukraine's annexation to the Russian Empire. Ukrainians and Russians resettled Tatar homes and villages.



Crimean Tatars mark the fifty-fourth anniversary of Stalin's order to deport their ancestors from the Crimean peninsula, May 18, 1998. PHOTOGRAPH BY SERGEI SVETLITSKY/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Many Tatars fled to Turkey, where they joined descendants of Tatars who had emigrated from Crimea in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the early 2000s it was estimated that there were more than 5 million Crimean Tatar descendants who were citizens of the Republic of Turkey. They have been thoroughly assimilated as Turks, though they continue Tatar cultural and literary activities.

During the next thirty-five years, Tatars in Central Asian exile continued to maintain their national identity, through cultural and political means. They published, in Tatar, a newspaper in Tashkent, *Lenin Bayragi*, and united their efforts with various Soviet dissident groups. Some attempted to return to the Crimean peninsula, with modest success.

With the collapse of the USSR, and the new independence of the Ukraine, continued efforts have been made by Tatars to reestablish some of their

communities on the peninsula. Crimean Tatars, however, remain one of the many "nationalities" of the former USSR that have not been able to establish a new nation.

See also: DEPORTATIONS; GASPIRALI, ISMAIL BEY; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST.

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CRIMEAN WAR

The Crimean War (1853–1856) was Europe's greatest war between 1815 and 1914, pitting first Turkey, then France and England, and finally Piedmont–Sardinia against Russia.

The incautious and miscalculated decision by Nicholas I to activate his southern army corps and Black Sea fleet in late December 1852 can be attributed to several general misperceptions: the official myth that Russia legally protected the Ottoman Orthodox; disinformative claims of Ottoman perfidy regarding the Orthodox–Catholic dispute over Christian Holy Places; and illusions of Austrian loyalty and British friendship. Attempts to interest the British in a partition of the Ottoman Empire failed. Britain followed France in sending a

fleet to the Aegean to back Turkey, after Russia's extraordinary ambassador to Istanbul, Alexander Menshikov, acted preemptorily, following the tsar's instructions, in March 1852. Blaming Turkish obstinacy on the British ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe, the Russians refused to accept the Ottoman compromise proposal on the Holy Places on the grounds that it skirted the protection issue. Russia broke relations with Turkey in May and occupied Moldavia and Wallachia in July.

While the Ottomans mobilized, European statesmen sought an exit. Russia's outright rejection in September of another Ottoman compromise finessing the protection issue, one which the British found reasonable, emboldened the Turks to declare war and attack Russian positions in Wallachia and the eastern Black Sea (October). Admiral Pavel



Encounter between Russians, nineteenth-century engraving. THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSEO DEL RISORGIMENTO ROME/DAGLI ORTI

Nakhimov's Black Sea squadron destroyed a Turkish supply convoy off Sinope (November 30), and the combined Anglo–French–Turkish fleet entered the Black Sea on January 1, 1854. Russia refused the humiliating allied demand to keep to port, and by early April, Britain and France were at war with Russia.

Russia's million-man army was larger than that of the allies, but had fewer rifles and deployed 600,000 troops from Finland to Bessarabia as insurance against attacks from the west. Anglo–French fleets and logistics far outclassed Russia's.

The war operated on several fronts. The Russians crossed the Danube in March and besieged Silistra, only to retreat and evacuate Wallachia and Moldavia in June in the face of Austro–German threats. Anglo–French naval squadrons entered the Baltic and destroyed Russia's fortifications at Bomarsund and Sveaborg, but did not harm Kronstadt. In Transcaucasia, Russian counterattacks and superior tactics led to advances into Eastern Anatolia and the eventual investment of Kars in September 1855.

The key theater was Crimea, where the capture of Sevastopol was the chief Allied goal. Both sides made mistakes. The Russians could have mounted a more energetic defense against Allied landings, while the Allies might have taken Sevastopol before the Russians fortified their defenses with sunken ships and naval ordnance under Admiral Vladimir Kornilov and army engineer Adjutant Eduard Totleben. The Allies landed at Evpatoria, defeated the Russians at the Alma River (September 20, 1854), and redeployed south of Sevastopol. The Russian attempt to drive the Allies from Balaklava failed even before the British Light Brigade made its celebrated, ill-fated charge (October 25, 1854). The well-outnumbered allies then tried to besiege Sevastopol and thus exposed themselves to a counter-attack at Inkerman on November 5, 1854, which the Russians completely mishandled with their outmoded tactics, negligible staff work, and command rivalries.

Despite a terrible winter, the Allies reinforced and renewed their siege in February 1855. Allied reoccupation of Evpatoria, where the Turks held off a Russian counterattack, and a summer descent on Kerch disrupted the flow of Russian supplies. The death of Nicholas I and accession of Alexander II (March 2) meant little at first. As per imperial wishes, the Russians mounted a hopeless attack on the besiegers' positions on the Chernaya River (Au-

gust 16). The constant Allied bombardment and French-led assaults on Sevastopol's outer defenses led to an orderly evacuation (September 8–9). The Russians in turn captured Kars in Eastern Anatolia (November 26), thereby gaining a bargaining chip. Hostilities soon abated.

Russia lost the war in the Baltic, Crimea, and lower Danube, with the demilitarization of the Åland Islands and the Black Sea and retrocession of southern Bessarabia, but, at the cost of 400,000–500,000 casualties, defended the empire's integrity from maximal Anglo–Ottoman rollback goals and won the war in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. The evidence of Russia's technological and structural inferiority to the West, as well as the massive turnout of peasant serfs expecting emancipation in return for volunteer service, were major catalysts of the Great Reforms under Alexander II. Russia became more like the other great powers, adhering to the demands of cynical self-interest.

See also: GREAT BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; NESSELRODE, KARL ROBERT; SEVASTOPOL; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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CRONY CAPITALISM

Crony capitalism is a term that describes an economic system where people with good connections to the center of power—the “cronies” of the government—manage to place themselves in positions of undue influence over economic policy, thus deriving great personal gains.

In the case of Russia, the term implies that between the president and the country's business leaders—known as the “oligarchs”—there emerged a tacit understanding. If the oligarchs used their economic power to supply political and financial support for the president, in return they would be allowed to influence for their own benefit the formulation of laws and restrictions on a range of important matters.

A prominent example is that of insider dealings in the process of privatization, which, for example, allowed the transfer of major oil companies into private hands at extremely low prices. Another is the introduction of a system of “authorized banks,” whereby a few select commercial banks were allowed to handle the government’s accounts. Such rights could be abused: for example, by delaying the processing of payments received. Under conditions of high inflation, the real value eventually passed on to the final destination would be greatly diminished. There have also been serious allegations of insider dealings by the cronies in Russian government securities.

The overall consequences for the Russian economy were negative in the extreme. The influence of the so-called crony capitalists over the process of privatization led to such a warped system of property rights that some analysts seriously argued in favor of selective renationalization, to be followed by a second round of “honest” privatization.

Even more important, by allowing the crony capitalists to take over the oil industry for a pittance, the Russian government freely gave up the right to extract rent from the country’s natural resource base. This represented a massive shift of future income streams out of the government’s coffers and into private pockets, with severe implications for the future ability of the state to maintain the provision of public goods.

See also: ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; MAFIA CAPITALISM

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CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most serious incidents of the Cold War. Many believed that war might break out between the United States and the Soviet Union over the latter’s basing of nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba.

Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba promising to restore the liberal 1940 constitution but immediately took more radical steps, including an eco-

nomie agreement in 1960 with the Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, promised in June to defend Cuba with Soviet nuclear arms. In early 1961, the United States broke relations with Havana, and in April it helped thousands of Cuban exiles stage an abortive uprising at the Bay of Pigs.

Khrushchev was convinced that the United States would strike again, this time with American soldiers; and he believed that Castro’s defeat would be a fatal blow to his own leadership. He decided that basing Soviet missiles in Cuba would deter the United States from a strike against the Castro regime. Moreover, so he reasoned, the Cuba-based medium-range missiles would compensate for the USSR’s marked inferiority to America’s ICBM capabilities. Finally, a successful showdown with Washington might improve Moscow’s deteriorating relations with China.

In April 1962, Khrushchev raised the possibility of basing Soviet missiles in Cuba with his defense minister, Rodion Malinovsky. He hoped to deploy the missiles by October and then inform Kennedy after the congressional elections in November. He apparently expected the Americans to accept the deployment of the Soviet missiles as calmly as the Kremlin had accepted the basing of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, when finally consulted, flatly told Khrushchev that Soviet missiles in Cuba would “cause a political explosion” (Taubman) in the United States, but the premier was unmoved. In late April, a Soviet delegation met with Khrushchev before departing for Cuba. They were told to “explain the plan” to install missiles “to Castro” (Taubman). In fact, their mission was more one of “telling than asking.” Castro was hardly enthusiastic, but was ready to yield to a policy that would strengthen the “entire socialist camp” (Taubman). Later the Presidium voted unanimously to approve the move.

Perhaps most remarkably, Khrushchev believed that the deployment of sixty missiles with forty launchers, not to mention the support personnel and equipment, could be done secretly. General Anatoly Gribkov warned that the installation process in Cuba could not be concealed. And American U-2 spy planes flew over the sites unhindered. The Cubans, too, doubted that the plan could be kept secret; Khrushchev responded that if the weapons were discovered the United States would not overreact, but if trouble arose, the Soviets would “send the Baltic Fleet.”



A U.S. reconnaissance photo reveals a Soviet cargo ship with eight missile transporters and canvas-covered missiles lashed on deck during its return voyage from Cuba to the Soviet Union. © HULTON ARCHIVE

In July 1962, the American government learned that the USSR had started missile deliveries to Cuba. By the end of August, American intelligence reported that Soviet technicians were in Cuba, supervising new military construction. In September, Kennedy warned that if any Soviet ground-to-ground missiles were deployed in Cuba, “the gravest issues would arise.” Rather than calling a halt to the operation, Khrushchev ordered it accelerated, while repeatedly assuring Washington that no build-up was taking place.

On October 14, U.S. aerial reconnaissance discovered a medium-range ballistic missile mounted on a launching site. Such a missile could hit the eastern United States in a matter of minutes. On October 16, Kennedy and his closest advisers met to discuss the crisis and immediately agreed that the missile must be removed. On October 22, Kennedy announced a “quarantine” around Cuba, much to Khrushchev’s delight. The premier thought

the word sufficiently vague to allow for negotiation and exulted, “We’ve saved Cuba!” Despite his apparent satisfaction, Khrushchev fired off a letter to Kennedy accusing him of interfering in Cuban affairs and threatening world peace. He then went to the opera.

The turning point came on October 24, when Attorney General Robert Kennedy told the Soviet ambassador that the United States would stop the Soviet ships, strongly implying that it would do so even if it meant war. Khrushchev reacted angrily, but a letter from President Kennedy on October 25 pushed the premier toward compromise. Kennedy wrote that he regretted the deterioration in relations and hoped Khrushchev would take steps to restore the “earlier situation.” With this letter, Khrushchev finally realized that the crisis was not worth the gamble and began to back down. Another war scare occurred on the twenty-seventh with the downing of a U-2 over Cuba, but by this

point both leaders were ready and even anxious to end the crisis. On October 29, the premier informed Kennedy that the missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba would be removed. Kennedy promised there would be no invasion and secretly agreed to remove America's Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Khrushchev's Cuban gamble helped convince the Soviet leadership that he was unfit to lead the USSR. This humiliation, combined with failures in domestic policies, cost him his job in 1964.

See also: COLD WAR; CUBA, RELATIONS WITH; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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CUBA, RELATIONS WITH

The Cuban Communist Party began its frequently interrupted existence in 1925. Classically aligned with Moscow, the Cuban communists were among the most active communist parties in Latin America, placing one of their members in the President Batista's cabinet during World War II. The Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with Cuba during the war and for a few years afterward, and reopened them in 1960.

In the mid-1950s Fidel Castro, the leader of a radical nationalist revolutionary movement, organized an armed revolt against Batista's increasingly dictatorial rule. Castro was not a member of the Communist Party; the communists provided little or no support to his movement and openly criticized his tactics and strategies. After Castro seized power in 1959, communists, with a few exceptions, did not staff his new government and fell into obscurity.

In 1960 President Eisenhower concluded that Castro threatened U.S. private and public interests and was not amenable to U.S. direction. Castro was seizing American-owned properties and moving toward one-man rule. In order to protect U.S. public and private interests and to reassert traditional bilateral relationships, the U.S. government embargoed sugar, Cuba's main export, cut off access to oil, and continued an embargo of arms and munitions begun against Batista. These measures, unopposed, would have terminated Castro's rule.

U.S. actions had unexpected results. The USSR seized this chance to establish a toehold in Cuba. Countering U.S. sanctions, the USSR bought Cuba's sugar, sold its oil, and provided arms. U.S. efforts to overthrow Castro at the Bay of Pigs failed, and Cuba's ties with the USSR were strengthened. Castro, his party, and the Cuban state adopted communist models.

The resolve of the three governments in the new triangular relationship was tested in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1963. Emboldened by his toehold near Florida and reassured by Castro's anti-Americanism and revolutionary intentions, Khrushchev ordered Soviet missiles to Cuba. President Kennedy, risking war, ordered the Navy to block missile deliveries. In subsequent negotiations Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles, and Kennedy agreed not to use force against Cuba.

The Cuban Missile Crisis settlement set the framework for the relationships between the three countries. Castro became even more dependent on Soviet largess, as he was deprived of political and economic ties with the United States, previously Cuba's most important economic partner. The United States continued its anti-Castro campaigns short of invasion. The USSR replaced the United States as the hegemonic power over Cuba with all the advantages, costs, and risks involved.

Castro's dependence on the Soviet Union for trade, military equipment, and foreign aid grew steadily over the years. In return for Soviet aid, Castro copied the ideology, political structure, and economic system of the USSR. In 1976 the constitution formalized a communist structure in Cuba that harmonized with communist structures elsewhere, with party control of agriculture, industry, and commerce. Cuba's ties with the USSR facilitated Castro's iron one-man rule for more than thirty years. Castro reciprocated ongoing Soviet assistance through his support of pro-Soviet revolutionary movements in Latin America, including

Nicaragua and El Salvador, and elsewhere, including Angola and Ethiopia. These movements supported the USSR and copied Soviet models.

The Soviet Union's ties with Cuba had global implications. Soviet armed forces had access to the Western Hemisphere, and Cuba could serve as a point of contact for regional revolutionary movements. This alliance, taken together with Communist governments in Eastern Europe and Asia, provided Moscow with an arguable claim to worldwide influence. Moscow also took satisfaction in having a presence in Cuba matching that of the U.S. in Berlin.

Castro proved independent and unruly, not an ideal client by Soviet standards. The leaders of other Communist parties in the hemisphere were under Soviet control through the Foreign Department of the Soviet Communist Party. Unlike most other Communist leaders, Castro manipulated Moscow as much as or more than Moscow manipulated him.

The Soviet Union's ties with Cuba proved very costly over the years. The USSR paid high prices for Cuban sugar, and Cuba paid low prices for Soviet oil. Moscow equipped Cuba with one of the strongest military forces in Latin America. Foreign economic assistance probably far exceeded \$70 billion during the relationship. Cuba became the Soviet Union's largest debtor along with Vietnam. The Soviet leadership kept these huge expenditures secret until the USSR began to collapse.

Soviet economic and military investments in Cuba, including the establishment of a military brigade near Havana, were both a strategic advantage and a vulnerability, the latter because of the preponderance of U.S. power in the region. Soviet leaders were careful to make clear that they did not guarantee Cuba against a US attack. Nor was Cuba admitted to the Warsaw Pact. In that military sense their relationship was more a partnership than an alliance. After the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979, Moscow was even more careful, learning from lessons in Cuba, not to guarantee the Sandinistas economic viability or military security.

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's commitment to glasnost led to public knowledge in Russia of the costly nature of Soviet subsidies to Cuba; perestroika led to a reexamination of the Cuban regime and its relationship to Soviet interests. In his efforts to put the USSR on a more solid footing, particularly with respect to Germany, Gorbachev sought support from the United States. For

their part, President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker sought Gorbachev's collaboration in ending the Cold War in Latin America. In response to U.S. pressure among other factors, Gorbachev withdrew the Soviet military brigade from Cuba and ended lavish economic aid to Cuba. His actions led to the termination of Soviet and Cuban involvement in revolutionary movements in Central America. To Moscow's advantage, and to the huge impoverishment of Cuba, the Soviet Union and Cuba were set free of their mutual entanglements.

See also: COLD WAR; CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH.

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COLE BLASIER

CULT OF PERSONALITY

At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev denounced Josef Stalin's "Cult of Personality" in the so-called "Secret Speech." He declared, "It is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god." In addition to enumerating Stalin's repression of the Communist Party during the purges, Khrushchev recounted how in films, literature, his *Short Biography*, and the *Short Course of the History of the Communist Party*, Stalin displaced Vladimir Lenin, the Party, and the people and claimed responsibility for all of the successes of the Revolution, the civil war, and World War II. Khrushchev's speech praised Lenin as a modest "genius," and demanded that "history, literature and the fine arts properly reflect Lenin's role and the great deeds of our Communist Party and of the

Soviet people." Khrushchev's formulation reveals the paradox of the "cult of personality." While denigrating the cult of Stalin, Khrushchev reinvigorated the cult of Lenin.

Analysts have traced the leader cult back to the earliest days of the Soviet Union, when a personality cult spontaneously grew up around Lenin. The cult grew among Bolsheviks because of Lenin's stature as Party leader and among the population due to Russian traditions of the personification of political power in the tsar (Tucker, 1973, pp. 59–60). Lenin himself was appalled by the tendency to turn him into a mythic hero and fought against it. After the leader's death in 1924, however, veneration of Lenin became an integral part of the Communist Party's quest for legitimacy. Party leaders drew on both political and religious traditions in their decision to place a mausoleum containing the embalmed body of Lenin at the geographic and political center of Soviet power in Moscow's Red Square. Once Lenin was enshrined as a sacred figure, his potential successors scrambled to position themselves as his true heirs.

After Stalin consolidated his power and embarked on the drive for socialist construction, he began to build his own cult of personality. Stalin's efforts were facilitated by the previously existing leader cult, and he trumpeted his special relationship with Lenin. Early evidence of the Stalin cult can be found in the press coverage of his fiftieth birthday in 1929, which extolled "the beloved leader, the truest pupil and comrade-in-arms of Vladimir Ilich Lenin" (Brooks, 2000, p. 61). In the early 1930s, Stalin shaped his image as leader by establishing himself as the ultimate expert in fields other than politics. He became "the premier living Marxist philosopher" and an authoritative historian of the Party (Tucker, 1992, pp. 150–151). Stalin shamelessly rewrote Party history to make himself Lenin's chief assistant and adviser in 1917. Soviet public culture of the 1930s and 1940s attributed all of the achievements of the Soviet state to Stalin directly and lauded his military genius in crafting victory in World War II. Stalin's brutal repressions went hand in hand with a near-deification of his person. The outpouring of grief at his death in 1953 revealed the power of Stalin's image as wise father and leader of the people.

Once he had consolidated power, Nikita Khrushchev focused on destroying Stalin's cult. Many consider Khrushchev's 1956 attack on the Stalin cult to be his finest political moment. Al-

though Khrushchev criticized Stalin, he reaffirmed the institution of the leader cult by invoking Lenin and promoting his own achievements. Khrushchev's condemnation of the Stalin cult was also limited by his desire to preserve the legitimacy of the socialist construction that Stalin had undertaken. After Khrushchev's fall, Leonid Brezhnev criticized Khrushchev's personal style of leadership but ceased the assault on Stalin's cult of personality. He then employed the institution of the leader cult to enhance his own legitimacy.

Like Stalin's cult, Brezhnev's cult emphasized "the link with Lenin, [his] . . . role in the achievement of successes . . . and his relationship with the people" (Gill). The Brezhnev-era party also perpetuated the Lenin cult and emphasized its own links to Lenin by organizing a lavish commemoration of the centennial of Lenin's birth in 1970. The association of Soviet achievements with Brezhnev paled in comparison to the Stalin cult and praise of Brezhnev's accomplishments often linked them to the Communist Party as well. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev sought to raise the status of the Communist Party in relation to its leader. Yet Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev all conceived of the role of the people as consistently subordinate to leader and Party.

It was not until Gorbachev instituted the policy of glasnost, or openness, in the mid-1980s that the institution of the cult of personality came under sustained attack. The Soviet press revealed Stalin's crimes and then began to scrutinize the actions of all of the Soviet leaders, eventually including Lenin. The press under Gorbachev effectively demolished the institution of the Soviet leader cult by revealing the grotesque falsifications required to perpetuate it and the violent repression of the population hidden behind its facade. These attacks on the cult of personality undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and contributed to its downfall.

In the post-Soviet period, analysts have begun to see signs of a cult of personality growing around Vladimir Putin. Other observers, however, are skeptical of how successful such a leader cult could be in the absence of a Party structure to promote it and given the broad access to information that contemporary Russians enjoy. The cult of personality played a critical role in the development of the Soviet state and in its dissolution. The discrediting of the cult of the leader as an institution in the late Soviet period makes its post-Soviet future uncertain at best.

See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; LENIN'S TOMB; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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KAREN PETRONE

CULTURAL REVOLUTION

"Cultural revolution" (*kulturnaya revolyutsiya*) was a concept used by Lenin in his late writings (e.g., his 1923 article "On Cooperation") to refer to general cultural development of the country under socialism, with emphasis on such matters as inculcation of literacy and hygiene, implying gradual transformation out of the backwardness that Lenin saw as the legacy of tsarism.

In the late 1920s, the term was taken up and transformed by young communist cultural militants who sought the party leaders' approval for an assault on "bourgeois hegemony" in culture; that is, on the cultural establishment, including Anatoly Lunacharsky and other leaders of the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment, and the values of the old Russian intelligentsia. For the militants, the essence of cultural revolution was "class war"—an assault against the "bourgeois" intelligentsia in the name of the proletariat—and they meant the "revolution" part of the term literally. In the years 1928 through 1931, the militants succeeded in gaining the party leaders' support, but

lost it again in 1932 when the Central Committee dissolved the main militant organization, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), and promoted reconciliation with the intelligentsia.

In the late 1950s and 1960s, the concept of cultural revolution received a new lease of life in the Soviet Union. The inspiration came from Lenin's writings, not from the militant episode of 1928 through 1931, which was largely forgotten or suppressed as discreditable. Cultural revolution was now seen as a unique process associated with socialist revolution, which, for the first time, made culture the property of the whole people. The emphasis was on the civilizing mission of Soviet power, particularly in the country's own "backward," non-Slavic republics and regions. Rebutting suggestions from East European scholars that cultural revolution was not a necessary step in the evolution of countries that were not backward when they came to socialism, Soviet writers such as Maxim Kim described cultural revolution as one of the general laws (*zakonomernosti*) of socialism first realized in the Soviet Union but applicable to all nations.

In Western Soviet historiography since the late 1970s, the term has often connoted the militant episode of the Cultural Revolution (in some respects foreshadowing the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960s) described in the 1978 volume edited by Sheila Fitzpatrick. It has also been used in a sense different from any of the above to describe a Bolshevik (or, more broadly, Russian revolutionary) transformationist mentality endemic in the first quarter of the twentieth century (Joravsky; Clark; David-Fox).

Along with collectivization and the First Five-Year Plan, the Cultural Revolution was one of the great upheavals of the late 1920s and 1930s sometimes known as the "Great Break" (*veliky perelom*) or Stalin's "revolution from above." There were two important differences between the Cultural Revolution and other "Great Break" policies, however. The first was that whereas the turn to collectivization, elimination of kulaks, and forced-pace industrialization proved to be permanent, the Cultural Revolution was relatively short-lived. The second was that, in contrast to the collectivization and industrialization drives, Stalin's personal involvement and commitment was limited to a few areas, notably the show trials of "wrecker" engineers and the formation of a new proletarian intelligentsia through worker promotion (*vydvizhenie*), and he

was doubtful of or positively hostile to a number of the militants' initiatives (e.g., in educational policy, literature, and architecture) when they came to his attention. The fact that the Cultural Revolution was followed by what Nicholas S. Timasheff called a "Great Retreat" in cultural and social policy in the mid-1930s strongly suggests that Stalin, like Lenin before him, lacked enthusiasm for the utopianism and iconoclasm that inspired many of the young cultural militants.

The most influential of the militant organizations in culture, RAPP, had been agitating since the mid-1920s for an abandonment of the relatively tolerant and pluralist cultural policies associated with Lunacharsky and his People's Commissariat of Enlightenment, and the establishment of uncompromising "proletarian" (which, in the arts, often meant communist-militant) rule in literature. RAPP's pretensions were rebuffed in 1925, but in 1928 the atmosphere in the party leadership abruptly changed with the staging of the Shakhty trial, in which "bourgeois" engineers—serving as a synecdoche for the noncommunist Russian intelligentsia as a whole—were accused of sabotage and conspiracy with foreign powers. At the same time, Stalin launched a campaign for intensified recruitment and promotion of workers and young communists to higher education, especially engineering schools, and administrative positions, with the purpose of creating a "worker-peasant intelligentsia" to replace the old bourgeois one. The obverse of this policy was purging of "socially undesirable" students and employees from schools, universities, and government departments.

Stalin used the drive against the bourgeois intelligentsia to discredit political opponents, whom he took pains to link with noncommunist intellectuals accused of treason in the series of show trials that began in 1928. "Rightists" like Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov, who opposed Stalin's maximalist plans for forcible collectivization and forced-pace industrialization, became targets of a smear campaign that linked them with the class enemy, implying that they were sympathetic to, perhaps even in league with, kulaks as well as "wreckers" from the bourgeois intelligentsia.

As an "unleashing" of militants in all fields of culture and scholarship, as well as in the communist youth movement (the Komsomol), the Cultural Revolution generated a host of spontaneous as well as centrally directed radical initiatives. As occurred later in the Chinese Cultural Revolution,

young radicals from the Komsomol launched raids on "bureaucracy" that severely disrupted the work of government institutions. Endemic purging of all kinds of institutions, from schools and hospitals to local government departments, often initiated by local activists without explicit instructions from the center, was equally disruptive.

Among the main loci of Cultural Revolution activism, along with RAPP, were the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors, scholarly institutions whose specific purpose was to train and advance a communist intelligentsia. Although Stalin had contact with some of these activists, and perhaps even toyed with the idea of establishing his own "school" of young communist intellectuals, he was also suspicious of them as a group because of their involvement in party infighting and their admiration for the party's two most renowned intellectuals and theorists, Trotsky and Bukharin. The young communist professors and graduate students did their best to shake up their disciplines, which were almost exclusively in the humanities and social sciences rather than the natural sciences, and to challenge their "bourgeois" teachers. In the social sciences, this challenge was usually mounted in the name of Marxism, but in remote areas such as music theory the challenge might come from an outsider group whose ideas had no Marxist underpinning.

Long-standing disagreements over theory and research took on new urgency, and many visionary schemes that challenged accepted ideas found institutional support for the first time. In architecture, utopian planning flourished. Legal theorists speculated about the imminent dissolution of law, while a similar movement in education for the dissolution of the school did considerable practical damage to the school system. Under the impact of the Cultural Revolution, Russian cultural officials dealing with the reindeer-herding small peoples of the north switched to an interventionist policy of active transformation of the native culture and lifestyle. In ecology, the Cultural Revolution exposed conservationists to attack by militants inspired by the ideology of transforming nature.

In 1931 and 1932, official support for class-war Cultural Revolution came to an end. Professional institutions were in shambles, and little work was being produced. In industry, with so many workers being promoted and sent to university, there was a shortage of skilled workers left in the factories. In June 1931 Stalin officially rehabilitated

the bourgeois engineers; in April 1932, RAPP and other proletarian cultural organizations were dissolved. Many of the radicals who had been instrumental in attacking established authority during the Cultural Revolution were accused of deviation and removed from positions of influence. Bourgeois specialists who had been fired or arrested were allowed to return to work. In education, radical theories were repudiated and traditional norms reestablished, and policies of aggressive proletarian recruitment were quietly dropped.

But although this was the end of the radical antibourgeois Cultural Revolution, it was hardly a return to the way things had been before. Academic freedom had been seriously curtailed, and party control over cultural and scholarly institutions tightened. Thousands of young workers, peasants, and communists (*vydvizhentsy*) had been sent to higher education or promoted into administrative jobs. During the Great Purges of 1937–1938, many activists of the Cultural Revolution perished (often denounced by resentful colleagues), though others survived in influential positions in cultural and academic administration. But the cohort of *vydvizhentsy*, particularly those trained in engineering who graduated in the first half of the 1930s, were prime, albeit unwitting, beneficiaries of the Great Purges. Members of this cohort, sometimes known as “the Brezhnev generation,” entered top party, government, and professional positions at the end of the 1930s and continued to dominate the political elite for close to half a century.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION; CONSTRUCTIVISM; FELLOW TRAVELERS; INDUSTRIALIZATION

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CUMANS *See* POLOVTSY.

CURRENCY *See* ALTYN; DENGA; GRIVNA; KOPECK; MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET; RUBLE.

CUSTINE, ASTOLPHE LOUIS LEONOR

(1790–1857), French writer and publicist.

Astolphe de Custine’s fame rests upon his book *Russia in 1839*, a voluminous travelogue depicting the empire of Nicholas I in an unfavorable light; it became an oft-quoted precursor to numerous subsequent works of professional “Sovietologists” and “Kremlinologists.” Custine was born into an old aristocratic family; both his father and grandfather were executed during the French Revolution. Originally a staunch political conservative, Custine traveled to Russia determined to provide French readers with the positive image of a functioning monarchy. However, the three months spent in the empire of Tsar Nicholas I—whom he met in person—turned Custine into a constitutionalist. Russia’s despotic, incurably corrupt order that entitled the state to any intrusions into its citizens’ lives shocked the European observer with its innate violence and hypocrisy. Custine particularly faulted

the Russian establishment for its quasi-military structure introduced by Peter I. Most astounding among his conclusions was the prediction that Russia would face a revolution of unprecedented scope within the next half century.

When *Russia in 1839* was published in four lengthy volumes in 1843, it became an immediate bestseller and was translated into English, German, and Danish. Russian diplomats and secret agents tried their utmost to discredit the book and its author; the tsar himself reportedly had a fit of fury while reading Custine's elaborations. On the other hand, Alexander Herzen and other dissidents praised *Russia in 1839* for its accuracy, and even the chief of Russia's Third Department conceded that the ungrateful French guest merely said out loud what many Russians secretly were thinking in the first place.

Astolphe de Custine, who also wrote other travelogues and fiction, died in 1857.

See also: AUTOCRACY; NICHOLAS I.

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PETER ROLLBERG

CUSTOMS BOOKS

Customs books (*tamozhennye knigi*) were official registers of customs and other revenues collected at customs offices between the sixteenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries, and often a source of data on expenditures by the customs administration.

Typical entries in a customs book list the quantities and values of the commodities carried by a given merchant. In addition, they usually give the name, rank, origin, and destination of each merchant. Customs records often include separate sections on particular "special" commodities, such as liquor, horses, cattle, grain, or treasury goods.

All Russian towns, as well as many smaller communities, kept records of all trade passing through them. A total of some 190 seventeenth-century customs books have survived to this day.

Although the collection has been repeatedly decimated over time, varying numbers of customs books still exist for fifty cities in European Russia and for most of the Siberian fortress towns, virtually all of them dated between 1626 and 1686. The best-preserved collections of early modern customs data are for the Southern Frontier, the Northern Dvina waterway, and the Siberian fortress towns. In contrast, practically all the information of the key commercial centers of Moscow, Yaroslavl', Arkhangel'sk, and Novgorod, among others, has been lost.

For the early eighteenth century, customs data pertaining to some 300 towns have survived. Dated from 1714 to 1750, 142 books survive in the collections of the *Kamer-kollegia*. The most important collections are for Moscow, Northern Russia, and the Southern Frontier. The practice of compiling customs books was discontinued following the abolition of internal customs points in 1754.

See also: FOREIGN TRADE; MERCHANTS

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JARMO T. KOTILAINE

CYRIL AND METHODIUS SOCIETY

The first Ukrainian political organization in the Russian Empire, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood existed from late 1845 to early 1847. A secret society with no clear membership criteria, the brotherhood consisted of a core group of some dozen members and a wider circle of an estimated one hundred sympathizers. The society was led by the historian Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov, the minor official Mykola Hulak, and the schoolteacher Vasyl Bilozersky. Scholars continue to disagree as to whether the great poet Taras Shevchenko, the most celebrated affiliate of the group, was a formal member. This organization of young Ukrainian patriots was established in Kiev in December 1845 and, during the fourteen months of its existence, its activity was limited to political discussions and the formulation of a program. Kostomarov wrote the society's most important programmatic statement, "The Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian

People.” Strongly influenced by Polish Romanticism and Pan-Slavism, this document spoke vaguely of the Christian principles of justice and freedom, but also proposed a number of radical reforms: the abolition of serfdom, the introduction of universal education, and the creation of a democratic federation of all the Slavic peoples with the capital in Kiev. The members of the brotherhood disagreed about priorities and ways of implementing their program. Kostomarov, who stressed the Pan-Slavic ideal, expressed the majority opinion that change could be achieved through education and moral example. Hulak and Shevchenko advocated a violent revolution. Shevchenko, together with the writer Panteleimon Kulish, saw the social and national liberation of Ukrainians as the society’s priority. In March 1847 a student informer denounced the society to the authorities, leading to the arrest of all active members. Most of them were subsequently exiled to the Russian provinces, but Hulak received a three-year prison term, while Shevchenko’s poems earned him ten years of forced army service in Central Asia. Soviet historians emphasized the difference between radicals and liberals within the brotherhood, while in post-Soviet Ukraine the group is seen as marking the Ukrainian national movement’s evolution from the cultural stage to a political one.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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SERHY YEKELCHYK

CYRILLIC ALPHABET

Russian and other Slavic languages are written using the Cyrillic alphabet. The letter system has been attributed to Cyril and Methodius, two brothers from Greek Macedonia working as Orthodox missionaries in the ninth century. Cyril invented the Glagolitic (from the word *glagoliti*, “to speak”) script to represent the sounds they heard spoken among the Slavic peoples. By adapting church rituals to the local tongue, the Orthodox Church became nationalized and more accessible to the masses. Visually, Glagolitic appears symbolic or



An eighteenth-century carved bone and wood panel with the Cyrillic alphabet. © MASSIMO LISTRI/CORBIS

runic. Later St. Clement of Ohrid, a Bulgarian archbishop who studied under Cyril and Methodius, created a new system based on letters of the Greek alphabet and named his system “Cyrillic,” in honor of the early missionary.

Russian leaders have standardized and streamlined the alphabet on several occasions. In 1710, Peter the Great created a “civil script,” a new typeface that eliminated “redundant” letters. Part of Peter’s campaign to expand printing and literacy, the civil script was designated for all non-church publications. The Bolsheviks made their own orthographic revisions, dropping four letters completely to simplify spelling. As non-Russian lands were incorporated into the Soviet Union, the Communist Party decreed that all non-Russian languages had to be rendered using the Cyrillic alphabet. Following the collapse of the USSR, most successor states seized the opportunity to restore their traditional Latin or Arabic script as a celebration of their national heritage.

Transliteration is the process of converting letters from one alphabet to another alphabet system. There are several widely used systems for transliterating Russian into English, including the Library of Congress system, the U.S. Board of Geographic Names system, and the informally named "linguistic system." Each system offers its own advantages and disadvantages in terms of ease of pronunciation and linguistic accuracy.

This Encyclopedia uses the U.S. Board of Geographic Names system, which is more accessible for non-Russian speakers. For example, it renders the name of the first post-communist president as "Boris Yeltsin," not "Boris El'tsin." The composer of the *Nutcracker Suite* and the *1812 Overture* becomes "Peter Tchaikovsky," not "Piotr Chaikovskii."

See also: BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; PETER I

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

CYRIL OF TUROV

(c. 1130–1182), twelfth-century church writer, bishop.

The facts of Cyril's (Kirill's) life and career are disputable, since contemporary sources for both are lacking. Customarily, it is asserted that he was born to a wealthy family in Turov, northwest of Kiev, about 1130 and died not later than 1182; that he was a monk who rose to be bishop of Turov in the late 1160s; and that he wrote letters to Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky about a rival bishop. Cyril's brief Prolog (Synaxarion) life (translation in Simon Franklin's *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*), written probably long after his death, is the only "authority" for most of these claims, although it is vague and gives no dates. Whether all of the works attributed to him were his, and whether he was ever in fact a bishop (the texts usually call him simply the "unworthy" or "sinful monk Cyril") are matters of speculation and scholarly convention.

Tradition credits more extant writings to Cyril of Turov than to any other named person thought

to have lived in the Kievan period. They include sermons, parables, and edifying stories. The corpus of texts attributed to Cyril was critically studied and edited in the 1950s by the late philologist Igor Petrovich Yeremin. Simon Franklin considers the "stable core" of the oeuvre to consist of three stories and eight sermons, while various other writings have frequently been added.

The eight sermons, which no doubt are Cyril's most admired works today, form a cycle for the Easter season stretching from Palm Sunday to the Sunday before Pentecost. Like the famous Sermon on Law and Grace of Hilarion, they are heavily dependent on Byzantine Greek sources and, of course, incorporate many Biblical quotations and paraphrases. The original accomplishment of Cyril was to express all this in a fluent and vigorous Church Slavonic language that makes it fresh and living. Cyril's style is elaborate and rich in poetic tropes, particularly metaphors. A familiar example is his extended comparison of the resurrection with the coming of spring in the world of nature, where (in the manner of Hilarion) he quickly resolves the metaphors and reveals explicitly the higher meaning for salvation history.

Another typical feature of Cyril's sermons is the extensive use of dramatic dialogue, very welcome in a church literature otherwise devoid of liturgical drama. Thus the speech of Joseph of Arimathea (with his repeated plea, "Give me body of Christ") and others in the Sermon for Low Sunday both instruct and convey deep emotion.

See also: HILARION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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NORMAN W. INGHAM

CZARTORYSKI, ADAM JERZY

(1770–1861), Polish statesman, diplomat, and soldier.

Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski was the scion of an aristocratic Polish family, the son of Prince Adam Kazimierz and Izabella (nee Fleming) Czartoryski.

He fought in the Polish army during the war of the second partition in 1793, after which his father's estates were confiscated by the Russians. In a last-ditch attempt to salvage his property, Czartoryski's father sent Adam and his brother Constantine to the Court of St. Petersburg. Summoning all his courage, Czartoryski befriended the grandson of Empress Catherine II, the Grand Duke Alexander, in the spring of 1796. Hoping that Alexander would soon be tsar, Czartoryski filled his friend's head with ideas about Polish freedom. When Alexander became emperor in 1801, after the murder of his father Paul, he appointed Czartoryski as Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Now one of Tsar Alexander's trusted advisors, Czartoryski intervened on behalf of the Poles whenever he could, repeatedly advocating the restoration of Poland to its 1772 boundaries, a Russian-English alliance, and the diplomatic recognition of Napoleonic France as a method of deterrence. Deeming Austria and Prussia to be Russia's main enemies, Czartoryski resigned in protest when the tsar formed an alliance with Prussia. He nevertheless continued to champion Polish independence after Napoleon's unsuccessful war with Russia, attending the Congress of Vienna (1814) and pleading with British and French statesmen. On May 3, 1815, the Congress of Vienna did establish the so-called Congress Kingdom of Poland, a small state united with Russia but possessing its own army and local self-government. Cruelly, however, Alexander appointed Adam's brother Constantine as commander-in-chief of the Polish army and shunted Adam aside, never to be called again to government service.

Czartoryski participated in the Polish insurrection of 1830 and 1831, and briefly headed a provisional Polish government. However, the Russians crushed the rebellion, and Czartoryski was sentenced to death. Fleeing to Paris, he set up a political forum for Polish émigrés from the Hôtel Lambert, where he resided. Only among the Hungarians, in armed revolt against the Habsburg empire in 1848, did the Hôtel Lambert group find, and give, support. Many Poles joined the Hungarian army as officers and soldiers. Nevertheless, the Hôtel's influence also faded, along with Czartoryski's dream of Polish independence in his lifetime.

See also: ALEXANDER I; POLAND

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

CZECHOSLOVAK CORPS *See* CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, INVASION OF

Late in the evening of August 20, 1968, Czechoslovakia was invaded by five of its Warsaw-Pact allies: the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The invasion force, which eventually totaled around half a million soldiers, 6,300 tanks, and 800 airplanes, targeted its entry from the north, northwest, and south to quickly neutralize the outnumbered Czechoslovak army. The immediate objective of the invasion was to prevent any resistance to the seizure of power by collaborators in the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ), who had signaled their agreement with Soviet disapproval of First Secretary Alexander Dubček's reform program and leadership style. Although it caused the deaths of around 100 civilians and is often credited with putting an end to the "Prague Spring," the invasion failed in many political and logistical respects, and its larger aims were met only months later by other means.

The possibility of military intervention in Czechoslovakia had been entertained in the Brezhnev Politburo from at least as early as March 1968, only weeks after Dubček had risen (with Soviet blessing) to the top of the KSČ. At first, the majority of Soviet leaders preferred to pressure Dubček into reimposing censorship over the mass media, silencing critical intellectuals, and removing the bolder reformers within the party. His repeated promises to restore control temporarily prevailed over the demands of Polish, East German, and Bulgarian leaders for Soviet-led military action. The Politburo was also restrained by its lack of personal contacts with, and trust in, other Czech and Slovak functionaries, to whom power would have to be entrusted.

By mid-July 1968, Soviet patience with Dubček had been exhausted, and alternative leaders had



A Czech youth displays a bloodstained flag to Soviet troops sprawled atop a passing tank in Prague, August 21, 1968. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

been identified. Under the cover of war games in and around Czechoslovakia, twenty divisions moved into striking position. After the failure of several last attempts to persuade Dubček to take the initiative in reversing his reforms, the Politburo concluded on August 17 that military intervention was unavoidable. The Czech and Slovak collaborators, however, botched their bid to seize power, and the invading armies' overextended supply lines broke down, forcing soldiers to beg for food and water from a hostile populace engaging in highly effective, nonviolent resistance. In Moscow, the Soviet powers decided to bring Dubček and his closest colleagues to the Kremlin. After three days of talks, a secret protocol was signed that committed the KSČ leadership to the restoration of censorship and a purge of the party apparatus and government ministries. Dubček remained at the helm of the KSČ until April 1969, when Moscow-fueled intrigue led to his replacement by the more amenable Gustáv Husák.

See also: BREZHNEV DOCTRINE; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, RELATIONS WITH

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KIERAN WILLIAMS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, RELATIONS WITH

Both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were born from the collapse of European empires at the

close of World War I. While the USSR rose directly from the rubble of the Russian Empire, the Paris Peace Conference crafted Czechoslovakia from Austro-Hungarian lands. From the outset, the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and Slovakia had as many differences as similarities, and tensions between the two halves of the state would resurface throughout its lifetime and eventually contribute to its demise in 1992.

Under the leadership of President Tomas G. Masaryk, Czechoslovakia was spared many of the problems of the interwar period. Its higher levels of industrialization helped it weather the financial crises of the 1920s better than its more agrarian neighbors. Czechoslovakia also remained a democracy, ruled by the "Petka"—the five leading political parties. Democracy ended only when Czechoslovakia was seized by Nazi Germany, first through the Munich Agreement of 1938, and later through direct occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. A separate Slovak state was established under Nazi protection in 1939. Ultimately, Soviet troops liberated Czechoslovakia in 1945.

Following World War II, Stalin moved to first install satellite regimes throughout Eastern Europe and then mold them to emulate Soviet structures. Unlike other future members of the Warsaw Pact, however, Czechoslovakia's communists were homegrown, not installed by Moscow. A Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) had been established in 1921 and had a much broader support base than the Soviet party. Communists served in the first post-war government of President Eduard Benes, taking a plurality (38 percent) of the vote in May 1946. They controlled key ministries, including the Interior, Education, Information, and Agriculture. They also acceded to Soviet pressure to not participate in the Marshall Plan reconstruction program. The CPCz seized power in February 1948, when non-Communist cabinet members resigned, hoping to force new elections. A handful of other parties competed in the May 1948 election, but the Communists were in charge. Benes resigned the presidency in June and was replaced by Communist Klement Gottwald.

Gottwald and CPCz First Secretary Rudolf Slansky then began a program of restructuring Czechoslovakia in the Soviet image. Noncommunist organizations were banned, economic planning was introduced, agriculture was collectivized, and media and educational institutions were subjected to ideological controls. Again emulating Stalin, the Czechoslovak communists used terror and purges

to consolidate their rule. Even Slansky succumbed to the purges; he was replaced by Antonin Novotny. Following Gottwald's death in 1953, Antonin Zapotocky became president.

The other major communist death of 1953, Stalin's, had little effect on Czechoslovakia. Like hard-line communist leaders in East Germany, officials in Prague did not embrace Nikita Khrushchev's efforts at liberalization and pluralism. They kept tight control over the Czechoslovak citizenry for the next fifteen years, using the secret police as necessary to enforce their rule. Public protest was minimal, in part due to the relative success—by communist standards—of Czechoslovakia's economy.

In January 1968 the CPCz removed Novotny and replaced him with Alexander Dubcek, who finally brought destalinization to Czechoslovakia. The CPCz now allowed broader political discussion, eased censorship, and tried to address Slovak complaints of discrimination. This new approach, called "socialism with a human face" led to a resurgence in the country's social, political, and economic life—an era that came to be called the Prague Spring. Soon popular demands exceeded the Party's willingness to reform. The CPCz's "Action Plan" was countered by "2,000 Words," an opposition list of grievances and demands.

The Kremlin kept a close eye on all developments in Czechoslovakia. Khrushchev had dispatched tanks to Budapest in 1956 when Hungarian Communists took reform too far. His successor, Leonid Brezhnev, was even less inclined to allow for experimentation. By summer, Moscow worried that Dubcek had lost control. Moscow declared its right to intervene in its sphere of influence by promulgating the Brezhnev Doctrine. On August 21, 1968, Warsaw Pact troops invaded to restore order. Dubcek was summoned to Moscow but not immediately fired.

In 1969 "socialism with a human face" was replaced with a new policy: normalization. Gustav Husak became the CPCz first secretary in April 1969, and Dubcek was dispatched to the forests of Slovakia to chop wood. Husak took orders from Moscow, turning Czechoslovakia into one of the Soviet Union's staunchest allies. The Party purged itself of reformist elements, alternative organizations shut down, and censorship was reimposed. In October 1969, Moscow and Prague issued a joint statement, announcing that their economies would be coordinated for the next six years.

The populace fell in line, quietly accepting the reversal of the Prague Spring. The communist leaders tried to temper the political hard-line by maintaining a high standard of living and plentiful consumer goods. As the shock of the crackdown faded, however, a handful of opposition movements emerged trying to keep alive the spirit of 1968. The best-known of these groups was Charter 77, named for the January 1977 declaration signed by 250 dissidents, including playwright and future president Vaclav Havel.

The rise of Gorbachev in 1985 alarmed the CPCz. The hard-line communist leaders of Czechoslovakia did not embrace Gorbachev's brand of new thinking. They stubbornly held onto their austere rule, while the economy began to skid. They had come to power in 1969 to block reform; they could hardly shift and embrace it now. Gorbachev's first official visit to Czechoslovakia, in 1987, raised hopes—and fears—that he would call for a resurrection of the 1968 reforms, but instead he made rather bland comments that relieved the Czech leaders. They believed they now had Moscow's blessing to ignore perestroika. Husak retired as First Secretary—but not President—in late 1987, apparently for personal reasons rather than on Moscow's order. His replacement, Milos Jakes, was another hard-line communist with no penchant for reform.

Czechoslovakia was one of the last states to experience popular demonstrations and strikes in the cascading events of late 1989. The West German embassy in Prague was overrun by thousands of

East Germans seeking to emigrate. When the other hard-line holdout, East Germany, collapsed in October, suddenly the end of communism in Czechoslovakia seemed possible. Unable to address popular demands, the Czechoslovak Politburo simply resigned en masse, after barely a week of demonstrations. Havel became president; Dubcek returned from internal exile to lead parliament.

The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 and the Czech Republic and Slovakia divorced on December 31, 1992. Initially, the new Czech state tilted westward, whereas Slovakia leaned toward Moscow, in part because its economy was still oriented in that direction. As the 1990s unfolded, both countries maintained proper ties with Moscow, but also joined NATO: the Czech Republic in 1999, Slovakia in 2002.

See also: CZECHOSLOVAKIA, INVASION OF; WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

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DAGESTAN

Dagestan, part of the ethnically diverse Caucasus region, is an especially rich area of ethnic and linguistic variety. An Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the RSFSR during the Soviet period, it has continued to be an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation since. There are twenty-six distinct languages in the Northeast Caucasian family. The majority of these languages' speakers live in Dagestan. The largest of these are Avar, Dargin, and Lezgin. The total population of the Dagestan A.S.S.R. in 1989 was 1.77 million. Many other nationalities, such as Russians, also live in Dagestan.

The capital of Dagestan is Makhachkala, located on the Caspian Sea. The Terek River is the most important river in Dagestan, flowing from Chechnya and toward the Caspian Sea. There is a small coastal plain that gives rise quickly to the eastern portion of the main Caucasus range. The most intense ethno-linguistic diversity is found in the mountains as a result of the isolation that historically separated groups of people. The northern part of Dagestan connects with the Eurasian steppe.

Many of the people of Dagestan are descendents of the residents of the ancient Caucasian Albanian Kingdom. This kingdom was known for its multiplicity of languages and was Christian for many centuries, having close relations with the Armenian people and their Christian culture.

Dagestanis were traditionally Muslims peoples. Attempts in the post-Soviet period to incite Islam-based rebellion, however, have been generally unsuccessful. These rebellions have come from the direction of the troubled Republic of Chechnya, which is located west of Dagestan. The Islam of Dagestan was traditionally a Sufi-based Islam, one that is inimical to the sort of puritanical Sunni sectarianism that is exported from other parts of the Islamic world. Sufism in this part of the world is not without its militant expression; one of the most famous leaders, Shamil, was an Avar of Dagestan. His power base was mainly in the Central Caucasus among the Chechens.

Unlike many of their other neighbors in the Caucasus, the Dagestanis, for the most part, did not experience the exile and deportation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This makes the narrative of their people much less filled with the anger and alienation that characterizes Chechen, Abkhazian, and other histories. The ethnic fragmentation of



Dagestan has also prevented a unified Dagestani national identity from being formed.

The Russian Empire appeared in this area in two different forms: by the Cossacks who lived at the periphery of the empire in the semiautonomous communities; and by means of the imperial army's movement down the Volga River and to the western shore of the Caspian. Peter the Great captured territory in this area, but Dagestan was not fully brought into the Russian Empire until the mid-nineteenth century.

The Soviet period saw the creation of Cyrillic-based alphabets for the various languages of Dagestan. This strengthened the existence of the larger languages, and may have forestalled the extinction of some of the smallest of the languages. It also served to forestall the creation of a united Dagestani national identity.

In the post-Soviet period, in addition to Islamic agitation from the west, there has also been a certain amount of ethnic conflict. The conflict is generally over who will control the politics and patronage of certain enclaves, while the larger groups jockey for position in the republic's government. Some of the conflicts result from the ethnic mixing that was encouraged and sometimes forced during the Soviet period.

See also: AVARS; CAUCASUS; DARGINS; ISLAM; LEZGINS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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PAUL CREGO

DANIEL, METROPOLITAN

(d. 1547), Metropolitan of Moscow, 1522–1539; leading Josephite and "Possessor."

Daniel was a native of Ryazan with a powerful frame, an encyclopedic turn of mind, a preacher's

bent, and disciplined work habits. He was tonsured by Joseph of Volokolamsk (also known as Iosif or Joseph of Volotsk) around 1500 and designated to succeed him before his death in 1515, when he and his monastery were under virulent attack by Vassian Patrikeyev and out of favor at court.

As abbot, Daniel demonstrably enforced the rule of communal property, and the cloister continued its remarkable growth as a landowner and center of learning, training future prelates, and writing. He oversaw the completion of the extended redactions of Joseph's *Enlightener* and Monastic Rule and masterminded the creation of the *Nikon Chronicle* with its milestone grand narrative, sacralizing Rus history and granting Moscow the contested succession to Kiev.

Selected metropolitan by Basil III, Daniel issued a worthless writ of safe-conduct to a suspect appanage prince (1523) and permitted Basil's controversial divorce and remarriage (1525), which resulted in the birth of the future Ivan IV (1530). In turn Daniel was able to organize synods against Maxim Greek (1525, 1531) and Vassian (1531), and canonize Joseph's mentor Pafnuty of Borovsk. Daniel also placed an enterprising ally, Macarius, on the powerful, long vacant archepiscopal see of Novgorod (1526) and Iosifov trainees as bishops of Tver (1522), Kolomna (1525), and Smolensk (1536). Presiding over Basil III's pre-death tonsure and the oaths to the three-year-old Ivan IV (1533), Daniel remained on his throne through the dowager Helen Glinsky's regency (1533–1538), but could not exercise his designated supervisory role, prevent murderous infighting at top, or keep his post after she died.

Using his office to bolster church authority, Daniel systematized canon law and the metropolitan's chancery, built up its library, and tried to impose Iosifov practices on some other monasteries. He handled dissenting voices in a variety of ways. The 1531 synodal sentences ended Vassian Patrikeyev's career with imprisonment in Iosifov, but permitted the less bellicose and eminently useful Maxim a milder house arrest in Tver. Foregrounding the Orthodox principle of patient endurance in public life, Daniel contested the diplomat Fyodor Karpov's Aristotle-based insistence upon justice, but did not prosecute him. Daniel also utilized Basil III's German Catholic physician Nicholas Bülew and commissioned Russia's first translation of a Western medical work, but obliquely opposed by pen Bülew's astrology and

arguments favoring union of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches.

Daniel left two collections of original writings modeled on the encyclopedist Nikon of the Black Mountain and Joseph of Volokolamsk—one with sixteen discourses, the other with fourteen missives. They cover a variety of theological and ethical issues and evince both Nil Sorsky's and Joseph's influences. Daniel composed six other similar extant pieces and still others now lost. These collections, however, unlike the *Nikon Chronicle* and Daniel's canonic compilation, never achieved the authoritativeness and popularity of Joseph's *Enlightener* or Maxim's works.

See also: BASIL III; IVAN IV; JOSEPH OF VOLOTSK, ST.; MAXIM THE GREEK, ST.

DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

DANIEL, YULI MARKOVICH

(1925–1988), translator, author, show-trial defendant.

A native of Moscow, Yuli Daniel fought in World War II, then studied at the Moscow Regional Teachers' Institute. He began his literary career as a translator of poetry.

During the cultural Thaw that followed Nikita Khrushchev's Secret Speech in 1956, Daniel began to write short stories of his own. These include "This Is Moscow Speaking" (1962), "Hands" (1963), and "The Man from MINAP" (1963). Daniel's stories were satirical and absurdist. For example, the protagonist of "The Man from MINAP" is able to choose the sex of any baby he fathers. To create a boy, he thinks about Karl Marx at the point of conception; for a girl, he fantasizes about Klara Zetkin. In "This Is Moscow Speaking," a summer day in 1960 is designated "National Murder Day," an obvious—and bold—reference to Stalinist terror.

Even under Khrushchev, Daniel published not in the USSR, but in the West, under the pseudonym Nikolai Arzhak. Nonetheless, for the time being, Daniel remained safe from actual persecution. However, the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964 and the rise of Leonid Brezhnev brought about a deep cultural retrenchment. Daniel was among the first of its victims.

In 1965 Daniel was arrested, with fellow author Andrei Sinyavsky (who used the *nom de plume*

Abram Tertz). Both were put on trial in February 1966, accused by the prosecution of "pouring mud on whatever is most holy and most pure." The authors were permitted to speak in their own defense, but the trial was conducted in Stalinist style, with its outcome determined in advance. Sinyavsky was sentenced to seven years of hard labor, Daniel to five years. The Sinyavsky–Daniel trial served as the regime's clear sign to the Soviet intelligentsia that Khrushchev's liberalism was at an end.

After serving his sentence, Daniel was forbidden to return to Moscow. He settled in Kaluga for a number of years, before finally being allowed to move back to the capital.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; SINYAVSKY-DANIEL TRIAL

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DANILEVSKY, NIKOLAI YAKOVLEVICH

(1822–1885), social theorist and pan-Slavist.

Nikolai Danilevsky, a pan-Slavist, introduced into Russian social thought of the early and mid-nineteenth century the utopian-socialist ideas of the French thinker, Charles François Marie Fourier. Danilevsky's major writing was his book *Russia and Europe: An Inquiry into the Cultural and Political Relations of the Slavs to the Germano-Latin World*, published in 1869.

In his interpretation of socialism as applied to peasant Russia, Danilevsky developed the idea of the existing Russian peasant commune, or *obshchina*, as a unique, progressive, specifically Russian institution. It contained, he said, the seeds of cooperative socialism as found in Fourier's "phalanstery," or socialist cooperative.

Into his socialist worldview Danilevsky had added the Russian ingredient of Slavophilism and pan-Russism. This nationalistic concept that influenced some segments of the Russian intelligentsia by the early nineteenth century was derived from German thinkers of Germanophilic persuasion,

such as Herder and Ruckert. In Danilevsky's construction, not Germany but Russia occupies a leading position in the world as the standard-bearer of socialism. At heart, his Slavophilism was not a religious conception but, in his view, a "scientific" one.

Danilevsky gave his cyclic theory of history a specifically Russian twist. In it he incorporated the historiography of Oswald Spengler as found in the latter's *Decline of the West*. For Danilevsky, the West and in particular Germany were in the throes of decadence and demise. Russia, by contrast, was the wave of the future. In his book, he insisted that "even today [in the Balkans] the Slavs prefer the heavy yoke of Islam to the civilized domination of Austria." Danilevsky came to the conclusion that Russia's interests ran parallel to those of Prussia, which needed Russian collaboration more than the other way around. Yet Russia alone, he insisted, could make the best synthesis of all types of civilization worldwide.

Danilevsky's views influenced such writers as Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881). Moreover, his Slavophilism and pan-Russism became a point of departure for rationalizing tsarist Russian foreign policy. This expansionist motivation allowed Slavs to become united as "brothers" around the Russian core. Polish Slavs, on the other hand, would be excluded in this brotherhood because Poland was said by some to be a collective "old traitor to Slavdom."

Because of his socialist views and his affinity to the revolutionist Petrashevsky Circle of socialists in St. Petersburg, Danilevsky ran afoul of the tsarist police. As the reputed leading Russian expert on Fourierism, he, too, was put on trial and imprisoned along with the other Petrashevtsy, including Dostoyevsky.

Although Bolshevik and Soviet propaganda disavowed Danilevskian Pan-Slavism as a tsarist dogma, Leninism-Stalinism nevertheless reflected, in essence, a good deal of this thought. Lenin had described the Great Russian proletariat as the "vanguard" of world revolution. Stalin, in turn, echoed this idea in his tributes to the Great Russians, placing them above all other peoples in the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. Moreover, in its domestic imperial policy, Moscow described the Russians as the elder brother of all nations and national groups composing the USSR.

See also: DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; OB-SHCINA; PANSLAVISM; PETRASHEVTSY

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

DARGINS

The Dargins (or Dargwa) are an ethnic group in the Republic of Dagestan in the Russian Federation. At the 1989 Soviet Census they numbered 280,431, or 15.8 percent of the republic. In the USSR as a whole there were 365,038 Dargins, of whom over 97 percent considered Dargin to be their native tongue. Of that same number 68 percent claimed fluency in Russian as a second language. This would include a significant majority of the adults. The Dargins are situated in the area of Kizlyar, where one of the branches of the Dagestani State University is found.

The Dargin language is a member of the Lak-Dargwa group of the Northeast Caucasian family of languages. In Soviet times it would also have been included in the larger category of Ibero-Caucasian languages. This grouping owed as much to the politics of *druzhba narodov* (the Soviet policy of Friendship of the Peoples) as it did to the reality of linguistic relation in this diverse collection of languages found in the Caucasus region. Following the general pattern of many of the non-Slavic languages of the Soviet Union, Dargin has had a modified Cyrillic alphabet since 1937. A Latin alphabet was utilized from 1926 to 1937 and before that Dargin was written in an Arabic script.

A modest number of books was published in Dargin during the Soviet period. From 1984 to 1985, for example, a total of fifty-one titles appeared. This compares favorably with other ethnic groups of its size, but without an ethnic jurisdiction of its own. A people such as the Abkhaz, with less than a third of the population of the Dargins, had 149 titles published in the same two-year period.

The Dargins have competed with other local nationalities for position within the diverse Dagestan Republic as ethnic politics are manipulated along with religious identity. The Dargins have traditionally been Sunni Muslims, with the strong in-

fluence of Sufism characteristic in the Caucasus region.

See also: CAUCASUS; DAGESTAN; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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PAUL CREGO

DASHKOVA, YEKATERINA ROMANOVNA

(1743–1810), public figure, author, and memoirist.

As director of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences and president of the Russian Academy, Princess Yekaterina Romanovna Dashkova (née Vorontsova) was one of the first women to hold public office in Europe. By any standard, Dashkova led a remarkable life: She was born in 1743 to a prominent Russian noble family, the Vorontsovs. After losing her mother at the age of two, Dashkova grew up in the household of her uncle, Count Mikhail Vorontsov, where she received the best instruction available for young women. Yet, as she points out in her *Memoirs*, Dashkova felt compelled to supplement her education with intensive reading of authors such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Helvétius, and demonstrated a lively interest in politics from her earliest years. Her passion for learning, and for theories of education, would prove constant throughout her life.

In 1759 Dashkova married Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Dashkov and bore him three children in quick succession: Anastasia (1760–1831), Mikhail (1761–1762), and Pavel (1763–1807). Their marriage was happy, but short-lived: Mikhail died after a brief illness in 1764, leaving Dashkova with the task of paying his debts and rearing their two surviving children. Significantly, Dashkova chose never to remarry. Moreover, her relationship with her children became the source of recurring sorrow to Dashkova, who outlived her son and disinherited her daughter.

By far the most significant figure in Dashkova's life, however, was Empress Catherine II, whom Dashkova met in 1758, while the former was Grand Duchess and twice the age of the fifteen-year-old Dashkova. According to Dashkova,

the attraction between the two was immediate, if only because—as she writes with some exaggeration in her *Memoirs*—“there were no other two women at the time . . . who did any serious reading” (p. 36).

The defining moment in Dashkova's life took place in 1762, when the young princess took part in the palace revolution that overthrew Peter III and brought Catherine, his wife, to power. While historians continue to debate the precise role that Dashkova played in the coup, Dashkova places herself at the center of the revolt in her *Memoirs*. Catherine initially rewarded Dashkova's loyalty with gifts of money and property. Within a short time, however, the relationship between the two women deteriorated—the result, perhaps, of Dashkova's exalted claims for her role in Catherine's ascension to the throne.

Following the death of her husband in 1764, Dashkova spent much of the next two decades in self-imposed exile from the Russian court. From 1769 to 1771, and again from 1775 to 1782, Dashkova traveled abroad, overseeing her son's education in Scotland and meeting with prominent figures of the Enlightenment, such as Diderot, Voltaire, Benjamin Franklin, and Adam Smith. After Dashkova returned to Russia, in 1783 Catherine appointed her director of the Academy of Sciences, which the previous director had left in considerable disarray. Not only did Dashkova restore the fortunes of the Academy—much as she would affairs on her various estates—but she also inspired Catherine to found the Russian Academy, with the goal of compiling the first Russian etymological dictionary and fostering Russian culture. In her role as director of both academies, Dashkova was instrumental in bringing Enlightenment ideas to Russia. Dashkova also wrote and published extensively: She translated works on education, travel, and agriculture; composed verse and several plays; and oversaw the publication of several journals.

After quarrelling with the empress over the publication of the Yakov Knyazhnin's play *Vadim Novgorodsky*, which Catherine claimed was an attack on autocracy, Dashkova requested a leave of absence from the Academy in 1794. Catherine's death in 1796 brought further misfortune to Dashkova: In order to punish her for the role she played in the downfall of his father, Emperor Paul exiled Dashkova to a remote estate in northern Russia. One year later, after Dashkova appealed for clemency on the grounds of ill health, Paul

permitted her to return to Troitskoye, her estate near Moscow. Paul's death and the accession of Alexander I to the throne in 1801 brought an end to Dashkova's exile, but she chose to spend her remaining years at Troitskoye, managing her holdings and writing her celebrated memoirs.

As a historical figure, Dashkova remains significant for her prominent role in the intellectual life of eighteenth-century Russia: She exemplified the Enlightenment ideal of the educated woman, or *femme savante*, and inspired both admiration and anxiety among her contemporaries for her unusual achievements. Furthermore, her accomplishments illuminate central themes in the social and cultural history of Russia: female intrigue and patronage during the era of empresses; the persistence of noble family politics in the emerging bureaucratic state; and the Russian reception of the Enlightenment.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; CATHERINE II; PETER III

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MICHELLE LAMARCHE MARRESE

DASHNAKTSUTIUN

The *Hay heghapokhakan dashnaktsutiun* (Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF, Dashnak Party, or Dashnaktsutiun) was founded in 1890 in Tbilisi, by Russian Armenian intellectuals, in order to help Armenians in the Ottoman Empire obtain economic and political reforms. The party established branches throughout the Ottoman and Russian Empires as well as in Europe and the United States. At different times the party supported guerrilla activities, political action, and Western intervention as means to achieve its goals in the Ottoman Empire.

In the Russian Empire the Dashnaktsutiun led the opposition to the anti-Armenian policies of the tsarist government (1903–1905) and, subsequently, the militia forces that clashed with Azerbaijani Turks in the Caucasus during the revolution of 1905–1907. In 1914 it supported a Russian plan for reforms in Ottoman Armenia. During World

War I it also organized Russian-supported Armenian volunteer units in Eastern Armenia to help Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

The genocide committed by the Young Turk government against the Armenian population ended the presence of the party in Turkey. With the disintegration of the Russian Empire, the Dashnaktsutiun led the first independent Armenia, 1918–1920, only to cede power to the Bolsheviks in 1920. The party, along with other noncommunist groups, was banned from Soviet Armenia.

In the diaspora the Dashnaktsutiun focused on community-building, representing Armenians in host countries, and pursuing national aspirations internationally. Until the 1960s that meant a free and independent Armenia. Beginning in the 1970s, the party shifted its focus from an anticommunist and anti-Soviet crusade to an anti-Turkish campaign for the recognition of the genocide and territorial reparations from Turkey, for which Russian and USSR support was considered essential.

The Dashnaktsutiun has claimed a special position in Armenian history through its maximalist demands for the reconstitution of historic Armenia. Having reestablished itself in Armenia in 1990, the party reserved the right to resist by force any government it considered unacceptable; it opposed the leadership of the national movement that rose in Armenia in 1988 and accepted with reluctance the country's declaration of independence in 1991. Vehemently opposed to the first president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, it has been more supportive of the second, Robert Kocharian. Nonetheless, despite substantial contributions from its diasporan segment, the Dashnaktsutiun has been unable to make significant gains in Armenia's elections.

The Dashnaktsutiun is a tightly knit, disciplinary organization with grass roots mechanisms in many communities. It is financed mainly by membership dues and donations by sympathizers.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; CAUCASUS; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN

DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION

Secret society, active from 1816 to 1825 in Russia, named after its unsuccessful revolt in Saint Petersburg on December 14, 1825.

The Decembrist movement began as a secret society named the Union of Salvation, active from 1816 to 1818 in St. Petersburg. The Union of Welfare, created in 1818, followed. The latter existed until 1821, united more than two hundred members, and had branches in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kishinev, and other cities of the Russian empire. Both societies were organized by young officers who had recently returned from a foreign military campaign during the Napoleonic wars. Convinced that the Russian army had granted freedom to European people, these liberally minded and well-educated young members of the Russian nobility were disappointed by the politics of Alexander I, whose reforming plans outlined at the beginning of his reign were not realized. Observing the steep growth of nationalism in Europe, and following the tradition of "love for the fatherland" of the Russian educated nobility in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Decembrists were inclined toward extreme patriotism. They imagined the Russian people as a nation and acted in its name. Taking as an example the German *Tugendbund* (Union of Virtue), active in Prussia throughout Napoleon's occupation, members of secret societies claimed the national revival as their main aim. In particular, this nationalistic tendency expressed itself in demands for the discharge of foreigners from Russian positions of authority. Freemasonry, with its idealism and moral imperative on the one hand and secrecy and ritualization on the other, also contributed to the movement. Many participants of Russian secret societies were simultaneously members of Masonic lodges.

The main goal of the Union of Welfare was to influence public opinion. Its members aspired to create favorable conditions for constitutional reforms in Russia aimed at the moral and spiritual improvement of the elite and society as a

whole. Many members were engaged in the establishment of Lancaster's school system in Russia, as they believed it promoted enlightenment among the poor classes and in the army. Literature, playing an important role in Russian public life since the reign of Catherine the Great, was also an important field of activity for the Union of Welfare and other Decembrist societies. Many Decembrists contributed to Russian political lyrics and literary romanticism and were members of various literary societies. The conspirators Kondraty Ryleyev, Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, and Wilhelm Kuchelbecker were famous writers of their time.

New secret societies created on the basis of the Union of Welfare were more conspiratorial and better organized. The Southern Society, with its absolute leader, colonel Pavel Pestel, appeared in 1820 in Tulchin; and the Northern Society was founded in 1821 in St. Petersburg. Nikita Muraviev and Nikolai Turgenev were the main figures of the latter society. In the summer of 1825 the Southern Society took members of the Society of United Slavs, hoping to create a Pan-Slavic confederation. The conspirators discussed projects of the Russian constitution and ways of performing an armed revolt and regicide.

Pestel's Russian Justice, accepted as a program of the Southern Society, and Muraviev's "Constitution" were the most representative of the Decembrists' constitutional projects. Both projects provided for the abolition of serfdom. Muraviev offered constitutional monarchy, a federal organization of the country, and property qualification at elections. Pestel's radical project provided for creation of a centralized Jacobin-like republic and specific land reform, dividing land into private and public sectors. According to Pestel's project, dictatorship of a provisional government was to last ten to fifteen years after the revolt, whereas the leaders of the Northern Society suggested early election of authority.

Immediate cause for the conspirators to act was the succession crisis. On November 19th, 1825, childless Alexander I died unexpectedly in the south of Russia in Taganrog, far from the capital. According to the law of 1797, the oldest of his brothers, Grand Duke Konstantin, Viceroy of Poland, was to become the successor. However, in 1820 Konstantin had entered a morganatic marriage, and in 1822, in a private letter to Alexander, he had abandoned his right to the Russian throne. In 1823

Alexander signed a manifesto wherein he proclaimed his next eldest brother Nicholas the successor. It is unknown why this document was kept secret from the public. When news of the death of Alexander reached the capital, the general governor of St. Petersburg, Mikhail Miloradovich, convinced Nicholas that the guards were not loyal to him and would consider his accession to the throne a usurpation. Nicholas and the army swore allegiance to Konstantin, who was residing in Poland. The latter was not willing to accept authority, and yet he did not renounce it publicly. In the dangerous situation of interregnum, Nicholas became emperor and set the new oath of allegiance for December 14.

Taking advantage of disorder in the troops and government, members of secret societies decided to persuade soldiers not to swear an oath to Nicholas. The plan of revolt was developed in Ryleyev's apartment on the night of December 13. The conspirators composed a manifesto to the Russian people, in which "the abolition of the former government" was proclaimed. Colonel Prince Sergei Trubetskoy, one of the leaders of the Northern Society, was appointed as the leader of the revolt.

Unfortunately for the conspirators, not all those officers and troops expected to participate in the revolt actually gathered. Trubetskoy seemed to lose nerve and did not lead the mutineers. About three thousand soldiers were lined up in combat readiness on the Senate Square with thirty officers as their leaders. The nearest streets were crowded with people. The troops loyal to Nicholas surrounded the square. For several hours the troops stood opposite each other. A few attempts to persuade the soldiers to return to their barracks were made, and General Governor Miloradovich was fatally wounded by retired lieutenant Pavel Kakhovsky. At last Nicholas gave an order to open fire, and the revolt was suppressed.

Despite the defeat in the capital, and despite Pestel's arrest on December 13, the southern conspirators, including the members of the United Slavs, decided to act. Sergei Muraviev-Apostol and Mikhail Bestuzhev-Ryumin supervised the revolt. On December 29 the conspirators managed to persuade soldiers of the Chernigov regiment to start out for the capital. On January 3, 1826, the government troops stopped the mutineers and defeated them.

A special investigation committee was created to determine the circumstances of the conspiracy. The High Criminal Court condemned to death five Decembrists: Pestel, Ryleyev, Muraviev-Apostol,

Kakhovsky, and Bestuzhev-Ryumin. They were hanged in St. Petersburg on July 13, 1826. Thirty-one officers were sentenced to lifelong hard labor. The other officers and soldiers were sentenced to different terms of hard labor, disciplinary battalions, and exile. By the amnesty declared in 1856 after Alexander II's accession, Decembrists were allowed to reside in the central part of Russia and regained their nobility privileges.

See also: FREEMASONRY; PANSLAVISM; SLAVOPHILES

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ELENA ZEMSKOVA

DECREE ON LAND

Upon seizing power from the Provisional Government in October 1917, the Bolsheviks immediately issued two decrees. The first decree served to withdraw Russia from World War I. The second decree issued by the new Bolshevik regime was entitled "On Land." The decree abolished property rights of landlords and provided for the confiscation of estates with no compensation. More generally, the Decree on Land abolished private ownership of land and introduced the nationalization of land. Under the terms of the decree, about 150 million hectares of arable land, pasture land, and forest land were confiscated and distributed to 25 million communal households. The October 1917 land decree was followed by legislation in January 1918 that forbade the selling, renting, or mortgaging of land. Nationalized land became the possession of "all the people" and could be used only by those who cultivated it. Although all land was nationalized, individuals or families could obtain allotments of land for small-scale agricultural activities, assuming that they themselves used the land and did not employ hired labor. These land plots included collec-

tive garden plots, private plots, and dacha plots, the size of which was restricted by local norms.

The prohibition on leasing land remained until March 1990, when a USSR law on land came into effect. Legal restrictions on private ownership of land remained in effect until December 1990 when a law was passed in the RSFSR that permitted the ownership of land, subject to certain constraints.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; OCTOBER REVOLUTION

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STEPHEN K. WEGREN

DEDOVSHCHINA

A term used for “hazing” in the Russian military from the Russian word for grandfather.

This set of practices, a long-standing feature of Soviet army life, appears to have accelerated dramatically in the 1990s. Observers note that “hazing” is itself a problematic translation, because it fails to grasp the severity of the systematic violence, humiliation, and torture visited upon new conscripts by their elders. Official estimates place the number of conscripts murdered at the hands of their comrades-in-arms at perhaps a thousand per year. Independent organizations, including the well-known advocacy group for military conscripts, Soldiers’ Mothers, estimates that as many as three to four thousand conscripts are murdered each year by other soldiers and believes that a large number die as a result of the collective practices known as *dedovshchina*. The problem has also contributed significantly to the very high rate of suicide evident in the Russian armed forces. Anatol Lieven argues that nothing has done more to destroy morale and cohesion than the problem of *dedovshchina*. The lack of an effective system of non-commissioned officers, capable of providing the disciplinary structure and rule-enforcement

necessary to head off such hazing, contributes significantly to the widespread nature of these abuses. The general lack of resources available to the Russian military in the 1990s, including the basic means of life, such as food, have also contributed to erosion of military morale, which many observers say has contributed to the high level of atrocities committed by Russian forces in the two campaigns in Chechnya, from 1994 to 1996, and from 1999 to the present. Lieven sees *dedovshchina* as a symbiosis between tyranny and anarchy in which rules and restraints are crippled “leaving only a veneer of autocratic but in fact powerless authority over a pit of chaos, corruption, and a host of private tyrannies.”

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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DEFECTORS, SOVIET ERA

Defectors (*perebezhchiki*) during the Soviet era were people who left the Soviet Union without permission and in violation of Soviet law. Soviet authorities applied the term *defection* more broadly than in the West, where a defector is usually defined as an individual who has committed treason by cooperating with a hostile foreign intelligence service. Because Soviet citizens were prohibited by law from leaving the country to settle elsewhere, anyone who sought political asylum in another country was labeled a defector and a traitor. This included scientists, artists, film directors, dancers, writers, musicians, scholars, journalists, and seamen. (The term did not apply to writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn or cellist Mstislav Rostropovich, who were forcibly exiled; the dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, who was brought to the West as part of an exchange; or former KGB general Oleg Kalygin, now residing in the United States, who criticized the KGB publicly but remained a Soviet citizen.)

Among well-known Soviet defectors who fall into the broader category were Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva; ballet dancers Rudolph

Nureyev, Natalia Makarova, Mikhail Baryshnikov, and Alexander Godunov; pianist Dmitry Shostakovich; theater director Yuri Lyubimov; and chess grandmaster Viktor Korchnoy.

In addition many Soviet defectors betrayed their country by passing on secrets to Western intelligence. Often they wrote books about their experiences. Among the earliest such defectors was NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) officer Walter Krivitsky, who sought asylum in the United States in 1937, wrote the book *I was Stalin's Agent*, and died under mysterious circumstances in 1941. Another NKVD officer, Viktor Kravchenko, the author of *I Chose Freedom*, defected to the United States in 1944 and died in 1966. Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk for Soviet military intelligence (GRU), turned himself over to Canadian authorities in Ottawa, Canada, in 1945. Gouzenko's revelations about the Soviet spy network in the West, supported by documents he brought with him, helped to spark the Cold War. Intelligence officer Peter Deryabin sought American asylum in Vienna in 1953, later writing several books about his career in the Soviet secret services. In 1954 KGB agents Vladimir and Yevdokia Petrov defected in Australia and later settled in the United States, where they published *Empire of Fear* in 1956. KGB officer Anatoly Golitsyn defected to the United States in 1961, reporting that the KGB had placed an agent at the highest levels of American intelligence, but unable to give details to identify the agent. Oleg Lyalin, a KGB officer posing as a trade official, defected to Britain in 1971. Alexei Myagkov, a KGB captain serving in Germany, defected to West Berlin in 1974, later writing *Inside the KGB: An Expose by an Officer of the Third Directorate*. Arkady Shevchenko, a high-ranking Soviet diplomat serving at the United Nations, defected in New York in 1978. In 1985 he published a best-selling book entitled *Breaking with Moscow*. Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB officer posing as a journalist, defected in Japan in 1979 and now resides in the United States. Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a KGB officer now living in Britain, defected while working under cover for the Soviet news agency TASS in Switzerland in 1980. He later wrote *Secret Servant: My Life with the KGB and the Soviet Elite*. Among other KGB officers who defected to Britain in more recent years were Vladimir Kuzichkin, a KGB officer who was working in Iran before he sought asylum in 1982; and Oleg Gordievsky, a high-ranking KGB colonel who had collaborated secretly with British intelligence since 1974 and escaped to the West in 1985.

For Western intelligence services, one challenge was to establish that the Soviet defectors were genuine and were not acting as double agents for the KGB. When Yury Nosenko, a middle-level KGB officer, offered himself to the CIA in Geneva in 1962, a debate ensued over his bona fides that lasted for ten years and seriously impaired CIA operations against the Soviet Union. Another controversial case was that of Alexander Orlov, an agent of the Soviet NKVD, who defected to Spain in 1938 and ended up in the United States. Orlov, whose book *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* created a sensation when it appeared in 1953, passed on information to the CIA and the FBI, but some historians have claimed that he remained loyal to the Soviets. When high-ranking KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko defected to the United States in 1985, it was an enormous blow to the KGB, because he passed on details of KGB secret agents and operations to the CIA. But when Yurchenko apparently became unhappy with his treatment by the CIA and, after a few months, slipped away and re-defected to the Soviet Union, the case was highly embarrassing to American authorities.

See also: COLD WAR; IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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AMY KNIGHT

DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) since its founding in 1990 has changed its face radically at least three times. It was created by politicians, including radical anticommunists as well as "communists with a human face," as a counterbalance to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The first split happened as early as the constituent assembly, and a number of well-known politicians left the party, unhappy with the selection of Nikolai Travkin, leader of the CPSU Democratic platform, as sole chair. In the 1993 elections, the DPR, whose list was headed by Travkin, film director Stanislav Govorukhin, and academician-

economist Oleg Bogomolov, received 3.0 million votes (5.5%, eighth place) and fourteen seats in the Duma. The second split happened in 1994, when Travkin entered the government; the majority of the fraction, charging him with compromise, elected a new leader, economist Sergei Glaziev, who had left Boris Yeltsin's administration in 1993. The DPR changed from "Travkin's party" into "the party of Glaziev-Govorukhin." The DPR did not participate independently in the 1995 elections. Its leaders joined three ballots: Glaziev was third on the KRO list, Govorukhin headed the Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc, and Bogomolov was third on the "Social-Democrat" list. None of the three lists crossed the five-percent barrier. In 1996, with the departure first of Glaziev from the DPR (via the Congress of Russian Communities to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, or KPRF), then Govorukhin (via the KPRF to Fatherland—All Russia, or OVR), the DPR came to be led by little-known functionaries. In the 1999 elections, the party first became a co-constituent of the bloc "Voice of Russia," then moved into the bloc "All Russia," and vanished completely with the formation of OVR.

When, in the fall of 2001, an attempt was made to restore the former popularity of the old brand, and the Novgorod governor Mikhail Prusak was elected leader of the DPR, many viewed this as an endeavor on the part of the Kremlin to create a tame right-centrist party to replace the Union of Right Forces (SPS), which was not sufficiently compliant. Prusak announced at the time that the "The DPR will most likely become a party of the center, with a clear structure in observance of the principle of single management. This will be a national party, whose tasks will include the construction of a democratic civil society, fortification of the government, preservation of its territorial integrity, formation of a middle class, and development of national product." In 2002, having created forty-nine regional branches with a total of more than 10 million members, the DPR was able to register again as a political party with the Ministry of Justice.

Prusak was not sufficiently dedicated to party matters, and at the 2003 congress the DPR deposed its leader. It was announced that the party would enter federal elections for the first time in ten years but that the position of leader would probably be vacant.

See also: POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM; UNION OF RIGHT FORCES

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NIKOLAI PETROV

DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA

The movement Democratic Russia (DR) is a relic of the end of the Soviet epoch, when opposition arose to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the only party at the time. Founded in October 1990, it initially united practically all the anticommunist opposition. Its predecessor was the bloc of candidates "Democratic Russia" in the March 1990 elections for people's deputies to the RSFSR and local soviets. Numbering up to 205 delegates in congresses from 1990 to 1993, the group "Democratic Russia," after the introduction of a prohibition against membership in more than one fraction, split into several fractions, two of which—"Democratic Russia" and "Radical Democrats"—composed the DR movement. In the 1991 presidential elections, DR and the parties belonging to it, including the DPR (Democratic Party of Russia), SDPR (Social-Democratic Party of Russia), Peasant Party of Russia, Russian Christian Democratic Movement, and the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, supported Boris Yeltsin, who won for his first term.

After the "victory over the communists," two tendencies struggled within the movement: One favored turning it into a broad coalition of parties and organizations, the other favored making a single organization of it, allowing collective and individual membership. As a result, parties broke off from DR: first the Democratic Party of Russia, the Constitutional-Democratic Party—Party of People's Freedom, and the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement (1991), then, in 1992 and 1993, the Social-Democratic Party of the RF, the Republican Party of the RF, the People's Party of Russia, and the Free Democratic Party of Russia. In the 1993 elections, DR was one of four co-constituents of the bloc "Russia's Choice," but by the end of

1994, most of the members of the movement, entering the Duma on the lists "Russia's Choice" and "Yabloko," dissociated themselves from the movement, and its co-chairs, delegates Lev Ponomarev and Gleb Yakunin, left the fraction Russia's Choice. At the outset of the 1995 campaign, the DR leaders created a federal party, DemRussia, and, alongside the Movement, established a bloc Democratic Russia and Free Trade Unions, which ultimately bowed out of participation in the elections, to the advantage of Russia's Democratic Choice (DVR) and Yabloko. In 1996 the co-chair of DemRussia, Galina Starovoytova, tried to establish candidacy for the presidential elections; in 1998 she was murdered in St. Petersburg in hazy circumstances.

In 1999 the Movement became one of a number of constituents of the bloc "A Just Cause," and in May 2001 it dissolved along with other democratic parties, becoming part of the Union of Right Forces (SPS). Up to the moment of its dissolution, according to the party's president, Sergei Stankevich, the party had about six thousand members, including two thousand activists. Never having been a leadership-oriented, monolithic, disciplined structure, DemRussia retains its character in its afterlife. Not all regional branches of the movement and party agreed with the idea of dissolution; from time to time the name DemRussia is mentioned in connection with various pickets and meetings (against the war in Chechnya, concerning anniversaries of the founding of the movement, protection of the White House, and so forth), as well as in connection with routine unification initiatives of the democrats.

See also: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DEMOCRATIC PARTY; POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM; UNION OF RIGHT FORCES; YABLOKO

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NIKOLAI PETROV

DEMOCRATIC UNION

The Democratic Union (DS) is a radical liberal party, the first political organization to emerge as an alternative to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), formed out of the dissident movement shortly after the beginning of perestroika. It was established in May 1988 on the basis of the seminar "Democracy and Humanism," which began in the summer of 1987. The Democratic Union's nonconformism distinguishes it from democratic parties that appeared later. Political tendencies that initially coexisted in the DS alongside the liberal—such as social democratic or Eurocommunist tendencies—gradually broke off. Under the strain of numerous ideological and personal disagreements, the DS went through numerous splits. Where internal conflict arose between radical and more moderate elements, the radical always gained the upper hand.

The Democratic Union's political activity consisted mainly of conducting unsanctioned meetings and making sensational announcements. In the words of DS leader Valeria Novgorodskaya (chair of the central coordinating council from 1996), DS activists were "genuine Bolsheviks, albeit with an anticommunist leaning." In December 1992, on the initiative of Novgorodskaya and N. Zlotkin, the party "Democratic Union of Russia" (DSR) was established, declaring itself a constituent of the DS. In the spring of 1993, the DSR supported Boris Yeltsin in the conflict with the Congress of People's Deputies, regarding him as a "fighter against Soviet power," and broke sharply with the DS, which continued to view the president and government as heirs of the Communist regime. Novgorodskaya's group was excluded from the Moscow DS organization, and from that point on, the DS and DSR existed separately. After troops were brought into Chechnya in 1994, the DSR moved into extreme opposition to the government, idealizing the Chechen side in the meantime. In 1996, the DSR first called for a repeal of the presidential elections, in order to avoid a situation in which "the formal observation of democratic procedures leads to the liquidation of democracy," then it supported the candidacy of Grigory Yavlinsky after Yeltsin's second term. During the Yugoslav crisis, the DS unequivocally sided with the U.S. and NATO and announced that it would send a detachment of volunteers to the Balkans as aid to NATO, headed by Novgorodskaya.

Officially the DSR never registered as a party, first because of identification with “opposition from outside the system,” then because of low numbers and lack of organizational structures in the provinces. In 1993 Novgorodskaya entered the ballot in a single-mandate district as a candidate from the bloc Russia’s Choice; in 1995 on the list of the Party of Economic Freedom, which a significant portion of the DSR entered in order to receive official status. In the 1999 elections, the DS joined with “A Just Cause,” but with the registration of the latter, left for the Union of Right Forces (SPS). In the 2000 presidential elections, the DS supported Konstantin Titov. Since then, the DS’s only appearances in the news have been thanks to Novgorodskaya’s activity and high profile.

See also: PERESTROIKA; POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

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NIKOLAI PETROV

DEMOCRATIZATION

While modern times have seen more than one, however partial, attempt to democratize Russia, democratization in the narrow sense refers to policies pursued by Mikhail Gorbachev and his closest associates, roughly from 1987 to 1991.

The language of democratization was widely employed within a one-party context by Gorbachev’s predecessors, most notably by Nikita Khrushchev. Yet their interpretations of *demokratizatsiya* and *democratizm* diverged fundamentally from universal definitions of democracy. “Soviet democratization” implied increased public discussions, mostly on economic and cultural issues; increased engagement of Communist Party (CPSU) leaders with ordinary people; and some liberalization, namely, expansion of individual freedoms

and relaxation of censorship. However, electoral contestation for power among different political forces was out of the question. The openly stated goals of democratization Soviet-style included reestablishing feedback mechanisms between the leadership and the masses over the head of the bureaucracy; encouraging public pressure to improve the latter’s performance; and improving the psychological and moral climate in the country, including confidence in the CPSU leadership, with expectations of a resulting increase in labor productivity. Additional, unspoken goals ranged from strengthening a new leader’s position, through public discussion and support, vis-à-vis conservative elements, to promoting Moscow’s international image and its standing vis-à-vis the West.

Gorbachev’s initial steps followed this pattern, relying, at times explicitly, upon the legacy and experience of Khrushchev’s thaw; the official slogan of the time promised “more democracy, more socialism.” Soon, however, Gorbachev pushed democratization toward full-scale electoral democracy. The reforms sparked demands for ideological pluralism and ethnic autonomy. As the momentum of reform slipped from under his control, Gorbachev’s own policies were increasingly driven by improvisation rather than long-term planning. Emerging nonparty actors—human rights organizations, independent labor unions, nationalist movements, entrepreneurs, criminal syndicates, proto-parties, and individual strongmen such as Boris Yeltsin—as well as old actors and interest groups, with new electoral and lobbying vehicles at their disposal, introduced their own goals and intentions, often vaguely understood and articulated, at times misrepresented to the public, into Gorbachev’s original design of controlled democratization.

Preliminary steps toward electoral democracy at the local level were taken in the wake of the CPSU Central Committee plenum of January 1987 that shifted perestroika’s emphasis from economic acceleration to political reform. A subsequent Politburo decision, codified by republican Supreme Soviets, introduced experimental competitive elections to the soviets in multi-member districts. They were held in June 1987 in 162 selected districts; on average, five candidates ran for four vacancies; election losers were designated as reserve deputies, entitled to all rights except voting. Bolder steps toward nationwide electoral democracy—multicandidate elections throughout the country and unlimited nomination of candidates (all this while preserving the CPSU rule, with the stated intent of

increasing popular confidence in the Party)—were enunciated by Gorbachev at the Nineteenth CPSU Conference in June 1988. The Conference also approved his general proposals for a constitutional change to transfer some real power from the CPSU to the representative bodies.

Seeking to redesign the Union-level institutions, some of Gorbachev's advisers suggested French-style presidentialism, while others harked back to the radical participatory democracy of the 1917 soviets, when supreme power was vested in the hands of their nationwide congresses. Idealistically minded reformers envisaged this as a return to the unspoiled Leninist roots of the system. Gorbachev initially opted for the latter, in the form of the Congress of People's Deputies, a 2,250-member body meeting once (and subsequently twice) per year. Yet only 1,500 of its deputies were directly elected in the districts, while 750 were picked by public organizations (from Komsomol to the Red Cross), including one hundred by the CPSU Central Committee, a precautionary procedure that violated the principle of voters' equality. The Congress was electing from its ranks a working legislature, the bicameral Supreme Soviet of 542 members (thus bearing the name of the preexisting institution that had been filled by direct however phony elections). The constitutional authority of the latter was designed to approximate that of Western parliaments, having the power to confirm and oversee government members.

The relevant constitutional amendments were adopted in December 1988; the election to the Congress took place in March 1989. This was the first nationwide electoral campaign since 1917, marked—at least in major urban centers and most developed areas of the country—by real competition, non-compulsory public participation, mass volunteerism, and high (some of them, arguably, unrealistic) expectations. Though more than 87 percent of those elected were CPSU members, by now their membership had little to do with their actual political positions. The full ideological spectrum, from nationalist and liberal to the extreme left, could be found among the rank and file of the Party. On the other hand, wide cultural and economic disparities resulted in the extremely uneven impact of democratization across the Union (thus, in 399 of the 1,500 districts only one candidate was running, while in another 952 there were two, but in this case competition was often phony). And conservative elements of the nomenklatura were able to rig and manipulate the elections, in spite of

the public denunciations, even in advanced metropolitan areas, Moscow included. Besides, the two-tier representation, in which direct popular vote was only one of the ingredients, was rapidly delegitimized by the increasingly radical understanding of democracy as people's power, spread by the media and embraced by discontented citizenry.

The First Congress (opened in Moscow on May 25, 1989, and chaired by Gorbachev), almost entirely broadcast live on national TV, was the peak event of democratization "from above," as well as the first major disappointment with the realities of democracy, among both the reform-minded establishment and the wider strata. Cultural gaps and disparities in development between parts of the Union were reflected in the composition of the Congress that not only was extremely polarized in ideological terms (from Stalinists to radical Westernizers and anti-Russian nationalists from the Baltics), but also bristled with social and cultural hostility between its members (e.g., representatives of premodern Central Asian establishments versus the emancipated Moscow intelligentsia). Advocates of further democratization (mostly representing Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Baltic nations, Ukraine, and the Caucasus, and ranging from moderate Gorbachevites to revolutionary-minded dissidents), who later united in the Interregional Deputies Group (IDG) and were widely described as "the democrats," had less than 250 votes in the Congress and even a smaller proportion in the Supreme Soviet. The bulk of the deputies had no structured political views but were instinctually conservative; they were famously branded by an IDG leader Yuri Afanasiev as "the aggressively obedient majority." The resulting stalemate compelled Gorbachev to abandon legislative experiments and shift to a presidential system, while the democrats (many of them recently high-ranking CPSU officials, with only a handful of committed dissidents) also turned their backs on the Congress to lead street rallies and nascent political organizations, eventually winning more votes and positions of leadership in republican legislatures and city councils.

Thus, democratization's center of gravity shifted away from the all-Union level. The key events of this stage were the unprecedentedly democratic republican and municipal elections (February–March 1990), with all deputies now elected directly by voters, and the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution that had designated the CPSU as "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system" with the right to

determine “the general policy of the country.” The elimination of this article, demanded by the IDG and mass rallies and eventually endorsed by Gorbachev, was approved by the Congress on March 13, 1990, thus removing constitutional obstacles for a multi-party system—arguably the major and perhaps the only enduring institutional change of the period achieved through public pressure.

From that time issues of democratization yielded center stage to institutional collapse and economic reforms. A major transitional point was Gorbachev’s decision to become USSR president through a parliamentary vote, instead of running in direct nationwide elections. As a result, his presidency and other Union-wide institutions lagged behind republican authorities in terms of their democratic legitimacy. This was accentuated by Yeltsin’s election as Russian president (June 1991), the first direct popular election of a Russian ruler, which initially endowed him with exceptional legitimacy, but with no effective mechanisms of accountability and restraint. And the disbanding of the Soviet Union (December 1991) had an ambivalent relationship to democratization, for while it was decided by democratically elected leaders, Yeltsin had no popular mandate for such a decision; to the contrary, it nullified the results of the Union-wide referendum of March 1991, where overwhelming majorities in these republics voted for the preservation of the Union.

As a result of the events of the years 1988–1991, Russia acquired and institutionalized the basic facade of a minimalist, or procedural democracy, without providing citizens with leverage for wielding decisive influence over the authorities. The disillusionment with democratization has been shared both in the elite—some viewing it as a distraction or even an obstacle in the context of market reforms—and among the population presented with the impotence and malleability of representative institutions in the face of economic collapse. Lilia Shevtsova describes post-Soviet Russia as “elective monarchy”; others emphasize a gradual reversal of democratic achievements since 1991, under Vladimir Putin in particular. The judgement about the ultimate significance of democratization on its own terms will hinge upon the extent to which a new wave of democratizers learns the accumulated experience and is able to benefit from this knowledge.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; PERESTROIKA; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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
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DMITRI GLINSKI

DEMOGRAPHY

The demography of Russia has influenced, and been influenced by, historical events. Demographic shifts can be seen in the population pyramid of 2002. The imbalance at the top of the chart indicates many more women live to older ages than men. The small numbers aged 55–59 represents the drastic declines in fertility from Soviet population catastrophes during the 1930s and 1940s, followed by a post-war baby boom aged 40–55. The relatively smaller number of men and women aged 30–34 reflects the echo of the 55–59 year old cohort. The larger cohorts at younger ages reflect the echo effect of Soviet baby boomers. The Russian population pyramid is unique in its dramatic variation in cohort

Table 1



size, and illustrates how population has influenced, and been influenced by, historical events.

Trends in migration, fertility, morbidity and mortality shaped Russia’s growth rate, changed the distribution of population resources, and altered the ethnic and linguistic structure of the population. The implications of demographic change varied by the historical period in which it occurred, generated different effects between individuals of different age groups, and influenced some birth cohorts more than others. Throughout Russia’s history, demographic trends were largely determined by global pandemics, governmental policies and interventions, economic development, public health practices, and severe population shocks associated with war and famine.

As in other countries, population trends provided a clear window into social stratification within Russia, as improvements in public health tended to be concentrated among elites, leaving the poor more susceptible to illness, uncontrolled fertility, and shorter life spans.

Two unique aspects concerning Russia’s demographic history warrant note. During both the Imperial and Soviet periods, demographic data were manipulated to serve the ideological needs of the state. Second, Russia’s demographic profile during the 1990s raised questions concerning the permanence of the epidemiological transition (of high mortality and deaths by infectious disease to low mortality and deaths by degenerative disease). Life expectancies fell dramatically and infectious diseases re-emerged during the 1990s as demographic concerns became significant security issues.

SOURCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The Mongols instituted the first population registry in Russia, but few large-scale repositories of demographic information existed before the late Imperial period. Regional land registry (*cadastral*) records provided household size information and could be used with church records, tax assessment documents, serf work assignments, and urban hos-

pital records to provide indirect and localized estimates of population, and in some cases, family formation, fertility, and mortality data. In 1718, the focus of enumeration shifted to an enumeration of individuals, with adjustments or *revizy*, conducted for verification. The move to local self-government, and the creation of *zemstvos* in 1864, also provided a wealth of historical data, particularly regarding the demographic situation within peasant households, but as previous sources, the data were limited to small scale regional indicators. In 1897, across the entire Russian Empire a population census with 100,000 enumerators collected information from 127 million present (*nalichnoye*) and permanent (*postoyanno*) residents on residence, social class, language (but not ethnicity), occupation, literacy, and religion. A second census was planned but not executed due to the outbreak of World War I.

Enumeration and registration of the population was a serious concern in the Soviet period, and censuses of the population supplied important verification of residence, linguistic identity, and ethnic composition. The first comprehensive census in 1926 enumerated 147 million residents of the Soviet Union, 92.7 million of whom resided in the RSFSR. The next full census of 1939 was not published, due to political concerns. Subsequent post-war censuses in the Soviet Union (1959, 1970, 1979, 1989) improved significantly upon previous censuses in terms of quality of coverage. These data provided information that could be evaluated with increasingly comprehensive records on fertility, mortality, migration, and public health indicators collected through various state ministries at the all-union and republic levels.

During the post-Soviet period, scholars agree the quality of population information declined during the early 1990s, as state ministries reorganized, funding for statistical offices became erratic, and decentralization increased burdens for record keeping for individual oblasts. A micro census was carried out in 1994 of a 5 percent population sample. After false starts in 1999 and 2001 and heated debates over questionnaire content, the first post-Soviet census was conducted in October of 2002.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

During the Time of Troubles (1598–1613), Russia experienced a sharp population decline due to declines in mortality and fertility. During the 1600s Russia's population increased, but the rate and sta-

bility of the trend over the century is subject to debate. During the following century substantial efforts to address public health needs were made in Russia's urban areas. Catherine II (the Great) established the first medical administration during the later 1700s, leading to some of the earliest epidemiological records for Russia. During the nineteenth century, mortality rates across age groups were higher than those found in Europe. Infant mortality was problematically high, declining only during the late 1800s due to increased public health campaigns.

Social changes such as the reforms of the 1860s served as catalysts for improved living standards, particularly in rural areas. These in turn improved the population's health. At the same time increases in literacy also improved health practices. Education and improvements in literacy across the empire led to linguistic Russification with members of various ethnic groups identifying primarily with Russian language. The positive influence of improved social conditions on demographic trends was checked by persistently unreliable food production and distribution, leading to widespread famines throughout the imperial period, but most notably in 1890. At the century's close, increased population density, particularly in urban areas, and extremely poor public works infrastructural provided an excellent breeding ground for deadly outbreaks of infectious diseases such as influenza, cholera, tuberculosis, and typhoid. Deaths from infectious diseases were higher in Russia than Europe during the early 1890s. Voluntary Public Health Commissions operated in the last decades of imperial rule. Lacking official state financial support, the commissions were unable to improve the health of the lower classes living in conditions conducive to disease transmission.

The state monitored the collection and dissemination of demographic information throughout the Imperial period. Records indicate that urban population counts, estimated deaths due to infectious disease, and population declines related to famines were, in some cases, corrected in three specific ways in order to minimize negative interpretations of living conditions within Russia and to avoid possible public unrest. First, information was simply not collected or published. In the case of fertility and mortality statistics this avenue was easily followed as most births and deaths took place at home and were not always registered. Secondly, selected information was published for small scale populations who tended to exhibit better health and

survival profiles than the population at large. Focusing upon epidemiological records from large urban hospitals, imperial estimates tend to undercount the health profiles among rural residents and the very poor, which tend to be far worse than those with access to formal urban care. Lastly, records may have been generated, but not published. This appears to be the case in several analyses of the 1890 famine and cholera outbreaks in southern Russian during the 1800s. Rather than utilizing demographic information to assist the development of informed social policy, scholars conclude that national demographic information was often manipulated in order to achieve specific ideological goals.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS DURING THE SOVIET ERA

The early years of Soviet rule were marked by widespread popular unrest, food shortages, civil war, and massive migration movements. The catastrophic effects of World War I, a global influenza epidemic, political and economic upheavals, and a civil war led to steep increases in mortality, declines in fertility, and deteriorations in overall population health. Between 1920 and 1922, famine combined with cholera and typhus outbreaks evoked a severe population crisis. As Soviet power solidified, several policies were enacted in the public health area, specifically in the realm of maternal and child health. Though underfunded, in combination with the expansion of primary medical care through feldshers (basic medical personnel), these programs were associated with declines in infant mortality, increased medical access, and improved population health into the 1930s.

During the late 1920s food instability reappeared in the Soviet Union, followed by a brutal collectivization of agriculture during the early 1930s. Millions of citizens of the Soviet Union perished in the collectivization drive and the famine that followed. Additional population losses occurred as a result of the Stalinist repression campaigns, as mortality was extremely high among the nearly fifteen million individuals sent to forced labor camps during the 1930s, and among the numerous ethnic groups subject to forced deportation and resettlement. These population losses were accelerated by massive civilian and military casualties during World War II. While each of these events is significant in its own right, in combination they produced a catastrophic loss of population that

significantly influenced the age structure of the Russian Federation for decades to come. The population loss consisted of not only those who perished, but also the precipitous declines in fertility in the period, in spite of intense pro-natalist efforts. The precise population loss associated with this series of events is a subject of intense and emotional debate, with estimates of population loss ranging from 12 to nearly 40 million. Even individuals surviving this tumultuous period were affected. Those in their infancy or early childhood during the period exhibited compromised health throughout their lives as a result of the severe deprivation of the period. Even after the end of the war, economic instability and intense shortages exacted a significant toll on living standards, fertility, and health during the 1950s.

The 1959 census documented increasing population growth, improvements in life expectancy, and increases in fertility across Russia. Life expectancy increased to sixty-eight years by 1959, twenty-six years longer than the life expectancy reported in 1926 (forty-two). The total fertility rate in 1956 stood at 2.63, a marked increase from the 1940s. Urbanization increased the proportion of the population with access to modern water and sewer systems, and formal medical care. The following decades were periods of economic stability, improving living standards, expanded social services, improved health and decreased infectious disease prevalence. While overall fertility rates declined, population growth was positive and noticeable improvements were reported for infant and maternal mortality in Russia.

During the late socialist period, improvements in population health stalled, as Russia entered a period of economic and social stagnation. Increased educational and employment opportunities for women, combined with housing shortages and the need for dual income earners in each family, drove fertility below replacement levels by 1970. Life expectancy, which peaked in 1961 at 63.78 for men and 72.35 for women, declined during the 1970s for both sexes. Negative health behaviors such as smoking and drinking appeared to rise throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and some reports of outbreaks of cholera and typhus were reported, especially in the southern and eastern regions of the country. Official statistics indicate an improvement in all demographic indicators in the mid-1980s, and links to pro-family policies and a strict anti-alcohol campaign could be drawn, but improved mortality and increased fertility were short-lived. By

the late 1980s increased mortality among males of working age was observed.

The Soviet state also manipulated demographic data to serve ideological ends. At best, official publications regarding issues such as life expectancy were often overly optimistic. At worst, the compilation of standard indicators (such as infant mortality rates) was altered to improve the relative standing of the Soviet Union in comparison to capitalist countries. Most significantly, demographic information was withheld from publication, and sometimes not collected. In spite of achieving remarkable improvements in public health and high rates of population growth in decades after World War II, as its predecessor, employed population information to further its ideology as well as to inform policy development.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS DURING THE POST-SOVIET ERA

The post-Soviet era is marked by dire demographic trends. Rapid and wide scale increases in mortality and marked declines in already low fertility and marriage rates generated negative natural rates of increase throughout the 1990s. Population decline was avoided only due to substantial immigration from other successor states during the period. This period has been identified as the most dramatic peacetime demographic collapse ever observed. Aspects of the crisis are linked to long-term processes begun in the Soviet period, but were significantly exacerbated by economic and institutional instability of the later period.

Increasing male mortality, especially among older working-aged males, gained momentum during the 1990s. Estimates vary, but official estimates reported a six-year decline in male life expectancy between 1985 and 1995. Female life expectancy also declined, however more modestly. Deaths from lung cancer, accidents, suicide, poisoning, and other causes related to alcohol consumption underpin the change in mortality, but death rates for heart disease and cancer also increased. Period explanations focus on the stress generated by the economic transition, linking that stress to the mortality increase. Age effect models argue that men at these ages are somehow uniquely susceptible to stress. Cohort explanations point out that men in the later working ages (50–59) in 1990 represent the birth cohorts of 1940s, and the declining mortality of the 1990s is an echo of the deprivations of the post World War II period. Each explanation contributed to ex-

plaining the mortality increase, which took place amidst health care and infrastructural collapse.

The Soviet system of health care was very successful in improving public health during the early years of the regime, and during the initial period after World War II, however the distribution and organization of care led to diminishing return in the later years of the regime and the organizational structure proved ineffective in the post-Soviet period. During the 1990s financial crises lead to serious shortages of medical supplies, wage arrears in the governmental health sector, and the rise of private pay clinics and pharmacies. Increased poverty rates, especially among the growing pension aged population, precluded health care access. Public works (hospitals, prisons, sewer systems, etc.) were poorly maintained during the late Soviet era, and contributed to the resurgence of old health risks such as cholera, typhus, and drug resistant forms of tuberculosis during the 1990s. The reemergence of infectious disease shocked demographers and epidemiologists, who previously contended improvements in mortality were permanent, and that deaths infectious diseases were a unique characteristic of undeveloped societies. The resurgence of infectious diseases includes HIV/AIDS. The numbers of infected were low, but in 2003 HIV infection rates were projected to increase in the near future.

Russia's post-Soviet demographic crises generated concerns over declining population size, especially in the Far East where border security is a concern. Immigration helped maintain population size without shifting the ethnic composition, but anti-immigrant sentiments were strong during the late 1990s. In 2002 government attention had turned to below replacement fertility, but as in the rest of Europe the fertility rate remained very low. During the second decade after Soviet rule, demographic trends were cause for serious concern, but indicators, if not political attitudes, were stabilized.

See also: COLONIAL EXPANSION; COLONIALISM; EMPIRE, USSR AS

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CYNTHIA J. BUCKLEY

DENGA

Throughout its history, the denga was a small silver coin, usually irregular in shape, with a fluctuating silver content, weighing from 0.53 to 1.3 grams (depending on region and period). The word *denga* was a lexicological borrowing into Russian from Mongol. The unit's origins are traced to Moscow where, beginning in the 1360s and 1370s, for the first time since the eleventh century, Rus princes began to strike coins. By early 1400s, dengi

(pl.) were minted in other eastern Rus lands (Nizhegorod and Ryazan) and by the 1420s in Tver, Novgorod, and Pskov. Thereafter, dengi were minted throughout the Rus lands by various independent princes and differed in weight. However, uniformity in weight, according to Moscow's standards, was introduced to the various principalities as the Muscovite grand princes absorbed them during the course of the second half of the fifteenth century.

For most of its history, six dengi made up an altyn, and two hundred dengi the Muscovite ruble. Novgorod also struck local dengi from the 1420s until the last decades of the fifteenth century, but their weight and value were twice the amount of the dengi minted in Moscow. While the unit denga was discontinued and replaced by the kopek with the monetary reforms of Peter the Great, the Russian word *dengi* came to designate money in general.

See also: ALTYN; COPPER RIOTS; GRIVNA; KOPECK; RUBLE

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

DENIKIN, ANTON IVANOVICH


(1872–1947), general, commander of White armies in Southern Russia during the Russian civil war.

Anton Denikin was born the son of a retired border guard officer in Poland. His own military career began in the artillery, from which he entered the General Staff Academy. He served in the Russo-Japanese War and the World War I, where he commanded the Fourth, or "Iron," Brigade (later a division). Beginning the war with the rank of major general, following the February 1917 Revolution, he received a rapid series of promotions, from command of the Eighth Corps to command of the Russian Western, and then Southwestern,

Fronts. In September 1917, however, he and a number of other officers were arrested as associates of Commander-in-Chief General Lavr Kornilov in the latter's conflict with Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky. Denikin was released from prison following the Bolshevik coup. He headed to Novocherkassk, where he participated in the formation of the Anti-Bolshevik (White) Army together with Kornilov and General Mikhail Alexeyev. Following the death of Kornilov in April 1918, Denikin took command of the White Army, which he led out of its critical situation in the Kuban Cossack territory. General Alexeyev's death in September of that year left him with responsibility for civil affairs in the White regions as well. With the subordination to him of the Don and Kuban Cossack armies, Denikin assumed the title Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia (December 1918).

By early 1919, the White Army controlled a territory encompassing the Don and Kuban Cossack territories and the North Caucasus. During the spring and summer, the army advanced in all directions, clearing the Crimea, taking Kharkov on June 11 and Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd) on June 17. On June 20, 1919, Denikin issued the Moscow Directive, an order which began the army's offensive on Moscow. After taking Kiev on August 17, Kursk on September 7, and Orel (some two hundred miles south of Moscow) on September 30, the overextended White Army had reached the limits of its advance. A Bolshevik counteroffensive initiated a retreat that ultimately resulted in the army's evacuation of all its territory with the exception of Crimea. This retreat was accompanied by epidemics of typhus and other diseases, which decimated the ranks of soldiers and the civilian population alike. Denikin handed over command to General Pyotr Wrangel on March 22, 1920, and left Russia for Constantinople (Istanbul), and then France, where he lived until November 1945. His final year and nine months were spent in the United States. He died on August 7, 1947, in Michigan.

The ill-fated Moscow offensive has colored Denikin's reputation, with some, such as General Wrangel, arguing that the directive initiating it was the death knell of the White movement in South Russia. Wrangel advocated a junction with Admiral Kolchak's forces in the east. Denikin himself felt that the conditions of the civil war were such that only a risky headlong rush could unseat the Bolsheviks and put an end to the struggle.



General Anton Denikin, commander of the White Army. © CORBIS

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; WHITE ARMY; WRANGEL, PETER NIKOLAYEVICH

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ANATOL SHMELEV

DENMARK, RELATIONS WITH

The earliest evidence of Danish–Russian interaction consists of discoveries in Russia of tenth-century

Danish coins and an eleventh-century chronicle reference to trips by Danish merchants to Novgorod. There are further mentions of Russian vessels to Denmark in the twelfth century. However, the available data is extremely fragmentary, and we have no indication of any direct commerce in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries.

Danish-Muscovite political relations were first established under a 1493 treaty between King Hans and Ivan III, designed as an offensive agreement against Sweden and Lithuania. The temporary Danish takeover of Sweden in 1497 made the Finnish border a source of contention, yet closer ties were pursued through discussions about a dynastic marriage. Frequent Danish embassies were sent to Russia in the early years of the sixteenth century, at which time Danish merchants also began to visit the Neva estuary and Ivangorod. A Russian embassy attended the coronation of Christian II in 1514 and negotiated a new treaty, again for the purpose of bringing about a Russian attack on Sweden.

Relations began to deteriorate in the second half of the sixteenth century due to Danish interest in Livonia during the Livonian War and intensifying border disputes between northern Norway and Russia. However, the Moscow treaty of 1562 recognized the Danish acquisition of the island of Ösel/Saaremaa off the Estonian coast in 1559. In 1569 Duke Magnus was made the administrator of Russian Livonia and married with Ivan IV's niece, although the couple subsequently was forced to flee to Poland. Further problems were created by Danish efforts to control and tax Western European shipping with Russia's Arctic Sea coast. Nonetheless, Boris Godunov in 1602 proposed a marriage between his daughter and the Danish Prince Hans who, however, died in Moscow soon after his arrival.

Danish economic interests in northern Russia increased after the establishment of the Romanov regime, and shipping on a fairly modest scale was almost annual. A diplomatic crisis ensued from Christian IV's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to set up a special company for illegal direct trade with the fur-rich areas to the east of Arkhangelsk. The Danish navy even raided Kola in 1623. The Danes further rejected overtures for a dynastic marriage in the early 1620s. Relations soon warmed again during Danish involvement in the Thirty Years' War, and the Muscovite government provided grain as a subsidy from 1627 to 1633.

The most serious effort at linking the Danish and Russian ruling families came between 1643 and 1645 when Prince Valdemar Christian was to be married with Tsarevna Irina Mikhailovna. However, differences over relations with Sweden and the refusal of Valdemar to convert to Orthodox ultimately scuttled the project. Attempts to contain Sweden again led to a rapprochement in the 1650s. The same considerations prompted Denmark to join Peter's anti-Swedish alliance to participate—with limited success—in the Great Northern War in 1700. Peter I visited Denmark in 1716 for discussions about a planned reconquest of southern Sweden. Relations deteriorated when the plans remained on paper and the Danes rejected a royal marriage proposal.

The Russian marriage-based alliance in 1721 with the ducal house of Gottorp—an independent-minded Danish vassal—evolved into a lasting source of tension between the two countries, especially under the long reign of Elizabeth Petrovna, who appointed the Gottorpians future Peter III as her successor. Open warfare between the two countries was only averted by Catherine II's *coup d'état*. During her reign, Denmark became a key link in Nikita Panin's Northern system. An alliance was established in 1773, and the end of the century saw a sharp increase in Danish-Russian commerce, making Russia one of Denmark's leading trade partners. Tsar Pavel's desire to seek Swedish support against England constituted the main threat to this alliance.

Denmark reacted to the rise of Napoleon by adopting a neutral position and refused to join in offensive action in northern Germany, fearing the safety of its possessions. Russia diplomatically supported Denmark against English aggression, but Swedish willingness to support Russia in return for the annexation of Norway from Denmark led to a cooling of Danish-Russian relations. Denmark was eventually forced to join the anti-French coalition and to accept the loss of Norway in 1814. Russian efforts to compensate Denmark ultimately resulted only in the acquisition of the small northern German city of Lauenburg.

Political relations in the nineteenth century were to a significant degree driven by a Russian desire to ensure free access to the Baltic through the Danish Sound and to balance off Sweden and Denmark against each other. The rise of Scandinavism was often associated with anti-Russian sentiment, which the government sought to control. In 1849,

Russia put pressure on Prussia to end an occupation of Jutland in order to prevent a Scandinavian alliance. The Russians considered various ultimately unsuccessful plans to neutralize Denmark toward the end of the century. Relations in the second half of the century benefited from a close relationship between the two royal families. Nicholas I in 1852 gave up the Russian claim on Gottorp and a dynastic marriage between Christian IX's daughter and the future Alexander III in 1866. The tsar and his family visited Denmark at least once a year. Russia also supported Denmark against Germany after 1864, following the loss of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg to Prussia and Austria.

Economic ties between the two countries acquired a new dimension with growth in Danish investment and entrepreneurship starting in the late nineteenth century. By 1917, Danish direct investment in Russia was comparable to the kingdom's annual budget. The Danes were especially active in the agricultural and food sector. A Dane—Carl Andreas Koefoed—was one of the driving forces behind the Stolypin reforms. Russia was Denmark's third or fourth most important trade partners and accounted for one-tenth of total Danish imports. Before World War I, Russia was the leading export market for Danish industry.

Following unsuccessful efforts to gain compensation for economic losses in connection with the Bolshevik Revolution, Denmark recognized the Soviet regime in 1923. However, a Bolshevik propaganda representation had operated in Copenhagen already in 1918 and 1919. Danish observance of political neutrality made relations with the communist regime relatively problem-free, in spite of Soviet sponsorship of the Danish Communist Party (DCP) and other revolutionary organizations. The DCP, however, remained throughout a relatively marginal factor in Danish internal politics. Adhering to its neutrality Denmark in 1939 refused to support the expulsion of the Soviets from the League of Nations and refused to join a Nordic defensive alliance thereafter.

The Red Army occupied the Island of Bornholm in 1945 with a view to ensuring free access to the Baltic. The British promise not to continue with the occupation of Denmark led to a Russian departure in 1946. The postwar government, committed to neutrality, sought to acquire a role as a bridge-builder between the East and the West. However, following Norwegian NATO accession in 1949, Denmark followed suit to face a virulent Soviet re-

action. The Soviets sought to foster forces opposed to Danish NATO membership and advocated the neutralization of Scandinavia or, at least, guarantees against the stationing of nuclear weapons there. A gradual rapprochement began under Nikita Khrushchev, but the Brezhnev regime sought to convince Denmark of the new geopolitical realities created by its active armament campaign. The Soviets were particularly enthusiastic about the emergence of a grassroots peace movement in the 1980s, which was viewed as a way of weakening Danish-U.S. ties. The ruling Social Democrats in Denmark became more favorable to a nuclear-free Scandinavia by the mid-1980s, and relations were fairly cordial thereafter, fully normalized after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

See also: GREAT NORTHERN WAR; NORWAY, RELATIONS WITH; SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH

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JARMO T. KOTILAINEN

DEPORTATIONS

The term *deportation* does not have an exact Russian equivalent (*vyselenie* is the most common, with *deportatsiya* also coming into use in the twentieth century). The term refers to the forced removal of a defined group from a certain territory. The largest cases of mass deportation occurred during the two world wars and were linked in many ways to the practices of ethnic cleansing and nationalist politics that swept through Europe during the dark years of the first half of the century.

But the practice can also be traced to precedents in earlier Russian history. Some of the best-known early attempts to use deportation as an official policy involved repressions of elites after conquest of new regions or in the aftermath of rebellions. After the conquest of Novgorod in the late fifteenth century, the Prince of Muscovy expropriated the

Major Ethnic Deportations, 1937–1944

Nationality	Number Deported	Date of Deportation	Place of Resettlement
Koreans	171,781	8/21/37–10/25/37	Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan
Finns	89,000	8/31/41–9/7/41	Kazakhstan
Germans	749,613	9/3/41–10/15/41	Kazakhstan, Siberia
Kalmyks	93,139	12/28/43–12/29/43	Siberia, Kazakhstan
Karachais	69,267	11/6/43	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
Chechens	387,229	2/23/44–2/29/44	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
Ingush	91,250	2/23/44–2/29/44	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
Balkars	37,713	3/8/44–3/9/44	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
Crimean Tatars	183,155	5/18/44–5/20/44	Uzbekistan, Molotov
Crimean Greeks	15,040	6/27/44–6/28/44	Uzbekistan, Mari ASSR
Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils	94,955	5/11/44–11/26/44	Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
Total	1,982,142		

SOURCE: Based on Pohl, J. Otto. (1999). *Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

lands of leading boyars and forcibly took them to Moscow. When Russia conquered the Crimea, there was a mass exodus of Tatars in which the role of Russian officials remains in dispute among historians. During the conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, the regime turned to extremely violent methods of driving the entire population from given regions, and encouraged mass emigrations of Adygy, Nogai, and other predominantly Muslim and Turkic groups. In the aftermath of both the 1831 and 1861 rebellions the authorities confiscated estates and deported thousands of Polish gentry it accused of participating to Siberia and the Caucasus.

Another important precedent for the twentieth-century deportations was the Russian punitive system, which relied heavily upon the exile of individuals to Siberia and other locations and thereby created a template for officials to apply to entire groups in extraordinary circumstances. Likewise, the myriad of regulations on Jewish rights of res-

idence resulted in a constant stream of forced expulsions of Jews from areas declared off-limits, including the mass expulsion of Jews from Moscow in 1891–1892.

Important as these precedents were, the mass deportations of the period from 1914 to 1945 stand in a category apart. The first major deportations of this period occurred during World War I. In the first months of the war, the regime interned enemy citizen males to prevent them from departing the country to serve in enemy armies. By the end of 1915, the regime had expanded these operations to include large numbers of women, children, and elderly, and by 1917, over a quarter million enemy citizens had been deported to the Russian interior. In a series of other operations, the army extended the mass deportations to Russian subjects. The largest of these operations resulted in the deportation of roughly 300,000 Germans and the expulsion of a half million Jews from areas near the front. In addition to these groups, ten thousand Crimean Tatars and several thousand Adzhars, Laz, gypsies, and others were swept up in the operations.

The motives and explanations for these operations include many different variables, of which two stand out. First were security concerns: The deported groups were accused of disloyalty or potential disloyalty if allowed to fall under enemy occupation. The second was economic nationalism. Demands among local populations to expropriate the lands and businesses of the foreigners, Germans, and Jews resonated with more general campaigns led by Russians during the war to nationalize and nativize the economy. As the war dragged on, security motives tended to give way to the nationalist ones. This was reflected in a series of administrative and legal decisions in 1915 that effectively ensured that the ownership of properties of deported groups would be permanently transferred to Russians, to other favored nationalities, or to the state.

DEPORTATIONS UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKS

After 1917, the Bolshevik regime attempted to use deportation to achieve revolutionary aims. The practice of deporting criminals to Siberia greatly expanded, and several campaigns resulted in attempts to deport entire social population categories. Most dramatic was the 1919–1920 “decossackization” campaign during the civil war, and the



Russian Jews gather at the Baltic Railway Station in St. Petersburg, bound for the Pale of Settlement. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

1930–1933 deportation of kulaks (in theory, the relatively affluent peasants in each village).

The next wave of mass deportations was closely linked to World War II, and the international tensions that preceded its outbreak. Fears of foreign influence, hostility toward foreign capitalist states, and insecurity about the loyalty of certain ethnic groups that straddled the border led the Bolsheviks to turn to mass ethnic deportations. Already in 1934, operations to clear the border regions of “unreliable elements” began with a deportations of Finns, Latvians, Estonians, Germans, and Poles from Leningrad, which was considered to be a strategic border city. In February and March 1935, authorities deported more than 40,000 “unreliables” (mostly ethnic Germans and Poles) from Ukrainian border regions. This was the first of a series of mass deportations from border areas, including about 30,000 Finns sent from the Leningrad border regions in 1936 and 170,000 Koreans de-

ported from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The latter was the first ethnic cleansing of an entire nationality.

During the Great Purge of 1937–1938, deportation to the Siberian camps was a major part of the operations, which targeted former kulaks, criminals, “anti-Soviet elements,” and in a separate set of “national operations,” a series of ethnic groups, including: Koreans, Poles, Germans, Greeks, Finns, Latvians, Estonians, Afghans, and Iranians. In all, according to Terry Martin (1998, p. 858), approximately 800,000 individuals were arrested, deported, or executed in the national operations from 1935 to 1938. The regime seems to have been motivated in this wave of peacetime mass ethnic deportations by an attempt to secure the border zones in preparation for war, and by the failure of its attempt to spread revolution beyond the Soviet Union by granting wide cultural autonomy and support to ethnic groups that were divided by the Soviet

border. Recognition of the failure of this latter strategy led the regime to turn in the opposite direction, toward prophylactic strikes to remove the same groups from border areas to prevent their own attraction to their co-ethnics abroad.

World War II brought mass deportations on an even greater scale. First, the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and parts of Poland and Rumania as a result of the Nazi-Soviet agreement of August 1939 was followed by mass deportations of the cultural, political, and economic elites of these states. The scale of the arrests and deportations was remarkable. Pavel Polian estimates that 380,000 people were deported in these operations from early 1940 to June 1941.

After the German invasion of June 1941, Joseph Stalin ordered the mass deportation of entire nationalities. Thirteen national groups in all were rounded up by special police units and deported by train to Central Asia in operations that lasted only a few days each. The first operations occurred in August and September 1941, when 89,000 Finns and 749,613 Germans were deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia. Hitler made no secret of his plans to use the German minority in the Soviet Union as a building block for his new racial order in the East, and his mass evacuation of ethnic Germans from the Baltic states to Germany in 1939 on the eve of the Soviet invasion of those states set the tone for Stalin's deportations of Germans. As in World War I, the regime deported ethnic Germans from the western and southern parts of the empire, but this time added the large German population in the middle Volga region. Germans accounted for nearly half of the wartime ethnic deportations. The Finns were deported largely from the Leningrad region in August 1941 as the Finnish Army was advancing toward the city.

From November 1943 to November 1944, the Kalmyks, Karachai, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Crimean Greeks, Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils were all deported *en masse* to Central Asia. These deportations were accompanied by accusations of collaboration while under German occupation, but the long histories of resistance among some of these groups to Russian rule doubtless was an important factor as well. This was particularly true in Chechnya, where an insurgency formed during the war and conducted raids and assassinations against Soviet officials.

In the final analysis, of course, there can be no rational explanation for the mass deportation of entire nationalities. The deportations were recog-

nized as early as the 1950s as one of Stalin's greatest crimes. The conditions of the deported groups were improved and restrictions on their movement were partially lifted between 1954 and 1956. The easing of conditions from 1954 to 1956 led to major unsanctioned return journeys of many of the Caucasus nationalities. This was a factor in the government's decisions from 1956 to 1958 to allow the Karachai, Balkars, Kalmyks, Chechens, and Ingush to return and to restore their local national governmental autonomy. But official rehabilitation for the Germans came only in 1964 and for the Crimean Tatars in 1967, and in neither case were their national autonomous governments restored, nor were these groups given permission to return to their homelands until the late 1980s and early 1990s. The mass deportations of the twentieth century left a bitter legacy that contributed to the determination of national movements from the Baltics to Chechnya to acquire full independence from Moscow.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; PALE OF SETTLEMENT; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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ERIC LOHR

DERZHAVA *See* PEOPLE'S PARTY OF FREE RUSSIA.

DERZHAVIN, GAVRYL ROMANOVICH

(1743–1816), poet.

Gavryl Derzhavin, one of the most original Russian poets of the eighteenth century, was regarded as the greatest national poet before Alexander Pushkin. Following a period in the army, he worked as a civil servant for more than twenty years. He served first as provincial governor from 1786 to 1788 in Tambov, a city in south-central European

Russia founded in 1636 as an outpost against the Crimean Tatars. A man of the Enlightenment, he became poet laureate and served as minister of justice for Catherine II from 1802 to 1805. Derzhavin also served briefly as Catherine's private secretary.

Derzhavin's most famous works, listed chronologically, include *The Courtier* (1776), *The Death of Prince Meshchersky* (1779–1783), *Felitsa* (1782), *Ode to God* (1784), *To the Potentates and Judges* (1780), and *The Waterfall* (1791–1794). While Derzhavin favored the ode as genre, he differed from the poet Lomonosov in that he did not consider it a laudatory form. His style is more reminiscent of the Roman lyric poet and satirist, Horace (65 B.C.E.–8 B.C.E.). Derzhavin first caught Catherine the Great's attention with his ode to her, *Felitsa*, named after a character in Catherine's own story "The Tale of Prince of Khlror." Here he broke several taboos, praising the sovereign not with awe, but with easy familiarity. She walks "on foot," eats, reads, writes, enjoys jokes, and treats people nicely. Derzhavin then contrasts her to the petty self-centeredness of the nobles surrounding her, with their feasts, fancy dress, and endless entertainments. Derzhavin sharply criticizes court life in *The Courtier* and *To the Potentates and Judges*, lampooning the unjust bureaucrats and parasitic aristocracy.

Derzhavin's poetry and memoirs present a rich and complex portrait of his time, employing a diverse range of topics from war and peace to love and dining. Open to the influence of all contemporary currents and at ease with various philosophical perspectives, Derzhavin is remembered as the poet who loved truth more than he loved kings. In his poetry he was a defender of justice and an independent spirit. Politically, however, Derzhavin remained a staunch monarchist and general opponent of liberal ideas. Along with Admiral Alexander Shishkov (a defender of serfdom), Derzhavin established the Colloquy of Lovers of the Russian Word (*Beseda Lyubitelei Russokogo Slova*, 1811–1816)—a formal literary society with as many as five hundred members whom Derzhavin would invite to his large home on the banks of the Fontanka in St. Petersburg.

In Derzhavin's poetical development, the themes of time and immortality become increasingly more prominent, until the other motifs—the poet's relationship with other people, his memories, and his own life experience—become varying aspects of his central poetic obsession with the element of time. When, on the morning of July 9,

1815, relatives discovered Derzhavin's corpse, they spotted an unfinished poem scrawled on a blackboard. Immortalized as "the slate ode" by Osip Mandelshtam more than a hundred years later, the poem begins:

Time's river carries on its current
All the affairs of men; it flings
To the abyss of oblivion
Drowned nations, kingdoms even as kings.

And if the voice of lyre and trumpet
Awhile holds aught above the spate,
That, too, eternity will swallow,
That, too, await the common fate.

The presence of Derzhavinian time imagery can be detected in the works of later Russian poets such as Pushkin, Tyutchev, Fet, and Mandelshtam. With its emphasis on the ode and on emulation of literary models, Derzhavin's poetry represents the culmination and expansion of Russian Classicism, rather than the first step toward Russian Romanticism. Unlike the Romantics, Derzhavin also demonstrated a Classicist-oriented belief in the stability of the world order, which he as an odist exalted.

See also: LOMONOSOV, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

DE-STALINIZATION

De-Stalinization refers to the attempt to handle the Stalin legacy following Stalin's death. Its chronological boundaries are not clearly defined, but the process began soon after Stalin died in March 1953 and was generally halted in the early years of the Brezhnev period following Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964. There were four principal elements of de-Stalinization.

The first element is official pronouncements. The two most important were Khrushchev's speeches to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956 and the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961. The former speech was delivered in closed session to the congress and was not published in the USSR until 1990, although it was published in the West in 1956 and was read to closed party meetings across the country. The second speech was delivered in open session and published in the Soviet press at the time of its delivery. The first speech sought to deflate the exaggerated image of Stalin and to place the responsibility for the terror and repressions upon him alone. Khrushchev sought to argue that Stalin was responsible for the application of terror to the Party (no mention was made of the suffering of anyone outside the party) and that he steered Soviet development off of the healthy course upon which the Party had set it. In the second speech, Khrushchev further attacked the image of Stalin and sought to associate some of his own current political opponents with Stalin's crimes.

Second are his policies. The policies embarked on by the Khrushchev leadership in many respects reversed or modified those pursued by Stalin. Among the most important of these were the formal reaffirmation of the principle of collective leadership; restoration of the Communist Party to the central place in the political system; the elimination of terror as a central aspect of life, including the rehabilitation of some of those who suffered; the opening of some of the labor camps and the return of many of the prisoners and internees to Soviet society; the increased priority given to light industry, without displacing heavy industry as the main priority; and a more flexible foreign policy. Such changes were crucial because of the freeing up of general life that they signified. The removal of the overt threat of terror was particularly important here.

Third is the freeing up of intellectual life. While this was, strictly speaking, a change in policy, its nature and importance warrants separate mention. The tight restrictions upon discussion, literature, and all forms of cultural expression were relaxed. Although censorship, especially self-censorship, remained firmly in place, the boundaries of acceptable expression expanded significantly. Particularly important was the emergence of so-called camp literature, which discussed life in the labor camps and brought a new perspective on the Stalinist experience. The publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's

One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1962) was particularly important in this regard. So was the rewriting of Soviet history to downplay, and at times almost eliminate, Stalin's role.

Fourth is symbolism: The manifestations of the Stalin cult disappeared as soon as Stalin died. His image and person ceased to dominate the Soviet media. And in a process that gathered speed following Khrushchev's 1956 speech, Stalin's name was removed from everything that had been named after him, all statues, busts, and portraits were removed from public display (except in his birthplace, Gori), and his writings were removed from public availability in the libraries. In 1962 his body was removed from the mausoleum on Red Square and buried in a simple plot beneath the Kremlin wall.

The impetus for de-Stalinization came from both above and below. It was widely recognized throughout society that some change would be necessary following Stalin's death, but there was widespread disagreement about how substantial such change should be. At the top of the political system, the issue of de-Stalinization became tangled up with factional conflict among the leaders. From 1956, Khrushchev became the major Soviet leader pressing the cause of de-Stalinization, while others like Kaganovich and Molotov, who had been closer to Stalin, sought to restrict the dimensions of this process. Similar disagreements about how far de-Stalinization should extend were evident within the community as a whole. Many intellectuals, responding to the greater scope for free expression, played an important part in fueling de-Stalinization. Many scholars, writers, artists, poets, and playwrights continually sought to push back the frontiers of what could and could not be said. This process was very uneven; many of the key positions in the artistic and creative worlds were held by conservatives who sought to hold the line against too much innovation and who were in a position to hinder publication and exhibition. In addition, the line coming from the top was not consistent; Khrushchev and his supporters were continually wavering about de-Stalinization, sometimes pushing it forward, at other times winding it back. Everyone was uncertain about how far and how fast the process could be undertaken, and the political elite in particular was concerned to ensure that de-Stalinization did not undermine the power and legitimacy of the system. In this sense even Khrushchev, while recognizing that changes had to be made, was uncertain about their speed and extent.

De-Stalinization constituted a classic case of liberalization. It was designed to bring about change without altering the basic Soviet power structure. In this sense de-Stalinization was limited in its effect and, when a more conservative leadership came to power under Brezhnev and Kosygin, many of these changes were wound back. This was especially clear in the cultural sphere, where the crackdown on free expression was important in generating the dissident movement. However, de-Stalinization left its mark nonetheless. In the short term it was important for the regime's ability to survive the crisis induced by Stalin's death, but in the longer term it was crucial in shaping many of those who were to come to the fore when Gorbachev sought to bring major change to the system in the 1980s. De-Stalinization was an important source of perestroika.

See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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GRAEME GILL

DÉTENTE

By *détente* (a French word for “release from tension”), historians refer to the period of gradually improved relations between the USSR and the West, during the 1960s and early 1970s.

The first signs of *détente* appeared shortly after Josef Stalin's death, with the signature of the peace treaty granting Austrian independence in May 1955 and the Geneva summit in July that opened the way for dialogue between the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France. In March 1956, during the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, “peaceful co-existence” became the “baseline of Soviet Foreign policy.” Competition with the West

was not over, but, for Nikita Khrushchev, this competition had to be ideological, economic, and technological rather than military. The USSR kept however improving its military potential (it fired its first inter-continental ballistic missile in August 1957 and launched the first Sputnik the following October) and, regarding the Third World, all means of influence were still contemplated. This new approach to international relations led Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin to visit Western countries (Britain in 1956, the United States in 1959, and France in 1960) and to participate in the Paris summit meeting in 1960. However, *détente* did not go without tensions and crises, such as the first Berlin Crisis in 1958, the U-2 incident in May 1960, the second Berlin Crisis in August 1961 that led to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

The Cuban crisis was actually a turning point for *détente*: it led Washington and Moscow to establish a hotline, so as to prevent the risk of a nuclear war that could arise from a lack of communications, and in August 1963 the USSR signed with the United States and Great Britain the first Nuclear Test Ban treaty. Despite Khrushchev's dismissal in October 1964 and the promotion of a new leadership with Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny, and Alexei Kosygin, *détente* was not only maintained but fostered, for the Soviets perceived it as the best way to achieve their two major objectives: obtaining the official recognition of the post-World War II European territorial status quo and improving the standard of living of the population, by devoting more resources to civil production than to the military-industrial complex and by importing Western advanced technologies and products.

And indeed, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, *détente* became a multilateral process as well as a bilateral one.

As a bilateral process between the USSR and the United States, *détente* focused primarily on strategic issues; it first led in July 1968 to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in May 1972, to the SALT I treaty limiting strategic arms; however, *détente* dealt also with economic matters: During his historical trip to the Soviet Union, President Nixon signed several agreements on cooperation and trade, including grain exports to the Soviet State; one year later, new agreements were signed during Brezhnev's visit of June 1973 to the United States. This Soviet-American *détente* was not lim-

ited to domestic questions, as shown by the active cooperation displayed by the two super-powers in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

But détente started involving West-European governments as well. In 1966 the French President Charles de Gaulle visited the USSR to promote “détente, entente, and cooperation” and give détente a broader content, extended to cultural and human questions. Three years later Chancellor Willy Brandt, previously mayor of West Berlin, engaged West Germany in the Ostpolitik, a policy of opening to the East which led to concrete achievements: in 1970, West Germany concluded two treaties, one with Poland and the other with the USSR, that recognized the current German frontiers, notably the Oder-Neisse border, gave up all claims to the lost lands, and implicitly recognized the existence of East Germany. In 1972, the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France signed an agreement on Berlin. These treaties paved the way to the official admission of the two Germanies to the United Nations in 1973.

Détente was also a truly multilateral process: In November 1972, thirty-five European countries, the United States, and Canada opened the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In August 1975, the Helsinki Final Act recognized the post-World War II borders and adopted declarations encouraging Western-Eastern trade and cultural exchanges as well as promoting human rights and freedom of movement.

Despite these successes, détente declined and faded in the second half of the seventies. The active support of the USSR to Marxist revolutionary movements in the Third World, its repeated violations of the Helsinki Final Act, its intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the euromissiles question, and the Polish crisis in 1980 all contributed to a revival of the Cold War.

See also: ARMS CONTROL; BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; COLD WAR; CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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MARIE-PIERRE REY

DEVELOPED SOCIALISM

The concept of developed (“mature,” or “real”) socialism emerged in the offices of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the late 1960s, soon after the establishment of Leonid Brezhnev’s regime, which reacted to the public ideology of Nikita Khrushchev’s regime. Almost immediately, it was accepted in all Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe as the leading doctrine. As a matter of fact, each new Soviet regime made considerable changes in the public ideology. With Brezhnev’s demise, the concept of developed socialism was almost immediately discarded. Already in the span of Yuri Andropov’s short regime skeptical attitudes toward the previous regime emerged. The new propaganda focused on social justice. Then, with the start of perestroika, this concept associated with Brezhnev’s stagnation was sent to the dustbin of history.

Khrushchev, the most eclectic Soviet leader, who tried to combine the goal of developing military might (his son Sergei Khrushchev aptly named a book about his father *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 2000) with a naive belief in communist ideals, and also with serious liberalization of society. Khrushchev wanted to reach the standard of living associated with communism without deflecting any resources from the defense of the motherland, the sacred cow of all Soviet leaders. It was Khrushchev who in 1961, just a few years before the coup against him, in the new program of the Communist Party, promised that “the next generations of the Soviet people will live under communism.”

Khrushchev tried to implement this belief through his policy, which had some disastrous consequences. He castigated the personal ownership of cars and private country houses, as well as encouraged collective transportation and vacations. He initiated people’s teams for keeping order as an attempt to diminish the role of the professional police, an idea that goes back to Vladimir Lenin’s utopian vision of socialist society in “State and Revolution,” written before the October revolution. Moved by the same motivation, Khrushchev promoted amateur theaters with the same ridiculous fervor. More serious consequences rose from Khrushchev’s economic policy. He promised a radical jump forward in the production of food by the collective farms. However, he put a limit on the production of milk and meat from private plots. While Khrushchev’s program in collective agriculture failed, the curtailment of food production in

the private sector led to big lines for food products in the state and even in the so-called free collective market.

The leadership who ousted Khrushchev as a demagogue and adventurist (or voluntarist as he was cautiously and indirectly named in the press) who endangered the system searched for more realistic mass propaganda. Preoccupied with military competition with the United States, Brezhnev and his colleagues did not want to spread the illusion that paradise was right around the corner. Such illusions, it was thought, would generate discontent among the people in the near future.

With a sober stance, the leadership looked for an ideological concept that would preserve the communist phraseology ("the building of the material-technological basis of communism"), but instead of waiting for the future, would proclaim that Soviet life could be enjoyed right now. This was the message of developed socialism, which commanded great fanfare in the early 1970s. The leadership's appeal to the masses to be "satisfied"—a famous term, often used by Brezhnev—with life at present seemed all the more reasonable because they were indeed "deeply satisfied" with the military parity with the West in the 1970s, an achievement that had been dreamed about by all the Russian leaders since Peter the Great.

The authors of the concept described the current Soviet society as having already accomplished many of the goals of socialism in the first stage of communism. They depicted Soviet society as based on highly developed productive forces, as a society that was close to eliminating class and ethnic distinctions, and as a new type of human community and socialist personality. Soviet ideologues also talked about the highly developed socialist democracy, and the scientific character of the political management. Most postulates of the concept had few links to reality. The pathetic statements about the technological revolution in the Soviet economy looked absurd against the backdrop of the growing economic gap between the Soviet and Western economies, particularly in the production of civil goods. The thesis about the flourishing of socialist democracy was ridiculous considering the system's harsh persecution of dissidents.

There was, however, one element of the new thinking—that is, the mode of life, or *obraz zhizni*—that held a special place in the concept of developed socialism. The "Soviet mode of life" was closer to reality than most other dogmas. While refusing to

claim that Soviet society can in the foreseeable future surpass the level of material consumption and productivity in the West (which had been promised by Khrushchev) the sophisticated Soviet ideologues focused on other elements of everyday life. They used the concept of "quality of life" with its focus on the subjective evaluation of different components of life that had just emerged in the West in the early 1970s.

While in some ways they followed the spirit of Western studies on the quality of life, the Soviet ideologues avoided the comparison of the material consumption in the USSR and the West. As the most important features of Soviet life, they concentrated on the free education and health care system (the quality of which was quite high by international standards) as well as the high level of science and culture, the relatively low social inequality, the importance of cultural activities in the lives of ordinary people, the big network of institutions for children, the vacations in resort institutions accessible to everybody, full employment, the absence of homeless people, and the impossibility of evicting people from their apartments. The Soviet ideologues also described, and not without reason for the significant part of the Soviet population, the Soviet people as patriots, internationalists, collectivists, and optimists. They depicted life in the West as full of various conflicts and deeply immoral. They also ascribed to the Soviet people mostly fictional properties, such as high labor discipline, temperance, active participation in the management of their factories and offices, and a motivation to work that was not driven by material incentives, but by the general willingness to make their country strong and prosperous.

Despite the permanent grumbling about the lines for consumer goods and services, the majority of the Soviet people accepted the propaganda about the superiority of the Soviet style of life compared to capitalist society. In a national survey, which the author conducted in 1976, the majority of the respondents evaluated the quality of life in the USSR as "four" on a five-point scale; they graded life in the USA as "three," and in the German Democratic Republic as "five."

The concept of developed socialism, which underpinned the anti-Western propaganda, was used also as a tool against "the Great Chinese Proletarian Revolution." Both countries since the late 1960s struggled for the leadership of the international communist movement as well as in the third world in the 1960s and 1970s. The Soviet ideo-

logues denounced the Maoist utopian leftist radicalism of the "Great Chinese Cultural Revolution," opposing it to Soviet "real socialism."

The concept of developed socialism was concocted as an ideological trick by the Soviet propagandists for the justification of the new regime. It was a laughing stock for liberal intellectuals, and the subject of political jokes from the moment of its birth. However, ironically, it became a monument to the period that is considered by many Russians as the happiest time of their lives. In any case, ten years after the demise of the USSR, one-half to two-thirds of the Russians, according to various polls, believed that life during Brezhnev's times was much better than in any other period of Russian history in the twentieth century, and definitely better than in post-Soviet Russia.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; SOCIALISM

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VLADIMIR E. SHLAPENTOKH

DEZHNEV, SEMEN IVANOVICH

(c. 1605–1673), Cossack; explorer of northeastern Siberia.

Originally from the Pomor region, on the North Dvina, Semen Dezhnev entered Siberian service with the Cossacks in 1630. His expeditions, particularly that of 1648–1649, were an important part of the great push eastward that Russia made into Siberia during the seventeenth century.

Based in Yakutsk, Dezhnev helped to explore and survey the Alazeya and Kolyma rivers in northeastern Siberia. In 1647 he set out to find and map the Anadyr River, but this attempt proved abortive. Dezhnev began again in June 1648, at the head of ninety men. From Srednekolymsk, Dezhnev's party sailed north, then, upon reaching the Arctic Ocean, turned east, along Russia's northern coast.

During the next one hundred days, Dezhnev's party lost six of seven boats. The surviving vessel

sailed two thousand miles, rounding the Chukotsk Peninsula, Asia's northeastern tip. Thus Dezhnev and his men became, albeit unwittingly, the first Europeans to navigate what later came to be known as the Bering Strait. Dezhnev also discovered the Diomed Islands. Dezhnev had sailed between Asia and North America, but not for another century, with Bering's Great Northern Expedition, would it be proven conclusively that the two continents were not physically linked.

In October 1648, Dezhnev's boat was cast ashore on Russia's Pacific coast, well south of the Anadyr. Before winter set in, the party marched north, locating the river's mouth. Sixteen men, Dezhnev included, survived the winter encampment. In the spring of 1649, they traveled upriver and founded the outpost of Anadyrsk. In 1650 and 1651, Dezhnev consolidated his control over the river basin, aided by Mikhail Stadukhin and Semyon Motora, who had reached the eastern Anadyr overland. Dezhnev was relieved in 1659 and returned to Yakutsk in 1662. In 1672, shortly before his death, he returned to Moscow.

See also: ALASKA; BERING, VITUS JONASSEN; SIBERIA

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JOHN MCCANNON

DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH

(1872–1929), famed Russian impresario.

Sergei Pavlovich Diaghilev founded and led the Ballets Russes, a touring ballet company that attained an unprecedented level of fame throughout Europe and the Americas from 1909 until 1929. Diaghilev, his company, and his collaborators introduced Russian dancers, choreographers, painters, composers, and musicians to Western audiences that previously had scant knowledge of them. His Ballets Russes single-handedly established the centrality of dance to the artistic culture of the early twentieth century.

A former law student, whose own attempts at musical composition proved a failure, Diaghilev bro-

kered the collaborations of some of his century's most celebrated creative artists, Russian and non-Russian (Stravinsky, Balanchine, Nijinsky, Pavlova, and Chaliapin, as well as Debussy, Ravel, Picasso, and Matisse). A series of art exhibits organized in Russian in 1897 marked the beginning of Diaghilev's career as an impresario. Those led to the founding of an ambitious art journal, *Mir iskusstva* (The World of Art, 1898–1904). As Diaghilev's attentions shifted to Western Europe, the nucleus of Diaghilev's *World of Art* group remained with him. His first European export was an exhibition of Russian paintings in Paris in 1906. A series of concerts of Russian music followed the next year, and in 1908 Diaghilev brought Russian opera to Paris. With designers Alexandre Benois and Léon Bakst, the choreographer Michel Fokine, and dancers of such renown as Vaslav Nijinsky and Anna Pavlova, Diaghilev began to introduce European audiences to Russian ballet in 1909.

The early Ballets Russes repertory included overwrought Orientalist fantasy ballets such as *Schéhérazade* (1910), investigations of the antique (*L'Après-midi d'un Faune*, 1912), and folkloric representations of Russian and Slavic culture (*The Firebird*, 1910). The company also introduced such masterworks as Stravinsky's *Petrushka* (1911, with choreography by Fokine) and *Rite of Spring* (1913, choreographed by Nijinsky). Whatever the lasting value of these early collaborations (the original choreography of many of them has been lost), the Diaghilev ballets were emblematic of Russian Silver Age culture in their synaesthesia (combining music, dance, and décors) and their engagement with the West.

Diaghilev's company toured Europe and the Americas for two decades, until the impresario's death in 1929. And while many of Diaghilev's original, Russian collaborators broke away from his organization in the years following World War I, Diaghilev's troupe became a more cosmopolitan enterprise and featured the work of a number of important French painters and composers in those years. Nonetheless, Diaghilev continued to seek out émigré Soviet artists; the final years of his enterprise were crowned by the choreography of George Balanchine, then an unknown dancer and promising choreographer.

Diaghilev had long suffered from diabetes and died in Venice in 1929. His influence continued to be felt in the ballets presented, the companies established, and the new popularity of dance in the twentieth century. The relatively short, one-act

work, typically choreographed to extant symphonic music, and the new prominence of the male dancer speak to Diaghilev's influence. An astonishing number of dance companies established around the world in the twentieth century owe their existence to Diaghilev's model; many of them boast a direct lineage.

See also: BALLET; SILVER AGE

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TIM SCHOLL

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

A concept in Soviet Marxist–Leninist ideology.

Dialectical materialism was the underlying approach to the interpretation of history and society in Soviet Marxist–Leninist ideology. According to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in the history of philosophy, the clash of contradictory ideas has generated constant movement toward higher levels. Karl Marx poured new content into the dialectic with his materialist interpretation of history, which asserted that the development of the forces of production was the source of the conflicts or contradictions that would demolish each stage of society and lead to its replacement with a higher stage. Marx's collaborator, Friedrich Engels, systematized the three laws of the dialectic that were to figure prominently in the official Soviet ideology: (a) the transformation of quantity into quality; (b) the unity of opposites; and (c) the negation of the negation. According to the first of those laws, within any stage of development of society, changes accumulate gradually, until further change cannot be accommodated within the framework of that stage and must proceed by a leap of revolutionary transformation, like that from feudal society to capitalism. The second law signifies that within any stage, mutually antagonistic forces are built into to the character of the system; for instance, the capitalists and the proletariat are locked in a relationship of struggle, but as long as capitalism survives, the existence of each of those classes presumes the existence of the other. The third law of the dialectic supposedly reflects the reality

that any new stage of society (i.e., capitalism) has replaced or negated a previous stage, but will itself eventually be replaced by still another stage of development (i.e., communism).

In Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology under successive political leaders, though the insistence on the universal validity of the laws of the dialectic became highly dogmatic, the application of those laws was continually adapted, depending on the political objectives and calculations of the top leaders. Most crucial is the example of Josef Stalin, who insisted that the dialectic took the form of destructive struggle within capitalist societies, but tried to exempt Soviet socialism from the harshness of such internal conflict by arguing that in socialism, the conscious planning and control of change eliminated fundamental inconsistency between the material base and the political-administrative superstructure. Thus in socialism the interplay of nonantagonistic contradictions could open the way to gradual leaps of relatively painless qualitative transformation. Mikhail Gorbachev later repudiated that reasoning as having been the philosophical rationale for evading necessary reforms in political and administrative structures in the Soviet Union from the 1930s to the 1980s.

See also: HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MARXISM

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ALFRED B. EVANS JR.

DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat originated with Karl Marx and was applied by Vladimir Lenin as the organizational principle of the communist state after the Russian Revolution. Josef Stalin subsequently adopted it to organize workers' states in Eastern Europe following the Soviet takeover after 1945. In China, Mao Zedong

claimed that the communist revolution of 1949 was the first step to establishing a proletarian dictatorship, even though the peasantry had been largely responsible for the revolution's success.

In *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), Marx gave the reasoning for establishing absolute authority in the name of the working class: "The first step on the path to the workers' revolution is the elevation of the proletariat to the position of ruling class. The proletariat will gain from its political domination by gradually tearing away from the bourgeoisie all capital, by centralizing all means of production in the hands of the State, that is to say in the hands of the proletariat itself organized as the ruling class." In *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875), he theorized how "between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the State can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." Marx employed the term, then, as absolutist rule not by an individual but an entire socio-economic class. If capitalism constituted the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, it would be replaced by socialism—a dictatorship of the proletariat. In turn, socialist dictatorship was to be followed by communism, a classless, stateless society.

In his 1891 postscript to Marx's *The Civil War in France* (1871), Friedrich Engels addressed social-democratic critics of this concept: "Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Differences over the principle—and over whether a conspiratorial communist party was to incorporate this idea—were to divide the left into revolutionary (in Russia, Bolshevik) and reformist (Menshevik) wings.

Lenin developed the praxis of proletarian dictatorship in *State and Revolution* (1917): "The proletariat only needs the state for a certain length of time. It is not the elimination of the state as a final aim that separates us from the anarchists. But we assert that to attain this end, it is essential to utilize temporarily against the exploiters the instruments, the means, and the procedures of political power, in the same way as it is essential, in order to eliminate the classes, to instigate the temporary dictatorship of the oppressed class." A dictatorship by and for the proletariat would realize Lenin's dictum that the only good revolution was one that could defend itself. Dictatorship would al-

low the working class to consolidate political power, suppress all opposition, gain control of the means of production, and destroy the machinery of the bourgeois state. Political socialization would follow: "It will be necessary under the dictatorship of the proletariat to reeducate millions of peasants and small proprietors, hundreds of thousands of office employees, officials, and bourgeois intellectuals." Paradoxically, Lenin saw this form of dictatorship as putting an end to "bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism" and replacing it with a system expanding democratic rights and liberties to the exploited classes.

In sum, for Lenin, "only he is a Marxist who extends his acknowledgement of the class struggle to an acknowledgement of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Moreover, "the dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society" (*Collected Works*, XXV, p. 190).

In *Foundations of Leninism* (1924), Stalin identified three dimensions of the dictatorship of the proletariat: 1) as the instrument of the proletarian revolution; 2) as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie; and 3) as Soviet power, which represented its state form. In practice, Lenin, and especially Stalin, invoked the concept to rationalize the Communist Party monopoly on power in Russia, arguing that it alone represented the proletariat.

See also: COMMUNISM; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MARXISM; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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RAY TARAS

DIOCESE

In early Greek sources (eleventh and twelfth centuries), the term signified a province, either secular or ecclesiastical. In Rus', and later in Russia, the

term was used only in the ecclesiastical sense to mean the area under the jurisdiction of a prelate.

Church organization evolved along with the spread of Christianity. The metropolitan of Kiev headed the Church in Rus'. Bishops and dioceses soon were instituted in other principalities. Fifteen dioceses were created in the pre-Mongol period. Compared with their small, compact Greek models centered on cities, these dioceses were vast in extent with vague boundaries and thinly populated, like the Rus' land itself.

The Mongol invasions changed the course of political and ecclesiastical development. The political center shifted north, ultimately finding a home in Moscow. Kiev and principalities to the southwest were lost, although claims to them were never relinquished. Church organization adapted to these changes. In the initial onslaught, several dioceses were devastated and many remained vacant for long periods. Later new dioceses were created, including the diocese of Sarai established at the Golden Horde. By 1488 when the growing division in the church organization solidified with one metropolitan in Moscow and another in Kiev, there were eighteen dioceses. Nine dioceses (not including the metropolitan's see) were subordinated to Moscow; nine dioceses looked to the metropolitan seated in Kiev.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed the elevation of the metropolitan of Moscow to patriarch (1589), periods of reform directed at strengthening church organization and raising the spiritual level of parishioners, and the subordination of the see of Kiev with its suffragans to the Moscow patriarch (1686). Ecclesiastical structure responded to these profound changes. By 1700 the number of dioceses had increased to twenty-one (excluding the Patriarchal see) as the Church struggled to create an effective organization able to meet the spiritual needs of the people and suppress dissident voices that had emerged. Thirteen of these dioceses were headed by metropolitans, seven by archbishops, and one by a bishop.

In 1721 the patriarchate was abolished and replaced by the Holy Synod. Despite this momentous change in ecclesiastical organization, the long-term trend of increasing the number of dioceses continued. In 1800 there were thirty-six dioceses; by 1917 the number had grown to sixty-eight. More and smaller dioceses responded to increased and changing responsibilities, particularly in the areas of education, charity, and missionary activity, but

also in the area of social control and surveillance as servants of the state.

The Bolshevik Revolution destroyed the organization of the Russian Church, making prisoners, fugitives, exiles, and martyrs of its prelates. The catastrophes that characterized the beginning of World War II prompted Stalin to initiate a partial rapprochement with the Church. This permitted a revival of its organization, but under debilitating constraints. In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Orthodox Church entered a new period institutionally. Constraints were lifted, the dioceses revived and liberated. By 2003 there were 128 functioning dioceses.

See also: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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CATHY J. POTTER

DIONISY

(c. 1440–1508), renowned Russian painter.

Dionisy was the first Russian layman known to have been a religious painter and to have run a large, professional workshop. He was associated with the Moscow School and is considered the most outstanding icon painter of the later fifteenth century in Russia. His biographer, Joseph of Volotsk (1440–1515), called him “the best and most creative artist of all Russian lands.” Certainly this can be considered true for his time period.

Dionisy's first recorded works were frescoes in the Church of St. Parfuntiev in the Borovsky

Monastery, completed around 1470 when he was an assistant to the painter Mitrophanes. In 1481 the Archbishop Vassian of Rostov, a close friend of the Great Prince of Moscow Ivan III, asked Dionisy to paint icons for the iconostasis of the Cathedral of the Dormition, Russia's main shrine in the Moscow Kremlin. This cathedral had just been finished by Aristotle Fioravanti, a well-known architect and engineer from Bologna, Italy. In this task Dionisy was assisted by three coworkers: Pope Timothy, Yarete, and Kon. Some fragmentary frescoes in this cathedral are also attributed to Dionisy, painted prior to the icon commission.

In 1484 Paisi the Elder and Dionisy, with his sons Fyodor and Vladimir, painted icons for the Monastery of Volokolamsk. It is generally agreed that the greatest achievement of Dionisy is the group of frescoes in the Church of the Nativity of the Virgin at St. Ferapont Monastery on the White Lake. He signed and dated this work 1500–1502. He was assisted again by his two sons. The entire fresco program centers on the glorification of the



The Theotokos by Dionisy. © RUSSIAN STATE MUSEUM, ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA/LEONID BOGDANOV/SUPERSTOCK

Virgin Mary. However, the usual Pantocrator (Christ enthroned, "Ruler of All") appears in the dome, but without the severity of earlier representations. In the apse the enthroned Virgin and Child are represented above the Liturgy of the Church Fathers. The nave walls have frescoes illustrating scenes from the Akathist Hymn praising the Virgin. Some unusual scenes of the life and miracles of Christ also appear (Parables of the Prodigal Son, Widow's Mite, and so forth). Dionisy apparently invented some compositions instead of copying traditional representations.

Stylistically he was very much indebted to the venerated Andrei Rublev who died in 1430. Characteristic of Dionisy's style is the "de-materialized bouyancy" (Hamilton) of his figures, which appear to be extremely attenuated. In addition, his figures have a certain transparency and delicacy that are distinctive to his approach.

Icon panels attributed to Dionisy include a large icon of St. Peter, the Moscow Metropolitan, St. Alexius, another Moscow Metropolitan, St. Cyril of Byelo-Ozersk, a Crucifixion icon, a Hodegetria icon, and an icon glorifying the Virgin Mary entitled "All Creation Rejoices in Thee." The Crucifixion icon especially characterizes his style. Christ's rhythmical, languid body with tiny head (proportions 1:12) dominates the composition while his followers, on a smaller scale, levitate below. A curious addition—perhaps from western influence—are the depictions of the floating personified Church and Synagogue, each accompanied by an angel.

The influence of Dionisy is clearly evident in subsequent sixteenth-century Russian icons and frescoes as well as in manuscript illuminations.

See also: CATHEDRAL OF THE DORMITION; RUBLEV, ANDREI; THEOPHANES THE GREEK

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A. DEAN MCKENZIE

DISENFRANCHIZED PERSONS

Soviet Russia's first Constitution of 1918 decreed that the bourgeois classes should be disenfranchised. The categories of people marked for disenfranchisement included those who hire labor for the purpose of profit; those who live off unearned income such as interest money or income from property; private traders and middlemen; monks and other clerics of all faiths and denominations; agents of the former tsarist police, gendarmes, prison organs, and security forces; former noblemen; White Army officers; leaders of counterrevolutionary bands; the mentally ill or insane; and persons sentenced by a court for crimes of profit or depravity. However, many more people were vulnerable to the loss of rights. Vladimir Lenin declared that his party would "disenfranchise all citizens who hinder socialist revolution." In addition, family members of disenfranchised persons shared the fate of their relatives "in those cases where they are materially dependent on the disenfranchised persons."

Also described as *lishentsy*, the disenfranchised were not only denied the ability to vote and to be elected to the local governing bodies or soviets: Under Josef Stalin the disenfranchised lost myriad rights and became effective outcasts of the Soviet state. They lost the right to work in state institutions or factories or to serve in the Red Army. They could not obtain a ration card or passport. The disenfranchised could not join a trade union or adopt a child, and they were denied all forms of public assistance, such as a state pension, aid, social insurance, medical care, and housing. Many *lishentsy* were deported to forced labor camps in the far north and Siberia.

In 1926, the government formalized a procedure that made it possible for some of the disenfranchised to be reinstated their rights. Officially, disenfranchised persons could have their rights restored if they engaged in socially useful labor and demonstrated loyalty to Soviet power. Hundreds of thousands of people flooded Soviet institutions with various appeals for rehabilitation, and some managed to reenter the society that excluded them.

According to statistics maintained by the local soviets, over 2 million people lost their rights, but these figures on the number of people disenfranchised are probably underestimated. In the electoral campaigns of 1926 to 1927 and 1928 to 1929, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)

reported roughly 3 to 4 percent of rural and 7 to 8 percent of the urban residents disenfranchised as a percentage of the voting-age population. Rates of disenfranchisement were higher in those areas with large non-Russian populations. Although portrayed as bourgeois elements, the disenfranchised actually included a wide variety of people, such as gamblers, tax evaders, embezzlers, and ethnic minorities. The poor, the weak, and the elderly were especially vulnerable to disenfranchisement.

Disenfranchisement ended with Stalin's 1936 Constitution, which extended voting rights to all of the former categories of disenfranchised people except for the mentally ill and those sentenced by a court to deprivation of rights. Nonetheless, "former people," or those with ties to the old regime, remained vulnerable during subsequent campaigns of Stalinist terror.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; CONSTITUTION OF 1918; CONSTITUTION OF 1936; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH

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GOLFO ALEXOPOULOS

DISHONOR *See* BECHESTIE.

DISSIDENT MOVEMENT

Individuals and informal groups opposed to Communist Party rule.

This movement comprised an informal, loosely organized conglomeration of individual and group-based dissidents in the decades following the death of Josef Stalin in March 1953 through the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. They opposed their posttotalitarian regimes, accepting, as punishment, exile, imprisonment, and sometimes even death. The dissidents subjected their fellow citizens to moral triage. By the year 1991, they helped to bring down

the regimes in Europe, which, for a number of reasons, had already embarked upon a political modernization and democratization process. Dissidents were less successful in the East and Southeast Asian countries of the communist bloc. It may be ironic that with the reversion to authoritarian practices in such former Soviet republics as the Russian Federation, Belarus, and the Ukraine by the turn of the twenty-first century, dissidents have reappeared in the 2000s as individuals, or, at most, small groups, but not as a movement.

DEFINITIONS

The most precise historical usage dates from the late 1960s. The term "dissident" (in Russian, *inakomysliachii* for men or *inakomysliachaia* for women) was first applied to intellectuals opposing the regime in the Soviet Union. Then, in the late 1970s, it spread to Soviet-dominated East Central and Southeast Europe, which was also known as Eastern Europe. Most broadly, a dissident may be defined as an outspoken political and social nonconformist.

The classic definition of dissent in the East Central European context is that by Vaclav Havel, a leading dissident himself and later president of the Czechoslovak and Czech Republics, from December 1989 until his resignation February 2, 2003. Wrote Havel: "[Dissent] is a natural and inevitable consequence of the present historical phase of the [Communist dictatorship—Y.B.] system it is haunting. It was born at a time, when this system, for a thousand reasons, can no longer base itself on the unadulterated, brutal, and arbitrary application of power, eliminating all expressions of nonconformity. What is more, the system has become so ossified politically that there is practically no way for such nonconformity to be implemented within its official structures" (Havel, 1985, p. 23). Havel thus places dissent into the post-Stalinist or posttotalitarian phase of the communist system. The semi-ironic concept of dissent also implies that its practitioners, the dissidents, differed in their thinking from the majority of their fellow citizens and were thus doomed to failure. By making, however, common cause with the party reformers in the governing structures, the dissidents, including Havel, prevailed for good in Eastern Europe, and at least temporarily in the Russian Federation, Belarus, and the Ukraine.

SOVIET LEADERS AND LEADING DISSIDENTS

The party reformer Nikita Khrushchev, who after Stalin's death headed the Soviet regime from March

1953 to October 1964, was committed to building communism in the Soviet Union, in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe and throughout the world. Paradoxically, he ended by laying the political and legal foundations for the dissident movement. That movement flourished under Khrushchev's long-term successor Leonid Brezhnev (October 1964–November 1982). Being more conservative, Brezhnev wanted to restore Stalinism, but failed, partly because of the opposition from dissidents. After the brief tenure of two interim leaders—the tough reformer Yuri Andropov (November 1982–February 1984) and the conservative Konstantin Chernenko (February 1984–March 1985)—power was assumed by Andropov's young protégé, the ambitious modernizer Mikhail Gorbachev (March 1985–December 1991). Like Khrushchev, Gorbachev both fought and encouraged the dissident movement. Ultimately, he failed all around. By December 1991, the Soviet Union withdrew from its outer empire in Eastern Europe and saw the collapse of its inner empire. It ceased to exist, and Gorbachev resigned from the presidency December 25, 1991.

The most outstanding ideological leaders of the Soviet dissidents were, from the Left to the Right, Roy Medvedev (Medvedev, 1971), Peter Grigorenko (Grigorenko, 1982), Andrei Sakharov (Sakharov, 1968, 1992), and Alexander Solzhenitsyn (Solzhenitsyn: 1963, 1974–1978). The more radical Andrei Amalrik (Amalrik, 1970) cannot be easily classified: he dared to forecast the breakup of the Soviet Union, but he also wrote one of the first critical analyses of the movement. Very noteworthy are Edward Kuznetsov (Kuznetsov, 1975), a representative of the Zionist dissent; Yuri Orlov (Alexeyeva, 1985), the political master strategist of the Helsinki Watch Committees; and Tatyana Mamonova (Mamonova, 1984), the leader of Russian feminists.

A Marxist socialist historian leaning toward democracy, Medvedev helped Khrushchev in his attempt to denounce Stalin personally for killing Communist Party members in the 1930s (Medvedev, 1971). Medvedev also provided intellectual underpinning for Khrushchev's drawing of sharp distinctions between a benevolent Vladimir Lenin and a psychopathic Stalin, between a fundamentally sound Leninist party rank-and-file and the excesses of the Stalinists in the secret police and in the party apparatus. This was better politics than history. Major General Peter Grigorenko, who was of Ukrainian peasant origin, shared with Roy

Medvedev the initial conviction that Stalin had deviated from true Leninism and with Roy's brother Zhores Medvedev, who had protested against the regime's mistreatment of fellow biologists, the wrongful treatment in Soviet asylums and foreign exile. As a dissident, Grigorenko was more straightforward. As early as 1961, he began to criticize Khrushchev's authoritarian tendencies, and under Brezhnev he became a public advocate of the Crimean Tatars' return to the Crimea. He also joined the elite Sakharov–Yelena Bonner circle within the Helsinki Watch Committees movement, having been a charter member of both the Moscow Group since May 1976 and the Ukrainian Group since November 1976 (Reich, 1979; Grigorenko, 1982). Through his double advocacy of the Crimean Tatars and his fellow Ukrainians, Grigorenko helped to sensitize the liberal Russian leaders in the dissident movement to the importance of a correct nationality policy and also of the restructuring of the Soviet federation.

Academician Sakharov, a nuclear physicist, the “father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb,” and an ethnic Russian, was one of the foremost moral and intellectual leaders of the Soviet dissident movement, the other being his antipode, the writer and ethnic Russian Solzhenitsyn. Unlike the Slavophile and Russian conservative Solzhenitsyn, who had expressed nostalgia for the authoritarian Russian past and had been critical of the West, Sakharov belonged to the liberal Westernizing tradition in Russian history and wanted to transform the Soviet Union in accordance with liberal Western ideas (Sakharov 1974, Solzhenitsyn 1974). As a political leader of the dissident movement, Sakharov practiced what he preached, especially after marrying the Armenian–Jewish physician Bonner, whose family had been victimized by the regime. He became active in individual human rights cases or acts of conscience, and thus set examples of civic courage. So long as the dissenter observed nonviolence, Sakharov publicly defended persecuted fellow scientists; Russian poets and politicians; and Crimean Tatars, who wanted to return to their homeland in the Crimea. He even spoke up for persecuted Ukrainian nationalist Valentyn Moroz, whose politics was more rightist than liberal. In 1970, Sakharov had also defended the former Russian–Jewish dissident turned alienated Zionist Kuznetsov, who was initially sentenced to death for attempting to hijack a Soviet plane to emigrate to Israel. To his death in December 1989, Sakharov remained the liberal conscience of Russia.

**DISSIDENT GROUPS, THEIR ACTIONS,
AND SOVIET COUNTERACTIONS**

As to the different groups and newsletters in the Soviet movement, David Kowalewski has counted and categorized as many as forty-three, of which six were religious. Of the thirty-seven secular groups, eleven were general, or multipurpose defenders of rights, nine were ethnic with all-Union membership or aims, seven were political, three each were socioeconomic and social, and one each was economic, artistic, intellectual, and cultural-religious. The inclusion of more regionally based and oriented groups from the Baltic States, Transcaucasia, and the Ukraine would increase the number of ethnic groups by at least four. According to first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Volodymyr V. Sherbytsky, on May 16, 1989, there were about fifteen anti-Socialist groupings in Ukraine.

What did the Soviet dissidents actually do? How did the regime react? What did the dissidents accomplish? Almost two thousand dissidents openly signed various appeals before 1968 (Rubenstein 1985, p. 125) Over time, hundreds took part in public demonstrations during Soviet Constitution Day (December 10), and on special occasions, such as the protest of seven against the USSR-led Warsaw Pact forces marching into Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Poets and writers surreptitiously published their works, which like much of nineteenth-century Russian literature carried a political and social message, in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union (the so-called samizdat, or self-publishing), or even abroad (tamizdat in Russian, meaning literally "published there"). Some of the poems would also be read publicly, in a political demonstration. The documentarists among the dissidents meticulously recorded facts, especially in *The Chronicle of Current Events*. They worked hand in glove with the legalists, who insisted that the regime observe its own laws and the explicit norms of the Stalin Constitution of 1936. In October 1977, Brezhnev had a more factual constitution passed, but it was too late to defeat the legalists. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews insisted on their right to leave the country altogether, and so did tens of thousands of Soviet Germans. Baltic dissidents protested both the current discriminatory policies of the regime and their countries having been forcibly included in the Soviet Union after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. Ukrainian dissidents insisted that the linguistic Russification was unconstitutional and that the regime's policies in economics

foreshadowed the abolition of Soviet republics and the merger of the Ukrainian people with the ethnic Russians. The movement was partly self-financed in that professionals donated their services free and the more successful authors of tamizdat such as Solzhenitsyn remitted their earnings to fellow dissidents in the USSR, especially to those that were imprisoned by the regime. Some of the funds were channeled from abroad: They were donations either by private foreign citizens, or by foreign governments.

By a stroke of political genius, in 1976 ethnic Russian Orlov brought the disparate sections of the dissident movement together in the Helsinki Watch Committees. Brezhnev wanted to legitimize his hold over Eastern Europe in the Helsinki accords, and the United States, Canada, and Western Germany insisted on the inclusion of human rights provisions. Taking a leaf from the legalists, Orlov, Bonner, and Sakharov insisted that the regime should be publicly aided in observing its new commitments toward its own citizens. Moreover, Orlov persuaded sympathetic American congresspersons and senators, such as the late Mrs. Millicent Fenwick, that with the support of the U.S. government, the Helsinki Review Process would work. It would advance the global cause of human rights and, on a regional level, would help Yuri Orlov's fellow Soviet citizens and also benefit Mrs. Fenwick's political constituents, who wanted their relatives to be allowed to emigrate to the West and to Israel.

What was the reaction of the Soviet government? At the very least, Brezhnev and his security chief and eventual successor Andropov ordered the disruption of public demonstrations by the dissidents by hiring a brass band or having thugs beat them up. The names of all the petitioners would be recorded and the more persistent letter signers would be talked to by the secret police, stripped of privileges such as foreign travel, and eventually dismissed from their jobs. The next step could be exile from Moscow, such as that of Sakharov from January 1880 to December 1986. Others, as for instance the famous tamizdat authors Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, would be formally tried, sentenced to long terms in prison camps, and expelled abroad after serving their sentences. The show trials led to further protests by dissidents and criticisms in the West. Brezhnev and Andropov tightened the screw by placing professionals with an intellectual bent in asylums, where they were

given mind-altering drugs, and also by authorizing the killing, whether by medical neglect during incarceration or by hired thugs, of carefully chosen dissidents. The most frightening aspect of the regime's policy was that the individual dissident did not know what fate had been decided for him or her. The post-Stalinist system of power was not fully posttotalitarian in that it retained Stalin's option of unpredictability.

THE MOVEMENT'S SUCCESS OR FAILURE

From the perspective of the first years of the twenty-first century, it is not clear whether Gorbachev would have embarked upon reforms and modernization by himself in the expectation that he would be given massive economic aid from the United States and Western Europe, or whether the pro-Western dissidents helped tilt his approach. The Soviet mode of economic and political thinking has been overcome in such East Central European countries as Poland, where after repeated political insurrections in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976 the dissidents coalesced in Solidarity in the 1980s (Rupnik 1979, Walesa 1992) in Hungary with its revolution of October 1956 in the Czech and Slovak republics that had benefited from Havel's moral leadership and in all three Baltic states where the dissidents have won political majorities. In the old Soviet Union, within the boundaries of September 1, 1939 (that is, with the probable exception of the Western Ukraine), Soviet attitudes have come back: wholesale in Belarus, where the dissident movement had been weak, and partly in Russia and Ukraine, where the dissidents continue operating as a tolerated political minority within "hybrid" (partly democratic, partly authoritarian) regimes.

In the old Soviet Union, where the citizens had lived under the communist regime for seventy years—as opposed to forty years in East Central Europe—many persons were like walking wounded. The dissident movement submitted their fellow citizens to a moral triage between members of the dissidents and members of the establishment, between the dissidents' foul- and fair-weather friends, between the establishment's decent reformers and its willing executioners. The dissident movement also raised fundamental questions about the future of Russia. Solzhenitsyn wondered whether Russia should return to a humane conservative monarchy, while Sakharov, with the support of U.S. pres-

idents and West European statesmen, chose to work for a liberal democracy and a civic society. Most interesting in view of the resurgence of pro-Soviet thinking in Russia and the Eastern Ukraine in the twenty-first century is the harsh judgment of the Zionist wouldbe emigrant Kuznetsov, who challenged both Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. Wrote Kuznetsov December 14, 1970: "The essential characteristics of the structure of the regime are to all intents and purposes immutable, and . . . the particular political culture of the Russian people may be classed as despotic. There are not many variations in this type of power structure, the framework of which was erected by Ivan the Terrible and by Peter the Great. I think that the Soviet regime is the lawful heir of these widely differing Russian rulers. . . . It fully answers the heartfelt wishes of a significant—but alas not the better—part of its population" (Kuznetsov, 1975, p. 63; Rubenstein, 1985, pp. 170–171). Was the dissident movement, therefore, bound to fail in the old Soviet Union? The definitive answer may be given later, a generation after the breakup of the USSR, or roughly by the year 2021.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; GRIGORENKO, PETER GRIGORIEVICH; INTELLIGENTSIA; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; MEDVEDEV, ROY ALEXANDROVICH; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH; SAMIZDAT; SOLZHENITSYN, ALEXANDER ISAYEVICH

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YAROSLAV BILINSKY

DMITRY ALEXANDROVICH

(d. 1294), Grand prince of Vladimir.

In 1260 Dmitry Alexandrovich was appointed to Novgorod by his father Alexander Yaroslavich "Nevsky" who, two years later, ordered him to attack the Teutonic Knights at Yurev (Tartu, Dorpat) in Estonia. But in 1264, after his father died, the Novgorodians evicted Dmitry because of his youth. Nevertheless, in 1268 they requested him to wage war against the castle of Rakovor (Rakvere, Wessenburg) in Estonia. After Dmitry's uncle Yaroslav of Vladimir died in 1271, he occupied Novgorod again, but his uncle Vasily evicted him. Vasily died in 1276, and Dmitry replaced him as grand prince of Vladimir. After that the Novgorodians once again invited him to rule their town. While there he waged war on Karelia and in 1280 built a stone fortress at Kopore near the Gulf of Finland. In 1281, however, Dmitry quarreled with the Novgorodians. He waged war against them and because of this failed to present himself to the new Khan in Saray. His younger brother Andrei, who did visit the Golden Horde, was therefore awarded the patent for Vladimir. Because Dmitry refused to abdicate, the khan gave Andrei troops with which he evicted his brother and seized Vladimir and Novgorod. Dmitry fled to Sweden and later returned to Pereyasavl. In 1283, when Andrei brought Tatar troops against him, Dmitry sought help from Khan Nogay, an enemy of the Golden Horde, who gave him troops. They wreaked havoc on northern Russia. Andrei eventually capitulated but continued to plot Dmitry's overthrow. In 1293, after summoning the Tatars the fourth time, he succeeded in forcing Dmitry's abdication. Dmitry died in 1294 while returning to Pereyasavl Zalesky.

See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH; GOLDEN HORDE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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MARTIN DIMNIK

DMITRY, FALSE

(d. 1606), Tsar of Russia (1605–1606), also known as Pretender Dmitry.

Dmitry of Uglich, Tsar Ivan IV's youngest son (born in 1582), supposedly died by accidentally cutting his own throat in 1591; however, many people believed that Boris Godunov had the boy murdered to clear a path to the throne for himself. In 1603 a man appeared in Poland-Lithuania claiming to be Dmitry, "miraculously" rescued from Godunov's assassins. With the help of self-serving Polish lords, the Pretender Dmitry assembled an army and invaded Russia in 1604, intending to topple the "usurper" Tsar Boris. The Godunov regime launched a propaganda campaign against "False Dmitry," identifying him as a runaway monk named Grigory Otrepev. Nevertheless, "Dmitry's" invasion was welcomed by many Russians; and, after Tsar Boris's sudden death in April 1605, "Dmitry" triumphantly entered Moscow as the new tsar. This mysterious young man, who truly believed that he was Dmitry of Uglich, was the only tsar ever raised to the throne by means of a military campaign and popular uprisings.

Tsar Dmitry was extremely well educated for a tsar and ruled wisely for about a year. Contrary to the conclusions of many historians, he was loved by most of his subjects and never faced a popular rebellion. His enemies circulated rumors that he was a lewd and bloodthirsty impostor who intended to convert the Russian people to Catholicism, but Tsar Dmitry remained secure on his throne. In May 1606, he married the Polish princess Marina Mniszecz. During the wedding festivities in Moscow, Dmitry's enemies (led by Prince Vasily Shuisky) incited a riot by claiming that the Polish wedding guests were trying to murder the tsar. During the riot, about two hundred men entered the Kremlin and killed Tsar Dmitry. His body was then dragged to Red Square, where he was denounced as an impostor. Shuisky seized power and proclaimed himself tsar, but Tsar Dmitry's adherents circulated rumors that he was still alive and stirred up a powerful rebellion against the usurper. The civil war fought in the name of Tsar Dmitry lasted many years and nearly destroyed Russia.

See also: DMITRY OF UGLICH; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; MNISZECH, MARINA; OTREPEV, GRIGORY; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

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CHESTER DUNNING

DMITRY MIKHAILOVICH

(1299–1326), Prince of Tver and grand prince of Vladimir.

Dmitry Mikhailovich ("Terrible Eyes") was born on September 15, 1299. Twelve years later he led a campaign against Yury Danilovich of Moscow to capture Nizhny Novgorod. But Metropolitan Peter, a supporter of Moscow, objected. Dmitry therefore cancelled the attack. In 1318, when Khan Uzbek executed his father Mikhail, Dmitry succeeded him to Tver. Soon afterward, he strengthened his hand against Moscow by marrying Maria, daughter of Grand Prince Gedimin, thereby concluding a marriage alliance with the Lithuanians. In 1321 Yury, now the Grand Prince of Vladimir, marched against Dmitry and forced him to hand over his share of the Tatar tribute and to promise not to seek the grand princely title. In 1322, when Yury delayed in taking the tribute to Khan Uzbek, Dmitry broke his pledge. He rode to Saray to complain to the khan that Yury refused to hand over the tribute and to ask for the grand princely title. For his service, the khan granted him the patent for Vladimir. Because Yury objected to the appointment, Uzbek summoned both princes to Saray, but the khan never passed judgment on them. On November 21, 1325, Dmitry murdered Yury to avenge his father's execution. He therewith incurred the khan's wrath. The latter sent troops to devastate the Tver lands and had Dmitry executed in the following year, on September 13, 1326.

See also: GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; METROPOLITAN; YURI DANILOVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

DMITRY OF UGLICH

(1582–1591), youngest son of Ivan the Terrible, whose early death was followed by the appearance of two “False Dmitry” claimants to the throne in the Time of Troubles.

Dmitry Ivanovich, the son of Tsar Ivan IV, was born in 1582 at a time of dynastic crisis. The tsarevich Ivan Ivanovich had been killed in 1581, and his mentally impaired brother Fedor had failed to produce offspring after several years of marriage. Dmitry’s mother, Maria Nagaia, was the last of the many wives taken by Ivan IV. Although their marriage was considered uncanonical, the birth of Dmitry raised hopes that the Rurikid line might continue. Upon the death of Ivan IV in 1584, Boris Godunov moved to protect the interests of his brother-in-law, Tsarevich Fedor, by removing Dmitry and the Nagoi clan from Moscow and exiling them to the town of Uglich. The Nagois were kept under close surveillance, and the young Dmitry, who suffered from epilepsy, grew up in Uglich surrounded by nannies and uncles. On May 15, 1591, the boy’s body was discovered in a pool of blood in a courtyard. Upon hearing the terrible news, the Nagois incited a mob against Godunov’s representatives in Uglich and several were murdered. A commission of inquiry sent from Moscow concurred with the majority of eyewitnesses that Dmitry’s death was an accident caused by severe epileptic convulsions that broke out during a knife-throwing game, causing him to fall on a knife and slit his own throat. Rumors of Godunov’s complicity began to circulate almost immediately, but they were not officially accepted at court until 1606. In that year tsar Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky, who had headed the commission of inquiry that pronounced Dmitry’s death an accident fifteen years earlier, brought the Nagoi clan back to court and proclaimed Dmitry’s death a political murder perpetrated by Godunov. Shuisky also organized the transfer of Dmitry’s remains to Moscow and promoted the cult of his martyrdom for propaganda purposes. During the Time of Troubles,

broad sectors of the population and influential factions at court endorsed the notion that Dmitry had miraculously escaped death. Over a dozen seventeenth-century texts excoriate Godunov for Dmitry’s murder, and historians have debated the events surrounding his death and public resurrection ever since.

See also: DMITRY, FALSE; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; RURIKID DYNASTY; SHUISKY, VASILY; TIME OF TROUBLES

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BRIAN BOECK

DOCTORS’ PLOT

On January 13, 1953, TASS and *Pravda* announced the exposure of a conspiracy within the Soviet medical elite. Nine doctors—including six with stereotypically Jewish last names—were charged with assassinating Andrei A. Zhdanov and Aleksandr S. Shcherbakov and plotting to kill other key members of the Soviet leadership. These articles touched off an explosion of undisguised chauvinism in the press that condemned Soviet Jews as Zionists and agents of United States and British imperialism. The Doctors’ Plot (*Delo vrachei*) was the product of an intensely russocentric period in Soviet history when non-Russian cultures were routinely accused of bourgeois nationalism. It marked the culmination of state-sponsored anti-Semitism under Josef Stalin and followed in the wake of the 1948 murder of Solomon M. Mikhoels and subsequent anti-Cosmopolitan campaigns.

Much of the Doctors’ Plot remains shrouded in mystery, due to the fact that virtually all relevant archival material remains tightly classified. Even its design and intent are unclear, insofar as the campaign was still evolving when it was abruptly terminated after Stalin’s death in March 1953. Although it was officially denounced shortly thereafter as the work of renegades within the security services, most scholars suspect that Stalin played a major role in the affair. Some believe that the inflammatory press coverage was intended to provoke a massive wave of pogroms that would give

Stalin an excuse to deport the Soviet Jews to Siberia. Adherents of this view differ over what precisely was to catalyze such a wave of popular anti-Semitism. According to some commentators, the court philosopher Dimitry I. Chesnokov was to publicly justify the sequestering of the Jews in Marxist-Leninist terms. Others suggest that the campaign in the press would climax with the show trial and execution of the Jewish “doctor-murderers” on Red Square. But the most common story involves an attempt to publish a collective letter to *Pravda* signed by approximately sixty prominent Soviet Jews that would condemn the traitorous doctors and propose that the entire Jewish community be “voluntarily” deported to Siberia to exculpate its sins. In each of these cases, the exiling of the Jews was to be accompanied by a thorough purge of party and state institutions, a murderous act that would apparently combine elements of the Great Terror with the Final Solution.

Of the three scenarios, only the collective letter to *Pravda* finds reflection in extant archival sources. Composed at Agitprop in mid-January 1953 by Nikita. A. Mikhailov, the collective letter condemned the “doctor-murderers,” conceded that some Soviet Jews had fallen under the influence of hostile foreign powers, and demanded “the most merciless punishment of the criminals.” I. I. Mints and Ia. S. Khavinson circulated this letter within the Soviet Jewish elite and coerced many, including Vasily S. Grossman and S. Ia. Marshak, to sign it. Others, however, refused. Although the letter did not explicitly call for mass deportations, Ilya G. Ehrenburg and V. A. Kaverin read the phrase “the most merciless punishment” to be a veiled threat against the entire Soviet Jewish population.

When Ehrenburg was pressured to sign the letter in late January 1953, he first stalled for time and then wrote a personal appeal to Stalin that urged the dictator to bar *Pravda* from publishing material that might compromise the USSR’s reputation abroad. This apparently caused Stalin to think twice about the campaign and a second, more mildly worded collective letter was commissioned later that February. This letter called for the punishment of the “doctor-murderers,” but also drew a clear distinction between the Soviet Jewish community and their “bourgeois,” “Zionist” kin abroad. It concluded by proclaiming that the Soviet Jews wanted nothing more than to live as members of the Soviet working class in harmony with the other peoples of the USSR. Curiously, although Ehrenburg and other prominent Soviet Jews ultimately

signed this second letter, it never appeared in print. Some commentators believe this to be indicative of ambivalence on Stalin’s part regarding the Doctors’ Plot as a whole during the last two weeks of his life.

Although neither draft of the collective letter explicitly mentioned plans for the Siberian exile of the Jews, many argue that this was the ultimate intent of the Doctors’ Plot. Since the opening of the Soviet archives in 1991, however, scholars have searched in vain for any trace of the paper trail that such a mass operation would have left behind. The absence of documentation has led some specialists to consider the rumors of impending deportation to be a reflection of social paranoia within the Soviet Jewish community rather than genuine evidence of official intent. This theory is complicated, however, by the accounts of high-ranking party members like Anastas I. Mikoyan and Nikolai A. Bulganin that confirm that the Jews risked deportation in early 1953. It is therefore best to conclude that speculative talk about possible deportations circulated within elite party circles on the eve of Stalin’s death, precipitating rumors and hysteria within the society at large. That said, it would be incautious to conclude that formal plans for the Jews’ deportation were developed, ratified, or advanced to the planning stage without corroborating evidence from the former Soviet archives.

See also: JEWS; PRAVDA; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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DAVID BRANDENBERGER

DOCTOR ZHIVAGO *See* PASTERNAK, BORIS LEONIDOVICH.

DOLGANS

The Dolgans (*Dolgani*) belong to the North Asiatic group of the Mongolian race. They are an Altaic people, along with the Buryats, Kalmyks, Balkars,

Chuvash, Evenks, Karachay, Kumyks, Nogay, and Yakuts. This Turkic-speaking people number today about 8,500 and live far above the Arctic Circle in the Taymyr (or Taimur) autonomous region (332,857 square miles, 862,100 square kilometers), which is one of the ten autonomous regions recognized in the Russian Constitution of 1993. This region is located on the Taymyr peninsula in north central Siberia, which is actually the northernmost projection of Siberia. Cape Chelyuskin at the tip of the peninsula constitutes the northernmost point of the entire Asian mainland. Located between the estuaries of the Yenisei and Khatanga rivers, the peninsula is covered mostly with tundra and gets drained by the Taymyra River. The Taymyr autonomous region also includes the islands between the Yenisei and Khatanga gulfs, the northern parts of the Central Siberian Plateau, and the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago. The capital is Dudinka. On the Taimyr Peninsula the Dolgans are the most numerous indigenous ethnic group. A few dozen Dolgans also live in Yakutia, on the lower reaches of the River Anabar.

Generally, the languages of the indigenous peoples of the Eurasian Arctic and subarctic can be grouped into four classes: Uralic, Manchu-Tungus, Turkic, and Paleo-Siberian. The Dolgan language is part of the northeastern branch of the Turkic language family and closely resembles Yakut. Although Dolgan is particularly active among the twenty-six languages of the so-called Peoples of the Far North in Russia, the small number of speakers (6,000 out of the total population of 8,500) of this rare aboriginal language in Siberia prompted UNESCO to classify Dolgan as a "potentially endangered" language. The demographical and ecological problems of the Taymyr region also work against the language. As for writing, the Dolgans lack their own alphabet and rely on the Russian Cyrillic.

The name Dolgan became known outside the tribe itself only as late as the nineteenth century. The word derives from *dolghan* or *dulghan*, meaning "people living on the middle reaches of the river." Some ethnologists believe the word comes from the term for wood (*toa*) or *toakihilär*, meaning people of the wood. Although originally a nomadic people preoccupied mostly by reindeer hunting and fishing, the advent of the Russians in the seventeenth century led to the near destruction of the Dolgans' traditional economy and way of life. The Taymyr, or Dolgan-Nenets National Territory, was proclaimed in 1930. The next year old

tribal councils were liquidated, the process of collectivization initiated. Taymyr's economy in the early twenty-first century depends on mining, fishing, and dairy and fur farming, as well as some reindeer breeding and trapping.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NORTHERN PEOPLES; SIBERIA

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

DOLGORUKY, YURI VLADIMIROVICH *See*

YURI VLADIMIROVICH.

DOMOSTROI

Sixteenth-century domestic handbook.

The term *domostroi*, which literally means "domestic order," refers to a group of forty-three manuscript books produced in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Less than a dozen copies explicitly contain the title: "This book called *Domostroi* has in it much that Christian men and women, children, menservants, and maidservants will find useful." All, however, share a basic text that is clearly recognizable despite additions, deletions, and variations.

Where *Domostroi* came from, who wrote it—or, more probably, compiled it—and when, remain matters for debate. So does the process by which the text evolved. Traditionally, it has been linked to the north Russian merchant city of Novgorod and dated to the late fifteenth century, although significant alterations were made until the mid-sixteenth century. This view attributes one version to Sylvester, a priest of the Annunciation Cathedral in the Kremlin, who came from Novgorod and supposedly had a close relationship with Ivan IV the

Terrible (1533–1584). Sylvester has proven to be a shadowy figure, his authorship of *Domostroi* is unlikely, and his friendship with Ivan the Terrible has often been questioned. Nevertheless, the possibility that *Domostroi* could somehow explain the Terrible Tsar continues to fascinate.

More recent research suggests that *Domostroi* was compiled in Moscow, probably in the 1550s, a period when Russian society was undergoing reform and reestablishing its links to Europe. One manuscript refers to an original written in 1552. Two copies (representing different versions) have watermarks from the 1560s or 1570s; and information in Sylvester's letter to his son, usually found at the conclusion of the type of *Domostroi* associated with him, suggests a date for the letter of approximately 1560. One copy of the Sylvester type also includes a reference to Tsaritsa Anastasia, Ivan the Terrible's first wife, who died in 1560. Therefore the text was probably circulating in the capital by the late 1550s.

This early period produced four major variants: a Short Version (associated with Sylvester), a Long Version, and two intermediate stages. All cover the family's obligations from three angles: its duties toward God, relationships between family members, and the practical tasks involved in running a large household. "Family," in *Domostroi*, means not only a husband, a wife, and their children but also dependent members of the extended family and servants, most of whom would have been slaves in the sixteenth century. Although slaves often had their own homes and practiced a craft, they were still considered dependent members of the family that owned them.

Domostroi seems to address not the highest echelon of society—the royal family and the great boyar clans—but a group several steps lower, particularly rich merchants and people working in government offices. In the sixteenth century Russia underwent rapid change; its social system was relatively fluid, and these people had quite varied backgrounds. Whereas boyars could learn essential skills from their parents, groups lower in the social hierarchy required instruction to function successfully in an environment that was new to them. The prescriptions in *Domostroi* are best understood from this standpoint.

The chapters detailing a household's responsibilities before God were mostly copied from standard religious texts and are remarkable primarily

for their unusually practical approach. Men were to attend church several times each day, to supervise household prayers morning and evening, and to observe all religious holidays (which in pre-imperial Russia exceeded one hundred). The text also supplies instructions for taking communion and behavior in church ("do not shuffle your feet"). Women and servants attended services "when they [were] able," but they, too, were to pray every day.

Within the family, *Domostroi* defines sets of hierarchical relationships: husbands, parents, and masters dominate (supervise); wives, children, and servants obey. Disobedience led to scolding, then physical punishment. The master is counseled to protect the rights of the accused by investigating all claims personally and exercising restraint; even so, this emphasis on corporal punishment, the best-known admonition in *Domostroi*, gives modern readers a rather grim view of family life.

This impression is partly undercut by the third group of chapters, which offers rare insight into the daily life of an old Russian household. Exhaustive lists of foodstuffs and materials, utensils and clothing, alternate with glimpses of women, children, and servants that often contradict the stern prescriptions. Wives manage households of a hundred people and must be advised not to hide servants or guests from their husbands; children require extra meals, dowries, training, and other special treatment; servants steal the soap and the silverware, entertain village wise women, and run away, but also heal quarrels and solve problems. These are the stories that won *Domostroi* its reputation as a leading source of information on sixteenth-century Russian life.

See also: IVAN IV; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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CAROLYN JOHNSTON POUNCY

DONATION BOOKS

Donation books first appeared in Muscovite Russia in the middle of the sixteenth century. The "Hundred chapters church council" in 1551 in the presence of Tsar Ivan IV ("the Terrible") obliged monasteries to secure proper liturgical commemoration of donors. This instruction served as an impetus for the composition of numerous Donation books. As for donations from former times, the Donation books relied upon older documentation, particularly deeds and lists of donations in appendices to other books. In addition, many Donation books match names with lists for liturgical commemoration, and indicate the days on which a commemorative meal, a *korm*, was to be held. Since the Books frequently taxed the value of an object, they serve as sources about the development of prices. The order of entries differs: Usually the donations of the tsar are registered at the beginning of the book; other entries are arranged principally in chronological order. Some Donation books from the seventeenth century are strictly organized on the basis of donor families. Eventually monasteries kept different Donation books at the same time, depending on the value of the donations and the expected liturgical services in return. So far one donation book is known in which a clan registered its donations to churches and monasteries over some decades. Donation books from the seventeenth century indicate that donations for liturgical commemoration lost their importance for the elite, while the circle of donors from the lower strata was widening.

See also: FEAST BOOKS; SINODIK; SOROKOUST

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LUDWIG STEINDORFF

DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH

(1350–1389), prince of Moscow and grand prince of Vladimir.

Dmitry earned the name "Donskoy" for his victory over the armies of Emir Mamai at the Battle

of Kulikovo Field near the Don River (September 8, 1380). He is remembered as a heroic commander who dealt a decisive blow to Mongol lordship over the Rus lands and strengthened Moscow's position as the senior Rus principality, preparing the way for the centralized Muscovite tsardom. Unofficially revered since the late fifteenth century, Dmitry was canonized by the Orthodox Church in 1988 for his selfless defense of Moscow. Modern historians have re-examined the sources on the prince's reign to offer a more tempered assessment of his legacy.

Following the death of his father, Ivan II (1326–1359), the nine-year-old Dmitry inherited a portion of the Moscow principality but failed to keep the patent for the grand principality of Vladimir. In 1360 Khan Navruz of Sarai gave the Vladimir patent to Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal and Nizhni Novgorod. A year later, Navruz was overthrown in a coup, and the Golden Horde split into eastern and western sections ruled by rival Mongol lords. Murid, the Chingissid khan of Sarai to the east, recognized Dmitry Donskoy as grand prince of Vladimir in 1362. In 1363, however, Dmitry Donskoy accepted a second patent from Khan Abdullah, supported by the non-Chingissid lord Mamai who had taken control of the western Horde and claimed authority over all the Rus lands. Offended, Khan Murid withdrew Dmitry Donskoy's patent and awarded it to Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal. Dmitry Donskoy's forces moved swiftly into Vladimir where they drove Dmitry Konstantinovich from his seat, then laid waste to the Suzdalian lands. During that campaign Dmitry Donskoy took Starodub, Galich, and possibly Belozero and Uglich. By 1364 he had forced Dmitry Konstantinovich to capitulate and sign a treaty recognizing Dmitry Donskoy's sovereignty over Vladimir. The pact was sealed in 1366 when Dmitry Donskoy married Dmitry Konstantinovich's daughter, Princess Yevdokia. To secure his seniority, Dmitry Donskoy sent Prince Konstantin Vasilevich of Rostov to Ustiug in the north and replaced him with his nephew Andrei Fyodorovich, a supporter of Moscow. In a precedent-setting grant, Dmitry Donskoy gave his cousin Prince Vladimir Andreyevich of Serpukhov independent sovereignty over Galich and Dmitrov. The grant is viewed as a significant development in the seniority system because it established the de facto right of the Moscow princes to retain hereditary lands, while disposing of conquered territory. In 1375, after a protracted conflict with Tver and Lithuania, Dmitry Donskoy forced Prince Mikhail of Tver to sign a treaty acknowledging himself as Dmitry's vassal.

With the defeat of Tver, Dmitry's seniority was recognized by most Russian appanage princes. Growing divisions within the Horde and internecine conflicts in Lithuania triggered by Olgerd's death in 1377 also worked to Moscow's advantage. Dmitry moved to extend his frontiers and increase revenues, imposing his customs agents in Bulgar, as Janet Martin has shown (1986). He also curtailed payment of promised tribute to his patron Mamai. Urgently in need of funds to stop his enemy Tokhtamysh, who had made himself khan of Sarai in that year, and wishing to avenge the defeat of his commander on the River Vozha, Mamai gathered a large army and issued an ultimatum to Dmitry Donskoy. Dmitry made an eleventh-hour effort to comply. But his envoys charged with conveying the funds were blocked by the advancing Tatar forces. On September 8, 1380, the combined armies of Mamai clashed with Dmitry Donskoy's army on Kulikovo field between the Don River and a tributary called the Nepryadva. The Tatars seemed about to prevail when a new force commanded by Prince Vladimir Andreyevich of Serpukhov surprised them. Mamai's armies fled the scene. As Alexander Presniakov and Vladimir Kuchkin point out, the gains made in this battle, though regarded as instrumental in breaking the Mongol hold on Moscow, were quickly reversed. Tokhtamysh, who seized the opportunity to defeat Mamai, reunified the Horde and reasserted his claims as lord of the Russian lands. In 1382 Tokhtamysh's army besieged Moscow and pillaged the city. Dmitry Donskoy, who had fled to Kostroma, agreed to pay a much higher tribute to Tokhtamysh for the Vladimir patent than he had originally paid Mamai.

Dmitry Donskoy skillfully used the church to serve his political and commercial interests. He sponsored a 1379 mission, headed by the monk Stephen, to Christianize Ustiug and establish a new bishop's see for Perm which, Martin documents, secured Moscow's control over areas central to the lucrative fur trade. Metropolitan Alexis (1353–1378) and Sergius (c. 1314–1392), hegumen (abbot) of the Trinity Monastery, supported his policies and acted as his envoys in critical situations. After Alexis's death, Dmitry moved to prevent Cyprian, who had been invested as metropolitan of Lithuania, from claiming authority over the Moscow see. Instead he supported Mikhail-Mityay, who died under mysterious circumstances before he could be invested by the patriarch. Dmitry's second choice, Pimen, was invested in 1380 and with a brief interruption (Cyprian was welcomed back by Dmitry after the Battle of Kulikovo until Tokhtamysh's

siege of 1382) served as metropolitan of Moscow until his death in 1389.

In May 1389 Dmitry Donskoy died. He stipulated in his will that his son Basil should be the sole inheritor of his patrimony, including the grand principality of Vladimir. As Presniakov (1970) notes, the khan, by accepting the proviso, acknowledged the grand principality as part of the Moscow prince's inheritance (*votchina*), even though, in the aftermath of the Battle of Kulikovo, Russia's subservience to the Horde had been effectively restored and the grand prince's power significantly weakened. In contrast to other descendants of the Moscow prince Daniel Alexandrovich, Dmitry Donskoy did not become a monk on his deathbed. Notwithstanding, grand-princely chroniclers eulogized him as a saint. The 1563 *Book of Degrees*, written in the Moscow metropolitan's scriptorium, portrays him and his wife Yevdokia as chaste ascetics with miraculous powers of intercession for their descendants and their land, thereby laying the ground for their canonizations.

See also: BASIL I; BOOK OF DEGREES; GOLDEN HORDE; IVAN II; KULIKOVO FIELD, BATTLE OF; SERGIUS, ST.

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GAIL LENHOFF

DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH

(1821–1881), preminent Russian prose writer and publicist.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky was born into the family of a former military physician, Mikhail Andreyevich Dostoyevsky (1789–1839), who practiced at the Moscow Mariinsky Hospital for the Poor. Dostoyevsky's father was ennobled in 1828 and acquired

moderate wealth; he and his wife, Mariya Fyodorovna (1800–1837), had three more sons and three daughters. As a youth, Dostoyevsky lost his mother to tuberculosis and his father to an incident that officially was declared a stroke but purportedly was a homicide carried out by his enraged serfs.

After spending several years at private boarding schools (1833–1837), Dostoyevsky studied Military Engineering in St. Petersburg (1838–1843) while secretly pursuing his love for literature. He worked for less than a year as an engineer in the armed forces and abandoned that position in 1844 in order to dedicate himself fully to translating fiction and writing. Dostoyevsky's literary debut, *Bednye liudi* (*Poor Folk*, 1845), was an immense success with the public; a sentimental novel in letters, it is imbued with mild social criticism and earned enthusiastic praise from Russia's most influential contemporary critic, Vissarion Belinsky. But subsequent short stories and novellas such as "Dvoinik" (*The Double*, 1846)—an openly Gogolesque story of split consciousness as well as an intriguing experiment in unreliable narration—disappointed many of Dostoyevsky's early admirers. This notwithstanding, Dostoyevsky continued to consciously resist attempts to label him politically or aesthetically. Time and time again, he ventured out from grim social reality into other dimensions—the psychologically abnormal and the fantastic—for which St. Petersburg's eerie artificiality proved a most intriguing milieu.

In April 1848, Dostoyevsky was arrested together with thirty-four other members of the underground socialist Petrashevsky Circle and interrogated for several months in the infamous Peter-Paul-Fortress. Charged with having read Belinsky's letter to Gogol at one of the circle's meetings, Dostoyevsky was sentenced to death. Yet, in a dramatic mock-execution, Nikolai I commuted the capital punishment to hard labor and exile in Siberia. A decade later, Dostoyevsky returned to St. Petersburg as a profoundly transformed man. Humbled and physically weakened, he had internalized the official triad of Tsar, People, and Orthodox Church in a most personal way, distancing himself from his early utopian beliefs while reconceptualizing his recent harsh experiences among diverse classes—criminals and political prisoners, officers and officials, peasants and merchants. Dostoyevsky's worldview was now dominated by values such as humility, self-restraint, and forgiveness, all to be applied in the present, while giving up his

faith in the creation of a harmonious empire in the future. The spirit of radical social protest that had brought him so dangerously close to Communist persuasions in the 1840s was from now on attributed to certain dubious characters in his fiction, albeit without ever being denounced completely.

Eager to participate in contemporary debates, Dostoyevsky, jointly with his brother Mikhail (1820–1864), published the conservative journals *Vremya* (*Time*, 1861–63) and *Epokha* (*The Epoch*, –65), both of which encountered financial and censorship quarrels. In his semi-fictional *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma* (*Notes from the House of the Dead*, 1862)—the most authentic and harrowing account of the life of Siberian convicts prior to Chekhov and Solzhenitsyn—Dostoyevsky depicts the tragedy of thousands of gifted but misguided human beings whose innate complexity he had come to respect. One of the major conclusions drawn from his years as a societal outcast was the notion that intellectuals need to overcome their condescension toward lower classes, particularly the Russian *muzhik* (peasant) whose daily work on native soil gave him wisdom beyond any formal education.

An even more aggressive assault on mainstream persuasions was "Zapiski iz podpol'ia" ("Notes from the Underground," 1864); written as a quasi-confession of an embittered, pathologically self-conscious outsider, this anti-liberal diatribe was intended as a provocation, to unsettle the bourgeois consciousness with its uncompromising anarchism and subversive wit. "Notes from the Underground" became the prelude to Dostoyevsky's mature phase. The text's lasting ability to disturb the reader stems from its bold defense of human irrationality, viewed as a guarantee of inner freedom that will resist any prison in the name of reason, no matter how attractive (i.e., social engineering, here symbolized by the "Crystal Palace" that Dostoyevsky had seen at the London World Exhibition).

The year 1866 saw the completion, in a feverish rush, of two masterpieces that mark Dostoyevsky's final arrival at a form of literary expression congenial to his intentions. *Prestuplenie i nakazanie* (*Crime and Punishment*) analyzes the transgression of traditional Christian morality by a student who considers himself superior to his corrupt and greedy environment. The question of justifiable murder was directly related to Russia's rising revolutionary movement, namely the permissibility of crimes for a good cause. On a somewhat lighter note, *Igrok*


(*The Gambler*) depicts the dramatic incompatibility of Russian and Western European mentalities against the background of a German gambling resort. Pressured by a treacherous publisher, Dostoyevsky was forced to dictate this novel within twenty-six days to stenographer Anna Grigor'evna Snitkina (1846–1918), who shortly thereafter became his wife.

Endlessly haunted by creditors and needy family members, the Dostoyevskys escaped abroad, spending years in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. They often lived near casinos where the writer unsuccessfully tried to resolve his financial ills. Against all odds, during this period Dostoyevsky created some of his most accomplished works, particularly the novel *Idiot* (1868), the declared goal of which was to portray a “perfectly beautiful human being.” The title character, an impoverished prince, clashes with the rapidly modernizing, cynical St. Petersburg society. In the end, although conceptualized as a Christ-like figure, he causes not salvation but murder and tragedy.

Dostoyevsky's following novel, *Besy* (*The Devils*, 1872), was interpreted as “anti-nihilist.” Openly polemical, it outraged the leftist intelligentsia who saw itself caricatured as superficial, naïve, and unintentionally destructive. Clearly referring to the infamous case of Sergei Nechaev, an anarchist whose revolutionary cell killed one of its dissenting members, *The Devils* presents an astute analysis of the causality underlying terrorism, and societal disintegration. Yet it is also a sobering diagnosis of the inability of Russia's corrupt establishment to protect itself from ruthless political activism and demagoguery.

While *The Devils* quickly became favorite reading of conservatives, *Podrostok* (*A Raw Youth*, 1875) appealed more to liberal sensitivities, thus reestablishing, to a certain extent, a balance in Dostoyevsky's political reputation. Artistically uneven, this novel is an attempt to capture the searching of Russia's young generation “who knows so much and believes in nothing” and as a consequence finds itself in a state of hopeless alienation.

In the mid-1870s, Dostoyevsky published the monthly journal *Dnevnik pisatel'ia* (*Diary of a Writer*) of which he was the sole author. With its thousands of subscribers, this unusual blend of social and political commentary enriched by occasional works of fiction contributed to the relative financial security enjoyed by the author and his family in the last decade of his life. Its last issue contained



Fyodor Dostoevsky by Vasily Perov, 1872. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS

the text of a speech that Dostoyevsky made at the dedication of a Pushkin monument in Moscow in 1880. Pushkin is described as the unique genius of universal empathy, of the ability to understand mankind in all its manifestations—a feature that Dostoyevsky found to be characteristic of Russians more than of any other people.

Brat'ia Karamazovy (*The Brothers Karamazov*, 1878–1880) became Dostoyevsky's literary testament and indeed can be read as a peculiar synthesis of his artistic and philosophical strivings. The novel's focus on patricide is rooted in the fundamental role of the father in the Russian tradition, with God as the heavenly father, the tsar as father to his people, the priest as father to the faithful, and the *paterfamilias* as representative of the universal law within the family unit. It is this underlying notion of the universal significance of fatherhood that connects the criminal plot to the philosophical message. Thus, the murder of father Fyodor Karamazov, considered by all three brothers and carried out by the fourth, the illegitimate son, becomes tantamount to a challenge the world order *per se*.

Dostoyevsky's significance for Russian and world culture derives from a number of factors,

among them the depth of his psychological perceptiveness, his complex grasp of human nature, and his ability to foresee long-term consequences of human action—an ability that sometimes bordered on the prophetic. Together with his rhetorical and dramatic gifts, these factors outweigh less presentable features in the author's persona such as national and religious prejudice. Moreover, Dostoyevsky's willingness to admit into his universe utterly antagonistic forces—from unabashed sinners whose unspeakable acts of blasphemy challenge the very foundations of faith, to characters of angelic purity—has led to his worldwide perception as an eminently Christian author. But it also caused distrust in certain quarters of the Orthodox Church; as a matter of fact, his confidence in a gospel of all-forgiveness was criticized as “rosy Christianity” (K. Leont'ev), a religious aberration neglecting the strictness of divine law. From a programmatic point of view, Dostoyevsky preached a Christianity of the heart, as opposed to one of pragmatism and rational calculation.

Dostoyevsky's impact on modern intellectual movements is enormous: Freud's psychoanalysis found valuable evidence in his depictions of the mysterious subconscious, whereas Camus' existentialism took from the Russian author an understanding of man's inability to cope with freedom and his possible preference for a state of non-responsibility.

Dostoyevsky was arguably the first writer to position a philosophical idea at the very heart of a fictional text. The reason that Dostoyevsky's major works have maintained their disquieting energy lies mainly in their structural openness toward a variety of interpretative patterns, all of which can present textual evidence for their particular reading.

See also: CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILIEVICH; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; PETRASHEVTSY

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PETER ROLLBERG

DUDAYEV, DZHOKHAR

(1944–1996), leader of Chechen national movement, first president of Chechnya.

One of ten children in a Chechen family deported to Kazakhstan in 1944 and allowed to return home in 1957, Dzhokhar Dudayev graduated from the Air Force Academy, entered the CPSU in 1966, and eventually became major general of the air force, the only Chechen to climb that high within the Soviet military hierarchy. Reportedly, he won awards for his part in air raids during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. In November 1990, Dudayev, an outsider to the Chechen national movement, was unexpectedly elected by its main organization, the Chechen National Congress, as its leader and commander of the National Guard. Having called for local resistance to the August 1991 coup in Moscow, Dudayev seized the opportunity to overthrow the CPSU establishment of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic by storming the Supreme Soviet in Grozny, forcing the resignation of key officials, and winning the presidency in a chaotic and irregular vote. On November 1, he decreed the independence of the Chechen Republic, soon ratified by the newly elected Chechen parliament (Ingushetia separated itself from Chechnya via referendum to remain within Russia). Political divisions in Moscow and latent support from sections of its elite helped to thwart a military invasion, while Dudayev bought or obtained most of Moscow's munitions in Chechnya from the federal military. The peaceful half of his rule (1991–1994) was plagued by general post-Soviet anarchy and the looting of assets, collusion between federal and local criminals and officials, and lack of economic brainpower, exacerbated by the outflow of Russ-



General Dzhokhar Dudayev and armed supporters in Chechnya. © Tchetchenie/CORBIS SYGMA

ian-speaking industrial cadres as a result of his ethnocentric policies. In mid-1993, Dudayev disbanded the opposition-minded Constitutional Court and dispersed the parliament (an example that he then advised Yeltsin to follow). From then on, he was faced with armed rebels, aided by Moscow hardliners. Initially a secular ruler, by late 1994 he shifted to Islamist rhetoric. In December 1994, after failed negotiations and a botched attempt by pro-Moscow rebels to dislodge him, Chechnya was invaded by federal troops. Dudayev had to flee Grozny and thereafter led the armed resistance in the mountains, up until his death in a rocket attack by federal forces in April 1996.

See also: CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS

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DMITRI GLINSKI

DUGIN, ALEXANDER GELEVICH

(b. 1962), head of the Russian sociopolitical movement Eurasia; editor of the journal *Elementy*; and a leading proponent of geopolitics and Eurasianism with a strong Anti-Western, anti-Atlantic bias.

In the late 1970s Dugin entered the Moscow Aviation Institute but was expelled during his second year for what he described as “intensive activities.” He joined the circles associated with a Russian nationalist movement of the 1980s and at the end of the 1980s was a member of the Central Council of the national-patriotic front “Pamyat” (Memory), then led by Dmitry Vasiliev. With the end of

the Soviet Union, Dugin emerged as the chief ideologue of the writer Edvard Limonov's National-Bolshevik Party, a fringe movement that cultivated political ties with alienated youths. Dugin also became a major figure in the "Red-Brown" opposition to the Yeltsin administration. He joined the editorial board of Alexander Prokhanov's *Den* (Day) and then *Zavtra* (Tomorrow) after 1993. Dugin's writings combine mystical, conspiratorial, geopolitical, and Eurasian themes and draw heavily on the notion of a conservative revolution. This ideology emphasizes the Eurasian roots of Russian messianism and its fundamental antagonism with Westernism and globalism, and outlines the way in which Russia can go about creating an alternative to the Western "New World Order." This alternative is totalitarian in its essentials. Drawing heavily upon German geopolitical theory and Lev Gumilev's Eurasianism, Dugin outlined his own position in *Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia* (1997). In 1999 Dugin campaigned actively for the victory of a presidential candidate who would embrace his ideas of an anti-Western Eurasianism and supported Vladimir Putin as the "ideal ruler for the present period." Working closely with Gleb Pavlovsky, the Kremlin's spin doctor, Dugin actively developed an Internet empire of connections to disseminate his message. In the wake of Putin's alliance with the United States in the war against terrorism, Dugin has called into question the president's commitment to Eurasianism and rejoined the opposition. Dugin has been particularly adept at exploiting the Internet to spread his message through a wide range of media.

See also: GUMILEV, LEV NIKOLAYEVICH; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

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JACOB W. KIPP

DUMA

Known officially as the State Duma, this institution was the lower house of the Russian parliamentary system from 1906 to 1917. In Kievan and Muscovite times, rulers convened a "boyars' duma"

of the highest nobles to provide counsel on major policy issues. During the 1600s this institution fell into disuse, but late-nineteenth-century liberals lobbied for establishment of a representative body to help govern Russia. After the Revolution of 1905, Tsar Nicholas II agreed to form an advisory council, the Bulygin Duma of August 1905. However, revolutionary violence increased in the next two months, and in his October 1905 Manifesto the tsar reluctantly gave into the urgings of Sergei Witte to grant an elected representative Duma with full legislative powers.

This promise, plus other proffered reforms, helped split the broad revolutionary movement, winning over a number of moderates and liberals. With violence waning, the tsar weakened the authority of the proposed Duma by linking it with a half-appointed upper house, the State Council; by excluding foreign and military affairs and parts of the state budget from its purview; and by weighting election procedures to favor propertied groups. Moreover, at heart Nicholas never accepted even this watered-down version of the Duma as legitimate, believing it an unwarranted infringement on his divine right to rule. On the other hand many reformers saw the Duma as the first step toward a modern, democratic government and hoped to expand its authority.

FIRST AND SECOND DUMAS, 1906–1907

Based on universal male suffrage over age twenty-five, elections for the First Duma were on the whole peaceful and orderly, although the indirect system favored nobles and peasants over other groups. The revolutionary Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries boycotted the elections, while the liberal Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) conducted the most effective campaign. The latter won a plurality of members, and peasant deputies, though usually unaffiliated with any party, proved anti-government and reformist in their views. Perhaps too rashly, the Cadet deputies pursued a confrontational policy toward the government, demanding radical land reform, extension of the Duma's budgetary authority, and a ministry responsible to the Duma. After three months of bitter stalemate, Nicholas dissolved the Duma.

Elections to the Second Duma in the fall of 1906 worsened the political impasse. Although the Cadets lost ground, radical parties participated and elected several deputies, and the peasants again re-



Nicholas II opens the Duma in St. Petersburg. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

turned oppositionist representatives. Openly hostile to the government, the Second Duma, like the first, proved unable to find a compromise program and was also dissolved after several months.

THIRD AND FOURTH DUMAS, 1907–1917

Under the Fundamental Laws adopted in 1906 as a semi-constitutional structure for Russia, the tsar could dissolve the Duma and enact emergency legislation in its absence. Using this authority, Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin decreed a new electoral system for the Duma on June 3, 1907. He retained indirect voting but increased the weighting in favor of the nobility from 34 to 51 percent and decreased that of the peasantry from 43 to 22 percent. The new law also reduced the number of non-Russian deputies in the Duma by about two-thirds. Stolypin achieved his goal of a more conservative

assembly, for the 1907 elections to the Third Duma returned 293 conservative deputies, 78 Cadets and other liberals, 34 leftists, and 16 nonparty deputies, giving the government a comfortable working majority. The Octobrists, a group committed to making the October Manifesto work, emerged as the largest single bloc, with 148 deputies. Consequently, the Third Duma lasted out its full term of five years, from 1907 to 1912.

Until his assassination in 1911, Stolypin succeeded for the most part in cooperating with the Third Duma. The deputies supported an existing agrarian reform program first drawn up by Witte and instituted in 1906 by Stolypin that called for dissolution of the peasant commune and establishment of privately owned peasant plots, a complicated procedure that was only partially completed when World War I interrupted it. The government and the Duma joined hands in planning an expansion

of primary education designed to eradicate illiteracy and to have all children complete at least four years of education. Although the State Council blocked this legislation, the Ministry of Education began on its own to implement it. Stolypin, a staunch nationalist, also initiated legislative changes limiting the authority of the autonomous Finnish parliament and establishing zemstvos in western Russia designed to subordinate Polish influence there. Finally, without much success the Third Duma propounded military reform, particularly the improvement of naval administration. By 1912 the Octobrist Party had split, government ministers were at odds, and rightist and nationalist influences dominated at court. Moreover, unrest was growing among the urban population.

Elections to the Fourth Duma in late 1912 returned a slightly more conservative body, but it had hardly begun work when World War I erupted in August 1914. An initial honeymoon between the Duma and the government soon soured as military defeats, administrative chaos, and ministerial incompetence dismayed and irked the deputies. By 1915 a Progressive Bloc, formed under liberal leadership, urged reforms and formation of a ministry of public confidence, but it had little impact on the government or the tsar. Shortly after the February 1917 Revolution broke out, Nicholas dissolved the Duma, but its members reconstituted themselves privately and soon formed a Temporary Committee to help restore order in Petrograd. After the tsar's abdication, this committee appointed the Provisional Government that, though sharing some aspects of power with the Petrograd Soviet, ran the country until the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in the fall of 1917.

The Duma system opened the door to representative government and demonstrated the political potential of an elected parliament. This experience helped legitimize the post-1991 effort to establish democracy in Russia. Yet the four Dumas' record was spotty at best. Useful legislation was discussed and sometimes passed, but divisions among the moderates, the inexperience of many politicians, the reactionary influences of the State Council along with some ministers and the tsar's entourage, and the visceral refusal of Nicholas II to accept an independent legislature made it almost impossible for the Duma to be the engine of reform in old-regime Russia.

See also: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF 1906; NICHOLAS II

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JOHN M. THOMPSON

DUNAYEVSKY, ISAAK OSIPOVICH

(1900–1955), composer.

The Soviet composer Isaak Dunayevsky has been compared to Irving Berlin and the other great songsters of the 1930s and 1940s in America. Like Berlin, he was a Russian-born Jewish composer whose musical fertility gained him fame and wealth in the realm of popular songs and musical comedy for film and stage. Unlike the American, he spent his most productive years under the shadow of the Great Dictator, Josef Stalin. This meant walking a tightrope from which a slight breeze could topple him. That tightrope was Soviet mass song, a genre embedded within a larger cultural system known as Socialist Realism, the officially established code of creativity fashioned in the early 1930s. Mass song required both political message and broad popular appeal, a combination usually possible only in moments of urgent national solidarity, as in wartime. Irving Berlin united these elements successfully in the two world wars, and in between settled for the unpolitical forms of love ballads and novelty tunes. Dunayevsky had to sustain the combination before, after, and during World War II.

Dunayevsky, born near Kharkov in Ukraine, began as a student of classical music. After the Russian Revolution, he played with avant-garde forms but eventually settled into composing popular music. His first big hit was the score for *Makhno's Escapades* (1927), a circus scenario that mocked the civil war anarchist leader of a Ukrainian partisan band opposed to the Bolsheviks. Dunayevsky went on to compose some twenty film scores, a dozen operettas, and music for two bal-

lets and about thirty dramas. His lasting legacy is the music from the enormously popular musical films of the 1930s: *Happy-Go-Lucky Guys*, *Circus*, *Volga, Volga*, and *Radiant Road*, all featuring the singing star of the era, Lyubov Orlova, and directed by her husband, Grigory Alexandrov. A fountain of melody, Dunayevsky wove elements of folk song, Viennese operetta styles, and jazz into optimistic declamatory tunes that captivated Soviet listeners for decades. The lyrics of the most famous of these, "Vast Is My Native Land" (1936), from the film *Circus*, celebrated the official image of Russia as a great nation, filled with free and happy citizens. The Dunayevsky mode was overshadowed somewhat during World War II, when more somber and intimate songs prevailed. His postwar hit, the music for *Kuban Cossacks* (1950), enhanced the propaganda value of that film, which idealized the affluence of Cossacks and peasants on the collective farms of the Kuban region. Dunayevsky died in 1955.

See also: MOTION PICTURES; SOCIALIST REALISM

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RICHARD STITES

DUNGAN

The Dungans (*Dungani*) are descendants of the Hui people who traveled to the northwestern provinces of China, namely the Kansu and Shensi provinces from the seventeenth to thirteenth centuries. Originally scholars, merchants, soldiers, and handicraftsmen, they gradually intermarried with the Han Chinese. Although they learned the Chinese language, they also retained their knowledge of the Arabic language and Muslim faith. From 1862 to 1878 the Hui people rebelled, and the Chinese emperor ruthlessly suppressed them. Three groups of Hui rebels fled across the Tien Shan mountains into Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Those who lived in

the Kansu province settled in Kyrgyzstan and today number approximately 30,000. Rebels from the Shensi province generally settled in Kazakhstan, where they number roughly 37,000. The third group fled to the Russian Empire later in 1881.

After their exodus, the rebels (named Dolgans by the Russians) cut off all contact with China, but nevertheless continued to refer to themselves as Chinese Muslims (*Hui-Zu*). They settled mainly along the Chu River on the banks of which the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek (named Frunze in the Soviet period) is situated. This river also forms part of the border between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

The Dungan language is Mandarin Chinese, but with heavy influence of Persian (Farsi), Arabic, and Turkish. In addition to Dungan, many speak Kyrgyz, and the younger ones also speak Russian. Dungan is written not in Chinese characters but Cyrillic script, and has three tones rather than four.

Generally, the Dungans in Kyrgyzstan are less devoted as Muslims than their kin in Kazakhstan. All Dungans subscribe to the Hanafite Muslim school of thought, established by the theologian Imam Abu Hanifa (699–767), who has shaped the Central Asian form of Islam. While elderly Dungans strictly observe Islamic law, their younger offspring usually ignore Islam until they reach their forties. Elders run village mosques, and the clergymen are supported by property taxes and the worshipers' donations. At present, although the Bible has been translated into Dungan, no Dungans are Christians. Living mostly in the river valleys, the Dungans are primarily farmers and cattle breeders, although some grow opium.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

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MARY ZIRIN

DUROVA, NADEZHDA ANDREYEVNA

(1783–1855), cavalry officer and writer.

Nadezhda Durova ("Alexander Alexandrov," "Cavalry Maiden") served in the tsarist cavalry throughout Russia's campaigns against Napoleon. Equally remarkably, in the late 1830s she published memoirs of those years (*The Cavalry Maiden* [*Kavalerist-devitsa*], 1836; *Notes* [*Zapiski*], 1839) and fiction in the Gothic/Romantic vein drawn from her military experience, much of it narrated by a female officer. At first she masqueraded as a boy, but in December 1807 Alexander II learned of the woman soldier in his army and, impressed by accounts of her courage in the East Prussian campaign, gave her a commission in the Mariupol Hussars under his name, Alexandrov. In 1811 Durova transferred to the Lithuanian Uhlans. During the Russian retreat to Moscow in 1812 she served in the rear guard, engaging in repeated clashes with the French. Bored with peacetime service and annoyed at not receiving promotion, Durova resigned her commission in 1816. She became briefly famous after *The Cavalry Maiden* was published, an experience she described laconically in "A Year of Life in St. Petersburg" (*God zhizni v Peterburge*, 1838), before retreating to provincial obscurity in Yelabuga, where she was known as an amiable eccentric woman with semi-masculine mannerisms and dress. Durova's memoirs omit inconvenient facts (an early marriage; the birth of her son), but she was a gifted storyteller, and her tales are rich in astute, humorous observations of military life as an outsider saw it. Her biography, heavily romanticized, became a propaganda tool during World War II, but *The Cavalry Maiden* was reprinted in full in the Soviet Union only in the 1980s.

See also: FRENCH WAR OF 1812; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; NAPOLEON I

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DVOEVERIE

"Dvoeverie"—"double-belief" or "dual faith"—is a highly influential concept in Russian studies, which began to be questioned in the 1990s. Since the 1860s, historians have used it to describe the conscious or unconscious preservation of pagan beliefs and/or rituals by Christian communities (generally as a syncretic faith containing Christian and pagan elements; a form of peasant/female resistance to elite/patriarchal Christianity; or two independent belief-systems held concurrently). This concept has colored academic perception of Russian medieval (and often modern) spirituality, leading to a preoccupation with identifying latent paganism in Russian culture. It has often been considered a specifically Russian phenomenon, with the medieval origins of the term cited as evidence.

This definition of *dvoeverie* is supported in part by one text, the eleventh-century *Sermon of the Christlover*, but its notable absence in other anti-pagan polemics (including those regularly cited as evidence of double-belief), plus many uses of the word in different contexts, lead one to conclude that the term was not originally understood in this way. *Dvoeverie* probably originated as a calque from Greek, via the translated Nomocanon. While at least six Greek constructions are translated as *dvoeverie* or a lexical derivative thereof, the common thread is that of being "in two minds"; being unable to decide or agree, or being unable to perceive the true nature of something. In the majority of these cases, there is no question of there being two faiths in which the practitioner believes simultaneously or even alternately, and sometimes no question of religious faith at all.

In other pre-Petrine texts, *dvoeverie* means "duplicious" or "hypocritical," or relates to an inability or unwillingness to identify solely with the one true and Orthodox faith. Lutherans and those fraternizing with Roman Catholics, rather than semi-converted heathens, were the target of this pejorative epithet.

See also: ORTHODOXY; PAGANISM

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STELLA ROCK

DVORIANSTVO

The term *dvorianstvo* is sometimes translated as "gentry," but often historically such a translation is simply incorrect. At other times, such as between the years 1667 and 1700, and again after 1762 (or 1785) until 1917, "gentry" is misleading but not totally wrong.

The term has its origins in the later Middle Ages in the word *dvor*, "princely court." In that historical context, the *dvorianstvo* were those who worked at the court of a prince. Originally such people might be free men, or they might be slaves of the prince or someone else. Moreover, these men, most of whom were cavalymen and a few of whom were administrators, were wholly dependent on the grand prince for their positions, status, and livelihoods. They did not have lands, but lived off booty, funds collected in the line of governmental duty, and funds collected by others for the sovereign's treasury. Their social origins were most diverse. A handful were princes (descendants of one of the princely houses circulating in Rus': the Rus' Riurikids, the Lithuanian Gedemids, or Turkic/Mongol nobility), some were slaves, others were of diverse origins. A prince or nobleman had no right to be a member of the *dvorianstvo*, for such men got their positions because they were selected by the grand prince and served at his pleasure. Promotion within the *dvorianstvo* was meritocratic, however service might be defined. Membership in the *dvorianstvo* conferred no special status, and in law such men could be punished like everyone else, including flogging.

The origins of the early *dvorianstvo* are obscure, but around 1480, the Moscow government began to formalize the situation when it initiated the first service class revolution after the annexation of Novgorod. Moscow initiated the service land system (*pomestie*) on the lands annexed from Novgorod, and then gradually extended it to the entire

Muscovite state. By 1556 most of the inhabited land (which did not belong to the church) in central Muscovy was included in the fund that had to support cavalymen. The cavalymen based in Moscow were the upper service class; those in the provinces were the middle service class. (Members of the lower service class did not have lands for their support and lived off government cash salaries, and their own extra-military employment; they were arquebusiers—later in the seventeenth century musketeers, fortress gatekeepers, artillerymen, some cossacks, and others.) Members of both the upper and middle service classes comprised the *dvorianstvo* and were the core of the army. They had to render military service almost every year, typically on the southern frontier against the Tatars, Nogais, Kalmyks, Kazakhs, and others who raided Muscovy in search of slaves and other booty. The *dvorianstvo* had to render military service on the western frontier whenever called against the Poles, Lithuanians, and Swedes, where the prizes for the victors were landed territory and booty (including slaves) of every sort.

Between 1480 and 1667 the life of the *dvorianstvo* was very hard. Military service was basically for life, from about age fifteen until immobility compelled retirement from service. Those who could no longer serve as cavalymen still could be called upon to render "siege service," which meant standing up in castles and shooting arrows out at besieging enemies. In the seventeenth century gunpowder arms replaced the arrows. Only when the member of the *dvorianstvo* was dead or could only be carried around in a litter was he allowed to retire from service. Members of the provincial *dvorianstvo* had the ranks of provincial *dvorianin* and *syn boyarsky* and were supported primarily by a handful of peasant households (government cash stipends were meant to purchase military goods in the market, such as cavalry horses, sabers, and guns in the seventeenth century and later). In the provinces they lived little better than most of their peasants and until the post-1649 period were as illiterate as their peasants also. The capital *dvorianstvo*, living in Moscow, had the ranks of *boyarin*, *okol'nichii*, *stol'nik*, *striapchii*, and *Moscow dvorianin*, lived the same rigorous lives as did their country cousins, although with higher incomes. Both rose in the *dvorianstvo* on the basis of perceived meritocratic service by petitioning for promotion. Because of their precarious economic positions, the provincial *dvorianstvo* were highly conscious of how many rent-paying peasants they had. Should their peasants depart, they were in

straits. They were the ones who forced the enserfment of the peasantry between the 1580s and 1649.

The *Ulozhenie* of 1649, which completed the enserfment by binding the peasants to the land, was a triumph for the provincial dvorianstvo, and a defeat for the capital dvorianstvo, who profited from peasant mobility. The Thirteen Years' War (1654–1667) delivered the coup de grace to the middle service class provincial dvorianstvo by illustrating definitively the obsolescence of bow-and-arrow warfare. Moreover, much of the dvorianstvo fell into Turkish captivity, where many of them remained for a quarter century. From then until 1700, the dvorianstvo occasionally fought the Turks, but otherwise did little to merit their near-monopoly over serf labor. Reflecting the fact that Russia was a very poor country with a very unproductive agriculture, the dvorianstvo comprised less than 1 percent of the population, a much smaller fraction than in other countries. After the annexation of Poland, the dvorianstvo of the Russian Empire rose by 1795 to 2.2 percent of the population.

At the battle of Narva in 1700 Charles XII defeated Peter the Great, who responded by launching the second service class revolution. This meant putting the dvorianstvo back in harness. In 1722 he introduced the Table of Ranks, which formalized the Muscovite system of promotion based on merit. Rigorous lifetime military or governmental service was compulsory until 1736, when the service requirement for the dvorianstvo was reduced to twenty-five years. In 1740 they could choose between military or civil service. Then in 1762 Peter III freed the dvorianstvo from all service requirements. His wife Catherine II in 1785 promulgated the Charter of the Nobility, whose infamous Article 10 freed the dvorianstvo from corporal punishment and thus made them a privileged caste. The measures of 1762 and 1785 created the conditions for the Russian dvorianstvo to begin to look like gentry living elsewhere in Europe west of Russia.

The years 1762 to 1861 were the "Golden Age" of the dvorianstvo. Its members were the potentially leisured, privileged members of society. Many differed little from peasants; a few were extraordinarily rich. They were the bearers and creators of culture. The Achilles heel of the dvorianstvo was its penchant for debt to finance excessive consumption, including imported goods that were equated with modernization and Westernization. The emancipation of the peasantry in 1861 initiated the decline of the dvorianstvo, whose members lost their slave-owner-like control over their

peasants. The dvorianstvo was compensated (excessively) for the land granted to the peasants, but debts were deducted from the compensation. Other reforms gradually cost the dvorianstvo their control over the countryside. Their inability to manage their funds and estates and in general to cope with a modernizing world is metonymically portrayed in Anton. P. Chekhov's play *The Cherry Orchard*, which came to be the name of the era for the dvorianstvo. By the Revolution of 1917 the dvorianstvo lost control over their initial bastion, the army, and nearly all other sectors of life as well. In the summer of 1917 the peasantry seized much of the dvorianstvo land, which was all confiscated when the Bolsheviks took power. Some members of the dvorianstvo joined the Whites and died in opposition to the Bolsheviks, while others emigrated. Those who remained in the USSR were deprived of their civil rights until 1936.

See also: BOYAR; CHARTER OF THE NOBILITY; LAW CODE OF 1649; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; SYN BOYARSKY; TABLE OF RANKS

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RICHARD HELLIE

DYACHENKO, TATIANA BORISOVNA

(b. 1960), adviser to her father, President Boris Yeltsin.

Tatiana Dyachenko became an adviser to her father, President Boris Yeltsin, in the last few years of his rule. Trained as a mathematician and computer scientist, she worked in a design bureau of the space industry until 1994. She then worked for the bank *Zarya Urala* (Ural Dawn).

In the early 1990s her father's ghostwriter Valentin Yumashev introduced her to the Mafia-connected businessman Boris Berezovsky. The latter courted her with attention and lavish presents, and handed her father three million dollars that he claimed were royalties on Yeltsin's second volume

of memoirs. This episode launched the rise of the businessmen oligarchs who became highly influential in Yeltsin's administration.

In February 1996, with a popular approval rating in single digits as he began his ultimately successful run for reelection, Yeltsin appointed Dyachenko to his campaign staff. Here she worked closely with key oligarchs and the campaign director Anatoly Chubais. That summer, she facilitated her father's ouster of his hitherto most trusted aide, Alexander Korzhakov, and then the ascent of Chubais to head the Presidential Administration.

In June 1997 Yeltsin formally appointed her one of his advisers, responsible for public relations. In 1998 she was named a director of Russia's leading TV channel, Public Russian Television (ORT), controlled by Berezovsky.

In 1999, as Yeltsin's power ebbed, Dyachenko's lifestyle fell under scrutiny with the unfolding of various top-level scandals. For example, the Swiss firm Mabetex was revealed to have paid major kickbacks to Kremlin figures, with Dyachenko and other Yeltsin relatives allegedly having spent large sums by credit card free of charge.

After her father's resignation in December 1999, Dyachenko continued to be an influential coordinator of her father's political and business clan and an unpaid adviser to the head of Vladimir Putin's Presidential Administration Alexander Voloshin.

Dyachenko has three children, one by each of her three husbands.

See also: YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER REDDAWAY

DYAK

State secretary, professional administrator.

The *dyak* (state secretary) spearheaded Muscovy's bureaucratic transformation from the late 1400s into the Petrine era. Moscow professional ad-

ministrators, seventeenth-century dyaks guaranteed daily chancellery operation, served in the governing tribunals, and supervised the clerks. Dyaks authorized document compilation, verified and signed documents after clerks drafted them, and sometimes wrote up documents.

Technical expertise was the dyak's *sine qua non*. Talent and experience governed promotion and retention of dyaks. Of appanage slave origin, the dyaks were docile, functionally literate, efficient paperwork organizers, and artificers of chancellery document style and formulae. Less than eight hundred dyaks served in seventeenth-century chancelleries, annually between 1646 and 1686; forty-six (or 6%) of all dyaks achieved Boyar Duma rank. The decrees of 1640 and 1658 formally converted dyaks and clerks into an administrative caste by guaranteeing that only their scions could become professional administrators. Dyaks' sons began as clerks, but father-son dyak lineages were uncommon, as few clerks ever became dyaks.

Almost half of the chancellery dyaks (some Moscow dyaks received no administrative postings) worked in one chancellery. Dyaks worked on average 3.5 years per state chancellery, their average earnings decreasing from one hundred rubles in the 1620s to less than ninety rubles in the 1680s. They could also receive land allotments as pay. In contrast, counselor state secretaries could earn two hundred rubles in the 1620s, and their salaries nearly doubled in the 1680s.

Seventeenth-century dyaks' social position declined, although their technical skills did not. Dyaks served also in provincial administrative offices, and numbered between 33 to 45 percent of their chancellery brethren. Few ever entered capital service.

See also: BOYAR DUMA; CHANCELLERY SYSTEM; PODYACHY

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PETER B. BROWN

DZERZHINSKY, FELIX EDMUNDOVICH

(1877–1926), Polish revolutionary; first head of the Soviet political police.

Felix Dzerzhinsky descended from a Polish noble family of long standing, with known paternal roots in seventeenth-century historic Lithuania. His father Edmund taught physics and mathematics at the male gymnasium in Taganrog before retiring to the family estate located in present-day Belarus. His mother, Helena Januszewska, came from a well-connected aristocratic family. After Edmund's death in 1882, she raised Felix in a devout Roman Catholic and Polish patriotic environment. A sheltered child, Dzerzhinsky was earmarked by his mother for the priesthood, but his participation in a series of progressively radical student circles in Vilnius led to his expulsion from the gymnasium two months before graduation in 1896. His subsequent in-



“Iron Felix” Dzerzhinsky, the feared chief of the Bolshevik political police. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

volvement with the fledgling Lithuanian Social Democratic Party ended with his arrest in Kaunas in 1897, the first of six arrests in his revolutionary career.

Dzerzhinsky was exiled to and escaped from Siberia on three different occasions. Following his first escape in 1899, he resurfaced in Warsaw, where he founded the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) by merging remnants of previously existing social democratic organizations in Warsaw and Vilnius. Over the next dozen years, despite long periods of confinement, Dzerzhinsky constructed the apparatus of a conspiratorial organization that guided the SDKPiL through and beyond the revolutionary turmoil of 1905–1907. An ideological disciple of Rosa Luxemburg, Dzerzhinsky was a permanent fixture on the party's executive committee and played a principal role in defining the SDKPiL's relations with the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDRP). Following the SDKPiL's formal unification with the Russian party in 1906, Dzerzhinsky represented the former on the RSDRP Central Committee and editorial board.

Dzerzhinsky's final arrest in Warsaw in 1912 resulted in successive sentences to hard labor. He was released from the Moscow Butyrki prison by the March 1917 revolution. Dzerzhinsky was soon caught up in the Russian revolutionary whirlwind, first in Moscow, then in Petrograd, at which time he entered the Bolshevik Central Committee. Dzerzhinsky played a key role in the Military Revolutionary Committee that carried out the October 1917 *coup d'état*, and he assumed responsibility for security of the Bolshevik headquarters at the Smolny Institute. From there it was a logical step for Dzerzhinsky to head an extraordinary commission, the Cheka, to act as the shield and sword of the Bolshevik regime against its enemies and opponents. Under Dzerzhinsky, the Cheka became more than a political police force and instrument of terror. Instead, Dzerzhinsky's obsessive personality and dynamic organizational talents drove the Cheka into almost every area of Soviet life, from disease control and social philanthropy to labor mobilization and management of the railroads. Following the civil war, Dzerzhinsky aligned himself with Bukharin's faction and, as Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, became a vigorous proponent of the New Economic Policy. Physically weakened by years spent in var-

ious prisons, Dzerzhinsky collapsed and died in July 1926 following an impassioned public defense of the policies of the existing Politburo majority.

See also: NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; RED TERROR; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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ROBERT E. BLOBAUM

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EARLY RUSSIA See KIEVAN RUS; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT.

ECONOMIC GROWTH, EXTENSIVE

In the quantitative analysis of aggregate economic development, modern economists commonly distinguish extensive from intensive growth. Extensive economic growth comes from the expansion of ordinary inputs of labor, reproducible capital (i.e., machines and livestock) and natural resources. Intensive growth, by contrast, involves increased effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of these inputs—usually measured as a growth of total factor productivity.

The early development of the USSR was primarily of the extensive sort. Increased application of labor inputs came from reduced unemployment, use of women previously engaged within the household, diminished leisure (e.g., communist sabbaticals or *subotniki*), and forced or prison labor. Increased capital investments were a result of forced savings of the population, taxes and compulsory loans, deferred consumption, and a small and varying amount of foreign investment in the country. Natural resources were expanded by new mines and arable acreage, most notably the “virgin lands” opened up in semiarid zones of Kazakhstan during the 1950s. But shifting resources from the backward peasant sector to modern industry, as well as to borrowed technology, also accounted for some intensive growth.

During the 1950s total growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was an impressive 5.7 percent annually, adjusted for inflation, of which approximately 3.3 percent came from increased inputs and only about 2.4 percent from increased productivity. Growth rates declined to 5.1 percent during the 1960s, 3.2 percent during the 1970s, and a mere 1.9 percent during the 1980s. Less than 1 percent of these growth rates came from intensive sources. The increased share of extensive sources meant that growth could not be sustained for several reasons. Population growth was slowing in Russia. Most of the increased labor supplies came from the less educated populations of Soviet Central Asia, where industrial productivity was considerably lower than in the traditional heartland of Russia and Ukraine. These Muslim populations did not move readily to, or were not welcome in, the most productive areas of the USSR,



such as the Baltic states. Some economists, including Martin Weitzman and Stanley Fischer, attributed the slowdown to the difficulty of substituting new investments for labor, as well. Depletion of oil and ore fields also played a role in reduced growth.

For systemic reasons, the Soviet command economy could not develop the new goods, higher quality, and innovative processes that increasingly characterized the economies of the developed West. Nor could it keep up with the newly industrializing economies of southeast Asia, which by the 1980s displayed higher growth rates, predominantly from intensive sources.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, IMPERIAL; ECONOMIC GROWTH, INTENSIVE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

ECONOMIC GROWTH, IMPERIAL

The economic development of the Russian Empire can be traced back to the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725), who was determined to industrialize Russia by borrowing contemporary technology from Western Europe and attracting foreign specialists. While military considerations played an important role in this drive, they combined with vast natural resources and large labor pool to develop an increasingly modern industrial sector by eighteenth-century standards. The less progressive policies of Peter's successors lead to a growing gap between Russia and its industrializing European competitors that became evident in the nineteenth century. Peter's most significant policy was his entrenchment of serfdom in the village, which was abolished in 1861. After the Crimean War (1854–1856), especially during the tenure of the Minister of Finance Count Sergei Witte (1892–1903), recognition of the dangers of the economic gap bolstered the accelerated industrialization of the Russian Empire. Large government investments in the rail network development expanded the transportation network from 2,000

kilometers in 1861 to more than 70,000 kilometers in 1913. This development helped to open up the iron and coal resources of the Southern regions (Ukraine) and facilitated the marketing of wheat, the major export commodity of the Russian empire. A vibrant textile industry grew in Moscow, and metalworking blossomed in St. Petersburg.

Government policy favored the influx of foreign capital, primarily from England, France, and Belgium, which were attracted by Russia's vast economic potential. The stabilized ruble exchange rate allowed Russia to join the international gold standard in 1897. The expansion of domestic heavy industries was promoted by government protectionist policies such as high tariffs, profit guarantees, tax reductions and exemptions, and government orders at high prices to insure domestic demand. The ministry of finance was the major agent in this strategy. Bureaucratic intervention into economic matters and bribery were among the numerous limitations on the development of a modern entrepreneurial class in Russia. More recent data suggest that the state was not as pervasive in Russian economic life as was originally thought. Budgetary subsidies were modest, and tariffs and indirect taxes were levied strictly for revenue purposes and played little role in the industrial policy. Russia had active commodity markets and was active in world markets. The state did not engage in economic planning, and both product and factor prices were set by markets. The creation of industrial trusts and syndicates in the early years of the twentieth century implied the existence of some monopolies in Russia.

The success of Russian industrialization before 1917 was evident, but agricultural progress was more modest (agriculture continued to account for more than half the national product). During the industrialization era, the share of agriculture fell from 58 percent in 1885 to 51 percent in 1913. Russian agriculture was characterized by feudal elements and serfdom that provided few incentives for investment, productivity improvements, or better management. Russian serfs had to work the landlords' land (called *barshchina*) or make in-kind or monetary payments from their crops (*obrok*). Peasant land prior to 1861 was held communally and was periodically redistributed. Agricultural reforms were modest or too late to prevent what many contemporary observers feel was a deepening agrarian crisis. The Emancipation Act of 1861 provided the peasants with juridical freedom and transferred to them about half the landholdings of the landed aristocracy. However, peasants had to

“redeem” (buy) their allotted plots of land. The size of land allotments was very small, and backward, unproductive communal agriculture remained the main organizational form in villages. While the production and marketing of grain increased substantially after the Emancipation Act of 1861, the primary objective of the Russian emancipation was not to create a modern agriculture, but to prevent revolts, preserve the aristocracy, and retain state control of agriculture.

Many observers feel that the agrarian crisis was one of the causes of the Revolution of 1905, which necessitated further reforms by the tsarist government. The reforms introduced in 1906 and 1910 by Peter Stolypin allowed the peasants to own land and cultivate it in consolidated plots rather than in small, frequently separated strips. The Stolypin reforms weakened communal agriculture and created the base for a class of small peasant proprietors. These reforms were considered long overdue, and they had a positive effect on the development of agriculture. In spite of persistent regional differences, peasant living standards rose, and productivity and per capita output increased. Overall, agricultural growth during the post-emancipation period was much like that of Western Europe. In spite of the late removal of serfdom, there is evidence of significant peasant mobility, and the completion of an extensive rail network greatly facilitated the marketing of grain. Regional price dispersion fell as transportation costs were lowered, and agricultural marketing and land rents were, in fact, dictated by normal market principles.

Despite scholarly controversy concerning the consequences of active government intervention in economy, the late tsarist era after 1880 is characterized by the significant acceleration of the output growth rate. Between the 1860s and 1880s the average annual rate of growth of net national product was 1.8 percent, while for the period thereafter, up to the 1909–1913 period, the rate of economic growth was 3.3 percent. At the same time, Russia experienced significant population growth, which put the Russian empire in the group of poorer West European countries in per capita terms. Russian economic growth was largely the consequence of the relatively rapid rate of growth of population (1.6% from 1885 to 1913) and labor force (1.7% from 1885 to 1913), pointing to the extensive character of the growth. Less reliable data on the tsarist capital stock suggests that roughly two-thirds of the growth of Russian output was accounted for by the growth of conventional labor and capital in-

puts. With respect to structural change, the decline in the shares of agriculture (from 58% in 1885 to 51% in 1913) and expansion of industry, construction, and transportation (from 23% in 1885 to 32% in 1913) suggests that the Russian economy had indeed embarked on a path of modern economic growth.

Russia's economic power was concentrated in agriculture. In 1861 Russia produced more grain than any other country and was surpassed only by the United States in 1913 (123,000 versus 146,000 metric tons). On a per capita basis, however, Russia ranked well behind major grain producers (the United States and Germany) and was close to the level of such countries as France and Austria–Hungary. Russia's industrial base was even weaker. In 1861 the country was a minor producer of essential industrial commodities such as coal, iron, and steel, and still lagged behind the major industrial powers in 1913. Russia began its modern era with a per capita output that was 50 percent that of France and Germany and 15 percent that of England and the United States. On per capita basis, in 1913 Russia was a poor European country ranking well below Spain, Italy, and Austria–Hungary. The relative backwardness of the Russian empire is explained by rapid population growth and slow output growth in the years before the 1880s. Russia's output growth figures do not paint a picture of a collapsing economy, but rather of an economy that was either catching up or holding its own with the most industrialized countries of the era.

Data on human capital development (in particular, literacy data) suggest that Russia was still a socially backward nation at the turn of the century. In 1897 the illiteracy rate was 72 percent; in 1913 it was still as high as 60 percent, with urban literacy almost three times that of rural literacy. By contrast, in 1900 the illiteracy rate in the United States was 11 percent. Despite this fact, after 1880 investment in primary education rose, and primary school enrollment increased considerably. While Russia's birth and death rates began to decline after 1889, birth rates were still at premodern levels at the time of the 1917 revolution.

Foreign investment played a substantial role in the industrialization of Russia, since the domestic production of capital equipment was limited. In addition to importing technology and equipment, the Russian economy was also aided by the receipt of foreign savings to finance Russian capital formation along with domestic savings. Russia was a

large debtor country during the period from 1880 to 1913, receiving significant capital influx from France, England, and Belgium. It accounted for 15 percent of world international debt by 1913. Foreign capital accounted for nearly 40 percent of Russian industrial investment, 15 to 20 percent of total investment, and about 2 percent of Russian output at the end of tsarist era. The Russian empire was more dependent upon foreign capital in both magnitude and duration than either the United States or Japan during their periods of dependence. The large foreign investments in Russia were a sign of confidence in its potential and responded to traditional signals such as profits sufficient to offset risk.

See also: AGRICULTURE; BARSHCHINA; INDUSTRIALIZATION; OBROK; PEASANT ECONOMY; PETER I; SERFDOM

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PAUL R. GREGORY

ECONOMIC GROWTH, INTENSIVE

Increases in aggregate economic activity, or growth, may be generated by adding more labor and capital or by improving skills and technology. Development economists call the latter "intensive growth" because labor and capital work harder. Growth is driven by enhanced productivity (higher output per unit of input) rather than augmented factor supplies. Theory predicts that all growth in a steady-state, long-run equilibrium will be attributable to technological progress (intensive growth). Developing nations may initially grow faster than this "golden mean" rate, benefiting both from rapid capital accumulation (capital deepening) and technological catch-up, but must converge to the golden mean thereafter. During the 1970s many Marxist economists hypothesized that socialist economies were not bound by these neo-classical principles. They forecasted that extensive growth (increased factor supply) would be replaced by socialist-intensive methods ensuring superior performance, but they were mistaken: Growth fell below zero in 1989, heralding the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, EXTENSIVE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET

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STEVEN ROSEFELDE

ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET

During the first decade of Soviet rule and up to 1929, the Soviet economy struggled to recover from the damages of World War I, the Revolution, and the civil war, and then to find its way through policy zigzags of the young and inexperienced Soviet leadership. It is commonly accepted that during this decade of the 1920s the Soviet economy more or less managed to regain the level of national product of 1913, the last prewar year. In 1929 the Soviet Union embarked upon a strategy of rapid economic growth focused mainly on industrialization. The main institutional instrument used in order to implement growth was the Five-Year Plan, the key economic tool of the centrally planned system.

The record of Soviet growth since 1928 and the main factors that contributed to it are presented in Table 1. The data reflect mostly Western estimates, based partly on Soviet official data following adjustments to conform to Western definitions and methodology as well as to accuracy. One major methodological difference related to the national product was that, following Marxist teaching, the concept of Net National Product (NNP), the main Soviet aggregate measure for national income, did not include the value of most services, considered nonproductive.

One of the main goals of Soviet communist leadership was rapid economic growth that would equal and eventually surpass the West. The pri-

mary aim was to demonstrate the superiority of the communist economic system and growth strategy, based on the teachings of Marx and Lenin, over capitalism. The goal was needed also in order to build a sufficient military power base to avert the perceived military threat of the capitalist world in general, initially that of Nazi Germany. Indeed the rates of growth of Soviet GNP were initially, during the 1930s and the first Five-Year Plans, exceptionally high by international comparisons for that period; this made the Soviet model a showcase for imitation to many developing countries that became independent in the aftermath of World War II. While the Soviet growth rates were still high during the 1950s and 1960s, they were already matched or exceeded at that time by countries such as Germany and Japan, as well as a number of developing countries. The decade of the 1940s, with the devastation of World War II, witnessed stagnation at first and slow growth during the reconstruction efforts later. Growth somewhat accelerated in the aftermath of the death of Josef Stalin, but from the 1960s onward the rates of economic growth began to fall, declining continuously throughout the rest of the Soviet period down to near zero just before the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991. Various efforts at economic reform in order to reverse this trend largely failed. As a result, the entire postwar growth record declined further by international comparisons to below that of most groups of developed as well as

developing countries, especially a number of East Asian and Latin American countries. While many developed market economies suffered from business cycles and oscillations in growth rates, they experienced sustained economic growth in the long run. Per contra the fall in Soviet growth rates proved to be terminal. Thus, although during the early decades the Soviet economy grew fast enough in order to catch up and narrow the gap with the developed countries, during its last decades it fell behind and the gap widened. The growth record with respect to GNP per capita, followed a similar trend of high rates of growth initially, but declined in later decades (Table 1). While in 1928 the Soviet level of GDP per capita stood around 20 percent of that of the United States, it reached about 30 percent in 1990, probably the best record in terms of comparisons with other Western economies. Throughout the period, the share of private consumption in GNP was lower than in most other nonsocialist countries. Consumption levels did go up significantly from very low levels during the two decades or so following Stalin's death. Also, throughout most of the period, there were relatively high public expenditures of education and health services, which helped to raise the comparative level of welfare and the quality of life. The failure of the communist regime to achieve sustained economic growth on a converging path with developed countries is no doubt the most important reason for the fall of the economy.

Table 1.

Growth, Productivity and Consumption 1928–1990 (AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES)								
Period/Category	1928–1990	1928–1940	1940–1950	1950–1960	1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1985	1986–1990
GNP	3.2	5.8	2.2	5.2	4.9	2.5	1.8	1.3
Population	1.2	2.1	-0.8	1.8	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9
GNP per Capita	2.0	3.6	3.0	3.3	3.6	1.6	0.9	0.4
Employment	1.4	3.9	0.3	1.6	1.8	1.4	0.7	0.1
Capital	5.7*	9.0	0.4	9.5	8.0	7.4	6.2	..
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)	0.5*	1.7	2	0.4	0.5	-1.2	-1.0	..
Consumption	3.2	3.5	3.3	5.2	5.2	3.4	1.9	2.2
Consumption per Capita	2.1	1.4	2.5	3.3	3.9	2.5	1.0	1.3

*1928–1985.

SOURCE: Ofer, 1987; Laurie Kurtzweg, "Trends in Soviet Gross National Product" in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee. *Gorbachev's Economic Plans*, Vol. 1, Washington D.C., pp. 126–165; James Noren and Laurie Kurtzweg, "The Soviet Economy Unravels: 1985–91" in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee. *The Former Soviet Union in Transition*, Vol. 1, Washington D.C. pp. 8–33, 1993; Angus Maddison. *Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992*, OECD, Paris, 1995; Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*, OECD, Paris, 2000.

The growth record of the Soviet Union—its initial success and eventual failure—is a joint outcome of the selected growth strategy and the system of central planning, including almost full state ownership of the means of production. The centrally planned system was more effective at the start in mobilizing all needed resources, and directing them to the goals of industrialization and growth. The system is also characterized by using commands instead of incentives and decentralized initiatives: emphasis on fulfillment of quantitative production targets rather than on improvements in quality, technology, and efficiency, routine expansion instead of creativity, and rigidity and “more of the same” instead of flexibility—a very high cost for any change. Some of the above characteristics, while advantageous at the start, turned out to be obstacles when the economy developed and became more complex. Other features, such as difficulties in creating indigenous technological innovations, were less harmful initially, when technology could be transferred from abroad, but more of a hindrance later when more domestic efforts were needed.

The Soviet communist growth strategy, following Marxian doctrine, was based on high rates of investment and a rapid buildup of capital stock. High rates of investment come at the expense of lower shares of consumption, sacrificed at the beginning in exchange for hopes of abundance in the future. Central planning, state ownership, and the dictatorship of the proletariat were the necessary tools needed to impose such sacrifices. Next the regime mobilized the maximum possible number of able-bodied men and women to the labor force. A model of growth based mostly on maximum mobilization of capital and labor is called “extensive.” The increase in output is achieved mainly through the increase in the amounts of inputs. Under an alternative “intensive” model, most of the increase in output is achieved through improvements in the utilization of a given amount of inputs. These include technological changes and improvements in management, organization, and networks, termed *total factor productivity* (TFP). The mobilization of capital in the Soviet growth model assumed that the newly installed equipment would embody also the most advanced technology. While this was the case to some extent during the first decade, with heavy borrowing of technology from abroad, the failure to generate indigenous civilian technology, as well as the mounting inefficiencies of central planning, diminished, eliminated, and turned neg-

ative the intensive contribution (TFP) to Soviet growth. Only during the 1930s TFP was significant and accounted for about 30 percent of total growth. Soviet leaders and economists were aware of the efficiency failure and tried to reverse it through many reforms but to no avail.

The problem with extensive growth is that the ability to mobilize more labor and capital is being exhausted over time; furthermore, in both cases early efforts to mobilize more resources backfire by reducing their availability in the future. Labor was mobilized from the start, by moving millions of people from farms to the cities, by obliging all able-bodied, especially women, to join the active labor force, and by limiting the number of people employed in services, forcing families to self-supply services during after-work hours. Very low wages compelled all adult members of the family to seek work. Table 1 illustrates that until the 1980s employment grew by a higher rate than the population, indicating a growing rate of labor force participation, achieving at the time one of the highest rates, especially for women, in the world. However, the table also shows that over time the rate of growth of employment declined, from nearly 4 percent per year from 1928 to 1940 to almost zero during the late 1980s. In the Soviet Union, birthrates declined far beyond the normal rates accompanying modernization everywhere. This was due to the heavy pressure on women to work outside the household, provide services in off-work hours, and raise children in small, densely inhabited, and poorly equipped apartments. In this way larger labor inputs early on resulted in fewer additions to the labor force in later years, thereby contributing to declining growth. During the 1980s employment increased at even a slower rate than the population.

A similar process affected capital accumulation. Because a labor force grows naturally by modest rates, the main vehicle of growth is capital (equipment and construction). This is especially true if the rate of efficiency growth is modest or near zero, as was the case most of the time in the USSR. It follows that the share of investment out of the national product must increase over time in order to assure a steady growth rate of the capital stock. An increased share of investment leaves less for improvements in consumption, in the supply of social services, and for defense. Indeed the share of (gross) investment increased in the Soviet Union to more than 30 percent of GNP, and this kept down the rate of growth of the capital stock and thus of

output. Furthermore, with the earlier drying up of increments of labor, Soviet growth was driven for a time, still extensively, by capital alone. This in turn forced the system to always substitute capital for labor, a difficult task by itself, more so when no new technology is offered. The outcome was further decline in productivity of capital and of growth.

The early mobilization of labor and capital inputs at the cost of their future decline is part of a general policy of haste by the Soviet leadership, which was frustrated by declining growth, the inability to provide for defense and other needs, and the failure of partial reforms. In addition to the above, there were also overuses of natural resources, over-pumping of oil at the expense of future output, neglect of maintenance of infrastructure and of the capital stock, and imposition of taut plans that forced producers to cut corners and neglect longer-term considerations. Initially this policy of haste produced some incremental growth but at a cost of lower growth later. The results of the policy of haste spilled over to the transition period in the form of major obstacles for renewed economic growth.

The heavy military burden was another significant factor adversely affecting Soviet growth. Early on the Soviet Union was threatened and then attacked by Germany, and following World War II engaged in the Cold War. Throughout the entire period it had to match the military capabilities of larger and more advanced economies, hence to set aside a higher share of its output for defense. During the Soviet system's last decades this share grew to around 15 percent of GNP. This amount was unprecedented in peacetime. The real defense burden was even heavier than shown by the figures because the defense effort forced the leaders to give priority to defense, in both routine production and in technological efforts, thereby disrupting civilian production and depriving it of significant technological innovation.

Additional causes of declining growth over time were the deterioration of work motivation and discipline, increasing corruption and illegal activities, declining improvements in the standard of living, and weakening legitimization of the regime. Collective agriculture, the cornerstone of the communist system, became the millstone around its neck.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, EXTENSIVE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, INTENSIVE; FIVE-YEAR PLANS; INDUSTRIALIZATION, RAPID; MARXISM; NET MATERIAL PRODUCT

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GLUR OFER

ECONOMIC REFORM COMMISSION

The State Commission on Economic Reform, chaired by economist and vice premier Leonid Abalkin, was created in July 1989. The first fruit of its work was a background report written for a conference on radical economic reform held October 30–November 1, 1989, in Moscow. This document was very radical by soviet standards. It argued, "We are not talking about improving the existing economic mechanism, nor about merely replacing its outdated parts. One internally consistent system must be dismantled and replaced by another one, also internally consistent and thus incompatible with the previous one."

In April 1990 Abalkin and Yuri Maslyukov (chairman of Gosplan) presented to the Presidential Council a program for a rapid transition to the market. This program drew attention to the costs involved in economic reform (e.g., open inflation, decline in production, closing of inefficient enterprises, fall in living standards, increased inequality). Most likely the program was rejected because of its honesty in discussing the costs of rapid marketization. The program officially adopted in May was substantially more conservative.

From May to August of 1990 two teams were working on economic reform programs, one headed by Abalkin and one headed by Stanislav Shatalin. The latter produced the Five-Hundred-Day Plan. Mikhail Gorbachev did not commit himself to either. He asked Abel Aganbegyan to merge the two documents. This compromise was adopted at the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1990. Abalkin was dissatisfied by these events and resigned effective February 1991.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH

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MICHAEL ELLMAN

ECONOMISM

The label applied to a group of moderate Russian Social Democrats at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.

An offshoot of the legal Marxists, the economist group emphasized the role of practical activity among industrial workers. According to their theories, activism at the rank-and-file level would lead to social change: Agitation for a ten-hour day, limitation on fines for petty infractions, better sanitation in the workplace, and so forth would ignite conflict with tsarist officialdom. Class conflict would provoke revolutionary political demands and eventually lead to a bourgeois-liberal revolution, which all Russian Marxists of the time thought necessary before the advent of socialism. For the time being, though, these economist Marxists were willing to follow worker demands rather than impose an explicitly socialist agenda on the laboring class. Workers involved themselves in strikes, mutual aid societies, and consumer and educational societies to raise their class consciousness. Thus this faction criticized the leading role assigned to the revolutionary intelligentsia by scientific Marxists such as Georgy Plekhanov and Pavel Axelrod.

Organized as the Union of Social Democrats Abroad, the economists published the newspaper

Rabochaia Mysl from 1897 to 1902 in St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Warsaw. While mostly concerned with worker grievances and local conditions, this newspaper (at first produced by St. Petersburg workers) did bring out a "Separate Supplement" in issue 7, written by Konstantin Takhtarev, that was critical of the more radical Marxists. The economists also sponsored the journal with a more political and theoretical character: *Rabochee Delo*, published from 1899 to 1902 in Switzerland. Economism is sometimes linked to the leading German revisionist Marxist Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932).

In 1899 one of the economists, Yekaterina Kuskova, wrote a "Credo," which came to the attention of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, who penned a protest the same year. That group's practical and local emphasis continued to be attacked, somewhat unfairly, by Lenin and his supporters in *Iskra* (Spark) and later in "What Is to Be Done?" (1902). Lenin argued that the opportunist notions of economism, as opposed to his revolutionary activism, justified a split in Russian Social Democracy the following year.

Several of the leading economists, for example, Sergei Prokopovich, later became liberals, like the more famous legal Marxist Peter Struve. Both Prokopovich and Kuskova became anticommunists and participated in an emergency relief committee during the 1920–1921 famine. Soon afterward they were arrested in the general crackdown on Lenin's opponents.

See also: LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MARXISM

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET

Establishing a market economy and achieving strong economic growth remained Russia's primary concerns for more than a decade after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. By the middle of the decade, Russia had made considerable progress toward creating the institutions of a mar-

ket economy. Although the process of privatization was flawed, a vast shift of property rights away from the state toward individuals and the corporate sector occurred. The main success of economic reforms were macroeconomic stabilization (gaining control over the inflation, relative reduction of government deficit, and so forth) as well as initial steps toward creating a modern financial system for allocating funds according to market criteria. The banking system was privatized, and both debt and equity markets emerged. There was an effort to use primarily domestic markets to finance the government debt.

In contrast to other ex-Soviet countries in Central Europe, Russia could not quickly overcome the initial output decline at the beginning of market reforms. Russia's economy contracted for five years as the reformers appointed by President Boris Yeltsin hesitated over the implementation of the basic foundations of a market economy. Russia achieved a slight recovery in 1997 (GDP growth of 1%), but stubborn budget deficits and the country's poor business climate made it vulnerable when the global financial crisis began in 1997. The August 1998 financial crisis signaled the fragility of the Russian market economy and the difficulties policymakers encountered under imperfect market conditions.

The crisis sent the entire banking system into chaos. Many banks became insolvent and shut down. Others were taken over by the government and heavily subsidized. The crisis culminated in August 1998 with depreciation of the ruble, a debt default by the government, and a sharp deterioration in living standards for most of the population. For the year 1998, GDP experienced a 5 percent decline. The economy rebounded in 1999 and 2000 (GDP grew by 5.4% in 1999 and 8.3% in 2000), primarily due to the weak ruble and a surging trade surplus fueled by rising world oil prices. This recovery, along with renewed government effort in 2000 to advance lagging structural reforms, raised business and investor confidence concerning Russia's future prospects. GDP is expected to grow by over 5.5 percent in 2001 and average 3–4 percent (depending on world oil prices) from 2002 through 2005. In 2003 Russia remained heavily dependent on exports of commodities, particularly oil, natural gas, metals, and timber, which accounted for over 80 percent of its exports, leaving the country vulnerable to swings in world prices. Macroeconomic stability and the improved business climate can easily deteriorate with changes in export com-

modity prices and excessive ruble appreciation. Additionally, inflation remained high according to international standards: From 1992 to 2000, Russia's average annual rate of inflation was 38 percent. Russia's agricultural sector remained beset by uncertainty over land ownership rights, which discouraged needed investment and restructuring. The industrial base was increasingly dilapidated and needed to be replaced or modernized if the country was to achieve sustainable economic growth.

Three basic factors caused Russia's transition difficulties, including the absence of broad-based political support for reform, inability to close the gap between available public resources and government spending, and inability to push forward systematically with structural reforms. Russia's second president, Vladimir Putin, elected in March 2000, advocated a strong state and market economy, but the success of his agenda was challenged by his reliance on security forces and ex-KGB associates, the lack of progress on legal reform, widespread corruption, and the ongoing war in Chechnya. Despite tax reform, the black market continued to account for a substantial share of GDP. In addition, Putin presented balanced budgets, enacted a flat 13 percent personal income tax, replaced the head of the giant Gazprom natural gas monopoly with a personally loyal executive, and pushed through a reform plan for the natural electricity monopoly. The fiscal burden improved. The cabinet enacted a new program for economic reform in July 2000, but progress was undermined by the lack of banking reform and the large state presence in the economy. After the 1998 crisis, banking services once again became concentrated in the state-owned banks, which lend mainly to the business sector. In 2000 state banks strengthened their dominant role in the sector, benefiting from special privileges such as preferential funding sources, capital injections, and implicit state guarantees. Cumulative foreign direct investment since 1991 amounted to \$17.6 billion by July 2001, compared with over \$350 billion in China during the same period. A new law on foreign investments enacted in July 1999 granted national treatment to foreign investors except in sectors involving national security. Foreigners were allowed to establish wholly owned companies (although the registration process can be cumbersome) and take part in the privatization process. An ongoing concern of foreign investors was property rights protection: Government intervention increased in scope as the enforcement agencies and officials in the attorney general's office attempted to re-examine pri-

vativation outcomes. The most significant barriers to foreign investment and sustainable economic growth continued to be the weak rule of law, poor infrastructure, legal uncertainty, widespread corruption and crime, capital flight, and brain drain (skilled professionals emigrating from Russia).

See also: BLACK MARKET; FOREIGN DEBT; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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PAUL R. GREGORY

ECONOMY, TSARIST

The economy of the Russian Empire in the early twentieth century was a complicated hybrid of traditional peasant agriculture and modern industry. The empire's rapidly growing population (126 million in 1897, nearly 170 million by 1914) was overwhelmingly rural. Only about 15 percent of the population lived in towns, and fewer than 10 percent worked in industry. Agriculture, the largest sector of the economy, provided the livelihood for 80 percent of the population and was dominated by peasants, whose traditional household economies were extremely inefficient compared to agriculture in Western Europe or the United States. But small islands of modern industrial capitalism, brought into being by state policy, coexisted with the primitive rural economy. Spurts of rapid industrialization in the 1890s and in the years before World War I created high rates of economic growth and increased national wealth but also set in motion destabilizing social changes. Despite its islands of modernity, the Russian Empire lagged far behind advanced capitalist countries like Great Britain and Germany, and was unable to bear the economic strains of World War I.

The country's agricultural backwardness was rooted in the economic and cultural consequences of serfdom, and it was reinforced by the government's conservative policies before the Revolution of 1905. The Emancipation Act of 1861, while nominally freeing the peasantry from bondage, sought to limit change by shoring up the village

communes. In most places the commune continued to control the amount of land allotted to each household. Land allotments were divided into scattered strips and subject to periodic redistribution based on the number of workers in each household; and it was very difficult for individual peasants to leave the commune entirely and move into another area of the economy, although increasing numbers worked as seasonal labor outside their villages (*otkhodniki*). Rapid population growth only worsened the situation, for as the number of peasants increased, the size of land allotments diminished, creating a sense of land hunger.

Most peasants lived as their ancestors had, at or near the margin of subsistence. Agricultural productivity was constrained by the peasantry's lack of capital and knowledge or inclination to use modern technology and equipment; most still sowed, harvested, and threshed by hand, and half used a primitive wooden plow. In 1901 a third of peasant households did not have a horse. Poverty was widespread in the countryside. Items such as meat and vegetable oil were rarely seen on the table of a typical peasant household.

After the 1905 revolution the government of Peter Stolypin (minister of the interior, later premier) enacted a series of laws designed to reform agriculture by decreasing the power of the village communes: Individual peasant heads of households were permitted to withdraw from the commune and claim private ownership of their allotment land; compulsory repartitioning of the land was abolished and peasants could petition for consolidation of their scattered strips of land into a single holding. However, bureaucratic processes moved slowly. When World War I began, only about one-quarter of the peasants had secured individual ownership of their allotment land and only 10 percent had consolidated their strips. While these changes allowed some peasants (the so-called *kulaks*) to adopt modern practices and become prosperous, Russian agriculture remained backward and underemployment in the countryside remained the rule. In increasing numbers peasants took out passports for seasonal work, many performing unskilled jobs in industry.

Industrialization accelerated in the 1890s, pushed forward by extensive state intervention under the guidance of Finance Minister Sergei Witte. He used subsidies and direct investment to stimulate expansion of heavy industry, imposed high taxes and tariffs, and put Russia on the gold standard in order to win large-scale foreign investment.

Although the process slowed from 1900 through the 1905 revolution, it soon picked up again and was very strong from 1910 to the outbreak of the war. The rate of growth in the 1890s is estimated to have been an impressive 8 percent a year. While the growth rate after 1910 was slightly lower (about 6%), the process of economic development was broader and the government's role diminished.

Railroad construction, so critical to economic development, increased greatly toward the end of the nineteenth century with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and then rose another 20 percent from 1903 to 1914. Although the number of miles of track per square mile and per capita was the lowest in Europe, the railroad-building boom stimulated great expansion in the related industries of iron and steel, coal, and machine building.

Industrial production came to be concentrated in large plants constructed during the period of rapid industrialization. In 1914, 56 percent of the employees in manufacturing worked in enterprises that employed five hundred or more workers, and 40 percent in plants employing one thousand or more workers. Such large-scale production frequently incorporated the most up-to-date technology. In a number of key industries production was concentrated in a few large oligopolies.

Starting in the later 1890s foreign investment became an important factor in the economy. In 1914 it amounted to one-third of total capital investment in Russian industry, most of it in mining, metallurgy, banking, and textiles. France, England, and Germany were the primary sources of foreign capital. Foreign trade policy was dominated by protectionism. Tariffs just before the war averaged an astonishing 30 to 38 percent of the aggregate value of imports, two to six times higher than in the world's most developed economies. Predictably, this led to higher prices.

Russia was highly dependent on Western imports of manufactured goods, largely from Germany. Raw materials, such as cotton, wool, silk, and nonferrous metals, comprised about 50 percent of all imports. Exports were dominated by grains and other foodstuffs (55% of the total). Russia was the world's largest grain exporter, supplying Western Europe with about one-third of its wheat imports and about 50 percent of its other grains.

The productivity of labor was extremely low because of the deficient capital endowment per

worker. In 1913 horsepower per industrial worker in Russia was about 60 percent of that per worker in England and one-third the level per an American worker. In addition, many industrial workers were still connected to their villages and spent part of their time farming. Because of these factors the costs of production were considerably higher in Russian industry than in Western Europe.

Russian workers faced wretched working conditions and long hours with little social protection. Wages were so low that virtually the entire income of a household went to pay for basic necessities. Living space was meager and miserable, and there were few if any educational opportunities. In the face of these circumstances, some turned to self-help, and the cooperative movement made rapid advances. Many workers began to organize despite the restrictions on trade unions even after the Revolution of 1905. The labor movement renewed its efforts in the years before the war, combining political and economic demands. From 1912 strikes rose dramatically until in the first half of 1914 almost 1.5 million workers went on strike.

The tsarist economy collapsed under the strain of World War I, inhibited by political as well as economic limitations from meeting the demands of total economic mobilization and undermined by bad fiscal policy that led to destructive inflation. But part of the collapse must be traced to prewar roots. Chief among these was the still unresolved legacy of the old serf system: an agricultural system that was inefficient and inflexible, lacking in capital and technology, heavily taxed, and, as a result, unable to provide a reasonable standard of living for a rapidly growing population. Of near equal importance were the consequences of the rapid industrialization in the two decades before the war. Industrialization created the possibility of escaping the limits of the agricultural system, but the way it was carried out imposed most of the costs on the common people and uprooted peasants from the old society before the institutions and policies of a new society had been created.

See also: AGRICULTURE; GRAIN TRADE; KULAKS; INDUSTRIALIZATION, RAPID; PEASANTRY; STOLYPIN, PETER ARKADIEVICH; TRADE UNIONS; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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EDINONACHALIE

The one-person management principle used in the Soviet economy to assign responsibility for the operation and performance of economic units, from industrial enterprises and R&D institutes to ministries and state committees.

Under edinsonachalie, the head (*rukovoditel* or *edinsonachalnik*) of each administrative unit issued all directives and took full responsibility for the results the organization achieved. Edinsonachalie was a key feature of the Soviet management system from the beginning of central planning in the early 1930s. It did not literally mean, however, that one person made every decision. In industrial ministries, major manufacturing plants, and other large organizations, deputies or other subordinates who specialized in one or another sphere of operations were authorized to make decisions in their designated areas of expertise on behalf of the head of the organization. Moreover, although fully responsible for the organization's performance, the edinsonachalnik was obliged to work with a consultative group of deputies, department heads, workers, and other technical personnel. This group could make decisions and give advice, but their decisions could only be implemented by the edinsonachalnik, who, in both principle and practice, was free to ignore their advice.

Edinsonachalie made enterprise managers responsible for the collective of workers and the outcome of the production process because it gave them the authority to direct the capital, material, and labor resources of the firm within the constraints of the targets and norms in the annual enterprise plan (*techpromfinplan*). Since the plan was law in the Soviet economy, this identified the manager as the person to punish if the plan was not fulfilled.

The concentration of decision-making authority and responsibility in the hands of the head of

the administrative unit was based upon a strict hierarchical order. Subordinates to the edinsonachalnik could not deal directly with higher authorities, although they could report to higher authorities that their superior was violating laws or rules.

See also: ENTERPRISE, SOVIET; TECHPROMFINPLAN

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SUSAN J. LINZ

EDUCATION

Education and literacy were highly politicized issues in both Imperial and Soviet Russia, tied closely to issues of modernization and the social order. The development of an industrialized society and modern state bureaucracy required large numbers of literate and educated citizens. During the Imperial period, state officials faced what one scholar has dubbed "the dilemma of education": how to utilize education without undermining Russia's autocratic government. During the early Soviet period, on the other hand, the Bolsheviks attempted to use the education system as a tool of social engineering, as they attempted to invert the old social hierarchy. In both cases, the questions of which citizens should be educated and what type of education they should receive were as important as the actual material they were to be taught.

THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA, 1700–1917

Before 1700, Russia had no secular educational system. Literacy, defined here as the ability to comprehend unfamiliar texts, was generally taught in the home. Although there was a considerable spike upwards in literacy in seventeenth-century Muscovy, the overall percentage of literate Russians remained low. In 1700 no more than 13 percent of the urban male population could read—for male peasants, the rate was between 2 and 4 percent.



The Communist Party brought free education and mass literacy to the Soviet people. © DAVID TURNLEY/CORBIS

This was well below Western European literacy rates, which exceeded 50 percent among urban men. The hostility of many Orthodox officials towards education and the absence of a substantial urban class of burghers and artisans were two factors that contributed to Russia's comparatively low literacy rates.

Like many aspects of Russian society, the educational system was introduced and developed by the state. Peter I opened the first secular schools—institutes for training specialists, such as navigators and doctors—as part of his plan to turn Russia into a modern state. A number of important institutions, such as Moscow University (1755), were created in the next decades, but it was not until 1786 that a ruler (Catherine II) attempted to create a regular system of primary and secondary schools.

This was only the first of many such plans initiated by successive tsars. The frequent reorganization of the school system was disruptive, and since new types of schools were opened in addition

to, rather than in place of, existing schools, the situation became quite chaotic over time. This confusion was compounded by the fact that many schools lay outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, which was created in 1802. Other state ministries regularly opened their own schools, ranging from technical institutes to primary schools, and the Holy Synod sponsored extensive networks of parochial schools. As a result, there were sixty-seven different types of primary schools in Russia in 1914.

Most schools fell into one of three categories: primary, secondary, or higher education. Primary schools were intended to provide students with basic literacy, numeracy, and a smattering of general knowledge. As late as 1911, less than 20 percent of primary school students went on to further study. Many secondary schools were also terminal, often with a vocational emphasis. Other secondary schools, such as gymnasias, prepared students for higher education. Higher education encompassed a variety of institutions, including universities and professional institutes.

From Peter I onward, the Russian state devoted a disproportionate amount of its educational spending on higher education. This was partly due to the pressing need for specialists, and partly because these institutions catered to social and economic elites. Ambitious plans notwithstanding, Russia developed a top-heavy educational system, which produced a relatively small number of well-educated individuals, but which failed to offer any educational opportunities to most Russians until the end of the nineteenth century. The number of primary school students in Russia grew from 450,000 in 1856 to 1 million in 1878 to 6.6 million in 1911; even then, there were still not enough spaces for all who wanted to enroll.

Access to education was, as a rule, better in cities and large towns than in rural areas, though it was still limited in even the largest cities until the 1870s. In 1911, 67 percent of urban youth aged eight to eleven were enrolled in primary schools (75% of boys, 59% of girls). In the countryside, the school system developed more slowly. Many rural schools opened before the 1870s were short-lived, and it was only in the 1890s that a concerted effort began to establish an extensive network of permanent rural schools. In 1911, 41 percent of rural children aged eight to eleven were enrolled in primary school (58% of boys, 24% of girls). Peasants in different areas had different attitudes about education, and there has been some dispute about how useful literacy was considered by rural populations.

The better access to education in urban areas is reflected in literacy statistics. The literacy rate among the urban population (over age nine) was roughly 21 percent in 1797 (29% of men, 12% of women); 40 percent in 1847 (50% of men, 28% of women); 58 percent in 1897; and 70 percent in 1917 (80% of men, 61% of women). In rural areas, the literacy rate was 6 percent in 1797 (6% of men, 5% of women); 12 percent in 1847 (16% of men, 9% of women); 26 percent in 1897; and 38 percent in 1917 (53% of men, 23% of women).

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS OF IMPERIAL EDUCATION POLICIES

While military and economic needs forced the Russian state to create an educational system, social and political considerations also played a role in shaping it. Tsars and their advisers carefully considered who should be educated, how long they should study, and what they should be taught. Above all, they were concerned about the educa-

tional policy's impact on Russia's political system and social hierarchy, both of which they wanted to preserve.

This was evident in the higher educational system, which was shaped to a degree by the tsars' desire to maintain social order and the nobility's support. Special institutes, such as the Corp of Cadets (1731), were created exclusively for the sons of hereditary nobles. While non-nobles were not barred from higher education (with a few exceptions), the very nature of the Russian school system made it difficult for such students to qualify for advanced institutions. Escalating student fees at gymnasias and universities in the nineteenth century provided an additional barrier.

Just as the nobility's position had to be defended, the lower classes had to be protected from "too much knowledge." Nicholas I and his Education Minister Sergei Uvarov (1831–1849) believed that excessive education would only create dissatisfaction among the peasantry. Accordingly, they placed strict limits on the curriculum and duration of rural primary schools. But they also increased the number of such schools, since they understood that basic literacy was of social and economic value. Uvarov, like many other Russian pedagogues, saw education as an opportunity to instill in young Russians loyalty to the tsar and proper moral values. A centrally controlled school inspectorate was created to ensure that teachers were imparting the right values to their students. All textbooks also required state approval.

Schools were used in other ways to maintain or modify the social order. A separate school system was created for Russia's Jews, and strict limits were placed on the number of Jewish students admitted into higher educational institutions. In the annexed Western provinces, schools were used as a weapon in the aggressive Russification campaign of the 1890s. And while most primary and secondary schools were coeducational, higher educational institutions were not. Separate women's institutes were only opened in 1876, and Russia's first coed university, the private Shaniavsky University, was established in 1908.

In order to prevent the circulation of subversive ideas, the state placed strict limits on private and philanthropic educational endeavors. In the 1830s all private educational institutions and tutors were placed under state supervision. The activities of volunteer movements trying to provide adult education, such as the Sunday School Move-



Moscow State University—the Soviet Harvard—rises above the Lenin Hills. © PAUL ALMASY/CORBIS

ment (1859–1862), were severely constrained, though zemstvos (local governmental bodies) were later allowed more leeway in this area. Alarm over the proliferation of unofficial (and illegal) peasant schools helped motivate the state's expansion of its rural education system in the 1890s.

Ironically, it was the educated elite the state had created that ultimately challenged the tsar's authority. Discontent became widespread in the 1840s,

as large segments of educated society came to see state policies as retrograde and harmful to the peasantry. Frustrated by the conservative bureaucracy's disregard of their ideas, many educated Russians began to question the legitimacy of the autocratic form of government, with a small number of them becoming revolutionaries. This was one reason why the tsarist government found itself with little support among educated Russians in February 1917.

Even as educated society was becoming estranged from the autocracy, its members were growing distant from the masses they wished to help. As educated Russians adopted Western values and ideas, a vast cultural and social divide developed between them and the mostly uneducated peasantry, which largely retained traditional beliefs and culture. The growth of the education system in the last decades before 1917 was starting to bridge this gap, but the inability of these groups to understand one another contributed to the violence and chaos of 1917. Scholars debate whether a more rapid introduction of mass education into late Imperial Russia would have stabilized or further destabilized the existing order.

EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

While the Bolsheviks shared their tsarist predecessors' belief in education's potential social and political power, they had a different agenda: swift industrialization, social change, and the dissemination of socialist values. Although they lacked an educational policy upon seizing power, the Bolsheviks pledged to make education accessible to all, co-educational at all levels, and to achieve full literacy.

The Russian Republic's educational system was placed under the control of the Russian Commissariat of Enlightenment (*Narodnyi kommissariat prosveshcheniia*, or Narkompros), a republic-level institution created in October 1917. Its first leader was Anatoly Lunacharsky (r. 1917–1929). Like all Soviet institutions, Narkompros was controlled by the Communist Party. Before 1920, however, it had little authority. Many instructors had supported the Provisional Government's moderate reform program, and they refused to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. During the civil war (1918–1921), education was under the control of local authorities.

After 1920, Narkompros' officials tried to implement the ideas of progressive pedagogues, such as John Dewey, in primary and secondary schools. Their attempts were largely unsuccessful, hampered by a lack of funds and teacher opposition. Narkompros also faced challenges from the economic commissariats, which eventually took control of vocational education. This was the first round in a decades-long debate over the roles of general and vocational education. Teachers were frequently harassed by members of the Leninist Youth League (Komsomol).

Bolshevik higher educational policies were even more ambitious. Most members of educated soci-

ety did not support the communists. Bolshevik leaders responded by creating a "red intelligentsia" to replace them. The children of "socially alien" groups were largely excluded from higher education, their places taken by young, poorly educated workers and peasants, known as *vydvizhentsy*. The number of technical institutes was expanded to accommodate the rapid growth of industry. A network of communist higher educational institutions was also opened. The influx of *vydvizhentsy* into higher education, and the persecution of "socially alien" teachers and students at all levels, climaxed during the cultural revolution (1928–1932). It has been argued that the *vydvizhentsy*, many of whom rose to prominent positions, provided an important base of support for Stalin's regime.

After 1932, experimental approaches were abandoned in favor of more practical teaching methods. Primary schools were returned to a more traditional curriculum, class-based preferences ended, and the separate communist educational system eliminated. The minimum duration of schooling was raised from four to seven years. Schools were now open to all students, though children whose parents were arrested faced serious discrimination until Stalin's death in 1953. Most of Narkompros' functions were transferred to the new Ministry of Education in 1946.

By the late 1950s, all children had access to a free education. Social mobility was possible on the basis of merit, although inequalities still existed. Children of the emerging Soviet elites often had access to superior secondary schools, which prepared them for higher education. Members of some non-Russian ethnic minorities had spaces reserved for them at prestigious higher educational institutions, as part of the Soviet Union's unique affirmative action program. After the 1950s, however, unofficial quotas again limited Jewish students' access to higher education.

There were also numerous adult education programs in the Soviet Union. These ranged from utopian attempts to train artists during the civil war to ongoing literacy campaigns. Literacy rates continued their steady rise after 1917 (88% in 1939, and 98% in 1959). Adult education programs were run by many groups, including the trade unions and the Red Army.

Soviet schools were expected to teach students loyalty to the state and instill them with socialist values; teachers who did otherwise were liable to arrest or dismissal. Political material was a con-

stant part of Soviet curricula. In some periods, it was restricted mainly to the social sciences and obligatory study of Marxism-Leninism. During Stalin's rule, however, almost every subject was politicized. Rote memorization was common and student creativity discouraged.

Despite its flaws, the Soviet educational system achieved some impressive successes. The heavily subsidized system produced millions of well-trained professionals and scientists in its last decades. After 1984 the state began to loosen its grip on education, allowing teachers some flexibility. These tentative steps were quickly overtaken by events, however. Since 1991 the Russian school system has faced serious funding problems and declining facilities. Control of education has been transferred to regional authorities.

See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; ACADEMY OF SCIENCE; HIGHER PARTY SCHOOL; LANGUAGE LAWS; LUNARCHSKY, ANATOLY VASILIEVICH; NATIONAL LIBRARY OF RUSSIA; RUSSIAN STATE LIBRARY

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BRIAN KASSOF

EHRENBURG, ILYA GRIGOROVICH

(1891–1967), poet, journalist, novelist.

Ilya Grigorovich Ehrenburg was an enigma. Essentially Western in taste, he was at times the spokesman for the Soviet Union, the great anti-Western power of his age. He involved himself with Bolsheviks beginning in 1907, writing pamphlets and doing some organizational work, and then, after his arrest, fled to Paris, where he would spend most of the next thirty years. In the introduction to his first major work, and probably his life's best work, the satirical novel *Julio Jurentino* (1922), his good friend Nikolai Bukharin described Ehrenburg's liminal existence, saying that he was not a Bolshevik, but "a man of broad vision, with a deep insight into the Western European way of life, a sharp eye, and an acid tongue" (Goldberg, 1984, p. 5). These characteristics probably kept him alive during the Josef Stalin years, along with his service to the USSR as a war correspondent and spokesman in the anticommunist campaign. Arguably, his most important service to the USSR came in the period after Stalin's death, when his novel *The Thaw* (1956) deviated from the norms of Socialist Realism. His activities in Writer's Union politics consistently pushed a kind of socialist literature (and life) "with a human face," and his memoirs, printed serially during the early 1960s, were culled by thaw-generation youth for inspiration. When Stalin was alive, Ehrenburg may well

have proven a coward. After his death, he proved much more courageous than most.

See also: BUKHARIN, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; JEWS; WORLD WAR II

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JOHN PATRICK FARRELL

EISENSTEIN, SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH

(1898–1948), film director, film theorist, teacher, arts administrator, and producer.

Sergei Eisenstein, born in Riga, was the most accomplished of Russia's first generation of Soviet filmmakers. Eisenstein both benefited from the communist system of state patronage and suffered



Acclaimed film director Sergei Eisenstein. ARCHIVE PHOTOS, INC.
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the frustrations and dangers all artists faced in functioning under state control.

The October Revolution and the civil war allowed Eisenstein to embark on a career in theater and film. His first moving picture was *Glumov's Diary*, a short piece for a theatrical adaptation of an Alexander Ostrovsky comedy. Between 1924 and 1929 he made four feature-length films on revolutionary themes and with revolutionary cinematic techniques: *The Strike* (1924), *The Battleship Potemkin* (1926), *October* (1928), and *The General Line* (also known as *The Old and the New*, 1929). In *Potemkin* Eisenstein developed the rapid editing and dynamic shot composition known as *montage*. *Potemkin* made Eisenstein world-famous, but at the same time he became embroiled in polemics with others in the Soviet film community over the purpose of cinema in "the building of socialism." Eisenstein believed that film should educate rather than just entertain, but he also believed that avant-garde methods could be educational in socialist society. This support for avant-garde experimentation would be used against him during the far more dangerous cultural politics of the 1930s. His last two films of the 1920s, *The General Line* and *October*, were influenced by the increasing interference of powerful political leaders. All of Eisenstein's Russian films were state commissions, but Eisenstein never joined the Communist Party, and he continued to experiment even as he began to accommodate himself to political reality.

From 1929 to 1932 Eisenstein traveled abroad and had a stint in Hollywood. None of his three projects for Paramount Pictures, however, was put into production. The wealthy socialist writer Upton Sinclair rescued him from the impasse by offering to fund a film about Mexico, *Qué Viva México!* Eisenstein thrived in Mexico, but Sinclair became disgruntled when filming ran months over schedule and rumors of sexual escapades reached him. When Stalin threatened to banish Eisenstein permanently if he did not return to the Soviet Union, Sinclair seized the opportunity to pull the plug on *Qué Viva México!* Eisenstein never recovered the year's worth of footage and he was haunted by the loss for the rest of his life.

The Moscow that Eisenstein found on his return in May 1932 was more constricted and impoverished than the city he had left. His polemics of the 1920s were not forgotten, and Eisenstein was criticized by party hacks and old friends alike for being out of step and a formalist, which is to say he cared more about experiments with cinematic

form than with making films “accessible to the masses.” Political attacks on the director culminated in 1937, at the height of the Great Terror, as Eisenstein was nearing completion of *Bezhin Meadow*, his first film since returning from abroad. Boris Shumyatsky, chief of the Soviet film industry, had the production halted; he proceeded to denounce Eisenstein to the Central Committee and then directly to Stalin, inviting a death sentence on the filmmaker. After barely surviving this attack, and after ten years of blocked film projects, Eisenstein wrote the required self-criticism and was given the opportunity to make a historical film. *Alexander Nevsky*, a medieval military encounter between Russians and Germans, would become his most popular film; however, Eisenstein was ashamed of it, and except for its “battle on the ice,” it is generally considered to be his least interesting in technical and intellectual terms. The success of *Alexander Nevsky* catapulted him to the highest of inner circles; he won both the Order of Lenin and, in 1941, the newly created Stalin Prize. Then, in a restructuring of the film industry, Eisenstein was made Artistic Director of Mosfilm, a prestigious and powerful position.

In 1941, just months before World War II began in Russia, Eisenstein accepted a state commission to make a film about the sixteenth-century tsar, Ivan the Terrible. He worked on *Ivan the Terrible* for the next six years, eventually completing only two parts of the planned trilogy. Eisenstein’s masterpiece, *Ivan the Terrible* is a complex film containing a number of coordinated and conflicting narratives and networks of imagery that portray Ivan as a great leader, historically destined to found the Russian state but personally doomed by the murderous means he had used. *Part I* (1945) received a Stalin Prize, *Part II* (1946, released 1958) did not please Stalin and was banned.

Eisenstein was one of few practicing film directors to develop an important body of theoretical writing about cinema. In the 1920s he wrote about the psychological effect of montage on the viewer; the technique was intended to both startle the viewer into an awareness of the constructed nature of the work and to shape the viewing experience. During the 1930s, when he was barred from filmmaking, Eisenstein wrote and taught. A gifted teacher, he relied on his wide reading and sense of humor to draw students into the creative process. Work on *Ivan the Terrible* in the 1940s stimulated his most productive period of writing. He produced several volumes of theoretical works in *Method* and

Nonindifferent Nature, as well as a large volume of memoirs. This work developed his earlier concept of montage by broadening its scope to include sound and color as well as imagery within the shot.

By nature Eisenstein was a private and cautious man. He could be charming and charismatic as well as serious and demanding, but these were public masks; he guarded his private life. It seems clear that he had sexual relationships with both men and women but also that these affairs were rare and short-lived; he consulted with psychoanalysts on several occasions about his bisexuality in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1934, just after a law was passed making male homosexuality illegal in the Soviet Union, Eisenstein married his good friend and assistant, Pera Atasheva. It is fair to say that Eisenstein’s sexuality was a source of some dissatisfaction for him and that his private life in general brought him considerable pain. He suffered from periodic bouts of serious depression and from the 1930s onward his health was also threatened by heart disease and influenza.

Eisenstein suffered a serious heart attack just hours after finishing Part II of *Ivan the Terrible*. He never recovered the strength to return to film production, but he wrote extensively until the night of February 11, 1948, when he suffered a fatal heart attack.

See also: CENSORSHIP; MOTION PICTURES

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JOAN NEUBERGER

ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Electoral commissions play a large role in the organization and holding of elections under Russia’s so-called guided democracy. They exist at four fundamental levels: precincts (approximately 95,000),

territorial (TIK, 2,700), regional (RIK), and central (TsIK). There are also municipal commissions in some of the large cities, and there are district commissions for elections to the State Duma (around 190 to 225 districts according to Duma elections, minus those falling on a region's borders).

The central, regional, and territorial commissions are permanent bodies with four-year terms. The district and precinct commissions are organized one to three months before elections, and curtail their activity ten days after the publication of results.

The electoral commissions have from three to fifteen voting members, at least half of whom are appointed based on nominations by electoral associations with fractions in the Duma and by the regional legislatures. Half of the members of the regional electoral commissions are appointed by the regional executive, the other half by the legislative assembly. This means that for all practical matters the electoral commissions are under the control of the executive power. Parties, blocs, and candidates participating in elections may appoint one member of the electoral commission with consultative rights in the commission at their level and the levels below them. The precinct and territorial commissions are organized by the regional commissions with the participation of local government.

A new form of central electoral commission arose in 1993, when it was necessary to hold parliamentary elections and vote on a constitution in a short time. Officials considered the election deadlines unrealistic. At that time the president named all members of the commission and its chair. The central electoral commission has fifteen members and is organized on an equal footing by the Duma, the Federation Council, and the president. The central commission is essentially a Soviet institution, with the actual power, including control over the numerous apparatuses, concentrated in the hands of the chair. Between 2001 and 2003, an electoral vertical was established whereby the central commission can directly influence the lower-level commissions. The central commission names at least two members of the regional commission and nominates candidates for its head. Moreover, in the future the regional electoral commissions may be disbanded in favor of central commission representation (this mechanism was tested in 2003 with the Krasnoyarsk Krai electoral commission). The role of the central commission, and also of the Kremlin, in regional and local elections has grown significantly. The central commission's authority to interpret am-

biguous legal clauses enables it to punish and pardon candidates, parties, electoral associations, and mass media organizations. As a bureaucratic structure, the central electoral commission has turned into a highly influential election ministry with an enormous budget and powerful leverage in relation to other federal and regional power structures and the entire political life of the country.

See also: DUMA; PRESIDENCY

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NIKOLAI PETROV

ELECTRICITY GRID

In 1920, Lenin famously said, "Communism equals Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country." He created the State Commission for Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) to achieve this, and the expansion of electricity generation and transmission became a core element in Soviet modernization. Total output rose from 8.4 billion kilowatt hours in 1930, to 49 billion in 1940 and 290 billion in 1960. After World War II the Soviet Union became the second largest electricity generator in the world, with the United States occupying first place. The Soviets built the world's largest hydroelectric plant, in Krasnoyarsk in 1954, and the world's first nuclear power reactor, in Obninsk.

Electrification had reached 80 percent of all villages by the 1960s, and half of the rail track was electrified. Power stations also provided steam heating for neighboring districts, accounting for one-third of the nation's heating. This may have been efficient from the power-generation point of view, but there was no effort to meter customers or

conserve energy. By 1960 the Soviet Union had 167,000 kilometers of high transmission lines (35 kilovolts and higher). This grew to 600,000 kilometers by 1975. Initially, there were ten regional grids, which by the 1970s were gradually combined into a unified national grid that handled 75 percent of total electricity output. In 1976 the Soviet grid was connected to that of East Europe (the members of Comecon).

The Soviet power supply continued to expand steadily, even as economic growth slowed. Output increased from 741 billion kilowatt hours in 1970 to 1,728 billion in 1990, with the USSR accounting for 17 percent of global electricity output. Still, capacity failed to keep pace with the gargantuan appetites of Soviet industry, and regional coverage was uneven, since most of the fossil fuels were located in the north and east, whereas the major population centers and industry were in the west. Twenty percent of the energy was consumed in transporting the coal, gas, and fuel-oil to thermal power stations located near industrial zones. In the early 1970s, when nuclear plants accounted for just two percent of total electricity output, the government launched an ambitious program to expand nuclear power. This plan was halted for more than a decade by the 1986 Chernobyl accident. In 1990 the Russia Federation generated 1,082 billion kilowatt hours, a figure that had fallen to 835 billion by 2000. Of that total, 15 percent was from nuclear plants and 18 percent from hydro stations, the rest was from thermal plants using half coal and half natural gas for fuel.

In 1992 the electricity system was turned into a joint stock company, the Unified Energy Systems of Russia (RAO EES). Blocks of shares in RAO EES were sold to its workers and the public for vouchers in 1994, and subsequently were sold to domestic and foreign investors, but the government held onto a controlling 53 percent stake in EES. Some regional producers were separated from EES, but the latter still accounted for 73 percent of Russian generating capacity and 85 percent of electricity distribution in 2000.

Electricity prices were held down by the government in order to subsidize industrial and domestic consumers. This meant most of the regional energy companies that made up EES ran at a loss, and could not invest in new capacity or energy conservation. By 1999, the situation was critical: EES was losing \$1 billion on annual revenues of \$7 billion. Former privatization chief Anatoly Chubais was appointed head of EES, and he proposed pri-

vatizing some of EES's more lucrative regional producers to the highest bidder. The remaining operations would be restructured into five to seven generation companies, which would be spun off as independent companies. A wholesale market in electricity would be introduced, and retail prices would be allowed to rise by 100 percent by 2005. The grid and dispatcher service would be returned to state ownership. Amid objections from consumers, who objected to higher prices, and from foreign investors in EES, who feared their shares would be diluted, the plan was adopted in 2002.

See also: CHERNOBYL; CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH

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PETER RUTLAND

ELIZABETH

(1709–1762), empress of Russia, 1741–1762, one of the “Russian matriarchate” or “Amazon auto-cratrices,” that is, women rulers from Catherine I through Catherine II, 1725–1796.

Daughter of Peter I and Catherine I, grand princess and crown princess from 1709 to 1741, Elizabeth (Elizaveta Petrovna) was the second of ten offspring to reach maturity. She was born in the Moscow suburb of Kolomenskoye on December 29, 1709, the same day a Moscow parade celebrated the Poltava victory. Elizabeth grew up carefree with her sister Anna (1708–1728). Doted on by both parents, the girls received training in European languages, social skills, and Russian traditions of singing, religious instruction, and dancing. Anna married Duke Karl Friedrich of Holstein-Gottorp in 1727 and died in Holstein giving birth to Karl Peter Ulrich (the future Peter III). Elizabeth never married officially or traveled abroad, her illegitimate birth obstructing royal matches. Because she wrote little and left no diary, her inner thoughts are not well-known.

Hints of a political role came after her mother's short reign when Elizabeth was named to the joint regency for young Peter II, whose favor she briefly enjoyed. But when he died childless in 1730 she



Portrait of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna by Pierre Duflos.

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was overlooked in the surprise selection of Anna Ivanovna. Under Anna she was kept under surveillance, her yearly allowance cut to 30,000 rubles, and only Biron's influence prevented commitment to a convent. At Aleksandrovka near Moscow she indulged in amorous relationships with Alexander Buturlin, Alexei Shubin, and the Ukrainian chorister Alexei Razumovsky. During Elizabeth's reign male favoritism flourished; some of her preferred men assumed broad cultural and artistic functions—for instance, Ivan Shuvalov (1717–1797), a well-read Francophile who co-founded Moscow University and the Imperial Russian Academy of Fine Arts in the 1750s.

Anna Ivanovna was succeeded in October 1740 by infant Ivan VI of the Brunswick branch of Romanovs who reigned under several fragile

regencies, the last headed by his mother, Anna Leopoldovna (1718–1746). This Anna represented the Miloslavsky/Brunswick branch, whereas Elizabeth personified the Naryshkin/Petrine branch. Elizabeth naturally worried the inept regency regime, which she led her partisans in the guards to overthrow on December 5–6, 1741, with aid from the French and Swedish ambassadors (Sweden had declared war on Russia in July 1741 ostensibly in support of Elizabeth). The bloodless coup was deftly accomplished, the regent and her family arrested and banished, and Elizabeth's claims explicated on the basis of legitimacy and blood kinship. Though Elizabeth's accession unleashed public condemnation of both Annas as agents of foreign domination, it also reaffirmed the primacy of Petrine traditions and conquests, promising to restore Petrine glory and to counter Swedish invasion, which brought Russian gains in Finland by the Peace of Åbo in August 1743.

Elizabeth was crowned in Moscow in spring 1742 amid huge celebrations spanning several months; she demonstratively crowned herself. With Petrine, classical feminine, and "restorationist" rhetoric, Elizabeth's regime resembled Anna Ivanovna's in that it pursued an active foreign policy, witnessed complicated court rivalries and further attempts to resolve the succession issue, and made the imperial court a center of European cultural activities. In 1742 the empress, lacking offspring, brought her nephew from Holstein to be converted to Orthodoxy, renamed, and designated crown prince Peter Fyodorovich. In 1744 she found him a German bride, Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst, the future Catherine II. The teenage consorts married in August 1745, and hopes for a male heir came true only in 1754. Elizabeth took charge of Grand Prince Pavel Petrovich. Nevertheless, the "Young Court" rivaled Elizabeth's in competition over dynastic and succession concerns.

While retaining ultimate authority, Elizabeth restored the primacy of the Senate in policymaking, exercised a consultative style of administration, and assembled a government comprising veteran statesmen, such as cosmopolitan Chancellor Alexei Bestuzhev-Ryumin and newly elevated aristocrats like the brothers Petr and Alexander Shuvalov (and their younger cousin Ivan Shuvalov), Mikhail and Roman Vorontsov, Alexei and Kirill Razumovsky, and court surgeon Armand Lestocq. Her reign generally avoided political repression, but she took revenge on the Lopukhin family, descendants of Peter I's first wife, by hav-

ing them tortured and exiled in 1743 for loose talk about the Brunswick family and its superior rights. Later she abolished the death penalty in practice. Lestocq and Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who was succeeded as chancellor by Mikhail Vorontsov, fell into disgrace for alleged intrigues, although Catherine II later pardoned both.

In cultural policy Elizabeth patronized many, including Mikhail Lomonosov, Alexander Sumarokov, Vasily Trediakovsky, and the Volkov brothers, all active in literature and the arts. Foreign architects, composers, and literary figures such as Bartolomeo Rastrelli, Francesco Araja, and Jakob von Stählin also enjoyed Elizabeth's support. Her love of pageantry resulted in Petersburg's first professional public theater in 1756. Indeed, the empress set a personal example by frequently attending the theater, and her court became famous for elaborate festivities amid luxurious settings, such as Rastrelli's new Winter Palace and the Catherine Palace at Tsarskoye Selo. Elizabeth loved fancy dress and followed European fashion, although she was criticized by Grand Princess Catherine for quixotic transvestite balls and crudely dictating other ladies' style and attire. Other covert critics such as Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov accused Elizabeth of accelerating the "corruption of manners" by pandering to a culture of corrupt excess, an inevitable accusation from disgruntled aristocrats amid the costly ongoing Europeanization of a cosmopolitan high society. The Shuvalov brothers introduced significant innovations in financial policy that fueled economic and fiscal growth and reinstated recodification of law.

Elizabeth followed Petrine precedent in foreign policy, a field she took special interest in, although critics alleged her geographical ignorance and laziness. Without firing a shot, Russia helped conclude the war of the Austrian succession (1740–1748), but during this conflict Elizabeth and Chancellor Bestuzhev-Ryumin became convinced that Prussian aggression threatened Russia's security. Hence alliance with Austria became the fulcrum of Elizabethan foreign policy, inevitably entangling Russia in the reversal of alliances in 1756 that exploded in the worldwide Seven Years' War (1756–1763). This complex conflict pitted Russia, Austria, and France against Prussia and Britain, but Russia did not fight longtime trading partner Britain. Russia held its own against Prussia, conquered East Prussia, and even briefly occupied Berlin in 1760. The war was directed by a new institution, the Conference at the Imperial Court, for Elizabeth's declining health lim-

ited her personal attention to state affairs. The war dragged on too long, and the belligerents began looking for a way out when Elizabeth's sudden death on Christmas Day (December 25, 1761) brought her nephew Peter III to power. He was determined to break ranks and to ally with Prussia, despite Elizabeth's antagonism to King Frederick II. So just as Elizabeth's reign started with a perversely declared war, so it ended abruptly with Russia's early withdrawal from a European-wide conflict and Peter III's declaration of war on longtime ally Denmark. Elizabeth personified Russia's post-Petrine eminence and further emergence as a European power with aspirations for cultural achievement.

See also: ANNA IVANOVNA; BESTUZHEV-RYUMIN, ALEXEI PETROVICH; PETER I; SEVEN YEARS' WAR

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JOHN T. ALEXANDER

EMANCIPATION ACT

The Emancipation Act was issued by the Russian Emperor Alexander II on March 3, 1861. By this act all peasants, or serfs, were set free from personal dependence on their landlords, acquired civil rights, and were granted participation in social and economic activities as free citizens.

The importance of emancipation cannot be overestimated. However, emancipation can be understood only by taking into consideration the history of serfdom in Russia. If in early modern Europe different institutions successfully emerged to represent the interests of different classes (e.g., universities, guilds, and corporations) against the state's absolutist tendencies, in Russia the state won over its competitors and took the form of autocracy. Despite the absolutist state's takeover in early modern Europe, it never encroached on the individual rights of its subjects to the extent that the Russian autocracy did. Indeed, autocracy presupposed that no right existed until it was granted and thus all subjects were slaves until the tsar decided otherwise.

As the process of state centralization proceeded in Russia, external sources of income (for instance, wars and territorial growth) were more or less exhausted by the seventeenth century, and the state switched its attention to its internal resources. Hence the continuous attempts to immobilize peasants and make them easily accessible as taxpayers. The Law Code of 1649 completed the process of immobilization declaring "eternal and hereditary attachment" of peasants to the land. Thus the Russian term for "serf" goes back to this attachment to the land more than to personal dependence on the master. Later in the eighteenth century it became possible to sell serfs without the land. Afterwards the only difference between the serf and the slave was that the serf had a household on the land of his master.

At the time of emancipation, serfdom constituted the core of Russian economic and social life. Its abolition undermined the basis of the autocratic state in the eyes of the vast majority of nobles as well as peasants. Those few in favor of the reform were not numerous: landlords running modernized enterprises and hindered by the absence of a free labor force and competition, together with liberal and radical thinkers (often landless). For peasants, the interpretation of emancipation ranged from a call for total anarchy, arbitrary redistribution of land, and revenge on their masters, to disbelief and disregard of the emancipation as impossible.

Thus Alexander II had to strike a balance between contradictory interests of different groups of nobility and the threat of peasant riots. The text of the act makes this balancing visible. The emperor openly acknowledged the inequality among his subjects and said that traditional relations between

the nobility and the peasantry based on the "benevolence of the noblemen" and "affectionate submission on the part of the peasants" had become degraded. Under these circumstances, acting as a promoter of the good of all his subjects, Alexander II made an effort to introduce a "new organization of peasant life."

To pay homage to the class of his main supporters, in the document Alexander stresses the devotion and goodwill of his nobility, their readiness "to make sacrifices for the welfare of the country," and his hope for their future cooperation. In return he promises to help them in the form of loans and transfer of debts. On the other hand, serfs should be warned and reminded of their obligations toward those in power. "Some were concerned about the freedom and unconcerned about obligations" reads the document. The Emperor cites the Bible that "every individual is subject to a higher authority" and concludes that "what legally belongs to nobles cannot be taken from them without adequate compensation," or punishment will surely follow.

The state initiative for emancipation indicates that the state planned to be the first to benefit from it. Though several of Alexander's predecessors touched upon the question of peasant reform, none of them was in such a desperate situation domestically or internationally as to pursue unprecedented measures and push the reform ahead. The Crimean War (1853–1856) became the point of revelation because Russia faced the threat not only of financial collapse but of losing its position as a great power among European countries. The reform should have become a source of economic and military mobilization and thus kept the state equal among equals in Europe as well as eliminate the remnants of postwar chaos in its social life. However, the emancipation changed the structure of society in a way that demanded its total reconstruction. A series of liberal reforms followed, and the question of whether the Emperor ever planned to go that far remains open for historians.

The emancipation meant that all peasants became "free rural inhabitants" with full rights. The nobles retained their property rights on land while granting the peasants "perpetual use of their domicile in return of specified obligations," that is, peasants should work for their landlords as they used to work before. These temporal arrangements would last for two years, during which redemption fees for land would be paid and the peasant

would become an owner of his plot. In general the Emancipation Act was followed by Regulations on Peasants Set Free in seventeen articles that explained the procedure of land redistribution and new organization of peasant life in detail.

Because peasants became free citizens, emancipation had far-reaching economic consequences. The organization of rural life changed when the peasant community—not the landlord—was responsible for taxation and administrative and police order. The community became a self-governing entity when rural property-holders were able to elect their representatives for participation in administrative bodies at the higher level as well as for the local court. To resolve conflicts arising between the nobles and the peasants, community justices were introduced locally, and special officials mediated these conflicts.

Emancipation destroyed class boundaries and opened the way for further development of capitalist relations and a market economy. Those who were not able to pay the redemption fee and buy their land entered the market as a free labor force promoting further industrialization. Moreover, it had a great psychological impact on the general public, because, in principle at least, there remained no underprivileged classes, and formal civil equality was established. A new generation was to follow—not slaves but citizens.

See also: ALEXANDER II; LAW CODE OF 1649; PEASANTRY; SERFDOM; SLAVERY

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JULIA ULYANNIKOVA

EMPIRE, USSR AS

The understanding of the concept of empire depends on time and space. During the nineteenth century the terms *empire* and *imperialism* were associated with the spread of progress by countries claiming to represent civilized forms of existence. By the end of World War II the emergent superpowers, the United States and the USSR, adhered to an anti-imperialist, anti-empire ideology and thereby ended the colonial empires of countries such as Britain and France.

According to Leninist thought, empire and imperialism represented the highest and last stages of capitalist development after which socialism would emerge. Therefore the Soviet leadership never considered the multinational USSR, the leader of socialist revolution, to be an empire. This Leninist ideological definition of empire, while providing a framework for comprehending the Soviet leadership's approach to governing, fails to describe the dynamics of the USSR as an empire. As shown by Dominic Lieven (2000), a country must fulfill several criteria to be considered an empire. It must be continental in scale, governing a range of different peoples, represent a great culture or ideology with more than local hegemony, exercise great economic and military might on more than a regional level, and arguably govern without the consent of the people. According to these criteria the USSR was indeed an empire, however not without certain characteristics distinguishing it from other empires, such as the British, Ottoman, or Hapsburg.

The USSR was the world's largest country, extending from Europe in the west to China and the Pacific in the east, its southern borders touching the boundaries of the Middle East. Given this geographic position, Moscow was a player in three of the world's most important regions. The Soviet Union's population consisted of hundreds of different peoples speaking a myriad of languages and practicing different religions, including Judaism, Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Sunni and Shia Islam. Such diversity was reminiscent of the great British and French maritime empires.

Josef Stalin's brutal industrialization policies and victory in World War II paved the way for the Soviet Union's emergence as a superpower with global reach and influence. The Soviet economy was the second largest in the world despite its many deficiencies and supported a huge military industrial complex, which by the 1960s had enabled the

USSR to attain nuclear parity with the United States while maintaining the largest armed forces in the world.

Ideological power accompanied this military and economic might. The Cold War between the USSR and the United States was rooted in alternative visions of modernity. Whereas the United States held that liberal democracy and capitalism ultimately represented the end of history, the Soviet Union believed that an additional stage, that of communism, represented the true end of history. Many across the globe found Soviet communism's claims of representing a truly egalitarian and therefore more humane society attractive. In other words, the ideological and cultural power of the USSR exercised global influence.

In the midst of war and revolution many areas of the former tsarist empire became independent. With the exception of Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and parts of Poland, the Bolsheviks, through the effective and brutal use of force and coercion and under the banner of progressive Soviet communism, resurrected the empire they once called "Prison of the Peoples." In 1940 Stalin invaded and occupied the Baltic States, which subsequently, according to Soviet propaganda, voluntarily became part of the USSR. Until the late 1980s during the reform process of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leadership governed without the direct consent of the people.

LAND-BASED EMPIRE

The Soviet Union was a land-based empire encompassing all the territories of its tsarist predecessor—except Poland and Finland—while adding other areas such as western Ukraine and Bessarabia. The dynamics of a land-based empire differ greatly from those of maritime empires, such as the British and French. Before embarking on maritime empire building, countries such as Britain, France, and Spain already had a relatively solidified national identity. In tsarist Russia, empire and nation building commenced at roughly the same time, thereby blurring empire and nation. To determine where Russia the nation ended and where the empire began was difficult. This theme would continue in the Soviet era.

Given the geographical distance between the metropole and its maritime empire, a clear division remained between colonized, most of whom were of different races and cultures, and colonizer, and therefore the question of assimilation of different

peoples under a single supranational ideology or symbol never arose. The metropolitan British identity was neither created nor adjusted to include the peoples of the vast empire ruled by London. In tsarist Russia the emperor and the crown represented the supranational entity to which the various peoples of the empire were to pledge their loyalty. Here, terminology is important. Two words for the English equivalent of "Russian" exist. When discussing anything related to Russian ethnicity, such as a person or the language, the word *russky* is used. However the empire, its institutions and the dynasty, were called *rossysky*, which carried a civil meaning designed to include everyone from Baltic German to Tatar. The emperor himself was known not as the "russky" tsar, but *vserossysky* (All-Russian).

The Soviet leadership faced the same problems of governing and assimilation associated with a multiethnic land empire. While Soviet nationality policy, in other words how Soviet leaders approached governing this large and diverse empire, varied over time, its goals never did. They were (a) to maintain the country's territorial integrity and domestic security; (b) to support the monopolistic hold on power of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); and (c) create a supranational Soviet identity, reminiscent of the civil *rossysky*. On one hand the Soviet leadership in line with Marxist-Leninist thought believed that nationalism, the death knell for any multinational empire, was a phenomenon inherent to capitalism and the bourgeois classes. Therefore, with the advent of socialism, broadly defined working class interests would triumph over national loyalties. In short, socialism makes nationalism redundant. On the other hand, the reality of governing a multiethnic empire required the Soviet leadership to pursue several policies reminiscent of a traditional imperial polity, such as deportations of whole peoples, playing one ethnic group against another, and drawing boundaries designed to maintain the supremacy of the central power.

Unlike previous empires, the USSR was a federation that had fifteen republics at the time of its dissolution in 1991. Confident in the relatively speedy victory of socialism and communism over capitalism, in the 1920s the Soviet leadership followed a very accommodating policy in regard to nationalities. Along with the creation of a federation that institutionalized national identities, the new Soviet authorities supported the spread and strengthening of non-Russian cultures, languages,



Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1985. XNR PRODUCTIONS. THE GALE GROUP

and identities. In areas where a national identity already existed, such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia, great ethnic cultural autonomy was allowed. In areas where no national identity yet existed, as in Central Asia, Soviet ethnographers worked to create peoples and national borders, based on cultural and economic considerations. The Soviet drawing of borders is comparable to the creation of states by European imperial powers in Africa and the Middle East. Each created republic had identical state, bureaucratic, and educational structures, an Academy of Sciences, and other institutions whose responsibility was the maintenance and strengthening of the national identity as well as propagation of Marxist–Leninist teachings. Therefore the Soviet Union supported and gave birth to national identities, whereas other land-based empires, such as the Ottoman and Habsburg, fought against them. At the same time the central Soviet authorities recruited indigenous people in the non-Russian republics to serve in local, republican, and even all-union institutions.

Alongside nation building went social and economic modernization, and a requirement for the emergence of socialism, which would bring an end to strong national feelings. Unlike French and British colonial rule, the Soviets made dramatic changes of the societies and peoples of the USSR—one of the main thrusts of their nationality policy. While Central Asia and the Caucasus were the most economically and socially “backward,” through rapid industrialization and collectivization of peasant land all societies of the USSR endured dramatic change, surpassing the extent to which France and Britain had affected their colonial possessions. Importantly, the Soviets strove to modernize Russia, which many regarded to be the imperial power. There is no such analogy in regard to the maritime European empires, whose metropole was considered to be at the forefront of modernization and civilization.

The rule of Josef Stalin brought changes to this policy. Regarding cultural autonomy a threat to the

integrity of the Soviet state, Stalin imposed very strong central control over the constituent republics and appointed Russians to many of the high posts in the non-Russian republics. The biggest change, however, was in regard to the position of the Russian people within Soviet ideology. The Russians were now portrayed as the elder brother of the Soviet peoples whose culture and language provided the means for achieving communist modernity. Appreciation and love of Russian culture and language was no longer regarded as a threat to Soviet identity, but rather a reflection of loyalty to it.

From Stalin's death to the collapse of the USSR, Soviet nationality policy was an amalgamation of the policies followed during the first thirty-five years of Soviet power. The peoples of the non-Russian republics again filled positions in republican institutions. Through access to higher education, privilege, and the opportunity to exercise power within their republican or local domain, the central leadership created a sizeable and reliable body of non-Russian cadres who, with their knowledge of the local languages and cultures, ruled the non-Russian parts of the empire under the umbrella of the CPSU. However, Great Russians, meaning Russians, Ukrainians, or Belarusians, usually occupied military and intelligence service positions.

The Soviet command economy centered in Moscow limited the power of the local and republican authorities. Through allocation of economic resources, goods, and infrastructure, the central Soviet authorities wielded a great degree of real power throughout the USSR. Moreover, in traditional imperial style, Moscow exploited the natural resources of all republics, such as Russian oil and natural gas and Uzbek cotton, to fulfill all-union policies even to the detriment of the individual republic.

The problem of assimilation of varied peoples and the creation of a supranational identity remained. After the death of Stalin, the Soviet leadership realized that ethnic national feelings in the USSR were not dissipating and in some cases were strengthening. The Soviet leadership's response was essentially the promotion of a two-tiered identity. On one level it spoke of the flourishing of national identities and cultures. The leadership stressed, however, that this flourishing took place within a Soviet framework in which the people's primary loyalty was to the Soviet identity and homeland. In other words, enjoyment of one's national culture and language was not a barrier to having supreme loyalty to the progressive supranational Soviet identity.

Nevertheless the existence of national feelings continued to worry the Soviet leadership. During the late 1950s it adopted a new language policy, at the heart of which was expansion of Russian language teaching. The hope was that acquisition of Russian language and therefore culture would bring with it the spread and strengthening of a Soviet identity. The issue of language is always sensitive in the imperial framework. Attempts by a land-based empire to impose a single language frequently results in enflaming national feelings among the people whose native tongue is not the imperial one. Yet every land-based empire, especially one the size of the USSR, needs a lingua franca in order to govern and ease the challenges of administration.

RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET EMPIRE

One of the more contentious issues concerns the extent to which the Soviet Union was a Russian empire. The USSR did exist in the space of the former tsarist empire. The Russian language was the lingua franca. From Stalin onwards the Russians and their high culture were portrayed as progressive and therefore the starting point on the path toward the modern Soviet identity. Great Russians held the vast majority of powerful positions in the center, as well as sensitive posts in the non-Russian republics. Many people in the non-Russian republics regarded the USSR and Soviet identity to be only a different form of Russian imperialism dating from the tsarist period.

On the other hand the Soviets destroyed two symbols of Russian identity—the tsar and the peasantry—while emasculating the other, the Russian Orthodox Church. During the 1920s Lenin and other Bolsheviks, seeing Russian nationalism as the biggest internal threat to the Soviet state, worked to contain it. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, by far the largest of the republics of the USSR whose population equaled all of the others combined, had no separate Communist Party and appropriate institutions in contrast to all of the other republics. The Soviet regime used Russian high culture and symbols, but in a sanitized form designed to construct and strengthen a Soviet identity. The Russian people suffered just as much as the other peoples from the crimes of the Soviet regime, especially under Stalin. Already by the 1950s Russian nationalism was on the rise. The Soviet regime was blamed for destroying Russian culture and Russia itself through its reckless exploitation of land and natural resources in pursuit

of Soviet goals. In the closing years of the USSR the symbols of Russian identity, the tsarist tricolor flag and the double-headed eagle, were commonly seen, while cities and streets regained their prerevolutionary Russian names. For many Russians, a distinction existed between Russian and Soviet identity.

COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE

Debate continues over the causes of the collapse of the USSR and specifically the extent to which Soviet handling of its multiethnic empire was responsible for it. The Soviet federal structure, although leaving real power in Moscow, nevertheless institutionalized and therefore strengthened national identities, which are lethal to any multinational empire. Yet the goal of nationality policy was the creation of a supranational Soviet identity. Despite this contradiction, Soviet nationality policy when compared to that of other imperial polities enjoyed a relative degree of success. By encouraging dependence on the state and protecting the educational and occupational interests of the local political elite and educated middle class, the central Soviet leadership blunted aspirations to independent nationhood and integrated groups within the Soviet infrastructure. While the use of local elites to govern the periphery is a traditional imperial practice, providing a degree of legitimacy to the imperial power, Soviet non-Russian elites achieved powerful positions within their respective republics, wielding power unattainable by the colonized local populations in the French and British empires.

Ideological power is as strong as its ability to deliver what it promises. Disillusionment with the unfulfilled economic promises of the Soviet ideology weakened loyalty to the Soviet identity. Gorbachev's economic policies only worsened the economic situation. At the same time, Gorbachev ended the CPSU's monopoly on power. Faced with growing popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation and loss of guarantee of power through the CPSU, regional and local political figures became nationalists when the national platform seemed to be the only way for them to retain power as the imperial center, the CPSU, weakened.

Russia itself led the charge against the Soviet center, thereby creating a unique situation. The country that many people inside and outside the USSR considered to be the imperial power, revolted against what it regarded to be the imperial power, the CPSU and central Soviet control over Russia,

leading to the collapse of one of the world's great land-based empires.

See also: COLONIAL EXPANSION; COLONIALISM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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ZHAND P. SHAKIBI

ENGELS, FRIEDRICH

(1820–1895), German socialist theoretician; close collaborator of Karl Marx.

Friedrich Engels is remembered primarily as the close friend and intellectual collaborator of Karl Marx, who was the most important socialist thinker and arguably the most important social theorist of the nineteenth century. Engels must be regarded as a significant intellectual figure in his own right. Engels's writings exerted a strong influence on Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology. Engels was born in Barmen in 1820, two and a half years after Marx. Ironically, Friedrich Engels worked for decades as the manager of enterprises in his family's firm of Ermen and Engels; this necessitated his move to Manchester in 1850. Engels contributed substantially to the financial support of Marx and

his family. He survived Marx by twelve years, during an important period in the growth of the socialist movement when Engels served as the most respected spokesman for Marxist theory.

In recent decades there has been a lively debate over the degree of divergence between Marx's thought and that of Engels, and therefore over whether the general scheme of interpretation known as "historical materialism" or "dialectical materialism" was primarily constructed by Engels or accorded with the main thrust of Marx's intellectual efforts. George Lichtheim and Shlomo Avineri, distinguished scholars who have written about Marx, see Engels as having given a rigid cast to Marxist theory in order to make it seem more scientific, thus implicitly denying the creative role of human imagination and labor that had been emphasized by Marx. On the other hand, some works, such as those by J. D. Hunley and Manfred Steger, emphasize the fundamental points of agreement between Marx and Engels. The controversy remains unresolved and facts point to both convergence and divergence: Marx and Engels coauthored some major essays, including *The Communist Manifesto*, and Engels made an explicit effort to give Marxism the character of a set of scientific laws of purportedly general validity. The well-known laws of the dialectic, which became the touchstones of philosophical orthodoxy in Soviet Marxism-Leninism, were drawn directly from Engels's writings.

See also: DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM; MARXISM

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ALFRED B. EVANS JR.

ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF

The Enlightenment is traditionally defined as an intellectual movement characterized by religious skepticism, secularism, and liberal values, rooted in a belief in the power of human reason liberated from the constraints of blind faith and arbitrary

authority, and opposed by the retrograde anti-Enlightenment. Originated with the French *philosophes*, especially Charles de Secondant Montesquieu (1689–1755), Denis Diderot (1713–1784), François Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1684–1778), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), the Enlightenment quickly spread through Europe and the American colonies. It reached Russia in the mid-eighteenth century, peaking during the reign of Catherine II (1762–1796) and becoming one of the most important components of the country's Westernization and modernization.

The impact of the Enlightenment in Russia is generally described in terms of its reception and accommodation of the ideas of the *philosophes*. These ideas spurred new scientific and secular approaches to culture and government that laid the foundation of Russia's modern intellectual and political culture. In addition to greater intellectual exchange with Europe, the Enlightenment brought Russia institutions of science and scholarship, arts and theater, the print revolution, and new forms of sociability, such as learned and charitable societies, clubs, and Masonic lodges. The Enlightenment created a new generation of Russian scientists, scholars, and men of letters (i.e., Mikhail Lomonosov, Nikolai Novikov, Alexander Radishchev, and Nikolai Karamzin). The Enlightenment also brought about an intense secularization that significantly diminished the role of religion and theology and transformed the monarchy into an enlightened absolutism.

The actual impact of the Enlightenment in Russia was limited and inconsistent, however. While the writings of the *philosophes* were widely translated and read, Russian audiences were more interested in their novels than in their philosophical or political treatises. Policy makers preferred German cameralism and political science. Catherine's self-proclaimed adherence to the principles of the *philosophes* was rather patchy, which prompted widespread accusations that she had created the image of philosopher on the throne to dupe the European public. The progress of science, education, and literature as well as the formation of the public sphere owed more to government tutelage than independent initiative. Most Russian champions of Enlightenment were profoundly religious. Thus, criticism of the Orthodox Church was virtually nonexistent; anticlerical statements were directed primarily against Catholicism, the old foe of Russian Orthodoxy. Some of the new forms of sociability, such as Masonic lodges, served as venues not only for liberal discussion, but also for the exer-

cises in occultism, alchemy, and criticism of the philosophes. The Enlightenment in Russia was preoccupied with superficial cultural forms rather than content.

The traditional picture outlined above needs to be revised in light of new studies of the European Enlightenment since the 1970s. Enlightenment is no longer identified as a uniform school of thought dominated by the philosophes. Instead it is understood as a complex phenomenon, a series of debates at the core of which lay the process of discovery and proactive and critical involvement of the individual in both private and public life. This concept softens the binary divides between the secular and the religious, the realms of private initiative and established public authority, and, in many cases, the conventional antithesis between Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment.

One may interpret the Enlightenment in Russia more comprehensively and less exclusively as a process of discovering contemporary European culture and adapting it to Russian realities that produced a uniquely Russian national Enlightenment. An analysis of enlightened despotism need not be preoccupied with the balance between Enlightenment and despotism and can focus instead on the reformer's own understanding of the best interests of the nation. For example, it was political, demographic, and economic considerations rather than an anticlerical ideology that drove Catherine's policy of secularization. There is no need to limit discussions of the public debate to evaluations of whether or not it conformed to the standards of religious skepticism. Contemporary discussions of the difference between true and false Enlightenment demonstrate that religious education and faith, along with patriotism, were viewed as the key elements of true Enlightenment, while religious toleration was touted as a traditional Orthodox value. Instead of emphasizing the dichotomy between adoption of cultural institutions and reception of ideas, twenty-first century scholarship looks at institutions as the infrastructure of Enlightenment that created economic, social, and political mechanisms crucial for the spread of ideas.

See also: CATHERINE II; FREEMASONRY; ORTHODOXY

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OLGA TSAPINA

ENSERFMENT

Enserfment refers to the broad historical process that made the free Russian peasantry into serfs, abasing them further into near-slaves, then emancipating them from their slavelike status and finally freeing them so that they could move and conduct their lives with the same rights as other free men in the Russian Empire. This process took place over the course of nearly five hundred years, between the 1450s and 1906. Almost certainly enserfment would not have occurred had not 10 percent of the population been slaves. Also, it could not have reached the depths of human abasement had not the service state been present to legislate and enforce it.

The homeland of the Great Russians, the land between the Volga and the Oka (the so-called Volga-Oka mesopotamia), is a very poor place. There are almost no natural resources of any kind (gold, silver, copper, iron, building stone, coal), the three-inch-thick *podzol* soil is not hospitable to agriculture, as is the climate (excessive precipitation and a short growing season). Until the Slavs moved into the area in the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries, the indigenous Finns and Balts were sparsely settled and lived neolithic lives hunting and fishing. This area could not support a dense population, and any prolonged catastrophe reduced the population further, creating the perception of a labor shortage. The protracted civil war over the Moscow throne between 1425 and 1453 created a labor shortage perception.

At the time the population was free (with the exception of the slaves), with everyone able to move about as they wished. Because population

densities were so low and agriculture was extensive (peasants cleared land by the slash-and-burn process, farmed it for three years, exhausted its fertility, and moved on to another plot), land ownership was not prized. Government officials and military personnel made their livings by collecting taxes and fees (which can be levied from a semi-sedentary population) and looting in warfare, not by trying to collect rent from lands tilled by settled farmers. Monasteries were different: In about 1350 they had moved out of towns (because of the Black Death, *inter alia*) into the countryside and entered the land ownership business, raising and selling grain. They recruited peasants to work for them by offering lower tax rates than peasants could get by living on their own lands. The civil war disrupted this process, and some monasteries, which had granted some peasants small loans as part of the recruitment package, found that they had difficulty collecting those loans. Consequently a few individual monasteries petitioned the government to forbid indebted peasants from moving at any time other than around St. George's Day (November 26). St. George's Day was the time of the pre-Christian, pagan end of the agricultural year, akin to the U.S. holiday, Thanksgiving. The monasteries believed that they could collect the debts owed to them at that time before the peasants moved somewhere else.

This small beginning—involving a handful of monasteries and only their indebted peasants—initiated the enserfment process. It is possible that the government rationalized its action because not paying a debt was a crime (a tort, in those times); thus, forbidding peasant debtors from moving was a crime-prevention measure. Also note that this was the normal time for peasants to move: The agricultural year was over, and the ground was probably frozen (the average temperature was -4 degrees Celsius), so that transportation was more convenient than at any other time of year, when there might be deep snow, floods, mud, drought, and so on.

For unknown reasons this fundamentally trivial measure was extended to all peasants in the Law Code (*Sudebnik*) of 1497. Similar limitations on peasant mobility were present in neighboring political jurisdictions, and there may have been a contagion effect. It also may have been viewed as a general convenience, for that is when peasants tended to move anyway. As far as is known, there were no contemporary protests against the introduction of St. George's Day, and in the nineteenth

century the peasants had sayings stating that a reintroduction of St. George's Day would be tantamount to emancipation. The 1497 language was repeated in the *Sudebnik* of 1550, with the addition of verbiage reflecting the introduction of the three-field system of agriculture: Peasants who had sown an autumn field and then moved on St. George's Day had the right to return to harvest the grain when it was ripe.

Chaos with its inherent disruption of labor supplies caused the next major advance in the enserfment process: the introduction of the "forbidden years." Ivan IV's mad *oprichnina* (1565–1572) caused up to 85 percent depopulation of certain areas of old Muscovy. Recent state expansion and annexations encouraged peasants disconcerted by *oprichnina* chaos to flee for the first time to areas north of the Volga, to the newly annexed Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, and to areas south of the Oka in the steppe that the government was beginning to secure. In addition to the chaos caused by *oprichnina* military actions, Ivan had given lords control over their peasants, allowing them "to collect as much rent in one year as formerly they had collected in ten." His statement ordering peasants "to obey their lords in everything" also began the abasement of the serfs by making them subject to landlord control. Yet other elements entered the picture. The service state had converted most of the land fund in the Volga-Oka mesopotamia and in the Novgorod region into service landholdings (*po-mestie*) to support its provincial cavalry, the middle service class. These servicemen could not render service without peasants on their *po-mestie* lands to pay them regular rent. Finding their landholdings being depopulated, a handful of cavalymen petitioned that the right of peasants to move on St. George's Day be annulled. The government granted these few requests, and called the times when peasants could not move "forbidden years." Like St. George's Day, the forbidden years initially applied to only a few situations, but in 1592 (again for precisely unknown reasons) they were applied temporarily to all peasants.

That should have completed the enserfment process. However, there were two reservations. First, it was explicitly stated that the forbidden years were temporary (although they did not actually end until 1906). Second, the government imposed a five-year statute of limitations on the enforcement of the forbidden years. Historians assume that this was done to benefit large, privileged landowners who could conceal peasants for five

years on various estates so that their legal possessors (typically middle-service-class cavalrymen) could not find them and file suit for their return. Moreover, there was the issue of colonial expansion: The government wanted the areas north of the Volga, south of the Oka in the steppe, and along the Middle and South Volga eastward into the Urals and Siberia settled. It even had its own agents to recruit peasants into these areas, typically with the promise of half-taxation. Those running the expansion of the Muscovite state did not want their sparse frontier populations diminished by the forcible return of fugitive peasants to Volga-Oka mesopotamia. Thus they also supported the five-year statute of limitations on the filing of suits for the recovery of fugitive serfs.

The Time of Troubles provided a breathing spell in the enserfment process. Events occurred relevant to enserfment, but they had no long-term impact—with the possible exception of Vasily Shuisky's near-equation of serfs with slaves in 1607. After the country had recovered from the Troubles and from the Smolensk War (1632–1634), the middle-service class sensed that the new Romanov dynasty was weak and thus susceptible to pressure. In 1637 the cavalrymen began a remarkable petition campaign for the repeal of the statute of limitations on the filing of suits for the recovery of fugitive peasants. This in some respects was modeled after a campaign by townsmen to compel the binding of their fellows to their places of residence because of the collective nature of the tax system: When one family moved away, those remaining had to bear the burden imposed by the collective tax system until the next census was taken. For the townsmen the reference point typically was 1613, the end of the Time of Troubles. For the cavalrymen petitioners, the reference points were two: the statute of limitations and the documents (censuses, pomestie land allotments) proving where peasants lived. The middle-service-class petitioners pointed out that the powerful (i.e., contumacious) people were recruiting their peasants, concealing them for five years, and then using the fugitives to recruit others to flee. The petitioners, who had 5.6 peasant households apiece, alleged that the solution to their diminishing ability to render military service because of their ongoing losses of labor would be to repeal the statute of limitations. The government's response was to extend the statute of limitations from five to nine years. Another petition in 1641 extended it from nine to fifteen years. A petition of 1645 elicited the promise that the statute of limi-

tations would be repealed once a census was taken to show where the peasants were living.

The census was taken in 1646 and 1647 but no action was taken. The government was being run by Boris Morozov, whose extensive estate records reveal that he was recruiting others lords' peasants in these years. Morozov and his corrupt accomplices got their comeuppance after riots in Moscow, which spread to a dozen other towns, led to their overthrow and to demands by the urban mob for a codification of the law. Tsar Alexis appointed the Odoyevsky Commission, which drafted the Law Code of 1649 (*ulozhenie*). It was debated and approved with significant amendments by the Assembly of the Land of 1648–1649. Part of the amendments involved the enserfment, especially the repeal of the forbidden years. Henceforth all peasants were subject to return to wherever they or their forbears were registered. This measure applied to all peasants, both those on the lands of private lords and the church (seignorial peasants) and those on lands belonging to the tsar, the state, and the peasants themselves (later known as state peasants). The land cadastre of 1626, the census of 1646–1647, and pomestie allotment documents were mentioned, but almost any other official documents would do as well. Aside from the issue of documentation, the other major enserfment issue was what to do with runaways, especially males and females who belonged to different lords and got married. The solutions were simple and logical: The Orthodox Church did not permit the breaking up of marriages, so the Law Code of 1649 decreed that the lord who had received a fugitive lost the couple to the lord from whom the fugitive had fled. If they wed as fugitives on "neutral ground," then the lord-claimants cast lots; the winner got the couple and paid the loser for his lost serf.

The Law Code did not resolve the issue of fugitives, because of the intense shortage of labor in Muscovy. After 1649 the government began to penalize recipients of fugitives by confiscating an additional serf in addition to the fugitive received. This had no impact, so it was raised to two. This in turn had no impact, so it was raised to four. At this point would-be recipients of fugitive serfs began to turn them away. Peter I took this one step further by proclaiming the death penalty for those who received the fugitive serfs, but it is not known whether anyone was actually executed.

The Law Code of 1649 opened the door to the next stage of enserfment. Lords wanted the peasants converted into slaves who could be disposed of as

they wished (willed, sold, given away, moved). This contradicted the idea that serfs existed to support the provincial cavalry. The Law Code permitted landowners to move their serfs around, whereas landholders had to leave them where they were so that the next cavalry serviceman would have rent payers when the *pomestie* was assigned to him. The extent to which (or even whether) serfs were sold like slaves before 1700 is still being debated.

The issue was resolved during the reign of Peter I by two measures. First, in 1714 the service landholding and hereditary estate (*votchina*) were made equal under the law. Second, the introduction of the soul tax in 1719 made the lord responsible for his serfs' taxes and gave him much greater control over his subjects, especially after the collection of the soul tax commenced in 1724. In the same year, peasants were required to have a pass from their owners to travel. This was strengthened in 1722, and again in 1724. That serfs were becoming marketable was reflected in the April 15, 1721, ban on the sale of individual serfs. Whether the ban was ever enforced is unknown. The fact that it probably was not was reflected in a law of 1771 forbidding the public sale of serfs (the private sale of serfs was permitted) and a 1792 decree forbidding an auctioneer to use a gavel in serf auctions, indicating that the 1771 law was not observed either.

After 1725 the descent of seignorial serfs into slavery accelerated. In 1601 Godunov had required owners to feed their slaves, and in 1734 Anna extended this to serfs. In 1760 lords were allowed to banish serfs to Siberia. This was undoubtedly done to try to ensure calm in the villages. That this primarily concerned younger serfs (who could have been sent into the army) is reflected in the fact that owners received military recruit credit for such exiles.

A tragic date in Russian history was February 18, 1762, when Peter III abolished all service requirements for estate owners. This permitted serfowners to supervise (and abuse) their serfs personally. Thus it is probably not accidental that five years later, in 1767, Catherine II forbade serfs to petition against their owners. Catherine, supposedly enlightened, opposed to serfdom, and in favor of free labor, gave away 800,000 serfs to private owners during her reign. The year 1796 was the zenith of serfdom.

Paul tried to undo everything his mother Catherine had done. This extended to serfdom. In 1797 he forbade lords to force their peasants to work on Sunday, suggested that peasants could only be compelled to work three days per week, and that they should have the other three days to work for themselves. Paul was assassinated before he could do more.

His son Alexander I wanted to do something about serfdom, but became preoccupied with Napoleon and then went insane. He was informed by Nikolai Karamzin in 1811 that the Russian Empire rested on two pillars, autocracy and serfdom. Emancipation increasingly became the topic of public discussion. After suppressing the libertarian Decembrists in 1725, Nicholas I wanted to do something about serfdom and appointed ten committees to study the issue. His successor, Alexander II, took the loss of the Crimean War to mean that Russia, including the institution of serfdom, needed reforming. His philosophy was "better from above than below." Using Nicholas I's "enlightened bureaucrats," who had studied serfdom for years, Alexander II proclaimed the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, but this only freed the serfs from their slavlike dependence on their masters. They were then bound to their communes. State serfs were freed separately, in 1863. The seignorial serfs had to pay for their freedom, that is, the state was unwilling to expropriate the serfowners and simultaneously feared the consequences of a landless emancipation.

The serfs were finally freed in 1906, when they were released from control by their communes, the redemption dues were cancelled, and corporal punishment for serfs was abolished. Thus, all peasants were free for the first time since 1450.

See also: EMANCIPATION ACT; LAW CODE OF 1649; PEASANTRY; PODZOL; POMESTIE; SUDEBANK OF 1497; SUDEBANK OF 1550; SERFDOM; SLAVERY

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RICHARD HELLIE

ENTERPRISE, SOVIET

Soviet industrial enterprises (*predpriyatie*), occupying the lowest level of the economic bureaucracy, were responsible for producing the goods desired by planners, as specified in the *techpromfinplan* (technical-industrial financial plan) received by the enterprise each year. Owned by the state, headed by a director, and governed by the principle of one-person management (*edinonachalie*), each Soviet enterprise was subordinate to an industrial ministry. For example, enterprises producing shoes and clothing were subordinate to the Ministry of Light Industry; enterprises producing bricks and mortar, to the Ministry of Construction Materials; enterprises producing tractors, to the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building. Enterprises producing military goods were subordinate to the Ministry of Defense Industry. In some cases, enterprises subordinate to the Ministry of Defense Industry also produced civilian goods—for example, all products using electronic components were produced in military production enterprises. Many enterprises producing civilian goods and subordinate to a civilian industrial ministry had a special department, Department No. 1, responsible for military-related production (e.g., chemical producers making paint for military equipment or buildings, clothing producers making uniforms and other military wear, shoe producers making military footwear). While the enterprise was subordinate to the civilian industrial ministry, Department No. 1 reported to the appropriate purchasing department in the Ministry of Defense.

During the 1970s industrial enterprises were grouped into production associations (*obedineniya*) to facilitate planning. The creation of industrial or production associations was intended to improve the economic coordination between planners and producers. By establishing horizontal or vertical mergers of enterprises working in related activities, planning officials could focus on long-term or ag-

gregate planning tasks, leaving the management of the *obedineniya* to resolve problems related to routine operations of individual firms. In effect the *obedineniya* simply added a management layer to the economic bureaucracy because the industrial enterprise remained the basic unit of production in the Soviet economy.

Soviet industrial enterprises were involved in formulating and implementing the annual plan. During plan formulation, enterprises provided information about the material and technical supplies needed to fulfill a targeted level and assortment of production, and updated accounts of productive capacity. Because planning policy favored taut plans (i.e., plans with output targets high relative to input allocations and the firm's productivity capacity), output targets based on previous plan fulfillment (i.e., the "ratchet effect" or "planning from the achieved level"), and large monetary bonuses for managers if output targets were fulfilled, Soviet enterprise managers were motivated to establish a safety factor by over-ordering inputs and under-reporting productive capacity during the plan formulation process. Similarly, during plan implementation, they were motivated to sacrifice quality in order to meet quantity targets or to falsify plan fulfillment documents if quantity targets were not met. In some instances managers would petition for a correction in the plan targets that would reduce the output requirements for a particular plan period (month, quarter, or year). In such instances they apparently expected that their future plan targets would be revised upward. In the current period, if plan targets were lowered for one firm, planning officials redistributed the output to other firms in the form of higher output targets, so that the annual plan targets would be met for the industrial ministry.

Unlike enterprises in market economies, Soviet enterprises were not concerned with costs of production. The prices firms paid for materials and labor were fixed by central authorities, as were the prices they received for the goods they produced. Based on average cost rather than marginal cost of production, and not including capital charges, the centrally determined prices did not reflect scarcity, and were not adjusted to capture changes in supply or demand. Because prices were fixed, and cost considerations were less important than fulfilling quantity targets in the reward structure, Soviet enterprises were not concerned about profits. Profits and profitability norms were specified in the annual enterprise plan, but did not signal the same

information about the successful operation and performance of the firm that they do in a market economy. Typically, failure to earn profits was an accounting outcome rather than a performance outcome, and resulted in the planning authorities providing subsidies to the firm.

The operation and performance of Soviet enterprises was monitored by planning authorities using the financial plan component of the annual *techpromfinplan*. The financial plan corresponded to the input and output plans, documenting the flow of materials and goods between firms, as well as wage payments, planned cost reductions, and the like. Financial accounts for the sending and receiving firms in any transaction were adjusted by the state bank (Gosbank) to match the flow of materials or goods. Furniture manufacturers, for example, were given output targets for each item in their assortment of production—tables, chairs, benches, cabinets, bookshelves. The plan further specified the input allocations associated with each item. Gosbank debited the accounts of the furniture manufacturer when the designated inputs were received and credited the accounts of the supplying firms. Planned transactions did not involve the exchange of cash between firms. Gosbank provided cash to the enterprise each month to pay wages; the maximum amount that an enterprise could withdraw from Gosbank was based on the planned number of employees and the centrally determined wages. Cash disbursements for wage payments were strictly controlled to preclude enterprise directors from acting independently from planners' preferences. Financial control was further exercised by planners in that Gosbank only provided short-term credit if specified in the annual enterprise plan. This system of financial supervision was called ruble control (*kontrol rublem*).

See also: EDINONACHALIE; GOSBANK; MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET; RUBLE CONTROL; TECHPROMFINPLAN

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SUSAN J. LINZ

ENVIRONMENTALISM

Environmental protection in Russia traces its roots to seventeenth-century hunting preserves and Peter the Great's efforts to protect some of the country's forests and rivers. But environmentalism, in the sense of an intellectual or popular movement in support of conservation or environmental protection, began during the second half of the nineteenth century and scored some important victories during the late tsarist and early soviet periods. The movement lost most of its momentum during the Stalin years but revived during the 1960s and 1970s, peaking during the era of perestroika. After a decline during the early 1990s, environmentalism showed a resurgence later in the decade.

EARLY HISTORY

Sergei Aksakov's extremely popular fishing and hunting guides (1847 and 1851) awakened the reading public to the extent and importance of central Russia's natural areas and helped popularize outdoor pursuits. As the membership in hunting societies grew in subsequent decades, so did awareness of the precipitous decline in populations of game species. Articles in hunting journals and the more widely circulated "thick" journals sounded the alarm about this issue. Provincial observers also began to note the rapid loss of forest resources. Noble landowners, facing straitened financial circumstances after the abolition of serfdom, were selling timber to earn ready cash. Anton Chekhov, among others, lamented the loss of wildlife habitats and the damage to rivers that resulted from widespread deforestation. By the late 1880s the outcry led to the enactment of the Forest Code (1888) and hunting regulations (1892). These laws had little effect, but their existence testifies to the emergence of a Russian conservation movement.

In contrast to the environmentalism around the same time in the United States and England, the main impetus for the movement in Russia came from scientists rather than amateur naturalists, poets, or politicians. Russian scientists were pioneers in the fledgling field of ecology, particularly the study of plant communities and ecosystems. While they shared with western environmentalists an aesthetic appreciation for natural beauty, they were especially keen about the need to preserve whole landscapes and ecosystems. During the early twentieth century when the Russian conservation movement began to press for the creation of na-



Half of the livestock in Muslumovo have leukemia, but their meat and milk are still consumed. © GYORI ANTOINE/CORBIS SYGMA

ture preserves, it did not adopt the U.S. model of national parks designed to preserve places of extraordinary beauty for recreational purposes. Instead, Russian scientists sought to preserve large tracts of representative landscapes and keep them off limits except to scientists who would use them as laboratories for ecological observation. They called these tracts *zapovedniks*, a word derived from the religious term for “commandments” and connoting something forbidden or inviolate. The Permanent Commission on Nature Preservation, organized in 1912 under the auspices of the Russian Geographical Society, proposed the creation of a network of *zapovedniks* in 1917, shortly before the Bolshevik Revolution. Its primary author was the geologist Venyamin Semenov-Tian-Shansky (1870–1942). His brother, Andrei (1866–1942), a renowned entomologist, was an important proponent of the project, along with the botanist Ivan Borodin (1847–1930), head of the Permanent Commission, and the zoologist Grigory Kozhevnikov (1866–1933), who had first articulated the need for inviolate nature preserves.

These scientists also sought to popularize a conservation ethic among the populace, especially among young people. Despite their many educational efforts, however, they were unable to build a mass conservation movement. This was at least partly because their insistence on keeping the nature preserves off limits to the public prevented them from capitalizing on the direct experience and visceral affection that U.S. national parks inspire in so many visitors.

SOVIET PERIOD

The early Bolshevik regime enacted a number of conservation measures, including one to establish *zapovedniks* in 1921. The politicization of all aspects of scientific and public activity during the 1920s, together with war, economic crisis, and local anarchy, threatened conservation efforts and made it difficult to protect nature preserves from exploitation. In 1924 conservation scientists established the All-Russian Society for Conservation (VOOP) in order to build a broad-based environ-

mental movement. VООP organized popular events such as Arbor Day and Bird Day, which attracted 45,000 young naturalists in 1927, and began publishing the magazine *Conservation (Okhrana prirody)* in 1928, with a circulation of 3,000. An All-Russian Congress for Conservation was convened in 1929, and an All-Soviet Congress in 1933. By this time conservationists had lost their optimism, overwhelmed by the Stalinist emphasis on conquering nature in the name of rapid industrial development. The government whittled away at the idea of inviolate zapovedniks over the ensuing decades, turning some into game reserves, others into breeding grounds for selected species, and opening still others to mining, logging, and agriculture. In 1950 the government proposed to turn over more than 85 percent of the protected territories to the agriculture and timber ministries.

Environmentalism of a grassroots and broad-based variety finally began to develop after Stalin's death. VООP had expanded to some nineteen million members, but it existed primarily to funnel extorted dues into dubious land-reclamation schemes. The real impetus for environmentalism came during the early 1960s in response to a plan to build a large pulp and paper combine on Lake Baikal. Scientists once again spearheaded the outcry against the plan, which soon included journalists, famous authors, and others who could reach a broad national and international audience. The combine opened in 1967, but environmentalists gained a symbolic victory when the government promised to take extraordinary measures to protect the lake. Similar grassroots movements arose during the 1970s and early 1980s to protest pollution in the Volga River, the drying up of the Aral Sea, river-diversion projects, and other threats to environmental health.

Under Leonid Brezhnev, environmentalists were able to air some of their grievances in the press, especially in letters to the editors of mass-circulation newspapers. As long as they did not attack the idea of economic growth or other underpinnings of soviet ideology, they were fairly free to voice their opinions. By and large, the environmentalists called for improvements in the central planning system and more Communist Party attention to environmental problems, not systemic changes. Their arguments took the form of cheerleading for beloved places rather than condemnations of the exploitation of natural resources, and it became difficult to distinguish environmentalism from local chauvinism. In contrast to its counterpart in the West, en-

vironmentalism in the Soviet Union was often closely aligned with right-wing nationalist politics. Furthermore, environmental activism had little impact on economic planners. Although, as official propagandists boasted, the country had many progressive environmental laws, few of them were enforced. Activists were further hampered by official secrecy about the extent of environmental problems. In 1978 a manuscript entitled "The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union" by Boris Komarov (pseudonym of Ze'ev Wolfson, a specialist in environmental policy) was smuggled out and published abroad.

Environmentalism left the margins of soviet society and took center stage in the period of glasnost. After the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, everyone became aware of the threat soviet industry posed for the environment and public health, and also of the need for full disclosure of relevant information. Environmental issues galvanized local movements against the central government, and nationalist overtones in the environmental rhetoric fanned the flames. In Estonia, protests in 1987 against a phosphorite mine grew into a full-blown independence movement. Environmental issues also helped initiate general political opposition in Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere. Environmentalists began to win real victories, closing or halting production on some fifty nuclear plants and many large construction projects. There were thousands of grassroots environmental groups in the country by 1991, and the Greens were second only to religious groups in the degree of public trust they enjoyed.

POST-SOVIET ACTIVISM

After 1991 the influence of Russian environmental organizations declined. As the central government consolidated its power, public attention turned to pressing economic matters, and pollution problems decreased as a result of the closing of many factories in the post-Soviet depression. Later in the decade the government became openly hostile to environmental activism. It arrested two whistleblowers, Alexander Nikitin and Grigory Pasko, who revealed information about radioactive pollution from nuclear submarines. President Vladimir Putin dissolved the State Committee on the Environment in 2000 and gave its portfolio to the Natural Resources Ministry.

Environmental organizations survived by becoming professionalized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the Western model, seeking

funding from foreign foundations and appealing to world opinion rather than cultivating local memberships. Among the most influential of these are the Center for Russian Environmental Policy under the direction of Alexei Yablokov (former environmental adviser to Boris Yeltsin), the St. Petersburg Clean Baltic Coalition, the Baikal Environmental Wave, the Russian branch of the Worldwide Fund for Wildlife (WWF), and Green Cross International, of which Mikhail Gorbachev became president in 1993. A few radical environmental groups emerged during the early 1990s, notably the Rainbow Keepers and Eco-Defense, which promote more fundamental societal change. Beginning during the late 1990s, there was a revival of grassroots activism on local issues of air and water quality, animal welfare, nature education, and protection of sacred lands. Such efforts rely on local members and on the resources of preexisting (i.e., Soviet-era) institutions and networks, and they tend to cultivate local bureaucrats and political leaders.

See also: CHERNOBYL; RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; THICK JOURNALS

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RACHEL MAY

EPARKHYA *See* DIOCESE.

EPISCOPATE

The episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) encompasses the whole body of bishops who govern dioceses and supervise clergy, as well as perform and administer church sacraments. The episcopate is drawn exclusively from the ranks of the celibate "black" clergy, although widowers who take monastic vows may also be recruited. The patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the ecclesiastical ranks below him—metropolitans, archbishops, bishops, and hegumens—comprise the leadership of the church. The patriarch and metropolitans hold power over the church hierarchy and carry on the debates that produce (or resist) change within the church.

Eastern Orthodoxy is widely believed to have been introduced in Kievan Rus in 988 C.E. At first the Russian church was governed by metropolitans appointed by the patriarchate of Constantinople from the Greek clergy active in the Rus lands. When the Russian church gained its independence from Constantinople in 1448, Metropolitan Jonas, resident in the outpost of Moscow, was given the title of metropolitan of Moscow and All Russia. Metropolitan Job of Moscow became the first Russian patriarch in 1589, thereby establishing the Russian church's independence from Greek Orthodoxy.

The close link between ecclesiastical and temporal authorities in Russia reflected Byzantine cultural influence. The alliance between church and state ended with the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725). Seeing the Russian Orthodox Church as a conservative body frustrating his attempts to modernize the empire, he did not appoint a successor when Patriarch Adrian died in 1700 and in his place appointed a bishop more open to Westernization. In 1721 Peter abolished the patriarchate and appointed a collegial board of bishops, the Holy Synod, to replace it. This body was subject to civil authority and similar in both structure and status to other departments of the state.

The reigns of Peter III (1762–1763) and Catherine II (1762–1796) brought Peter the Great's reforms to their logical conclusion, confiscating the church's properties and subjecting it administratively to the state. A (lay) over-procurator was

empowered to supervise the church, appointing important officials and directing the activities of the Holy Synod. The full extent of the over-procurator's control was realized under the conservative Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1880–1905), who kept the episcopate in submission.

The calls for reform during Tsar Nicholas II's reign (1894–1917) included demands for an end to state control of the church. By and large the bishops were dissatisfied with the Holy Synod and the role played by the over-procurator. Nicholas II responded by granting the church greater independence in 1905 and agreeing to allow a council that church officials anticipated would result in the liberalization of the church. In 1917, when the council was finally convened, it called for the restoration of the patriarchate and church sovereignty, and decentralization of church administration.

The October Revolution brought a radical change in the status of the episcopate. The Bolsheviks implemented a policy of unequivocal hostility toward Orthodoxy, fueled by the atheism of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and also by the church's legacy as defender of the imperial government. Bishops were a special target and, along with priests, monks, nuns, and laypersons, were persecuted on any pretext. Nearly the entire episcopate was executed or died in labor camps. In 1939 only four bishops remained free. Throughout the Soviet period, the number of bishops rose and fell according to the whims of the communist regime's religious policy.

While initially the episcopate was hostile to the Bolsheviks, the sustained persecution of believers made it apparent that if the church wished to survive as an institution it would have to change its position. In 1927 Patriarch Sergei, speaking for the church, issued a "Declaration of Loyalty" to the Soviet Motherland, "whose joys and successes are our joys and successes, and whose setbacks are our setbacks" This capitulation began one of the most controversial chapters in the episcopate's history. The Soviet authorities appointed all of the church's important officials and unseated any who challenged their rule. The regime and the church leadership worked together to root out schismatic groups and sects. Meanwhile, prelates assured the international community that accusations of religious persecution were merely anti-Soviet propaganda.

The reinstitutionalization of the Orthodox Church during the perestroika years marked the end of the episcopate's subordination to the athe-

ist regime. The Orthodox Church figured prominently in discussions about the renewal and regeneration of Soviet society. In post-communist Russia, the patriarch and other Orthodox dignitaries became high-profile public figures. The episcopate has influenced political debate, most notably the deliberations on new religious legislation during the mid- and late 1990s. The end of communism also produced new challenges for the episcopate. Schismatic movements, competition from other faiths, and reformist priests have created divisions and threatened the Orthodox Church's preeminence.

See also: CHRISTIANIZATION; JOB, PATRIARCH; KIEVAN RUS; ORTHODOXY; PATRIARCHATE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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ZOE KNOX

ESTATE *See* SOSLOVIE.

ESTONIA AND ESTONIANS

Estonia covers the area from 57.40° to 59.40° N and 21.50° to 28.12° E, bordered on the north by the Gulf of Finland, on the east by Russia, on the south by Latvia, and on the west by the Baltic Sea. Its area is 17,462 square miles (45,222 square kilometers), and its capital is Tallinn (population 400,378 in 2000). The estimated population of Estonia in 2003 was 1,356,000, including 351,178 ethnic Russians. Outside the country there are

approximately 160,000 Estonians, among them 46,390 in the Russian Federation.

The Estonian constitution separates church and state. According to the census of 2000, there were 152,237 Lutherans (of whom 145,718 were Estonians), 143,557 Orthodox Christians (104,698 of them Russians), 6,009 Baptists, and 5,745 Roman Catholics. Non-Christian religions included Islam (1,387 Muslims), Estonian native religion (1,058), Buddhism (622), and Judaism (257).

The Estonian language belongs to the Baltic-Finnic branch of the Finno-Ugric languages of the Uralic language family. The first book in Estonian was printed in 1525. According to the 2000 census, 99.1 percent of Estonians considered Estonian their mother tongue.

The Estonian constitution, adopted in 1992, vests political supremacy in a unicameral parliament, the Riigikogu, with 101 members elected by proportional representation for four-year terms. The Riigikogu makes all major political decisions, such as enacting legislation, electing the president and prime minister, during the longevity of governments, preparing the state budget, and making treaties with foreign countries. The head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces is the president, who is elected to not more than two consecutive five-year terms. The president is elected by a two-thirds majority of the Riigikogu. If no candidate receives two-thirds, the process moves to the Electoral College, made up of the members of Riigikogu and representatives of local government.

The Estonian economy is mainly industrial. The dominant branches are the food, timber, textile, and clothing industries, but transportation, wholesaling, retailing, and real estate are also significant. The importance of agriculture is diminishing, but historically it was the most important branch of Estonian economy. The main fields of agriculture are cattle and pig keeping and raising of crops and potatoes. In 2001 there were 85,300 agricultural households in Estonia.

The earliest settlements in Estonia date to the Mesolithic Age (9000 B.C.E.). Its Neolithic Age continued from 4900 B.C.E. to 1800 B.C.E., its Bronze Age until 500 B.C.E., and the Iron Age until the beginning of the thirteenth century. After a struggle for independence between 1208 and 1227, Estonia was conquered by the Danes and Germans. Its territory was divided between Denmark (Tallinn and northern Estonia), the Teutonic Knights (southwestern Estonia), and the bishoprics of Saare-Lääne



Estonia, 1992 © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

(western Estonia and the islands) and Tartu (southeastern Estonia). In 1346 the Danish crown sold northern Estonia to the Teutonic Order. During the Livonian Wars (1558–1583), Ivan the Terrible invaded Old Livonia (now Estonia and Latvia). The largest of the Estonian islands, Saaremaa, became the property of the Danish king, northern Estonia capitulated to Sweden, and the southern part of present-day Estonia to Poland. By the Truce of Altmark (1629) Poland surrendered southern Estonia to Sweden. In 1645 Sweden obtained Saaremaa from Denmark. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Peter the Great of Russia defeated Charles XII of Sweden in the Great Northern War, and, by the Peace of Nystad (1721), obtained Estonia, which he had occupied in 1710. Between 1816 and 1819, serfdom was abolished in Estonia. This led to an improved economic situation and the cultural development of the Estonian people, who constituted most of the class of peasants by that time. Between 1860 and 1880 there was an Estonian national awakening, the beginning of a modern Estonian nation. Estonians began to publish national newspapers, organized all-Estonian song festivals, and developed literature, education, and the arts. In the late nineteenth century, a wave of Russification,

initiated by the tsarist government, reached Estonia. Estonian politicians demanded radical political changes during the revolution of 1905, but the Russian authorities responded with repressions. After the February Revolution in Russia, the Provisional Government allowed Estonia's territorial unification as one province (until then it had been divided into the Estonia and Livonia guberniyas).

On February 24, 1918, Estonia declared its independence. Its War of Independence (1918–1920) concluded with Soviet Russia recognizing its independence in the Tartu Peace Treaty signed on February 2, 1920. In 1939 the Nazi-Soviet Pact (also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) assigned Estonia to the Soviet sphere of influence. Soviet troops occupied the Estonian Republic in June 1940 and incorporated it into the USSR. During the first year of the Soviet regime, 2,000 Estonian citizens were executed and 19,000 deported, more than half of them in June 1941. During the period 1941–1944, Estonia was occupied by Germany.

At the end of World War II there were nearly 100,000 Estonian refugees in the West. An anti-Soviet guerilla movement was active from 1944 through the mid-1950s. In March 1949, during the collectivization campaign, more than 20,000 Estonians were deported to Siberia. Throughout the Soviet period, a directed migration of population from Russia was conducted, mainly into Tallinn and the industrial region of northeastern Estonia. The 1970s and the first half of the 1980s comprised the most intense period of Russification. At the end of the 1980s, a new wave of national awakening began in Estonia, accompanied by political struggle to regain independence. On August 20, 1991, Estonia proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union, and in September 1991 it was admitted to the United Nations.

See also: GREAT NORTHERN WAR; LATVIA AND LATVIANS; LIVONIAN WAR; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; WORLD WAR II

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ART LEETE

ETHIOPIAN CIVIL WAR

The Ethiopian civil war, between the Ethiopian government and nationalists from Eritrea (an Ethiopian province along the Red Sea), has raged off and on and has been tightly interconnected with Ethiopia's internal political problems and conflict with neighboring Somalia. In the 1880s Italy captured Eritrea. By 1952 Ethiopia regained control, but eight years later, in 1961, Eritrean nationalists demanded independence from Ethiopia. When the Ethiopian government rejected this demand, civil war erupted.

The civil war was a symptom of profound changes within Ethiopia, involving a confrontation between traditional and modern forces that changed the nature of the Ethiopian state. The last fourteen years of Haile Selassie's reign (1960–1974) witnessed growing opposition to his regime. Ethiopians demanded better living conditions for the poor and an end to government corruption. In 1972 and 1973, severe drought led to famine in the northeastern part of Ethiopia. Haile Selassie's critics claimed that the government ignored victims of the famine. In 1974 Ethiopian military leaders under Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam seized the government and removed Haile Selassie from power.

The Ogaden region of southeastern Ethiopia also became a trouble spot, beginning in the 1960s. The government of neighboring Somalia claimed the region, which the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik had conquered in the 1890s. Many Somali people had always lived there, and they revolted against Ethiopian rule. In the 1970s fighting broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden region.

Until then, Ethiopia had enjoyed U.S. support, while the Soviet Union had sided with its rival, Somalia. In fact, in the space of just four years (1974–1978), the USSR concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia, Ethiopia experienced a revolution in 1974, and the Soviet Union dramatically shifted massive support from Somalia to Ethiopia and then played a key part in

the military defeat of its former ally in the Ogaden conflict of 1977–1978. During the conflict, about fifty Soviet ships passed through the Suez Canal to the port of Assab to unload fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, and munitions—an estimated 60,000 tons of hardware—for delivery to Mengistu’s regime.

After the 1974 revolution, the new military government under Mengistu adopted socialist policies and established close relations with the Soviet Union. The government began large-scale land reform, breaking up huge estates of the former nobility. The government claimed ownership of this land and turned it into farmland. But the military leaders also killed many of their Ethiopian opponents, further alienating former U.S. supporters who opposed the human rights abuses.

Eritrean rebels stepped up their separatist efforts after the 1974 revolution. Mengistu’s regime invaded rebel-held Eritrea several times, but failed to regain control. Ethiopia’s conflict with Eritrea also had a strong East–West dimension. The Soviet Union, along with some Arab states, advocated complete independence for Eritrea. In a speech to the United Nations, the Soviet delegate rejected the federalist compromise solution advocated by the United States, claiming that the Eritrean people had not given their consent. Soviet scholars also backed Ethiopia’s claim to Eritrea on both historical and economic grounds. They noted that the Soviet Union had favored Ethiopian access to the Eritrean port of Assab as early as 1946. Despite an influx of Soviet military aid after 1977, Mengistu’s counterinsurgency effort in Eritrea progressed slowly. Talks between the two sides continued well into the 1980s. The war ended in 1991 with Eritrea’s independence; however, conflict between the two countries persisted for more than a decade. In June 2000, the two countries signed a cessation of hostilities agreement, and a United Nations peacekeeping force of more than 4,300 military personnel was dispatched later that year.

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

ETHNOGRAPHY, RUSSIAN AND SOVIET

Russian ethnography took shape as a distinct field of scholarship in the mid-nineteenth century, but the creation of ethnographic knowledge in Russia dates back at least to Kievan Rus. The *Russian Primary Chronicle* abounds with information about Slavic tribes and neighboring peoples, while later medieval and early modern Russian writings provide accounts of the peoples of Siberia and the Far North. It was only in the period following the reforms of Peter the Great (d. 1725), however, that the population of the empire was studied using explicitly scientific methods. In the 1730s Vasily Tatishchev disseminated Russia’s first ethnographic survey, thereby legitimizing the notion of peoples and their cultures as objects of systematic scientific inquiry. From the 1730s to the 1770s the Russian Academy of Sciences sponsored two major expeditions dedicated to the study of the empire. Led by Gerhard Friedrich Miller and Peter Pallas, the academic expeditions covered a vast expanse from Siberia to the Caucasus to the Far North and, drawing on the talents of numerous dedicated scholars, amassed an enormous amount of ethnographic information and physical artifacts. But for all their achievements as ethnographers, eighteenth-century scholars viewed the study of cultural diversity as merely one component of a broadly defined natural science.

FOLKLORE AND THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY

During the last decades of the eighteenth century Russian scholars began to turn their attention to folklore. Publishers of folk songs in the 1790s, such as Mikhail Popov and Nikolai Lvov, claimed that their collections were of value not only for entertainment but also as relics of ancient times and as sources of insight into the national spirit. By 1820 several significant folklore collections had appeared, including the Kirsha Danilov collection of folk epics, and the first efforts to collect folklore among the common people had begun under the patronage of Count Nikolai Rumiantsev. As Russian intellectuals struggled in the 1820s to define *narodnost*, the



The Caucasus region is one of the most ethnically diverse areas in the former Russian empire. © MAPS.COM/CORBIS

national spirit, they turned increasingly to folklore for inspiration. Peter Kireyevsky assembled the largest folk song collection, drawing on an extensive network of contributors, including Alexander Pushkin, Nikolai Gogol, and other prominent writers. While Kireyevsky's songs were not published during his lifetime, other folklorists in the 1830s and 1840s, such as Ivan Snegarev, Ivan Sakharov, Vladimir Dal, and Alexander Tereshchenko, put out collections that enjoyed considerable success with the reading public despite their often dubious authenticity.

ETHNOGRAPHY AS A DISCIPLINE

Geographic exploration and folklore, the two main branches of ethnographic research up to this point, came together in the Ethnographic Division of the Russian Geographical Society, the founding of which in 1845 marks the emergence of ethnography as a distinct academic field. In its first years the society considered two well-developed conceptions of ethnography as a scholarly discipline. The eminent scientist Karl Ernst von Baer proposed that the Ethnographic Division study primarily the smaller and less-developed populations of the em-

pire, paying particular attention to the role of environment and heredity. In contrast, Nikolai Nadezhdin, a well-known editor, literary critic, and historian, advocated a science of nationality dedicated to describing the full range of cultural, intellectual, and physical features that make up national identity. First priority, he felt, should go to the study of the Russian people. After replacing Baer as chair of the Ethnographic Division in 1847, Nadezhdin launched a major survey of the Russian provinces based on a specially designed questionnaire. The materials generated were published by the Ethnographic Division in its journal *Ethnographic Anthology* (*Etnografichesky sbornik*), the first periodical in Russian specifically devoted to ethnography, and were used for several major collections of Russian folklore.

In the 1860s a second major center of ethnographic study arose in Moscow with the founding of the Society of Friends of Natural History, Anthropology, and Ethnography (known by its Russian initials, OLEAE). Dedicated explicitly to the popularization of science, the society inaugurated its ethnographic endeavors in 1867 with a major exhibition representing most of the peoples of the Russian Empire as well as neighboring Slavic nationalities.

During the 1860s and 1870s ethnographic studies in Russia flourished and diversified. The Russian Geographical Society in St. Petersburg and OLEAE in Moscow sponsored expeditions, subsidized the work of provincial scholars, and published major ethnographic works. At the same time regional schools began to take root, particularly in Siberia and Ukraine. Landmark collections appeared in folklore studies, such as Alexander Afanasev's folktales, Vladimir Dal's proverbs and dictionary, Kireevsky's folksongs, and Pavel Rybnikov's folk epics (*byliny*). As new texts accumulated, scholars such as Fedor Buslaev, Alexander Veselovsky, Vsevolod Miller, and Alexander Pypin developed sophisticated methods of analysis that drew on European comparative philology, setting in place a distinctive tradition of Russian folklore studies.

The abolition of serfdom in 1861 sparked an upsurge of interest in peasant life and customary law. Nikolai Kalachov, Peter Efimenko, Alexandra Efimenko, and S.V. Pakhman undertook major studies of customary law among Russian and non-Russian peasants, while the Russian Geographical Society formed a special commission on the topic in the 1870s and generated data through the dissemination of a large survey. The vast literature on

customary law was cataloged and summarized by Yevgeny Iakushkin in a three-volume bibliography. Alongside the study of customary law, ethnographers probed peasant social organization, with emphasis on the redistributive land commune.

THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ETHNOGRAPHY

While ethnographers in the 1860s through the 1880s produced an enormous quantity of important work, the boundaries and methods of ethnography as a discipline remained fluid and ill-defined. Not only did ethnography overlap with a number of other pursuits, such as philology, history, legal studies, and belle-lettres, but the field itself was distinctly under-theorized—descriptive studies were pursued as an end in themselves, with little attempt to integrate the data generated into broader theoretical schemes. During the 1880s and 1890s, however, ethnography began to establish itself on a more solid academic footing. New journals appeared, most notably the *Ethnographic Review* (*Etnograficheskoe obozrenie*) distributed by OLEAE and the Russian Geographical Society's *Living Antiquity* (*Zhivaia starina*). Instruction in ethnography, albeit rather haphazard, began to appear at the major universities. Museum ethnography also moved forward with the transformation, under the direction of Vasily Radlov, of the old *Kunstkamara* in St. Petersburg into a Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography, and the founding around the turn of the twentieth century of the Ethnographic Division of the Russian Museum.

By the 1890s theoretical influences from Western Europe, particularly anthropological evolutionism, had begun to exert a stronger influence on Russian scholars. Nikolai Kharuzin, a prominent young Moscow ethnographer, made evolutionist theory the centerpiece of his textbook on ethnography, the first of its kind in Russia. In the field, Lev Shternberg, a political exile turned ethnographer, claimed to find among the Giliak people (Nivkhi) of Sakhalin Island confirmation of the practice of group marriage as postulated by the evolutionist theorist Henry Lewis Morgan and Friedrich Engels. With the growing theoretical influence of Western anthropology came increased contacts. Shternberg and his fellow exiles Vladimir Bogoraz-Tan and Vladimir Iokhelson participated in the Jessup North Pacific Expedition sponsored by the American Museum of Natural History in New York under the direction of Franz Boas. Upon his return from exile, Shternberg was hired by Radlov

of the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography in St. Petersburg, and made use of his friendship with Boas to cultivate a fruitful collaboration with the museum in New York.

SOVIET PERIOD

The Russian Revolution presented both opportunities and dangers for the field of ethnography. On the eve of the February Revolution of 1917 a Commission for the Study of the Ethnic Composition of the Borderlands (KIPS) was established under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences. While initially established to aid the Russian effort in World War I, KIPS found a niche under the Bolshevik regime, which welcomed the collaboration of ethnographers in coping with the immense ethnic diversity of the Soviet state. During the 1920s KIPS ethnographers played a major role in defining the ethnic composition of the Soviet Union. The 1920s also saw the emergence of the first comprehensive programs of professional training in ethnography at Leningrad and Moscow universities.

In the late 1920s, however, "bourgeois" ethnography became a target of attack by radical Marxist activists. After a dramatic confrontation in April 1929, key ethnographic institutions were disbanded and ethnography itself was reclassified as a subfield of history devoted exclusively to the study of prehistoric peoples. Nevertheless ethnographers such as Sergei Tokarev and Nina Gagin-Torn continued to produce substantive scholarly works during the 1930s, while others collaborated with state institutions in conducting censuses and resolving practical issues of nationality policy. Soviet ethnographers and anthropologists were also called upon to repudiate Nazi racial ideology. Like many other fields, ethnography was badly shaken by the trials and purges of the 1930s. By the end of the decade many leading ethnographers had been executed or imprisoned in the gulag.

After World War II Soviet ethnography revived. Sergei Tolstov of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow was instrumental in drawing together a cadre of talented scholars, revitalizing professional training, and regaining for the field the autonomous status it had previously enjoyed. By the 1960s Soviet ethnography was a thriving profession whose central and local institutions produced a wealth of publications, sponsored numerous expeditions, and trained large numbers of talented students. Ideological constraints persisted, however, as ethnographers were often called upon to document a priori the successes of soviet nationality policy. As a rule

ethnographers were expected to show a stark contrast between a dark past and a present tarnished in places by lingering survivals but well on the way toward the bright communist future. Rather than confront the exigencies of the present day, however, many ethnographers chose to linger in the past. Much of the most substantive work produced in the 1950s and 1960s was historical in nature, with the topic of ethnogenesis, or the origins of peoples, enjoying particular popularity. The 1970s, however, brought a renewed emphasis on contemporary ethnic processes. Yuly Bromlei, director of the Institute of Ethnography in Moscow, put forth his theory of ethnos, which attempted to show how ethnicity continued to be a vital force even as the peoples of the Soviet Union drew together (*sblizhenie*) in a process that would ultimately lead to their merging (*slyanie*) into a new form of human collectivity—the Soviet nation. Bromlei's theory remained the guiding doctrine of the field through the 1980s as social processes, such as intermarriage, geographical mobility, and bilingualism seemed to support the model of the merging of the peoples. However, much of the practical work of ethnographers, particularly on the local level, had the effect of solidifying and reinforcing the symbolic attributes of ethnic consciousness. The flowering of ethnic nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s took place on ground well prepared by the work of Soviet ethnographers.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; BYLINA; FOLKLORE; FOLK MUSIC; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; NATION AND NATIONALITY; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY

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NATHANIEL KNIGHT

EVENKI

The Evenki are the most geographically wide-ranging native people of Russia, occupying a territory from west of the Yenisey River to the Pacific Ocean, and from near the Arctic Ocean to northern China. One of Russia's northern peoples, they number about thirty thousand. Traditionally many Evenki pursued hunting, using small herds of domesticated reindeer mainly for transport and milk. Some groups focused more on fishing, whereas in northerly areas larger-scale reindeer husbandry was pursued. Largely nomadic, Evenki lived in groups of a few households, gathering annually in larger groups to trade news and goods, arrange marriages, and so forth.

The Evenki language is part of the Manchutungus language group. Its four dialects differ substantially, a fact ignored by the Soviets when they introduced Evenki textbooks based on the central dialect, which were barely intelligible to those in the East. Evenki cosmology includes a number of worlds; and their shamans negotiate between these worlds. Indeed, the word *shaman* derives from the Evenki *samanil*, their name for such spiritual leaders. Shamans were severely repressed during the Soviet period; the possibility of revitalizing shamanism proved a common trope for cultural revival among Evenki in early post-Soviet years.

Russian traders began to penetrate Evenki homelands in the mid-seventeenth century. Prior to this, southern Evenki had carried on trade relations with the Chinese. Russians subjected Evenki to a fur tax (*yasak*), and held hostages to ensure its payment. The Soviet government brought new forms of con-

trol, organizing Evenki into collective farms, arresting rich herders, and settling nomads to the extent possible. Families were often sundered, as adults remained with the reindeer herds while children attended compulsory school. Children were not taught their own language or how to pursue traditional activities. Inadequate schooling, racism, and apathy have hindered their ability to pursue nontraditional activities. In some areas, mining and smelting have removed substantial pastures and hunting grounds through environmental degradation. Hydropower projects have also challenged traditional activities by appropriating portions of Evenki territory.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Evenki reindeer herds have suffered serious decline. At the same time substantial numbers of families took the opportunity provided by new laws to leave state-owned farms and establish small, family based hunting and herding operations. However, lack of government support has made the survival of these enterprises almost impossible. Evenki are battling this predicament through the establishment of quasipolitical organizations, mainly at the regional level, to pursue their rights.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NORTHERN PEOPLES

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GAIL A. FONDAHL

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FABERGÉ, PETER CARL

(1846–1920), jeweler to the Russian imperial court; creator of the stunning Easter eggs, holiday gifts to Nicholas II and his family.

Peter Carl Fabergé was born in 1846 in St. Petersburg, the son of a master goldsmith. The French surname of the future jeweler derives from his family's Huguenot background; they left France during the seventeenth century, moving eastward from Germany to the Baltic before settling in Russia. Peter Carl, also called Carl Gustavovich in keeping with the Russian patronymic tradition, was educated in the local German-language school and later attended commercial courses at the Dresden Handelsschule. The combination of his astonishing craftsmanship and cosmopolitanism gave him entry to all European royal houses.

In 1861 young Carl set out on his requisite Grand Tour of the continent. He developed an abiding interest in renaissance and baroque designs and was especially influenced by the French rococo of the eighteenth century. His mastery of fine detail and ability to work in a variety of precious metals and jewels, including hardstone carving, contributed to his unique *style Fabergé*. In addition to his legendary eggs, whose matching of the delicacy of fine jewelry with technological innovations was epitomized by the miniature Trans-Siberian train that chugged through one of them, his *oeuvre* ranged from carved animals to icons to cigarette cases. His clients, primarily from the pan-European aristocracy, knew that he could be trusted not to repeat the specific designs they requested.

Fabergé matched his exquisite style with a finely honed business acumen. From his renowned establishment in St. Petersburg on Bolshaya Morskaya Street, he published catalogs of his *objets d'art*. Employing the finest craftsmen, he expanded his enterprise to Moscow, drawing the attention of serious art collectors from Bangkok to Boston; special exhibitions held around the world continue to attract by the thousands. He left Russia in 1918 and died in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1920. Fabergé lies buried alongside his wife in Cannes.

See also: FRENCH INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA; ST. PETERSBURG

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LOUISE McREYNOLDS

FAMILY CODE OF 1926

In 1926 the Soviet government affirmed a new Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship to replace the 1918 version. Adopted after extensive and often heated nationwide debate, the new Code addressed several social issues: the lack of protection for women after divorce; the large number of homeless orphans (*besprizorniki*); the incompatibility of divorce and common property within the peasant household; and the mutual obligations of cohabiting, unmarried partners.

The new Code promoted both individual freedom and greater protection for the vulnerable. It simplified the divorce procedure in the 1918 version even further by transferring contested divorces from the courts to local statistical bureaus. Either spouse could register a divorce without the partner's consent or even knowledge. This provision removed the law's last vestige of authority over the dissolution of marriage, circumscribing both the power of law and the marital tie. The Code recognized de facto marriage (cohabitation) as the juridical equal of civil (registered) marriage, thus undercutting the need to marry "legally." It provided a definition of de facto "marriage" based on cohabitation, a joint household, mutual upbringing of children, and third party recognition. It established joint property between spouses, thus providing housewives material protection after divorce. It abolished the controversial practice of "collective" paternity featured in the 1918 Family Code. If a woman had sexual relations with several men and could not identify the father of her child, a judge would assign paternity (and future child support payments) to one man only. The Code incorporated an April 1926 decree that reversed the prohibition on adoption and encouraged peasant families to adopt homeless orphans, who were to be fully integrated into the peasant household and entitled to land. It set a time limit on alimony to one year for the disabled and provided six months of alimony for the needy or unemployed. It also created a wider circle of family obligations by expanding the base of alimony recipients to include children, parents, siblings, and grandparents.

See also: FAMILY CODE ON MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY, AND GUARDIANSHIP; FAMILY EDICT OF 1944; FAMILY LAWS OF 1936; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

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WENDY GOLDMAN

FAMILY CODE ON MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY, AND GUARDIANSHIP

The Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets ratified the Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship in October 1918, one year after the Bolsheviks took power. Alexander Goikhbarg, the young author of the Code, expected that family law would soon be outmoded and "the fetters of husband and wife" unnecessary. Goikhbarg and other revolutionary jurists believed children, the elderly, and the disabled would be supported under socialism by the state; housework would be socialized and waged; and women would no longer be economically dependent on men. The family, stripped of its social functions, would "wither away," replaced by "free unions" based on mutual love and respect. The Code aimed to provide a transitional legal framework for that short period in which legal duties and protections were still necessary.

Prerevolutionary jurists had attempted throughout the late nineteenth century to reform Russia's strict laws on marriage and divorce, but achieved little success. Up to 1917, Russian law recognized

the right of religious authorities to control marriage and divorce. Women were accorded few rights by either church or state. According to state law, a wife owed her husband complete obedience. She was compelled to live with him, take his name, and assume his social status. Up to 1914, a woman was unable to take a job, get an education, or execute a bill of exchange without her husband's consent. A father held almost unconditional power over his children. Only children from a legally recognized marriage were considered legitimate, and illegitimate children had no legal rights or recourse. Up to 1902, when the state enacted limited reforms, a father could recognize an illegitimate child only by special imperial consent. The Russian Orthodox Church considered marriage a holy sacrament, and divorce was almost impossible. It was permissible only in cases of adultery (witnessed by two people), impotence, exile, or unexplained and prolonged absence. In cases of adultery or impotence, the responsible party was permanently forbidden to remarry.

The 1918 Code swept away centuries of patriarchal and ecclesiastical power and established a new vision based on individual rights and gender equality. It was predated by two brief decrees enacted in December 1917 that substituted civil for religious marriage and established divorce at the request of either spouse. The 1918 Code incorporated and elaborated on these two decrees. It abolished the inferior legal status of women and created equality under the law. It eliminated the validity of religious marriage and gave legal status to civil marriage only, creating a network of local statistical bureaus (ZAGS) for the registration of marriage, divorce, birth, and death. The Code established no-grounds divorce at the request of either spouse. It abolished the juridical concept of "illegitimacy" and entitled all children to parental support. If a woman could not identify the father of her child, a judge assigned paternal obligations to all the men she had sexual relations with, thus creating a "collective of fathers." It forbade adoption of orphans by individual families in favor of state guardianship: jurists feared adoption, in a largely agrarian society, would allow peasants to exploit children as unpaid labor. The Code also sharply restricted the duties and obligations of the marital bond. Marriage did not create community of property between spouses: a woman retained full control of her earnings after marriage, and neither spouse had any claim on the property of the other. Although the Code provided an unlimited term of alimony for either gender, support was

limited to the disabled poor. The Code presumed that both spouses, married or divorced, would support themselves.

The 1918 Code was very advanced for its time. Comparable legislation on equal rights and divorce would not be passed in Europe or the United States until the end of the twentieth century. Yet many Soviet jurists believed that the Code was not "socialist" but "transitional" legislation. Goikhbarg, like many revolutionary jurists, expected that law, like marriage, the family, and the state, would soon "wither away."

The Code had a significant effect on the population, both rural and urban. By 1925, Soviet citizens had widely adopted civil marriage and divorce. The USSR displayed a higher divorce rate than any European country, with fifteen divorces for every one hundred marriages. The divorce rate was higher in the cities than in the rural areas, and highest in Moscow and Leningrad. In Moscow, there was one divorce for every two marriages. Soviet workers, women in particular, suffered high unemployment during the 1920s, and divorce proved a special hardship for women who were unable to find work. Peasant families found it difficult to reconcile customary law with the autonomous property provisions of the Code. After extensive debate, Soviet jurists enacted a new Family Code in 1926 to redress these and other problems.

See also: FAMILY CODE OF 1926; FAMILY EDICT OF 1944, FAMILY LAWS OF 1936; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

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WENDY GOLDMAN

FAMILY EDICT OF 1944

This decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet claimed to “protect motherhood and childhood.” Amid deep concern for wartime manpower losses and social dislocation, the decree sought to increase natality and reinforce marriage.

The law’s best-known provisions rewarded prolific mothers and made divorce more difficult to obtain; its pro-natalism and support for marriage reinforced prewar trends apparent in the Family Laws of 1936. Pro-natalist measures included family allowances paid to mothers regardless of marital status, extended maternity leave, protective labor legislation for pregnant and nursing women, and an ambitious plan to expand the network of childcare services and consumer products for children. Bearers of ten or more living children were honored as “Mother-heroes.”

Other provisions tightened marital bonds by making divorce more onerous. Proceedings now took place in open court, with both parties present and the court obligated to attempt reconciliation. The intent to divorce was published in the newspaper, and fines increased substantially. Reversing the 1926 Family Code, only registered (not common-law) marriages were now officially recognized. The state also reestablished the notion of illegitimacy: only children of registered marriages could take their father’s name and receive paternal child support.

The legislation had no significant lasting effect on birth or divorce rates. Despite its ambitious goals, promises of augmented childcare services and consumer goods went unfulfilled, given postwar economic devastation and prioritization of defense and heavy industries. The law’s greatest significance was perhaps as a manifestation of the ongoing Soviet effort to imbue private life with public priorities.

See also: FAMILY CODE OF 1926; FAMILY CODE ON MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY, AND GUARDIANSHIP; FAMILY LAWS OF 1936

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REBECCA BALMAS NEARY

FAMILY FARM *See* KHUTOR.

FAMILY LAWS OF 1936

In 1936, the Soviet state enacted several laws that sharply departed from previous legislation. The Soviet Union had been the first country in the world to legalize abortion in 1920, offering women free abortion services in certified hospitals. In 1936, however, the Central Executive Committee outlawed abortion. Anyone who performed the operation was liable to a minimum of two years in prison, and a woman who received an abortion was subject to high fines after the first offense. The new law offered monetary incentives for childbearing, providing stipends for new mothers, progressive bonuses for women with many children, and longer maternity leave for white-collar workers. The criminalization of abortion reflected growing anxiety among health workers, managers, and state officials over the rising number of abortions, the falling birth rate, the shortage of labor, and the possibility of war.

The law also made divorce more difficult and stiffened criminal penalties for men who refused to pay alimony or child support. It required both spouses to appear to register a divorce and increased costs for the first divorce to fifty rubles, 150 rubles for the second, and three hundred rubles for the third. It set minimum levels for child support at one-third of a defendant’s salary for one child, fifty percent for two children, and sixty percent for three or more, increasing the penalty for nonpayment to two years in prison.

The law was part of a longer and larger public campaign to promote “family responsibility” and to reverse almost two decades of revolutionary juridical thinking. In April 1935, the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) granted the courts sweeping new powers to try and sentence children aged twelve and older as adults; this resulted in mass arrests and imprisonment of teenagers, mostly for petty theft. In May 1935 the local Commissions on the Affairs of Minors were abolished, and responsibility for all juvenile crime was shifted to the courts. Punishment replaced an earlier commitment to pedagogical correction. The 1936 laws also marked a turn in attitudes toward law and family. Jurists condemned as “legal nihilism” earlier notions that the law and the family would “wither away.” Many legal theorists of the

1920s, including Yevgeny Pashukanis and Nikolai Krylenko, were arrested and shot.

See also: FAMILY CODE OF 1926; FAMILY CODE ON MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY, AND GUARDIANSHIP; FAMILY EDICT OF 1944

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WENDY GOLDMAN

FAMINE OF 1891–1892

The famine of 1891–1892 was one of the most severe agricultural crises to strike Russia during the nineteenth century. In the spring of 1891 a serious drought caused crops to fail along the Volga and in many other grain-producing provinces. The disaster came on the heels of a series of poor harvests, its impact worsened by endemic peasant poverty and low productivity. The population of the affected areas had few reserves of food and faced the prospect of mass starvation.

Beginning in the summer of 1891, the imperial Russian government organized an extensive relief campaign. It disbursed almost 150 million rubles to the stricken provinces, working closely with the *zemstvos*, institutions of local self-government responsible for aiding victims of food shortages. The ministry of internal affairs established food supply conferences to coordinate government and *zemstvo* efforts to find and distribute available grain supplies. When massive backlogs of grain shipments snarled the railroads and threatened the timely delivery of food, the government dispatched a special agent to remedy the situation. The heir to the throne, the future Nicholas II, chaired a committee designed to encourage and focus charitable efforts. Many public-spirited Russians—Leo Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, Vladimir

Korolenko and others—rushed into the countryside on their own initiative, setting up a large network of private soup kitchens and medical aid stations.

The relief campaign was remarkably successful. More than 12 million people received aid, and starvation was largely averted. Mortality for 1892 rose in the sixteen famine provinces—about 400,000 deaths above normal—much of it due to a simultaneous cholera epidemic. But compared to contemporary Indian and later Soviet famines, this loss of life was minimal. Still, the famine aroused public opinion. Many blamed the government's economic policies for causing the disaster, and its relief efforts were often unfairly criticized. Consequently, the famine proved to be an important turning point in Russian history, beginning a new wave of opposition to the tsarist regime.

See also: FAMINE OF 1921–1922; FAMINE OF 1932–1933; FAMINE OF 1946

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RICHARD G. ROBBINS JR.

FAMINE OF 1921–1922

This devastating famine, comparable only to that of 1932 and 1933, most seriously affected the Volga provinces, Ukraine, and the Urals, and to a lesser extent several other regions, from late 1920 to mid-1923. At its peak in the summer of 1922, some thirty million people were starving (statistics from this period are uncertain), in towns as well as villages. One of the largest relief efforts in history, including foreign and Soviet agencies, reached most of these people despite enormous logistical and ideological obstacles.

Severe droughts in 1920 and especially 1921, as well as locusts and other natural disasters, most

directly caused the famine. One-fourth of the crops failed overall, and many other areas had low yields. Agrarian developments during World War I and the Civil War also contributed to the crisis. The peasants' subdivision of landlord estates, the collapse of industrial production, and massive inflation led increasing numbers of peasants to orient production toward subsistence. From 1918 to 1920, many peasants sold or bartered food to townspeople despite Bolshevik efforts against private trade, but these sales declined because of requisitions by tsarist and provisional governments, the German-Austrian occupation in Ukraine, and the White armies and Bolsheviks, which depleted peasants' grain reserves. With insufficient seed, draft forces, and deteriorating equipment, peasants in 1921 succeeded in planting only two-thirds to three-fourths of the cropland farmed prior to the wars and much less in some regions. Yet even this would not have caused the disaster that occurred without the droughts of 1920 and 1921.

The Bolshevik government responded to the 1920 drought by ceasing requisitions from the central provinces and, in February 1921, by forming a commission for aiding agriculture in the affected regions, distributing food relief and seed, and importing grain. By late May 1921 it was clear that the country was in the midst of a second drought even more severe than that of 1920. Peasants resorted to eating weeds and other food surrogates, and cannibalism, trying to save their seed for the fall planting. Thousands of peasants fled from famine districts to Ukraine and other regions, often with government assistance, which sometimes spread famine conditions.

During the summer of 1921, the Bolshevik government distributed limited seed and food relief to famine regions, often by curtailing rationed supplies to towns, and appealed for food relief at home and abroad. Many groups responded. The International Red Cross set up an International Committee for Russian Relief, under the leadership of Fridtjof Nansen. Other agencies offering help included the International Committee of Workers' Aid, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

By far most aid came from the American Relief Administration (ARA), headed by Herbert Hoover. In the Riga agreement of August 1921, the Bolsheviks allowed the ARA to distribute its own relief. Investigation of the Volga region led the ARA to attempt to aid as many people as possible until the 1922 harvest. Hoover persuaded the U.S. Con-

gress to allocate \$20 million for food supplies; these were shipped and distributed in a "corn campaign," conducted from January to August of 1922, which had to overcome the catastrophic disrepair of the railroads and the incompetence and ideologically motivated resistance of some local and central government officials. By the summer of 1921, some eleven million people received food from foreign relief agencies.

The ARA also organized medical aid and international food remittances, many sent to Ukraine. In October ARA personnel went to Ukraine and found famine conditions that the Moscow Bolsheviks had not mentioned, as well as a Ukrainian government that refused to accept the Riga agreement. Only after negotiations in December was Ukraine brought into the relief effort. The ARA and other groups also provided medical aid that reached more people than the food relief.

By the summer of 1922, Soviet government food relief had reached some five million people in the Volga, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Many ordinary Soviet citizens also contributed to famine relief. Soviet and foreign seed aid supported a 1922 harvest. Although grown on an area about 20 percent smaller than that of 1921, the 1922 harvest was much larger than that of the previous year because normal rainfall had returned. Still, famine conditions continued in many regions and especially among abandoned children (*besprizorniki*). The ARA continued relief into mid-1923 against intrusive Soviet efforts to limit its operations. A few small relief programs continued, but the 1923 harvest basically ended the famine.

Estimates of famine mortality vary, with the most widely accepted being five million deaths, most resulting from typhus and other epidemics spread by refugees. So vast was the famine that the combined relief efforts at their peak in the summer of 1922 encompassed at most two-thirds of famine victims, despite substantial imports. The ARA imported some 740,000 tons of food; the Bolshevik government supplied more than one million tons of grain.

The famine weakened armed resistance to the Bolshevik regime, and some argue that this was intentionally manipulated. It also, however, delayed national economic recovery for at least two years. The fact that Vladimir Lenin and other Soviet leaders agreed (however ambivalently) to foreign relief indicated a fundamental shift in their attitude toward the peasants and their orientation toward pri-

vate production. This shift was reflected in the New Economic Policy of 1921, which legalized free trade and abolished the requisition policies of the Civil War and in the regime's food imports during famines in 1924 and 1928. The 1921 famine also convinced Soviet leaders that Soviet agriculture needed significant modernization, which underlay the decision to collectivize agriculture nine years later.

See also: AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION; FAMINE OF 1891–1892; FAMINE OF 1932–1933; FAMINE OF 1946

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MARK B. TAUGER

FAMINE OF 1932–1933

The famine began in the winter of 1931 and 1932, peaked between the fall of 1932 and the summer of 1933, and subsided with the 1933 harvest. Mortality was highest in rural areas of Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the central and southern Volga Basin, but increased in most rural and even urban areas.

The famine affected all of Soviet society. Not only peasants, but also industrial workers and other townspeople desperately sought to supplement their inadequate food rations. Officials and managers responsible for production, transport, and distribution faced disastrous labor conditions from the subsistence crisis. The OGPU (Soviet security police), grain procurement agencies, and Soviet leaders, in their efforts to obtain grain and other supplies from the villages at all costs, minimized or ignored the pleas and starving conditions of the peasants.

The causes of the famine are disputed. The conventional view, that it was a human-made famine imposed by Joseph Stalin on Ukraine and certain other regions to suppress nationalist opposition, has been challenged. Conclusive new evidence shows that the harvests of 1931 and especially

1932 were much smaller than claimed by the Soviet government or later memoir and eyewitness accounts, that they were reduced by natural disasters, and that famine mortality was not limited to specific national regions or even to rural areas. New sources also show that the regime had inadequate reserves yet provided peasants limited famine relief, including relief from imported sources, in addition to supplying more than forty million people in towns, the army, and others on the rationing system in 1932–1933.

The famine developed in the wake of collectivization campaigns in 1930 and 1931 that reorganized most villages into collective or state farms. By this means the regime sought to increase food production and procurement to feed towns and industrial sites, which were growing rapidly because of the First Five-Year Plan and were dependent on government rationing systems, and to export in order to earn hard currency for purchases of producer goods. Collectivization allowed procurement agencies to obtain substantially more grain from the villages than during the 1920s, even considering what the peasants would have sold voluntarily. This left many peasants short of food as early as 1930. A drought in 1931 in the Volga region, Ukraine, the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere reduced the harvest drastically. Yet the authorities procured more from this harvest than from that of 1930 (22.8 million tons vs. 22.1 million tons), often taking the last reserves from many farms. Peasants were left in desperate circumstances, and their mortality increased. Hundreds of thousands fled the drought regions seeking food.

Soviet leaders acknowledged the drought and returned grain to farms for food and seed. They introduced new labor organization rules in the collective farms to reduce evasion of responsibility for farm work. Laws in May 1932 legalized private trade in food products in an effort to increase production and improve urban food supplies. Unfortunately, 1932 was worse than 1931. Weakened by starvation and often resentful of procurements and collectivization, some peasants worked poorly or not at all. The new labor system encountered confusion and resistance and often had little effect. Crops were planted later than in previous years and with less seed. A complex of natural disasters—drought, heavy rains, infestations, soil exhaustion—drastically reduced the harvest. Yet agricultural and statistical authorities minimized or overlooked these problems and projected output matching or even exceeding that of 1931.

The harvest shortfall became evident early: July procurements were only 470,000 tons compared to 950,000 tons in July 1931. Statistical and OGPU reports convinced Stalin and other Soviet leaders that the 1932 harvest was normal and that procurements collapsed because peasants withheld grain from procurements to sell on the free market at astronomical prices and because local officials mismanaged procurements. The leadership changed its approach from incentives to extreme coercion in procurements and distribution. One part of this shift was the decree of August 7 that imposed harsh penalties for “theft of socialist property.” In the following year, in the Russian republic alone, more than 200,000 people were arrested and more than 8,000 executed under this law. Simultaneously, the authorities conducted an intensive procurement campaign that lasted into the spring of 1933 in some regions. Procurement agents came from towns almost as famished as the villages, and their desperation led them to irrational actions they found difficult to explain in memoirs written later. They dug up peasants’ yards to find concealed hoards, though the amounts they found were miniscule; they took prepared meals away from peasants. Starving peasants (and to a lesser extent townspeople) tried to survive on surrogates, and some resorted to cannibalism.

The authorities repeatedly reduced procurement quotas, ultimately obtaining fifteen percent less grain from the 1932 harvest (18.5 million tons) than from the 1931 harvest, but at a much greater cost in life and disruption. Even with reduced procurements, the small harvest left practically nothing to be sold on the market. By January 1933, most of the USSR was in a state of famine, and millions of peasants and townspeople fled their homes seeking subsistence. The Politburo attempted to control this situation by establishing an internal passport system, by directives to prevent starving peasants from fleeing the main agricultural regions and return to their farms those who had fled, and by establishing political departments in the state farms and machine-tractor stations to remove opposition officials and improve work organization.

The regime allocated much more food for relief and seed from the 1932 harvest, 5.7 million tons, than it had from the 1931 harvest, with rations doled out to peasants in return for their work. Still, farm work in the spring and summer of 1933 proceeded under desperate conditions, and many peasants died of starvation or related diseases while

working. Moreover, the regime exported more than 300,000 tons of grain during the first half of 1933 to meet contractual commitments and cover loan payments. Purchasing countries received diplomatic reports about the famine but did not raise the issue and continued imports at dumping-level prices. Soviet officials at all levels denied the famine publicly, refused aid from foreign organizations, and tried to conceal the famine from foreign visitors.

Improved agricultural conditions and desperate work by all concerned led to a substantially greater harvest in 1933 that ended the famine in most areas by the fall of 1933. Estimates of mortality range from five million to eight million lives, mostly peasants but also townspeople and others, yet government aid in supplies, equipment, and organizational measures helped agriculture to recover and produce large harvests soon after the famine. This tragedy could have been substantially mitigated had Soviet leaders been less distrustful of and hostile toward the peasants, more skeptical of their own personnel and knowledge, and more open to outside aid.

See also: AGRICULTURE; FAMINE OF 1891–1892; FAMINE OF 1921–1922

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FAMINE OF 1946

In 1946, the devastation of World War II and a severe drought that engulfed most of the major grain producing areas of the country, including Ukraine, Moldavia, the lower and middle Volga, Rostov oblast, and the central black earth zone, resulted in a poor harvest in the Soviet Union. Shortage of workforce, machinery, and livestock exacerbated

the situation. Despite food shortages and malnutrition in the countryside in the spring of 1946, the Soviet government enforced unrealistic procurement quotas while exporting grain to Eastern Europe and France. Toward the end of 1946, the government lowered procurement plans in drought areas but raised quotas in other parts of the country in order to compensate for the shortfall. The authorities provided grain loans to collective farms and opened kitchens and children's houses, but the relief was administered inconsistently and belatedly. As a result, approximately two million people died from famine and related diseases in 1946 and 1947. The mortality rate peaked in the summer of 1947. The famine contributed to mass flight from the countryside to the cities and was followed by the arbitrary purging of peasants labeled "kulaks" from the countryside.

Despite its major political and social implications, this famine had not been studied until the 1990s, largely because the Soviet government ignored its existence. Even in confidential government documents, officials avoided mention of hunger or starvation, employing euphemisms suggesting difficulties with provisions. The central authorities advanced the image of a heroic postwar rebuilding process and a smooth transition to peacetime.

See also: FAMINE OF 1891–1892; FAMINE OF 1921–1922; FAMINE OF 1932–1933

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FAR EASTERN REGION

The easternmost extremity of the Russian Federation is a vast territory with a sparse and declining population. It comprises 6.2 million square kilometers (2,394,000 square miles), or more than 36 percent of the country, but holds barely seven million residents, or less than 5 percent of the population. Given the inclement climate and poor

transportation infrastructure in the north, residents are concentrated near the southern border with China, many living along the Amur River and the Pacific coast. Russians reached the coast during the seventeenth century; only in 1861 did they establish the city of Vladivostok after securing control over the southeastern maritime zone through a treaty with China. Construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad from the 1890s onward brought increased settlement. The Soviet state continued to rely on prison labor and exiles as well as military garrisons to develop the region, although at times it succeeded in drawing young settlers and workers with material incentives. During the 1990s incentives were ended, and many began to leave the region.

The Russian Far East is rich in natural resources, but fear of neighboring countries has affected their development and use. After accepting migrants and welcoming trade during the 1930s and 1940s, the Kremlin, led by Josef Stalin, expelled the Chinese and deported the Koreans to Central Asia. At great cost, the Far East sent marine products to European Russia in return for industrial goods. A brief rise in Sino-Soviet trade during the 1950s was followed by a massive military buildup that forced Moscow to spend much more on the area. Plans for exporting vast quantities of coal and lumber to Japan in return for investment in infrastructure were only partly realized before bilateral relations deteriorated at the end of the 1970s. Huge cost overruns meant that during the early 1980s, when authorities announced the completion of the Baikal-Amur Mainline railroad to extend development northward, even funds for maintenance could not be found. During the 1990s local elites diverted marine and lumber products to exports without paying taxes to Moscow. None of these approaches to the use of natural resources proved efficient for sustained development. During the early twenty-first century, Russians hoped that oil and gas projects, especially offshore by Sakhalin Island, would fuel the region's prosperity, yet fear of foreign control continued to leave investors uncertain of their prospects.

The Russian Far East has the potential to become part of the emerging Northeast Asian region, drawing together China, Japan, South Korea, and eventually North Korea. First, it would need to resolve tensions between the ten regional administrations, which pressed local agendas during the 1990s, and Moscow, which made efforts at recentralization. While there was a brief fear of the local

governments banding together to restore the Far Eastern Republic of the early 1920s and gain substantial autonomy, the pendulum tilted toward Moscow; a presidential representative resided in Khabarovsk. Second, territorial disputes with China and Japan must be further resolved, stabilizing tensions over the border. Third, Russia must become confident of the balance of power in the region, overcoming fear that China or another country will dominate. Finally, plans for economic development need firm backing in Moscow, which must recognize that only by opening its eastern border to the outside world can it secure its future as a country facing both the developed European Union and the dynamic Asia-Pacific.

See also: BAIKAL-AMUR MAGISTRAL RAILWAY; CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; GEOGRAPHY; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

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GILBERT ROZMAN

FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA

"Fatherland-All Russia" (*Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya*, or OVR) was an alternative "ruling party," a bloc formed in the summer of 1999 in order to seize power from the weakening Kremlin. The first step towards organization was the formation of the bloc called Fatherland, a political structure created by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who had presidential ambitions. Established and registered on December 19, 1998, a full year before Duma elections, Fatherland brought together a number of organizations that appealed to patriotism or paternalism. These included the Congress of Russian Communities (which later left it) and the "Power" movement, as well as the political wing of the reformist trade unions (*profsoyuzy*), "Union of Labor" and Women of Russia. It also included a handful of influential heads of Luzhkov-oriented regions:

Karelia, Komi, Mordvinia, Udmurtia, and the Arkhangelsk, Moscow, Murmansk, Nizhegorod, Novosibirsk, and Yaroslavl oblasts. Prospective politicians, often the mayors of centers, headed the ubiquitous regional branches. This often led to conflict, when two or three local organizations simultaneously claimed to be the area's regional branch. The material base of "Fatherland" was provided by a powerful consortium of financial and industrial groups known as the "Moscow clan."

Established three months later, the "All Russia" bloc became an alternative gubernatorial political project. The bloc included another dozen influential regional heads, including the leaders of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Petersburg, Irkutsk oblast, among others, as well as a few regional speakers. The mayor of St. Petersburg, Vladimir Yakovlev, became chair of the bloc. Four and a half months before the elections, despite the opposition of the Kremlin, the two powerful gubernatorial blocs were able to unite, advancing the recently retired prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, as their leader. Soon after their formation, they were joined by a large contingent of the Agrarian Party of Russia, which did not see a future in continuing its association with Zyuganov's Communist Party.

Fatherland-All Russia, united not so much by ideology as by a foretaste of full assumption of power, announced an eclectic program. Its main slogan, "Trust only deeds," drew the voter's attention to powerful politicians united under the bloc's banners and to authoritarian governors. The overall agenda of the bloc, including the continuity of ruling power, social peace, and rejection of revolutionary shocks, were combined with concrete programmatic elaborations concerning key questions of economy, politics, and social development. These elaborations went through a series of discussions and were summarized in the form "Notices for the president." At the core of OVR's propaganda campaign was the juxtaposition of its candidates with the ruling Kremlin command, along with criticism of Yeltsin and his entourage, an identification of the "family" as the locus of corruption, and allegations of the government's secrecy and incompetence.

A crucial moment in the campaign, and the beginning of the end of OVR as a "party of future power," was a series of explosions in residential areas of Moscow and other cities, and the beginning of a new war in the northern Caucasus. People no longer wanted the economic and social improve-

ments promised by OVR; instead, they wanted the safety and protection provided by a strong government. Although the complex and clumsy propaganda machine of OVR continued to attack Yeltsin, a social question based on new principles took hold and was answered in large part by the new prime minister, Vladimir Putin. The extremely strong public relations campaign of the Kremlin against OVR played its part as well.

In the end, OVR received 13.3 percent of the votes (third place), losing by nearly half to the KPRF and to the Unity Party that had been created shortly before the elections and had campaigned as a party of regional power. Moreover, nearly half the OVR votes came from four regions whose elites remained loyal to the bloc: Moscow, Moscow oblast, Tatarstan, and Bashkiria. In these regions, the bloc brought forth most of its candidates in districts where they already enjoyed a distinct majority. In the Duma, OVR formed the OVR faction (which delegates from Fatherland joined) and the delegate group called "Regions of Russia," which opposed the Kremlin for a while. In the absence of ideology and the disagreements associated with it, this factionalism could not continue for long. Beginning in mid-2000, a long process of unification took place, and in December 2000, Unity, Fatherland, and All Russia officially merged into the party "Unity and Fatherland" ("United Russia") with three co-chairs: Sergei Shoigu, Yuri Luzhkov, and Mintimir Shaymiev. Two weeks later, the new party was registered with the Ministry of Justice.

See also: LUZHKOVA, YURI MIKHAILOVICH; PRIMAKOV, YEVGENY MAXIMOVICH; UNITY (MEDVED PARTY); WOMEN OF RUSSIA BLOC

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NIKOLAI PETROV

FEAST BOOKS

Special paraliturgical books that register the annual commemorative meals in a monastic community throughout the calendar year.

Formally the Feast books are similar to Western late medieval anniversary books in parishes and brotherhoods. The Russian term for "feast book" is *kormovye kniga*, literally "feeding book." *Kormy*, "feedings," in memory of the deceased, correspond functionally and genetically to anniversary meals in Byzantine monasteries as well as in Western communities. The Russian term reflects the idea that by means of the donation, on the basis of which the meal is established, the monks become guests of the donor. "Feeding" the monks equals alms to the poor, in return for which the monks offer their liturgical services. *Kormy* were the most representative and most expensive form of commemoration in Muscovite Russia. Regular *kormy* usually took place on the anniversary of death or on the name day of the deceased. In earlier times, the dates of *kormy* were registered within the *Ustav*, the liturgical Rule. Probably as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, monasteries began to register the dates separately in special Feast Books, but the preserved manuscripts derive only from the last third of that century and from the seventeenth century. The entries range from brief notation of date and name of the commemorated person to elaborate detail concerning donor and donation, the food to be served, and the burial place within the monastery. Some Feast Books additionally specify the menu throughout the year and contain instructions concerning discipline of the brethren, services, distribution of alms, and related matters.

See also: DONATION BOOKS; SOROKOUIST

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LUDWIG STEINDORFF

FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

The February Revolution (which, according to New Style dates, actually took place in March) developed out of a wave of industrial strikes in Petrograd from

January to March 1917. It gathered force when workers at Russia's largest factory were locked out on March 7 and when women workers at a few factories, angered by the food shortages, marched out from their factories on March 8 demanding bread. Men at nearby factories joined them, and over the next two days antigovernment demonstrations grew to include most of the industrial work force. By March 10 they were joined by students and broad sections of the urban lower and middle classes. Soldiers who were called out to help break up demonstrations acted with reluctance. The government's ordering of troops to fire into the crowds on March 11 broke the fragile bonds of discipline among the soldiers, who were mostly recent draftees with the same grievances as the demonstrators. A revolt by one detachment of the Volynsky Guard Regiment the morning of March 12 (February 27 O.S.) quickly spread to other regiments. By midday the government lost control of the means of armed coercion and collapsed.

To this point the revolution had been mainly a popular revolt, with little leadership. What there was came from socialist activists at the factory level and from individuals who emerged as organizers of factory demonstrations and leaders in attacks on police stations and other symbols of authority. The revolutionary parties, whose main leaders were in exile, played few leadership roles before March 12. But leadership was necessary to consolidate the revolution that had taken place in the streets. Two groups stepped forward on March 12. One was a group of Duma leaders who had watched the events of the preceding days, concerned about their implications for the war effort but also realizing that this might offer the long-sought opportunity to force Tsar Nicholas II to reform the government. That evening they formed a "Temporary Committee of the State Duma," which would take governmental responsibility in Petrograd. They opened negotiations with the army high command to secure its support in forcing Nicholas to make concessions. The involvement of these respected public figures proved vital in the following days.

At the same time, a multiparty group of socialist intellectuals met at the Duma building and led workers and soldiers in the formation of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. This was a more avowedly revolutionary body, committed to making the street revolt into a sweeping social and economic as well as political revolution. The Duma Committee and the Petrograd Soviet leaders immediately, if warily, be-

gan to cooperate to consolidate the February Revolution and to form a new government. On March 15 they announced formation of a Provisional Government that would govern Russia until a new governmental system could be created by a Constituent Assembly, which was to be elected by universal franchise. The same day Nicholas II gave way to the reality of events and the pressures from his army commanders, and abdicated. News of the revolution in Petrograd sparked mostly peaceful revolutions in the cities and towns of Russia. New city governments, drawn primarily from liberal circles of educated society, replaced the old government authorities, while alongside them local soviets of workers and soldiers deputies sprang up.

The new government was drawn primarily from the liberal political leadership of the country. Its head, the minister-president, was Prince G. E. Lvov, a well-known liberal. The socialist Petrograd Soviet leaders promised to support the new government insofar as it pursued policies of which they approved. This political situation, however, was very unstable. The existence of the Petrograd Soviet alongside the Provisional Government robbed the latter of much of its actual authority, giving rise to what quickly was dubbed "dual-authority" (*dvoyevlastie*). The government had the generally recognized official authority and responsibility but not the effective power, while the Soviet had the actual power but not responsibility for governing. This situation emerged because the Soviet commanded the primary loyalty of the industrial workers and garrison soldiers, the main bases of power in Petrograd, and could call on this support in a conflict with the government.

The February Revolution resulted not merely in the overthrow of the monarchy and creation of a new government, but in an unleashing of popular self-assertion and the formation of thousands of organizations dedicated to expressing popular aspirations. Factory committees, soldiers' committees, trade and professional unions, cultural clubs, minority nationalist organizations, feminist groups, householders' associations, and other organizations were created to safeguard and advance the interests and hopes of the population in its varied identities. These became a major force in the later unfolding of the revolution as they asserted themselves and as political parties and leaders struggled to articulate their demands and win their allegiance. Gaining control over popular activism became one of the key tasks of the political elites and would-be leaders of the revolution.

As the new political system was unstable, it took some time for the main contours of power to become clear. While political parties remained important, three broad political blocs quickly emerged: liberals, moderate socialists, and radical left socialists. The liberals, represented especially by the Cadet Party (Constitutional Democrats), dominated the first Provisional Government and then shared it in coalition with the moderate socialists from May to October. The moderate socialists—the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) predominantly—were the main force in the Petrograd and most other soviets around the country. The radical left—Bolsheviks, left-wing Mensheviks, and SRs, anarchists—were at first a small minority voice, but soon grew as the alternative to the “coalition” of liberals and moderate socialists when the Provisional Government failed to satisfy popular aspirations. Socialism was the overwhelming political position in 1917, and therefore the conflict between the moderate and radical socialists determined the main course of politics in 1917.

The moderate socialists, primarily Mensheviks and SRs, took form first. A key development here was the return of a group of socialist exiles from Siberia in March. Under the leadership of Irakli Tsereteli, a Georgian Menshevik, they established the policy of Revolutionary Defensism as the basic policy of the Petrograd Soviet (and, in fact, for most soviets in the country). Revolutionary Defensism spoke to the desire of the populace for an end to the war by calling for a general negotiated peace based on the principle of self-determination of nations and without annexations or indemnities. At the same time it addressed still strong patriotism by calling for continued defense of the country until this peace could be achieved. The Revolutionary Defensists also were willing to cooperate with the liberals in the Provisional Government, and beginning in May some of their leaders entered the government in what was called “coalition” governments—that is, ones with liberals and socialists, after massive antiwar demonstrations underscored the weakness of the government and strength of the Soviet.

A radical left opposition to these policies existed from the beginning, but received a major reinforcement by the return of political exiles from Western Europe. The most important of these proved to be Vladimir Lenin, who electrified politics on his return in April by denouncing not only the government, but also the policy of the dominant Revolutionary Defensists. This made the Bol-

sheviks relatively impotent in the optimistic mood of the spring of 1917, but positioned them to receive the support of the dissatisfied sections of the population in the summer and fall as the policies of the Revolutionary Defensists and the Provisional Government failed to find a way out of the war or to solve domestic problems.

The Provisional Government initiated important and far-reaching reforms, especially in areas of civil rights and individual and group freedoms. However, the new leadership faced almost unsolvable problems. The desire for peace was immense, and failure to make progress on ending the war undermined both the Provisional Government and the Revolutionary Defensist leaders of the Petrograd Soviet. This problem was compounded by an enormously unpopular, and unsuccessful, military offensive in the summer, which drove the soldiers and many others leftward politically. The government also failed to move swiftly to meet the peasantry's expectations for land reform. During the summer and early fall the economy deteriorated rapidly, food and other goods became ever scarcer, crime rose, and other social and economic problems multiplied, along with rising social tensions. Demands for autonomy or even separatism grew among some of the national minorities. The cumulative problems gave rise by June to a call for “All Power to the Soviets,” a call for a more radical, soviet-based, government that would act more vigorously to end the war and solve the many problems. This resulted in massive street demonstrations in favor of soviet power in July (the “July Days”). This in turn was followed by an attack on the government from the right on September 9–13, the unsuccessful putsch by General Lavr Kornilov. Meanwhile, the Provisional Government was unstable, undergoing fundamental restructuring (accompanied by violence and major crises) in May, July, and September. During one of these Alexander Kerensky, a moderate socialist, became head of the government on July 21.

By September the radicals were winning elections to the leadership of soviets, workers' and soldiers' committees, and other popular institutions. The Kornilov Affair gave an enormous boost of support for the Bolsheviks and radical left. Bolshevik-led coalitions took the leadership of the Petrograd Soviet—the most important political institution in the country—and soviets in Moscow and elsewhere. This, in addition to the increasing social problems and tensions, prepared the ground for the October Revolution.

See also: APRIL THESES; BOLSHEVISM; KORNILOV AFFAIR; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MENSHEVIKS; NICHOLAS II; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; REVOLUTION OF 1905

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REX A. WADE

FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

For most of the Soviet period, Russia's legislature was a ceremonial, rubber stamp body called the Supreme Soviet. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, however, Russia's legislative structures underwent dramatic reform, becoming an arena for competitive elections and debates on major policy issues.

From May 1990 until September 1993, the Russian legislature consisted of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Congress of People's Deputies and a smaller body called the Supreme Soviet, which was the full-time working parliament. On September 21, 1993, President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the RSFSR Congress and Supreme Soviet after a protracted political confrontation with its members over constitutional and policy issues. He further decreed that elections to a new bicameral parliament called the Federal Assembly would be held in December 1993. This parliamentary structure was to be given constitutional status through a national referendum on a new constitution to be held simultaneously with the parliamentary elections. The elections and referendum took place on December 12, 1993, and on January 11, 1994, the newly elected deputies convened in Moscow for the opening of the new Federal Assembly.

The 1993 constitution provides for a mixed presidential-parliamentary system with a directly elected president and a prime minister approved by parliament. The lower chamber of the bicameral Federal Assembly is called the State Duma, and the upper chamber is the Federation Council. The president appoints the prime minister, and the Duma votes whether to confirm the appointment. The president has wide legislative powers, including the powers of veto and decree. Decrees (*ukazy*) carry the force of law, but may not violate existing law. A decree remains in effect until the parliament enacts legislation that supersedes it. The Federal Assembly may override a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote of each chamber.

The Duma may deny the government its confidence. Upon the first vote of no confidence in the government, the president may ignore the parliament's action. But the president must either dismiss the government or dissolve the Duma if the Duma votes no confidence a second time within three months. The prime minister may submit a motion of confidence to the Duma, which, if de-

feated by the Duma, leads the president to decide whether to dismiss the government or dissolve the Duma.

The president may not dissolve the Duma within one year of its election, nor during a state of emergency or national state of martial law, nor within six months of a presidential election. Parliament does have the right to remove the president by impeachment, but the constitution requires that both chambers, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court concur with the charges.

Legislation originates in the Duma and, if passed, is sent to the Federation Council. If the Federation Council approves the legislation or fails to examine it within fourteen days, the legislation is sent to the president to be signed. If the Federation Council rejects the legislation, the two houses may form a commission to resolve differences. However, the Duma may override a Federation Council veto by a two-thirds vote. Following final action by the Federal Assembly, legislation is sent to the president, who must sign or veto the legislation.

ELECTIONS

The electoral system used in the December 1993 Duma elections was put into effect by presidential decree, but its essential features have been preserved under subsequent legislation. Duma elections employ a mixed system of proportional representation and single-member districts. Half of the Duma's 450 seats are allocated proportionately to registered parties that receive at least five percent of the vote in a single nationwide electoral district. The other 225 deputies are elected in single-round plurality elections in single-member districts.

Unlike the Duma, the Federation Council has changed significantly in the manner in which its members are chosen. The Constitution provides that two individuals from each of Russia's eighty-nine constituent territorial subjects, representing the legislative and executive branches of each region, are to be chosen as members of the Federation Council. The membership of the 1994–1995 chamber was chosen by popular election. A 1995 law provided, however, that thereafter the two members would be the head of the executive branch and the head of the legislature in each territorial subject. Therefore the members of the Federation Council were part-time members of the chamber and full-time officials in their home regions. Typically they traveled to Moscow for a few days every month for brief parliamentary sessions.

During the summer of 2000, President Vladimir Putin again changed the method for selecting Federation Chamber members. Under the new law he sponsored, all members were to be full-time delegates chosen by the chief executive officers and the legislative assemblies of the eighty-nine territorial subjects. The members chosen do not need to reside in the region sending them, allowing regions to send prominent businesspeople, retired military officers, and influential politicians as their representatives. The changeover was complete by the end of 2001.

Most observers believe that the system for selecting members of the Federation Council is likely to evolve further. Many advocate holding direct elections of senators, as in the United States. One difficulty with this is the constitutional provision stipulating that the two senators from each region represent the executive and legislative branches.

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

Over the 1994–1995 and 1996–1999 terms of the State Duma, no party or coalition held a clear majority. However, in both Dumas, deputies opposed to President Yeltsin held a majority. Vetoes were frequent, and in 1999 the Duma came within fourteen votes of passing a motion to remove Yeltsin through impeachment. Nonetheless, behind-the-scenes bargaining over legislation was the norm. The chairman of the Duma in 1994 and 1995, Ivan Rybkin, was a communist but took a cooperative approach to his dealings with the executive branch, as did his successor as chairman, Gennady Seleznev, also a communist. On some highly contentious issues, such as the privatization of land, the branches were deadlocked. On many other issues, however, president and parliament were able to reach agreement. Overall, the president eventually signed about three-quarters of the laws passed by the Duma between 1994 and 1999.

The December 1999 parliamentary election and President Yeltsin's subsequent resignation resulted in a substantial change in legislative-executive relations. The Duma that convened in January 2000 was far friendlier to the president, and President Putin proved to be skillful in managing his relations with the Duma. By mid-2001 a coalition of four pro-Kremlin political factions had come to dominate the chamber, and the president was successful in passing an ambitious reform agenda. Much legislation that had been stalled under Yeltsin, including land privatization, cleared both chambers. So did many other laws, including a new

Labor Code, pension reform, simplified rules for business licensing and regulation, and ratification of the START-II treaty.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

In the Duma, political factions exercise substantial collective power over agenda-setting, organization, and procedures. The chamber's steering body is the Council of the Duma, which is made up of the leaders of each of the party factions (i.e., each party clearing the five percent threshold in the party list vote) as well as the heads of each organized deputy group possessing at least thirty-five members. The Council of the Duma forges the political compromises needed to reach agreement on important legislation. In addition, the leaders of the factions decide among themselves on the distribution of chairpersonships of the standing committees. Committee chairpersonships are distributed in rough proportion to factional strength, although under Putin, pro-presidential factions control the most influential committees. The Duma is not divided into "majority" and "minority" coalitions, although some evolution in that direction began in 2001.

The Federation Council lacks a system of political factions and is organized around its chairman and standing committees. The 2000 reform has led to significant changes in the way the chamber operates. A pro-Putin caucus, called "Federation," with approximately one hundred members, came to dominate the legislative proceedings in 2001. One of its members, a Putin ally named Sergei Mironov, was elected chairman of the chamber in December 2001. President Putin's legislative reforms began to sail through the chamber with almost no opposition. "Federation" was dissolved in January 2002, but the chamber remained strongly supportive of President Putin's program.

THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY IN PERSPECTIVE

The 1993 constitution gives the president preponderant power in the political system. However, the electoral system that uses party-list voting for half the seats in the Duma, combined with the president's interest in seeking legislative legitimacy for his policy agenda, has allowed the parliament to exercise greater influence than President Yeltsin had originally anticipated. During his first two years, President Putin succeeded in marginalizing political opposition in both chambers and securing parliament's support for his legislative program, which included measures strengthening the central gov-

ernment vis-à-vis the regions and laws intended to improve the climate for investors and entrepreneurs. However, each chamber has developed a capacity for deliberation and decision making that may make parliament a more effective counterweight to future presidents. Therefore it is likely that the role of the Federal Assembly in the political system will continue to evolve.

See also: CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES; DUMA; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; SUPREME SOVIET; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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THOMAS F. REMINGTON

FEDERALISM

The Russian Federation, as its name implies, is a federated political entity. However, this concept continues to evolve and is periodically challenged by a variety of political forces. Even if using one of the simpler definitions of federalism—that of "self rule plus shared rule" within a country—the Russian case defies easy classification.

According to the Russian constitution, there are eighty-nine distinct territorial entities within the Russian Federation, with some based on ethnic groups and others on territorial foundations. How these entities fit together in the Russian political system is a result of more than a decade of negotiation and practice. After all, the initial challenge was that while the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) was called a federation during the Soviet period, it was a unitary system in practice. Thus, at the time of independence in 1991, each of these political units had to renegotiate its

standing within the new state, which eventually developed a system referred to as “asymmetrical federalism.” A number of the ethnic-based republics, for example, sought greater autonomy, or outright independence.

The Federation Treaty of March 1992 was the first step in formally resolving the question of powers and rights within the federated system. By the end of that year, all but Chechnya and Tatarstan signed the agreement, and the abstention of these two republics raised questions of a possible splintering of the Russian Federation. With the adoption of the new Russian constitution in December 1993, however, the Federation Treaty was enshrined in the main legal basis of the country. Beginning in 1994, the government in Moscow worked out an agreement with Tatarstan, as well as treaties with the other republics of the Russian Federation, leaving the Chechen Republic as the sole holdout. Indeed, that part of the Russian Federation remains contested and in the early twenty-first century is mired in a bloody conflict.

There are several key issues that continue to confront the federal structure in Russia. First, there are questions concerning basic budgetary and taxation rights. Are the regions able to create their own financial bases from which to fund specific projects? From education policies to economic development plans, problems exist as to what the republics can do. Second, there remains a problem of resource management on the national level. This is particularly important in the energy and strategic mineral fields. For example, control over energy deposits in the Yamalo–Nenets okrug was contested by that entity, the Tiumen oblast within which it is located, and the government in Moscow. Third, there are questions about the actual political power of regional governors. During the late–Yeltsin era, there was a tendency for the federal government to appoint regional officials in order to better control them from the center. Since that time, however, these officials are elected, and a few of these have begun to exercise real authority in their specific regions. In addition, the Federal Council, the upper chamber of the Russian legislature (similar to the U.S. Senate), is designed to represent the interests of these various subnational entities.

Given the vast territorial expanse of the Russian Federation, as well as the ethnic diversity of the regions, political leaders in Russia at least support the idea of a federated political system. However, the history of unitary control, both during tsarist and Soviet times, has yielded a legacy within

the bureaucracy and administration that is difficult to change. In addition, the specific conditions and needs of each region undoubtedly dictate the specific level of authority that may be attained throughout the country. Most analysts and experts suggest that “federalism” in the Russian Federation will remain a multi-level system that will continue to see variations from region to region.

See also: FEDERATION TREATIES; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF NATIONALITIES; RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

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ROGER KANGAS

FEDERAL PROPERTY FUND

The State Property Committee agency charged with receiving and overseeing privatization of state enterprises designated for privatization began operations in October 1992 (under Anatoly Chubais) in what became a large-scale sale of state enterprises. The first stage was voucher privatization. Vouchers were sent to every man, woman, and child in Russia. These voucher checks could be used to purchase shares in what had previously been state enterprises. Or they could be invested in managed mutual funds or sold on the secondary market.

Enterprises slated for privatization were transferred to the Federal Property Fund. The initial stage of privatization excluded enterprises of national significance, such as oil and electric generation

and those of military or strategic significance. Large scale, non-military enterprises were transferred subsequently in 1994–1995 and many were auctioned off under what was called the “loans for shares” program. When enterprises were transferred to the Federal Property Fund they were required to be converted into open joint stock companies before privatization. The Federal Property Fund was to oversee this transformation and supervise the privatization process.

In the end the Federal Property Fund participated in the largest privatization program in economic history, one that was replete with insider advantages, corruption, bribery, and scandalous underpayment by the ultimate owners. Privatization was also incomplete because the government maintained either a majority ownership or “golden shares” that allowed a veto over management decisions.

See also: PRIVATIZATION

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FEDERATION TREATIES

On March 13, 1992, representatives of eighteen of Russia's twenty ethnic republics initialed a treaty of federation with the Russian federal government. Two republics—Chechnya and Tatarstan—refused to sign. A separate agreement was initialed by representatives of Russia's oblasts and *kraya* (administrative divisions) that same week, followed several days later by a third agreement with the country's autonomous *okruga* (territorial divisions) and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. On March 31, 1992, the three treaties, which would be collectively referred to as the “Federation Treaty,” were formally signed into law. After the formal separation of the Chechen and Ingush Republics was ratified by the Sixth Congress of Peoples' Deputies in April 1992, the number of republics under Russian constitutional law rose to twenty-one. While Ingushetia signed the Treaty

upon its establishment, Chechnya refused to do so, asserting that it had declared formal independence in November 1991.

The April 1992 Treaty provided for a complicated and vague division of powers between the federal government and Russia's eighty-nine “subjects of the federation.” It also required as many as one hundred enabling laws, most of which were never adopted. Symbolically, the most important provision was the Treaty's designation of the ethnic republics, but not the Russian Federation's other constituent units (oblasts, *kraya*, and autonomous *okruga*), as “sovereign,” although it was not clear what legal rights, if any, “sovereign” status entailed. Some advocates of the republics argued that it implied a right to refuse to join the federation as well as a right of unilateral secession. Unlike the USSR constitution in effect at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, however, Russia's Federation Treaty of 1992 made no reference to a right of secession for the republics. Nor did federal authorities agree that the republics had a right to refuse to join the federation. The Treaty also stipulated that the constitutions of the republics had to conform to the federal constitution.

The intent of the drafters of the April 1992 had been to include the Treaty's provisions in a new constitution for the Russian Federation. However, the text of the Treaty was left out of the Russian Constitution of December 12, 1993, although Article 11.3 stated that the distribution of federal and regional powers is governed by “this Constitution, the Federation Treaty, and other treaties (*dogovory*) that delineate objects of jurisdiction and powers.” Article 1, Part 2, of the constitution added that “should the provisions of the Federation Treaty . . . contravene those of the Constitution of the Federation, the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall apply.” In effect, the terms of the Federation Treaty were superseded by the federation provisions in the new constitution, which did not identify the republics as sovereign and was unequivocal in denying the subjects of the federation a unilateral right of secession.

While the Treaty had limited legal significance, its signing in early 1992 helped ameliorate some of the tension between the Russian federal government and the republics in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR. It also provided President Boris Yeltsin with an important political victory. But it left many critical issues unresolved, particularly the legal status of Chechnya and Tatarstan. In Febru-

ary 1994, Tatarstan agreed to become a constituent unit of the Russian Federation pursuant to the terms of a bilateral treaty. Chechnya would continue to refuse to join the federation, however, a position that led to war between the Russian federal government and supporters of Chechen independence later that year.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; FEDERALISM; RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

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EDWARD W. WALKER

had to be devoted to the producers' goods sector. Net investment would have to be proportional to the existing allocation of capital. The greater the capacity to produce capital goods, the faster the economy could grow, according to the model. Capital-output ratios in the two sectors could be minimized by working several shifts. This early growth model, however, ignored likely scarcities of food, foreign exchange, and skilled labor that would result when growth accelerated.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; GOSPLAN

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

FELDMAN, GRIGORY ALEXANDROVICH

(1884–1958), a pioneer in the mathematical study of economic growth.

Grigory Alexandrovich Feldman, an electrical engineer by profession, worked in Gosplan from 1923 until 1931. His report to the committee for long-term planning of Gosplan, entitled "On the Theory of the Rates of Growth of the National Income," was published in 1928 and became the basis for the committee's preliminary draft of a long-term plan. However, Feldman soon came under attack for his ideas on the politically sensitive subject of socialist industrialization and use of mathematics in the heroic atmosphere of those times. His numerical targets, though supported by the head of the committee, proved too optimistic and could not be realized. After some tendentious criticism, Feldman's career never recovered. Even his later work on growth in the United States, an early interest of his, could not be published. He apparently spent several years in labor camps before being released, quite sick, in 1953.

Feldman's two-sector growth model was based on the macroeconomic concepts of Karl Marx. Feldman first demonstrated that the higher the aggregate growth of an economy, the more capital

FELDSHER

Medical assistant.

Feldshers first appeared in Russia during the eighteenth century, when they served as medical assistants in urban hospitals or as army corpspeople. During the nineteenth century they played a major role in rural medical systems. The law restricted them to practice under a physician's direct supervision; many were nevertheless assigned to run remote clinics on their own because of the dearth of physicians in the countryside. Forced by circumstances to tolerate such independent feldsher practice, known as "feldsherism," leading physicians adamantly opposed granting it legal sanction. "Feldsherism" remained a contentious issue as well as a widespread practice well into the 1920s.

During the 1870s, many provincial zemstvos established feldsher schools in order to raise feldshers' overall qualifications. Opening feldsher practice to women in 1871 brought growing numbers of urban women with gymnasium training into these schools. By the twentieth century, the qualifications of these newer feldshers and feldsher-midwives had improved dramatically. As of 1914 there were more than 20,000 civilian feldshers in Russia. Most served in rural areas, but one-third worked for urban hospitals, railroads, schools, and factories.

The publication in 1891 of the newspaper *Feldsher* sparked the appearance of a feldsher professional movement. In 1906, local feldsher societies formed a national Union of Societies of Physicians' Assistants, which published the newspaper *Feldshersky vestnik* (Feldsher Herald) and lobbied on feldshers' behalf. During the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, most feldshers identified with moderate socialist parties. In 1918 the Union was dissolved; its members entered the industrial medical union *Vsemeditsantrud*.

The Soviet regime ceased training feldshers altogether in 1924, focusing instead on midwives and nurses. Feldsher training was resumed in 1937, and feldshers continue to serve as auxiliary medical personnel in Russia.

See also: HEALTH CARE SERVICES, IMPERIAL; HEALTH CARE SERVICES, SOVIET

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SAMUEL C. RAMER

FELLOW TRAVELERS

Intellectuals sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause and later to the Soviet Union as a socialist state.

The term *fellow traveler* (*poputchiki*) was used by Vladimir Lenin and other Bolsheviks to describe those who agreed with the principles of socialism but did not accept the entire Bolshevik program. Lenin attacked these "petty-bourgeois fellow travelers" for their weak understanding of theory and tactics, and for leading workers away from revolution. Leon Trotsky, in 1918, described the Left Socialist Revolutionaries in similar terms because of their vacillation on the October Revolution.

The pejorative sense of the term gave way in 1924, when Trotsky argued that fellow travelers in literature could be useful for the young Soviet state. He used the term to describe non-party writers who could serve the cause of revolution even though they were not proletarians. In *Literature and*

Revolution, Trotsky argued that non-party intellectuals were no longer a serious threat and could be guided toward a proletarian view of the world. This was followed by a Central Committee resolution in 1925 refusing to prefer one faction or theory of literature over any other.

The groups and individuals defined as fellow travelers during the 1920s constituted a flourishing artistic and literary culture that produced the best Soviet literature of the decade. The most famous group was the Serapion Brotherhood, whose membership included Konstantin Fedin, Yevgeny Zamyatin, and Vsevolod V. Ivanov. These authors believed that literature should be free from outside control, but were generally sympathetic to the goals of the revolution. Others, perhaps less favorably inclined toward the Bolsheviks but nonetheless counted as fellow travelers, were Boris Pilnyak, Isaac Babel, and Mikhail Bulgakov.

By the late 1920s, fellow travelers were coming under increasing pressure from groups claiming to represent the proletariat, such as the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP). In 1932, all independent organizations for writers and artists disappeared and the Writers' Union was created. Fellow travelers were required to either join the union and follow its rules or stop publishing.

By the end of 1920s, the term "fellow traveler" had been taken up in other countries as a designation for people sympathetic to the Soviet Union and especially for intellectuals who publicly expressed support for Stalin. Romain Rolland and George Bernard Shaw, for instance, praised the Soviet Union and saw it as a real alternative to western political systems. In the post-World War II era, "fellow traveler" became a term of derision, applied by conservatives to people who were communists in all but party affiliation. Albert Einstein, for example, was called a "dupe and a fellow traveler" by *Time* magazine in 1949 for his outspoken belief in socialism.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION; RUSSIAN ASSOCIATION OF PROLETARIAN WRITERS; SERAPION BROTHERS; UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS

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KARL E. LOEWENSTEIN

FEMINISM

Feminism in Russia first developed during the 1850s, following the disastrous Crimean War and the accession of Alexander II. At a time of political ferment over the nation's future, an intense debate arose within educated society over the dependent status of women and inherited assumptions about their capacities and their roles. The idea of women's emancipation was readily linked to peasant emancipation, plans for which were being publicly debated during these years. If one section of the population—enslaved peasants—could be liberated, why not women too, half the human race? Many activists in the women's movement over the next half-century pinpointed the 1850s and 1860s as the moment when women first challenged their own subordinate legal status, inferior education, exclusion from all but menial paid employment, and vulnerability to sexual exploitation, as well as the complex web of convention and sanction that restricted their everyday lives. A number of women writers—and some radical male writers—had already addressed these themes a generation earlier, but always as individuals. It was only during the 1850s that a women's movement, dedicated to change, could coalesce.

Unlike women in many western countries, Russian upper- and middle-class women kept their property upon marriage and were not forced into financial dependence on their husbands. However, even propertied women were disadvantaged by inferior inheritance rights; despite their financial autonomy, the law required that they obey their husbands and live in the marital home unless given formal permission to leave. In an abusive marriage a woman could apply to the courts for legal separation, but this was a tortuous process and available only to the relatively well-to-do. The vast majority of Russian women in this period were peasants; before 1861 many were serfs. Even after peasant emancipation their status in the family was subordinate, particularly as young women. They were valued in the village for their ability to work—in the fields and in the household—and to produce and raise children. Few had time to think about the possibilities of an alternative life or about their own lack of rights or status. It was feminists and female radicals who first set out to improve women's personal rights and establish their legal and actual autonomy, though the prevailing social conservatism on gender issues and the extreme limitations on political campaigning impeded any

meaningful legislative change until the last years of tsarist rule.

Feminist ideas in Russia were inspired not only by social and political change at home, but equally by the emerging women's movement in the West (particularly North America, Britain, and France) in this period. Russian feminists established lasting contacts with their western counterparts and read western literature on the "woman question." Most considered themselves "westernizers" rather than "slavophiles" in the contemporary political-cultural controversy over Russia and its future. The word "feminism" itself was rarely used in Russia or elsewhere, and even when it gained wider currency toward the end of the century, it most often had a pejorative connotation, both for conservative and radical opponents of reformist women's movements, and for feminists too. Before 1905 they called themselves "activists in the women's movement" (*deyatelnitsy zhenskogo dvizheniya*). During the 1905 Revolution, when the movement was politicized, the most uncompromising became "equal-righters" (*ravnopravki*), emphasizing the struggle for social equality overall, not just for women. After 1917 feminist activists either emigrated or were silenced, and for the entire Soviet period feminism was branded a "bourgeois deviation."

RADICAL ALTERNATIVES TO FEMINISM

Like feminists, revolutionary women and men espoused sexual equality. But they fiercely rejected feminism, insisting that women's liberation must be part of a wider social revolution. Feminists, they claimed, based their appeal to women by driving a wedge between men and women of the oppressed classes struggling for their rights. Feminists denied the radical claim that they were motivated only by their own "selfish" ends, and saw themselves working for Russia's "renewal" and "regeneration," for the betterment of the whole population.

Although a socialist women's movement developed in Russia (as elsewhere) around 1900, both populist and Marxist revolutionary groups were antagonistic to separate work among women, and only well after 1900 was it possible for Bolshevik women (such as Alexandra Kollontai, Inessa Armand, and Nadezhdaya Krupskaya, Lenin's wife) to address women's issues specifically within their party organization. Though dubbed a "Bolshevik feminist" by later western historians, Kollontai herself was one of the most outspoken critics of reformist feminism—and the very concept of feminism—before and after 1917.



Soviet communism declared gender equality, as celebrated in this 1961 postcard, reading “Glory to Soviet Women!”

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Disagreements between feminist reformers and radicals were present from the beginning. At first these conflicts were more over lifestyle than politics. Reformers observed existing social codes (dress, comportment, family obligations, respectability). Many, though not all, came from well-to-do gentry backgrounds and had no need to earn a living. Radicals, often of gentry origin too, were in conscious revolt against family and social propriety. They wore cropped hair and simple, unadorned clothing, smoked in public, and called themselves “nihilists” (*nigilistki*). Whether in financial need or not (many were), nihilists joined urban “communes,” or set up their own. For a few years there was some contact (including individual friendships) between nihilists and feminists, focusing on attempts to set up an employment bureau for women and cooperative workshops providing employment and essential skills for themselves and other women. This collaboration foundered during the mid-1860s; within a few years many nihilist

women had moved into illegal populist groups whose aim was the liberation of the “Russian people,” the *narod*. In their own estimation, by the early 1870s the radicals had left the “woman question” behind.

FEMINIST CAMPAIGNING

The reformers were dedicated to working within the system. They raised petitions, lobbied ministers, and exploited personal connections to reach influential figures, many of them already sympathetic to feminist ideas. Of necessity, they focused on philanthropy and higher education. Philanthropy was the one form of public activity then open to women, an acknowledged extension of their “caring” role within the family. It aimed both to encourage self-sufficiency in the beneficiaries and to give their organizers practical experience of public administration. Feminist philanthropists ran their enterprises, as far as was possible, democratically and with minimal regulation. Most successful was a Society to Provide Cheap Lodgings (founded in 1861 and by 1880 a major charity) in St. Petersburg. Another society provided refuges for poor women. A major feminist preoccupation, particularly important in a rapidly urbanizing society, was to provide poorer women with alternatives to prostitution.

Campaigns for higher education were a new departure, but still within a familiar realm—woman as educator of her children—a role that became increasingly important in Russia’s drive to “modernize.” Feminists received support from individual professors and even university administrations. Persistent lobbying of government led to permission for public lectures for women (1869), then preparatory courses and finally university-level courses (1872 in Moscow), all existing on public goodwill, organization, and funding. Medical courses (for “learned midwives”) were opened to women in St Petersburg (1872), extended to full medical courses in 1876. In 1878 the first Higher Courses for Women opened in St. Petersburg, followed by Moscow, Kiev, and Kazan. Though outside the university system, with no rights to state service and rank as given to men, these courses were effectively women’s universities. Feminist campaigners also provided financial resources to students needing assistance, setting up a charity to raise money for the Higher Courses in 1878.

The campaign for higher education and specialist training was critically important for radical women too. Radicals’ increasing identification with

“the people” inspired them to train for professions that could be of direct use, principally teaching and medicine. During the early 1870s dozens of radical women (along with nonpolitical women in search of professional education not then available in Russia) went abroad to study, especially to Zurich, where the university was willing to admit them. Some radicals completed their training; others were drawn into Russian émigré political circles, abandoned their studies, and soon returned to Russia as active revolutionaries.

Feminism—like all reform movements in Russia during the 1870s—suffered in the increasingly repressive political environment. All independent initiatives, legal or illegal, came under suspicion: these included a feminist publishing cooperative founded during the mid-1860s, fundraising activities, proposals to form women’s groups, and so forth. Alexander II’s assassination in 1881 brought further misfortune. Several of the terrorist leaders were women, former *nigilistki*, and in the wholesale assault on liberalism following the murder, feminists were tarred with the same brush. The reaction after 1881 proved almost fatal. Expansion of higher education was halted; some courses were closed. Feminists ceased campaigning, and all avenues for action were barred. Only during the mid-1890s could feminists begin to regroup, but under strict supervision, and always limited by law to education and philanthropy.

POLITICAL ACTION

Before 1900 Russian feminism had no overt political agenda. For some activists this was a matter of choice, for many others a frustrating restriction. In several, though not all, western countries women’s suffrage had been a focal point of feminist aspirations since the 1850s and 1860s. When rural *zemstvos* and municipal *dumas* were set up in Russia in the 1860s, propertied women received limited proxy rights to vote for the assemblies’ representatives, but legal political activity—by either gender—was not permitted. Indeed, no national legislature existed before 1906, when the tsar was forced by revolutionary upheaval to create the State Duma. It was during the build up of this opposition movement, from the early 1900s, that Russian feminism began to address political issues, not only women’s suffrage, but calls for civil rights and equality before the law for all citizens.

After Bloody Sunday (January 9, 1905), feminist activists began to organize, linking their cause

with that of the liberal and moderate socialist Liberation Movement. Besides existing women’s societies, such as the Russian Women’s Mutual Philanthropic Society (*Russkoye zhenskoye vzaimnoblagoтворitelnoye obshchestvo*, established in 1895), new organizations sprang up. Most directly political was the All-Russian Union of Equal Rights for Women (*Vserossiysky soyuz ravnopraviya zhen-shchin*), dedicated to a wide program of social and political reform, including universal suffrage without distinction of gender, religion, or nationality. It quickly affiliated itself with the Union of Unions (*Soyuz soyuzov*). Feminist support for the Liberation Movement was unmatched by the movement’s support for women’s political rights, and much of the union’s propaganda during 1905 was directed as much at the liberal opposition as at the government. Unlike the latter, however, many liberals were gradually persuaded by the feminist claim, and support increased significantly in the years of reaction that followed. The government refused to consider women’s suffrage at any point.

The women’s union—though itself overwhelmingly middle-class and professional—was greatly encouraged by women’s participation in workers’ strikes during the mid-1890s and, particularly, women’s involvement in working-class action in 1904 and 1905. After 1905, however, feminists were increasingly challenged by revolutionary socialists in a competition to “win” working-class women to their cause. Prominent Bolsheviks such as Kollontai had finally convinced their party leaders of working-class women’s revolutionary potential. During the last years of tsarist rule, when the labor movement overall was becoming increasingly active, Kollontai and her comrades benefited from the feminists’ failure to make any headway in the mass organization of women, a failure exacerbated after the outbreak of World War I by the feminists’ stalwart support for the war effort. It was the Bolsheviks, not the feminists, who capitalized on the war’s catastrophic impact on the lives of working-class women and men.

With the outbreak of the February Revolution of 1917, the feminist campaign resumed, and initial opposition from the Provisional Government was easily overcome. In the electoral law for the Constituent Assembly, women were fully enfranchised. Before it was swept away by the Bolsheviks, the Provisional Government initiated several projects to give women equal opportunities and pay in public services, and full rights to practice as lawyers. It also proposed to transform the higher

courses into women's universities; in the event, the courses were fully incorporated into existing universities by the Bolsheviks in 1918.

During the 1920s, with "bourgeois feminism" silenced, women's liberation was sponsored by the Bolsheviks, under a special Women's Department of the Communist Party (*Zhenotdel*). In 1930 the *Zhenotdel* was abruptly dismantled and the "woman question" prematurely declared "solved."

See also: KOLLONTAI, ALEXANDRA MIKHAILOVNA; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE; ZHENOTDEL

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LINDA EDMONDSON

FERGHANA VALLEY

A triangular basin with rich soil and abundant water resources from the Syr Darya River, modern canals, and the Kayrakkum Reservoir; the Fergana Valley (Russian: *Ferganskaia dolina*; Uzbek: *Fargona ravnina*) is situated primarily in Uzbekistan and partly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and is formed below the Tien Shan Mountains to the north and the Gissar Alay Mountains to the south. This has been the agricultural center of Central Asia for the last several thousand years. The basin is a major producer of cotton, fruits, and raw silk. It is one of the most densely populated regions of Central Asia, including the cities of Khujand, Kokand, Fergana, Margilan, Namangan, Andijan, Osh, and Jalalabad.

Throughout its history, material and cultural wealth have made the valley a frequent target of conquest. Khujand, at the western edge of the valley, was once called "Alexandria the Far" as an outpost of Alexander the Great's army. From the third century the valley emerged as a Persian–Sogdian nexus and major stop along the Silk Road under the suzerainty of the Sassanids. The Chinese Tang Dynasty briefly exerted influence in the valley during the seventh and eighth centuries, followed by Arab conquest and Islamic conversions during the eighth and ninth centuries and Persian Samanid dominion during the tenth century. The rise of the Karakhanids brought lasting Turkicization of the Fergana Valley during the eleventh century. The Chaghatay Ulus of the Mongol Empire during the thirteenth century and the Turkic Timur (Tamerlane) and his grandson Ulugh Bek during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries introduced a period of burgeoning literature and Islamic erudition, followed by centuries of shifting local powers and instability under the various Turkic groups. Kokand khans ruled from the late eighteenth century until the Russian Empire annexed the valley as the Fergana oblast to the Turkestan governor-generalship in 1876.

During the establishment of Soviet power in Central Asia (1920s and 1930s), the valley provided a fertile area for the Basmachi movement. In 1924, it was divided between the Uzbek SSR, the Tajik ASSR, and the Kirgiz ASSR. As a result, the valley inherited several cross border enclaves in a traditionally interwoven ethnic region. Despite a tradition of multiethnic cooperation, late-Soviet unrest and ethnic clashes erupted there in 1989 between

Uzbeks and Meshkhetian Turks, and in 1990 between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh. The famous Ferghana Canal was an early Soviet engineering project celebrated in prose, poetry, and film.

See also: BASMACHIS; CENTRAL ASIA; UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS

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MICHAEL ROULAND

FEUDALISM

According to the nearly unanimous consensus of Western scholars, pre-Soviet Russian scholars, and most Soviet scholars until the mid- to late-1930s, feudalism never appeared in Russia. By the end of the 1930s, however, it became the entrenched dogma in the Soviet Union that Russia had experienced a feudal period. Post-Soviet Russian historians have been unable to rid themselves of this erroneous interpretation of their own history, in spite of Western arguments to the contrary that have been advanced since 1991.

The fundamental issue is whether the term "feudalism" has any meaning other than "agrarian regime," that is, that most of the population lives in the countryside and makes its living from farming and that most of the gross domestic product is derived from agriculture. If that is all it means, then Russia was feudal until after World War II. Most definitions of feudalism, however, involve other criteria as well, which, as defined by George Vernadsky and others, typically encompass: (1) a fusion of public and private law; (2) a dismemberment of political authority and a parcellization of sovereignty; (3) an interdependence of political and economic administration; (4) the predominance of a natural, i.e., nonmarket, economy; (5) the presence of serfdom. Presumably all of these criteria, not just one or two, should be present for there to be feudalism in a locality.

The first historian to posit the existence of feudalism in Russia was Nikolai Pavlov-Silvansky

(1869–1908), who based his theory primarily on the political fragmentation of Russia from the collapse of the Kievan Russian state in 1132 to the consolidation of Russia by Moscow by the early sixteenth century. The basic problem with that thesis is that there was no serfdom until the 1450s. Moreover, there were no fiefs. In 1912 Lenin defined feudalism as "land ownership and the privileges of lords over serfs." Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868–1932) worked out a "Soviet Marxist" understanding of Russian feudalism and traced its origin and major cause (large landownership) to the thirteenth century. "Feudalism" was necessary to legitimize the October Revolution and Soviet power. According to Marx, human history went through the stages of (1) primordial/primitive communism; (2) slave-owning; (3) feudalism; (4) capitalism; (5) imperialism; (6) socialism; (7) communism. The fact that Russia in reality never experienced "stages" two through five made it difficult to claim that the October Revolution was historically inevitable and therefore legitimate. Inventing "stages" three through five was therefore politically necessary.

A major problem for the Soviets was that Russia never knew a slave-owning stage (as in Greece and Rome). This "problem" was worked out in the early 1930s by a Menshevik historian, M. M. Tsvibak (who was liquidated a few years later in the Great Purges), with the claim that Russia had bypassed the slave-owning period entirely, that feudalism arose about the same time as the Kievan Russian state during the ninth century, or even earlier. Boris Grekov, the "dean" of Soviet historians between 1930 and 1953 (he allegedly had no use for Stalin), earlier had alleged that Russia had passed through a slave-owning stage, but he took the Tsvibak position in the later 1930s, and that remained the official dogma to the end of the Soviet regime. As a result, nearly all of Russian and Ukrainian history was deemed feudal and succeeded by "capitalism" with the freeing of the serfs from seignorial control in 1861.

See also: MARXISM; PEASANTRY; SLAVERY

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RICHARD HELLIE

FILARET DROZDOV, METROPOLITAN

(1782–1867), Metropolitan of Moscow, theologian, and churchman.

Throughout his long career, Filaret (Vasily Mikhailovich Drozdov) played a central role in important matters of church, state, and society: as a moving force behind the Russian translation of the Bible, as a teacher of the Orthodox faith through his famous catechism, sermons, and textbooks, and as a reformer of the church, particularly its monasteries. His widespread reputation as a man of profound faith and great integrity made him the government's natural choice to compose the emancipation manifesto ending serfdom in 1861. When he died in 1867, the country went into mourning. As Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the future over-procurator of the Holy Synod, wrote on the day of the metropolitan's funeral: "The present moment is very important for the people. The entire people consider the burial of the metro[politan] a national affair."

Filaret's early career focused on reform of religious education, which he shifted from the Latin scholastic curriculum of the eighteenth century to a Russian and Bible-centered one during the early nineteenth century. He wrote two Russian textbooks in 1816 inaugurating a new Orthodox Biblical theology: *An Outline of Church-Biblical History* (*Nachertanie tserkovno-bibleiskoi istorii*) and *Notes on the Book of Genesis* (*Zapiski na knigu Bytiya*). By this time he was also heavily engaged in a contemporary Russian translation of the Bible that would carry the Christian message to the Russian people more effectively than the Slavonic Bible published during the previous century. He personally translated the Gospel of John. In 1823 he wrote a new Orthodox catechism with all of its Biblical citations in Russian. His abilities and work quickly advanced his career. He became a member of the Holy Synod in 1819 and archbishop of Moscow in 1821 (metropolitan in 1826).

Filaret's new Bible and catechetical initiatives provoked opposition in church and governing circles, who saw them as signs of Orthodoxy's deepening dependence on Protestantism. The critics soon stopped the Bible translation, burned its completed portions, and redirected church education on what Filaret called the "reverse course to scholasticism." His catechism was reissued in 1827 in revised form and in Slavonic. Under these circumstances, Filaret had to rethink his own position and ideas.

While he never departed from his belief that the church must communicate its teachings in a language people could understand (he finally won publication of a Russian translation of the Bible during the more liberal reign of Alexander II), Filaret now gave his ideas a more explicitly patristic underpinning, as evidenced in the dogmatic theology he eloquently and poetically expressed in his sermons. Moreover, he sponsored publication of the *Writings of the Holy Fathers in Russian Translation* (1843–1893). One eminent Russian theologian identifies the new work as the crucial moment in the "awakening of Orthodoxy" in modern times, the moment when Russian theology began to recover the teachings of the Eastern church fathers and to define itself with respect to both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

While many aspects of Filaret's activity as a leader of the Russian church for more than forty years bear mentioning, his efforts to reform and strengthen monasticism stand out. He promoted contemplative asceticism (*hesychasm*) on the territory of the Holy Trinity–St. Sergius monastery and elsewhere. Fully reformed monasteries, he believed, might inspire the return of the Old Ritualist and reconvert Byzantine Rite Catholics (Uniates) of Poland. He encouraged informal women's communities to become monasteries, and during the 1860s devised badly needed guidelines for all monasteries, stressing wherever possible that they follow the rule of St. Basil with its obligation for a common table, community property, work, and prayer. Filaret was canonized as a saint in 1992.

See also: METROPOLITAN; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SAINTS

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ROBERT NICHOLS

FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH

(c. 1550–1633), Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus (1619–1633).

Born Fedor Nikitich Romanov, the future Patriarch Filaret came from an old boyar clan, known

variously from the fourteenth century as the Koshkins, the Zakharins, the Iurevs, and finally as the Romanovs. The clan reached the height of power and privilege after 1547, when Tsar Ivan IV (“the Terrible”) married Anastasia Iureva, Fedor Nikitich’s aunt (Fedor was probably born after the wedding). During the reign of Ivan the Terrible’s son and heir, Tsar Fedor Ivanovich (1584–1598), Fedor Nikitich Romanov succeeded his father, Nikita Romanovich Iurev, on a regency council that ruled along with Tsar Fedor. Fedor Nikitich had been a boyar since 1587. He was regional governor (*namestnik*) of Nizhnii Novgorod (1586) and later of Pskov (1590) and served in numerous ceremonial functions at court.

On the death of Tsar Fedor in 1598, Fedor Nikitich continued to hold important posts and retained his seniority among the boyars under the new tsar, Boris Godunov. In 1601, however, as part of a general attack by Boris on real and potential rivals to his power, Fedor was forcibly tonsured (made a monk) and exiled to the remote Antoniev-Siisky Monastery, near Kholmogory. His wife, Ksenia Ivanovna Shestova (whom he married around 1585), was similarly forced to take the monastic habit in 1601. She took the religious name Marfa and was sent in exile to the remote Tolvuiskey Hermitage. Other Romanov relatives—Fedor’s brothers and sisters and their spouses—similarly fell into disgrace under Boris Godunov, with only one of Fedor’s brothers (Ivan) surviving his confinement.

That Fedor should be considered a rival to Boris was natural enough. He was the last tsar’s first cousin, whereas Boris was merely a brother-in-law. There was also the more or less general belief, known even to foreign travelers in Russia at the time, that just before his death, Tsar Fedor had bequeathed the throne to his cousin Fedor, and that Boris Godunov had been elected to the throne only after the Romanovs had first refused it. While there is enough contemporary evidence to suggest that the Romanovs were genuinely thought of as candidates for the throne in 1598, many of the stories about Tsar Fedor’s nomination of one of the Romanovs as his heir date from only after the Romanov ascension to the throne (in 1613) and therefore must be regarded with some suspicion.

Whatever the case, Fedor Nikitich, having taken the monastic name of Filaret, received some relief from his circumstances in 1605, when Boris Godunov died and was replaced by the First False Dmitry, who freed him (and his former wife, the

nun Marfa) from his confinement and elevated him to the rank of Metropolitan of Rostov. After the fall of the First False Dmitry, Filaret took charge of the translation of the relics of Tsarevich Dmitry from Uglich to Moscow’s Archangel Cathedral in the Kremlin. This was where Dmitry was interred and, shortly thereafter, where he was glorified as a saint. With the election of (St.) Germogen as patriarch, Filaret was sent back to Rostov; but when the Second False Dmitry captured the city in 1608, Filaret soon became one of his supporters in a struggle with Tsar Vasily Shuisky (r. 1606–1610), establishing himself in Dmitry’s camp at Tushino, near Moscow. It was the Second False Dmitry, in fact, who elevated Filaret to be patriarch after (St.) Germogen was murdered by the Poles, who had intervened in Russian internal affairs.

Filaret briefly fell into Polish hands when Dmitry was defeated and put to flight, but he quickly made his way back to Moscow under the protection of Tsar Vasily Shuisky. However, military defeats brought Shuisky’s regime down in 1610, and Shuisky was forcibly tonsured a monk. Political power rested then in a council of seven boyars who dispatched Filaret to Poland to invite Prince Wladislaw, son of Poland’s King Sigismund III, to be tsar in Muscovy. During these negotiations, Filaret insisted that the young prince convert to Orthodoxy and to do so by rebaptism, a stipulation to which the Polish king was unwilling to concede. With the breakdown of these talks, Filaret was placed under house arrest, where he remained until after the Treaty of Deulino in 1618, which finally provided an end to Polish interests in the Russian throne.

In June 1619, Filaret returned to a Moscow and to a Russia ruled now by his son, Mikhail, who had been elected tsar by the Assembly of the Land (*Zemsky Sobor*) in February 1613. Within days, Filaret was consecrated patriarch and within days after that, he was proclaimed “Great Sovereign”—a title usually reserved for the ruler—signaling Filaret’s unique position at the court. Filaret took the reins of government in his own hands, directing church and foreign policy with evidently little input from his son. In church matters, Filaret continued his previous position with regard to the non-Orthodox, insisting on the rebaptism of all converts and, in general, further hardening confessional lines with Muscovy’s non-Orthodox neighbors and minorities. He also advocated for the Polish war that started in 1632, which turned against Muscovy with the failure of the siege of

Smolensk and the routing of the Russian army. Filaret died on October 1, 1633, amid the unfolding disasters of that war.

See also: ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; CATHEDRAL OF THE ARCHANGEL; DMITRY, FALSE; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; KREMLIN; METROPOLITAN; ROMANOV DYNASTY; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

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RUSSELL E. MARTIN

FINLAND

Finland, a country of approximately five million people, located in northeastern Europe, was part of the Russian Empire from 1809 to 1917. It gained its independence in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and had a complex, close, and occasionally troubled relationship with the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the USSR, Finland began to turn more toward the West, joining the European Union in 1995.

Finns are not Slavs. They speak a Finno-Ugric language, closely related to Estonian and more distantly to Hungarian. The territory of modern-day Finland was inhabited as early as 7000 B.C.E., but there is no written record of the earliest historical period. During the ninth century C.E., Finns accompanied the Varangians on expeditions that led to the founding of Kievan Rus. The Finnish peoples maintained close trading ties with several early Russian cities, especially Novgorod, while from the west they were influenced by the nascent Swedish state.

UNDER SWEDISH RULE

Starting in the twelfth century, most of Finland was absorbed by the Swedish kingdom. Legend tells

of a crusade led by King Erik in 1155 that established Christianity in Finland. The Swedes and Novgorod fought several conflicts in and around Finland during this time. The Peace of Noteborg in 1323 established a rough boundary between Swedish and Russian lands, with some Finns (Karelians) living on the eastern side of the border and adopting the Orthodox faith. Although the Swedes were Catholic at the time of the conquest, they broke with Rome under Gustavus Vasa (1523–1560), and Lutheranism was established as the official religion of Sweden and Finland in 1593. The Finnish lands enjoyed some local autonomy under the Swedes, and the Finnish nobility had certain political rights. Swedish was the language of the upper classes and remains an official language in Finland in the early twenty-first century.

During the mid-sixteenth century, Sweden became embroiled in several wars of religion and state expansion with Denmark, Poland, and Russia. Russia and Sweden fought over territory along the Arctic Ocean, and Sweden intervened during Russia's Time of Troubles (1598–1613). Later, under Gustavus Adolphus (1611–1632), the Treaty of Stolbova (1617) gave substantial territory on both sides of the Gulf of Finland to Sweden, thereby enabling it to control trade routes from the Baltic to Russia.

Under Charles XII (1697–1718) and Peter I (1682–1725), Sweden and Russia fought a major war for control of the Baltic. In 1714, Russia occupied Finland after the Battle of Storkro. However, in 1721, in the Treaty of Nystad (Uusikaupunki), the Russians withdrew from most of Finland (keeping the region of Karelia in the east) in return for control over Estonia and Livonia. More than 500,000 Finns, roughly half the population, died during this long conflict, and the national economy was ruined. Another war between Russia and Sweden from 1741 to 1743 again resulted in the Russian occupation of Finland. However, in accordance with the Peace of Turku (1743), Russia withdrew from most of Finland, although it did annex some additional lands in the eastern part of the country. There were no further border changes after the third war between the two states from 1788 to 1790.

UNDER RUSSIAN RULE

In 1808, as a result of a Russian alliance with Napoleonic France, Russia attacked Sweden and again occupied Finland. This time, however, Finland was incorporated into the empire as an autonomous grand duchy, with Tsar Alexander I

becoming its first grand duke. Under this arrangement, the Finns were to enjoy religious freedom, and Finland, in Alexander's words, would "take its place in the rank of nations, governed by its own laws." Russia returned land to the Finns, and most of them accepted Russian rule. During the nineteenth century Finland experienced a national awakening, spurred by developments in the arts, language, and culture, and political parties began to organize around national issues. By the end of the century, when Alexander III and Nicholas II tried to assert Russia's authority in Finland, there was resentment and resistance, culminating in the assassination of the Russian governor general in 1904.

INDEPENDENCE

Before and during the fateful events of 1917, many Russian revolutionaries, including Vladimir Lenin, took refuge in Finland, where there were active socialist and communist parties. After the Bolsheviks seized power, the Finns, taking advantage of the breakdown in central authority, declared independence on December 6, 1917. Later that month, Lenin recognized Finnish independence. Nonetheless, there was fighting in Finland during the Russian Civil War between Reds, backed by Moscow, and anti-communist Whites, backed by Sweden and Germany. The Whites prevailed, exacting vengeance on those Reds who did not flee to Russia. Finland made peace with Russia in 1920 with the Treaty of Tartu and adopted a constitution creating a democratic republic that continues to remain in effect. During the 1920s and 1930s Finnish democracy came under assault by both left-wing and right-wing groups, the former allied with the communists in the USSR and the latter attracted to Germany's Adolf Hitler and Italy's Benito Mussolini.

Finland's democracy survived, but a more serious threat was posed by Soviet military action. After the Germans and Soviets carved up Poland and the Baltic states during the fall of 1939, Finland found itself the target of territorial demands of Joseph Stalin. The Soviets demanded border changes around Leningrad and in the far north, islands in the Gulf of Finland, and a naval base in southern Finland. Diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution failed, and Soviet forces invaded Finland on November 30, 1939. Finland received assistance from Western countries, and its forces fought ferociously against the Soviets, who according to some accounts suffered 100,000 dead.



Finland, 1992 © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

Nonetheless, the Finns were outnumbered and outgunned. In March 1940 they agreed to the Soviet territorial demands, and more than 400,000 Finns left their homes rather than become citizens of the Soviet state. Continuing economic and military demands by the USSR eventually made Finland turn to Germany for assistance. Finnish troops advanced with the Germans in June 1941 when Germany attacked the USSR, precipitating, in effect, another war with the Soviets. In 1943 and 1944, as the tide of the war turned against Germany, Finland made



Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov signs the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Standing behind him are Andrei Zhdanov, Klimenty Voroshilov, Josef Stalin, and Otto Kuusinen. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

peace with the USSR and turned on the Germans, but it had to make additional territorial concessions to Moscow, most of which were incorporated into the USSR's Autonomous Republic of Karelia. Thus Finland enjoyed the dubious distinction of fighting both the Soviets and the Germans, and the country was devastated by years of war.

Although Finland was subjected to Russian influence during the war, the Finns avoided the fate of the East European states, which became communist satellites of the Soviet Union. Instead, in 1948, Finland signed an Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the USSR that allowed it to keep its democratic constitution but prohibited it from joining in any anti-Soviet alliance. This agreement is sometimes derided as "Finlandization": Finland retained its constitutional

freedoms but gave the USSR an effective veto over its foreign policy (e.g., it had close trade links with the USSR but did not join NATO or the European Community) and, on some questions, its domestic politics (e.g., anti-Soviet writers could not be published in Finland; Finnish politicians had to publicly affirm their confidence in Soviet policy). This was especially the case under President Urho Kekkonen (1956–1981), who had close ties with Moscow. Nonetheless, Finland was generally regarded as a nonaligned, neutral state. This culminated with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, which led, among other things, to the Helsinki Accords, an important human rights agreement that would later be used against the communist rulers of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. During the postwar period,

Finland, like the other Scandinavian states, developed a social-democratic welfare state, and Finns enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in the world.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland and Russia signed a new treaty in 1992, which ended the “special relationship” between the two states. Trade ties have suffered because of Russia’s economic collapse, and Finns increasingly have looked to the West for economic relationships. Finland joined the European Union in 1995, and enjoys close ties with the Baltic states, particularly Estonia.

See also: ESTONIA AND ESTONIANS; FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NYSTADT, TREATY OF; SOVIET-FINNISH WAR

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PAUL J. KUBICEK

FINNS AND KARELIANS

Finns, Karelians (in Karelian Republic and eastern Finland), Izhorians (Ingrians) and Ingrian Finns (around St. Petersburg), Vepsians (southeast of St. Petersburg), near-extinct Votians (southwest of St. Petersburg), and Estonians speak mutually semi-intelligible Finnic languages. Novgorod absorbed many of them during the thirteenth century, without formal treaties. After defeating the Swedes and taking territory that included the present St. Petersburg, tsarist Russia subjugated all these peoples. Finns, Ingrian Finns, and most Estonians were Lutheran, while Karelians, Vepsians, Izhorians, and Votians were Greek Orthodox. Livelihood has ex-

tended from traditional forest agriculture to urban endeavors.

Finland and Estonia emerged as independent countries by 1920, while Karelia became an autonomous oblast (1920) and soon an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1923). Deportations, immigration, and other means of russification have almost obliterated the Izhorians, while reducing the Karelians, Finns, and Vepsians to 13 percent of Karelia’s population (103,000 out of 791,000, in 1989). Altogether, the Soviet 1989 census recorded 131,000 Karelians (23,000 in Tver oblast), 18,000 Finns, and 6,000 Vepsians (straddling Karelia and the Leningrad and Vologda oblasts).

Karelia occupies a strategic location on the railroad to Russia’s ice-free port of Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean. Much of the crucial American aid to the Soviet Union during World War II used this route. The Karelian Isthmus, seized by Moscow from Finland during that war, is not part of the Karelian republic, which briefly (1940 to 1956) was upgraded to a Karelo-Finnish union republic so as to put pressure on Finland.

The earliest surviving written document in any Finnic language is a Karelian thunder spell written on birch bark with Cyrillic characters. Karelia contributed decisively to the world-famous Finnish epic *Kalevala*. Finnish dialects gradually mutate to northern and western Karelian, to Aunus and Ludic in southern Karelia, and on to Vepsian. Given such a continuum, a common Karelian literary language has not taken root, and standard Latin-script Finnish is used by the newspaper *Karjalan Sanomat* (Karelian News) and the monthly *Karjala* (Karelia). A Vepsian periodical, *Kodima* (Homeland), uses both Vepsian (with Latin script) and Russian. Only 40,000 Karelians in Karelia and 22,000 elsewhere in the former Soviet Union consider Karelian or Finnish their main language. Among the young, russification prevails.

Karelia is an “urbanized forest republic” where agriculture is limited and industry ranges from lumber and paper to iron ore and aluminum. The capital, Petrozavodsk (Petroskoi in Karelian), includes 34 percent of Karelia’s entire population. Ethnic Karelians have little say in political and economic management. Hardly any of the republic government leaders or parliament members speak Karelian or Finnish. The cultural interests of the indigenous minority are voiced by *Karjalan Rahva-han Liitto* (Union of the Karelian People), the

Vepsian Cultural Society, and the Ingrian Union for Finns in Karelia.

Economic and cultural interactions with Finland, blocked under the Soviet rule, have revived. Karelia's future success depends largely on how far a symbiosis with this more developed neighboring country can reach.

See also: FINLAND; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NORTHERN PEOPLES

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REIN TAAGEPERA

FIREBIRD

The Firebird (*Zhar-ptitsa*) is one of the most colorful legendary animal figures of Russian magical tales (fairy tales). With golden feathers and eyes like crystals, she is a powerful source of light, and even one of her feathers can illuminate a whole room. Sometimes she functions as little more than a magical helper who flies the hero out of danger; in other tales her feather and she herself are highly desired prizes to be captured. "Prince Ivan, the Firebird, and the Gray Wolf" depicts her coming at night to steal golden apples from a king's garden and becoming one object of a heroic quest by the youngest prince, Ivan. Helped by a gray wolf, he ends up with the Firebird as well as a noble steed with golden mane and golden bridle and Princess Yelena the Fair.

The tales became the narrative source for the first of two famous folklore ballets composed by Igor Stravinsky under commission from Sergei Diaghilev and his Ballets Russes. *L'Oiseau de feu*, with choreography by the noted Russian Michel Fokine, premiered at the Paris Opera on June 25, 1910, with great success and quickly secured the young Stravinsky's international reputation. Like his *Petrushka* that followed it, *The Firebird* impressed audiences with the colorfulness of both story and music and with its bold harmonic innovations. The

two ballets also helped spread awareness of Russia's rich folk culture beyond its borders.

See also: BALLET, FOLKLORE

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FIRST SECRETARY, CPSU *See* GENERAL SECRETARY.

FIVE-HUNDRED-DAY PLAN

Proposals for reform of the Soviet economic system began to emerge during the 1960s, and some concrete reforms were introduced. All of these efforts, such as Alexei Kosygin's reforms in 1965, the new law on state enterprises in 1987, and the encouragement of cooperatives in 1988, basically involved tinkering with details. They did not touch the main pillars of the Soviet economy: hierarchical command structures controlling enterprise activity, detailed central decision-making about resource allocation and production activity, and fixed prices set by the government. The need for reform became ever more obvious in the "years of stagnation" under Leonid Brezhnev. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, reform proposals became more radical, culminating in the formulation of the Five-Hundred-Day Plan, put together at the request of Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin by a group of able and progressive reform economists headed by Academician Stanislav Shatalin and presented to the government in September 1990.

The plan fully accepted the idea of a shift to a market economy, as indicated by its subtitle "transition to the market," and laid out a timetable of institutional and policy changes to achieve the transition. It described and forthrightly accepted the institutions of private property, market pricing, enterprise independence, competition as regulator, transformation of the banking system, macroeconomic stabilization, and the need to open the economy to the world market. It specified a timetable

of steps to be taken and provided draft legislation to undergird the changes. One of its more radical elements was its acceptance of the desire of the republics for devolution of central power, and it endorsed their right to economic independence. This feature of the plan was fatal upon its acceptance, as Gorbachev was not ready to accept a diminution of central power.

Parallel with the Five-Hundred-Day Plan, a group in the government worked up an alternative, much less ambitious, proposal. Gorbachev asked the economist Abel Aganbegyan to meld the two into a compromise plan. Aganbegyan's plan accepted most of the features of the Five-Hundred-Day Plan, but without timetables. By then, however, it was too late. Yeltsin had been elected president of the Russian republic and had already started to move the RSFSR along the path of reform envisioned in the Shatalin plan. This was followed in August 1991 by the abortive coup to remove Gorbachev, and in December 1991 by the breakup of the Union, ending the relevance of the Five-Hundred-Day Plan to a unified USSR. But its spirit and much of its content were taken as the basis for the reform in the Russian republic, and many of the reformers involved in its formulation became officials in the new Russian government. The other republics went their own way and, except for the Baltic republics, generally rejected radical reform.

See also: AGANBEGYAN, ABEL GEZEVICH; COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY; KOSYGIN REFORMS; SHATALIN, STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH

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ROBERT W. CAMPBELL

FIVE-YEAR PLANS

Russian economic planning had its roots in the late nineteenth century when tsarist explorers and engineers systematically found and evaluated the rich resources scattered all around the empire. Major deposits of iron and coal, as well as other minerals, were well documented when the Bolsheviks turned their attention to economic development. Initial at-

tention focused on several centers in south Russia and eastern Ukraine, which were to be rapidly enlarged. Electric power was the glamorous new industry, and both Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin stressed it as a symbol of progress.

By 1927 the planners had prepared a huge three-volume Five-Year Plan, consisting of some seventeen hundred pages of description and optimistic projection. By 1928 Stalin had won control of the Communist Party from Leon Trotsky and other rivals, enabling him to launch Russia on a fateful new path.

The First Five-Year Plan (FYP) laid out hundreds of projects for construction, but the Party concentrated on heavy industry and national defense. In Germany Adolf Hitler was already calling for more "living room." In a famous 1931 speech Stalin warned that the USSR only had ten years in which to prepare against invasion (and he was right).



A 1950 propaganda poster urging farmers to fulfill the Five-Year Plan. The slogan reads, "Let us give to the country 127 million tons of grain per year." © HULTON ARCHIVE

The First Five-Year Plan was cut short as planning gave way to confusion. A Second Five-Year Plan was issued in one volume in 1934, already behind schedule. The planners were learning that one-year plans were more effective for managing the economy, leaving the five-year plans to serve as propaganda documents, especially effective abroad where the Great Depression seemed to signal the collapse of capitalism.

The Third Five-Year Plan had limited circulation, and the Fourth was only a pamphlet, issued as a special edition of the party newspaper, *Pravda*.

The Nazi invasion, starting June 22, 1941, required hasty improvisation, using previously prepared central and eastern bases to replace those quickly overrun by well-equipped German forces. The Nazis almost captured Moscow in December 1941.

After Soviet forces rallied, wartime planners organized hasty output increases, drawing on newly trained survivors of Stalin's drastic purges. Russian planners worked uneasily with U.S. and British officials as the long-delayed second front was opened, and abundant Lend-Lease supplies arrived.

After the war, improvisation gave way to Stalin's grim 1946 Five-Year Plan, which held the Soviet people to semi-starvation rations while he rebuilt heavy industry and challenged the United States in building an atomic bomb.

Fortunately for the Soviet people and the world, Stalin died in March 1953, and by 1957 Nikita Khrushchev was able to give Soviet planners a more humane agenda. The next Five-Year Plan was actually a seven-year plan with ambitious targets for higher living standards. Soviet welfare did improve markedly. However, Khrushchev was diverted by his efforts to control Berlin and by his ill-fated Cuban missile adventure. The Party leadership was furious, but instead of having him executed, they allowed him to retire.

This brilliant leader's successors were a dull lot. The planners returned to previous five-year plan procedures, which mainly cranked up previous targets by applying a range of percentage increases. Growth rates steadily declined.

In 1985 the energetic Mikhail Gorbachev looked for help from Soviet planners, but the planners were outweighed by the great bureaucracies running the system. In a final spasm, the last Five-Year Plan set overambitious targets like those of the first such endeavor.

Other Russians contributed greatly by creating new tools for economic management, especially Leonid Kontorovich, who invented linear programming; Wassily Leontief, who invented input-output analysis; and Tigran Khachaturov, who provided skillful political protection for several hundred talented economists as they improved Russian economics. These men rose above the barriers of the Russian planning system and thus deserve worldwide respect.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

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HOLLAND HUNTER

FLORENCE, COUNCIL OF

In 1438 Pope Eugenius IV called a church council to consider reunion of the eastern and western churches. The Latin and Greek churches had been drifting apart for centuries and from the year 1054 onward had rarely been in communion with each other. The sack of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople by the western crusaders made it clear that they no longer considered the Greeks their co-religionists and proved to the Greeks of Byzantium that the Latins were not their brothers in faith. But by the fifteenth century, with the Ottoman Turks already in control of most of the territory of the Byzantine Empire and moving on its capital of Constantinople, reunion of the churches seemed to be a necessity if the Christian world were to respond with a united front to the Muslim threat to Europe.

The council convened in 1439 in the Italian city of Ferrara and then moved to Florence. Present were not only the Pope, the cardinals, and many western bishops and theologians, but also the Byzantine Emperor John VIII, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Joseph II, the foremost cleric of the eastern

Christian world, and a number of leading officials and clergy of the Byzantine world (including a Russian delegation). The main points of dispute between the two churches were the legitimacy of a western addition to the creed (the “filioque”) and the nature of the church: whether it should be ruled by the Pope or by all the bishops jointly. After much discussion and debate, the delegates of the eastern church, under political pressure, accepted the western positions on the “filioque” and Papal supremacy, and reunion of the churches was solemnly proclaimed.

When the Greek representatives returned home, however, their decision was greeted with derision. Church union was never accepted by the masses of the Eastern Christian faithful. In any case, it became a dead letter with the 1453 Turkish conquest of Constantinople, renamed Istanbul by the Turks. When the Greek Isidore, Metropolitan of Kiev and presiding bishop of the Russian church, returned to Moscow where he normally resided and proclaimed the Pope as the head of the church, he was arrested on the orders of Grand Prince Basil II (“The Dark”) and then diplomatically allowed to escape to Poland. In 1448 he was replaced as metropolitan by a Russian bishop, Jonah, without the consent of the mother church in Constantinople, which was deemed to have given up its faith by submitting to the Pope. From now on, the church of Russia would be an independent (autocephalous) Orthodox church.

The ramifications of the Council of Florence were significant. The rejection of its decisions in the East made it clear that the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches were to be separate institutions, as they are today. Yet the concept of incorporating eastern ritual into Catholicism in certain places, a compromise that evolved at the council, became the model for the so-called uniate church created in Polish-governed Ukraine and Belarus in 1596, whereby the Orthodox church in those lands became part of the Catholic church while retaining its traditional eastern rites.

See also: BASIL II; METROPOLITAN; UNIATE CHURCH

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GEORGE P. MAJESKA

FOLKLORE

Folklore has played a vital role in the lives of the Russian people and has exerted a considerable influence on the literature, music, dance, and other arts of Russia, including such major nineteenth- and twentieth-century writers and composers as Alexander Pushkin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Peter Tchaikovsky, and Igor Stravinsky.

A folklore tradition has existed and flourished in Russia for many centuries, has been collected and studied for well more than two hundred years, and is represented by a variety of large and small genres, including oral epic songs, folktales, laments, ritual and lyric songs, incantations, riddles, and proverbs.

A simple explanation for the survival of folklore over such a long period of time is difficult to find. Some possible reasons can be found in the fact that the population was predominately rural and unable to read and write prior to the Soviet era; that the secular, nonspiritual literature of the folklore tradition was for the most part a primary source of entertainment for Russians from all classes and levels of society; or that the Orthodox Church was unsuccessful in its efforts to repress the Russian peasant’s pagan, pre-Christian folk beliefs and rituals, which over time had absorbed many Christian elements, a phenomenon commonly referred to as “double belief.” The fact that the Russian peasant was both geographically and culturally far removed from urban centers and events that influenced the country’s development and direction also played a role in folklore’s survival. And Russia’s geographical location itself was a significant factor, making possible close contact with the rich folklore traditions of neighboring peoples, including the Finns, the nomadic Turkic tribes, and the non-Russian peoples of the vast Siberian region.

Evidence of a folklore tradition appeared in Russian medieval religious and secular works of the eleventh through the fourteenth centuries, and conflicting attitudes toward its existence prior to the eighteenth century are well documented. The church considered it as evil, as the work of the devil. But memoirs and historical literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries indicate that folklore, folktales in particular, was quite favorably regarded by many. Ivan the Terrible (1533–1584), for example, hired blind men to tell stories at his bedside until he fell asleep. Less than one hundred



Prince Ivan and the Grey Wolf, nineteenth-century engraving after a watercolor by Boris Zvorykin. THE ART

ARCHIVE/BIBLIOTHÈQUE DES ARTS DÉCORATIFS PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

years later, however, Tsar Alexis (1645–1676), son of Peter the Great (1696–1725), ordered the massacre of practitioners of this and other secular arts. Royal edict notwithstanding, tellers of tales continued to bring pleasure to people, and on the rural estates of noblemen and in high social circles of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Moscow, skillful narrators were well rewarded.

The earliest collection of Russian folklore, consisting of some songs and tales, was made during the seventeenth century by two Oxford-educated Englishmen: Richard James, chaplain to an English diplomatic mission in Moscow (1619–1620), and Samuel Collins, physician to Tsar Alexei (during the 1660s).

The first important collection of Russian folklore by Russians was that of folksongs from the

Ural region, made during the middle of the eighteenth century and published early during the nineteenth century. At about the same time a real foundation was laid for folklore research and scholarship in Russia, due largely to the influence of Western romanticism and widespread increase in national self-awareness. This movement, represented in particular by German romantic philosophers and folklorists such as Johann Herder (1744–1803) and the brothers Grimm (Jacob, 1785–1863; Wilhelm, 1786–1859), was mirrored in Russia during the early years of the nineteenth century among the Slavophiles, a group of Russian intellectuals of the 1830s, who believed in Russia's spiritual greatness and who showed an intense interest in Russia's folklore, folk customs, and the role of the folk in the development of Russian culture. Folklore now began to be seriously collected, and among the significant works published were large collections of Russian proverbs by V. I. Dal (1801–1872) and Russian folktales by A. N. Afanasev (1826–1871).

But the latter part of the nineteenth century signaled the most significant event in Russian folklore scholarship, when P.N. Rybnikov (1831–1885) and A.F. Hilferding (Gilferding, 1831–1872) uncovered a treasury of folklore in the Lake Onega region of northwestern Russia during the 1860s and 1870s, including a flourishing tradition of oral epic songs, which up to that time was believed to be almost extinct as a living folklore form. This discovery led to a systematic search for folklore that is still being conducted during the early twenty-first century.

During the Soviet period folklore was criticized for depicting the reality of the past and was even considered harmful to the people. Until the death of Stalin in 1953 folklore scholarship was under constant Party supervision and limited in scope, focusing on social problems and ideological matters. But folklore itself was recognized as a powerful means to promote patriotism and advance Communist ideas and ideals, and it became a potent instrument in the formation of Socialist culture. New Soviet versions of folklore were created and made public through a variety of media—concert hall, radio, film, television, and tapes and phonograph records. These new works included contemporary subject matter: for example, an airplane instead of the wooden eagle on whose back the hero often traveled, a rifle for slaying a modern dragon in military uniform, or marriage to the daughter of a factory manager rather than a princess.

Since the 1970s, Russian folklore has become free from government control, and the sphere of study has expanded. During the early twenty-first century, folklore of the far-flung regions of the former Soviet Union is being collected in the field. Many of the older, classic collections of Russian folklore are being republished, old cylinder recordings restored, and bibliographies published, mainly under the direction of the Folklore Committee of the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House) of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in St. Petersburg and the Folklore Section of the Gorky Institute of World Literature in Moscow.

Among the most important narrative folklore genres are Russian oral epic songs and folktales, which provide a rich diversity of thematic and story material. The oral epic songs are the major genre in verse. Many of them concern the adventures of heroes associated with Prince Vladimir's court in Kiev in southern Russia; the action in a second group of epic songs occurs on the "open plain," where Russians fight the Tatar invaders; and the events of a third group of songs take place near the medieval city of Novgorod in northern Russia. The stories are made up of themes of feasting, journeys, and combats; acts of insubordination and punishment; trials of skill in arms, sports, and horsemanship; and themes of courtship, marriage, infidelity, and reconciliation. Some popular songs are about the giant Svyatogor, the Old Cossack Ilya Muromets, the dragon-slayer Dobrynya Nikitich, Alyosha Popovich the priest's son, and the rich merchant Sadko.

The leading genre in prose, one that is well known beyond Russia, is the folktale, which includes tales of various kinds, such as animal and moral tales, as well as magic or so-called fairy tales, similar to the Western European fairy tales. Russian magic or fairy tales often tell a story about a hero who leaves home for some reason, must carry out one or several different tasks, encounters many obstacles along the way, accomplishes all of the tasks, and gains wealth or a fair maiden in the end. Among the popular heroes and villains of Russian folktales are Ivan the King's son, the witch Baba Yaga, Ivan the fool, the immortal Kashchey, Grandfather Frost, and the Firebird.

See also: FIREBIRD; FOLK MUSIC; PUSHKIN HOUSE

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PATRICIA ARANT

FOLK MUSIC

Russian folk music is the indigenous vocal (accompanied and unaccompanied) and instrumental music of the Russian peasantry, consisting of songs and dances for work, entertainment, and religious and ritual occasions. Its origins lie in customary practice; until the industrial era it was an oral tradition, performed and learned without written notation. Common instruments include the *domra* (three- or four-stringed round-bodied lute), *balalaika* (three-stringed triangular-bodied lute), *gusli* (psaltery), *bayan* (accordion), *svirel* (pennywhistle), and *zhaleyka* (hornpipe). Russian folk music includes songs marking seasonal and ritual events, and music for figure or circle dances (*korovody*) and the faster *chastye* or *plyasovye* dances. A related form, *chastushki* (bright tunes accompanying humorous or satirical four-line verses), gained rural and urban popularity during the late nineteenth century. The sung epic *bylina* declined during the nineteenth century, but *protyazhnye*—protracted lyric songs, slow in tempo and frequently sorrowful in content and tone—remain popular. Significant stylistic and repertoire differences exist among various regions of Russia.

Russian educated society's interest in folk music began during the late eighteenth century. Numerous collections of Russian folk songs were published over the next two centuries (notably N. L. Lvov and J. B. Práč, *Collection of Russian Folk Songs with Their Tunes*, St. Petersburg, 1790). From the nineteenth century onward, Russian composers used these as an important source of musical ma-



Russian peasants playing folk music, early-twentieth-century postcard. THE ART ARCHIVE/BIBLIOTHÈQUE DES ARTS DÉCORATIFS

PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

terial. During the nineteenth century, German philosopher Johann Herder's ideas of romantic nationalism and the importance of the folk in determining national culture inspired interest in and appreciation of native Russian musical sources, especially as they reflected notions of national pride. Mikhail Glinka, for his purposeful use of Russian folk themes in his 1836 opera *A Life for the Tsar*, is considered the founder of the "national" school of Russian music composition, most famously embraced by Mili Balakirev, Alexander Borodin, César Cui, Modest Mussorgsky, and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov. This designation had more political than musical significance, as composers not associated with the national school, such as Peter Tchaikovsky and Igor Stravinsky, also made use of folk music in their compositions.

Russian ethnographers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made efforts to record

native folk music in the face of increasing urbanization. In 1896 Vasily Andreyev (1861–1918) organized an orchestra of folk instruments, and in 1911 Mitrofan Piatnitsky (1864–1927) founded a Russian folk choir. Originally consisting of peasant and amateur performers, both became well-known professional ensembles, providing folk music as entertainment for urban audiences.

During the Soviet era folk music had important symbolic importance as a form genuinely "of the people." During the 1930s, state support for socialist realism encouraged study and performance of folk music. Composers and amateur performers developed a new "Soviet folk song" that wedded traditional forms and styles with lyrics praising socialism and the Soviet state. Official support was demonstrated in the establishment of the Pyatnitsky choir and the Russian folk orchestra directed by Nikolai Osipov (1901–1945) as State ensembles. Russian folk music became a state-sanctioned performance genre characterized by organized amateur activities, notated music, academic study, and large professional performing ensembles that toured internationally. During the 1970s, Dmitry Pokrovsky (d. 1996) began a new effort to collect and perform Russian folk songs and tunes in authentic peasant village style, with local variations. This revival of Russian folk music received international attention as part of the world music movement.

See also: BALALAIKA; FOLKLORE; GLINKA, MIKHAIL; MUSIC; RIMSKY-KORSAKOV, NIKOLAI ANDREYEVICH

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SUSANNAH LOCKWOOD SMITH

FONDODERZHATELI

Literal translation: "fund holders."

In the Soviet economy, various organizations were holders and managers of inputs (*fondoderzhately*). The principal fund holders were ministries and regional and local governments. In some instances, the state executive committees that directed construction organizations and local industry had fund-holding authority as well. Only fund holders were legally entitled to allocate funded resources, the most important of which were allocated by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the State Committee for Material Technical Supply (Gossnab). Fund holders had to estimate input needs and their distribution among subordinate enterprises. They were obliged to allocate funds among direct consumers, such as enterprises, plants, and construction organizations within their jurisdiction. Fund holders also monitored the use of allocated funds. Funding (*fondirovanie*) was the typical form of centralized distribution of resources for important and highly "deficit" products. Such centrally allocated materials were called "funded" (*fondiruyemye*) commodities and were typically distributed among the enterprises by ministries. Enterprises were not allowed to exchange funded inputs legally. Material balances and distribution plans among fund holders were developed by Gosplan and then approved by the Council of Ministries. The ministries had their own supply departments that worked with central supply organizations. The enterprises related input requirements to their superiors through orders (*zayavki*), which were aggregated by the fund holder. At each stage of economic planning, requested inputs were compared to estimated input needs, and imbalances were corrected administratively without the use of prices. The process of allocating funded resources was characterized by constant bargaining between fund holders and consumers, where the latter were required to "defend" their needs.

See also: FUNDED COMMODITIES

PAUL R. GREGORY

FONVIZIN, DENIS IVANOVICH

(1744–1792), dramatist.

Denis Fonvizin, the first truly original Russian dramatist in the eighteenth century, is best known

for two satirical plays written in prose: *The Brigadier-General* (*Brigadir*) and *The Minor* (*Nedorosl*). *Brigadir*, written in 1766, was not published until 1786. *Nedorosl* was first staged in 1783 and published the following year. Both are considered masterpieces combining Russian and French comedy.

Like all writers at the time, Fonvizin was born into a well-to-do family. His father, a strict disciplinarian, trained him to become a real "gentleman," and became the model for one of the characters—the father of Mr. Oldwise (*Starodum*)—in Fonvizin's play *The Minor*. Although thoroughly Russianized, the family's ancestor was a German or Swedish prisoner captured in the Livonian campaigns of Ivan the Terrible. At Moscow University Fonvizin participated actively in theatrical productions. Upon graduation in 1762 (when Catherine II became empress), Fonvizin entered the civil service. In St. Petersburg, he befriended Ivan Dmitrievsky, a prominent actor, and began to translate and adapt foreign plays for him. He wrote minor works, such as *Alzire, or the Americans* (1762) and *Korion* (1764), but tasted his first real success when Catherine summoned him to the Hermitage to read his comedy *The Brigadier* to her. In 1769 she then appointed him secretary to Vice-Chancellor Nikita Panin, Catherine's top diplomatic advisor.

Although faithful to the French genre in writing *The Brigadier*, Fonvizin was less inspired by Molière than by the Danish playwright Barin Ludvig Holberg, from whose play *Jean de France* Fonvizin's play was derived. A salon comedy, *The Brigadier* attacks the nobility's corruption and ignorance. After reading the play, Panin wrote to Fonvizin: "I see that you know our customs well, because the wife of your general is completely familiar to us. No one among us can deny having a grandmother or an aunt of the sort. You have written our first comedy of manners." The play also mocks the Russian gentry's "gallomania"; without French rules for behavior "we wouldn't know how to dance, how to enter a room, how to bow, how to perfume ourselves, how to put a hat on, and, when excited, how to express our passions and the state of our heart."

In 1782 Fonvizin finished *The Minor*. Since it was unthinkable that these lines could be read aloud to Catherine, he arranged a performance at Kniper's Theater in St. Petersburg with Dmitrievsky as the character, Mr. Oldwise. The audience, recognizing the play as original and uniquely Russian, signaled its appreciation by flinging purses onto the stage. The play condemns domestic tyranny and false

education, while touching also on larger social questions, such as serfdom. The play concerns the stupid son in a noble family, the Prostakovs (a play on the word *prostoi* or “simple”), who refuses to study properly but still expects to receive privileges. The lad’s name—Mitrofan (or Mitrofanushka in the diminutive)—is now a synonym in Russia for a dolt or fool. The composition of the family is telling. The mother, a bully, is obsessed with her son (that he get enough to eat and marry an heiress). Her brother resembles a pig more than a man (as his name, Skotina, suggests). Her husband acts sheepishly; the nurse spoils the boy; and the boy—wildly selfish and stupid—beats her. The play’s basic action revolves around the conflict between the Prostakovs on the one hand and Starodum and his associates on the other. The formers’ “coarse bestiality” (as Gogol termed it) contrasts sharply with the lofty morality that Starodum and his friends exhibit.

In 1782 Fonvizin’s boss, Count Panin, had a stroke and summoned Fonvizin to write his Political Testament. He instructed the dramatist to deliver the testament, containing a blunt denunciation of absolute power, to Catherine after Panin’s death. However, when Panin died the next year, Catherine impounded all his papers (not to be released from archives until 1905) and dismissed Fonvizin. Pushkin later wrote that Catherine probably feared him. The playwright’s health declined after a seizure in 1785, and he died in 1792.

See also: THEATER

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

FOOD

Russian food is typically hearty in taste, with mustard, horseradish, and dill among the predominant condiments. The cuisine is distinguished by the

many fermented and preserved foods necessitated by the short growing season of the Russian North. Foraged foods, especially mushrooms, are important to Russian diet and culture. The Russians excel in the preparation of a wide range of fresh and cultured dairy products; honey is the traditional sweetener.

Russian cuisine is known for its extensive repertoire of soups and pies. The national soup (*shchi*) is made from cabbage, either salted or fresh. Soup is traditionally served at the midday meal, accompanied by an assortment of small pies, croutons, or dumplings. The pies are filled with myriad combinations of meat, fish, or vegetables, and are prepared in all shapes and sizes. The Russian diet tends to be high in carbohydrates, with a vast array of breads, notably dark sour rye, and grains, especially buckwheat.

Many of Russia’s most typical dishes reflect the properties of the traditional Russian masonry stove, which blazes hot after firing and then gradually diminishes in the intensity of its heat. Breads and pies were traditionally baked when the oven was still very hot. Once the temperature began to fall, porridges could cook in the diminishing heat. As the oven’s heat continued to subside, the stove was ideal for the braised vegetables and slow-cooked dishes that represent the best of Russian cooking.

The Orthodox Church had a profound influence on the Russian diet, dividing the year into feast days and fast days. The latter accounted for approximately 180 days of the year. Most Russians took fasting seriously, strictly following the prescriptions against meat and dairy products.

From the earliest times the Russians enjoyed alcoholic beverages, especially mead, a fermented honey wine flavored with berries and herbs, and *kvas*, a mildly alcoholic beverage made from fermented bread or grain. Distilled spirits, in the form of vodka, appeared only during the fifteenth century, introduced from Poland and the Baltic region.

The reforms carried out by Peter I greatly affected Russian cuisine. The most significant development was the introduction of the Dutch range, which relied on a cooktop more than oven chambers and resulted in more labor-intensive cooking methods. The vocabulary introduced into Russian over the course of the eighteenth century reveals influences from the Dutch, German, English, and ultimately French cuisines. By the close of the eighteenth century, Russia’s most affluent families em-

ployed French chefs. With so much foreign influence, Russian cuisine lost its simple national character. The eighteenth-century refinements broadened Russian cuisine, ushering in an era of extravagant dining among the wealthy.

The sophistication of the table was lost during the Soviet period, when much of the populace subsisted on a monotonous diet low in fresh fruits and vegetables. Shopping during the Soviet era was especially difficult, with long lines even for basic foodstuffs. Hospitality remained culturally important, however, and the Soviet-era kitchen table was the site of the most important social exchanges.

The collapse of the Soviet state brought numerous Western fast-food chains, such as McDonald's, to Russia. With the appearance of self-service grocery stores, shopping was simplified, and food lines disappeared. However, food in post-Soviet Russia, while plentiful and widely available, was expensive during the early twenty-first century.

See also: AGRICULTURE; CAVIAR; PETER I; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; VODKA

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DARRA GOLDSTEIN

FOREIGN DEBT

The first stage in Russia's involvement with international capital markets was associated with the great drive for industrialization that marked the final decades of the nineteenth century. The backwardness of the country's largely rural economy implied substantial needs for imports, which in turn meant foreign borrowing. The epic railway construction projects in particular would not have been possible without such financing.

With growing volumes of Russian debt floating abroad, the country became increasingly vulnerable to speculative attacks, which could have proven highly damaging. The skillful policies of finance ministers Ivan Vyshnegradsky and Sergei Witte averted such dangers. By imposing harsh taxes on the rural economy, they also managed to promote exports from that sector, which made for a healthy trade surplus. As a result of the latter, by the end of the century the currency qualified for conversion to the gold standard.

Russia thus entered the twentieth century with a stable currency and in good standing on foreign capital markets. The Bolsheviks put an end to that. By deciding to default on all foreign debt of Imperial Russia, Vladimir Lenin effectively deprived the Soviet Union of all further access to foreign credit. Since the economy remained backward, all subsequent ambitions of achieving industrialization thus would have to be undertaken with domestic resources, or with the goodwill of foreign governments offering loan guarantees.

An early illustration of problems resulting from the latter scenario was provided during World War II, when the Soviet Union received substantial military assistance from its western allies, shipped via the famed Murmansk convoys. Known as "Lend-Lease," the program was not originally intended as a free gift, but during the subsequent Cold War the Soviet Union refused to make repayments. In 1972 the United States followed a previous British example in forgiving ninety percent of the debt. When Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, about \$600 million of the remainder was still outstanding—and more had been added.

Toward the end of the Soviet era, much-needed modernization of the economy produced growing demands for imports of foreign technology, which in turn required foreign credits. Eager to have good relations with Mikhail Gorbachev, many Western governments gladly offered guarantees for such loans. By the end of 1991, with the Soviet Union in full collapse, those loans went into effective default. The total of all outstanding Soviet foreign debt came to almost \$100 billion.

The first decade of Russia's post-Soviet existence was heavily marked by problems surrounding the handling of that debt. While foreign creditor governments remained insistent that it be repaid, they were also willing to offer substantial new credits in support of Russia's economic transition. The Russian government responded by evolving a

strategy for debt management that rested on aggressively threatening default on old debt in order to obtain forgiveness, rescheduling, and fresh credits.

Much of the subsequent political wrangling would revolve around Russia's increasingly controversial relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). An initial credit of \$1 billion was granted in July 1992, when Russia became a member of the Fund. In 1993, a further \$1.5 billion was paid out, under a special "Systemic Transformation Facility" (STF). As Moscow failed to live up even to the soft rules of the STF, the IMF withheld disbursement of an agreed second \$1.5 billion tranche.

Following severe criticism for having failed to offer proper support, in April 1994 the Fund decided to release the second tranche of the STF. The essentially political nature of the relation was now becoming evident. Despite Russia's continued problems in honoring its commitments, in April 1995 the IMF granted Russia a \$6.5 billion twelve-month credit, and in March 1996 it agreed to a three-year \$10.1 billion "Extended Fund Facility."

The latter was the second-largest commitment ever made by the Fund, and there was little effort made to hide its essentially political purpose. The objective was to secure the reelection of Boris Yeltsin to a second term as president, and the IMF was not alone in offering support. On a parallel track, France and Germany offered bilateral credits of \$2.4 billion, and the "Paris Club" of foreign creditor governments agreed to a rescheduling of \$38 billion in Soviet-era debt.

The latter was of particular importance, in that it opened the doors for Russia to the market for Eurobonds. Receiving its first sovereign credit rating in October 1996, in November the Russian government placed a first issue of \$1 billion, which was to be followed, in March and June of the following year, by two further issues of DM2 billion and \$2 billion, respectively. Up until the crash in August 1998, Russia succeeded in issuing a total of \$16 billion in Eurobonds.

As the Russian government was gaining credibility as a debtor in good standing, other Russian actors, ranging from city governments to private enterprises, also began to venture into the market. Russian commercial banks in particular began securing substantial loans from their partners in the West.

Compounding the exposure, the Russian government was simultaneously saturating the mar-

ket with ruble-denominated government securities, known as GKO and OFZ. While these instruments technically represented domestic debt, they became highly popular among foreign investors and therefore essential to the issue of foreign debt.

The final stage of Russia's financial bubble was heralded with the onset of the financial crisis in Asia, during the summer of 1997. At first believed to be immune to contagion by this "Asian flu," in the spring of 1998 Russia was becoming seriously ill. In May, the Moscow markets were in free fall, and by June the IMF was under substantial political pressure to take action. Some even warned of pending civil war in a country with nuclear capacities.

Following protracted negotiations, on July 13 the Fund announced a bailout package of \$22.6 billion through December 1999, which was supported both by the World Bank and by Japan. A first disbursement of \$4.8 billion was made on July 20, and the financial markets began to recover confidence. On August 17, however, the Russian government decided to devalue the ruble anyway and to declare a ninety-day moratorium on short-term debt service.

The potential losses were massive. The volume of GKO debt alone was worth about \$40 billion. To this could be added \$26 billion owed to multilateral creditors, and the \$16 billion in Eurobonds. There also were additional billions in commercial bank credits, including about \$6 billion in ruble futures contracts. And there still remained \$95 billion in Soviet-era debt, some of which had been recently rescheduled.

In the spring of 1999, few believed that Russia would be able to stage a comeback within the foreseeable future. One foreign banker even stated that he would rather eat nuclear waste than lend any more money to Russia. The situation was aggravated by suspicions that the Russian Central Bank was clandestinely bailing out well-connected domestic actors, at the expense of foreign investors. It was also hard for many to accept the Russian government's unilateral decision to ignore its Soviet-era debt and to honor only purely "Russian" debt.

A year later, fuelled by the ruble devaluation and by rapidly rising oil prices, the Russian economy was making a spectacular recovery. In 2000, the first year of the Putin presidency, GDP grew by nine percent. The federal budget was finally in the

black, with a good margin, and foreign trade generated a massive surplus of \$61 billion. Despite this drastic improvement in economic performance, the Russian government nevertheless appeared bent on continuing its policy of threatening default in order to secure further restructuring and forgiveness of its old debts.

For the German government in particular, this finally proved to be too much. When the Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov hinted that Russia might not be able to meet its full obligations in 2001, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder informed Moscow that in case of any further trouble with Russian debt service, he would personally do all he could to isolate Russia. The effect was immediate and positive. From 2001 onward Russia has been current on all sovereign foreign debt (excluding the defaulted GKO's).

In support of its decision to fully honor its credit obligations, the Russian government made prudent use of its budget surplus. By accelerating repayments of debt to the IMF, it drew down the principal, and by introducing a strategic budget reserve to act as a cushion against future debt problems, it strengthened its credibility. The reward has been a series of upgrades in Russia's sovereign credit rating, and a calming of previous fears about further rounds of default.

While this has been positive indeed for Russia's international standing, it has not come without a price. Every billion that is paid out in foreign debt service effectively means one billion less in desperately needed domestic investment. In that sense, it will be a long time indeed before the Russian economy has finally overcome the damage that was done by foreign debt mismanagement during the Yeltsin years.

See also: BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; BANKING SYSTEM, TSARIST; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; ECONOMY, CURRENT; INDUSTRIALIZATION; LEND LEASE.

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STEFAN HEDLUND

FOREIGN TRADE

Owing to its geographic size and diversity, Russia's foreign trade has always been relatively small, as compared to countries of Western Europe with whom it traded. Nevertheless, foreign trade has provided contacts with western technologies, ideas, and practices that have had considerable impact on the Russian economy, even during periods when foreign trade was particularly reduced. From earliest times Russia has typically traded the products of its forests, fields, and mines for the sophisticated consumer goods and advanced capital goods of Western Europe and elsewhere. Trade with Persia, China, and the Middle East, as well as more remote areas, has also been significant in certain times.

The first recorded Russian foreign trade contact was a treaty concluded in 911 by Prince Oleg of Kiev with the Byzantine emperor. During the medieval period most of the trade was conducted by *gostiny dvor* (merchant colonies), such as the Hanseatic League, resident in Moscow or at fairs at Novgorod or elsewhere. This practice was quite typical of the European Middle Ages because of the expense of travel and communication and the need to assure honest exchanges and payment.

During the early modern period Russian iron ore was very attractive to the British, but until the coking coal of Ukraine became available during the nineteenth century, Russia had to import much of its smelted iron and steel. Up to about 1891, when Finance Minister Ivan Vyshnegradsky raised the tariff, exports of grain and textiles did not suffice to cover imports, interest on previous loans, and the expenses of Russians abroad. Hence Russia had to depend on more foreign capital. Although Russia was known in this period as the "granary of Europe," prices were falling because of new supplies from North America. Nonetheless, Vyshnegradsky insisted, "Let them eat less, and export!"

One aspect of the state-promoted industrialization of 1880–1913 was an effort by the state bureaucracy to increase exports in support of the gold-backed ruble, introduced in 1897. To develop outlets for Russian manufactures, the next minister of finances, Count Sergei Witte, encouraged Russians consular officials to cultivate markets in China, Persia, and Turkey, where prior trade had been mostly in high-value goods such as furs. Witte's new railways, built for military purposes, made exchange of bulkier items economical for the first time. Subsidized sugar and cotton textiles

would be sent to Persia and the East, with foreign competition foreclosed by prohibition on transit routes. Nonetheless, in 1913 fully sixty percent of Russian exports were foodstuffs and animals, another third lumber, petroleum, and other materials. Scarcely six percent were textiles, much of it from tsarist Poland. Russian imports were luxury consumer goods (including coffee and tea), equipment, and cotton fiber. Spurred by railroads, industrialization, and a convertible currency, foreign trade during the tsarist period reached a peak just before World War I with a turnover of \$1.5 billion in prices of the time. This total was not matched after the Communist Revolution until the wartime imports of 1943, paid for largely by loans. Exports were approximately one-tenth of gross domestic product in 1913, a proportion hardly approached since. They were only four percent of GDP in 1977, for example.

Under the Bolsheviks, Russia conducted an off-and-on policy of self-sufficiency or autarky. According to Michael Kaser's figures, export volumes rose steadily from five percent of the 1913 level in 1922 to sixty-one percent by 1931. When Britain signed a trade agreement in 1922 and others followed, the Soviet government began to buy consumer goods to provide incentives for the workers. They also bought locomotives, farm machinery, and other equipment to replace those lost in the long war years. Exports also rose smartly.

With the beginnings of planning at the end of the 1920s, however, trade fell off throughout the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, reflecting extreme trade aversion and suspicions of western intentions on Josef Stalin's part, as well as the general world depression, which adversely affected Russia's terms of trade. Russia wanted to be as self-sufficient as possible in case war cut off its supplies, as indeed occurred from 1939 to 1945. Imports of consumer goods fell precipitously, but so did some important industrial materials that were now produced domestically. Since 1928, Russian exports have averaged only about one to two percent of its national income, as compared with six to seven percent of that of the United States in a comparable period. Imports showed a similarly mixed pattern, with imports much exceeding exports during the long war years.

After World War II, Russia no longer pursued such an extreme policy of autarky. Export volumes rose every year, reaching 4.6 times the 1913 level by 1967. But they were still less than four percent

of output. The statistical breakdown of Soviet trade was often censored. Its deficits on merchandise trade account and invisibles were financed in unknown part by sales of gold and by borrowings in hard currency. The latter resulted in a growing hard-currency debt to western creditors from 1970 onward, amounting to an estimated \$11.2 billion by 1978. Neglect of comparative advantage and international specialization has probably been negative for economic growth and consumer welfare.

During the post-World War II period, most Soviet merchandise imports and exports were traded with the other Communist countries in bilateral deals concluded under the auspices of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Even though trade with the developed capitalist countries of the West and with less developed countries increased throughout this era, USSR trade with other "socialist" states still exceeded fifty percent of the total in 1979, while the share of the West was about one-third. Trade with COMECON members was nearly balanced year by year, but when it was not, the difference was credited in "transferable rubles," a book entry that hardly committed either side to future shipments. Franklyn Holzman termed this feature of Soviet trade "commodity inconvertibility," as distinct from currency inconvertibility, which also characterized intra-bloc trade and finance.

Trade with the developed western capitalist countries was always impeded by the deficient quality of Soviet manufactured goods, including poor merchandising and after-sales service. Furthermore, western countries also discriminated against Soviet exports by their tariff and strategic goods policies. Even so, some Russian-produced articles, like watches produced in military factories and tractors, entered a few markets. More significantly, the USSR was able to export tremendous quantities of oil, gas, timber, and nonferrous metals such as platinum and manganese, as well as some heavy chemicals. Notable imports included whole plants for the production of automobiles, tropical foodstuffs, and grain during periods of harvest failure.

Foreign trade was always a state monopoly in the USSR, even during the New Economic Policy (NEP). Under the control of the Minister of Foreign Trade, foreign-trade "corporations" conducted the buying and selling, though industrial ministries and even republic authorities could be involved in the negotiations. Barter deals at the frontiers and

tourist traffic provide trivial exceptions to the rule. The object of the monopoly was to fit imports and exports into the overall plan regardless of changes in world prices and availabilities. Foreign trade corporations are not responsible for profits or losses caused by the difference between the prices they negotiate and the corresponding ruble price, given the arbitrary exchange rate. Exports must be planned to cover the cost of necessary imports—notably petroleum, timber, and natural gas during the last decades in exchange for materials, equipment, and foodstuffs during poor harvest years. Hence enterprise managers were told what to produce for export and what may be available from foreign sources. Thus, they had little or no knowledge of foreign conditions, nor interest in adjusting their activities to suit the international situation of the USSR. With internal prices unrelated to international scarcities, the planning agencies could not allow ministries or chief administration, still less enterprises, to decide on their own what to buy or sell abroad. Tariffs were strictly for revenue purposes. For instance, when the world market price of oil quadrupled in 1973–1974, the internal Soviet price did not change for nearly a decade. But trade with the outside world is conducted in convertible currencies, their volumes then translated into *valyuta* rubles at an arbitrary, overvalued rate for the statistics. Prices charged to or by COMECON partners were determined in many different ways, all subject to negotiation and dispute. Some effort was made during the 1970s to calculate a more efficient pattern of foreign trade for investment purposes, but in practice these calculations were little applied.

Given the shortage of foreign currency and underdeveloped trading facilities, Soviet trade corporations often engaged in “counterpart-trade,” a kind of barter, where would-be western sellers were asked to take Soviet goods in return for possible resale. For instance, the sale of large-diameter gas pipes for West European customers would be repaid in gas over time. Obviously, these practices were awkward, and Soviet leaders tried a number of organizational measures to interest producers in increased exports, with little success.

One of the changes instituted under Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership was permission for Soviet enterprises to deal directly with foreign suppliers and customers. Given the short time perestroika had to work, it is impossible to tell whether these direct ties alone would have improved Soviet penetration of choosy markets in the developed world.

After all, Soviet manufactures suffered from poor design, unreliability, and insufficient incentives, as well as substandard distribution and service.

During the years immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian ruble became convertible for trade and tourist purposes, but exporters were required to rebate part of their earnings to the state for repayment of foreign debts. Further handicapping Russian exporters was the appreciating real rate of exchange, owing to continued inflation. The IMF also supported the overvalued ruble. By 1996 the ruble became fully convertible. All this made dollars cheap for Russians to accumulate and stimulated capital flight estimated at around \$20 billion per year throughout the 1990s. It also made imports of food and luxuries unusually inexpensive, while making Russian exports uncompetitive. What is more, the former East European CMEA partner countries and most Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members now preferred to trade with the advanced western countries, rather than Russia. When in mid-1998 the government could no longer defend the overvalued ruble, it accepted a sixty percent depreciation to eliminate the large current account deficit in the balance of payments. This stimulated a recovery of Russian industry, particularly those firms producing import substitutes. Russian exports of oil and gas (which furnish about one-third of tax revenues) also recovered during the late 1990s. Rising energy prices likewise allowed the government to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, pay off much of its foreign debt, and finance still quite extensive central government operations. However, absent private investment, prospects for diversifying Russian exports beyond raw materials and arms were still unclear in the early twenty-first century.

See also: COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, IMPERIAL; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; FOREIGN DEBT; TRADE ROUTES; TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH

If the first official contact between France and Russia was established in 1049, when the daughter of Yaroslav, prince of Kiev, married Henri, King of France, bilateral relations were established with the treaty of friendship signed in 1613 by King Louis XIII and Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich. Since then, cultural exchanges regularly expanded, most notably during the reigns of Peter the Great and Elizabeth. However, on political and economic grounds, the exchanges remained thus: England retained primacy in Russian foreign trade throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and on the diplomatic scene, despite common geopolitical interests, France and Russia were quite often the victims of mutual hostile stereotypes. In 1793, embittered by France's radical revolution, Catherine II broke all diplomatic relations with the revolutionary state; and in 1804, despite the treaty of nonaggression concluded in 1801 with Napoleon, Alexander I joined the Third Coalition to defeat the "usurper," his political ambitions, and his expansionism. The war against Napoleon (1805–1813) was a national disaster, marked by several cruel defeats and by the fire of Moscow in 1812, but Alexander's victory, marked by his entrance into Paris in March 1814, gave him a decisive role during the Congress of Vienna.

The second half of the nineteenth century brought a major change in Russian-French relations. If France took part in the humiliating Crimean War in 1854–1856, during the late 1860s reconciliation began to take place and, in 1867 and 1868, the Russian Empire participated in the universal exhibitions organized in Paris. Political and military concerns motivated a decisive rapprochement during the last third of the century: France, traumatized by the loss of the provinces of Alsace and

Lorraine, desperately needed an ally against Bismarck's Prussia, while for Alexander III's Russia, the goal was to gain an ally against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which opposed the Russian pan-Slavic ambitions in the Balkans. In December 1888, the first Russian loan was raised in Paris and three years later, in August 1891, the two countries concluded a political alliance, followed by a military convention in December 1893. To sanctify the rapprochement, Tsar Nicholas II visited France three times, in October 1896, September 1901, and July 1909; and in July 1914, President Poincaré visited Russia to reinforce the alliance on the eve of World War I.

The October 1917 Revolution killed these privileged links. The Bolsheviks opted for a peace with no annexing and no indemnity—and refused to recognize the tsarist loans. As a result, the French state felt deceived, and in December 1917, it broke relations with Russia and engaged instead in a struggle against it. In the spring of 1918, France organized the unloading of forces to support the White Guard and took part in the Polish war against Russia (May–October 1920). However, these interventions failed to overthrow the Soviet regime and, by the end of 1919, French diplomacy opted for a policy of containment against the expansion of communism. By that time, French-Soviet contacts were reduced: the French presence in the USSR was limited to the settlement of a small group of radical intellectuals and to the visits of French Communists; similarly, there was no official Soviet presence in France, although communist intellectuals and artists continued actively promoting Soviet interests and values.

In 1924 Edouard Herriot, chief of the French government, decided to recognize the USSR. While he had no illusion about the authoritarian nature of the Soviet regime, he thought that France could no longer afford to ignore such an important country politically and that the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 could be dangerous. Therefore, for geopolitical reasons, he chose to reestablish diplomatic relations.

This decision gave rise to a rapid growth of economic, commercial, and cultural exchanges. In particular, Soviet artists became increasingly present in France: Maxim Gorky and Ilya Ehrenburg, for example, became brilliant spokesmen for the Socialist literature. However, this improvement was a fragile one and remained subject to diplomatic turbulences, due to Fascism and Nazism. Foreign



French president Jacques Chirac shakes hands with Russian president Vladimir Putin as they meet in April 2003 to discuss the situation in Iraq. © AFP/CORBIS

Commissar Maxim Litvinov tried to bring the USSR closer to France and England, but French hesitation, demonstrated by the ambivalent French-Soviet treaty concluded in May 1935 and the lack of strong reaction to the Spanish Civil War, led Josef Stalin to conclude an alliance with Adolf Hitler instead. And on August 23, 1939, the conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact sanctified the collapse of the Soviet-French entente.

Bilateral relations were reestablished during World War II. In September 1941, three months after the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Stalin decided to recognize General Charles de Gaulle officially as the "Chief of Free France"; in December 1944 in Moscow, de Gaulle and Stalin signed a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance. However, the Cold War, which began to spread over Europe in 1946, had deep conse-

quences for Soviet-French relations, and in 1955 the Soviet state denounced the treaty of 1944.

In 1956 Nikita Khrushchev's proclaimed de-Stalinization was favorably received by French diplomacy, and in the same year the head of the French government, Guy Mollet, made a trip to the USSR. This trip reestablished contacts and led to a protocol on cultural exchanges. But from 1958 on, de Gaulle's return to power brought a new dynamic to relations with Moscow. De Gaulle wished to encourage "détente." In his view, this would restore France's international significance. In June 1966, he signed several important bilateral agreements with the USSR. Two committees were designed to improve economic cooperation; cooperation was also planned for space, civil nuclear, and television programs; and an original form of cooperation took place in the movie industry.

These agreements conferred a distinct flavor on bilateral relations: in contrast to the American-Soviet dialogue, which remained limited to strategic issues, the French-Soviet détente was in essence more global and covered a wide variety of areas of mutual interest. Political cooperation, economic and scientific exchanges, cultural exhibits, performers' tours, and movie festivals all contributed to build a bridge between the two countries.

Perestroika brought a new impulse to these relations. When Mikhail Gorbachev introduced drastic changes in March 1985, François Mitterrand's diplomacy first hesitated but, after a few months, provided strong support for the new leader; and in October 1990, a bilateral treaty of friendship—the first since 1944—was signed.

The collapse of the USSR imposed another yet another series of geopolitical and cultural changes on the new leaders. But these changes had little impact on the long-lasting structural bonds forged with France through the centuries.

See also: FRENCH INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA; FRENCH WAR OF 1812; NAPOLEON I; POLISH-SOVIET WAR; TILSIT, TREATY OF; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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FREE ECONOMIC SOCIETY

The Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, established in 1765 to consider ways to improve the rural economy of the Russian Empire, became a center of scientific research and practical activities designed to improve agriculture and, after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, the life of the peasantry. "Free" in the sense that it was not subordinated to any government department or the Academy of Sciences, the society served as a bridge between science, agriculture, and reform until shut down during World War I. It sponsored a wide variety of research in the natural and social sciences as well as essay competitions, publishing reports and essays in *Transactions of the Free Economic Society* (comprising 280 volumes by 1915), and nine other periodicals.

Founded under the sponsorship of Catherine the Great, who provided funds for a building and library, as well as a reformist agenda influenced by physiocratic ideas, the society brought together noble landowners, government officials, and scholars to study and disseminate information on advanced methods of agriculture and estate management, particularly as practiced abroad. Papers were presented on rural economic activities, new technologies, and economic ideas that could be applied to Russia. Young men were sent abroad to study agronomy. At the initiative of Catherine, the society's first essay competition examined the utility of serfdom for the commonweal, but the winning essay, which opposed serfdom, was ignored.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the society's membership came to include more scientists, professionals, and officials, and fewer landowners. Its work focused on discussion of advanced ideas in agronomy, medicine, and the developing sciences of chemistry and biology. After 1830 the society concentrated on practical applications of technology to agriculture. Among its most important projects were research on the best varieties of plants to grow on Russian soil, efforts to improve crop yields and sanitary measures, and the introduction of smallpox vaccination into rural areas.

After the accession of Alexander II in 1855, the society threw itself into reform efforts and greatly expanded its activities. It offered popular lectures on physics, chemistry, and forestry. It entered the fight against illiteracy and in 1861 established a committee to study popular education. It supported research on soil science, agricultural economics, demography, and rural sociology, and carried out systematic geographic studies. To educate the newly freed peasantry, the society initiated a wide range of activities, mounting agricultural exhibits, establishing experimental farms, encouraging the use of chemical fertilizer and industrial crops, promoting scientific animal husbandry and beekeeping, and expanding its efforts to vaccinate the peasantry against smallpox. As part of its educational mission, the society published popular works on agriculture and distributed millions of pamphlets and books free of charge.

Increasingly, as the society became a forum for progressive economic thought critical of government policy toward the peasantry, its work took on political dimensions. The government revoked its charter in 1899, ordering it to confine its activities to agricultural research. Nonetheless, in 1905 the society supported the election of a constitu-

tional assembly and after 1907 published surveys of peasant opinion on the land reforms proposed by Interior Minister Peter Stolypin that were implicitly critical of government policy. During World War I the tsarist government closed down the society because of its oppositional stance, and the new Soviet government formally abolished it in 1919.

See also: AGRARIAN REFORMS; AGRICULTURE; MOSCOW AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY; STOLYPIN, PETER ARKADIEVICH

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FREEMASONRY

Freemasonry came to Russia as part of the eighteenth-century expansion that made the craft a global phenomenon. Although at first it was one of several social institutions, including salons, societies, and clubs, that made their way to Russia in the course of Westernization, Freemasonry soon acquired considerable importance, evolving into a widespread, variegated, and much vilified social movement.

Despite the legends that attributed the origins of Russian Freemasonry to Peter the Great (who purportedly received his degree from Christopher Wren), the first reliable evidence places the beginnings of the craft in Russia in the 1730s and early 1740s. The movement expanded in the latter half of the eighteenth century, especially between 1770 and 1790, when more than a hundred lodges were created in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and the provinces.

Freemasonry was an important element of the Russian Enlightenment and played a central role in the evolution of Russia's public sphere and civil society. The lodges were self-governed and open

to free men (but not women) of almost every nationality, rank, and walk of life, with the notable exception of serfs. While many lodges were nothing but glorified social clubs, there were numerous brethren who saw themselves as on a mission to reform humankind and battle Russia's perceived "barbarity" by means of charity and self-improvement. They regarded the lodges as havens of righteousness and nurseries of virtue in a depraved world.

The history of Russian Freemasonry followed a tortuous path. Most of the lodges, especially in the provinces, were short-lived, and Russian Freemasonry was very fragmented. Some lodges were subordinated to the Grand Lodge of England; others belonged to the Swedish Rite, the Strict Observance, or some other jurisdiction. Contemporaries made a distinction between Freemasonry proper and Martinism, a mystical strand in the movement that claimed the famous mystic Claude Saint-Martin as its founder. A group of Moscow Rosicrucians headed by Johann-Georg Schwarz and Nikolai Ivanovich Novikov were the most important Martinists. Often referred to as "Novikov's circle," they enjoyed close ties with the university, the government, and even the local diocese and initiated numerous educational and charitable initiatives, such as the Friendly Learned Society, the Typographical Company, and the Philological Seminary. Novikov's circle was an important episode in the history of the Russian Enlightenment. Its activities, however, came to an end in 1792, when Novikov was arrested, interrogated, and sentenced to life in prison.

Many aspects of the so-called Novikov affair are still unclear. The government of Catherine II may have had political motives for arresting Novikov, given the Rosicrucians' ties to foreign powers as well as to the future Emperor Paul I and his entourage. The affair may also, in large part, have been caused by the fear of occult secret societies and anti-Masonic sentiment that was spreading through Europe. Anti-Masonry later became an important political factor in imperial and post-Soviet Russia.

Russian Freemasonry enjoyed a brief period of relatively unhampered existence in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The craft counted among its members practically every politician, military leader, and intellectual of note, including Mikhail Kutuzov and Alexander Pushkin; many of the Decembrists belonged to the Astrea lodge in St. Petersburg. After 1822, when Alexander I imposed

a ban on all secret societies, the situation changed. The ban, confirmed by Nicholas I in 1826, signified the official end of Freemasonry, although some clandestine lodges continued to operate, particularly during a brief revival on the eve of World War I. Freemasonry was again outlawed in Soviet Russia in the early 1920s. The ban ended in the 1990s, when the French National Grand Lodge established lodges in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Voronezh, and chapters of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite were also organized.

See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; NOVIKOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; PAUL I

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OLGA TSAPINA

FRENCH INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA

The first real manifestations of the influence of France in Russia date from Russia's first political opening toward Europe, undertaken by Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725) and further advanced by Catherine II (r. 1762–1796). In the first instance, this influence was cultural. The adoption of the French language as the language of conversation and correspondence by the nobility encouraged access to French literature. The nobility's preference for French governesses and tutors contributed to the spread of French culture and educational methods among the aristocracy. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Russian nobility still preferred French to Russian for everyday use, and were familiar with French authors such as Jean de la Fontaine, George Sand, Eugene Sue, Victor Hugo, and Honoré de Balzac.

The influence of France was equally strong in the area of social and political ideas. Catherine II's interest in the writings of the philosophers of the Enlightenment—Baron Montesquieu, Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, Voltaire, and Denis Diderot—contributed to the spread of their ideas in Russia during the eighteenth century. The empress conducted regular correspondence with Voltaire, and received Diderot at her court. Convinced that it was her duty to civilize Russia, she encouraged the growth of a critical outlook and, as an extension

of this, of thought regarding Russian society and a repudiation of serfdom, which had consequences following her own reign.

The support of Catherine II for the spirit of the Enlightenment was nonetheless shaken by the French Revolution of 1789. It ceased entirely with the execution of King Louis XVI (January 1793). The empress was unable to accept such a radical challenge to the very foundations of autocratic rule. From the close of her reign onward, restrictions on foreign travel increased, and contacts were severely curtailed. Despite this change, however, liberal ideas that had spread during the eighteenth century continued to circulate throughout Russia during the nineteenth, and the French Revolution continued to have a persistent influence on the political ideas of Russians. When travel resumed under Alexander I (ruled 1801–1825), Russians once again began to travel abroad for pleasure or study. This stimulated liberal ideas that pervaded progressive and radical political thought in Russia during the nineteenth century. The welcome that France extended to political exiles strengthened its image as a land of liberty and of revolution.

During the nineteenth century, travel in France was considered a form of cultural and intellectual apprenticeship. Study travel abroad by Russians, as well as trips to Russia by the French, shared a common cultural space, encouraging exchanges most notably in the areas of fine arts, sciences, and teaching. Because they shared geopolitical interests *vis à vis* Germany and Austria-Hungary, France and Russia were drawn together diplomatically and economically after 1887. This resulted, in December 1893, in the ratification of a defensive alliance, the French-Russian military pact. At the same time, French investment capital helped finance the modernization of the Russian economy. Between 1890 and 1914, numerous French industrial and banking houses established themselves in Russia. French and Belgian capital supplied the larger part of the flow of investment funds, the largest share of which went into mining, metallurgy, chemicals, and especially railroads. The largest French banks, notably the *Crédit Lyonnais*, made loans to or invested in Russian companies. Public borrowing by the Russian state, totaling between eleven and twelve billion gold francs, was six times greater than direct investment on the part of the French.

On the eve of 1914, there were twelve thousand French nationals in Russia. Forty consuls were in the country looking out for French interests. French newspapers had permanent correspondents

in St. Petersburg. In 1911, l'Institut Français (a French institute) was created there to help spread French culture in Russia. In fact, from the 1890s onward, France's cultural presence in Russia was consistently viewed as an adjunct to its policy of industrial and commercial implantation.

Following the close of the nineteenth century, the role of France as a land that welcomed political exiles and refugees had a reciprocal influence on the countries from which they came. When they returned to Russia, some of these individuals brought back ideas as well as social, pedagogical, and political experiences. For example, the experience acquired by Maxim Kovalevsky (1851–1916), professor of law and sociology, as the head of the Ecole supérieure russe des sciences sociales de Paris (the Russian Advanced School for Social Sciences in Paris), founded in 1901, served to organize the Université populaire Shanyavsky in Moscow (the Shanyavsky People's University), founded in 1908.

After the October Revolution of 1917, Paris, along with Berlin and Prague, was one of the three principal cities of Russian emigration in Europe. A hub of intellectual activity from the 1920s onward, the French capital was among the leading centers abroad for publishing Russian newspapers and books, of which a portion subsequently made its way into Russia, thereby helping to bind the emigrant population with Soviet Russians back home. The suspension of scientific and cultural relations between the USSR and the rest of the world, starting in the mid-1930s, put an end to this exchange.

The cultural influence of France did not disappear, however. Beginning in 1954, new attempts were made to bring France and the USSR closer together, beginning with cultural exchanges. During that year the Comédie française made a triumphant tour of the Soviet Union. Later, the trip by General Charles de Gaulle, in June of 1966, marked the beginning of a time of privileged relations between the two countries. A joint commission was created to foster exchange, and numerous cultural agreements were signed, some of which remained in effect during the early twenty-first century. French teaching assistants were appointed in Soviet universities, the teaching of French was expanded at the secondary school level, and agreements were signed for the distribution of French films in the USSR.

In the end, in the perception of the Russian people, France has remained the country of the Revolution of 1789 and the homeland of the Rights of Man. From the 1960s onward, French intellectuals

outside of Russia strengthened this image by supporting the cause of Soviet dissidents. It is again in the name of human rights that France has attempted, since 1994, to soften the position of the Russian government with regard to Chechnya.

See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH

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MARTINE MESPOULET

FRENCH WAR OF 1812

The French war of 1812 was one of the most decisive conflicts of modern times. Napoleon crossed the Russian frontier on June 24, 1812, with more than 650,000 troops, and just a few months later recrossed the frontier, defeated, with less than one-tenth of that number. Although winter played a role in the deaths of tens of thousands of French soldiers during the retreat, Russia won the campaign through a skillful withdrawal and the careful selection of battlefields. Napoleon contributed to his own disaster by failing to provide adequately for an extended campaign in terms both of supplies and of reinforcements.

Originally Russia had contemplated an invasion of French-held Poland, but the Russian commander, Mikhail B. Barclay de Tolly, quickly changed the plan. When Napoleon crossed the frontier, Barclay de Tolly intended to have his First Army withdraw to a fortified camp at Drissa, luring

Napoleon's main body behind it. While Napoleon attacked the camp, Peter I. Bagration's Second Army was to fall on the French rear, destroying the invading army. The plan was abandoned and the retreat began when the Russians realized that Napoleon's force was more than twice as large as they had believed.

The Russian armies had been drawn up with a considerable gap between them, and Napoleon drove right through it, intending to keep them separated. Barclay de Tolly and Bagration naturally wished to link up before they accepted battle, but were unable to do so before reaching Smolensk in mid-August. Facing ever-increasing pressure from Tsar Alexander to fight, Barclay de Tolly prepared to accept battle supported by Smolensk's impressive walls. Napoleon, however, attempted to envelop the Russian position rather than attack head-on. As Barclay de Tolly became aware of this movement, he decided once again that discretion was the better part of valor and withdrew from Smolensk rather than risk losing his army.

Frustrated by this continued retreating and also by the bickering between Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, neither of whom was prepared to take orders from the other, Alexander appointed Mikhail I. Kutuzov as overall commander of what was now effectively an army group comprising two armies marching together. Despite Alexander's continued prodding, Kutuzov continued the retreat. As he neared Moscow, he recognized that he would have to give battle before abandoning Russia's ancient capital, and so he selected the field near Borodino, which he prepared with field fortifications.

Napoleon, chastened by his experience at Smolensk and desperate for a decisive battle, refused the advice of his subordinates to envelop the Russian position at Borodino and on September 7 launched a bloody frontal assault instead. The Russian army held, and Kutuzov mustered it to continue its retreat that night. Barely pausing in Moscow, Kutuzov withdrew to the south in order to prevent Napoleon from marching into the rich fields of Ukraine to replenish his supplies, and also to protect Russian reinforcements coming from those regions. Napoleon occupied Moscow on September 14 and remained in the city for more than a month before abandoning it on October 18. During the French occupation, the city was destroyed almost completely in an enormous fire, although the exact cause of the blaze remains unclear and controversial to this day.

Having decided to leave Moscow when Alexander refused to make any move toward peace, Napoleon tried to march southward but found Kutuzov's army arrayed against him at Maloyaroslavets. The bloody battle there on October 24–25 forced Napoleon back to the Warsaw-Moscow highway along which he had originally invaded, and he began the long retreat by the way he had come.

Napoleon's retreating forces suffered horribly. They had eaten most of the supplies along the road on their inward march, and the Russians had deliberately pursued a scorched-earth policy to destroy the remaining supplies. The burning of Moscow had also deprived Napoleon of valuable supplies, and when Kutuzov cut him off from Ukraine, the fate of the *Grande Armée* was sealed. All the way back to the Russian border, peasants, Cossacks, and Russian regular troops harried the French, who died in droves. The Russians attempted to cut off the French retreat altogether at the Battle of the Berezina on November 27–28. Although Napoleon managed to batter his way through, his casualties were staggering. When the remnants of the French army struggled across the Russian frontier, one of the most powerful armies ever assembled to that point in history had been virtually wiped out.

It is customary to credit the Russian winter with the destruction of the French army, but this notion is greatly exaggerated. The most critical events in the campaign—Napoleon's initial operations, the maneuver at Smolensk, the Battle of Borodino, the seizure of Moscow, and even the Battle of Maloyaroslavets—were fought before hard cold and snow set in. The Russian army was forced to confront the vast French force on its own without climatological aids for four months, and literally hundreds of thousands of French soldiers perished in that time. The hard winter that followed merely added to the misery and completed the destruction of a French force that had already been defeated by Russian arms.

The invasion of Russia set the stage for the collapse of Napoleon's hegemony in Europe. In the wake of Napoleon's flight, the Prussian auxiliary corps he had forced to advance into the Baltic States made peace with the Russia on its own accord and committed Prussia to fight against France. As Russian forces crossed their own frontier and marched westward, Austria, Britain, and Sweden were persuaded to join the now-victorious Russian army,

and the final coalition against Napoleon was born. By catalyzing this last great and victorious coalition, the War of 1812 marked a profound turning point in European history and also in Russian history. Pursuing the French back to France, Russian troops found themselves in Paris itself. Alexander committed himself absolutely to a prominent role in the affairs of the entire European continent. Russian soldiers who had the unique chance to see the French capital, on the other hand, would ultimately become so frustrated with Alexander's conservative regime as to stage the Decembrist Rebellion in 1825. The costs of this greatest of Russian victories were, in every respect, staggering.

See also: BORODINO, BATTLE OF; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH; HOLY ALLIANCE; KUTUZOV, MIKHAIL ILARIONOVICH; QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE AND QUINTUPLE ALLIANCE

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FREDERICK W. KAGAN

FRONTIER FORTIFICATIONS

Fortified lines played a major role in Muscovy's southern frontier defense strategy. The great scale of these fortifications projects testified to the Muscovite state's considerable powers of resource mobilization.

The defense of Muscovy's southern frontier relied heavily upon long fortified lines linking garrison towns and serving as stations for the corps of the southern frontier field army. These lines were never intended to be impermeable walls keeping out the Tatars, but rather a supporting infrastructure for reconnaissance patrols, signaling, and corps movements beyond or behind the defense line. The gradual extension of these defense lines deeper into the steppe over the course of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reflected the Muscovite state's successes in the military colonization of its southern frontier and in its command and control of much larger field armies.

To stop the Crimean Tatars from invading central Muscovy, it had become necessary by 1512 to

station several thousand troops along the Bank Line (Bereg), an especially vulnerable 250-kilometer (155.3-mile) stretch of the Oka between Kolomna and Kaluga, every spring and summer. By century's end the Abatis Line (Zasechnaya cherta), an additional network of forest abatis and fortifications almost 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) in span, had arisen another 100 kilometers (62 miles) farther south; the field army was restationed along it, providing central Muscovy with greater defense in depth and also encouraging military colonization of the forest-steppe zone. From 1637 to 1658 a new Belgorod Line was built along most of the southern edge of the forest-steppe, from Akhtyrka in northeastern Ukraine to Chelnavsk; it consisted of earthen fortifications built in the new Dutch manner, as well as abatis, and linked twenty-five garrison towns. From 1646 it became the new line of deployment for the corps of the southern field army as well as a place d'armes for aggressive operations down the Don (against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman fortress of Azov) and in Ukraine (against the Commonwealth during the Thirteen Years War). In 1679–1680 most of the steppe along the Northern Donets and Oskol rivers was enclosed behind yet another new line, the Izyuma Line, another 160 kilometers (99.42 miles) southeast of the Belgorod Line.

See also: CRIMEAN TATARS; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MUSCOVY; THIRTEEN YEARS' WAR

BRIAN DAVIES

FRUNZE, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH

(1885–1925), military leader and theoretician.

Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze was a native of Semirchesk oblast, the son of an orderly, and a student in the Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, from which he failed to graduate. He joined the social democratic movement (1904) and led strikes in Ivanovo (May 1905). Arrested and twice sentenced to death, he was exiled instead and managed to escape. He did party work in Belorussia (1917), was head of the militia in Minsk, and was a member of the Party committee of the West Front. Frunze was head of the Party Soviet in Shuia (September 1917). Opposed to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, he joined the "Left-Communists." Frunze

was military commissar of Yaroslavl Military District. From February 1919, he was at the front as commander of the Fourth and Turkestan Armies, then he was commander of the south wing of the East Front, fighting against Kolchak. From July 1919, Frunze was commander of the East Front deployed in the Urals, and from September 1919, he commanded the Turkestan Front. From September 1920, Frunze served as commander of the South Front deployed in Crimea and accepted the surrender of Pyotr Wrangel's remaining forces in the Crimea, who were later massacred by the Party and Cheka operatives, despite his disapproval. From December 1920, he headed the Revolutionary Military Soviet (RVS) and commanded the Crimea and Ukraine forces, which embarked on various punitive operations. He was elected to the Party Central Committee (1921), appointed as Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (March 1924), and later (April 1924) served as the Chief of Staff of the Red Army. Frunze was a candidate member of the Politburo (1924). He authored a number of studies, including a guide on reorganizing the Red Army (1921), on military doctrine (1921, 1924), and on Vladimir Lenin and the Red Army (1925). He led the military reforms in 1924–1925. Frunze's ideas, formed in bruising battles with Leon Trotsky, involved a "unified doctrine" and setting up of a bureaucratically structured Red Army high command to meet wartime as well as peacetime needs. The necessity for an industrial defense base, as well as machinery for rapid mobilization, was also emphasized. These views were opposed by those who favored a militia-type Red Army.

On March 11, 1924, Frunze was appointed as Trotsky's deputy, and on January 1, 1925, Joseph Stalin named him Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, replacing Trotsky. Frunze's death, as a result of an operation recommended by Stalin, has given rise to a number of claims that his demise was no accident and that it gave Stalin the opportunity to replace him with Kliment Voroshilov, about whose loyalty there was little doubt. Frunze is buried on Red Square. His son, fighter pilot Timur Frunze, was killed during the Battle of Stalingrad.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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MICHAEL PARRISH

FULL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING

In the Soviet economy, industrial enterprises were treated as independent units from a financial management and economic accountability perspective. Under the system of full economic accounting (*polny khozrchet*) introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, each enterprise was to be self-financing in the long run, meeting wage payments and other production costs from sales revenues. Investment requirements identified in the *techpromfinplan* were to be met from enterprise profits. Full economic accounting was a cornerstone of perestroika, regarded as an important measure to improve enterprise operations.

The *khosrchet* system used by Soviet enterprises during the 1980s was not new, but the attention paid to enterprise autonomy and accountability during the period of perestroika appeared more serious. Under the system of full economic accounting, unprofitable or "negative-value-added" firms were to go out of business either through a bankruptcy proceeding or by another enterprise taking over the loss-making firm's assets. Prior to perestroika, the *khosrchet* system gave lip service to self-financing and economic accountability, but in practice, loss-making firms routinely received subsidies from central authorities or industrial ministries redistributing profits from "winners" to "losers."

Gorbachev's full economic accounting system was supposed to end the automatic subsidies provided to loss-makers. It appeared to be the Soviet answer to the question of how to eliminate the "soft budget constraint" described by Janos Kornai as the primary contributing source of scarcity in a planned economy. However, centrally determined prices for inputs received by the firm and output sold by the firm made calculations of cost, revenue, and profit somewhat meaningless from an efficiency or economic accountability perspective. Centrally determined prices did not reflect scarcity, nor did they signal accurate information about the operation or performance of the Soviet industrial enterprise. Consequently, basing the full economic accounting system on these prices, in an environ-

ment of persistent and pervasive shortages, provided little opportunity to maneuver Soviet enterprises away from the production of shoddy goods and toward the production of goods that adequately captured the specifications or preferences of customers. Moreover, as planners maintained the bonus system that linked substantial monetary payments to the fulfillment of output targets rather than cost reductions, enterprise managers continued to over-order inputs and hoard labor in order to achieve the planned output targets. As planners continued to set output plan targets high relative to the firm's productive capacity, enterprise managers continued to disregard cost in efforts to fulfill planned output targets. In short, policies pursued by planners sustained the outcome that the extension to full economic accounting was to replace. The absence of bankruptcy law and established bankruptcy proceedings, plus the lack of a mechanism for one firm to acquire the assets of a second firm, also undermined the effectiveness of full economic accounting in improving enterprise operations.

See also: KORNAI, JANOS; PERESTROIKA; TECHPROMFIN-PLAN

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SUSAN J. LINZ

FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF 1906

The Fundamental Laws, a 203-article compilation of existing laws on supreme rule, were first published in the Set of Laws of the Russian Empire (*Svod zakonov Rossyskoi impery*) in 1832. Unchanged since the edition published in 1892, they had to be revised in order to carry out the principles set forth in the October Manifesto of 1905. The revision was based on the principles established by the Manifesto of 1906, which made the State Council a second legislative chamber with the right to veto acts by the State Duma, thereby establishing that the Duma did not have the right to change the Fundamental Laws. The new revision of the Fundamental Laws was hurriedly accepted before the upcoming election of the Duma.

Count Sergei Witte, one of the initiators of the October Manifesto and of the introduction of national representatives into Russian politics, warned that if the revision was issued before the election, the Duma would become the Constitutional Assembly, and this would lead to violence and the end of the new order.

There were three drafts of the Fundamental Laws: one liberal, one conservative, and one "moderate" (in fact closer to liberal). The latter, created at the State Chancellery by the deputy state secretary, Peter Kharitonov, was adopted as basis for the future document. The Japanese, Prussian, and Austro-Hungarian constitutions were studied in the process of creating and compiling the laws, as was a draft prepared by the Union of Liberation and published abroad. The draft prepared by the State Chancellery was discussed at five meetings of the Council of Ministers in March of 1906 under the chairmanship of Witte and was completed in a spirit of fortifying conservative principles. Such articles as "the restriction to punish in ways other than the court's ruling" and "the respected secrecy of private correspondence" were removed, and the tsar's prerogatives were strengthened. The project and its revisions were discussed at meetings on April 1906 in Tsarskoye Selo under the chairmanship of Tsar Nicholas II. After he approved the new edition of the Fundamental Laws, it was published on May 10 (April 27 O.S.), 1906, the day the State Duma opened. The new edition, containing 223 articles, transformed Russia into a constitutional monarchy.

Whereas the first article of the earlier version of the Fundamental Laws stated that "The Russian emperor is an autocratic monarch with unlimited power," article 4 now gave the tsar supreme autocratic power. The term "unlimited" was removed, and "autocratic" (*samoderzhavnyi*) was defined as declaring the independence of the country and the monarch. A special note by the historian Sergei Knazkov proved that the word "autocracy" had been used in this sense during the seventeenth century and had only assumed the meaning of unlimited power during the eighteenth. The new article proclaimed the unity and indivisibility of the Russian Empire. It noted that Finland was an "inseparable part" of Russia, but "was governed by special institutions on the basis of being a special legislative authority." Russian was declared the official language of the empire, and its use was required in the army, navy, and all state and civil institutions.

From then on, no law could be passed without the approval of the State Council and the State Duma. Members of the Duma were elected for five years. The State Council and the Duma could legislate on matters not covered by the Fundamental Laws. The chief innovation was the inclusion into the Fundamental Laws of articles that guaranteed identity rights and civil freedoms, specifically the protection of identity and residence, freedom of residence, activity, movement, protection of possessions, freedom of speech, press, unions, assembly, and religion. The declared rights and freedoms did not include Jews, for whom residential restrictions (the Jewish Pale of Settlement) and restrictions on civil service positions still existed.

These concessions notwithstanding, the tsar retained an enormous amount of power. He had the right of the legislative initiative, including the exclusive right to initiate revisions of the Fundamental Laws. Without his approval, laws approved by the legislative chambers could not be passed. Moreover, in emergency situations the tsar could promulgate laws when the Duma was not in session (article 87). These would be nullified, however, unless ratified by the Duma within two months. The tsar had supreme control of the country, including control over foreign policy, the power to declare war and peace, supreme command of the armed forces, the right to mint coins, the appointment and dissolution of the government, and the unlimited right to declare a state of war or emergency. The tsar had power over the Council of Ministers and could hold them accountable.

The State Council and the Duma were to be convened annually. The tsar determined the time span of their yearly activities and the duration of the "holidays" for legislative institutions. He appointed half of the members of the State Council and had the right to dissolve the Duma before the five-year mark. If he did so, he had to announce a date for new elections to the Duma. Nicholas II used this right twice, dissolving the first and second Dumas. In the second case, on June 3 (16), 1907, the electoral law was changed. This was a violation of the Fundamental Laws, because the new electoral law was not presented to the legislative institutions.

Under the second revision of the Fundamental Laws, Russia became a dualistic monarchy (Duma monarchy).

See also: DUMA; NICHOLAS II; OCTOBER MANIFESTO; STATE COUNCIL; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

FUNDED COMMODITIES

Funded commodities were a category of commodities considered so critical to the success of the annual plan that allocation was tightly controlled by Gosplan and the USSR Council of Ministers.

Soviet central planning aspired to comprehensive coverage of the supply and demand of all commodities and services in the economy. As there were millions of transactions in an economy the size of the USSR, this was not a realistic ambition. The system of materials balances was designed to replace market forces of supply and demand in attaining equilibrium in each market. This enormous task was subdivided by category in order to decentralize the burden of achieving balances to various administrative and territorial planning units.

Funded commodities represented a restricted list of critical commodities that were under the direct control and allocation of the Gosplan and required explicit approval by the USSR Council of Ministers. The number of commodities in this category varied considerably over time, reflecting various reorganizations of planning procedures, changes in priorities, and attempts to reform the process. According to Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart, the number of funded commodities varied from 277 in the beginning in 1928 to as many as 2,390. During the 1980s, the number was approximately 2,000. About 75,000 other commodities were also specifically planned and controlled either by Gosplan in conjunction with various centralized supply organizations, or by the ministries without explicit central oversight.

See also: FONDODERZHATELI; GOSPLAN

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JAMES R. MILLAR

FUTURISM

A term coined by the Italian poet Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944), Futurism emphasized discarding the static and irrelevant art of the past. It celebrated change, originality, and innovation in culture and society and glorified the new technology of the twentieth century, with emphasis on dynamism, speed, energy, and power. Russian Futurism, founded by Velimir Khlebnikov (1885–1922), a poet and a mystic, and Vladimir Mayakovsky (1893–1930), the leading poet of Russian Revolution of 1917 and of the early Soviet period, went beyond its Italian model with a focus on a revolutionary social and political outlook. In 1912 the Russian Futurists issued the manifesto “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste” that advocated the ideas of Italian futurism and attacked Alexander Pushkin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Leo Tolstoy. With the Revolution of 1917, the Russian Futurists attempted to dominate postrevolutionary culture in hopes of creating a new art integrating all aspects of daily life within a vision of total world transformation; artists would respond to a call to transcend and remake reality through a revolutionized aesthetic, to break down the barriers that had heretofore alienated the old art and the old reality. Russian Futurism argued that art, by eliciting predetermined emotions, could organize the will of the masses for action toward desired goals. In 1923 Mayakovsky cofounded with Osip Brik the Dadaistic journal *LEF*. Soviet avant-garde architects led by Nikolai Ladovsky were also highly influenced by Futurism and the theory that humanity’s “world understanding” becomes a driving force determining human action only when it is fused with world-perception, defined as “the sum of man’s emotional values . . . created by sympathy or revulsion, friendship or animosity, joy or sorrow, fear or courage.” Only by sensing the world through the “feeling of matter” could one understand, and thus be driven to change, the world. The Futurists were initially favored by Anatoly Lu-

nacharsky, the Soviet commissar of education, and obtained important cultural posts. But by 1930 they had lost influence within the government and within most of the literary community.

See also: LUNACHARSKY, ANATOLY VASILIEVICH; MAYAKOVSKY, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; OCTOBER REVOLUTION

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HUGH D. HUDSON JR.

FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH

(1661–1682), tsar of Russia, February 9, 1676 to May 7, 1682.

Fyodor was the ninth child of Tsar Alexis and his first wife, Maria Miloslavskaya. He became heir to the throne following the death of an elder brother in 1670. Fyodor is said to have studied Latin and Polish with the Belarusian court poet Simeon Polotsky, but sources indicate that his education was predominantly traditional, with some modern elements. Just fourteen on his accession in 1676, Fyodor ruled without a regent, but was supported by a number of advisors and personal favorites, notably his chamberlain Ivan Yazykov and the brothers Alexei and Mikhail Likhachev. Less intimate with the tsar, but highly influential, was Prince Vasily Golitsyn. Members of Fyodor’s mother’s family, the Miloslavskys, were less prominent, although they succeeded early in the reign in securing the banishment of Artamon Matveyev and several members of the rival Naryshkin clan. There were power struggles throughout the reign. There were also rumors that Fyodor’s ambitious sister Sophia Alekseyevna regularly attended his sickbed. In fact, Fyodor, although delicate, was by no means the hopeless invalid depicted by some historians. Records show that he regularly participated in ceremonies and presided over councils. He married twice. His first wife Agafia Grushetskaya (of part-Polish extraction) and her newborn son died in July 1681. In February 1682 he married the noblewoman Marfa Apraksina.

The central event of Fyodor's reign was war with Turkey (1676–1681), precipitated by Turkish and Tatar incursions into Ukraine, compelling Russia to abandon the fort of Chigirin on the Dnieper. The treaty of Bakhchisarai (1681) established a twenty-year truce. War determined economic policy. In 1678 a major land survey was conducted in order to reassess the population's tax obligations, providing the only reliable, if partial, population figures for the whole century. In 1679 the household rather than land became the basis for taxation. Provincial reforms included abolition of some elected posts and wider powers for military governors. Fyodor's major reform was the abolition of the Code of Precedence (*mestnichestvo*) in 1682. An associated scheme to separate civil and military offices and create permanent posts was shelved, allegedly after the patriarch warned that such officials might accumulate independent power. In 1681 and 1682 a major church council sought to raise the caliber of priests and intensified the persecution of Old Believers.

Fyodor had his portrait painted, encouraged the introduction of part-singing from Kiev, and approved a charter for an academy modeled on the Kiev Academy (implemented only in the late 1680s). Polish fashions and poetry became popular with courtiers, but traditionalists regarded "Latin" novelties with suspicion. Tsar Alexis's theatre was closed down, and foreign fashions were banned. Historians remain undecided whether Fyodor was a sickly young nonentity manipulated by unscrupulous favorites or whether he showed promise of becoming a strong ruler. His reign is best viewed as a continuation of Russia's involvement in international affairs and of mildly West-ernizing trends, especially via Ukraine and Poland.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; GOLITSYN, VASILY VASILIEVICH; PETER I; SOPHIA

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LINDSEY HUGHES

FYODOR II

(1589–1605), Tsar of Russia and son of Boris Godunov.

Fyodor Borisovich Godunov was born in 1589 and eventually became tsar. His father, Boris Godunov, was the regent of the mentally retarded Tsar Fyodor I. Fyodor Godunov's mother, Maria, was the daughter of Tsar Ivan IV's favorite, Malyuta Skuratov (the notorious boss of the *oprichnina*, the tsar's hand-picked military and administrative elite). Upon the death of the childless Tsar Fyodor I in 1598, Boris Godunov became tsar, and Fyodor Borisovich became heir to the throne. Contemporaries described young Fyodor as handsome, athletic, and kind. Like his older sister Ksenya, Fyodor was well educated and learned from his father the art of government as he grew up. Fyodor was also an avid student of cartography, and he is credited with drawing a small map of Moscow, included on a well-known Dutch map of Russia published in 1614.

In April 1605 Tsar Boris died, and Fyodor was proclaimed Tsar Fyodor II. Although well prepared to rule, the sixteen-year-old tsar was soon overwhelmed by the civil war his father had been fighting against supporters of someone claiming to be Dmitry of Uglich (the youngest son of Tsar Ivan IV). Several of Fyodor's courtiers immediately began plotting to overthrow him, but it was the rebellion of the tsar's army on May 7, 1605, that sealed the fate of the Godunov dynasty. Tsar Fyodor II was toppled in a bloodless popular uprising in Moscow on June 1, 1605. Several days later he and his mother were strangled to death, and it was falsely reported that they had committed suicide. Almost no one mourned the death of Fyodor II; Moscow was too busy celebrating the arrival of Tsar Dmitry.

See also: DMITRY OF UGLICH; FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; OPRICHNINA

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CHESTER DUNNING

FYODOR IVANOVICH

(1557–1598), Tsar of Russia reigned 1584–1598.

Fyodor Ivanovich was the second son of Ivan IV ("The Terrible" or *Ivan Grozny*). Ascending the throne in 1584, three years after his father killed his older brother Ivan in a fit of rage, Fyodor Ivanovich was nevertheless too mentally deficient to govern. His brother-in-law, Boris Godunov (the brother of his wife Irene), ruled instead as regent. Fyodor did not have children and thus was the last descendant of Rurik to occupy the Russian throne.

Fyodor's father Ivan IV had the longest reign in Russian history, from 1533 to 1584, and the first half of his reign was marked by constructive achievements in both foreign and domestic policy. His defeat of the Tartars of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) opened the way southward and eastward to Russian expansion. He also welcomed the British explorer Richard Chancellor in 1553–1554 and established commercial relations with England. By 1560 Ivan IV had established the power and legitimacy of the tsar. He authorized reforms in the army and even established a consultative body known as the *zemsky sobor* to debate issues and provide advice (although only when he solicited it).

After the death in 1560 of his first wife Anastasia—whom he suspected had been poisoned—Ivan IV became moody and violent. Withdrawing from the boyars and the church, he insisted on personal control, exercised through the establishment of the *oprichnina*—the private police force he could order to kill his personal enemies. In 1591, just seven years after he killed his oldest son, Ivan's youngest son Dmitry died under mysterious circumstances, possibly by the hand of Boris Godunov, a member of the lesser nobility who had become Ivan's protégé. In 1584 when Ivan's second son Fyodor Ivanovich became tsar, Godunov shrewdly exploited Fyodor's feeble-mindedness to assume *de facto* power as regent. When Fyodor died in 1598, the *zemsky sobor* elected Godunov as tsar.

Godunov was an effective regent and tsar. Although he did nothing to ease the burden on the peasants (issuing a decree in 1601 limiting their rights to move from one estate to another), Godunov made strides in economic development and colonization of Siberia. He also established the patriarchate in 1589. Before then the Russian church recognized the patriarch of Constantinople (now Istanbul). Under Godunov's tutelage, Russia waged

successful wars against the Tatars (1591) and Sweden (1595).

Plots, intrigues, and natural disasters soon undermined Godunov's power, however. A stranger appeared, claiming to be Ivan's youngest son, Dmitry (the first of three "False Dmitrys"). A famine from 1601 to 1603 stimulated rural unrest and opposition to Godunov's rule. Godunov was killed in 1605 while suppressing a revolt during the advance on Moscow of one of the False Dmitrys. His death ushered in a "Time of Troubles" (*Smutnoye vremya*), which lasted until the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613.

See also: DMITRY, FALSE; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; TIME OF TROUBLES

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

FYODOROV, BORIS GRIGORIEVICH

(b. 1958), economist, deputy prime minister (1992–1993), finance minister (1990, 1993), advocate of liberal economic reform.

Boris Fyodorov, an ambitious young economist who served briefly as deputy prime minister, found a business career more fruitful than politics. Fyodorov graduated from the Moscow Institute of Finance and went on to earn candidate and doctor's degrees at Moscow State University (1985) and the USA/Canada Institute (1990). From 1980 to 1987 he worked at Gosbank, and then at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. He was part of the team led by Grigory Yavlinsky that prepared the Five-Hundred-Day Plan in 1990. In July 1990 he became finance minister in the Russian Federation government, but resigned in December. From April 1991 to October 1992 he worked for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,

and then spent two months as Russian director at the World Bank. In December 1992 he became deputy prime minister in Boris Yeltsin's cabinet, taking on the job of finance minister in March 1993. In December 1993 he was elected to the State Duma from a Moscow constituency as a member of Yegor Gaidar's Russia's Choice party.

Fyodorov fell out with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in January 1994, citing frustration with weak monetary and fiscal discipline. He then formed a liberal parliamentary fraction, Union of December 12, and in 1995 created his own party, Forward Russia, which mixed advocacy of market reform with patriotic slogans, including support for the war in Chechnya. He was reelected to the Duma in December 1995, famously publishing a book of blank pages entitled "The Economic Achievements of the Chernomyrdin Government." From May to September 1998 he headed the State Tax Administration, but his political career did not progress. In subsequent years he remained a prominent advocate of further liberal reforms and a defender of minority shareholder interests. In 2000 he was elected a member of the board of Gazprom and Unified Energy Systems, the two largest companies in Russia.

See also: CHERNOMYRDIN, VIKTOR STEPANOVICH; FIVE-HUNDRED-DAY PLAN; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH

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PETER RUTLAND

FYODOROV, IVAN

(c. 1510–1583), the most celebrated among printers in old Rus.

Ivan Fyoderov (also called Ivan Fyodorovich, Fyodorov syn, Moskvitin, and drukar Moskvitin) was the initiator of printing in Muscovy and Ukraine, and was a printer also in Belarus. He produced the first printed Church Slavonic Bible (the "Ostroh Bible" of 1580–1581), the first Russian (or other East Slavic) textbook (Bukvar, 1574), and the first printed Russian alphabetical subject index, calendar, and poem. He was an accomplished craftsman in numerous trades, and a man of broad vision and great persistence. Altogether, Ivan played an

important role in the promotion of literacy and Eastern Orthodox confessional unity, and he introduced a high level of content, design, and craftsmanship into a critically needed profession.

Born sometime around 1510 in Muscovy, he studied at Krakow University, where he probably received training in Greek and Latin, and from which he graduated in 1532. Subsequently, he worked as deacon in the St. Nikola Gostunsky church in the Moscow Kremlin, serving from some time after 1533 until 1565. He was selected by Tzar Ivan IV "Grozny" to initiate an official printing press in Moscow where, together with his partner Petr Mstislavets, he printed books that were needed for an expanding Russian Orthodox Church. These included the first dated Russian imprint, the *Apostol* of 1563–1564, and two editions of the *Chasovnik* (*Horologion*, 1565). Several anonymous Moscow editions from the immediately preceding period (c. 1553–1563) are also generally ascribed to Ivan. His Moscow activity was cut short by what he de-



Ivan Fyodorov, the first Russian printer. Painting by Alexander Moravov. © TASS/SOVFOTO

scribes in one of his later editions as the antagonism of narrow-minded people, and he moved to Zabludovo in Belarus together with his son (also named Ivan) and Petr Mstislavets. Here he opened a new print shop under the sponsorship of Hetman G. A. Khodkevich and produced several more editions, including the *Evangelie uchitelnoe* (1569, *Instructive Evangelary*) and a psalter (1570). Advised by his aging sponsor to retire to farming on land provided him, he declined, saying he was suited to sowing not seeds but the printed word. Instead, he moved to the city of Lviv (now in Ukraine), where with his son he printed more editions, including a reprint of his Moscow *Apostol* (1573–1574), and the *Bukvar* (1574, *Primer*).

Fedorov subsequently established one more print shop, on the estate of Prince Kostiantyn (Constantine) of Ostroh, participating in the latter's defense of Eastern Orthodoxy against increasing pressure from Western denominations. The major publication among the several issued there was the famous Ostroh Bible, which remains of prime historical, textual, and confessional importance. The first complete printed Church Slavonic Bible, it was issued in a large print-run and widely distributed

among East Slavic lands and abroad, surviving in the early twenty-first century in some 300 copies. In 1581 Ivan left Ostroh to return to Lviv, where he died on December 15, 1583. He was buried in the Onufriev Monastery; his gravestone read, in part, "printer of books not seen before." The literature devoted to Ivan Fyodorov is vast, well exceeding two thousand titles, mostly in Russian and other Slavic languages.

See also: EDUCATION; IVAN IV

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HUGH M. OLMSTED

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GAGARIN, YURI ALEXEYEVICH

(1934–1968), cosmonaut; first human to orbit Earth in a spacecraft.

The son of a carpenter on a collective farm, Yuri Gagarin was born in the village of Klushino, Smolensk Province. During World War II, facing the German invasion, his family evacuated to Gziatsk (now called Gagarin City). Gagarin briefly attended a trade school to learn foundry work, then entered a technical school. He joined the Saratov Flying Club in 1955 and learned to fly the Yak-18. Later that year, he was drafted and sent to the Orenburg Flying School, where he trained in the MIG jet. Gagarin graduated November 7, 1957, four days after Sputnik 2 was launched. He married Valentina Goryacheva, a nursing student, the day he graduated.

Gagarin flew for two years as a fighter pilot above the Arctic Circle. In 1958 space officials recruited air force pilots to train as cosmonauts. Gagarin applied and was selected to train in the first group of sixty men. Only twelve men were taken for further training at Zvezdograd (Star City), a training field outside Moscow. The men trained for nine months in space navigation, physiology, and astronomy, and practiced in a mockup of the spacecraft Vostok. Space officials closely observed the trainees, subjecting them to varied physical and mental stress tests. They finally selected Gagarin for the first spaceflight. Capable, strong, and even-tempered, Gagarin represented the ideal Soviet man, a peasant farmer who became a highly trained cosmonaut in a few short years. Sergei Korolev, the chief designer of spacecraft, may have consulted with Nikita Khrushchev, Russia's premier, to make the final selection.

Gagarin was launched in Vostok 1 on April 12, 1961, from the Baikonur Cosmodrome near Tyuratam, Kazakhstan. The Vostok spacecraft included a small spherical module on top of an instrument module containing the engine system, with a three-stage rocket underneath. Gagarin was strapped into an ejection seat. He did not control the spacecraft, due to uncertainty about how spaceflight would affect his physical and mental reactions. He orbited the earth a single time at an altitude of 188 miles, flying for one hour and forty-eight minutes. He then ejected from the spacecraft at an altitude of seven kilometers, parachuting into a field near Saratov. His mission proved that humans could survive in space and return safely to earth.





Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin prepares to be the first man to orbit the Earth. © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Gagarin was sent on a world tour to represent the strength of Soviet technology. A member of the Communist Party since 1960, he was appointed a deputy of the Supreme Soviet and named a Hero of the Soviet Union. He became the commander of the cosmonaut corps and began coursework at the Zhukovsky Institute of Aeronautical Engineering. An active young man, Gagarin often felt frustrated in his new life as an essentially ceremonial figure. There were many reports of Gagarin's resulting depression and hard drinking. In 1967, however, he decided to train as a backup cosmonaut in anticipation of a lunar landing.

On March 27, 1968, Gagarin conducted a test flight with a senior flight instructor near Moscow. The plane crashed, killing both men instantly. Gagarin's tragic death shocked the public in the USSR and abroad. A special investigation was conducted amid rumors that Gagarin's drinking caused the crash. Since then, investigators have indicated other possible causes, such as poor organization and faulty equipment at ground level.

Gagarin received a state funeral and was buried in the Kremlin Wall. American astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin left one of Gagarin's medals on the moon as a tribute. The cosmonaut training center where he had first trained was named after him. A crater on the moon bears his name, as does Gagarin Square in Moscow with its soaring monument, along with a number of monuments and streets in cities throughout Russia. At Baikonur, a reproduction of his training room is traditionally visited by space crews before a launch. Russians celebrate Cosmonaut Day on April 12 every year in honor of Gagarin's historic flight.

See also: SPACE PROGRAM

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PHYLIS CONN

GAGAUZ

More than ten hypotheses exist about the origins of the Gagauz, although none of them has been proven decisively. In Bulgarian and Greek scholarship, the Gagauz are considered, respectively, to be Bulgarians or Greeks who adopted the Turkish language. The Seljuk theory is popular in Turkey. It argues that the Gagauz are the heirs of the Seljuk Turks who in the thirteenth century resettled in Dobrudja under the leadership of Sultan Izeddina Keikavus, and together with the Turkish-speaking Polovetsians of the southern Russian steppes (Kipchaks in Arabic, Kumans in European historiography) established the Oghuz state (Uzieialet).

In Russia scholars believe that the base of the Gagauz was laid by Turkish-speaking nomads

(Oghuz, Pechenegs, and Polovetsians) who settled in the Balkan Peninsula from Russia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and there turned from nomadism into a settled population and adopted Christianity.

During the Russian–Turkish wars at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the Gagauz resettled in the Bujak Steppe of southern Bessarabia, which had been emptied of the Nogai and annexed by the Russian Empire. From 1861 to 1862 a group of Gagauz settled in the Tauride province, a region that is today part of Ukraine. During the Stolypin agrarian reforms of 1906 to 1911, some of the Gagauz resettled in Kazakhstan, and in the 1930s, in protest against the collectivization imposed by Josef Stalin, they moved to Uzbekistan. There they stayed until the end of the 1980s under the name of Bulgars. At the end of the 1920s a few dozen families, in order to save themselves from the discriminatory policies of rumanization, migrated to Brazil and Canada.

The short-lived migration of some families to southern Moldavia, at the time of the Khrushchev Thaw at the end of the 1950s, was unsuccessful. According to the census of 1989, there were 198,000 Gagauz in the former Soviet Union, of whom 153,000 lived in Moldavia, 32,000 in Ukraine, and 10,000 in the Russian Federation. One-third of the Gagauz lived in cities.

Those Gagauz who are religious are Orthodox. The Gagauz language belongs to the southwestern (Oghuz) subgroup of the Turkish group of the Altaic language family. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, folklore texts were published in the Gagauz language, using the Cyrillic alphabet. In 1957 a literary language was established on the basis of the Russian alphabet. On January 26, 1996, by order of the People's Assembly of Gagauzia, writing switched to the Latin alphabet. The official languages in Gagauzia are Moldavian, Gagauz, and Russian.

The majority of the Gagauz are bilingual. In 1959, 94.3 percent of Gagauz spoke the language of their nationality; in 1989, 87.4 percent. The Gagauz speak fluent Russian. In 2000 the Gagauz language was taught in forty-nine schools, in Komrat State University, and in teachers' colleges and high schools.

The contemporary culture of the Gagauz is represented by the State Dramatic Theater (in the city of Chadyr-Lunga), the Kadynzha Ensemble, and musical and folklore groups.

On January 24, 1994, the parliament of the Republic of Moldova passed the law On the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (*Gagauz Eri*), which established the autonomous region of Gagauzia. This new form of self-determination for the Gagauz was based on the two principles of ethnicity and territory and won great approval in Europe.

At the turn of the twentieth century cattle-raising and livestock husbandry dominated, this has been replaced by agriculture, viniculture, tobacco farming, and industrial production.

See also: MOLDOVA AND MOLDOVANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

MIKHAIL GUBOGLO

GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH

(b. 1956), economist, prime minister.

The public face of shock therapy, Yegor Timurovich Gaidar was a soft-spoken economist who, at the age of thirty-six, became prime minister in the turbulent first year of Boris Yeltsin's administration. He came from a prominent family: his father was *Pravda's* military correspondent, and his grandfather a war hero and author beloved by generations of Soviet children. Gaidar graduated from Moscow State University in 1980 with a thesis on the price mechanism, supervised by reform economist Stanislav Shatalin. He then worked as a researcher at the Academy of Sciences Institute of Systems Analysis. In 1983 he joined a commission on economic reform that advised General Secretary Yuri Andropov. In 1986, he formed an informal group, Economists for Reform, and from 1987 to 1990 he was an editor at the Communist Party journal *Kommunism*, under the reformist editor Otto Latsis. In 1990, he became a department head at *Pravda* and headed a new Institute of Economic Policy. Gaidar walked into the White House during the August coup and offered his services to Yeltsin aide Gennady Burbulis. With the support of the young democratic activists, Gaidar became a key player in Yeltsin's team, drafting his economic program and even the Belovezh accords, which broke up the Soviet Union. He later described himself as on a kamikaze mission to turn Russia into a market economy. As deputy prime minister (with Yeltsin serving as prime minister) and minister of finance and economics from November 1991, Gaidar oversaw the introduction of price liberal-



Yegor Gaidar directed Russia's 1992 shock-therapy program.

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ization in January 1992. Russia experienced a burst of hyper-inflation, but formerly empty store shelves filled with goods. Communist and nationalist opposition leaders unfairly blamed the collapsing economy on Yeltsin's policies and Gaidar's ideas. Gaidar was appointed acting prime minister in June 1992, but the Congress of People's Deputies refused to approve his appointment in December. He left the government, returning as economics minister and first deputy prime minister in September 1993, in the midst of Yeltsin's confrontation with the parliament. At one point in the crisis Gaidar appealed to people over television to take to the streets to defend the government. Gaidar took part in the creation of a liberal, progovernment electoral bloc, Russia's Choice, but it lost to red-brown forces in the December 1993 parliamentary elections, winning just 15.5 percent of the party list vote. Gaidar left the government in January 1994, although he stayed on as leader of Russia's Choice in Parliament. At the same time, Gaidar became head of his own think tank, the Institute of Transition Economies. In the December 1995 elections he led the renamed Russia's Democratic Choice, which failed to clear the five percent threshold. He spoke out against the war in Chechnya, but supported Yeltsin in the 1996 election. During the later 1990s Gaidar served more as an author and commentator than as a front-rank politician. He defended his record, advocated more liberal reform,

and pursued business and academic interests. He was again elected to the Duma in December 1999 as head of the Union of Right Forces, an umbrella group uniting most of the fractured liberal leaders. The bloc went on to offer conditional support to President Vladimir Putin.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PERESTROIKA; PRIME MINISTER; PRIVATIZATION; SHOCK THERAPY; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER RUTLAND

GAMSAKHURDIA, ZVIAD

(1931–1999), human rights activist and writer.

Born the son of Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, a famous Georgian writer and patriot, Zviad Gamsakhurdia became a leading Georgian dissident and human rights activist in the Soviet Union. In 1974, along with a number of fellow Georgian dissidents, he formed the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights and in 1976, the Georgian Helsinki Group (later renamed the Helsinki Union). Active in the Georgian Orthodox church, during the 1970s he wrote and published a number of illegal *samizdat* (self-published) journals. The best-known were *The Golden Fleece* (*Okros sats'misi*) and *The Georgian Messenger* (*Sakartvelos moambe*). Arrested in 1977 for the second time (he was first imprisoned in 1957), after a public confession he was released in 1979 and resumed his dissident activities. After the arrival of *perestroika*, he participated in the founding of one of the first Georgian informal organizations in 1988, the Ilya Chavchavadze the Righteous Society. An active leader in major demonstrations and protests in 1988–1989, he became the most popular anticommunist national figure in Georgia and swept to power in October 1990 as leader of a coalition of nationalist parties called the Round Table-Free Georgia Bloc. Elected Chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, after amendments to the constitution, he was elected the first president of the Georgian Republic in May 1991.

His period in office was brief and unsuccessful. Unable to make the transition from dissident activist to political mediator and statesman, his in-

creasing authoritarianism alienated almost every interest group in Georgian society. A coalition of paramilitary groups, his own government's National Guard, intellectuals, and students joined to overthrow him in a fierce battle in the city center in January 1992. He made his base in neighboring Chechnya and in 1993 attempted to reestablish his power in Georgia, leading the country into civil war. Quickly defeated after his forces captured a number of major towns in west Georgia, he was killed, or committed suicide in December 1993 in the Zugdidi region, Georgia.

See also: GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; PERESTROIKA

STEPHEN JONES

GAPON, GEORGY APOLLONOVICH

(1870–1906), Russian Orthodox priest led a peaceful demonstration of workers to the Winter Palace on Bloody Sunday, 1905; the event began the 1905 revolution.

Father Georgy Apollonovich Gapon was a Ukrainian priest who became involved with missionary activity among the homeless in St. Petersburg, where he was a student at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy. His work attracted the attention of police authorities, and when Sergei Zubatov began organizing workers in police-sponsored labor groups, Gapon was brought to his attention. Zubatov's efforts in Moscow ran into the opposition of industrialists who objected to police interference in business matters. In St. Petersburg Zubatov tried to tone down police involvement by recruiting clergy to provide direction to his workers. Gapon was reluctant to become involved, sensing opposition to Zubatov among the officials and the distrust of workers, but he began attending meetings and established contacts with the more influential workers. He also argued with Zubatov that workers should be allowed to decide for themselves what was good for them.

During the summer of 1903, Zubatov was dismissed and given twenty-four hours to leave the city. In this manner Gapon inherited an organization created and patronized by the police. On the surface Gapon seemed to justify the trust of the authorities. A clubroom was opened where meetings began with prayers and the national anthem.

Portraits of the tsars hung on the wall. Ostensibly there were no reasons for the authorities to be concerned about the Assembly, as the organization was named, but beneath the surface, Gapon's ambitious plans began to unfold. Gathering a small group of the more active workers, he unveiled to them his "secret program," which advocated the winning of labor concessions through the strength of organized labor. His advocacy of trade unionism met with the enthusiastic support of the conferees, and he gained loyal supporters who would provide the leadership of the Assembly.

During the turbulent year of 1904, the Assembly grew rapidly. By the end of the year it had opened eleven branches. However, its rapid growth was causing concern among the factory owners, who feared the growing militancy of the workers and resented police interference on their behalf. Shortly before Christmas, four workers, all active members of the Assembly, were fired at the giant Putilov Works. Rumors spread that all members of the Assembly would be fired. When Gapon and police authorities tried to intercede, they were told that labor organizations were illegal and that the Assembly had no right to speak for its members. Faced with a question of survival, Gapon called a large meeting of his followers, at which it was decided to strike the Putilov Works—a desperate measure, since strikes were illegal.

The strike began on January 16, and by January 17 the entire working force in the capital had joined the strike. Branches turned into perpetual gatherings and rallies of workers. At one of the meetings, Gapon threw out an idea of a peaceful mass demonstration to present a workers' petition to the tsar himself. The idea caught on like fire. Gapon began preparing the petition. It essentially contained the more specific demands of his secret program and a vague compilation of the most popular demands of the opposition groups. Copies of the petition, "Most Humble and Loyal Address to be presented to the Tsar at 2 P.M. on the Winter Palace Square," were sent to various officials.

Meanwhile the march was prohibited, and reinforcements were brought to St. Petersburg. Police tried to arrest Gapon, but he could not be found. By then the workers were too agitated to abandon their hope to see the tsar; moreover, they did not think soldiers would fire on a peaceful procession that in some places was presented as a religious procession. But the soldiers opened fire in several locations, resulting in more than 130 casualties.

These events, known as Bloody Sunday, began the revolution of 1905.

Gapon called for a revolution, then escaped abroad. Becoming disillusioned with the revolutionary parties, he attempted to reconcile with the post-1905 regime of Sergei Witte. Upon his return to St. Petersburg, he tried to revive his organization but was killed by a terrorist squad acting on the orders of the notorious double agent, Evno Azef. To explain Gapon's murder, the perpetrators concocted a story of a workers' trial and execution.

See also: BLOODY SUNDAY; REVOLUTION OF 1905; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; ZUBATOV, SERGEI VASILEVICH

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WALTER SABLINSKY

GASPIRALI, ISMAIL BEY

(1851–1914), Crimean Tatar intellectual, social reformer, publisher, and key figure in the emergence of the modernist, or *jadid*, movement among Russian Turkic peoples.

Ismail Bey Gaspirali was born March 8, 1851, in the Crimean village of Avci, but he spent most of his first decade in Bakhchisarai, the nearby town to which his family had moved during the Crimean War (1853–1856). Reared in the Islamic faith, his education began with tutoring in Arabic recitation by a local Muslim teacher (*hoca*), but then continued in the Russian-administered Simferopol gymnasium and Russian military academies in Voronezh and Moscow. In 1872 he embarked on a foreign tour that took him through Austria and Germany to France, where he remained for two years. A year followed in Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire, before Gaspirali returned home during the winter of 1875. His observations abroad became the basis for one of his earliest and most important essays, *A Critical Look at European Civilization*

(*Avrupa Medeniyetine bir Nazar-i Muvazene*, 1885), and inspired the urban improvement projects during the four years (1878–1882) that he served as mayor of Bakhchisarai.

By then, the importance of education and the modern press had become for Gaspirali the keys to improving the quality of life for Crimean Tatars and other Turkic peoples, who were mostly adherents of Islam. Nineteenth-century European military might, economic development, scientific advances, increased social mobility, political experimentation, and global expansion impressed upon him the need for reconsideration of Turkic cultural norms, perspectives, and aspirations. The narrow focus of education, inspired by centuries of Islamic pedagogy whose purpose was the provision of sufficient literacy in Arabic for reading and reciting the *Qur'an*, struck Gaspirali as unsuited for the challenges of modern life as defined by European experience. A new teaching method (*usul-i jadid*), emphasizing literacy in the child's native language, and a reformed curriculum that included study of mathematics, natural sciences, geography, history, and the Russian language, should be instituted in new-style primary schools where children would be educated in preparation for enrolling in more advanced, modern, and Russian-supported institutions. The survival of non-European societies such as his own, many already the victims of European hegemony and their own adherence to time-honored practices, depended upon a willingness to accept change and new information, open up public opportunities for women, mobilize resources and talents, and become involved with worldly affairs.

The medium by which Gaspirali propagandized his new method, both as pedagogue and social transformer, was the modern press. Beginning in April 1883, he published a dual-language newspaper in both Turkic and Russian entitled *The Interpreter* (*Tercüman* in Turkic, *Perevodchik* in Russian). It appeared without interruption until early 1918, becoming the longest surviving and most influential Turkic periodical within the Russian Empire. In later years, Gaspirali published other newspapers—*The World of Women* (*Alem-i Nisvan*), *The World of Children* (*Alem-i Sibyan*), and *Ha, Ha, Ha!* (*Kha, Kha, Kha!*), a satirical review—and numerous essays and didactic manuals on subjects ranging from Turkic relations with Russia to pedagogy, geography, hygiene, history, and literature.

Gaspirali's espousal of substantive social change raised opposition from both Russian and Turkic

sources, but his moderate and reasoned tone won him important allies within local and national official circles, allowing him to continue his work with little interference. The intensification of ethnic controversy by the early twentieth century, however, increasingly marginalized him in relation to advocates of more strident nationalist sentiments and the politicization of Russian-Turkic relations. He died September 11, 1914 after a long illness.

See also: CRIMEAN TATARS; ISLAM; JADIDISM

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EDWARD J. LAZZERINI

GATCHINA

One of the great imperial country palaces to the south of St. Petersburg, Gatchina was located near the site of a village known since 1499 as Khotchino. In 1708 Peter I granted the land to his beloved sister Natalia Alexeyevna, after whose death in 1717 the property belonged to a series of favored court servitors. In 1765 Catherine II purchased the estate from the family of Prince Alexander Kurakin and presented it to Grigory Orlov. She commissioned the Italian architect Antonio Rinaldi to design for Orlov a lavish palace-castle in a severe and monumental neoclassical style. Rinaldi, who had worked with the Neapolitan court architect Luigi Vanvitelli, created not only a grandiose palace ensemble but also a refined park.

The palace, begun in 1766 but not completed until 1781, was conceived as a three-story block

with square, one-story service wings—designated the Kitchen and Stables—attached to either side of the main structure by curved colonnades. In order to project the appearance of a fortified castle, Rinaldi departed from the usual practice of stuccoed brick and surfaced the building in a type of limestone found along the banks of the nearby Pudost River. The flanking towers of the main palace and its restrained architectural detail further convey the appearance of a forbidding structure. On the interior, however, the palace contained a display of luxurious furnishings and decorative details, including lavish plaster work and superb parquetry designed by Rinaldi. Rinaldi also contributed to the development of the Gatchina park with an obelisk celebrating the victory of the Russian fleet at Chesme. The exact date of the obelisk is unknown, but presumably it was commissioned by Orlov no later than the mid-1770s in honor of his brother Alexei Orlov, general commander of the Russian forces at Chesme.

Following the death of Orlov in 1783, Catherine bought the estate and presented it to her son and heir to the throne, Paul. He in turn commissioned another Italian architect, Vincenzo Brenna, to expand the flanking wings of the palace. Brenna, with the participation of the brilliant young Russian architect Adrian Zakharov, added another floor to the service wings and enclosed the second level of a colonnade that connected them to the main palace. Unfortunately, these changes lessened the magisterial Roman quality of the main palace structure. Brenna also modified and redecorated a number of the main rooms, although he continued the stylistic patterns created by Rinaldi.

Grand Duke Paul was particularly fond of the Gatchina estate, whose castle allowed him to indulge his zeal for a military order based, so he thought, on Prussian traditions. The palace became notorious for military drills on the parade grounds in front of its grand facade. With the accession of Paul to the throne after the death of Catherine (November 1796), the Gatchina regime extended throughout much of Russia, with tragic results not only for the emperor's victims but also for Paul himself. After his assassination, in 1801, the palace reverted to the crown.

Among the many pavilions of the Gatchina park, the most distinctive is the Priory, the product of another of emperor Paul's fantasies. After their expulsion from the island of Malta, Paul extended to the Maltese Order protection and refuge, including the design of a small pseudo-medieval palace known as the Priory, intended for the prior

of this monastic military order. In his construction of the Priory, the architect Nikolai Lvov made innovative use of pressed earth panels, a technique that Paul had observed during a trip to France. The relatively isolated location of the Priory made it a place of refuge in 1881–1883 for the new emperor, Alexander III, concerned about security in the wake of his father's assassination.

For most of the nineteenth century the palace drifted into obscurity, although it was renovated from 1845 to 1852 by Roman Kuzmin. After the building of a railway through Gatchina in 1853, the town, like nearby Pavlovsk, witnessed the development of dacha communities. Gatchina briefly returned to prominence following the Bolshevik coup on November 7, 1917. The deposed head of the Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky, attempted to stage a return from Gatchina, but by November 14 these efforts had been thwarted. In the fall of 1919 the army of General Nikolai Yudenich also occupied Gatchina for a few weeks before the collapse of his offensive on Petrograd.

After the Civil War, the palace was nationalized as a museum, and in 1923 the town's name was changed to Trotsk. Following Trotsky's fall from power, the name was changed again, in 1929, to Krasnogvardeysk. With the liberation of the town from German occupation in January 1944, the imperial name was restored. Notwithstanding the efforts of museum workers to evacuate artistic treasures, the palace ensemble and park suffered catastrophic damage between September 1941 and 1944. Major restoration work did not begin until the 1970s, and in 1985 the first rooms of the palace museum were reopened.

See also: ARCHITECTURE

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WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

GENERAL SECRETARY

Top position in the Communist Party

Prior to the revolution, Vladimir I. Lenin, the head of the Bolshevik faction, had a secretary,

Elena Stasova. After the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, Lenin gave the position of secretary in the ruling Communist Party of Russia to Yakov Sverdlov, a man with a phenomenal memory. After Sverdlov's death in 1919, three people shared the position of secretary. In 1922, in recognition of the expanding party organization and the complexity of the newly formed USSR, a general secretary was appointed. Josef Stalin, who had several other administrative assignments, became general secretary, and used it to build a power base within the party. Lenin, before his death, realized Stalin had become too powerful and issued a warning in his Last Testament that Stalin be removed. However, skillful use of the patronage powers of the general secretary solidified Stalin's position. After Stalin's death in 1953, the position was renamed first secretary of the Communist Party (CPSU) in an attempt to reduce its significance. Nonetheless, Nikita S. Khrushchev (1953–1964) succeeded in using the position of first secretary to become the single most powerful leader in the USSR. Khrushchev's successor, Leonid I. Brezhnev (1964–1982) restored the title of general secretary and emerged as the most important political figure in the post-Khrushchev era. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, working as unofficial second secretary under general secretaries Yuri V. Andropov (1982–84) and Konstantin U. Chernenko (1984–85), solidified his position as their successor in 1985. Gorbachev subsequently reorganized the presidency in 1988–89, and transferred his attention to that post. After the 1991 coup, Gorbachev resigned as general secretary, one of several steps signaling the end of the CPSU.

The position of general secretary was the most influential role in leadership for most of the Soviet period. Its role was closely associated with the rise of Stalin and the end of the position was also a signal of the end of the Soviet system.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; SUCCESSION OF LEADERSHIP, SOVIET

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NORMA C. NOONAN

GENETICISTS

Adherents of a prescriptive theoretical model for economic development planning in a controversy of the 1920s.

The geneticists participated in an important theoretical controversy with the teleologists over the nature and potential limits to economic planning. The issue was fundamental and cut to the heart of the very possibility of central planning. Would a central planning agency be constrained by economic laws, such as supply and demand, or by other fixed economic regularities, such as sector proportions, or could planners operate to shape the economic future according to their own preferences?

The geneticists argued that it was necessary to base economic plans on careful study of economic laws and historical determinants of economic activity. The past and certain general laws constrained any plan outcome. In this view, planning was essentially a form of forecasting. The teleologists argued on the contrary that planners should set their objectives independently of such constraints, that planning could seek to override market forces to achieve maximum results focused on decisive development variables, such as investment. Proponents of the geneticist view included Nikolai Kondratiev and Vladimir Groman and were well disposed to the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s. The teleologists included Stanislav Strumilin and Pavel Feldman who were less well disposed toward the NEP and believed it would be possible to force economic development through binding industrial and enterprising targets.

The argument became quite heated and oversimplified. The degree of freedom of action that the geneticists allowed planners was miniscule, and it appeared that planning would involve little more than filling in plan output cells based almost entirely on historical carryover variables. The teleologists claimed a degree of latitude to planners that was almost total. In the end the geneticists lost, and Soviet planning followed the teleologists' approach: it consisted of a set of comprehensive targets designed to force both the pace and the character of development. Soviet experience over the long run, however, suggests that the geneticists were closer to the mark concerning constraints on development.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; KONDRATIEV, NIKOLAI DMITRIEVICH; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; TELEOLOGICAL PLANNING

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JAMES R. MILLAR

GENEVA SUMMIT OF 1985

A summit meeting of U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev took place in Geneva, Switzerland, on November 19–20, 1985. It was the first summit meeting of the two men, and indeed of any American and Soviet leaders in six years. Relations between the two countries had become much more tense after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979, and the election a year later of an American president critical of the previous era of détente and disposed to mount a sharp challenge, even a crusade, against the leaders of an evil empire. However, by 1985 President Reagan was ready to meet with a new Soviet leader and test the possibility of relaxing tensions.

Although the Geneva Summit did not lead to any formal agreements, it represented a successful engagement of the two leaders in a renewed dialogue, and marked the first step toward several later summit meetings and a gradual significant change in the relationship of the two countries. Both Reagan and Gorbachev placed a high premium on direct personal encounter and evaluation, and they developed a mutual confidence that helped steer national policies.

Gorbachev argued strongly at Geneva for a reconsideration of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars), but to no avail. He did, however, obtain agreement to a joint statement that the two countries would "not seek to achieve military superiority" (as well as reaffirmation that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought"). This joint statement was given some prominence in Soviet evaluations of the summit, and was used by Gorbachev in his redefinition of Soviet security requirements. Although disappointed at Reagan's unyielding stance on SDI, Gorbachev had come to realize that it represented a personal moral commitment by Reagan and was not simply a scheme of the American military-industrial complex.

The Geneva summit not only established a personal bond between Reagan and Gorbachev, but for the first time involved Reagan fully in the execution of a strategy for diplomatic reengagement with the Soviet Union, a strategy that Secretary of State George Schultz had been advocating since 1983 despite the opposition of a number of members of the administration. For Gorbachev, the summit signified recognition by the leader of the other superpower. Although it was too early to predict the consequences, in retrospect it became clear that the renewed dialogue at the highest level would in time lead to extraordinary changes, ultimately contributing to the end of the Cold War.

See also: COLD WAR; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

side pressed for the broadest possible repayment of Russian obligations, but offered little in loans and trade credits. The Soviets pushed for as much Western financed trade and technological assistance as possible, but conditioned limited debt repayment on the recovery of the Soviet economy. Moreover, Foreign Commissar Georgy Chicherin angered the Western representatives by calling for comprehensive disarmament and representation for the colonial peoples in the British and French empires. The impasse between Russia and the West, combined with a similar stalemate between the Anglo-French side and Germany, caused Berlin and Moscow to conclude a political and economic pact, the Rapallo Treaty. Thus, the Genoa Conference ended in failure, though the USSR succeeded in gaining recognition as an integral part of European diplomacy and in bolstering its relationship with Germany.

See also: WORLD WAR I

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TEDDY J. ULDRICKS

GENOA CONFERENCE

The Genoa Conference, convened in April and May 1922, was an international diplomatic meeting of twenty-nine states, including Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, and Japan, but not the United States. It was summoned to resolve several problems in the postwar restructuring of Europe, including the desire to reintegrate Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany into the political and economic life of Europe on terms favorable to the dominant Anglo-French alliance. The Allies wanted Moscow to repay foreign debts incurred by previous Russian governments, compensate foreign owners of property nationalized by the Bolsheviks, and guarantee that revolutionary propaganda would cease throughout their empires.

The invitation for Soviet participation in the conference facilitated Moscow's drive for peaceful coexistence with the West and for the substantial foreign trade, technology, loans, and investment required by the New Economic Policy. Both sides failed to achieve their objectives. The Anglo-French

GENOCIDE

Genocide is a word coined after World War II to designate a phenomenon that was not new—the extermination, usually by a government, of a group of people for their ethnic, religious, racial, or political belonging. The term implies both a deliberate intent as well as a systematic approach in its implementation. Until international law came to terms with the Holocaust of the Jewish people in Europe, the extermination of such groups was considered as a crime against humanity or as a war crime, since wars tended to provide governments the opportunity to execute their designs. In a resolution adopted in 1946, the U.N. General Assembly declared genocide a crime under international law—its perpetrators to be held accountable for their actions. Two years later, with the full support of the USSR, the same body approved the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that went into effect soon after.

Article II of the Convention defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another.” Article III of the Convention stipulated that those who commit such acts as well as those who support or incite them are to be punished. The Convention provided for an International Court of Justice to try cases of genocide. The Tribunal was established only in 2002. Meanwhile, the genocide of Ibos in Nigeria during the 1970s was not considered by any court; those responsible for the Cambodian genocide during the 1980s were tried by a domestic court some years later; the genocide during the mid 1990s of the Tutsis by the Hutus in Rwanda was finally considered by an international court in Tanzania, while an international tribunal in The Hague undertook a review of charges of genocide against Serb, Croat, and other leaders responsible for crimes during the Balkan crisis following the collapse of Yugoslavia during the early 1990s.

Two well-known cases of genocide have affected Russia and the Soviet Union. The Young Turk Government of the Ottoman Empire implemented a deliberate and systematic deportation and extermination of its Armenian population during World War I in the Western part of historic Armenia under its domination. Eastern Armenia had been integrated into the Russian Empire by 1828. Russia, along with other European powers, had pressed Ottoman governments to introduce reforms in Ottoman Armenia and Russian Armenians were involved in the efforts to produce change. Close to one million Armenians perished as a result. The Russian army, already at war with the Ottomans, was instrumental in saving the population of some cities near its border, assisted by a Russian Armenian Volunteer Corps. Many of the survivors of the Genocide ended up in Russian Armenia and southern Russia. Others emigrated after 1920 to Soviet Armenia, mainly from the Middle East during the years following World War II. A few of the Young Turk leaders responsible for the Armenian genocide were tried by a Turkish court following their defeat in the war and condemned, largely in absentia, but the trials were halted due to changes in the domestic and international environment.

During World War II Nazi advances into Soviet territory provided an opportunity to German forces to extend the policy of extermination of Jews into those territories. Nazi leaders responsible for the Holocaust were tried and condemned to various sentences at Nuremberg, Germany, following the war.

Russian and Soviet governments have tolerated or implemented policies that, while not necessarily qualified as genocides, raise questions relevant to the subject. Pogroms against Russian Jews during the last decades of the Romanov Empire and the deportation of the Tatars from Crimea, Chechens and other peoples from their Autonomous Republics within Russia, and Mtskheta Turks from Georgia during and immediately following World War II on suspicion of collaboration with the Germans reflect a propensity on the part of Russia and Soviet governments to resolve perceived political problems through punishment of whole groups. Equally important, the politically motivated purges engineered by Josef Stalin and his collaborators of the Communist Party and Soviet government officials and their families and various punitive actions against whole populations claimed the lives of millions of citizens between 1929 and 1939.

In one case, Soviet policy has been designated as genocidal by some specialists. As a result of the forced collectivization of farms during the early 1930s, Ukraine suffered a famine, exacerbated by a severe drought, which claimed as many as five million lives. The Soviet government’s refusal to recognize the scope of the disaster and provide relief is seen as a deliberate policy of extermination.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; WORLD WAR II.

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GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN

GEOGRAPHY

Russia is the world's largest country, 1.7 times larger than second-place Canada, ten times larger than Alaska, and twenty-five times larger than Texas. It stretches from 19° E Longitude in the west to 169° W Longitude in the east, spanning 5,700 miles (9,180 kilometers) and eleven time zones. If Russia were superimposed on North America with St. Petersburg in Anchorage, Alaska, the Chukchi Peninsula would touch Oslo, Norway, halfway around the globe. Thus, when Russians are eating supper on any given day in St. Petersburg, the Chukchi are breakfasting on the next. From its southernmost point (42° N) to its northernmost islands (82° N), the width of Russia exceeds the length of the contiguous United States.

Russia's size guarantees a generous endowment of natural features and raw materials. The country contains the world's broadest lowlands, swamps, grasslands, and forests. In the Greater Caucasus Mountains towers Europe's highest mountain, Mt. Elbrus. Flowing out of the Valday Hills northwest of Moscow and into the world's largest lake, the Caspian Sea, is Europe's longest river, the "Mother Volga." Almost three thousand miles to the east, in Eastern Siberia, is Lake Baikal, the world's deepest lake. The Russian raw material base is easily the world's most extensive. The country ranks first or second in the annual production of many of the world's strategic minerals. Historically, Russia's size has ensured defense in depth. Napoleon and Hitler learned this the hard way in 1812 and in the 1940s, respectively.

Because Russia is such a northerly country, however, much of the land is unsuitable for human habitation. Ninety percent of Russia is north of the 50th parallel, which means that Russian farmers can harvest only one crop per field per year. Three-fourths of Russia is more than 250 miles (400 km) away from the sea. Climates are continental rather than maritime. Great temperature ranges and low annual precipitation plague most of the country. Therefore, only 8 percent of Russia's enormous landmass is suitable for farming. The quest for food is a persistent theme in Russian history. Before 1950, famines were harsh realities.

The Russian people thus chose to settle in the temperate forests and steppes, avoiding the mountains, coniferous forests, and tundras. The primary zone of settlement stretches from St. Petersburg in

the northwest to Novosibirsk in Western Siberia and back to the North Caucasus. A thin exclave of settlement continues along the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok in the Russian Far East. Except for random mining and logging, major economic activities are carried out in the settled area.

Russia's size evidences great distances between and among geographic phenomena. Accordingly, it suffers the tyranny of geography. Many of its raw materials are not accessible, meaning they are not resources at all. The friction of distance—long rail and truck hauls—accounts for high transportation costs. Although in its entirety Russia displays great beauty and diversity of landforms, climate, and vegetation, close up it can be very dull because of the space and time required between topographical changes. Variety spread thinly over a massive land can be monotonous. Three-fourths of the country, for example, is a vast plain of less than 1,500 feet (450 meters) in elevation. The typical Russian landscape is flat-to-rolling countryside, the mountains relegated to the southern borders and the area east of the Yenisey River. The Ural Mountains, which divide Europe from Asia, are no higher than 6,200 feet (1,890 meters) and form a mere inconvenience to passing air masses and human interaction. Russia's average elevation is barely more than 1,000 feet (333 meters).

Russia is a fusion of two geologic platforms: the European and the Asiatic. When these massive plates collided 250 million years ago, they raised a mighty mountain range, the low vestiges of which are the Urals. West of the Urals is the North European Plain, a rolling lowland occasioned by hills left by Pleistocene glaciers. One set of hills stretches between Moscow and Warsaw: The Smolensk-Moscow Ridge is the only high ground between the Russian capital and Eastern Europe and was the route used by Napoleon's and Hitler's doomed armies. Further north between Moscow and St. Petersburg are the Valday Hills, which represent the source of Russia's major river systems: Volga, Dnieper, Western Dvina, and so forth. Where it has not been cleared for agriculture, the plain nurtures a temperate forest of broadleaf trees, which dominate in the south, and conifers, which prevail in the north. The slightly leached gray and brown soils of this region were first cultivated by the early eastern Slavs.

In the south, the North European Lowland merges with the Stavropol Upland of the North Caucasus Foreland between the Black and Caspian seas. Here the forests disappear, leaving only grass-



Russia, 1992 © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION.

land, or steppe, the soils of which are Russia's fertile *chernozems*. Along the western and northern shores of the Caspian Sea, desert replaces the grasslands. Farther south, North Caucasia merges with the Greater Caucasus Mountains, the highest peak of which is Mt. Elbrus (18,481 feet [5,633 meters]).

The northern part of the European Lowland supports a northern coniferous forest, known as taiga. The largest continuous stand of conifers in the world, the taiga stretches from the Finnish border across Siberia and the Russian Far East to the Pacific Ocean. Even farther north, flanking the Arctic Ocean is the Russian tundra. Permafrost plagues both the taiga and tundra, limiting their use for anything other than logging and mineral development. Soils are highly infertile podzols. Virtually all of Siberia and the Russian Far East consist of either taiga or tundra, except in the extreme southeast, where temperate forest appears again.

East of the Urals is the West Siberian Lowland, the world's largest plain. The slow-moving Ob and Irtysh rivers drain the lowland from south to north. This orientation means that the lower courses of the rivers are still frozen as the upper portions thaw. The ice dam causes annual floods that create the world's largest swamp, the Vasyugan. The Ob region contains Russia's largest oil and gas reservoirs. In southeastern Western Siberia is Russia's greatest coal field, the Kuzbas. South of the Kuzbas are the mineral-rich Altai Mountains, which together with the Sayan, and the Yablonovy ranges, form the border between Russia, China, and Mongolia.

East of the Yenisey River is the forested Central Siberian Plateau, a broad, sparsely populated tableland that merges farther east with the mountain ranges of the Russian Far East. In the southeastern corner of the plateau is a great rift valley in which

lies Lake Baikal, "Russia's Grand Canyon." Equal to Belgium in size, the world's deepest lake gets deeper with every earthquake.

See also: CLIMATE

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GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS

Georgia [Sak'art'velo] is among the "Newly Independent States" to emerge from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its territory covers 69,700 square kilometers, bordered by the North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation on the north, Azerbaijan to the west, Armenia and Turkey to the south and southwest, and the Black Sea to the east. It includes three autonomous regions: Adjara, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. The latter two have maintained a quasi-independent status for most of the post-Soviet period, and have been the scenes of violence and civil war. The capital city of Tiflis, located on the Mtkvari (or Kura) River in the heart of Georgia, has a population of 1.2 million, approximately 22 percent of the republic's 5.4 million. Georgia's head of state is a president. A unicameral parliament is Georgia's legislative body.

The Georgians are historically Orthodox Christians, with some conversions to Islam during times of Muslim rule. Their language, with its own alphabet (thirty-three letters in the modern form), is a member of the Kartvelian family, a group distinct from neighboring Indo-European or Semitic languages. Speakers of Mingrelian and Svanetian, two of the other Kartvelian languages, also consider themselves Georgian. Laz, closely related to Mingrelian, is spoken in Turkey. Georgia has an ethnically diverse population: Georgian 70.1 percent, Armenian 8.1 percent, Russian 6.3 percent, Azeri

5.7 percent, Ossetian 3 percent, Abkhaz 1.8 percent, and other groups comprising 5 percent.

Georgian principalities and kingdoms began to appear in the last few centuries of the first millennium B.C.E, and existed alongside a well-traveled east-west route on the peripheries of both Persian and Greco-Roman civilizations. These influences were mediated through their Armenian neighbors who, with the Georgians, also maintained contacts with Semitic cultures.

Ancient Georgian culture was split into two major areas: east and west, divided by the Likhi mountains. The eastern portion, known as Kartli, or Iberia, had its center at Mtskheta, at the confluence of the Aragvi and Mtkvari Rivers. When not directly controlled by a Persian state, it still maintained ties with the Iranian political and cultural spheres. This connection lasted well into the Christian period, when the local version of Zoroastrianism vied with Christianity.

Western Georgia was known by different names, depending upon the historical source: Colchis, Egrisi, Lazica. It had more direct ties with Greek civilizations, as several Greek colonies had existed along the Black Sea coast from as early as the sixth century B.C.E. Western Georgia was eventually more directly under the control of the Roman Empire, in its successive incarnations.

The conversion of the Kartli to Christianity occurred in the fourth century as the Roman Empire was beginning its own transition to Christianity. As with other aspects of cultural life, Armenian and Semitic sources were important. Mirian and his royal family, after being converted by St. Nino, a Cappadocian woman, made Christianity the official religion. Dates in the 320s and 330s are argued for this event. The conversion of the west Georgians land owes itself more directly to Greek Christianity.

The conversion of the Georgians was accompanied by the invention of an alphabet in the early fifth century. Scripture, liturgy, and theological works were translated into Georgian. This association of the written language with the sacred is a vital aspect of Georgian culture.

The Georgian capital was transferred from Mtskheta to Tiflis in the fifth century, a process begun during the reign of King Vakhtang, called Gorgasali, and completed under his son Dachi. Vakhtang is portrayed in Georgian sources, in an



Georgian citizens wave flags and shout during an anti-government rally in Tiflis, May 26, 2001. © AFP/CORBIS

exaggerated fashion, as one of the important figures in transferring Kartli from an Iranian orientation to a Byzantine one. This was a complex time of struggle in the South Caucasus, not only between Byzantine and Persian Empires, but also among various Armenian, Caucasian Albanian, and Georgian states vying for power.

These currents of conflict were drastically altered in the seventh century when Islam asserted its military and political power. Tiflis was captured by an Arab army in 645, a mere thirteen years after the death of Muhammad, and would remain under Arab control until the time of David II/IV (the numbering of the Bagratid rulers differs according to one's perspective) in the eleventh century.

While Christianity was tolerated in Eastern Georgia, the political center shifted westward, where

the Kingdom of Abkhazia grew to preeminence in the eighth century. This realm was one of mixed ethnic composition, including the Kartvelians of West Georgia (i.e. the ancestors of today's Mingrelians and Svanetians) and, toward the northwest, the ancestors of the Abkhazian people.

Meanwhile, a branch of the Bagratid family, which had ruled parts of Armenia, and who were clients of the Byzantine Empire, became prominent in the Tao-Klarjeti region of southwest Georgia. Because of Bagrat III (d. 1014), they became inheritors of the Kingdom of Abkhazia. From their capital Kutaisi they contemplated the re-conquest of Tiflis and the unification of Georgian lands. This was accomplished in 1122 by David II/IV, called the Builder, who reigned from 1089 to 1125. For nearly two centuries, through the reign of Tamar (1184–1212), the Georgians enjoyed a golden age,



Georgia, 1992 © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION.

when they controlled a multiethnic territory from the Black to the Caspian Seas and from the Caucasus Mountains in the north, toward the Armenian plateau in the south. It was also a time of great learning, with theological academies at Gelati, near Kutaisi, and in the east at Iqalto on the Kakhetian plain. The literary output of this time reached its zenith with Shota Rustaveli's epic tale of heroism and chivalry, *Knight in the Panther Skin*, written in the last quarter of twelfth century.

In the thirteenth century a succession of invasions by Turks and Mongols brought chaos and destruction upon the Georgians. These culminated in the devastating raids of Timur in the early fifteenth century. From these depredations Georgian society was very slow to recover, and for much of the next four centuries it remained under the sway of the Safavid Persian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Georgians at this time were active at the

Safavid court. The Bagratid dynasty continued to reign locally over a collection of smaller states that warred against one another. West European travelers who ventured through Georgia in these centuries give sad reports about the quality of life.

In the eighteenth century the Russian Empire's steady expansion brought it to the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains and along the Caspian Sea to the east of Georgia. Russians and Georgians had been in contact through earlier exchanges of embassies. Persian invasions in that century had been especially harsh, and the Georgians looked to their northern Orthodox neighbor for assistance. This assistance culminated first in the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk, by which Irakle II's realm of Kartli-Kakheti became a protectorate of the Russian Empire. Then, in 1801, soon after his accession to the throne, Alexander I signed a manifesto proclaiming Kartli-Kakheti to be fully incorporated into Rus-

sia. Other parts of Georgia followed within the next decade, although not always willingly.

Despite Russification efforts during the nineteenth century, the Georgian language and culture underwent a renaissance that would undergird Georgian national aspirations in the twentieth century. The Society for the Spread of Literacy among the Georgians, founded by Iakob Gogebashvili, was important for fostering language acquisition, especially among children. Ilia Chavchavadze, Akaki Tsereteli, and Vazha Pshavela dominated the literary scene into the twentieth century.

Georgians joined with comrades throughout the Russian Empire in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. When the Russian state began to shed its periphery in 1918, the Georgians briefly entered the Transcaucasian Republic. This political entity lasted from February until May 1918, but then split into its constituent parts. Georgia proclaimed its independence on May 26, 1918. The Democratic Republic of Georgia, beset by internal and external enemies, lasted less than three years, and on February 26, 1921, the Bolsheviks established Soviet power in Tiflis. Independent Georgia had been governed mainly by Mensheviks, an offshoot of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. They were reluctant nationalists, led by Noe Zhordania, who served as president. These Mensheviks became the demonic foil for any number of aspects of Soviet historiography and remained so for the Abkhazians when they would press for greater autonomy.

The Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia entered the USSR through the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1922 and remained a member of it until its dissolution in 1936. Afterward the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic became one of the USSR's constituent republics. Three autonomous regions were created within Georgia, part of what some describe as a manifestation of the "divide and conquer" regime of ethnic pseudo-sovereignties. The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was established across the border from North Ossetia, and the Adjar A.S.S.R. was an enclave of historically Muslim Georgians in the southwest. The third, and most troubled, part of Georgia was Abkhazia. This region in the northwest along the Black Sea coast had been in an ambiguous federative, treaty status with Georgia, but was finally, in 1931, incorporated as an A.S.S.R.

Georgia fared generally no better or worse for having its "favorite son," Iosep Jugashvili (a.k.a.

Josef Stalin), as the dictator of the Soviet Union. With other parts of the U.S.S.R., it suffered the depredations of party purges and the destruction of its national intelligentsia in the 1930s.

In the latter decades of the Soviet period, Georgia was held up as a sort of paradise within the Soviet system. Agriculture, with tea and citrus in the subtropical zone in the west, prospered, and the Black Sea coast was a favorite spot for vacationers from the cold north. The hospitality of the Georgians, seemingly uncooled by Soviet power, and always warmed by the quality of Georgia's famous wines, wooed Soviet and foreign guests alike.

The Georgians developed a vigorous dissident movement in the 1970s, with Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava playing leading roles. Tens of thousands came out into the streets of Tiflis in 1978 to protest the exclusion of the Georgian language from the new proposed Constitution of the Georgian S.S.R.

As Gorbachev's glasnost worked its effects, the Georgian independence movement gave rise to competing movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In reaction to a communiqué issued by Abkhazian intellectuals in March 1989, the main streets of Tiflis again overflowed with protesters. On the morning of April 9, 1989, troops moved against the demonstration, killing at least twenty and injuring scores of others. This outburst of violence marked the beginning of the rapid devolution of Soviet power in Georgia.

Georgia voted for its independence on April 9, 1991, and elected its first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, in May. His rule was harsh, and his presidency barely survived the final collapse of the USSR by a few months into 1992. Eduard Shevardnadze, who had held power in Georgia under Communist rule, and who became Gorbachev's foreign minister, returned to Georgia, eventually to be elected twice to the presidency. His presidency was plagued by warfare and continuing conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of which claimed independence. The ethnic conflict compounded the economic dislocations, although the proposed Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the beginning of an east-west energy corridor, has brought the promise of some future prosperity.

See also: CAUCASUS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD AMVROSIEVICH

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PAUL CREGO

GEORGIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Orthodox Church of Georgia, an autocephalous church of the Byzantine rite Eastern Churches, is an ancient community. It dates from the fourth century, and stories of the evangelization of Kartli center around St. Nino, called Equal to the Apostles, who was born in Cappadocia, studied in Jerusalem, and made her way through Armenia to preach, heal, baptize, and convert the Georgian people. Later traditions add apostolic visits from St. Andrew and St. Simeon the Canaanite that reflect evangelization of western Georgia. Christians in Kartli continued to have a strong relationship with the Armenians until the seventh century, when these Christian people opted for different Christologies.

The autocephaly of the Orthodox Church is claimed from the fifth century, when the Archbishop of Mtskheta was given the title of Catholicos. There was later also a Catholicos in western Georgia, coinciding with the Kingdom of Abkhazia.

Western Georgia was evangelized more directly by Greeks, and, after the split from the Armenians, the entire Georgian Church strengthened its ties with the church in Constantinople. Of the family of Orthodox Churches that derive their liturgies from the Byzantine tradition, the liturgical language remains an archaic Georgian, not entirely intelligible to modern speakers.

The Georgians, for much of their history, have lived under the rule of Muslim states. Arab Muslims conquered Tiflis in 645, and it continued under Muslim rule until 1122. After a brief golden age the Georgians again came under Muslim control, alternating between Savifid Persians and Ottoman Turks. The church endured this period of time with difficulty and looked for assistance from their Orthodox neighbors in Russia toward the end of the eighteenth century. The identification of the Georgian nation with its Orthodox identity was strengthened in this period, as the church was often the guarantor of linguistic and national identity and the legal authority for the nation.

Soon after the Russians annexed Georgia (1801), the autocephaly of the Georgian Church was rescinded (1811) and it became a part of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Georgian Church became one of the institutions in Georgia through which the imperial government attempted its program of Russification.

The Georgian Church reclaimed its autocephaly in 1918, as Georgia was proclaiming its independence. This short period of breathing space was quickly constricted with the imposition of Soviet power, and nearly seven decades of atheist education and oppression took a devastating toll on the Georgian Church. As in the rest of the USSR, church buildings were closed, confiscated for other purposes, left to ruin, or destroyed. The role of the clergy was restricted, and many came under suspicion as possible KGB agents.

The reign of Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II from December 1977 marked a new beginning in the life of the Georgian Church. Slowly, Ilia began to restore episcopal sees and reopen churches. In October 1988, the Tiflis Theological Academy was opened. With the changes of perestroika and glasnost and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Georgian Church continued a dramatic revival. By the end of the 1990s dozens of churches had been rebuilt and many new ones built.

During the first decade of Georgia's new independence the church struggled to find its place in society and in relation to the state. Georgian politicians, especially the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, have used and misused their ties to the church. The new Georgian Constitution not only guarantees freedom of religion and conscience but gives the church a place of historical honor. This place of honor was given further definition and practical meaning by a Concordat signed by the government and the church on October 14, 2002.

The Georgian Church was encouraged to join the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1961, and Iliia II has served as its president. Internal pressures from conservatives helped to further the decision of the Georgians to leave the WCC and other ecumenical bodies during the spring of 1997.

There has also been considerable persecution of non-Orthodox religious communities, including Baptists, Pentecostals, and Jehovah's Witnesses, in the post-Soviet period, some of it violent. The Orthodox responsible for this persecution are generally persons excommunicated by the Georgian Church. Some within the church, however, have participated either by direct violence or by an elevation of rhetoric against the non-Orthodox.

See also: BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; RUSSIFICATION.

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PAUL CREGO

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

One of the unintended and initially unforeseen consequences of World War II was the division of Germany. At the end of the war, Western forces controlled and occupied Western Germany, while Soviet forces occupied Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe. The Allied powers, including Russia, agreed to divide Germany and Berlin into occupation zones. The tensions resulting from the joint administration of Germany, as well as the emergence of the Cold War, led in 1949 to the formal division of Germany into two separate states.

In 1949 occupied West Germany was transformed into the Federal Republic of Germany, a democratic state with close ties to the Western powers. In East Germany, the German Democratic Republic was founded. The Soviets had allowed political parties to form in their section of Germany as early as 1945, but had used pressure and coer-

cive measures to achieve a merger between the socialist and communist parties during April of 1946. The result was the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) or SED, which came to exercise near-complete control in East Germany. The GDR, like other communist governments established in Eastern Europe, had a central committee, and power came from the party leadership, which also assumed key roles in the state bureaucracy. The government used repressive measures such as censorship and arrest, and began to require communist ideology to be taught in schools. Walter Ulbricht, the head of the German Democratic Republic, had been part of the German Communist Party from 1919, the year it was founded, and had served as a communist deputy in the Reichstag during the Weimar Republic. Ulbricht was flown from the Soviet Union to Germany after the Soviet army had invaded Germany. Ulbricht, a hard-line Stalinist, stated in 1952 that East Germany could pursue the construction of full socialism, further restricting workers and reducing the availability of consumer goods. Although the Soviet Union had been exerting considerable pressure upon Ulbricht to reform and alter his repressive policies, the Soviets used force to suppress the rebellion his policies provoked in 1953.

Since the Soviet occupation of East Germany had begun, hundreds of thousands of Germans had fled to the West. The desire to escape Soviet-occupied territory intensified during Ulbricht's tenure, a fact illustrated by the 400,000 Germans who left East Germany in 1953. The Soviet Union was able to lessen this massive emigration by patrolling the border between the two German states and making it impassable, but until 1961, Germans could take public transportation from East Berlin to West Berlin and then declare themselves to authorities. In 1961, the Soviets officially sealed off East Berlin, as well as the last breach in East Germany, by building the Berlin Wall.

The erection of the Berlin Wall led to a stabilization of the situation in East Berlin and the end to the constant drain on the population. Ulbricht introduced the New Economic System in 1963. The New Economic System did not succeed in substantially altering the centralized structure of the East Germany economy, but it allowed for a relaxation of the rigid economic policies and for some independent decisions. As a result of these changes, the East German economy became the strongest of all of those countries within the Soviet sphere of occupation, while still far below the economies of

Western Europe. Ulbricht appeared to be at the height of his power in 1968, but many of his policies were unpopular. In 1971 Soviet authorities forced Ulbricht to step down. Ulbricht died in 1973, and his death paved the way for improved relations between East and West Germany. The East German minister, Willie Stoph, negotiated and signed several treaties with the German Federal Republic. Stoph briefly served as the effective head of state but was replaced by Erich Honecker in 1976. In 1989 the changes and reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and the reluctance of the Soviet leader to use force to suppress rebellions elsewhere led to uprisings in Eastern Europe. In East Germany the Berlin Wall symbolized not just the repressive Soviet-style government that had been in place since 1949 but also the single largest cause of resentment among Germans. The Soviet control of East Berlin and East Germany necessitated the forced separation of family and friends who were unable to secure travel permits or permission to emigrate from the notoriously inefficient and reactionary bureaucracy in the East. The uprisings in Eastern Europe and the discontent in Germany led the SED to replace Honecker and to pass a new law regarding travel and emigration. It was too little too late, however, and crowds swarmed the crossing point arguing that restrictions had been relaxed. When Soviet guards, unsure of the situation, opened the gate and allowed them to pass, Germans began to dismantle the Wall, and it was not long until the communist government in East Germany collapsed. The non-communist leadership of the German Democratic Republic immediately arranged to meet with authorities from the German Federal Republic. The initial focus of these talks was on the financial situation and the request for a loan to East Germany, but the question of German reunification also hung in the air. These developments led to the "Two plus Four" talks, encompassing the two German states and the four powers that had occupied Germany. The Two plus Four Treaty, concluded on September 12, 1990, dealt with all international issues regarding affairs in Germany, to the satisfaction of the major powers. The support of the president of the United States, George H.W. Bush, was instrumental in securing the approval of the French, who had grave concerns about the renewal of Germany. At 12:01 A.M. on October 3, 1990, the GDR ceased to exist, and the German Federal Republic became the sole authority for a reunified Germany. Reunification has greatly impacted all Germans socially, economically, and politically as

the complicated process of reintegrating East and West Germany has taken place within both a national and an international context.

See also: COMMUNIST BLOC; COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH

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MELISSA R. JORDINE

GERMAN SETTLERS

German traders and missionaries began settling on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea during the thirteenth century and eventually became the exclusive nobility in the region. The Germans ruled over the native Estonian and Latvian peasants and converted them first to Catholicism and then, after the Protestant Reformation, to Lutheranism. They were responsible for establishing merchant and artisan guilds in urban areas and feudal manors in rural areas. The Baltic Germans retained their privileged status even after Sweden decisively conquered the region during the 1620s. In 1721 the Russian Empire acquired the territories of Estland and Livland (equivalent to modern-day Estonia and northern Latvia) from Sweden. Germans became influential and loyal members of the Russian government and army, with some serving as generals, administrators, and diplomats. Baltic Germans fought simultaneously against the Bolsheviks and the Latvian nationalists during the late 1910s but did not succeed in establishing a permanent German-ruled state in the Baltics. The number of Germans living in the Baltics steadily decreased. Following a pact signed between the foreign ministers of Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin in August 1939, almost all of the remaining Baltic Germans moved to German-ruled Poland over the next two years.

Germans arrived in the Russian Empire in several additional waves of immigration between 1763 and 1862. The areas in which these Germans initially settled included the Middle Volga Area, southern Ukraine, the Crimean peninsula, Bessarabia, Volhynia, and the Caucasus. Their religions included Lutheranism, Catholicism, and Mennonitism.

On July 22, 1763, the Russian Tsar Catherine the Great issued a manifesto that offered foreigners the opportunity to settle in Russia. The newcomers were promised land, self-governance, religious freedom, exemptions from taxes and military service, and other privileges. The manifesto particularly appealed to Germans, who had suffered during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), a time of rampant famine and forced military conscription. From 1763 until 1767, approximately 25,000–27,000 Germans resettled in the Middle Volga river valley in 104 colonies in the provinces of Saratov and Samara, which later developed into 192 towns and villages. Most of the Volga Germans engaged in agriculture, harvesting such crops as rye, sunflowers, potatoes, and sugar beets, but some worked as tanners, sausage makers, millers, and craftspeople. Tsar Alexander II began drafting them into the Russian army in 1874. During the following decades, some Volga German families moved to Siberia, while others immigrated to the United States, Canada, and other countries. Volga Germans were afflicted by severe famines in 1891–1892, 1921–1922, and 1932–1933, the last one caused by Stalin's forced collectivization of farms. While the Volga Germans had been granted their own autonomous republic in 1924, it was abolished by Stalin on August 28, 1941, in the aftermath of Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, and the Volga Germans were deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia and forced into slave labor.

Between 1783 and 1812, the Russian Empire annexed former Ottoman and Crimean Tatar territories on the northern Black Sea coast. In 1787 Germans began to settle in New Russia, which later became the provinces of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, and Tauride. In 1813 Tsar Alexander I invited Germans to Bessarabia and offered them many privileges. The first German settlement in Bessarabia was founded in 1814, and in the following years, until 1842, many more Germans arrived and formed numerous other colonies. Many of the Bessarabian and Ukrainian Germans specialized in farming and grape growing, but others worked in trades like weaving, blacksmithing, shoemaking, and carpentry. Germans also founded factories and mills. Bessarabia became part of Romania in 1918, and its Germans departed in 1940.

The Russian Germans were very conscious of their identity, operating their own schools and churches and teaching their children the German language. Tsar Alexander III's Russification policies in the 1880s and 1890s made Russian the language

of all schools and abolished the Germans' right to self-government. During World War I, with Germany an enemy of Russia, German organizations and newspapers were shut down by the Russian government, preaching in German was outlawed, and Germans from Volhynia were exiled to Siberia (1915). During the Soviet years, increasing numbers of young Germans became fluent in Russian rather than in German.

Whereas from the 1950s to the 1970s few Soviet Germans were allowed to immigrate to Germany, during the late 1980s and 1990s a much larger number of Germans did so following the gradual easing of restrictions beginning in 1987. As of the 1989 census there were at least two million Germans living in the Soviet Union, but the majority of them left within a decade.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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KEVIN ALAN BROOK

GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH

The reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725) marked Russia's official entry into European diplomatic affairs. Around 1740 this was followed by the entry of another power, Prussia, transformed under Frederick the Great. Significant Russian-Prussian relations began during the reign of Catherine the Great

(1762–1796), a former German princess. Catherine's husband, Peter III, a great admirer of Frederick II, the king of Prussia, had withdrawn from the Seven Years' War, a decision that left Russia with no gains from a costly conflict that it had been waging successfully. After the coup removing Peter from the throne, Catherine repudiated his treaty with Prussia in order to demonstrate Russia's power and independence. By 1772, however, relations with Prussia had been reestablished, in part in connection with the negotiations leading to the partition of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon posed a direct threat to Prussia and Russia, and they both participated in the coalitions formed in opposition to the French emperor. The defeat of Napoleon led to the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The three most conservative of the attending powers (Russia, Austria, and Prussia) were determined to preserve a balance of power through the Concert of Europe and to preserve the old order by exercising the right to intervene militarily in order to preserve legitimate governments.

The next significant period in German-Russian relations occurred just prior to and during the unification of Germany under the leadership of King Wilhelm I of Prussia, and his iron chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck was able to unite Germany in part by securing Russian nonintervention. Although Russia has been criticized for enabling the rise of Germany, there were practical considerations for its support of Bismarck, such as the possibility of increasing its influence in certain areas as a consequence of the Austro-Prussian War. Furthermore, the possible consequences of German unification under Prussia were not fully understood. During the immediate aftermath of the unification, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany formed the Three Emperors' League (1872–1873), a defensive military alliance that attempted to revive and maintain the old order upheld at the Congress of Vienna. Difficulties and disagreements arising from the situation in the Crimea and in the Balkans brought about the league's collapse. It was revived and then allowed to lapse permanently in 1887 because of the impossibility of reconciling the differences between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Bismarck maintained relations with Austria and negotiated the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, which guaranteed the neutrality of the signatories in case of war, except if Germany attacked France or Russia attacked Austria-Hungary. Wilhelm II's dismissal of Bismarck and refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 led to the formation of

new alliances. Russia, no longer tied to Germany or Austria-Hungary, and afraid of being diplomatically isolated and without allies, negotiated a treaty with France. Wilhelm II alienated the British, who maintained friendly relations with the French, and Germany found itself allied with only Italy and Austria-Hungary.

During the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia that triggered World War I, Germany was compelled to support Austria-Hungary and Russia was similarly committed to support the Serbians. The resulting war led to a major conflict between Russia and Germany on the Eastern Front. Russia's poor performance in the war combined with the policies of Tsar Nicholas II led to defeat and revolution. The Bolshevik regime that replaced the Provisional Government ended Russia's participation in the war by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 which was bitterly resented by many Russian. The Versailles Treaty, signed by a defeated Germany, in 1919, overturned the earlier Russian-German agreement.

The refusal of the Allied powers to recognize the communist government and the diplomatic isolation of the Soviet Union were factors in German-Soviet relations during the interwar years. Even after the rise of Adolf Hitler and the violent suppression of the Communist Party in Germany, Josef Stalin continued to maintain relations with Germany. Although Hitler and Stalin gave considerable aid and support to different factions during the Spanish Civil War, no breach of their relationship occurred and negotiations for a nonaggression treaty were initiated. Stalin's primary reason for signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 is still uncertain. The Nazi-Soviet Pact included a nonaggression clause and a secret protocol calling for the division of Poland between the two countries. Whether Stalin believed a genuine alliance could be formed with Germany against the Allied powers or was merely attempting to gain time to further industrialize and prepare for war, it is clear that he did not expect the massive German invasion of the Soviet Union that was launched on June 22, 1941.

The defeat of Hitler and Germany by the Allied powers led to the occupation of Eastern Germany and East Berlin by the Soviet Union. Although divided and occupied, Germany played a role in the Cold War; the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was allied with the Soviet Union, while the German Federal Republic (West Germany) was allied with the United States and the Western pow-

ers. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union paved the way for the reunification of Germany in 1990. The republics of the former Soviet Union have established economic and diplomatic relations with unified Germany, which has become the Russian Federation's most important trading and financial partner in the post-communist era.

See also: GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC; GERMAN SETTLERS; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; SOVIET-GERMAN TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1939; THREE EMPERORS' LEAGUE; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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MELISSA R. JORDINE

GIGANTOMANIA

Gigantomania is the creation of abnormally large works. Gigantomania dominated different areas of political and cultural life in the Soviet Union and was a feature of other totalitarian societies (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, communist states of Eastern Europe, and modern China).

According to the Marxist theory, socialism must triumph historically over capitalism. Soviet rulers attempted to prove the superiority of the socialist system by the creation of gigantic industrial complexes, huge farms, colossal buildings, and enormous statues.

Enormous new cities and industrial centers were erected in the Soviet Union from the end of the 1920s through the 1930s. Historian Nicolas V. Riasanovsky wrote, "Gigantic industrial complexes, exemplified by Magnitostroi in the Urals and Kuznetsstroi in western Siberia, began to take shape. Entire cities arose in the wilderness. Magnitogorsk, for instance, acquired in a few years a population of a quarter of a million."

However, the execution of the Five-Year Plans, industrialization, and the forced collectivization of agriculture were accompanied by a huge number of human victims. Gulag prisoners working in terrible conditions built many of the huge projects.

Gigantism and monumental classicism became the typical features of Soviet architecture starting in the 1930s. All other architecture styles were suppressed in the Soviet Union. Historian Geoffrey Hosking points out that in the Soviet architecture ". . . neoclassical forms gradually became distorted, more extended in size . . ." As the result of this distortion, many large buildings were erected, as exemplified by the tasteless "wedding cake" style skyscrapers built in Moscow after World War II.

The same standard was used in Soviet sculpture and art. Huge monuments of Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin were erected in every sizable city. Many Soviet artists created paintings showing gigantic images of the communist leaders with tiny figures of the common people in the background.

Gigantomania began in Stalin's time, but continued after his death. During the 1960s to the 1980s two huge sculptures depicting the warrior "Motherland-Mother" were erected by sculptor Yevgeny Vuchetich near Kiev and Volgograd. According to Soviet doctrine, art should show the super-human accomplishments of the new socialist man, who was depicted as a huge muscular and overpowering human being. Even women were sculpted as enormous figures with rugged masculine physiques.

These works are now generally thought to be the vulgar creations of dilettante artists; showing the exceedingly poor taste of the all-powerful Soviet leaders who commanded their creation.

See also: ARCHITECTURE

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VICTORIA KHITERER

GINZBURG, EVGENIA SEMENOVNA

(1904–1977), Stalin-era memoirist.

Evgenia Semenovna Ginzburg was one of the most well-known and respected memoirists of Josef Stalin's purges and life in the Soviet Gulag. She was born into a middle-class Jewish family in Moscow. She became a teacher and party activist in Kazan. She married Pavel Aksenov, a high-ranking party official in Kazan, and the couple had two sons. The eldest, Alyosha, would die during the Siege of Leningrad; the younger, Vasily, became a noted writer in his own right. In 1937 both Ginzburg and her husband were arrested. Ginzburg spent the next two years in solitary confinement before being sent to a labor camp in Kolyma. While in the camps, she undertook a variety of work, including nursing, and she met Anton Walter, a fellow prisoner who worked as a doctor. He became her second husband. In 1947 Ginzburg was released from captivity but chose to stay in the Magadan area to wait for Walter to finish his allotted prison sentence. She began teaching Russian language and literature. Ironically many of her students at the time worked for the security services. Ginzburg was re-arrested in 1949. In 1955 she was released again. This time Ginzburg was allowed to return to Moscow and was officially rehabilitated. She began to write pieces for such Soviet periodicals as *Youth (Yunost)*, the *Teacher's Newspaper (Uchitelskaya gazeta)*, and the *News (Izvestiya)*. Despite her rehabilitation, Ginzburg's background still made her a bit suspect in the eyes of the authorities, so she never joined the Soviet Writers' Union. In 1967 the first volume of her memoirs, *Journey into the Whirlwind*, was published in Italy. The book covers the 1934–1939 period of her life. In it, she describes how her mentality as a devoted party member changed once she realized the extent of the Purges, and she notes the kinds of things people had to do to survive their imprisonment. In Ginzburg's case, for instance, she took great solace from her vast

knowledge of Russian poetry, and she would recite it at length for her fellow prisoners. The second volume of her memoirs, *Within the Whirlwind*, was published abroad in 1979 and describes her remaining years in prison as well as her life in Magadan and her eventual return to Moscow. There is a distinct difference in tone between the two volumes, with the second book being much harsher and honest in its criticisms. Many scholars have speculated that Ginzburg knew by then that her memoirs would not legally be published in the Soviet Union during her lifetime and that she chose not to temper her language in the hopes of publication. Both volumes of memoirs have been translated into an array of languages, and they remain among the best, most widely read accounts of Soviet prison life. In the Soviet Union, the books circulated widely in samizdat form among the dissident community and, finally, in 1989 they were published officially.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GULAG; PURGES, THE GREAT

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ALISON ROWLEY

GKOS

GKOs, *Gosudarstvennye Kratkosrochnye Obyazatel'stva*, are short-term ruble-denominated treasury bills issued since 1993. They played a major role in Russia's August 1998 economic crisis.

In the 1990s Russia was unable to balance its budget. The general government budget deficit

varied from 5 to as much as 25 percent of GDP without any declining trend. First the deficit was covered by money emission, which contributed to very high and variable inflation. The Russian government started in May 1993 to issue short-term zero-coupon bonds known as GKO. This was meant as a non-inflationary method of financing the deficit. The GKO maturity is less than a year. Sometimes the average maturity has been as short as half a year. There are also ruble-denominated medium-term federal bonds known as OFZs (since 1995). Other government debt instruments were also issued, but GKO remained the most important ones.

Russian inflation came down after 1995. The root problem, the budget deficit, was not addressed. It was believed that deficits could be financed by increasing debt. The government debt market was the fastest-growing market in 1996 and 1997. Domestic ruble-denominated debt remained very small until 1996 but rose to 13 percent of GDP in January 1997. This is still not an internationally high figure. But the high yields, short maturities, and large foreign ownership shares of GKO made the situation explosive.

The GKO real interest rates were first highly negative due to unexpectedly high inflation. As inflation subsided but GKO nominal yields remained high—due to high inflation expectations, political uncertainty or other reasons—real interest rates shot up. They were 30–60 percent in 1996–1997. Later they decreased, only to reach new highs in early 1998, as the danger of default became evident. Interest payments rose to 27.6 percent of federal government revenue in 1995 and more than half in early 1998. Most GKO were consequently issued to service earlier debt. By 1997 the GKO contribution to financing the deficit was actually negative. On the other hand, they had become the main revenue source for the larger Russian banks.

Access for foreigners to the GKO market was quite restricted until 1996. Due to the small size of the market relative to international capital flows and very high real interest rates, access was only liberalized gradually. Measures were used to keep the non-residents' earnings within limits. Still, by the end of 1997 their share in GKO stock was at least a third, perhaps more. The rest was basically owned by the Central Bank and the state-owned Sberbank. The risk of sudden exit of nonresident GKO holders was real. Nonresident behavior soon became a major source of the GKO market crisis in the spring of 1998.

After the crisis of August 1998, the government chose to restructure the GKO and OFZs, which were to a large part frozen. Afterward, Russian government debt market has remained quite illiquid. With budget surpluses, the government has not needed new debt. Investors remain wary. GKO stock is less than 1 percent of GDP. However, debt instruments would be useful for liquidity control and protection from inflation.

See also: ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; SBERBANK

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PEKKA SUTELA

GLASNOST

Glasnost is a Russian word that proved fateful for the Soviet communist empire in its last years of existence. Various translated as "openness," "transparency," or "publicity," its root sense is public voice or speech. Freedom of speech is a close Western equivalent.

Upon his rise to power in 1985 as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced *glasnost* as one of a troika of slogans in his campaign to reform a faltering Soviet system. He called for *glasnost* (openness) in public discussion, *perestroika* (restructuring) in the economy and political system, and *novoye mneniya* (new thinking) in foreign policy. All three slogans broke away from the ideology-laden sloganeering of past Soviet leaders and suggested movement away from dictatorship to a more open and democratic Soviet future.

While Gorbachev made *perestroika* the troika's centerpiece, *glasnost* was the most potent in bringing new political forces and formerly silenced voices onto the political stage. The notion of a public voice distinct from the ruling power and the idea of open

public debate ran hard against the Soviet ideological system.

Before Gorbachev, the regime recognized no public voice beyond the voice of the *nomenklatura*, the Communist Party hierarchy, speaking to its subjects through state-controlled media. All non-political, literary, academic, and scientific publication was subject to the strictures of the party line and censorship.

Glasnost made its initial and unofficial appearance during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, Gorbachev's predecessor. A small but vocal dissident movement (also known as the Democratic Movement) broke through the regime's facade of ideological conformity. It produced an underground press, *samizdat* (lit. self-publishing), which gave voice to a wide range of opinion and criticism at odds with the official line. A notable moment in samizdat came when Andrei Sakharov, the famed Soviet nuclear physicist and advocate of civil and democratic rights, published an unauthorized essay in 1968. He appealed to the top leaders to move toward glasnost and democracy as the path toward overcoming the country's urgent problems. Entitled *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, the essay, written in typescript, circulated widely inside the USSR and was smuggled to the West. Sakharov's outspokenness led the Brezhnev regime to exile him in 1980 to the closed city Gorky, far from Moscow and Western media sources. In a symbolic gesture of his glasnost policy, Gorbachev freed Sakharov from exile six years later and allowed him to return to Moscow.

Though Sakharov's essay may well have influenced Gorbachev, Gorbachev's version of glasnost was limited and aimed at a controlled change and liberalizing reform of the Soviet system without destroying its foundations. Yet, despite his effort to keep glasnost within manageable limits, it opened the door ever wider to an intensifying and searching public debate challenging the Soviet order itself. Newspapers, journals, once-banned books, and revelations from archives appeared and found appreciative audiences. Glasnost as transparency brought to light what the regime had hidden. Revelation upon revelation of its record of mass repressions, abuses, lies, and corruption were publicized, deepening its disrepute among the public at large. Glasnost also gave voice to long-suppressed national independence movements within the empire, which contributed to its disintegration. Defenders of the old order warned Gorbachev that glasnost was a

"two-edged sword" that could turn against its user. Yegor Ligachev, a fellow member of the Politburo, aimed a barb at Gorbachev that it was not wise to enter a room if you do not know the way out. And, in fact, the explosion of the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl, Ukraine, severely tested Gorbachev's commitment to glasnost.

Gorbachev's glasnost policy was a major factor precipitating and informing the political struggle developing in the leadership in the latter half of the 1980's and culminating in the coup of August 1991. The struggle began in earnest in the fall of 1987 with a split inside the ruling Politburo. Yegor Ligachev, former ally of Gorbachev, became his adversary on the right. Boris Yeltsin became his rival in the cause of reform on the left. Second in command in the Politburo, Ligachev defended the interests of the *nomenklatura* against Gorbachev's reforms. Yeltsin, who entered the Politburo under Gorbachev's patronage from provincial Sverdlovsk, pressed for a faster pace of reform than Gorbachev was then ready to promote. At a Central Committee meeting in October 1987, Yeltsin attacked Ligachev for sabotaging his reform efforts as Moscow party chief and accused Gorbachev of foot-dragging on perestroika. The upshot was Yeltsin's ouster from the Politburo and then as Moscow party secretary. His fall was a blessing in disguise for Yeltsin and freed him subsequently to rise as a popular leader untainted by association with the ruling group.

Despite his effort to control glasnost, Gorbachev soon found himself driven to more radical measures by the dynamic of the new political world that glasnost was bringing into play. First he proposed at a party plenum in January 1987 that party leaders be elected from below instead of by cooptation from above. He ran into a wall of resistance from local and regional party secretaries who feared losing power. He then turned to shifting his own base of power from the party to a new parliamentary body with constitutional powers beyond the reach of party control. In March 1989 he realized his project. A Congress of Peoples Deputies was instituted with two-thirds of its deputies popularly elected and a third selected from party and other official organizations. The Congress became a platform of open public debate televised to the whole country. Andrei Sakharov led the democratic grouping (Interregional Group) in opposition to the party *nomenklatura*. Sakharov lent his great prestige and the fire of his moral passion to the sharp and open debate in the body (often to Gor-

bachev's irritation as the president) and galvanized public opinion against Communist Party abuses. Though conservative party elements held a large majority in the Congress, they found themselves on the defensive in the face of withering criticism from the Sakharov-led opposition. Glasnost was winning the day, but Gorbachev's grip on public debate and democratic reform began to slip. The introduction of popular elections was reversing the political thrust in the heart of the Soviet system. Power from above was increasingly challenged by power coming from below.

Yeltsin lost no time in using the electoral process Gorbachev brought into being. In Moscow he won a seat in the Congress by landslide, and after Sakharov's death in December, he assumed Sakharov's place as leader of the democratic faction. He also won a seat in the parliament of the Russian Federation, the body that elected Yeltsin its president in May 1990. At his initiative the Russian presidency was made into a national elective office, and in June 1991 he handily won that office in a national election, becoming the first Russian leader so chosen. Yeltsin became a powerful challenger to Gorbachev and to the Soviet system itself. Glasnost and democratic reform were no longer Gorbachev's preserve. What formerly had been a mere facade of Russian self-government now became a second center of authority in the land.

As rivalry between Gorbachev and Yeltsin unfolded, conservative elements inside the party were marshaling their forces to challenge Gorbachev and suppress glasnost and the democratic movement. Gorbachev now walked a tightrope between right-wing forces and the Yeltsin-led forces on the left. Gorbachev's effort to shore up his presidential powers and build his base in the Congress of Peoples Deputies and its Supreme Soviet was ineffectual. His popularity plummeted as Yeltsin's soared.

Leaders of the party's old guard finally struck in August 1991. They sought to employ all the Soviet agencies of repression against the developing democratic and national revolution. They organized an emergency committee, seized power in its name, declared martial law, sent an armada of tanks into Moscow, and put Gorbachev under house arrest in his vacation dacha in the Crimea. Yeltsin defied the perpetrators of the coup from atop a tank in front of the White House (the Russian parliament building), drawing a mass of supporters around him. The standoff ended when the military and special forces refused the emergency

committee's orders to crush the opposition. The Russian democratic and national revolution under Boris Yeltsin's lead dissolved the emergency committee, arresting its members and the coup participants. The Russian Federation assumed full authority in its territories, abolished the Soviet Communist Party, and ushered the Soviet Union out of existence at the end of the year. The principal nations that had been subjected to the Soviet empire gained their independence. Gorbachev became a private citizen, and his rival, Yeltsin, went on to lead the resurrected Russian republic.

Before his death in December 1989, Sakharov, in a private encounter with Gorbachev, forewarned him that if he continued to seek unlimited power without standing for election, he would one day find himself without public support in a leadership crisis. Gorbachev was unwilling or unable to act on the clear implication that glasnost posed for his leadership, namely, that democratic legitimacy could only be secured through a process of public debate and popular election.

Though this was not his intention, Gorbachev paved the way for Russia's historical return as a nation-state and in the form of a democratic republic. His taking up of the cause of glasnost led to a renaissance of Russian intellectual and political life. Despite instability and a perilous transition from Soviet despotism to a fledgling republic, glasnost continued to be the rule in the new Russia's first decade, in the provisions of its new constitution, the existence of free public debate, and a series of orderly and reasonably fair parliamentary and presidential elections. Whether the spirit of glasnost prevails or wanes in the post-Yeltsin era was yet to be determined as the reborn Russia entered the twenty-first century. One thing was clear: glasnost would go down in the annals of Russian history as the potent word that brought down an empire.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; LIGACHEV, YEGOR KUZMICH; PERESTROIKA; SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH; SAMIZDAT; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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CARL A. LINDEN

GLAVKI

Plural, short for *glavnoye upravlenie*, or chief administration.

Glavki are subordinate administrative units or departments of Soviet state planning and existed in economic, military, and cultural ministries, such as tourism. In the economy these subdivisions of central or local industrial ministries dealt with specific industrial branches in formulating and administering the annual and perspective plans.

These departments appeared originally as parts of the Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh or Vesenkha) controlling particular sectors, such as the match, soap, oil, and timber industries (*Glavspichki*, *Tsentromylo*, *Glavneft*, *Glovles*, and so forth). They replaced the corresponding People's Commissariats by early 1918. During the civil war period, the glavki controlled distribution of scarce materials and ordered new production of items for war, subject to interference from the Party's Politburo and without a national plan, wages, or bookkeeping. By 1921 this had become a bureaucratic chaos (called *glavkism*). Nevertheless, these units survived reorganizations during the New Economic Policy of the 1920s and thereafter, emerging once again in 1931. Now under the commissariats (called ministries after 1946) and Gosplan in the Stalinist planning period, they acquired direct power over their subordinate enterprises until Nikita Khrushchev's reorganization in 1957.

As a result of subdivisions, some glavki became new ministries, whose number in the industrial and

construction branches alone reached thirty-three in 1946 and 1947, but about a year later the number was again reduced by unification. For instance, the Ministry of Textiles sometimes reverted to a chief administration within the Ministry of Light Industry, or the reverse. These continual organizational changes had questionable practical effect. Some of these *glavki*—such as those for finance or labor—were responsible for functional administration, and some were specialized subdivisions, such as the *glavki* for woolens in the Ministry of Textiles. Enterprises received their plans from the chief administration, usually in Moscow, and submitted their requirements to it. So-called funded inputs, which were especially scarce, were allocated to enterprises by the *glavki*, which set up their own supply arrangements to make sure their firms met the planned targets. They set up workshops to produce spare parts on an inefficiently small scale, a practice that also led to duplication. The chiefs of these chief administrations, usually called Deputy Ministers, became nonpolitical technical specialists, like most of the ministers over them, subject only to occasional intervention from party officials in the Kremlin. Their incentives were linked informally to the success of the enterprises under them, but not necessarily their profit or productivity. Accordingly, they could be relied on to support enterprises' requests for more investments and supplies and easier plans, even when they knew higher productivity would be possible. Sometimes they reallocated profits among their subordinated enterprises to allow all of them to meet their financial obligations. Even during the regional reorganization instituted by Khrushchev, the more important allocation decisions were made in the republican or sectoral glavki of the all-Union *Gossnab* (supply agency) in Moscow. This was necessary to prevent "localism," a preference for enterprises within one's region over the needs of enterprises elsewhere.

See also: GOSPLAN; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

GLAVLIT

The Main Directorate for Literary and Publishing Affairs (Glavnoe Upravlenie po Delam Literaturny i Izdatelstv), known as Glavlit, was the state agency responsible for the censorship of printed materials in the Soviet Union. Although print was its main focus, it sometimes supervised the censorship of other media, including radio, television, theater, and film. Glavlit was created in 1922 to replace a network of uncoordinated military and civilian censorship agencies set up after the Bolshevik seizure of power. Although freedom of the press nominally existed in the Soviet Union, the government reserved the right to prevent the publication of certain materials. Glavlit was charged with preventing the publication of economic or military information believed to pose a threat to Soviet security; this included subjects as diverse as grain harvests, inflation, incidence of disease, and the location of military industries. Party and military leaders compiled a list of facts and categories deemed secret.

Glavlit was also charged with suppressing any printed materials deemed hostile to the Soviet state or the Communist Party. This ran the gamut from pornography to religious texts to anything that could be construed as critical of the party or state, whether implicitly or explicitly. Individual censors had a fair amount of discretion in this area, and often showed considerable creativity and paranoia in their work. The severity of censorship varied with the political climate. Glavlit was particularly strict in its supervision of the private publishers allowed to operate between 1921 and 1929.

Although some state publishing houses were initially exempted from Glavlit's supervision, by 1930 all printing and publishing in the Soviet Union was subject to pre-publication censorship. Everything from newspapers to books to ephemera, such as posters, note pads, and theater tickets, required the approval of a Glavlit official before it could be published; violation of this rule was a serious criminal offense.

Glavlit had several secondary functions, including the censorship of foreign literature imported to the Soviet Union. It also took part in purging materials associated with "enemies of the people" from libraries, bookstores, and museums.

Glavlit was part of the Russian Republic's Commissariat of Enlightenment until 1946, when it was placed under the direct authority of the All-Union

Council of Ministers. Its official name changed several times after this point, usually to a variant of Main Directorate for the Protection of Military and State Secrets. Despite these changes, the acronym Glavlit continued to be used in official and unofficial sources. Technically a state institution, Glavlit answered directly to the Communist Party's Central Committee, which oversaw its work and appointed its leadership. Each Soviet Republic had its own Glavlit, with the Russian Republic's Glavlit setting the overall tone for Soviet censorship.

While most Soviet writers and editors learned to practice a degree of self-censorship to avoid problems, Glavlit served as a deterrent for those willing to question orthodox views. Its standards were relaxed in late 1988 as part of Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost campaign. Glavlit was dissolved by presidential decree in 1991, essentially ending prepublication censorship in Russia, but other forms of state pressure on media outlets remained in effect.

See also: CENSORSHIP; GLASNOST; JOURNALISM; NEWS-PAPERS; SAMIZDAT; TELEVISION AND RADIO; THEATER

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BRIAN KASSOF

GLINKA, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH

(1804–1857), composer, regarded as founder of Russian art music, especially as creator of Russian national opera.

Mikhail Glinka, the musically gifted son of a landowner, gained much of his musical education during a journey to Europe (1830–1834). In Italy he became acquainted with the opera composers Vincenzo Bellini and Gaetano Donizetti, and in Berlin he studied music theory. After his return, Glinka channeled the spiritual effects of the trip into the composition of a work that went down in history as the first Russian national opera, "A Life for

the Tsar" (1836). Three aspects of this opera were formative to operatic style in Russia: the national subject (here taken from the seventeenth century), the libretto in Russian, and the musical language, which combined the European basic techniques with Russian melodic patterns. The patriotic character of the subject fit extremely well into the conservative national attitudes of the 1830s under Tsar Nicholas I. In spite of Glinka's stylistic borrowings from European tradition, the Russian features of the music made way for a national art music apart from the dominant foreign models. Overnight, Glinka became famous and soon was admired as the father of Russian music. Whereas the "Life for the Tsar" marked the beginning of the historical opera in Russia, "Ruslan and Lyudmila" (1842) established the genre of the Russian fairy-tale opera. Thus, Glinka embodied the two strands of Russian opera that would flourish in the nineteenth century. Stylistically Glinka's Russian and Oriental elements exerted greatest influence on the following generations. Glinka became not only a creative point of reference for many Russian composers but also a national and cultural role model, and later a figure of cult worship with the reestablishment of Soviet patriotism under Josef Stalin.

See also: MUSIC; OPERA

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MATTHIAS STADELMANN

GLINSKAYA, YELENA VASILIEVNA

(d. 1538), the second wife of Grand Prince Basil III and regent for her son Ivan IV from 1533 to 1538.

Yelena Vasilievna Glinskaya was the daughter of Prince Vasily Lvovich Glinsky and his wife Anna, daughter of the Serbian military governor, Stefan Yakshich. After Basil III forced his first wife, Solomonina Saburova, to take the veil in 1525 because of her inability to produce offspring, he entered into a second marriage with Glinskaya in the following year. They bore two sons, the future Ivan IV and his younger brother Yury Vasilyevich.

Because Ivan IV was only three years old at the time of Basil III's death in 1533, Glinskaya became a regent of the Russian state during his minority. Although Basil III had entrusted the care of his widow and sons to relatives of Glinskaya and apparently had not made specific provisions for her regency, the royal mother used her pivotal dynastic position to defend her son's interests against those of rival boyar factions at court. Aided by her presumed lover, Prince Ivan Ovchina-Telepnev-Obolensky, and Metropolitan Daniel, Glinskaya headed up a government marked by efficient policies, both abroad and at home. Her government successfully fended off the efforts of Lithuania, the Crimean khan, and Kazan to encroach on Russian territories. At Glinskaya's death in 1538, Russia was at peace with its neighbors. Domestically, Glinskaya moved to eliminate the power of the remaining appanage princes, who presented a dynastic challenge to the Grand Prince. She initiated the creation and fortification of towns throughout the Russian realm, increasing the protection of the population and that of the realm substantially. In 1535 the regency government introduced a currency reform, adopting a single monetary system, which significantly improved economic conditions in Russia. Glinskaya's government also worked toward the institution of a system of local judicial officials, which was eventually realized in Ivan IV's reign. While Glinskaya managed to keep in check the various aristocratic factions, which sought to increase their influence vis-à-vis the young heir to the throne, the situation quickly reversed after her death. Without the protecting hand of his mother, the young Ivan IV was exposed to the political intrigues of the boyars until his ascendance to the throne in 1547.

As a royal wife, Glinskaya shared the problems of all Muscovite royal women, especially their concern about the production of children and their health. Glinskaya joined her husband on arduous pilgrimages to pray for offspring. Like her predecessor, Saburova, she seems to have believed that her womb could be divinely blessed. Five letters to Glinskaya attributed to Basil III portray the Grand Princess as a devoted mother who struggled to maintain her children's physical and emotional well-being.

Glinskaya's legitimacy and effectiveness as a regent have been the subject of scholarly debate. While earlier studies have treated the grand princess as a figurehead and her regency as a period of transition, recent work on the early sixteenth century

stresses Glinskaya's political achievements in her own right. During the reign of her son, the Grand Princess's political and social status was enhanced in the chronicles produced at the royal court, and Glinskaya became a model for future tsars' wives.

See also: BASIL III; IVAN IV

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ISOLDE THYRÊT

GNEZDOVO

Located in the Upper Dnepr River, thirteen kilometers west of Smolensk, Gnezdovo was a key portage and transshipment point along the "Route to the Greeks" in the late ninth through the early eleventh centuries. The area provided easy access to the upper reaches of the Western Dvina, Dnepr, and Volga rivers. The archaeological complex consists of several pagan and early Christian cemeteries (17 hectares), one fortified settlement (1 hectare), and several unfortified settlements. More than 1,200 of the estimated 3,500 to 4,000 burial mounds have been excavated. While Balt and Slav burials are found in great number, the mounds with Scandinavian ethnocultural traits (cremations in boats and rich inhumations and chamber graves) receive the most attention. However, no more than fifty mounds can be positively identified as Scandinavian. Gnezdovo's burials are among the richest for European Russia in the tenth century and include glass beads, swords, horse riding equipment, silver and bronze jewelry, and Islamic, Byzantine, and western European coins.

Although much of Gnezdovo's settlement layers have perished, recent excavations reveal house foundations and pits containing the remains of iron smithing and the working of nonferrous metals into ornaments, not unlike production of the contemporaneous and better-preserved sites of Staraiia

Ladoga and Riurikovo gorodishche. Gnezdovo's most intense period of settlement dates to the period from 920 to the 960s, when its settlements had reached their maximum size and when many of the largest burial mounds were raised. Gnezdovo was abandoned in the early eleventh century, when a new center, Smolensk, assumed Gnezdovo's role in international and regional trade.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; ROUTE TO THE GREEKS; VIKINGS

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HEIDI M. SHERMAN

GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH

(1552–1605), Tsar of Russia (1598–1605).

Tsar Boris Godunov, one of the most famous (or infamous) rulers of early modern Russia, has been the subject of many biographies, plays, and even an opera by Mussorgsky. Boris's father was only a provincial cavalryman, but Boris's uncle, Dmitry Godunov (a powerful aristocrat), was able to advance the young man's career. Dmitry Godunov brought Boris and his sister, Irina, to the court of Tsar Ivan IV, and Boris enrolled in Ivan's dreaded Oprichnina (a state within the state ruled directly by the tsar). Boris soon attracted the attention of Tsar Ivan, who allowed him to marry Maria, the daughter of his favorite, Malyuta Skuratov (the notorious boss of the Oprichnina). Boris and Maria had two children: a daughter named Ksenya and a son named Fyodor. Both children received excellent educations, which was unusual in early modern Russia. Boris's sister Irina was the childhood playmate of Ivan IV's mentally retarded son, Fyodor, and eventually married him. When Tsar Ivan died in 1584, he named Boris as one of Tsar Fyodor I's regents. By 1588, Boris triumphed over his rivals to become Fyodor's sole regent and the effective ruler of Russia.

Boris Godunov has been called one of Russia's greatest rulers. Handsome, eloquent, energetic, and extremely bright, he brought greater skill to the tasks of governing than any of his predecessors and was an excellent administrator. Boris was respected in international diplomacy and managed to make



Tsar Boris Godunov posed with the Russian regalia of state, to underscore his dubious claim to the throne. ARCHIVO

ICONGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

peace with Russia's neighbors. At home he was a zealous protector of the Russian Orthodox Church, a great builder and beautifier of Russian towns, and generous to the needy. As regent, Boris was responsible for the elevation of his friend, Metropolitan Job (head of the Russian Orthodox Church), to the rank of Patriarch in 1589; and Boris's generosity to the Church was rewarded by the strong loyalty of the clergy. Boris continued Ivan IV's policy of rapidly expanding the state to the south and east; but, due to a severe social and economic crisis that had been developing since the 1570s, he faced a declining tax base and a shrinking gentry cavalry force. In order to shore up state finances and the gentry so that he could continue Russia's imperial expansion, Boris enserfed the Russian peasants in the 1590s, tied townspeople to their taxpaying districts, and converted short-term slavery to permanent slavery. Boris also tried to tame the cossacks (bandits and mercenary soldiers) on

Russia's southern frontier and harness them to state service. Those drastic measures failed to alleviate the state's severe crisis, but they did make many Russians hate him.

Boris was accused by his enemies of coveting the throne and murdering his rivals. When it was reported that Tsar Ivan IV's youngest son, Dmitry of Uglich (born in 1582), had died by accidentally slitting his throat in 1591, many people believed Boris had secretly ordered the boy's death in order to clear a path to the throne for himself. (Several historians have credited that accusation, but there is no significant evidence linking Boris to the Uglich tragedy.) When the childless Tsar Fyodor I died in 1598, Boris was forced to fight for the throne. His rivals, including Fyodor Romanov (the future Patriarch Filaret, father of Michael Romanov), were unable to stop him from becoming tsar, but they did manage to slow him down. At one point, an exasperated Boris proclaimed that he no longer wanted to become tsar and retired to a monastery. Patriarch Job hastily convened an assembly of clergy, lords, bureaucrats, and townspeople to go to the monastery to beg Boris to take the throne. (This ad hoc assembly was later falsely represented as a full-fledged Assembly of the Land [or *Zemsky Sobor*] duly convened for the task of choosing a tsar.) In fact, Boris had enormous advantages over his rivals; he had been the ruler of Russia for a decade and had many supporters at court, in the Church, in the bureaucracy, and among the gentry cavalymen. By clever maneuvering, Boris was soon accepted by the aristocracy as tsar, and he was crowned on September 1, 1598.

For most Russians, the reign of Tsar Boris was an unhappy time. Indeed, it marked the beginning of Russia's horrific Time of Troubles (1598–1613). By the end of the sixteenth century, Russia's developing state crisis reached its deepest stage, and a sharp political struggle within the ruling elite undermined Tsar Boris's legitimacy in the eyes of many of his subjects and set the stage for civil war. In his coronation oath, Tsar Boris had promised not to harass his political enemies, but he ended up persecuting several aristocratic families, including the Romanovs. That prompted some of his opponents to begin working secretly against the Godunov dynasty. Contemporaries described the fearful atmosphere that developed in Moscow and the gradual drift of Tsar Boris's regime into increasingly harsh reprisals against opponents and more frequent use of spies, denunciations, torture, and executions.

Early in Tsar Boris's reign catastrophe struck Russia. In the period 1601–1603, many of Russia's crops failed due to bad weather. The result was the worst famine in all of Russian history; up to one-third of Tsar Boris's subjects perished. In spite of Boris's sincere efforts to help his suffering people, many of them concluded that God was punishing Russia for the sins of its ruler. Therefore, when a man appeared in Poland-Lithuania in 1603 claiming to be Dmitry of Uglich, miraculously saved from Boris Godunov's alleged assassins back in 1591, many Russians were willing to believe that God had saved Ivan the Terrible's youngest son in order to topple the evil usurper Boris Godunov. When False Dmitry invaded Russia in 1604, many cossacks and soldiers joined his ranks, and many towns of southwestern Russia rebelled against Tsar Boris. Even after False Dmitry's army was decisively defeated in the battle of Dobrynichi (January 1605), enthusiasm for the true tsar spread like wildfire throughout most of southern Russia. Support for False Dmitry even began to appear in the tsar's army and in Moscow itself. A very unhappy Tsar Boris, who had been ill for some time, withdrew from public sight. Despised and feared by many of his subjects, Boris died on April 13, 1605. It was rumored that he took his own life, but he probably died of natural causes. Boris's son took the throne as Tsar Fyodor II, but within six weeks the short-lived Godunov dynasty was overthrown in favor of Tsar Dmitry.

See also: ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; COSSACKS; DMITRY, FALSE; DMITRY OF UGLICH; FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH; FYODOR IVANOVICH; IVAN IV; JOB, PATRIARCH; OPRICHNINA; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; SLAVERY; TIME OF TROUBLES

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CHESTER DUNNING

GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILIEVICH

(1809–1852), short-story writer, novelist, playwright, essayist.

Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol, whose bizarre characters, absurd plots, and idiosyncratic narrators have both entranced and confounded readers worldwide and influenced authors from Fyodor Dostoyevsky to Franz Kafka to Flannery O'Connor, led a life as cryptic and circuitous as his fiction. He was born in 1809 in Sorochintsy, Ukraine. His father was a playwright; his mother, a highly devout and imaginative woman and one of Gogol's key influences. By no stretch a stellar student, Gogol showed theatrical talent, parodying his teachers and peers and performing in plays.

In 1828 Gogol moved to Petersburg with hopes of launching a literary career. His long poem *Hans Kuehelgarten* (1829), a derivative, slightly eccentric idyll, received only a brief and critical mention in the *Moscow Telegraph*. Dismayed, Gogol burned all the copies he could find and left for Lübeck, Germany, only to return several weeks later. In 1831 he met the poet Alexander Pushkin. His first collection *Evenings on a Farm Near Dikanka* (1831–1832), folk and ghost tales set in Ukraine and narrated by beekeeper Rudy Panko, reaped praise for its relative freshness and hilarity, and Gogol became a household name in Petersburg literary circles.

Gogol followed the *Dikanka* stories with two 1835 collections, *Arabesques* and *Mirgorod*. From *Mirgorod*, the "Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan Nikiforovich" (nicknamed "The Two Ivans"), blends comedy with tragedy, prose with poetry, satire with gratuitous play. Describing the two Ivans through bizarre juxtapositions, the narrator explains how the fatal utterance of the

word *gander* (*gusak*) severed their friendship for good.

Gogol's Petersburg tales, some included in *Arabesques*, some published separately, contain some of Gogol's best-known work, including "The Nose" (1835), about a nose on the run in full uniform; "Diary of a Madman" (1835), about a civil servant who discovers that he is the king of Spain; and "The Overcoat" (1842), about a copyist who becomes obsessed with the purchase of a new overcoat. In all these stories, as in the "Two Ivans," plot is secondary to narration, and the tension between meaning and meaninglessness remains unresolved.

In 1836 a poor staging and mixed reception of Gogol's play *The Inspector General* precipitated his second trip to Europe, where he stayed five years except for brief visits to Russia. While in Rome he wrote the novel *Dead Souls* (1842), whose main character, Pavel Ivanovich Chichikov, travels from estate to estate with the goal of purchasing deceased serfs (souls) to use as collateral for a state loan. Chichikov's travels can be considered a tour of Gogol's narrative prowess. With each visit, Chichikov encounters new eccentricities of setting, behavior, and speech.

In 1841 Gogol returned to Russia. There he began a sequel to *Dead Souls* chronicling Chichikov's fall and redemption. This marked the beginning of Gogol's decline: his struggle to establish a spiritual message in his work. His puzzling and dogmatic *Selections from Correspondence with Friends* (1847), in which he offers advice on spiritual and practical matters, dismayed his friends and supporters. Various travels, including a pilgrimage in 1848 to the Holy Land, failed to bring him the strength and inspiration he sought. Following the advice of his spiritual adviser and confessor, the fanatical Father Matthew, who told him to renounce literature, he burned *Dead Souls* shortly before dying of self-starvation in 1852.

See also: DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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DIANA SENECHAL

GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE

The Golden Age of Russian Literature is notably not a term often employed in literary criticism. It does not refer to any particular school or movement (e.g., Classicism, Romanticism, Realism); rather, it encompasses several of them. As such, it immediately falls prey to all the shortcomings of such literary categorizations, not the least of which is imprecision. The term furthermore demands, *eo ipso*, a pair of ungilded ages at either end, and might lead one to an easy and unstudied dismissal of works outside its tenure. Finally, those who wrote during its span were not particularly aware of living in an aureate age, and they certainly never consciously identified themselves as belonging to a unified or coherent faction—any similarity is adduced from the outside and puts in jeopardy the authors' particular geniuses. That said, the phrase "golden age of Russian literature" has gained currency and therefore, if for no other reason, deserves to be defined as carefully and intelligently as possible.

When they indulge in a yen for periodization, literary specialists tend to distinguish two contiguous (or perhaps slightly overlapping) golden ages: the first, a golden age of Russian poetry, which lasted (roughly) from the publication of Gavrila Derzhavin's Ossianic-inspired "The Waterfall" in 1794, until Aleksandr Pushkin's "turn to prose" around 1831 (or as late as Mikhail Lermontov's death in 1841); and the second, a Golden Age of Russian prose, which began with the nearly simultaneous publication of Nikolai Gogol's *Evenings on a Farm near the Dikanka* and Pushkin's *Tales of Belkin* (1831), and which petered out sometime during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

It is historians, with their professional inclination to divide time into discrete and digestible pieces, who most often make use of the term under discussion. Nicholas Riasanovsky, in *A History of Russia*, offers the following span: The golden age of Russian literature has been dated roughly from 1820 to 1880, from Pushkin's first major poems [his stylized, Voltairean folk-epic *Ruslan and Liudmila*] to Dostoevsky's last major novel [*Brothers*

Karamazov]. Riasanovsky's dates are notably narrower than those mentioned above. His span omits the first two decades of the century, and with them the late pseudo-classicism of Derzhavin, as well as the Sentimentalism and Ossianic Romanticism of Nikolai Karamzin and Vasily Zhukovsky—schools that constituted Pushkin's and Gogol's frame of reference and laid the verbal foundation for the later glorious literary output of Russia. On the far end, it disbars the final two decades of the nineteenth century, Anton Chekhov and Maksim Gorky notwithstanding. Ending the golden age in 1880 furthermore neatly excludes the second half of Tolstoy's remarkable sixty-year career.

1830S AND 1840S: ROMANTICISM

If one is to follow the historians in disregarding the first decades of the nineteenth century—to discount, so to say, the first blush and to wait until the flower has fully bloomed—then arguably a better date to initiate the golden age of literature would be 1831, which witnessed the debut of two uncontested masterpieces of Russian literature. In January, for the first time in its final form, *Woe from Wit*, Alexander Griboyedov's droll drama in verse (free iambs), was performed. A few months later, Pushkin put the final touches on *Eugene Onegin*, his unequaled novel in verse, which he had begun in 1823. The works are both widely recognized by Russians as the hallmarks of Russian literature, but they receive short shrift outside of their native land, a fate perhaps ineluctable for works of subtle and inventive poetry.

The year 1831 also witnessed Gogol's successful entry into literary fame with his folksy *Evenings on a Farm near the Dikanka*. Gogol and Pushkin had struck up an acquaintance in that year, and Gogol claimed that Pushkin had given him the kernel of the ideas for his two greatest works: *Dead Souls* (1842), perhaps the comic novel *par excellence*; and the uproarious *Inspector General* (1836), generally recognized as the greatest Russian play and one that certainly ranks as one of the world's most stageable.

Pushkin also served as the springboard for another literato of the golden age, Lermontov, who responded to Pushkin's death (in a duel) in 1837 with his impassioned "Death of a Poet," a poem which launched Lermontov's brief literary career (he was killed four years later in a duel). Although his corpus is smallish—he had written little serious verse before 1837—and much of it was left unpublished until after his death (mostly for censorial

reasons), Lermontov is generally considered Russia's second-greatest poet. He also penned a prose masterpiece, *A Hero of Our Time*, a cycle of short stories united by its jaded and cruel protagonist, Pechorin, who became a stock type in Russian literature.

In 1847 Gogol published his *Selected Passages from My Correspondence with Friends*, a pastiche of religious, conservative, and monarchical sermonettes—he endorses serfdom—that was met by an overwhelmingly negative reaction by critics who had long assumed that Gogol shared their progressive mindset. Vissarion Belinsky, perhaps the most influential critic ever in Russia, wrote a lashing rebuke that was banned by the censor, in part because it claimed that the Russian people were naturally atheists. The uproar surrounding *Selected Passages* effectively ended Gogol's career five years before the author's death in 1852.

REALISM

In 1849, the young writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky—who had created a sensation in 1845 with his parodic sentimentalist epistolary novel *Poor Folk*, but whose subsequent works had been coolly received—injudiciously read the abovementioned rebuke of Gogol and allowed his copy to be reproduced, for which he spent ten years in Siberia. When he returned to St. Petersburg, he published *Notes from the House of the Dead*, an engrossing fictionalized memoir of the years he had spent in penal servitude. The work was his first critical success since *Poor Folk*, and he followed it, during the 1860s and 1870s, with a series of novels that were both critical and popular successes, including *Notes from Underground* (1864) and *Crime and Punishment* (1866)—both, in part, rejoinders to the positivistic and utilitarian *Geist* of the time. His masterpiece *Brothers Karamazov* (1880) won him the preeminent position in Russian letters shortly before his death in 1881.

Gogol's death in 1852 moved Ivan Turgenev to write an innocuous commemorative essay, for which he was arrested, jailed for a month, and then banished to his estate. That year, his *Sportsman's Sketches* was first published in book form, and popular response to the vivid sketches of life in the countryside has been long identified as galvanizing support for the Emancipation. (Its upper-class readers were apparently jarred by the realization that peasants were heterogeneous and distinct individuals). Turgenev's prose works are united by their careful and subtle psychological depictions of

highly self-conscious characters whose search for truth and a vocation reflects Russia's own vacillations during the decades of the 1860s and 1870s. His greatest work, *Fathers and Sons* (1862), depicted the nihilist and utilitarian milieu of Russia at the inception of Age of the Great Reforms. The clamor surrounding *Fathers and Sons*—it was condemned by conservatives as too liberal, but liberals as too conservative—pricked Turgenev's *amour propre*, and he spent the much of his remaining two decades abroad in France and Germany.

It was also in 1852 that Tolstoy's first published work, *Childhood*, appeared in *The Contemporary* (a journal Pushkin founded), under the byline L. N. (the initials of Tolstoy's Christian and patronymic names). The piece made Tolstoy an instant success: Turgenev wrote the journal's editor to praise the work and encourage the anonymous author, and Dostoyevsky wrote to a friend from faraway Siberia to learn the identity L. N., whose story had so engaged him. Along with Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy's prose dominated the Russian literary and intellectual spheres during the 1860s and 1870s. *War and Peace* (1869), his magnum opus, describes the Russian victory over Napoleon's army. *Anna Karenina* (1878), a Russian version of a family novel, was published serially in *The Russian Messenger* (the same journal that soon thereafter published Dostoyevsky's *Brothers Karamazov*) and is generally considered one of the finest novels ever written.

THE END OF THE GOLDEN AGE

Although none of Tolstoy's works (before 1884) treated politics and social conflict in the direct manner of Dostoyevsky or Turgenev, they were nonetheless socially engaged, treating obliquely historical or philosophical questions present in contemporary debates. This circumspectness ended in the early 1880s after Tolstoy's self-described "spiritual restructuring," after which he penned a series of highly controversial, mostly banned works beginning with *A Confession*, (1884). Marking the end of golden age at the threshold of the 1880s—with Tolstoy's crisis and the deaths of Dostoyevsky (1881) and Turgenev (1883)—relies on the convenient myth of Tolstoy's rejection of literature in 1881, despite works such as *Death of Ivan Ilich*, *Resurrection*, *Kreutzer Sonata*, *Hadji Murad*, several excellent and innovative plays, and dozens of short stories—in brief, an output of belletristic literature that, even without *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, would have qualified Tolstoy as a world-class

writer. It also excludes Anton Chekhov, whose short stories and plays in many ways defined the genres for the twentieth century. Chekhov's first serious stories began to appear in the mid-1880s, and by the 1890s he was one of the most popular writers in Russia. Ending the golden age in the early 1880s likewise leaves out Maxim Gorky (pseudonym of Alexei Peshkov), whose half-century career writing wildly popular, provocative and much-imitated stories and plays depicting the social dregs of Russia began with the publication of "Chelkash" in 1895.

A better date to end the golden age, therefore, might well be 1899, a year that bore witness to the publication of Sergei Diaghilev's and Alexander Benois's *The World of Art*, that herald of the silver age of Russian literature, with its bold, syncretic program of music, theater, painting, and sculpture, idealistic metaphysics, and religion. The same year Tolstoy published (abroad) his influential *What Is Art?*, an invective raging equally against the Realist, socially-engaged literature of the previous century and the esthete, *l'art pour l'art* school that then dominated the literary scene. In their stead, it promulgated an emotive art that would unify all of humankind into a mystical brotherhood—a program not at all irreconcilable with the silver age aesthetics, proving the lozenge that *les extrêmes se touchent*.

OVERVIEW

Although the golden age should in no way be seen as an internally, self-consciously united movement, several features marry the individual authors and their works. Russian literature of this period thrived independently of politics. Its prodigious growth was unchecked, perhaps encouraged, by autocracy (some flowers bloom best in poor soil): It set its roots during the stifling reign of Nicholas I, continued to grow during the Era of Great Reforms begun under the Tsar-Liberator Alexander II, blossomed profusely during the reactionarily conservative final years of his rule, and continued to bloom in fits under Alexander III. The literature of the period engaged and influenced the social debates of the era. It remained, however, above the fray, characteristically criticizing, as overly simplistic, the autocratic and conservative government and the utilitarian ideas of progressive critics alike, for which it was frequently condemned by all sides.

It was also, in many important ways, *sui generis*. One constant characteristic of all the works

cited above is their distinctive Russian-ness. All of the authors were fluent in the conventions and heritage of Western European literature, but they frequently and consciously rejected and parodied its traditions. (This tendency explains why many early Western European readers and popularizers of Russian literature (e.g., Vogüé) considered Russians to be brilliant but unschooled savages.) What exactly constitutes the quiddity of this Russian-ness is a thorny issue, though one might safely hazard that one defining characteristic of Russian literature is its concern with elaborating the Russian idea.

Finally, the limited amount of Russian literature cannot be exaggerated. In the brief overview of the period given above, one might be surprised by the tightly interdigitated fates of Russian authors during the golden age. However, the world of Russian letters was remarkably small. As late as 1897, according to the census conducted that year, only 21.1 percent of the population was literate, and only 1 percent of the 125 million residents had middle or higher education. The Russian novelist and critic Vladimir Nabokov once noted that the entirety of the Russian canon, the generally acknowledged best of poetry and prose, would span 23,000 pages of ordinary print, practically all of it written during the nineteenth century—a very compact library indeed, when one figures that a handful of the works included in this anthological daydream are nearly a thousand pages each. Despite its slenderness, youth, and narrow base, in influence and artistic worth Russian literature rivals that of any national tradition.

See also: CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILIEVICH; LERMONTOV, MIKHAIL YURIEVICH; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH

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GOLDEN HORDE

An anachronistic and misleading term for an area more appropriately called the Ulus of Jochi or Khanate of Qipchaq (although Arabic sources at times refer to it as the Ulus of Batu or Ulus of Berke).

In Russian sources contemporary to the existence of the Golden Horde, the term *Orda* alone was used to apply to the camp or palace, and later to the capital city, where the khan resided. The term *Zolotaya Orda*, which has been translated as “Golden Horde,” first appears in Russian sources of the late sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries, many decades after the end of the Qipchaq Khanate. In a travel account of 1624 concerning a journey he took to Persia, the merchant Fedot Afanasievich Kotov describes coming to the lower Volga River: “Here by the river Akhtuba [i.e., the eastern effluent of the Volga] stands the Zolotaya Orda. The khan’s court, palaces, and [other] courts, and mosques are all made of stone. But now all these buildings are being dismantled and the stone is being taken to Astrakhan.” Zolotaya Orda can be understood here to mean the capital city of the Qipchaq Khanate. Of the two capitals of that khanate—Old Sarai or New Sarai (referred to in the historiography as Sarai Batu and Sarai Berke, respectively)—Kotov’s description most likely refers to New Sarai at the present-day Tsarev archaeological site.

In the *History of the Kazan Khanate* (*Kazanskaya istoriya*), which some scholars date to the second half of the sixteenth century and others to the early seventeenth century, the term *Zolotaya Orda* (or *Zlataya Orda*) appears at least fifteen times. Most of these references seem to be to the capital city—that is, where the khan’s court was—but some can by extension be understood to apply to the entire area ruled by the khan. The problem with accepting the reliability of this work is its genre, which seems to be historical fiction. Given the popularity of the *History of the Kazan Khanate* (the text is extant in more than two hundred manuscript copies),

one can understand how the term *Golden Horde* became a popular term of reference. It is more difficult to understand why.

Neither Kotov nor the author of the *History of the Kazan' Khanate* explains why he is using the term *Golden Horde*. It does not conform to the steppe color-direction system, such that black equals north, blue equals east, red equals south, white equals west, and yellow (or gold) equals center. The Qipchaq Khanate was not at the center of the Mongol Empire but at its western extremity, so one should expect the term *White Horde*, which does occur, although rarely, in sources contemporary to its existence. Even then the term seems to apply only to the khanate's western half, while the term *Blue Horde* identifies its eastern half. One could refer to the palace or the camp of any khan as "golden" in the sense that it was at the "center" of the khanate, but in no other case is it used to refer to a khanate as a whole.

In the eighteenth century, Princess Yekaterina Dashkova suggested that the term *Golden Horde* was applied to the Qipchaq Khanate "because it possessed great quantities of gold and the weapons of its people were decorated with it." But this conjecture seems to fall into the realm of folk etymology. Others have suggested that the term refers to the golden pavilion of the khan, or at least a tent covered with golden tiles (as the fourteenth-century traveler Ibn Battuta described the domicile of Khan (Özbek). Yet khans in other khanates had similar tents or pavilions at the time, so there was nothing that would make this a distinguishing trait of the Qipchaq khan or of his khanate, let alone a reason to call the khanate "golden." George Vernadsky proposed that *Golden Horde* may have been applied to the Khanate of Qipchaq (or Great Horde) only after the separation of the Crimean Khanate and Kazan Khanate from it in the mid-fifteenth century. It would have occupied, accordingly, a central or "golden" position between the two. Yet, neither of the other khanates, in the evidence available, was designated white or blue (or red or black) as would then be expected.

This leaves three intractable considerations: (1) there is no evidence that the Qipchaq Khanate was ever referred to as "Golden Horde" during the time of its existence; (2) the earliest appearance of the term in a nonfictional work is one written more than a hundred years after the khanate's demise and refers specifically to the capital city where the khan resided, not to the khanate as a whole; and (3) no better reason offers itself for calling the

Qipchaq Khanate the *Golden Horde* than an apparent mistake in a late sixteenth- or early seventeenth-century Muscovite work of fiction.

The Khanate of Qipchaq was set up by Batu (d. 1255) in the 1240s after the return of the Mongol force that invaded central Europe. Batu thus became the first khan of a khanate that was a multiethnic conglomeration consisting of Qipchaqs (Polovtsi), Kangli, Alans, Circassians, Rus, Armenians, Greeks, Volga Bulgars, Khwarezmians, and others, including no more than 4000 Mongols who ruled over them. Economically, it was made up of nomadic pastoralists, sedentary agriculturalists, and urban dwellers, including merchants, artisans, and craftsmen. The territory of the khanate at its greatest expanse reached from Galicia and Lithuania in the west to present-day Mongolia and China in the east, and from Transcaucasia and Khwarezm in the south into the forest zone of the Rus principalities and western Siberia in the north. Some scholars dispute whether the Rus principalities were ever officially part of the Qipchaq Khanate or merely vassal states. These scholars cite the account of the fourteenth-century Arabic historian al-Umari to the effect that the Khanate consisted of four parts: Sarai, the Crimea, Khwarezm, and the *Desht-i Qipchaq* (the western Eurasian steppe). Since most Rus principalities were not in the steppe but in the forest zone north of the steppe, they would seem to be excluded. Other scholars argue that not too fine a point should be put on what al-Umari understood as the northern limit of the *Desht-i Qipchaq*, for, according to Juvaini, Jochi, the son of Chinghis Khan and father of Batu, was granted all lands to the west of the Irtysh River "as far in that direction as the hooves of Tatar horses trod," which would seem to include the Rus principalities conquered in campaigns between 1237 and 1240. In addition, a number of Rus sources refer to the Rus principalities as *ulus* of the khan.

The governmental structure of the Qipchaq Khanate was most likely the same as that of other steppe khanates and was led by a ruler called a "khan" who could trace his genealogical lineage back to Chinghis Khan. A divan of *qarachi beys* (called *ulus beys* in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), made up of four emirs, each of whom headed one of the major chiefdoms, constituted a council of state that regularly advised the khan. The divan's consent was required for all significant enterprises on the part of the government. All important documents concerning internal matters had to be countersigned (usually by means of a

seal) by the *qarachi* beys for them to go into effect. Their witnessing was also required for all agreements with foreign powers to become official. The khan was not allowed to meet with foreign ambassadors without the presence of the *qarachi* beys, as representatives of the major chiefdoms. At times an assembly called a *quriltai* advised the khan but could also be called to choose a new khan or depose the reigning khan. Notable men from the ruling class made up the *quriltai*, and this included the khan's relatives and retainers, religious leaders, and other members of the nobility from the ruling class's lower ranks. The government was set up on a dual-administrative basis with a vizier in charge of civilian administration, including record-keeping and the treasury. The *beklaribek* (head of the *qarachi* beys) presided over military administration. The clan of each *qarachi* bey held the highest social and political status within its chiefdom, with people of every social status in descending order down to slaves beneath.

Six of the early khans of the Qipchaq Khanate were sky worshipers, the traditional religion of the Mongols. One of these khans, Sartaq (r. 1256–1257), may have been a Nestorian Christian and another, Berke (r. 1257–1267), was Muslim. But all the early khans followed policies of religious toleration. In the early fourteenth century, Khan Özbek (r. 1313–1341) converted to Islam, which from then on became the official religion of the elite of the Khanate and spread to most of the rest of the population. The Rus principalities, however, remained Christian, since the Rus Church enjoyed the protection of the khans as long as the Rus clergy prayed for the well-being of the khan and his family.

The Qipchaq Khanate had extensive diplomatic dealings with foreign powers, both as part of the Mongol Empire and independently. It maintained agreements with the Byzantine Empire and Mamluk Egypt. It fought incessantly with the Ilkhanate and maintained alternating periods of agreement and conflict with the Grand Dukes of Lithuania. It maintained extensive commercial dealings with Byzantium, Egypt, Genoa, Pisa, and Venice to the west, as well as with the other Mongol khanates and China to the east. During the fourteenth century, a high Islamic Turkic culture emerged in the Qipchaq Khanate.

At the end of the thirteenth century, the Qipchaq Khanate survived a devastating civil war between Khan Tokhta and the Prince Nogai. After the assassination of Khan Berdibek in 1359, the khanate went through more than 20 years of tur-

moil and endured another devastating civil war, this time between Khan Tokhtamish and the Emir Mamai. In 1395 Tamerlane swept through the khanate, defeated the army of Tokhtamish, and razed the capital cities. In the middle of the fifteenth century the Qipchaq Khanate began to split up, with the Crimean Khanate and Kazan Khanate separating off. Finally in 1502, the Crimean Khan Mengli Girey defeated the last khan of the Qipchaq Khanate, absorbed the western part of the khanate into his domains, and allowed the organization of the Khanate of Astrakhan to govern the rest. The Qipchaq Khanate, nonetheless, had lasted far longer as an independent political entity than any of the other *ulus* granted by Chinghis Khan to his sons.

See also: ASTRAKHAN, KHANATE OF; BATU; CENTRAL ASIA; CRIMEAN KHANATE

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GOLD STANDARD

A gold standard is a monetary system in which a country backs its currency with gold reserves and allows the conversion of its currency into gold. Tsarist Russia introduced the gold standard in January 1897 and maintained it until 1914. The policy was adopted both as a means of attracting foreign capital for the ambitious industrialization efforts of the late tsarist era, and to earn international respectability for the regime at a time when the world's leading economies had themselves

adopted gold standards. Preparation for this move began under Russian Finance Minister Ivan Vyshnegradsky (1887–1892), who actively built up Russia's gold supply while restricting the supply of paper money. After a brief setback, the next finance minister, Sergei Witte (1892–1903), continued to amass gold reserves and restrict monetary growth through foreign borrowing and taxation. By 1896, Russian gold reserves had reached levels commensurate (in relative terms) with other major European nations on the gold standard. The gold standard proved so controversial in Russia that it had to be introduced directly by imperial decree, over the objections of the State Council (Duma). This decree was promulgated on January 2, 1897, authorizing the emission of new five- and ten-ruble gold coins. At this point the state bank (Gosbank) became the official bank of issue, and Russia pegged the new ruble to a fixed quantity of gold with full convertibility. This meant that the ruble could be exchanged at a stable, fixed rate with the other major gold-backed currencies of the time, which facilitated trade by eliminating foreign exchange risk.

Private foreign capital inflows increased considerably after the introduction of the gold standard, and currency stability increased as well. By World War I, Russia had been transformed from a state set somewhat apart from the international financial system to the world's largest international debtor. Proponents argue that the gold standard accelerated Russian industrialization and integration with the world economy by preventing inflation and attracting private capital (substituting for the low rate of domestic savings). They also point out that the Russian economy might not have recovered so quickly after the Russo-Japanese war and civil unrest in 1904 and 1905 without the promise of stability engendered by the gold standard. Critics, however, charge that the gold standard required excessively high foreign borrowing and tax, tariff, and interest rates to introduce. They further charge that once in place, the gold standard was deflationary, inflexible, and too preferential to foreign investment. Economist Paul Gregory argues that the entire debate may be moot, inasmuch as Russia had no choice but to adopt the gold standard in an international environment that practically required it for countries wishing to take advantage of the era's large-scale cross-border trade and investment opportunities. Russia abandoned the gold standard in 1914 under the financial pressure of World War I.

See also: FOREIGN TRADE; INDUSTRIALIZATION; VYSHNEGRADSKY, IVAN ALEXEYEVICH; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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JULIET JOHNSON

GOLITSYN, VASILY VASILIEVICH

(1643–1714), chief minister and army commander during the regency of Sophia Alekseyevna.

Prince Vasily Golitsyn was the eldest son of Prince Vasily Andreyevich Golitsyn and Tatiana Streshneva. Both his parents were from aristocratic clans with strong connections, which brought young Vasily the honorific posts of cup-bearer to Tsar Alexis in 1658 and coach attendant in 1666. In 1663 he married Avdotia Streshneva, who bore him six children. In 1675 he was posted to Ukraine, where he served intermittently during the Russo-Turkish war of 1676–1681, leading an auxiliary force, organizing fortification works and provisioning, and taking a major role in negotiations with Cossack leaders. He was appointed commander in chief of the southern army just before the truce of 1681. During visits to court, Golitsyn won the favor of Tsar Fedor (r. 1676–1682), who promoted him to the rank of boyar in 1676. He also held posts as director of the Artillery Chancellery and the Vladimir High Court. In 1681 he returned to Moscow to chair a commission on army reform, with special reference to regimental structure and the appointment of officers. The commission's proposals led to the abolition in January 1682 of the Code of Precedence, although its scheme for provincial vice-regencies was rejected.

Following Tsar Fedor's death in May 1682, Golitsyn rose further thanks to the patronage of

Tsarevna Sophia Alekseyevna, who became regent to the joint tsars Ivan V (r. 1682–1696) and Peter I (r. 1682–1725). Their relationship is said to have begun when Sophia was caring for the ailing Fedor, to whose bedchamber Golitsyn often reported, but contemporary Russian sources do not record any such meetings. The claim that the couple became lovers rests on hearsay and some coded letters dating from the later 1680s. Golitsyn was not closely involved in the intrigues with the Moscow militia (musketeers) that brought Sophia to power following a bloody revolt, but he remained close to the tsars during the so-called *Khovanshchina* and was appointed director of the important Foreign Office, and later accumulated the directorships of the Foreign Mercenaries, Cavalry, Little Russian (Ukrainian), Smolensk, Novgorod, Ustyug, and Galich chancelleries, which afforded him a substantial power base. In 1683 Sophia dubbed him “Guardian of the Tsar’s Great Seal and the State’s Great Ambassadorial Affairs.”

Golitsyn’s main talent was for foreign affairs. He was unusual among Russian boyars in knowing Latin and Greek and became known as a friend of foreigners. He was instrumental in negotiating the renewal of the 1661 Treaty of Kardis with Sweden (1684), trade treaties with Prussia (1689), and the important treaty of permanent peace with Poland (1686), by which Russia broke its truce with the Ottomans and Tatars and entered the Holy League against the infidels. In fulfillment of Russia’s obligations to the League, Golitsyn twice led vast Russian armies to Crimea, in 1687 and 1689, on both occasions returning empty-handed, having suffered heavy losses as a result of shortages of food and water. Golitsyn’s enemies blamed him personally for the defeats, but Sophia greeted him as a victor, thereby antagonizing the party of the second tsar Peter I, who objected to “undeserved rewards and honors.” Following a stand-off between the two sides in August–September 1689, Golitsyn was arrested for aiding and abetting Sophia, bypassing the tsars, and causing “losses to the sovereigns and ruin to the state” as a result of the Crimean campaigns. He and his family were exiled to the far north, first to Kargopol, then to Archangel province, where he died in 1714.

Historians have characterized Golitsyn as a “Westernizer,” one of a select band of educated and open-minded Muscovite boyars. His modern views were reflected not only in his encouragement of contacts with foreigners, but also in his library of books in foreign languages and his Moscow man-

sion in the fashionable “Moscow Baroque” style, which was equipped with foreign furniture, clocks, mirrors, and a portrait gallery, which included Golitsyn’s own portrait. The French traveler Foy de la Neuville (the only source) even credited Golitsyn with a scheme for limiting, if not abolishing, serfdom, which is not, however, reflected in the legislation of the regency. Golitsyn’s downfall was brought about by a mixture of bad luck and poor judgement in court politics. Peter I never forgave him for his association with Sophia and thereby forfeited the skills of one of the most able men of his generation.

See also: FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH; SOPHIA ALEXEYEVNA (TSAREVNA); WESTERNIZERS.

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LINDSEY HUGHES

GONCHAROVA, NATALIA SERGEYEVNA

(1881–1962), artist, book illustrator, set and costume designer.

Natalia Sergeyevna Goncharova was born on June 21, 1881, in the village of Nagaevo in the Tula province; she died on October 17, 1962, in Paris. She lived in Moscow from 1892 and enrolled at the Moscow School of Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture in 1901 to study sculpture. She met Mikhail Larionov in 1900–1901 who encouraged her to paint and became her lifelong companion. They were married in 1957. In 1906 she contributed to the Russian Section at the Salon d’Automne, Paris. In 1908–1910 she contributed to the three exhibitions organized by Nikolai Riabushinsky, editor of the journal *Zolotoe runo* (*The Golden Fleece*) in Moscow. In 1910 she founded with Larionov and others the Jack of Diamonds group and participated in their first exhibition. In 1911 the group split and from 1911–1914 she participated in a series of rival exhibitions organized

by Larionov: the "Donkey's Tail" (1912), the "Target" (1913), and the "No. 4" (1914). Throughout this period she worked in several styles—Primitivist, Cubist, and, in 1912–1913, Futurist and Rayist. Her work immediately became a lightning rod for debate over the legitimacy and cultural identity of new Russian painting. In 1910 a one-day exhibition of Goncharova's work was held at the Society for Free Esthetics. The nude life studies she displayed on this occasion led to her trial for pornography in Moscow's civil court (she was acquitted). Major retrospective exhibitions of Goncharova's work were organized in Moscow (1913) and St. Petersburg (1914). Paintings of religious subject matter were censored, and in the last exhibition temporarily banned as blasphemous by the Spiritual-Censorship Committee of the Holy Synod.

On April 29, 1914 Goncharova left with Larionov for Paris to mount Sergei Diaghilev's production of Rimsky-Korsakov's *Le Coq d'Or* (a collaboration between herself and choreographer Mikhail Fokine). Also in 1914, the Galerie Paul Guillaume in Paris held her first commercial exhibition. During the 1920s and 1930s she and Larionov collaborated on numerous designs for Diaghilev and other impresarios. Returning briefly to Moscow in 1915, she designed Alexander Tairov's production of Carlo Goldoni's *Il Ventaglio* at the Chamber Theater, Moscow. After traveling with Diaghilev's company to Spain and Italy, she settled in Paris with Larionov in 1917. In 1920–1921 she contributed to the "Exposition internationale d'art moderne" in Geneva and in 1922 exhibited at the Kingore Gallery, New York. From the 1920s onward she continued to paint, teach, illustrate books, and design theater and ballet productions. After 1930, except for occasional contributions to exhibitions, Larionov and Goncharova lived unrecognized and impoverished. Through the efforts of Mary Chamot, author of Goncharova's first major biography, a number of their works entered museum collections, including the Tate Gallery, London, the National Gallery of Modern Art, Edinburgh, and the National Art Gallery in Wellington, New Zealand. In 1954 their names were resurrected at Richard Buckle's "The Diaghilev Exhibition" in Edinburgh and London. In 1961 Art Council of Great Britain organized a major retrospective of Goncharova's and Larionov's works, and numerous smaller exhibitions were held throughout Europe during the 1970s. In 1995 the Musée national d'art moderne, Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris organized a large exhibition of their work in Europe. Exhibitions were also held at the State Tretyakov Gallery,

Moscow (1999, 2000). The first retrospective of her Russian oeuvre since 1914 was held at the State Russian Museum in St. Petersburg in 2002.

See also: DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH

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JANE A. SHARP

GONCHAROV, IVAN ALEXANDROVICH

(1812–1891), writer.

Born in Simbirsk to a family of wealthy merchants, Ivan Goncharov moved to Moscow for his schooling in 1822 and then moved to St. Petersburg in 1835 where, with a few breaks, he remained until his death. He worked from 1855 to 1867 as government censor, a post that earned the criticism and mistrust of many of his contemporaries. Although his politics as a censor were clearly conservative when it came to reviewing Russian journals, he also used his position to allow many important and liberal works of literature into print, including works by Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Alexander Herzen. Goncharov's unfounded accusation of plagiarism against the novelist Ivan Turgenev in 1860 caused a scandal in the literary world; Goncharov suffered from bouts of neurosis and paranoia and lived most of his life in sedentary seclusion.

Goncharov is known primarily for three novels—*A Common Story* (1847), *Oblomov* (1859), and *The Precipice* (1869)—as well as a travel memoir of a government expedition to Japan, *The Frigate Pallas* (1855–1857). By far his best-known work is *Oblomov*, whose hero, an indolent and dreamy Russian nobleman, became emblematic of a Russian social type, the superfluous man. The figure of Oblomov made such a deep impression on readers that the radical critic Nikolai Dobrolyubov pop-

ularized the term *oblomovshchina* (oblomovitis) to describe the ineptitude of the Russian intelligentsia. Goncharov's novels rank him among the best Russian realist writers, yet his university years in Moscow at the height of the Russian romantic movement and his consequent attraction to its ideals places him within the era of the Golden Age of Russian literature.

See also: GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE

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CATHERINE O'NEIL

GOODS FAMINE

The concept of the goods famine refers to excess demand (at prevailing prices) for industrial goods in the Soviet Union during the latter half of the 1920s. The importance of this excess demand can only be understood within the context of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s and the underlying forces leading to excess demand. Specifically, the goods famine was an outgrowth of the Scissors Crisis and state policies relating to this episode.

Specifically, in the middle and late 1920s, the quicker recovery of agricultural production relative to industrial production meant that increases in the demand for industrial goods could not be met, an outcome characterized as the goods famine. State policy was ultimately successful in forcing a reduction of the prices of industrial goods. The concern was that a goods famine might drive rural producers, unable to purchase industrial goods, to reduce their grain marketings. This was viewed as a critical factor limiting the possible pace of industrialization.

The goods famine is important to the understanding of the changes implemented by Stalin in the late 1920s. Moreover, these events relate to economic issues such as the nature and organization of the industrial sector (e.g., monopoly power), state

policies in a semi-market economy, and most important, the nature of peasant responses to market forces when facing the imperatives of an industrialization drive.

See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PEASANT ECONOMY; SCISSORS CRISIS

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ROBERT C. STUART

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH

(b. 1931), Soviet political leader, general editor of the CPSU (1985–1991), president of the Soviet Union (1990–1991), Nobel Peace Prize laureate (1990).

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union during a period of sweeping domestic and international change that saw the dismantling of communist systems throughout Europe and ended with the disintegration of the USSR itself, was born in the southern Russian village of Privolnoye in Stavropol province. His parents were peasants and his mother was barely literate.

Mikhail Gorbachev did not have an easy childhood. Born on March 2, 1931, he was just old enough to remember when, during the 1930s, both of his grandfathers were caught in the purges and arrested. Although they were released after prison, having been tortured in one case and internally exiled and used as forced labor in the other, young Misha Gorbachev knew what it was like to live in the home of an enemy of the people.

The war and early postwar years provided the family with the opportunity to recover from the stigma of false charges laid against the older generation, although the wartime experience itself was harsh. Gorbachev's father was in the army, saw action on several fronts, and was twice wounded. Remaining in the Russian countryside, Gorbachev and his mother had to engage in back-breaking

work in the fields. For two years Gorbachev received no schooling, and for a period of four and one-half months the Stavropol territory, including Privolnoye, was occupied by the German army. In Josef Stalin's time, those who had experienced even short-lived foreign rule tended to be treated with grave suspicion.

Nevertheless, the Gorbachevs engaged as wholeheartedly in the postwar reconstruction of their locality as they had in the war effort. Exceptionally, when he was still a teenager, Gorbachev was awarded the Order of Red Banner of Labor for heroic feats of work. He had assisted his father, a combine operator (who was given the Order of Lenin) in bringing in a record harvest in 1948. The odds against a village boy gaining entry to Moscow State University in 1950 were high, but the fact that Gorbachev had been honored as an exemplary worker, and had an excellent school record and recommendation from the Komsomol, made him one of the exceptions. While still at high school during the first half of 1950, Gorbachev became a candidate member of the Communist Party. He was admitted to full membership in the party in 1952.

Although the Law Faculty of Moscow University, where Gorbachev studied for the next five years, hardly offered a liberal education, there were some scholars of genuine erudition who opened his eyes to a wider intellectual world. Prominent among them was Stepan Fyodorovich Kechekyan, who taught the history of legal and political thought. Gorbachev took Marxism seriously and not simply as Marxist-Leninist formula to be learned by rote. Talking, forty years later, about his years as a law student, Gorbachev observed: "Before the university I was trapped in my belief system in the sense that I accepted a great deal as given, assumptions not to be questioned. At the university I began to think and reflect and to look at things differently. But of course that was only the beginning of a long process."

Two events of decisive importance for Gorbachev occurred while he was at Moscow University. One was the death of Stalin in 1953. After that the atmosphere within the university lightened, and freer discussion began to take place among the students. The other was his meeting Raisa Maximovna Titarenko, a student in the philosophy faculty, in 1951. They were married in 1953 and remained utterly devoted to each other. In an interview on the eve of his seventieth birthday, Gorbachev described Raisa's death at the age

of 67 in 1999 as his "hardest blow ever." They had one daughter, Irina, and two granddaughters.

After graduating with distinction, Gorbachev returned to his native Stavropol and began a rapid rise through the Komsomol and party organization. By 1966 he was party first secretary for Stavropol city, and in 1970 he became *kraikom* first secretary, that is, party boss of the whole Stavropol territory, which brought with it a year later membership in the Central Committee of the CPSU. Gorbachev displayed a talent for winning the good opinion of very diverse people. These included not only men of somewhat different outlooks within the Soviet Communist Party. Later they were also to embrace Western conservatives—most notably U.S. president Ronald Reagan and U.K. prime minister Margaret Thatcher—as well as European social democrats such as the former West German chancellor Willy Brandt and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez.

However, Gorbachev's early success in winning friends and influencing people depended not only on his ability and charm. He had an advantage in his location. Stavropol was spa territory, and leading members of the Politburo came there on holiday. The local party secretary had to meet them, and this gave Gorbachev the chance to make a good impression on figures such as Mikhail Suslov and Yuri Andropov. Both of them later supported his promotion to the secretaryship of the Central Committee, with responsibility for agriculture, when one of Gorbachev's mentors, Fyodor Kulakov, a previous first secretary of Stavropol territory, who held the agricultural portfolio within the Central Committee Secretariat (along with membership in the Politburo), died in 1978.

From that time, Gorbachev was based in Moscow. As the youngest member of an increasingly geriatric political leadership, he was given rapid promotion through the highest echelons of the Communist Party, adding to his secretaryship candidate membership of the Politburo in 1979 and full membership in 1980. When Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982, Gorbachev's duties in the Party leadership team were extended by Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov, who thought highly of the younger man. When Andropov was too ill to carry on chairing meetings, he wrote an addendum to a speech to a session of the Central Committee in December 1983, which he was too ill to attend in person. In it he proposed that the Politburo and Secretariat be led in his absence by Gor-

bachev. This was a clear attempt to elevate Gorbachev above Konstantin Chernenko, a much older man who had been exceptionally close to Brezhnev and a senior secretary of the Central Committee for longer than Gorbachev. However, Andropov's additions to his speech were omitted from the text presented to Central Committee members. Chernenko had consulted other members of the old guard, and they were united in wishing to prevent power from moving to a new generation represented by Gorbachev.

The delay in his elevation to the general secretaryship of the Communist Party did Gorbachev no harm. Chernenko duly succeeded Andropov on the latter's death in February 1984, but was so infirm during his time at the helm that Gorbachev frequently found himself chairing meetings of the Politburo at short notice when Chernenko was too ill to attend. More importantly, the sight of a third infirm leader in a row (for Brezhnev in his last years had also been incapable of working a full day) meant that even the normally docile Central Committee might have objected if the Politburo had proposed another septuagenarian to succeed Chernenko. By the time of Chernenko's death, just thirteen months after he succeeded Andropov, Gorbachev was, moreover, in a position to get his way. As the senior surviving secretary, it was he who called the Politburo together on the very evening that Chernenko died. The next day (March 11, 1985) he was unanimously elected Soviet leader by the Central Committee, following a unanimous vote in the Politburo.

Those who chose him had little or no idea that they were electing a serious reformer. Indeed, Gorbachev himself did not know how fast and how radically his views would evolve. From the outset of his leadership he was convinced of the need for change, involving economic reform, political liberalization, ending the war in Afghanistan, and improving East-West relations. He did not yet believe that this required a fundamental transformation of the system. On the contrary, he thought it could be improved. By 1988, as Gorbachev encountered increasing resistance from conservative elements within the Communist Party, the ministries, the army, and the KGB, he had reached the conclusion that systemic change was required.

Initially, Gorbachev had made a series of personnel changes that he hoped would make a difference. Some of these appointments were bold and innovative, others turned out to be misjudged. One



General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev waves to the crowd at Orly Airport in Paris. RELITERS/BETTMANN. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

of his earliest appointments that took most observers by surprise was the replacement of the long-serving Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, by the Georgian Party first secretary, Eduard Shevardnadze, a man who had not previously set foot in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet Shevardnadze became an imaginative and capable executor of a foreign policy aimed at ending the Cold War. At least as important a promotion was that given to Alexander Yakovlev, who was not even a candidate member of the Central Committee at the time when Gorbachev became party leader, but who by the summer of 1987 was both a secretary of the Central Committee and a full member of the Politburo. Yakovlev owed this extraordinarily speedy promotion entirely to the backing of Gorbachev. He, in turn, was to be an influential figure on the reformist wing of the Politburo during the second half of the 1980s.

Other appointments were less successful. Yegor Ligachev, a secretary of the Central Committee who had backed Gorbachev strongly for the leadership, was rapidly elevated to full membership in the

Politburo and for a time was de facto second secretary within the leadership. But as early as 1986 it was clear that his reformism was within very strict limits. Already he was objecting to intellectuals reexamining the Soviet past and taking advantage of the new policy of glasnost (openness or transparency) that Gorbachev had enunciated. Successive heads of the KGB and of the Ministry of Defense were still more conservative than Ligachev, and the technocrat, Nikolai Ryzhkov, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, was reluctant to abandon the economic planning system in which, as a factory manager and, subsequently, state official, he had made his career.

Gorbachev embraced the concept of *demokrati-zatsiya* (democratization) from the beginning of his General Secretaryship, although the term he used most often was perestroika (reconstruction). Initially, the first of these terms was not intended to be an endorsement of pluralist democracy, but signified rather a liberalization of the system, while perestroika was a useful synonym for reform, since the very term *reform* had been taboo in Soviet politics for many years. Between 1985 and 1988, however, the scope of these concepts broadened. democratization began to be linked to contested elections. Some local elections with more than one candidate had already taken place before Gorbachev persuaded the Nineteenth Party Conference of the Communist Party during the summer of 1988 to accept competitive elections for a new legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies, to be set up the following year. That decision, which filled many of the regional party officials with well-founded foreboding, was to make the Soviet system different. Even though the elections were not multiparty (the first multiparty elections were in 1993), the electoral campaigns were in many regions and cities keenly contested. It became plain just how wide a spectrum of political views lay behind the monolithic facade the Communist Party had traditionally projected to the outside world and to Soviet citizens.

While glasnost had brought into the open a constituency favorably disposed to such reforms, no such radical departure from Soviet democratic centralism could have occurred without the strong backing of Gorbachev. Up until the last two years of the existence of the Soviet Union the hierarchical nature of the system worked to Gorbachev's advantage, even when he was pursuing policies that were undermining the party hierarchy and, in that sense, his own power base. While there had been a

great deal of socioeconomic change during the decades that separated Stalin's death from Gorbachev's coming to power, there was one important institutional continuity that, paradoxically, facilitated reforms that went beyond the wildest dreams of Soviet dissidents and surpassed the worst nightmares of the KGB. That was the power and authority of the general secretaryship of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the post Gorbachev held from March 1985 until the dissolution of the CPSU in August 1991 and which—in particular, for the first four of his six and one-half years at the top of the Soviet political system—made him the principal policy maker within the country. Perestroika, which had originally meant economic restructuring and limited reform, came to stand for transformative change of the Soviet system. Both the ambiguity of the concept and traditional party norms kept many officials from revolting openly against perestroika until it was too late to close the floodgates of change.

A major impetus to Gorbachev's initial reforms had been the long-term decline in the rate of economic growth. Indeed, the closest thing to a consensus in the Soviet Union in 1985–1986 was the need to get the country moving again economically. A number of economic reforms introduced by Gorbachev and Ryzhkov succeeded in breaking down the excessive centralization that had been a problem of the unreformed Soviet economic system. For example, the Law on the State Enterprise of 1987 strengthened the authority of factory managers at the expense of economic ministries, but it did nothing to raise the quantity or quality of production. The Enterprise Law fostered inflation, promoted inter-enterprise debt, and facilitated failure to pay taxes to the central budget.

The central budget also suffered severely from one of the earliest policy initiatives supported by Gorbachev and urged upon him by Ligachev. This was the anti-alcohol campaign, which went beyond exhortation and involved concrete measures to limit the production, sale, and distribution of alcohol. By 1988 this policy was being relaxed. In the meantime, it had some measure of success in cutting down the consumption of alcohol. Alcohol-related accidents declined, and some health problems were alleviated. Economically, however, the policy was extremely damaging. The huge profits on which the state had relied from the sale of alcohol, on which it had a monopoly, were cut drastically not only because of a fall in consumption but also because,

under conditions of semi-prohibition, moonshine took the place of state-manufactured vodka. Since the launch of perestroika had also coincided with a drop in the world oil price, this was a loss of revenue the state and its political leadership could not afford.

Gorbachev had, early in his general secretaryship, been ready to contemplate market elements within the Soviet economy. By 1989–1990 he had increasingly come to believe that market forces should be the main engine of growth. Nevertheless, he favored what he first called a “socialist market economy” and later a “regulated market.” He was criticized by market fundamentalists for using the latter term, which they saw as an oxymoron. Although by 1993 Yegor Gaidar, a firm supporter of the market, was observing that “throughout the world the market is regulated.” Gorbachev initially endorsed, and then retreated from, a radical but (as its proponents were later to admit) unrealistic policy of moving the Soviet Union to a market economy within five hundred days. The Five-Hundred-Day Plan was drawn up by a group of economists, chosen in equal numbers by Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin (the latter by this time a major player in Soviet and Russian politics), during the summer of 1990. In setting up the working group, in consultation with Yeltsin, Gorbachev completely bypassed the Communist Party. He had been elected president of the Soviet Union by the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR in March 1990 and was increasingly relying on his authority in that role. However, the presidency did not have the institutional underpinning that the party apparatus had provided for a General Secretary—until Gorbachev consciously loosened the rungs of the ladder on which he had climbed to the top. Ultimately, in the face of strong opposition from state and party authorities attempting to move to the market in a giant leap, Gorbachev sought a compromise between the views of the market enthusiasts, led by Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky, and those of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and his principal economic adviser, Leonid Abalkin.

Because radical democrats tended also to be in favor of speedy marketization, Gorbachev’s hesitation meant that he lost support in that constituency. People who had seen Gorbachev as the embodiment and driving force of change in and of the Soviet system increasingly in 1990–1991 transferred their support to Yeltsin, who in June 1991 was elected president of Russia in a convincing first-round victory. Since he had been directly elected,

and Gorbachev indirectly, this gave Yeltsin a greater democratic legitimacy in the eyes of a majority of citizens, even though the very fact that contested elections had been introduced into the Soviet system was Gorbachev’s doing. If Gorbachev had taken the risk of calling a general election for the presidency of the Soviet Union a year earlier, rather than taking the safer route of election by the existing legislature, he might have enhanced his popular legitimacy, extended his own period in office, and extended the life of the Soviet Union (although, to the extent that it was democratic, it would have been a smaller union, with the Baltic states as the prime candidates for early exit). In March 1990, the point at which he became Soviet president, Gorbachev was still ahead of Yeltsin in the opinion polls of the most reliable of survey research institutes, the All-Union (subsequently All-Russian) Center for the Study of Public Opinion. It was during the early summer of that year that Yeltsin moved ahead of him.

By positing the interests of Russia against those of the Union, Yeltsin played a major role in making the continuation of a smaller Soviet Union an impossibility. By first liberalizing and then democratizing, Gorbachev had taken the lid off the nationalities problem. Almost every nation in the country had a long list of grievances and, when East European countries achieved full independence during the course of 1989, this emboldened a number of the Soviet nationalities to demand no less. Gorbachev, by this time, was committed to turning the Soviet system into something different—indeed, he was well advanced in the task of dismantling the traditional Soviet edifice—but he strove to keep together a multinational union by attempting to turn a pseudo-federal system into a genuine federation or, as a last resort, a looser confederation.

Gorbachev’s major failures were unable to prevent disintegration of the union and not improving economic performance. However, since everything was interconnected in the Soviet Union, it was impossible to introduce political change without raising national consciousness and, in some cases, separatist aspirations. If the disintegration of the Soviet Union is compared with the breakup of Yugoslavia, what is remarkable is the extent to which the Soviet state gave way to fifteen successor states with very little bloodshed. It was also impossible to move smoothly from an economic system based over many decades on one set of principles (a centralized, command economy)

to a system based on another set of principles (market relations) without going through a period of disruption in which things were liable to get worse before they got better.

Gorbachev's failures were more than counterbalanced by his achievements. He changed Soviet foreign policy dramatically, reaching important arms control agreements with U.S. president Reagan and establishing good relations with all the Soviet Union's neighbors. Defense policy was subordinated to political objectives, and the underlying philosophy of *kto kogo* (who will defeat whom) gave way to a belief in interdependence and mutual security. These achievements were widely recognized internationally—most notably with the award to Gorbachev in 1990 of the Nobel Peace Prize. If Gorbachev is faulted in Russia today, it is for being overly idealistic in the conduct of foreign relations, to an extent not fully reciprocated by his Western interlocutors. The Cold War had begun with the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. It ended when one East and Central European country after another became independent in 1989 and when Gorbachev accepted the loss of Eastern Europe, something all his predecessors had regarded as non-negotiable. Gorbachev's answer to the charge from domestic hard-liners that he had "surrendered" Eastern Europe was to say: "What did I surrender, and to whom? Poland to the Poles, the Czech lands to the Czechs, Hungary to the Hungarians...."

After the failed coup against Gorbachev of August 1991, when he was held under house arrest on the Crimean coast while Yeltsin became the focal point of resistance to the putschists, his political position was greatly weakened. With the hard-liners discredited, disaffected nationalities pressed for full independence, and Yeltsin became increasingly intransigent in pressing Russian interests at the expense of any kind of federal union. In December 1991 the leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian republics got together to announce that the Soviet Union was ceasing to exist. Gorbachev bowed to the inevitable and on December 25 resigned from the presidency of a state, the USSR, which then disappeared from the map.

During the post-Soviet period Gorbachev held no position of power, but he continued to be politically active. His relations with Yeltsin were so bad that at one point Yeltsin attempted to prevent him from travelling abroad, but abandoned that policy following protests from Western leaders. Throughout the Yeltsin years, Gorbachev was never invited to the Kremlin, although he was con-

sulted on a number of occasions by Vladimir Putin when he succeeded Yeltsin. Gorbachev's main activities were centered on the foundation he headed, an independent think-tank of social-democratic leanings, which promoted research, seminars, and conferences on developments within the former Soviet Union and on major international issues. Gorbachev became the author of several books, most notably two volumes of memoirs published in Russian in 1995 and, in somewhat abbreviated form, in English and other languages in 1996. Other significant works included a book of political reflections, based on tape-recorded conversations with his Czech friend from university days, Zdeněk Mlynář, which appeared in 2002. He became active also on environmental matters as president of the Green Cross International. Domestically, Gorbachev lent his name and energy to an attempt to launch a Social Democratic Party, but with little success. He continued to be admired abroad and gave speeches in many different countries. Indeed, the Gorbachev Foundation depended almost entirely on its income from its president's lecture fees and book royalties.

Gorbachev will, however, be remembered above all for his contribution to six years that changed the world, during which he was the last leader of the USSR. Notwithstanding numerous unintended consequences of perestroika, of which the most regrettable in Gorbachev's eyes, was the breakup of the Union, the long-term changes for the better introduced in the Gorbachev era—and to a significant degree instigated by him—greatly outweigh the failures. Ultimately, Gorbachev's place in history is likely to rest upon his playing the most decisive role in ending the Cold War and on his massive contribution to the blossoming of freedom, in Eastern Europe and Russia itself.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; DEMOCRATIZATION; GLASNOST; GORBACHEV, RAISA MAXIMOVNA; NEW POLITICAL THINKING; PERESTROIKA; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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ARCHIE BROWN

GORBACHEV, RAISA MAXIMOVNA

(1932–1999), “first lady” of the Soviet Union, spouse of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Raisa Maximovna Titarenko was born on January 5, 1932, in Siberia and died at the age of 67 on September 21, 1999. She married Mikhail Gorbachev, a fellow student at Moscow State University in 1953 and achieved fame as the first spouse of a Soviet leader to accompany him on all his travels. This made a substantial contribution to the favorable impact the Gorbachevs had on their many foreign interlocutors.

Raisa Gorbachev became one of the best-known women in the world, partly because her attractive appearance, vivacity, and self-assurance were so much at odds with the image the wives of high-ranking Soviet politicians had projected hitherto. Her partnership with her husband was exceptionally close. It caused a sensation when Gorbachev revealed, in answer to a question from an American television interviewer, that he discussed every-

thing with his wife, including high-level politics and the affairs of state.

Raisa, as she became universally known, was intellectually well equipped for the role she played. Though she had to attend many different schools as her father, a railway worker, moved from place to place, she gained a gold medal for maximum grades in all subjects and entered the philosophy department at Moscow State University in 1949. Later she did pioneering sociological research, gained the Russian equivalent of a Ph.D., and published a book in 1969 on the way of life of the peasantry in the Stavropol region (where her husband was the First Secretary of the Communist Party). Whereas many Soviet officials had books produced for them by hired hands, Raisa Gorbachev did her own field research and writing.

As a very visible “First Lady” in the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1991, she aroused envy and resentment at home (for her glamour and smart clothes) as well as admiration, but she was much more universally liked and respected abroad. She played a significant part in projecting both the new image and new reality of Soviet politics following the accession of her husband to the highest post in the Kremlin.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH

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ARCHIE BROWN

GORCHAKOV, ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH

(1798–1883), Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire, 1856–1881.

A descendant of an illustrious Russian aristocratic family, Alexander Gorchakov was educated at the lyceum in Tsarskoye Selo that is best known for his classmate, Alexander Pushkin. He excelled as a classical scholar and gained more than the usual fluency in Latin and French. He chose a

diplomatic career, entering the foreign ministry under the tutelage of Count Karl Nesselrode, serving as minister to Stuttgart and Württemberg during the 1830s and 1840s and to the German Confederation, where he first met Otto von Bismarck. His promotion to Austrian ambassador during the Crimean War was a more serious test of his diplomatic ability and won his recognition as a worthy successor to Nesselrode. He was, nevertheless, a sharp critic, not only of the blunders that led to the war, but also of the peace terms that resulted. He consistently counseled caution on Russian involvement in the Balkans, a policy unheeded by his predecessors and successors, to Russia's and the world's misfortune.

As a true Russian following a German master, he rose to the occasion of the Russian defeat in the Crimean War to be Foreign Minister and Chancellor under Tsar Alexander II. In a period of vulnerability and weakness during the reforms of the tsar, he maintained a conservative-cautious front in European diplomacy, while gradually managing to nullify most of the ignominious restrictions of the Treaty of Paris (1856), such as the restrictions on warships in the Black Sea. His major subsequent accomplishments were to shield successfully the substantial Russian expansion in Central Asia (Turkistan) and the Far East (the acquisition of the Maritime Provinces) from European interference and to dispose of a costly and vulnerable territory in North America (Alaska) to the United States in 1867. His greatest accomplishment was the achievement of a dominant position for Russia in the Balkans through the treaty negotiations at San Stefano that concluded the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and at the Congress of Berlin that followed. His over-commitment to pan-Slavic and nationalist Russian goals, however, moved Russia into the center of Great Power rivalries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sowing the seeds for the debacle of World War I.

Much of Gorchakov's success in advancing Russia's European interests, however, could also be credited to Bismarck, who promoted German-Russian collaboration, supported Gorchakov's initiatives, and whose paramount role in European diplomacy overshadowed Gorchakov's. In response, Gorchakov willingly supported German aggression in Holstein and in the Franco-Prussian War, thus promoting Bismarck's creation of the German Empire. They were partners in both waging limited wars for expansionist gains and in preserving general peace through aggressive diplomacy, but the

Russian chancellor clearly resented the appearance of a German domination of Russian policy. While Bismarck suffered dismissal by his own government in 1879, Gorchakov overstayed his tenure, becoming a senile embarrassment by 1881. Unfortunately for both major European powers, none would follow with equal skill, international outlook, prestige, and ability to compromise and maintain peace. It is perhaps no surprise that Vladimir Putin's "new Russia" recognizes Gorchakov as a statesman who successfully promoted Russian interests in international relations and, in his honor, awarded the annual "Gorchakov peace prize," in 2002 to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan.

See also: ALEXANDER II; NESSELRODE, KARL ROBERT; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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NORMAN E. SAUL

GORDON, PATRICK LEOPOLD

(1635–1699), born in Cronden, Aberdeen, Scotland, died in Moscow.

Patrick Leopold Gordon, known in Russia as Petr Ivanovich Gordon, was a descendant of a Scottish Catholic aristocratic family and studied at Braunberg College in Danzig (Gdańsk) where he graduated in 1655. Gordon served in the Swedish and Polish armies, and then entered Russian service in 1661 with the rank of major, given the task of training New Formation regiments. Gordon was dispatched as an unofficial Russian envoy to England in 1666–1667 where he met with James II and played an important role in reviving Anglo-Russian relations, including trade which had been of marginal significance since the expulsion of the English from the Russian interior in 1649. He advised the English government and the Muscovy Company on strategies to adopt for negotiations with Russia. He also was an active participant in the Chyhyryn (Chigirin) campaign in 1677–1678

and the Crimean expeditions of 1687 and 1689. Gordon headed the Butyrskii Regiment, was promoted to general-major in 1678, and general-lieutenant in 1683.

Having supported the regime of Sof'ia Alekseevna, in 1689 he switched sides back to Peter I (the Great) who deposed his half-sister. Gordon became one of Peter's close associates and played a crucial role in the creation of a regular Russian army. He headed the Kozhukhov campaign of 1694 and obtained Peter's permission for the presence in Russia of a Roman Catholic clergy, and in 1694 founded a Catholic church in Moscow. Gordon was a leader of the Azov campaigns of 1695–1696, and was in charge of the seizure of the fortress in 1696. Gordon subdued the Strel'tsy (Musketeer) Uprising of 1698. He authored an extensive diary describing his experiences in Sweden, Poland, and Russia, 1655–1699, and also produced a large number of surviving letters pertaining to Anglo-Russian political and commercial relations, and late Muscovite political history.

See also: PETER I

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JARMO T. KOTILAINE

GOREMYKIN, IVAN LONGINOVICH

(1839–1917), minister of interior and twice prime minister under Nicholas II.

Ivan Loginovich Goremykin was the prototypical bureaucrat and conservative leader of late tsarist times, and became, especially during World War I, a symbol of the old regime's outdatedness and resistance to change.

Born of a noble family, Goremykin spent his long life almost entirely in public service. During the 1860s, while an official in Russian Poland, he took a special interest in peasant affairs, and later he was involved in many studies of rural issues. Characteristic of his record, however, he never proposed any solutions. After various posts in the Senate, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Interior, Goremykin was appointed minister of Interior in October 1895 by the new tsar, Nicholas II, who valued him as a "safe" bureaucrat and a staunch supporter of the autocracy. Goremykin assured Nicholas that Russian society was basically stable and only some "completion and repair" was required to fix minor problems. Goremykin proposed extending the zemstvo system into the empire's western provinces plus a few borderlands, but Nicholas, fearing the spread of liberal ideas, decided in October 1899 to replace Goremykin.

After the tsar became disillusioned with Sergei Witte's reform efforts in 1905 and 1906, he fired Witte as prime minister in April 1906 and brought in Goremykin, then sixty-seven years old. Goremykin discarded the program Witte had intended to submit to the First Duma and stonewalled the Duma's demands. Having decided to dismiss the Duma and seeking a stronger leader, the tsar sent Goremykin into retirement in July 1906, replacing him with Peter Stolypin.

But in January 1914 Goremykin, at the age of seventy-four, again became prime minister. Because of his frailty and lack of initiative and because he rebuffed public attempts to improve the government's war effort, Goremykin came to symbolize the regime's incompetence and callousness. Despite public pressure, Nicholas II stuck by his decrepit prime minister until January 1916, when Goremykin was finally replaced.

See also: NICHOLAS II; STOLYPIN, PETER AKRADIEVICH; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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
JOHN M. THOMPSON

GORKY, MAXIM

(1868–1936), renowned writer and playwright.

Maxim Gorky (Maxim the Bitter) was born Alexei Maximovich Peshkov in Nizhny Novgorod during the reign of Tsar Alexander II and died in the Stalinist Soviet Union. Gorky was orphaned at an early age, and his formal education ended when he was ten because his impoverished grandparents could not support him. He was self-taught in many areas, including literature, philosophy, and history, both Russian and Western.

Gorky rose to prominence early in life and made his mark as a writer, playwright, publicist, and publisher in Russia and abroad. His literary career began in 1892 with the publication of the story "Makar Chudra." His articles and stories were soon appearing in provincial newspapers and journals. His ideas of the writer's involvement in the social, political, and economic problems facing Russia were close to those of Leo Tolstoy and Vladimir G. Korolenko, who became his mentor and friend. Some of his literary works had important political sig-



Writer Maxim Gorky established the Socialist Realism genre.

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nificance, such as the poem *Burevestnik* (*The Stormy Petrel*), which in 1901 prophesied the oncoming storm of revolution. While visiting the United States in 1906 on a mission to win friends for the revolution and raise funds for the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP), he wrote the novel *Mat* (*Mother*). Gorky's revolutionary ideology lay in his insistence on the inevitability of radical change in Russian society.

Disillusioned with the passivity and ignorance of the peasant, Gorky gradually abandoned *narodnik* (populist) ideology in favor of social democracy. He financed Vladimir Lenin's *Iskra* (*The Spark*). At the same time he supported other parties, such as the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Liberals.

The events of Bloody Sunday and the Revolution of 1905 induced Gorky to become involved, for the only time in his life, in revolutionary work. He wrote articles for the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, *Novaia zhizn* (*New Life*), gave financial assistance, and criticized the tsar's October Manifesto for its conservatism. Warned of his imminent arrest, Gorky left Russia for the Italian island of Capri and did not return until 1913. Alienated by the Lenin and the RSDWP, Gorky joined a group led by Alexander A. Bogdanov, who shared his belief in mass education. With Bogdanov and Anatoly V. Lunacharsky, he organized a school for underground party workers. This was also the time of the emergence of a new religion called *Bogostroitel'stvo* (*God-building*), best defined as a theory of the divinity of the masses. Gorky's *Ispoved* (*Confession*), written in 1908, served as an exposition of this belief and led to a break with Lenin.

On his return to Russia in 1913, Gorky devoted his time, ability, and resources to advancing Russian education and culture, projects brought to an end by World War I and the revolutions of 1917. Gorky was enthusiastic about the February Revolution, hoping that Russia would become a liberal democratic state. Soon after Lenin's return to Russia in April 1917, Gorky, writing in *Novaia zhizn* (*New Life*), criticized the Bolshevik propaganda for a socialist revolution. These views appeared in articles called *Nesvoevremennye mysli* (*Untimely Thoughts*). Russia, wrote Gorky, was not ready for the socialist revolution envisioned by the Bolsheviks.

Under Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Gorky saw it as his task to save Russia's cultural treasures and intellectual elite. In 1921, horrified by the cruelty and bloodshed of the civil war, he decided to leave Soviet Russia but not before he succeeded in ob-

taining American aid for the country's famine victims.

His second exile was spent mostly in Sorrento, Italy. Among his political writings of this period is the essay *O russkom krestianstve* (*On the Russian Peasantry*), which appeared in 1922 in Berlin and during the 1980s in the Soviet Union. A bitter indictment of the Russian peasantry, it was resented by both the Russian émigré community and Soviet leaders. In 1928, under pressure from Josef Stalin, Gorky returned to the Soviet Union. The years from 1928 to 1936 were trying for him, for he could see but not speak of the realities of Stalinist Russia. He became an icon and cooperated with the regime, apparently believing that socialism would modernize Russia.

The cause of Gorky's death in 1936 is still debated, some maintaining that he died of natural causes, others that he was a victim of a Stalinist purge. Similarly, opinion in today's Russia is divided on the question of Gorky as a political activist. Gorky was a great political activist and writer of short stories, plays, memoirs, and novels such as *Foma Gordeev*, *The Artamonovs*, the trilogy *My Childhood*, *In the World*, and *My Universities*, and *The Life of Klim Samgin*.

See also: KOROLENKO, VLADIMIR GALAKTIONOVICH; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY; SOCIALIST REALISM; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH

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TOVAH YEDLIN

GOSBANK

Gosbank (the State Bank of the USSR) was the Soviet Union's monobank. Characteristic of command economies, monobanks combine central and commercial banking functions into a single state-owned institution. Gosbank's primary tasks were to issue cash and credit according to government directives, and to operate the payments and clearing system. The Soviet government created Gos-

bank in October 1921 as the State Bank of the Russian Federation and changed its name to the State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank) in July 1923. The Soviet government permitted communal and cooperative banks to exist separately during the New Economic Policy period of the 1920s, but a series of banking reforms from 1930 to 1932 ended these last vestiges of commercial activity.

Several organizational changes ensued in the following years, and by the mid-1960s Gosbank's structure had crystallized. The USSR Council of Ministers directly controlled Gosbank. Gosbank's director sat on the Council of Ministers, and the Council nominated the members of Gosbank's board. Besides its main branches in each of the fifteen union republics and sub-branches in autonomous republics, territories, and regions, Gosbank controlled three subordinate banks: Stroibank USSR (the All-Union Bank for Investment Financing), Sberbank USSR (the Savings Bank), and Vneshtorgbank (the Foreign Trade Bank). In addition, Gosbank and Vneshtorgbank controlled foreign subsidiary banks in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, and Vienna. The oldest and most prominent were Moscow Narodny Bank, founded in London in 1919, and Eurobank, founded in Paris in 1925.

As a part of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika (restructuring) program, the Soviet government dismantled the monobank in January 1988 and created a two-tiered banking system. Gosbank became a central bank, and retained only its major offices in the republics, large cities, and oblasts. The state foreign trade bank (now renamed Vneshekonombank) and Sberbank remained under Gosbank's direct control. The rest of Gosbank split off into three specialized banks. Agroprombank (the Agro-Industrial Bank) and Zhilsotsbank (the Housing and Social Development Bank) emerged from Gosbank proper, while Stroibank became Promstroibank (the Industrial-Construction Bank).

In 1990 the Russian government transformed a Moscow branch of Gosbank into the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during the battle for sovereignty between the Soviet and Russian governments. The CBR and Gosbank operated in parallel until after the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev in August 1991, when the Soviet governing bodies lost their hold on power. On August 23, Russian president Boris Yeltsin ordered the USSR Council of Ministers to complete the transfer of Union-level organizations on Russian territory to the custody

of the Russian state by the end of the year. On November 15, Yeltsin took over, by decree, the USSR Ministry of Finance and the USSR Chief Administration for the Production of State Bank Notes, Coins, and Medals. The Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet then unilaterally passed a resolution dissolving Gosbank and transferring its "facilities, documents, and specialists" to the CBR. On January 1, 1992, the CBR officially took over the rest of Gosbank's resources in Russia, and Gosbank ceased to exist.

See also: BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA; SBERBANK; STROIBANK

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JULIET JOHNSON

GOSIZDAT

State publishing house of the Russian Republic.

Gosizdat was the most important publishing house in Soviet Russia between 1919 and 1930, and played an important role in the creation of the Soviet publishing system. After coming to power, the Bolsheviks nationalized most private book publishers and printers, transferring their assets to local party and state organizations, which used them to set up their own publishing operations. When the new publishing system proved too disorganized and chaotic, Gosizdat was founded in May 1919 to provide a centralized alternative. Gosizdat started as a contract-printer, receiving most of its editorial content from other Soviet institutions, though it did produce some titles independently. It also acted as a regulatory body overseeing the work of remaining local publishing houses, controlling their

access to raw materials and enforcing political censorship. Gosizdat's production during this period consisted primarily of short agitational and military titles, though it also published some longer scientific works. These books and pamphlets were state-funded and distributed at no charge. Gosizdat's output was almost entirely in the Russian language.

With the onset of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, the Soviet publishing industry and Gosizdat underwent dramatic changes. Publishing was decentralized, as Soviet institutions were permitted to open their own publishing operations, and books became priced commodities. Gosizdat lost its regulatory functions and focused on producing its own books, though it continued to do some contract printing. Unlike most Russian-language publishing houses, whose production was specialized (at least in theory), Gosizdat remained a universal publishing house, issuing works on a wide variety of subjects, including fiction, children's literature, scientific texts, propaganda, and works on Marxism and Leninism. It had monopolies on the publication of Russian literary classics and textbooks. Gosizdat issued between 25 and 40 percent of Soviet Russian-language book production (measured by pages) each year in the 1920s. Gosizdat also published a number of important periodicals. During the 1920s, Gosizdat absorbed a number of prominent Soviet publishing houses, including *Krasnaya nov*, *Priboy*, and *Zemlya i fabrika*.

Gosizdat was technically part of the Commissariat of Enlightenment, though in practice it answered directly to the Communist Party's Central Committee, which appointed its board of directors, reviewed editorial appointments, and monitored its work. Gosizdat acted as the Central Committee's main book publisher and was afforded special privileges, including large state subsidies and freedom from external ideological censorship.

In August 1930, Gosizdat provided the foundation for a new, centralized publishing conglomerate, the Association of State Publishing Houses (OGIZ), into which most existing Soviet publishing houses were merged. Even after this time, it was not uncommon for Soviet sources to use the term *gosizdat* to describe the Russian Republic's main publishing operation, whatever its official name. Variants of the term were also used to describe the main publishing house serving some republics or languages: The Tatar State Publishing House, for instance, was known as *Tatizdat* or *Tatgiz*. Spe-

cialized Russian-language publishing houses were also popularly known by similar acronyms; for example, the State Technical Publishing House was Gostekhizdat.

See also: CENSORSHIP; CENTRAL COMMITTEE; SAMIZDAT

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BRIAN KASSOF

GOSKOMSTAT

The term *Goskomstat* is the abbreviation used to designate the State Committee for Statistics (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Statistiki, or Goskomstat), which, in July 1997, replaced the Central Statistical Agency (TsSU). Founded in 1918, the Soviet office for statistics went through various institutional transformations starting in January 1930, when central planning was established. The office lost its institutional independence that year and was subsumed under Gosplan, the State Planning Administration. Its missions were redefined. From then on its main task would be to supply Gosplan with the numbers it needed to create the indicators necessary to the planned management of the Soviet economy and society. Conflicts erupted as early as the end of the 1920s between TsSU statisticians and the political leadership on a number of issues, particularly on the measurement of crop levels and the analysis of social differences in the countryside. During the 1930s, disagreements on population numbers led to the purges that touched most of the officials in charge of the census of 1937. In 1948, TsSU once again became independent from Gosplan, but its activity remained essentially focused on the production of numbers for the planning and improvement of indicators.

Following the launching of perestroika policies, in 1985, a decree dated July 17, 1987, stated the necessity to "rebuild the foundations for statistical

activity in the country." Nevertheless, planned management of the economy was not abandoned right away. The year 1991 marked a breaking off in this respect with Goskomstat entering a period of reforms clearly oriented toward the abandonment of planning and the transition to a market economy. First, the disappearance of the Soviet state caused the breakup of USSR's Goskomstat followed by the transfer of its various services to each new state born out of the former USSR: each created its own statistics committee or department. After the founding of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), on December 30, 1991, a statistics committee was created to coordinate the activities of statistics committees of CIS member states.

Adjustment to the new constraints imposed upon the production of statistical data resulting from the transition to a market economy brought about a number of different programs affecting Goskomstat starting in 1992. The recasting of economic indicators, the elaboration of new monitoring tools—notably for trade and financial activities—and methods for gathering economic data from a growing number of companies outside the state sector, as well as the construction of a new national accounting system, were all accomplished thanks to the support of experience from statistical administrations of Western countries. Concern for the ability to compare Russian statistical data with those released by other countries explains the attention that was given to the elaboration of principles for the calculation of GNP and such indicators as price, population, labor, foreign trade, and financial activity statistics that match the practices adopted by Western nations in this domain.

See also: CENTRAL STATISTICAL AGENCY; ECONOMY, CURRENT; GOSPLAN

MARTINE MESPOULET

GOSPLAN

Gosplan SSSR (*Gosudarstvenny planovy komitet SSSR*—the State Planning Committee of the USSR), the core state committee of the Soviet economic bureaucracy, was created in 1921. During the first Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) Valerian Kuybyshev headed Gosplan. Gosplan was responsible for executing the directives of the Council of Ministries,

translating general directives into operational plans for the ministries, and advising the Council of Ministries on a wide range of issues. Gosplan planned for the ministries, not for enterprises, although some large enterprises were planned directly by Gosplan. Gosplan communicated extensively with the ministries in the process of drafting the plan. It was subdivided into industrial departments, such as coal, ferrous metals, and machine building, and also had summary departments, such as finance, to deal with functions that crossed functional bodies. The early recognition of Gosplan's importance came in 1925 and 1926, when it began to prepare the annual preliminary plan targets, or so-called control figures. During the 1930s the principle of guidance of economic policy on an annual basis was established, although much publicity was devoted to nonoperational five-year plans. Annual plans, including production and financial targets, so-called *promfinplany*, were drawn up sector by sector. By 1926 and 1927, *promfinplany* that were originated by ministries became dependent on the control figures. Formally, the plan era began in 1928 with the First Five-Year Plan for intensive economic growth. The Five-Year Plan was a comprehensive plan that set the major economic goals for a five-year period. The five-year goals were not put into operation in the shorter-term operational plans. Once the Soviet regime stipulated the plan figures, all levels of the economy from individual enterprises to the national level were theoretically obliged to meet those goals ("The plan is the law"). During the period from 1928 to 1932, the basic principles of Soviet planning were established. Gosplan was to be the central coordinating body to which all other planning bodies were to submit their proposals. The control figures would provide the general direction for the economy. The actual detailed operational plans for enterprises (*promfinplany*) were to conform to the control figures. Materials were to be allocated through a system of balances, which would elaborate the sources and uses of basic industrial materials. The long-term planning horizon was set at five years, the average period required for the completion of investment projects. Operational plans were prepared in cooperation with the planning departments of ministries, the most important of which were the all-union ministries. In day-to-day operations, inter-ministry cooperation was limited in such matters as equipment delivery and construction planning. Soviet law gave Gosplan substantial responsibilities concerning supply planning. Gosplan was charged with preparing and confirming plans

for the distribution of production among ministries. It was Gosplan who prepared general material limits (*limityu*) for the ministries. Later these material limits would be broken down into product profiles by the State Committee for Material Technical Supply, Gossnab, which was formed in 1947 to assist in supply planning. Gosplan remained the primary planning body of the Soviet Union until its collapse in December 1991.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; FIVE-YEAR PLANS

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GOSTI

The *gosti* (singular: *gost*) were great merchants who enjoyed high social status. They are encountered in the Kievan and later Mongol period, but are best known as a corporate group that emerged in the sixteenth century and figured prominently in the economic, political, administrative, and court life of seventeenth-century Russia.

In the last half of the sixteenth century, the leading merchants of Muscovy were organized into three privileged corporations: the *gosti*, the *gostinnaya sotnya*, and the *sukonnaya sotnya*. They were obliged to render services to the government and were compensated with certain privileges. The *gosti*, whose number averaged around thirty throughout the seventeenth century, stood at the top of the merchant hierarchy. The rank was not hereditary, so the government periodically designated replacements for those who had died or became incapable of rendering service.

They were obliged, among other burdensome duties, to serve as the tsar's factors, to collect customs at the port of Archangel and at Moscow, to oversee the state liquor monopoly, and to participate in ceremonial functions at the court. In return for the exercise of these duties, the *gosti* were freed of the obligation to quarter troops, and permitted to brew and keep stocks of liquor. They were not

required to pay taxes imposed on other townsmen, and they were the only Russian merchants permitted to travel abroad on business.

Representatives of the gosti participated in the land assemblies (*zemskie sobory*) and advised the rulers on questions of war and peace. They were leaders of a long-running campaign to abolish privileges granted to foreign merchants and to secure uncontested control of the domestic market. Peter the Great, dissatisfied with their perceived want of dynamism, phased them out in the first quarter of the eighteenth century.

See also: GOSTINAYA SOTNYA; MERCHANTS; SUKKONNAYA SOTNYA

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SAMUEL H. BARON

GOSTINAYA SOTNYA

Literally "Guest Hundred," a privileged corporation of Russian merchants between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries.

The name Gostinaya sotnya derives from the word *gost* (guest), which was used to refer to prosperous merchants in medieval Russia. The Gostinaya sotnya was the second most important corporation of elite merchants after the *gosti* (pl. of *gost*). Members of the Gostinaya sotnya tended to be relatives of gosti, former members of the *Sukonnaya sotnya* (a lower corporation of merchants), prominent local merchants, and prosperous peasant-traders. Three categories of Gostinaya sotnya members were defined in terms of wealth.

Members of the Gostinaya sotnya performed official duties for the government, usually once every six years for half a year at a time. They typically served as heads or officials of local customs and taverns. They assisted gosti in large cities and conducted similar functions independently in smaller towns. They sold treasury goods at fairs

and abroad. In return, Gostinaya sotnya members were exempted from direct taxes, minor customs duties, and the responsibility to quarter soldiers. They were excluded from the jurisdiction of local authorities and granted other privileges, including the right to distill liquor for personal consumption. Elevated fines of ten to twenty rubles were assessed in cases of dishonor committed against Gostinaya sotnya members. Unlike the status of a gost, membership in the Gostinaya sotnya was hereditary and typically shared with other family members engaged in a joint enterprise.

A 1613 charter issued to members of the Gostinaya sotnya closely resembled the charter of the gosti; however, it did not authorize travel abroad. Foreign travel was subsequently permitted through government-issued passes. The Gostinaya sotnya typically sent two representatives to Assemblies of the Land (*zemskie sobory*).

The Gostinaya sotnya had 345 members in 1601 and 1602; membership fell to 185 in 1630 and 158 in 1649. A total of 2,100 individuals joined the Gostinaya sotnya during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, with a particular marked growth in the 1680s. With the introduction of the poll tax in the 1720s, members of the Gostinaya sotnya, along with townsmen, joined the stratum of merchants.

See also: GOSTI; FOREIGN TRADE; MERCHANTS; SUKONNAIA SOTNYA; TAXES

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GOSUDARYEV DVOR

Literally, "sovereign's court," a hierarchical institution made up of the ruler's elite servitors during the late twelfth through seventeenth centuries.

Courts of east Slavic princes usually included close members of the retinue, service cavalymen, and household officials. Members of boyar families with established ties to the prince of Moscow

formed the basis of the Muscovite court during the fourteenth century. The growing political power of the Muscovite ruler attracted numerous distinguished newcomers, including members of the Lithuanian and Tatar ruling families, to his court in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. Muscovite rulers also incorporated the princes of territories annexed by Moscow into their court, although some of them, known as service princes, retained some organizational autonomy within the court until the end of the sixteenth century.

As a result of the reforms of the 1550s, the sovereign's court functioned on the basis of a mixture of hierarchical and territorial principles. During the second half of the sixteenth century, the court acquired a clear hierarchy of ranks: boyars, *okolnichie*, counselor cavalymen, counselor secretaries, the household ranks and chancellery secretaries, the ruler's personal guard (*stolniki*, *stryapchie*, *zhiltsy*), service princes, and the lowest ranks (*dvorovye deti boyarskie*, later *vybornye dvoryane*). Service relations between courtiers were subject to rules of precedence (*mestnichestvo*), a complex system that defined the status of a courtier on the basis of the prominence and service appointments of his ancestors and relatives. Territoriality was crucial to the court's lowest strata, which included members of collateral branches of boyar families, people who had advanced through faithful service, and newcomers of lower status. The people who held the lowest court ranks were leading members of local cavalymen communities and were listed by the town where they had service lands. They served in Moscow on a rotating basis. Secretaries entered the court thanks to their literacy and the patronage of the ruler or influential courtiers. A servitor's career at court thus dependent on his pedigree, his position in the local cavalymen community, his personal skills and merits, and the favor of his patrons.

The princes of Moscow used a variety of means to secure the integrity of their court. Members of the court swore an oath of allegiance and received land grants on condition that they served the prince. Muscovite rulers secured the loyalty of distinguished newcomers by granting them superior status over the boyars, manipulating their land possessions, encouraging marriages with members of the royal family and the local elite, and subjecting the disloyal to disgrace and executions. Ivan IV's reign saw the climax of repressions against members of the court, which was divided in two parts during the Oprichnina. The social and genealogical composition of the court, however, re-

mained stable until the middle of the seventeenth century, when people of lower origin began entering the court's upper strata. At the same time, the leaders of local cavalymen communities were excluded from the court. Peter I stopped making appointments to the upper court ranks during the early 1690s.

The sovereign's court included the most combat-worthy Muscovite troops and provided cadres for administrative and diplomatic tasks. An efficient military and administrative institution, the sovereign's court was vital to the victory of the princes of Moscow over their opponents and to the functioning of the Russian state during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

See also: BOYAR; CHANCELLERY SYSTEM; IVAN III; IVAN IV; OPRICHNINA

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SERGEI BOGATYREV

GOVERNING SENATE

The Governing Senate was founded in 1711. Its initial primary responsibility was to govern the empire when the emperor was on military campaigns. The establishment of the Senate was also part of a government re-organization undertaken by Peter I (1689–1725) who wished to make the government structure more responsive to his wishes and more effective at tapping society's resources for military purposes. In 1722 it was transformed from a higher governing organ to a higher supervisory one responsible for resolving legal and administrative disputes. Catherine II (1763–1796) further systemized the Senate by dividing it into six departments with relatively clear institutional responsibilities related to administrative oversight.

The governmental reforms undertaken by Alexander I (1801–1825) fundamentally changed the role of the Senate. According to his decrees of 1801 and 1802 the Senate had the right to judicial

review and supervision of the highest governmental organs, including the newly established ministries. No legislative bill could become law without the Senate's approval. However, one year later a new decree stripped the Senate of these powers. The founding of the ministerial system and the State Council (1810) fatally weakened the Senate's role in practice. For the remainder of the nineteenth century it played the role of a High Court of Review and along with other institutions exercised limited administrative supervision. Until 1905 the Senate, whose forty or fifty members were chosen by the tsar, rarely met, except on ceremonial occasions. Six departments that dealt with a myriad of judicial, social, and political issues continued to work under the supervision of the Senate.

After the Revolution of 1905 the role of the Senate changed once again. It became the High Criminal Court dealing with corruption in the bureaucracy. Its first department played a role in the preparations for the formation of the First Duma, while its Second Department became the supreme appellate court for land-related issues.

See also: ALEXANDER I; CATHERINE II; PETER I

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GRAIN CRISIS OF 1928

The Grain Crisis of 1928 was economic and political in nature and was a turning point in the Soviet regime's policy toward the peasantry, a preview of Josef Stalin's harsh methods of collectivization. Ten years after the Revolution, agriculture was still based on individual farming, with peasants cultivating more than ninety-seven percent of the land and selling their product to the state at set procurement prices in order to meet their tax obligations. The most important product was grain, and the system of state procurement supplied grain to feed the cities and the military, and for export. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), the existence of a free market for agricultural products helped keep procurement prices competitive. Most peasants were at or near the

subsistence level. A small number of richer peasants (the so-called kulaks) supplied most of the grain sold on the free market. Prices for industrial products produced by the state sector were kept relatively high in order to accumulate capital. In December 1927, the Fifteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party endorsed the idea of planned economic development, requiring the state to accumulate even more capital from domestic sources, principally the peasantry, while maintaining exports. Grain procurement prices were lowered in order to keep state expenditures down. A war scare in 1927 led people to hoard food.

Within this context, the grain crisis began to take shape toward the end of 1927. Although it was an average harvest, grain procurements fell precipitously at the end of the year; in November and December of 1927, procurements were about half of what they had been during the same months of the previous year. The problem was especially acute in Siberia, the Volga, and the Urals, even though the harvest had been good in these areas. Richer peasants withheld grain from the market, waiting for prices to rise. Peasants also switched from producing grain to other agricultural commodities. For example, in the Urals, while peasant grain sales to the state declined by a third, the sale of meat rose by fifty percent, egg sales doubled, and bacon sales went up four times.

Stalin insisted that the kulaks were withhold grain from the market to sabotage the regime, creating as much a political problem as an economic problem. He argued that the class struggle was intensifying. In January 1928 he visited the Urals and West Siberia and called for a series of emergency measures to extract grain from the recalcitrant peasantry. In direct opposition to the views of Nikolai Bukharin and other moderates in the Politburo, quotas for compulsory grain deliveries were imposed on kulaks and also on middle peasants. Peasants responded by decreasing grain production during 1928, but this simply intensified the crisis. For the year October 1927–October 1928, grain procurements fell by fourteen percent relative to the same period a year earlier, although the harvest was down by only seven to eight percent.

The grain crisis of 1928 was a critical turning point in Soviet economic and political history. Applying compulsion to the peasants rather than using economic incentives meant that NEP was dead. Most significantly, the events of 1928 showed that Stalin saw the peasantry as the enemy and established the context of a warlike crisis that would

justify violence. The outlines of the harsh collectivization drive were already visible.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; KULAKS; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

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GRAIN TRADE

In Russia the dynamics of the grain trade depended on demand in the domestic and foreign markets. Before 1762 the export of grain was conducted under government supervision and depended on the domestic price level. If local prices exceeded an established level, export of grain was prohibited because of fears of further price rises. But even in the years of low prices, permission for the export of grain was required. The government considered grain a strategic commodity and gave this permission reluctantly. As a result, before 1762 grain trade was limited mainly to the empire's frontiers. Only after the declaration of freedom of grain trade in 1762 did a systematic growth of grain exports begin. Before the 1780s the export of grain was prohibited only in case of a substantial price rise, and by the 1790s export became virtually free. Domestic demand for grain came from the urban population, the army, industry (mainly distillation), and the rural population of provinces that experienced a grain deficit.

The demand for marketable grain was comparatively small because nearly 75 percent of the population, even as late as 1897, was engaged in agriculture and able to satisfy its need for grain with its own production. The urban population was not large (in 1914 only 15.3% of the population lived in towns, and a portion of the townspeople engaged in agriculture). The regular army was comparatively small (in 1719, 2.9% of the country's total population; in 1795, 2.5%; in 1850, 1.5%; in 1913, 0.8%). The consumption of vodka was limited physiologically (in 1913 in Russia the consumption of vodka converted to spirit was only

3.1 liters per capita) and the technology of distillation was improving. A constant demand for grain was felt only in the vicinity of big cities, industrial centers, and where arable land was scarce or soil poor. According to rough estimates, during the 1800s the urban population consumed 4.7 percent of all grain produced; in 1851–1860, 5.6 percent; and in 1912–1913, 9.1 percent; with industry consuming 4.1, 3.5, and 0.5 percent correspondingly; the army, 2.1, 2.1, and 1.2 percent; and exports 1.0, 3.8, and 15.7 percent. During the 1800s the share of marketable grain was nearly 12 percent of the gross yield of grain; during the 1850s, 15 percent; and in 1892–1913, 26.4 percent.

The grain trade began to grow markedly after the abolition of serfdom. Domestic and, even more, foreign demand increased, both of which were stimulated by extension of the railway network. Of three most important factors stimulating the demand for grain, export was in the first place, industrialization the second, and urbanization the third. The export of marketable grain constituted 7 percent of the total grain trade during the early 1800s, 26 percent during the 1850s, and 60 percent in 1892–1893; in terms of weight the average annual export of grain amounted to 0.2 million tons, 1.1 million tons, and 10.7 million tons correspondingly. The export of grain acquired vital importance for Russia. The main export cereals were wheat, rye, barley, and oats. In the mass of exported grain in 1762–1802 the share of wheat was 48 percent; rye, 45 percent; barley, 3.9 percent; oats, 2.8 percent; other cereals, 0.3 percent; in 1841–1850, 66, 17, 4, 6, and 7 percent correspondingly; in 1912–1913, 37, 8, 41, 11, and 3 percent. Russian grain was mainly exported to Western European countries. Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy imported mainly Russian grain, while England, Belgium, and France imported U.S. grain. Russia and the United States competed mainly in exports of red cereals: wheat and some barley. Grey cereals, rye and oats, were chiefly delivered from Russia and did not encounter U.S. competition.

During the post-reform period considerable success was achieved in the organization of the grain trade: A whole army of trade agents appeared; credit for marketable grain was created; great amounts of capital were mobilized; means of communication, ports, and the merchant navy were improved; a tariff system was designed; a fairly dense network of elevators and granaries was formed; a corporative organization of grain tradesmen emerged; grain ex-



Laborers in Odessa walk among the cattle-driven wagons laden with sacks of wheat, 1878. © CORBIS

changes were founded in major centers of grain trade (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Voronezh, Elizavetgrad, Borisoglebsk); information on crops, grain exports, stocks, prices, and freights became widely available. Western European commercial ethics and trade customs were gradually adopted. Despite indisputable progress, the organization of Russian grain trade did not attain the high level of development that it did in the United States, Russia's main competitor in the world grain market. Elevators and granaries served merely as storehouses in Russia;

classification of grains was not practiced there. Railways were not equipped with proper warehouses, rolling stock, and double track sections. Consequently, in good years, grain piled up at railway junctions, waiting for loading in the open, sometimes for up to two months. The quality of grain deteriorated, making it difficult for tradesmen to meet the conditions of contracts. The state of the roads along which grain was delivered to railway stations was unsatisfactory. Macadamized roads were few. In European Russia in 1912, there were

6 kilometers (3.7 miles) of them per 1,000 square kilometers (386.1 square miles); in the United States, 53 kilometers (33 miles); in Germany, 516 kilometers (320.6 miles); in Great Britain, 819 kilometers (508.9 miles); and in France, 1,073 kilometers (666.7 miles). Grain was brought to the stations not when it was profitable to sell it but when roads permitted. In ports there was a lack of warehouses for grain storage as well as a lack of facilities for grain reloading. All this raised overhead expenses and prices, and reduced the competitive capacity of Russian grain.

In Russia, foreign grain trade was in the hands of Western European tradesmen, and domestic trade remained in the hands of native tradesmen, mainly Jews, who purchased grain in the country and delivered it to ports for foreign exporters who gave credits and therefore dictated the conditions. The buyers-up were interested only in expanding and accelerating their turnovers. They did not attach much importance to the price level, since they made money on the difference between purchase and sale price. The sellers were peasants overburdened with various payments and landowners with big debts. They were short of liquid capital and, because of transportation conditions, not free to choose the moment of sale. Russian grain producers could neither wait for a favorable situation in the market nor exert influence upon prices, the level of which depended on crops and market competition of the sellers themselves. Inadequate organization of the grain trade resulted in the sale of Russian grain on world markets at less of a profit than U.S. grain. U.S. producers and sellers were to some extent able to regulate grain supplies to the world market, restraining the fall in prices in case of surplus grain supplies and maintaining high prices in a profitable market situation.

On account of great export (during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries grain played the same role as did oil and gasoline during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries) the level of prices was of great significance for Russia. Incomes and solvency of peasants and landlords, the country's trade balance, and earnings from customs duties depended on the price level. From the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, the situation in the world grain markets was for the most part advantageous to Russia. Russian local grain prices, expressed in grams of gold, rose 10.2 times from 1,707 grams (60.2 ounces) to 1,914 grams (67.5 ounces) (5.7 times during the eighteenth century), while the general

index of prices for domestic goods rose 6.6 times (five times during the eighteenth century). By contrast, in European countries, despite cyclic fluctuations, grain prices and the general price index had a tendency to decline in this period. In eighteenth-century Russia, a phenomenal rise in grain prices (and generally in all prices) occurred. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Russia had stood apart from the price revolution in Europe, but during the eighteenth century Russia entered world trade, and a belated price revolution took place. The Russian price revolution resulted in a leveling of Russian and world prices. At the turn of the eighteenth century, Russian prices were about nine to ten times lower than world prices, and at the turn of the twentieth century only 20 to 30 percent lower.

The leveling of Russian and world prices occurred under the influence of the market economy laws, which required, first of all, that prices for Russian goods correspond not only with national but also with world production costs, and, second, that they be determined by the relations between demand and supply both in the Russian and world markets. As Russia was joining the world market, local grain prices were becoming less dependent on local crops and local demand, and more dependent on the situation in the world market. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the dynamics of Russian grain prices were largely determined by the world market situation, and red grain prices were fully dependent on it. All of this attests that from the beginning of the eighteenth century Russia joined the international division of labor and gradually turned into a full member of the world economy and world market, and that the principles of the market economy penetrated the Russian national economy as early as the eighteenth century, long before the reforms of the 1860s. Hence, from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century the general line of Russia's socioeconomic evolution remained unchanged and consisted in commercialization of the economy and enhancement of the role of the market as a production regulator. Serfdom hampered and slowed down but did not prevent the development of capitalism in Russia, just as prior to 1865 slavery did not stop the development of capitalism in the United States. Grain prices exerted substantial influence upon numerous aspects of the economic, social, and political life of the country. They played an important part in the modernization of the national economy, development of social stratification of the peasantry, destruction of the peasant

commune, and urbanization and industrialization of the country.

See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMY, TSARIST; FOREIGN TRADE; PEASANT ECONOMY.

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GRAND ALLIANCE

Officially termed the Anti-Hitlerite Coalition by the Soviet Union, the Grand Alliance (1941–1945) was a military and political coalition of countries fighting against the Axis (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan), and their satellites. The alliance evolved during World War II through common understandings and specific formal and informal agreements negotiated between the Big Three (United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain) at wartime conferences, ministerial meetings, and periodic summits between the respective heads of state. In addition to the Big Three, the alliance included China, members of the British Commonwealth, France, and many other countries. While some formal agreements and modest liaison and coordinating bodies existed within the context of these agreements, particularly between the United States and Great Britain, the alliance as a whole formed few formal official policy organs.

Evolving step by step after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the alliance was a virtual marriage of necessity between the two Western democracies and Stalin's communist government, impelled by the reality of war and a common threat to all three powers, as well as the necessity of joining military and political forces to achieve victory in the war. The motives and attitudes of alliance members varied over time according to the military situation and the member states' political aims. To varying degrees, the Big Three shared certain wartime goals in addition to victory: for instance, mutual military assistance, formulation of a common unified wartime military strategy, es-

tablishment of a postwar international security organization, and elimination of any future threats from Germany and Japan.

The decisive stage in the formation of the Grand Alliance occurred after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, when, prompted by fear that Germany might win the war, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared their support for the Soviet Union as "true allies in the name of the peoples of Europe and America." Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed a mutual aid treaty in July 1941, and Stalin endorsed the peace aims of Roosevelt's and Churchill's Atlantic Charter in September. In November the United States solidified the alliance by extending lend-lease assistance to the Soviet Union. Thereafter, a steady stream of agreements and periodic meetings between unofficial representatives, ministers, and heads of state of the three countries formalized the alliance. The most important ministerial meetings took place in London (September–October 1941) and Moscow (October 1941 and October 1943) and at the Big Three summits at Tehran (November 1943–January 1944), Yalta (Crimea) (February 1945), and Potsdam (July–August 1945). During wartime, tensions emerged within the alliance over such vital issues as the adequacy of lend-lease aid, military coordination among Allied armies, the opening of a second front on mainland Europe, the postwar boundaries of the Soviet Union, the political structure of liberated European countries, Soviet participation in the war against Japan, European reconstruction, and the shape and nature of postwar peace.

See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH; GREAT BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH; WORLD WAR II

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GRAND PRINCE

The title of "grand prince" designated the senior prince of the Rurikid dynasty in Rus principalities from the era of Kievan Rus until 1721.

In scholarly literature on Kievan Rus the term *grand prince* is conventionally used to refer to the prince of Kiev. Succession to the position of grand prince was determined by principles associated with the rota system, according to which the position passed laterally from the eldest member of the senior generation of the dynasty to his younger brothers and cousins. When all members of that generation died, those members of the next generation whose fathers had actually held the position of grand prince of Kiev became eligible to inherit the position in order of seniority.

Despite common usage of the term in scholarly literature, the absence of the title "grand prince" and even the title "prince" in contemporary sources, including chronicles, treaties, charters, diplomatic documents, seals, and coins, suggests that they were rarely used during the Kievan era. The title "grand prince" in tenth-century treaties concluded between the Rus and the Byzantines has been interpreted as a translation from Greek formulas rather than a reflection of official Rus usage. The title also occurs in chronicle accounts of the deaths of Yaroslav the Wise (1054), his son Vsevolod (1093), and Vsevolod's son Vladimir Monomakh (1125), but this usage is regarded as honorific, borrowed from Byzantine models, and possibly added by later editors.

"Grand prince" was first used as an official title not for a prince of Kiev, but for Vsevolod "the Big Nest" of Vladimir-Suzdal (ruled 1176–1212). Within their principality it was applied to his sons Konstantin and Yuri as well. Outside of Vladimir-Suzdal, however, recognition of Vsevolod as grand prince, despite his dynastic seniority, was inconsistent, and during the very late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries the title was occasionally attributed to rulers of Kiev.

The title "grand prince" came into more common and consistent use during the fourteenth century. In addition to its use by the prince of Vladimir, it was also adopted by the princes of Tver, Riazan, and Nizhny Novgorod by the second half of the century. The princes of Moscow, who acquired an exclusive claim to the position of grand prince of Vladimir during this period, joined the title to the phrase "of all Rus" to elevate themselves

above the other grand princes. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as they absorbed the other Rus principalities into Muscovy and subordinated their princes, they not only monopolized the title "grand prince," but also began to use other titles conveying the meaning of sovereign (*gosudar* or *gospodar*). From 1547, when Ivan IV "the Terrible" was coronated, until 1721, when Peter I "the Great" adopted the title "emperor," the rulers of Muscovy used "grand prince and tsar" as their official titles.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; ROTA SYSTEM; RURIKID DYNASTY

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GREAT BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH

Russia's relations with Great Britain have been marked by chronic tension. During the nineteenth century, the British were keenly aware of tsarist Russia's expansion into Central Asia and of the menace it might hold for lands in the British Commonwealth, particularly India. Twice during that century the British invaded Afghanistan to forestall what they perceived as a Russian threat to occupy the country and use it as a staging area for an attack on India. Prophetic of George Kennan's "X" telegram of 1946 and the U.S. policy of containment, the British foreign minister Lord Palmerston said in 1853: "The policy and practice of the Russian government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance and then to wait for the next favorable opportunity." That same year the British decided to resist the effort by Tsar Nicholas I (1796–1855) to enhance Russian power and influence over the Black Sea region and the Ottoman Empire. War broke out between Russia and Turkey in October 1853 over a dispute about religious rights in the Holy Land. Great Britain and France joined forces with Turkey and laid siege to Sevastopol, Russia's naval base in the Crimea, and in September 1855 the Russians were forced to accept defeat. The Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856),

ending the war, was a serious diplomatic setback for Russia, because it guaranteed the integrity of Ottoman Turkey and obliged Russia to surrender southern Bessarabia, at the mouth of the Danube. The Crimean War failed to settle the Russian-British rivalry, but it impressed upon Nicholas's successor, Alexander II, the need to overcome Russia's backwardness in order to compete successfully with Britain and the other European powers.

As a further result of the Crimean War, Austria, which had sided with Great Britain and France, lost Russia's support in Central European affairs. Russia joined the Triple Entente with Britain and France in 1907, more as a result of the widened gap between it and the two Germanic powers and improved relations with Britain's ally, Japan, than out of any fondness for Britain and France. When Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated (June 28, 1914), Russia was not prepared to see Austria-Hungary defeat Serbia, a Slavic country, and the mobilization systems and interlocking alliances of the great powers undermined all attempts to avert a general war. The general disruption caused by World War I contributed to the revolutions in February and October 1917.

The Bolshevik Revolution enraged the British. Vladimir Lenin and other communists called on the workers in all countries to overthrow their capitalist oppressors and characterized the war as caused by rivalries between capitalist and imperialist countries like Britain. Lenin withdrew Russia from the war and signed a separate peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. In the aftermath, Soviet support for national liberation movements in the empire, and of anti-British sentiment and activity in the Middle East, was a special source of annoyance to Britain. To avenge the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and alarmed that the Germans might transfer troops to the Western Front, the British, French, and Japanese intervened in Russia's Civil War, deploying troops to Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Vladivostok, and later funneling material and money to the White armies opposing the Red Army. Winston Churchill (minister of munitions in 1917) made no secret of his antipathy toward Bolshevism, aiming to "strangle the infant in its crib."

Soviet policy toward Britain during the 1920s and 1930s was marked by contradictions. On the one hand, Josef Stalin tried to expand his diplomatic and commercial contacts with this archetypical imperialist power, as part of an effort to win recognition as a legitimate regime. On the other hand, he and his colleagues in the Kremlin remained

wary of an anti-Soviet capitalist alliance and worked for the eventual demise of the capitalist system. Then, with the League of Nations weakened by the withdrawal of Japan and Germany, the Versailles Peace Treaty openly flaunted by Adolf Hitler's rearming of Germany, and the world economy crashing in the Great Depression, Stalin began thinking of an alliance with Britain as protection against Germany. When Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain capitulated to Hitler at Munich in 1938, Stalin decided to make a pact with the Nazis and did so the following year. But on June 22, 1941, Hitler renounced the nonaggression treaty and invaded the Soviet Union, thus precipitating the Grand Alliance between Britain, the Soviet Union, and United States. Churchill's cynical words reveal his true feelings about Stalin and the Slavic country to the east: "If Hitler had invaded Hell, I would find something nice to say about the Devil in the House of Commons."

The USSR lost twenty million lives and suffered incalculable destruction during World War II. The conflict ended in the total defeat of the Axis powers, with the Red Army occupying Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Relations between Britain and the Soviet Union chilled rapidly. Churchill warned of the hazards of growing Soviet domination of Europe (a descending "iron curtain") in a historic March 5, 1946, speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. The formation of two military alliances, NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955), solidified the Cold War, which lasted until 1989.

In the postwar era, the Soviet Union perceived Britain as an imperialist power in decline, especially after it relinquished most of its colonies. Nevertheless, Britain remained an important power in Soviet eyes because of its nuclear forces, its leadership of the British Commonwealth, and its close ties with the United States. In general, however, Soviet relations with Britain took a back seat to Soviet relations with France (especially during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle) and West Germany (especially during the administration of Willy Brandt). This may have been because Britain, unlike West Germany, was a united country and thus not susceptible to Soviet political pressure exerted through the instrument of a divided people, and because the British Communist Party, because of its small size, had less influence in electoral politics than the French Communist Party. Given its close trade ties with the United States, Britain was less dependent economically than other West European states on

Soviet and East European trade and energy resources. Britain also fulfilled its obligations as a NATO member, whereas France withdrew in 1966 from the military side of the alliance.

Even after the collapse of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe in 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Soviet-era division of Europe continued to influence Russia's foreign policy toward Britain and other West European countries. Although the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, NATO extended its reach, admitting three former Soviet allies (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech republic) in 1999. Some Russian hardliners feared that NATO would embrace all of Russia's former allies and deprive it of its traditional European buffer zone. Nevertheless, the al Qaeda terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 fostered closer ties between Russian president Vladimir Putin and other Western leaders, including British prime minister Tony Blair. New security threats that transcend state borders, such as global networks of suicidal terrorists, chemical and biological warfare, international organized crime, cyberwar, and human trafficking, all underscore the need for greater cooperation among sovereign states.

See also: CRIMEAN WAR; GRAND ALLIANCE; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; WORLD WAR II

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

GREAT NORTHERN WAR

The Great Northern War (1700–1721) was the main military conflict of Peter the Great's reign, ending in a Russian victory over Sweden that made Russia an important European power and expanded Russia's borders to the Baltic Sea, including the site of St. Petersburg. The war began in the effort of Denmark and Poland-Saxony to wrest control of territories lost to Sweden during the seventeenth century, the period of Swedish military hegemony in northern Europe. When the rulers of those countries offered alliances to Peter in 1698 and 1699, he saw an opportunity to recover Ingria, the small territory at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland that Russia had lost to Sweden in 1618. Possession of Ingria would once again give Russia access to the Baltic Sea, which seems to have been Peter's principal aim. To achieve this aim Peter built a European-style army and a navy based in the Baltic. The war also served as a major stimulus to Peter's reforms.

The initial phase of the war (1700–1709) was marked by Swedish successes. Peter's attempt to capture the port of Narva in Swedish-held Estonia ended in catastrophic defeat on November 30, 1700, at the hands of Charles XII, king of Sweden. The defeat meant the destruction of most of Peter's new army, which he then had to rebuild. Fortunately, Charles chose to move south into Poland, hoping to unseat August II from the throne of Poland and expand Swedish influence. In 1706 Charles succeeded in forcing August II to surrender and leave the war and to recognize Stanislaw Leszczyński, a Swedish puppet, as king of Poland. In 1707 Charles moved east through Poland toward Russia, apparently hoping to both defeat and overthrow Peter and replace him with a more compliant tsar from among the Russian boyars. Charles also managed to convince Ivan Mazepa, the Hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks, to join him against Peter, but in Russia itself there was no move in favor of Charles. Instead, the Russian army retreated before the Swedes, acquiring experience and mounting ever more effective resistance. Charles was forced south into Ukraine during the fall of



The Battle of Poltava in 1709 marked the turning point in the Great Northern War. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

1708, and Peter's defeat of the Swedish relief column at Lesnaya (October 9, 1708) left him without additional food and equipment.

The battle of Poltava (July 8, 1709) proved the turning point of the war. The Swedish army suffered heavy casualties and fled the field southwest toward the Dnieper River. When they reached the banks with the Russians in hot pursuit, they found too few boats to carry them across and had to surrender. Only Charles, his staff, and some of his personal guard escaped into Ottoman territory. Thus the way was clear for Peter to occupy the Baltic provinces and southeast Finland, then a Swedish possession, in 1710.

By the end of 1710 Peter had achieved his principal war aims, for these conquests secured the approaches to St. Petersburg. In 1711 the outbreak of war with the Turks provided an unwelcome distraction, and he was able to turn his attention to the Northern War only in 1712. His allies now included the restored August II of Poland-Saxony, as well as Denmark and Prussia. Russian troops moved

into northern Germany to support these allies, and Sweden's German possessions, Bremen, Stralsund, and Stettin, fell by 1714. In 1713 Peter managed to occupy all of Finland, which he hoped to use as a bargaining chip in the inevitable peace negotiations. Charles XII, who returned to Sweden from Turkey in 1714, would not give up. Ignoring Sweden's rapidly deteriorating economic situation, he refused to acknowledge defeat. Peter's small but decisive naval victory over the Swedish fleet at Hangö peninsula on the Finnish coast in 1714 preserved Russian control over Finland and allowed Peter to harass the Swedish coast. A joint Russo-Danish project to invade Sweden in 1716 came to nothing, and the war continued until 1721 with a series of Russian raids along the Swedish coast. The death of Charles XII in 1718 even prolonged the war, for Great Britain, worried over Russian influence in the Baltic region and northern Germany, began to support Sweden, but it was too late. In 1721 the treaty of Nystad put an end to the war, allowing Russia to keep southeast Finland (the town of Viborg), Inghria, Estonia, and the province of Livonia (today

southern Estonia and Latvia north of the Dvina river).

Peter's victory in the Great Northern War radically altered the balance of power in northern and eastern Europe. The defeat of Sweden and the loss of most of its overseas territories other than Finland and Stralsund, as well as the collapse of Swedish absolutism after 1718, rendered Sweden a minor power once again. The events of the war revealed for the first time decisively the political and military weakness of Poland. Russia, by contrast, had defeated the formerly hegemonic power of the region, recovered Ingria, acquired the Baltic provinces and part of Finland, and founded St. Petersburg as a new city and new capital. These acquisitions gave Russia a series of seaports to support both trade and a naval presence in the Baltic Sea, as well as a shorter route to Western Europe. Victory in the war justified Peter's military, administrative, and economic reforms and the Westernization of Russian culture. It also enormously reinforced his personal prestige and power.

See also: LESNAYA, BATTLE OF; PETER I; NARVA, BATTLES OF; POLTAVA, BATTLE OF; SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH

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PAUL A. BUSHKOVITCH

GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR *See* WORLD WAR II.

GREAT REFORMS

At the accession of Alexander II in 1855, some twenty-two million Russian peasants were serfs; their status was like slavery. "State peasants" were similarly constrained. In 1861, serfdom was abolished. Other reforms followed. Together they are called the "great reforms." How did they emerge from a conservative regime? How did they relate one to another? What was their impact on Russia's development?

The explanations most often given for the abolition of serfdom do not work. Russia's defeat in the Crimean War left the regime discredited and impoverished, ill positioned to challenge the serfholding elite. The regime believed that peasant rebellions were more likely a result of reform. It expected economic growth if serfdom were abolished, but dreaded economic disruption. It understood that serfdom was outmoded, but it seemed to work. When, in August 1857, a secret committee pronounced that "not only the peasants but even the Government itself is not prepared for a general emancipation" of the serfs, Alexander expressed satisfaction.

Three months later, the government began to reform serfdom. The turnabout occurred because serfdom was weak. The serfholders were dependent upon the state, to which they had mortgaged two-thirds of their serfs and on which they relied to keep the serfs subordinate. They had no political experience. Most of them shared a culture oriented to western Europe, where serfdom had disappeared. No articulate voice in Russia could praise serfdom. Thanks to censorship, nothing critical or supportive of serfdom, appeared in print. Russia had no Garrison, but also no Calhoun; serfdom had no ideology.

The breakthrough took the form of directives to the governor-general of three northwestern provinces. These incoherent documents were the by-product of an abandoned initiative, but their publication committed the government to the reform of serfdom. And they contained the germ of a resolution to the key problem. The government believed that a noble's land was inalienable private property; peasants believed the land was theirs because they tilled it. Freedom without land would, from a peasant perspective, be a monstrous injustice. To give privately-owned land to the peasants would, from an elite perspective, be no less monstrous. The directives reaffirmed the serfholders' property rights, but provided peasant households with the use of allotments of land.

Ostensibly, the nobility of each province was to participate in drafting the reform. The government learned that there was no flim-flam the nobility would not tolerate. It made a series of promises to the nobility and withdrew or ignored each one. The nobles barely responded, confident because most top positions in government were held by men as hostile to reform as they were.

The abolition legislation was not created by these dignitaries, but by a group of zealous reformers

assembled in an Editorial Commission. They had enormous energy and guile. They managed to convince Alexander that their critics were actually challenging his autocratic prerogatives.

The legislative process was epitomized when the commission's draft came before the Council of State in early 1861. The council was composed of Alexander's friends and confidants. It voted down each section of the draft by large margins. The members were counting on the emperor's sympathy and his distrust of reformers. These dignitaries could not, however, come up with a coherent alternative. Furthermore, the council was not a legislature. With each section of the draft, the emperor used his prerogative to endorse the minority position, and the Editorial Commission's version became law without significant change. The result was a cautious reform that was nonetheless much more radical than anyone in authority had contemplated.

The terms of the legislation promulgated on February 19, 1861, varied from province to province. The reformers wanted to accommodate the nobility. Hence, in the North the allotments of land assigned to the ex-serfs were relatively large but costly; since the land was of little value, the squires would rather have cash. To the south, where land was valuable, the allotments were smaller but not so costly. The complexity of the legislation is compounded by special cases, some involving millions of peasants. The commune was unknown in Ukraine and was not imposed there. State peasants would be more generously treated than serfs when the reform was extended to them in 1866; the regime was more willing to sacrifice its interests than those of serfholders. If one focuses on a majority of Great Russian serfs, one can grasp the reform by comparing it to the system of serfdom.

(1) Authority: The essence of serfdom was the subjection of the serfs to the arbitrary power of their master or mistress. Serfholders could buy and sell serfs and subject them to physical or sexual abuse. The laws limiting the squires' powers were vague and rarely enforced. This arbitrary power of the serfholding noble was utterly abolished by the legislation of 1861. The ex-serfs found themselves subject in a new way, however, to the nobles as a class, because they dominated local administration. And most ex-serfs were dependent, as renters, wage-laborers, or sharecroppers, on a squire in the neighborhood.

(2) Ascription: A second element of serfdom was ascription, or fastening. The reform left peasants ascribed, but transferred the power to regulate their comings and goings from the squire to the village commune, which now issued the passports that enabled peasants to go in search of wage work. The government retained ascription as a security measure.

(3) Economics: It was the economic elements of the reform that most severely restricted the freedom of ex-serfs. Most peasants received (through the commune) an allotment of land and had to meet the obligations that went with the allotment. It was almost impossible to dispose of the allotment. Few peasants who wanted to pull up stakes and start afresh could do so.

Servile agriculture was linked to the repartitional commune. Plowland was held by the commune and subject to periodic repartition among households. The objective of repartition was to match landholding to the labor-power of each household, since the commune allocated and reallocated burdens, such as taxes, as well as plowland. The reform, like the serfholders before, imposed a system of mutual responsibility. If one household did not meet its obligations, the others had to make up the difference. It was in the interests of the commune that each household have plowland proportional to its labor power.

Also characteristic of the servile economy was "extraeconomic compulsion." Under serfdom, it was not the market but the serfholders's arbitrary authority that determined the size of the serfs' allotments and the dues they had to render. After the reform, these were determined not by the market, but by law.

These characteristics of the servile economy broke down slowly because, to minimize disruption, the reformers took the elements of serfdom as their point of departure. The size of the allotments set by statute derived from the size under serfdom. In the interests of security, the reformers retained the commune, although it impeded agricultural progress. The statutes sought to minimize the economic dependence of ex-serfs on their former masters. They provided that peasants could redeem their allotments over a forty-nine-year period. Redemption entailed an agreement between the squire and his ex-serfs, which was hard to achieve. Until the redemption process began in a village, the ex-serfs were in a state of "temporary obligation," subject to yesterday's serfholder. Within limits set by

statute, they had to render dues in cash or in labor in return for their allotments.

The abolition of serfdom regulated more than it changed, but regulation represented an enormous change: The arbitrary power of the serfholder had been the essence of serfdom. The reform could not provide an immediate stimulus to economic development. The regime set a higher value on stability, on the prosperity of the nobility, and on the welfare of the peasantry, than on development. It feared chaos more than it wanted progress. So it imposed stability and opened the way for a slow passage out of the structures of serfdom.

It is argued that the other great reforms followed from the abolition of serfdom, but the peasant reform reordered the Russian village, while the other reforms addressed the opposite end of the social spectrum. For example, the education reform (1863) restored autonomy to Russia's universities, permitting the rector and faculty to run them; the minister of education, however, had broad authority to interfere. It also provided for technical secondary schools. However, only graduates of the traditional, classical schools could enter the universities; the regime supposed that Greek and Latin had a sobering effect on the young. The reform also gave new authority, but little money, to local agencies to establish primary schools. Finally, it allowed some education to women, provided that they would get an education "appropriate for the future wife and mother."

The censorship was reformed in 1865. Under the old system, a censor went over every word of a book or magazine, deleting or changing anything subversive. This system had been supportive of serfdom, but useful publications had been impeded, and pre-censorship had not prevented the dissemination of radical ideas. The emperor wanted knowledge to flourish, but he was suspicious of intellectuals. He observed, "There are tendencies which do not accord with the views of the government; they must be stopped." The censorship reform did that. It eliminated the prepublication censorship of books and most journals. Editors and publishers were responsible for everything they printed, however, and subject to heavy fines, criminal penalties, and the closing of periodicals. The regime appreciated that publishers dreaded financial loss. The result was self-censorship, more exacting than precensorship.

The Judicial Reform (1864) was not closely related to the abolition of serfdom, since peasants

were not usually subject to the new courts. Under the old system, justice had been a purely bureaucratic activity. There were no juries, no public trials, and no legal profession. Corruption and delay were notorious. Commercial loans were available only on short terms and at high interest because the courts could not protect the interests of creditors.

The new system provided for independent judges with life tenure; trial by jury in criminal cases; oral and public trials; and an organized bar of lawyers to staff this adversary system. Peasants were formally eligible to serve on juries, but property qualifications for jury service excluded all but a few peasants. Here, as elsewhere, distinctions linked to the system of estates of the realm (*sosloviya*) were retained by other means.

The reform of the courts had long been under discussion. Officials who shared the emperor's suspicion of lawyers and juries were unable to produce any workable alternative to the chaos they knew. Hence the task of drafting the new system passed to a group of younger men with advanced legal training. With the task came powers of decision making. The reformers acted in the spirit of the cosmopolitan legal ethos they had acquired with their training. They, alone of the drafters of reform statutes, avowedly followed western models and produced the most thorough-going of the reforms.

The *zemstvo*, or local government, reform (1864) provided for elective assemblies at the district and provincial levels; the electorate was divided into three *curias*: landowners (mostly nobles), peasant communities, and towns. Voting power was proportional to the value of real estate held by each *curia*, but no *curia* could have more than half the members.

The *zemstvo's* jurisdiction included the upkeep of roads, fire insurance, education, and public health. Squires and their ex-serfs sat together in the assemblies, if not in proportion to their share of the population. Public-spirited squires found a sphere of activity in the boards elected by the assemblies. These boards, in turn, hired health workers, teachers, and other professionals. The *zemstvo* provided an arena of public service apart from the state bureaucracy, where liberal landowners and dissidents interacted. The accomplishments of the *zemstvo* were remarkable, given their limited resources and the government control over them. The provincial governor could suspend any decision taken by a *zemstvo*. The *zemstvo* had only a lim-

ited power to tax, and as much as half the total it collected went to functions performed for the state.

Why didn't the government do more? It cherished autocracy and realized that genuine constitutional change would favor the rich and the educated, not the peasants; many nobles sought a national *zemstvo* as compensation for their supposed losses. Most important, to let authority pass to judges, juries, editors, and others not under direct bureaucratic discipline required a trust in which the regime was deficient. Many bureaucrats feared that the reforms would come back to haunt the regime. They were right. The bar did become a rallying point for dissidents, the economic and social position of the nobility did decline, and the *zemstvo* eventually protested. Cautious officials can be good prophets, even if the solutions they offer are ineffective.

See also: ALEXANDER II; EMANCIPATION ACT; PEASANTRY; SERFDOM

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DANIEL FIELD

GREECE, RELATIONS WITH

Ideas originating in Greece, a country in southeastern Europe that occupies the southernmost part of the Balkan Peninsula and is bordered by the Aegean, Mediterranean, and Ionian seas, first influenced Russian culture as early as the tenth century, during the golden age of Kievan Rus. Prince Vladimir (978–1015) adopted Eastern Orthodoxy, which reflected his close personal ties with Constantinople, a city that dominated both the Black Sea and the Dnieper River, Kiev's busiest commercial route. Adherence to the Eastern Orthodox

Church had long-range political, cultural, and religious consequences for Russia. The church liturgy was written in Cyrillic, and a corpus of translations from the Greeks had been produced for the South Slavs. The existence of this literature facilitated the East Slavs' conversion to Christianity and introduced them to rudimentary Greek philosophy, science, and historiography without the necessity of learning Greek. Russians began to look to the Greeks for religious inspiration and came to regard the Catholics of Central Europe as schismatics. This tendency laid the foundation for Russia's isolation from the mainstream of Western civilization.

Seeking warm-water ports, Russian explorers were attracted to Greece. No part of mainland Greece is more than 100 kilometers (60 miles) from water, and islands constitute about one-fifth of the country's land area. By the nineteenth century, as the Russian Empire expanded to the southwest, its population grew more diverse and began to include Greek Orthodox peoples.

After Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905, the government began to take a more active interest in the Balkans and the Near East. The decline of the Ottoman Empire ("the sick man of Europe") encouraged nationalist movements in Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. In 1912 the Balkan League, which included Greece, defeated the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War. A year later, the alliance split, and the Greeks, Serbs, and Romanians defeated Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War. Russia tried to extend its influence over the new nations. Greco-Russian relations became strained when Russia sided with Serbia in the conflict between Serbia and Greece for control of Albania.

Greece fought on the side of the Western allies and Russia in World War I, and similarly on the side of the Allies, including the Soviet Union, in World War II. In the immediate aftermath of the war, tensions arose between the legitimate Greek government and the Soviet Union. The Greek resistance movement during World War II, the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its army (ELAS), were dominated by the Communist Party. When the Greek government-in-exile returned to Athens in late 1944 shortly after the liberation, the communists tried to overthrow it, and in the ensuing civil war they were supported by Josef Stalin's USSR and (more enthusiastically) Tito's Yugoslavia. Britain funded the non-communists, but when the economic commitment exceeded its postwar capabilities, the United States took on the burden with

the Truman Doctrine. Thanks to massive military and economic aid from the United States, which came just in time, the communists, who had established a provisional government in the northern mountains, were ultimately defeated.

Relations between Greece and the USSR cooled with the former's admission to NATO in 1952. Beginning in the mid-1950s, NATO's southeastern flank experienced periodic cycles of international tension. The problem in Cyprus, where the population is split between Greek-Cypriots (approximately 78%) and Turkish-Cypriots (18%) led eventually to a Turkish invasion of the island on July 20, 1974, to protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority.

Nevertheless, Greek-Soviet ties established during the 1980s not only survived the political upheaval that ended the Soviet Union, they even improved. In 1994 Greece signed new protocols with Russia for delivery of natural gas from a pipeline to run from Bulgaria to Greece. In 2002, during its fourth presidency of the European Union (EU), Greece repeatedly called for improved relations with Russia. At the Russia-EU summit in Brussels on November 11, 2002, Prime Minister Costas Simitis emphasized the importance of implementing the Brussels agreement on the Kaliningrad region, an enclave on the Baltic Sea that would be cut off from the rest of Russia by the Schengen zone when Poland and Lithuania joined the EU. Greece also prepared a new strategy for greater cooperation between Russia and the EU, which is Russia's largest trading partner.

See also: BALKAN WARS; KIEVAN RUS; ORTHODOXY; ROUTE TO GREEKS

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

GREEKS

As early as 1000 B.C.E., pre-Hellenic Greeks, in search of iron and gold, explored the southeast shores of the Black Sea. Beginning in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C.E., Greeks established fishing villages at the mouths of the Danube, Dnieper, Dniester, and Bug Rivers. They founded the colony of Olbia between the eighth and sixth centuries B.C.E. near the South Bug River and carried on trade in metals, slaves, furs, and later grain. Greek jewelry, coins, and wall paintings attest to the presence of Greek colonies during the Scythian, Sarmatian, and Roman domination of the area.

During the late tenth century C.E., Prince Vladimir of Kievan Rus accepted the Orthodox Christian religion after marrying Anna, sister of Greek Byzantine Emperor Basil II. With the conversion came the influence of Greek Byzantine culture including the alphabet, Greek religious literature, architecture, icon painting, music, and crafts. The East Slavs carried on a vigorous trade with Byzantium following the famous route "from the Varangians to the Greeks"—from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

With the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, many Greeks, fleeing onerous taxes, emigrated to Russia. Ivan III (1462–1505) married Sophia, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, giving rise to the Muscovite claim that Moscow was the "Third Rome." Ivan, like many future Russian rulers, employed Greeks as architects, painters, diplomats, and administrators.

The opening of the Black Sea grain trade with Western Europe and the Near East during the early nineteenth century gave impetus to a large Greek immigration to the Black Sea coast. Greek merchant families prospered in Odessa, which was the headquarters of the Philiki Etaireia Society, advocating the liberation of Greece from Turkey (1821–1829).

In 1924 some 70,000 Greeks left the Soviet Union for Greece. Of the estimated 450,000 Greeks at the time of Stalin, 50,000 Greeks perished during the collectivization drive and Purges of the

1930s. Greeks, especially from the Krasnodar Region, were sent to the Solovki Gulag and to Siberia. In 1938 all Greek schools, theaters, newspapers, magazines, and churches were closed down. In 1944 Crimean and Kuban Greeks were exiled to Kazakhstan. Between 1954 and 1956 Greek exiles were released, but they could not return to the Crimea until 1989. The last major immigration of Greeks to the Soviet Union began in 1950 with the arrival of about 10,000 communist supporters of the Greek Civil War of 1949. The Soviet census for 1970 showed 57,800 persons of Greek origin. The Soviet census for 1989 had 98,500 Greeks in Ukraine and 91,700 Greeks in Russia. The 2001 census for Ukraine reported 92,500 Greeks.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; ORTHODOXY

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PATRICIA HERLIHY

GREEN MOVEMENT

Green Movement is the term used to describe peasant resistance to the Bolshevik government during the Russian Civil War.

The first rebellions against the Bolshevik government began in 1918 and increased with frequency and intensity through the civil war period. In 1918 and 1919 peasant rebellions were poorly organized and localized affairs, easily suppressed by small punitive expeditions. In 1920, however, after the defeat of the White armies, the Bolsheviks faced large, well-organized peasant insurgent movements in Tambov, the Volga and Urals regions, Ukraine, and Siberia.

The causes of the rebellions were similar. After the failure of Committees of the Rural Poor to bring a reliable government to the countryside, the Bolshevik regime relied on armed detachments to procure grain and recruits, and to stop the black market in food and consumer goods. The deprivations of these detachments, the only representatives of the Soviet government that most peasants saw, became increasingly severe as war communism ground down the Russian economy. By 1920, many peasants had little grain left, even as communist food supply organizations made greater demands on them. Large numbers of young men—deserters and draft-dodgers from the Red Army—hid in villages and the surrounding countryside from armed detachments sent to gather them.

The Soviet-Polish war, beginning in August 1920, increased the demands on peasants for food and recruits, and stripped the provinces of trained, motivated troops. This allowed peasant uprisings that were initially limited to a small area to grow, with armed bands finding willing recruits from the mass of deserters and draft-dodgers. By early 1921 much of the countryside was unsafe even for large Red Army detachments.

The Green Movement of 1920 and 1921 was qualitatively different from the peasant rebellions the communist government had faced in 1918 or 1919. While many peasant insurgents fought in small independent bands, Alexander Antonov's Insurgent Army in Tambov and Nestor Makhno's forces in Ukraine were organized militias whose members had military training. Enjoying strong support from political organizations (often made up of local SRs [Socialist Revolutionists], Anarchists, or even former Bolsheviks), they established an underground government that provided food, horses, and excellent intelligence to the insurgents, and terrorized local communists and their supporters. They were much harder to defeat.

By February 1921 the communist government suspended grain procurements in much of Russia and Ukraine, and in March, at the Tenth Party Congress, private trade in grain was legalized. The end of the Soviet-Polish war in March also freed elite armed forces to turn against the insurgents. In the summer of 1921 hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers, backed by airplanes, armored cars, and artillery, attacked the insurgent forces. In their wake followed the Cheka, who eliminated support for the insurgents by holding family members

hostage, making villages collectively responsible for guerilla attacks, shooting suspected supporters of the insurgents, and sending thousands more to concentration camps. Facing drought and terror, and with the abolition of forced grain procurement and military conscription, support for the Green Movement collapsed by September 1921. A few leaders, such as Makhno, slipped across the border, but most were hunted down and killed, such as Antonov, who died in a shootout in June 1922.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917-1922; COMMITTEES OF THE VILLAGE POOR; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; WAR COMMUNISM

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A. DELANO DUGARM

GRIBOEDOV, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

(1795-1829), dramatist and diplomat.

Alexander Griboedov is best known as the author of *Woe from Wit* (*Gore ot uma*). The first Russian comedy of manners, the play was written in 1823, but not published until 1833 because of censorship.

Born in Moscow as the son of a military officer, Griboedov showed talent at an early age in a number of areas. He was admitted to Moscow University at the age of eleven. By the age of sixteen he had graduated in literature, law, mathematics, and natural sciences. He also had a gift for music. The Napoleonic invasion prevented him from pursuing a doctorate. He served in the military from 1812 to 1816. After the war he entered the civil service in the ministry of foreign affairs. In 1818 he was sent to Persia (Iran) as secretary to the Russian mission. There Griboedov added Arabic and Persian to the long list of foreign languages he had

mastered (French, German, Italian, and English). In 1821 he transferred to service in the Caucasus, but took a leave of absence in St. Petersburg and Moscow from February 1823 to May 1825 to write *Woe from Wit*. Although Griboedov was back in the Caucasus by December of 1825, he was nevertheless summoned under arrest for his alleged involvement in the abortive Decembrist uprising of that time. After extensive interrogations, however, he was cleared of suspicion and returned to his diplomatic post. Griboedov negotiated the peace treaty of 1828 that ended the Russo-Persian War. As a reward for his wits, he was appointed Russian minister in Tehran in 1828, where—in ironic mockery of his own play's title—he was murdered in January 1829 by religious fanatics who attacked the Russian embassy. The twentieth-century novelist Yuri Tynianov wrote about Griboedov's death in *Death and Diplomacy in Persia* (1938).

Woe from Wit, composed in rhymed verse, is a seminal work in Russian culture. Many lines from the play have entered everyday Russian speech as quotations or aphorisms. Its hero, Chatsky, is the prototype of the so-called superfluous man, who criticizes social and political conditions in his country but does nothing to bring about a change. In addition to the gap between generations, the concept of service is a key theme. In a monolithic country with minimal private enterprise, a man's career choices were either civil or military. Griboedov mocks as shallow and morally irresponsible the character Famusov, who says in the play: "For me, whether it is business matters or not, my custom is, once it's signed, the burden is off my shoulders." As for military service, the hero Chatsky prefers to serve the cause and not specific personalities. He says to Famusov: "I should be pleased to serve, but worming oneself into one's favor is sickening" (*Sluzhit' by rad, prisluzhivat'sia toshno*). Famusov rejects such serious loyalty to a higher cause, reminiscing fondly of his uncle who stumbled and hurt himself while in court. When Catherine the Great showed amusement, the uncle deliberately fell again as a way to please her. Here Griboedov appears to counter the poet Gavryl Romanovich Derzhavin's ode to Catherine ("Felitsa"), written in 1789, in which Catherine is praised as someone who treats subordinates respectfully. The play contains an extensive gallery of satirical portraits that continue to hold relevance to contemporary audiences in Russia and around the world.

See also: THEATER

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JONATHAN WEILER

GRIGORENKO, PETER GRIGORIEVICH

(1907–1987), leading Soviet human rights activist.

Born in Ukraine, Peter Grigorenko was a decorated war hero during World War II. He rose to the rank of Major General in 1959. In 1964 Grigorenko was arrested for participation in the Society for the Restoration of Leninist Principles, which warned of the reemergence of a Stalinist cult of personality. For fifteen months he was in psychiatric hospitals and prisons before being released in 1965. Stripped of a military pension, denied professional work, Grigorenko, at age 58, emerged as a tireless campaigner for human rights. He became a mythic figure among Crimean Tatars for aiding their fight for national rights. He organized demonstrations at dissident trials in the late 1960s and wrote and signed petitions on behalf of dissidents. He attacked the use of psychiatric confinement as a method of punishing political prisoners. For his troubles, he was arrested again, in Tashkent on May 7, 1969, and held in psychiatric confinement until 1974. He subsequently became one of the founding members of the Moscow Helsinki Group, established after the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. On November 30, 1977, Grigorenko flew to New York with his wife and a son for emergency surgery. While there, he was stripped of his Soviet citizenship. Peter Reddaway, writing in 1972 about the Soviet human rights movement, said “if one person had to be singled out as having inspired the different groups within the Democratic movement more than anyone else, then it would surely be [Grigorenko]. Indeed he became, while free, in an informal way the movement’s leader.” Grigorenko died in New York City in 1987.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT

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GRISHIN, VIKTOR DMITRIEVICH

(1914–1992), member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Twice decorated Hero of Socialist Labor (1974, 1984), Viktor Grishin was one of the highest-ranking members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on the eve of Michael S. Gorbachev’s selection as party leader. Born in Moscow, he received his degree in geodesy in 1932. From 1938 to 1940 he served in the Red Army, during which time he became a member of the CPSU. Following his discharge from the army in 1941, he was assigned to duties in the Moscow Party organization.

Grishin entered the upper echelons of the party when he was made a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1952. He took on additional responsibilities as the head of Soviet professional unions in 1956, a position he held until 1967. In 1961 he was made a candidate of the Politburo, and in 1967 he became First Secretary of the Moscow Party organization, one of the most powerful posts in the CPSU. By 1971, he was a full member of the Politburo.

Grishin was one of Gorbachev’s rivals for the post of General Secretary in 1985. In order to ensure the loyalty of the Moscow Party organization, Gorbachev had Grishin removed from both the Politburo and the Moscow Party organization in 1986. He was replaced in both posts by Boris Yeltsin. Grishin was retired from the CPSU and lived on a party pension until his death in 1992.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; MOSCOW; POLITBURO

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TERRY D. CLARK

GRIVNA

A Russian monetary and weight unit used from the ninth or tenth century to the eighteenth century.

Initially the grivna was a unit of account (twenty-five dirhams or Islamic silver coins) and a unit of weight (c. 68 grams, or 2.4 ounces), used interchangeably for denominating imported coined silver. Since foreign coins fluctuated in weight and fineness and diminished in import frequency, by the late tenth century the grivna weighed around 51.2 grams (1.8 ounces) and equaled fifty cut dirhams. By the eleventh century, the ratio of coins to weight of a grivna was further altered with the appearance of a rodlike, or Novgorodian type, silver ingot in northern Rus, weighing around 200 grams (7 ounces). This unit, called mark in German, like the silver itself, was imported from western and central Europe to northern Russia via the Baltic. Consequently, in Novgorod there developed a 1:4 relationship between the silver ingot, called grivna of silver, and the old grivna, or grivna of kunas. Both units diffused outside of Novgorod to other parts of Russia, including the Golden Horde, but the relationship of the grivna of kunas to the grivna of silver fluctuated throughout the lands until the fifteenth century, when the ingots were replaced by Russian coins. However, the term grivna (grivenka) and the 200 grams (7 ounces) it represented remained in Russian metrology until the eighteenth century.

The southern Rus lands also manufactured and used silver grivna ingots, but they were hexagonal in shape and, following the weight of the Byzantine litra, weighed around 160 grams (5.6 ounces). These Kievan-type ingots were known in southern Rus from the early eleventh century until the Mongol conquest.

See also: ALTYN; DENGA; KOPECK; RUBLE

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

GROMOV, BORIS VSEVOLODOVICH

(b. 1943), Commander of Fortieth Army in Afghanistan, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Deputy Minister of Defense, Member of the State Duma, and Governor of Moscow Oblast (District).

Boris Gromov had a distinguished career as a professional soldier in the Soviet Ground Forces. In 1962 he graduated from the Suvorov Military School in Kalinin. From there he attended the Higher Combined Arms Command School in Leningrad and was commissioned in the Soviet Army in 1965. From 1965 Gromov held command and staff assignments. In 1974 he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. From 1980 to 1982 he commanded a motorized rifle division in Afghanistan; on his return to the Soviet Union, he attended the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff, graduating in 1984. In 1987 Gromov returned to Afghanistan as Commander of the Fortieth Army and led the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, which was completed in February 1989. His next assignment was that of Commander of the Kiev Military District, a post he held until November 1990, when, in an unexpected move, he was named First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Commander of Internal Troops. He held that post until August 1991. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful coup against Gorbachev, Gromov was appointed First Deputy Commander of Soviet (later Commonwealth of Independent States) Conventional Forces. In May 1992 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. In 1994 Gromov joined a group of senior Russian officers who broke with Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and publicly warned against military intervention in Chechnya when Russian forces were unprepared. In the aftermath of that act, Gromov was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1995 he stood for election to the State Duma on the My Fatherland Party ticket and won. In January 2000 he was elected Governor of the Moscow Oblast. Gromov received the Hero of the Soviet Union award for his service as army commander in Afghanistan.

See also: AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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
JACOB W. KIPP

GROMYKO, ANDREI ANDREYEVICH

(1909–1989), Soviet foreign minister and president.

Andrei Gromyko was born into a peasant family in the village of Starye Gromyki in Belorussia. He joined the Communist Party in 1931. He completed study at the Minsk Agricultural Institute in 1932 and gained a Candidate of Economics degree from the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Agronomy in 1936. From 1936 to 1939 he was a senior researcher in the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences and the executive editorial secretary of the journal *Problemy ekonomiki*; he later gained a doctorate of Economics in 1956. In 1939 Gromyko switched to diplomatic work and became section head for the Americas in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Later that year he became counselor in the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Between 1943 and 1946 he was Soviet ambassador to the United States and Cuba. During this time, he was involved in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944) called to produce the UN Charter and the 1945 San Francisco conference establishing the United Nations. He also played an organizational role in the Big Three wartime conferences. From 1946 to 1948 he was the permanent representative in the UN Security Council as well as deputy (from 1949 First Deputy) minister of foreign affairs. Except for the period 1952–1953 when he was ambassador to Great Britain, he held the First Deputy post until he was promoted to foreign minister following the anti-party group affair of 1957. Gromyko remained foreign minister until July 1985, when he became chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, effectively Soviet president.

Throughout his career, Gromyko was neither highly ambitious nor a major political actor on the domestic scene. Although a full member of the Central Committee from 1956, he did not become a full member of the Politburo until 1973. He developed his diplomatic skills and became the public face of Soviet foreign policy, gaining a reputation as a tough negotiator who never showed his hand. He was influential in the shaping of foreign policy, in particular *détente*, but he was never unchallenged as the source of that policy; successive lead-



Soviet foreign ministry Andrei Gromyko, nicknamed "Mr. Nyet" by his Western counterparts, addresses the U.N. General Assembly. UNITED NATIONS

ers Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev both sought to place their personal stamp upon foreign policy, while there was always competition from the International Department of the Party Central Committee and the KGB. Gromyko formally nominated Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary in March 1985, and three months later was moved from the Foreign Ministry to the presidency. The foreign policy for which he was spokesperson during the Brezhnev period now came under attack as Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze embarked on a new course. Gromyko's most important task while he was president was to chair a commission that recommended the removal of restrictions on the ability of Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea. Gromyko was forced to step down from the Politburo in September 1988, and from the presidency in October 1988, and was retired from the Central Committee in April 1989. He was the author of many speeches and articles on foreign affairs.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH

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GRAEME GILL

GROSSMAN, VASILY SEMENOVICH

(1905–1964), one of the most important Russian novelists of the twentieth century who became increasingly disillusioned with the Soviet system.

Vasily Grossman was born in 1905 in the town of Berdichev in Ukraine. He spent the years from 1910 to 1914 in Switzerland with his mother and attended high school in Kiev. He received a degree in chemical engineering from Moscow University in 1929 and worked in various engineering jobs until becoming a full-time writer in 1934. He published his first news article in 1928 and his first short story in 1934 and became a prolific writer of fiction during the 1930s. He published a long novel about the civil war entitled *Stepan Kolchugin* between 1937 and 1940. In 1938, his wife was arrested, but Grossman wrote to Nikolai Yezhov and achieved her release.

During World War II, Grossman served as a correspondent for *Red Star* (*Krasnaya Zvezda*) and spent the entire war at the front. His writing during the war years was immensely popular, and his words are inscribed on the war memorial at Stalingrad (now Volgograd). He also began writing short stories, which were collected in titles such as *The People are Immortal*. However, from that perspective, he also began to doubt the abilities of the systems that organized the war effort.

Grossman's postwar projects were often challenging to the Soviet system, and several were not published until long after their completion. Beginning in 1943, Grossman and Ilya Ehrenburg began to collect personal accounts of the Holocaust on the territories of the Soviet Union, entitled the *Black Book of Russian Jewry*. Grossman became the editor of the collection in 1945 and continued to prepare it for publication. The printing plates were actually completed, but in 1946, as anti-Semitism began to increase and Josef Stalin turned against the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, they were removed from

the printing plant. The book would not be published in any part of the former USSR until 1994.

His postwar fiction about the war generated intense criticism from Soviet officials. His novel *For a Just Cause* (*Za pravoye delo*), published in 1952, led to attacks for its lack of proper ideological focus. His most contemplative piece about the war, *Life and Fate* (*Zhizn i sudba*) was arrested by the KGB in 1961. Although they seized Grossman's copy of the manuscript, another had already been hidden elsewhere and preserved. Often compared to Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, the novel bitterly attacks Stalin and the Soviet system for failures. He focuses on the suffering of one family at the hands of large forces outside of their control. In it he touches upon the Gulags, the Holocaust, and the repressions that accompanied the heroism of ordinary Soviets. After twenty years, it was smuggled out of the Soviet Union on microfilm and published in the West. His last novel, *Everything is in Flux* (*Vse techet*), is an angry indictment of Soviet society and was distributed only in Samizdat.

On his death from cancer in 1964, Grossman disappeared from public Soviet literary discussions, only reappearing under Mikhail Gorbachev. In retrospect, Grossman's writing has been acknowledged as some of the most significant Russian literature of the twentieth century.

See also: CENSORSHIP; JEWS; SAMIZDAT; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II

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KARL E. LOEWENSTEIN

GUARDS, REGIMENTS OF

The Russian Imperial Guards regiments originated in the two so-called play regiments that the young Tsar Peter I created during the 1680s. They took their names, Preobrazhensky and Semonovsky, from the villages in which they had originally taken

form. Peter used those regiments to seize power from Sophia Alexeyevna, then ruling as regent, and establish himself in sole rule. Unlike the *streltsy* musketeer units that had been the elite element in the Russian army to that point, the guards were trained and equipped in the style of Western European armies, and drilled by Western officers.

Their original complements were entirely noble, including the enlisted ranks, and the guards regiments served as the principal training ground for officers for the line units. The guards, especially the Preobrazhensky regiment, often provided escorts for the tsar, even accompanying him on his tour of Europe. They also fought in his wars, playing an important role at the Battle of Narva in 1700 and throughout the Northern War. The guards served a political function under Peter as well, participating in the arrests of nobles and other governmental activities.

With Peter's death, the guards regiments increased in political significance. A demonstration by both regiments played a role in bringing Peter's wife, Catherine I, to power peacefully. They also brought Anna and Elizabeth to power through forceful *coup d'état*, and participated in Catherine II's seizure of the throne and murder of her husband, Peter III. Although they continued to participate in the smaller wars of the eighteenth century against Poland, Sweden, and Turkey, they did not play an important role in the Seven Years' War. Their numbers were nevertheless expanded, including the formation of the Izmailovsky Regiment by Anna and the Cavalier-Guard Cavalry Regiment, as well as the Guard Horse Regiment, among others.

The political significance of the guards regiments fell between Catherine the Great's reign and the end of the Napoleonic wars, while the guards' combat role increased. They accompanied Alexander I to battle in the war of 1805 and played an important role on the Austerlitz battlefield. They also participated in the 1812 campaign, including a prominent role in the Battle of Borodino, and they fought throughout the following two years of conflict against France. The Napoleonic Wars saw a significant reorganization of the guards similar to that which occurred throughout the Russian army at that time. In 1806 a guards division was formed of the three guards infantry regiments. In 1811 an Independent Guards Corps was formed, which persisted in various forms until the end of the empire.

The years after Napoleon's defeat saw a resurgence in the guards' political importance. In 1820

the Semenovskiy Guards Regiment mutinied, and the rebellion had to be suppressed by other, loyal, troops. And in 1825, during the interregnum following the death of Alexander I, guards troops participated in the abortive Decembrist Rebellion, likewise suppressed by troops loyal to Nicholas I, the new tsar. Although the individuals who participated in the rebellions were punished, the guards as a whole were not. Indeed, the number of guards units mushroomed through the nineteenth century, so that in 1914 there were seventeen infantry and fourteen cavalry regiments with four artillery brigades, in addition to smaller detachments. The guards also spread into the navy in the form of individual units and ships.

Guards units participated in the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1828–1829 and 1877–1878, and individual guards officers participated as volunteers in the Russo-Japanese War. The guards units were used to help put down the Revolution of 1905. The guards regiments then played a prominent role in all of the major campaigns of World War I. Their ranks were decimated by the casualties they incurred, however, and by 1917 most guards units were filled with simple conscripts. Their political reliability, therefore, was no greater than that of any other army units. As a result, guards regiments garrisoned in Petrograd participated in the February Revolution against the government and helped bring down the tsarist regime. Guards units also helped the Bolsheviks to power in October.

Throughout the imperial period, members of the guards units received a number of significant privileges. In particular, guards officers were granted an additional one or two steps on the Table of Ranks, depending upon which units they belonged to (this benefit was reduced by one step toward the end of the nineteenth century). The tsars and tsaritsas and their favorites frequently served as the colonels of the guards regiments, and appointments in those regiments were keenly sought as a step toward political, social, and, of course, military advancement. On the whole, guards regiments did not perform better in combat than most good, well-trained regiments of the regular army.

With the advent of communist rule the guards regiments were disbanded. In 1941, however, Josef Stalin reestablished the concept of "guards" in a new form. Following the Battle of Smolensk, five rifle divisions were redesignated the First through the Fifth Guards Infantry Divisions for extraordinary valor as units in combat. Thereafter other units, including divisions, corps, and armies,

received the designation “guards” as a reward for valor in battle.

See also: MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; PETER I

FREDERICK W. KAGAN

GUBA ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

The guba system made communities partially responsible for their own policing and entrusted the investigation and partial adjudication of felony cases to local elected officials.

In the early sixteenth century the local administration of criminal justice was in the hands of vicegerents (*namestniki*) appointed by the grand prince and remunerated with the right to collect their own feeding maintenance (*kormlenie*). An increasing number of community complaints that the vicegerents were corrupt or unable to deal decisively with banditry led the government of Grand Prince Ivan IV to begin issuing in 1538 and 1539 ordinance charters permitting petitioning communities to remove criminal justice affairs from their vicegerents' jurisdiction and entrust them to criminal justice chiefs (*gubnye golovy*) elected from the local middle service class and criminal justice elders (*gubnye starosty*) elected from the more prosperous local peasants and taxpaying townsmen. A guba was the territorial jurisdiction of an elected criminal justice chief or elder, be it an urban *posad* commune or a rural canton. The elected guba executives and their deputies (*tselovalniki*) were made responsible for hunting down and arresting bandits and other felons, investigating and trying felony cases, and carrying out the sentences upon them.

This guba reform appears to have been motivated less by the need to respond to sharpening class conflict than by Moscow's interest in achieving greater specialization in and central control over provincial criminal justice matters than had been possible with the vicegerents. The degree of genuine administrative autonomy it conceded to the recipient communities was limited in that the communities, once given the privilege of electing guba officials, were under collective responsibility for their performance, and their guba officials were required to submit reports and accounts to a supervising commission of boyars at Moscow. By 1555 this supervising commission had evolved into the Robbery Chancellery (*Razboyny prikaz*). It is unclear whether guba officials themselves ever had the au-

thority to pronounce death sentences upon felons, or whether the right of verdict in capital cases had to be reserved for the Robbery Chancellery. Some see in the 1550 Sudebnik law code Moscow's intent of universalizing the guba system, but there is no evidence this was accomplished.

The development of norms for guba policing, investigations, and hearings is reflected in a series of sources: the first guba community charters of the 1530s through the 1550 Sudebnik code; the 1555 Ordinance Book of the Robbery Chancellery; the revisions of this Ordinance book produced between 1617 and 1631; Chapter Twenty-One of the 1649 Ulozhenie law code; and the 1669 New Decree Statutes on Theft, Robbery, and Murder Cases. Some elements of traditional diadic justice remained to the end: for example, continued partial reliance on community hue and cry to apprehend criminals, and some continued reliance on community polling (*povalny obysk*) to establish guilt on the basis of reputation in the community's eyes. But in these successive ordinances, the shift to a more triadic criminal justice system became more apparent, especially from 1617 on, as seen in increasing emphasis placed on proactive struggle against brigandage and greater use of torture to produce confessions and name accomplices. In the 1669 New Decree Statutes, the guba organs are instructed in how to cooperate with special inquisitors sent from Moscow to conduct mass dragnets. The tendency after the Time of Troubles was also to subordinate most guba offices to the offices of the chancellery-appointed town governors (*voyevodas*). In 1679 the guba offices were abolished and the town governors given full authority over felony cases. The purpose was apparently to simplify the financing of local government and reduce the number of elective offices in which men might take refuge from military duty. But it had the effect of increasing the workload of the town governors and providing more opportunities to corrupt them, so the guba system was restored in 1684.

See also: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY; IVAN IV; LAW CODE OF 1649; SUDEBNIK OF 1550; TIME OF TROUBLES

BRIAN DAVIES

GUBERNIYA

The highest unit of administrative-territorial division in prerevolutionary Russia.

In 1708 Peter I decreed the organization of Russian territory into eight large administrative regions (Petersburg, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Kazan, Azov, and Siberia), each under the jurisdiction of a centrally appointed governor. Between 1713 and 1719, each government was subdivided into *provintsii* (provinces) and *uezdy* (districts). By the time of Catherine II's accession in 1762, Russian territory had been reorganized into twenty governments. During the first decade of her reign, Catherine resolved to rationalize the territorial division and administration of imperial territory. Her "Constitution for the Administration of Governments" of 1775 established forty *guberny*, each with a male population of between 300,000–400,000 (by the end of her reign the number of governments had increased to fifty-one). Each government was subdivided into several *okrugy* or *uezdy* of between twenty and thirty thousand male inhabitants. This system was retained in European Russia throughout the nineteenth century, but the new territories of the imperial periphery were organized into general-governorships and, later, *oblast* (regions). The 1864 *zemstvo* reform established assemblies in many provinces, elected on a narrow, indirect franchise, which were responsible for nominating an executive board with responsibility for regional economic administration. Judicial and policing matters remained the responsibility of the governor, who also ratified the appointment of the president of the executive board. After the February Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government replaced governors with commissars and after the Bolshevik Revolution authority passed to the executive committee of the regional soviet. Between 1924 and 1929 the new regime dissolved governments and replaced them with *oblast* and *kraya*.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION; UEZD; ZEMSTVO

NICK BARON

GUILDS

Organizations of merchants in groups called a "hundred" (*sto* or *sotnya*) existed in medieval Novgorod and in Muscovy. The first organization of merchants in guilds (*gildy*; singular *gildia*) occurred in December 1724, when Peter I divided the urban population into a first guild, composed of wealthy

merchants, doctors, pharmacists, ship captains, painters, and the like; a second guild, comprising retail traders and artisans; and all others, called the "common people."

Although the word *guild* was borrowed from medieval European practice, guilds in Russia had purely administrative functions: to categorize merchants according to the extent of their economic activities and to collect fees from them. Merchants also bore heavy responsibilities of unpaid state service, such as tax collection and service on municipal boards, law courts, and other local institutions.

A decree issued on January 19, 1742, specified three merchant guilds. In a decree of March 17, 1775, Catherine II freed merchants from the soul tax and set 500 rubles of declared capital as the minimum requirement for enrollment in the merchant estate, subject to the payment of 1 percent of declared capital each year. A law issued on May 25, 1775, set specific minimum amounts: 10,000 rubles for the first guild, 1,000 rubles for the second, and 500 rubles for the third. In her Charter to the Cities, promulgated on April 21, 1785, Catherine II increased the minimum capital requirements to 5,000 rubles for the second guild and 1,000 rubles for the third. By abolishing the merchants' former monopoly on trade and industry, Catherine allowed the gentry and serfs to engage in ruinous competition with the merchants, free of the annual guild payment. Many enterprising merchants fled this precarious situation by rising into the gentry. The merchant estate therefore remained small and weak.

In 1839 a first-guild certificate, costing 600 rubles, entitled a merchant with at least 15,000 rubles in assets to own ships and factories, to offer banking services, and to trade in Russia and abroad. Second-guild certificates, sold for 264 rubles, entitled merchants whose stated wealth surpassed 6,000 rubles to manage factories and engage in wholesale or retail trade in Russia. Members of the third guild were permitted to conduct retail trade in the city or district where they resided, provided they owned assets worth 2,400–6,000 rubles and purchased certificates costing 1.25 percent of the declared amount.

The third guild was abolished in 1863 and a new fee structure established, but the link between large-scale economic activity and membership in the merchant estate was already dissolving. Laws issued in 1807, 1863, and 1865 allowed non-merchants engaged in manufacturing and wholesale commerce

to enroll in a merchant guild while maintaining their membership in another social estate as well. From 1863 onward, anyone, regardless of social status or even citizenship, could create and manage a corporation. Still, many industrialists and traders enrolled in merchant guilds, as their fathers and grandfathers had done, to demonstrate their commitment to a group identity separate from the gentry.

See also: CAPITALISM; CHARTER OF THE CITIES; MERCHANTS; RUSSIA COMPANY

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THOMAS C. OWEN

GULAG

Stalinist labor camps.


The prison camp system of the Stalin era, whose acronym in Russian (GULag—hereafter Gulag) stood for *Glavnoye upravlenie lagerei*, or Main Camp Administration, grew into an enormous network of camps lasting into the mid-1950s. Other penal institutions, including prisons, labor colonies, and special settlements, supplemented the labor camps to form a vast number of sites available to the Soviet government for the incarceration and exile of its enemies. While much larger than both its tsarist and Soviet antecedents in size and scope, Stalin's prison empire evolved along lines clearly established over centuries of Russian rule. But the gulag far outpaced all predecessor systems and became an infamous symbol of state repression in the twentieth century.

Although unprecedented in reach, the labyrinth of Stalinist camps had its roots in both the tsarist and early Soviet periods. The secret police under the tsars, ranging from the *oprichniki* at the time of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century to the Third Section and *Okhranka* of later years, established the broad historical outlines for Stalinist institutions. Imprisonment, involuntary servitude, and exile to Siberia formed a long and well-known

experience meted out by these prerevolutionary organs of state security. Soon after the October Revolution, however, the new government under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin also issued key resolutions on incarceration, forced labor, and internal exile that explicitly set the stage for the gulag. The Temporary Instructions on Deprivation of Freedom (July 1918) and the Decree on Red Terror (September 1918) took aim at class enemies of the new regime to be sent to prison for various offenses. Other Bolshevik decrees from as early as January 1918 stipulated arrest and hard labor for political opponents of the new state as well as workers who had violated the labor code. The initial Soviet secret police agency, the Cheka (acronym for the Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-revolution and Sabotage), controlled many but not all of the camps, which would in time be reintegrated with other prison structures and grow to an immense scale.

Other than proportion, one of the critical differences between this embryonic camp system under Lenin and its successor under Stalin concerned the problem of jurisdiction. In Lenin's time, the Soviet government lacked a centralized administration for its prison organizations. The Cheka, People's Commissariat of the Interior, and People's Commissariat of Justice all oversaw various offshoots of the penal camp complex. In 1922 and 1923, the GPU (State Political Administration) and then the OGPU (Unified State Political Administration) replaced the Cheka as the main secret police organization and assumed command over many of the labor camps. The first and largest cluster of prison camps under its authority, the primary ones of which existed on the Solovetski Islands in the White Sea to the north of Petrograd (renamed Leningrad in 1924), became known at this time as SLON (Northern Camps of Special Designation). While Lenin left no blueprint for a future camp leviathan under Stalin, the infamous archipelago of Gulag sites that lasted until the time of Nikita Khrushchev clearly grew out of these early variants. In 1930, the gulag was officially established just as the parameters of the labor camp network began to expand greatly after Stalin's consolidation of power.

The tremendous growth in inmate numbers throughout the 1930s proved a defining feature of Stalinism, and certainly one that sets it apart from previous eras. Whereas prisoner counts of the Stalin era would rise into the millions, neither the tsars nor Soviet leaders before 1929 incarcerated



Perm-35, the last Soviet gulag. © P.PERRIN/CORBIS SYGMA

more than a few hundred thousand inmates. The collectivization of agriculture and the dekulakization campaign in the early 1930s began new trends in the Soviet Union, ushering in much higher rates of imprisonment. The Great Purges later in the decade again increased these statistics, particularly in the number of political prisoners sentenced to the Gulag. Other events, such as signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in August 1939, led to further waves of inmates, including Polish and Baltic citizens who joined their Soviet counterparts in remote camp zones across the USSR. By the 1940s, the Stalinist labor camps contained a multinational assortment of prisoners.

The *troika*, or three-person extrajudicial panel that could both try and sentence the accused even in absentia, became infamous in the late 1930s as a common mechanism for dispatching enemies of the state to widespread gulag regions. Comprising fourteen sections, Article 58 of the well-worn Soviet Criminal Code found extensive and arbitrary

application throughout the Stalin era as the labor camps began to stretch to all corners of the nation. The organs of state security became preoccupied with the shipment of prisoners to penal sites across the country. One of the most legendary in the early 1930s involved construction of the Baltic-White Sea Canal. Other inmates labored under similarly hostile conditions on the Solovetski Islands, or at gulag sites in and around Vorkuta, Magadan, Pechora, and Karaganda.

Throughout its history, the gulag served both a punitive and economic function. From its very origins, Soviet prisons and camps had been repositories for enemies of the regime. Useful both for isolating and punishing real and imagined opponents, the labor camps in particular became a tool of repressive state policy. But while inefficient and substandard in many respects, the gulag fulfilled a vital economic role as well. Russia had long wrestled with the question of adequate labor in remote parts of the empire, which only compounded the

intractable problems of a cash-poor economy nationwide. Although the roots of serfdom can in part be found in such conditions, Peter the Great in later years addressed numerous shortcomings with ever-increasing levels of coercion that expanded the realm of forced labor to include large prisoner contingents and peasants ascribed to factories. Political exile and hard labor became synonymous with Siberia in particular, and provided a blueprint for the Stalin era.

Although going far beyond Petrine goals, Stalin employed similar methods in the twentieth century. Inmates offered a bottomless pool of workers to be sent to areas historically poor in labor supply. The most famous and important gulag zones, focused upon the procurement of lumber and minerals, were located in remote northern and eastern regions of the USSR far from population centers. Leaving aside the question of productivity and efficiency, both of which registered at exceedingly low levels in the camps, the Soviet state sought a fulfillment of industrialization targets in such areas through the widespread application of prison contingents. But the labor camps soon grew beyond this scope, and began to fill economic functions within a larger national framework. Some gulag sites in time even appeared in and around major cities and industries. The Soviet government expanded the use of inmates in numerous large-scale construction projects, particularly involving railroad, canal, and highway plans. Eventually, the secret police concentrated inmate scientists in special prison laboratories known as sharashkas, where vital technical research proceeded under the punitive eye of the state.

While circumstances proved much better in such special design bureaus, most inmates throughout the gulag system both lived and worked under grueling conditions. Aside from enervating physical labor in extreme winter climates, prisoners suffered as well from poor living arrangements and minimal food rations. Hard labor in the mines and forests of Siberia was backbreaking and required a stamina that few inmates could maintain over long periods. Turning Marxism on its head, inmates also received caloric norms based upon a sliding scale of labor output that penalized low production levels even from the least healthy. Moreover, prisoners were subject to the whims of an unpredictable camp hierarchy that meted out harsh punishments for offenses, however minor. The threat of the isolator or lengthier terms of incarceration hung over every inmate

and made the camp population dread the seemingly wanton authority of the camp bosses.

As a rule, conditions within the camps worsened over time up through the end of the 1930s and early 1940s. The brunt of this fell on the politicals, who as a result of the Great Purges had begun to arrive in the gulag in significant numbers by this time. Constituting the most dangerous element in the view of the Soviet government, political prisoners occupied the lowest rung in the camps. Moreover, prison bosses favored actual criminals convicted for far lesser economic crimes, and placed them in positions of authority within the informal camp structure. The result was an inverted universe in which normal societal mores were suspended and the rules of the criminal world came to the fore. For many inmates, such moral corrosion proved even more onerous than the physical hardships of camp life.

The gulag incarcerated several million inmates over the length of its existence. Archival records reveal that the numbers were not as high as those posited by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others in previous years, although exact counts remain elusive for several reasons. In terms of the gulag proper, the highest camp figures for any one time were to be found in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Even then, there were not much more than two million prisoners on average within the camps at any given moment. Additional totals from internal exile, special settlement, and labor colonies augmented this number. But statistics convey only a narrow viewpoint on the reality of the gulag, which proved to be one of the most repressive mechanisms in the history of the Soviet Union.

See also: BERIA, LAVRENTI PAVLOVICH; PRISONS; PURGES, THE GREAT; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; YEZHOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

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DAVID J. NORDLANDER

GUM

The acronym GUM stands for Main Department Store (Glavnyi universal'nyi magazin), and indeed, from the time it opened in 1953, GUM was the Soviet Union's largest and busiest retail establishment. Located on the northeast corner of Red Square, GUM occupies the historic premises of Moscow's Upper Trading Rows. This enormous glass-roofed complex, completed in 1893, might be considered an early shopping mall; in the late imperial period, it housed between three hundred and one thousand shops at a time. The Upper Trading Rows were nationalized along with other commercial businesses in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, and were almost immediately converted into office space for the new Soviet bureaucracy. The New Economic Policy of the 1920s brought a brief revival of trade in the building when the municipal government established a five-and-dime emporium there, but it soon reverted to administrative use.

When the premises were refurbished for retailing during the early 1950s, the emphasis was no longer on discounted sales. GUM became the Soviet capital's most prestigious store, with specialized departments for such luxuries as Central Asian rugs, televisions, crystal stemware, and fur coats. Another department, Section 200, sold luxury wares exclusively to the Soviet elite; entry into this department was by permit only.

In 1992 GUM was reorganized as a joint-stock company. According to a 1991 formula, one-quarter of the shares went to the Moscow city government and one-quarter to employees, while the balance was sold to private investors.

See also: RED SQUARE

JULIE HESSLER

GUMILEV, LEV NIKOLAYEVICH

(1912–1992), dissident historian, geographer, and ethnographer in the Soviet Union.

Lev Gumilev belonged to the old Russian intelligentsia. His father, Nikolai Gumilev, was a prominent poet of the Silver Age and a victim of Bolshevik terror. His mother, Anna Akhmatova, was one of the greatest Russian women poets. Lev Gumilev's ties with the old intelligentsia led to frequent imprisonments from the 1920s to the 1950s in Josef Stalin's Gulag (prison camp system). Gumilev joined a punishment battalion in 1944 and fought in the Battle of Berlin. In spite of this, he became a major intellectual figure in Leningrad and developed an international reputation for his studies of the ancient Turkic and Mongol peoples. He combined historical and archeological research with historical geography to develop a new discipline, ethnography (*narodovedenie*) in the Department of Oriental Studies of Leningrad State University. Soviet scholar circles found thought anti-Marxist in his research and publications. He was accused of ignoring the role of the class struggle in history. Gumilev was particularly concerned with the relationship between culture and nation and the impact of biological energy and morals upon the development of ethnic groups. He advanced a theory of ethnogenesis to explain the rise and decline of particular ethnic groups in terms of biological and not social factors. He stressed the absence or presence of drive (*passionarnost*) in a particular people as manifest in the personalities of leaders to explain the people's role in the unfolding of the nation's history. These ideas have had a profound influence on Russian nationalist thought and the development of Eurasianism in contemporary Russia.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

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JACOB W. KIPP

GUMILEV, NIKOLAI STEPANOVICH

(1886–1921), poet executed by the Bolsheviks.

Born in Kronstadt and educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Gymnasium, Nikolai Stepanovich Gumilev was a major Silver Age poet and a victim of

Bolshevik repression. Gumilev, his first wife, Anna Akhmatova, and Osip Mandelstam were the foremost representatives of acmeism, a movement emphasizing concrete personal experience that arose in response to the dominant symbolist school of poetry during the 1910s. Gumilev also played a central role in the St. Petersburg-based Guild of Poets, a literary organization intermittently active between 1910 and 1921.

As a monarchist and self-styled “poet-warrior,” Gumilev volunteered to serve in the Russian army in August 1914. In 1918 he returned to Petrograd, where he worked as an editor and translator for the World Literature series.

Gumilev was arrested by the Bolsheviks in August 1921 for his alleged part in an anti-Soviet plot. Although the charges were almost certainly fabricated, Gumilev and sixty others were executed within weeks, over the protest of many writers. His execution was part of a sustained campaign against intellectuals by the Bolsheviks, who hoped to stifle potential dissent while loosening economic and social controls during the New Economic Policy. Gumilev’s execution is frequently cited as evidence that the systematic use of state terror was an integral part of communist rule, not an aberration associated with Stalinism. Many contemporaries viewed the deaths of Gumilev and the poet Alexander Blok, just twelve days apart, as symbolic of the destruction of the prerevolutionary intelligentsia.

Gumilev’s work was banned in the Soviet Union from 1923 until 1986. His poetry has become very popular in Russia since that time, with more than forty editions of his works appearing. Major collections included *Romantic Flowers* (1908), *Alien Sky* (1912), *Quiver* (1916), and *The Pillar of Fire* (1921). Gumilev also wrote several plays.

See also: AKHMATOVA, ANNA ANDREYEVNA; BLOK, ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH; MANDELSHTAM, OSIP EMILIEVICH; SILVER AGE

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BRIAN KASSOF

GYPSEY

Gypsies (*tsygane* in Russian, while *Roma* is the name preferred by this group) have been one of the most visible and yet least powerful of ethnic groups in Russia. The population is considerably larger than the 153,000 in the Russian Federation who were listed as Gypsies in the 1989 census. This is due to underreporting, a high birth rate, and immigration from former Soviet republics. Roma leaders claim a population of at least one million. As is true of Roma populations all over Europe, little is known of their ethnic origins and history as a people, though it is theorized that Gypsies originated in India. Many migrated to Russia by way of Germany and Poland during the eighteenth century after suffering persecution there. Romani, the language spoken by most gypsies, has Indo-European roots with some links to ancient Sanskrit.

Gypsies are widely dispersed across Russia, with communities in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, Komi Republic, Sverdlovsk, Vologda, Volgograd, Voronezh, Yaroslavl, and elsewhere. Following long-standing cultural traditions, Roma have resisted assimilation and exist on the margins of society. Geographic dispersal and social marginalization meant that the Roma did not enjoy the state support that often characterized Soviet nationality policy. Gypsies had no territorial entity of their own, no schools offering instruction in their own language, and no newspapers. The first Roma newspaper in Russia began publication in Samara only in 2001. Even under Josef Stalin, however, the cultural role of gypsies in Soviet society was recognized. In 1931 the Romen Theater opened in Moscow. It was the first theater in the world to showcase gypsy culture, and gypsy actors and musicians performed and were trained there. The theater continues to be active in post-Soviet Russia. Gypsy themes have been prominent in Russian culture, particularly through the popular film *Tabor Goes to Heaven* (*Tabor ukhodit v nebo*) which was released in 1976.

In Russia as in the rest of Eastern Europe, gypsies have been the object of public scorn and official repression. Many have traditionally engaged in illegal or semilegal occupations such as black marketeering, petty theft, fencing stolen goods, and organized begging. This is both a cause and effect of the lack of acceptance of gypsies in Russian society. During the Soviet period, gypsies often engaged in black-market selling of alcohol and

perfume, as well as fortune-telling and other occult arts. State repression of the gypsies reached a new height during the Nikita Khrushchev period. New regulations issued in 1957 attempted to restrict their movements outside of places where they were registered. This attempt to prevent the movement of gypsies has continued in post-Soviet Russia, with the police sometimes tearing down illegal gypsy settlements and forcing residents to return to their home region. With the expansion of private enterprise in post-Soviet Russia, the Roma reportedly have been squeezed out of their traditional commercial occupations, with even fortune-telling taken over by non-gypsy entrepreneurs who had an easier time dealing with the authorities. There has been an increasing incidence of gypsies involved in more serious crimes, such as the drug trade, a tendency bemoaned by leaders of the Roma community.

In 2000 the Russian government officially recognized the need for gypsies to have a political voice, and it authorized the creation of a council that would defend gypsy interests. Its leaders have campaigned against frequent stereotyping of gypsies in the media and have condemned police harassment based solely on ethnic identity.

See also: GYPSYMANIA; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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DARRELL SLIDER

GYPSYMANIA

Gypsymania took both literary and musical forms during the early nineteenth century. The gypsy theme—imagined scenes from their life and customs—captivated Russian poets. Alexander Pushkin's contributions gained popularity

and immediately entered the literary canon. Gypsymania in music (*tsyganshchina*) outlasted the literary genres. Its sources—choirs comprising free, serf, and state peasant ethnic gypsies (Roma) and Russian composers who adapted gypsy motifs to popular romances—were blended by star performers such as Stesha (Stepanida Sidorovna Soldatova, 1784–1822) and her successors. *Tsyganshchina*'s attraction rested on lyrics, music, and performance style. Song lyrics represented gypsies as hot-blooded, wild in love, cruel in hatred, and enamored of freedom and the open road. The music was marked by sharp contrasts and sudden changes of tempo. The critic Apollon Grigorev wrote in 1847: "If you seek sounds, if you seek expression for those undefined, incomprehensible, sorrowful 'blues' (*khandra*), you make off to the Gypsies, immerse yourself in the hurricane of these wild, passionate, oppressively passionate songs." An English visitor to a Moscow cafe during the 1850s described the performance of a gypsy choir wearing expensive and gaudy garments. They sat or lay on the floor; the soloist was joined by the company who drank and smoked as they strolled from table to table, stamping their feet. As cafes, restaurants, and phonograph records proliferated during the early twentieth century, gypsymania launched the careers of a half dozen superstars of the era who often emulated in life the emotional turbulence of their songs. Most Russians found them irresistible.

Critics accepted both the traditional music of the Roma, because it bore a folkish spirit, and the stylizations of composers at play like Franz Liszt and Johannes Brahms. The middle range, by far the most popular, invited rancor: the local vernacular adorned with gypsy devices of rhythm, sonority, instrumentation, and phrasing. In Russia, songs composed in the gypsy manner, such as "Two Guitars" and "Dark Eyes," evoked repugnance among some critics. Ironically, genuine gypsies when playing Roma music also borrowed from local styles, and this habit accounts for the huge variety among the various authentic gypsy styles from Spain to Finland. Under Bolshevism, hostility to *tsyganshchina* took on a political edge. During the 1920s, classical musicians lamented its vulgarity, and proletarian composers charged the music with inciting decadence, bourgeois values, and miscreant sexuality. The gypsy genre disappeared during the Cultural Revolution (1928–1931), and a form of gypsy music was partially

revived, in a sanitized form, with the founding of the Teatr Romen in 1931 where something like genuine Roma performances were mounted. Recordings by other Soviet singers of selected gypsy songs were released under the watchful eye of the censors. With the coming of glasnost under Mikhail Gorbachev, every kind of previously taboo gypsy songs resurfaced, only to be drowned out soon by Western rock and hip-hop.

See also: FOLK MUSIC; GYPSY; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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RICHARD STITES

HAGIOGRAPHY

Various types of narratives with documentary and commemorative functions for the Orthodox Church are also regarded as important literary works in the medieval Russian canon. Sacred biographies (*vitae*) were written about persons who had followed Christ's example in life and shown evidence of powers after death to intercede for believers, attributes that qualified them for sainthood. A short summary of the saint's life was read initially at the ceremonial inauguration of the feast day and thereafter to honor the saint's memory. Longer vitae circulated in religious anthologies of devotional readings. Eulogistic biographies of rulers, initially written for the funeral service, were recorded in chronicles, then revised for hagiographical anthologies. Tales from the Patericon record episodes from the lives of holy monks, their teachings, or the history of a monastic community. The vitae also include extended accounts of miracles worked by icons, some of which are viewed as local or national symbols, as well as tales of individual miracles.

When the Kievans converted to Christianity during the reign of Vladimir I (d. 1015), they received Greek Orthodox protocols for the recognition and veneration of saints, as well as a corpus of hagiographical texts. Beginning in the eleventh century, Kievan monks produced their own records of native saints. Veneration for the appanage princes Boris and Gleb, murdered in the internecine struggles following the death of their father Vladimir, inspired three extended lives that are regarded as literary classics. Also influential was the life of Theodosius (d. 1074), who became a monk and helped to found the renowned Kiev Cave Monastery. His biography, together with stories of the monastery's miraculous founding and of its monks, was anthologized in the *Kiev Cave Monastery Patericon*. The earliest hagiographical works from the city-state of Novgorod, surviving in thirteenth-century copies, focus on the bishops and abbots of important cloisters. Lives of Suzdalian saints, such as the Rostov bishops Leontius, Isaiah, and Ignatius, and the holy monk Abraham, preserve collective memories of clerics who converted the people of the area to Christianity.

In the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, Russian monks fled the cities, moving into wilderness areas to live as hermits, then founded monasteries to house their disciples. The writings produced in these monastery scriptoria promoted



asceticism as the highest model to which a Christian could aspire. Biographies of saints were supplemented with long prefaces, prayers, laments, and digressive praises employing the poetic imagery and complex syntactic structures characteristic of hymnography. An introductory commonplace, declaring the writer's wish to write an account that will be a fitting crown or garland of praise for the saint, has inspired some scholars to group these lives into a hagiographical school whose trademark is "word-weaving" (*pletenie sloves*). The most prominent writers of this school include Metropolitan Cyprian (c. 1330–1406), identified by some as a Bulgarian and others as a Serb, who wrote a revised life of the holy Metropolitan Peter in 1381; Epiphanius the Wise (second half of the fourteenth century to the first quarter of the fifteenth century), author of the first life of St. Sergius of Radonezh and St. Stephen of Perm (1390s); and Pachomius the Logothete, an Athonian monk sometimes identified as a Serb, who was commissioned to rewrite the lives of widely venerated holy men from Novgorod, Moscow, and leading monasteries between 1429 and 1484.

Sixteenth-century Muscovite hagiographers composed expansive narratives celebrating saints and icons viewed as protectors of the Russian tsardom. The most influential promoter of the Muscovite school was Macarius. While serving as archbishop of Novgorod (1537–1542), Macarius ordered the collection of saints' lives and icon legends, as well as other translated and original religious texts, for a twelve-volume anthology known as the *Great Menology* (*Velikie Minei Chetii*). The first "Sophia" version was donated to the Novgorod Cathedral of Holy Wisdom in 1541. During his tenure as metropolitan of Moscow (1542–1563), Macarius commissioned additional lives of saints who were recognized as national patrons at the Church Councils of 1547 and 1549, for a second expanded version of this anthology, which he donated to the Kremlin Cathedral of the Dormition in 1552. A third fair copy was prepared between 1550 and 1554 for presentation to Tsar Ivan the Terrible. Between 1556 and 1563, expanded sacred biographies of Kievan rulers Olga and Vladimir I, appanage princes and princesses and four Moscow metropolitans, as well as an ornate narrative about the miracles of the nationally venerated icon Our Lady of Vladimir, were composed for Macarius's *Book of Degrees*. These lives stressed the unity of the Russian metropolitan see and the theme that the line of Moscow princes had prospered because they followed the guidance of the Church.

In the seventeenth century, two twelve-volume hagiographical anthologies were produced by clerics affiliated with the Trinity-Sergius Monastery: the Trinity monk German Tulupov and the priest Ioann Milyutin. Their still unpublished menologies preserve lives of native Russian saints and legends of local wonder-working icons not included in earlier collections. In 1684 the Kiev Cave Monastery monk Dmitry (Daniel Savvich Tuptalo), who would be consecrated metropolitan of Rostov and Yaroslavl in 1702, began to research Muscovite, Western, and Greek hagiographical sources. Dmitry's goal was to retell the lives of saints and legends of wonder-working icons in a form accessible to a broad audience of Orthodox readers. The first version of his reading menology was printed in 1705 at the Kiev Cave Monastery. In 1759, a corrected edition printed in Moscow became the authorized collection of hagiography for the Russian Orthodox Church. Also noteworthy as sources on the spirituality of the seventeenth century are the lives of Old Believer martyrs (Archpriest Avvakum, burned as a heretic on April 1, 1682, and Lady Theodosia Morozova who died in prison on November 2, 1675) and the life of the charitable laywoman Yuliana Osorina, written by her son Kallistrat, district elder (*gubnaya starosta*) of Murom between 1610 and 1640.

See also: KIEVAN CAVES PATERICON; ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SAINTS

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GAIL LENHOFF

HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES

Tsar Nicholas II summoned peace conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907. His gestures appealed to pacifist sentiments in the West, but his primary motives were quite pragmatic. He hoped the 1899 conference would ban the rapid-fire artillery being developed by Austria-Hungary, Russia's rival in the Balkans. Russia could neither develop nor purchase such weapons except at great expense. Finance Minister Serge Witte urged that such money be spent instead on modernizing Russia's economy. Having called the conference, the Imperial government found itself tied in knots. Its war minister warned that Russia would need more and better arms to achieve its goals in the Far East against Japan and in the Black Sea region against Ottoman Turkey. Russia's major ally, France, objected to any limitations because it sought new arms to cope with Germany. Before the conference even opened, St. Petersburg assured Paris that no disarmament measures would be adopted.

The 1899 Hague Conference did not limit arms, but it did refine the laws of war, including the rights of neutrals. It also established an international panel of arbiters available to hear cases put before it by disputing nations.

A second Hague conference was planned five years after the first, but did not convene then because Russia was fighting Japan. Nicholas did summon the meeting in 1907, after Russia began to recover from its defeat by Japan and from its own 1905 revolution. It was during the 1905 upheaval that Vladimir Ilich Lenin first articulated his view on disarmament. The revolutionary task, he said, is not to talk about disarmament (*razoruzhenie*) but to disarm (*obezoruzhit'*) the ruling classes.

The Russian delegation in 1907 proposed less sweeping limits on armaments than in 1899. However, when some governments proposed a five-year ban on dirigibles, Russia called for a permanent ban. Nothing came of these proposals, and the second Hague conference managed only to add to refinements to the laws of war.

See also: LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; NICHOLAS II

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WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR.

HANSEATIC LEAGUE

The Hanseatic League was an association of north European towns that dominated trade from London in the west to Flanders, Scandinavia, Germanic Baltic towns, and Novgorod in the east. There is no precise date for the beginning of the Hansa, but during the twelfth century German merchants established a commercial center at Visby on the island of Gotland, and by the early thirteenth century founded Riga, Reval (Tallinn), Danzig (Gdansk), and Dorpat (Tartu).

German and Scandinavian merchants established the Gothic Yard (*Gotsky dvor*) and the Church of St. Olaf on Novgorod's Trading Side. Toward the end of the twelfth century, Lübeck built the German Yard (*Nemestsky dvor*, or *Peterhof* for the Church of St. Peter) near the Gothic Yard. At the same time Novgorodian merchants frequented Visby, Sweden, Denmark, and Lübeck.

During the thirteenth century Lübeck gradually replaced Visby as the commercial center of the League, and during the fourteenth century the Gothic Yard became attached to Peterhof. In 1265 the north German towns accepted the "law of Lübeck" and agreed for the common defense of the towns. The League's primary concern was to ensure open sea-lanes and the safety of its ships from piracy. In addition to Novgorod, the League founded counters or factories in Bruges, London, and Bergen. At its height between the 1350s and 1370s, the League consisted of seventy or more towns; perhaps thirty additional towns were loosely associated with the Hansa. The cities met irregularly in a diet (or *Hansetage*) but never developed a central political body or common navy. The League could threaten to exclude recalcitrant towns from its trade.

A Novgorod-Hansa agreement of 1269 laid the basic structure of commercial relations. German and Scandinavian merchants from Lübeck, Reval, Riga, and Dorpat traveled twice per year, in summer and winter, to Novgorod. German merchants were under their own jurisdiction within Peterhof, but disputes involving Novgorodians fell to a joint court that included the mayor and chiliarch (military commander). During the thirteenth century the German Yard elected its own aldermen, but during the fourteenth century Lübeck and Visby chose the aldermen. During the fifteenth century the Livonian towns selected a permanent official who resided in Novgorod.

Novgorod supplied the Hansa with furs, wax, and honey, and received silver ingots (the source of much of medieval Rus's silver), as well as Flemish cloth, salt, herring, other manufactured goods, and occasionally grain. In 1369 the League imposed duties on its silver exports to Novgorod; in 1373 it halted silver exports for two years, and in 1388 for four years. Novgorod turned to the Teutonic Order for silver, but exports stopped after 1427. During the 1440s war broke out between Novgorod and the Teutonic Order and the League, closing the German Yard from 1443 to 1448.

Novgorod's fur trade declined in the second half of the fifteenth century. After conquering Novgorod in 1478, Moscow closed the German Yard in 1494. The Yard reopened in 1514, but Moscow developed alternative trading routes through Ivangorod, Pskov, Narva, Dorpat, and Smolensk. During the sixteenth century Dutch and English traders further undermined the League's commercial monopolies. In 1555 the English obtained duty-free privileges to trade manufactured goods for Russian furs.

See also: FOREIGN TRADE; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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LAWRENCE N. LANGER

HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS

In market economies, firms face hard budget constraints. This means that they must cover their costs of production using revenues generated either from

the sales of their product or from other financial sources. In the short term, firms facing hard budget constraints may borrow to cover their operating costs. In the long term, however, if firms cannot cover their costs from their revenues, they fail, which means they must declare that the company is bankrupt or they must sell their assets to another firm. Hard budget constraints coincide with a situation where government authorities do not bail out or subsidize poorly performing or loss-making firms.

Soviet industrial enterprises did not face hard budget constraints. Unlike their counterparts in market economies, Soviet firms' primary objective was to produce output, not to make a profit. In many respects, planners controlled the financial performance of firms, because planners set the prices of labor, energy, and other material inputs used by the firm and also set the prices on products sold by the firm. Centrally determined prices in the Soviet economy did not facilitate an accurate calculation of costs, because they were not based on considerations of scarcity or efficient resource utilization. Nor did prices reflect demand conditions. Consequently, Soviet firms were not able to accurately calculate their financial condition in terms that would be appropriate in a market economy. More importantly, however, Soviet planners rewarded the fulfillment of output targets with large monetary bonuses and continually pressured Soviet industrial enterprises to produce more. With quantity targets given highest priority, managers of Soviet firms were not concerned with costs, nor were they faced with bankruptcy if they engaged in ongoing loss-making activities. Without the constraint to minimize or reduce costs, and given the emphasis on fulfilling or expanding output targets, Soviet firms were encouraged to continually demand additional resources in order to increase their production. In contrast to hard budget constraints faced by profit-maximizing firms in market economies, Soviet industrial enterprises faced soft budget constraints.

See also: NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; VALUE SUBTRACTION; VIRTUAL ECONOMY

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SUSAN J. LINZ

HAYEK, FRIEDRICH

(1899–1992), leading proponent of markets as an evolutionary solution to complex social coordination problems.

One of the leaders of the Austrian school of economics in the twentieth century, Friedrich Hayek received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1974. Born to a distinguished family of Viennese intellectuals, he attended the University of Vienna, earning doctorates in law and economics in 1921 and 1923. He became a participant in Ludwig von Mises's private economics seminar and was greatly influenced by von Mises's treatise on socialism and his argument about the impossibility of economic rationality under socialism due to the absence of private property and markets in the means of production. Hayek developed a theory of credit-driven business cycles, discussed in his books *Prices and Production* (1931) and *Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle* (1933). As a result he was offered a lectureship, and then the Tooke Chair in Economics and Statistics at the London School of Economics and Politics (LSE) in 1931. There he worked on developing an alternative analysis to the nascent Keynesian economic system, which he published in *The Pure Theory of Capital* in 1941, by which point the Keynesian macro model had already become the accepted and dominant paradigm of economic analysis.

In the 1930s and 1940s, Hayek made his major contribution to the analysis of economic systems, pointing out the role of markets and the price system in distilling, aggregating, and disseminating usable specific knowledge among participants in the economy. The role of markets as an efficient discovery procedure, generating a spontaneous order in the flux of changing and unknowable specific circumstances and preferences, was emphasized in his "Economics and Knowledge" (1937), "The Use of Knowledge in Society" (1945), and *Individualism and Economic Order* (1948). These arguments provided a fundamental critique of the possibility of efficient economic planning and an efficient socialist system, refining and redirecting the earlier Austrian critique of von Mises. They have also provided the basis for a substantial theoretical literature on the role of prices as a conveyor of information, and for the revival of non-socialist economic thought in the final days of the Soviet Union.

Hayek worked at LSE until 1950 when he moved to Chicago, joining the Committee of Social

Thought at the University of Chicago. There Hayek moved beyond economic to largely social and philosophic-historical analysis. His major works in these areas include his most famous defense of private property and decentralized markets, *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (1978), and the compilation *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism* (1988). These works, more than his economic studies, provided much of the intellectual inspiration and substance behind the anti-Communist and economic liberal movements in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1962 Hayek left Chicago for the University of Freiburg in Germany, and subsequently for Salzburg, where he spent the rest of his life. The Nobel Prize in 1974 significantly raised interest in his work and in Austrian economics.

See also: LIBERALISM; SOCIALISM

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RICHARD E. ERICSON

HEALTH CARE SERVICES, IMPERIAL

Prior to the reign of Peter the Great there were virtually no modern physicians or medical programs in Russia. The handful of foreign physicians employed by the *Aptekarskyi prikaz* (Apothecary bu-

reau) cared almost exclusively for the ruling family and the court. Peter himself took a serious interest in medicine, including techniques of surgery and dentistry. His expansion of medical services and medical practitioners focused on the armed forces, but his reformist vision embodied an explicit concern for the broader public health.

As of 1800 there were still only about five hundred physicians in the empire, almost all of them foreigners who had trained abroad. During the eighteenth century schools in Russian hospitals provided a growing number of Russians with limited training as surgeons or surgeons' assistants. The serious training of physicians in Russia itself began in the 1790s at the medical faculty of Moscow University and in medical-surgical academies in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Later these were joined by medical faculties at universities in St. Petersburg, Dorpat, Kazan, and elsewhere. The early medical corps in Russia also included auxiliary medical personnel such as feldshers (physicians' assistants), midwives, barbers, bonesetters, and vaccinators. Much of the population relied upon traditional healers and midwives well into the twentieth century.

Catherine the Great made highly visible efforts to improve public health. In 1763 she created a medical college to oversee medical affairs. She had herself and her children inoculated against smallpox in 1768 and sponsored broader vaccination programs. She established foundling homes, an obstetric institute in St. Petersburg, and several large hospitals in the capitals. Her provincial reform of 1775 created Boards of Public Welfare, which built provincial hospitals, insane asylums, and almshouses. In 1797, under Paul I, provincial medical boards assumed control of medicine at the provincial level, and municipal authorities took over Catherine's Boards of Public Welfare. With the establishment of ministries in 1803, the Medical College was folded into the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its Medical Department.

The paucity of medical personnel made it difficult to provide modern medical care for a widely dispersed peasantry that constituted over eighty percent of the population. During the 1840s the Ministry of State Domains and the Office of Crown Properties initiated rural medical programs for the state and crown peasants. The most impressive advances in rural medicine were accomplished by zemstvos, or self-government institutions, during the fifty years following their creation in 1864. District and provincial zemstvos, working with the

physicians they employed, developed a model of rural health-care delivery that was financed through the zemstvo budget rather than through payments for service. By 1914 zemstvos had crafted an impressive network of rural clinics, hospitals, sanitary initiatives, and schools for training auxiliary medical personnel. The scope and quality of zemstvo medicine varied widely, however, depending upon the wealth and political will of individual districts. The conferences that physicians and zemstvo officials held at the district and provincial level were a vital dimension of Russia's emerging public sphere, as was a lively medical press and the activities of professional associations such as the Pirogov Society of Russian Physicians.

By 1912 there were 22,772 physicians in the empire, of whom 2,088 were women. They were joined by 28,500 feldshers, 14,000 midwives, 4,113 dentists, and 13,357 pharmacists. The fragmentation of medical administration among a host of institutions made it difficult to coordinate efforts to combat cholera and other epidemic diseases. Many tsarist officials and physicians saw the need to create a national ministry of public health, and a medical commission headed by Dr. Georgy Ermolayevich Rein drafted plans for such a ministry. Leading zemstvo physicians, who prized the zemstvo's autonomy and were hostile to any expansion of central government control, opposed the creation of such a ministry. The revolutions of 1917 occurred before the Rein Commission's plans could be implemented.

See also: FELDSHER; HEALTH CARE SERVICES, SOVIET

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SAMUEL C. RAMER

HEALTH CARE SERVICES, SOVIET

Soviet socialized medicine consisted of a complex of measures designed to provide free medical care to the entire population, at the time of service, at the expense of society. The Soviet Union was the first country in the world to grant every citizen a constitutional right to medical care. This commitment was one of the few brighter (and redeeming) aspects of an otherwise bleak totalitarian system and often held as an example to emulate by other nations. The promise of universal, free (though not necessarily equal) care was held as the fulfillment of an age-long dream of providing care to those who needed it regardless of their station in life and ability to pay. It thus promised to eliminate the commercial aspects of the medical encounter that, in the eyes of many, had turned the physician into a businessman concerned primarily with his income and his willingness to treat only those who were affluent.

In the first decade of the Soviet regime, the official ideology held that illness and premature mortality were the products of a faulty socioeconomic system (i.e., capitalism) and that the establishment of a socialist society (eventually to become communist) would gradually eliminate most of the social causes of disease and early deaths by creating improved conditions (better nutrition, decent standard of living, good working conditions, housing, and prevention). This approach was set aside when Stalin took power at the end of the 1920s. He launched a program of forced draft industrialization and militarization at the expense of the standard of living, with an emphasis on medical and clinical or remedial approach, rather than prevention, to maintain and repair the working and fighting capacity of the population. The number of health personnel and hospital beds increased substantially, though their quality was relatively poor, except for the elites.

Soviet socialized medicine was essentially a public and state enterprise. It was the state that

provided the care. It was not an insurance system, nor a mix of public and private activities, nor was it a charitable or religious enterprise. The state assumed complete control of the financing of medical care. Soviet socialized medicine became highly centralized and bureaucratized, with the Health Ministry USSR standing at the apex of the medical pyramid. Physicians and other health personnel became state salaried employees. The state also financed and managed medical education, all health facilities from clinics to hospitals to rest homes, medical research, the production of pharmaceuticals, and medical technology. The system thus depended entirely on budgetary allocations as line items in the budget. More often than not, the health care system suffered from low priority and was financed on what came to be known as the residual principle. After all other needs had been met, whatever was left would go to health care. Most physicians (the majority of whom were women) were poorly paid compared to other occupations, and many medical facilities were short of funds to purchase equipment and supplies or to maintain them.

Access to care was stratified according to occupation, rank, and location. Nevertheless the population, by and large, looked upon the principle of socialized medicine as one of the more positive achievements of the Soviet regime and welfare system, and held to the belief that everyone was entitled to free care. Their major complaint was with the implementation of that principle. Soviet socialized medicine could be characterized as having a noble purpose, but with inadequate resources, flawed execution, and ending in mixed results.

See also: FELDSHER; HEALTHCARE SERVICES, IMPERIAL

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MARK G. FIELD

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH

(1770–1831), leading nineteenth-century philosopher.

Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel was one of the most influential idealist philosophers of the nineteenth century. In German philosophical thought, Hegel was rivaled in his own times perhaps only by Immanuel Kant.

Hegel developed a sweeping spectrum of thought embracing metaphysics, epistemology, logic, historiography, science, art, politics, and society. One branch of his philosophy after his death was reworked and fashioned into an “algebra of revolution,” as developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Russian Marxists and socialists, and later by Vladimir I. Lenin, the founder of Bolshevism.

For Hegel, reality, which progresses dynamically through a process, or phases, of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—his triadic concept of logic, inspired



Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel influenced the writings of Karl Marx. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

by the philosophy of Heraclitus—is essentially spiritual. Ultimate, determinant reality, according to Hegel, is the absolute World Spirit (*Weltgeist*). This spirit acts in triadic, dialectical fashion universally throughout world history. For Hegel, the state was the principal embodiment, or bearer, of this process.

Because of its occasional obscurity and complexity, Hegelianism as a social and political philosophy soon split into various, contrasting branches. The primary ones were the extremes widely known as Right and Left Hegelianism. There was also a middle, or moderate, form of Hegelianism that in some ways influenced English, Italian, American, and other branches of late-nineteenth-century idealism and pragmatism.

Right (or Old) Hegelianism regarded reality more or less passively, as indubitably rational. Whatever is real is rational, as seen in the status quo. Spirit, it alleged, develops on a grand, world scale via the inexorable, dialectical processes of history. Wherever this process leads must be logical since spirit is absolute and triadically law-bound. In the milieu of contrasting European politics of the nineteenth century, Right Hegelianism translated into reactionary endorsement of restorationism (restoring the old order following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars) or support for monarchist legitimacy.

By contrast, however, Left (or Young) Hegelianism, which influenced a number of thinkers, including Marx and Engels together with Russian Marxists and socialists, stressed the idea of grasping and understanding, even wielding, this law-bound process. It sought thereby to manipulate reality, above all, via society, politics, and the state. For revolutionaries, the revolutionary movement became such a handle, or weapon.

Hegel had taught that there was an ultimate reality and that it was spiritual. However, when the young, materialist-minded Marx, under the influence of such philosophers as Feuerbach, absorbed Hegel, he “turned Hegel upside down,” to use his collaborator Friedrich Engels’s apt phrase. While retaining Hegelian logic and the historical process of the triadic dialectic, Marx, later Engels, and still later Lenin, saw the process in purely nonspiritual, materialistic, historical, and socioeconomic terms. This became the ideology, or science, of historical materialism and dialectical materialism as embraced by the Russian Marxist George Plekhanov and, thence, by Lenin—but in an interpretation of the ideology different from Plekhanov’s.

In the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin interpretation of Left Hegelianism, historical change, the motor of history as determined by the forces and processes within the given social and economic system, is law-bound and strictly predictable. As presented in historical materialism, the history of societies develops universally by stages—namely, from slavery, to feudalism, to capitalism, and finally to socialism, whose final stage is full-fledged communism.

Each stage, except the merged last two (socialism/communism), contains the seeds of its own destruction (or “contradictions”) as the dialectical process of socioeconomic development spirals upward to the next historical stage. For instance, capitalism’s antithesis is seen in the seeds of its own destruction together with the anticipation of the new synthesis of socialism/communism. Such seeds, said the Marxists, are capitalism’s impoverishment of a majority of the exploited population, overproduction, unemployment, class struggle, economic collapse, and, inevitably, revolution.

Progressive elements of the former, capitalist order are then continued in new form in the final, socialist/communist phase. This assumes the form of industrialization, mass production, a just socio-political order (under a workers’ dictatorship of the proletariat). In this formulation the Marxists developed the theory of base and superstructure. The base is the economic system; the superstructure are such facets of society as government, laws, religion, literature, and the arts. The superstructure both reflects and rationalizes the base.

Ultimately, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, state power, as described in the Marxist Critique of the Gotha Program, gradually withers away. The society is thence led into the final epoch of communism. In this final stage, a virtual millennium, there are no classes, no socioeconomic inequality, no oppression, no state, no law, no division of labor, but instead pure equality, communality, and universal happiness. Ironically, in contrast to Marx’s formulation, the ultimate phase in Hegel’s own interpretation of the dialectic in history was the Prussian state.

In Lenin’s construction of Marxism, Hegelianism was given an extreme left interpretation. This is seen, among other places, in Lenin’s “Philosophical Notebooks.” In this work Lenin gives his own interpretation of Hegel. He indicates here and in other writings that absolute knowledge of the inevitable historical process is attainable—at least by those equipped to find it scientifically.

The leaders of the impending proletarian revolution, Lenin says in his 1903 work, *What Is to Be Done?*, become a select circle of intellectuals whose philosophy (derived from Marx and Hegel) equips them to assume exclusive Communist Party leadership of the given country. Lenin could imagine that such knowledge might allow a nation’s (namely, Russia’s) socioeconomic development to skip intermediate socioeconomic phases, or at least shorten them. In this way, the Russian Bolsheviks could lead the masses to the socialist/communist stage of development all but directly. This could be accomplished by reducing or suppressing the phase of bourgeois capitalism. (This Leninist interpretation of the dialectic has been criticized by other Marxists as running counter to Hegel’s, and Marx’s, own explanations of the dialectic.)

Thus, in Lenin’s interpretation of Hegel and Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes the leader and teacher of society, the single indoctrinator whose absolute power (based on the people) saves the masses from the abuses of the contradictions of capitalist society, whether in rural or urban society, while guiding society to the final, communist phase.

See also: DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM; ENGELS, FRIEDRICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MARXISM

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

HELSINKI ACCORDS

Signed at the Finnish capital of Helsinki on August 1, 1975, the Helsinki Accords were accepted by

thirty-five participating nations at the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The conference included all of the nations of Europe (excluding Albania), as well as the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada. The Helsinki Accords had two noteworthy features. First, Article I formally recognized the post-World War II borders of Europe, which included an unwritten acknowledgement of the Soviet Union's control over the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which the USSR had annexed in 1940. Second, Article VII stated that "the participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." This passage, in theory, held the Soviet Union responsible for the maintenance and protection of basic human rights within its borders.

Although the Soviet government was never serious about conforming to the human rights parameters defined by the Helsinki Accords, the national leadership under General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev believed that its signing of the document would improve the Soviet Union's diplomatic position with the United States and other Western countries. Specifically, the state wished to foster the perception that it was as an equal player in the policy of *détente*, in which both superpowers sought to relax Cold War tensions. What the regime did not anticipate, however, was that those outside the Soviet Union, as well as many of the USSR's own citizens, would take the Accords seriously. Soon after the Soviet delegation returned from Finland, a number of human rights watchdog groups emerged to monitor the USSR's compliance with the Accords.

Among those organizations that arose after the signing of the accords was Helsinki Watch, founded in 1978 by a collection of Soviet dissidents including the notable physicist Andrei D. Sakharov and other human rights activists living outside the USSR. Helsinki Watch quickly became the best-known and most outspoken critic of Soviet human rights policies. This collection of activists and intellectuals later merged with similar organizations to form an association known as Human Rights Watch. Many members of both Helsinki Watch and Human Rights Watch who were Soviet citizens endured state persecution, including trial, arrest, and internal exile (e.g., Sakharov was exiled to the city of Gorky) from 1977 to 1980. Until the emergence of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as Soviet general secretary in 1985, independent monitoring of Soviet compliance with the accords from within the USSR re-

mained difficult, although the dissidents of Helsinki Watch were never completely silenced. After the introduction of openness (*glasnost*) and restructuring (*perestroika*) under Gorbachev in the late 1980s, however, these individuals' efforts received much acclaim at home and abroad. The efforts of Helsinki Watch and its successor organizations served notice in an era of strict social control that the Soviet Union was accountable for its human rights obligations as specified by the Helsinki Accords.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; DÉTENTE; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; HUMAN RIGHTS

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CHRISTOPHER J. WARD

HERZEN, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH

(1812–1870), dissident political thinker and writer, founder of Russian populism.

Alexander Ivanovich Herzen was born in Moscow, the illegitimate son of a Russian aristocrat and his German-born mistress. His family name, derived from the German *herz* ("heart"), was given to him by his father. In 1825 Herzen was deeply affected by the Decembrist revolt that fueled his rejection of the Russian status quo. His early commitments were developed in the companionship he formed with a young relative, Nikolai Ogarev. In 1828 on the Vorobyevy Hills, they took a solemn oath of personal and political loyalty to each other.

While a student at Moscow University, Herzen became the center of gravity for a circle of critically-minded youth opposed to the existing social and moral order; in 1834 both Herzen and Ogarev were arrested for expressing their opinions in private. Herzen was exiled to Perm and later to Vyatka, where he worked as a clerk in the governor's

office. A surprise encounter with the future tsar Alexander Nikolayevich (later Alexander II) led to his transfer to the city of Vladimir. There he found work as a journalist, and later received permission to reside in St. Petersburg. This, however, was soon followed by another period of exile that lasted until 1842. Meanwhile, Herzen's study and propagation of Hegelian philosophy became the cornerstone of his debates and intellectual alliances with radical Westernizers such as Vissarion Grigorievich Belinsky, moderates such as Timofey Nikolayevich Granovsky, and the early Slavophiles. He established himself as a prolific writer on issues such as the perils of excess specialization of knowledge, the promises and defaults of utopian socialism exemplified by Robert Owen (1771–1858) and Charles Fourier (1772–1837), the libertarian anarchism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), and, most of all, the purportedly socialist promise of the Russian peasant commune. This latter subject became the centerpiece of his thought and worldview; as set forth in his key work, *From the Other Shore* (1847–1848, coinciding with the appearance of Marx's *Communist Manifesto*), Herzen laid out the key arguments of Russian populism, arguing that the primordial collective morality of the commune must be preserved against the inroads of capitalism, and extolling Russia's opportunity to overtake the West on the path of social progress toward a just and equitable organization of society, without having to pass through the capitalist stage. Populism, as envisioned by Herzen, was to become one of the two main currents of Russia's revolutionary thought, alongside with Marxism. Each of these philosophical strains cross-fertilized and competed with the other.

In 1847, urged by Ogarev from abroad to escape the dictatorial regime of Nicholas I, Herzen managed to overcome political obstacles to his emigration and leave Russia, as it later turned out, forever. He traveled across continental Europe, witnessed the failure of the French Revolution of 1848, and invested in a radical newspaper edited by Proudhon that was soon to be shut down. He developed a bitter critique of European capitalism, which he denounced for its Philistine depravity and wickedness. In his view, even the promise of socialism was hardly a cure for corruption of what one would call today the consumer society. This new outlook reinforced the Russo-centric element of his populism (although never reconciling him with Russian domestic oppression), and was reflected in his major writings of the period, including *Letters from France and Italy*, published over the

period from 1847 to 1854; *On the Development of Revolutionary Ideas in Russia*, published in 1851; and *Russian People and Socialism*, published in 1851.

In 1852 Herzen moved from Nice to London, which became his home until the end of his life. He set up the first publishing house devoted to Russian political dissent, printing revolutionary leaflets, his journal *Polyarnaya zvezda* (Polar Star), and, finally, his pivotal periodical, *Kolokol* (The Bell), which he published between 1857 and 1867. This brought Herzen great fame in Russia, where the liberal atmosphere of Alexander II's Great Reforms allowed Herzen's works to be distributed, albeit illicitly, across the country. *Kolokol's* initial agenda advocated the emancipation of the serfs and played a major role in shaping social attitudes such that emancipation became inevitable.

Although living in London, Herzen often spoke out publicly on key issues of the day, addressing his remarks directly to Tsar Alexander II, at times positioning himself as a mediator between the authorities and the liberal and radical elements of Russian society, but identifying firmly with the latter. After 1861, however, his émigré politics were rapidly overtaken by growing radicalism within Russia, and he was increasingly treated with condescension by the younger activists as being out of touch with the new realities. The crackdown on the Polish rebellion by tsarist troops in 1863 and the ensuing conservative tilt in Russia marked the twilight of Herzen's public career. He died in Paris in 1870, and was buried in Nice. Over time he became a symbolic founding figure of Russia's democratic movement, broadly conceived to include its different and often widely divergent ideological and political traditions. In this, his reputation is similar to Pushkin's standing within Russian literature. He is best remembered for his ability to synthesize a variety of anti-authoritarian currents, from liberal and libertarian to revolutionary-socialist and Rusophile populist, whose mutual contradictions were not as clearly evident in his time as they became in later years.

Among his many literary works, which range from fiction to philosophy and politics, the central place is occupied by *My Past and Thoughts*, which was written between 1852 and 1866. This is a personal, political, and intellectual autobiography, into which he injected a wide-ranging discussion and analysis of the major developments of his time in Russia and Europe.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; POPULISM; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; WESTERNIZERS

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DMITRI GLINSKI

HIGHER PARTY SCHOOL

The Higher Party School was created in 1939 under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was tasked with training future leaders (known in Soviet parlance as “cadres”) for Party and state positions. The purpose was to prepare them for propaganda work with the masses and for supervising managers and state officials, while ensuring their political loyalty or *partynost* (Party-mindedness). In 1978 it was merged with the Academy of Social Sciences, which provided more advanced training. A similar Higher School was created for the Young Communist League (Komsomol) in 1969. Party officials under the age of forty were selected by the Communist Party and came to the main school in Moscow from across the Soviet Union for a two-year training program that was long on Marx, Lenin, and the latest Party edicts and short on practical skills. For leaders from the non-Russian republics, attendance provided important exposure to life in the Soviet capital. With the general erosion of ideology in the Brezhnev era, the Party became increasingly concerned about the efficacy of its ideological training, so funding for Party education was increased.

Selection for the school was an important step in the career ladder for would-be members of the

higher Party *nomenklatura*. Living conditions at the school were comfortable, and it provided an opportunity to meet senior Party officials and to network with one’s peers, connections that could be useful in one’s future career. The Moscow school had about 120 faculty and 300 students per year; it also had 22 regional branches that ran shorter seminars and correspondence courses for Communist leaders at every level in the Party hierarchy, including the heads of regional and city councils (soviets). Some of these schools provided remedial education for Party cadres who had missed out on higher education. In the 1980s one in three of the regional (*obkom*) party secretaries had passed through the Higher Party School; its graduates included General Secretary Yuri Andropov. Ironically Vyacheslav Shostakovsky, the school’s rector, was one of the leaders of the Democratic Platform movement that in 1990 called for the Communist Party to relinquish its monopoly of power. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the network of Party schools turned themselves into colleges of management and public administration. The premises of the Higher Party School itself are now occupied by the Russian State Humanities University.

See also: CADRES POLICY; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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PETER RUTLAND

HILARION, METROPOLITAN

(Eleventh century; exact dates unknown), first native of Rus to be metropolitan of Kiev, author of the *Sermon on Law and Grace*.

Very little biographical information is known about Hilarion. In the *Russian Primary Chronicle* under 1051 it is reported that Prince Yaroslav of Kiev assembled the bishops in St. Sophia Cathedral and appointed Hilarion, a Carpatho-Rusyn (native of Rus), as metropolitan bishop. He is described as a devout man, learned in the Scriptures, and an ascetic, who served as one of Yaroslav’s priests in the church of the Holy Apostles at Berestovo, a favorite princely residence located just south of Kiev.

While a priest, Hilarion selected a spot on a hill above the Dnieper not far from Berestovo where he dug a small cave in which to chant the hours and pray to God in solitude. This cave was later occupied by Anthony of the Caves and served as the foundation for the Caves Monastery of Kiev. Hilarion was the first native of Rus to be metropolitan. The only other Carpatho-Rusyn to serve as metropolitan in Kievan Rus was Klim Smolyatich in the twelfth century. Scholars have long debated Yaroslav's motives for appointing Hilarion, and many maintain that the decision reflects an anti-Byzantine bias. There is no condemnation of the appointment in Byzantine sources, however, and Yaroslav's purpose remains unclear. There is much speculation but no concrete information for Hilarion's biography after his appointment. All that is known is that the *First Novgorod Chronicle* mentions a new metropolitan by 1055. Whether Hilarion's tenure survived his patron Yaroslav (d. 1054) is not known.

Hilarion's most significant contribution to Kievan culture is his *Sermon on Law and Grace*. A master of rhetoric and the oratorical tradition, Hilarion expressed the pride of his newly converted nation as it joined the Christian community, and celebrated its past achievements. Utilizing the familiar Biblical contrast between law and grace, Hilarion began by emphasizing the gift of grace through Christ, which ended humankind's subservience to the law and through which Rus was converted. In the second part of the sermon, Hilarion turned his attention to the apostle of Rus, Vladimir I, as well as to the works of his son, Yaroslav.

Scholars have often seen an anti-Jewish bias or evidence of a struggle with Byzantium in the sermon. There is little evidence of either, however, and it is best read as a sophisticated and effective attempt to establish the place of Rus in sacred history by moving from theological doctrine to the specific pious actions of the Kievan princes.

Although a number of works have been attributed to Hilarion, only the sermon and a confession of faith followed by a postscript can with any certainty be ascribed to his pen.

See also: CAVES MONASTERY; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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DAVID K. PRESTEL

HIS MAJESTY'S OWN CHANCERY

His Majesty's Own Chancery was formally founded by Paul I (r. 1796–1801) in 1796. Centralizing power further, Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) greatly expanded the Chancery's power and role in government, placing it above the regular bureaucracy and under his direct control. As the Russian bureaucracy grew during the nineteenth century, the emperors struggled to maintain personal control over it and to have it carry out the imperial will. The Chancery was one solution to this problem. It provided a mechanism for greater monarchical control over government and society, and it gave the emperor the opportunity to bypass bureaucratic inertia.

In 1826 two departments were added to the Chancery. The First Section prepared documents and papers for the emperor's review and supervised the bureaucracy's personnel. The Second Section worked on the codification of the empire's laws, resulting in the publication in 1832 of *The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire*. After the death of Empress Maria Fedorovna in 1828, a Fourth Section was established to handle her sizeable charitable endowments. In 1836, a Fifth Section studied the conditions under which the state peasants lived, and implemented reforms designed to improve them. In contrast to serfs, who were owned by the nobility, state peasants belonged to the emperor, which gave the government greater flexibility in regard to reform. More importantly, its research became the basis for the emancipation of the serfs legislation that was passed by Alexander II in 1861. In 1842, a Sixth Section was charged with the establishment of Russian administrative control in the Caucasus. These last two sections had a relatively short existence, and were closed when the tasks assigned to them were completed.

The Third Section, founded in 1826, became the most famous—or infamous—part of the Chancery, because of its police and supervisory functions that were equivalent to an internal intelligence service. It was a relatively effective state organ for the collection and analysis of information and for the implementation of the emperor's will. Five subsections

handled wide ranging duties. The first of these was the most secret, and probably the most important from the government's point of view. It conducted investigations into political crimes, and maintained surveillance of society, and it kept watch on groups and individuals that were deemed politically unreliable. After the revolutions of 1848 in several European countries, its activities intensified, reflecting the government's, and Nicholas's, growing fear of penetration of radical revolutionary ideas into Russia. A second subsection handled corruption and crime within the state apparatus. The third kept an eye on foreigners living in Russia. The fourth managed and controlled relations between peasants and landowners. Censorship and control over printed matter was assigned to the fifth subsection.

The Third Section also had an executive body known as the Gendarme Corps, who were personal representatives of the emperor. Members of the corps were assigned to individual governorships and large cities, where they played the role of arbiter between society and local governments while supervising both. The corps provided the emperor with reliable information on the condition of his empire. Nicholas could not completely control the bureaucratic machine that was his Chancery, however. For example, the Third Section maintained surveillance on the heir to the throne, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, illegally and without his or the emperor's knowledge.

In the 1880s, the Chancery underwent serious reorganization. Many of its functions were transferred to the ministries and the central bureaucracy. The Ministry of the Interior took over many of the responsibilities of the Third Section. The Gendarme Corps remained in existence until 1917 as an elite police force, but its central position did not survive after the death of Nicholas I. By the reign of Nicholas II, His Majesty's Own Chancery handled only questions related to promotions and pensions of bureaucrats.

See also: NICHOLAS I

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ZHAND P. SHAKIBI

HISTORICAL SONGS

Folklorists apply this term to certain Russian oral epic songs tracing to a later period than the type of the bylina and dealing with known historical persons and events. Although Soviet specialists attempted to find earlier examples, the historical song as people know it most probably arose in Muscovy in the sixteenth century; the first clear examples have to do with the reign of Tsar Ivan IV but appear to have been composed somewhat after it. Historical songs are typically shorter than the bylina but continue many features of oral epic composition, including prosody. In place of the larger-than-life *bogatyr*, the hero of a historical song is often a common soldier or cossack. In this folklore genre from a relatively late period observers have one of their best opportunities to see how historical events became adapted and transformed in the minds of simple Russian people. What they produced were imaginative, poetic treatments of problems, persons, and happenings.

Two outstanding songs concerning Ivan the Terrible and known in many collected variants are those called "The Conquest of Kazan" and "The Wrath of Ivan the Terrible against His Son." Both stress the dangerous anger of the tsar, which may explode suddenly like the gunpowder that breached the wall of Kazan during the Russian siege of 1552. In the second instance it is turned against his own son, a tsarevich whom he suspects of treason. The offending parties have to be saved by a third person who risks his own life by speaking up to the tsar and is the real hero of the song. Historians have tried to associate "The Wrath of Ivan the Terrible against His Son" with the sack of Novgorod in 1570, but the imperfect fit with history brings out the fact that songs often embodied only a popular conception of the spirit of events. Ivan IV emerges as both a fearful and a respected ruler.

Seventeenth-century historical songs include themes associated with the Time of Troubles: the supposed murder of Tsarevich Dmitry, a lament of Ksenia Godunova, the rise of pretender Grishka Otrepiev, the assassination of Mikhailo Skopin-Shuisky. Stenka Razin's reputation naturally inspired a number of songs later in the century. From

the eighteenth century, there is a cycle about Peter the Great that depicts him as a people's tsar who mingled with the common folk. A development from the historical songs were the so-called cosack songs and soldier songs, usually still shorter and sung rather than chanted. Although examples of historical songs are claimed even from the mid-nineteenth century, the genre was clearly dying out.

See also: BYLINA; FOLKLORE; FOLK MUSIC; MUSIC

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NORMAN W. INGHAM

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Historiography is the writing of history, the aggregation of historical compositions. The establishment of history as a modern scholarly discipline in Russia dates back to the end of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. At the order of Peter the Great, the accumulation of historical sources began with the translation of works of Western European historians such as Samuel Pufendorf. Compositions that justified the tsar's activity and, in particular, the reasons behind the Northern War were recounted by Peter's companions, including Feofan Prokopovich and Petr Shafirov. The eminent Russian statesman and Historian of the first half of the eighteenth century, Vassily Tatischev, was influenced by rationalism. He understood history as a political history of the country. In *Istoriia Rossiiskaia* (Russian History, published after his death), he provided, for the first time, the classification of the periods of Russian history.

German historians were invited to work at the Academy of Sciences in the 1730s and 1740s, and they had a great impact on Russian historiography. Three of these Germans were particularly important: Gerhard Friedrich Müller and Gottlieb Siegfried Bayer, who formulated what is known as Norman theory, and August Ludwig Schlözer, who tried to reconstruct the original text of the earliest Russian chronicle, *Povest Vremennykh Let* (The Primary Russian Chronicle), in his work titled *Nestor*.

Also important were the works of Major General Ivan Boltin, written in the 1780s and 1790s. Boltin proposed the idea of a comparative method of studying history, an approach that would take into account the cause-and-effect connection between historical events. A great impact on social conscience was made by Nikolai Karamzin's *Istoriia Gosudarstva Rossiiskogo* (The history of the Russian state), published in twelve volumes between 1816 and 1829. This work was sold in enormous quantities, according to the time's standards. While working on the *History*, Karamzin developed the modern Russian language. According to Alexander Pushkin, Russia was discovered by Karamzin, like America was discovered by Columbus. Methodologically, however, the belles-lettres style of Karamzin's work did not suit the standards of historical science of the time. Karamzin proved that autocracy was vital for Russia, having proposed the thesis that the history of the people belongs to the tsar.

As a counterweight to Karamzin's history of the state, publisher and journalist Nikolai Polevoi tried to create *Istoriia Russkogo Naroda* (A History of the Russian People), but he could not cope with the task. Instead of the history of society, his six-volume work, published between 1829 and 1833, was yet another version of the history of state power. He was unable to break away from the convention of organizing the material by ruling periods.

In the nineteenth century, historiography became professional, and a majority of historical works were now created by scholars at universities. The development of Russian historiography was greatly affected by the philosophy of Georg Hegel and the works of German historians, especially the representatives of the German historical law school. From 1840 through the 1860s, in the works of Konstantin Kavelin, Sergei Soloviev, and Boris Chicherin, the Russian state (judicial) school of historiography was formed. According to the views of the historians of the Russian state school, Russia differed markedly from the West, where social development came from the bottom. In Russia, according to this view, the organizer of society, classes, and the relations between classes was the state. The society was typically weak, unorganized, and movable, which was supported by the geographical distribution of Russian people on the Western European plain, a circumstance that provided for no natural borders. For Kavelin, the state acted as a creator of history.

The theoretical views of historians of the state school were most fully embodied in the *Istoriia*

Rossii S Drevneishikh Vremen (History of Russia from Ancient Times), published in twenty-nine volumes between 1851 and 1879. This work was written by the greatest Russian historian, Sergei Mikhailovich Soloviev. His conception was characterized by the perception of the inner organic pattern of the historical process, defined by objective, primarily geographical, factors and of the state, as the supreme embodiment of the history of the people. He believed the most important factor of Russian history to be its colonization, and he saw the breakthrough in Russian history to be the reign of Peter the Great, who put Russia on the path to Europeanization.

As a counterweight to the members of the state school, referred to as Westernizers, who believed that Russia was developing the same way as Western Europe, Slavophiles (among them Ivan and Konstantin Aksakov and Ivan and Petr Kireyevsky) believed that Russia's development was independent and self-directed, and that Peter the Great's reforms were artificial. They believed that it was necessary to return to the policies of the seventeenth century, when the tsar had the power of rule and the people had the power of opinion. They were influenced by German Romanticism, especially as expressed in Friedrich Schelling's philosophy. Slavophiles did not create any significant historical works other than Ivan Belyaev's *Krestiane na Rusi* (Peasants in Russia), published in 1860.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, more and more works of Russian historians concerned the socioeconomic problems, the history of peasants and serfdom, and peasant communes. The eminent historian of this time period was Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky, who replaced his teacher, Soloviev, in the Department of Russian History at the Moscow University. Klyuchevsky believed that Russian history developed under the influence of various factors, geographical, economic, social, and political. Klyuchevsky's great influence is partly explained by the brilliant style of his works, especially his lectures *Kurs Russkoi Istorii* (A Course of Russian History), first printed in 1880 as lithographs, appearing in five bound volumes between 1904 and 1921. He was known for his deeply psychological approach, and his portraits of Russian historical figures are still unmatched. Klyuchevsky was skeptical of Peter the Great's reforms, believing them to be chaotically organized and prompted by the needs of the Northern War.

Klyuchevsky's school became the leading school in Russian historiography of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The members of this

school included Paul Milyukov, Alexander Kizeveter, Mikhail Lubavsky, Mikhail Bogoslovsky, and others. Methodological searches were typical for Russian historians of that time: they were affected by ideas of neopositivism (Miliukov), neokantianism (Alexander Lappo-Danilevsky), and Marxism (Mikhail Tugan-Baranovksy, Petr Struve). The more popular general work on the history of Russia published in this period was Milyukov's *Ocherki Po Istorii Russkoi Kultury* (Essays on the History of Russian Culture), which came out in several parts from 1896 to 1903. Milyukov formed a thesis about the simplicity and slowness of Russia's historical process, and of the structure of Russian history as having been built from the top down. Standing apart from the supporters of Russia's independent historical process, Nikolai Pavlov-Silvansky tried to prove its similarity to the Western European experience, postulating the presence of feudalism in medieval Russia in his *Feodalizm v Drevnei Rusi* (Feudalism in Old Russia) published in 1907.

For the Moscow school generalizations were typical, but the historians of the St. Petersburg school (Konstantin Bestuzhev-Riumin, Sergei Platonov, Lappo-Danilevsky, and others) paid special attention to publication and the analysis of earlier historical sources.

In general, Russian historiography of the early twentieth century blossomed early, but this ended abruptly with the October Revolution of 1917. After the Bolsheviks prohibited the teaching of history in schools and dismantled the historical departments in universities, the last citadel of non-Marxist historiography was the Academy of Sciences, but after the so-called Academic Affair and mass repressions against historians from 1929 to 1931, the Marxist-Leninist school of historiography became supreme in the USSR.

See also: KARAMZIN, NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH KLYUCHEVSKY, VASILY OSIPOVICH

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

HOLY ALLIANCE

The Holy Alliance is the name given to the treaty signed on September 26, 1815, in Paris by the monarchs of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Its maker and prime mover was Tsar Alexander I. In 1815 after the downfall of Napoleon, Alexander was at the height of his powers. A romantic, an idealist, indeed something of an evangelical who had experienced a religious conversion in 1812, Alexander had fallen under the influence of a spiritualist, Baroness Julie von Krüdener, the wife of one of his diplomats, and the alliance was the product of nightly prayer meetings between the two. The alliance called upon the three powers to deal with one other and with their peoples on the basis of the Christian Gospel so there could emerge a fraternal union of rulers and peoples that would forever rid the earth of the scourge of war. At the insistence of the Austrian chancellor, Klemens von Metternich, Alexander's ally in the war against Napoleon, "fraternal" was struck out and changed to "a paternal alliance of monarchs over their peoples," lest the former clause be interpreted by Russia in a manner that would conflict with the language of other treaties under negotiation at this time.

Two common criticisms of the Holy Alliance are that its members (which in time included most the sovereigns of Europe) forged it into an instrument of oppression against their subjects, and, more important, that Alexander used it as a base to attain hegemony in Europe. Neither criticism is persuasive. The first can be challenged on factual grounds. The aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Europeans in the aftermath of the devastation of the Napoleonic Wars ran to one thing and one thing only: peace. National rights, national liberties, and the like were at this time simply not matters of priority. Moreover, the Holy Alliance powers exercised considerable restraint after 1815, as demonstrated by the extent to which they allowed multiple revolutionary fuses to be lit before they stepped in—in a real sense they allowed revolutions to explode (the Spanish and Italian revolutions of 1820–1821; the revolutions in France, Belgium, the Papal States, and Poland in 1830–1831; those in France, Germany, Austria, and Italy in 1848). Similarly, the argument that Alexander was bent on expansion in Europe overlooks the many things he did that pulled the opposite way. With a combination of threats and persuasion, he forced Prussia from the path of aggrandizement in Poland and onto that of cooperation with Austria. He re-

sisted repeated appeals from the smaller German states for an anti-Austrian alliance—a move that he believed would be inimical to the interests of the general peace. Finally, he continually urged Russians to respect Turkish interests in the Balkans and especially in Greece. The fact is that Alexander was a committed moderate statesman who happened to believe what he said, and what he said illustrates a point often forgotten by historians and political scientists—that there is a place in the international system for principles and moral values.

See also: NAPOLEON I; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF

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DAVID WETZEL

HOLY SYNOD

The governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church from 1721 to 1917.

On January 25, 1721, Peter the Great formally established an Ecclesiastical College to rule and reform the Russian Orthodox Church. This new governing body was renamed the Most Holy Governing Synod at its first session in February and replaced the former office of Patriarch, which had been in abeyance since the death of the last incumbent, Adrian, in 1700. The creation of the Synod, modeled after the state-controlled synods of the Lutheran church, was an integral part of Peter's wider program for the reform of Russia's secular administrative and military machine, a program aimed at improving efficiency, eradicating abuses, and, above all, increasing the Sovereign's control of revenue.

The Synod was entrusted with the administration of all church affairs. A governing statute called the Ecclesiastical Regulation was written by Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich, with amendments by Peter. According to the statute, the Synod was to

have twelve clerical members appointed by the tsar, although in practice there were always fewer. Despite the powers granted by the statute, ecclesiastical authority was effectively reduced in 1722 when Peter created the office of over-procurator to oversee the Synod. The over-procurator was to be a lay official whose chief duty was to be the Sovereign's "eye," to "ensure that the Synod does its duty." In theory the Synod was meant to be equal to its secular counterpart, the Senate, but in reality ecclesiastical government had very little autonomy and was firmly subordinate to the tsar. Collegial administration guaranteed the Sovereign firmer control over the church than patriarchal administration had allowed, and removed the challenge to the tsar's authority that a patriarch had represented.

Despite the formal recognition of the Synod in 1723 by four Eastern patriarchs, Russian clergy resented the abolition of Russia's patriarchate, the domination of the Synod by Peter's handpicked foreign clergy, and the interference in church affairs by the over-procurator. Nonetheless, attempts to restore the patriarchate after Peter's death in 1725 failed. Instead, the office of over-procurator (in abeyance from 1726) was restored in 1741, gaining exclusive access to the tsar in 1803. From 1824 the over-procurator exercised effective authority over all aspects of church administration and held ministerial rank. The best-known incumbent, Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev (1880–1905), was able to wield far-reaching influence during his procuratorship.

After the election of the First Imperial Duma in 1905, deputies began to voice concern over the Synod's subservience to the procurator and tsar, but only after Nicholas II's abdication could steps be taken to restore the autonomy of the church. In July 1917 the Provisional Government abolished the post of over-procurator and invited the Synod to call elections to a council to decide the future of church administration. In November 1917 a council of 564 delegates reestablished the patriarchate and elected Metropolitan Tikhon of Moscow as Patriarch of All Russia, thus bringing to an end Peter the Great's system of Synodal governance.

See also: ORTHODOXY; PETER I; POBEDONOSTSEV, KONSTANTIN

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DEBRA A. COULTER

HOMELESS CHILDREN

Homeless children, or *besprizorniki*, constituted one of the most vexing social problems facing the new Soviet state, caused by cumulative effects of World War I (1914–1917), the Russian Revolution and Civil War (1918–1921), and cold, hunger, and disease, which claimed the lives of millions of parents. The catastrophic famine of 1921 and 1922 produced millions of additional orphaned and abandoned children. Divorce, single motherhood, unemployment, and economic dislocation pushed surviving children out on the streets. By 1922, historian Alan Ball estimates, there were seven million homeless children in Russia.

These homeless children represented a profound crisis for the Bolshevik government. They roamed the country alone and in groups, often following rail arteries to Moscow, Rostov-on-the-Don, Samara, Saratov, Tashkent, and other cities. Seemingly omnipresent waifs begged for food in train stations and other public places. Most resorted to stealing, petty crimes, and prostitution. The state sent children to special homes (*detdoma*), long-term boarding institutions run by the Commissariat of Enlightenment (Narkompros). Initially intended to offer programs capable of instilling in the waifs an instinct for the collective and preparing them to join the ranks of the proletariat, these children's homes were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of homeless children. Many children's homes lacked food and heat and were rife with dysentery, scurvy, and syphilis. Countless children escaped from these institutions, preferring to take their chances on the streets. Labor communes, most notably the secret police's Dzerzhinsky Labor Commune run by Anton Makarenko, sought to rehabilitate young delinquents and met with mixed success.

Convinced that socialized child rearing was an impossible ideal, the state, beginning in 1925, shifted its focus back to the family as the basic unit for social structure. The 1926 Family Code emphasized the family as a unit for effecting social

change rather than the state; thousands of besprizorniki left state-funded children's homes and were adopted. By 1927 besprizorniki were considered less a pedagogical than a social problem stemming from the breakdown of the Soviet family. Increasingly, the state relied on punishment rather than pedagogy to clear the streets of besprizorniki, ordering militia sweeps of the children in the 1930s. The problem of homeless children did not go away; collectivization and the famine of 1932 and 1933 produced another wave of homeless children. Most of these besprizorniki were placed in children's homes and special schools for young delinquents. The number of homeless children continued to increase during times of severe social strain, notably World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union, though not on the scale that the country witnessed in the 1920s.

See also: FAMILY CODE OF 1926

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JACQUELINE M. OLICh

HONOR AND DISHONOR *See* BESCHESTIE.

HRUSHEVSKY, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH

(1866–1934), prominent Ukrainian historian and statesman.

In 1890 Mikhail Hrushevsky graduated from Kiev University, where he studied under Volodymyr Antonovych. In 1894 he was appointed to the newly created chair of Ukrainian history at Lviv University (at the time, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire). While in Lviv, Hrushevsky reorganized the Shevchenko Scientific Society (est. 1873) into an equivalent of a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,

founded new scholarly journals, and established his school of Ukrainian history. After the 1905 Revolution Hrushevsky lived in St. Petersburg and Kiev, where he became increasingly involved in liberal politics. In Kiev he founded the Ukrainian Scientific Society (1907), as well as a cluster of journals and newspapers. Arrested and exiled to eastern Russia during World War I, Hrushevsky emerged after the February Revolution as a recognized leader of moderate Ukrainian nationalists. In March 1917 he was elected president of the Central Rada (Council), which eventually developed into a Ukrainian parliament. During the Revolution Hrushevsky moved to the left and joined the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, which had a majority in the Rada. On the last day of its existence, April 29, 1918, the Rada elected Hrushevsky president of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Hrushevsky lived abroad after 1919, but returned to Soviet Ukraine in 1924 and soon resumed his role as the dean of Ukrainian historians. But the authorities increasingly criticized his scholarship as nationalistic and in 1931 transferred him to Moscow. By the time of his death in 1934, his school in Soviet Ukraine was destroyed by arrests and condemnations. Hrushevsky's main scholarly achievement is his monumental *History of Ukraine-Rus'* (10 vols., 1898–1937) covering the period until 1658. He also authored several short surveys of Ukrainian history and a five-volume *History of Ukrainian Literature*. Rejecting the history of state formations in favor of the history of the people, Hrushevsky criticized traditional Russian historical models and was influential in claiming Kievan Rus as a part of Ukrainian history. In contrast to Hrushevsky's denigration by the Soviet ideologues as a bourgeois nationalist, in post-Soviet Ukraine Hrushevsky is lauded as the nation's greatest historian and statesman.

See also: UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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SERHY YEKELCHYK

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights are the rights individuals are said to have as human beings. They are claims on society—its members and government (Henkin, 1996). They are spelled out in international law, drawing on the norms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (Steiner and Alston, 2000). Russia has a long history of authoritarian rule and human rights abuses. Nikolai Berdyayev went so far as to connect the depth and longevity of Russian communism, a system inimical to human rights, to this persistent culture of despotism (1960). In the vivid phrasing of Alexander Radishchev, an eighteenth-century dissident, in his *Journey from Saint Petersburg to Moscow* (which landed him in Siberia), the rigid censorship under Catherine the Great resembled a restrictive nursemaid who stunts children's growth toward self-reliant maturity.

Human rights improved somewhat thanks to the liberating effects of Russia's rapid industrialization after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the judicial and local government reforms in 1864. In Tsarist Russia by 1914, a liberal and democratic socialist professional class of educators, lawyers, judges, social workers, women's rights advocates, and rapidly growing and mainly non-Bolshevik political parties increasingly demanded the protection of individual rights and a law-governed state. That meant broadening the selective westernization, launched two hundred years earlier by Peter the Great and aimed at strengthening Russia, to include the rights and freedoms he and his successors generally sought to exclude.

Following the abdication of Nicholas II in March 1917, the Provisional Government of March–November 1917 produced what the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin himself called the freest country in Europe, before he and his minority party of Bolsheviks forcibly ended that freedom by sharply curbing human rights.

The Bolsheviks socially cleansed Russia's reformed courts, democratic professionals, and growing autonomous civil society. They held Russia to the constitutional principles that rights must serve the cause of socialism as interpreted by the Communist Party. Vladimir Lenin's death in 1924 opened the way to the consolidation of total power by Josef Stalin, his forced collectivization of the peasants, his five-year plans for heavy industrialization, and his purges of alleged enemies of the people.

The cultural thaw after Stalin's death in March 1953 ended with the ousting of Party leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Ensuing trials of social satirists and critics sparked a courageous dissident movement in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Its members, who were promptly imprisoned or exiled, included Andrei Sakharov, proponent of East-West convergence; Yuri Orlov and the Moscow Helsinki Group; and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, chronicler of Soviet labor camps.

Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet leader from March 1985 to December 1991, introduced *glasnost*—openness or free expression—and soon after, *perestroika*—attempts at economic and political reform. Gorbachev freed political prisoners and exiles between 1986 and 1989. His UN speech of December 7, 1988, praised the once spurned Universal Declaration of Human Rights and revised the 1977 Constitution accordingly. But he reformed too little too late. Four months after his near-overthrow in the August 1991 coup by his own reactionary appointees, the Soviet Union split into three once-again independent Baltic republics and twelve newly independent states, including the Russian Federation.

Boris Yeltsin, Russian president from 1991 until his resignation in 1999, forced on Russia the 1993 Constitution increasing presidential power but also containing Article 2: "The individual and his rights and freedom are the highest value. The recognition, observance and defense of the human rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen are the obligation of the state." The Constitution proclaims a broad range of civil, political, social, and economic rights. Contrasting realities under overbearing and corrupt state administrations infringed on freedom of expression, religion, fair and humane justice, freedom of movement, and freedom from racial, ethnic, and homophobic bigotry, and hate crimes. Moreover, during the wars to retain Chechnya just about every human right was violated. Inequality, poverty, and homelessness haunted the land while the new rich lived high. Women experienced inequality and exploitation in employment, widespread divorce, abandonment, and domestic violence, and trafficking into prostitution. Life expectancy fell to third-world levels, especially among men, owing to stress, accidents, alcoholism, and the pervasive inadequacy of health care (Juviler, 2000; Human Rights Watch).

Such political and social human rights violations prompted the formation of numerous free but under-funded human rights advocacy groups—

nongovernmental organizations. They ranged from Russian Soldiers' Mothers, who were against the wide abuses of military recruits, to the anti-Stalinist and pro-rights Memorial Society, to Muslim cultural and aid societies.

Seventy years of Communist social and legal cleansing are not overcome in a decade or two. In Ken Jowitt's words, "We must think of a 'long march' rather than a simple transition to democracy" (Jowitt, 1992, 189), with all sorts of human rights to redeem.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GULAG; SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH; SOLZHENITSYN, ALEXANDER ISAYEVICH

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PETER JUVILER

HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern Europe and the first shooting war to occur between socialist states. In contrast to earlier uprisings after the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in March 1953, such as the workers' revolt in East Berlin (1953) and the Polish workers' rebellion in Poznan, Poland (October 1956), the incumbent Hungarian leader, Imre Nagy, did not summon Soviet military troops to squelch the revolution. Instead, he attempted to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. Hence,

the Hungarian revolution symbolizes perhaps the first major "domino" to fall in a process that ultimately resulted in the Soviet Union's loss of hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1989.

When Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, delivered his Secret Speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, he not only exposed Stalin's crimes, but also presented himself as a proponent of different paths to socialism, a claim that would later prove hard to fulfill. All over Eastern Europe, hardline Stalinist leaders wondered fearfully how far destalinization would go. Meanwhile, their opponents, who criticized Stalinist policies, suddenly gained in popularity. In Hungary, Nagy was one such critic and reformer. He had served as Hungary's prime minister from July 4, 1953, to April 18, 1955. In the spring of 1955, however, Nagy was dislodged by a hard-line Stalinist leader, Mátyás Rákosi, who had been forced to cede that post to Nagy in mid-1953.

Social pressures continued to build in Hungary under the leadership of Rákosi, called Stalin's "best disciple" by some. He had conducted the anti-Yugoslav campaign in 1948 and 1949 more zealously than other East European party leaders. Hundreds of thousands of Hungarian communists had been executed or imprisoned after 1949. By late October 1956 the popular unrest in Hungary eluded the control of both the Hungarian government led by Rákosi's successor, Ernő Gerő, and the USSR.

On October 23, 1956, several hundred thousand people demonstrated in Budapest, hoping to publicize their sixteen-point resolution and to show solidarity with Poland where, in June, an industrial strike originating in Poznan turned into a national revolt. The Budapest protesters demanded that Nagy replace Gerő, the Hungarian Communist Party's first secretary from July 18 to October 25, 1956. Fighting broke out in Budapest and other Hungarian cities and continued throughout the night.

It is now known that Soviet leaders decided on October 23 to intervene militarily. Soviet troops executed Plan *Volna* ("Wave") at 11:00 P.M. that same day. The next morning a radio broadcast announced that Nagy had replaced András Hegedüs as prime minister. On October 25, János Kádár, a younger, centrist official, replaced Gerő as first secretary. However, this first Soviet intervention did not solve the original political problem in the country. New documents have revealed that the Kremlin initially decided on October 28 against a



Russian tanks and armored vehicles surround the Hungarian parliament building in Budapest. © HULTON ARCHIVE

second military intervention. But on October 31, they reversed course and launched a more massive intervention (Operation *Vikhr*, or “Whirlwind”). During the night of November 3, sixteen Soviet divisions entered Hungary. Fighting continued until mid-November, when Soviet forces suppressed the resistance and installed a pro-Soviet government under Kádár.

See also: HUNGARY, RELATIONS WITH; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH;

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

HUNGARY, RELATIONS WITH

Russian and Soviet relations with Hungary, in contrast to those with other east central European countries, have been especially tense due to factors such as Hungary’s monarchical past, historical rivalry with the Russians over the Balkans, Russia’s invasion of Hungary in 1848, Hungary’s alliances in both world wars against Russia or the USSR, the belated influence of communism in the interwar period, the Soviet invasion in 1956 to crush the nationalist revolution, and Hungary’s vastly different language and culture in general.

No part of Hungary had ever been under direct Russian rule. Instead, Hungary formed part of the Habsburg Empire, extending over more than 675,000 square kilometers in central Europe. Both empires—the tsarist and Habsburg—fought for hegemony over Balkan territories. The Habsburg empire included what is now Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, as well as parts of present-day Poland, Romania, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In July 1848 the Hungarians, led by Lajos Kossuth, fought for liberation from Austria. However, upon the Austrians' request in 1849, Tsar Nicholas I sent Russian troops to crush the rebellion. Nevertheless, Kossuth's initiative paved the way for the compromise in March 1867 (known in German as the *Ausgleich*), which granted both the Austrian and Hungarian kingdoms separate parliaments with which to govern their respective internal affairs. It also established a dual monarchy, whereby a single emperor (Francis Joseph I) conducted the financial, foreign, and military affairs of the two kingdoms.

By the late 1800s and early 1900s, ethnic groups within the empire clamored for self-rule. On June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a member of a secret nationalist movement, Mlada Bosna ("Young Bosnia"), shot Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo, thus precipitating World War I. Austro-Hungary fought with Germany against Great Britain, France, and Russia. Throughout the fall of 1918 the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed as its armies retreated before enemy forces.

On March 21, 1919, Béla Kun established a communist regime in Hungary that lasted four months. Given their monarchical past, Hungarians resented communists, who seized their farms and factories and sought to form a stateless society. After a brief transition, Admiral Miklós Horthy became Regent of Hungary, heading a new monarchy that lasted twenty-five years.

Defeated in World War I, Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its territory in the 1920 peace settlement ("Treaty of Trianon"). In 1914 Hungary had 21 million inhabitants; Trianon Hungary had less than 8 million. German Nazi leader Adolf Hitler was able to coax Hungary to fight on the Axis side in World War II by promising the return of some of the territory Hungary lost in 1920. Despite its gradual alliance with Germany and Italy against the Soviet Union in the war, the German army

(Wehrmacht) occupied Hungary on March 19, 1944. Hitler put Ferenc Szálasi (leader of the fascist Arrow Cross Party) in charge as prime minister. By mid-April 1945, however, the Soviet Red Army expelled the Germans from Hungary. The Soviet troops remained in Hungary until 1990.

Another element of Hungary's particularly anti-Soviet history is the belated influence of communism in the interwar period. While most other East European countries turned authoritarian after 1935, Hungary remained relatively liberal until 1944. After a short democratic period, the Communist Party took over in 1948. The Hungarian Communist Party never did win an election, but gained control due to the presence of Soviet troops and their hold over government posts. Its first secretary was Matyás Rákosi, a key figure in the international communist movement who had returned with other Hungarian communists from exile in the Soviet Union. These include Imre Nagy (later prime minister during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956) and József Révai who became the key ideologist in the 1950s. Other communists remained in Hungary and organized the Communist Party illegally during the war, such as János Kádár (who became general secretary after 1956) and László Rajk (the first key victim of the purges in 1949).

The Soviet Union also established its hegemony over Eastern Europe in commercial and military spheres. In 1949 Stalin had established the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (CMEA or Comecon) to counter President Truman's Marshall Plan, which Stalin prevented Hungary and other East European countries from joining. In Comecon the member states were expected to specialize in particular industries; for example, Hungary focused on bus and truck production.

The East European satellites were expected to copy the Stalinist model favoring heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods. In doing so, Rákosi's economic plans contradicted Hungary's genuine interests, as they required the use of obsolete Soviet machinery and old-fashioned methods. Unrealizable targets resulted in a flagrant waste of resources and the demoralization of workers.

Meanwhile, fearing a World War III against its former ally, the United States, the Soviet leadership encouraged the Hungarian army to expand. Having failed to prevent West Germany's admission into NATO, the USSR on May 14, 1955, established

the Warsaw Pact, which subordinated the satellites' armies to a common military command. Austria was granted neutrality in the same year. In 1956 the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern Europe—the Hungarian Revolution—took place. It is not surprising that Hungary, given its history, culture, and language (a non-Slavic tongue, Magyar), was the first satellite to challenge Moscow directly by declaring neutrality and withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.

Despite the restlessness of the population after the crushed revolution and the repression of 1957–1958, Kádár's regime after normalization differed sharply from Rákosi's style of governance. Kádár's brand of lenient ("goulash") communism earned grudging respect from the Hungarian people. Kádár never trumpeted his moderate New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of 1968 as a socioeconomic model for other satellites, lest he irritate Moscow.

Hungary's overthrow of its Communist regime in 1989–1990 and independence today prove that the nationalist spirit of the revolution was never extinguished. The Soviet collapse in 1991 led to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. In March 1999 NATO admitted Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic as members.

See also: HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

HUNS

The Huns (the word means "people" in Altaic) were a confederation of steppe nomadic tribes, some of whom may have been the descendants of the Hsiung-nu, rulers of an empire by the same name in Mongolia. After the collapse of the Hsiung-nu state in the late first century C.E., the Huns migrated westward to Central Asia and in the process mixed with various Siberian, Ugric, Turkic, and Iranian ethnic elements. Around 350, the Huns migrated further west and entered the Ponto-Caspian steppe, from where they launched raids into Transcaucasia and the Near East in the 360s and 370s. Around 375, they crossed the Volga River and entered the western North Pontic region, where they destroyed the Cherniakhova culture and absorbed much of its Germanic (Gothic), Slavic, and Iranian (Sarmatian) ethnic elements. Hun movement westward initiated a massive chain reaction, touching off the migration of peoples in western Eurasia, mainly the Goths west and the Slavs west and north-northeast. Some of the Goths who escaped the Huns' invasion crossed the Danube and entered Roman territories in 376. In the process of their migrations, the Huns also altered the linguistic makeup of the Inner Eurasian steppe, transforming it from being largely Indo-European-speaking (mainly Iranian) to Turkic.

From 395 to 396, from the North Pontic the Huns staged massive raids through Transcaucasia into Roman and Sasanian territories in Anatolia, Syria, and Cappadocia. By around 400, Pannonia (Hungary) and areas north of the lower Danube became the Huns' staging grounds for attacks on the East and West Roman territories. In the 430s and 440s, they launched campaigns on the East Roman Balkans and against Germanic tribes in central Europe, reaching as far west as southern France.

The Huns' attacks on territories beyond the North Pontic steppe and Pannonia were raids for booty, campaigns to extract tribute, and mercenary fighting for their clients, not conquests of their wealthy sedentary agricultural neighbors and their lands. Being pastoralists, they wielded great military powers, but only for as long as they remained in the steppe region of Inner Eurasia, which provided them with the open terrain necessary for their mobility and grasslands for their horses. Consequently, Hun attacks west of Pannonia were minor, unorganized, and not led by strong leaders until Attila, who ruled from about 444 or 445 to 453. However, even he continued the earlier Hun practice of viewing the Roman Empire primarily as a source of booty and tribute.

Immediately after Attila's sudden death in 453, the diverse and loosely-knit Hun tribal confederation disintegrated, and their Germanic allies revolted and killed his eldest son, Ellac (d. 454). In the aftermath, most of the Huns were driven from Pannonia east to the North Pontic region, where they merged with other pastoral peoples. The collapse of Hun power can be attributed to their inability to consolidate a true state. The Huns were always and increasingly in the minority among the peoples they ruled, and they relied on complex tribal alliances but lacked a regular and permanent state structure. Pannonia simply could not provide

sufficient grasslands for a larger nomadic population. However, the Hun legacy persisted in later centuries. Because of their fierce military reputation, the term "Hun" came to be applied to many other Eurasian nomads by writers of medieval sedentary societies of Outer Eurasia, while some pastoralists adopted Hun heritage and lineage to distinguish themselves politically.

See also: CAUCASUS; CENTRAL ASIA; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

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ICONS

Icons are representations, usually on wood, of sacred figures—Christ and the Virgin Mary, the apostles, saints, and miraculous events. The Greek term *eikon* (Russian, *obraz*) denotes “semblance,” indicating that the icon does not incarnate but only represents sacred objects. As such it serves to facilitate spiritual communion with the sacred; the distinctive two-dimensional flatness symbolizes an immateriality and hence proximity to the otherworldly. In rare cases this mediating role reaches miraculous proportions when the faithful believe that a “miracle-working” (*chudotvornaya*) icon has interceded to save them from harm, such as the depredations of war and disease.

The evolution of icons in Russia paralleled the development of Eastern Orthodoxy itself. Initially, after Grand Prince Vladimir embraced Eastern Orthodoxy in 988, icons were produced by Greek masters in Byzantium; few in number, they were restricted to the urban elites that actually practiced the new faith. The most venerated icon in Russia, the “Vladimir Mother of God,” was actually a twelfth-century Greek icon imported from Constantinople. Revered for its representation of the Virgin’s tender relationship to Christ, it became the model of the *umilenie* (tenderness) style that dominated Marian representation in most Russian iconography.

The Crusades from the West and the Mongol invasion from the East suddenly disrupted the Byzantine predominance in the mid-thirteenth century. The new indigenous icons showed a marked tendency toward not only simplification but also regionalization. As Kiev Rus dissolved into separate principalities under Mongol suzerainty, icon-painting acquired distinctive styles in Vladimir-Suzdal, Novgorod, Pskov, Yaroslavl-Rostov, Tver, and Moscow. Some icons also bore a distinctive local theme, such as the “Battle between the Novgorodians and Suzdalians,” a mid-fifteenth century icon with unmistakable overtones for Novgorod’s life-and-death struggle with Moscow.

The evolution of icon painting also derived from external influences. One phase began with the resumption of ties to Byzantium in the mid-fourteenth century and culminated in the icons and frescoes of Theophanes the Greek (c. 1340–after 1405). His indigenous co-workers included the most venerated Russian icon-painter, Andrei Rublev (c. 1360–1430), whose extant creations include the



celebrated “Trinity” icon. A second phase came in the late fifteenth century, when Italian masters—imported to construct an awe-inspiring Kremlin—helped introduce some Western features (for example, the clothing and gestures of the Virgin). That was but a foreshadowing of the far greater Western influence in the seventeenth century, when the official icon-painting studios in the Kremlin Armory (under Simon Ushakov, 1626–1686) used Western paints and techniques to produce more naturalistic, monumental icons. Such innovations elicited sharp criticism from traditionalists such as Archpriest Avvakum, but they heralded tendencies ever more pronounced in Imperial Russia.

Even as Moscow developed an official style, the production of icons for popular consumption became much more widespread. The Church Council of 1551 complained about the inferior quality of such images and admonished painters not to “follow their own fancy” but to emulate the ancient icons of “the Greek icon-painters, Andrei Rublev, and other famous painters.” That appeal did nothing to stem the brisk production of popular icons, with some small towns (e.g., Palekh, Kholuy, Shuya, and Mstera) gaining particular renown. Popular icons were not only simpler (indulging fewer details and fewer colors), but also incorporated folkish elements alien to both traditional Byzantine and newer official styles. Although authorities sought to suppress such icons (e.g., a 1668 edict restricting the craft to certified icon-painters), such decrees had scant effect.

Indeed, both popular and elite icon-painting continued to coexist in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Popular icons flourished and proliferated; while some centers (such as the specialized producers in Vladimir province) exhibited artistic professionalization, the expanding production of amateur icons aroused the concern of both Church and state. But attempts to regulate the craft (e.g., decrees of 1707 and 1759) did little to restrict production or to dampen demand. A far greater threat eventually came from commercialization—the manufacture of brightly colored, cheap lithographs that pushed artisanal icons from the marketplace in the late nineteenth century. Seeking to protect popular icon painting, Nicholas II established a Committee for the Stewardship of Russian Icon Painting in 1901, which proposed a broad set of measures, such as the establishment of icon-painting schools to train craftsmen and to promote their work through special exhibitions.

Icon production for elites took a quite different path. After Peter the Great closed the icon-painting studio of the Armory in 1711, its masters scattered to cities throughout the realm to ply their trade. By the late eighteenth century, however, the Academy of Arts became the main source of icons for the major cathedrals and elites. By the mid-nineteenth century the Academy had not only developed a distinct style (increasingly naturalistic and realistic) but also significantly expanded its formal instruction in icon painting, including the establishment of a separate icon-painting class in 1856.

At the same time, believers and art connoisseurs showed a growing taste for ancient icons. By mid-century this interest began to inspire forgeries as well as orders for icons in the old style. The meaning of that old style underwent a revolutionary change in the early twentieth century: As art restorers peeled away the layers of paint and varnish applied in later times, they were astonished to discover that the ancient icons were not dark and somber, but bright and clear. The All-Russian Congress of Artists in 1911 held the first exhibition of restored icons; the new Soviet regime would devote much attention to the process of restoration.

While placing a high priority on icon restoration, the Soviet regime repressed production of new icons: It closed traditional ecclesiastical producers (above all, monasteries), and redirected popular centers of icon production such as Palekh to specialize in secular folk art. Although Church workshops continued to produce icons (by the early 1980s more than three million per year—an important source of revenue), not until 1982 did the Church establish an elite patriarchal icon-painting studio. The subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union not only generated a sharp surge in demand (from believers and reopened churches), but enabled the Church to establish a network of icon-painting schools specifically devoted to the revival of traditional iconography.

See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; DIONISY; ORTHODOXY; PALEKH PAINTING; RUBLEV, ANDREI; THEOPHANES THE GREEK; USHAKOV, SIMON FEDOROVICH

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GREGORY L. FREEZE

IDEALISM

The debates regarding Russia's national identity and historical destiny were always vital to the work of the prominent Russian thinkers, who were also preoccupied with moral issues and closely involved with literature. Due to its location between Europe and Asia, Russia belongs to both cultural worlds, having inherited different and often contradictory value standards that played a significant role in the course of its history. This marginal cultural situation of the country resulted in two competing approaches to its role in world history: national isolationism and openness to Europe, both trends still present in the national consciousness. During the Kievan Rus period, affiliation with Europe was a strong feature of culture. The Tatar invasion and the development of the Moscow Kingdom generated a strong tide of alienation from the West. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the Moscow Kingdom was the proclaimed "the third Rome" (by monk Filotius)—the vanguard force in world history inheriting the grandeur of the Roman Empire and at the same time opposed to the declining West. Peter the Great made a radical attempt to bridge the gap between Russia and the West by assimilating European values and life standards on Russian soil. However, his attempt to create a new cultural synthesis brought about contradictory results: superficial reception of the Western standards in economic, social, political, and cultural spheres on the one hand, and reinforcement of traditional non-European Russian values on the other. As Nikolai Berdyayev noted, Russia never knew the Renaissance and never accepted the humanism and individualism produced within this cultural paradigm. Although European civilization created the disciplinary society (Michel Foucault) in the modern period, it preserved the sphere of individual rights and liberties that was gradually expanding in parallel with rational standards of social control and coercion. Communal and authoritarian tendencies of Russian culture had no real counterbalance in personal values such as those commonly accepted in Europe. Even in the period of Russian Enlightenment that started under Catherine II, the critical ef-

forts of such leading intellectuals as Nikolai Novikov, Mikhail Shcherbatov, or Alexander Radishchev did not bring radical change to tsarist rule and the prevailing cultural climate of the country.

The understanding of national history throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was considerably influenced by the Enlightenment, German idealism, and the philosophy of Romanticism. Whatever their value systems, Russian thinkers of the first part of the nineteenth century interpreted history in view of the tragic events of the French Revolution and Napoleon's invasion of Russia. This is the reason why, as Vasily Zenkovsky pointed out, Russian thinkers were highly critical of the results of Western historical development. The structure of Russian thought from the Enlightenment to the beginning of the twenty-first century was based on binary oppositions lacking synthetic reconciling units. Oppositions deeply embedded in Russian thought included communitarianism and democracy versus imperial autocracy; egalitarianism versus social hierarchy; progress versus traditionalism; and so forth. The deficiency of synthesis of contradictions inherent in Russian thought constitutes its difference from the Western intellectual paradigm.

RUSSIA AND THE WEST: THE DILEMMA OF NATIONAL SELF-IDENTITY

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Westernized Russian thought found its expression in two different trends: the moderate conservatism of historian and writer Nikolai Karamzin, who defended autocracy of the Catherine II variety against the chaos of the French Revolution, and the Decembrist movement, which idealized the democratic traditions of Novgorod and Pskov republics and intended to put constitutional limits on the autocracy of the tsar. Famous poet Alexander Pushkin (according to Berdyayev, the only Russian man of the Renaissance) vigorously supported the ideas of the Decembrists. At the opposite pole, Vladimir Odoyevsky, Dmitry Venevitinov, and other members of the Wisdom-lovers society, who represented the anti-Enlightenment trend and were convinced followers of Schelling, believed in the leading role of Russia and its mission to save European civilization. Although Pyotr Chaadayev's thought was also nourished by Schelling and other representatives of German idealism, he took a more critical approach to Russia. According to Chaadayev, Russia lacked a true heritage of historical tradition and should therefore assimilate the European cultural

legacy before assuming a leadership role in tackling humanity's problems.

These discussions evolved into the debate of the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. Despite their criticism of serfdom and the existing political order, Ivan Kireyevsky, Alexei Khomyakov, Konstantin Aksakov, and other Slavophiles, highly disparaging of Catholicism and Protestantism, European individualism, and the rationalist culture of the Enlightenment, proclaimed the necessity of finding a particularly Russian path of cultural and political development. While critical of the West, German idealism, and Hegelian doctrine as its utmost expression, the Slavophiles were nevertheless nourished conceptually by Schelling's philosophy. They believed in the superiority of Russian civilization based on the Russian Orthodox vision of the unity of human and God, the special harmonic order of relations existing among the believers (*sobornost*), and the peasant commune organization of social life as a paradigm of organic relations that should replace the external coercion of state power.

In contrast to the Slavophiles, the Westernizers believed in the productive role of humanity's rational development and progress, the positive significance of the modernization process initiated by Peter the Great, and the necessity to unify Russia with the European West. Unlike the Slavophiles, this movement had no homogeneous philosophy and ideology, representing rather a loose alliance of different trends of literary and philosophical thought that were strongly influenced by German idealism and, in particular, by Hegel. Radical democrats, such as Vissarion Belinsky, Alexander Herzen, or Nikolai Ogarev, proposed ideas that differed from the liberal persuasions of Timofei Granovsky, Konstantin Kavelin, and Boris Chicherin. Moderate criticism of the European West and nascent mass society, common to many Westernizers, found its utmost expression in the peasant socialism of Herzen and Ogarev, who, like the Slavophiles, idealized the peasant commune as a pattern of organic social life needed by Russia.

Nikolai Chernyshevsky and other revolutionary democratic enlighteners of the 1860s, who further developed the Westernizers' ideas while upholding the value of the communal foundations of Russian peasant society, paved the way for the radical populist ideology of Pyotr Lavrov, Pyotr Tkachev, and Mikhail Bakunin and the liberal populism of Nikolai Mikhailovsky. Radical populist ideology influenced the Russian version of Marxism considerably. The "return to the soil" move-

ment, headed by Fyodor Dostoevsky, Nikolai Strakhov, and Apollon Grigoriev, was a reaction to this trend of thought. In the 1870s, Nikolai Danilevsky developed his philosophical theory of historical-cultural types inspired by the ideal of Pan-Slavic unity with the leadership of Russia. Skeptical of both the Pan-Slavic ideal and the contemporary stage of European liberal egalitarian society, Konstantin Leontiev proposed, in his version of the conservative theory of historical-cultural types, the ideal of Byzantinism preserving the communal and hierarchical traditional foundations of Russian culture and society in isolation and opposition to the liberal-individualistic European West.

THE SEARCH FOR THE UNIVERSAL VISION OF HISTORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century were marked by the growing popularity of Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Leo Tolstoy, and Vladimir Soloviev in Russian intellectual circles. As one of the prophets of his time, Tolstoy, in the tradition of Rousseau, put forward a criticism of industrial civilization and state power in the capitalist age and proposed his utopian ideal of Christian anarchism glorifying the archaic peasant way of life as a radical denial of the existing social order and alienation. Based on the ideas of Plato and the neo-Platonists Leibniz and Schelling, Soloviev's doctrine of absolute idealism interpreted history as a field of human creativity, a realization of Godmanhood—that is, the permanent cooperation of God and human. In his philosophy of history, Soloviev moved from the understanding of Russia's role as the intermediary link between the East and West to the ideal of theocratic rule unifying the Church power (the pope) with earthly rule of the Russian tsar, and finally came to a profound criticism of theocratic rule. On the final stage of his philosophical career, he gave a very critical evaluation of the autocratic tradition of the Moscow Kingdom and the Russian Empire that became the source of inspiration for Dmitry Merezhkovsky, Nikolai Berdyayev, Vyacheslav Ivanov, and other Silver Age religious philosophers who revealed the negative traits of the alliance between the Orthodox Church and the State and called for the free creativity of religious laymen in order to bring about radical change in Russian social and cultural life.

After the Bolshevik Revolution the majority of prominent Russian thinkers had to migrate abroad. Berdyayev, Georgy Fedotov, and Merezhkovsky continued there the tradition of the philosophy of

history based on the idea of unity of Russia and Europe. At the opposite pole, national conservative isolationism found its expression in the works of Pyotr Alexeyev, Pyotr Bicilli, Nikolai Trubetskoy, Pyotr Savitsky, Lev Karsavin, and other representatives of the Eurasian movement. The liberal and conservative nationalist visions of Russian history are still present in contemporary thought. The liberal paradigm coined by Andrei Sakharov was preserved in the writings of Yegor Gaidar, Boris Fyodorov, Grigory Yavlinsky, and others. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's vision of Russian history based on Berdyayev's legacy is moderately conservative, while Alexander Dugin and other neo-Eurasians form the extreme right wing, advocating an isolationist nationalist approach to Russia's past and present.

See also: BERDYAYEV, NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH; CHAADAYEV, PETER YAKOVLEVICH; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH; KARAMZIN, NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH; LOVERS OF WISDOM, THE; SLAVOPHILES; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH; WESTERNIZERS

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BORIS GUBMAN

IGOR

(d. 945), second grand prince of Kiev, who, like his predecessor Oleg, negotiated treaties with Constantinople.

Igor, the alleged son of Rurik, succeeded Oleg around 912. Soon after, the *Primary Chronicle* reports, the Derevlyane attempted to regain their independence from the prince of Kiev. Igor crushed the revolt and imposed an even heavier tribute on the tribe. In 915, when the Pechenegs first arrived in Rus, Igor concluded peace with them, but in 920 he was forced to wage war. After that, nothing is known of his activities until 941 when, for unexplained reasons, he attacked Byzantium with 10,000 boats and 40,000 men. His troops ravaged the Greek lands for several months. However, when the Byzantine army returned from Armenia and from fighting the Saracens, it destroyed Igor's boats with Greek fire. In 944 Igor sought revenge by allegedly launching a second attack. When the Greeks sued for peace, he conceded, sending envoys to Emperor Romanus Lecapenus to confirm the agreements that Oleg had concluded in 907 and 911. The treaty reveals that Igor had Christians in his entourage. They swore their oaths on the Holy Cross in the Church of St. Elias in Kiev, while the pagans swore their oaths on their weapons in front of the idol of Perun. In 945 the Derevlyane once again revolted against Igor's heavy-handed measures; when he came to Iskorosten to collect tribute from them, they killed him. His wife, the esteemed Princess Olga from Pskov, then became regent for their minor son Svyatoslav.

See also: GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; PECHENEGS; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; RURIKID DYNASTY

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MARTIN DIMNIK

ILMINSKY, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(1822–1891), professor of Turkic Languages at Kazan University and lay Russian Orthodox missionary, known as “Enlightener of Natives.”

Nikolai Ilminsky gave up a brilliant academic career to devote himself to missionary work among

the non-Russians. He was convinced that only through the mother tongue and native teachers and clergy could the nominally baptized and animists become true Russian Orthodox believers and thus resist conversion to Islam. This conviction was at the heart of what became known as the "Ilminsky System."

In 1863, while still holding the chair of Turkic languages at both Kazan University and Kazan Theological Academy, Ilminsky established the Kazan Central Baptized-Tatar School, which served as his showcase and model for non-Russian schools and whose thousands of graduates spawned numerous village schools. In 1867 Ilminsky founded the Gurri Brotherhood, which supported the growing network of native schools, and set up the Kazan Translating Commission. By 1891 the Commission had produced 177 titles in over a dozen languages; by 1904 the Commission had produced titles in twenty-three languages. For most of the languages, this required the creation of alphabets, grammars, primers, and dictionaries. Starting with the baptized Tatars of the Kazan region, Ilminsky's activities extended to the multinational Volga-Ural area, to Siberia, and to Central Asia. But disciples carried his system further: Ivan Kasatkin, for example, founded the Orthodox Church of Japan.

Ilminsky's system encountered strong opposition from Russian nationalists who saw in the Russian language the "cement of the Empire" and feared that his approach encouraged national self-esteem among the minorities. Yet by demonstrating the fervent piety of his students and above all stressing that the alternative was defection to Islam, he was able to obtain the backing of powerful figures in the government and the Church, including Konstantin Pobedonostev. Ilminsky even became a quasi-official advisor on nationality affairs and as such promoted strict censorship, unfavorable appointments, and restrictive laws for Muslims and Buddhists.

The impact of Ilminsky's system on preliterate nationalities was revolutionary, as these peoples, equipped with a written language and the beginnings of a national intelligentsia, experienced a national awakening. Such national leaders as the Chuvash Ivan Yakovlev and the Kazakh Ibrai Altynsarin were Ilminsky's disciples and protégés, while Lenin's father worked closely with Ilminsky in promoting non-Russian education in Simbirsk Province. This may explain why Lenin's nationality policy, summarized as "national in form, socialist in content" was remarkably similar to

Ilminsky's system, which was defended by his supporters as "national in form, Orthodox in content."

See also: EDUCATION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; TATARSTAN AND TATARS

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ISABELLE KREINDLER

IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION

To paraphrase the nineteenth-century historian of Russia, Vasily Klyuchevsky, the history of Russia is the history of migration. The Kievan polity itself was founded by Varangian traders in the ninth century, then populated by the steady migration and population growth of Slavic agriculturalists. By the sixteenth century the attempt to control population movement became one of the most important tasks of the Muscovite state. Serfdom (i.e., elimination of the right of peasants to move from one lord to another) was entrenched in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries by the tsars of Muscovy in order to ensure that their servitors could feed their horses and buy sufficient weaponry. Serfdom's logic led to an elaborate system of controls over movement within the country and of course precluded any possibility of legal emigration for the vast majority of the population. The Muscovite polity also developed mechanisms to prevent the departure of its servitors and elites. Peasant flight—often to join the Cossacks in border regions—was not a negligible phenomenon, and there were several exceptional mass emigrations. Most notable was the departure of an estimated 400,000 Crimean Tatars, Nogai, and Kalmyks in the late eighteenth century after the annexation of their lands by the Russian Empire, and another mass emigration in the 1850s and 1860s of Adygs, Cherkess, Nogai, and others after the completion of the conquest of the Caucasus. But regular yearly emigration did not occur on a significant scale until the 1860s.



Russian Jewish exiles arrive in New York City. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

Thus it would be logical to link the first appearance of steady yearly emigration with the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. But this relationship is not so clear. Of the four million emigrants from the Russian Empire from 1861 to 1914, less than 3 percent were Russians. The vast majority were Jews and Germans, neither of which had been under serfdom. It was probably not serfdom so much as the commune, with its systems of collective responsibility and partible inheritance, that kept emigration figures so low for Russians. A massive emigration of Germans began in the 1870s in reaction to the abolition of their exemption from military conscription and continued due to the increasingly serious shortage of fertile lands in the Russian Empire as a result of population growth. Nearly 1.5 million Jews emigrated from 1861 to 1914, both in reaction to ongoing government repression and pogroms and in order to take advantage of civic equality and economic

opportunities available in the United States and elsewhere. The sudden and massive increase in emigration also had a great deal to do with the transportation revolution, which brought cheap railroad and steamship tickets, making intercontinental travel possible for those of modest means.

While the tsar selectively recruited and encouraged immigrants from Europe to serve as soldiers, technicians, architects, and engineers on a fairly extensive scale by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the second half of the eighteenth century was the heyday of immigration to the Russian Empire. Inspired by physiocratic notions that the population is the fundamental source of wealth, and eager to populate the vast, fertile, untilled southern steppe that they had conquered, empresses Elizabeth and Catherine created very favorable conditions for immigrants in the mid-eighteenth century. These included free grants of land, permanent exemption from military service, temporary

exemption from taxes, and even a degree of religious freedom. The result was a rapid and massive immigration that slowed only in the mid- to late nineteenth century as the amount of free land declined. By the late nineteenth century, as a result of rapid population growth after the emancipation of the serfs, a shortage of land led the regime to reverse its encouragement of immigration and impose some serious restrictions upon it.

Immigration did not take place on a major scale at any period under Soviet rule. While technical experts were recruited from the West in the 1930s, and workers came to the Soviet Union in relatively small numbers in the 1920s, and then again in the 1950s, on the whole, immigration was remarkably small in scale throughout the entire Soviet period.

Likewise, emigration was illegal throughout the Soviet era, and it occurred on a significant scale only on an exceptional basis. During the Civil War, before the Bolsheviks established firm control over the entire territory of the state, a major emigration of political opponents of the regime and others occurred. By some estimates roughly 2 million people left from 1918 to 1922. The next major exodus occurred as a result of World War II, which left millions of Soviet civilians and soldiers as displaced peoples in areas occupied by Russia's allies. Millions were returned after the war—often against their will—as a result of allied agreements. But at least a half million were able to emigrate permanently.

The next major wave of emigration came in the 1970s when Soviet Jews were allowed to leave in relatively substantial numbers. While only about 10,000 Soviet Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1970, an average of 22,800 emigrated per year from 1971 to 1980. Soviet Jewish emigration was sharply curtailed in the 1980s, but when restrictions were first eased in 1988 and then effectively removed in 1990, a mass emigration of roughly a million Jews occurred. Soviet German emigration followed a similar pattern, though fewer Germans were allowed to emigrate prior to 1988. A mass emigration of nearly 1.5 million Soviet Germans, encouraged by the German policy of automatically granting citizenship (and generous access to welfare and public services), occurred from 1988 to 1996. In the 1990s economic difficulties led to large emigrations of Russians and other groups as well. This wave of emigration began to slow by the end of the 1990s, but it remained important and a matter of concern at the beginning of the twenty-first century, especially considering the continuing high rates of emigra-

tion among well-educated and highly trained young people.

See also: DEMOGRAPHY; GERMAN SETTLERS; JEWS; NATIONALITIES POLICY, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICY, TSARIST

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ERIC LOHR

IMPERIAL RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY

Legend holds that the idea for the Russian Geographical Society (RGS) arose at a dinner party thrown by A. F. Middendorf in St. Petersburg in 1845. Middendorf had just returned from his famous expedition to Eastern Siberia. He, along with Fyodr Litke, Karl Ber, and Ferdinand Wrangel, conceived the society, which ultimately attracted seventeen charter members, including the most prominent Russian explorers, scientists, and public officials of their day. The goal was systematically to expand and quantify the understanding of their country, which was still relatively unknown. Geographical societies elsewhere in the world (England, France, Prussia, and so on) were mainly concerned with general geography, whereas homeland geography (*domashnyaya geografiya*) was for them secondary. The early founders of the RGS thus were leading proponents of the nationalist reform-minded movement that perfused Russia in the mid-1800s. The emphasis would be upon Russia's special place in the world: its diversity of climates, languages, customs, peoples, and so forth.

Although, early on, members wished to call it the "Russian Geographical-Statistical Society," on August 18, 1845, Tsar Nicholas I declared that it would be named the "Russian Geographical Society"; this remained the official name for the next five years. In October 1845, the majority of the charter members held their first meeting and selected 51 active members from throughout Russia. After 1850 the society was renamed the Imperial Russian Geographical Society (*Imperatorskoye russkoye geograficheskoye obshchestvo* [IRGS]), an appellation that would persist until 1917.

Almost immediately after its founding, the RGS became a polestar for opponents of Nicholas I. It became one of the ideological centers of the struggle against serfdom and had direct links to Russian utopian socialists, such as the Petrashevsky Circle. Its titular leader was the tsar's second son, Grand Prince Constantine, who represented the most "progressive" (i. e., nationalistic) ideas of that time. Within the society, conflict arose between the largely non-Russian founders (the Baltic Germans) and the ethnically pure Russian contingent. Throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, the IRGS stressed Russia's messianic mission in Asia, and most of the society's sponsored expeditions, including the famous Amur expedition of 1855–1863, were indeed carried out in Asia. By 1917 the IRGS had compiled a legacy of 1,500 volumes of scholarly literature.

See also: GEOGRAPHY; RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY

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VICTOR L. MOTE

IMPERIAL RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

In the era before the revolution, the Imperial Russian Technical Society (IRTS) was the most important and oldest technical organization in Russia. Founded in 1866 in St. Petersburg on the model of similar societies across Europe, it brought together scientists, engineers, and other people interested in promoting technological development. Subsidized by the Ministry of Public Education, the Ministry of Finances, and other government agencies, and by industry, it focused on inventions and the application of technology in order to further the development of Russia's manufacturing and production industries and foster the country's overall industrial and economic growth. Headed by scientists such as chemist Dmitry I. Mendeleev and military engineer and chemist Count Kochubei, IRTS

encouraged greater cooperation between government and the world of science, technology, and industry.

The members of IRTS were concerned about the output of Russia's weak private sector and felt that the technology policy of the tsarist state was inadequate, especially in the military sphere. This view was confirmed by the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), and in fact it was not until then that the government began to encourage IRTS in its support of aviation. World War I provided IRTS with another opportunity to demand greater state support for scientific and technological research.

From the outset IRTS was strongly committed to the dissemination of technical education, favoring the polytechnic model at the university level rather than specialized institutes, because students in schools of the former type would be more creative and flexible in their future jobs. In addition to technical schools and special classes, it conducted night schools for adults. It also tried to popularize technological development by organizing a technical library, a technical museum, and an itinerant museum, and by publishing science books for technical schools. As early as 1867 IRTS started publishing a magazine, *Notes from the Imperial Russian Technical Society (Zapiski IRTS)*, and organizing meetings on technical subjects and on technical and professional training. Finally, it distributed awards and medals in support and reward of inventions and research and applications in the field of technology.

IRTS was a national organization and had a network of correspondents throughout Russia. Starting in the 1860s it had offices in many provinces. By 1896 there were twenty-three of these, some of which published their own magazines. In 1914 IRTS had two thousand members, four times as many as when it began. The Russian Technical Society continued its activities until 1929, when it was eliminated on the grounds that it was an organization of bourgeois specialists.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; MENDELEYEV, DMITRY IVANOVICH; MOSCOW AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

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MARTINE MESPOULET

INDEX NUMBER RELATIVITY

The period of the first Five-Year Plans and the rapid collectivization of Soviet agriculture, 1929–1937, witnessed rapid economic growth accompanied by radical changes in the structure of the Soviet economy—first, from a predominantly agricultural towards an industrial one, and second, within industry, from a predominantly smaller-scale economy of light and consumer industries, to heavy industry, machinery, construction, and transportation. The vast expansion and mass production of heavy manufacturing goods reduced their cost of production, relative to those of light industry and of agricultural products. This phenomenon of simultaneous changes in the structure of production and relative prices during periods of rapid economic growth in the Soviet context was discovered and analyzed by Alexander Gerschenkron when he estimated the rate of economic growth of Soviet manufacturing during this period. Growth of the national product (GNP) of a country is estimated by a quantity index, aggregating the growth of production of individual sectors by assigning to each sector a "weight" corresponding to the average price of the products of this sector at a certain point of time during the period under investigation. It has been demonstrated that when the relative prices of the expanding sector are declining, as in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, the index produces a much higher rate of growth when prices of the initial period are used as weights than the index that uses prices at the end of the period. The first is called a Laspeyres index and the second a Paasche index, both named after their developers. Under the Laspeyres index, relatively higher prices, and hence

larger weights, are assigned to faster growing sectors, thus producing a higher aggregate rate of growth, and vice versa. Hence the term "index number relativity."

One commonly quoted calculation of the two indexes for the period 1928 to 1937 is Abram Bergson's: According to his estimates Soviet GNP grew over that period by 2.65 times according to the Laspeyres variant but only by 1.54 times according to the Paasche index (1961, Table 18, p. 93). The two measures apparently present two very different views on the achievements of the Soviet economy during this crucial period, as well as on the estimates of economic growth over the longer run. However, since both are "true," they must be telling the same story. One commonly used "solution" to dealing with this relativity was to use the (geometric) average of the two estimates. An alternative was to replace both measures by a Divisia index (also named after its developer) that calculates growth for every year separately using prices of that year as weights, and then add up all growth rates for the entire period. The outcome is usually not far away from the average of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes. Subsequent estimates of Soviet GDP growth over this period offered a variety of amendments to the original ones; some among them narrowed the gap between the two indices. During the rest of the Soviet period, the second half of the twentieth century, index number relativity did not play an important role, mostly because the major structural changes were accomplished already before World War II.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; FIVE-YEAR PLANS

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GUR OFER

INDICATIVE PLANNING

As distinct from directive planning, as practiced in the Soviet Union from 1928 onward, indicative planning is a set of consistent numerical projections

of the economic future without specific incentives for their fulfillment. Rather, the indicative plan is conceived as coordinated information that guides the choices of separate entities in the market economy.

The first indicative plans were those made up by Gosplan in the USSR during the mid-1920s. These were soon integrated into mandatory instructions issued by the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh), later by Gosplan itself. The output plans were supplemented by material balances, inspired by German experience during World War I and generalized as input-output analysis in the work of Wassily Leontief and others.

During and immediately after World War II economists in Continental Europe developed the idea of indicative planning as a guide to recovery and to ongoing short-term economic policy making. Notable were the Central Planning Bureau in the Netherlands, led by Jan Tinbergen, the French Commissariat Général du Plan, inspired by Jean Monnet, and the Japanese Economic Planning Agency. In all of these, government agencies play a role in collecting and developing the information necessary to build a multi-sectoral econometric model. Such a model allows alternative policy instruments to be tested for their effects on such targets as inflation, the growth rate, and the balance of payments. While indicative planning assumes a primarily private market economy with competition from outside the country, the *concertation* (unofficial collusion) of private investment plans—as practiced in France and Japan—is supposed to avoid duplication of effort, increase investment volumes, and perhaps reduce cyclical instability. Japanese and French bureaucrats have also guided investment funds from state-controlled sources into favored projects. In practice, however, it is doubtful that indicative planning has had much positive influence on the economic performance of these economies, particularly as they opened themselves up to international trade and capital flows.

Communist Yugoslavia adopted a kind of indicative planning in the 1950s. The main purpose was to guide the distribution of capital to self-managed enterprises throughout the republics of that country. After the fall of Communism, indicative planning was also adopted in Poland. The theoretical basis for indicative planning in a socialist context was developed by Janos Kornai and his coauthors, but practice never conformed to such rational schemes.

Indicative planning should be distinguished from so-called “indirect planning,” embodied in the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary in 1968 and contemplated by Soviet reformers of the late 1980s. Instead of establishing a mixed or regulated market economy, as in Western Europe, the Communist authorities continued to dominate the economy through investment and supply planning, as well as subsidies. In both Hungary and Gorbachev’s Russia, a weak budget constraint on wages and other costs led to inflationary pressure and shortages, along with rising external debts. These problems contributed to the collapse of indirect planning.

See also: GOSPLAN; INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

INDUSTRIALIZATION

The concept of industrialization implies the movement of an economy from a primarily agricultural basis to a mixed or industrial/service basis with an accompanying increase in output and output per capita. Although the early stages of industrialization require systemic and policy measures to steer resources into the productive process, eventually the growth of output must be generated through the growth of productivity. During the process of successful industrialization, measurement of the importance of the agricultural and industrial sectors, characterized for example by output shares in GDP, will indicate a relative shift away from agricultural production towards industrial production along with the sustained growth of total output. The analysis of these changes differs if cast within the framework of neoclassical economics (and its variations) as opposed to the Marxist-Leninist framework. Much of our analysis of the Russian economy during the Tsarist era and the subsequent events of the Soviet era have focused on the process of industrialization under varying institutional arrangements, policy imperatives, and especially changing ideological strictures.

To the extent that Lenin and the Bolshevik Party wished to pursue the development of a socialist and ultimately a communist economic system after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the relevant issue for the Bolshevik leadership was the degree to which capitalism had emerged in pre-revolutionary Russia. Fundamental to industrialization in the Marxist-Leninist framework is the development of capitalism as the engine of progress, capable of building the economic base from which socialism is to emerge. Only upon this base can industrial socialism, and then communism, be built. From the perspective of classical and neoclassical economic theory, by contrast, the prerequisites for industrialization are the emergence of a modern agriculture capable of supporting capital accumulation, the growth of industry, the transformation of population dynamics, and the structural transformation of the Russian economy placing it on a path of sustained economic growth.

While there is considerable controversy surrounding the events of the prerevolutionary era when cast in these differing models, the level of economic development at the time of the Bolshevik revolution was at best modest, and industrialization was at best in early stages. From the standpoint of neoclassical economic theory, structural changes taking place were consistent with a path of industrialization. However, from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, capitalism had not emerged. The relevance of disagreements over these issues can be observed if we examine the abortive period, just after the Revolution of 1917, of War Communism. While indeed an attempt was made during this period to move towards the development of a socialist economy, these efforts contributed little, if anything, to the long-term process of industrialization.

Although during the New Economic Policy (NEP) a number of approaches to industrialization were discussed at length, the outcome of these discussions confirmed that ideology would prevail. The Marxist-Leninist framework would be used, even in a distorted manner, as a frame of reference for industrialization, albeit with many institutional arrangements and policies not originally part of the ideology. While the institutional arrangements based upon nationalization and national economic planning facilitated the development and implementation of socialist arrangements and policies, priority was placed nonetheless on the rapid accumulation of capital, a part of the process of industrialization that should have occurred during the

development of capitalism, according to Marx. Thus, while an understanding of the elements of Marxism-Leninism is useful for the analysis of this era, most Western observers have used the standard tools of neoclassical economic theory to assess the outcome.

During the command era (after 1929), industrialization was initially rapid, pursued through a combination of command (nonmarket) institutions and policies within a socialist framework. The replacement of private property with state ownership facilitated the development of state institutions, which, in combination with command planning and centralized policy-making, ensured a high rate of accumulation and rapid expansion of the capital stock. In effect, the basic components of industrialization traditionally emerging through market forces were, in the Soviet case, implemented at a very rapid pace in a command setting, effectively replacing consumer influence with plan prerogatives. The pace and structural dimensions of industrialization could, with force, therefore be largely dictated by the state, at least for a limited period of time. Private property was eliminated, national economic planning replaced market arrangements, and agriculture was collectivized.

For some, the emergence of Soviet economic power and its ultimate collapse presents a major contradiction. While there is little doubt that a major industrial base was built in the Soviet Union, it was built without respect for basic economic principles. Specifically, because the command economy lacked the flexibility of market arrangements and price messages, resources could be and were allocated largely without regard to long-term productivity growth. The command system lacked the flexibility to ensure the widespread implementation of technological change that would contribute to essential productivity growth. Finally, and significantly, the socialization of incentives failed, and the consumer was largely not a part of the industrial achievements. Even the dramatic changes of perestroika during the late 1980s were unable to shift the Soviet economy to a new growth path that favored rational and consumer-oriented production.

Industrialization in the post-1990 transition era was fundamentally different from that of earlier times. First, the ideological strictures of the past were largely abandoned, though vestiges may have remained. Second, to the extent that the command era led to the development of an industrial base in-

appropriate for sustaining long term economic growth and economic development, the task at hand became the modification of that industrial base. Third, the modification of the industrial base required the development of new institutions and new policies capable of implementing necessary changes that would place the contemporary Russian economy on a long-term sustainable growth path. It is this challenge that separated the early stages of industrialization from the process of industrialization during transition, since the latter implies changes to an existing structure rather than the initial development of that structure.

The process of industrialization is necessarily modified and constrained by a variety of environmental factors. In the case of Russia, those environmental factors should be largely positive insofar as Russia is a country of significant natural wealth and human capital.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, RAPID; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

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ROBERT C. STUART

INDUSTRIALIZATION, RAPID

Soviet growth strategy was focused on fast growth through intensive industrialization. It involved the self-development of an industrial base, concentrated in capital goods or “means of production,” also dubbed “Sector A” according to Marxian jargon. It became the official strategy of the Soviet leadership as a resolution of the Soviet Industrialization debate that occupied communist thinkers and politicians during the mid-1920s. The industrialization debate considered two growth strategies. One, supported by moderates and led by Nikolai Bukharin, advocated an extension of the New Economic Policy (NEP), centered on industrialization but based on the initial development of agriculture, mostly by individual and independent

farmers. A prospering agricultural sector would create demand on the part of both consumers and producers for industrial goods, as well as surplus resources in terms of savings, to finance this industrialization. While all sectors of manufacturing would be developed, surplus agricultural products would be used as exports in order to import machinery and technology from the West. Advocates of the alternative strategy, including leaders of the left such as Leon Trotsky, preferred a more rapid state-led industrialization drive, concentrated in large state-owned heavy industrial enterprises financed by forced savings, extracted from collectivized (thus supposedly more productive) agriculture and from the population. While machinery and technology would be imported, the main thrust would be to build an indigenous heavy industrial base and early self-sufficiency in all industrial goods, and more autarky. The high level of forced savings would minimize consumption and hence provide for higher rate of investment, faster growth, and a relatively smaller “Sector B” of consumer goods and light industry; in contrast with a normal path of early development of light and consumer goods industries, followed by gradual move toward the production of machinery and capital goods. The more radical variant was also more consistent with Marxian doctrine and teaching.

Josef Stalin used the industrialization debate as a leverage to gain control, first by siding with the moderates to oust Trotsky and his followers, and then by ousting the moderates and adopting an even more extreme variant of forced industrialization. Other motivations for his choice of the heavy industrialization route were the Soviet Union’s rich endowment of natural resources (coal, iron ores, oil, and gas), and the need (facing external threats), or desire, to develop a strong military capability.

This strategy guided the industrialization drive throughout, with only some easing off toward the end of the Soviet period. The 1930s were characterized by the construction of a large number of giant industrial, power, and transportation projects that involved moving millions of people to new and old cities and regions. This was also the period when collectivized agriculture was expected to provide surplus products and resources to feed the growing industrial labor force and to export in exchange for modern technology. Students of the period differ on the extent to which this really happened, and some claim that most of the extracted surplus through food procurements had to

be reinvested in machinery and other inputs needed to make the new collective and state farms work. With the increasing threat of war toward the end of the 1930s, manufacturing became more oriented toward military production. Much of the industrial effort during the war years was directed toward the production of arms, but it was also characterized by a gigantic transfer of many hundreds of enterprises from the western parts of the USSR eastward to Siberia and the Far East in order to protect them from the advancing German army. This transfer happened to be consistent with an explicit goal of the regime to develop the east and northeast, the main concentration of natural resources, an effort that was facilitated over the years through the exploitation of millions of forced labor workers.

The rate of industrial growth in the Soviet Union was higher than that of agriculture and services, and the share of industry in total output and in the labor force increased over time as in any developing country. Except that in the Soviet Union these trends were stronger: The gaps in favor of industry were wider, also due to the deliberate constraint on the development of the service sector, considered nonproductive according to Marxian doctrine. Thus the share of industrial output in GNP climbed to more than 40 percent in the 1980s, significantly above the share in other countries of similar levels of economic development. The share of industrial labor was not exceptionally high due to the concentration of capital and of labor-saving technology. This over-industrialization, including noncompetitive industries, even some creating negative value, was recognized in the 1990s as a drag on the ability of former Communist states to adjust to a normal market structure and an open economy during the transition. The autarkic policy of industrialization pursued over most of the Soviet period contributed to a technological non-compatibility with the West, which further hurt the competitiveness of Soviet industry.

The bias of Soviet industrialization toward Sector A of investment and capital, as well as military goods, is apparent in the internal structure of industry. The share of Sector A industry grew fast to almost half of total industry and stayed at approximately that level throughout the entire period. It was also estimated that during the 1970s and 1980s military-related production occupied a substantial share of the output of the machine-building and metalworking sector as well as more than half the entire activities of research and de-

velopment. The development of consumer and light industry ("Sector B," under Marxian parlance) was not only limited in volume; it also suffered from a low priority in the planning process and thus from low quality and technological level. "Sector A" industries, including the major military sector, enjoyed preferential treatment in the allocation of capital and technology, of high-quality labor resources and materials, and of more orderly and timely supplies. Hence some of the technological achievements in the spheres of defense and space. Hence also the very high costs of these achievements to the economy at large and to Sector B consumer industries in particular, which were characterized by low-quality and lagging technology, limited assortment, and perennial shortages. This policy of priorities also explains the very limited construction resources allocated to housing and to urban development, causing housing shortages, as well as the very low production of private cars and (to a lesser extent) household appliances. The biased structure of industry became also a serious barrier for restructuring under the transition.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION

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GUR OFER

INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

The industrialization of the Soviet Union proceeded at a rapid pace between the two World Wars, starting in 1929. Within an historically short period of twelve to fifteen years, an economically backward agrarian country achieved rapid economic growth, created a more modern industrial sector, and acquired new technologies that changed it from an agrarian to an industrial economy.

At the turn of the century Imperial Russia was lagging behind its neighbors to the west in practically all aspects of economic development. Weakened by World War I and the civil war that followed, Russia was in ruins in 1918. The Communist Party that seized power after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 initially proclaimed a world revolution as its goal. The first socialist revolution occurred in Russia, the weakest link among the world capitalist states. However, later failures to propagate communist rule in Germany, Hungary, and Poland demonstrated that the export of revolution required not an ideological dogma, but a powerful economy and military might. Both required powerful industry.

Soviet industrialization was organized according to five-year plans. The first five-year plan was launched by the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1928. It was designed to industrialize the USSR in the shortest possible time. The plan, put into action ruthlessly, aimed to make the USSR self-sufficient and emphasized heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods. The first plan covered the period from 1928 to 1933 but was officially considered completed in 1932, although its achievements were greatly exaggerated. One objective of the plan was achieved, however: the transformation of agriculture from predominantly individual farms into a system of large collective farms. The communist regime thought that the resources for industrialization could only be squeezed out of agriculture. Moreover, they believed that collectivization would improve agricultural productivity and produce sufficient grain reserves to feed the growing urban labor force caused by the influx of peasants seeking industrial work. Forced collectivization also enabled the party to extend its political dominance over the peasantry, eliminating the possibility of resurrection of market relations in agriculture. The traditional Russian village was destroyed and replaced by collective farms (*kolkhoz*) and state farms (*sovkhos*), which proved to be highly inefficient.

Although the first five-year plan called for the collectivization of only 20 percent of peasant households, by 1940 some 97 percent of all peasant households had been collectivized, and private ownership of property was virtually eliminated in trade. Forced collectivization helped Stalin achieve his goal of rapid industrialization, but the human costs were huge. Stalin focused particular hostility on the wealthier peasants or kulaks. Beginning in 1930 about one million kulak households (some five million people) were deported and never heard from again. Forced collectivization of most of the remaining peasants resulted in a disastrous disruption of agricultural production and a catastrophic famine in 1932 and 1933 in Ukraine, one of the richest agricultural regions in the world, which exacted a toll of millions of lives. The rationale for collectivization in the Soviet Union, with all of its negative consequences, was its historic necessity in communist terms: Russia had to engage in rapid industrialization in order to create a massive heavy industry and subsequently powerful modern armed forces.

The second five-year plan (1933–1937) continued and expanded the first, albeit with more moderate industrial goals. The third plan (1938–1942) was interrupted by World War II. The institution of the five-year plan was reinforced in 1945, and five-year plans continued to be published until the end of the Soviet Union.

From the very beginning of industrialization, the Communist Party placed the main emphasis on the development of heavy industry, or, as it was called in the Soviet literature, “production of means of production.” Metallurgical plants that included the whole technological chain from iron ore refining to furnaces and metal rolling and processing facilities were constructed or built near the main coal and iron ore deposits in Ukraine, the Ural Mountains, and Siberia. Similarly, production plants for aluminum and nonferrous metals were constructed at a rapid pace. Electric energy supply was ensured through the construction of dozens of hydroelectric and fuel-operated power stations; one of them, a Dnieper plant, was canonized as a symbol of Soviet industrialization. Railroads and waterways were modernized and built to ensure uninterrupted flow of resources. Automobile and aviation industries were built from scratch. Whole plants were purchased in the West, mostly from the United States, and put in operation in the Soviet Union. Stalingrad Tractor Plant and Gorki Automotive Plant began production in the early

1930s. Many American engineers were lured by promises of high wages to work at those plants and contributed to a rapid technology transfer to Russia.

New weapon systems were developed and put into production at the expense of consumer goods. On the eve of World War II the Red Army had more than twenty-three thousand tanks—six times more than Fascist Germany. Similar ratios applied for artillery, aircraft, navy vessels, and small arms. Substantial resources were materialized and frozen in the stockpiles of weapons. Nonetheless, World War II did not begin according to Stalin's plans. The USSR was unprepared for Hitler's invasion.

During the first period of war a substantial portion of the European territory was lost to Germany. During the second half of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, industrial facilities were relocated to the east (beyond the Volga river and the Urals) from European Russia, Central and Eastern Ukraine (including major industrial centers of Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoy Rog, Mariupol and Nikopol, Donbass), and the industrial areas of Moscow and Leningrad; this relocation ranks among the most difficult organizational and human achievements of the Soviet Union during World War II. The industrial foundation laid between 1929 and 1940 proved sufficient for victory over Fascist Germany in World War II.

See also: INDUSTRIALIZATION; INDUSTRIALIZATION, RAPID

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PAUL R. GREGORY

INORODTSY

Any non-Slavic subject of the Russian Empire, such as Finns, Germans, or Armenians.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the term *inorodtsy* carried pejorative overtones. First used in a legislative project of 1798, the word was given a precise legal definition by a legal statute of 1822. Here it was used to refer to groups of Rus-

sian subjects for whom the fundamental laws of the Empire were deemed inappropriate and who therefore required a special, protected status. While under the protection of the state, they would be gradually "civilized," becoming more like the settled Russian population. Initially applied to peoples living in Siberia, the category also came to include newly-annexed peoples of Middle Asia (Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen), some of whom had a long tradition of permanent settlement and high culture.

With the exception of the Jews, the inorodtsy were indigenous peoples who inhabited areas of Siberia and Central Asia. (Thus, the common translation of this term in English as "aliens" is misleading; "natives" might better convey what the term implied to Russian colonizers.) They included the Kyrgyz; the Samoyeds of Archangel province; the nomads of Stavropol province; the nomanic Kalmuks of Astrakhan and Stavropol provinces; and the Kyrgyz of the Internal Hordes of Middle Asia (the regions of Akmolin, Semipalatinsk, Semirech, and the territory beyond the Ural mountains).

The Statute on the Inorodtsy of 1822, associated with Mikhail Speransky's enlightened administration of Siberia, sought to protect the traditional hunting and grazing areas of native peoples from encroachment by Russian settlers. The Statute placed all inorodtsy into one of three categories: settled, nomadic, and wandering hunter-gatherer-fishermen. Each category received special prerogatives and levels of protection thought appropriate for its level of culture and its economic pursuits. The inorodtsy were permitted local self-administration, which included police duties, administration of justice (based on customary law), and the collection of taxes in money or in kind, as appropriate. Administration was placed in the hand of the local elites, generally tribal elders and chieftains.

With a few exceptions, such as some groups of Buryats, inorodtsy were generally exempted from military service. The military reform of 1874 began to erode this privilege. A Bashkir cavalry squadron was created in Orenburg province in 1874, while in the 1880s a growing number of native peoples in Siberia were subject to some form of service. Some groups were permitted to substitute service with a monetary tax, while others were recruited on an individual basis, with the assurance that they would be assigned to specific regiments. An attempt, announced on June 25, 1916, to end the tradition of a general exemption from military service of many Middle Asian peoples and to draft

390,000 inorodtsy into the army for support duties, triggered a vast anticolonial revolt in Middle Asia, which was put down with great brutality.

Jews were included in the category of inorodtsy by a statute of 1835. This categorization was entirely anomalous. The general tendency of Russian legislation towards the Jews was to promote their *sliyanie* (merger) with the non-Jewish population, yet their designation as inorodtsy placed them in a special, unique category. All other inorodtsy received special privileges and exemptions as a result of this status, while for the Jews it was a vehicle for the imposition of liabilities. The inorodtsy of Siberia in particular were viewed as living at a lower cultural level, as followers of animistic, pagan belief systems. (Many of the inorodtsy of Middle Asia were Muslims.) The Jews, in contrast, were adherents of a "higher" religion. Most inorodtsy were in the eastern regions of the Empire; the Jews were resident in the Russian-Polish borderlands; indeed, they were largely barred from settlement in those areas where most inorodtsy were to be found. The most distinctive privileges of the inorodtsy were their own institutions of government, and exemption from military service; the Jews were made liable for military service in 1827, and the autonomous Jewish community, the *kahal*, was abolished in 1844. There was an ethnic component of inorodets status, since any inorodets who converted from paganism to Christianity retained all the rights and privileges of an inorodets; Jewish converts to Christianity lost the legal status of "Jew" and the disabilities that it carried. Nonetheless, this bizarre anomaly endured until the demise of the Russian Empire, when the Provisional Government not only granted full equality to the Jews, but also abolished all special legislation for the inorodtsy.

See also: JEWS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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JOHN D. KLIER

INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS

Input-output analysis is a methodology for investigating production relations among primary factors, intersectoral flows, final demands, and transfers. Primary and intermediate factors are the "inputs," and final demands and transfers are the "outputs." Aggregate input values equal "gross national income" and aggregate output "gross domestic product." Consequently, input-output is best conceptualized as a map, or flowchart, of intersectoral activities that underlie the standard aggregate measures of national income and product. It permits analysts to quantify precisely and assess the matrix of intersectoral relationships, often hidden or overlooked in more aggregative methodologies. Sometimes this serves an informative purpose. For example, Soviet leaders suppressed data on the USSR's military-industrial production level, and the delivery of weapons to final demand, but this information was contained in its input-output tables, and could be ferreted out by Western scholars and intelligence agencies in principle. Input-output tables also shed light on the internal consistency of Soviet statistics. If these data were a patchwork, either of truths or lies, latent inconsistencies should be visible in the flow relationships.

Soviet economists were concerned with the latter application of the technique, and viewed input-output analysis as a useful adjunct to "materials balance" planning. Gosplan (the state planning agency) constructed its plans from the late 1920s onward on a sector-by-sector basis, taking inadequate account of intersectoral dependencies. Soviet input-output tables, first introduced for 1959, provided a sophisticated check, enabling planners to discern whether adjustments were required in specific instances to their simpler procedures.

The construction of input-output tables is a laborious task that could not be completed swiftly enough to displace material balancing as the method of choice for developing annual and five-year plans. Nonetheless, it did serve as a valuable tool for perspective planning. The great strength of the methodology was its lucid theoretical foundation, which permitted analysts to grasp the hidden assumptions affecting the reliability of their forecasts.

Wassily Leontiev, Nobel Laureate and the father of input-output analysis, hypothesized that production technologies for practical purposes could be conceived as approximately linear homogeneous functions, with constant returns to scale, and rectangular isoquants, even though he knew that this would not always be true. The working assumption implied that both “socialist” and “capitalist” economies were strongly determined by their technological structure (supply side economics) because factor proportions were fixed and could not be altered by competitive negotiations. Nor did planners and entrepreneurs have to fret about diminishing returns to proportional investment, because a doubling of all inputs would always result in a doubling of output. Some economists contended before the demise of communism that this strong determinism proved that markets were superfluous, but this is no longer fashionable. During the early twenty-first century input-output in post-Soviet Russia serves primarily as a guide to indicative perspective planning, that is, a tool used by policy makers to evaluate various development scenarios. Whereas it once was an adjunct to material balance planning, it became a tool for managing market-based development.

See also: GOSPLAN

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STEVEN ROSEFIELDE

INSTITUTE OF RED PROFESSORS

The Institute of Red Professors (*Institut Krasnoy professury*, or IKP) was founded by government decree on February 11, 1921, in order to train a new gen-

eration of Marxist cadres for careers in education and elsewhere in the Party, state, and scientific establishment. Along with the Communist Academy, the IKP was launched as an alternative to the “bourgeois” Academy of Sciences and universities that the Bolsheviks had inherited from the old regime. Headed between 1918 and 1932 by Mikhail Pokrovsky, the IKP was formally affiliated with the Commissariat of the Enlightenment. In practice it was also subordinate to the party’s Central Committee—specifically, the Politburo, Orgburo, Secretariat, and department of agitation and propaganda.

At its launch the IKP was designed to be an interdisciplinary body. But by 1922 it had been divided into three departments—history, economics, and philosophy—that were augmented in 1924 by a preparatory program for less-qualified students. Four more departments were added in 1928 that concerned party history, law, literature, and the natural sciences. After an abortive merger with the Communist Academy between 1930 and 1931, the IKP was broken up into separate institutes devoted to history, Communist Party history, economics, philosophy, and the natural sciences. These divisions, in turn, were quickly flanked by six more institutes after the IKP assumed responsibility for the Communist Academy’s graduate program in 1931.

Although the IKP was initially designed to be an elite institution of the red intelligentsia, it was transformed in the mid-1920s by repeated reorganizations, the dismissal of former Trotskyites and Mensheviks, and ongoing efforts to proletarianize the IKP community as a whole. Personal ambition and the turbulence of the so-called cultural revolution between 1928 and 1932 further divided the IKP. Although wholly Marxist, the faculty and student body split repeatedly along generational, class, and educational lines during these years. These tensions led faculty and students to seek positions elsewhere, a trend encouraged by the Sovietization of the universities and the Academy of Sciences that was underway at this time. Indeed, the Stalinist cooption of these educational institutions—facilitated by a merciless purge of the old bourgeois professorate—left the IKP without a clear mandate and ultimately led to its closure in 1938.

Over the course of its existence, the IKP was frequented by both party officials and Marxist scholars. Some of the most prominent among them included Vladimir Adoratsky, Andrey Bubnov, Nikolai Bukharin, Abram Deborin, Sergey Dubrovsky,

Emilian Yaroslavsky, Bela Kun, Nikolai Lukin, Anatoly Lunacharsky, Vladimir Nevsky, Mikhail Pokrovsky, Yevgeny Preobrazhensky, Karl Radek, Leon Trotsky, Yevgeny Varga, and Vyacheslav Volgin. IKP graduates who went on to serve in prominent positions in party, state, and scientific institutions included Grigory Alexandrov, Isaak Mints, Mark Mitin, Militsa Nechkina, Anna Pankratova, Boris Ponomarev, Pyotr Pospelov, Nikolai Rubinshtein, Arkady Sidorov, Mikhail Suslov, Pavel Yudin, and Nikolai Voznesensky.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; COMMUNIST ACADEMY; EDUCATION

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DAVID BRANDENBERGER

INSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF CATHERINE II

In July of 1767 the Legislative Commission met in Moscow and was presented with Catherine II's *Instructions*. The lengthy *Instructions* (twenty chapters and 526 articles) were intended to guide the work of the Commission as they came together to discuss the grievances of their electors and the nature of government and the laws in Russia. The *Instructions* borrowed heavily from writers such as Baron de Montesquieu (*The Spirit of the Laws*), Cesare Beccaria (*An Essay on Crimes and Punishments*), William Blackstone (*Commentaries on the Laws of England*), and Baron Bielfeld (*Political Institutions*), as well as from Catherine's correspondence with such enlightenment thinkers as Voltaire and Diderot.

The *Instructions* themselves were neither a law code nor a blueprint for a constitution (as some historians have claimed), but rather a kind of guide as to the type of government and society Catherine hoped to mold in Russia. Catherine may have been inspired by Frederick II of Prussia, who had also promulgated his own visions as to the proper role of the monarch and the organization of the bureaucracy; when Catherine finished writing and

editing her *Instructions*, she sent a German translation to Frederick II. Certainly one goal of the *Instructions* was to proclaim Russia's place as a modern European state rather than the Asiatic despotism Montesquieu had named it. The *Instructions* deal with political, social, legal, and economic issues, and in 1768 Catherine issued a supplement that dealt with issues of public health, public order, and urban life.

Catherine's reasons for promulgating the *Instructions* as well as her success in achieving the stated goals have been the subject of considerable debate. The Legislative Commission disbanded in 1768 as war broke out between Russia and Turkey, and the Commission never succeeded in finalizing a draft of a law code. Several partial codes were issued later, and some refer back directly to Catherine's *Instructions*. However, a complete body of law code was never produced in Catherine's time. The other perceived failure of the *Instructions* was the fact that it did not deal with serfdom. Catherine's criticisms of serfdom were deleted from her final draft after consultations with her advisers. Chapter 11 of the *Instructions* does note that a ruler should avoid reducing people to a state of slavery. However, Catherine had originally included a proposal that serfs should be allowed to accumulate sufficient property to buy their freedom and that servitude should be limited to six years.

Because Catherine did not abolish serfdom, reduce the power of the nobility, draft a constitution, or promulgate a complete law code, Catherine's *Instructions* have often been considered a failure. Many people have assumed that Catherine was simply vain or a hypocrite or that she hoped to dazzle the west with visions of Russia's political progress. De Madariaga disagrees, noting that the *Instructions* were never intended to limit Catherine's power. Catherine made it clear that she saw absolutism as the only government suitable for Russia, but that even in an absolute government fundamental laws could and should be obeyed. In states ruled by fundamental laws (a popular concept in the eighteenth century), citizens could not be deprived of their life, liberty, or property without judicial procedure. In her *Instructions* Catherine made the case for the importance of education, for abolishing torture, and for very limited capital punishment. Perhaps just as importantly, the *Instructions* disseminated a great deal of important legal thinking from the West and created a language in which political and social discussions could be held.

See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF

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MICHELLE DENBESTE

INTELLIGENTSIA

The intelligentsia were a social stratum consisting of people professionally engaged in intellectual work and in the development and spread of culture.

The term *intelligentsia* was introduced into the Russian language by the minor writer Boborykin in the 1860s and it soon became widely used. According to Martin Malia, the word intelligentsia has had two primary overlapping uses: either all people who think independently, whom the Russian literary critic Dmitry Pisarev called “critically thinking realists,” or the more narrow meaning, “the intellectuals of the opposition, whether revolutionary or not.” However, the second definition, which is often found in historical literature, is too narrow and unjustifiably excludes important thinkers, philosophers, writers, public figures, and political rulers. For example, the famous Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev called Tsar Alexander I “a Russian *intelligent* on the throne.” Thus one may consider as intelligentsia well-educated and critical-thinking people of all political spectrums of society, not just radicals and liberals.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Historians have different opinions about the time of the appearance of the Russian intelligentsia as a historical phenomenon. Some of them consider

people who were opposed to the Russian political regime since the end of the eighteenth century as intelligentsia. According to this chronology the first representatives of Russian intelligentsia were writers Alexander Radischev and Nikolai Novikov, who protested against serfdom and the existing regime, as well as the first Russian revolutionaries, the Decembrists. They were either separated individuals or small groups of people without significant influence on Russian society. Their ideas foreshadowed important future intellectual trends. Because of this, most historians considered them as a proto-intelligentsia.

In the 1830s–1850s philosophical debates largely divided Russian intellectuals into Westernizers and Slavophiles, in line with their opinion about how Russian society should develop. Westernizers advocated a West European way for the development of Russia, while Slavophiles insisted on Russian historical uniqueness. Both these groups of Russian proto-intelligentsia had their distinguished representatives. The most famous Slavophiles were the writers Ivan and Konstantine Aksakov and the thinkers Ivan Kiryevsky and Alexsei Khomiyakov. The most distinguished Westernizers of this time were Peter Chaadayev and writer and radical publicist Alexander Herzen. Since there was strict censorship in Russia, Herzen established the Russian publishing house “Free Russian Press” in London in 1852, where he published the journal *Kolokol* (*The Bell*).

The most radical faction of Russian intellectuals began to adopt Western socialist ideas at this time. Among the famous radical intelligentsia were publicist Vissarion Belinsky, anarchist Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin, and the radical Mikhail Petrashevsky’s circle, which discussed the necessity of the abolition of serfdom in Russia and reform of the Russian monarchy in a democratic, federal republic.

The circle of Russian intellectuals remained very small before the 1860s. Higher education was available only to the noble elite of society; consequently most of the Russian proto-intelligentsia was from the gentry.

The majority of western historians agree that the Russian intelligentsia appeared as an actual social stratum in the 1860s. There were several reasons for its appearance, among them the period of Great Reforms in Russia under Tsar Alexander II with the liquidation of serfdom, liberalization of society, and awakening of public opinion. Also, the

development of capitalism in Russia and the beginning of industrialization demanded more educated people. At this time the technical intelligentsia appeared in Russia, while education became more widespread among the population.

In the 1860s there appeared a current among Russian intelligentsia called “nihilism” (from the Latin *nihil* meaning reject). Some historians believe that nihilism was a reaction of part of Russian society to the failure of the government in the Crimean War. The term *nihilism* was popularized by the Russian author Ivan Turgenev in his novel *Fathers and Sons* in 1862, where he described the conflict between two generations. Historian Philip Pomper wrote: the “Nihilist denied not only traditional roles of women but also the family, private property, religion, art—in a word, all traditional aspects of culture and society.” According to Pomper the doctrinal bases of Russian nihilism were materialism, utilitarianism, and scientism. The most famous writers and literary critics, who more or less shared nihilistic ideas, were Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Dobrolubov, and Dmitry Pisarev.

Populism became the ideology of a large segment of the Russian intelligentsia in the 1870s–1880s. This was a reaction to the nihilist’s rationalistic elitism on one side, and the continuation of the ideas of the Slavophiles on the other. Populists had great sympathy for the suffering peasant masses and, like Slavophiles, they believed in the uniqueness of the Russian peasant commune and saw in it the germ of the future socialist society. They created the movement “Going to the people.” The many admirers of this movement lived among peasants, attempting to educate them and spread their ideas about a future just society. Peasants usually looked suspiciously at these intelligent agitators from the cities and sometimes physically attacked them.

When “Going to the people” failed, Russian populists rejected this tactic and instead created several secret societies to struggle against the government. One of these groups of Russian radical intelligentsia, *Zemlya i Volya*, was established in Petersburg in 1876. In 1878 this organization split into two parts. Extreme members founded the new group *Narodnaya Volya* that chose political terror as their primary tactic. In 1881 members of *Narodnaya Volya* assassinated Tsar Alexander II. Moderate members of *Zemlya i Volya* founded *Chernyi Peredel*, which continued anti-government agitation. The most noted member of *Chernyi Peredel* was the future Marxist Georgy Plekhanov.

Marxism and other socialist movements became popular in Russia in the 1890s with the development of industry and the rise in the number of industrial workers. The first Marxist and socialist groups in Russia were composed almost entirely of intellectuals. The writings of Karl Marx and the other ideologists of socialism were too complicated for comprehension by barely literate workers. The Russian radical intelligentsia took on the mission of spreading these socialist ideas among the proletariat. Their motivation was similar to their radical predecessors of the 1860s: the search for social justice and dreams about equality for all members of society. But unlike in earlier times, these political groups transformed into large political parties with well-formed programs of political struggle against the government. Among these political parties were the Russian Social-Democratic Party that split in 1903 into the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries, various anarchist groups, etc. These political parties used a variety of methods to struggle against the government: from political agitation and propaganda to terror, organization of political strikes, and attempts to overthrow the government. Members of these parties were from disparate sections of society, but Russian radical intelligentsia led all of these groups.

These political movements had support in their struggle with the existing regime from the movements of national minorities in the Russian empire. The best representatives of the Ukrainian and Polish intelligentsia were persecuted by the tsarist regime for expression of their national feelings and calling for the independence of their nations. Thus the celebrated Ukrainian poet and artist Taras Shevchenko was sent by order of Tsar Nicolas I to a ten-year term in a labor battalion in Siberia “under the strictest supervision” and was forbidden to write and sketch. Use of the Ukrainian language was forbidden several times in the Russian empire. Russian governments severely suppressed Polish uprisings and sent thousands of people who participated in them to exile in Siberia.

Jews were the most oppressed group in the Russian empire. Their restriction to the Pale of Settlement, the “percentage norm” (i.e., limitation on numbers admitted) in Russian universities and gymnasiums for Jewish students, and the policy of state anti-Semitism made the life of the Jewish intelligentsia miserable in the empire. Revolutionary and nationalist moods were widely spread among the Jewish intelligentsia. Thus Jews comprised a

percentage of revolutionaries far higher than the proportion of Jews in the Russian population.

Conservatives in the Russian intelligentsia always opposed Russian radicals and revolutionaries. Russian conservatives did not create their political parties until the beginning of the twentieth century. They usually supported the Russian monarchy and government, and expressed their ideas in philosophical and literary works, and in the Russian conservative press. Among them were famous thinkers (Konstantin Leontiev), writers (Feodor Dostoyevsky), and publicists (Mikhail Katkov, Vasily Shulgin). All of them warned Russian society about the danger of the socialists' ideas and the impending revolution. Their ideas were shared by a significant part of the Russian intelligentsia.

After the first Russian revolution in 1905 the volume of essays *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*, 1909) argued against the revolutionary inclinations of the Russian intelligentsia. Among the authors was a group of famous Russian religious philosophers and publicists (philosophers Nicolai Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, publicist Peter Struve, and others). Some of the authors of this book were former socialists and Marxists who were greatly disillusioned after the first Russian revolution. *Vekhi* was one of the most famous books in Russia in the early 1900s, it was reprinted five times during its first year.

The Liberal movement appeared comparatively late among the Russian intelligentsia, on the eve of the First Russian Revolution of 1905. During the First Russian Revolution, Russian liberals created the Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets), with the goal of transforming the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy. The ideas of liberalism were not widely spread among the Russian population; thus the Constitutional Democratic Party never had a large influence on political events in the country. The Constitutional Democratic Party was often called the party of Russian intelligentsia, because they dominated the party, although intelligentsia led most political parties and movements in Russia.

The Russian intelligentsia was responsible for what is arguably the greatest achievement of Russian culture: Russian literature. The majority of Russian writers, artists, scholars, and scientists lived a quiet everyday life and pursued their aesthetic, scholarly, and scientific tasks. The apolitical Russian intelligentsia believed that literature and art should have only aesthetic goals. These ideas were shared by many celebrated writers, poets, and

artists of the Silver Age of the Russian culture (at the beginning of the twentieth century).

A large part of the intelligentsia greeted the February revolution as an attempt at the liberalization of the country. Many of them favored the provisional government. However, at the time of the October revolution only an insignificant minority of the Russian intelligentsia supported the Bolsheviks.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE SOVIET UNION

The Russian intelligentsia felt responsible for the future of the country, and some of them had the naïve illusion that they could persuade the Bolshevik leaders to stop terror. However, such attempts by the Russian writers Maxim Gorky and Vladimir Korolenko, who appealed personally to the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin, were unsuccessful. Bolsheviks did not forgive the counter-revolutionary mood of the intelligentsia and soon began repression against it. One of the first victims was the famous poet of the Silver Age of Russian culture Nikolai Gumilev. In 1921 he was accused of conspiracy against the Soviet regime and was executed. Many of the intelligentsia emigrated from Russia after the October revolution. The elite of the Russian intelligentsia, including famous philosophers (among them was an author of *Vekhi*, Nicolai Berdiaev) and writers, were expelled from the country by the order of the Bolshevik leaders in the fall of 1922.

The Bolsheviks attempted to spread Marxist ideology among the entire population and to control the development of culture in the Soviet Union. They declared war on illiteracy. Thousands of new schools were opened in the Soviet Union, and education became obligatory. The children of peasants and workers received the right to enter technical schools and universities. In contrast members of formerly rich bourgeois families were deprived of many rights, and the Soviet universities were very reluctant to accept them. The educational system in the Soviet Union was under the absolute control of the Communist Party, and communist ideology was the core of the educational curriculum.

The majority of the new Soviet intelligentsia consisted of technically trained personnel who, according to Richard Pipes, had ". . . mere nodding acquaintance with the liberal arts, once considered the essence of a higher education." Thus Pipes characterized these people as semi-intelligentsia or "white collar." However, people educated in this

way were most devoted to the political system. They did not know any other ideology beside the Communist. The Soviet government exterminated all other sources of knowledge except the apolitical and pro-Soviet. Many authors and books, and all press except the Bolsheviks', were forbidden in the Soviet Union. All publications appeared only after approval under strict Soviet censorship. In literature, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), with its dogmatic party approach controlled all works of Soviet writers. The communications of Soviet citizens with foreigners was severely restricted. Thus was created the Soviet intelligentsia, completely devoted to the communist regime.

Soviet propaganda even influenced the minds of some Russian emigrants. Among the Russian emigrant intelligentsia there appeared a movement called "left-wing Smenovekhism." Members of this movement criticized the authors of *Vekhi* for ". . . their inability to accept the great Russian Revolution." The authors of the volume of essays *Smena Vekh (Change Landmarks)* proclaimed their pro-Soviet position.

During Josef Stalin's regime many thousands of intelligentsia became the innocent victims of political repression. Only a small percentage of them dared to resist the regime. Most of the repressed intelligentsia were loyal to the Soviet system. Among them were talented writers (Boris Pil'niak, Isaac Babel), poets (Osip Mandelstam), scientists, and scholars. Others, such as the poet Marina Tsvetaeva, were pushed to commit suicide.

Nevertheless, the Communist government needed the creators of weapons and ideologies, as well as musicians and artists. Thus in the Soviet Union there always existed an intellectual elite that made distinguished achievements in many areas of scientific and scholarly life, and in art and culture. The other part of the Soviet intelligentsia actively collaborated with the state in the hope of promoting their careers, with the expectation of receiving some state privileges. Thus at the same time, when some Soviet writers, poets, artists, and musicians created masterpieces, others created works devoted to the Soviet political leaders. Huge portraits of Stalin and Lenin decorated every state office and their statues were erected in each city.

Some change in the political climate appeared after the secret speech of Nikita Khrushchev to the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union (1956) about the crimes of Stalin's regime. The time from this speech through the first part of the 1960s was called the period of cultural "Thaw." At that time political executions were stopped, and the intelligentsia felt freer to express their ideas and feelings. During this period many political prisoners were released, including many intellectuals. The Thaw brought a new approach to culture and art, which became more humane. During these years many masterpieces of Russian literature were published, many of them devoted to the recent past: Stalin's repression and World War II. Among these works was *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the poetry of Anna Akhmatova and Boris Pasternak, and Pasternak's novel *Doctor Zhivago*, for which he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1958. However, the treatment of Pasternak in the Soviet Union was appalling and hastened his death. Thus Khrushchev's cultural policy was contradictory: he united some cultural liberalization with the continuation of some repression. During the cultural Thaw the Communist Party did not release culture from ideological control, but only extended the limits on the creativity of the intelligentsia.

The period of Leonid Brezhnev's leadership (1964–1982) was a time of political and cultural stagnation. Stalin and his policies were somewhat rehabilitated, which led to increased repression against the intelligentsia. In 1965 two writers, Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, were arrested for publishing satirical works in the West. But the Soviet intelligentsia were not completely silent as in the past. Prominent intellectuals protested against the arrest of Sinyavsky and Daniel. The period of Thaw, with the humanization of the society and the rethinking of the recent historical past, changed the social atmosphere in the Soviet Union. Soviet intellectuals began the dissident and "human rights" movements. They avoided state censorship by *samizdat* (self-publishing) printings that gave freedom of self-expression to their authors. The Soviet regime did not surrender its ideological positions and continued the persecution of nonconformist intellectuals. In 1974 the famous writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn was forcibly deported from the Soviet Union. In 1980 the hydrogen bomb physicist and progressive thinker Andrei Sakharov was sent to internal exile to Gorky. These people who participated in the dissident and Human rights movements were the forerunners of glasnost and the transformation of the communist regime into a democratic society.

Mikhail Gorbachev began his leadership in 1985 with an initiative for “democratization of social and economic life.” He did not want to undermine the communist regime, but intended to improve it and make it more effective. However, the liberalization of society and diminishing of the censorship opened the press and mass media for political discussions and public exposure of historical reality. In a short time this changed public opinion, social values, and the attitude of the majority of the society against the communist regime. After a long break the intelligentsia had revived their influence on public opinion. The former dissidents Andrey Sakharov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and hundreds of others returned from emigration, exile, and prisons to lead movements opposing the communists. All these processes, combined with the economic crisis, undermined the communist government. The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 with the intelligentsia playing an important role in the destruction of the Soviet empire.

The post-Soviet years, however, have not become years of the flourishing of arts and sciences in the former Soviet states. In most of the new countries the intelligentsia have received freedom of expression, but have lost almost all government financial support. The new post-Soviet states are unable to adequately finance scientific projects and development of culture and art. Many intellectuals have lost their jobs, and some emigrated from the former Soviet states to the West in the 1990s. The future of the intelligentsia in the post-Soviet countries depends entirely upon political and economic developments.

See also: AKSAKOV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH; AKSAKOV, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH; BAKUNIN, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH; BELINSKY, VISSARION GRIGORIEVICH; BULGAKOV, SERGEI NIKOLAYEVICH; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; HERZEN, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH; JOURNALISM; PISAREV, DMITRY IVANOVICH; SOLZHENITSYN, ALEXANDER ISAYEVICH.

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VICTORIA KHITERER

INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

In 1987 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed the first major Soviet-U.S. disarmament agreement—the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The pact broke precedent in three ways. Previous treaties limited weapons, but the INF Treaty stipulated abolition of top-of-the-line missiles. Second, the deal was highly asymmetrical: Moscow gave up more than Washington. Third, the treaty’s provisions were to be verified not just by “national means” (mainly, spy satellites), but also by on-site inspections by Soviets in the United States and Americans in the USSR.

Demand for such a treaty arose in the 1970s when the USSR began to deploy what the West called SS-20 missiles. These were two-stage, intermediate-range missiles, many of them mobile, hard for the United States to track or attack. Since most SS-20s targeted Europe (some aimed at China), they were intimidating to America’s NATO partners.

The Reagan administration proposed a “zero option.” If the USSR abolished all its SS-20s, the United States would not build an equivalent. After

Moscow refused, the United States deployed in Europe two kinds of INF: cruise missiles that could fly in under Soviet radar, and ballistic missiles with warheads able to reach Kremlin bomb shelters.

Seeking better relations with the West, Gorbachev put aside his objections to the U.S. quest for antimissile defenses. Gorbachev and Reagan in 1987 signed a treaty that obliged both countries to destroy all their ground-based missiles, both ballistic and cruise, with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. To reach zero, the Kremlin had to remove more than three times as many warheads and destroy more than twice as many missiles as Washington, a process both sides completed in 1991. Skeptics noted that each side retained other missiles able to do the same work as those destroyed and that INF warheads and guidance systems could be recycled.

See also: COLD WAR; STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE; ZERO-OPTION

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INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION

The United States in 1984 initiated a program to build a space station—a place to live and work in space—and invited its allies in Europe, Japan, and Canada to participate in the project, which came to

be called “Freedom.” In 1993 the new presidential administration of Bill Clinton seriously considered canceling the station program, which had fallen behind schedule and was over budget. Space officials in Russia suggested as an alternative that the United States merge its space station program with the planned Russian Mir-2 program.

The United States accepted this suggestion and made it a key element of the redesign of what came to be called the International Space Station (ISS). The existing partners in the Freedom program issued a formal invitation to Russia to join the station partnership, which Russia accepted in December 1993.

There were both political and technical reasons for welcoming Russia into the station program. The Clinton administration saw station cooperation as a way of providing continuing employment for Russian space engineers who otherwise might have been willing to work on improving the military capabilities of countries hostile to the United States. Cooperation provided a means to transfer funds into the struggling Soviet economy. It was also intended as a signal of support by the White House for the administration of President Boris Yeltsin.

In addition, Russia brought extensive experience in long-duration space flight to the ISS program and agreed to contribute key hardware elements to the redesigned space station. The U.S. hope was that the Russian hardware contributions would accelerate the schedule for the ISS, while also lowering total program costs.

Planned Russian contributions to the ISS program include a U.S.-funded propulsion and storage module, known as the Functional Cargo Block, built by the Russian firm Energia under contract to the U.S. company Boeing. Russia agreed to pay for a core control and habitation unit, known as the service module; Soyuz crew transfer capsules to serve as emergency escape vehicles docked to the ISS; unmanned Progress vehicles to carry supplies to the ISS; two Russian research laboratories; and a power platform to supply power to these laboratories.

The Functional Cargo Block (called *Zarya*) was launched in November 1998, and Russia continued to provide a number of Soyuz and Progress vehicles to the ISS program. However, Russia’s economic problems delayed work on the service module (called *Zvezda*), and it was not launched until July 2000, two years behind schedule. As of

January 2002, it was unclear whether Russia would actually be able to fund the construction of its two promised science laboratories and the associated power platform.

With the launch of *Zvezda*, the ISS was ready for permanent occupancy, and a three-person crew with a U.S. astronaut as commander and two Russian cosmonauts began a 4.5 month stay aboard in November 2000. Subsequent three-person crews are rotating between a Russian and a U.S. commander, with the other two crew members being from the other country. The crew size aboard ISS is planned to grow to six or seven after the European and Japanese laboratory contributions are attached to ISS sometime after 2005.

The sixteen-nation partnership in the ISS is the largest ever experiment in technological cooperation and provided a way for Russia to maintain its involvement in human space flight, which dates back to 1961, the year of the first person in space, Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin.

See also: MIR SPACE STATION, SPACE PROGRAM

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JOHN M. LOGSDON

INTOURIST *See* TOURIST.

INTER-REGIONAL DEPUTIES' GROUP

The Inter-Regional Deputies' Group (IRDG) took shape in June 1989 as a loose democratic grouping in the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies. But its main historical achievements were the propagation of democratic ideas to the Soviet public, and its catalytic role as a focus and example for democratic groups. Its period of intense activity lasted less than a year. Its functions were soon superseded, primarily by the rise of the Democratic Russia movement.

At the time of IRDG's spontaneous emergence, its spokespersons took pains to deny that it was a faction that might divide the congress. However, by the time it held its founding conference on July 29–30, 1989, Soviet miners had launched a strike that put forward political as well as economic demands and radicalized political thinking among Soviet democrats. The IRDG realized that its original goal of merely pressuring the Communist Party into conducting reforms no longer fit the mood of those elements in a society that favored change. Now it needed to campaign for what the former dissident Andrei Sakharov had demanded at the congress: the repeal of Article Six of the Soviet Constitution, which legitimized the political monopoly of the Communists. Only such repeal would allow the emergence of a variety of constitutionally legitimate parties, and thus open the door to radical change.

This principle, coupled with the IRDG's insistence on the right of the union republics to exercise the sovereignty to which they were already entitled on paper, became the two main planks of the IRDG's initial program. Later, principles such as support for a market economy and private property were added.

The founding conference, attended by 316 of the congress's 2,250 deputies, saw much debate on whether the IRDG should constitute itself as a faction, and whether it should define itself as an opposition. The majority, convinced by historian Yuri Afanasiev's proposition that Marxism-Leninism was unreformable, was inclined to answer these questions in the affirmative. Organizationally, 269 of those present joined the new group and elected as their leaders five co-chairmen and a coordinating council of twenty. The co-chairmen comprised Afanasiev; Sakharov; the politically reascendant Boris Yeltsin; the economist and future mayor of Moscow, Gavriil Popov; and—to symbolize the IRDG's commitment to the sovereignty of the union republics—the Estonian Viktor Palm.

Over the next months the IRDG held meetings at which numerous speeches were made and many draft laws proposed. However, partly because its most ambitious politician, Yeltsin, usually chose to act independently of the IRDG, the group proved unable to channel all this activity into practical action. Soon it realized that factional activity in the congress was not feasible for a small group that never numbered more than four hundred. Some of its members, notably Yeltsin, saw that the upcoming elections to the fifteen new republican con-

gresses, scheduled for early 1990, held out more promise of real political change than did the USSR congress. Others, such as Sakharov and Afanasiev, rejected this approach, which was inevitably tinged with ethnic nationalism, in favor of uniting democrats and promoting democratization throughout the whole of the USSR.

In sum, the IRDG's brief but bold example of self-organization in the often hostile environment of the USSR congress, and the enormous publicity generated by the televised speeches of IRDG members at the first two congresses and other public meetings, had major repercussions for the democratic groups and candidates who organized themselves for the 1990 elections, and thus, also, for the development of Russian democracy.

See also: ARTICLE 6 OF 1977 CONSTITUTION; CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES; POPOV, GAVRIIL KHARITONOVICH; SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER REDDAWAY

IRAN, RELATIONS WITH

During the period of the Shah, Soviet-Iranian relations were cool, if not hostile. Memories of the 1946 Soviet occupation of Northern Iran, the activities of the Iranian Communist Party, and the increasingly close U.S.-Iranian alliance kept Moscow and Tehran diplomatically far apart, although there was a considerable amount of trade between the two countries. Following the overthrow of the Shah, Moscow initially hoped the Khomeini regime would gravitate toward the Soviet Union. However, the renewed activities of the Iranian communist party, together with Tehran's anger at Moscow for its support of Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war, kept the two countries apart until 1987, when Moscow increased its support for Iran. By 1989 Moscow had signed a major arms agreement with Tehran, and the military cooperation between the

two countries continued into the post-Soviet period.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran emerged as Russia's primary ally in the Middle East. Moscow became Iran's most important supplier of sophisticated military equipment, including combat aircraft, tanks, and submarines, and began building a nuclear reactor for Tehran. For its part, Iran provided Moscow with important diplomatic assistance in combating the Taliban in Afghanistan and in achieving and maintaining the ceasefire in Tajikistan, and both countries sought to limit U.S. influence in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

The close relations between Russia and Iran, which had begun in the last years of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, developed steadily under both Yeltsin and Putin, with Putin even willing to abrogate the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, negotiated between the United States and Russia in 1995, which would have ended Russian arms sales to Iran by 2000.

Moscow was also willing, despite U.S. objections, to aid Iran in the development of the Shihab III intermediate-range ballistic missile and to supply Iran with nuclear reactors. However, there were areas of conflict in the Russian-Iranian relationship. First, the two countries were in competition over the transportation routes for the oil and natural gas of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Iran claimed it provided the shortest and safest route for these energy resources to the outside world, while Russia wished to control the energy export routes of the states of the former Soviet Union, believing that these routes lay in the Russian sphere of influence. Second, by early 2001 Russia and Iran had come into conflict over the development of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea. Russia sided with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in their call for the development of their national sectors of the Caspian Sea, while Iran demanded either joint development of the Caspian Sea or a full 20 percent of the Caspian for itself. A third problem lay on the Russian side. Throughout the 1990s the conservative clerical regime in Iran became increasingly unpopular, and while it held the levers of power (army, police, and judiciary), the election of the Reformist Mohammed Khatami as Iran's President in 1997 (and his overwhelming reelection in 2001), along with the election in 2000 of a reformist Parliament (albeit one with limited power), led some in the Russian leadership to fear a possible Iranian-American rapprochement, which would have limited Russian

influence in Iran. The possibilities of economic cooperation between the United States and Iran dwarfed those of Russia and Iran, particularly because both Russia and Iran throughout the 1990s encountered severe economic problems. Fortunately for Moscow, the conservative counterattack against both Khatami and the reformist Parliament at least temporarily prevented the rapprochement, as did President George W. Bush's labeling of Iran as part of the "axis of evil" in January 2002. On the other hand, Russian-Iranian relations were challenged by the new focus of cooperation between Russia and the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and by Russia's acquiescence in the establishment of U.S. bases in central Asia.

In sum, throughout the 1990s and into the early twenty-first century, Russia and Iran were close economic, military, and diplomatic allies. However, it was unclear how long that alliance would remain strong.

See also: IRAQ, RELATIONS WITH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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ROBERT O. FREEDMAN

IRAQ, RELATIONS WITH

Following the signing of its Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1972, Iraq became Moscow's primary ally in the Arab

world. The warm Soviet-Iraqi relationship came to an end, however, in 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran, thereby splitting the Arab world and creating serious problems for Moscow's efforts to create anti-imperialist Arab unity. During the Iran-Iraq war Moscow switched back and forth between Iran and Iraq, but by the end of the war, in 1988, Gorbachev's new thinking in world affairs had come into effect, and the United States and USSR had begun to cooperate in the Middle East. That cooperation reached its peak when the United States and USSR cooperated against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Yeltsin's Russia inherited a very mixed relationship with the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Although Iraq had been a major purchaser of Soviet arms, Saddam's invasion of Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990 had greatly complicated Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East and led to the erosion of Moscow's influence in the region. At the beginning of his period of rule as Russia's President, Boris Yeltsin adopted an anti-Iraqi position and even contributed several ships to aid the United States in enforcing the anti-Iraqi naval blockade to prevent contraband from reaching Iraq.

However, beginning in 1993 when Yeltsin came under attack from the increasingly powerful parliamentary opposition, he began to improve relations with Iraq, both to gain popularity in parliament and to demonstrate he was not a lackey of the United States. Thus Yeltsin began to criticize the periodic U.S. bombings of Iraq, even when it was in retaliation for the assassination attempt against former President George Bush.

By 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov became Russia's Foreign Minister, Russia had three major objectives in Iraq. The first was to regain the more than seven billion dollars in debts that Iraq owed the former Soviet Union. The second was to acquire business for Russian companies, especially its oil companies. The third objective by 1996 was to enhance Russia's international prestige by opposing what Moscow claimed was Washington's efforts to create an American-dominated unipolar world.

Moscow, however, ran into problems with its Iraqi policy in 1997 and 1998 when U.S.-Iraqi tension escalated over Saddam Hussein's efforts to interfere with U.N. weapons inspections. While Russian diplomacy helped avert U.S. attacks in November 1997, February 1998, and November 1998, Moscow, despite a great deal of bluster, was un-

able to prevent a joint U.S.–British attack against suspected weapons sites in December 1998.

Following the attack, Moscow sought a new U.N. weapons inspection system, and when Putin became Prime Minister in 1999, Russia succeeded in pushing through the U.N. Security Council the UNMOVIC inspection system to replace the UNSCOP inspection system. Unfortunately for Moscow, which, under Iraqi pressure, abstained on the vote, Iraq refused to accept the new system, which linked Iraqi compliance with the inspectors with the temporary (120-day) lifting of U.N. sanctions on civilian goods. This meant that most of the Russian oil production agreements that had been signed with the Iraqi government remained in limbo, although Moscow did profit from the agreements made under the U.N.–approved “oil-for-food” program.

When the George W. Bush administration came to office, it initially sought to toughen sanctions against Iraq, especially on “dual-use” items with military capability, such as heavy trucks (which could carry missiles). Russia opposed the U.S. policy, seeking instead to weaken the sanctions. The situation changed, however, after September 11, 2001, when there was a marked increase in U.S.–Russian cooperation, and the two countries worked together to work out a mutually acceptable list of goods to be sanctioned. Russia, however, ran into problems when the U.S. attacked Iraq in March 2003. Russia condemned the attack, and U.S.–Russian relations deteriorated as a result, although there was a rapprochement at the end of the war when Russia supported the U.S.–sponsored UN Security Council resolution 1483 that confirmed U.S. control of Iraq.

See also: IRAN, RELATIONS WITH; PERSIAN GULF WAR; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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ROBERT O. FREEDMAN

IRON CURTAIN

“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.” With these words on March 5, 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill marked out the beginning of the Cold War and a division of Europe that would last nearly forty-five years. Churchill’s metaphorical iron curtain brought an end to the uncomfortable Soviet–Anglo–American alliance against Nazi Germany and began the process of physically dividing Europe into two spheres of influence. In his speech Churchill recognized the “valiant Russian people” and Josef Stalin’s role in the destruction of Hitler’s military, but then asserted that Soviet influence and control had descended across Eastern Europe, thereby threatening the safety and security of the entire continent through “fifth columns” and “indefinite expansion of [Soviet] power and doctrines.” In even more provocative language Churchill equated Stalin with Adolph Hitler by telling his American audience that the Anglo–American alliance must act swiftly to prevent another catastrophe, this time communist instead of fascist, from befalling Europe.

In response, Stalin also equated Churchill with Hitler. Stalin rebuked Churchill for using odious Nazi racial theory in his suggestion that the nations of the English-speaking world must unite against this new threat. For Stalin this smacked of racial domination of the rest of the world. He noted that Soviet casualties (which he grossly undercounted) far outweighed the deaths of the other allies combined and that therefore Europe owed a debt to the USSR, not to the United States as Churchill claimed, for saving the continent from Hitler. Stalin explained his intentions in occupying what would become known as the Eastern Bloc: After such devastating losses, was it not logical, he asked, to try to find peaceful governments on the Soviet border? Stalin conceded Churchill’s point that communist parties were growing, but argued that this

was due to the failures of the West, not Soviet occupation. The people for whom Churchill had such disdain, according to Stalin, were moving toward leftist parties because the communists throughout Europe were some of the first and fiercest foes of fascism. Moreover, he noted that this was precisely why British citizens voted Churchill out of power in favor of the Labor Party.

By linking the other to Hitler, both men sought to demonize their one-time ally and convince their audiences that a new war against an equal evil was on the horizon. This set the tone for the rest of the Cold War as the western powers established the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and NATO, to which the USSR responded in quick succession. The chief battleground was divided Germany and Berlin. Any escalation by one side was quickly met by the other, as both sides operated on mistaken assumptions that a war for world dominance (or at least regional dominance) was at hand. In short, the “Iron Curtain” speech, the real title of which was “Sinews of Peace,” created a metaphorical division of Europe that soon became a reality. This division only began to erode in 1989 with the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union.

See also: COLD WAR; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II

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ISLAM

From the beginning, Rus and its successors have interacted with Muslims as neighbors, rulers, and subjects. Long-distance trade in silver from Muslim lands provided the impetus for the establishment of the first Rus principalities, and Islam

arrived in the lands of Rus before Christianity. The rulers of the Volga Bulghar state converted to Islam at the turn of the tenth century, several decades before Vladimir’s conversion to Christianity in 988 C.E. The Bulghar state was destroyed between 1236 and 1237 by the Mongols, who then went on to subjugate the principalities of Rus. The conversion to Islam in 1327 of Özbek Khan, the ruler of the Golden Horde, meant that political overlordship of the lands of Rus was in the hands of Muslims for over a century. As the power relationship between Muscovy and the Golden Horde began to shift, Muscovite princes found themselves actively involved in its succession struggles. In 1552 Ivan IV conquered Kazan, the most prominent of the successor states of the Golden Horde, and began a long process of territorial expansion, which brought a diverse group of Muslims under Russian rule by the end of the nineteenth century.

THE TSARIST STATE AND ITS MUSLIM POPULATION

Muscovy acquired its first Muslim subjects as early as 1392, when the so-called Mishar Tatars, who inhabited what is now Nizhny Novgorod province, entered the service of Muscovite princes. The khans of Kasymov, a dynasty that lost out in the succession struggles of the Golden Horde, came under Muscovite protection in the mid-fifteenth century and became a privileged service elite. Nevertheless, the conquest of Kazan was a turning point, for it opened up the steppe to gradual Muscovite expansion. Over the next two centuries Muscovy acquired numerous Muslim subjects as it asserted suzerainty over the Bashkir and Kazakh steppes. In 1783 Catherine II annexed Crimea, the last of the successors of the Golden Horde, and late-eighteenth-century expansion brought Russia to the Caucasus. While the annexation of the Transcaucasian principalities (including present-day Azerbaijan) was accomplished with relative ease, the conquest of the Caucasus consumed Russian energies for the first half of the nineteenth century. The final subjugation of Caucasian tribes was complete only with the capture of their military and spiritual leader, Shamil, in 1859. Finally, in the last major territorial expansion of its history, Russia subjugated the Central Asian khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand in a series of military campaigns between 1864 and 1876. Kokand was abolished entirely, and large parts of the territory of Khiva and Bukhara were also annexed to form the province of Turkestan. The remaining territories of Khiva and Bukhara were turned into Russian pro-



Muslims pray at Moscow's principal mosque, March 5, 2001. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS

tectorates in which traditional rulers enjoyed wide-ranging autonomy in internal affairs, but where external economic and political relations were under the control of Russia. The conquest of Central Asia dramatically increased the size of the empire's Muslim population, which stood at more than fourteen million at the time of the census of 1897.

The Russian state's interaction with Islam and Muslims varied greatly over time and place, and it is fair to say that no single policy toward Islam may be discerned. In the immediate aftermath of the conquest of Kazan, the state followed a policy of harsh repression. Repression was renewed in the early eighteenth century, when Peter and his successors began to see religious uniformity as a desirable goal. In 1730 the Church opened its Office of New Converts and initiated a campaign of conversion in the Volga region. While its primary target were the animists inhabiting the region, the Office also destroyed many mosques. As many as 7,000 Tatars may have converted to Orthodoxy,

thus laying the foundation of the Kräshen community of Christian Tatars. For much of the rest of the imperial period, however, the state's attitude is best characterized as one of "pragmatic flexibility" (Kappeler). Service to the state was the ultimate measure of loyalty and the source of privilege. Those Tatar landlords who survived the dispossession of the sixteenth century were allowed to keep their land and were even able to own Orthodox serfs.

The reign of Catherine II (1762–1796) marks a turning point in the state's relationship with its Muslim subjects. She made religious tolerance an official policy and set about creating a basis for loyalty to the Russian state in the Tatar lands. She affirmed the rights of Muslim nobles and even sought to induct the Muslim clergy in this endeavor. In 1788, she established a "spiritual assembly" at Orenburg. The Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly was an attempt, unique in the Muslim world, by the state to impose an organizational structure

on Islam. Islam was for Catherine a higher form of religion than shamanism, and she hoped that the Kazakhs would gradually be brought into the fold of Islam through the efforts of the Tatars. This was of course intertwined with the goal of bringing the Kazakh steppe under closer Russian control and outflanking Ottoman diplomacy there. Headed by a mufti appointed by the state, the assembly was responsible for appointing and licensing imams as teachers throughout the territory under its purview, and overseeing the operation of mosques.

While the policies enacted by Catherine survived until 1917 in their broad outline, her enthusiasm for Islam did not. The Enlightenment had also brought to Russia the concept of fanaticism, and it tended to dominate Russian thinking about Islam in the nineteenth century. Islam was now deemed to be inherently fanatical, and the question now became one of curbing or containing this fanaticism. If Catherine had hoped for the Islamization of the Kazakhs as a mode of progress, nineteenth-century administrators sought to protect the “natural” religion of the Kazakhs from the “fanatical” Islam of the Tatars or the Central Asians.

Conquered in the second half of the nineteenth century and having a relatively dense population, Central Asia came closer than any other part of the Russian empire to being a colony. The Russian presence was thinner, and the local population not incorporated into empire-wide social classifications. Not only was there was no Central Asian nobility, but the vast majority (99.8%) of the local population were defined solely as *inorodtsy* (alien, i.e., non-Russian, peoples). The region was ruled by a governor-general possessing wide-ranging powers and answerable directly to the tsar. The first governor-general, Konstantin Kaufman (in office 1867–1881), laid the foundations of Russian policies in the region. For Kaufman, Islam was irredeemably connected with fanaticism, which could be provoked by thoughtless policies. Such fanaticism could be lessened by ignoring Islam and depriving it of all state support, while the long-term goal of assimilating the region into the Russian empire was to be achieved through a policy of encouraging trade and enlightenment. Kaufman therefore did not allow the Orenburg Muslim Assembly to extend its jurisdiction into Turkestan. The policy of ignoring Islam completely was modified after Kaufman’s death, but the Russian presence was much more lightly felt in Central Asia than in other Muslim areas of the empire.

ISLAM UNDER RUSSIAN RULE

Islam is an internally diverse religious system in which many traditions and ways of belonging to the community of Muslims coexist. As Devin DeWeese has shown, Islam became a central aspect of the communal identities of Muslims in the Golden Horde. Conversion was remembered in sacralized narratives that defined conversion as the moment that the community was constituted. Shrines of saints served to Islamize the very territory on which Muslims lived. Until the articulation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of modern national identities among the various Muslim communities of the Russian empire, communal identities were a composite of ethnic, genealogical, and religious identities, inextricably intertwined.

The practice of Islam, its reproduction, and its transmission to future generations took place in largely autonomous local communities. Each community was centered around a mosque and (especially in Central Asia) a shrine. The servants of the mosques were selected by the community, and the funding provided by local notables or through endowed property (*waqf*). Each community also maintained a *maktab*, an elementary school in which children acquired basic knowledge of Islamic ritual and belief. Higher religious education took place in *madradas*, both locally and in neighboring Muslim countries. Unlike the Christian clergy, Muslim scholars, the *ulama*, were a self-regulating group. Entry into the ranks of the *ulama* was contingent upon education and insertion into chains of discipleship. Islamic religious practice required neither the institutional framework nor the property of a church. This loose structure meant that the fortunes of Islam and its carriers were not directly tied to the vicissitudes of Muslim states.


The process of Islamization continued after the Russian conquest of the steppe and was at times even supported by the Russian state. The state settled Muslim peasants in the trans-Volga region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the main agent of the Islamization of the steppe was the Tatar mercantile diaspora. As communities of Tatar merchants appeared throughout the steppe beginning in the late eighteenth century, Tobolsk, Orenburg, and Troitsk became major centers of Islamic learning. Tatar merchants began sending their sons to study in Central Asia, and Sufi linkages with Central Asia and the lands beyond were strengthened.

VARIETIES OF REFORM

In the early nineteenth century, reform began to emerge as a major issue among Tatar ulama. The initial issues, as articulated by figures such as Abdunnasir al-Qursavi (1776–1812) and Qayyum Nasiri (1825–1902), related to the value of the tradition of interpretation of texts as it had been practiced in Central Asia and in the Tatar lands since Mongol times. Qursavi, Nasiri, and their followers questioned the authority of traditional Islamic theology and argued for creative reinterpretation through recourse to the original scriptural sources of Islam. This religious conception of reform was connected to developments in the wider Muslim world through networks of education and travel. By the turn of the twentieth century, Tatar scholars such as Musa Jarullah Bigi, Alimjan Barudi, and Rizaetdin Fakhretdin were prominent well beyond the boundaries of the Russian empire.

A different form of reform arose around the reform of Muslim education. Its initial constituency was the urban mercantile population of the Volga region and the Crimea, and its origins are connected with the tireless efforts of the Crimean Tatar noble Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851–1914). Gaspirali had been educated at a military academy but became involved in education early on in his career. Muslims, he felt, lacked many skills important to full participation in the mainstream of imperial life. The fault lay with the *maktab*, which not only did not inculcate useful knowledge, such as arithmetic, geography, or Russian, but failed, moreover, in the task of equipping students with basic literacy or even a proper understanding of Islam itself. Gaspirali articulated a modernist critique of the *maktab*, emanating from a new understanding of the purposes of elementary education. The solution was a new method (*usul-i jadid*) of education, in which children were taught the Arabic alphabet using the phonetic method of instruction and the elementary school was to have a standardized curriculum encompassing composition, arithmetic, history, hygiene, and Russian. Gaspirali's method found acceptance among the Muslim communities of the Crimea, the Volga, and Siberia, and eventually appeared in all parts of the Russian empire inhabited by Muslims. New-method schools quickly became the flagship of a multifaceted movement of cultural reform, which came to be called "Jadidism" after them.

Jadidism was an unabashedly modernist discourse of cultural reform directed at Muslim society itself. Its basic themes were enlightenment,



Sixteenth-century manuscript illustration showing Bahram Gur, legendary Sassanian king in Persian mythology, and the Russian princes in the Red Pavilion. © THE ART ARCHIVE/BODLEIAN LIBRARY OXFORD/THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY

progress, and the awakening of the nation, so that the latter could take its own place in the modern, civilized world. Given the lack of political sovereignty, however, it was up to society to lift itself up by its bootstraps through education and disciplined effort. Jadid rhetoric was usually sharply critical of the present state of Muslim society, which the Jadids contrasted unfavorably to a glorious past of their own society and the present of the civilized countries of Europe. The single most important term in the Jadid lexicon was *taraqqi*, progress. Progress and civilization were universal phenomena for the Jadids, accessible to all societies on the sole condition of disciplined effort and enlightenment. There was nothing in Islam that prevented Muslims from joining the modern world; indeed, the Jadids argued that only a modern per-

son equipped with knowledge “according to the needs of the age” could be a good Muslim. In this, Jadidism differed sharply from other currents of reform among the ulama. The debate between the Jadids and their traditionalist opponents was the defining feature of the last decades of the Tsarist period.

In Central Asia, the distinct social and political context imparted Jadidism a distinct flavor. The ulama retained much greater influence in Central Asia, while the new mercantile class was weaker. Central Asian Jadids, therefore, tended to be more strongly rooted in Islamic education than their counterparts elsewhere. Nevertheless, they faced resolute opposition from within their own society, as well as from a Russian state always suspicious of unofficial initiatives.

THE “MUSLIM QUESTION” IN LATE IMPERIAL POLITICS

For the Jadids, the nation was an integral part of modernity, and they set out to define the parameters of their nation. The new identity was not foreordained, however, for the nation could be defined along any of several different axes of solidarity. For some, all Muslims of the Russian empire constituted a single national community. Gaspirali argued that the Muslims needed “unity in language, thought, and deeds,” and his newspaper sought to show this through example. In 1905 a number of Tatar and Azerbaijani activists organized an All-Russian conference for Muslim representatives to work out a common plan of action. The conference established the Ittifaq-i Müslimin (Union of Muslims) as a quasi-political organization. Delegates resolved to work for greater political, religious, and cultural rights for their constituency. During the elections to the Duma, the Ittifaq aligned itself with the Kadets. Two further conferences were held in 1905 and 1906, but Muslim political activity was curbed after the Stolypin coup of 1907, which reduced the representation of Muslims and denied the Ittifaq permission to register a political party.

Muslim unity was threatened by regional and ethnic solidarities. The discovery of romantic notions of identity by the Jadids led them to articulate the identity of their community along ethnonational lines. Here too, visions of a broad Turkic unity coexisted with narrower forms of identity, such as Tatar or Kazakh. The appeal of local ethnic identities proved too strong for broader Islamic or Turkic identities to surmount. This was the case in 1917, when the All-Russian Muslim movement

was briefly resurrected and Tatar leaders organized a conference in Moscow to discuss a common political strategy for Muslims. Divisions between representatives from different regions quickly appeared, and the various groups of Muslims went their separate ways.

Although Muslim activists continually professed their loyalty to the state, their activity aroused suspicion both in the state and among the Russian public, which construed it as pan-Islamism and connected it with alleged Ottoman intrigues to destabilize the Russian state. The rise of ethnic self-awareness was likewise seen as pan-Turkism and also connected to outside influences. Russian administrators had hoped that enlightenment would be the antidote to fanaticism. Now the fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, both articulated by modern-educated Muslims, led to a reappraisal. The fanaticism of modernist Islam was deemed much more dangerous than that of the traditional Islam, since it led to political demands. This perception led the state to intensify its support for traditional Islam.

THE SOVIET PERIOD

The Russian revolution utterly transformed the political and social landscape in which Islam existed in the Russian empire. The new regime was radically different from its predecessor in that it actively sought to intervene in society and to reshape not just the economy, but also the cultures of its citizens. It was hostile to religion, perceiving it as both an alternate source of loyalty and a form of cultural backwardness. As policies regarding Soviet nationalities emerged in the 1920s, the struggle for progress acquired a prominent role, especially among nationalities deemed backward (and all Muslim groups were so classified). Campaigns for cultural revolution began with the reform of education, language, and the position of women, but quickly extended to religion. The antireligious campaign eventually led to the closure of large numbers of mosques (many were destroyed, others given over to “more socially productive” uses, such as youth clubs, museums of atheism, or warehouses). *Waqf* properties were confiscated, *madrasas* closed, and large numbers of ulama arrested and deported to labor camps or executed. The only Muslim institution to survive was the spiritual assembly, now stationed in Ufa.

The campaign was effective in its destructiveness. Islam did not disappear, but the infrastructure which reproduced Islamic religious and

cultural knowledge was badly damaged and links with the outside Muslim world cut off. Islam was forced into isolation. The most important consequence of this isolation was that "Islam" was rendered synonymous with "tradition". Official channels of socialization, such as the school system and the army, which reached very deep into society, were not just secular, but atheistic. With *maktabs* and *madrasas* abolished, the ranks of the carriers of Islamic knowledge denuded, and continuity with the past made difficult by changes in script, religious knowledge was vastly circumscribed and the site of its reproduction pushed into private or covert realms. The public sphere were stripped of all references to Islam.

During World War II, as the state's hostility to religion abated briefly, it sought to permit limited practice of religion under close supervision. To this end, it created three new Muslim spiritual administrations in addition to the one at Ufa to oversee the practice of Islam. Of the four, the one based in Tashkent and responsible for Central Asia soon emerged as the most significant. The spiritual assemblies had to tread a thin line between satisfying the requirements of the state and ensuring a space in which Islamic institutions could exist officially. A great deal of religious activity existed beyond the control of the assemblies, but it was at home in a specifically Soviet context. Islam in the postwar decades was subordinated to powerful national identities formed for the most part in the Soviet period. Islam and its rituals were celebrated as part of one's national heritage even as Islamic knowledge shrunk greatly.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islam has become more prominent in public life as Muslims have engaged in a recovery of their national and cultural heritage. Mosques have been reopened or rebuilt and contacts with Muslims abroad established, and there has been a general increase in personal piety. Nevertheless, the Soviet-era connections between Islam and national heritage remain intact, and as post-Soviet regimes undertake nation-building, Islam retains its strong cultural definitions.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; GASPIRALI, ISMAIL BEY; GOLDEN HORDE; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; RELIGION

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ADEEB KHALID

ISRAEL, RELATIONS WITH

During most of the Soviet period, Soviet-Israeli relations were strained if not broken. Although Moscow gave diplomatic and even military support (via Czechoslovakia) to Israel during its war of independence (1948–1949), by 1953 it had shifted to a pro-Arab position and it broke diplomatic relations with Israel during the June 1967 Six-Day War. From the mid-1960s until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the USSR, seeking to align the Arab world against the United States, called Israel the “lynchpin of U.S. imperialism in the region.” Under Gorbachev, however, the USSR made a major shift in policy, taking an even-handed position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and by 1991 had reestablished full diplomatic relations with Israel.

In the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Moscow and Jerusalem, already warming in the final years of the Soviet Union when Gorbachev was in power, continued to improve. Trade between the two countries rose to a billion dollars per year, Jews were free to emigrate from Russia to Israel, and the two countries even cooperated in the production of military equipment such as helicopters and airborne command-and-control aircraft (AWACS). On the diplomatic front, under both Yeltsin and Putin, Russia took a balanced position, unlike the pre-Gorbachev Soviet government, which consistently took a pro-Arab, anti-Israeli stand. However, during the period when Yevgeny Primakov was Russia’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister (1996–1999), there was a marked tilt toward the Arab position. Following Primakov’s ouster and the renewed Russian involvement in a war against Islamic rebels in Chechnya (where Israel supported Russia diplomatically), Russia under Putin’s leadership switched back to a balanced position. Some Russian leaders even compared the Islamic-based terrorism Israel faced, from Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to the Islamic-based opposition Russia was battling in Chechnya.

The major problem in the Russian-Israeli relationship was the supply of Russian arms and military technology—including missile technology—to Iran. Given the fact that the clerical leadership of Iran called for Israel’s destruction and supplied weapons to both Hezbollah and to the Palestinian Authority to fight Israel, Israel bitterly opposed the Russian sales. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran became Russia’s number one ally

in the Middle East, and Russia continued to supply Iran with arms.

One of the dynamic aspects of the Russian-Israeli relationship after 1991 was the role of the million-plus Jews from the former Soviet Union (FSU) who emigrated to Israel. They formed the largest Russian-speaking diaspora outside the FSU and constituted a major cultural bond between Israel and Russia. As the Russian vote became increasingly important in Israeli elections, candidates for the post of Israeli Prime Minister sought to cultivate this electorate by announcing their wish to improve ties with Russia. For its part, Moscow, especially under Putin, developed a special relationship with the Russian community in Israel and saw that community as a tool to enhance Russian-Israeli trade and hence improve the Russian economy. Below the level of official relations, the Russian mafia created ties (including money-laundering ties) with its Russian counterparts in Israel, and this led to joint efforts by the Russian and Israeli governments to fight crime, occasioning frequent mutual visits of the Ministers of the Interior of both countries to deal with this problem.

Another major change from Soviet times was Russia’s willingness to follow the U.S. lead in seeking to end the Israeli-Arab conflict. Thus Russia supported the OSLO I and OSLO II peace agreements in tandem with U.S. efforts to end the Al-Aksa intifada through the U.S.-backed Mitchell Report. Such action was facilitated in part by the decreasing importance to Russia of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was pivotal to Moscow’s policy in the Middle East during Soviet times, and in part by Russia’s desire, especially under Putin, to demonstrate cooperation with the United States.

See also: JEWS; IRAN, RELATIONS WITH; IRAQ, RELATIONS WITH; REFUSENIKS; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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ROBERT O. FREEDMAN

ITALY, RELATIONS WITH

From the time of Italy's unification in the mid-nineteenth century through the post-Soviet era, schizophrenic collaboration and competition in the Balkans and Danubian Europe has marked Italo-Russian relations, with national interests consistently trumping shifting ideologies in both countries.

The schizophrenia was there from the beginning. Although Tsar Alexander II, for example, objected to Italy's unification, the wars fought to that end could not have been arranged and contained without the Tsar's complicity. By the late 1870s liberal Italy was becoming enmeshed in the Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany. Although it was primarily directed against France, the Italians hoped the alliance would also blunt autocratic Russia's penetration of the Balkans. Later, Russia's defeat at Japanese hands in 1905 removed the counterbalance to Austria's influence in the Balkans, and Italy became every bit as aggrieved as Russia by Austria's conduct during the First Bosnian Crisis (1908–1909). The result was the Italo-Russian Racconigi Agreement (1909). Of the European powers, only Italy supported Russia on the Straits Question. Although Rome promised several times to stand by its obligations taken at Racconigi, Russia proved unable to use the Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912) as an excuse to reexamine the Straits Question.

During World War I, both Rome and Petrograd feared Austro-German advances into the Balkans. Rome, however, was no more eager to see Germanic dominance replaced by Russian-led Pan Slavism than Russia was to see it replaced by Italian influence. The complex, multilateral negotiations that brought Italy into the war (1915) required the uneasy compromise of Russian and Italian ambitions in the Balkans. These compromises seriously eroded Russia's political situation and betrayed Serbia, Russia's ally and *caucasus belli*. After the war, Italy generally refrained from supporting the anti-Bolshevik

White armies during Russia's civil war, although Rome did provide small contingents to the Allied intervention in Vladivostok and briefly planned to intervene in Georgia.

Thereafter, Italo-Soviet relations fell into the old grooves of *Realpolitik*. Even Benito Mussolini's rise to power (1922) had little effect on diplomatic directions. Despite the presumed ideological antipathies dividing communist Russia and fascist Italy, the Duce exploited Italy's position between the Allies and the Soviets to reintroduce Russia into Europe and to arbitrate among the great powers. Although commercial aspirations motivated Italy's recognition of the Soviets (1924), the fascists and soviets also drew together in common hostility to responsible parliamentary systems of government. By 1930, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany were tending to ally against France and its allies.

With Hitler's rise to power (1933), Moscow and Rome sought ways to contain the threat of a resurgent Germany. Through extensive cooperation, both began to support the status quo to block German expansion, especially in the Balkans. Russia's nonaggression pact with Italy (1933) marked a significant step in its Collective Security policy directed against Germany. Italy's successful defense of Austria (1934)—the one successful example of Collective Security before World War II—seemed to vindicate Soviet policy.

Good relations, despite Moscow's extraordinary efforts at appeasement, collapsed during the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935–1936) and the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Afterward the Italo-Soviet economic agreements (February 1939) began a rapprochement and presaged the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August. Even after World War II began, Moscow continued to hope to split the Italo-German alliance and to use Italy to block German penetration into the Balkans: for example, by encouraging Italy's plan for a bloc of Balkan neutrals in the Fall and Winter of 1939. These plans came to naught when Germany and then Italy attacked Russia in June 1941. The Italian expeditionary army on the Eastern Front met horrific disaster in 1943.

The Allies signed an armistice with Italy in 1943, and the following year the USSR recognized the new Italy. In 1947, the two signed a peace treaty. Italo-Russian relations were again subsumed in the struggles between larger alliance systems, this time with Italy playing a crucial role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which stood against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Particularly interesting

was the rise of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). After the brutal crushing of the Hungarian Revolt (1956), however, the PCI began to distance itself from the USSR and to promote an "Italian Road to Socialism." In March 1978, the PCI entered a governmental majority for the first time. Stung by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the PCI increasingly promoted Eurocommunism, which ultimately played a large role in delegitimizing Soviet Russia's imperial satellite system in Eastern Europe. After the collapse of Communism in Russia in the early 1990s, the main point of cooperation and conflict between Russia and Italy remained focused in the Balkans and Danubian regions.

See also: BALKAN WARS; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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J. CALVITT CLARKE III

IVAN I

(d. 1340), prince of Moscow and sole grand prince of Vladimir.

By collaborating with the Tatar overlords in Saray, Ivan I overcame his rivals in Tver and made Moscow the most important domain in northeast Russia. He was nicknamed "Moneybag" ("Kalita") to reflect his shrewd money handling practices.

Ivan Danilovich was the son of Daniel and grandson of Alexander Yaroslavich "Nevsky." In 1325, when he succeeded his brother Yury as prince of Moscow, he continued Moscow's fight with Tver for supremacy. Two years later the people of

Tver, the town ruled by Grand Prince Alexander Mikhailovich, revolted against the Tatars. In 1328 Ivan visited Khan Uzbek, who gave him the patent for the grand princely throne and troops to punish the insurgents. After Ivan devastated Tver and forced Alexander to flee, the town and its prince never regained their position of power. Significantly, in his rivalry with Tver, Ivan won the support of the Metropolitan, who chose Moscow for his residence. In the 1330s, as Grand Prince Gedimin increasingly threatened Russia, Ivan also fought to suppress pro-Lithuanian factions in the northwestern towns. His greatest challenge was to subdue Novgorod, which used its association with Lithuania against him, and which challenged him when he levied Tatar tribute on it. By faithfully collecting the tribute, however, and by visiting the Golden Horde on nine occasions and winning the khan's trust, he persuaded the Tatars to stop raiding Russia. Moreover, by currying the khan's favour, Ivan was able to keep the title of grand prince and secure succession to it for his son Simeon. Ivan died on March 31, 1340.

See also: GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; MOSCOW

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MARTIN DIMNIK

IVAN II

(1326–1359), prince of Moscow and grand prince of Vladimir.

In the 1340s Lithuania encroached into western Russia and challenged the Golden Horde for control of Russian towns. Thus the prince of Moscow and other princes had to establish relations with both foreign powers. Ivan's elder brother Simeon and father Ivan I Danilovich "Kalita" ("Moneybag") had collaborated with the Tatars to promote Moscow's interests against princely rivals and against Lithuania. Ivan, a weak ruler under whose reign Moscow's authority declined, charted a different course. After Simeon died in 1353, Ivan traveled to Saray, where Khan Jani-Beg, against the objections of Novgorod and Suzdal-Nizhny Novgorod, gave him

the patent for the grand princely throne of Vladimir. Later, however, he was persuaded to establish cordial relations with Lithuania and to decrease Moscow's subordination to the khan. He formed a treaty with pro-Lithuanian Suzdal, arranged a marriage alliance with Lithuania, and prevented Tatar envoys from entering Muscovite lands. His change of policy kindled serious opposition. Many of his councilors fled to pro-Tatar Ryazan, thus weakening Moscow's internal solidarity. Metropolitan Alexei also sided with the defectors. When the khan himself challenged Ivan, he yielded to the pressure. In 1357 he submitted to Berdi-Beg, the new khan, and was reconciled with his disgruntled boyars. But he failed to increase Moscow's territories, and Novgorod ignored him. Moreover, in the testament he issued before his death, he confirmed the practice of hereditary appanages, which his brother Simeon had first espoused, and which further fragmented the Moscow principality. He died on November 13, 1359.

See also: GOLDEN HORDE; MOSCOW

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MARTIN DIMNIK

IVAN III

(1440–1505), grand prince of Moscow (1462–1505), sovereign of "all Russia" (from 1479).

Ivan Vasilyeich was the eldest son and successor to Basil II, co-regent in the last years of his blind father. Ivan's youth coincided with the dynastic war, in which he took part at age twelve, leading the campaign against Dmitry Shemyaka (1452). Thereafter, Ivan became a steady champion of autocratic rule.

Under Ivan III's reign, the uniting of separate Russian principalities into a centralized state made great and rapid progress. Some of these principalities lost their independence peacefully (Yaroslavl, 1463–1468; Rostov, 1474); others tried to resist and were subjugated by military force (Great Novgorod, 1471–1478; Tver, 1485; Vyatka, 1489).



Eighteenth-century portrait of Ivan III. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS

The incorporation of Great Novgorod into the emerging Muscovite state took especially dramatic form. When Novgorodian boyars questioned the sovereignty of the grand prince over their city-state, Ivan III led his troops to Great Novgorod. In the battle on the Shelon River, July 14, 1471, the Novgorodian army was completely defeated. Four boyars who had been captured (including Dmitry Boretsky, one of the leaders of anti-Muscovite party in Novgorod) were executed by the grand prince's order. In the peace treaty of August 11, 1471, the city acknowledged the lordship of the grand prince and gave up the right of independent foreign relations. Six years later, Ivan III found a pretext to start a new campaign against Novgorod; this time the city-state surrendered without a struggle. In January 1478, Great Novgorod lost its autonomy completely: The *veche* (people's assembly) and the office of *posadnik* (the head of the city government) were abolished, and the assembly's bell, the symbol of Novgorod's sovereignty, was taken away to Moscow. In the 1480s, having

confiscated the domain of the archbishop of Great Novgorod and the estates of local boyars, Ivan III began to distribute these lands among his military men on condition of loyal service. Thus the pomestie system was established, which became the basis of the social and military organization in Muscovy.

Soon after the conquest of Great Novgorod, Ivan III assumed the title of the sovereign of all Russia (*gosudar vseya Rusi*). Not only did the title reflect the achievements of the grand prince in uniting the Russian lands, but it also implied claims to the rest of the territories with eastern Slavic population, which at that time lived under the rule of Lithuanian princes. So conflict with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania became imminent.

In the 1480s, some princes from the Upper Oka region (Vorotynskies, Odoyevskies, and others) left Lithuanian service for Moscow, and Ivan III accepted them and their patrimonies (towns Vorotynsk, Peremyshl, Odoev, and so forth). During the war of 1492 to 1494, the Muscovite army occupied an important town of Vyazma (in the Smolensk region). The peace treaty signed on February 5, 1494, legalized all the acquisitions of Ivan III. Peace, though ensured by the marriage of Ivan's daughter, Elena, to the grand duke of Lithuania, Alexander, turned out to be a short-term armistice: In 1500 another Russian-Lithuanian war began.

First, the princes of Novgorod Seversk and Starodub went over to the grand prince of Moscow. Then Ivan III sent his troops to defend his new vassals. In the battle at Vedrosha River (July 14, 1500), which decided the outcome of the war, Muscovite commanders defeated the Lithuanian army and captured its leader, hetman Konstantin Ostrozhsy. During the summer campaign of 1500 Muscovite forces occupied Bryansk, Toropets, Putivl, and other towns. According to the armistice of 1503, the border with Lithuania moved far in the southwestern direction.

Ivan III was the first Russian ruler to gain full independence from the Golden Horde. From about 1472 he paid no tribute to the khan. Twice, in 1472 and 1480, khan Ahmad invaded Russia, trying to restore his sovereignty over the Russian land and its ruler, but both times he failed. The withdrawal of Ahmad from the banks of Ugra River in November 1480 symbolized the overthrow of the yoke.

The unified Russian state played an increasingly visible role on the international scene: Ivan

III established relations with Crimea (1474), Venice (1474), Hungary (1482), the German empire (1489), Denmark (1493), and the Ottoman empire (1496). To meet the needs of his expanded state, Ivan III began to recruit engineers and military specialists from the West. The towers and walls of the Kremlin were built in the 1480s and 1490s by Italian architects and remain one of the most visible material signs of Ivan III's reign.

The contours of the Russian foreign policy, shaped in Ivan's reign, remained stable for generations to come. In the west, Ivan III left to his heir the incessant struggle with the Polish and Lithuanian rulers over the territories of the eastern Slavs. In the east and south, a more differentiated policy was pursued toward the khanates that had succeeded the Golden Horde. This policy included attempts to subjugate the khanate of Kazan in the middle Volga and efforts aimed at neutralizing Crimea.

In his last years Ivan III faced a serious dynastic crisis after the unexpected death in 1490 of his heir, also Ivan (the "Young"), the son of the first Ivan's III wife, Maria of Tver (d. 1467). In 1472 Ivan III married Sophia Paleologue, a Byzantine princess brought up in Rome. This marriage also produced children, including Basil (Vasily). Ivan the Young, married to Yelena, the daughter of Moldavian prince, left a son, Dmitry. So, after 1490, Ivan III was to choose between his grandson (Dmitry) and son (Basil). At first, he favored the grandson: In February 1498, Dmitry was crowned as grand prince and heir to his grandfather. But later Dmitry and his mother Yelena fell into disgrace and were taken into custody; Basil was proclaimed the heir (1502). The reasons for these actions remain unclear. In July 1503, Ivan III experienced a stroke and real power passed into the hands of Basil III.

Contemporaries and later historians agree in depicting Ivan III as a master politician: prudent, cautious, efficient, and very consistent in his policy of constructing a unified and autocratic Russian state.

See also: GOLDEN HORDE; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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MIKHAIL M. KROM

IVAN IV

(1530–1584), "The Terrible" (Grozny), grand prince of Moscow and tsar of all Russia.

The long reign of Ivan IV saw the transformation of Muscovy into a multiethnic empire through ambitious political, military, and cultural projects, which revolved around the controversial figure of the monarch.

IVAN IV AND THE RURIKID DYNASTY

Born to the ruling Moscow branch of the Rurikid dynasty, Ivan nominally became grand prince at the age of three after the death of his father, Grand Prince Vasily III. During the regency of Ivan's mother, Yelena Glinskaya, from 1533 to 1538, ruling circles strengthened Ivan's position as nominal ruler by eliminating Prince Andrei Ivanovich of Staritsa and Prince Yury Ivanovich of Dmitrov, representatives of the royal family's collateral branches. Ivan's status as dynastic leader was reinforced during his coronation as tsar on January 16, 1547. Drawing extensively on Byzantine and Muscovite coronation rituals and literary texts to reveal the divine sanction for Ivan's power, the ceremony posited continuity between his rule and the rule of the Byzantine emperors and Kievan princes. Ivan continued the aggressive policy of his ancestors toward the collateral branches of the dynasty by eliminating his cousin, Prince Vladimir Andreyevich of Staritsa (1569).

Ivan was married several times. His wives were from Muscovite elite clans (Anastasia Zakharina Romanova, Maria Nagaya) and from relatively obscure gentry families (Marfa Sobakina, Anna Koltovskaya, Anna Vasilchikova). He also tried to raise the status of the dynasty by establishing matrimonial ties with foreign ruling houses, but succeeded only in marrying the Caucasian Princess Maria (Kuchenei) (1561). Throughout his reign, Ivan sought to secure the succession of power for



Ivan the Terrible stands before St. Basil's Cathedral, erected to commemorate his victory over the Kazan khanate. THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

his sons, although he accidentally killed his elder son Ivan (1581). The tsar's other son, the reportedly mentally challenged Fyodor, eventually inherited the throne.

IVAN IV AND HIS COURT

When Ivan was a minor, power was in the hands of influential courtiers. Under Yelena Glinskaya, Prince Mikhail Lvovich Glinky competed for power with Yelena's favorite, Prince Ivan Fyodorovich Ovchina-Obolensky. Yelena's death (1538) was followed by fierce competition between the princely clans of Shuyskys, Belskys, Kubenskys, and Glinkys, and the boyar Vorontsov clan. After his coronation, Ivan attempted to stabilize the situation at court through improving the registry of elite military servitors, providing them with prestige landholdings around Moscow, and regulating service relations among the elite during campaigns. The authorities limited the right of some princely families to dispose of their lands in order to pursue the lands policy. Ivan granted top court ranks to a wide

circle of elite servitors, which especially benefited the tsarina's relatives, the Zakharins-Yurevs. Ivan also favored officials of lower origin, Alexei Fyodorovich Adashev and Ivan Mikhaylovich Viskovaty, though some experts question their influence at court. Historians sometimes call the ruling circles of the 1550s "the chosen council," but this vague literary term is apparently irrelevant to governmental institutions.

Beginning in 1564, Ivan IV subjected his court to accusations of treason, executions, and disgraces by establishing the *Oprichnina*. Despite the subsequent abolition of the *Oprichnina* in 1572, Ivan continued to favor some of its former members. Among them were the elite Nagoy and Godunov families, including Ivan's relative and would-be tsar Boris Godunov. The established princely Shuysky and Mstislavsky clans and the Zakharin-Yurev boyar family retained their high positions at court throughout Ivan's reign.

Ivan's court also included Tatar servitors, including prominent members of the Chingissid dynasty, who received the title of tsar. Ivan granted the last survivor of those Tatar tsars, Simeon Bekbulatovich (Sain-Bulat), the title of grand prince of Moscow and official jurisdiction over a considerable part of the realm. Historians usually interpret the reign of Simeon (1575–1576) as a parody of the Muscovite political system. It may be that Ivan, in granting Simeon the new title, sought to deprive Simeon of the title of tsar and thereby eliminate a possible Chingissid succession to the throne.

IVAN IV AND HIS REALM

In the 1550s, Ivan IV and his advisors attempted to standardize judicial and administrative practices across the country by introducing a new law code (1550) and delegating routine administrative and financial tasks to the increasingly structured chancelleries. The keeping of law and order and control of the local population's mobility became the tasks of locally elected officials, in turn accountable to the central chancelleries. The remote northern territories enjoyed a greater autonomy in local affairs than the central parts of the country.

Albeit limited and inconsistent, these reforms allowed Ivan to maintain an approximately 70,000-man army and to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. With the capture of the Tatar states of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556), Ivan acquired vast territories populated with a multiethnic, predomi-

nantly Muslim population with distinctive cultural and economic traditions. The conquest of those lands, whose peoples remained rebellious throughout Ivan's reign, contributed to the tension between Muscovy and the powerful Muslim states of Crimea and Turkey, which jointly attacked Astrakhan in 1569. The Crimean khan devastated Moscow in 1571, but Ivan's commanders inflicted a defeat on him in 1572. Ivan failed to avoid simultaneous involvement in military conflicts on several fronts. Without settling the conflict in the south, he launched a war against his western neighbor, Livonia, in 1558. Historians traditionally interpret the Livonian War (1558–1583) in geopolitical terms, asserting that Ivan was looking for passage to the Baltic Sea to expand overseas trade. Revisionists explain the war's origins in terms of Ivan's short-range interest in getting tribute. The Livonian war only resulted in human and material losses for Muscovy. Ivan supported commercial relations between Muscovy and England, but attempts to conclude a political union with the queen of England were in vain. The war, famines, epidemics, and the *Oprichnina* caused a profound economic crisis in Muscovy, especially in the Novgorod region. By the end of Ivan's reign, peasants abandoned 70 to 98 percent of arable land throughout the country. Many of them fled to the periphery of the realm, including Siberia, whose colonization intensified in the early 1580s.

IVAN IV AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

Ivan IV cultivated a close relationship with the Orthodox Church through regular pilgrimages and generous donations to monasteries. The symbolism of court religious rituals, in which the tsar participated with the metropolitan, and the semiotics of Ivan's residence in the Kremlin stressed the divine character of the tsar's power and the prevailing harmony between the tsar and the church. In 1551, Ivan participated in a church council that attempted to systematize religious practices and the jurisdiction of church courts. Metropolitan Macarius, head of the church and a close advisor to the tsar, sponsored an ideology of militant Orthodoxy that presented the tsar as champion and protector of the true faith. Macarius also played a part in conducting domestic and foreign policy. Contrary to traditional views, the court priest Silvester apparently did not exert political influence on the tsar. Ivan demonstrated a flexible attitude toward the landownership of the church and its tax privileges.

Ivan often played ecclesiastical leaders off each other and even deposed disloyal hierarchs.

CONTROVERSY OVER IVAN'S PERSONALITY AND HISTORICAL ROLE

Ivan is credited with writing diplomatic letters to European monarchs, epistles to elite servitors and clerics, and a reply to a Protestant pastor. Dmitry Likhachev, J. L. I. Fennell, and other specialists describe Ivan as an erudite writer who developed a peculiar literary style through the use of different genres, specific syntax, irony, parody, and mockery of opponents. According to his writings, Ivan, traumatized by childhood memories of boyar arbitrariness, sought through terror to justify his autocratic rule and to prevent the boyars from regaining power. Edward Keenan argues that Ivan was illiterate, never wrote the works attributed to him, and was a puppet in the hands of influential boyar clans. The majority of experts do not share Keenan's view. All information on the influence of particular individuals and clans on Ivan comes from biased sources and should be treated with caution.

Nikolay Karamzin created an influential romantic image of an Ivan who first favored pious counselors but later became a tyrant. Many historians have explained Ivan's erratic policy in psychological terms (Nikolay Kostomarov, Vasily Klyuchevsky); some have assumed a mental disorder (Pavel Kovalevsky, D. M. Glagolev, Richard Hellie, Robert Crummey). The autopsy performed on Ivan's remains in 1963 suggests that Ivan might have suffered from a spinal disease, but it is unclear how the illness affected his behavior. The probability that Ivan was poisoned should be minimized. Other historians sought to rationalize Ivan's behavior, presuming that he acted as a protector of state interests in a struggle with boyar hereditary privileges (Sergei Solovyov, Sergei Platonov). According to Platonov, Ivan was a national democratic leader whose policy relied on the nonaristocratic gentry. This concept was revived in Stalinist historiography, which implicitly paralleled Ivan and Stalin by praising the tsar for strengthening the centralized Russian state through harsh measures (Robert Vipper, Sergei Bakhrushin, Ivan Smirnov). Stepan Veselovsky and Vladimir Kobrin subjected Platonov's concept to devastating criticism. Beginning in the 1960s, Soviet historians saw Ivan's policy as a struggle against various elements of feudal fragmentation (Alexander Zimin, Kobrin, Ruslan Skrynnikov).

The political liberalization of the late 1980s evoked totalitarian interpretations of Ivan's rule (the later works of Kobrin and Skrynnikov). Boris Uspensky, Priscilla Hunt, and Andrei Yurganov explain Ivan's behavior in terms of the cultural myths of the tsar's power.

See also: AUTOCRACY; BASIL III; GLINSKAYA, ELENA VASILYEVNA; KIEVAN RUS; KURBSKY, ANDREI MIKHAILOVICH; MAKARY, METROPOLITAN; MUSCOVY; OPRICHNINA; OTHRODOXY

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SERGEI BOGATYREV

IVAN V

(1666–1696), Tsar Ivan Alexeyevich, third son of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.

Ivan V, who suffered from physical and perhaps mental impairments, ruled jointly with his younger brother Peter (the Great). There is no evidence that Ivan ever exercised power or made any independent decisions during his lifetime. Virtually nothing is known about his early life in the Kremlin Palace. He suddenly came into prominence in April 1682 with the death of his older brother, Tsar Fyodor (r. 1676–1682). Though the boyars and the church passed him over in favor of his half-brother Peter, the revolt of the musketeers compelled them to appoint Ivan as co-tsar and soon made possible the emergence of Ivan's sister Sophia as regent of Russia. Despite having been often portrayed as merely the unhappy tool of Sophia and her Miloslavsky relatives against Peter and his family, the Naryshkins, it seems that Ivan's household soon distanced itself from Sophia and in 1689 supported the coup d'état that removed Sophia from the regency. In 1684 Sophia had Ivan married to Praskovya Saltykova, a young noblewoman from a clan Sophia believed to be friendly to her aims. Ultimately the Saltykovs supported Peter and became an important element in Peter's court. Ivan and Praskovya's daughter, Anna Ivanovna, ruled Russia from 1730 to 1740.

See also: PETER I; SOPHIA; STRELTSY

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IVAN VI

(1740–1764), emperor of Russia, October 28, 1740 to December 6, 1741.

Ivan was born in August 1740, the son of Duke Anton-Ulrich of Brunswick and Anna Leopoldovna (1718–1746), niece of the childless Empress Anna (reigned 1730–1740), who nominated Anna's as yet unborn child as her heir. The infant Ivan succeeded Anna in October 1740, first with Ernst J. Biron, then with Anna Leopoldovna as regent. A cabinet equally composed of Russians and Germans was formed. Supported by the very capable B. C. Münnich and Heinrich Osterman, the regime continued policies inaugurated during Empress Anna's reign. It fell as a result of its vulnerability more

than its inadequacy. The emperor's mother, the twenty-two year old regent, Anna Leopoldovna, became the target of gossip and scandal. In November/December 1741, on the eve of the departure of troops for war against Sweden, Peter I's daughter Elizabeth seized her chance to overthrow Ivan, with the support of guard regiments and the French and Swedish ambassadors. Elizabeth's proclamations emphasized the service she was doing Russia by bringing "German" rule to an end. Osterman and Münnich were sentenced to death, then reprieved and banished to Siberia. The deposed imperial family was moved to the far north and the ex-emperor Ivan was imprisoned in Schlüsselburg fortress to prevent him from becoming a rallying point for opposition to the throne. His mental health was severely damaged by years of incarceration. In 1764 a supporter devised an ill-conceived plan to release him and restore him to the throne, which had been seized by Catherine II in 1762. The ex-emperor was killed by his guards, who were acting on orders from St. Petersburg to take extreme measures in the event of an escape attempt.

See also: ELIZABETH; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH

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IVAN THE TERRIBLE *See* IVAN IV.**IVASHKO, VLADIMIR ANTONOVICH**

(b. 1932), Ukrainian Communist Party leader.

Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko was born in the Poltava region of Ukraine and made his career in politics. He graduated from the Kharkiv Mining Institute in 1956 and joined the Communist Party in 1960. In 1978 he was appointed secretary of the Kharkiv oblast (provincial) committee of the Party, and by 1986 he had been promoted to the Party secretariat. In 1987 Ivashko became the first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk Party organization in Ukraine (a very significant power base of the Soviet Union, and the area in which Leonid Brezhnev had made his career). At the same time, he became the deputy party leader of the Communist Party of

Ukraine (CPU) under Volodymyr Shcherbytsky (1918–1989). In early 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Ivashko was sent temporarily to Kabul, where he played the role of advisor to Soviet puppet ruler Babrak Karmal. Subsequently, however, he remained in Ukraine. After the resignation of Shcherbytsky in September 1989, Ivashko was elected first secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPU. During the summer of 1990, he resigned suddenly after Mikhail Gorbachev requested that he take up a newly created position in Moscow as deputy general secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on July 11, 1990. At the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress of the same month, he defeated Yegor Ligachev in an election to take on this role. Analysts continue to debate Ivashko's role in the failed putsch of August 1991 in Moscow, in which he appeared to have adopted a middle role between the plotters and Gorbachev.

See also: UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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IZBA

Izba is the Russian word for "peasant hut."

The East Slavic (Russian, Ukrainian) *izba* remained fundamentally unchanged as the Slavs migrated into Ukraine sometime after 500 C.E., then moved north to Novgorod and the Finnish Gulf by the end of the ninth century, and finally migrated east into the Volga-Oka mesopotamia between 1000 and 1300. Primarily the Slavs settled in forested areas because predatory nomads kept them north of the steppes. In forested regions the *izba* typically was a log structure with a pitched, thatched roof. The dimensions of the huts depended on the height of the trees out of which they were constructed. In the few non-forested areas where East Slavs lived prior to the construction of forti-

fied lines (especially the Belgorod Line in 1637–1653), which walled the steppe off from areas to the north of it, people inhabited houses constructed of staves, wattle, and mud. From time to time people also lived in semi-pit dwellings, dugouts in the ground covered over with branches and other materials to keep out the rain and snow.

The interiors of the *izba* were fundamentally the same everywhere, though the precise layouts depended on locale. In the North and in central Russia, when one entered through the door, the stove (either immediately adjacent to the wall or with a space between the stove and the wall) was immediately to the right, and the stove's orifice was facing the wall opposite the entrance. In southeastern Russia the stove was along the wall opposite the entrance, with the orifice facing the entrance. Other variations could be found in western and southwestern Russia. Because the fundamental problem of the *izba* was heating it, conservation of heat during the six months of the heating season (primarily October through March) was the major structural issue. There were several solutions. One was to chink the spaces between the logs with moss and mud. The second was the so-called "Russian stove," typically a large, three-chambered object made of various combinations of stone, mud, brick, and cement. Its three chambers extracted most of the heat before it reached the smoke hole and radiated it out into the room. The third solution for saving heat was not to have any form of chimney (and only a few small windows), because typically eighty percent of the heat generated by a stove or an open hearth in the middle of the room will be lost if there is a chimney venting the stove or a hole in the roof to exhaust the smoke. Such a large percentage of heat is lost because of the requirement of a "draw" to pull the smoke upward and out of the *izba*.

The consequences of this third form of *izba* heating were numerous. For one, there was soot scattered throughout the *izba*, typically with a line around the walls, about waist-high, marking where the bottom of the smoke typically was. The smoke had two basic harmful constituents: carbon monoxide gas and more than two hundred varieties of particulate matter. The harm this did to peasant health and the amount by which it reduced residents' energy have not been calculated. Government officials beginning at least as early as the reign of Nicholas I were concerned about the health impact of the smoky hut, and by 1900 most were gone, though some lingered on into the 1930s. That

peasants thereafter were able to afford the fuel to compensate for the heat lost through chimneys indicates that peasant incomes were rising.

The other features of the izba were benches around the room, on which the peasants sat during the day and on which many of them slept at night. The most honored sleeping places were on top of the stove. These places were reserved for the old people, an especially relevant issue after the introduction of the household tax in 1678, which forced the creation of the extended Russian family household and increased the mean household size from four to ten. This packing of so many people into the izba must have increased the communication of diseases significantly, another consequence of the izba that remains to be calculated.

The Russian word for "table" (*stol*) is old, going back to Common Slavic, whereas the word for chair (*stul*) only dates from the sixteenth century. These facts correspond with historians' general understandings: most peasant *izby* had tables, but many probably did not have chairs. Ceilings were introduced in some huts around 1800, pushing the smoke all the way down to the floor. Before 1800 the huts all had pitched roofs and the smoke would rise up under the roof and fill the space from the underside of the roof down to where the smoke line was. With the introduction of the ceiling, that cavity was lost and the smoke went down to the floor. Goods were stored in trunks.

See also: PEASANTRY; SERFDOM

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IZVESTIYA

The newspaper *Izvestiya* was first published on February 28, 1917, by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies formed during the February Revolution. The paper's name in Russian means "Bulletin," and it first appeared under the complete title "Bulletin of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies." Immediately upon seizing power in October 1917, the Bolsheviks appointed their own man, Yuri Steklov, editor-in-chief. In

March 1918 the newspaper's operations were transferred to Moscow along with the Bolshevik government. From an official standpoint the newspaper became the organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets—the leading organ of the Soviet government, as opposed to the Communist Party.

For the first ten years of its existence, the paper relied heavily on the equipment and personnel from the prerevolutionary commercial press. In Petrograd, *Izvestiya* was first printed at the former printshop of the penny newspaper *Copeck* (*Kopeyka*), and until late 1926 many of its reporters were veterans of the old *Russian Word* (*Russkoye slovo*).

Throughout the Soviet era *Izvestiya*, together with the big urban evening newspapers such as *Evening Moscow* (*Vechernaya Moskva*) was known as a less strident, less political organ than the official party papers such as *Pravda*. Particularly in the 1920s but also later, the paper carried miscellaneous news of cultural events, sports, natural disasters, and even crime. These topics were almost entirely missing from the major party organs by the late 1920s. In the late 1920s head editor Ivan Gronskey pioneered coverage of "man-against-nature" adventure stories such as the Soviet rescue of the crew of an Italian dirigible downed in the Arctic. Later dubbed "Soviet sensations" by journalists, such ideologically correct yet thrilling stories spread throughout the Soviet press in the 1930s.

In part as a result of its less political role in the Soviet press network, Josef Stalin and other Central Committee secretaries tended to be suspicious of *Izvestiya*. The editorial staff was subjected to a series of purges, beginning with the firing of "Trotskyite" journalists in 1925, and continuing in 1926 with the firing of veteran non-Communist journalists from *Russkoye slovo*. In 1934 the Party Central Committee appointed Stalin's former rightist political opponent Nikolai Bukharin to the head editorship. However in 1936 and 1937, Bukharin, former editor Gronskey, and many other senior editors were purged in the Great Terror. Bukharin was executed; Gronskey and others survived the Stalinist prison camps.

During the Thaw of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the editor-in-chief of *Izvestiya* was Alexei Adzhubei, Nikita Khrushchev's son-in-law, who used the paper to advocate de-Stalinization and Khrushchev's reforms. Under Adzhubei, *Izvestiya* writers practiced a "journalism of the person," which presented "heroes of daily life" and exposed

the problems of ordinary Soviet subjects. Adzhubei was removed from the editorship in 1964 when Khrushchev fell, but Thomas Cox Wolfe has argued that the “journalism of the person” laid important ideological groundwork for Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reform program in the second half of the 1980s.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, *Izvestiya* made a successful transition to operation as a private corporation.

See also: ADZHUBEI, ALEXEI IVANOVICH; JOURNALISM; UNIVERSITIES

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IZYASLAV I

(1024–1078), grand prince of Kiev and progenitor of the Turov dynasty.

Before Yaroslav Vladimirovich “the Wise” died in 1054, he designated his eldest living son, Izyaslav, as grand prince of Kiev. Izyaslav and his younger brothers Svyatoslav and Vsevolod ruled as a triumvirate for some twenty years. During that time they asserted their authority over all the other princes and defended Rus against the nomadic Polovtsy (Cumans). However, Izyaslav’s rule in Kiev was insecure. In 1068, after he was defeated by the Polovtsy and refused to arm the Kievans, the latter rebelled, and he fled to the Poles. Because his brother Svyatoslav refused to occupy the throne, Izyaslav returned to Kiev in 1069 with the help of Polish troops. Two noteworthy events occurred during his second term of rule. In 1072 he and his brothers transported the relics of Saints Boris and Gleb into a new church that he had built in Vyshgorod. They also compiled the so-called “Law Code of Yaroslav’s Sons” (*Pravda*

Yaroslavichey). In 1073, however, Izyaslav quarreled with his brothers. They drove him out of Kiev and forced him to flee once again to Boleslaw II of the Poles. Failing to obtain help there, he traveled to Western Europe, where he sought aid unsuccessfully from the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV and from Pope Gregory VII. He finally returned to Kiev after his brother Svyatoslav died there in 1076. His last sojourn in Kiev was also short: on October 3, 1078, he was killed in battle fighting his nephew Oleg, Svyatoslav’s son.

See also: GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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IZYASLAV MSTISLAVICH

(c. 1096–1154), grandson of Vladimir Vsevolodovich “Monomakh” and grand prince of Kiev.

Between 1127 and 1139, when his father Mstislav and his uncle Yaropolk ruled Kiev, Izyaslav received, at different times, Kursk, Polotsk, southern Pereyaslavl, Turov, Pinsk, Minsk, Novgorod, and Vladimir in Volyn. In 1143 Vsevolod Olgovich, grand prince of Kiev, gave him southern Pereyaslavl again, but his uncle Yuri Vladimirovich “Dolgoruky” of Suzdalia objected, fearing that he would use the town as a stepping-stone to Kiev. After Vsevolod died in 1146, the Kievans, despite having pledged to accept his brother Igor as prince, invited Izyaslav to rule Kiev because he belonged to their favorite family, the Mstislavichi. But his reign was insecure, because the Davidovichi of Chernigov and Yuri challenged him. In 1147, in response to a plot by the Davidovichi to kill Izyaslav and reinstate Igor, whom Izyaslav was holding captive, the Kievans murdered Igor. Meanwhile Yuri argued that Monomakh’s younger sons, Izyaslav’s uncles, had prior claims to Izyaslav, in keeping with the lateral system of succession to Kiev that Yaroslav Vladimirovich “the Wise” had allegedly instituted in his so-called testament. Yuri and his allies waged war on Izyaslav and expelled him on two occasions. Finally, in 1151, Izyaslav invited Vyacheslav, Yuri’s

elder brother, to rule Kiev with him. Yuri acknowledged the legitimacy of Vyacheslav's reign and allowed Izyaslav to remain co-ruler of Kiev until his death on November 13, 1154. Izyaslav's reign was exceptional in that, in 1147, he ordered a synod of bishops to install Klim (Kliment) Smolyatich as the second native metropolitan of Kiev.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH.

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MARTIN DIMNIK

JACKSON-VANIK AGREEMENT

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the U.S.-Soviet Trade Bill, which became law in 1974, was to play a major role in Soviet-American relations until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment had its origins in 1972. In response to the sharp increase in the number of Soviet Jews seeking to leave the Soviet Union, primarily because of rising Soviet anti-Semitism, the Brezhnev regime imposed a prohibitively expensive exit tax on educated Jews who wanted to leave. In response, Senator Henry Jackson of the State of Washington introduced an amendment to the Soviet-American Trade Bill, linking the trade benefits Moscow wanted (most favored nation treatment for Soviet exports and U.S. credits) to the exodus of Soviet Jews. Jackson's amendment quickly got support in Congress, as Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio introduced a similar amendment in the U.S. House of Representatives. The Soviet leadership, which might have thought that a trade agreement with the Nixon Administration would conclude the process, belatedly woke up to the growing Congressional opposition. After initially trying to derail the Jackson-Vanik amendment by threatening that it would lead to an increase in anti-Semitism both in the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet leaders began to make concessions. At first they said there would be exemptions to the head tax, and then they put the tax aside as the Soviet-American Trade Bill neared passage in Congress in 1974. At the last minute, however, Senator Adlai Stevenson III, angry at Soviet behavior during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 when Moscow had cheered the Arab oil embargo against the United States, introduced an amendment limiting U.S. credits to the Soviet Union to only \$300 million over four years, and prohibiting U.S. credits for developing Soviet oil and natural gas deposits. The Soviet leadership, which had been hoping for up to \$40 billion in U.S. credits, then repudiated the trade agreement. However, the impact of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment remained. Thus whenever Moscow sought trade and other benefits from the United States, whether in the 1978-1979 period under Brezhnev, or in the 1989-1991 period under Gorbachev, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union soared, reaching a total of 213,042 in 1990 and 179,720 in 1991.

See also: JEWS; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH



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JADIDISM

The term *jadidism* is used to describe a late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century project to modernize Turkic Islamic cultures within or indirectly influenced by the Russian Empire. Emerging between the 1840s and 1870s among a small number of intellectuals as a fragmented but spirited call for educational reform and wider dissemination of practical knowledge by means of the modern press, jadidism became by the early twentieth century a socially totalizing movement that was epistemologically rationalist and ultimately revolutionary in its expectations and consequences.

The successes of European and Russian advances into all of the historic centers of world civilization, beginning with the Portuguese explorations of the fifteenth century and lasting through the final stage of the Russian conquest of Central Asia in the 1880s, instigated reactions abroad that ranged from indifference to multiple forms of resistance and accommodation.

In those regions with historically deep literate cultures (China, India, and the Islamic lands from Andalusia to Central Eurasia and beyond), interaction with the West encouraged some intellectuals to question the efficacy for the unfolding modern age of arguably timeless cultural canons, centuries of commentaries, and classical forms of education, as well as political, economic, and social norms and practices. They concluded that modernity, as defined by what Europeans were capable of accomplishing and how they made their lives, was a goal

toward which all peoples had to strive, and that its pursuit required reform of indigenous cultures, if not their abandonment, with at least a degree of imitation of Western ways.

Within the Turkic communities of the Russian Empire, beginning with groups inhabiting the Volga-Ural region, Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Kazakh Steppe, the lures of modernity stimulated such reformist sentiments. The early advocates, all Russophiles, included Mirza Muhammad Ali Kazem Beg (1802–1870), Abbas Quli Aga Bakikhanli (1794–1847), Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzade (1812–1878), Hasan Bey Melikov Zardobi (1837–1907), Qokan Valikhanov (1835–1865), Ibrai Altynsarin (1841–1889), Abdul Qayyum al-Nasyri (1824–1904), and Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851–1914). These men, for the most part isolated from one another temporally and geographically, articulated critiques of the Islamic tradition that held intellectual and institutional sway over their separate societies. This critique did not decry Islamic ethics, nor did it deny historic achievements wherever Islam had taken root. Rather, it approached Islam from a rationalist perspective that reflected the influence of Western intellectual tendencies, through a Russian prism, emanating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This perspective viewed religion as socially constructed and not divinely ordained, as one more aspect of human experience that could and should be subjected to scientific inquiry and reexamination, and as a private, personal matter rather than a public one. For these men, who represent the first jadidists, the properly functioning, productive, competitive, and modern society was secular, guided but not trumped at every turn by religion.

The popular appeal of jadidism remained limited and diffused prior to the turn of the twentieth century. Projects for educational reform and publishing ventures were either short-lived or unfulfilled. The persistence of Ismail Bey Gaspirali in both areas proved a turning point, with his new-method schools (the first opened in 1884) establishing a model and his newspaper *Perevodchik/Tercuman* (The Interpreter, 1883–1918) becoming the first Turkic-language periodical in the Russian Empire to survive more than two years. These successes and the effects of social, economic, and political turmoil, which gained momentum across the empire between 1901 and 1907, helped expand the social base and influence of jadidism, leading to a proliferation of publications, regional and imperial-wide gatherings, and involvement in the newly created State Duma.

For a brief period, jadidism seemed to have come of age, but its apparent triumph disguised underlying confusion over its long-term goals and meaning. First, growing participation in the movement by Islamic clerics, some remarkably educated and attuned to early-twentieth-century realities, seemed fortuitous, but their attempts to reconcile Islam with the modern age, to draw analogies with the Christian Reformation and raise the specter of Martin Luther, and to persist in the goal of keeping Islam at the center of society ran against the fundamentally secular spirit of jadidism. Second, the jadidist founding fathers had accepted, for practical reasons if not genuine sympathy, Russian political authority and the need for close cooperation with the dominant Russian population. After 1905, such political accommodation seemed less persuasive to a new generation enervated by the patent weaknesses of the monarchy and the equally visible power of the people to influence imperial affairs. Finally, jadidism always spoke to a universal way of life that transcended the limitations of any particular religion, intellectual tradition, culture, or time. In post-1905 Russia, the appeal of local and regional ethnic identities overwhelmed this universalism and its moderating spirit, replacing it with romantic notions of primordial ethnicity, nationalism, and the nation-state. Against such forces, jadidism, as conceived by its putative founders, proved inadequate; by 1917, it had all but disappeared from the public discourse of Central Eurasia.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM

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EDWARD J. LAZZERINI

JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH

Russian-Japanese relations throughout the twentieth century were characterized by hostility, mu-

tual suspicion, and military conflict. Foreign policy perceptions, policies, and behaviors shaped the relationship, as did personalities, issues, and disputes—most notably the dispute over the four Kuril islands, or northern territories, in Japanese parlance. Japan and the USSR emerged from World War II with radically different views of security: the former inward-looking and defensive, with constrained military capabilities; the latter outward-looking, offensive, and militaristic. The Japanese were convinced that internal law and justice dictated the return of the southern Kurils, while the Soviets asserted that territory acquired by war could not be relinquished. Post-Soviet Russia has been more amenable to discussing the territorial issue, but progress has been glacial.

Russian explorers first pushed southward from Kamchatka into the Kuril island chain, encountering Japanese settlers in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The two countries eventually agreed on a border, with the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda granting Etorofu and the islands south of it to Japan. Russia's push into Manchuria and construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway late in the nineteenth century threatened Japan's growing



Russian president Vladimir Putin and Japanese prime minister Yoshiro Mori confer in Irkutsk, Russia, March 25, 2001. © AFP/CORBIS

imperial interests in China and led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. The 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth, brokered by U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, ended the war and gave Japan control of coal-rich Sakhalin south of the fiftieth parallel along with the adjacent islands.

Formally Russia's ally during World War I, Japan became alarmed at the Bolshevik coup in 1917 and subsequently deployed some 73,000 troops to protect its interests in the Russian Far East. Japan withdrew from Russia in 1922 but negotiated concessions for natural resources in northern Sakhalin. Tensions remained high during most of the interwar period, and there were armed clashes along the Soviet border with Japanese-occupied Manchuria between 1937 and 1939. Moscow and Tokyo negotiated a neutrality pact in April 1941. The two armies clashed only during the final days of the war, as the Red Army swept through Manchuria and occupied all of Sakhalin and the Kurils. Nearly 600,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were captured and interned in Soviet labor camps; roughly one-third of them perished in Siberia.

Relations between Japan and the USSR during the Cold War were tense and distant. The Soviet government refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty at the 1951 San Francisco Conference, which in any event failed to specify ownership of Sakhalin and the Kurils. Differing interpretations over sovereignty of the islands would preclude a Russo-Japanese peace treaty well into the twenty-first century. The Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 normalized relations and proposed the return of Shikotan and the Habomais (an idea quashed by U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles), but it failed to solve the territorial issue. Moscow objected to the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and from the 1960s through the 1980s targeted part of its substantial military force deployed in the Russian Far East toward Japan.

For much of the postwar era Russo-Japanese relations reflected the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. For Washington, Japan was the key ally against Communist expansion in the western Pacific. The Soviet leadership in the Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev eras seems to have regarded Japan as merely an extension of the United States, and consistently blamed Japan for the poor state of Russo-Japanese relations. Stalemate on the territorial issue served American interests by maintaining confrontation between Japan and Russia, ensuring the Soviets

would need to commit resources to protect their sparsely populated eastern borders.

Moscow's leadership refused to acknowledge Japan as a significant international actor in its own right, even as the country developed into an export powerhouse with the world's second largest economy. Moscow's approach to Japan must be viewed in the context of Soviet global and regional considerations, especially the Cold War competition with America and, after 1961, the deterioration of ties with Communist China. The Kremlin's foreign policy architects generally viewed Japan with disdain. They seldom relied on the considerable expertise of the USSR's Japan specialists and frequently pursued contradictory goals with regard to Japan.

Cultural distance also may explain part of the antipathy between Russia and Japan. Public opinion surveys indicate that Russia consistently ranks at the top of countries most disliked by Japanese. Russians are considerably more favorably inclined to Japan, but in many respects their two civilizations are very different. Tellingly, the collapse of the Soviet Union was not enough to provoke a sudden upsurge of pro-Russian sentiment, as it did in much of Europe and the United States.

Not until Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" did Soviet foreign policy show much flexibility toward Japan. Gorbachev and his foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze were more attentive to their Asia specialists, but they ranked Japan relatively low on the list of foreign policy priorities, after ties with the United States, Europe, and China. By the time Gorbachev visited Tokyo in April 1991, his freedom to maneuver was constrained by a backlash from conservatives in Moscow that, combined with growing nationalist and regional opposition, made any progress on the territorial issue virtually impossible.

Russo-Japanese relations did not improve markedly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian president Boris Yeltsin's 1993 meeting with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa produced the Tokyo Declaration, in which the two sides pledged to negotiate the territorial issue on the basis of historical facts and the principles of law and justice. But the two sides interpreted these terms differently. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996–1998) tried a package approach to relations, bundling a wide range of issues including trade, energy, security, and cultural exchanges, and he came closer to reaching an accord than had any previous Japan-

ese leader. But the flurry of informal summits and intensified diplomatic activity in the late 1990s failed either to deliver a peace treaty or to enhance economic cooperation.

Prospects for trade and investment improved early in the twenty-first century as Tokyo urged Moscow to approve a Siberian oil pipeline to the eastern coast, competing with a Chinese bid for a route to Daqing. Relations were said to be entering a new, businesslike phase following the January 2003 summit between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. But as in the latter half of the twentieth century, the territorial dispute remained the touchstone for Russo-Japanese relations.

See also: KURIL ISLANDS; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

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CHARLES E. ZIEGLER

JASSY, TREATY OF

During the eighteenth century, Russia and Turkey fought repeatedly for hegemony on the Black Sea and in adjacent lands, including the Pontic steppe. Russia's growing power became truly dominant during Catherine II's Second Turkish War, when the military-administrative talents of Grigory Alexandrovich Potemkin and the generalship of Alexander Vasilievich Suvorov and Nikolay Vasilyevich Repnin finally brought Turkey to its knees. In a treaty negotiated successively by Potemkin and Aleksandr Andreyevich Bezborodko at Jassy in modern Romania, Sultan Selim III's representative, Yusof Pasha, agreed with terms that essentially acknowledged Russia's stature as a Black Sea power.

Potemkin died before the treaty was signed on January 9, 1792, but his absence did not affect the outcome. Russia agreed to withdraw its troops from south of the Danube, and Turkey recognized Russian annexation of the Crimea and lands between the Bug and Dniester rivers. Both parties recognized the Kuban River as their mutual boundary in the foothills of the Caucasus, while Turkey agreed to restrain raids on Georgia and Russia's Kuban territories. The southern steppe now came under full Russian control, with a subsequent blossoming of settlement and commercial activities. The Russians now also had both naval bases on the Black Sea and a territorial springboard for further military action, either in the Caucasus or in the Balkans. The Treaty of Jassy thus marked a major milestone in the titanic struggle between Russia and Turkey for empire in the Black Sea basin.

See also: POTESKIN, GRIGORY ALEXANDROVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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BRUCE W. MENNING

JEW S

The Russian Empire acquired a Jewish population through the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. By 1800 Russia's Jewish population numbered more than 800,000 persons. During the nineteenth century the Jews of the Russian Empire underwent a demographic explosion, with their population rising to more than five million in 1897 (a number that does not include the approximately one million persons who emigrated from the empire prior to 1914). Legislation in 1791, 1804, and 1835 required most Jews to live in the provinces acquired from Poland and the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the so-called Pale of Jewish Settlement. There were also some residence restrictions within the Pale, such as a ban on settlement in most districts of the city of Kiev, and restrictions on settlement within fifty kilometers of the foreign borders. The Temporary

Laws of May 1882 forbade new Jewish settlement in rural areas of the Pale. Before 1882 the Russian state progressively permitted privileged categories of Jews (guild merchants, professionals, some

army veterans, students, and master-craftsmen) to reside outside the Pale. Larger in size than France, the Pale included areas of dynamic economic growth, and its restrictions were widely evaded,



Jewish bystanders are attacked by an angry mob after someone throws a bomb during the Christian Corpus Domini procession in Bielostok, June 1906. © MARY EVANS PICTURE LIBRARY

but it was nonetheless considered the single greatest legal liability on Russian Jews. The regulations of the Pale, including the May Laws, did not apply to Jews in the Kingdom of Poland, although they too were barred from settlement in the Great Russian provinces.

ECONOMIC LIFE

Jews were primarily a trade-commercial class, serving in the feudal economy as the link between the peasants and the market, and as agents of the noble landowners and leasees of the numerous monopolies on private estates. They were particularly active in the production and sale of spirits, as agents of noble and state monopolies on this trade. Individual Jewish families lived in peasant villages, while larger communities were found in market towns, the *shtetl* of Jewish lore.

The Jewish population increase and internal migration contributed to the growth of urban centers such as Odessa, Kiev, Vilna, Warsaw, and Lodz. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Jews moved into occupations in urban-based factory work. A small elite gained prominence as tax farmers, bankers, railway contractors, and industrial entrepreneurs. A number of Jews had successful careers in the professions, chiefly law, medicine, and journalism. Most Jews, however, lived lives of relative poverty.

RELIGION AND CULTURE

The vernacular of Jews in the empire comprised various dialects of Yiddish, a Germanic language with a substantial admixture of Hebrew and Slavic languages. Hebrew and Aramaic were languages of prayer and study. In the all-Russian census of 1897 more than 97 percent of Jews declared Yiddish their native language, although this figure obscures the high level of multi-lingualism among East European Jewry.

The empire's Jews were, with very few exceptions, Ashkenazi—a Yiddish-speaking cultural community that shared common rituals and traditions. It was a highly literate culture that valorized learning and the study of legal and homiletic texts, the Talmud. Ashkenazi culture also included elements of the Jewish mystical tradition, the Kabbalah. The main division between adherents to religious traditionalism in Eastern Europe was between the so-called *Mitnagedim*, (The Opponents) and the *Hasidim* (The Pious Ones). The latter contained many strands, each grouped around a charismatic leader, or *tzaddik* (righteous man).

There was also a small band of *maskilim*, the adherents of Haskalah, which was the Jewish version of the European Enlightenment movement. They advocated religious reform and intellectual and linguistic acculturation.

In an effort to reach the non-accultured masses, followers of the Russian Haskalah wrote literary works in Yiddish and Hebrew, helping to create standardized and modernized versions of both languages. The most notable of these writers were Abraham Mapu, Perez Smolenskin, and Reuven Braudes in modern Hebrew; Sholem Yakov Abramovich (pen name, Mendele Moykher-Sforim) in Hebrew and Yiddish; and Sholem Rabinovich (Sholem Aleichem) and Yitsak Leybush Perets in Yiddish. Avraam Goldfaden was the foremost creator of a Yiddish-language theater, although its growth was stunted by a governmental ban in 1883. The turn of the century saw the emergence of a number of outstanding Hebrew poets, most notably Khaim Nakhman Bialik and Shaul Chernikhovsky. There was a vigorous Jewish press in Hebrew, Yiddish, Russian, and Polish.

In response to the challenges of modernity, religious movements such as Israel Lipkin Salanter's Musar Movement, which penetrated traditional study centers (*yeshivas*), sought ways to preserve a vigorous traditional style of life. While women were not expected to be scholars, many were literate. Both religious and secular literature aimed at a female audience was published in Yiddish.

All young males were expected to study in religious schools known as the *cheder*. A state initiative of 1844 created a state-sponsored Jewish school system with primary and secondary levels, offering a more modern curriculum. Total enrollment was low, but the schools served Jews as a point of entry into Russian culture and higher education. Most *maskilim* and acculturated Jews in the mid-nineteenth century had some connection with this school system. By the 1870s Jews in urban areas began to enter Russian schools in large numbers. Concerned that the Jews were swamping the schools, the state imposed quotas on the admission of Jews to secondary and higher education. A number of Jews became prominent artists in Russia, most notably the painter Isaac Levitan and the sculptor Mark Antokolsky.

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT

Until 1844 the internal government of the Jews comprised the *kahal* (*kagal* in Russian), a system of autonomous local government inherited from



Russian Jews under assault while police look on with indifference, 1880s. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The *kahal*, dominated by local elites, exercised social control, selected the religious leadership (rabbis), and assessed and collected taxes under a system of collective responsibility. After 1827 the *kahal* also oversaw the selection of recruits for the army. A number of taxes were unique to the Jews, most notably a tax on kosher meat (*korobochka*) and a tax on sabbath candles. Jews in Poland and Lithuania created a number of national bodies, the *va'adim* (the singular form is *va'ad*), which assessed taxes on communities, negotiated with the secular authorities, and attempted to set social standards. Although similar bodies were abolished in Poland in 1764, the Russian state allowed Jews to create them on a regional basis. These included provincial *kahals*, and the institution of Deputies of the Jewish People, which lasted until 1825. Seen as an obstacle to Jewish integration, the *kahal* system was technically abolished in 1844, but virtually all of its functions endured unchanged.

Within each community existed a wide variety of societies (*hevrah*, plural: *hevrot*) that over-

saw an extensive range of devotional, educational, and charitable functions. The most important of these was the burial brotherhood, the *hevrah kad-disha*.

LEGAL STATUS

The defining characteristic of a Jew in Russian law was religious confession; a convert from Judaism to any other faith ceased legally to be a Jew. In other respects Russian law possessed numerous and contradictory provisions that applied only to Jews. In Russia's social-estate based system, almost all Jews were classed as townspeople (*meshchane*) or merchants (*kuptsy*), and the general regulations for these groups applied to them, but with many exceptions. Confusingly, all Jews were also placed in the social category of aliens (*inorodtsy*), which included groups such as Siberian nomads, who were under the special protection of the state. A huge body of exceptional law existed for all aspects of Jewish life, including tax assessment, military recruitment, residence, and religious life. Jewish

emancipation in Russia would have had to encompass the removal of all such special legislation.

THE "JEWISH QUESTION" IN RUSSIA

The guiding principles of Russia's Jewish policy were not based on traditional Russian, Orthodox Christian anti-Semitism, nor was there ever a sustained and coordinated effort to convert all Jews to Russian Orthodoxy, with the exception of conversionary pressures on Russian army recruits. Russian policy was influenced by the Enlightenment-era critique of the Jews and Judaism that saw them as a persecuted minority, but also isolated and backward, economically unproductive, and religious fanatics prone to exploit their Christian neighbors. In 1881 Russian policy was broadly aimed at the acculturation and integration of the Jews into the broader society. The anti-Jewish riots (pogroms) of 1881 and 1882 led to a reversal of this policy, inspiring efforts to segregate Jews from non-Jews through residence restrictions (the May Laws of 1882) and restricted access to secondary and higher education. Much of Russian legislation towards the Jews after 1889 lacked a firm ideological basis, and was ad hoc, responding to the political concerns of the moment.

Following the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, Russian public opinion, fearful of Jewish exploitation of the peasantry, grew increasingly critical of the Jews. These critical attitudes were characterized as Judeophobia. Originally based on concrete, albeit exaggerated, socioeconomic complaints (exploitation, intoxication of the peasantry), Russian Judeophobia acquired fantastic elements by the end of the century, exemplified by forgeries like *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which claimed to expose a Jewish plot bent on world domination. The presence of Jews in the revolutionary movement led the state to attribute political disloyalty to Jews in general. Right-wing political parties were invariably anti-Semitic, exemplified by their rallying cry, "Beat the Yids and Save Russia!"

Jews made significant contributions to all branches of the Russian revolutionary movement, including Populism, the Social Revolutionaries, and Marxist Social Democracy, which included a Jewish branch, the Bund, that concentrated on propaganda among the Jewish working class. Lev Pinsker, author of the 1882 pamphlet *Auto-Emancipation!*, and Ahad Ha'am were major ideologues of the early Zionist movement. East European Jews were the mainstay of Theodor Herzl's movement of political Zionism.

See also: BUND, JEWISH; JUDAIZERS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST PALE OF SETTLEMENT; POGROMS

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JOHN D. KLIER

JOAKIM, PATRIARCH

(1620–1690), Ivan "Bolshoy" Petrovich Savelov (as a monk, Joakim) was consecrated Patriarch Joakim of Moscow and All Russia on July 26, 1674.

When Patriarch Joakim assumed the post, the Russian Church was experiencing increasing opposition. Joakim moved firmly but tactfully to rationalize the administrative structure of the church, to bolster patriarchal finances, and to bring the institution under his control. Joakim's administrative reforms were complemented by efforts to revitalize the reform program begun at mid-century, which included both liturgical and spiritual reform. During Joakim's tenure, liturgical reform continued, and sermons and other simple religious tracts were composed, printed, and distributed in increasing numbers. Joakim was also committed to a program of education, under the control of the church. Joakim's ardent conviction that the church alone could define doctrine and should control education generated opposition. Individuals and groups, ranging from the original opponents of Patriarch Nikon and their followers to disparate dissenters who did not conform to new practices, vocally and sometimes violently opposed the liturgical and administrative changes effected by Patriarch Joakim and the church he led. When teaching, preaching, and persuasion failed to convince opponents, the state stepped in to persecute and repress. In the 1680s Joakim's determination that a proposed academy of higher learning be under patriarchal control led to a clash with the monk Sylvester Medvedev and a faction that enjoyed the sympathy of the regent, Sophia Alexeyevna. This conflict ripened into a dispute about the Eucharist that drew in learned members of the clerical elite in Ukraine. The debate threatened plans to subordinate the Kievan see to the Moscow patriarchate. Quickly it degenerated into polemics. The palace coup of 1689 that brought Peter to the throne ended the dispute. Patriarch Joakim's support of Peter assured his victory in this affair. Sylvester Medvedev was arrested, then, almost a year after Patriarch Joakim's death, tried and executed. This was a crude political resolution to what had begun as a learned debate. As such, it undermined the legitimacy of the church in the eyes of the educated. Joakim died on March 17, 1690, shortly after the coup, leaving a testament that manifested profound anxiety for the future of both church and state.

Joakim has attracted little scholarly attention. Discussions that relate to his patriarchate focus on the increasing influence of Ukrainian churchmen in Moscow, the struggle over the opening of an academy in Moscow, the Eucharistic controversy of the late 1680s, and the subordination of the Kievan church to the Russian patriarch. Until recently, the dominant theme in this literature was

the growing tension in Moscow as Old Muscovite culture confronted Ukrainian Culture and as supporters of a Greek direction for the Russian Church came into conflict with those favoring an allegedly Latin direction. Joakim traditionally was placed on the side of the conservative, Old Muscovite, Greek faction opposed to a progressive, Ukrainian, Latin faction. An emerging body of related scholarship questions this binary analysis, suggesting the need for a more complex approach to the period and the man.

See also: MEDVEDEV, SYLVESTER AGAFONIKOVICH; NIKON, PATRIARCH; PATRIARCHATE; PETER I; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SOPHIA

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CATHY J. POTTER

JOB, PATRIARCH

(d. 1607), first patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Tonsured in the Staritsky Monastery around 1553, Job was appointed archimandrite by Tsar Ivan IV in 1569. In 1571 he was transferred to Moscow as prior of the Simonov Monastery, then as head of the Novospassky Monastery (1575–1580). Job was consecrated Bishop of Kolomensk in April 1581, Archbishop of Rostov in 1586, and Metropolitan of Moscow in December 1586. On January 26, 1589, he was raised to the position of Patriarch of All Russia by Patriarch Jeremiah of Constantinople.

Job's consecration as Russia's first patriarch was an event of national significance. The Russian Church had formerly been under the jurisdiction of Constantinople with the status of a metropolitanate, but by the sixteenth century many Russians believed that Moscow was the last bastion of true faith, a "Third Rome." Hence the establishment of an autocephalous church was considered necessary for national prestige. During Russia's civil war

in 1605, Job played a leading role by declaring the Pretender “False Dmitry” a heretic and calling on the people to swear allegiance to Tsar Boris Godunov and his son Fyodor. Consequently, when Dmitry became tsar in June 1605 Job was deposed and exiled to Staritsky monastery. He died in 1607.

Although sometimes criticized by contemporaries and historians for his support of the Godunovs, Job was known as a humble man of impeccable morals, learned for his times, who worked for the good of the church and the promotion of Orthodox Christianity. In 1652 Job was canonized as a saint by Patriarch Nikon, with the approval of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.

See also: DMITRY, FALSE; FYODOR IVANOVICH; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; METROPOLITAN; NIKON, PATRIARCH; ORTHODOXY; PATRIARCHATE; SIMONOV MONASTERY

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DEBRA A. COULTER

JOSEPH OF VOLOTSK, ST.

(c. 1439–1515), coenobiarch and militant defender of Orthodoxy.

Of provincial servitor origin, Ivan Sanin became the monk Joseph (Iosif) around 1460 under the charismatic Pafnuty of Borovsk. Having a robust body, superb voice, powerful will, clear mind, excellent memory, and lucid pen, Joseph was forced by Ivan III to succeed as abbot in 1477. They soon quarreled over peasants, and in 1479 Joseph returned with six seasoned colleagues to Volotsk to start his own cloister under the protection of Ivan's brother Boris. Joseph attracted additional talent and quickly developed his foundation into a center of learning rivaling its model, Kirillov-Beloozersk. Dionisy, the leading iconographer of the day, painted Iosif's Dormition Church gratis.

Joseph joined Archbishop Gennady's campaign against the Novgorod Heretics in the late 1480s. Mas-

termining the literary defense of Orthodoxy, Joseph personally persuaded Ivan III to sanction the synod (1504), which condemned a handful of dissidents to death and others to monastery prisons. The celebrated quarrel with Nil Sorsky's disciple Vassian Patrikeyev and the “Kirillov and Trans-Volgan Elders” erupted soon after these executions, which, the latter argued, were not canonically justifiable.

In 1507, claiming oppression by his new local prince, Joseph placed his monastery under royal protection. He was then excommunicated by his new spiritual superior, Archbishop Serapion of Novgorod (r. 1505–1509), for failing to consult him. Basil III, Metropolitan Simon (r. 1495–1511), and the Moscow synod of bishops backed Joseph and deposed Serapion, but Joseph was tainted as the courtier of the grand prince and as a slanderer, while Vassian's star rose. Nevertheless, the monastery continued to flourish. As Joseph physically weakened, he formally instituted the cogoverning council, which ensured continuity under his successors.

Joseph's chief legacies were the Iosifov-Volokolamsk Monastery and his *Enlightener (Prosvetitel)* or *Book Against the Novgorod Heretics*. Under his leadership the cloister innovated and rationalized the lucrative commemoration services for the dead, patronized religious art, initiated one of the country's great libraries and scriptoria, and became a quasi-academy, nurturing prelates for half a century. Among his disciples and collaborators were the outstanding ascetic Kassian Bosoi (d. 1531), who had taught Ivan III archery and lived to help baptize Ivan IV; a nephew, Dosifey Toporkov, who composed the *Russian Chronograph* in 1512; the book-copyist Nil Polev, who donated to Iosifov the earliest extant copies of both Nil Sorsky's and Joseph's writings; and Joseph's enterprising successor, the future Metropolitan Daniel.

The *Enlightener*, produced before 1490 and revised through the year of Joseph's death, was his most authoritative and copied work. It served simultaneously as the foundation of Orthodoxy for militant churchman and as a doctrinal and ethical handbook for laity and clergy. Its dramatic and distorted introductory “Account of the New Heresy of the Novgorod Heretics” sets the tone of diabolic Judaizers confronted by heroic defenders of the faith. The eleven polemical-didactic discourses that follow justify Orthodoxy's Trinitarian and redemptive doctrines (1–4), the veneration of icons and other holy objects (5–7), the unfathomability of the Second Coming and the authority of Scripture

and patristics (8–10), and monasticism (11). The standard concluding part, either appended epistles composed before the 1504 synod in the brief redaction, or the four or five extra discourses of the post-1511 extended redaction, defend the repression and execution of heretics. Joseph's conscious rhetorical strategy of lumping all dissidence together allows him to impute to the heretics the objections by fellow Orthodox to inquisitorial measures. Among his notable assertions are that one should resist unto death the blasphemous commands of a tyrant; that killing a heretic by prayer or hands is equivalent; that one should entrap heretics with divinely wise tricks; and, most famous, that the Orthodox Tsar is like God in his authority.

Joseph's extended, fourteenth-discourse and nine-tradition *Monastic Rule*, adumbrated in a brief, eleven-sermon redaction, was Russia's most detailed and preaching work of its kind, but chiefly an in-house work for his cloister. The blueprint for the monastery's success is contained in his polemical claim to represent native traditions and his insistence on attentiveness to rituals, modesty, temperance, total obedience, labor, responsibility of office, precise execution of commemorations, protection of community property, pastoral care, and the council's authority. In addition, ten of his extant epistles defend the monastery's property in concrete ways. Questionable sources from the 1540s and 1550s, connected with his followers' struggles, also link him to the generic defense of monastic property, supposedly at a church council in 1503. He composed a variety of other admonitions, including a call for price-fixing during a local famine.

Canonized in 1591, Joseph was venerated also by the Old Believers. The Russian Church today invokes him as the "Russian star," but some observers since the 1860s have considered his ritualism and inquisitorial intolerance an unfortunate phenomenon and legacy.

See also: BASIL III; CHURCH COUNCIL; DANIEL, METROPOLITAN; DIONISY; IVAN III; JUDAIZERS; ORTHODOXY; POSSESSORS AND NON-POSSESSORS

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

JOURNALISM

Russian journalism, both under the tsars and since, has more often responded to state requirements than it has exemplified the freedom of the press. Moreover, not until a decade or so before the 1917 Revolution did a number of newspapers win mass readerships by lively and extensive daily reporting of domestic and foreign news.

Peter I (r. 1682–1725) started the first newspaper in a small format, the *St. Petersburg Bulletin*, and wrote for it himself to advance his reform program. Later in the eighteenth century journals appeared as outlets for literary and didactic works, but they could not escape the influence of the state. As part of her effort to enlighten Russia, Catherine II (r. 1762–1796) launched *All Sorts of Things* in 1769. This was a weekly publication modeled on English satirical journals. Nicholas Novikov, a dedicated Freemason, published his well-known *Drone* on the presses of the Academy of Sciences, providing outlet for pointedly critical comments about conditions in Russia, including serfdom, but he went too far, and the Empress closed down his publishing activities.

In the early, reformist years of the reign of Alexander I (1801–1825), a number of writers promoted constitutional ideas in periodicals controlled or subsidized by the government. Between 1804 and 1805, an education official named I. I. Martynov edited one such newspaper, *Northern Messenger*, and promoted Western ideas. He portrayed Great Britain as an advanced and truly free society. Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin, the tsar's unofficial historian, founded *Messenger of Europe* (1802–1820) to introduce Russian readers to European developments.

Among the reign's new monthlies, those issued by the Ministries of War, Public Education, Justice, the Interior, and the Navy continued until the 1917 Revolution. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a newspaper in French. After the Napoleonic wars, Alexander I backed a small newspaper, *Messenger of Zion*, its main message being that the promoters of Western European Enlight-



A student browses through newspapers for sale at a St. Petersburg University kiosk, 1992. © STEVE RAYMER/CORBIS

ement were plotting to subvert the Russian church and state.

The reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855) saw commercial successes by privately owned but pro-government periodicals. For example, the *Library for Readers*, founded by Alexander Filippovich Smirdin, reached a peak circulation of seven thousand subscribers in 1837. As the first of the so-called thick journals that dominated journalism for about three decades, each issue ran about three hundred pages and was divided into sections on Russian literature, foreign literature, science, art, and the like. Its size and content made it especially appealing in the countryside, where it provided a month's reading for landlord families. Works by virtually all of Russia's prominent writers appeared in serial form in such journals.

Smirdin also acquired Russia's first popular, privately owned daily newspaper, *Northern Bee*, which was essentially a loyalist publication that had permission to publish both foreign and domestic political information. The *Bee* also had the exclusive right to publish news of the Crimean

War, but only by excerpting it from the Ministry of War's official newspaper, *Russian War Veteran*. During the war, the *Bee* achieved the unprecedented readership of ten thousand subscribers.

Another major development was the growing success in the 1840s of two privately owned journals, *Notes of the Fatherland* and *The Contemporary*. Each drew readers largely by publishing the literary reviews of a formidable critic, Vissarion Belinsky, who managed to express his moral outrage at human wrongs, despite the efforts of censors. However, journalism turned from a literary emphasis to a more political one during the reign of the tsar-reformer Alexander II (r. 1855–1881), who emancipated some 50 million serfs and effected reforms in education, local government, the judiciary, and the military, and relaxed the practice of preliminary, or pre-publication, censorship. One of his first steps in this regard was, in 1857, to permit journalists to publicize the peasant emancipation question, a topic previously forbidden. The next was allowing journalists to comment on how best to reform the courts and local government.

Journalists seized what was, on the whole, a genuine expansion of free speech about public affairs. They had as their ideal Alexander Herzen, the emigre whose banned words they read in *The Bell*, a Russian-language paper he produced in London and smuggled into Russia. By keeping informed on developments in Russia through correspondence and visitors, Herzen published authoritative information and liberal arguments, especially on the emancipation of the serfs, and influenced many who served under Alexander II. Meanwhile, Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky, an erudite man who read several languages, became Russia's leading political journalist through the pages of *The Contemporary*; and he, like Herzen, wove in relevant events from Western Europe to shape public and government opinion on reform issues. Another such journalist, Dmitry Pisarev, wrote many of his major pieces in prison, and published them in the other major radical journal within the Empire, *Russian Word*; however, he espoused the nihilist position of accepting nothing on faith but, rather, testing all accepted truths and practices by the critical tools of reason and science. In line with the view of a liberal censor at that time, Alexander Vasilevich Nikitenko, higher censorship officials suspended both journals for eight months in 1862 and later permanently closed them.

Through his new censorship statute of 1865, widely hailed as a reform, Alexander II unleashed a major expansion of the commercial daily press, which was concentrated in Moscow and the capital, St. Petersburg. During the last decade of the previous reign, only six new dailies (all in the special-interest category) had been allowed, but officials now approved sixty new dailies in the first decade under Alexander II, and many of these were granted permission to publish not just general news but also a political section. In 1862, private dailies received permission to sell space to advertisers, a right that allowed lower subscription fees. The new income source prompted the publisher of *Son of the Fatherland* to change it from a weekly to a daily, and it soon acquired twenty thousand subscribers, well over half of them in the provinces.

By Western standards, however, overall circulation levels remained modest, even as more and more newspapers became commercially successful in the 1860s. Andrei Alexandrovich Kraevsky's moderate daily, *Voice*, saw profits grow as readers increased to ten thousand by the close of the 1860s. *Moscow Bulletin*, edited by Michael Katkov, who leased it in 1863 and changed it from a weekly to

a daily, doubled its circulation to twelve thousand in two years' time, in part because of its ardently nationalistic leaders, which were front-page opinion pieces modeled on French *feuilletons* and written by Mikhail Nikiforovich Katkov, known as the editorial "thunderer." Just as outspoken and popular were the leaders written in the capital for the daily, *St. Petersburg Bulletin*, by Alexei Sergeevich Suvorin, who kept that conservative paper's circulation high. Readers preferring nationalistic and slavophile journalism critical of the government bought Ivan Aksakov's *Day* (1865–1866) and then his *Moscow* (1867–1869), its end coming when the State Council banned his daily and barred him from publishing, citing his unrelenting defiance of censorship law.

Another boon for newspapers under Alexander II was their new right, granted in the early 1860s, to buy foreign news reports received in Russia by the Russian Telegraph Agency (RTA, run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), after such dispatches had been officially approved. In this period, too, publishers improved printing production by buying advanced equipment from Germany and elsewhere in Europe, including typesetting machines and rotary presses that permitted press runs in the tens of thousands. Publishers also imported photographic and engraving tools that made possible the pictorial magazines and Sunday supplements.

Following the politically-motivated murder of Alexander II, his son and heir Alexander III (r. 1881–1894) gave governors full right to close publications judged to be inciting a condition of alarm in their provinces, without the approval of the courts. But there were still possibilities for critical journalists even at a time of conservative government policies. Nicholas K. Mikhailovsky, who espoused a radical populist viewpoint, published in *Notes of the Fatherland* until the government closed it in 1884. Most of the staff moved to *Northern Messenger*, which began publishing in 1885. After spending a period in exile, Mikhailovsky joined the *Messenger* staff and wrote later for two other populist journals, *Russian Wealth* and *Russian Thought*. He was one of the outstanding examples of the legal populist journalists and led the journalistic critique of the legal Marxists.

During the early years of Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917), some Russian journalists promoted anti-government political and social views in the papers printed abroad by such illegal political par-

ties as the Social Democrats, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Union of Liberation. The Social Democrats, led by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, began *Spark* in 1902 in London, its declared purpose being to unseat the tsar and start a social revolution. Those who backed *Spark* in Russia had to accept *Spark's* editorial board as their party's leaders. When the various anti-autocracy factions cohered as legal parties in Russia following the Revolution of 1905, each published its own legal newspaper. The Mensheviks launched *Ray* in 1912 and Lenin's Bolsheviks started *Pravda* (Truth) in 1912, but the government closed the latter in 1914. (*Pravda* emerged again after the Revolution of 1917 as the main outlet for the views of the ruling Communist Party). Another type of journalism was that of Prince V. P. Meshchersky, editor of the St. Petersburg daily, *The Citizen*. Meshchersky accepted money from a secret government "reptile" fund. His publishing activities were completely venal, but both Alexander II and Nicholas II supported him because of his pro-autocracy, nationalistic views.

With mass publishing commonplace in the big cities of Russia by 1900, publishers in those centers continued to increase readerships, some with papers that primarily shocked or entertained. In the first category was *Rumor* of St. Petersburg; in the second, *St. Petersburg Gazette*, for which Anton Chekhov wrote short stories pseudonymously. The copeck newspapers of Moscow and St. Petersburg provided broad coverage at little cost for urban readers. Making a selling point of pictures and fiction, by 1870 Adolf Fyodorovich Marks lined up nine thousand paid subscriptions to meet the initial costs of his illustrated magazine, *The Cornfield*, which was the first of the so-called thin journals, and increased readership to 235,000 by century's turn. The government itself entered into mass production of its inexpensive newspaper for peasants, *Village Messenger*, and achieved a press run of 150,000.

High reporting standards set by long-time publisher Alexei Sergeevich Suvorin, on the other hand, won a large readership for the conservative *New Times*, the daily he had acquired in 1876. Reputedly the one paper read by members of the Imperial family, *New Times* merited respect for publishing reporters such as Vasily Vasilevich Rozanov, one of the best practitioners of the cryptic news style typical in modern journalism. Imperial funding to friendly publishers like Suvorin, regardless of need, continued to 1917 through subsidies and subscription purchases. (Other recipients of lesser stature were *Russian Will*, *Contemporary*

Word, *Voice of Moscow*, and *Morning of Russia*.) Another paper receiving help from the government was *Russian Banner*, the organ of the party of the extreme right wing in Russia after 1905, the Union of the Russian People. On the other end of the political spectrum, satirical publications targeting high officials and Tsar Nicholas II flourished in the years 1905 through 1908, though many were short-lived. One count shows 429 different titles of satirical publications during these years.

One outstanding newspaper, *Russian Word* of Moscow, became Russia's largest daily. Credit goes to the publisher of peasant origins, Ivan D. Sytin, who followed the journalistic road urged on him by Chekhov by founding a conservative daily in 1894 and transforming it into a liberal daily outside party or government affiliations. Sytin was no writer himself, but in 1901 he hired an excellent liberal editor, Vlas Doroshevich, who became one of Russia's most imitated journalists and a prose stylist whom Leo Tolstoy ranked as second only to Chekhov. Doroshevich gained the title king of *feuilletonists* by dealing with important issues in an engaging, chatty style. As editor of *Word*, he ordered each reporter to make sense of breaking events by writing as if he were the reader's informative and entertaining friend. At the same time he barred intrusion by the business office into the newsroom, and kept Sytin to his promise not to interfere in any editorial matters whatsoever. Through these journalistic standards, Doroshevich built *Russian Word* into the only million-copy daily published in Russia prior to the Revolution of 1917.

Pravda, not *Russian Word*, however, would be the paper that dominated the new order established by Lenin's Bolsheviks. In the early twenty-first century, the front section of the building that housed *Word* abuts the building of *Izvestiia*, another Bolshevik paper from 1917 that has, in its post-communist incarnation, become one of Russia's great newspapers. *Pravda*, the huge Soviet-era daily with a press-run of more than six million, was first and foremost the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and it perpetuated Lenin's idea that the press in a socialist society must be a collectivist propagandist, agitator, and organizer. Other newspapers during the Soviet era were bound to follow *Pravda's* political line, expressed in the form of long articles and the printing of speeches of high officials, and to promote the achievements of Soviet life. Regional and local papers, little distinguishable

from *Pravda* in format, had leeway to cover local news, and specialized papers had scope to introduce somewhat different coverage, as well. In any event, the agitational purpose of Soviet papers meant that Western concepts of independent reporting and confidentiality of sources had no place in journalism in the USSR.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new Constitution of the Russian Federation, approved by popular referendum on December 12, 1993, recognized freedom of thought and speech, forbade censorship, and guaranteed “the right to freely seek, obtain, transmit, produce, and disseminate information by any legal method.” The Constitution prohibited the creation of a state ideology that could limit the functioning of the mass media. Within months, in June of 1994, the Congress of Russian Journalists insisted that journalists resist pressure on the reporting of news from any source.

Russian journalists, working to these high standards, have sometimes paid a price for their commitment to objective reporting. Journalist Anna Politkovskaya, for writing critical dispatches from Chechnya for the small, biweekly newspaper *New Gazette*, was detained for a period by the FSB, the federal security service, and received numerous threats to her personal security. When Gregory Pasco, the naval officer turned journalist, exposed nuclear waste dumping in the Pacific Ocean by the Russian fleet, a court convicted him of treason. Other Russian journalists who engaged in forthright reporting have been killed under mysterious circumstances.

Major Russian newspapers have not managed to establish their own financial independence, because they are owned by wealthy banks and resource companies closely connected to the federal government. Most newspapers outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg (from 95 to 97% of them, according to the Glasnost Foundation) are owned or controlled by governments at the provincial or regional level. One of their tasks is to assist in the reelection of local officials. Overall, only a handful of newspapers in Russia are independent journalistic voices in the early twenty-first century. On the other hand, controls on journalism in Russia are no longer monolithic, as in the Soviet era, and citizens of the Russian Federation had access to varied sources of news reports in the print and electronic media. The Internet newspaper *lenta.ru*, for instance, offers coverage comparable to a Western paper.

See also: BELINSKY, VISSARION GRIGORIEVICH; CENSORSHIP; CHERNYSHEVSKY, NIKOLAI GAVRILOVICH; HERZEN, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH INTELLIGENTSIA; KATKOV, MIKHAIL NIKIFOROVICH; MIKHAILOVSKY, NIKOLAI KONSTANTINOVICH; NEWSPAPERS; SUVORIN, ALEXEI SERGEYEVICH; SYTIN, IVAN DMITRIEVICH; THICK JOURNALS

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CHARLES A. RUUD

JUDAIZERS

A diverse group of heretics in Novgorod (c. 1470–1515), sometimes referred to as the Novgorod-Moscow heretics.

The Judaizing “heresy” arose in Novgorod in the years 1470 and 1471, after a Kievan Jew named Zechariah (Skhary) proselytized the priest Alexei, who in turn enticed the priest Denis and many others, including the archpriest Gavril, into Judaism. Around 1478, Ivan III, who had just subjugated Novgorod, installed them in the chief cathedrals of the Moscow Kremlin. In 1484 or 1485, the influential state secretary and diplomat Fyodor Kuritsyn and the Hungarian “Martin” joined with Alexei and Denis and eventually attracted, among others, Metropolitan Zosima (r. 1490–1494), as well as Ivan III’s daughter-in-law Elena of Moldavia. Meanwhile, Archbishop Gennady of Novgorod (r. 1484–1504) discovered the Novgorod heretics and started a campaign against them, which was later taken up by Joseph of Volotsk. Synods were held in Moscow in 1488 and 1490, leading to an auto-da-fé in Novgorod and to the imprisonment of Denis and several others. Alexei had already died, however, and several others, like the historiographer-copyist Ivan Cherny, fled. Joseph’s faction forced

Zosima from office and convened another Moscow synod in 1504, which condemned five heretics to death, including the late Kuritsyn's brother Ivan Volk, a state secretary expert in the law, and Archimandrite Kassian of Novgorod's Yurev Monastery. Others, like the merchant Semon Klenov, were imprisoned.

The accusations against the "heretics" reveal a hodgepodge of tenets rather than a coherent sect. The dissidents allegedly elevated Old Testament law, denigrated Christian scripture and patristic writings, attacked icons and monasticism, and denied the Trinity and the Incarnation. They dissimulated in the presence of steadfast adherents of Orthodoxy, practiced astrology and black magic, and after the end of the Russian Orthodox year 7000 (1492 C.E.) ridiculed Christian writings that had predicted the Second Coming around that time, and especially the New Testament for describing its own era as the last epoch. They also opposed the condemnation of heretics and demanded that repentant heretics not be punished.

Whatever Jewishness lies behind these accusations may go back to the scriptural, astronomical, and philosophical interchanges between Jews and Orthodox Christians in western Rus during the fifteenth century. Fyodor Kuritsyn's "Laodician Epistle," a chain poem, is reminiscent of Jewish wisdom literature. In addition, the dissidents were more open to secular culture and rationalism than most representatives of the official church. Some of the accusations of heresy may have derived from issues pertaining to specific icons, to various Novgorodian practices, to the use of Jewish astronomical knowledge, to Moscow's treatment of conquered Novgorod, and even to church lands. Whatever the case, when a similar outbreak of dissidence occurred in Novgorod and Moscow during the 1550s, it was attributed to Protestant, not Jewish, influences. The phenomenon of dissidence prompted Archbishop Gennady to assemble a coterie of Orthodox and Catholic experts to compile the first complete Slavonic Bible and make other useful translations.

See also: IVAN III; JOSEPH OF VOLOTSK, ST.; KURITSYN, FYODOR VASILEVICH; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; ORTHODOXY; POSSESSORS AND NON-POSSESSORS

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

JULY DAYS OF 1917

Abortive Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd in July 1917.

On July 3–5, 1917, in Petrograd, militant soldiers, sailors, and factory workers staged an abortive uprising. For weeks, local Bolshevik, Anarchist, and Left Socialist Revolutionary organizers had agitated against the Provisional Government and for immediate transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. This call to action resonated with workers engaged in bitter labor conflicts and among garrison soldiers facing deployment to the front. July 3 witnessed a flurry of meetings, demonstrations, and strikes. That evening tens of thousands of soldiers and workers, led by left socialist agitators, marched on the city center and insisted that the Soviet assume power. However, the Soviet's Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary leaders, already engulfed in a crisis in the government coalition, refused.

The Bolshevik Military Organization and Petersburg Committee pushed for an uprising while the Central Committee wavered. Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev, and Lev Kamenev initially urged restraint but tentatively endorsed the demonstrations in the early hours of July 4. The party's leader, Vladimir Lenin, remained absent from Petrograd until midday.

On July 4 huge crowds of armed workers, soldiers, and sailors controlled the city's streets; nearly four hundred people died in scattered fighting and random shootings. Crowds again demanded that unwilling Soviet leaders accept power. Lenin and the Central Committee meanwhile debated the possibility of a successful seizure of power. By evening, the tenor of events had changed dramatically. When the government publicly alleged that Lenin was a German agent, several garrison units turned against the demonstrations. Rumor spread that sol-

diers were marching on Petrograd to defend the government. By morning on July 5, the inchoate seizure of power collapsed. The government arrested several Bolshevik leaders, on whom it blamed the uprising. Lenin went into hiding, and his party suffered a significant temporary decline.

The July Days resonated throughout Russia—rallies for Soviet power, for instance, took place in Moscow, Saratov, Krasnoyarsk, and other provincial cities—but its chief significance lay in exposing the fragility of the Provisional Government and

in accelerating the polarization of Russian politics and society.

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MICHAEL C. HICKEY


KABARDIANS

Kabardians are one of the titular nationalities of the north Caucasian Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria in the Russian Federation. The population of the republic, whose capital city is Nalchik, is 790,000, of whom 48 percent are Kabardian. Of these, 55 percent are rural and engaged in agriculture, animal husbandry, and metallurgy, as well as in health services in the well-known spa resorts of the region. Kabardians also live in the adjacent Stavropol Krai, the Krasnodar Krai, and in North Ossetia.

Kabardian is linguistically classified as East Circassian, and the Kabardians belong to the same ethnolinguistic family as the Adyge and the Cherkess who live in neighboring republics. Policies on nationalities during the Soviet era established these three groups as separate “peoples” and languages, but historical memory and linguistic affinity, as well as post-Soviet ethnic politics, perpetuate notions of ethnic continuity. An important element in this has been the contact, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, with Kabardians living in Turkey, Syria, Israel, Jordan, western Europe, and the United States. These are the descendents of migrants who left for the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. In the 1990s a number of Kabardian families from the diaspora settled in Nalchik, but integration remains fraught with social and legal problems.

The Kabardians are largely Muslim, though a small Kabardian Russian Orthodox group inhabits the city of Mozdok in Ossetia. Other religious influences, including Greek Orthodox Christianity and indigenous beliefs and rituals, can still be discerned in cultural practices. The Soviet state discouraged Islamic practice and identity but supported cultural nation-building. Kabardian folk-dance groups (i.e., “Kabardinka”) have achieved widespread fame.

In the post-Soviet period, interethnic tensions led, in the early 1990s, to an attempted partition of the republic between the two nationalities, but this did not come to pass. The wars in Abkhazia (between 1992 and 1993) and Chechnya (1994–1997; 1999–2000) affected Kabardian sympathies and politics, causing the Russian state to intermittently infuse the republic with resources to prevent the spreading of conflict. Islamic movements, generally termed “Wahhabism,” are in some evidence, and mosque building and religious instruction and practice are on the increase.



See also: ABKHAZIAN; ADYGE; CAUCASUS; CHERKESS; CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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SETENEY SHAMI

KADETS *See* CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

KAGANOVICH, LAZAR MOYSEYEVICH

(1893–1991), Stalinist; deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union from 1944 to 1957.

Known for his viciousness, Lazar Kaganovich was a staunch Stalinist and a ruthless participant in the purges of the 1930s. Born near Kiev, Ukraine, Kaganovich became active in the Social Democratic Party from 1911 and served as the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party from 1925 to 1928. A brilliant administrator, Kaganovich served on the Presidium of the CPSU from 1930 to 1957 and held numerous important posts, including first secretary in the Moscow Party Organization (1930–1935), key administrator of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee (1933), people's commissar of transport (1935), and people's commissar of heavy industry (1935). In December 1944 he was appointed deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union.

An influential proponent of forced collectivization, Kaganovich advocated harsh repression of the rich peasants, or kulaks, in the late 1920s. During

the grain procurement campaign of 1932, Kaganovich headed a commission that was sent to the North Caucasus to speed up grain collection. On November 2 his commission adopted a resolution that called for the violent breakup of kulak sabotage networks and the use of terror to break the resistance of rural communists. The result was the arrest of thousands and the deportation of tens of thousands of rural inhabitants.

His belief in the efficacy of coercion led him to develop a strategy that called for indiscriminate mass repression of workers as a way to increase productivity and punish what he considered anti-Soviet actions in industry. As commissar of transport, Kaganovich was particularly hard on railway men, calling for the death sentence for various offenses that might lead to the breakdown of Soviet transport plans. He devised the so-called theory of counterrevolutionary limit setting on output that he used to destroy hundreds of engineering and technical cadres.

In the Great Purges (1936–1938) Kaganovich took the extreme position that the Party's interests justified everything. In the summer of 1937 Kaganovich was sent to carry out purges of local Party organizations in Chelyabinsk, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, and Smolensk. Throughout 1936 and 1937 he also had all his deputies, nearly all road chiefs and political section chiefs, and many other officials in transport arrested without any grounds whatsoever. In August 1937 he demanded that the NKVD (secret police) arrest ten officials in the People's Commissariat of Transport because he thought their behavior suspicious. All were arrested as spies and shot. He ultimately had thirty-eight transport executives and thousands of Party members arrested.

Following Stalin's death in 1953, Kaganovich opposed Nikita Khrushchev's proposal to admit errors committed by the Party under Stalin's leadership. He remained an oppositionist, eventually allying with Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Dmitry Shepilov, in the so-called Anti-Party Group that attempted to remove Khrushchev from power in 1957. Following the failed coup, Kaganovich was removed from his position as deputy prime minister and assigned to managing a potash works in Perm oblast. He died there of natural causes in 1991.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; KULAKS; PURGES, THE GREAT; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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KATE TRASCHEL

KAL 007

On September 1, 1983, a Soviet SU-15 shot a Korean civilian 747 airliner from the sky. All 269 passengers on board perished. Korean authorities publicly stated the plane had mistakenly strayed off its intended course by some 365 miles. This was caused by a technical error programmed into the inertial navigation system by the plane's pilot, according to Korean authorities. Unfortunately, the plane entered Soviet territory over the Kamchatka peninsula where submarines were located and, on the night of the flight, a secret test of an SS-25 Soviet missile reportedly was planned. A U.S. RC-135 spy plane was in the area, and it is assumed the Soviets believed they were destroying the RC-135 or a civilian version of a spy plane. Soviet Colonel Gennadi Osipovich was the pilot given the responsibility of challenging and eventually shooting and destroying Korean Airlines flight 007. Osipovich recalled in a 1996 interview in the *New York Times* how he pulled alongside the airliner and recognized in the dark the configuration of windows indicating a civilian airliner. He believed this civilian airliner could have a military use and believes to this day, according to the interview, that the plane was on a spy mission. He regrets not shooting the plane down over land so that such proof could be recovered. If Osipovich had waited another twenty to twenty-five seconds to destroy the plane, KAL 007 would have been over neutral territory, which most likely would have averted the incident. A serious U.S.-Soviet diplomatic fallout ensued.

See also: KOREA, RELATIONS WITH

TIMOTHY THOMAS

KALININGRAD

At the 1945 Potsdam Conference, the Western allies acceded to Josef Stalin's demand that the northern third of East Prussia be awarded to the Soviet Union. He provided two justifications for the transfer of the territory that would be renamed Kaliningrad: The USSR needed an ice-free port on the Baltic Sea, and, through the annexation, the Germans would compensate the Soviet people for the millions of lives they lost at the hands of the Nazi invaders. The American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, said in the Potsdam Protocol that the transfer of territory was contingent upon a final peace treaty; this treaty was never signed by the Allied and Axis powers.

The Prussians, who originally occupied the area, lost their lands after the Teutonic Knights invaded the southern shores of the Baltic littoral in the thirteenth century. By the seventeenth century, the Prussians—cousins to the Latvians and Lithuanians, all of whom spoke a closely related language—disappeared as a nation, and the German invaders henceforth adopted the name "Prussians."

Russians never lived in East Prussia, although in 1758, during the Seven Years War, Russian troops briefly occupied the capital Königsberg and some surrounding territory. After World War I, the German province of East Prussia was created on this territory but was separated from the rest of Germany by the Polish Corridor. Poland was awarded the southern two-thirds of old East Prussia after World War II, and the Soviet Union took control of its northern third, about the size of Northern Ireland. Henceforth most of the German residents fled, or were forced from the area, and their farms and cities were occupied by migrants from other areas of the Soviet Union. Most were Russians and by the mid-1990s this westernmost Russian region had about 930,000 residents. About 80 percent lived in urban areas, the rest in the countryside.

During the Cold War, Kaliningrad was a closed territory with a heavy military presence: The USSR's Baltic Sea fleet was located there along with contingents of ground and air defense units. It was the first line of defense against an attack from the west and could be used simultaneously for offensive operations in a westward coup de main.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kaliningrad became an "exclave" of the Russian Fed-

eration (i.e., a geographical anomaly, since it was a political entity of Russia but surrounded by Lithuania, Poland, and the Baltic Sea). All land and rail routes to and from Kaliningrad to Russia henceforth had to traverse foreign borders.

In the 1990s Kaliningrad was perceived simultaneously as a flash point of conflict with its neighbors and a gateway to Europe. The first perspective was based on the presence of large numbers of Russian troops, and on Russian fears that foreign interests (in Germany and Lithuania) claimed the oblast. By the late 1990s none of these latent points of conflict became manifest. According to U.S. government estimates, there were 25,000 Russian military personnel in the oblast, and no foreign government had claims on it.

But Kaliningrad did not become a gateway to Europe either. On the contrary: Afflicted by daunting economic, political, and social problems, Kaliningrad was described by Western observers as a “black hole” in the center of Europe. Today the oblast no longer receives the heavy subsidies it enjoyed during the Soviet era, and it has experienced greater dips in its agricultural and manufacturing sectors than other Russian regions. To make matters worse, the region’s residents and political leadership complained that the authorities in Moscow have ignored them, or have adopted conflicting policies that have exacerbated the oblast’s economic problems.

To attract domestic and foreign investment, first a “free” and then a “special” economic zone was created. But Moscow’s failure to enact enabling legislation, or to change existing laws, have undercut the zones. After Russia’s August 1998 fiscal crisis, Kaliningrad’s economic situation deteriorated further. By 2000 the European Union indicated that it was prepared to address the “Kaliningrad Question” through its Northern Dimension—a development plan for Russia’s northwestern regions—but they received mixed signals from Moscow.

Russian authorities expressed concern that Kaliningraders would suffer once Poland and Lithuania entered the EU and adopted stricter border controls. Also, while President Vladimir Putin indicated that he desired closer ties with Europe, his representatives in Moscow and Kaliningrad were slow to adopt a common approach toward the oblast’s problems. By the fall of 2002, however, the EU and Russia reached an agreement on providing transit documents (and a sealed train) to facilitate travel

to and from Kaliningrad to Russia through Lithuania.

Many European and American analysts believe that Kaliningrad can serve as a test case and demonstrate how the West might help Russia in its drive to build a democratic and capitalist society.

See also: ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; PRUSSIA, RELATIONS WITH

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RICHARD J. KRICKUS

KALININ, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH

(1875–1946), Bolshevik, president of the USSR in 1922.

Active in the Russian Social Democratic Party from 1898, Mikhail Kalinin was an Old Bolshevik who held numerous important positions, including chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (1919) and president of the USSR (1922).

Born of peasant parents in Tver Province, Kalinin moved to St. Petersburg in 1889 and found employment at the Putilov factory. Kalinin’s peasant origins and experience as a skilled industrial worker made him an attractive representative of the Communist Party. After the October Revolution in 1917, he became the chief administrator in Petrograd. He quickly rose to prominence as a member of the party’s Central Committee from 1919, a full member of the Politburo from 1925, and chair of commissions to prepare Soviet constitutions in 1923 and 1936.

In defense of the New Economic Policy (NEP), Kalinin allied with Josef Stalin against Leon Trotsky and the Left Opposition in struggles for power following Vladimir Lenin’s death. When Stalin switched sides, adopting the Left’s program of forced collectivization of agriculture, Kalinin sided

with Nikolai Bukharin in advocating moderation. Urging a conciliatory approach toward the peasantry, Kalinin opposed harsh treatment of the kulaks. While never publicly criticizing Stalin, Kalinin expressed reservations about the terror of the 1930s. He continued to serve the party as a propagandist until the end of World War II, and was one of the few Old Bolsheviks to survive the Stalinist purges. On June 3, 1946, Kalinin died of cancer.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; CONSTITUTION OF 1936

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KATE TRANSCHEL

KALMYKS

The Kalmyks, who call themselves the Khalmg, are descendants of the Oyrats people originating from western Mongolia (Jungaria). These were nomadic tribes, kindred to the Mongols in material culture, language, and religion. Today, most Kalmyks live in Kalmykia (the Republic of Kalmykia), which is one of the twenty-one nationality based republics of the Russian Federation recognized in the 1993 Russian Constitution. Kalmykia (about 29,400 square miles) is located in southeastern Russia on the northwestern shore of the Caspian Sea. Its capital, Elista, has more than 90,000 residents. Salt lakes abound in the region, but Kalmykia lacks permanent waterways. Lying in the vast depression of the north Caspian lowland, the territory consists largely of steppe and desert areas.

In 2000 roughly 314,300 people lived in Kalmykia. Its population was 45 percent Kalmyk, 38 percent Russian, 6 percent Dagestani, 3 percent Chechen, 2 percent Kazak, and 2 percent German. Representatives of the Torgut, Dorbet, and Buzawa tribes also inhabit the republic. In contrast to some of the other non-Russian languages spoken in the Russian Federation, the Kalmyk language (Kalmukian) has been classified as an "endangered language" by UNESCO due to the declining number of active speakers. Very few children learn the language, and those who do are not likely to become active users.

Another characteristic that distinguishes the Kalmyks from many non-Russian nationalities is their long and tortuous past. Due to the deficit of pasture lands and to feudal internecine dissension, the Oyrat tribes migrated westward from Chinese Turkistan to the steppes west of the mouth of the Volga River in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Between 1608 and 1609, the Oyrats pledged their allegiance to the Russian tsar. As allies, they guarded the Russian Empire's eastern frontier during the reign of Peter I (the Great), from 1682 to 1725. Under Catherine II, however, the Kalmyks' fortune changed, and they became vassals. Unhappy with this situation, about 300,000 Kalmyks living east of the Volga began to return to China, but were attacked en route by Russian, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz warriors. Another group residing west of the Volga had remained in Russia, adopting a seminomadic lifestyle and practicing Lamaist Buddhism. They became known as the Kalmyk, which in Turkish means "remnant," referring to those who stayed behind.

In 1920 the Kalmyk autonomous oblast (province) was established, which became the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) in 1934. However, the Kalmyks' status shifted radically again when, in 1943, Josef Stalin dissolved the republic and deported some 170,000 Kalmyks to Siberia. He sought to punish the Kalmyk units who had fought the Russians in collaboration with the Germans. Stalin forcibly resettled a total of more than 1.5 million people, including the Volga Germans and six other nationalities of the Crimea and northern Caucasus: the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachai, and Meskhetians. Other minorities evicted from the Black Sea coastal region included Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians.

Things improved for the Kalmyks when in 1956 Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, denounced the earlier deportation as criminal and permitted about 6,000 Kalmyks to return the following year. The Kalmyk ASSR was officially reestablished in 1958. Thirty-five years later, the Russian Constitution of 1993 officially recognized the Republic of Kalmykia (Khalmg Tangch). That year, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov won the first presidential elections in the new republic. His program focused on socioeconomic improvements and the revival of Kalmyk language.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

KAMENEV, LEV BORISOVICH

(1883–1836), Bolshevik leader, Soviet state official, purged and executed under Stalin.


Born July 18, 1883, in Moscow and raised in Tbilisi, Lev Borisovich Rosenfeld entered the revolutionary movement while studying law at Moscow University. In 1901 he joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) and adopted the pseudonym Kamenev (“man of stone”). In 1903 the RSDLP split into two factions, and Kamenev aligned himself with the Bolsheviks and Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin). Kamenev’s revolutionary activities brought several arrests and brief periods of exile. During the 1905 Revolution, Kamenev proved an outstanding orator and organizer. In 1908 he joined Lenin’s inner circle in exile, then led the Bolshevik faction in Russia’s State Duma. In November 1914, tsarist police arrested Kamenev for endorsing Lenin’s “defeatist” position on the war and exiled him to Siberia.

The February 1917 Revolution brought Kamenev back to Petrograd. He initially rejected Lenin’s “April Thesis” and on the Bolshevik Central Committee (CC) opposed the idea of seizing power. Instead he endorsed an all-socialist coalition government. On October 23, 1917, the CC endorsed Lenin’s call for insurrection; Kamenev balked. He resigned from the CC on October 29, but rejoined it during the October Revolution and became chair of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets

(CEC). Still he pursued an all-socialist coalition. Because the CC rejected these efforts, Kamenev again quit on November 17, 1917. He also resigned from the CEC, on November 21, 1917, after the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) issued decrees without CEC approval. Kamenev recanted on December 12, 1917, and rejoined the CC in March 1918.

Afterward, Kamenev held high-level government and Party positions, including chair of the Moscow Soviet (1919–January 1926), and memberships on the Sovnarkom (1922–1926), the Council of Labor and Defense (1922–1926), the CC (1918–1926), and the Politburo (1919–1926). A “triumvirate” of Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, and Josef Stalin assumed tacit control of the Party and state in 1923, as Lenin lay dying, and engaged in a fierce campaign of mutual incrimination against Leon Trotsky over economic policy and bureaucratization. By January 1925 the triumvirate had defeated Trotsky’s Left Opposition, but a rift emerged pitting Kamenev and Zinoviev against Stalin and the Politburo’s right wing. In December 1925, Kamenev criticized Stalin’s dictatorial tendencies at the Fourteenth Party Congress; this led to his condemnation as a member of the New Opposition. Demoted to candidate Politburo status, Kamenev was stripped of important state posts. In the spring of 1926, he and Zinoviev joined Trotsky in a United Opposition, criticizing the CC majority’s “pro-peasant” version of the New Economic Policy. The majority stripped him of Politburo membership in October 1926. The United Opposition continued in vain through 1927; the majority removed Kamenev from the CC on November 14, and the Party’s Fifteenth Congress expelled him on December 2, 1927. In ritual self-abnegation, he recanted and was readmitted to the Party in June 1928. He subsequently held minor posts, and faced the threat of arrest.

Kamenev was arrested, again expelled from the Party, and exiled to Siberia in October 1932, for purported association with Martemian Ryutin’s oppositionist group. Released, then readmitted to the Party in December 1933, he briefly served in Moscow bureaucratic publishing posts. On December 16, 1934, he was arrested once more, for alleged complicity in the murder of Sergei Kirov. At a January 16, 1935, secret trial he was falsely convicted for conspiring to kill Kirov and sentenced to five years imprisonment; an additional five-year sentence was added after a second secret trial in July 1935, for allegedly plotting to kill Stalin. In



Lev Kamenev rose through the Bolshevik ranks to become a member of the Politburo, only to be later executed on Stalin's orders. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

July 1936, Kamenev conceded to Stalin's demand for a public show trial. This August 1936 spectacle concluded with sixteen "Trotskyist-Zinovievist plotters" convicted on a range of fantastic charges, including spying for the Nazis. Despite Stalin's promise to spare the lives of Old Bolsheviks, all were condemned to death. On August 24, 1936, Kamenev was executed alongside Zinoviev.

See also: SHOW TRIALS; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH

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MICHAEL C. HICKEY

KANDINSKY, VASSILY VASSILIEVICH

(1866–1944), artist.

In 1889, after studying at Moscow University in law and economics, Vassily Vasilievich Kandinsky participated in an expedition to the Vologda province in the north of Russia, sponsored by the Imperial Society for Natural Sciences, Ethnography, and Anthropology. The folk art, music, and rituals of the far north were influences that prompted his later decision to abandon his law profession for art at the age of thirty.

In 1897 Kandinsky moved to Munich to study at the private art school of Anton Abè, where he met Alexei von Jawlensky and Marianne Werefkin. After finishing his studies in the Munich Academy in 1901, Kandinsky joined the Expressionist association, Phalanx, where he met Gabrielle Münther, a student at the Phalanx school. Although Kandinsky maintained Munich as his principle place of residence, he exhibited in Moscow at the Moscow Association of Artists, at the Izdebsky Salon in Odessa, and with the Neue Künstlervereinigung in Munich, all the while maintaining and strengthening the contacts between Russian artists and their German counterparts.

By 1911 Kandinsky was the leading representative of the Russian avant-garde, participating in the Jack of Diamonds show and organizing the Blaue Reiter group with Franz Marc, inviting David Burliuk and the Hyleans to participate in the exhibition and the Blaue Reiter Almanac. In 1912 he published his theory of art, *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, in Munich. After the outbreak of World War I, he returned to Russia and actively participated in Russian cultural life. After the Revolution of 1917, he served in IZO Narkompros (The Visual Arts Section of the People's Commissariat for Enlightenment). From 1918 he taught at the SVOMAS (Free Art Studio), and in 1920 he became director of INKhUK (The Institute of Artist Culture). By 1921 the art establishment began to turn away from abstraction in art toward more realistic representation, and a disillusioned Kandinsky returned to Germany to participate in Bauhaus.

See also: CHAGALL, MARC

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MARK KONECNY

KANTOROVICH, LEONID VITALIYEVICH

(1912–1986), Soviet mathematician and economist; founder of the theory of optimal planning and of linear programming.

Kantorovich showed early promise as a mathematical scientist, entering Leningrad University at the age of fourteen and graduating at eighteen. There he did research in set theory and soon met other great Soviet mathematicians, among them Andrey Nikolaevich Kolmogorov. By 1934 Kantorovich was made a full professor. After the war, he played an important role in the new Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences, moving to Novosibirsk in 1960.

During the 1930s Kantorovich contributed to the developing theory of partially ordered functional spaces. In 1938 he began his applied work in economics when he was asked by the Laboratory of the Plywood Trust to solve the problem of distributing raw materials to maximize equipment productivity under quantitative restrictions. This problem proved to be mathematically similar to that of optimizing a sown area or the distribution of transportation flows. Kantorovich solved this by using a kind of functional analysis he called the “method of resolving multipliers.” By 1939 he had published a small book laying out the main ideas and algorithms of linear programming, later advanced independently by Tjalling Koopmans, George Dantzig, and others. Subsequently, Kantorovich combined linear programming with the idea of dynamic programming to advance methods for calculating wholesale prices and transportation tariffs, a norm for the effectiveness of capital investments

and depreciation allowances, and other payments. This work, generalized to planning problems on the industrial, regional, or national level, led to his receiving the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1975, the only Soviet economist ever so honored. A full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences from 1960, Kantorovich received the Lenin Prize and many other honors in Russia and abroad.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

KAPLAN, FANYA

(1887–1918), anarchist-terrorist; arrested and executed for a failed attempt on Lenin’s life.

Born into the family of a Jewish teacher in Ukraine, Fanya Kaplan (also known as Feiga Kaplan, Feiga Roitblat, Dora Kaplan) joined a local anarchist terrorist organization during the 1905 Revolution. For her participation in a bomb-making operation in Kiev, she spent ten years in the Nerchinsk penal complex in Siberia. Here she became acquainted with other female terrorists, most notably the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) Maria Spiridonova and Anastasia Bitsenko. A number of her prison comrades maintain that Kaplan went blind during her early years in Nerchinsk but partially recovered her vision in 1913; one memoirist also noted Kaplan’s deafness. Released by the Provisional Government’s amnesty for political prisoners following the February Revolution of 1917, Kaplan was receiving medical treatment in Ukraine when the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917. Kaplan later stated that she was a supporter not of the Bolshevik-Left SR coalition government, but rather of the Constituent Assembly promoted by the SRs and their leader Victor Chernov. In the spring of 1918 Kaplan returned to Moscow and there visited her former prison comrade, Bitsenko, who, like Spiridonova, had joined the Left SRs. Kaplan, however, appears to have had nothing to do with the Left SR

Party and little to do with the SRs. When Lenin was wounded in August 1918, Kaplan's nervous behavior at the scene led to her arrest, although it subsequently emerged that no one had actually witnessed her role in the shooting. She was executed within days of being apprehended. Bolshevik authorities labeled Kaplan an SR and the attempt on Lenin's life an SR terrorist conspiracy; SR leaders strongly denied both accusations during their show trial in 1922.

See also: ANARCHISM; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; SHOW TRIALS; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; TERRORISM

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SALLY A. BONIECE

KARACHAI

The Karachai are a small Turkic nationality of the central North Caucasus. They speak a language from the Kypchak group of the Altaic language family and are closely related to the Balkars. They inhabit high-elevation mountain valleys of the upper Kuban and Teberda river basins, and their pastures once stretched up to the peaks and glaciers of the northern slope of the Great Caucasus mountain range.

Their remote origins can be traced to Kypchak-speaking pastoralist groups such as the Polovtsians, who may have been forced to take refuge high in the mountains by the Mongol invasions in thirteenth century. At some point before the sixteenth century, the Karachai came under the domination of the princes in Kabarda. The Crimean khanate claimed nominal jurisdiction over much of the northwest Caucasus and, correspondingly, Karachai territories, until its demise in 1782. Conversion to Islam took place gradually, gaining momentum during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A series of military incursions into their territories motivated several Karachai elders to sign a capitulation agreement and nonaggression pact with Russian forces in 1828. Although they were

officially considered subjects of the tsar from that moment, various forms of resistance to Russian rule continued until 1864. A Karachai-Cherkess autonomous region was established in 1922 and in 1926 was divided into two distinct units. Karachai territories were occupied by the forces of Nazi Germany between July 1942 and January 1943. While many Karachai men served in the Red Army, others joined bandit and anti-Soviet partisan groups. In the fall of 1943 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ordered the deportation of the Karachai people for alleged cooperation with the Germans and participation in organized resistance to Soviet power. The Karachai autonomous region was abolished in 1944 and virtually the entire Karachai population was deported to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In 1956 party members and Red Army veterans were allowed to return to their homeland, and in 1957 others were legally given the right to return. In 1957 the joint Karachai-Cherkess autonomous region was reestablished and the mass return of the Karachai was initiated. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Karachai-Cherkess autonomous region became a republic of the Russian Federation.

Traditionally, Karachais subsisted on a combination of agriculture and stock-raising. As late as the first decades of the twentieth century, only one-fourth of all Karachai had adopted a completely stationary lifestyle. The rest of the population seasonally relocated from summer to winter pastures with their herds of horses, cattle, sheep, and goats. During the Soviet period, the Karachai remained one of the least urbanized groups: Less than 20 percent lived in cities. Clans were a central component of traditional Karachai social organization. Although some clans and their elders could be recognized as more prominent or senior than others, the Karachai did not have a powerful princely elite or nobility. In the twentieth century the Karachai population grew from about 30,000 to about 100,000. A Karachai literary language was developed and standardized in the 1920s.

See also: CAUCASUS; CHERKESS; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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BRIAN BOECK

KARAKALPAKS

Karakalpaks are a Turkic people who live in Central Asia. Of the nearly 500,000 Karakalpaks, more than 90 percent live in northwestern Uzbekistan, in the Soviet-created Karakalpak Autonomous Republic (KAR). Other Karakalpaks live elsewhere in Uzbekistan, as well as in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Afghanistan. Most adhere to Sunni Islam, although Sufi sects have also attracted many followers. They speak a language that is closely related to Kazakh and Kyrgyz.

Most historians trace the Karakalpaks' origins to Persian and Mongolian peoples living on the steppes of Central Asia and Southern Russia. Their name literally means "black hatted," and mention of a tribe thought to be ancestral to today's Karakalpaks first appears in Russian chronicles (as Chorniye Kolbuki) in 1146. Renowned for their military prowess, this group allied themselves with the Kievan princes in their battles with other Russian princes and tribes of the steppes. In the 1200s some Karakalpaks joined the Mongol Golden Horde, and by the 1500s they enjoyed a short-lived independence. Over time, however, they became subjects of other Central Asian peoples and eventually the Russians, who pushed into Central Asia in the 1800s.

In 1918 they were included with other Central Asian peoples in the Turkistan Autonomous Republic, and in 1925 a Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast was created in the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This oblast eventually became the KAR, and in 1936 it became part of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Under Soviet rule, Karakalpaks were encouraged to move to the KAR, their nominal homeland.

The post-Soviet period found most Karakalpaks desperately poor, living in an environmentally devastated area adjacent to the rapidly shrinking Aral Sea. Serious health problems such as hepatitis, typhoid, and cancer are widespread. Despite their nomadic traditions, their economy is dominated by agriculture, especially cotton production, which has suffered due to water shortages, soil erosion, and environmental damage. Because of lack of investment in the region, the KAR's relations with the central Uzbek government have been strained.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS

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PAUL J. KUBICEK

KARAKHAN DECLARATION

In the Karakhan Manifesto of 1919, the Soviet government offered to annul the unequal treaties imposed on China by Imperial Russia. The declaration, signed by Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Lev M. Karakhan, included rights of extraterritoriality for Russians in China, economic concessions, and Russia's share of the Boxer rebellion indemnity. Though dated July 25, 1919, it was not actually published for another month. Civil war prevented its delivery to China, but the Beijing authorities soon learned its substance.

Controversy arose because the document was prepared in two versions. One variant contained the statement that "the Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people, without any compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway [CER]. . . ." The version published in Moscow in August 1919 did not include this provision, but the copy that was delivered to Chinese diplomats in February 1920 did incorporate the offer to return the CER. However, a Soviet proposal on September 27, 1920, for a Sino-Russian agreement made no mention of returning the Chinese Eastern Railway, but requested a new agreement for its joint administration by the two nations. All subsequent Soviet reprintings of the Karakhan Manifesto omit the offer to return the CER, while a Chinese reprinting of the document in 1924 included the offer. The existence of two versions manifests the ambiguity in Soviet policy toward the Far East in 1919 and 1920, arising from the unpredictable course of the civil war and foreign intervention. Thereafter, the consolidation of Bolshevik power in Siberia, combined with continuing instability in China, led Moscow to seek some degree of control over the economically and strategically important CER.

See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; RAILWAYS

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TEDDY J. ULDRICKS

KARAMZIN, NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH

(1766–1826), writer, historian, and journalist.

Born in the Simbirsk province and educated in Moscow, Nikolai Karamzin served only briefly in the military before retiring to devote himself to intellectual pursuits. In 1789 he undertook a journey to western Europe, visiting several luminaries, including Immanuel Kant, on his way. Reaching Paris in the spring of 1790, he witnessed history in the making. He described his trip in his *Letters of a Russian Traveler*, published upon his return in 1790 in a series of journals he founded himself. The *Letters* display an urbane, westernized individual in command of several languages and behavioral codes and are meant to signal Russia's coming of age. They demonstrate a keen interest in history, but primarily as a collection of anecdotes.

The short stories Karamzin wrote in the 1790s exerted tremendous influence on the development of nineteenth-century fiction. Karamzin's main purpose in literature and journalism was to promote a culture of politeness. History became one of the main themes of his works, which grappled with the paradoxes of modernity: The systematic debunking of myths, inspired by a commitment to reason, clashed with a need to mythologize the past to throw into relief the moral and intellectual emancipation enabled by the Enlightenment.

Karamzin elaborated a new political stance while editing the *Messenger of Europe* in 1802 and 1803. A professed realist, he argued for a strong central government, whose legitimacy would lie in balancing conflicting interests and preventing the emergence of evil. Karamzin grew disenchanted with Napoleon, who had first seemed to bring forth peace and stability, but his infatuation with consolidated political power endured.

In October 1803, Karamzin became official historiographer to Tsar Alexander I. He uncovered many yet unknown sources on Russian history, including some that subsequently perished in the Moscow fire of 1812. In 1811 Karamzin submitted his *Memoir on Ancient and New Russia*, which contained a biting critique of the policies of Alexan-

der I, but vindicated autocracy and serfdom. The *Memoir* signaled Karamzin's turn away from an Enlightenment-inspired universalist notion of history and affirmed the distinctness of Russia's historical path.

In 1818 Karamzin published the first eight volumes of his *History of the Russian State*, an instant bestseller. The *History* consists of two parts: a naive-sounding account of events, close in style to the *Chronicles*, with minimal narratorial intrusions and an apparent lack of overriding critical principle; and extensive footnotes, which display considerable skepticism in the handling of sources and sometimes contradict the main narrative. The narrative rests on the notion that the course of events is vindicated by their outcome—the consolidation of the Russian autocratic state—but it lets stories speak for themselves.

Due to this narrative and political stance, the immediate reception of the *History* was mostly negative. Yet after the publication of three more volumes from 1821 to 1824, which included a condemnation of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the reception began to shift (the last volume was published posthumously in 1829). Alexander Pushkin called the *History* "the heroic deed of an honest man," and Karamzin's stance of moral independence came to the foreground. The *History* continued to be read in the nineteenth century, primarily as a storehouse of patriotic historical tales. It fell into disfavor during Soviet times, yet met an intense period of renewed interest in the perestroika years as part of an exhumation of national history.

See also: ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; HISTORIOGRAPHY; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS

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ANDREAS SCHÖNLE

KASYANOV, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH

(b. 1957), prime minister of the Russian Federation.

Kasyanov graduated from the Moscow Automobile and Road Institute and worked for the State

Construction Committee and Gosplan, State Planning Committee, from 1981 to 1990. He moved to the economics ministry, and in 1993 Boris Fyodorov brought him to the Finance Ministry to take charge of negotiations over Russia's foreign debts. Fluent in English, Kasyanov became deputy finance minister in 1995 and finance minister in May 1999. In January 2000 he was appointed first deputy prime minister under prime minister and acting president Vladimir Putin. Katyanov, praised by Putin as a "strong coordinator," was named prime minister of the government in May 2000, winning easy confirmation from the State Duma in a vote of 325 to 55. The calm, gravel-voiced Kasyanov was seen as a figure with close ties to Boris Yeltsin's inner circle—the owners of large financial industrial groups.

Despite repeated rumors of his impending dismissal, Kasyanov was still in office in mid-2003. He oversaw cautious but substantial reforms in taxation and the legal system, but liberals criticized him for failing to tackle the "natural monopolies" of gas, electricity, and railways. This led to some embarrassing criticism from members of his own administration, such as economy minister German Gref and presidential economic advisor Andrei Illarionov, not to mention public admonition from President Putin in spring 2003 for failing to deliver more rapid economic growth. In Russia's super-presidential system, the job of prime minister is a notoriously difficult one. Although the prime minister has to be approved by the State Duma, once in office he answers only to the president, and has no independent power beyond that which he can accumulate through skillful administration and discreet political maneuvering.

See also: GOSPLAN; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

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PETER RUTLAND

KATKOV, MIKHAIL NIKIFOROVICH

(1818–1887), Russian journalist and publicist.

The son of a minor civil servant, Mikhail Nikiforovich Katkov graduated from Moscow University in 1838 and attended lectures at Berlin University in 1840–1841. From 1845 to 1850 Katkov was an

assistant professor of philosophy at Moscow University. In 1851 he became editor of the daily *Moskovskie Vedomosti* (*Moscow News*), and in 1856 he also became editor of the journal *Russky Vestnik* (*Russian Messenger*).

Katkov changed his political preferences several times during his life. In the 1830s he shared the ideas of the Russian liberal and radical intelligentsia and was close to the Russian literary critic Vissarion Belinsky, radical thinker Alexander Herzen, and the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin. In the early 1840s Katkov broke his connections with the radical intelligentsia, instead becoming an admirer of the British political system. During his early journalistic career, he supported the liberal reforms of Tsar Alexander II and wrote about the necessity of transforming the Russian autocracy into a constitutional monarchy.

The Polish uprising had a great impact on the changing of Katkov's political views from liberalism to Russian nationalism and chauvinism. He published a number of articles favoring reactionary domestic policies and aggressive pan-Slavic foreign policies for Russia. The historian Karel Durman wrote, "Katkov claimed to be the watchdog of the autocracy and this claim was widely recognized." As one of the closest advisors of Tsar Alexander III, Katkov had a great impact on Russian policies. According to the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod Constantine Pobedonostsev, "there were ministries where not a single important action was undertaken without Katkov's participation." Durman points out that in no other country could a mere publicist standing outside the official power structure exercise such an influence as had Katkov in Russia.

See also: ALEXANDER II; ALEXANDER III; INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM

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VICTORIA KHITERER

KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

Katyn Forest, a wooded area near the village of Gneizdovo outside the Russian city of Smolensk,

was the scene in early 1940 of a wholesale killing by the Soviet NKVD (Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del), or secret police, of 4,143 Polish servicemen, mostly Polish Army officers. These victims, who had been incarcerated in the Kozielsk Soviet concentration camp, constituted only part of the genocide perpetrated against Poles by the NKVD in 1939 and 1940.

The Poles fell as POWs into Soviet hands just after the Soviet Red Army occupied the eastern half of Poland under the terms of two notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop pacts: the Nazi-Soviet agreements signed between the USSR and Nazi Germany in August and September 1939. The crime, committed on Stalin's personal orders at the opening of World War II, is often referred to as the Katyn Massacre or the Katyn Forest Massacre.

The incident was not spoken of for sixty years. Even such Western leaders as President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill placed little or no credence in reports of the crime at the time, despite the fact that informed Poles had provided proof. For his part, Churchill urged exiled Polish officials such as Vladislav Sikorski to keep the incident quiet lest the news upset the East-West alliance of the Soviet and Western powers fighting Nazi Germany.

These first deaths came after one of the most notorious of several repressions by the Stalin regime against Poles. In 1939, notes Robert Conquest, besides the 440,000 Polish civilians sent to Soviet concentration camps as a result of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland beginning in September, the Soviets took 200,000 POWs during the Red Army's campaign in Poland. Most of these officers and enlisted men of the Polish Army wound up in camps at Kozielsk, Starobelsk, and Ostachkov. Of these, only forty-eight were ever seen alive again. Later Stalin promised Polish officials that the Soviet government would "look into" the disappearance of these men. But Soviet officials refused to discuss the matter whenever it was again raised.

With the coming of World War II, that is, the war between Germany and the USSR after June 21, 1941, the German Army swept into eastern Poland. In 1943 the Germans, as occupiers of Poland, came across the Polish corpses at Katyn. They duly publicized their grim discovery to a skeptical world press, blamed the Soviets for the terror, and shared their find with a neutral European medical commission based in Switzerland. The members of this

commission were convinced that the mass graves were the result of Soviet genocide, but they voiced their findings discreetly, sometimes refusing even to give an opinion.

In 1944, when the Red Army retook the Katyn area from the Wehrmacht, Soviet forces exhumed the Polish dead. Again they blamed the Nazis. Many people throughout the world supported the Soviet line.

It was not until near the end of communist rule in Russia in 1989 with the unfurling of the new policy of glasnost (openness) in the USSR, that partial admission of the crime was acknowledged in Russia and elsewhere. Later, after the demise of communist rule in Russia, two further sites were found where Poles, including Jews, were executed. The number of victims of the killings at all three sites totaled 25,700.

See also: SOVIET-POLISH WAR; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

KAUFMAN, KONSTANTIN PETROVICH

(1818–1882), Russian general (of Austrian ancestry) who became governor-general (viceroy) of Turkestan following its conquest.

Konstantin Petrovich Kaufman's fame came as the ruler of Russia's new colony in Central Asia. His previous military experience had scarcely prepared him for his career as creator of colonial Turkestan. He trained as a military engineer and served for fifteen years in the Russian army fighting the mountain tribes in the Caucasus. His achievements during his service there called him to the attention of a fellow officer, General Dimitri Milyutin. When Milyutin became minister of war in the 1860s, he needed a trustworthy, experienced officer to govern Turkestan. Kaufman was his choice.

At the time Kaufman received his appointment in 1867, the conquest of Turkestan had only begun. He became commander of the Russian frontier forces there and had authority to decide on military action along the borders of his territory. When neighboring Turkish principalities began hostile military action against Russia, or when further conquests appeared feasible, Kaufman assumed command of his troops for war. By the end of his rule, Russia's borders enclosed much of Central Asia to the borders of the Chinese Empire. Only Khiva and Bukhara remained nominally independent khanates under Russian control. Turkestan's borders with Persia (Iran) and Afghanistan were for many years a subject of dispute with Great Britain, which claimed a sphere of domination there.

Kaufman had charge of a vast territory far removed from European Russia. Its peoples practiced the Muslim religion and spoke Turkic or Persian languages. It so closely resembled a colony, like those of the overseas possessions of European empires, that he took example from their colonial policies to launch a Russian civilizing mission in Turkestan. He ended slavery, introduced secular (nonreligious) education, promoted the scientific study of Turkestan's various peoples (even sending an artist, Vasily Vereshchagin, to paint their portraits), encouraged the cultivation of improved agricultural crops, and even attempted to emancipate women from Muslim patriarchal control. Kaufman's means to achieve these ambitious goals were meager, because of the lack of sufficient funds and the paucity of Russian colonial officials. Also, he feared that radical reforms would stir up discontent among his subjects. His fourteen-year period as governor-general brought few substantial changes to social and economic conditions in Turkestan. However, it ended the era of rule by Turkish khans and left Russia firmly in control of its new colony.

See also: TURKESTAN

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DANIEL BROWER

KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS

Kazakhstan, a Eurasian region inhabited since the mid-1400s by the Kazakh people, comprises an immense stretch of steppe that runs for almost 3,200 kilometers (2,000 miles) from the Lower Volga and Caspian Sea in the west to the Altai and Tien Shan mountain ranges in the east and south-east. In the early twenty-first century, the Kazakh republic serves as a bridge between Russian Siberia in the north and the Central Asian republics of Kirghizia/Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenia/Turkmenistan in the south. To the east it is bounded by the region of the People's Republic of China that is known as Xinjiang (Sinkiang) or Chinese Turkestan. With an area of some 2,71,500 square kilometers (1,050,000 square miles), Kazakhstan is almost twice the size of Alaska. As the Kazakh SSR it was the largest republic in the USSR next to the Russian Federation and was sometimes known as the Soviet Texas. The climate is severely continental, with January's mean temperatures varying from –18 degrees Celsius (0 degrees Fahrenheit) in the north to –3 degrees C (27 degrees F) in the south, and July's from 19 degrees C (66 degrees F) in the north to 28–30 degrees C (83–86 degrees F) in the south. Annual precipitation in the north averages 300 millimeters (11.7 inches), in the mountains 1,600 millimeters (62 inches), and in the desert regions less than 100 millimeters (3.9 inches). Fortunately, the region is one of inland drainage with a number of rivers, the Irtysh, Ili, Chu, and Syr Darya included, that flow into the Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash. This permits the extensive irrigation that now threatens the Aral Sea with extinction.

Originally peopled by the Sacae or Scythians, by the end of the first century B.C.E. the area of Kazakhstan was populated by nomadic Turkic and Mongol tribes. Known to the Chinese as the Usun, they were the ancestors of the later Kazakhs. First, however, these tribes formed a succession of loose, tribal-based confederations known as khaganates (later khanates). Of these the most powerful was the Turgesh (or Tiurkic) of the sixth century C.E. Other nomadic empires followed its collapse in the 700s, beginning with the Karakhanids who ruled southern Kazakhstan or Semireche from the 900s to the 1100s. They were replaced by the Karakitai (Kara Khitai), who succumbed to the Mongols during 1219–1221. Subsequently these tribes were included in the semiautonomous White Horde, which was established by Orda, the eldest son of Genghis



Public square in Astana, the new post-Soviet capital of Kazakhstan. © LIBA TAYLOR/CORBIS

Khan's eldest son Dzhuchi, as a component of the more extensive Mongol Golden Horde. Having established itself between the Altai Mountains and Syr Darya River, the White Horde quickly gained control of Semireche and East Turkestan as well. But if its rulers were descendants of the Mongol royal line, most of its populace were ethnically Turkic.

With the collapse of that empire, these tribes at first were subject to the Nogai Tatars, formerly of the Golden Horde, and then of the Uzbeks. By 1447 the latter had conquered the territory between the Syr Darya and Irtysh Rivers, the inhabitants of whom became known as the Uzbek Kazakhs. Yet the White Horde lingered, civil strife and fights for power were constant, and in 1465 two of its princes, the brothers Janibek (Dzhanibek) and Gerei, led a number of Turkic tribes in a migration southeast to Mogulstan (Mogolistan), which once was part of the domain of Genghis Khan's second son Chagatai, and which now was an independent state. They were welcomed by its ruler and given lands on the Chu and Talas Rivers, where they

formed a powerful Kazakh khanate. By the late 1400s this had extended its power over much of the formerly Uzbek-controlled *Desht-i Kipchak*, or Kipchak Steppe. Over the next few decades most of the Kazakh tribes—the Kipchaks, Usuns, Dulats, and Naimans included—were united briefly under Kasym Khan (1511–1518). He extended their power southward while giving his subjects a period of relative calm. Internal strife then reemerged after his death, and the Kazakh state began disintegrating as its components joined with other tribes arriving from the collapsing Nogai Horde. Having merged during the 1600s they formed themselves into three nomadic confederations known as “hordes” or *zhuzy* (dzhuzy): the *Ulu* (Large, Great, or Senior) in Semireche, the *Kishiu* (Small, Lesser, or Junior) between the Aral and Caspian Seas, and the *Orta* (Middle) in the central steppe. But taken together, they were now an ethnically distinct people, known to the Russians since the latter 1500s as the Kirgiz-Kazakhs, with a social system based on the families and clans that continued to influence Kazakh politics into the twenty-first century.



A woman lights candles during a Russian Orthodox ceremony in northern Kazakhstan, a region heavily populated by ethnic Russians. © AFP/CORBIS

By the mid-1600s the Kazakhs were again under pressure, this time from the Jungarian (Dzhungarian) Oriots or Kalmyks who attacked westward from Mongolia. Divided as they were, the Kazakhs at first had difficulty in opposing the invaders, and the conflict dragged on into the 1700s. Although the Kazakhs then did unite briefly to win some major victories, the menace only lifted after the Manchus decisively vanquished the Oriot-Kalmyks in 1758. In the interim, the Kazakhs had drifted gradually but steadily into the orbit of Imperial Russia. Consequently, some leaders began seeking support from the Russians in their struggles. Thus the khans and other leaders of the Small Horde in 1731, of the Middle Horde in 1740, and of part of the Great Horde in 1742, agreed to accept Russian suzerainty. But matters were not that straightforward, and while Russian scholars generally regard such treaties as evidence of the Kazakhs' "volun-

tary union" with their empire, subsequent Kazakh historians disagree. They argue that this was a mere tactic in a larger game of playing Russia off against Manchu China, maintain that the khans lacked the requisite authority to make such concessions, and as evidence point to the frequent cases of resistance to and uprisings against the Russian colonizers. A textbook appearing in the new Republic of Kazakhstan charges that the tsarist authorities even encouraged the Oriot-Kalmyk attacks as a means of driving the Kazakhs into Russian arms. So, as elsewhere, history has become a major weapon in modern Kazakhstan's bitter ethnic and nationalist debates.

From 1730 to 1840 St. Petersburg's rule was exercised through the governor-general of Orenburg. As Russian expansion southward became progressively more organized and effective, the authorities were able to abolish the traditional Kazakh



Kazakhstan, 1992 © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

forms of leadership. They deposed the khan of the Middle Horde in 1822, that of the Small Horde in 1824, and that of the Large Horde in 1848. Meanwhile, they also created the new Bukei (Bukej) or Inner Horde in 1812. Then Bukei, younger son of the Small Horde's Khan Nurali, received permission to move some 1,600 tents into lands between the Urals and Volga, which had been abandoned by the western Oriot-Kalmyks, who had fled to China. These Kazakhs eventually settled in the Province of Astrakhan and by the mid-1800s had some 150,000 tents. At this time the Large Horde meanwhile had some 100,000 tents, the Small Horde 800,000, and the Middle Horde 406,000 tents.

In the mid-1800s St. Petersburg organized the governor-generalships of the Steppe and of Turke-

stan to manage the Kazakhs and Central Asians to the south. During the late 1800s a growing wave of Russian and other Slavic (largely Ukrainian) peasant immigrants flowed into the region's northern sections and began settling on Kazakh lands. The resulting discontent of the Kazakhs and other Central Asians boiled over in the great revolt of 1916 and reemerged again during the civil strife between 1917 and 1920.

During that conflict the intellectuals of the Alash Orda sought to establish a Western-style Kazakh state. Many eventually supported the Communists in the creation of the Kirghiz (Kazakh) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) as part of Soviet Russia in 1920. Reorganized as the Kazakh ASSR in 1925, it became a constituent republic under Josef

Stalin in 1936 and remained so until December 1991. But despite its “democratic” constitution, during the 1930s Kazakhstan underwent the horrors of collectivization, of the forced settlement of the nomadic stockbreeders, of the resulting famine and epidemics, and of deportations and executions. Meanwhile, the purges decimated the Kazakh intelligentsia and political leadership. The result was a reported 2.2 million Kazakh deaths (a 49% loss), so that there were fewer Kazakhs in the USSR in 1939 than in 1926. Equally disturbing, by the decade’s end the republic was being flooded by deportees from elsewhere, converted into a basic element of Stalin’s Gulag Archipelago, and from 1949 into a testing ground for nuclear weapons as well.

Although a new Soviet Kazakh educated elite slowly emerged after 1938, their position in their own nominal state was threatened further by the new influx of hundreds of thousands of Russian, Ukrainian, and German immigrants during Nikita Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands agricultural program in the 1950s. The mixed results of this effort, the problems raised by nuclear testing on the republic’s territory, and the fact that by 1979 the Kazakhs reportedly were outnumbered by Russians (41% to 36%), further fueled their ethnic resentments. These exploded in riots that gripped the capital of Alma-Ata in December 1986 when Dinmukhammed Kunayev, the ethnic Kazakh long-time head of the republican Communist Party, was replaced by a Russian in December 1986. But in April 1990 Nursultan Nazarbayev, another ethnic Kazakh, assumed the post of Party chief. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, he charted the course that established the Republic of Kazakhstan and brought it into the new CIS. Emerging as virtual president-for-life from the votes of 1995 and 1999, and backed by his own and his wife’s families and elements of his Large Horde clan, he has preserved the unity of his ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse state, which awaits the development of the Caspian oil reserves as a means of alleviating the crushing poverty that afflicts many of its citizens, Kazakhs and others alike.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; KUNAYEV, DINMUKHAMMED AKHMEDOVICH; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NAZARBAYEV, NURSULTAN ABISHEVICH

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KAZAN

Kazan is the capital and major historic, cultural, and economic center of the autonomous republic of Tatarstan, Russia. It is located on the left bank of the Volga River where the Kazanka River joins it, eighty-five kilometers north of the Kama tributary. In 2002 it had an estimated population of 1,105,300.

The traditional understanding is that the name comes from the Turkic and Volga Tatar word *qazan*, meaning “kettle.” A rival theory has been proposed that it derives from the Chuvash *xusan/xosan*, meaning “bend” or “hook,” referring to the bend of the Volga near which Kazan is located. The Bulgars founded Iski Kazan in the thirteenth century as one of the successors to their state, which had been destroyed by the Mongols. At that time, it was located forty-five kilometers up the Kazanka. Around the year 1400, it was moved to its present location. Ulu Muhammed, who had been ousted from the Qipchaq Khanate in 1437, defeated the last ruler of the principality of Kazan to establish a khanate by 1445. It was an important trading center, with an annual fair being held nearby.

During the first half of the sixteenth century, the khanate of Kazan was involved in a three-cornered struggle with Muscovy and the Crimean khanate for influence in the western steppe area. Ivan IV conquered the city in 1552, ending the

Khanate of Kazan. Muscovy then used Kazan as an advanced staging area for further expansion down the Volga. In 1555 the archepiscopal see of Kazan was established.

From the late sixteenth century on, Kazan was the gateway to Siberia, as people and supplies were funneled through the town en route to the east, and furs and minerals were brought west. It was made capital of the Volga region in 1708, and Peter I had the ships for his Persian campaign built there. The Slavonic-Latin Academy, which became the Kazan Theological Academy, was founded in 1723 but abolished after 1917. From 1723 to 1726 the Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul was built in Kazan. The first lay provincial secondary school was founded there in 1758.

Kazan was sacked by Emelian Pugachev in 1774, but Catherine II rebuilt the city on a gridiron design and named it a provincial capital in 1781. During the eighteenth century, light industry and food production developed, as well as a theater, which led to a number of similar theaters being founded in the nineteenth century. In 1804 the University of Kazan was founded, which helped to establish the city as an intellectual center. The first provincial newspaper was published there in 1811. Kazan was also considered a major manufacturing center, the products of which included prepared furs, leather manufacture, shoes, and soap. In the 1930s heavy industry developed, such as aircraft production and transportation and agricultural machinery. More recent industries include the production of chemicals, electrical engineering, and precision equipment, as well as oil refining. In 1945 the Kazan branch of the Academy of Sciences was established. Presently, Kazan has a philharmonic society, a museum of Tatar culture, and a theater devoted to the production of Tatar operas and ballets.

See also: MUSCOVY; TATARSTAN AND TATARS

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DONALD OSTROWSKI

KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT

The Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as the Pact of Paris, was the creation of French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg in 1928. Parties to this treaty pledged themselves to "renounce the resort to war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations" and to resolve all international disputes by "peaceful means alone." This agreement was signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, by France, the United States, and thirteen other powers. Soon it was endorsed by almost every country in the world, including the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, and Japan. The treaty contained no enforcement mechanism and was, therefore, merely a pious promise to avoid war.

Soviet ratification of the pact on August 29, 1928, was part of a "peace offensive" spearheaded by Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim M. Litvinov. Beyond attempts to improve bilateral relations with the great powers and Russia's smaller neighbors, this campaign included efforts to promote broad measures of disarmament and to involve the USSR in the multilateral diplomacy of Europe. The pact was also supplemented by the Litvinov Protocol, signed on February 9, 1929, by the USSR, Poland, Rumania, and Latvia (and subsequently by Lithuania, Iran, and Turkey), pledging the peaceful resolution of all disputes among the signatories. Soviet participation in the pact and the protocol represented a victory for Litvinov's policy of constructive engagement with the dominant Western powers and a defeat for his nominal chief, Foreign Commissar Georgy Chicherin. It also marked a temporary victory for Nikolai Bukharin and other moderate Politburo members who supported the New Economic Policy and advocated security through peace and cooperation with the great powers.

See also: BUKHARIN, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; LITVINOV, MAXIM MAXIMOVICH; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

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TEDDY J. ULDRICKS

KERENSKY, ALEXANDER FYODOROVICH

(1881–1970), leading figure of the Provisional Government in 1917.

Alexander Kerensky was born on May 4, 1881, in Simbirsk, Russia. He studied history and law at St. Petersburg University. In 1906 he became a defense lawyer in political cases and soon became a well-known public figure. In 1912, Kerensky was elected to the Fourth Duma. Although he described himself as a socialist and associated with the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs), he was the mildest of socialists, his views constituting a blend of moderate socialism with left-wing liberalism.

During the February Revolution he seemed to be everywhere—giving a speech here, haranguing soldiers there, scurrying in and out of meetings, issuing orders, dramatically arresting members of

the old regime and equally dramatically rescuing others from mob violence. A young man of thirty-five, he emerged as the popular hero of the February Revolution and the new government, the object of public adulation; his face adorned postcards and store windows. When the Petrograd Soviet was formed on March 27, he was elected vice-chairman. He was the only Socialist to enter the Provisional Government when it was formed on March 2 and more and more became its key figure, serving in succession as minister of justice (March–May), minister of war (May–September), and minister-president (July–November), and adding the title of commander in chief of the army in September. Indeed, more than any other political figure of 1917 he identified completely with the Provisional Government and in turn came to be identified with it, both in 1917 and after.

In May and June 1917 he became the government's focal point for preparing a major military



Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky salutes while inspecting his troops in 1917. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

offensive, taking long tours of the front to stimulate fighting enthusiasm among soldiers. Despite the unpopularity and disastrous outcome of the offensive, Kerensky's personal reputation survived, and he became minister-president of the new, second coalition government. Moreover, as other leading political figures left the government, Kerensky became more and more dominant within it. Even as Kerensky achieved complete leadership of the government, however, both its and his own popularity eroded as the government failed to solve problems and to fulfill popular aspirations (despite its substantial achievements). The Kornilov Affair in September, a conflict growing out of the complex relation between Kerensky and General Lavr Kornilov that many saw as a counterrevolutionary attempt, earned Kerensky the enmity of both left and right and completed the destruction of his reputation. Crowds that earlier had cheered him as the hero of the revolution now cursed him. Kerensky remained head of the government after the Kornilov Affair, but his popularity was gone, and his personal authority swiftly declined. His fateful decision was to move against the Bolsheviks on the eve of the Second Congress of Soviets; this sparked the October Revolution, which swept him from power.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, Kerensky spent several weeks underground, trying unsuccessfully to organize an anti-Bolshevik movement. In May 1918, he made his way out of the country and lived the rest of his life in exile, where he was active in emigré politics, delivered lectures, and wrote several accounts of the revolution and his role in it. He died on June 11, 1970, in the United States.

Kerensky was both the heroic and the tragic figure of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Thin, pale, with flashing eyes, theatrical gestures, and vivid verbal imagery, he was a dramatic and mesmerizing speaker with an incredible ability to move his listeners. Huge crowds turned out to hear him. As the year wore on, however, Kerensky's oratory could not compensate for the government's failures. The same speech-making that had made him a hero in the spring earned him scorn and a reputation as an empty babler by autumn's end. The new paper currencies issued by the Provisional Government under his leadership were popularly called "Kerenki," and because inflation quickly made them worthless, his name thus took on something of that meaning as well. It was a tragic fall for the hero of February.



Alexander Kerensky, leader of the 1917 Provisional Government. THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSÉE DES 2 GUERRES MONDIALES PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; KORNILOV AFFAIR; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

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REX A. WADE

K.G.B. *See* STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF.

KHABAROV, YEROFEI PAVLOVICH

(c. 1610–1667), adventurer, explorer of Siberia.

Born in Vologda region, Yerofei Khabarov began his career managing a saltworks for the famed Stroganov clan. He traveled throughout western Siberia in the 1620s. He moved on to the Yenisei River, then the Lena, in the 1630s. He invested in farmlands and local saltworks. He also developed useful ties to Vasily Poyarkov, the administrator of Yakutsk and an early explorer of the Amur River basin.

In 1649 Khabarov turned to exploration. His goal was to follow up on Poyarkov's earlier forays into the Amur region, seeking an easier and more reliable route than Poyarkov had been able to find. In March, Khabarov left Yakutsk with 150 men, following the Olekma River.

Over the winter of 1650, Khabarov crossed the Yablonovy Range, reaching the Amur River soon after. He ruthlessly pacified the local tribe, the Daurs. He also established a garrison on the Amur. In his reports to Yakutsk and Moscow, Khabarov advocated conquest of the Amur, both for the river's strategic importance and the region's economic assets: grain, fish, and fur.

In 1650 and 1651, Khabarov launched further assaults against the Daurs, expanding Russian control over the area, but with great violence. Khabarov founded Achansk, captured Albazin, and made his way down the Amur until the summer of 1651. By this point, he was encroaching on territory that China's recently founded Manchu (Qing) Dynasty considered to be its sphere of influence. When the Daurs appealed to China for assistance, the Manchus attacked Achansk in the spring of 1652. Khabarov's garrison was forced to withdraw, but for the moment, the Manchus did not press their advantage. Nonetheless, Russia and China would engage in many frontier struggles until the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689).

Meanwhile, word of Khabarov's cruel treatment of the Daurs reached Russian authorities, and he was arrested in the fall of 1653. Khabarov was put on trial, but his services were considered valuable enough to have outweighed the abuses he had committed. He was exonerated and placed in command of the Siberian fortress of Ilimsk. In 1858 Russia's new city at the juncture of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, Khabarovsk, was given his name.

See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; SIBERIA

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JOHN MCCANNON

KHAKASS

The Khakass Republic or Khakassia (23,855 square miles, 61,784 square kilometers) is an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. Located in Krasnoyarsk Krai at the far northwestern end of the Altay Range in south-central Siberia, it differs from other Siberian republics in at least two ways. First, the Khakass, while Turkic speaking, are actually Orthodox Christians, not Muslims, Buddhists, or shamanists. Second, ethnic Russians outnumber the Khakass. In 1959, 48,000 Khakass were living in Khakassia, forming 12 percent of the total population. By 1979 there were 57,300 Khakass, forming 11.4 percent of the population. Ethnic Russians now constitute the remaining 80 to 90 percent of the population of Khakassia.

The Khakass Republic extends along the left bank of the Yenisey River, upon the wooded slopes of Kuznetsk Ala-Tau and the Sayans, in the western portion of the Minusinsk depression. Lake Baikal lies 1,000 kilometers to the east. The Abakan (a tributary of the Yenisey) and Chulym rivers drain the area. The capital is Abakan and the next largest city is Chernogorsk (a coal-mining center). While the terrain in the southern and western regions is hilly, the northern and eastern parts of the region are flat, black-earth steppelands (the Abakan-Minusinsk Basin). The climate is continental, with the average temperatures between –15 and 21 degrees Celsius in January, and between 17 and 19 degrees Celsius in July.

The origin of the name Khakass is in the word *hagias* (*hjagas*), which was used by the Chinese for an ancient tribe in the Sayan Mountains. Historically, the Khakass have gone by several different names: the Tatars of Minusinsk, the Tatars of Abakan, the Turks of Abakan, the Turks of the

Yenisey. The Khakass themselves call themselves by their own tribal names, including *sagai*, *khas*, *pel-tyr*, *shor*, *koybal*, and *hyzyl-kizhi*.

The Khakass language belongs to the Uighur-Oguz group in the Eastern Hun branch of the Turkic languages. While the structure and the basic vocabulary of the Khakass language are of Turkic-Tatar origin, the language contains many loan words from the Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian languages.

The first Russians arrived in Khakassia in the seventeenth century. The Khakass Autonomous Region was established in 1930. In 1992 the region became an official autonomous republic in the Russian Federation. Formerly nomadic herders, the Khakass now farm, hunt, or breed livestock. The republic produces timber, copper, iron ore, barite, gold, molybdenum, and tungsten.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; SIBERIA

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

KHALKIN-GOL, BATTLE OF

In the late 1930s, as events pushed the world inexorably toward war, the Soviet Union and Japan clashed several times over the precise location of their borders. The most serious of these incidents, occurring from May to September of 1939, took place in Mongolia, by a river named Khalkhin-Gol. Soviet forces crossed the river to assert their sovereignty over a disputed tract of land and ran into serious resistance from the Japanese Sixth Army. The Japanese believed that the river marked the border and had just been ordered to treat any in-

cursions with the utmost severity. They launched a series of attacks against the Mongolian and Soviet troops and eventually managed to push back the initial advance. Stalin and his advisors, already convinced that the Japanese army wanted to seize Siberia for its natural resources, decided that this was the great attack they feared. In response, they gave the commander on the scene, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, all the tanks, aircraft, and manpower he would need to deal with the threat.

Zhukov put together a major offensive that would not only drive the Japanese from Mongolia, but also take the disputed land irrevocably for the Soviet satellite. By the time he was ready for his attack, at the end of August, his forces outnumbered the Japanese two to one, and he had far more tanks and artillery than the Japanese could muster. His strategy, which called for the envelopment and destruction of the enemy, worked as planned, and the Japanese army suffered heavy casualties. The Japanese commander, Michitaro Komatsubara, refused to accept the outcome of the battle, however, and had prepared a counteroffensive. This was canceled when a cease-fire was signed in Moscow. War had broken out in Europe, and neither country could afford to be distracted by minor clashes on their borders. The battle at Khalkhin-Gol convinced the Japanese army that a fight with the Soviets would be a long, drawn-out affair, and helped the Japanese empire make the decision to turn southward in 1941, rather than attack Siberia.

See also: JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH; ZHUKOV, GEORGY KONSTANTINOVICH

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KHANTY

The Khanty people live in western Siberia from the Arctic Circle in the north to the conflux of the Irtys and Tavda rivers in the south. The Khanty are mainly concentrated in the Khanty-Mansiysk autonomous okrug, with the administrative center Khanty-Mansiysk (population 34,300 in 1995).

The Khanty also live in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrug and in Tomsk oblast. According to the Soviet 1989 census, the total population of the Khanty numbered 22,521.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Khanty were baptized by Russian Orthodox missionaries. However, Khanty have followed their native religion until the present time. According to Khanty cosmology, there exist several layers of Heaven and Underworld and seven main gods, the most powerful of whom is Numi Torum. Shamans are mediators between gods and humans.

The Khanty language belongs to the Ob-Ugrian branch of the Finno-Ugrian language family of Uralic language stock. Standardized written language based on the Latin alphabet was introduced in the 1930s. In 1940 it was transferred into the Cyrillic system. According to the All-Union census data as of 1989, the knowledge of native language among the Khanty was 60.5 percent.

Traditionally, the Khanty were divided between two phratries and several clans. Political leaders of the Khanty were clan elders and princes who collected taxes for Tsarist authorities and were responsible for native administration and court. During the Soviet period this native political structure was abolished.

The Khanty are seminomadic hunters, fishers, and reindeer breeders. During the Soviet period, animal husbandry, fur farming, and agriculture were introduced as small-scale enterprises.

From the eleventh century, the Khanty traded and had armed conflicts with Russians from Novgorod. Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Khanty paid tribute to the Siberian Khanate. At the end of the sixteenth century the Khanty were conquered by Russia. The most serious change in Khanty recent history was the collectivization campaign in the 1930s. Between 1933 and 1934, the Khanty rebelled against the Soviets in what is known as the Kazym War. After the 1980s the native political movement expanded, mainly concentrating around the Association for the Salvation of the Ugra (founded in 1989).

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NORTHERN PEOPLES; SIBERIA

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ART LEETE

KHASBULATOV, RUSLAN IMRANOVICH

(b. 1942), economist, Russian legislator.

Ruslan Khasbulatov studied at Kazakh State University and Moscow State University (MGU), where he was active in the Komsomol and joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1966. He earned a doctorate in economics from MGU in 1970. Khasbulatov spent the 1970s and 1980s working at the Academy of Sciences's Institute of Scientific Information and the Scientific Research Institute for Questions of Secondary Schools. He transferred to the Plekhanov Institute for Economic Management in 1979, eventually becoming chair of the division of Economy of Foreign Countries.

In 1990 Khasbulatov was elected to the first RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) Congress of People's Deputies. When the Congress elected Yeltsin as chair, he picked Khasbulatov as his first deputy (May 1990). Following Yeltsin's election to the newly created Russian presidency, Khasbulatov became speaker of parliament (October 1991).

Khasbulatov opposed the amount of power that devolved to Yeltsin after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He also opposed Yeltsin's economic policy of shock therapy and the privatization campaigns. As Yeltsin's team drafted a new Russian constitution, Khasbulatov spearheaded a parliamentary effort to reduce Yeltsin's authority and more equitably redistribute powers between the Russian executive and legislative branches.

The power struggle culminated in Yeltsin's dissolution of parliament in September 1993. Led by Khasbulatov and Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, legislators barricaded themselves in the parliamentary building. Yeltsin responded by firing on the building the night of October 3–4, 1993. Khasbulatov was led from the building in hand-

cuffs and sent to prison. In February 1994, the Russian State Duma amnestied Khasbulatov along with all the participants in the parliamentary rebellion.

An ethnic Chechen, Khasbulatov became involved in the domestic politics of the rebellious republic. He unsuccessfully ran for president in 1996 and has been involved in negotiations to end the second Chechen war. As of 2003, Khasbulatov teaches at the Plekhanov Institute in Moscow.

See also: CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; PRIVATIZATION; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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KHAZARS

A nomadic Turkic-speaking tribal confederation and an offshoot of the Turk kaghanate, the Khazars established one of the earliest and most successful states in medieval eastern Europe. Khazar history is divided into two periods: the Crimean–North Caucasus (c. 650–750) and the Lower Volga (c. 750–965) phases. Politically focused on the northern Black Sea region, during the first phase the Khazars were locked in endless wars against the Arabs over the control of the Caucasus. After a major defeat in 737, the Khazars relocated their political focus to the north and established their capital of Atil/Itil in the Volga delta around 800. The next one hundred years of Khazar history (known as Pax Chazarica) brought security to the Russian steppe and the surrounding regions, permitting cross-continental trade to flourish via Khazaria and providing it with the necessary stability for the formation of a unique material culture, known to archaeologists as Saltovo.

Khazaria was an empire or kaghanate, the highest form of Turkic political organization. The kaghan or its leader was apparently of Turkic origin and had supreme secular and sacred functions. During the ninth century, his political-religious role was split: He retained his religious-sacred function, while the governor or *beg* ruled the state.

At its height in the first half of the ninth century, Khazar territories stretched from the middle Dnieper in the west to the Volga-Ural steppe in the east, and from the middle Volga in the north to the Crimea in the south. It was populated by Turkic and Iranian nomads, Finno-Ugrian foragers, Slavic agriculturalists, and urban Crimean Greeks, making the kaghanate a multiethnic, multilingual, and multireligious state. Khazar economy was diverse and included animal husbandry, agriculture, hunting and gathering, fishing, craft production, agriculture, viniculture, and domestic and international trade. Khazars traded locally manufactured goods as well as the furs, slaves, honey, and wax they obtained as tribute from the Slavic and Finno-Ugrian tribes of the north. Khazaria also acted as an intermediary for Rus–Arab trade and received a tithe from the bypassing merchants. Millions of Islamic silver coins (dirhams) were exported via the “Khazar Way” (lower Volga–Don–Donets–Oka–upper Volga) trade route to northwestern Russia in exchange for Rus commodities.

Most Khazars practiced shamanist–Täri religion. In the late eighth to early ninth century (but perhaps as late as 861), the Khazar ruling elite converted to Judaism. While many questions remain concerning this conversion and its pervasiveness, it is clear that by accepting Judaism, the ruling class made Khazaria a religious neutral zone for its warring Christian and Islamic neighbors. Religious tolerance and Khazaria’s international commercial interests brought Christians, Muslims, Jews, pagans, and others to trade and live within the kaghanate.

Pax Chazarica came to an end by the early tenth century. Already in the 890s, Pechenegs and Magyars infiltrated Khazaria from the east, while the Rus annexed Khazarian territories in the northwest. Concurrently, the Khazar Way declined and the Rus–Islamic trade shifted to the lands of the Volga Bulgars, thereby bypassing Khazar toll collectors. Greatly weakened, Khazaria was destroyed in 965 by the Rus and their Torky allies.

See also: ISLAM; JEWS; RELIGION; TORKY

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KHIVA

Khiva, a city in northwestern Uzbekistan and the name of a khanate in existence prior to and during the rule of the Russian Empire, is located in the midst of the deserts of Central Asia. Early in human history, farming peoples settled in the region, relying on irrigation to bring water to their fields from the nearby Amu River (Amu-Darya), known in antiquity as the Oxus. Its sources in the great glacial fields of the Pamir and Hindu Kush mountains to the southeast assured a steady supply of water sufficient to sustain agriculture and human settlement. Long-distance commerce began with the opening of the great trade routes (collectively known as the Silk Route) between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Nomadic tribes frequently invaded the territory, conquering the lands of Khorezm (as Khiva was then called) and destroying the cities. Settlers founded the city of Khiva in the tenth century, during a period of prosperity. That time of peace came to an end with the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century. Two centuries later, Turkic tribes in turn conquered the region.

One Turkic leader (khan) founded the Khanate of Khiva shortly afterward. The strongest unifying force among its peoples was the Islamic religion. All the peoples living there belonged to the Sunni branch of Islam. The hot climate permitted the Khivan farmers to grow cotton. It was woven into beautiful rugs, which Khiva's merchants transported for sale to the Middle East and to Russia. Slavery was common, for nomads brought captives for sale in Khiva whom they had captured in

Persia (Shiite Muslims), and in the Siberian plains (Russians). The Khivan peoples were divided by clan and tribal loyalties, and spoke several Turkic languages. The most important division was between the nomadic tribes of the desert and those who lived in towns or farmed the irrigated land. Nomadic raids and revolts unsettled the principality. Frequent wars with neighboring rulers (especially Bukhara) also kept Khiva weak.

The Russian Empire conquered the khanate in the 1870s. In the eighteenth century, it had begun to expand into the plains of southern Siberia and northern Central Asia, with the goal of colonial domination of the area. In the 1860s its armies began their offensive against the khanates of the southern oasis lands. The khanate forces were poorly armed and quickly capitulated. Khiva surrendered to a Russian army after a brief war in 1873. Some khanates were absorbed into the empire. Khiva (and Bukhara) remained as Russian protectorates, independent in their internal affairs but forced to accept the empire's control over their foreign affairs. The Khanate of Khiva was left with a shrunken territory within the borders imposed by Russia. Its trade with Russia grew rapidly, for its cotton was in great demand for Russian textile manufacturing.

Following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the khanate briefly regained its full independence. But in 1918 armies under the command of the Communist Party from the revolutionary state of Soviet Russia invaded Central Asia. The Communists won the support of a group of Khivan reformers, who took charge of a tiny state that they called the Khorezm People's Republic. It lasted only until 1924, when the Soviet government ordered Khorezm's leaders to agree to the annexation of their state by the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its lands were divided between the Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Communists believed that their new ethno-territorial republics, grouped around one majority ("titular") nationality, would assist in bringing socialism to the Central Asian peoples. Uzbek and Turkmen communists assumed command of the peoples once ruled by the Khivan khan. The city of Khiva became a small regional center. Its ancient walled city was a picturesque reminder of its pre-Russian past.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; TURKMENISTAN AND TURKMEN; UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS



Ichan-Kala, the ancient inner city of Khiva, was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site for its many monuments and oriental architecture. © LUDOVIC MAISANT/CORBIS

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DANIEL BROWER

KHMELNITSKY, BOHDAN

(c. 1595–1657), hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host (1648–1657) and founder of the Hetmanate (Cossack state).

Born into a family of Orthodox petty gentry, Khmelnytsky fought at the Battle of Cecora (1620) and was taken prisoner to Istanbul for two years. Enrolled as a registered Cossack, he was a military

chancellor during the Cossack revolts of 1637 and 1638. In 1646 he took part in a Cossack delegation to King Wladyslaw IV, who sought to win the Cossacks over to his secret plans for a war against the Ottomans. In 1647 a magnate's servitor attacked Khmelnytsky's estate. Khmelnytsky found no redress. Arrested in November 1647, he escaped and fled to the traditional Cossack stronghold, or *Sich*, where he was proclaimed hetman in February 1648. He received support from the Crimean Khanate, and in May Khmelnytsky defeated the Polish armies sent against him. The king died in that month, throwing the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, an elective monarchy, into crisis.

Throughout 1648, as an uprising raged in Ukraine with attacks on landholders, Catholic clergy, and Jews, Khmelnytsky energetically organized a military force and a civil administration. Defeating what remained of the Commonwealth's forces in September, he influenced the election of Jan Kazimierz as a propeace candidate. At the end of the year, Khmelnytsky marched east, entering

Kyiv to the acclamation that he was a Moses liberating his people from the "Polish bondage." He declared his intentions to rule as an autocrat as far as Western Ukrainian Lviv.

A renewed war (the Battle of Zboriv) proved inconclusive because of the desertion of the Crimean khan. From mid-1649 Khmelnytsky searched for foreign allies against the Commonwealth, but the Tatars remained his only ally. Initially the Ottoman Empire seemed the most likely supporter, but the extension of Ottoman protection in 1651 did not bring the required military assistance. Khmelnytsky sought to gain a status for Ukraine similar to the Ottoman vassal Moldavia, in part by marrying his son into its ruling family. Having been defeated by the Poles at Berestechko in June 1651, he in turn defeated them in June 1652. His Danubian intervention ended in fiasco with his son Tymish's death in September 1653. The weakened Khmelnytsky then turned more seriously to the Muscovite tsar, and after the Russian decision to take him under "tsar's high hand" in 1653, he convened a Cossack council at Pereiaslav and took an oath of loyalty to the tsar in January 1654, but failed to receive an oath from his emissaries. Retaining far greater power in Ukraine than the terms negotiated, Khmelnytsky came to be disillusioned with Muscovy, especially after the truce between Muscovy and the Commonwealth in November 1656. He joined a coalition with Sweden and Transylvania against the Commonwealth (and against Muscovite wishes), but a Transylvanian-Ukrainian invasion had failed just before his death.

Evaluations of Khmelnytsky and his policies vary greatly, with some seeing him as a great statesman and others as a destructive rebel. The nature of the Pereiaslav Agreement has been the subject of controversy; in Soviet historiography it was viewed as the "reunification" of Ukraine with Russia.

See also: COSSACKS; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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FRANK E. SYSYN

KHOMYAKOV, ALEXEI STEPANOVICH

(1804–1860), slavophile philosopher, theologian, poet, and playwright.

Alexei Khomyakov was born in Moscow of an old noble family. He was well educated in a pious, traditional, cultivated household, under the particular influence of his devout mother. He was tutored in French, English, and Latin in his childhood and youth, and later added Greek and German. The Khomyakov house burned to the ground in the Moscow fire of 1812, and the family was forced to take refuge on one of their country estates near Ryazan. When Khomyakov first saw St. Petersburg in 1815, the pious young Muscovite allegedly found it a pagan and thoroughly un-Russian place. At the University of Moscow, Khomyakov studied philosophy and theology, but took his kandidat (master's; in some cases equivalent of Ph.D.) degree in mathematics in 1821.

Between 1822 and 1825, Khomyakov served in the military, to which he briefly returned in 1828 as the captain of a regiment, when Emperor Nicholas I appealed for volunteers to fight in the Turkish War. In the early 1820s he also had relations with the so-called Lovers of Wisdom (*Obshchestvo Lyubomudriya*) and published several poems in the *Moscow Messenger*. Following his first stint in the army, he briefly studied painting in Paris and visited Switzerland and Italy before returning to Russia.

In the 1820s and the 1830s, Khomyakov was known primarily as a playwright (*Ermak, the False Dmitry*) and a poet. His poetry is "characterized by rhetorical pathos, a lofty view of the poet's calling, and a preview of his later Slavophile ideas." In 1829 he retired from government service to devote himself to literature and his estates, and in 1834 he married Yekaterina Yazykov, the sister of the poet.

Unlike most of his Slavophile contemporaries, Khomyakov had strong practical and scientific interests: He concerned himself with the practical pursuit of profitable agriculture on his estates and followed developments in modern science and even engineering. In addition to his growing theological and practical pursuits, he followed contemporary social and political issues closely. Nevertheless, from his childhood on, he felt that science and politics must always be subordinated to religious values.

Khomyakov and Ivan Kireyevsky had known each other since the early 1820s, but in the mid-1830s they became close friends. Khomyakov's "On the Old and New," followed by Kireyevsky's "An Answer to Khomyakov" (1839) are the earliest surviving written documents of Slavophilism, as these traditionally minded aristocrats groped for an answer to Peter Chaadayev's "Philosophical Letter." Khomyakov was more willing than other Slavophiles to admit that the Russian state had been an important factor in Russian history. He thought the Russian state that arose in the wake of Mongol domination showed an "all-Russian" spirit, and he regarded the history of Russia between the Mongol period and the death of Peter the Great as the consolidation of the idea of the state—a dreadful process because of the damage it did to Russian society, but necessary. Only through Peter's reforms could the "state principle" finally triumph over the forces of disunity. But now the harmony, simplicity, and purity of pre-Petrine Russia, which had been so badly damaged, must be recovered for future generations.

If Ivan Kireyevsky may be described as the philosopher of Slavophilism, Khomyakov was surely its theologian. His introduction of the concept of *sobornost* (often translated as "conciliarity" or "conciliarism") as a fundamental distinction between the Orthodox Church and the Western confessions took a long time to be recognized in Russia but has become a fundamental aspect of Orthodox theology since his death. Opposing both Catholic hierarchy and Protestant individualism, Khomyakov defined the church as a free union of believers, loving one another in mystical communion with Christ. Thus *sobornost* is the consciousness of believers in their collectivity. Contrasting with Catholic authority, juridical in nature, was the creative role of church councils, but only as recognized over time by the entire church. Faith, for Khomyakov, was not belief in or commitment to a set of crystallized dogmas, but a prerational, col-

lective inner knowledge or certainty. An excellent brief statement of Khomyakov's theology can be found in his influential essay *The Church Is One*, written in the mid-1840s but published only in 1863. He also published three theological treatises in the 1850s entitled "Some Words of an Orthodox Christian about Western Creeds."

Clearly Khomyakov's idea of *sobornost* had its social analogue in the collective life of the Russian peasant in his village communal council (*obshchina*), which recognized the primacy of the collectivity, yet guaranteed the integrity and the well-being of the individual within that collective. *Sobornost* was particularly associated with Khomyakov, but his view of the centrality of the peasant commune was generally shared by the first-generation Slavophiles, especially by Ivan Kireyevsky. In addition, Khomyakov distinguished in his posthumously published *Universal History* between two fundamental principles, which, in their interaction, determine "all thoughts of man." The "Iranian" principle was that of freedom, of which Orthodox Christianity was the highest expression, while the Kushite principle, its opposite, rested on the recognition of necessity and had clear associations with Asia.

Khomyakov, unlike Kireyevsky or the Ak-sakovs, had a special sense of Slav unity, which may have originated in his travels through south Slavic lands in the 1820s. In that limited sense he represented a bridge between Slavophilism and pan-Slavism. As early as 1832 he wrote a poem called "The Eagle," in which he called on Russia to free the Slavs. At the beginning of the Crimean War, he wrote an even more famous poem entitled "To Russia," in which he excoriated his country for its many sins but called upon it to become worthy of its sacred mission: to fight for its Slavic brothers. The message of his "Letter to the Serbs" (1860) was similar. Khomyakov died suddenly of cholera in 1860.

See also: PANSLAVISM; SLAVOPHILES; THEATER

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ABBOTT GLEASON

KHOVANSHCINA

The Khovanshchina originated in the struggle over the succession following the death of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich in 1682. Strictly speaking, the term refers to the period following the musketeer revolt of May 1682, when many leading boyars and officials in the Kremlin were massacred, and the creation of the dual monarchy of Tsars Ivan and Peter under the regency of Tsarevna Sophia Alexeyevna, although some historians use the term loosely as a general heading for all the unrest of 1682. The musketeers demanded that Sophia's government absolve them of all guilt and erect a column on Red Square to commemorate their service in eliminating "wicked men." The government duly complied but failed to prevent a new wave of unrest associated with religious dissidents and with the musketeers' continuing dissatisfaction with pay and working conditions.

The troops were encouraged to air their grievances by the new director of the Musketeers Chancellery, Prince Ivan Khovansky, a veteran of campaigns against Poland in the 1650s and 1660s. He had shown sympathy for Old Believers while governor in Novgorod and was angered by the prominence of many new men at court whom he, of ancient lineage, regarded as upstarts. Acting as the musketeers' self-styled "father," Khovansky made a show of mediating on their behalf and also organized a meeting between the patriarch and dissidents to debate issues of faith. When the defrocked dissident priest Nikita assaulted an archbishop, he was arrested and executed, but his sponsor Khovansky remained too popular with the musketeers for the government to touch him. Instead, they tried to reduce the power of the Khovansky clan by reshuffling chancellery personnel. Sophia took the tsars on tours of estates and monasteries, leaving Khovansky precariously in charge in Moscow and increasingly isolated from other boyars.

Khovansky's failure to obey several orders allowed Sophia further to isolate him. His fate was sealed by the discovery of an anonymous—and probably fabricated—letter of denunciation. In late September Khovansky and his son Ivan were lured to a royal residence outside Moscow, where they

were charged with plotting to use the musketeers to kill the tsars and their family to raise rebellion all over Moscow and snatch the throne. Lesser charges included association with "accursed schismatics," embezzlement, dereliction of military duty, and insulting the boyars. The charges were full of inconsistencies, but the Khovanskys were beheaded on the spot. The musketeers prepared to barricade themselves into Moscow, but eventually they were reduced to begging Sophia and the tsars to return. They were forced to swear an oath of loyalty based on a set of conditions, the final clause of which threatened death to anyone who praised their deeds or fomented rebellion. The government's victory consolidated Sophia's regime and marked a stage in the eventual demise of the musketeers.

These events provided material for Mussorgsky's opera *Khovanshchina* (1872–1880), which treats the historical facts fairly loosely and culminates in a mass suicide of Old Believers.

See also: FYODOR IVANOVICH; OLD BELIEVERS; SOPHIA

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LINDSEY HUGHES

KHOZRASCHET

Within the planned economy, Soviet industrial enterprises operated on an independent economic accounting system called *khovraschet*. In principle, enterprises were to operate according to the principle of self-finance, which meant they were to cover their production costs from sales revenue, as well as earn a planned profit. A designated portion of the planned profit was turned over to the industrial ministry to which the firm was subordinate. However, prices paid by firms for input as well as prices earned by firms from the sales of their output were centrally determined and not based upon scarcity or efficiency considerations. Consequently, calculations of costs, revenues, and profit had little prac-

tical significance in evaluations of the need to adjust present or future activities of the firm. For example, firms operating with persistent losses were not subject to bankruptcy or closure; firms earning profits did not willingly offer to increase production. Under *khozraschet*, profits and losses did not serve either a signaling role or disciplinary role, as they tend to do for firms in a market economy.

The *khozraschet* system enabled Soviet enterprise managers to monitor their operations and overall plan performance, and to have financial relations with the State bank, Gosbank. Funds earned by the enterprise were deposited at Gosbank; enterprises applied to Gosbank for working capital loans. Given the enterprise autonomy granted by the *khozraschet* system, financial relations with other external administrative units, such as the industrial ministry to which the firm was subordinate, also occurred when conditions warranted. Under the *khozraschet* system, enterprise managers were able to exercise some degree of flexibility and initiative in fulfilling plan targets.

The *khozraschet* system was applied to work brigades in the construction industry in the early 1970s and expanded to work brigades introduced in other industries in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. State farms, called *sovkhozy*, operated under the *khozraschet* system of independent financial management, as did the Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs) operating under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The *khozraschet* system vanished with the end of central planning.

See also: COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY; GOSBANK

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SUSAN J. LINZ

KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

(1894–1971), leader of the USSR during the first decade after Stalin's death.

Nikita Khrushchev rose from obscurity into Stalin's inner circle, unexpectedly triumphed in the battle to succeed Stalin, equally unexpectedly attacked Stalin and embarked on a program of de-Stalinization, and was suddenly ousted from power after his reforms in internal and foreign policy proved erratic and ineffective.

Khrushchev was born in the poor southern Russian village of Kalinovka, and his childhood there profoundly shaped his character and his self-image. His parents dreamed of owning land and a horse but achieved neither goal. His father, who later worked in the mines of Yuzovka in the Donbas, was a failure in the eyes of Khrushchev's mother, a strong-willed woman who invested her hopes in her son.

In 1908 Khrushchev's family moved to Yuzovka. By 1914 he had become a skilled, highly paid metalworker, had married an educated woman from a fairly prosperous family, and dreamed of becoming an engineer or industrial manager. Ironically, the Russian Revolution "distracted" him into a political career that culminated in supreme power in the Kremlin.

Between 1917 and 1929, Khrushchev's path led him from a minor position on the periphery of the revolution to a role as an up-and-coming apparatchik in the Ukrainian Communist party. Along the way he served as a political commissar in the Red Army during the Russian civil war, assistant director for political affairs of a mine, party cell leader of a technical college in whose adult education division he briefly continued his education, party secretary of a district near Stalino (formerly Yuzovka), and head of the Ukrainian Central Committee's organization department.

In 1929 Khrushchev enrolled in the Stalin Industrial Academy in Moscow. Over the next nine years his career rocketed upward: party leader of the academy in 1930; party boss of two of Moscow's leading boroughs in 1931; second secretary of the Moscow city party organization itself in 1932; city party leader in 1934; party chief of Moscow Province, additionally, in 1935; candidate-member of the party Central Committee in 1934; and party leader of Ukraine in 1938. He was powerful enough not only to have superintended the rebuilding of Moscow, but to have been complicit in the Great Terror that Stalin unleashed, particularly in the Moscow purge of men who worked for Khrushchev and of whose innocence he must have been convinced.



Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev sign the January 1964 Soviet-Cuban Trade Agreement. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

Between 1938 and 1941, Khrushchev was Stalin's viceroy in Ukraine. During these years, he grew more independent of Stalin while at the same time serving Stalin ever more effectively. Even as he developed doubts about the purges, Khrushchev grew more dedicated to the cause of socialism and proud of his own service to it, particularly of conquering Western Ukrainian lands and uniting them with the rest of Ukraine as part of Stalin's 1939 deal with Hitler.

Khrushchev's role in World War II blended triumph and tragedy. A political commissar on several key fronts, he was involved in, although not primarily responsible for, great victories at Stalin-grad and Kursk. But he also contributed to disastrous defeats at Kiev and Kharkov by helping to convince Stalin that the victories the dictator sought were possible when in fact they proved not to be. After the war in Ukraine, where Khrushchev remained until 1949, his record continued to be contradictory: on the one hand, directing the rebuilding of the Ukrainian economy, and attempt-

ing to pry aid out of the Kremlin when Stalinist policies led to famine in 1946; on the other hand, acting as the driving force in a brutal, bloody war against the Ukrainian independence movement in Western Ukraine.

In 1949 Stalin called Khrushchev back to Moscow as a counterweight to Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenti Beria in the Kremlin. For the next four years, Khrushchev seemed the least likely of Stalin's men to succeed him. Yet, when Stalin died on March 5, 1953, Khrushchev moved quickly to do so. After leading a conspiracy to oust Beria in June 1953, he demoted Malenkov and then Vyacheslav Molotov in 1955.

By the beginning of 1956, Khrushchev was the first among equals in the ruling Presidium. Yet a mere year and half later, he was nearly ousted in an attempted Kremlin coup. His near-defeat resulted from a variety of factors, of which the most important were the consequences of Khrushchev's Secret Speech attacking Stalin at the Twentieth

Party Congress in February 1956. This speech, the content of which became widely known, sparked turmoil in the USSR, a political upheaval in Poland, and a revolution in Hungary, which Soviet troops crushed in November 1956. Khrushchev's aims in unmasking Stalin ranged from compromising Stalinist colleagues to expiating his own sins. The result of the speech, however, was to begin the process of undermining the Soviet system while at the same time undermining himself.

Khrushchev's opponents, primarily Malenkov, Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich, took advantage of the disarray to try to oust him in June 1957. With their defeat, he might have been expected to intensify his anti-Stalin campaign. Instead, his policies proved contradictory, as if the tumultuous consequences of the Secret Speech had taught Khrushchev that his own authority depended on Stalin's not being totally discredited.

Even before Khrushchev was fully in charge, improving Soviet agriculture had been perhaps his highest priority. In 1953 he had endorsed long-needed reforms designed to increase incentives: a reduction in taxes, an increase in procurement prices paid by the state for obligatory collective farm deliveries, and encouragement of individual peasant plots, which produced much of the nation's vegetables and milk. By 1954, however, he was pushing an ill-conceived crash program to develop the so-called Virgin Lands of western Siberia and Kazakhstan as a quick way to increase overall output. Another example of Khrushchev's impulsiveness was his wildly unrealistic 1957 pledge to overtake the United States in the per capita output of meat, butter, and milk in only a few years, a promise that counted on a radical expansion of corn-growing even in regions where that ultimately proved impossible to sustain.

That all these policies failed to set Soviet agriculture on the path to sustained growth was visible in the disappointing harvests of 1960 and 1962. These setbacks led Khrushchev to raise retail prices for meat and poultry products in May 1962, breaking with popular expectations. The move triggered riots, including those in Novocherkassk, where nearly twenty-five people were killed by troops brought in to quell the disturbances. Khrushchev's next would-be panacea was his November 1962 proposal to divide the Communist Party itself into agricultural and industrial wings, a move that alienated party officials while failing to improve the harvest, which was so bad in 1963 that Moscow



First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev wears his two Hero of the Soviet Union medals. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

was forced to buy wheat overseas, including from the United States.

The party split was the latest in a series of reorganizations that characterized Khrushchev's approach to economic administration. In 1957 he replaced many of the central Moscow ministries that had been running the economy with regional "councils of the national economy," a change that alienated the former central ministers who were forced to relocate to the provinces.

Housing and school reform were also on Khrushchev's agenda. To address the dreadful urban housing shortage bequeathed by Stalin, Khrushchev encouraged rapid, assembly-line construction of standardized, prefabricated five-story apartment houses, which proved to be a quick fix, but not a long-term solution. Khrushchev's idea of school reform was to add a year to the basic ten-year program, to be partly devoted to learning a manual trade at a local factory or farm, an idea that reflected his own training but met widespread

resistance from parents, teachers, and factory and farm directors loath to take on new teenage charges.

The Thaw in Soviet culture began before Khrushchev's Secret Speech but gained momentum from it. The cultural and scientific intelligentsia was a natural constituency for a reformer like Khrushchev, but he and his Kremlin colleagues feared the Thaw might become a flood. His inconsistent actions alienated all elements of the intelligentsia while deepening Khrushchev's own love-hate feelings toward writers and artists. On the one hand, he authorized the 1957 World Youth Festival, for which thousands of young people from around the world flooded into Moscow. On the other hand, he encouraged the fierce campaign against Boris Pasternak after the poet and author of *Dr. Zhivago* was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1958. The Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, which was marked by an eruption of anti-Stalinist rhetoric, seemed to recommit Khrushchev to an alliance with liberal intellectuals, especially when followed by the decision to authorize publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel about the Gulag, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, and Yevgeny Yevtushenko's poem "The Heirs of Stalin." But after the Cuban missile crisis ended in defeat, Khrushchev turned to chastising and browbeating the liberal intelligentsia at a series of ugly confrontations in the winter of 1962 and 1963.

As little as his minimal education prepared him to run the internal affairs of a vast, transcontinental empire, it prepared him even less for foreign policy. For the first fifty years of his life he had little exposure to the outside world and almost none to the great powers, and after Stalin's death, he initially remained on the foreign policy sidelines. Even before defeating the Anti-Party Group, however, he began to direct Soviet foreign relations, and afterward it was almost entirely his to command. Stalin's legacy in foreign affairs was abysmal: When he died, the West was mobilizing against Moscow, and even allies (in Eastern Europe and China) and neutrals had been alienated. All Stalin's heirs sought to address these problems, but Khrushchev did so most boldly and energetically.

To China Khrushchev offered extensive economic and technical assistance of the sort for which Stalin had driven a hard bargain, along with benevolent tutelage that he assumed Mao would appreciate. Initially the Chinese were pleased, but Khrushchev's failure to consult them before de-

nouncing Stalin in 1956, his fumbling attempts to cope with the Polish and Hungarian turmoil of the same year, and his requests for military concessions in 1958 led to two acrimonious summit meetings with Mao (in August 1958 and September 1959), after which he precipitously withdrew Soviet technical experts from China in 1960. The result was an open, apparently irrevocable Sino-Soviet split.

Khrushchev tried to bring Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc, the better to tie the Communist camp together by substituting tolerance of diversity and domestic autonomy for Stalinist terror. Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade in May 1955, undertaken against the opposition of Molotov, gave him a stake in obtaining Yugoslav President Tito's cooperation. But if Tito, too, was eager for reconciliation, it was on his own terms, which Khrushchev could not entirely accept. As with China, therefore, Khrushchev's embrace of a would-be Communist ally ended not in new harmony but in new stresses and strains.

Whereas Stalin had mostly ignored Third World countries, since he had little interest in what he could not control, Khrushchev set out to woo them as a way of undermining "Western imperialism." In 1955 he and Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin traveled to India, Burma, and Afghanistan. In 1960 he returned to these three countries and visited Indonesia as well. He backed the radical president of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, and reached out to support Fidel Castro in Cuba. Yet, despite these and other moves, Khrushchev also tried to ease Cold War tensions with the West, and particularly with his main capitalist rival, the United States. As Khrushchev saw it, he had opened up the USSR to Western influences, abandoned the Stalinist notion that world war was inevitable, made deep unilateral cuts in Soviet armed forces, pulled Soviet troops out of Austria and Finland, and encouraged reform in Eastern Europe.

The Berlin ultimatum that Khrushchev issued in November 1958—that if the West didn't recognize East Germany, Moscow would give the German Communists control over access to West Berlin, thus abrogating Western rights stipulated in postwar Potsdam accords—was designed not only to ensure the survival of the beleaguered German Democratic Republic, but to force the Western allies into negotiations on a broad range of issues. And at first the strategy worked. It secured Khrushchev an invitation to the United States in

September 1959, the first time a Soviet leader had visited the United States, after which a four-power summit was scheduled for Paris in May 1960. But in the end, Khrushchev's talks with Eisenhower produced little progress, the Paris summit collapsed when an American U-2 spy flight was shot down on May 1, 1960, and his Vienna summit meeting with President John F. Kennedy in June 1961 produced no progress either. Instead of a German agreement, he had to settle for the Berlin Wall which was constructed in August 1961.

By deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962, Khrushchev aimed to protect Fidel Castro from an American invasion, to rectify the strategic nuclear imbalance, which had swung in America's favor, and just possibly to prepare the way for one last diplomatic offensive on Berlin. After he was forced ignominiously to remove those missiles, not only was Khrushchev's foreign policy momentum spent, but his domestic authority began to unravel. With so many of his domestic and foreign policies at dead ends, with diverse groups ranging from the military to the intelligentsia alienated, and with his own energy and confidence running down, the way was open for his colleagues, most of them his own appointees but by now disillusioned with him, to conspire against him. In October 1964, in contrast to 1957, the plotters prepared carefully and well. Led by Leonid Brezhnev, they confronted him with a united opposition in the Presidium and the Central Committee, and forced him to resign on grounds of age and health.

From 1964 to 1971 Khrushchev lived under de facto house arrest outside Moscow. Almost entirely isolated, he at first became ill and depressed. Later, he mustered the energy and determination to dictate his memoirs; the first ever by a Soviet leader, they also served as a harbinger of glasnost to come under Mikhail Gorbachev. Called in by party authorities to account for the Western publication of his memoirs, Khrushchev revealed the depth not only of his anger at his colleagues-turned-tormentors, but his deep sense of guilt at his complicity in Stalin's crimes. By the very end of his life, to judge by a Kremlin doctor's recollections, he was even losing faith in the cause of socialism.

After his death, Khrushchev became a "non-person" in the USSR, his name suppressed by his successors and ignored by most Soviet citizens until the late 1980s, when his record received a burst of attention in connection with Gorbachev's new round of reform. Khrushchev's legacy, like his life,

is remarkably mixed. Perhaps his most long-lasting bequest is the way his efforts at de-Stalinization, awkward and erratic though they were, prepared the ground for the reform and then the collapse of the Soviet Union.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; COLD WAR; CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; DE-STALINIZATION; STALIN, JOSEF VISARIONOVICH; THAW, THE

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WILLIAM TAUBMAN

KHUTOR

Although there were proposals dating from the early 1890s to establish small-scale farming based on the establishment of the khutor, it was not until the 1911 Stolypin rural reforms that the khutor came into existence as part of the land settlement provisions for "individual enclosures." The khutor lasted for three decades before it was eliminated by the Soviets. In contrast to the long-standing system of land ownership under which farms were held and worked in common by an entire village,

under the Stolypin reforms an individual could now own a plot of land on which was also located his house and farm buildings. This totally self-contained farm unit was the khutor.

Never important as an agricultural institution either under the tsars or during the Soviet period, khutors, along with the closely related *otrub* (where only the farmland was enclosed), accounted for less than 8 percent of total farm output at its height before the Bolshevik Revolution and for a mere 3.5 percent of all peasant land as of January 1, 1927. Only in the northwest and western parts of the Russian Republic were khutors an important part of peasant agriculture—11 percent and 19 percent of all households, respectively.

Before collectivization in 1929, there were two forces causing the number of khutors to fluctuate in number. On the one hand, as a result of the revolution and the civil war that followed, many of the khutors once again became part of a communal mir. But, on the other hand, the 1922 Land Code permitted peasants to leave the mir, and in some places peasants were encouraged to create khutors. As a consequence, the number of khutors increased in the western provinces as well as the central industrial region of Russia.

In spite of its relative numerical unimportance, the khutor remained a thorn in the side of the Soviet leadership, who rightly saw the often prosperous khutor as inconsistent with the larger effort to socialize Soviet agriculture. The khutor, which existed alongside collective farm agriculture in the 1930s, was finally dissolved at the end of the decade. All peasant homes located on the khutors were to be destroyed by September 1, 1940, without compensation to the peasants who lived in them. Nearly 450,000 rural households were transferred to the collective farm villages. The khutor as a form of private agriculture in Russia became extinct.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; MIR; PEASANT ECONOMY; STOLYPIN, PETER ARKADIEVICH

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KIEVAN CAVES PATERICON

The *Kievan Caves Patericon* is a monastic collection of tales about monks of the Caves Monastery of Kiev. It reflects the rich monastic practice and theology of the learned monks of the Kievan Caves Monastery. The core of the patericon is the epistolary works of Bishop Simon of Vladimir-Suzdal, a former Caves monk, and the monk Polikarp, to whom Simon addresses an epistle and accompanying stories, written between 1225 and his death in 1226. Ostensibly, Simon writes to Polikarp because he is appalled at the latter's ambition for a see and feels he must instruct him to remain in the holy Monastery of the Caves. Attempting to convince Polikarp to stay at the Caves, Simon attaches nine stories to his letter, which are intended to illustrate the holiness of the monastery and its inhabitants. There is no recorded response to Bishop Simon, but sometime prior to 1240, Polikarp wrote to his superior, the archimandrite Akindin, and attached to his brief missal eleven tales recounting the exploits of thirteen more monks.

To this core were added in various editions a number of disparate works associated with the Caves Monastery, including the *Life of Theodosius*. It is not clear when the collection began to be called a patericon (*paterik*), a word used to designate a number of Byzantine monastic collections translated into Slavic, but this title was not used in the oldest extant manuscript, the *Berseniev Witness*, which was copied in 1406 at the request of Bishop Arseny of Tver. A printed version appeared in 1661, which, though seriously flawed, was apparently quite popular, as it was reprinted many times up to the nineteenth century.

See also: CAVES MONASTERY; KIEVAN RUS

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DAVID K. PRESTEL

KIEVAN RUS

Kievan Rus, the first organized state located on the lands of modern Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, was

ruled by members of the Rurikid dynasty and centered around the city of Kiev from the mid-ninth century to 1240. Its East Slav, Finn, and Balt population dwelled in territories along the Dnieper, the Western Dvina, the Lovat-Volkhov, and the upper Volga rivers. Its component peoples and territories were bound together by common recognition of the Rurikid dynasty as their rulers and, after 988, by formal affiliation with the Christian Church, headed by the metropolitan based at Kiev. Kievan Rus was destroyed by the Mongol invasions of 1237–1240. The Kievan Rus era is considered a formative stage in the histories of modern Ukraine and Russia.

The process of the formation of the state is the subject of the Normanist controversy. Normanists stress the role of Scandinavian Vikings as key agents in the creation of the state. Their view builds upon archeological evidence of Scandinavian adventurers and travelling merchants in the region of northwestern Russia and the upper Volga from the eighth century. It also draws upon an account in the *Primary Chronicle*, compiled during the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, which reports that in 862, Slav and Finn tribes in the vicinity of the Lovat and Volkhov rivers invited Rurik, a Varangian Rus, and his brothers to bring order to their lands. Rurik and his descendants are regarded as the founders of the Rurikid dynasty that ruled Kievan Rus. Anti-Normanists discount the role of Scandinavians as founders of the state. They argue that the term Rus refers to the Slav tribe of Polyane, which dwelled in the region of Kiev, and that the Slavs themselves organized their own political structure.

According to the *Primary Chronicle*, Rurik's immediate successors were Oleg (r. 879 or 882 to 912), identified as a regent for Rurik's son Igor (r. 912–945); Igor's wife Olga (r. 945–c. 964), and their son Svyatoslav (r. c. 964–972). They established their authority over Kiev and surrounding tribes, including the Krivichi (in the region of the Valdai Hills), the Polyane (around Kiev on the Dneper River), the Drevlyane (south of the Pripyat River, a tributary of the Dneper), and the Vyatichi, who inhabited lands along the Oka and Volga Rivers.

The tenth-century Rurikids not only forced tribal populations to transfer their allegiance and their tribute payments from Bulgar and Khazaria, but also pursued aggressive policies toward those neighboring states. In 965 Svyatoslav launched a

campaign against the Khazaria. His venture led to the collapse of the Khazar Empire and the destabilization of the lower Volga and the steppe, a region of grasslands south of the forests inhabited by the Slavs. His son Vladimir (r. 980–1015), having subjugated the Radimichi (east of the upper Dnieper River), attacked the Volga Bulgars in 985; the agreement he subsequently reached with the Bulgars was the basis for peaceful relations that lasted a century.

The early Rurikids also engaged their neighbors to the south and west. In 968, Svyatoslav rescued Kiev from the Pechenegs, a nomadic, steppe Turkic population. He devoted most of his attention, however, to establishing control over lands on the Danube River. Forced to abandon that project by the Byzantines, he was returning to Kiev when the Pechenegs killed him in 972. Frontier forts constructed and military campaigns waged by Vladimir and his sons reduced the Pecheneg threat to Kievan Rus.

Shortly after Svyatoslav's death, his son Yaropolk became prince of Kiev. But conflict erupted between him and his brothers. The crisis prompted Vladimir to flee from Novgorod, the city he governed, and raise an army in Scandinavia. Upon his return in 980, he first engaged the prince of Polotsk, one of last non-Rurikid rulers over East Slavs. Victorious, Vladimir married the prince's daughter and added the prince's military retinue to his own army, with which he then defeated Yaropolk and seized the throne of Kiev. Vladimir's triumphs over his brothers, competing non-Rurikid rulers, and neighboring powers provided him and his heirs a monopoly over political power in the region.

Prince Vladimir also adopted Christianity for Kievan Rus. Although Christianity, Judaism, and Islam had long been known in these lands and Olga had personally converted to Christianity, the populace of Kievan Rus remained pagan. When Vladimir assumed the throne, he attempted to create a single pantheon of gods for his people, but soon abandoned that effort in favor of Christianity. Renouncing his numerous wives and consorts, he married Anna, the sister of the Byzantine Emperor Basil. The Patriarch of Constantinople appointed a metropolitan to organize the see of Kiev and all Rus, and in 988, Byzantine clergy baptized the population of Kiev in the Dnieper River.

After adopting Christianity, Vladimir apportioned his realm among his principal sons, sending

each of them to his own princely seat. A bishop accompanied each prince. The lands ruled by Rurikid princes and subject to the Kievan Church constituted Kievan Rus.

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries Vladimir's descendants developed a dynastic political structure to administer their increasingly large and complex realm. There are, however, divergent characterizations of the state's political development during this period. One view contends that Kievan Rus reached its peak during the eleventh century. The next century witnessed a decline, marked by the emergence of powerful autonomous principalities and warfare among their princes. Kiev lost its central role, and Kievan Rus was disintegrating by the time of the Mongol invasion. An alternate view emphasizes the continued vitality of the city of Kiev and argues that Kievan Rus retained its integrity throughout the period. Although it became an increasingly complex state containing numerous principalities that engaged in political and economic competition, dynastic and ecclesiastic bonds provided cohesion among them. The city of Kiev remained its acknowledged and coveted political, economic, and ecclesiastic center.

The creation of an effective political structure proved to be an ongoing challenge for the Rurikids. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, princely administration gradually replaced tribal allegiance and authority. As early as the reign of Olga, her officials began to replace tribal leaders. Vladimir assigned a particular region to each of his sons, to whom he also delegated responsibility for tax collection, protection of communication and trade routes, and for local defense and territorial expansion. Each prince maintained and commanded his own military force, which was supported by tax revenues, commercial fees, and booty seized in battle. He also had the authority and the means to hire supplementary forces.

When Vladimir died in 1015, however, his sons engaged in a power struggle that ended only after four of them had died and two others, Yaroslav and Mstislav, divided the realm between them. When Mstislav died (1036), Yaroslav assumed full control over Kievan Rus. Yaroslav adopted a law code known as the *Russkaya Pravda*, which with amendments remained in force throughout the Kievan Rus era.

He also attempted to bring order to dynastic relations. Before his death he issued a "Testament" in which he left Kiev to his eldest son Izyaslav.

He assigned Chernigov to his son Svyatoslav, Pereyaslavl to Vsevolod, and lesser seats to his younger sons. He advised them all to heed their eldest brother as they had their father. The Testament is understood by scholars to have established a basis for the rota system of succession, which incorporated the principles of seniority among the princes, lateral succession through a generation, and dynastic possession of the realm of Kievan Rus. By assigning Kiev to the senior prince, it elevated that city to a position of centrality within the realm.

This dynastic system, by which each prince conducted relations with his immediate neighbors, provided an effective means of defending and expanding Kievan Rus. It also encouraged cooperation among the princes when they faced crises. IncurSIONS by the Polovtsy (Kipchaks, Cumans), Turkic nomads who moved into the steppe and displaced the Pechenegs in the second half of the eleventh century, prompted concerted action among Princes Izyaslav, Svyatoslav, and Vsevolod in 1068. Although the Polovtsy were victorious, they retreated after another encounter with Svyatoslav's forces. With the exception of one frontier skirmish in 1071, they then refrained from attacking Rus for the next twenty years.

When the Polovtsy did renew hostilities in the 1090s, the Rurikids were engaged in intradynastic conflicts. Their ineffective defense allowed the Polovtsy to reach the environs of Kiev and burn the Monastery of the Caves, founded in the mid-eleventh century. But after the princes resolved their differences at a conference in 1097, their coalitions drove the Polovtsy back into the steppe and broke up the federation of Polovtsy tribes responsible for the aggression. These campaigns yielded comparatively peaceful relations for the next fifty years.

As the dynasty grew larger, however, its system of succession required revision. Confusion and recurrent controversies arose over the definition of seniority, the standards for eligibility, and the lands subject to lateral succession. In 1097, when the intradynastic wars became so severe that they interfered with the defense against the Polovtsy, a princely conference at Lyubech resolved that each principality in Kievan Rus would become the hereditary domain of a specific branch of the dynasty. The only exceptions were Kiev itself, which in 1113 reverted to the status of a dynastic possession, and Novgorod, which by 1136 asserted the right to select its own prince.

The settlement at Lyubech provided a basis for orderly succession to the Kievan throne for the next forty years. When Svyatopolk Izyaslavich died, his cousin Vladimir Vsevolodich Monomakh became prince of Kiev (r. 1113–1125). He was succeeded by his sons Mstislav (r. 1125–1132) and Yaropolk (r. 1132–1139). But the Lyubech agreement also acknowledged division of the dynasty into distinct branches and Kievan Rus into distinct principalities. The descendants of Svyatoslav ruled Chernigov, Galicia and Volynia, located southwest of Kiev, acquired the status of separate principalities in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, respectively. During the twelfth century, Smolensk, located north of Kiev on the upper Dnieper river, and Rostov-Suzdal, northeast of Kiev, similarly emerged as powerful principalities. The northwestern portion of the realm was dominated by Novgorod, whose strength rested on its lucrative commercial relations with Scandinavian and German merchants of the Baltic as well as on its own extensive empire that stretched to the Ural mountains by the end of the eleventh century.

The changing political structure contributed to repeated dynastic conflicts over succession to the Kievan throne. Some princes became ineligible for the succession to Kiev and concentrated on developing their increasingly autonomous realms. But the heirs of Vladimir Monomakh, who became the princes of Volynia, Smolensk, and Rostov-Suzdal, as well as the princes of Chernigov, became embroiled in succession disputes, often triggered by attempts of younger members to bypass the elder generation and to reduce the number of princes eligible for the succession.

The greatest confrontations occurred after the death of Yaropolk Vladimirovich, who had attempted to arrange for his nephew to be his successor and had thereby aroused objections from his own younger brother Yuri Dolgoruky, the prince of Rostov-Suzdal. As a result of the discord among Monomakh's heirs, Vsevolod Olgovich of Chernigov was able to take the Kievan throne (r. 1139–1146) and regain a place in the Kievan succession cycle for his dynastic branch. After his death, the contest between Yuri Dolgoruky and his nephews resumed; it persisted until 1154, when Yuri finally ascended to the Kievan throne and restored the traditional order of succession.

An even more destructive conflict broke out after the death in 1167 of Rostislav Mstislavich, successor to his uncle Yuri. When Mstislav Izyaslavich,

the prince of Volynia and a member of the next generation, attempted to seize the Kievan throne, a coalition of princes opposed him. Led by Yuri's son Andrei Bogolyubsky, it represented the senior generation of eligible princes, but also included the sons of the late Rostislav and the princes of Chernigov. The conflict culminated in 1169, when Andrei's forces evicted Mstislav Izyaslavich from Kiev and sacked the city. Andrei's brother Gleb became prince of Kiev.

Prince Andrei personified the growing tensions between the increasingly powerful principalities of Kievan Rus and the state's center, Kiev. As prince of Vladimir-Suzdal (Rostov-Suzdal), he concentrated on the development of Vladimir and challenged the primacy of Kiev. Nerl Andrei used his power and resources, however, to defend the principle of generational seniority in the succession to Kiev. Nevertheless, after Gleb died in 1171, Andrei's coalition failed to secure the throne for another of his brothers. A prince of the Chernigov line, Svyatoslav Vsevolodich (r. 1173–1194), occupied the Kievan throne and brought dynastic peace.

By the turn of the century, eligibility for the Kievan throne was confined to three dynastic lines: the princes of Volynia, Smolensk, and Chernigov. Because the opponents were frequently of the same generation as well as sons of former grand princes, dynastic traditions of succession offered little guidance for determining which prince had seniority. By the mid-1230s, princes of Chernigov and Smolensk were locked in a prolonged conflict that had serious consequences. During the hostilities Kiev was sacked two more times, in 1203 and 1235. The strife revealed the divergence between the southern and western principalities, which were deeply enmeshed in the conflicts over Kiev, and those of the northeast, which were relatively indifferent to them. Intradynastic conflict, compounded by the lack of cohesion among the components of Kievan Rus, undermined the integrity of the realm. Kievan Rus was left without effective defenses before the Mongol invasion.

When the state of Kievan Rus was forming, its populace consisted primarily of rural agriculturalists who cultivated cereal grains as well as peas, lentils, flax, and hemp in natural forest clearings or in those they created by the slash-and-burn method. They supplemented these products by fishing, hunting, and gathering fruits, berries, nuts, mushrooms, honey, and other natural products in the forests around their villages.

Commerce, however, provided the economic foundation for Kievan Rus. The tenth-century Rurikid princes, accompanied by their military retainers, made annual rounds among their subjects and collected tribute. Igor met his death in 945 during such an excursion, when he and his men attempted to take more than the standard payment from the Drevlyane. After collecting the tribute of fur pelts, honey, and wax, the Kievan princes loaded their goods and captives in boats, also supplied by the local population, and made their way down the Dnieper River to the Byzantine market of Cherson. Oleg in 907 and Igor, less successfully, in 944 conducted military campaigns against Constantinople. The resulting treaties allowed the Rus to trade not only at Cherson, but also at Constantinople, where they had access to goods from virtually every corner of the known world. From their vantage point at Kiev the Rurikid princes controlled all traffic moving from towns to their north toward the Black Sea and its adjacent markets.

The Dnieper River route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” led back northward to Novgorod, which controlled commercial traffic with traders from the Baltic Sea. From Novgorod commercial goods also were carried eastward along the upper Volga River through the region of Rostov–Suzdal to Bulgar. At this market center on the mid-Volga River, which formed a nexus between the Rus and the markets of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, the Rus exchanged their goods for oriental silver coins or dirhams (until the early eleventh century) and luxury goods including silks, glassware, and fine pottery.

The establishment of Rurikid political dominance contributed to changes in the social composition of the region. To the agricultural peasant population were added the princes themselves, their military retainers, servants, and slaves. The introduction of Christianity by Prince Vladimir brought a layer of clergy to the social mix. It also transformed the cultural face of Kievan Rus, especially in its urban centers. In Kiev Vladimir constructed the Church of the Holy Virgin (also known as the Church of the Tithe), built of stone and flanked by two other palatial structures. The ensemble formed the centerpiece of “Vladimir’s city,” which was surrounded by new fortifications. Yaroslav expanded “Vladimir’s city” by building new fortifications that encompassed the battlefield on which he defeated the Pechenegs in 1036. Set in the southern wall was the Golden Gate of Kiev. Within the protected area Vladimir constructed a new complex of

churches and palaces, the most imposing of which was the masonry Cathedral of St. Sophia, which was the church of the metropolitan and became the symbolic center of Christianity in Kiev.

The introduction of Christianity met resistance in some parts of Kievan Rus. In Novgorod a popular uprising took place when representatives of the new church threw the idol of the god Perun into the Volkhov River. But Novgorod’s landscape was also quickly altered by the construction of wooden churches and, in the middle of the eleventh century, by its own stone Cathedral of St. Sophia. In Chernigov Prince Mstislav constructed the Church of the Transfiguration of Our Savior in 1035.

By agreement with the Rurikids the church became legally responsible for a range of social practices and family affairs, including birth, marriage, and death. Ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over church personnel and were charged with enforcing Christian norms and rituals in the larger community. Although the church received revenue from its courts, the clergy were only partially successful in their efforts to convince the populace to abandon pagan customs. But to the degree that they were accepted, Christian social and cultural standards provided a common identity for the diverse tribes comprising Kievan Rus society.

The spread of Christianity and the associated construction projects intensified and broadened commercial relations between Kiev and Byzantium. Kiev also attracted Byzantine artists and artisans, who designed and decorated the early Rus churches and taught their techniques and skills to local apprentices. Kiev correspondingly became the center of craft production in Kievan Rus during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

While architectural design and the decorative arts of mosaics, frescoes, and icon painting were the most visible aspects of the Christian cultural transformation, Kievan Rus also received chronicles, saints’ lives, sermons, and other literature from the Greeks. The outstanding literary works from this era were the *Primary Chronicle* or *Tale of Bygone Years*, compiled by monks of the Monastery of the Caves, and the “Sermon on Law and Grace,” composed (c. 1050) by Metropolitan Hilarion, the first native of Kievan Rus to head the church.

During the twelfth century, despite the emergence of competing political centers within Kievan Rus and repeated sacks of it (1169, 1203, 1235), the city of Kiev continued to thrive economically.

Its diverse population, which is estimated to have reached between 36,000 and 50,000 persons by the end of the twelfth century, included princes, soldiers, clergy, merchants, artisans, unskilled workers, and slaves. Its expanding handicraft sector produced glassware, glazed pottery, jewelry, religious items, and other goods that were exported throughout the lands of Rus. Kiev also remained a center of foreign commerce, and increasingly re-exported imported goods, exemplified by Byzantine amphorae used as containers for oil and wine, to other Rus towns as well.

The proliferation of political centers within Kievan Rus was accompanied by a diffusion of the economic dynamism and increasing social complexity that characterized Kiev. Novgorod's economy also continued to be centered on its trade with the Baltic region and with Bulgar. By the twelfth century artisans in Novgorod were also engaging in new crafts, such as enameling and fresco painting. Novgorod's flourishing economy supported a population of twenty to thirty thousand by the early thirteenth century. Volynia and Galicia, Rostov-Suzdal, and Smolensk, whose princes vied politically and military for Kiev, gained their economic vitality from their locations on trade routes. The construction of the masonry Church of the Mother of God in Smolensk (1136–1137) and of the Cathedral of the Dormition (1158) and the Golden Gate in Vladimir reflected the wealth concentrated in these centers. Andrei Bogolyubsky also constructed his own palace complex of Bogolyubovo outside Vladimir and celebrated a victory over the Volga Bulgars in 1165 by building the Church of the Intercession nearby on the Nerl River. In each of these principalities the princes' boyars, officials, and retainers were forming local, landowning aristocracies and were also becoming consumers of luxury items produced abroad, in Kiev, and in their own towns.

In 1223 the armies of Chingis Khan, founder of the Mongol Empire, first reached the steppe south of Kievan Rus. At the Battle of Kalka they defeated a combined force of Polovtsy and Rus drawn from Kiev, Chernigov, and Volynia. The Mongols returned in 1236, when they attacked Bulgar. In 1237–1238 they mounted an offensive against Ryazan and then Vladimir-Suzdal. In 1239 they devastated the southern towns of Pereyaslavl and Chernigov, and in 1240 conquered Kiev.

The state of Kievan Rus is considered to have collapsed with the fall of Kiev. But the Mongols went on to subordinate Galicia and Volynia before

invading both Hungary and Poland. In the aftermath of their conquest, the invaders settled in the vicinity of the lower Volga River, forming the portion of the Mongol Empire commonly known as the Golden Horde. Surviving Rurikid princes made their way to the horde to pay homage to the Mongol khan. With the exception of Prince Michael of Chernigov, who was executed, the khan confirmed each of the princes as the ruler in his respective principality. He thus confirmed the disintegration of Kievan Rus.

See also: OLGA; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; ROUTE TO GREEKS; VIKINGS; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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JANET MARTIN

KIPCHAKS *See* POLOVTSY.

KIREYEVSKY, IVAN VASILIEVICH

(1806–1856), the most important ideologist of Russian Slavophilism, along with Alexei Khomyakov.

The promulgation of Slavophilism in the middle third of the nineteenth century marked the turn from Enlightenment cosmopolitanism to the fixation on national identity that has dominated much of Russian culture since that time. No life better suggests that crucial change in Russian cultural consciousness than Kireyevsky's. He first ventured into publicism as the editor of a journal that he called *The European*. The journal appeared in 1830, but was suppressed by the government after only two issues, almost entirely on the basis of a fanciful reading of Kireyevsky's important essay, *The Nineteenth Century*, in the inflamed atmosphere created by the European revolutions of that year. This traumatic event helped to end the Western orientation of Kireyevsky's earlier career and led to a series of new relationships, which, taken together, constituted a conversion to romantic nationalism.

Kireyevsky's childhood was spent in Moscow and on the family estate (Dolbino) in the vicinity of Tula and Orel, where the Kireyevsky family had been based since the sixteenth century. His father died of cholera during the French invasion of 1812, and he, his brother Peter, and their sisters were raised by their beautiful and intelligent mother, A. P. Elagina, who was the hostess of one of Moscow's most influential salons during the 1830s and 1840s. The poet Vasily Zhukovsky, her close friend, played some role in Kireyevsky's early education and he had at least a nodding acquaintance with other major figures in Russian culture, including Pushkin.

Kireyevsky studied with Moscow University professors in the 1820s, although he did not actually attend the university. There, under the influence of Professor Mikhail Grigorevich Pavlov, his interests shifted from enlightenment thinkers to the metaphysics of Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling. After graduation he became one of the so-called archive youth, to whom Pushkin refers in *Eugene Onegin*; he also frequented an informal grouping known as the Raich Circle, as well as a kind of inner circle drawn from it, called the Lovers of Wisdom (*Obshchestvo Liubomudriya*), devoted to romantic and esoteric knowledge.

After producing some literary criticism for the *Moscow Messenger*, Kireyevsky spent ten months in Germany, cultivating his new intellectual interest in German philosophy. He was entertained by Hegel in Berlin and attended some of Schelling's lectures in Munich, but, like many a Russian traveler, he was homesick for Russia and returned earlier than

he had planned. The outbreak of cholera in Moscow was the official reason for his hasty return.

After the fiasco of the *European*, Kireyevsky underwent an intellectual and spiritual crisis from which he emerged, at the end of the 1830s, a considerably changed man: married, converted to Orthodoxy, and purged of many Western aspects of his former outlook. His wife's religiosity; his brother's interest in Russian peasant culture, and his new friend Alexei Khomyakov's belief in the superiority of Orthodox practice over the Western confessions all worked on him profoundly.

The immediate catalyst for the first Slavophile writings, however, was the famous "First Philosophical Letter" of Peter Chaadayev, which appeared in a Moscow journal in 1836. Chaadayev famously found Russia's past and present stagnant, sterile, and ahistorical, largely because Russia had severed itself from the Roman and Catholic West. The discussion between Kireyevsky, Khomyakov, and their younger followers over the next several decades constituted a collective "answer to Chaadayev." Orthodox Christianity, according to the Slavophiles, actually benefited from its separation from pagan and Christian Rome. Orthodoxy had been spared the rationalism and legalism which had been taken into the Roman Catholic Church, from Aristotle, through Roman legalism, to scholasticism and Papal hierarchy. Russian society had thus been able to develop harmoniously and communally. Although, since Peter the Great, the Russian elite had been seduced by the external power and glamor of secular Europe, the Russian peasants had preserved much of the old, pre-Petrine Russian culture in their social forms, especially in the peasant communal structure. Kireyevsky and the other Slavophiles hoped that these popular survivals, combined with an Orthodox revival in the present, could restore Russian culture to its proper bases. Kireyevsky expressed these ideas in a series of short-lived journals, which appeared under the editorship of various Slavophile individuals and groups. The Slavophile sketch of the patrimonial and traditional monarchy of the pre-Petrine period is largely fanciful, as is that of the social and political life dominated by a variety of communal forms, but such sketches constituted a highly effective indirect attack on the Russia of Nicholas I and on the development of European industrialism. Kireyevsky's Slavophilism, with its curious blend of traditionalism, libertarianism, and communalism, has left unmistakable marks on virtually all variants of Russian nationalism and social romanticism since

his time. Although his written legacy was limited to a few articles, Ivan Kireyevsky was the philosopher of Slavophilism, just as Khomyakov was its theologian.

See also: KHOMYAKOV, ALEXEI STEPANOVICH; SLAVOPHILES

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ABBOTT GLEASON

KIRILL-BELOOZERO MONASTERY

The Kirill-Beloozero Monastery was founded in 1397 in the far Russian north as a hermitage dedicated to the Dormition of the Virgin. Its founder was Cyril of Belozersk, conversant of Sergius of Radonezh, hesychast (mystical hermit), and former abbot of Simonov Monastery. It rapidly gained brethren, land, and renown. At Cyril's death in 1427, its patron was the prince of Belozersk-Mozhaisk, and its titular head was the Archbishop of Rostov, to whom Kirillov was administratively subordinated by 1478.

Social and administrative reforms occurred under Abbot Trifon, who lived from about 1434 to about 1517. Trifon was a monk of the Athos-linked St. Savior Monastery on the Rock, and later became Archbishop of Rostov (1462–1467). At this point the monastery gained the name “Kirillov” and, probably, its strict cenobitic (communal-disciplinarian) rule. It entered a relationship with the Moscow authorities. During the civil wars, Trifon loosed Basil II from his cross oath to Dmitry Shemyaka (1446); Cyril was canonized in 1448 and his *vita* (life) was written by Pachomius the Logothete in 1462. Trifon's successor and fellow St. Savior monk, Abbot Cassian, who lived from about 1447 until about 1469, went on a Moscow embassy to the ecumenical patriarch in Constantinople.

During Trifon's abbacy, a Byzantine-influenced school flourished, where basic texts of grammar,

logic, cosmology, and history circulated. Its legacy was a bibliographical trend whose representatives (such as Efrosin, fl. 1463–1491) compiled and catalogued much of the literary inheritance of Bulgaria, Kievan Rus, and Serbia, and edited important works of Muscovite literature (such as the epic *Zadonshchina*) and chronography (the *First Sophia Chronicle*). Kirillov's great library (1,304 books by 1621) has survived almost intact.

From 1484 to 1514, Kirillov was a focal point for the Non-Possessors, abbots and monks—including Gury Tushin, Nilus Sorsky, and Vassian Patrikeev—who rejected monastic estates and promoted hesychast ideals of mental prayer and hermitism. After 1515, Kirillov followed the Possessor trend, whose first leader, Joseph of Volok, had praised the cenobitic discipline of several of its early abbots. Kirillov's sixteenth-century abbots achieved high rank, such as Afanasy (1539–1551), later bishop of Suzdal, whom Andrew Kurbsky called “silver-loving,” and from 1530 to 1570 their landholdings expanded terrifically (at mid-seventeenth century Kirillov was the fifth-largest landowner in Muscovy).

Attracting wealth, privileges, and pilgrims from the central government as well as the boyar aristocracy, Kirillov lost self-governance to Moscow. Ivan IV, whose birth was ascribed to St. Cyril's intervention and who expressed a wish to join Kirillov's brethren in 1567, took over its administration, lecturing its abbot and boyar monks (such as Ivan-Jonah Sheremetev) on piety in a letter of 1573. (Boris Godunov later selected Kirillov's abbot, and the False Dmitry chose its monks.) By the mid-sixteenth century, Kirillov had become fiscally subject to the bishop of Vologda, and by century's end to the patriarch.

In the 1590s Kirillov was transformed from a cultural center into a fortress, with stone towers and walls that withstood Polish-Lithuanian attacks during the Time of Troubles. Its infirmary treated monks and laymen, and its icon-painting and stonemasonry workshops sold their wares to Muscovites. Kirillov was also used as a prison. Its most illustrious detainee, Patriarch Nikon, was held in solitary confinement from 1676 to 1681 without access to his library, paper, or ink.

From the eighteenth century, Kirillov lost its military importance, and an economic and spiritual decline began. It was closed by Soviet authorities in 1924 and transformed into a museum. In 1998 monastic life at Kirillov was partly restored.

See also: CAVES MONASTERY; SIMONOV MONASTERY; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

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ROBERT ROMANCHUK

KIRIYENKO, SERGEI VLADILENOVICH

(b. 1962), former prime minister of the Russian Federation and a leader of the liberal party Union of Right Forces.

Kiriyenko was born in Sukumi, which is presently in Abkhazia, nominally a part of the Republic of Georgia. In 1993 he received a degree in economic leadership from the Academy of Economics. Soon he founded a bank, *Garantiya*, in Nizhny Novgorod. He was so successful that the governor, Boris Nemtsov, recommended that he take over the nearly bankrupt oil company, *Norsi*. He succeeded once again, breaking the apathy that allowed a bad situation to fester. He first threatened to close the company, hoping this would spur workers' efficiency. It did not. So he worked out a complicated restructuring plan that involved tax breaks and new negotiations with workers, suppliers, and buyers. Kiriyenko managed to convince all parties that it was in their joint interests to increase production, and within a year production increased about 300 percent.

Kiriyenko now had a national reputation, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin made him minister for fuel and energy in 1997. In this capacity he favorably impressed American President Bill Clinton's Russian specialist Strobe Talbott. In March 1998 Yeltsin shocked Russia and the world when he fired his long-time prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and announced his intention to replace him with Kiriyenko. There ensued a bitter battle between Yeltsin and the Duma over Kiriyenko's appointment. Only on the third and last vote did the Duma confirm Kiriyenko. In his first speech as prime minister, Kiriyenko pointed out that Russia faced "an enormous number of problems."

Despite his talents, Kiriyenko could not change some basic facts. By July 1998 unpaid wages totaled 66 billion rubles (\$11 billion); service of the government debt consumed almost 50 percent of

the budget; the price of oil, one of Russia's chief exports, was falling; and a financial crisis in Asia had investors fleeing "emerging markets," Russia included. In June a desperate Yeltsin telephoned Clinton to ask him to intervene in the deliberations of the International Monetary Fund on Russia's behalf. It was too late. In August the Russian government in effect declared bankruptcy, and Yeltsin dismissed the Kiriyenko government. As of June 2003, Kiriyenko was president of Russia's chemical weapons disarmament commission.

See also: NEMTSOV, BORIS IVANOVICH; UNION OF RIGHT FORCES; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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HUGH PHILLIPS

KIROV, SERGEI MIRONOVICH

(1886–1934), Leningrad Party secretary and Politburo member.

Born in 1886 as Sergei Mironovich Kostrikov in Urzhum, in the northern Russian province of Viatka, Kirov was abandoned by his father and left orphaned by his mother. He spent much of his childhood in an orphanage before training as a mechanic at a vocational school in the city of Kazan from 1901 to 1904. He became involved in radical political activity during his student years, after which he moved to Tomsk and joined the Social Democratic Party, garnering attention as a local party activist before the age of twenty. Kirov joined the Bolshevik Party and was arrested in 1906 for his activities in the revolutionary events of 1905 in Tomsk. After his release in 1909, he moved to Vladikavkaz and resumed his career as a professional revolutionary, taking a job with a local liberal newspaper and changing his last name to Kirov. He continued his party activities in the Caucasus in the years before the October Revolution, serving in various capacities as one of the leading Bolsheviks in the Caucasus during the Revolution and civil war eras. Kirov occupied the post of secretary of the Azerbaijan Central Committee from 1921 to 1926. In 1926 he became a candidate mem-



Sergei Kirov, the popular leader of the Leningrad Party Committee, was assassinated in 1934. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

ber of the Politburo and took the position of first secretary of the Leningrad Provincial Party organization, playing a major role in the political defeat of Grigory Zinoviev by Josef Stalin. Kirov gained full Politburo membership in 1930 and retained his position as head of the Leningrad Party organization until his death in 1934.

On December 1, 1934, a lone gunman named Leonid Nikolaev murdered Kirv at the Leningrad party headquarters. Kirov's murder served as a pretext for a wave of repression that was carried out by Stalin in 1935 and 1936 against former political oppositionists, including Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, and against large sectors of the Leningrad population. The connection between Kirov's death and the coordinated repression of 1935 and 1936 has led numerous contemporary observers, as well as later scholars, to speculate that Stalin himself arranged the murder in order to justify an attack on his political opponents. Proponents of this theory argue that Kirov represented a moderate opposition to Stalin in the years 1930 to 1933, in

particular as an opponent to Stalin's demand in 1932 for the execution of the oppositionist Mikhail Riutin; they also argue that provincial-level party bosses wanted to replace Stalin with Kirov as general secretary of the Bolshevik Party at the Seventeenth Congress in 1934. Archival research carried out after the fall of the USSR has generally failed to support these claims, suggesting instead that Kirov was a dedicated Stalinist and that Kirov's murderer was a disgruntled party member working without instruction from higher authorities. Stalin's repressive response to the Kirov murder was likely a cynical use of the assassination for his own political ends as well as a genuine response of shock at the murder of a high-level Bolshevik official. Proponents of Stalin's responsibility, however, have not conceded the argument, and the debate is unlikely to be resolved without substantial additional evidence.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PURGES, THE GREAT; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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PAUL M. HAGENLOH

KLYUCHEVSKY, VASILY OSIPOVICH

(1841–1911), celebrated Russian historian.

Vasily Klyuchevsky was born to the family of a priest of Penza province. In 1865 he graduated from the Moscow University (Historical-Philological Department). In 1872 he earned a master's degree and in 1882 a doctorate. In 1879 he became associate professor, and in 1882 professor, of Russian history at Moscow University. He was named corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1889 and academician of history and Russian antiquities in 1900. Klyuchevsky was connected with government and church circles. From 1893 to 1895 he taught history to Grand Duke Georgy, son of Alexander II. In 1905 he took part in a conference organized by Nicholas II on the new

press regulations and also participated in conferences on designing the state Duma. He was the holder of many decorations and in 1903 was given the rank of Privy Councilor. After legalization of political parties in October 1905, Klyuchevsky ran for election to the First State Duma on the Constitutional Democratic ticket, but lost.

Klyuchevsky was a pupil and follower of Sergei Solovev and his successor in the Department of Russian History at Moscow University. His main works are: (1) *Drevne-russkie zhitiya sviatykh kak istorichesky istochnik* (*The Old Russian Hagiography as a Historical Source*), published in 1872, in which he proved that hagiography did not contain reliable historical facts; (2) *Boiarskaya Duma drevnei Rusi* (*The Boyar Duma of Old Russia*), published in 1882, in which he studied the history of the most important government institution in pre-Petrine Russia; (3) *Proiskhozhdenie krepostnogo prava v Rossii* (*The Genesis of Serfdom in Russia*), published in 1885, in which he suggested a new conception of the origin of serfdom according to which serfdom was engendered by peasants' debts to landowners and developed on the basis of private-legal relations, the state only legalizing it; (4) *Podushnaya podat i otmena kholopstva v Rossii* (*Poll-Tax and the Abolition of Bond Slavery in Russia*), published in 1885, in which he showed that a purely financial reform had serious socio-economic consequences; and (5) *Sostav predstavitelstva na zemskikh soborakh drevnei Rusi* (*The Composition of Representatives at Assemblies of the Land in Old Russia*), published in 1892, in which he substantiated the point of view that the assemblies were not representative institutions. Klyuchevsky prepared a number of special courses on source study, historiography of the eighteenth century, methodology, and terminology and wrote many articles on the history of Russian culture.

Starting in 1879 Klyuchevsky taught a general course on Russian history from the ancient times to the Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s. This course is regarded as a summation of his research findings and interpretations. Klyuchevsky believed that world history developed in accordance with certain objective regularities, "peoples consecutively replacing one another as successive moments of civilization, as phases of the development of humankind," and that in the history of an individual country these regularities play out under the influence of particular local conditions. He analyzed Russian history through three principal categories: the individual, society, and environment. In his opinion, these elements determined the process of

a country's historical development. The objective of his course was to discover the "secret" of Russian history: to assess what had been done and what had to be done to put the developing Russian society into the first rank of European nations. In his opinion, a student who mastered his course should become "a citizen who acts consciously and conscientiously," capable of rectifying the shortcomings of the social system of Russia.

Klyuchevsky was a positivist and tried to attain positive scientific knowledge in his course. However, from the point of view of his admirers, the most valuable and attractive feature of his course consisted in his artistic descriptions of historical events and phenomena, replete with vivid images and everyday scenes of the past; his original analysis of sources and psychological analysis of historical figures; and his skeptical and liberal judgments and evaluations—in other words, in his figurative and intuitive comprehension and artistic representations of the past. He spoke ironically of the shortcomings of the social system, social institutions, manners, and customs, and censured the faults of tsars and statesmen. All these qualities attracted crowds of students who understood his ideas of the past as comments on current conditions. His course exhibited such mastery of literary style that in 1908 he was named an honorary member of Russian Academy of Sciences in belles lettres.

At the Moscow University Klyuchevsky created his own school, which prepared such prominent historians as Alexander Kizeveter, Matvei Lyubavskii, Yuri Got'e, Pavel Milyukov, and others. Klyuchevsky's works continue to enjoy popularity and to influence historiography in Russia to this day.

See also: EDUCATION; HISTORIOGRAPHY; UNIVERSITIES

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BORIS N. MIRONOV

KOKOSHIN, ANDREI AFANASIEVICH

(b. 1946), member of the State Duma; deputy chairman of the Duma Committee on Industry, Construction, and High Technologies; chairman of Expert Councils for biotechnologies and information technologies; director of the Institute for International Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; chairman of the Russian National Council for the Development of Education.

A graduate of Bauman Technical Institute, Kokoshin worked for two decades with the Institute of the United States and Canada of the Academy of Sciences (ISKAN), rising to the position of deputy director and establishing a reputation as one of the leading experts on U.S. defense and security policy. He received his doctorate in political science and is a member of the Academy of Natural Sciences.

In the late 1980s Kokoshin collaborated on a series of articles that promoted a radical change in Soviet defense policy, supporting international disengagement, domestic reform, and the technological-organizational requirements of the Revolution in Military Affairs. In 1991 he opposed the August Coup. With the creation of the Russian Ministry of Defense in May 1992, he was appointed first deputy minister of defense with responsibility for the defense industry and research and development. In May 1997 Russian President Boris Yeltsin named him head of the Defense Council and the State Military Inspectorate. In March 1998 Yeltsin appointed him head of the Security Council. In the aftermath of the fiscal crisis of August 1998, Yeltsin fired Kokoshin. In 1999 Kokoshin ran successfully for the State Duma.

Kokoshin has written extensively on U.S. national security policy and Soviet military doctrine. He championed the intellectual contributions of A. A. Svechin to modern strategy and military art. His *Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–1991*, was published by MIT Press in 1998.

See also: SVECHIN, ALEXANDER

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JACOB W. KIPP

KOLCHAK, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH

(1873–1920), admiral, supreme ruler of White forces during the Russian civil war.

Following his father's example, Alexander Kolchak attended the Imperial Naval Academy, and graduated second in his class in 1894. After a tour in the Pacific Fleet and participation in scientific expeditions to the Far North, he saw active duty during the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905). By July 1916 he merited promotion to vice-admiral and command of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

Kolchak continued to serve under the Provisional Government following the February Revolution of 1917, but resigned his command when discipline broke down in his ranks. At the time of the Bolshevik seizure of power in October, Kolchak was abroad. But he responded with alacrity to the invitation of General Dimitry L. Horvath, manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, to help coordinate the anti-Bolshevik forces in Manchuria.

White resistance to Soviet rule was also mounting along the Volga and in western Siberia, as well as in the Cossack regions of southern Russia. During May and June 1918 in Samara, KOMUCH (Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly)—a moderate socialist government with pretensions to national legitimacy—emerged to compete with the even more anti-Bolshevik but autonomist-minded Provisional Siberian Government (PSG) in Omsk for leadership of the White cause. Under pressure from the Allies, KOMUCH agreed to merge with PSG into a five-man Directory as a united front against the Bolsheviks in September 1918. But the short-lived Directory lasted only until November 18. On that day, Kolchak was appointed dictator with the ambitious title of supreme ruler of Russia—and in due course recognized as such by the two other main White military commanders, Anton Denikin in the south and Nikolai Yudenich in the Baltic region.

The arrival of French General Maurice Janin, as commander-in-chief of all Allied forces in Russia, complicated the issue of the chain of command

and authority. Its significance became obvious when Janin and the “Czechoslovak Legion” (prisoners-of-war from the Austro-Hungarian Army who were in the process of being repatriated with Allied assistance) took over guarding the Trans-Siberian railway and proceeded at their discretion to block the passage of the supreme ruler’s echelons.

While Kolchak’s British-trained army came to number approximately 200,000 men (with a very high proportion of officers), it was never an effective fighting machine. Moreover, the admiral failed to implement a popular political program. Indeed, he was unable to unite the White forces completely, even in Siberia and the Far East. The Russian heartland remained under control of the Bolsheviks, and their depiction of the admiral as a tool of the old regime and foreign interests had enough of the ring of truth.

For Kolchak the military tide turned decisively in the summer of 1919. In mid-November his capital in Omsk fell. By late December, the chastened supreme ruler was in the less-than-sympathetic custody of Janin and the hastily departing Czech Legion. Consequently, even his safe passage to Irkutsk—where the moderate socialist Political Center had just taken over—could not be guaranteed. When the Center demanded Kolchak as the price of letting the Legion and Janin go through, the Admiral was unceremoniously surrendered on January 15, 1920. To forestall Kolchak’s rescue by other retreating White forces, he was shot early on February 7. His dignified conduct at the end has long been admired by White emigrés, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kolchak’s reputation has undergone a dramatic rehabilitation in Russia as well.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; WHITE ARMY

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N. G. O. PEREIRA

KOLKHOZ *See* COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE.

KOLLONTAI, ALEXANDRA MIKHAILOVNA

(1872–1952), theoretician of Marxist feminism; founder of Soviet Communist Party’s Women’s Department.

Kollontai was born Alexandra Domontovich. Her father, Mikhail Domontovich, was a politically liberal general. Her mother, Alexandra, shared Domontovich’s free-thinking attitudes and supported feminism as well. They provided their daughter a comfortable childhood and good education, including college-level work at the Bestuzhevsky Courses for Women. When Alexandra was twenty-two, she married Vladimir Kollontai. Within a year she had given birth to a son, Mikhail, but the matronly life soon bored her. She dabbled in volunteer work and then decided in 1898 to study Marxism so as to become a radical journalist and scholar.

Between 1900 and 1917 Kollontai participated in the revolutionary underground in Russia, but mostly she lived abroad, where she made her reputation as a theoretician of Marxist feminism. To Friedrich Engels’ and Avgust Bebel’s economic analysis of women’s oppression Kollontai added a psychological dimension. She argued that women internalized society’s values, learning to accept their subordination to men. There was hope, however, for the coming revolution would usher in a society in which women and men were equals and would therefore create the conditions for women to emancipate their psyches. In the meantime socialists should work hard to draw working-class women to their movement. Kollontai was a severe critic of feminism, which she considered a bourgeois movement, but she shared with the feminists a deep commitment to women’s emancipation as a primary goal of social reform.

In the prerevolutionary period Kollontai also became known as a skilled journalist and orator. She was a Menshevik, but in 1913, when Bolsheviks Konkordia Samoilova, Inessa Armand, and Nadezhda Krupskaya launched a newspaper aimed at working-class women, they invited Kollontai to be a contributor. She responded enthusiastically. In 1915 she came over to their faction because she believed that Vladimir Lenin was the only Russian So-

cial-Democratic leader who was resolute in his opposition to World War I.

Kollontai returned to Russia in the spring of 1917. She spent the revolutionary year working with other Bolshevik feminists on projects among working-class women. She also became one of the Bolsheviks' most effective speakers; her popularity earned her election to the Central Committee. After the party seized power in October, Kollontai became Commissar of Social Welfare, and in that capacity she laid the foundation for socialized obstetrical and newborn care. In early March 1918 she resigned her post to protest the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany, and for the next two years she divided her energies between agitation on the front, writing, and organizing activities with working-class women. In fall 1920 she was appointed head of the Zhenotdel, the Communist Party's Women's Department.

Kollontai had argued for a woman's department since before the revolution. When she became its head she worked diligently to build up the organization, which suffered from poor funding and lack of support. She managed to stave off efforts to abolish the Zhenotdel and also publicized widely the party's program for women's emancipation. Kollontai's tenure in this office was short, however, because in 1921 she joined the Workers Opposition, a group critical of Party authoritarianism. She was fired from the Zhenotdel the next year.

In the following two decades Kollontai became a distinguished Soviet diplomat. She served as Soviet ambassador to Sweden from 1930 to her retirement in 1945. Her most important contribution was as mediator in negotiations to end the Winter War between the USSR and Finland (1939–1940). In the 1920s she also published novels and essays that analyzed the gender and sexual liberation that would come with the construction of a communist society. These works drew strong criticism from more conservative communists, and Kollontai ceased to publish on her favorite subject after the Stalinist leadership consolidated power in the late 1920s. Thereafter she wrote multiple versions of her memoirs. She survived the party purges in the 1930s, probably because she was a respected diplomat who lived far away from party politics.

Kollontai died in Moscow on March 9, 1952. With the revival of feminism in the 1960s, her writings were rediscovered, and she came again to be seen an important Marxist feminist.



Diplomat, feminist, and revolutionary, Alexandra Kollontai was the world's first female ambassador. © HULTON ARCHIVE

See also: ARMAND, INESSA; BOLSHEVISM; FEMINISM; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA; SAMOILOVA, KONKORDIA; ZHENOTDEL

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BARBARA EVANS CLEMENTS

KOMBEDY *See* COMMITTEES OF THE VILLAGE POOR.

KOMI

The Komi are an indigenous Arctic people. Of the 497,000 Komi (1989 census), the majority (292,000) live in the Komi Republic, which extends to the Arctic Circle, and in the contiguous Permian Komi Autonomous okrug within the Perm oblast (Komi population 95,000). Their language belongs to the Finno-Ugric family and is mutually semi-intelligible with Udmurt, farther south. In the 1300s the Komi were the merchants of the Far North and had a unique alphabet. Most Komis have Caucasian features. Distinguished U.S. sociologist Pitrim Sorokin (1889–1968) was a Komi cultural activist in his youth.

The northern Komi partly converted to Greek Orthodoxy in the late 1300s, prior to the Novgorod conquest, and maintained Komi-language liturgies up to 1700. The Permian Komi Duchy of Great Perm converted under duress just before Novgorod was seized (1472) by Moscow, which allowed the duke to stay as a vassal but dismissed his son. Cultural renaissance was strong by 1900.

Despite Komi pleas, Moscow excluded the Permian Komi from the Komi Autonomous *oblast*, formed in 1921 and upgraded to Autonomous Republic in 1936. The Permian Komi National okrug (district), formed in 1925, remains a “periphery of a periphery” within the Perm oblast. Two separate literary languages were developed. Numerous slave labor camps were located in Komi lands. Russian immigration has reduced the Komi from 92 percent of the population in 1926 to 23 percent in 1989. In the okrug the drop has been from 77 percent to 60 percent.

The huge and flat Komi Republic (population 1.3 million) produces 10 percent of Russia’s paper, 7 percent of its coal, and also oil and gas. Indigenous Komi live mainly in the southern agricultural zone. Those who have shifted to Russian as their main language (25%) participate actively in the economic life. The Permian Komi okrug is a depressed area where the only resource, lumber, has been depleted.

In 1989 the First Komi National Congress established a Komi National Revival Committee, which succeeded in having Komi and Russian declared coequal state languages in the Republic. The impact has been real but limited, leading to the creation of a more activist organization, Dorian Anõmõs (Let’s Defend Ourselves).

See also: FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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REIN TAAGEPERA

KOMUCH

The Committee of the Constituent Assembly (Komitet Uchreditelnogo Sobraniya) or KOMUCH the first constitutional alternative to the Soviet rule in Russia, emerged during the spring of 1918. The alternative derived its legitimacy from the Constituent Assembly, whose nine hundred deputies had been elected in late 1917 to draft a new constitution for the Russian Republic, proclaimed by the Provisional Government on September 9. The electoral victory of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR or SRs)—which won 58 percent of the popular vote and 440 seats in the assembly, compared to the Bolsheviks’ 25 percent of the vote and 175 seats—augured well for the possibility of a constitutional and peaceful evolution of Russia into a modern democratic republic.

This possibility was thwarted, however, when Lenin dissolved the Assembly on January 6. However, the SRs convened a secret conclave in Petrograd at the end of January and decided to organize an armed uprising on behalf of the Assembly to divest the Bolsheviks of power. They aimed to reconvene the Assembly as the only source of legitimate authority in the country on the territories liberated from the Bolsheviks; to renew the Assembly’s work on drafting a new constitution; and to enact land and other reforms. To implement these policies the party decided to shift the center of its activities from Petrograd to Samara, Saratov, and other strongholds in the Volga region. In Samara the party established a Revolutionary Center early in February 1918, to organize the uprising as soon as twenty of its deputies from that region returned to their home constituencies. The center entrusted B. K. Fortunatov with organizing

the military forces, while P. D. Klimushkin and I. M. Brushvit engaged in political work to secure cooperation with the deputies of other political parties and other anti-Bolshevik forces in the region.

When the Czechoslovak Legion captured Samara on June 8, 1918, the Revolutionary Center assumed power in the name of the KOMUCH, in order to govern, on behalf of the Constituent Assembly, not only that city but also other cities liberated by the joint forces of the Legion and the KOMUCH. These joint operations captured Nikolayevsk on July 20, Khvalinsk on July 11, Kunzetsk on July 15, Syzran on July 10, Simbirsk on July 22, Sterlitamak on July 15, and Kazan on August 6. As a result, a beachhead more than 300 miles long was established on the western bank of the Volga. The objective was to hold it until the arrival of the Allied forces from Vladivostok to reestablish the Eastern Front in Russia, according to the decision of the Allied Supreme War Council of July 2. While this was a feasible project—the entire Trans-Siberian Railway from the Volga to that port was under the control of the Czechs—the Allied forces never came, because of President Woodrow Wilson's opposition.

Although by the beginning of October the Legion and the KOMUCH deployed on this beachhead 62,370 men, they were outnumbered by Trotsky's 93,500 troops, a large number of them composed of former German, Hungarian, and Austrian prisoners of war serving now in the Bolshevik ranks. Samara was evacuated on October 8. The evacuation of the administrative and political activities of KOMUCH from Samara to Ufa terminated its four-month-long effort to establish the constitutional alternative to the Soviet rule in the Volga region. And in Ufa, by accepting the authority, although grudgingly, of the All Russia Provisional Government established there on September 23, 1918, the Komuch ceased to exist.

See also: ALLIED INTERVENTION; CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES

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VICTOR M. FIC

KONDRATIEV, NIKOLAI DMITRIEVICH

(1892–1938), agricultural economist and business cycle analyst.

Internationally renowned for his work on long-run economic cycles, Nikolai Kondratiev was born in 1892 in Ivanovskaya region. He studied economics under Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky and became an important member of the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party. His first major work was a detailed study of the Russian grain market, and in 1921 he created the world-famous Conjunction Institute in Moscow. In 1922 he published his first account of long cycles. These were approximately fifty-year economic cycles, revealed in price levels and trade statistics, which appeared to provoke (or be provoked by) technological innovations and social upheavals, and which were caused by the periodic renewal of basic capital goods. This idea, subsequently called the Kondratiev cycle, has been very influential among non-mainstream economists and is even employed by historians and stock market analysts, but it is fundamentally questioned by more orthodox economists.

From within the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, Kondratiev also wrote insightful commentary on the economic development of Russia, particularly on agriculture and planning methodology, and advocated a market-led industrialization strategy for the USSR. This involved specializing in the export of agricultural produce in the short term in order to fund industrial development in the medium term, in line with the Ricardian idea of comparative advantage. This approach received impetus from Kondratiev's trip overseas in 1924 and 1925, and was crystallized in Kondratiev's plan for agriculture and forestry from 1924 to 1928. Such thinking was anathema to Josef Stalin, who had Kondratiev arrested in 1930, jailed for eight years, and finally shot. While in jail, Kondratiev wrote a book on economic methodology as well as moving letters to his wife on the human condition.

See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

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VINCENT BARNETT

KONEV, IVAN STEPANOVICH

(1897–1973), military leader and marshal of the Soviet Union.

Born to a peasant family in Viatsky, Konev entered the Old Army in 1916 and rose to the rank of junior officer before joining the Party and the Red Army in 1918 and being appointed commissar of Nikolskii District. During the civil war, he was commander of Armored Train No. 105, attached to the 5 Rifle Brigade, and fought in Siberia and the Far East. From 1921 to 1922 he took part in putting down the Kronshtadt Rebellion and was appointed commissar in the staff in the National Revolutionary Army of the Far East Republic.

Konev attended a higher course in the military academy in 1926 and graduated from the Frunze Academy in 1934. During the 1920s and 1930s he commanded the 2 Rifle Division and later a corps. Untouched by the purges, he was elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1937, and in 1938 he took over as the commander of the newly formed 2 Independent Red Banner Far East Army. Despite rumors to the contrary, Konev was not involved in fighting the Japanese in Lake Khasan or Khalkhin Gol. In 1939 he was elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee. During 1940 and 1941, he commanded the Transbaikalian and North Caucasus Military Districts. The latter was reinstated shortly before World War II as the 19 Army and was transferred to the Western Special Military District to be mauled by the blitzkrieg.

In September, 1941, Konev took over the command of the Western Front, which was pushed back in the Battles of Orel and Viasma by the Germans, and for a few anxious days in October contact was lost with him. Josef Stalin threatened to court-martial him but was persuaded by Zhukov to appoint Konev as commander of the newly formed neighboring Kalinin Front, which played a significant part in finally stopping the German advance toward Moscow. In August 1942 Konev replaced Zhukov as commander of the Western Front,

which failed to defeat the now well-entrenched Germans. For a brief period in March 1943 Konev commanded the Northwest Front before being appointed commander of the Steppe Military District (later Steppe Front), the massive reserve force formed by the Russians in anticipation of the German attack against the Kursk Bulge. Konev's units were deployed sooner than planned, but managed, with enormous losses, to persuade the Germans to break off their offensive. With the German defeat at Kursk, which Konev called the swan song of the German panzers, the Red Army went on the offensive with Konev commanding the 2 Ukraine (October 1943) and later 1 Ukraine (May 1944) Fronts.

Konev was involved in most of the major battles of the last two years of the war, which included the crossing of several major rivers, including the Dnepr and Vistula-Oder. During the Battle of Berlin, Stalin used the rivalry between Konev and Georgy Zhukov, who now commanded the neighboring 1 Belorussian Front, to advance his military and political goals. In the last phase of the campaign, forces commanded by Konev captured Prague. In both 1944 and 1945 Konev received the title Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, Konev was appointed commander of the Central Group of Forces, and in 1946 he took over the ground forces, as well as being appointed Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces. He lost the former position in 1950. In 1951 he was appointed commander of the Carpathian Military District.

In late 1952 Konev wrote to Stalin claiming that he had been a victim of the Doctor's Plot. In December 1953 Konev presided over the military court that sentenced to death Laurenti Beria and his colleagues. In 1955–1956 Konev was once again commander of the Ground Forces. From 1955 to 1960, he was also the first deputy minister of the Armed Forces, and from May 1955 to June 1960 commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces, taking part in putting down the 1956 revolution in Hungary. In 1961–1962 Konev was commander of Soviet forces in Germany before being transferred to the military inspectorate. In 1965 he represented the USSR at Winston Churchill's funeral. Konev himself is buried at the Kremlin Wall. Konev was a typical Soviet commander in his indifference to losses and was one of Stalin's favorites.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; WORLD WAR II; ZHUKOV, GEORGY KONSTANTINOVICH

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MICHAEL PARRISH

KONSTANTIN NIKOLAYEVICH

(1827–1892), political and naval figure, second son of Tsar Nicholas I, brother of Tsar Alexander II, and an advocate of liberal reform.

Because Konstantin Nikolayevich was not the tsarevich, his designation as a general admiral at the age of four marked him early for a career in the Imperial Russian Navy. In 1853 he actually began to discharge the functions of his rank, and between 1855 and 1881 he simultaneously headed the Naval Ministry and served as commander-in-chief of Russian naval forces. A reformer of broad vision and originality, he bore responsibility for modernizing the navy, overseeing the transition from sail to steam. After 1845 he was also honorary president of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society, from whose membership sprang a number of future Russian reformers. Characteristically, the grand duke viewed his own naval bailiwick as an engine of change, in contemporary parlance “a ministry of progress,” engaged in training personnel for service in other branches of government. His reform-minded protégés were known as the *konstantinovtsy*.

An opponent of serfdom and government censorship, Konstantin Nikolayevich spurned his father's legacy to advocate openness, reform, and the cause of liberal bureaucrats such as Nikolai Milyutin and Alexander Golovnin. The grand duke believed that peasants should receive title to their own private holdings. In 1857, to speed deliberations over serf emancipation, Tsar Alexander II appointed him president of the Secret Committee on the peasant question. Following emancipation in 1861, Konstantin Nikolayevich served for two decades as president of the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs, which oversaw implementation of peasant-related reform legislation.

Meanwhile, as a counter to growing Polish opposition to Russian rule, the grand duke in March 1862 also received appointment to Warsaw as viceroy and commander-in-chief. He was removed



Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, second son of Nicholas I.

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in August 1863, after his liberal “policy of pacification” had failed to forestall open rebellion. Nevertheless, throughout the 1860s and 1870s he remained a staunch advocate of his brother's Great Reforms, supporting them from various influential governmental positions, including presidency of the State Council between 1865 and 1881. In general, the grand duke also backed the military policies of war minister Dmitry Milyutin, while resisting the reactionary policies of Dmitry Tolstoy, the minister of education. In 1866 Konstantin Nikolayevich unsuccessfully sponsored moderate legislation that would have introduced into the State Council representatives from both zemstvo and noble assemblies. During the last years of his brother's reign, he sided with the liberal policies of Mikhail Loris-Melikov, Minister of the Interior. Upon the accession of Tsar Alexander III in 1881, the grand duke left state service.

A cultivated man, Konstantin Nikolayevich read widely, maintained diverse interests, and played the cello. He was accepted in intellectual circles and

maintained honorary membership in a number of learned societies. He left important memoirs and an impressive correspondence, much of which has been published.

See also: ALEXANDER II; GREAT REFORMS; MILITARY, IMPERIAL; MILITARY REFORMS; PEASANTRY

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LARISSA ZAKHAROVA

KOPECK

The kopeck (*kopeyka*)—equal to one-hundredth of the ruble—was first introduced as part of a 1534 monetary reform as equal to 0.68 grams of silver.

The silver coin was twice as heavy as the Muscovite *denga* (*moskovka*) and known as *denga kopeynaya*, because—like its Lithuanian model—it depicted a rider carrying a lance (*kope*). The name *novgorodka*, initially much more common, reflected the fact that it equaled in value the old Novgorod *denga*. In spite of the reform, the Muscovite *denga* and *altyn* (the latter equal to three kopecks) remained the basic units of accounting until the eighteenth century. The kopeck was the largest denomination minted until the 1654 monetary reform, along with the *denga* and the *polushka* (one-quarter kopeck). Vasily Shuisky briefly minted gold kopecks, and during Alexei Mikhailovich's currency reform from 1655 to 1663, kopecks were minted of copper. Alexei also began to mint ruble, *poltina* (50 kopecks), and *altyn* coins, as well as, experimentally, the *grosh* (two kopecks). In 1701 the *polupoltinnik* (25 kopecks), the *grivna* (10 kopecks), and the *polugrivna* (5 kopecks) were introduced.

Peter I's monetary reform of 1704 introduced a decimal system with the copper kopeck as the basic subdivision of the silver ruble, although silver kopecks continued to be minted until 1718. Fifteen- and twenty-kopeck coins were introduced in 1760. Coins of up to 5 kopecks during the rest of the Imperial Era tended to be minted of copper, regardless of transition between silver, gold, and paper rubles. During the Soviet period, kopecks were minted of an alloy of copper and zinc.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; ALTYN; COPPER RIOTS; DENGA; RUBLE; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH

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JARMO T. KOTILAINE

KOREANS

Korean emigration to Russia began in 1864 and continued until the late 1920s, when the Communist authorities managed to close the border. This migration was driven largely by the abundance of arable land in the Russian Maritime Province, as well as by political reasons. By 1917 there were some 100,000 ethnic Koreans residing in the Russian far east.

During the Russian Civil War, Koreans actively supported the Reds. However, in 1937 all Soviet Koreans in the far east were forcefully relocated to Central Asia, allegedly to undermine the Japanese espionage networks within their ranks. Until the late 1950s, Soviet Koreans largely engaged in farming, but after Stalin's death they began to move to the cities. By the 1980s Koreans had become one of the best-educated ethnic groups in the USSR.

In 1945 the USSR acquired southern Sakhalin from Japan. The area included a number of Korean workers who had been moved there by the Japanese colonial administration. Most of these workers came from the southern provinces of Korea. Until the 1970s they were not allowed to become citizens of the USSR, and held either North Korean citizenship or no citizenship at all. Within the Soviet Korean community, these Sakhalin Koreans have formed quite a distinct group.

Most of the Korean migrants initially spoke the Hamgyong (northwestern) dialect, which is quite different from standard Korean, although the Soviet Korean schools taught the standard Seoul dialect. From the late 1950s young Soviet Koreans switched to the exclusive use of Russian. Most Korean schools were closed in the late 1930s, but two Korean-language newspapers and a Korean theater survived. Korean was also taught as a second language in some schools in Korean villages. In Sakhalin secondary education in Korean was available until 1966 and a part of the Korean community still uses Korean.

After the collapse of the USSR, most Koreans remained in Uzbekistan (some 200,000) and Kaza-

khstan (100,000). The Russian Federation has an estimated 140,000 ethnic Koreans. Their numbers are rapidly increasing due to migration from Central Asia, where Koreans are often discriminated against. There is almost no return migration to South Korea.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; FAR EASTERN REGION; KOREA, RELATIONS WITH; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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KOREAN WAR

Following the defeat of Japan in 1945, the Soviet Union and the United States jointly occupied Korea, which had been ruled by Japan for four decades. After the United States and USSR failed to agree on the composition of a government for the country, separate states were established in 1948 in the two occupation zones, each aspiring to extend its rule over the remainder of the country. In 1949 North and South Korea engaged in serious fighting along their border, and on June 25, 1950, the North Korean army launched a massive conventional assault on South Korea, led by Soviet-made tanks.

Because North Korea was closely controlled by the Soviet Union and heavily dependent on Soviet assistance, Western leaders unanimously viewed the attack on South Korea as an act of Soviet aggression. Fearing that a failure to repel such aggression would encourage Moscow to mount similar invasions elsewhere, leading possibly to a third world war, the United Nations (UN) for the first time in its history authorized the creation of a multinational force to defend South Korea. The United States commanded the UN forces and contributed the overwhelming majority of troops, supplemented by units from Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Turkey, Ethiopia, South Africa, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Colombia.

The invasion of South Korea also prompted the United States to take a series of actions that shaped the Cold War for the remainder of the USSR's ex-

istence. The United States sent naval forces to protect Taiwan from an attack from the mainland, strengthened its support for the French in Indochina, solidified NATO, moved toward the rearmament of Germany, signed a separate peace treaty with Japan, tripled its military spending, and began to station troops overseas indefinitely.

After UN forces advanced into North Korean territory in October 1950, the People's Republic of China sent massive numbers of troops to prevent a North Korean defeat. The Soviet Air Force also intervened, thinly disguised as Chinese, beginning an undeclared air war with the United States that was the only sustained military engagement between the two superpowers. By the spring of 1951 the war had become a stalemate along a front roughly following the prewar border. Negotiations for an armistice began in the summer of 1951, but the war was prolonged another two years, at the cost of massive casualties and intensification of the East-West conflict worldwide. The armistice signed in July 1953 left intensely hostile states on the Korean peninsula, the North backed by the Soviet Union and China, and the South by the United States and its allies.

Russian archival documents made available in the 1990s show that Western leaders were correct in assuming that the decision to attack South Korea was made by Josef Stalin. His chief aim was to prevent a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union through the Korean peninsula, and he concluded that the U.S. failure to prevent a communist victory in China indicated that it would not intervene to prevent a similar victory in Korea. He was never willing to commit Soviet ground forces but urged the Chinese and North Koreans to keep fighting. Immediately after Stalin's death the new leadership in Moscow decided to bring the war to an end.

See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; COLD WAR; KOREANS; KOREA, RELATIONS WITH; UNITED NATIONS; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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KOREA, RELATIONS WITH

The first contact between Russia and Korea can be traced to the seventeenth century, but it was only from 1858 to 1861, when Russia established its control over the lower Amur River and acquired a short (8.7-mile [14-kilometer]) land border with Korea that the interaction of the two countries began in earnest. Formal diplomatic relations were established on July 7, 1884, when a Russo-Korean Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed in Seoul.

From 1890 to 1905, Korea featured prominently in Russian diplomatic designs as a major target of economic and political expansion in the Far East. Russia was also heavily involved in Korean domestic politics. Attempts to increase the Russian influence in Korea and Manchuria were among the reasons for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905.

After the October Revolution in 1917, Soviet-Korean exchanges remained limited in scope. The Soviet Union was instrumental in the creation of the local communist movement in Korea. Moscow promoted the unification of leftist groups into the short-lived Korean Communist Party (created in 1925 and disbanded in 1928). In the 1930s the USSR also provided support to Korean communist guerrillas in Manchuria.

World War II led to a dramatic change in the situation. On August 11, 1945, the Soviet Army crossed the Korean border and within a week established control over the territory north of the 38th parallel (this parallel had been agreed upon with the U.S. command as a provisional demarcation line). Meanwhile, the southern half of Korea was occupied by U.S. forces in September. From 1945 to 1947 the Soviet and American governments made some progress toward a compromise over the future government of a united Korea. At the same time, the Soviet military administration was actively establishing a communist regime in the north.

The Soviet administration backed Kim Il Sung, a former Manchurian guerrilla commander who

had served in the Red Army since 1942. After the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was declared in September 1948, Russia was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with the new state (October 12, 1948). Relations with the south, where the Republic of Korea was proclaimed in 1948, were meanwhile completely frozen.

From 1948, Kim Il Sung lobbied Moscow for permission to attack the South. Initially these suggestions were rejected, but in late 1949 Josef Stalin approved the proposal. Russian advisers were sent to Pyongyang to plan the operations, which commenced on July 26, 1950. The North Korean armed forces were trained by Soviet advisers and equipped with Soviet weapons. During the war, the USSR also dispatched several units of fighter jets to fight on the North Korean side.

After the Korean War, Russia remained the main source of military and economic aid for North Korea. On July 6, 1961, a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was signed in Moscow. According to this treaty, Russia was obliged to protect the DPRK militarily in the event of a war (this clause was deleted from a new treaty signed in 2000).

In the late 1950s Kim Il Sung refused to follow the new policies of de-Stalinization. He skillfully used the Sino-Soviet rivalry to extricate North Korea from Soviet control and proceeded with the construction of his own brand of national Stalinism. North Korea remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict and was more politically distant from the USSR than any other communist state apart from China and Albania. However, strategic considerations forced Moscow to continue with its economic aid to the North.

With the advent of perestroika, the changing strategic outlook led the USSR to seek rapprochement with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which was seen as an important trading partner. In the late 1980s the USSR engaged in numerous unofficial exchanges with Seoul, and on September 30, 1990, official diplomatic relations between the USSR and the ROK were finally established.

After the collapse of the USSR, the new Russian government refused to subsidize the trade with its erstwhile ally. Trade collapsed (from 2.3 billion USD in 1990 to 0.1 billion USD in 1995) and has remained insignificant ever since (0.1 billion USD in 2000). At the same time, attempts to influence the security situation in northeast Asia and other strategic considerations prompted Russia in the late

1990s to increase its diplomatic exchanges with the DPRK (including a visit by President Vladimir Putin in 2000).

Meanwhile Russian exchanges with the ROK were developing rapidly. By 2001 the trade volume between the two countries had reached \$2.9 billion. South Korean companies imported raw materials, scrap metal, and seafood from Russia while selling finished goods, including consumer electronics, textiles, and cars.

See also: KAL 007; KOREANS; KOREAN WAR; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

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ANDREI LANKOV

KORENIZATSYA

The USSR's founding agreement of 1922 and its Constitution of 1924 gave it the form of a federal state that was organized according to national principles. This marked the beginning of a phase of limited autonomy for the non-Russian ethnic groups living in Soviet Russia and the blossoming of nationalism, which sometimes went as far as the actual formation of nations. Not only the large nationalities, but even the smaller, scattered peoples were given the opportunity to form their own national administrative territories. The will of the Communist Party—which was expressed in the program of the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923—was that all Soviet institutions in non-Russian areas, including courts, administrative authorities, all economic bodies, the labor unions, even the party organs themselves, should consist as much as possible of local nationality cadres. *Korenizatsya* was supposed to protect and nurture the autochthonous population's way of life, its customs and traditions, and its writing system and language. Up to the middle of the 1930s, *korenizatsya* was a central political slogan whose program was diametrically opposed to a policy of Russification and national repression.

Especially in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, *korenizatsya* (which is also referred to in research literature as indigenization or Stalin's nativization campaign) achieved significant success. Forty-eight nationalities, including the Turkmen, Kirgiz, Komi, and Yakut peoples, received a written language for the first time. The status of the Ukrainian language greatly increased. In Belarus a strong and lasting national awakening occurred. The use of the national languages in schools and as administrative languages was, without a doubt, a nation-forming factor. The proportion of national cadres greatly increased in all sectors. Attributes of nation states, such as national academies of science, national theater, national literature, national historical traditions, and the like, were established or consolidated and staffed by indigenous personnel.

However, with the social revolution that started in 1929, the policy of *korenizatsya* got into a conflict that some researchers consider to have caused its end. The forced industrialization promoted centralization and Russification. The modernization demand of the Bolsheviks collided with the promise of *korenizatsya* to respect local customs. The women's policy in Central Asia is an example of this conflict. Collectivization was even more strongly perceived as an attack on the nationalities. National autonomy, which could have provided a framework for organized resistance to collectivization, was revoked by the Stalinist state power and increasingly relegated to formal elements. National communists were eliminated. Many of the indigenous elites produced by the *korenizatsya* program frequently did not survive the purges of 1937 and 1938. However, they were replaced by new, compliant cadres of the same ethnic group.

Especially when viewed against the background of the rigid Russification policy of tsarist Russia, the *korenizatsya* policy can be considered to represent significant progress in the treatment of the nationalities. In the cultural area the achievements of *korenizatsya* still continue to have an effect up to the present day. They provided an important foundation for the relatively smooth emergence of independent national states after the breakup of the USSR in 1991. Of course, it should be noted that the federal structure of the Soviet State had a centrally organized Communist Party opposite it, which, together with the state security organs, was always in a position to limit national autonomy, or, if the party required it, even to eliminate it

entirely. Thus, in the time after 1935, the blossoming of the nationalities was purely a propaganda backdrop, in front of which the Father of Nations (that is, Stalin) staged his increasingly Great Russia-oriented policy.

See also: KOMI; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; SAKHA AND YAKUTS; TURKMENISTAN AND TURKMEN; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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ROBERT MAIER

KORMCHAYA KNIGA

The *Kormchaya Kniga*, also known as the Navigator's Chart (Map) or The Pilot's Book, is the Slavic version of the Greek laws known as the *Nomocanon*. The first Slavic translation of the Greek *Nomocanon* was probably made by St. Methodius in the second half of the ninth century. It included the canons found in the "Syntagma of Fifty Titles" and the first Slavic manual of laws called the "Court Law of the People" (Zakon sudny lyudem). The *Kormchaya* usually contained information such as Apostolic canons, decrees of the first four Ecumenical Councils, resolutions of local synods, instructions of the Church Fathers, and imperial edicts on church issues. It became the guide for ecclesiastical courts and church affairs in Rus. Before the seventeenth century, no single copy of the *Kormchaya* served as the official code of the Russian Church. A copy assumed local authority when a bishop made it the law of his eparchy. Consequently, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the diversity of materials in the many existing copies created confusion. Around 1649 Patriarch Joseph, concerned by this ambiguity, arranged for a correct version of church laws to be published. In 1650, the first printed *Kormchaya* appeared, but three years later Patriarch Nikon published a re-

vised version, which, although severely criticized by the Old Believers, remained the official code. The Holy Synod reprinted Nikon's version in 1787 and reissued it in 1804, 1810, 1816, and 1834. In 1889 Patriarch Joseph's *Kormchaya* was reprinted and used by a sect of Old Believers. It was reprinted again in St. Petersburg in 1912 and 1913.

See also: NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVERS; PATRIARCHY; ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

KORMLENIE

Old Russian term that describes a specific system of remunerating state officials.

Loosely translated as "feeding," *Kormlenieu* meant that princes awarded their servitors lands from which tribute could be extracted. Part of what was taken would be passed on to the prince, and the remainder would be kept.

In a situation of general poverty, where there was insufficient money to pay for needed troops, it may have seemed rational to offer *kormlenie*, but as that system came to form the basis for financing an emerging state bureaucracy, its serious drawbacks became apparent.

One problem was the lack of effective controls over how much was extracted; another, that the subjects would be drawn into complex patterns of personalized relations, where all distinctions between public and private were eroded. Above all, *kormlenieu* constituted a serious obstacle to the introduction of a money economy.

Under Tsar Peter the Great an attempt was made to replace *kormlenie* by the payment of wages, but under his successors persistent shortages of money caused a reversal to the old policies of allowing officials to live off the land.

Even in the Soviet era, one might well interpret the positions of local party bosses as similar to those of the holders of old *kormlenie*, who were al-

lowed to help themselves to whatever they felt that their fiefdoms could offer.

See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST

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STEFAN HEDLIND

KORMOVYE KNIGI *See* FEAST BOOKS.

KORNAI, JANOS

(b. 1928), economist.

Janos Kornai was educated in Budapest and became professor of economics in the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1967 and at Harvard University in 1986.

In *Overcentralization in Economic Administration* (1957) Kornai was one of the first in the Soviet bloc to show the defects of central planning and argue for more decentralization and use of financial and market methods in guiding the socialist economy. His *Mathematical Planning of Structural Decisions* (1967; second edition 1975) developed the idea of two-level planning.

Kornai attempted to apply organizational and information theory, as well as management science, to analyze the advanced socialist economy in his *Anti-Equilibrium* (1971). He employed non-equilibrium concepts to replace the Walrasian market-clearing of standard neoclassical theory. Along these lines, his *Economics of Shortage* (2 vols., 1980) pictured an economy, like Hungary's or Soviet Russia's, with chronic excess demand and limited price flexibility. Supply would be allocated to meet excess demand by nonprice, quantitative methods. Tautness would show up as queues for consumer goods, indicating inefficiency and underutilization of resources.

During this period, Kornai developed his famous concept of the "soft budget constraint." Socialized enterprises were not required to cover costs, as ad hoc subsidies and credits would invariably be made available by state institutions so that the firm would not have to close. Loss-making enterprises were a cause of excess demand in the economy.

Following the democratic revolution in Hungary, Kornai argued for fiscal restraint, particularly in the payment of pensions, so that Hungary could invest more for growth.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET

MARTIN C. SPECHLER

KORNILOV AFFAIR

The Kornilov Affair was the main counterrevolutionary episode of the Russian Revolution of February 1917. It grew out of the general political and socioeconomic crises of the summer, including the failure of the military offensive, government instability, economic disintegration, and, in particular, the emergence in July and August of a more assertive political right demanding a "restoration of order." Attention increasingly centered on General Lavr Kornilov, who emerged as the potential Napoleon of the Russian Revolution.

After the summer 1917 offensive failed, Kornilov vigorously advocated using harsh measures to restore discipline in the army. This drew the attention of a wide range of people interested in restoration of order, mostly conservatives and liberals but also some socialists, who found him more acceptable than most generals (he had a reputation for being more "democratic" because of his modest background and good relations with his troops). They pressured Alexander Kerensky, now head of government, to appoint Kornilov supreme commander-in-chief of the army, which Kerensky did on July 31. The problems that lay ahead were signaled by Kornilov's remarkable acceptance conditions, especially that he would be "responsible only to [his] own conscience and to the whole people," and his insistence on a free hand to restore military discipline. Kerensky did not really trust Kornilov, but hoped to use him both to appease the right and to counterbalance the left. Kornilov in turn disdained the Petrograd politicians. Intermediaries, especially Boris Savinkov, a former Socialist Revolutionary terrorist who was now the assistant minister of war, tried to convince Kerensky and Kornilov that the salvation of the country rested on their cooperation.

During August, tensions surrounding Kornilov's presumed intentions grew. Leftist newspapers and orators warned that he was a potential

counterrevolutionary military dictator, while conservative newspapers and speakers hailed him as the prospective savior of Russia. People looking to break the power of the soviets and change the political structure began to organize around him. The degree of his knowledge and approval of these efforts remains unclear, but he clearly saw himself as a key figure in the regeneration of Russia and the reconstruction of Russian politics, perhaps by force.

By September political tensions in Petrograd were high. Kerensky and Kornilov groped toward some sort of agreement, despite mutual distrust. An exchange of messages, mostly through intermediaries (Kornilov was at military front headquarters), explored restructuring the government and discussed the respective roles of the two men. These also revealed their suspicions of each other. Kerensky became convinced that the general planned a coup and, on September 9, he suddenly dismissed Kornilov. Outraged, Kornilov denounced Kerensky and launched army units toward Petrograd. This quickly collapsed as delegates from the Petrograd Soviet convinced the soldiers that they were being used for counterrevolution. By September 12 the Kornilov revolt had foundered, and Kornilov and some other generals were arrested.

The Kornilov Affair had enormous repercussions. Kerensky, the moderate socialists, and the liberals were discredited because of their earlier support of Kornilov. The Bolsheviks and radical left, in contrast, had warned against the danger of a military coup and now seemed vindicated. Their political stock soared, and they soon took over the Petrograd and other soviets, preparing the way for the October Revolution.

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; KERENSKY, ALEXANDER FYODOROVICH; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

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REX A. WADE

KOROLENKO, VLADIMIR GALAKTIONOVICH

(1853–1921), noted Russian short-story writer, publicist, and political activist.

When Korolenko was arrested in 1879 for alleged populist activities and exiled to Siberia, he used the time to write many lyrical tales, exceptional for their descriptions of human sadness and desolate nature. His existential sufferings in Yakutsk, during which he often contemplated suicide, find expression in his writings.

One of Korolenko's famous short stories, "Makar's Dream" (1885), is also set in Siberia. In it, Makar, a poor little peasant who has become half-savage by his association with the Yakutsk people, dreams of a better future. Normally he has no time for dreaming; his days are consumed by hard physical labor—chopping, ploughing, sowing, and grinding. He only dreams when he is drunk. One Christmas Eve, Makar drifts off in a drunken sleep and dreams that the god of the woods, Tayon, has judged him harshly for his former deeds and has decided to transform him into a post-horse. Makar ends up convincing Tayon of his innate goodness.

In another famous story, "The Blind Musician" (1886), a blind youth overcomes his painful self-pity to become a sensitive violinist whose music takes on universal resonance. As his uncle watches the captivated audience, he thinks about his nephew. "He understands suffering. He has had his share, and that is why he can change it into music for this happy audience." Korolenko's talent thus lies in his expressions of the emotional and sentimental dimensions of life, his compassion for the downtrodden, as well as his masterful depictions of nature, which have much in common with Turgenev's.

Like many Russian writers, Korolenko felt that literature should play a leading role in advancing human progress; that a writer should not stand idly by in the face of injustice. He sought to create works that would unite realism and romanticism. In one historical story about the revolt of the Jews against the Romans ("A Tale about Florus, Agrippa, and Menachem, the Son of Jehudah"), Korolenko rebuts Tolstoy's doctrine of nonviolent resistance to evil. In works such as "The Day of Atonement" (first entitled "Iom-Kipur," 1890) and later in "House Number 13," Korolenko also took issue with anti-Semitism. Korolenko condemned the Bolshevik regime and the Red Terror he witnessed in

indignant letters that he wrote to Anatoly Lunacharsky, the People's Commissar for Education.

See also: INTELLIGENTSIA; SIBERIA

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

KORSH THEATER

Founded in 1882 by entrepreneur F. A. Korsh (1852–1923), this was the first successful private, commercial theater established after the repeal of the government's monopoly on theaters in the two capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Built in the heart of Moscow's bustling theater district, the Korsh Theater was designed to meet four professional objectives: to respond to audiences' changing aesthetic demands; to increase performance opportunities for provincial actors; to present productions of new plays, which led to special Friday night performances of experimental works; and to make both the Russian and the international dramaturgy available to students, which Korsh accomplished by offering free Sunday morning performances. The playwrights whose works played in Russia first at the Korsh included Hermann Sudermann, Edmond Rostand, Henrik Ibsen, August Strindberg, George Bernard Shaw, and, perhaps most significantly, Anton Chekhov. Performers who advanced their careers here included comedian Vladimir Davydov, heartthrob Alexander Lensky, and light opera celebrities Lidia Yavorskaya and Maria Blyumental-Tamarina. The theater itself, designed by nationalist architect M. N. Chichagov, was the first to use electric lighting.

Korsh could afford his artistic innovations because of the extent to which he catered to the crowd, exemplifying the "dictatorship of the box office." The most popular, and prolific, playwright in his employ was I. I. Myasnitsky (Baryshev), who kept Korsh supplied with farces, comedies of topical is-

ues with protagonists from all social backgrounds, such as "The Old Woman Makes a Fool of Herself." The theater's most famously popular production was the 1892 staging of Victorien Sardou's comedy about Napoleon's ex-washer woman, *Madame Sans-Gene*, translated by Korsh himself, and featuring the latest fashions directly from Paris.

Until its incorporation by the Soviet government in 1925, the Korsh Theater offered a central locale where new ideas about Russian culture were contested, reshaped, sometimes vulgarized, but always celebrated.

See also: CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; THEATER

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LOUISE McREYNOLDS

KORYAKS

The Koryaks (*Koryaki*) are an indigenous Paleo-Asiatic people living in northeast Siberia, on the northern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and on the adjoining mainland from the Taigonos Peninsula to the Bering Sea (a total of 152,000 square miles, or 393,680 square kilometers). The traditional roaming area of the nomadic Koryaks has been west of the Kamchatka Central Range, up to the Itelmen settlements. In addition to Koryaks, Itelmens, Chukchi, and Evenki have also lived on this territory for centuries. Administratively the Koryaks live in the Koryak Autonomous Region (*okrug*), a territory approximately the size of Arizona and which is one of the ten autonomous regions recognized in the Russian Constitution of 1993.

The Koryak Autonomous Region is just one part of the larger Kamchatka Peninsula, which includes the Karaginsky and Komandorsky islands in the Bering Sea. With an area of about 490,425 square miles, the countries England, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxembourg together could be placed on the territory of Kamchatka. The peninsula contains many volcanoes, some of them active. The Koryak territory is mostly forest tundra, as well as tundra in the subarctic climate belt. The highest temperature in the summer is 34° centigrade and the lowest in the winter (in the central and northern parts of the peninsula) falls to about –49° centigrade.

The term *koryak* derives from the word for reindeer (*kor*). When combined with its prepositional suffix, *korak* means “with (or at) the reindeer.” This is not surprising, given the Koryak’s heavy reliance on reindeer for a wide range of bare essentials, including meat, transportation, household articles, fat (to light indoor lamps), materials for constructing mobile dwellings (*yarangas*), bones (for tools and household items), and hides (to make clothes, footwear, and even diapers and sanitary napkins). When referring to themselves, however, the Koryaks do not use the term. Instead, they call themselves either *nimilany* (“residents of a settled village”) or *chavchuvens* (nomadic reindeer people).

In contrast to some other non-Russian nationalities, such as the Tuvinians, the Koryaks are a minority in their own region. Russians and Ukrainians make up more than 75 percent of the total population. The remaining 25 percent are Koryaks, Chukchi, Itelmens, and Evenki. Koryaks make up only one-fifth of the indigenous Siberian population.

See also: EVENKI; NORTHERN PEOPLES; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; SIBERIA

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

KORZHAKOV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH

(b. 1950), aide to President Boris Yeltsin.

Alexander Vasilievich Korzhakov was the most trusted aide of President Boris Yeltsin until Yeltsin dismissed him in 1996. From 1970 until 1989 he worked in Administration 9 of the KGB, which pro-

vided personal security for senior Soviet officials. From 1985 to 1987 he was a bodyguard to Yeltsin, and remained loyal to him after Yeltsin was politically disgraced in 1987. For this the KGB dismissed him in 1989. During Yeltsin’s political resurrection Korzhakov resumed work as his bodyguard. From 1991 he headed the Presidential Security Service (PSS) with the rank of major general, and increasingly became a close political adviser to Yeltsin. In August 1991 he played an important role in Yeltsin’s successful defeat of the three-day hard-line coup.

In October 1993, Korzhakov apparently played a key role in persuading the defense minister to have the military storm the parliament. Also, he personally arrested the leaders of the armed opposition.

Later he turned the PSS into what Yeltsin called his personal “mini-KGB.” He built up departments for personal surveillance, political dirty tricks, and political and economic analysis. He encouraged Yeltsin to become politically more authoritarian and less liberal on economic reform, and even advocated specific policies on oil. As he freely admitted in his revealing memoir about Yeltsin, he played a major role in recruiting Boris Berezovsky and other rich businessmen to support Yeltsin financially and through their media. Thus he helped turn them into oligarchs with political clout. In 1995 he even arranged for Berezovsky to control, financially and otherwise, the newly created television company, Public Russian Television. It was important, he argued, to have a major channel that was firmly pro-administration and would counter the widespread criticism of the Kremlin in the existing media.

In 1996 Yeltsin appointed Korzhakov to one of the two teams that organized his reelection bid, the team headed by Oleg Soskovets. But Korzhakov feared that Yeltsin would lose, and therefore urged him to find a pretext to postpone the election and close down the parliament, or Duma. In March, Yeltsin took his advice, but opposition in the cabinet thwarted his plans at the last minute. In May he named Korzhakov his first adviser. In June, however, when Korzhakov and his allies clashed with the second election team in a fierce struggle for influence over Yeltsin, the latter suddenly opted for the second team, headed by Anatoly Chubais, and dismissed Korzhakov.

In February 1997 Korzhakov was elected to the Duma as an independent from Tula. In 1999 he

was reelected on a Fatherland ticket and served on the Defense Committee. During the late 1990s he gave lengthy interviews detailing numerous allegedly corrupt activities of Yeltsin, his family, Chubais, and others, but did not discuss his own business affairs. He was never sued for libel or slander, apparently because the people he exposed believed he had evidence for what he said. Of special significance were his repeated accounts of how Berezovsky gave Yeltsin three million dollars in 1994, claiming this was a payment of royalties on Yeltsin's memoirs, when in fact the book had earned negligible royalties.

In 2001 Korzhakov was instrumental in launching the monthly investigative newspaper *Stringer*.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; SOSKOVETS, OLEG NIKOLAYEVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER REDDAWAY

KOSMODEMYANSKAYA, ZOYA

(1923–1941), partisan girl known as “Tanya” in World War II and canonized as Russian war heroine; also known as the Soviet Joan of Arc, she was posthumously awarded the honorary title Hero of the Soviet Union.

At the outbreak of war in June 1941, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, member of the Moscow *Komsomol* (Communist Youth), volunteered for the partisan movement. According to the official Soviet version, in December 1941, while carrying out a military assignment behind the front line, she was caught by the Germans, arrested, tortured, and finally hanged.

The young girl's tragic end was used as propaganda to arouse hatred for the cruel enemy and convey the necessity for vengeance. Written for this purpose, the numerous reports, which emphasized her courage, steadfastness, and exceptional strength of resistance, portrayed her as a true Soviet model and saint who had endured torture and chosen death over betraying her comrades—a model ex-



Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya hanged by the Nazis. © HULTON ARCHIVE

ample for sacrificial death in the “Holy War” against fascism.

She shared the fate of many other daring and fearless compatriots who were popularized as heroes and heroines in the same manner. Yet Kosmodemyanskaya differed in that the public responded with compassion and affection, even abroad. Her unusual popularity cannot be explained by her heroic exploit alone, being that many others were called heroes for the same or similar behavior in fighting the enemy. Rather the visual and verbal depiction of her short life and tragic fate by several outstanding artists, poets, and filmmakers contributed to the unusually high degree of veneration.

In addition to dozens of publications on her exemplary life, bearing true hagiographic qualities, including poems (one by Margarita Aliger), songs, paintings, plays, it was a documentary photograph published in the newspaper *Pravda* on the occasion of her death that drew the public's attention because it broke with the traditional Soviet style of

visual representation. Most influential, however, was the film *Zoya* directed by Lev Arnshtam (1944). The beauty and the performance of the actress Galina Vodyanitskaya in the role of Kosmodemyanskaya left a lasting impression in popular consciousness that turned the partisan heroine into a symbol of identity for more than one postwar generation of young Soviet women imitating her in dress, hairdo, and manner.

In the post-Soviet debate on the legend and reality of Soviet war heroes, some voices turned her into a henchman of Stalin's plan of "scorched earth," killed by the villagers, not by the Germans; others raised questions about her identity. Still, Kosmodemyanskaya is one of the few members of the Soviet pantheon of heroes who did not fall victim to the strong iconoclastic movement of the 1990s. Kosmodemyanskaya's place in history lies beyond historical truth; it is founded on her power as a legend that became part of collective memory.

Her grave can be found in the Moscow Novodevichy Cemetery, a special museum and a monument by M. G. Manizer in the village Petrishchevo, the place of her execution, near Moscow.

See also: WORLD WAR II

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ROSALINDE SARTORTI

KOSYGIN, ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH

(1904–1980), Soviet prime minister.

Alexei Kosygin was born into a worker's family in St. Petersburg. After finishing schooling at the Leningrad Cooperative Technical School in 1924, he moved to Siberia and worked in a series of positions in the cooperative movement. It was while in Siberia, in 1927, that he joined the Communist Party. After returning to Leningrad he completed further studies at the Leningrad Textile Institute in 1935. Reflecting the opportunities opened up by the Stalinist terror and the patronage of Leningrad party boss Andrei Zhdanov, Kosy-

gin moved rapidly from being a foreman and shop superintendent in the Zhelyabov factory through a series of industrial, city, and party posts, until in 1939 he became people's commissar for the textile industry. From April 1940 until March 1953 he was deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (from 1946 Council of Ministers), or deputy prime minister; from June 1943 until March 1946 he was also prime minister of Russia. During this period, he likewise held a series of ministerial appointments, principally in the light industry and consumer goods industry areas. Kosygin had become a full member of the Party's Central Committee in 1939, a candidate member of the Politburo in March 1946, and a full member in February 1948.

Kosygin's upward trajectory was halted in connection with the fall of Zhdanov and the Leningrad Affair. Although one of the intended victims of this affair, Kosygin survived, but at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 he was dropped to candidate status in the Presidium (as the Politburo was then called). Following Stalin's death and the consolidation of the position of one of Kosygin's enemies, Georgy Malenkov, Kosygin was dropped altogether from the enlarged Presidium in March 1953. At the same time, he was removed as deputy prime minister. He retained a ministerial position in the consumer goods/light industry sector and was restored as deputy prime minister in December 1953. He held this post until December 1956 when he became deputy chair (and from 1959 chair) of the state planning body. With Malenkov's fall as part of the Antiparty Group, in June 1957 Kosygin was restored to candidate membership of the Presidium and in the following month to the deputy prime ministership. He retained this post, from May 1960 as first deputy chairman, until October 1964, when he became chairman of the Council of Ministers, or prime minister. In May 1960 he also became a full member of the Central Committee Presidium.

The fluctuations in Kosygin's official positions in the early to mid-1950s reflect the vicissitudes of factional politics in the late-Stalin and early post-Stalin periods. In particular, Kosygin's fortunes seem to have been related inversely to those of Malenkov. Khrushchev's triumph over the Antiparty Group consolidated Kosygin's position near the apex of Soviet politics, but it was Kosygin's turning against Khrushchev that later allowed Kosygin to attain prime ministership. When the Soviet leadership tired of Khrushchev, they turned

to Kosygin and Brezhnev. In the initial post-Khrushchev period, there seemed to be a general balance both between these two leaders and within the broader party leadership. Initially Kosygin was actively involved in foreign policy, including overseeing the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan in 1965, negotiating with U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson at Glassboro in 1967, and conducting key talks with the Chinese in 1965 and 1969. He was the sponsor of the so-called Liberman economic reforms (also known as the Kosygin reforms) in September 1965, which sought to generate greater autonomy from party control for the economic managers, although he also tightened central direction of the economy by eliminating the regional economic councils. Kosygin basically sought the more efficient management of the economy, but with the hostile Soviet reaction to the Prague Spring, the likelihood of liberalizing moves in the economy was eliminated. The suppression of the Prague Spring marked the ascendancy of Brezhnev and the clear subordination of Kosygin, who remained prime minister until his retirement in October 1980, and therefore through most of the period that Gorbachev would later call the “era of stagnation”. He was more a technocrat than a politician, but bears some of the responsibility for the Soviet Union’s perilous economic situation during the 1980s.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; KOSYGIN REFORMS; LENINGRAD AFFAIR; MALENKOV, GEORGY MAXIMILYANOVICH; ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

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GRAEME GILL

KOSYGIN REFORMS

After Nikita S. Khrushchev was removed in October 1964, Alexei N. Kosygin (1904–1980) became chairman of the USSR Council of the Ministers, as part of a duumvirate with Leonid Brezhnev. Within months the new leadership restored the industrial

ministerial structure, which Khrushchev had replaced with regional *sovnarkhozy* (economic councils). Gosplan regained its prime role in economic planning.

In September 1965, Kosygin announced a comprehensive planning reform that implemented some of the ideas of the Kharkov economist Yevsey Liberman and many other industrial economists who had urged relying on the profit indicator instead of detailed and numerous directives, which often conflicted with each other. Profitability had for some time been one of the indicators of plan fulfillment, though the main indicator was still gross output (*valovaya produktsia*, or *val* for short), as compared with planned levels. Now the directives would be seven in number, with profitability on capital (at controlled prices, not market ones)—or sales, for consumer goods firms—to constitute the main bonus-forming indicator. Instead of four standard indicators for use of labor, there would be only one: the wage fund.

Other obligatory tasks were to be sales (*realizatsiya*), assortment, payments to the budget, centralized investments, new techniques to be introduced, and mandatory supply tasks. The infamous *val* would be abandoned, along with the cost reduction target, both of which jeopardized quality of production. Depending on the enterprise’s success in increasing sales and the profit rate—and subject to fulfillment of the other tasks in plan—retained profits would go to new investments, social facilities and housing, and extra worker bonuses. This provision was intended to enhance material incentives for those engaged at the enterprise. Though differentiated and quite complicated, these norms were supposed to be stable. After paying a new capital charge of 6 percent, more than half of net profits usually went to the state, however, not to enterprise funds. New enterprise whole prices would be announced by 1967 but still based on costs, not market scarcity. This would permit the end to subsidies for loss-making enterprises.

One advantage of the *sovnarkhozy* system was retained: The regional inter-industrial supply depots were preserved under the State Committee on Material Supplies (*Gossnsab*). Wholesale trade was thereby to be expanded. Several other state committees were also established for price setting and for science and technology. Concern for technological change was also reflected in the creation of science-production associations, intended to make a better connection between research, technology, and the introduction of new goods.

No sooner were these reforms implemented than significant modifications had to be introduced to regulate the size and distribution of enterprise funds. New targets were added for consumer goods and quality; later in the 1970s, labor productivity, gross output, and other targets returned to the mandatory list. Supply problems persisted; little wholesale trade occurred.

Most specialists believe that the Kosygin reforms failed because of continuing imbalances between feasible supplies and the demands of the Party-controlled government, the unwillingness to release prices, and bureaucratic resistance to any radical change. But tinkering and experiments continued until 1982. Perestroika would revive many of the basic ideas of the Kosygin reforms, with a very different denouement: chaos and collapse rather than reversal and stagnation.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; KOSYGIN, ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH; LIBERMAN, YEVSEI GRIGOREVICH; PERESTROIKA; SOVNARKHOZY

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

KOTOSHIKHIN, GRIGORY KARPOVICH

(c. 1630–1667), Muscovite official, émigré, and author.

As an under-secretary of the Muscovite Chancery for Foreign Affairs, Grigory Kotoshikhin was one of the few seventeenth-century Russians allowed to travel to the West, on diplomatic missions to Poland and Sweden. In 1663 he began to give information on foreign policy to the Swedish agent in Moscow. The following year he fled abroad, finally settling in Stockholm. At the behest of the Swedish government he compiled a lengthy description of the Muscovite state. Fatally injuring his landlord in a drunken quarrel, Kotoshikhin was sentenced to death. On the eve of his execution he embraced the Lutheran faith.

Kotoshikhin's manuscript was soon translated into Swedish but then forgotten. Rediscovered in

the late 1830s, it was published in Russia in 1840 under the title *On Russia in the Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich*. Though its importance as a historical source was immediately recognized, the evaluation of Kotoshikhin's account in Russia and the Soviet Union would long be influenced by ideological considerations. In the nineteenth century, Westernizers praised Kotoshikhin for exposing Muscovite backwardness, while Slavophiles condemned him for blackening Muscovite reality. In the late Stalin period and beyond, the dictates of hyper-nationalism obligated scholars to excoriate Kotoshikhin as a traitor who defamed his country to please his Swedish hosts.

There are indeed a few passages in which Kotoshikhin lashes out at Muscovite ignorance, dishonesty, superstition, and xenophobia and lauds the "blessed freedom" of the West. But these passionate outbursts, almost certainly interpolations in the original text, are in striking contrast with the content and tone of the rest of the account, which is severely factual and almost entirely free of broad generalizations and value judgments. The level of accuracy is remarkably high, particularly for someone writing in a foreign country with no sources other than the Law Code of 1649. Kotoshikhin emphasized those topics that were of interest to the Swedish government; these corresponded well with what he knew best. There are lengthy descriptions of the central administrative institutions, diplomatic protocol, and court ceremonial; somewhat shorter discussions of the nobility, the army, provincial administration, merchants and trade, and the marriage customs of the upper class; and virtually nothing on the peasantry or the Orthodox Church. Kotoshikhin portrays a government of legal norms and bureaucratic process, and provides strong though not unimpeachable evidence on the constitutional role of the estates of the realm in electing or confirming each tsar from 1584 to 1645.

On Russia in the Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich has been republished a number of times (1859, 1884, 1906, 1984, and twice in 2000; Pennington, 1980, is the definitive edition of the text, with exhaustive linguistic commentaries). It remains a uniquely valuable source. No other Muscovite ever wrote anything comparable, and no Western traveler ever had Kotoshikhin's expert knowledge.

Kotoshikhin was born ahead of his time. From the reign of Peter the Great onward, Russians were able to adopt Western ways and values while re-

maining loyal to their native land. In Kotoshikhin's generation this was not yet possible.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; LAW CODE OF 1649; SLAVOPHILES; WESTERNIZERS

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BENJAMIN UROFF

KOVALEV, SERGEI ADAMOVICH

(b. 1930), dissident, politician, human rights activist.

Sergei Kovalev became famous as a dissident in the 1970s and later as a politician working for human rights in post-communist Russia. Trained as a biologist, he spent much of his early career at Moscow State University. In 1969 he was dismissed for dissident activity. From 1970 to 1974 he worked in a research station.

In 1967 Kovalev became involved in human rights circles, and soon developed a close friendship with fellow dissident Andrei Sakharov. Like Sakharov, he believed in the strategy of insisting on strict application by the authorities of the existing laws, and also of working for law reform. In 1968 he was one of the anonymous founders and editors of the *samizdat* (typewritten self-published) journal *A Chronicle of Current Events*, which documented violations of human rights and circulated covertly from hand to hand. In 1969 he was a founding member of the Action Group to Defend Civil Rights in the USSR.

In 1974 he was arrested and eventually tried in closed court. Sentenced to seven years in a strict-regime labor camp, he served his whole term, taking part in numerous protests and hunger strikes by prisoners. On his release he was forced to live from 1984 to 1987 in the remote town of Kalinin.

In the late 1980s Kovalev took part in various initiatives aimed at creating a civil society. In 1990 he was elected on a Democratic Russia ticket to the RSFSR's Congress of People's Deputies and its Supreme Soviet. He chaired the latter's Human Rights Committee, which passed important legislation on refugees, citizenship, procedures for emergency

rule, the exculpation of political prisoners, and parliamentary supervision of the security services.

In the fall of 1993 he opposed Yeltsin's proroguing of the parliament, but did not support the parliamentary opposition. In October Yeltsin appointed him chair of his Commission on Human Rights, and the political movement Russia's Choice elected him chair of its council. In December he was elected to the new parliament, and as of 2003 has remained a deputy, switching his allegiance in 2001 from the successor of Russia's Choice to Yabloko.

In 1996 Kovalev resigned from Yeltsin's Human Rights Commission, in protest against his increasing authoritarianism and the war crimes committed by the military in Chechnya. He continues to be active in a variety of forums, and is widely seen in the early twenty-first century as the leading champion of human rights in Russia.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; MEMORIAL; SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH; SAMIZDAT

PETER REDDAWAY

KOVALEVSKAYA, SOFIA VASILIEVNA

(1850–1891), mathematician and writer.

Sofia Korvin-Krukovskaya, growing up on an estate in Vitebsk province, displayed unusual mathematical ability from childhood. Desperate to escape the strictures of gentry womanhood, at eighteen she contracted a "fictive" marriage with the paleontologist and social activist Vladimir Kovalevsky, who took her to western Europe to study. In 1874 Kovalevskaya, mentored by the eminent German mathematician Karl Weierstrass, received a doctorate from Göttingen University. Afterward, the Kovalevskys, now married in fact, returned to St. Petersburg, where their daughter was born in 1878. In 1883 Kovalevsky, embroiled in financial scandal connected with an oil company scheme, committed suicide. Unable to find suitable teaching work in Russia, Kovalevskaya, at the urging of Weierstrass and the Swedish mathematician Gustav Mittag-Leffler, accepted a professorship in the newly established Stockholm University, becoming the first woman in modern Europe to hold such a post. In Sweden the homesick Kovalevskaya wrote her vivid reminiscences of girlhood; a novella based on a true incident, *The Nihilist Girl*; two plays written in Swedish with writer Anna Charlotte Leffler

under the title *Struggle for Happiness*, concerning the contrast between real and ideal fates in life; and some journalistic articles. In 1888 Kovalevskaya received the prestigious French Prix Bordin for mathematics in blind competition. Death from pneumonia in 1891 cut short Kovalevskaya's dual careers as mature scientist and budding author. In the early twentieth century her story served as inspiration for science-minded girls throughout Europe. Her mathematics—in particular, equations describing the motions of rotating solids over time (“Kovalevsky's top”)—has particular relevance in the space age.

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MARY ZIRIN

KOZLOV, FROL ROMANOVICH

(1908–1965), top Communist party leader during the 1950s and early 1960s.

Frol Kozlov's path to power was typical for party leaders of his generation of Soviet. Born in a village in Ryazan Province, Kozlov became a worker and assistant foreman at a textile plant where he also served as Communist Youth League secretary. After studying at the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute and working as an engineer, he rose through the ranks: secretary of the Izhevsk city party committee (1940–1941), second secretary of Kuibyshev Province (1947–1949), a party leader of Leningrad (1949–1957), candidate member of the Central Committee's Presidium (1957), and a Central Committee secretary in 1960.

Presidium colleague Alexander Shelepin later described Kozlov as a “very limited man.” Anastas Mikoyan labeled him an “unintelligent, pro-Stalinist reactionary and careerist.” Yet Kozlov backed Khrushchev in his battle with the Antiparty Group in 1957, and according to Khrushchev, he seemed

knowledgeable about economic matters, and “firm, not someone who can be easily swayed.”

By 1963, when Kozlov was de facto second secretary of the Soviet Communist party, he seemed to Western Kremlinologists to be leading conservative resistance to Khrushchev's reforms. In all probability, however, there was no organized opposition, and in fact, Kozlov soon began to irritate Khrushchev, for example, when he allowed the Soviet Communist Party's ritual May Day 1963 greetings to other Communist parties to imply an unauthorized change of line on Yugoslavia. Shortly after Khrushchev berated Kozlov for this mistake (but not necessarily because of Khrushchev's tirade), Kozlov suffered a stroke, which removed him from participation in the Presidium, although he formally remained a member until Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964.

See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

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WILLIAM TAUBMAN

KOZYREV, ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH

(b. 1951), Russian foreign minister.

Andrei Kozyrev served as post-Communist Russia's first foreign minister, from 1990 to 1996. He was well known as an advocate of pro-Western policies, but by the mid-1990s, as these views fell out of favor, he was forced from office.

Kozyrev was born in Belgium in 1951, where his father, a Soviet diplomat, was then serving. He was educated at Moscow State Institute of International Relations, and he joined the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, becoming head of the Department of International Organizations in 1986. He is fluent in English, Spanish, and French.

In 1990, when Russia declared its sovereignty, Kozyrev was named foreign minister, and he was one of the leading advocates for reform in Boris Yeltsin's circle. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he helped spearhead Russia's pro-Western

turn in foreign policy, pursuing cooperation with the United States on issues such as disarmament, the Middle East, Yugoslavia, and trade and economic relations. He was also viewed by many as one of the most important voices for liberalism and democracy in post-Communist Russia.

However, the incipient partnership between Moscow and Washington began to flounder in 1993 over such issues as the war in Yugoslavia and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) expansion. Critics began to push for a more forceful and aggressive Russian foreign policy, and Kozyrev's language also became more bellicose on occasion, including threats against Russia's neighbors and an assertion of special rights for Russia in the former Soviet space—the Near Abroad. Nonetheless, this was not enough, and by 1995 Yeltsin let it be known that he was no longer satisfied with the course of Russia's foreign policy. In January 1996 Yevgeny Primakov, a career Soviet diplomat known for more conservative views, replaced Kozyrev, who then served as a member of the Russian Duma (parliament) until the end of 1999. He has written numerous articles and books on international politics.

See also: NEAR ABROAD; PERESTROIKA; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PAUL J. KUBICEK

KRASNOV, PYOTR NIKOLAYEVICH

(1869–1947), Cossack ataman, anti-Bolshevik leader, and author.

Son of a Cossack general, Pyotr Krasnov was born in St. Petersburg and educated at Pavlovsk Military School, graduating in 1888. During World War I, he rose to the rank of lieutenant-general and to the command of the Third Cavalry Corps in August 1917. After the October Revolution, in uneasy collaboration with Alexander Kerensky (whom, as a monarchist, he despised), Krasnov was among the first to take military action against the Bolsheviks, attempting to lead Cossack forces from Gatchina toward Petrograd. However, the Bolsheviks dis-

suaded his Cossacks from becoming involved in "Russian affairs," and Krasnov himself was taken prisoner near Pulkovo. Remarkably, he was released after swearing not to oppose the Soviet government further. He immediately moved to the Don territory, was elected ataman of the Don Cossack Host in May 1918, and, assisted by Germany, cleared the Don of Red forces over the summer of that year. After the armistice, his former collaboration with Germany made his position difficult. Following defeats at the hands of the Reds and quarrels with the pro-Allied General Denikin, in early 1919 Krasnov resigned his post and emigrated to Germany. He subsequently became a prolific writer of forgettable historical novels but also worked with various anti-Bolshevik groups in inter-war Europe, eventually allying himself with the Nazis and helping them, from 1941 to 1945, to form anti-Soviet Cossack units from Soviet POWs. In 1945 he joined the Cossack puppet state that the Nazis established in the Italian Alps. Surrendering to the British in May 1945, he was among those forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union, in accordance with provisions of the Yalta agreement. In January 1947, accused of treason, he was hanged, by order of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; COSSACKS; KERENSKY, ALEXANDER FYODOROVICH

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JONATHAN D. SMELE

KRAVCHUK, LEONID MAKAROVICH

(b. 1934), Ukrainian politician and first president of post-Soviet Ukraine.

Elected president of Ukraine on December 1, 1991—the same date as the historic referendum on Ukrainian independence—Kravchuk won decisively, garnering 61.6 percent of the popular vote in a six-way contest. His primary political achievement was to establish Ukraine's sovereignty and maintain peace and social order with a minimum of violence and almost no ethnic conflict. It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of this accomplishment. However, he appears to have misunderstood the relationship between state building

and economic reforms. This failure would cost him the presidency in early elections in July 1994.

A consummate politician, Kravchuk gained for himself the nickname “sly fox” because of his ability to maneuver in predicaments that he himself had created. His political shrewdness manifested itself in the events of 1991 when, as chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, he publicly vacillated during the Moscow coup attempt of August 19–21. While other Ukrainian officials supported Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Kravchuk urged caution. With the failure of the coup and with public opinion turning against him, Kravchuk led the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) to join the democratic opposition on August 24 and to adopt Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence by a vote of 346 to 1. Kravchuk also redeemed himself by resigning from the CPU and the CPSU.

Clearly, the CPU strategy was to retain power in an independent Ukraine. The democratic opposition was too weak and disorganized to take power on its own; for this, they needed the Communists. It is ironic that, as the former ideology chief of the CPU, Kravchuk persecuted nationalist groups, such as the Popular Front for Perestroika in Ukraine (*Rukh*), only to appropriate their goals and program in his 1991 bid for the newly established presidency. As president, however, Kravchuk effectively postponed economic and political reforms in favor of nation building. A notable aspect of his leadership was a continuing reliance on officials of the former Communist *apparat* in key governmental positions. Consequently, the simultaneous pursuit of political stability and economic reform was all but ruled out.

Confused and contradictory economic policies emanated from Kravchuk’s government. He publicly supported radical reforms even as he worked to strengthen the hold of the former *nomenklatura* over the state and economy. The saga of Kravchuk’s management of the economy was the massive emission of cheap credits and budget subsidies to industry, coupled with the imposition of administrative controls over prices and currency exchange rates. Major price increases in January and July 1992 drove Ukraine from the ruble zone in November of that year. But Ukrainian authorities proved no better at controlling inflation, plunging the nation into hyperinflation throughout 1993, when prices increased by more than 10,000 percent. Industrial output also plunged precipitously as the economic crisis widened and deepened.

Throughout 1992 and into 1993, Kravchuk was locked in a struggle with Prime Minister Leonid D. Kuchma for authority to reform the economy. Consequently, Kravchuk dismissed his errant premier in September 1993. The president made a half-hearted attempt to renew the command economy in late 1993, but by then the economic decline severely damaged Kravchuk’s credibility. In response to pressure from heavily industrialized eastern Ukraine, Kravchuk agreed to early elections, to be held in July 1994. Facing his one-time premier, Leonid Kuchma, Kravchuk was defeated in the second round, garnering but 45.1 percent of the popular vote. The former president did not retire from politics, however; he was elected a member of parliament in a special election in September 1994, replacing a people’s deputy who died before taking office. He was reelected in 1998 and 2002 from the party lists of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, and from 1998 onward has been a member of the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Relations.

See also: PERESTROIKA; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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ROBERT S. KRAVCHUK

KREMLIN

Few architectural forms have acquired greater resonance than the Moscow Kremlin. In actuality many medieval Russian towns had a “kremlin,” or fortified citadel, yet no other kremlin acquired the fame of Moscow’s. The Kremlin structure, a potent symbol of Russian power and inscrutability, owes much of its appearance to the Russian imagination—especially the tower spires added in the seventeenth century by local architects. Yet the main towers and walls are the product of Italian fortification engineering of the quattrociento, already long outdated in Italy by the time of their construction in Moscow. Nonetheless, the walls proved



The Moscow Kremlin at twilight. © ROYALTY-FREE/CORBIS

adequate against Moscow's traditional enemies from the steppes, whose cavalry was capable of inflicting great damage on unwalled settlements, but had little or no heavy siege equipment.

In the 1460s the Kremlin's limestone walls, by then almost a century old, had reached a dangerous state of disrepair. Local contractors were hired for patchwork; as for reconstruction, Ivan III turned to Italy for specialists in fortification. Between 1485 and 1516 the old fortress was replaced with brick walls and towers extending 2,235 meters and ranging in thickness from 3.5 to 6.5 meters. The height of the walls varied from eight to nineteen meters, with the distinctive Italian "swallowtail" crenellation. Of the twenty towers, the most elaborate were placed on the corners or at the main entrances to the citadel. Among the most im-

posing is the Frolov (later Spassky, or Savior, Tower), built between 1464 and 1466 by Vasily Ermolin and rebuilt in 1491 by Pietro Antonio Solari, who arrived in Moscow from Milan in 1490. The decorative crown was added in 1624 and 1625 by Bazhen Ogurtsov and the Englishman Christopher Halloway. At the southeast corner of the walls, the Beklemishev Tower (1487–1488, with an octagonal spire from 1680) was constructed by Marco Fiazin, who frequently worked with Solari. This and similar Kremlin towers suggest comparisons with the fortress at Milan. The distinctive spires were added by local architects in the latter part of the seventeenth century.

Although he built no cathedrals, Pietro Antonio Solari played a major role in the renovation of the Kremlin. He is known not only for his four

entrance towers—the Borovitsky, the Constantine and Helen, the Frolov, and the Nikolsky (all 1490–1493)—as well as the magnificent corner Arsenal Tower and the Kremlin wall facing the Red Square, but also for his role in the completion of the Faceted Chambers (*Granovitaya palata*), its name due to the diamond-pointed rustication of its limestone main facade. Used for banquets and state receptions within the Kremlin palace complex, the building was begun in 1487 by Marco Friazin, who designed the three-storied structure with a great hall whose vaulting was supported by a central pier. Much of the ornamental detail, however, was modified or effaced during a rebuilding of the Chambers by Osip Startsev in 1682.

The rebuilding of the primary cathedral of Moscow, the Dormition of the Virgin, began in the early 1470s with the support of Grand Prince Ivan III and Metropolitan Philip, leader of the Russian Orthodox Church. Local builders proved incapable of so large and complex a task. Thus when a portion of the walls collapsed, Ivan obtained the services of an Italian architect and engineer, Aristotle Fioravanti, who arrived in Moscow in 1475. He was instructed to model his structure on the Cathedral of the Dormition in Vladimir; and while his design incorporates certain features of the Russo-Byzantine style, the architect also introduced a number of technical innovations. The interior—with round columns instead of massive piers—is lighter and more spacious than any previous Muscovite church. The same period also saw the construction of smaller churches in traditional Russian styles, such as the Church of the Deposition of the Robe (1484–1488) and the Annunciation Cathedral (1484–1489).

The ensemble of Kremlin cathedrals commissioned by Ivan III concludes with the Cathedral of the Archangel Mikhail, built in 1505–1508 by Aleviz Novy. The building displays the most extravagantly Italianate features of the Kremlin's Italian Period, such as the scallop motif, a Venetian feature soon to enter the repertoire of Moscow's architects. The wall paintings on the interior date from the mid-seventeenth century and contain, in addition to religious subjects, the portraits of Russian rulers, including those buried in the cathedral from the sixteenth to the end of the seventeenth centuries.

The culminating monument in the rebuilding of the Kremlin is the Bell Tower of Ivan the Great, begun in 1505, like the Archangel Cathedral, and completed in 1508. Virtually nothing is known of its architect, Bon Friazin, who had no other recorded

structure in Moscow. Yet he was clearly a brilliant engineer, for his bell tower—60 meters high, in two tiers—withstood the fires and other disasters that periodically devastated much of the Kremlin. The tower, whose height was increased by an additional 21 meters during the reign of Boris Godunov, rests on solid brick walls that are 5 meters thick at the base and 2.5 meters on the second tier.

The most significant seventeenth-century addition to the Kremlin was the Church of the Twelve Apostles, commissioned by Patriarch Nikon as part of the Patriarchal Palace in the Kremlin. This large church was originally dedicated to the Apostle Philip, in implicit homage to the Metropolitan Philip, who had achieved martyrdom for his opposition to the terror of Ivan IV.

During the first part of the eighteenth century, Russia's rulers were preoccupied with the building of St. Petersburg. But in the reign of Catherine the Great, the Kremlin once again became the object of autocratic attention. Although little came of Catherine's desire to rebuild the Kremlin in a neo-classical style, she commissioned Matvei Kazakov to design one of the most important state buildings of her reign: the Senate, or high court, in the Kremlin. To create a triangular four-storied building, Kazakov masterfully exploited a large but awkward lot wedged in the northeast corner of the Kremlin. The great rotunda in its center provided the main assembly space for the deliberations of the Senate. To this day the rotunda is visible over the center of the east Kremlin wall.

During the nineteenth century, Nicholas I initiated the rebuilding of the Great Kremlin Palace (1839–1849), which had been severely damaged in the 1812 occupation. In his design the architect Konstantin Ton created an imposing facade for the Kremlin above the Moscow River and provided a stylistic link with the Terem Palace, the Faceted Chambers, and the Annunciation Cathedral within the Kremlin. Ton also designed the adjacent building of the Armory (1844–1851), whose historicist style reflected its function as a museum for some of Russia's most sacred historical relics.

With the transfer of the Soviet capital to Moscow in 1918, the Kremlin once again became the seat of power in Russia. That proved a mixed blessing, however, as some of its venerable monuments, such as the Church of the Savior in the Woods, the Ascension Convent, and the Chudov Monastery, were destroyed in order to clear space for government buildings. Only after the death of

Josef Stalin was the Kremlin opened once again to tourists. The most noticeable Soviet addition to the ensemble was the Kremlin Palace of Congresses (1959–1961, designed by Mikhail Posokhin and others). It has the appearance of a modern concert hall (one of its uses), whose marble-clad rectangular outline is marked by narrow pylons and multi-storied shafts of plate glass. The one virtue of its bland appearance is the lack of conflict with the historic buildings of the Kremlin, which remain the most important cultural shrine in Russia.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; ARMORY; CATHEDRAL OF THE ARCHANGEL; CATHEDRAL OF THE DORMITION; MOSCOW; RED SQUARE

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WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

KREMLINOLOGY

Close analysis of the tense power struggles among the Soviet leadership. A term coined during the last days of the Stalin regime with the onset of the Cold War.

Usually more than just a study of contending personalities, or a “who-whom” (who is doing what to whom), Kremlinology was an indispensable analysis of Soviet policy alternatives and their implications for the West. It also turned out to be a point of departure for any serious political history, inevitably connected to the ideas that drove the Soviet regime and in the end determined its fate. Western intelligence experts, academics, and journalists all made contributions to this pursuit. Attention was often focused on “protocol evidence,” such as the order in which leaders’ names might appear on various official lists, or the way they were grouped around the leader in photographs. However, since factional rivalry was usually expressed in ideological pronouncements and debates, the most widely respected practitioners of Kremlinology were émigré writers who had direct experience of the ways of the Soviet communists. The most famous of these was the Menshevik Boris Nikolayevsky. Initially Kremlinologists centered on quarrels among Josef Stalin’s subordinates in or-

der to get an idea of his policy alternatives and turns. After Stalin’s death, Kremlinology mapped out the succession struggle that occasioned the rise of Nikita Khrushchev. It was again useful in understanding the politics of the Gorbachev reform era and the destruction of Soviet power.

The domestic and foreign policy issues were debated in the ideological language of the first great Soviet succession struggle in the 1920s that brought Stalin from obscurity to supreme power. After his defeat and exile, Leon Trotsky explained Stalin’s rise to the Western public as the victory of a narrow insular national Communism, according to the slogan “socialism in one country,” over his own internationalist idea of “permanent revolution.” Materials from three Trotsky archives in the West later showed these extreme positions to have been less crucial to Stalin’s ascent than his complex maneuvers for a centrist position between right and left factions. Trotsky continued to analyze Soviet politics during the Great Purge of 1936–1938 in his *Byulleten oppositsy* (Bulletin of the Opposition). This was matched by the commentary of the well-connected Moscow correspondents of the Menshevik *Sotsialistichesky vestnik* (Socialist Courier).

For various reasons, the émigré writings had to be read with caution. Often they were employed to establish a position in the debate over the Russian Question: What is the nature of the Soviet regime, and has it betrayed the revolution? In 1936 Nikolayevsky published the *Letter of an Old Bolshevik*, presumably the confessions of Nikolai Bukharin interviewed in Paris. It contained important information indicating the origins of Stalin’s purges in a 1932 dispute over the anti-Stalin platform document of Mikhail Ryutin. However, the *Letter* was dramatized and embellished by Nikolayevsky’s gleanings from other sources. Some historians later rejected it as spurious and even denied the existence of a Ryutin Program. But during Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost campaign the full text was published, reading quite as Nikolayevsky had described it.

In Stalin’s last days, Nikolayevsky tried to interpret the antagonism between Leningrad chief Andrei Zhdanov and Stalin’s protégé Georgy Malenkov by linking Zhdanov to Tito and the Yugoslav Communists and Malenkov to Mao and the Chinese. Later studies bore this out. The rise of Khrushchev as successor to Stalin was charted by Boris Meissner, Myron Rush, Wolfgang Leonhard, and Robert Conquest. Michel Tatu described Khrushchev’s fall in 1964 and the central role played by Mikhail Suslov, the ideological secretary.

Suslov loomed large in Soviet politics from this point until his death at the end of the Brezhnev regime in 1982. The ideological post was the center of gravity for a regime of collective leadership under the rubric of "stabilization of cadres." That Suslov died a few months before Brezhnev in 1982 meant he could not oversee the succession in the interests of the Kremlin gerontocracy. The result was a thorough housecleaning by Yuri Andropov in his brief tenure. An even more thorough shakeup by Mikhail Gorbachev followed. This would have been unlikely had Suslov lived.

In defense of the Suslov pattern of collective leadership, the Politburo tried its best to shore up Yegor Ligachev in the ideological post as a limit on Gorbachev. But Gorbachev managed to destroy all the party's fetters on his power by 1989, just as he lost the East European bloc. After that, he behaved like a conscious student of Soviet succession and proclaimed himself a centrist, balancing between the radical Boris Yeltsin and the weakened consolidation faction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The last stand of the latter was the attempted putsch of August 1991, the failure of which left Gorbachev alone with a vengeful Yeltsin.

Commentary on the Yeltsin leadership of post-Soviet Russia echoed some themes of Kremlinology, especially in analysis of the power of the Yeltsin group ("The Family") and its relation to well-heeled post-Soviet tycoons ("The Oligarchs"). However, power in the Kremlin could no longer be read in Communist ideological language and had to be studied as with any other state. Kremlinology, or analysis of Soviet power struggles, nevertheless retains its value for political historians who can take note of a recurrent programmatic alternance between a leftist Leningrad tendency and a rightist Moscow line. The centrist who defeated the others by timely turns was able to triumph in the three great Soviet succession struggles.

See also: HISTORIOGRAPHY; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; SUSLOV, MIKHAIL ANDREYEVICH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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ANTHONY D'AGOSTINO

KRITZMAN, LEV NATANOVICH

(1890–c. 1937), Soviet economist and agrarian expert.

Born in 1890, Kritzman became a Menshevik in 1905. After a long period in exile, he returned to Russia in early 1918 when he joined the Bolshevik Party. An expert in economic policy and a strong advocate of planning, he held various posts in the Supreme Council for the National Economy and in 1921 joined the Presidium of Gosplan (State Planning Agency).

In addition to his professional duties, he published numerous works on planning and the economy in which he argued for introducing a single economic plan. He was criticized by Lenin for this position. After the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921, Kritzman, together with Ya. Larin, Leon Trotsky, and Yevgeny Preobrazhensky, continued to advocate an extension of state planning. During the 1920s, Kritzman produced a number of important works, including a major study of war communism, *Geroichesky period velikoi russkoi revolyutsy* (*The Heroic Period of the Great Russian Revolution*), still one of the key analyses of economic policy in the early Soviet period. As director of the Agrarian Institute of the Communist Academy from 1925 and editor of its journal *Na Agrarnom Fronte* (*On the Agricultural Front*), he promoted empirical research into class differentiation among the peasantry and called for greater state support for socialized agriculture. He also served during his career as assistant director of the Central Statistical Administration and a member of the editorial boards of *Pravda*, *Problemy Ekonomiki* (*Problems of Economics*) and the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*. Stalin's launch of mass collectivisation and dekulakization in late 1929 rendered Kritzman's work and ideas obsolete by eradicating the individual household farm. After

some years conducting private research, he was arrested and died in prison either in 1937 or 1938.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PEASANT ECONOMY; WAR COMMUNISM

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NICK BARON

KRONSTADT UPRISING

The Kronstadt Uprising was a well-known revolt against the Communist government from March 1 to 18, 1921, at Kronstadt, a naval base in the Gulf of Finland, base of the Russian Baltic Fleet, and a stronghold of radical support for the Petrograd Soviet in 1917.

By early 1921 the Bolshevik government had defeated the armies of its White opponents, but had also presided over a collapse of the economy and was threatened by expanding Green rebellions in the countryside. The Kronstadt garrison was disillusioned by reports from home of the depredations of the food requisitioning detachments, and by the corruption and malfeasance of Communist leaders. In response to strikes and demonstrations in Petrograd in February 1921, a five-man revolutionary committee took control of Kronstadt. It purged local administration, reorganized the trade unions, and prepared for new elections to the soviet, while preparing for a Communist assault. It called for an end to the Communist Party's privileges; for new, free elections to soviets; and an end to forced grain requisitions in the countryside.

Communist reaction was quick. A first attack on March 8 resulted only in bloodshed; however, on March 18 a massive assault across the ice by 50,000 troops, stiffened by Communist detachments and several hundred delegates to the Tenth Party Congress and led by civil war hero Mikhail Tukhachevsky, captured the island stronghold. Thousands of Kronstadt activists died in the assault or in the repression that followed.

The Kronstadt rebellion, along with the Green Movement, presented a direct threat to Communist control. While the rebellions were put down, their threat led to important policy changes at the Tenth Party Congress, including the abandonment of War Communism (the grain monopoly and forced grain requisitions) and a ban on factions within the Communist Party.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; GREEN MOVEMENT; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES

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A. DELANO DUGARM

KROPOTKIN, PYOTR ALEXEYEVICH

(1842–1921), Russian revolutionary.

Born into a family of the highest nobility, Kropotkin (the "Anarchist Prince," according to his 1950 biographer George Woodcock) swam against the current of convention all his life. He received his formal education at home and then at the Corps of Pages in St. Petersburg, graduated in 1862, and, to the tsar's astonishment, requested a posting to Siberia rather than the expected court career. There he remained until 1867. Siberia was a liberation for Kropotkin, contrary to the experience of others. He participated as a geographer and naturalist in expeditions organized by the Imperial Russian Geographical Society (IRGS). He was also entering his parallel career as a revolutionary: for him, Russia's Age of Great Reforms was that of the discovery of unchanging corruption among Siberian state officials.

In 1867 Kropotkin returned to St. Petersburg where he enrolled at the University (he never graduated), supporting himself by working for the IRGS. His scientific reputation grew and in 1871 he was offered the post of IRGS secretary, which he rejected. Events in his own life (the death of his tyrannical father), in Russia (the growth of a revolutionary student movement), and in the world (the Paris Commune) strengthened his revolutionary feelings. In 1872 he visited Switzerland for the

first time to discover more about the International Workingmen's Association and on his return to Russia began to frequent the Chaikovsky Circle. As his 1976 biographer Martin Miller revealed, Kropotkin authored the Circle's principal pamphlet, "Must We Examine the Ideal of the Future Order?" (1873).

Kropotkin was by this time (though the title was yet to be invented) an anarchist-communist—that is, he advocated the destruction of state tyranny over society (as anarchist predecessors like William Godwin, Pierre Proudhon, and Mikhail Bakunin had done) on one hand, while on the other he sought a communist, egalitarian transformation of society (like Karl Marx, only without using the authority of the state). This paradox required the dissolution of national government and its post-revolutionary replacement by a free federation of small communes, a local government freely administered from below rather than national and imposed from above. Revolutionaries from privileged backgrounds must organize the preceding popular revolt by propaganda and persuasion only: Workers and peasants must make the revolution themselves.

In March 1874 Kropotkin was arrested for his revolutionary activities and interrogated over a two-year period. Moved to a military hospital, he was liberated in a complex, sensational escape organized by his comrades. Kropotkin continued his revolutionary career in the Jura Federation, Switzerland, comprising the anarchist sections of the International, and from early 1877 began for the first time to take part in public political life: demonstrating, making speeches, attending congresses, writing articles. This activity is chronicled in detail in Caroline Cahm's 1983 biography. Around 1880, the issue of terrorism or "propaganda by the deed," as was the expression of the time, arose. This was crystallized by the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. Although not approving assassination as a political method, Kropotkin was unwilling to condemn the assassins, explaining their actions as the result of impotent desperation. At the end of 1882 he was arrested in France for revolutionary activity in which, for once, he had not participated. Sentenced to five years' imprisonment, he was released following international pressure in early 1886 and settled in London, England.

For a living and for the cause, Kropotkin now lectured throughout Britain and wrote for numerous publications. His principal fame during the British period derived from his books, including *In*

Russian and French Prisons (1887), *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (1899), *Fields, Factories, and Workshops* (1899), *Mutual Aid* (1902), *Modern Science and Anarchism* (1903), *Russian Literature* (1905), *The Terror in Russia* (1909), and *The Great French Revolution* (1909). With British comrades, he launched the anarchist journal *Freedom*. He wrote frequently for political publications in several languages. He was greatly encouraged by the 1905 revolution in Russia.

Kropotkin's writings during these years of exile are parts of an ongoing argument with those hegemonic Victorian thinkers Thomas Malthus, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Darwin. He takes issue with Malthus's bleak vision to argue that humanity's future is not limited by its reproductive success, but by science and equality. Nature shows the role of mutual aid in its evolution, analogous to the freely cooperating communes of postrevolutionary humanity. Anarchist communism is not merely desirable, but inevitable. Kropotkin's optimistic view of science no longer commands respect, but to many his works beckon us to a wonderful future.

In 1917, in old age, Kropotkin was able to return to revolutionary Russia. He worked for a while on various federalist projects and died in Dmitrov, a Moscow province. His last major work, *Ethics*, was published posthumously and incomplete in 1924.

See also: ANARCHISM; BAKUNIN, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH; IMPERIAL RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY

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JOHN SLATTER

KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA

(1869–1939), revolutionary, educator, head of Glavpolitprosvet (the Chief Committee for Political Education) and deputy head of the Commissariat of Enlightenment, full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (1927–1939), wife of Vladimir Ilich Lenin.

A native of St. Petersburg, Nadezhda Krupskaya developed an early and lifelong interest in education, especially that of adults. Beginning in the 1890s, she taught in workers' evening and adult education schools. In Marxist circles she met Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov (Lenin). When she and Lenin were both arrested in 1895 and 1896, she followed him to Siberia as his fiancée and later as his wife. While in exile, Krupskaya wrote her most famous work, *The Woman Worker* (first published in 1901 and 1905). Here she explored the problems faced by women as workers and mothers.

From 1901 to 1917 Krupskaya shared Lenin's life in exile abroad, helping to direct his correspondence and build up the organization of the Party. She worked on the editorial boards of the journals *Rabotnitsa*, *Iskra*, *Proletary*, and *Sotsial-Demokrat*. She also began writing about theories of progressive American and European education, especially those of John Dewey. In the 1920s these ideas on education were to have some impact on Soviet schooling, though they were then reversed in the 1930s.

After 1917 she headed the newly created Extra-Curricular Department of the Commissariat of Education, which was later replaced by the Chief Committee on Political Education (*Glavpolitprosvet*). She also worked in the *zhenotdel* (the women's section of the Party), editing the journal *Kommunistka*, but never heading the section.

In 1922 and 1923, when Lenin was seriously incapacitated with illness, Krupskaya quarreled badly with Josef Stalin, whom she found rude and boorish. When Lenin died in January 1924, Krupskaya found herself isolated and increasingly drawn to side with the Leningrad Opposition led by Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev. By the fall of 1926, however, she had defected from the Opposition. From 1927 to 1939 she served as a full member of the (now much weakened) Central Committee of the Party. During the height of the Purges, she tried to save some of Stalin's victims,



Nadezhda Krupskaya, wife of Vladimir Lenin, seated at her desk. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

including Yuri Pyatakov, but without success. Although Stalin gave a eulogy at her funeral in 1939, her works were suppressed until Nikita Khrushchev's Thaw.

Historians have tended to minimize Krupskaya's importance, viewing her primarily as Lenin's wife. Yet she played a crucial role in establishing the Party, building up the political education apparatus that reached millions of people, and keeping women's issues on the political agenda.

See also: ARMAND, INESSA; EDUCATION; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; ZHENOTDEL

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ELIZABETH A. WOOD

KRYLOV, IVAN ANDREYEVICH

(1769–1844), writer, especially of satirical fables, who is often called the "Russian Aesop."

The son of a provincial army captain who died when he was ten, Krylov had little formal education but significant artistic ambitions. Entering the civil service in Tver, Krylov was subsequently transferred to the imperial capital of St. Petersburg in 1782, which gave him access to the most prominent of cultural circles. Although he began his literary career penning comic operas, when he joined Nikolai Novikov and Alexander Radishchev on the editorial board of the satirical journal *Pochta dukhov* (Mail for Spirits) in 1789, he became recognized as a leading figure in Russia's Enlightenment. When the French Revolution made enlightened principles particularly dangerous during the last years of the reign of Catherine the Great, Krylov left St. Petersburg to escape the more severe fates suffered by his coeditors. He spent five years traveling and working in undistinguished positions.

In 1901, with the assumption of the throne by Catherine's liberally minded grandson, Alexander I, Krylov moved to Moscow and resumed his literary career. Five years later, he returned to St. Petersburg, returning also to satire. He began translating the works of French storyteller Jean La Fontaine, and in the process discovered his own talents as a fabulist. Moreover, his originality coincided with the intellectual movement to create a national literature for Russia. His new circle was as illustrious as the old, including the poet Alexander Pushkin, who was the guiding spirit behind the evolution of Russian into a literary language.

Krylov's fables, which numbered more than two hundred, featured anthropomorphized animals

who made political statements about contemporary Russian politics. This satirical style allowed him to describe repressive aspects of the autocracy without suffering the wrath of Catherine's heirs. He received government sinecure with a position in the national public library, where he worked for thirty years. Many of his characters and aphorisms continue to resonate in Russian popular culture.

See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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LOUISE McREYNOLDS

KRYUCHKOV, VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH

(b. 1924), Soviet police official; head of the KGB from 1988 to 1991.

Born in Volgograd, Russia, Vladimir Kryuchkov joined the Communist Party in 1944 and became a full-time employee of the Communist Youth League (*Komsomol*). In 1946 Kryuchkov embarked on a legal career, working as an investigator for the prosecutor's office and studying at the All-Union Juridical Correspondence Institute, from which he received a diploma in 1949. Kryuchkov joined the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1951 and enrolled as a student at the Higher Diplomatic School in Moscow. He received his first assignment abroad in 1955, when he was sent to Hungary to serve under Soviet Ambassador Yuri Andropov. Kryuchkov was in Budapest during the Soviet invasion in 1956 and was an eyewitness to the brutal suppression of Hungarian nationalists by Soviet troops. After returning to Moscow in 1959, he worked in the Central Committee Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries, which his former supervisor Andropov now headed. In 1967, when Andropov was appointed to the leadership of the KGB, the Soviet police and intelligence apparatus, he brought Kryuchkov, who rose to the post of chief of the KGB's First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence) in 1977. In 1988 Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Kryuchkov chairman of the KGB. Although Kryuchkov voiced public support for Gorbachev's liberal reforms, he grew increasingly

alarmed by the threats to Soviet unity posed by the non-Russian republics. In August 1991, Kryuchkov and his hard-line colleagues in the government declared a state of emergency in the country, hoping that Gorbachev, who was vacationing in the Crimea, would support them. When Gorbachev refused, they backed down and were arrested. Kryuchkov was released from prison in 1993 and in 1996 published his memoirs, *A Personal File (Lichnoye delo)*, where he defended his attempt to keep the Soviet Union together and accused Gorbachev of weakness and duplicity.

See also: ANDROPOV, YURI VLADIMIROVICH; AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEEVICH; INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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AMY KNIGHT

KUCHUK KAINARJI, TREATY OF

The first war between Russia and Turkey during the reign of Catherine the Great began in 1768. After the Russians won a series of victories and advanced beyond the Danube River deep into Ottoman territory in the Balkans, Field Marshal Peter Rumyantsev and Turkish plenipotentiaries met in an obscure Bulgarian village and signed a peace treaty on July 10, 1774. The war was a major victory for Catherine's expansionist policy and a realization of the goals of Peter the Great in the south. The Russian Empire gained permanent control of all the fortress-ports on the Sea of Azov and around the Dneiper-Bug estuary, the right of free navigation on the Black Sea, including the right to maintain a fleet, and the right of passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for merchant vessels. The Tatar khanate of the Crimean Peninsula was recognized as independent, thus removing the Ottoman presence from the northern shore of the Black Sea and essentially bringing the area under Russia control (it was peacefully annexed in 1783), and the Turks paid an indemnity of 4.5 million rubles, which covered much of the Russian costs of the war.

The treaty also gave Russia the right to maintain consulates throughout the Ottoman Empire and

to represent the interests of the Orthodox Church in the Holy Land. Because Russia no longer needed an alliance with an independent Zaporozhian Cossack host, this military and diplomatic success led to its destruction and the end of any notion of an autonomous Ukraine for more than a hundred years. The treaty symbolized the consolidation of Russian control of the southern steppe, the rise of Russia as a great European and Middle Eastern power, and the beginning of the end of Turkish supremacy in the area. No wonder there were great celebrations in Moscow a year later, during which the foremost Russian military heroes were lavishly rewarded and Rumyantsev was given the honorific *Zadunyasky* ("beyond the Danube"). More than any other event, the treaty established Catherine II as "the Great" in terms of Russian expansion. The Ottoman loss, however, left a vacuum in the eastern Mediterranean open for the ambitions of Napoleon I twenty-five years later, and many more battles in the eastern Mediterranean would result. Perhaps the shattering international impact of the treaty is the ghost behind the Middle Eastern and Balkan problems of the twentieth century and beyond.

See also: CATHERINE II; RUMYANTSEV, PETER ALEXANDROVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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NORMAN SAUL

KULAKS

The term *kulak* came into use after emancipation in 1861, describing peasants who profited from their peers. While *kulak* connotes the power of the fist, the nearly synonymous term *miroyed* means "mir-eater." At first the term "kulak" did not refer to the newly prosperous peasants, but rather to village extortioners who consume the commune, men of special rapacity, their wealth derived from usury or trading rather than from agriculture. The term never acquired precise scientific or economic definition. Peasants had a different understanding of the kulaks than outsiders; however, both definitions focused on social and moral aspects. During the

twentieth century Lenin and Stalin defined the kulaks in economic and political terms as the capitalist strata of a polarized peasantry. Exploitation was the central element in the peasants' definition of the *miroyed* as well as in outsiders' definition of the kulak. Peasants, by contrast, attributed power to the kulak and limited their condemnation to peasants who exploited members of their own community. The kulaks also played an important political role in self-government of the peasant community. In the communal gathering they controlled decision making and had great influence on the opinion of the rest of the peasants.

The meaning of the term changed after the October Revolution, as the prerevolutionary type of kulak seldom survived in the village. In the 1920s the kulaks were in most instances simply wealthier peasants who, unlike their predecessors, were incontestably devoted to agriculture. They often were only slightly distinguishable from the middle peasants. Thus many Bolshevik leaders denied the existence of kulaks in the Soviet countryside. When in the mid-1920s the question of differentiation of the peasantry became part of the political debate, the statisticians had to provide a picture based on Lenin's assumption of class division. As social differentiation was still quite weak, it was impossible to define a clear class of capitalist peasants. The use of hired laborers and the leasing of land was under control of the rural soviets. Traditional forms of exploitation in the countryside, such as usury and trading, had lost their significance due to the growing cooperative organization of the peasantry. Since the use of hired laborers—a sign of capitalist exploitation—made it difficult to find a significant number of peasant capitalists for statistical purposes, a mixture of signs of wealth and obscure indicators of exploitation came into use in definition of the kulak: for example, ownership of at least three draught animals, sown area of more than eleven hectares, ownership of a trading establishment even without hired help, ownership of a complex and costly agricultural machine or of a considerable quantity of good quality implements, and hiring out of means of production. In general, the existence of one criterion was enough to define the peasant household as kulak. The statisticians thus determined that 3.9 percent of the peasantry consisted of kulaks.

It was exactly its indefiniteness that allowed the Bolsheviks to use the term *kulak* to initiate class war in the Soviet countryside toward the end of the 1920s. In order to force the peasants into the

kolkhoz, the Politburo declared the almost nonexistent group of kulaks to be class enemies. Every peasant who was unwilling to join the kolkhoz had to fear being classified as kulak and subjected to expropriation and deportation. The justification lay in the political role the stronger peasants played in the communal assemblies. Together with the bulk of the peasants they were skeptical of any ideas of collective farming. The sheer existence of successful individual peasants ran counter to the Bolshevik aim of collectivization.

Due to the political pressure of new regulations for disenfranchisement in the 1927 election campaign and expropriation by the introduction of an excessive and prohibitive individual taxation in 1928, the number of kulaks started to decrease. This process was called self-dekulakization, meaning the selling of means of production, reducing the rent of land, and the leasing of implements to poorer farms. It was easy for the kulak to bring himself socially and economically down to the situation of a middle peasant. He only had to sell his agricultural machine, dismiss his *batrak* (hired laborer), or close his enterprise for there to be nothing left of the kulak as defined by the law. Several kulaks sought to escape the blows by flight to the towns, to other villages, or even into the kolkhozy if they were admitted.

On December 27, 1929, Stalin announced the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, that is, their expropriation and deportation. For the sake of the general collectivization the kulaks were divided into three different groups. The first category, the so-called "counterrevolutionary kulak-activists, fighting against collectivization" should be either arrested or shot on the spot; their families were to be deported. The second category, "the richest kulaks," were to be deported together with their families into remote areas. The rest of the kulaks were to be resettled locally. The Politburo not only planned the deportation of kulaks, ordering between 3 to 5 percent of the peasant farms to be liquidated and their means of production to be given to the kolkhoz, but also fixed the exact number of deportees and determined their destinations. The kulaks were clearly needed as class enemies to drive the collectivization process forward: After the liquidation of the kulaks in early 1930, and during the second major wave of collectivization in 1931, the Politburo ordered a certain percentage of the remaining peasant farms to be defined as kulaks and liquidated. Even if a peasant was obviously not wealthy, the term *podkulak* (walking alongside the

kulaks) enabled the worker brigades to expropriate and arrest him.

Between 1930 and 1933, some 600,000 to 800,000 peasant households consisting of 3.5 to 5 million people, were declared to be kulaks, expropriated, and turned out of their houses. As local resettlement proved difficult, deportation hit more families than originally planned. By the end of 1931, about 380,000 to 390,000 kulak households consisting of about two million people were deported and brought to special settlements in remote areas, mostly in northern Russia or Siberia. Between 1933 and 1939, another 500,000 people reached the special settlements, mostly deportees from the North Caucasus during the famine of 1933. About one-fourth of the deportees did not survive the transport or the first years in the special settlements. After the new constitution of 1936, the term *kulak* fell out of use. At the beginning of 1941, 930,000 people were still registered in the special settlements. They were finally reinstated with their civilian rights during or shortly after World War II.

See also: CLASS SYSTEM; COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES; EMANCIPATION ACT; PEASANTRY; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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STEPHAN MERL

KULESHOV, LEV VLADIMIROVICH

(1899–1970), film director and theorist.

Along with Sergei Eisenstein, Vsevolod Pudovkin, and Dziga Vertov, Lev Kuleshov revolu-

tionized the art of filmmaking in the 1920s. One of the few Young Turks to have had significant prerevolutionary experience in cinema, Kuleshov was employed by the Khanzhonkov studio as an art director in 1916 and worked with the great Russian director Yevgeny Bauer until Bauer's death in 1917. Kuleshov's first movie as a director was *Engineer Prite's Project* (1918). During the Russian Civil War he organized newsreel production at the front.

In 1919 he founded a filmmaking workshop in Moscow that came to be known as the Kuleshov collective. Because of the shortage of film stock during the civil war, the collective shot "films without film," which is to say that they staged rehearsals. Several important directors and actors emerged from the collective, including Boris Barnet, Vsevolod Pudovkin, Alexandra Khokhlova, Sergei Komarov, and Vladimir Fogel.

Kuleshov also became known as the leading experimentalist and theorist among the Soviet Union's future cinema artists, and published his ideas extensively. His most famous was known as the "Kuleshov effect." By juxtaposing different images with the same shot of the actor Ivan Mozzhukhin, Kuleshov demonstrated the relationship between editing and the spectator's perception. Although there is some debate about the validity of the experiment in the early twenty-first century, at the time it was widely reported that viewers insisted that Mozzhukhin's expression changed according to the montage. He published his film theories in 1929 as *The Art of the Cinema*.

Kuleshov made a series of brilliant but highly criticized movies in the 1920s, most important among them *The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks* (1924) and *By the Law* (1926). Even before the Cultural Revolution (1928–1931), Kuleshov had been attacked as a "formalist," and his career as a director essentially ended in 1933 with *The Great Consoler*. In 1939 Kuleshov joined the faculty of the All-Union State Institute of Cinematography and taught directing to a new generation of Soviet filmmakers.

See also: BAUER, YEVGENY FRANTSEVICH; CULTURAL REVOLUTION; EISENSTEIN, SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH; MOTION PICTURES

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KULIKOVO FIELD, BATTLE OF

On September 8, 1380, Rus forces led by Grand Prince Dmitry Ivanovich fought and defeated a mixed (including Tatar, Alan, Circassian, Genoese, and Rus) army led by the Emir Mamai on Kulikovo Pole (Snipe's Field) at the Nepryadva River, a tributary of the Don. As a result of the victory, Dmitry received the sobriquet "Donskoy." Estimates of numbers who fought in the battle vary widely. According to Rus chronicles, between 150,000 and 400,000 fought on Dmitry's side. One late chronicle places the number fighting on Mamai's side at 900,030. Historians have tended to downgrade these numbers, with estimates ranging from 30,000 to 240,000 for Dmitry and 200,000 to 300,000 for Mamai.

The circumstances of the battle involved politics within the Qipchaq Khanate. Mamai attempted to oust Khan Tokhtamish, who had established himself in Sarai in 1378. In order to raise revenue, Mamai intended to require tribute payments from the Rus princes. Dmitry organized the Rus princes to resist Mamai and, in effect, to support Tokhtamish. As part of his strategy, Mamai had attempted to coordinate his forces with those of Jagailo, the grand duke of Lithuania, but the battle occurred before the Lithuanian forces arrived. After fighting most of the day, Mamai's forces left the field, presumably because he was defeated, although some historians think he intended to conserve his army to confront Tokhtamish. Dmitry's forces remained at the scene of the battle for several days, and on the way back to Rus were set upon by the Lithuania forces under Jagailo, which, too late to join up with Mamai's army, nonetheless managed to wreak havoc on the Rus troops.

Although the numbers involved in the battle were immense, and although the battle led to the weakening of Mamai's army and its eventual defeat by Tokhtamish, the battle did not change the vassal status of the Rus princes toward the Qipchaq khan. A cycle of literary works, including *Zadonshchinai* (Battle beyond the Don) and *Skazanie o Maevom poboishche* (Tale of the Rout of Mamai), devoted to ever-more elaborate embroidering of the

bravery of the Rus forces, has created a legendary aura about the battle.

See also: DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH; GOLDEN HORDE; KIEVAN RUS

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DONALD OSTROWSKI

KULTURNOST

The term *kulturnost* ("culturedness") originates from the Russian *kultura* (culture) and can be translated as "cultured behavior," "educatedness," or simply "culture."

Kulturnost is a concept used to determine the level of a person's or a group's education and culture, which can be purposefully transferred and individually adopted. It first appeared in the 1870s when the *narodniki* (group of liberals and intellectuals) tried to bring education and enlightenment to the working and peasant masses. A "cultured person" (*kulturnyi chelovek*) was one who mastered culture.

The meanings of kulturnost can differ with time, place, and context. It became a strategy of the Soviet regime in the 1930s, when millions of peasants poured into the cities and new construction sites, and their *nekulturnost* (uncultured behavior) seemed to endanger public order. Cultural policy aimed to transform them into disciplined Soviet citizens by propagandizing kulturnost, which in this context demanded good manners, personal hygiene (e.g. cleaning teeth), dressing properly, but also a certain educational background, level of literacy, and basic knowledge of communist ideology.

Kulturnost was thus part of a broader Soviet civilizing mission addressing the Russian peasants, but also native "backward" peoples. In the creation of a new Soviet middle class, kulturnost centered on individual consumption. Values and practices that were formerly scorned as bourgeois could be reestablished on the basis of kulturnost in the 1930s.

As an integration strategy used by the regime and as a reference point for various parts of the

population, *kulturnost* gained significance in the formation of Russian and Soviet identities.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICY, SOVIET; PEASANTRY

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JULIA OBERTREIS

KUNAYEV, DINMUKHAMMED AKHMEDOVICH

(1912–1993), second ethnic Kazakh to lead the Kazakh Communist Party, member of the Soviet Politburo.

Born in Alma-Ata, Dinmukhammed Kunayev became a mining engineer after graduating from Moscow's Kalinin Metals Institute in 1936. He joined the Communist Party in 1939 and soon became chief engineer, and then director, of the Kounrad Mine of the Balkhash Copper-Smelting Combine. Between 1941 and 1945 he was deputy chief engineer and head of the technical section of the Altaipolimetall Combine, director of the Ridder Mine, and then director of the extensive Lenino-gorsk Mining Administration. From 1942 to 1952 he also was deputy chairman of the Kazakh Council of People's Commissars. Having obtained a candidate's degree in technical sciences in 1948, he became a full member of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences in 1952 and served as its president until 1955 and as chairman of the Kazakh SSR's Council of Ministers from 1955 to 1960.

By now a regular delegate to both the Kazakh and Soviet Party Congresses and Supreme Soviets, Kunayev progressed within the Communist hierarchy as well. In 1949 he became a candidate, and in 1951 a full member, of the Kazakh Central Committee, and in 1956 a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A member of the Kazakh Party's Bureau, he first served as the powerful first secretary from 1960 to 1962 and, after chairing the min-

isterial council from 1962 to 1964, served again as first secretary from 1964 to 1986. In 1966 he also became a candidate member of the Soviet Central Committee's Politburo, in 1971 he was promoted to full membership, and he was twice named a Hero of Socialist Labor (1972, 1976). Much of his success was due to the patronage of the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, who himself earlier had been the Kazakh Party's first secretary. Critics charged that Kunayev showered Brezhnev with gifts and cash, but left politics to Party officials while he focused on the interests of his large and corrupt Kazakh clan. Even so, he did promote the concept of Kazakhstani citizenship and, in December 1986, his dismissal for corruption and replacement by the Russian Gennady Kolbin sparked the Alma-Ata riots. Despite Kunayev's ejection from the Politburo in January 1987, in 1989 his supporters secured his election to the Kazakh parliament, and he remained a deputy until he died near Alma-Ata in 1993. In late 1992 his clan and former Kazakh officials honored him by establishing a Kunayev International Fund in Alma-Ata. It had the proclaimed goals of strengthening the Kazakh Republic's sovereignty, improving its living standards, and reviving the Kazakh cultural heritage.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS

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DAVID R. JONES

KURBSKY, ANDREI MIKHAILOVICH

(1528–1583), prince, boyar, military commander, emigré, writer, and translator.

A scion of Yaroslav's ruling line, Kurbsky began his career at Ivan IV's court in 1547. From 1550 on, Kurbsky participated in military campaigns, including the capture of Kazan (1552). In 1550 he was listed among the thousand elite military servitors in Muscovy. In 1556 Kurbsky received the highest court rank, that of boyar. During the Livonian war, Kurbsky became a high-ranking commander (1560). In 1564 Kurbsky fled to Sigismund II Augustus, ruler of Poland and Lithuania, fearing persecution in Muscovy. Kurbsky's defec-

tion resulted in the confiscation of his lands and the repression of his relatives in Muscovy.

Receiving large estates from Sigismund II, Kurbsky served his new lord in a military capacity, even taking part in campaigns against Muscovy (1564, 1579, 1581). Kurbsky tried to integrate himself into Lithuanian society through two marriages to local women and participation in the work of local elective bodies. At the same time, he was involved in numerous legal and armed conflicts with his neighbors.

A number of literary works and translations are credited to Kurbsky. Among them are three letters to Ivan IV, in which Kurbsky justified his flight and accused the tsar of tyranny and moral corruption. His "History of the Grand Prince of Moscow" glorifies Kurbsky's military activities and condemns the terror of Ivan IV. Kurbsky is sometimes seen as the first Russian dissident, though in fact he never questioned the political foundations of Muscovite autocracy. Continuing study of Kurbsky's works has overturned traditional descriptions of him as a conservative representative of the Muscovite aristocracy. Together with his associates, Kurbsky compiled and translated in exile works from various Christian and classical authors. Kurbsky's literary activities in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are a striking example of contacts between Renaissance and Eastern Orthodox cultures in the second half of the sixteenth century. Kurbsky's interest in theological and classical writings, however, did not make him part of Renaissance culture or alter his Muscovite cultural stance.

Edward L. Keenan argues that the texts attributed to Kurbsky were in fact produced in the seventeenth century and that Kurbsky was functionally illiterate in Slavonic. Keenan's hypothesis is based on the dating and distribution of the surviving manuscripts, on textual similarities between works credited to Kurbsky and those by other authors of later origin, and on his idea that members of the sixteenth-century secular elite, including Kurbsky, remained outside the tradition of church Slavonic religious writing. Most experts reject Keenan's ideas. His opponents offer an alternative textual analysis and detect circumstantial references to Kurbsky's letters to Ivan IV in sixteenth-century sources. Scholars have discovered an earlier manuscript of Kurbsky's first letter to Ivan IV and have provided considerable information on Kurbsky's life in exile, on his political importance as an opponent of Ivan IV, and on the cultural interaction between the church and secular elites in Muscovy. Though Kurbsky

claimed he could not write Cyrillic, this statement is open to different interpretations. Other Muscovites, whose ability to write is well documented, also made similar declarations. Kurbsky's major works were translated into English by J. L. I. Fennell: *The Correspondence between Prince Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia* (1955); *Prince A. M. Kurbsky's History of Ivan IV* (1963).

See also: IVAN IV; LIVONIAN WAR; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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SERGEI BOGATYREV

KURDS

The Kurds (or *kurmandzh*, as they call themselves) are a people of Indo-European origin who claim as their homeland (Kurdistan) the region encompassing the intersection of the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The name "Kurd" has been officially used only in the Soviet Union; the Turks call them Turkish Highlanders, while Iranians call them Persian Highlanders. Although the Kurdish diaspora throughout the world numbers 30 to 40 million, most Kurds live in the mountains and uplands of the above mentioned countries and number between 10 and 12 million.

The Kurds have never had their own sovereign country, but for a short period in the early 1920s a Kurdish autonomous region existed in Azerbaijan. Although most Kurds live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq,



Lithograph depicting Kurds fighting Tatars, c. 1849. © HISTORICAL PICTURE ARCHIVE/CORBIS

and Syria, two types of Kurdish peoples lived in the Soviet Union before its collapse: the Balkano-Caucasian Caspian type of the European race akin to the Azerbaijanis, Tats, and Talysh (living in Transcaucasia), and the Central-Asian Kurds such as the Baluchis (living in Tajikistan). Most Muslims of the former Soviet Union resided in Central Asia, but some also lived on the USSR's western borders, as well as in Siberia and near the Chinese border. Ethnically Soviet Muslims included Turkic, Caucasian, and Iranian people. The Kurds, along with the Tats, Talysh, and Baluchis, are Iranian people. In Transcaucasia the Kurds live in enclaves among the main population: in Azerbaijan (in Lyaki, Kelbadjar, Kubatly, and Zangelan); in Armenia (in Aparan, Talin, and Echmiadzin); and in Georgia (scattered in the eastern parts). In Central Asia they lived in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (along the Iranian border, as well as in Ashkhabad).

The Kurds of Caucasia and Central Asia were isolated for so long from their brethren in the Middle East that their development in the Soviet Union has diverged enough that some consider the Soviet

Kurds to be a separate ethnic group. Kurdish is an Indo-European language belonging to the Northwestern Iranian branch and is divided into several dialects. The Kurds of Caucasia and Central Asia speak the *kurmandzh* dialect. Younger generations of Soviet Kurds in larger cities grew up bilingual, speaking Russian as well. In the main, the Kurds are followers of Islam. The Armenian Kurds are Sunnites, while the Central Asian and Azerbaijani Kurds are Shiites.

In the Russian Federation in the twenty-first century, Kurds are frequently the targets of ethnic violence. Skinheads, incited by Eduard Limonov (a right-wing author and journalist) and Alexander Barkashov (former head of the Russian National Unity Party who openly espouses Nazi beliefs) have assaulted Kurds, Yezids, Meskheti Turks, and other non-Russians, particularly those from the Caucasus. Racism has prevailed even among Russian officials, who have stated that non-Russian ethnic groups such as the Kurds can only be guests in the Krasnodar territory (in the Russian southwest), but not for long.

See also: CAUCASUS; CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

KURIL ISLANDS

The Kurils form an archipelago of more than thirty mountainous islands situated in a curving line running north from Japanese Hokkaido to Russia's Kamchatka peninsula, enclosing the Sea of Okhotsk and occupying an area of 15,600 square kilometers. The Kurils have numerous lakes and rivers, with a harsh monsoon climate, and are highly seismic, with some thirty-five active volcanoes. Russians in search of furs first moved into the islands from Kamchatka early in the eighteenth century, thus coming into contact with the native Ainu and eventually with the Japanese, who were expanding northward. The 1855 Treaty of Shimoda divided the islands; those north of Iturup were ceded to Russia, while Japan controlled the four southern islands. In the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg, Japan ceded Sakhalin to Russia in exchange for the eighteen central and northern islands; the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth granted Japan sovereignty over southern Sakhalin and all neighboring islands. The USSR reoccupied the Kurils after World War II, and in 1948 expelled 17,000 Japanese inhabitants. Since then the southern four islands (Kunashiri, Shikotan, Iturup, and the Habomais group) have been disputed territory.

The Kuril islands are administered by Russian Sakhalin. Never large, the population declined to about 16,000 following a major earthquake in 1994. Some 3,500 border troops, far fewer than in Soviet times, remain to guard the territory. Dur-

ing the Soviet period the islands were considered a vital garrison outpost. The military valued the island chain's role in protecting the Sea of Okhotsk, where Soviet strategic submarines were located. The major industries are fish processing, fishing, and crabbing, much of which is illegal. Once pampered and highly paid by the Soviet government, the Kuril islanders were neglected by Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Of necessity, the inhabitants are developing closer ties with northern Japan.

See also: JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

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CHARLES E. ZIEGLER

KURITSYN, FYODOR VASILEVICH

(died c. 1502), state secretary (*diak*) and accused heretic under Ivan III.

From an unknown family, but recognized for his linguistic, literary, and administrative talents, Fyodor Vasilevich Kuritsyn was one of Ivan III's chief diplomats in the 1480s and 1490s. Kuritsyn's most important mission was to Matthias Corvinus of Hungary and Stefan the Great of Moldavia from 1482 to 1484 to arrange an alliance against Poland-Lithuania. Kuritsyn then became one of the sovereign's top privy advisors and handled several affairs with Crimea and European states, including secret matters. Fixer of the first official Russian document with the two-headed eagle, Kuritsyn was also involved in Muscovy's initial land cadastres. The disappearance of his name from the written sources after 1500 may have been connected with the fall of Ivan III's half-Moldavian grandson and crowned co-ruler Dmitry.

The traces of Kuritsyn's intellectual life are intriguing. According to testimony obtained from a Novgorod priest's son under torture, Kuritsyn returned from Hungary and formed a circle of clerics and scribes that "studied anti-Orthodox material." Other "heretics" found refuge at his home, so Archbishop Gennady concluded that Ku-

ritsyn was the “protector . . . and . . . leader of all those scoundrels.” According to Joseph of Volotsk’s exaggerated *Account*, the Novgorodian heresiarch-archpriest Alexei and Kuritsyn “studied astronomy, lots of literature, astrology, sorcery, and secret knowledge, and therefore many people inclined toward them and were mired in the depths of apostasy.” Kuritsyn’s milieu probably did have access to some philosophical and astronomical treatises.

The only work with Kuritsyn’s name as conveyor or translator-copyist is a brief poem with an attached table of letters and coded alphabet, sharing the deceptive, New Testament-Apocryphal title, “Laodicean Epistle.” The poem is of the chain type, on the theme of the sovereign soul enclosed in faith, linking wisdom, knowledge, the prophets, fear of God, and virtue. The table gives phonetic and, where appropriate, grammatical characteristics of the letter symbols in their dual function as letters and numbers. It uses both Greek and Slavic terms—the latter having the metaphorical symmetry of vowel-soul and consonant-body—and may contain some hidden meanings or utility for divination. An anonymous explanatory introduction is close to the likewise anonymous “Outline of Grammar,” both possibly by Kuritsyn. They promote the sovereignty of the literate mind and treat letters as God’s redemptive gift to humanity and the source of wisdom, science, memory, and predictive powers. Not strictly heretical, but akin to Jewish wisdom literature, these works sat on the humanist fringe of the acceptable in Muscovy.

Kuritsyn also may have composed, redacted, or simply conveyed from Moldavia the underlying text of the Slavic “Tale of Dracula.” This string of semi-folklorish anecdotes about the “evil genius” Wallachian *voevoda* Vlad the Impaler recounts the just and unjust beastly reprisals of this self-styled “great sovereign” without moral commentary—except in the description of his purported apostasy to Catholicism. Implicitly “Dracula” teaches that despots must be humored and envoys trained and smart.

Kuritsyn probably died around 1501. In 1502 or 1503 Ivan III reportedly knew “which heresy Fyodor Kuritsyn held,” and in 1504 allowed Fyodor’s brother, the diplomat-jurist state secretary Ivan Volk, to be burned as a heretic or apostate. Fyodor’s son Afanasy was also a state secretary.

See also: IVAN III; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

KUROPATKIN, ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH

(1848–1925), adjutant general, minister of war, commander during the Russo-Japanese War, colonial administrator, and author.

Born in Sheshurino, Pskov Province, in 1848 to a retired officer with liberal inclinations, Alexei Kuropatkin received a superb military education, graduating from the Paul Junker Academy in 1866 and the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff in 1874. Much of Kuropatkin’s career was linked to the empire’s eastern frontier. Beginning as an infantry subaltern in Central Asia, he saw active duty during the conquest of Turkestan (1866–1871, 1875–1877, 1879–1883) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). Kuropatkin’s close association with the flamboyant White General Mikhail Dimitriyevich Skobelev, earned him a misleading reputation as a decisive commander in combat (a deception Kuropatkin actively promoted by writing popular campaign histories). Kuropatkin was best suited for administration and intelligence, and he enjoyed a rapid rise in the military bureaucracy, including posts in the army’s Main Staff (1878–1879, 1883–1890), head of the Trans-Caspian Oblast (1890–1898), and minister of war (1898–1904).

Kuropatkin assumed command of the ministry in a climate of strategic vulnerability, as growing German military power combined with a weakening economy. Accordingly, his top priority was to strengthen the empire’s western defenses against the Central Powers. However, Nicholas II’s adventures on the Pacific drew him back to the East, albeit reluctantly. Well aware of the threat posed by Japan’s modern armed forces, Kuropatkin opposed the Russian emperor’s increasingly aggressive course in Manchuria. Nevertheless, he loyally resigned his post as minister to command Russia’s land forces in East Asia when Japan attacked in 1904. Insecurity and indecision hobbled his performance in the field. Reluctant to risk his troops in a decisive contest, Kuropatkin chose instead to order retreats whenever the outcome of a clash seemed in doubt. As a result, while he never lost a

major battle, his repeated pullbacks fatally corroded Russian morale, and constituted one of the leading reasons for tsarist defeat in 1905.

After the war, Kuropatkin published prolifically in an effort to restore his tarnished reputation. During World War I, he returned to the colors on the northwestern front in 1915, but his leadership proved to be equally undistinguished. In July 1916 Nicholas II reassigned him as Turkestan's governor-general, where he suppressed a major nationalist rebellion later that year. Although he was relieved of his post and even briefly arrested by the Provisional Government in early 1917, Kuropatkin avoided the postrevolutionary fate of many other prominent servants of the autocracy. He spent his remaining years as a schoolteacher in his native Sheshurino until his death of natural causes on January 26, 1925. Kuropatkin does not figure prominently in the pantheon of great Russian generals, but his many published and unpublished writings reveal one of the more perceptive minds of the tsarist military.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; SKOBELEV, MIKHAIL DIMITRIYEVICH; TURKESTAN

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KURSK, BATTLE OF

The Battle of Kursk (July 5–August 23, 1943) resulted in the Soviet defeat of the German Army's last major offensive in the East and initiated an unbroken series of Red Army victories culminating in the destruction of Hitler's Third Reich. The battle consisted of Operation *Zitadelle*, (Citadel), the German Army's summer offensive to destroy Red Army forces defending the Kursk salient, and the Red Army's Operations Kutuzov and Rumyantsev

against German forces defending along the flanks of the Kursk salient. More than seven thousand Soviet and three thousand German tanks and self-propelled guns took part in this titanic battle, making it the largest armored engagement in the war.

The defensive phase of the battle began on July 5, 1943, when the 9th Army of Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge's Army Group Center and the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South launched concentric assaults against the northern and southern flanks of the Kursk salient. In seven days of heavy fighting, the 13th and 70th Armies and 2nd Tank Army of General K. K. Rokossovsky's Central Front fought three German panzer corps to a virtual standstill in the Ponyri and Samodurovka regions, seven miles deep into the Soviet defenses. To the south, during the same period, three panzer corps penetrated ten to twenty miles through the defenses of the Voronezh Front's 6th and 7th Guards and 69th Armies, as well as the dug in 1st Tank Army, before engaging the Steppe Front's counterattacking 5th Guards Army and 5th Guard Tank Armies in the Prokhorovka region. Worn down by constant Soviet assaults against their flanks, the German assault faltered on the plains west of Prokhorovka. Concerned about the deteriorating situation in Italy and a new Red Army offensive to the north, Hitler ended the offensive on July 13.

The day before, the Red Army commenced its summer offensive by launching Operation Kutuzov, massive assaults by five Western and Bryansk Front armies against German Second Panzer Army defending the Orel salient. Red Army forces, soon joined by the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies and most of the Central Front, penetrated German defenses around Orel within days and began a steady advance, which compelled German forces to abandon the Orel salient by August 23. On August 5, three weeks after halting German forces at Prokhorovka, the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts commenced Operation Rumyantsev, a massive offensive by ten armies toward Belgorod and Kharkov. Spearheaded by the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies and soon reinforced by three additional armies, for the first time in the war the advancing forces defeated counterattacks by German operational reserves, and captured Kharkov on August 23.

The defeat of Hitler's last summer offensive at Kursk marked the beginning of the Red Army sum-

mer-fall campaign, which by late September collapsed the entire German front from Velikie Luki to the Black Sea and propelled Red Army forces forward to the Dnieper River. After Kursk the only unresolved questions regarded the duration and final cost of Red Army victory.

See also: WORLD WAR II

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KURSK SUBMARINE DISASTER

On Saturday, August 12, 2000, the nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine Kursk (K-141), one of Russia's most modern submarines, was lost with all 118 crewmembers during a large-scale exercise of the Russian Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea. The Kursk sank just after its commander, Captain First Rank Gennady Lyachin, informed the exercise directors that the submarine was about to execute a mock torpedo attack on a surface target. Exercise controllers lost contact with the vessel and fleet radio operators failed to reestablish communication. Shortly after the Kursk's last communication, Russian and Western acoustic sensors recorded two underwater explosions, one smaller and a second larger (the equivalent of five tons of TNT).

Russian surface and air units began a search for the submarine and in the early evening located a target at a depth of 108 meters (354.3 feet) and about 150 kilometers (93 miles) from the Northern Fleet's base at Murmansk. Russian undersea rescue units were dispatched to the site. The command of the Northern Fleet was slow to announce the possible loss of the submarine or to provide re-

liable information on the event. On August 13 Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, commander of the Northern Fleet, conducted a press conference on the success of the exercise but did not mention the possible loss of the Kursk. A Russian undersea apparatus reached the Kursk on Sunday afternoon and reported that the submarine's bow had been severely damaged by an explosion. The rescue crews suggested three hypotheses to explain the sinking: an internal explosion connected with the torpedo firing, a possible collision with another submarine or surface ship, or the detonation of a mine left over from World War II.

On Monday, August 14, the Northern Fleet's press service began to report its version of the disaster. The reports emphasized the absence of nuclear weapons, the stability of the submarine's reactors, and the low radioactivity at the site. It also falsely reported that communications had been reestablished with the submarine. The Northern Fleet and the Naval High Command in Moscow reported the probable cause of the disaster as a collision with a foreign submarine. While there were reports of evidence supporting this thesis, none was ever presented to confirm the explanation, and both the United States and Royal navies denied that any of their submarines had been involved in any collision with the Kursk. The Russian Navy was also reluctant to publish a list of those on board the submarine. The list, leaked to the newspaper *Komsomolskaya pravda* (Komsomol Truth), was published on August 18. The Russian Navy's initial unwillingness to accept foreign assistance in the rescue operation and failure to get access to the Kursk undermined its credibility.

When President Vladimir Putin learned of the crisis while on vacation in Sochi, he created a State Commission under Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov to investigate the event. Putin invited foreign assistance in the rescue operation. British and Norwegian divers successfully entered the Kursk on August 21 and found no survivors. Putin had kept a low profile during the rescue phase and did not directly address the relatives of the crew until August 22. At that time Putin vowed to recover the crew and vessel. In the fall of 2001 an international recovery team lifted the Kursk, minus the damaged bow. The hull was brought back to a dry dock at Roslyakovo. In December 2001, on the basis of information regarding the preparation for the exercise in which the Kursk was lost, President Putin fired fourteen senior naval officials, including Admiral Popov. Preliminary data from the Klebanov

commission seems to confirm that the submarine sank as a result of a detonation of an ultra high-speed torpedo, *skval*-type. On June 18, 2002, Ilya Klebanov confirmed that the remaining plausible explanation for the destruction of the submarine was an internal torpedo explosion.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

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JACOB W. KIPP

KUSTAR

Cottage worker, home worker; a peasant engaged in cottage industry (*kustarnaya promyshlennost*) to earn cash, usually in combination with agricultural production.

Cottage industry became an important source of income for rural peasants in some parts of Russia by the sixteenth century and developed extensively during the nineteenth century, producing a wide range of wooden, textile, metal, and leather goods. It was usually a family enterprise, although some peasants formed producer cooperatives and worked under the supervision of an elected elder. Some cottage workers independently produced and sold their production, while others participated in a putting-out system in which they worked for a middleman who furnished them with raw or semi-finished materials and collected and marketed the finished products. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the state, *zemstvos*, and cooperatives had established schools, credit banks, and warehouses to assist cottage workers in producing and marketing a wide variety of goods.

The socioeconomic position of Russian cottage workers was the subject of many debates in the decades preceding the revolution. Populists argued that most cottage workers remained peasant agriculturists and engaged in cottage industry only to supplement their earnings from agriculture, while Marxists contended that cottage workers were becoming proletarianized and wholly dependent on the income they earned from selling manufactured goods to middlemen.

Despite increasing competition from factories, cottage industry continued to account for a large share of Russian manufactured goods until the end of the tsarist regime, and enjoyed a brief revival in the 1920s under the New Economic Policy. Notwithstanding the importance of cottage industry in the Russian economy, there is no reliable data for the number of cottage workers in the country as a whole. Estimates range from 2.5 million to 15 million peasants engaged in cottage industry at the end of the nineteenth century.

See also: PEASANT ECONOMY; PEASANTRY

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E. ANTHONY SWIFT

KUTUZOV, MIKHAIL ILARIONOVICH

(1745–1813), general, renowned for his victory over Napoleon.

At the age of sixty-seven, Mikhail Kutuzov led the Russian armies to victory over Napoleon in the War of 1812 and created the preconditions for their final victory in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. Kutuzov first distinguished himself in extensive service against the Turks during the reign of Catherine II. He served in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, first on the staff of Petr Rumyantsev's army, and then in line units with Vasily Dolgorukov's Crimean Army. In combat in the Crimea in 1774 he was shot through the head and lost an eye. When he returned to service, he took command of the Bug Light Infantry Corps of Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov's army. He led his corps into combat with the Turks once again when war broke out in 1788. He was wounded again at the siege of Ochakov in that year, but continued to command troops throughout the war, serving under Grigory Potemkin and Alexander Suvorov. Fol-

lowing the end of hostilities, Kutuzov served in a number of senior positions, including ambassador to Turkey, commander of Russian forces in Finland, and military governor of Lithuania. It seemed that his days as an active commander had passed. In September 1801 he retired.

The Napoleonic Wars put a quick end to Kutuzov's ease. When war threatened in 1805, Alexander I designated Kutuzov, now a field marshal, commander of the leading Russian expeditionary army sent to cooperate with the Austrians. On the way to the designated rallying point of Braunau, on the Austrian border with Bavaria, Kutuzov learned of the surrender of the Austrian army at Ulm on October 20. Now facing French forces four times stronger than his army, Kutuzov began a skillful and orderly withdrawal to the east, hoping to link up with reinforcements on their way from Russia. Desperate rearguard actions made possible this retreat, which included even a brief victory over one of Napoleon's exposed corps at the Battle of Dürnstein. Despite Napoleon's best efforts, Kutuzov managed to withdraw his army and link up with reinforcements, headed by the tsar himself, at Olmütz in Moravia in late November. Fooled into thinking that Napoleon was weak, Alexander overruled the more cautious Kutuzov repeatedly in the days that followed, ordering the field marshal to launch an ill-advised attack on the French at Austerlitz on December 2. Wounded once again while trying to rally his men to hold a critical position, Kutuzov helped Alexander salvage what could be saved from the wreckage, and then commanded the army during its retreat back to Russian Poland.

Blaming Kutuzov for his own mistakes, Alexander relegated Kutuzov to the post of military governor general of Kiev. It was not long before Kutuzov returned to battle, however, for he joined the Army of Moldavia in 1808 and commanded large units in the war against the Turks (1806–1812). In 1809 he was relieved once more and sent to serve as governor general of Lithuania, but in 1811 Alexander designated Kutuzov as the commander of the Russian army fighting the Turks. In the shadow of the impending Franco-Russian war, Kutuzov waged a skillful campaign that resulted in the Peace of Bucharest bare weeks before the French invasion began.

The War of 1812 was Kutuzov's greatest campaign. Alexander relieved Mikhail Barclay de Tolly after his retreat from Smolensk and appointed Ku-

tuzov, hoping thereby to see a more active resistance to the French onslaught. Kutuzov, however, continued Barclay de Tolly's program of retreating in the face of superior French numbers, until he stood to battle at Borodino. Following that combat, Kutuzov continued his withdrawal, eventually abandoning Moscow and retreating to the south. He defeated Napoleon's attempt to break out to the richer pastures of Ukraine at the Battle of Maloyaroslavets, and then harried the retreating French forces all the way to the Russian frontier and beyond. He died on April 28, 1813, a few weeks after having been relieved of command of the Russian armies for the last time.

See also: ALEXANDER I; AUSTERLITZ, BATTLE OF; BORODINO, BATTLE OF; BUCHAREST, TREATY OF; FRENCH WAR OF 1812; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; NAPOLEON I; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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FREDERICK W. KAGAN

KUYBYSHEV, VALERIAN VLADIMIROVICH

(1888–1935), Bolshevik, politician, Stalinist, active in civil war and subsequent industrialization initiatives.

Active in the Social Democratic Party from 1904, Valerian Kuybyshev was an Old Bolshevik who played a major role in the Russian Civil War as a political commissar with the Red Army. Having fought on the Eastern Front against the forces of Admiral Kolchak, he was instrumental in consolidating Soviet power in Central Asia following the civil war. Kuybyshev subsequently held several important political posts: chairman of the Central Control Commission (1923); chairman of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Economy (1926); member of the Politburo (1927); chairman of Gosplan (1930); and deputy chairman of both the Council of People's Commissars and Council of Labor and Defense (1930).

A staunch Stalinist throughout the 1920s, Kuybyshev advocated rapid industrialization and supported Stalin in the struggle against the Right Opposition headed by Nikolai Bukharin. Kuybyshev's organizational skills and boundless energy were critical in launching the First Five-Year Plan

in 1928. However, in the early 1930s Kuybyshev became associated with a moderate bloc in the Politburo who opposed some of Stalin's more repressive political policies.

Kuybyshev died suddenly on January 26, 1935, ostensibly of a heart attack, but there is some speculation that he may have been murdered by willful medical mistreatment on the orders of Genrich Yagoda—an early purge following the assassination of Sergei Kirov. Whatever the actual circumstances of his death, he was given a state funeral, and the city of Samara was renamed in his honor.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; INDUSTRIALIZATION, RAPID; RED ARMY; RIGHT OPPOSITION; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH.

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KATE TRANSCHEL

KUZNETSOV, NIKOLAI GERASIMOVICH

(1904–1974), commissar of the navy and admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union.

A native of the Vologda area, from a peasant background, Kuznetsov was born on July 11, 1904. He joined the Red Navy in 1919, served during the civil war with North Dvina Flotilia, and fought against the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Whites. He served in the Black Sea Fleet beginning in 1921, became a Communist Party member in 1925, and graduated from the Frunze Naval School in 1926 and the naval Academy in 1932. He served as assistant commander of the cruiser *Krasnyi Kavkaz* (1932–1934), and as commander of the cruiser *Chervona Ukraina* (1934–1936). Kuznetsov served as naval attaché in Spain and was the Soviet advisor to the Republican Navy during the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1937. After returning from Spain, he served as the first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet (commissioned August 15, 1937) and as commander of the Pacific Fleet from 1938 to 1939.

Kuznetsov was recalled to Moscow in March of 1939 and was appointed as the first deputy. Days later, on March 12, 1939, he was appointed

commissar of the Navy. He held this position until 1946, leading the Soviet Navy during World War II with mixed results. The Navy did not perform well against an enemy whose naval interests were elsewhere, and it remained in a defensive mode for most of the war, suffering heavily at the hands of the Luftwaffe. The Soviet retreat from the Baltics proved to be a fiasco, but the Navy performed better in the evacuation of Odessa and Sevastopol. Two landings in Kerch in 1942 and 1943 ended in disaster, but the blame was not confined to the Navy. The Volga Flotilla played a significant part in the defense of Stalingrad, and the stationary Baltic Fleet provided artillery support in the Battle of Leningrad. Throughout 1944 and 1945, a number of landings took place behind the enemy lines, which resulted in little gain and heavy losses.

The outspoken Kuznetsov may have offended Stalin, although he blamed the Navy's shortcomings on Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov, the political commissar of the Navy before the war. In February 1946, Stalin divided the Baltic and Pacific Fleets into four separate units, a decision Kuznetsov opposed. The end result was the removal of Kuznetsov. He was forced to face a Court of Honor, where several admirals were accused of passing naval secrets to the Allies during the war. Kuznetsov was reduced to the rank of rear admiral on February 3, 1948, and was sent to the reserves, but was called back and appointed as deputy commander in chief in the Far East for the Navy on June 12, 1948. On February 20, 1950, he was reappointed to his old job of commander of the Pacific Fleet. Stalin, encouraged by Lavrenti Beria (head of the secret police), also recalled him, and once again named him commissar of the Navy on July 20, 1951. He kept this position even after Stalin's death.

On the night of October 29, 1955, the Soviet Navy suffered its greatest peacetime disaster when the battleship *Novorossisk* blew up in Sevastopol, with the loss of 603 lives. Kuznetsov was blamed for this disaster, and was removed from his position. On February 15, 1956, he was once again reduced in rank and forcibly retired. Kuznetsov's reputation was rehabilitated only in 1988, fourteen years after his death and after a long campaign by his widow. During his roller-coaster career, he was rear admiral twice, vice admiral three times, and admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union twice. He was deputy to the Supreme Soviet three times, and served the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939. He was also declared a Hero of the Soviet Union on

September 14, 1945. The Soviet naval policy changed after Kuznetsov, who was mainly a surface-ship admiral, to emphasize an oceanic navy that was heavily dependent on a large fleet of submarines, missile cruisers, and even the occasional aircraft carrier.

See also: BALTIC FLEET; BLACK SEA FLEET; MILITARY, IMPERIAL; PACIFIC FLEET

MICHAEL PARRISH

KYRGYZSTAN AND KYRGYZ

The Kyrgyz are a nomadic people of Turkic descent living in the northern Tien Shan mountain range. Originally chronicled as living in the region of what is today eastern Siberia and Mongolia, the Kyrgyz migrated westward more than a thousand years ago and settled in the mountains of Central Asia. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, ethnic Kyrgyz live in the countries of Kazakhstan, China, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The majority of the Kyrgyz live in the country of the Kyrgyz Republic (known as Kyrgystan), a former republic of the Soviet Union that received its independence in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. With an area of 76,000 square miles (198,500 square kilometers), the mountainous, landlocked republic is nestled between Kazakhstan, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz Republic's population is 4,822,166, of which 2,526,800 (52.4%) are ethnic Kyrgyz. Significant minority groups include Russians (18%), Uzbeks (12.9 percent), Ukrainians (2.5%), and Germans (2.4%). The capital city of Bishkek has an estimated population of 824,900, although the number may be closer to one million if illegal immigrants are considered.

Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School is the dominant faith among the Kyrgyz. However, when Islam was introduced to the people, many kept their indigenous beliefs and customs. The force of Islam was further weakened during the Soviet period when active religious adherence was discouraged. During the early twenty-first century, the Kyrgyz government espouses strong support for maintaining a secular state and any sympathy for radical Islam has been marginalized.

Linguistically, Kyrgyz is a Turkic language that is mutually intelligible with Kazakh. Throughout

the past several centuries, it has been written in the Arabic, Latin, and Cyrillic scripts, with the latter two dominant during the Soviet period. The government is shifting the language back to the Latin script, with an effort to emulate the Turkish model.

The early history of the Kyrgyz is shrouded in mythology, particularly the founding legend of the Manas, an epic poem of more than one million lines that is still presented orally, through song. Kyrgyz have had, in the past, their own forms of government, although more often they have been under the rule of outside forces: Mongol, Chinese, Timurid, and Russian, to name the most significant. During the period of the Russian Empire, the Kyrgyz were often called Kara-Kyrgyz. There is a common history with the Kazakhs, who were confusingly called the Kyrgyz by Russian ethnographers for most of the nineteenth century. Although they were incorporated into the Khanate of Kokand in the eighteenth century, the Kyrgyz were not always content with being controlled by others. Kyrgyz clans rebelled four times between 1845 and 1873. When the Khanate of Kokand was incorporated into the Russian province of Semirech'e in 1876, the same ire was directed against the new overlords.

Through the rest of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the region of the Kyrgyz was firmly entrenched in the Russian Empire. In 1916, there was a large-scale uprising in the region against the threat of drafting ethnic Kyrgyz and other Central Asians into the Russian Army, to support the effort against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The regional turmoil only deepened with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent civil war, both of which had direct effects on the Kyrgyz people. Significant fighting took place on Kyrgyz soil, and the anti-Bolshevik Basmachi Rebellion was partially based in the regions of southern Kyrgyzstan, around the city of Osh. By the early 1920s the region was pacified, but at a high cost: Perhaps a third of all residents of the region either died in the fighting and in the famine that plagued Central Asia in those years, or fled to China.

In the National Delimitation of 1924, the territory of the Kyrgyz was incorporated in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and was dubbed an Autonomous Republic. The region was elevated to full Union-Republic status in 1936 and was officially called the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic (Kir.S.S.R.). This entity lasted until 1991, when the



Kyrgyzstan, 1992. © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

Soviet Union was officially dissolved. At the time of independence, the name was changed to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and later the Kyrgyz Republic. With independence, the former president of the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic, Askar Akayev, was elected president of the new country. He continued to hold that position in 2003, and has consolidated his authority over the years. The Kyrgyz Republic has the institutions associated with a democracy—a legislature, a judiciary, a president, and a constitution—but the conditions for democratic development remain weak.

Economically, the Kyrgyz have traditionally been nomadic herders, and pastoral activity remains important for the Kyrgyz. With more than 80 percent of the territory being mountainous, pastoral habits include bringing the herds to high-elevation fields during the summer and back to the valleys during the winter months. There are also mineral deposits in the country, particularly of gold and some strategic minerals that can be exploited. Overall, the economy remains poor, with a gross national product (GDP) of approximately \$13.5 billion dollars. While the purchasing power

parity (PPP) of the country is \$2,800 per capita, typical incomes often fall to less than \$100 per month per person.

Making matters worse is the fact that the country has borrowed heavily from the international community during the first decade of independence. The national budget is actually exceeded by the amount owed to organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, totaling more than \$1.6 billion as of 2003. In addition, corruption is rampant and most international companies and observers view the business conditions in the country in a negative light. These problems will continue to plague any effort at economic reform that the current government, or its successor, might try to implement.

While there are ethnic Kyrgyz in neighboring Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and China, the respective populations are relatively modest and do not cause much concern. Regardless, the Kyrgyz feel it necessary to establish positive relations with these neighboring states, in large part because of the difficult borders and the fact that the Kyrgyz Republic

is a relatively small neighbor in this region. Thus, it is not surprising to see the Kyrgyz government participate in a number of multilateral security and trade agreements. It is an active member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which includes China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan), the Collective Security Agreement (with six CIS states), as well as a number of regional initiatives. It is also a member of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program and, as a result of the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism, agreed to have NATO forces establish a military airbase outside of the capital city Bishkek in 2001. During 2002, the Kyrgyz government allowed the Russian Air Force to base jets at a second airbase, and in 2003 the army of Kyrgyzstan conducted military exercises with the People's Liberation Army of China.

Foreign relations ultimately are less of a concern than the day-to-day domestic problems that plague the country. Economic development, employment difficulties, crime, corruption, and social problems continue to exist in the Kyrgyz Republic.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; POLOVTSY

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ROGER KANGAS

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
LABOR

Labor commonly refers to the work people do in the employ of others. In its history, labor in Russia has taken a wide variety of forms, from slavery to labor freely exchanged for wages, and the full gamut of possibilities between those extremes. The fates of both peasants and workers have been tightly bound together through most of Russian history.

FROM KIEV THROUGH PETER I

While slavery was common through the reign of Peter I, perhaps accounting for 10 percent of the population around 1600, it was never the dominant factor in the economy. In Kievan Rus, labor was generally free in both the vibrant cities and the countryside. Although information is scarce, manufacturing throughout the Kievan and Muscovite periods seems to have been generally on a small-scale, artisanal basis; for a variety of reasons a European-style guild system never developed. The free-hire basis of labor only began to become seriously restricted with the centralization of the Muscovite state. The slow but steady imposition of serfdom on peasants was matched by a similar reduction in the urban population's mobility. Both peasants and city dwellers were permanently tied to their locations by the Law Code of 1649. Constraints on movement became even more severe when Peter I instituted the poll tax as a communal obligation, firmly binding all non-nobles to their communal organization, whether rural or urban.

Before 1700, urban manufacture was artisanal, carried out in very small enterprises, which makes it difficult to speak of an urban working class. Large-scale manufacturing began in the countryside, close to natural resources, either on noble-owned land, with nobles utilizing their own peasants, or on land granted by the government for specifically industrial purposes. In the latter case, although labor was hired at times, the work force was more usually peasants who had been assigned either temporarily or permanently to that particular enterprise. The binding of the entire population to specific locations after 1649 made freely hireable labor difficult to find. This problem was exacerbated after Peter the Great began large-scale industrialization, most notably in the Urals metallurgical complex.



FROM PETER TO THE GREAT REFORMS

During the course of the 1700s, however, the role of hired labor became more important, as the increasing importance of money in the economy made industrial labor an attractive option for both cash-starved serf owners and peasant households. This was true especially in northern Russia, where the soil was less fertile, the growing season shorter, and agriculture less viable. These regions would also experience a new kind of industrial growth, as peasant entrepreneurs, under the protection of financially interested owners, slowly exploited local craft traditions and began to build industries using hired labor. The two Sheremetev-owned villages of Ivanovo and Pavlovo are examples of this trend, becoming major textile and metalworking centers, respectively.

The first decades of the nineteenth century witnessed an increased acceleration in the factory and mining workforce, from 224,882 in 1804 to 860,000 in 1860. Although less than 10 percent of workers in 1770 were hired as opposed to assigned, by 1860 well over half were hired. Not all of this labor was free, however, since it included hiring contracts forced upon peasants by serf owners or even village communes. In addition, hired labor was concentrated in the greatest growth industry of the period, textiles, especially in the central provinces of Moscow and Vladimir. Forced labor still comprised the great majority of the metallurgical and mining work forces on the eve of the Great Reforms.

PEASANT OR PROLETARIAN?

Although peasants remained tied to their commune as a result of the emancipation of the serfs, this hindered the labor market as little as serfdom had. By 1900, 1.9 million Russians worked in factories and mines; by 1917, 3.6 million did so. In addition, the total number of those earning any kind of wage, either full or part time, increased from 4 million to 20 million between 1860 and 1917. The bulk of this increase in the factory and mining work force came from the peasantry. For a century, historians have debated whether the Russian industrial worker was more a peasant or a proletarian, an argument rendered more acute by the coming to power in 1917 of a regime claiming to rule in the name of the proletariat. This argument has never been satisfactorily resolved. Most industrial peasants remained juridical peasants, with financial obligations to the village commune. More than that, they usually identified themselves as

peasants. A few historians have claimed that with an unceasing influx of peasants into the work force, the Russian working class was simply the part of the peasantry who worked in factories, and some see the Bolshevik Revolution as the successful manipulation by intellectuals of naïve peasant-workers. Others, on the other hand, have carefully traced the development of a hereditary work force, as the children of migrants themselves went to work in the factories, lost their ties to the countryside, and came to identify themselves not as peasants, but as workers. The archetype of this is the iconic St. Petersburg skilled metalworker, a second or third-generation worker, literate, born and raised in the city, with a sophisticated understanding of political matters and consciously supporting a socialist path in the recasting of Russian society. The truth is certainly somewhere between these poles, but there is no consensus on where. Certainly through the 1930s most of the industrial workforce consisted of first-generation workers. However, on the eve of the revolution, possibly a third of workers were hereditary.

What it meant to be a hereditary worker is not clear. Many workers grew up in the countryside, worked in a factory for several years, then returned to the village to take over the family plot. Their children grew up in the village, might themselves die in the village, would work in factories for a decade or so, and could thus be considered both peasants and hereditary workers. In addition, well over half of Russia's factory workers labored in mills located in the countryside. Thus, although they worked in a factory, they were still in and of the village.

LABOR IN REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

Regardless of whether they were peasant or proletarian, there was a continually increasing quantity of factory workers, who constituted growing proportions of the two rapidly expanding capitals, St. Petersburg and Moscow, where workers would play a political role beyond their numerical weight in the general population. Throughout the imperial period, working conditions were horrible, with seventy-hour work-weeks and little concern for worker health.

Although strikes remained illegal through most of the imperial period, they are recorded as early as the 1600s. However, the size of the industrial sector was not large enough to produce strikes of major concern to the state until the 1880s, with larger strike waves occurring in the mid-1890s and



Woman working in Soviet electronics factory in Moscow. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

the first years of the twentieth century. Socialist activists began large-scale efforts to organize the industrial labor force in the 1890s, and many historians have seen the steady fall in violence and increase in political demands during strikes as the result of politically motivated organizers. Whether workers were more led by the political parties, or rather utilized the parties' organizational capabilities for their own ends, remains a debatable issue.

Independent labor unions have never played a large role in Russia, in part because they were illegal until 1905. The state attempted to organize some unions before 1905 to counteract the influence of the socialists. This backfired in January 1905, when one of these officially sanctioned worker organizations led protests that were repressed by the state in the massacre known as Bloody Sunday. During the subsequent year of revolution, workers played a visible role. Their participation in a general strike in the fall led directly to the October Manifesto. In 1917, industrial workers, especially in Petrograd, help set the tone for the revolution. This was especially apparent in their

support of the soviets as an institution and, eventually for the Bolsheviks, who not only advocated soviet power, but also spoke out for the workers' favorite parochial concern: worker control of the factories.

THE SOVIET PERIOD AND BEYOND

During the Civil War, however, working class influence weakened significantly. The regime banned strikes, and natural worker leaders were co-opted into the party and state bureaucracies and the military. Furthermore, economic collapse caused most workers with peasant ties to flee the starving cities. General strikes in Moscow and Petrograd in early 1921 helped usher in the New Economic Policy (NEP), although the NEP would produce its own labor discontent. Workers resented that prewar technical elites retained supervisory roles and the state's attempts to increase worker productivity. There was chronic underemployment and peasant competition for jobs.

This discontent provided much popular support for the radical measures of the First Five-Year

Plan, which in turn brought millions more peasants into new factories. The chaos of the early 1930s led to the imposition of very strict labor laws, removing strikes as a viable weapon for labor until the late 1980s. The stabilization of the planned economy produced the first unmistakably hereditary working class in Russian history, as migration from the countryside slowed significantly and educational policies restricted social mobility. This was also a very docile period in labor relations, with very few strikes or viable protests. One major wave of labor discontent did occur from 1962 to 1964, which helped bring down Nikita Khrushchev when he tried to attack the status quo with price hikes and demands for increased productivity. Workers were guaranteed a job, were rarely fired, and were seldom threatened with demands for greater productivity, while being granted a lifestyle that could be considered comfortable by historical standards. As a popular epigram expressed it, "We pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us." This situation changed in the Mikhail Gorbachev era. The massive dislocations that accompanied the shift from a planned to free market economy at first produced massive strikes, followed by sullen quiescence, as those who still had jobs did not feel secure enough to strike. Labor discontent in the 1990s manifested itself primarily in a steady sizable vote for the Communist Party. Political and economic stability in the early twenty-first century led to normalization of labor markets and more consistent payment of wages than after the shock therapy of the early 1990s.

See also: FIVE-YEAR PLANS; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PEASANTRY; SERFDOM; SLAVERY

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DAVID PRETTY

LABOR BOOKS

Labor Books were issued to all officially employed persons in the Soviet Union and were used to keep a written record of the daily work behavior of each worker. These labor books were introduced in the Soviet Union in late 1938. Labor books are of historical interest as one of several drastic changes in labor regulations implemented in the late 1930s in an effort to develop and to sustain labor discipline. Moreover, these regulations, which included the requirement of internal passports, limitations on mobility, and the organized and controlled placement of labor, were significant elements of the general process of labor allocation reducing the influence of market-type forces and incentives and were more generally important as restrictions on the freedom of the population.

Throughout the Soviet era, the mix of mechanisms used for labor allocation changed considerably. Beginning in the 1930s, the system of controls was expanded in many directions. These controls, including the widespread use of forced labor, were a fundamental systemic component of the Soviet economic system. However, during the post-Stalin era, the use of direct controls over labor allocation was reduced and began to be replaced by market-type forces and direct incentive arrangements. These incentives were increasingly used to allocate labor in a variety of dimensions, for example by sector and region of the economy.

The use of labor books in the Soviet Union is an important component of the more general process of replacing market mechanisms with state directed nonmarket mechanisms during the command era. The impact of these controls on labor al-

location and labor productivity in an economy artificially characterized as a full employment economy (an economy with a “job right constraint”) remain controversial in the overall judgement of labor allocation procedures and results during the Soviet era.

See also: LABOR

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LABOR CAMPS *See* GULAG.

LABOR DAY

The labor day (*trudoden*) was a mechanism for calculating the labor payment of peasants belonging to collective farms. In theory the collective farm was a cooperative form of organization, and thus peasants divided among themselves a residual payment for work rather than a contractual wage. The latter was reserved for the payment of state workers (*rabochii*) in industrial enterprises and on state farms.

Each daily task on a collective farm was assigned a number of labor days, according to the nature of the task, its duration, difficulty, and so forth. Peasants accumulated labor days, which were recorded in a labor book. Although a peasant might have some sense of the value of a labor day from past experience, the value of a labor day in terms of money or product would not be known until the end of the agricultural season. Valuation would be determined by the following general formula: To calculate the value of a labor day, the compulsory deliveries to the state would be subtracted from the farm output, and the result divided by the total number of labor days.

After the completion of the harvest, the value of each labor day could be known, and each peas-

ant rewarded in kind (for example, grain) or in money (rubles). With the magnitude of compulsory deliveries at low fixed prices set by the state, the state wielded significant power by extracting products from the farm. Moreover, even though changes in the frequency and form of payment were made over time, the labor day system was a very crude mechanism of payment, with severe limitations as an incentive system.

See also: COLLECTIVE FARM; PEASANTRY

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LABOR THEORY OF VALUE

The labor theory of value may be traced to the writings of John Locke, an English philosopher of the late 1600s. While Locke assumed that all the resources that were found in nature had been provided by God and therefore were common property, he argued that when people took things that had been present in a natural state and reshaped them into products of use for human beings, they mixed their labor with the raw materials, and thus had the right to personal ownership of the resulting products. Indeed, the products that a worker produced became an extension of that worker. Locke employed the labor theory of value to justify private ownership of property, the cornerstone principle of capitalism. He planted the seeds of the ideas that human labor is the unique factor that creates value in commodities, and that the value of any product is approximately determined by the amount of labor that is necessary to produce it.

Karl Marx became familiar with the labor theory of value through his extensive reading of the works of British economists, including Adam Smith and David Ricardo, whose works reflected the pervasive influence of Locke’s ideas and accepted the labor theory of value. Ironically, in Marx’s hands, the Lockean premises became the basis for an radical critique of capitalism and an implicit justification of socialism. In Marx’s theoretical model of a

capitalist economy, the workers or proletarians labor with means of production, such as industrial plant and machinery, which are owned by a capitalist. Since the workers own no share of the means of production, they are driven by necessity to work for someone who does own productive property. During the hours of each worker's labor, the worker produces commodities, or products that are bought and sold in the market. The capitalist sells those commodities in order to receive income. The price for which each commodity is sold is called "exchange value" in Marxist terminology. The capitalist must return some of that value to the worker in the form of wages, since workers will not work without some material reward. It is axiomatic in Marx's theory that the value that is returned to the worker is less than that which has been created by the worker's labor. That portion of the value that has been created by the labor of the proletarian, but is not returned to the proletarian, obviously flows to the capitalist, and constitutes "surplus value" in Marx's words.

In Marx's view, surplus value is the excess of the value the proletarian has produced above what it takes to keep the proletarian working, and surplus value is the source of profit for the capitalist. Marx argued that with the development of capitalism, competition would force capitalists to strive relentlessly to extract as much surplus value as possible from their workers. Initially the capitalists would simply increase the hours of labor of their workers and decrease the workers' pay, but that kind of simple intensification of exploitation would soon reach physical limits. The capitalists would then adopt the strategy of increasing the mechanization of production, substituting machine power for human muscle power to an ever-growing degree, with the objective of getting more products out of fewer laborers. Mechanization, by throwing ever larger numbers of workers out of the factories, would ensure the growth of unemployment, which would guarantee that the wages of those who continued to work would be driven down to the subsistence level. Marx believed that he was describing the inexorable tendency of the increasing misery of the proletariat, which would give rise to a progressively sharpening struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which, with the final crisis of capitalism, would result in proletarian revolution and the elimination of capitalism.

In the first volume of *Capital*, which he published in 1867, Marx clearly suggested that the exchange value or market price of a commodity was

determined, at least on the average, by the labor which had gone into producing it. Until the end of his intellectual career, Marx continually struggled with the attempt to reconcile the conception of the intrinsic value of a product, which supposedly represented the amount of labor embodied in it, and its exchange value, which in actuality reflected supply and demand. It could be argued that in the third volume of *Capital*, edited by Friedrich Engels and published after Marx's death, that problem was still unresolved, as indeed it could not be resolved on the basis of Marx's fundamental assumptions.

The labor theory of value was wholly accepted by Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology as a fundamental theoretical assumption. The premises of that theory explain why Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev were extremely suspicious of the practice of hiring laborers for wages in private enterprises, since any employment of workers on privately owned property was automatically considered exploitation, the essential source of class struggle. In fact, with the proclamation by Stalin that the foundations of socialism had been constructed in the Soviet Union by 1936, hiring people to work for private employers was prohibited by law. In socialist society, the payment of wages to workers and peasants in collective enterprises was not thought to present any problem, since in theory the means of production in the Soviet Union belonged to those same workers and peasants. In light of the labor theory of value, it is not difficult to understand why, in the late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev finally began to allow limited, small-scale private enterprises, such endeavors were officially termed "individual labor activity" and "cooperatives," avoiding the admission of a relationship between employers and employees in the private sector.

See also: MARXISM; SOCIALISM

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ALFRED B. EVANS JR.

LAKE BAIKAL

Known as the “Pearl of Siberia,” Lake Baikal is the oldest and deepest lake on earth. Home to more than one thousand endemic species of aquatic life, it is a focal point for environmental activism and Siberian national pride.

Located in south central Siberia, Baikal is 636 kilometers (395.2 miles) long, 80 kilometers (49.71 miles) wide, and 1,637 meters (5,371 feet) deep. A watershed of 55,000 hectares (212.4 square miles) feeds the lake through more than three hundred rivers. Only the Angara River drains Baikal, flowing northwest from the southern tip of the lake. The lake probably began to form about 25 million years ago, at the site of a tectonic rift. The fault continues to widen and there are thermal vents in the lake’s depths.

Baikal’s zooplankton, called epishura, is at the base of a unique food chain, with the prized Omul salmon and the nerpa, the world’s only freshwater seal, at its top. Epishura is also a biological filter, contributing to the lake’s extraordinary clarity and purity. The Baikal Ridge along the northwest shore of the lake is heavily populated by birds and animals and contains deposits of titanium, lead, and zinc. The Khamardaban range, lying to the south of the lake, contains gold, tungsten, and coal.

Humans have inhabited the area around Baikal at least since the Mesolithic period (ten to twelve thousand years ago). The dominant native peoples in the area since the twelfth to fourteenth centuries C.E. are Buryat Mongols. Another local tribe is the Evenks, a Tungus clan of traditional reindeer nomads of the taiga. Many native peoples consider Baikal sacred, and some believe that Olkhon Island, the largest on the lake, was the birthplace of Genghis Khan.

Russian explorers first came to the shores of Baikal in 1643, and by 1650 Russia had completed its annexation of the area around the lake. Russians met little resistance from indigenous peoples in the area, and Russian populations gradually increased over the following centuries, attracted by the fur trade and mining. The city of Irkutsk, on the Angara River, was a destination for convicts, including political exiles, during the nineteenth century. The Trans-Siberian Railway, which runs around the south tip of the lake, brought more settlers and more rapid economic development to the area during the 1890s. A Circum-Baikal Railway opened in 1900. Construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline

(BAM), a second trans-Siberian rail line that passes just north of the lake, took place from 1943 to 1951 and resumed in the 1974.

The fragile ecology of Lake Baikal faces many threats. The two large rail lines at either end of the lake have compromised the watersheds through logging and erosion. Lumber mills and factories near Ulan-Ude send thousands of tons of contaminants annually into the lake. The Baikalsk cellulose combine has altered the ecology of the southern part of the lake, killing off epishura and accounting for high concentrations of PCBs and other toxins. Large die-offs of nerpa seals have been attributed to dioxin contamination. Environmental activists have vigorously opposed industrial development, and have focused international attention on the lake. Two nature reserves (*zapovedniks*) and two national parks protect portions of the lake-shore. The entire lake and its coastal protection zone became a UNESCO World Natural Heritage Site in 1996.

See also: BURYATS; ENVIRONMENTALISM; EVENKI

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RACHEL MAY

LAND AND FREEDOM PARTY

There were two revolutionary groups named “Land and Freedom” (*Zemlya i Volya*). The first was a phenomenon of the early 1860s, with a membership largely of intellectuals in Moscow and the Russian provinces. It maintained contacts with émigrés living abroad (most notably Alexander Herzen) and was supported in Russia by the anarchists Prince Peter Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin. Repressed by the government, it ceased to exist by 1863 or 1864.

The second and better-known Land and Freedom group emerged after the failure of the “Going to the People” experiments in the early 1870s.

Forced to review their strategy and activities, Russian populists realized that the peasants were hostile to intellectuals and that the state would not change of its own accord. In 1876, in St. Petersburg, they organized a new Land and Freedom group as a secret political organization. The leaders of the group, whose members included Mark Natanson, Alexander Mikhailov, and Lev Tikomirov, reasoned that revolutionaries would have to go among and work through the Russian people (*narod*). They were well aware, however, that many Russian activists had idealized the peasants and overestimated their willingness to revolt. Thus, if Land and Freedom was to achieve its goals of giving peasants collective ownership of the land through the *obshchina*, promoting freedom of the individual so that the peasants would be able to regulate their own affairs, and bringing about the abolition of private property, it would have to be better organized (through a more centralized structure) and, above all, would have to use *agitprop* (agitation and propaganda) in both word and deed to win the people over.

To this end, members of Land and Freedom went out in the Russian countryside, concentrating on the Volga region, where there had been peasant uprisings in the past. They also agitated among rebellious students in the winter of 1877 to 1878. In the late 1870s, Land and Freedom decided to disrupt the Russian state by carrying out terrorist acts targeting landowners, the police, and government officials. When the state responded by restricting its activities and arresting many of its members, Land and Freedom split into two other groups, *Narodnaia Volya* (People's Will) and *Chernyi Peredel* (Black Petition), both of which left a mark on Russian history when Alexander II was assassinated in 1881.

See also: AGITPROP; ANARCHISM; PEASANTRY; PEASANT UPRISINGS; TERRORISM

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

LAND CAPTAIN

Land captains were representatives of the administrative and judicial authority in Russian villages from 1889 to 1917.

The Statute Concerning Land Captains was passed on July 12, 1889, and was one of the counter-reforms made during the rule of Emperor Alexander III. The purpose of this law was the partial restoration of the control of provincial nobility over the peasants. In 40 provinces, 2,200 land districts, headed by land captains, were formed. Land captains were appointed by the Minister of Interior, usually from local hereditary nobles at the recommendation of governors and provincial marshals of nobility. They had extensive administrative and judicial power, controlled the activity of peasant communities, and formed the primary judicial authority for peasants and other taxpayers. A land captain had to have a higher education and three years of experience in serving as a peace mediator (*mirovoy posrednik*), a mirian (mir-peasant commune) judge, or member of a provincial council of peasant affairs. Moreover, he had to possess at least 200 desiatinas (approximately 540 acres of land) or real estate worth at least 7.5 thousand rubles. When candidates with records sufficient for the position were unavailable, local hereditary nobles with primary and secondary education were eligible. In special cases any local noble could be appointed. A land captain had the right to cancel any decision made by the village or the *volost* gathering (*skhod*) of the district, order the physical punishment of a taxpayer for minor misdemeanors, and order a three-day arrest or a six-ruble fine. The land captain appointed *volost* courts, which had been previously elected by the peasants, from a number of candidates selected by village communities (the *volost* was the smallest administrative unit in tsarist Russia). He could cancel any decision of a *volost* court, remove a judge, arrest, fine, or order physical punishment. The decisions of a land captain were considered final and did not allow for revision or complaints. In accordance with the reform of 1889, District (*Uyezd*) Bureaus of Peasant Affairs and *mir* (communal) courts were cancelled. The *mir* courts were reinstated in 1912. The post of a land captain was cancelled by a decision of the Provisional Government on October 14, 1917.

See also: AUTOCRACY; PEASANTRY

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

LANDSBERGIS, VYTAUTAS

(b. 1932), Lithuanian musicologist and political leader.

Vytautas Landsbergis, a musicologist by training, emerged as a political leader in Lithuania in the fall of 1988. One of the founding members of the Movement for Perestroika in Lithuania, better known as Sajudis, he quickly became one of the Sajudis Initiative Group's most prominent public spokespersons. In the fall of 1988 he became Sajudis's President when the organization began openly to advocate political goals and to demand the restitution of the independent Lithuanian state. In 1989 he won note throughout the Soviet Union as a deputy in the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, where he led the campaign to force the Soviet government to recognize the existence of the Secret Protocols to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, and to renounce them as having been immoral. As an uncompromising Lithuanian leader, he became one of Mikhail Gorbachev's best-known political opponents, and for a time he found common cause with Gorbachev's major Russian opponent, Boris Yeltsin.

In March 1990, after Sajudis had won an overwhelming majority in the elections to the Lithuanian parliament, Landsbergis was elected President of the Supreme Council's Presidium, and as such became the Lithuanian chief of state. On March 11, 1990, the Supreme Council proclaimed Lithuania's reestablishment as an independent state, and Landsbergis focused on Lithuania's drive to win international recognition of its independence. Toward this goal he followed a policy of harsh confrontation with the Soviet government, and he traveled widely abroad seeking support. Posing the question of Lithuanian independence as a moral more than a political issue, he appealed to world public opinion over the heads of what he saw as unresponsive foreign governments. In January 1991, when Soviet troops seized key buildings in Vilnius, Landsbergis remained at his office in the parliament and became the prime symbol of Lithuanian resistance to Soviet rule.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the fall of 1991, Landsbergis's political fortunes began to wane, although he continued to be a popular figure among Lithuanian émigrés in the United States, from whom he received considerable moral and financial support. A referendum aimed at strengthening his authority failed in the spring of 1992, and in the fall he was forced out of office by the overwhelming victory of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (the former Communist Party) in the elections to the new parliament, now called the Seimas. For the next four years, Landsbergis held the post of Leader of the Opposition. In 1996, after the victory of his political party, the Homeland Union, in parliamentary elections, he became President of the Presidium of the Seimas, a post he held until new elections in 2000. In 1997 he failed in his bid to become President of the Republic.

See also: LITHUANIA AND LITHUANIANS; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

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ALFRED ERICH SENN

LAND TENURE, IMPERIAL ERA

Two themes predominate in historical literature on land tenure in the imperial era: first, the fragility of private property rights and their association with Russian economic "backwardness"; and, second, the problem of agrarian reform after the abolition of serfdom in 1861. From the medieval era, two competing conceptions of property coexisted in Russian law. The first concerned inherited (patrimonial) forms of landed property, which privileged the rights of the kin group, or clan (*rod*), over those of the individual. Although individuals controlled inherited property, their right to alienate patrimonial land was restricted. Proprietors acted as custodians, rather than absolute owners, of immovable assets: If they chose to sell an estate without the consent of family members, the latter enjoyed the right to redeem the estate at its

purchase price. Testamentary freedom over patrimonial estates was also severely circumscribed.

Alongside the institution of patrimonial property, a second conception of property emerged in the early modern era that invested far greater rights of ownership in the individual. Muscovite law codes allowed for the special status of the acquired estate, or land purchased from another clan. Proprietors of acquired land could alienate and bequeath such assets as they wished. After a family member inherited acquired property, however, this land became patrimonial and was subject to the laws governing lineage land. The notion of acquired property surfaced as early as the twelfth century; nonetheless, many legal historians argue that the concept of private property was not fully elaborated in the law until the reign of Catherine II, when the empress confirmed the status of acquired property in her Charter of the Nobility in 1785.

Yet even the Charter of the Nobility stopped short of granting the nobility unfettered rights over their landed estates. Patrimonial property continued to be governed by the rules of partible inheritance, according to which surviving spouses received one-seventh and daughters claimed one-fourteenth of the immovable estate of the deceased; sons then divided the remaining land equally. In the absence of sons, each daughter received an equal share of the estate. The result of partible inheritance was estate fragmentation: In contrast to landowners in Western Europe, Russian proprietors often held land in small parcels, scattered in several districts, rather than consolidated holdings.

Some historians maintain that partible inheritance was instrumental in the decline of the Russian nobility and discouraged individual proprietors from improving their estates. Certainly this was the view of Peter the Great, who attempted to overturn inheritance practice with the Law of Single Inheritance in 1714. The new law instructed parents to bequeath land in its entirety to one son or daughter. From the perspective of the nobility, the Law of Single Inheritance not only violated centuries of tradition but also undermined their children's welfare. Many nobles circumvented the decree through illegal transactions, fabricating debts and selling land in order to redistribute the proceeds among their heirs. When Anna Ivanovna ascended the throne in 1730, she quickly succumbed to noble demands to reinstitute partible inheritance. Devotion to partible inheritance did not preclude acknowledgement of its harmful effects, however. Until the

eve of the Revolution, tension persisted between the nobility's conviction that landed property should be divided among all sons and daughters, and the conflicting desire to prevent disintegration of their patrimony.

Historians also blame absentee ownership and the insecurity of property for poor productivity on noble estates. The broad consensus is that Russian nobles were chronically in debt, preferred life in the city to residing on their estates, and were far more likely to engage in conspicuous consumption than to invest in the development of their holdings. Moreover, until the late eighteenth century, Russian nobles risked confiscation of their land for a whole series of misdemeanors. Although Catherine II's Charter of the Nobility stipulated that nobles could not be deprived of their estates without due process, the charter nonetheless defined crimes meriting confiscation as broadly as possible. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 dealt a further blow to noble property rights, as proprietors lost their unpaid labor and were compelled to relinquish approximately half of their land to their former serfs. Although the government guaranteed the nobility generous redemption payments for the land they had sacrificed, the response of many nobles in the post-Emancipation era was to sell their land and seek other sources of income. Some ambitious proprietors moved to the country and devoted their energies to modernizing their estates. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the vast majority of noble landowners were unable to support their families on the proceeds of their estates alone.

While the nobility campaigned to bolster the institution of private property, the notion of individual property rights was largely alien to Russian peasants, even after the abolition of serfdom in 1861. The majority of Russian peasants lived in villages in which arable land was controlled by the repartitional commune (*mir*). Although regional variations existed, in most villages individual peasants owned their tools and livestock, while households controlled the land upon which they built their houses and cultivated their gardens. Arable land, however, was held jointly by the commune, which periodically redistributed strips of land among the village households. The goal of redistribution was to provide each household in the village with an equal share of resources and to ensure that each would fulfill its fiscal obligations. Redistribution by no means created perfect equality among commune members, but it allowed peasants some measure of security in an environment

characterized by a short growing season, severe weather, poor soil, and primitive transportation.

For Russian intellectuals—in particular, the Slavophiles—the peasant commune represented the true collectivist and egalitarian nature of the Russian people, which they contrasted with Western veneration of the individual. Yet the repartitional commune did not become a feature of peasant life until the eighteenth century, when the fiscal pressures of the Petrine reforms encouraged noble proprietors to impose collective responsibility on their villages to meet tax obligations. Collective ownership nonetheless impeded the development of the notion of private property among the peasantry. While historians continue to debate what the long-term consequences of the Stolypin reforms (1906–1914) might have been, if they had not been interrupted by war and revolution, when Petr Stolypin, advisor to Nicholas II, sought to transform the Russian countryside by allowing peasant households to separate from the commune and claim a consolidated holding, only a minority of villages took advantage of this opportunity. Educated Russians were convinced that collective ownership caused low agricultural productivity, but for the majority of Russian peasants the commune offered far more benefits than private ownership. Furthermore, although land hunger remained a constant among the peasantry in the years following Emancipation, historians have begun to question the existence of an agrarian crisis in the years leading up to the Revolution and to suggest that collective cultivation of land was by no means the major obstacle to economic innovation. The village commune remained central to the peasant way of life, not only until 1917, but until Stalin succeeded in destroying rural tradition with collectivization. Significantly, when peasants during the October Revolution seized the estates of noble proprietors, they claimed the land not for individual peasants, but in the name of the village commune.

Ultimately, the concept of private property was fraught with inconsistencies in imperial Russia, for nobles and peasants alike. As Richard Wortman has noted, property rights remained “an attribute of privilege” (p. 15), associated with despotism and oppression, rather than the foundation for political and civil rights. Educated Russians on the eve of Revolution remained divided in their belief that peasant loyalty to the repartitional commune was a sign of their “backwardness,” and their own suspicion that the defense of private property would benefit only the landowning nobility. Under these

conditions, the Bolshevik agenda to nationalize the land in 1917 initially met with little opposition.

See also: DVORIANSTVO; EMANCIPATION ACT; LAND TENURE, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; SERFDOM

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MICHELLE LAMARCHE MARRESE

LAND TENURE, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

A central idea of communist ideology was opposition to private ownership of the means of production. This prohibition against private property was manifest first and foremost in land relations. Guided by their ideological beliefs, the new Bolshevik regime, the day after seizing power from the Provisional Government in October 1917, issued a decree “On Land” that abolished private ownership of land and introduced the nationalization of land. The October decree was followed by land legislation in January 1918 that forbade the renting or exchange of land.

Following the end of the Russian Civil War (1917–1921), the first Soviet Land Code was adopted in 1922. It regulated land use and stayed

in force until the early 1990s. The first Soviet Land Code affirmed the nationalization of land and abolished private ownership of land, minerals under the soil, water, and forests. Article 27 of the 1922 Land Code forbade the purchase, sale, bequeathing, or mortgaging of land. The 1922 Land Code did allow land leasing from the state until 1928. Starting in 1928, legal changes were introduced that eroded the liberties contained in the 1922 Land Code. Restrictions on land leasing laid the basis for the collectivization of agricultural land starting in 1929. Family farms, which were based on leased land, were aggregated into large state and collective farms based on state ownership of land. Restrictions on land leasing remained in force until the late 1980s.

The prohibition on private land ownership did not mean, however, that Soviet citizens were deprived of land use. Rural and urban households were able to use small land plots, which were used for the growing of food for family consumption and to supplement family income. These plots of land were called “auxiliary plots,” sometimes translated as personal subsidiary plots or simply “private plots.” In general, food production and food sales from state and collective farms were planned and regulated by the central government. Auxiliary plots were not based upon private ownership of land, but they did lie outside the scope of state planning. Auxiliary plots could be assigned to a family or an individual. Although communist ideology was opposed to these private uses of land and considered those land plots remnants of capitalism, the food produced from these plots contributed significant percentages of the nation’s food, in particular meat, milk, eggs, vegetables, and potatoes. For rural dwellers, the food produced from auxiliary plots and sold at urban food markets accounted for nearly one-half of the family income well into the 1950s. Given these circumstances, the Soviet leadership had to put pragmatism above ideology and permit auxiliary plots to exist. Successive Soviet leaders had different ideas concerning the treatment of auxiliary plots. During difficult economic times, the Soviet regime adopted more lenient attitudes. However, among the political elite the supremacy of large-scale collective agriculture was not and could not be doubted, and, prior to the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, no Soviet leader considered allowing independent farms based on land leasing.

When Gorbachev became General Secretary, he wanted to revitalize Soviet agriculture, which had

experienced stagnation in its food production during the early 1980s. His idea was to allow individuals who desired to start independent farms to lease land from state and collective farms. In February 1990, the USSR Law on Land was adopted. It legalized the leasing of agricultural land in order to create independent individual farms, but did not legalize land ownership. In April 1991, a new Land Code was adopted, replacing the 1922 Land Code, and this new version codified the right of land leasing.

The Law on Land also allowed individual republics of the USSR to pass their own land laws. In December 1990, the Russian Republic reversed the 1922 legislation regarding land ownership by adopting a Law on Property that distinguished between private (*chastnaya*) and state ownership of land. The passage of a number of other laws, including On Land Reform, meant that, for the first time since the Communists came to power in 1917, private ownership of land was permitted, although the purchase of land was heavily regulated and a ten-year moratorium placed on land sales.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in late December 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin moved decisively to reaffirm his commitment to private land ownership, which had already been legalized during the Soviet period. In late December 1991, Yeltsin issued government resolutions and presidential decrees ordering large farms to reorganize and distribute land shares to all farm members and allocate actual land plots to those who wanted to leave the parent farm. He also restated the right to private ownership of land and encouraged the rise of a new class of private farmers based on private ownership of land. Despite these steps, during the 1990s the issue of private land ownership and the right to buy and sell land were heavily contested and were key aspects of the policy conflict between reformers and conservatives.

Following the dissolution in October 1993 of the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People’s Deputies—the leftover Soviet era legislature—Yeltsin continued to shape land relations. On October 27, 1993, Yeltsin issued a decree entitled “On the Regulation of Land Relations and the Development of Agrarian Reform in Russia,” which had an important impact on land relations until the end of the decade. This decree provided for the distribution of land deeds to owners of land and land shares, thereby creating the legal foundation for a land market. In December 1993, the new Russian Con-

stitution guaranteed the right to private ownership of land. This right was reaffirmed in the Civil Code, adopted in 1994.

Starting in 1994, a rudimentary land market arose, involving the buying and selling of land, including agricultural land. The land market was somewhat restricted in that agricultural land was to be used only for agricultural purposes. But the decree was an important first step and had the desired effect: By the end of the 1990s, millions of land transactions were being registered annually (although most were lease transactions).

After seven years of heated political disagreement, a post-Soviet Land Code was passed and signed into law by President Vladimir Putin in October 2001. For the first time since 1917, a Land Code existed that allowed Russian citizens to possess, buy, and sell land. The most contentious issue, the right to buy and sell agricultural land, was omitted from the new Land Code.

Following the passage of the Land Code, the Putin administration moved quickly to enact a law regulating agricultural land sales. By June 2002, a government-sponsored bill on the turnover of agricultural land passed three readings in the State Duma and was sent to the upper chamber, the Federation Council, where it was approved in July 2002. Near the end of July 2002, President Putin signed the bill into law, the first law since 1917 to regulate agricultural land sales in Russia.

The law that was signed into force was very conservative, requiring that agricultural land be used for agricultural purposes. With the exception of small plots of land, such as household subsidiary plots, if the owner of privately owned land wished to sell his land, he was required to offer it to local governmental bodies, who had one month to exercise their right of first refusal before the land could be offered to third parties. If the land was offered to a third party, it could not be at a price lower than was originally offered to the local government. Owners of land shares were required to offer their shares first to other members of the collective, then to the local government, both of which had one month to exercise their right of first refusal. Only if this right was not used could the shares be sold to a third party, but not at a price lower than was originally offered to the local government. If the owner changed the price of his land (or his land shares), then the local government had to be given the right of first refusal again at the

new price. The law established minimum size limits on land transactions and maximum size limits on land ownership. Finally, the law provided for land confiscation (as did the Land Code) if the land was not used, or was not used for its intended purpose, or if use resulted in environmental degradation.

See also: AGRICULTURE; COLLECTIVE FARMS; LAND TENURE, IMPERIAL ERA

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STEPHEN K. WEGREN

LANGUAGE LAWS

The issue of language question has been the subject of recurring political, social, and ideological controversy in Russia since the fifteenth century. Both the intellectual elite and the state were involved in discussions of the issue. Until the 1820s they were primarily concerned with the formation and functions of the Russian literary language.

EIGHTEENTH AND EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Peter the Great's educational and cultural reforms were the first direct state involvement in the language question in Russia. During the early eighteenth century, governmental orders systematically regulated and resolved the language system, which at this time was characterized by the progressive penetration of original Russian elements into the established Church Slavonic literary norm and by a significant increase in the influence of foreign languages. Peter's program envisioned the creation of a civil idiom based on various genres of the spoken language, and the modernization and secularization of elevated Church Slavonic, whose resources were insufficient for adequate description

of the vast new areas of knowledge. At the same time, the language of the epoch was oriented toward Western European languages as sources of novel information and terminology, and thus there were many foreign borrowings. The tsar tackled this problem personally, requiring that official documents were to be written in plain Russian that avoided the use of obscure foreign words and terms. Peter's nationalization of language culminated in the 1707 orthography reform. He decreed the creation of the so-called civil alphabet and removed eight obsolete letters from Church Slavonic script. However, in 1710, partly in response to criticism from the church, Peter reintroduced certain letters and diacritic signs into the civil alphabet. In spite of its limitations, Peter's orthographic reform was a first step toward the creation of a truly secular, civil Russian writing system. It paved the way for three consecutive reforms by the Imperial Academy of Sciences in 1735, 1738, and 1758 that further simplified the alphabet.

Throughout the eighteenth century, the language question dominated intellectual debate in Russia. During the first decades of the nineteenth century, linguistic polemics intensified with the emergence of Nikolai Karamzin's modernizing program aimed at creating an ideal literary norm for Russian on the basis of the refined language of high society. Karamzin's plan met with a heated response from conservatives who wanted to retain Church Slavonic as a literary language. His opponents were led by Admiral Alexander Shishkov. In December 1812, Emperor Alexander I encouraged the Imperial Russian Bible Society to translate and publish the scriptures in the empire's many languages to promote morality and religious peace between its peoples. The society distributed tens of thousands of Bibles in Church Slavonic, French, German, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Armenian, Georgian, Kalmyk, and Tatar in the first year of its existence. The publication of the scriptures in Russian, however, aroused strong opposition from the conventional Orthodox clergy, who eventually persuaded Alexander to change his position. In 1824 he appointed Admiral Shishkov to head the Ministry of Education. Shishkov terminated the publication of the Russian Bible and reestablished Church Slavonic as the sole language of scripture for Russians.

1860s TO 1917

Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, imperial policy promoted Russian national

values among the non-Russian population of the empire and established Russian as the official language of the state. The government exercised administrative control over the empire's non-Russian languages through a series of laws that considerably, if not completely, restricted their functions and spheres of usage.

These laws primarily concerned the Polish and Ukrainian languages, which were feared as sources and instruments of nationalism. Russification had been adopted as the government's official policy in Poland in response to the first Polish uprising. After the second uprising, in 1863, Polish was banished from education and official usage. Russian became the language of instruction. Harsh censorship ensured that most of the classics of Polish literature could be published only abroad; thus, for instance, the dramas of the national poet, Adam Mickiewicz, were not staged in Warsaw.

The suppression of Ukrainian culture and language was also a consequence of the 1863 uprising. Ukrainian cultural organizations were accused of promoting separatism and Polish propaganda, and in July 1863 Peter Valuev, the minister of internal affairs, banned the publication of scholarly, religious, and pedagogical materials in Ukrainian. Only belles-lettres were to be published in the "Little Russian" dialect. In 1875, renewed Ukrainophile activity again aroused official suspicion. An imperial special commission recommended that the government punish Ukrainian activists and ban the publication and importation of Ukrainian books, the use of Ukrainian in the theater and as a language of instruction in elementary schools, and the publication of Ukrainian newspapers. Alexander II accepted these ruthless recommendations and encoded them in the Ems Decree, signed in the German town of Ems on May 18, 1876.

Belorussian was also regarded as a dialect of Russian, but was not officially prohibited because of the limited scope of its literature. Georgian was subjected to a number of severe restrictions. Imperial language policy was not liberalized until after the Revolution of 1905, and then only under enormous public pressure. From 1904 there had also been democratic projects for alphabet reform, championed by such famous scholars as Jan Baudouin de Courtenay and Filipp Fortunatov. In 1912 the orthography commission submitted its propositions to the government, but they were never approved, due to strong opposition in intellectual and clerical circles. The implementation of the orthog-

raphy reform, which again removed certain superfluous letters from the alphabet, came only in October 1918, when the Bolshevik government adopted the commission's recommendations.

REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET LANGUAGE POLICY

The language question had always been high on the Bolshevik political and cultural agenda. Soon after the Revolution, the Bolshevik government declared a new language policy guaranteeing the complete equality of nationalities and their languages. Formulated in a resolution of the Tenth Communist Party Congress in March 1921, this policy emphasized that the Soviet state had no official language: everyone was granted the right to use a mother tongue in private and public affairs, and non-Russian peoples were encouraged to develop educational, administrative, cultural, and other institutions in their own languages. In practice, this meant that the more than one hundred languages of the non-Russian population, of which only twenty had a written form, had to be made as complete and functional as possible. The revolutionary language policy was indisputably democratic in stance, but some observers argue that its real driving force was the new government's need to establish its power and ideology in ethnically and linguistically diverse parts of the country. In any case, the language reform of the 1920s and early 1930s was unprecedented in scale. More than forty unlettered languages received a writing system, and about forty-five had their writing systems entirely transformed. During the 1920s a Latinization campaign created new alphabets and transformed old ones onto a Latin (as opposed to a Cyrillic or Arabic) basis. In February 1926 the First Turcological Congress in Baku adopted the Latin alphabet as a basis for the Turkic languages. Despite a few instances of resistance, the language reform was remarkably successful, and during the early 1930s education and publishing were available in all the national languages of the USSR. Between 1936 and 1937 a sharp change in Soviet nationalities policy led to a sudden decision to transform all of the country's alphabets onto a Cyrillic basis. Complete Cyrillicization was implemented much faster than the previous alphabet reforms. From the late 1930s until the late 1980s, Soviet language policy increasingly promoted russification. National languages remained equal in declarations, but in practice Russian became the dominant language of the state, culture, and education for all the peoples of the USSR. It was only at the end of the 1980s,

when a measure of political and cultural self-determination was restored, that the various Soviet nations and their languages acquired a higher status.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Article 68 of the 1993 constitution of the Russian Federation declares that Russian is the state language. Federal subunits of Russia have the constitutional right to establish their own state languages along with Russian. The state guarantees protection and support to all the national languages, with emphasis on the vernaculars of small ethnic groups. On December 11, 2002, however, President Vladimir Putin introduced amendments to the Law on Languages of the Russian Federation that established the Cyrillic alphabet as a compulsory norm for all of the country's state languages. Supported by both chambers of the Russian parliament, this amendment was strongly opposed by local officials in Karelia and Tatarstan. Russian lawmakers are also concerned about the purity of the Russian language. In February 2003 a draft law prohibiting the use of jargon, slang, and vulgar words, as well as the use of foreign borrowings instead of existing Russian equivalents, was adopted by the lower chamber of the Duma but was rejected by the Senate. The language issue clearly remains as topical as ever in Russia, and state language policy may be entering a new phase.

See also: CYRILLIC ALPHABET; EDUCATION; KARAMZIN, NIKOLAI MIKAILOVICH; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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VLADISLAVA REZNIK

LAPPS See SAMI.

LATVIA AND LATVIANS

The Republic of Latvia is located on the eastern littoral of the Baltic Sea, and the vast majority of the world's Latvians (est. 1.5 million in 2000) live in the state that bears their name. They occupy this coastal territory together with the other two Baltic peoples with states of their own, the Estonians and the Lithuanians, as well as a substantial number of other nationality groups, including Russians. The complex relationship between this region and the Russian state goes back to medieval times. The modern history of this relationship, however, can be dated to the late eighteenth century, when the Russian Empire, under Catherine the Great, concluded the process (begun by Peter the Great) of absorbing the entire region. From then until World War I, the Latvian population of the region was subject to the Russian tsar. The disintegration of the empire during the war led to the emergence of the three independent Baltic republics in 1918 (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania), which, however, were annexed by the USSR in 1940. They were formally Soviet Socialist Republics until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Since then, Latvia and the other two Baltic republics have been independent countries, with strong expectations of future membership in both NATO and the European Community. The notion among political leaders in Russia that the Baltic territories, among others, were the Russ-

ian "near abroad," however, remained strong during the 1990s.

Before they were united into a single state in 1918, the Latvian-speaking populations of the Baltic region lived for many centuries in different though adjacent political entities, each of which had its own distinct cultural history. The Latvians in Livonia (Ger. Livland) shared living space with a substantial Estonian population in the northern part of the province. Those in the easternmost reaches of the Latvian-language territory were, until the eighteenth century, under the control of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and afterward part of Vitebsk province of the Russian Empire. The Latvians of Courland (Ger. Kurland), until 1795, were residents of the semi-independent duchy of Courland and Semigallia, the dukes owing their loyalty to the Polish king until the duchy became part of the Russian Empire. The final acquisition of all these territories by the Russian Empire was not accompanied by an internal consolidation of the region, however, and most of the eighteenth-century administrative boundaries remained largely unchanged. Also remaining unchanged throughout the nineteenth century was the cultural and linguistic layering of the region. In the Latvian-language territories, social and cultural dominance remained in the hands of the so-called Baltic Germans, a sub-population that had arrived in the Baltic littoral as political and religious crusaders in the thirteenth century and since then had formed seemingly unchanging upper orders of society. The powerful Baltic German nobility (Ger. Ritterschaften) and urban patriciates (especially in the main regional city of Riga) continued to mediate relations between the provincial lower orders and the Russian government in St. Petersburg.

Most historians hold that a national consciousness that transcended the provincial borders was starting to develop among the Latvian-speakers of these provinces during the eighteenth century. The main national awakening of the Latvians, however, took place from the mid-1800s onward, and by the time of World War I had produced a strong sense of cultural commonality that manifested itself in a thriving Latvian-language literature, a large number of cultural and social organizations, and a highly literate population. Challenging provincial Baltic German control, some Latvian nationalists sought help in the Russian slavophile movement; this search for friends ended, however, with the systematic russification policies under Alexander III in the late 1880s, which restricted the use of the



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Latvian language in the educational and judicial systems and thus affected everyday life. Henceforth, both the Baltic German political elite and the Russian government seemed to many Latvian nationalists to be forces inimical to Latvian aspirations for independence.

The main events in the region during the twentieth century changed the nature of the inherited antagonisms of the Latvian area, but did not solve them. The emergence of a Latvian state capped the growth of Latvian nationalism, but created in the new state the need to resolve the problems of economic development, national security, and minority nationalities. The Russian population in Latvia in the interwar years remained in the range of 7 to 10 percent. In the fall of 1939 virtually the entire Baltic German population of Latvia emigrated to the lands of the Third Reich. World War II, how-

ever, brought annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, occupation by the Third Reich from 1941 to 1945, and from 1945 the continued sovietization of the Latvian state that had begun in 1940 and 1941. As a constituent republic of the USSR, the Latvian SSR from the mid-1940s onward experienced, over the next four decades, an influx of Russians and Russian-speakers that entirely changed its nationality structure. Simultaneously, the Latvian language was downgraded in most spheres of public life and education, and resistance to these trends was attacked by the Latvian Communist Party as bourgeois nationalism. The Latvian capital, Riga, became the headquarters of the Baltic Military District, vastly enlarging the presence of the Soviet military. For many Latvians all these developments seemed to endanger their language, national culture, and even national autonomy. Thus



President Karlis Ulmanis reviews troops at an Independence Day parade (c. 1935). His great-nephew Guntis Ulmanis was the first president of post-Soviet Latvia. © HULTON ARCHIVE

the large-scale participation of Latvians (even Communist Party members) in the Latvian Popular Front in the Gorbachev period was not surprising, and the view that Latvia should reclaim its independence became a powerful political force from 1989 onward.

The collapse of the USSR and the return of Latvian independence left the country with a population of about 52 percent ethnic Latvians and 48 percent Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and others. In 2001 the proportion of Latvians stood at 57.9 percent, the other nationalities having been reduced by emigration and low fertility rates. About 40 percent of the Slavic minority populations were Latvian citizens, leaving the social and political integration of other members of these populations as one of the principal problems as the country became integrated into Western economic, social, and security organizations.

See also: CATHERINE I; ESTONIA AND ESTONIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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ANDREJS PLAKANS

LAW CODE OF 1649

The Russian/Muscovite law code of 1649, formally known as the *sobornoye ulozhenie* (or *Ulozhenie*, the name of the code, which will be used in the article), was one of the great legal monuments of all time. Historically, in Russia, it is probably the second most important literary monument composed

between 882 and at least 1800, outranked only by the various redactions of the Russian chronicle.

Like some other major legal monuments in Russian history, the Law Code of 1649 was the product of civil disorder. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich had come to the throne at age 16 in 1645. His former tutor, Boris Morozov, was ruling in his name. Morozov and his clique, at the pinnacle of corruption, aroused great popular discontent. A crowd formed in Moscow on June 2, 1648, and presented a petition to Tsar Alexei, whose accompanying bodyguards tore it up and flung it back into the faces of the petitioners, who, joined by others, then went on a looting and burning rampage. The rebellion soon spread to a dozen other Russian towns. Inter alia, the petitioners cited judicial abuses by the Morozov clique, mentioned that great rulers in Byzantium had compiled law codes, and demanded that Alexei follow suit.

To calm the mob, Alexei agreed that a new law code should be compiled and on July 16 appointed one of the leading figures of the seventeenth century, Nikita Odoyevsky, to head a commission of five to compile it. Three of them were experienced bureaucrats who together had decades of experience working in the Moscow central governmental chancellery system (the *prikazy*). The Odoyevsky Commission set to work immediately, and the preamble to the Law Code explains how they worked. They asked the major chancelleries (about ten of the existing forty) for their statute books (*ustavnye/ukaznye knigi*), the decisions of the chancelleries on scrolls. The scrolls summarized the cases and contained the resolutions for each case. The Odoyevsky Commission selected the most important resolutions and tried to generalize them by removing the particulars of each case as well as put them in logical order (on the scrolls they were in chronological order). Depending on how frequently the resolutions had been used and how old they were, the fact that many of the Law Code's articles were summaries from the statute books is more or less apparent. When seeking precedents to resolve a case, the chancelleries frequently wrote to each other asking for guidance, with the result that similar resolutions sometimes can be found in several statute books. Fires during the Time of Troubles had destroyed most of the chancellery records; the chancelleries restored some of these by writing to the provinces requesting legal materials sent from Moscow before 1613. The same approach was used after a fire in 1626 again had destroyed many of the chancellery records.

The chancelleries had other sources of precedents, some of which are mentioned in the Law Code itself (in the preamble and rather often in marginalia on the still-extant original scroll copy of the Law Code) and others that can be found by comparing the chancellery scrolls and other laws with the Law Code. Major sources were Byzantine law, which circulated in Russia in the Church Statute Book (the *Kormchaya kniga*, a Russian version of the Byzantine *Nomocanon*) and the *Lithuanian Statute* of 1588 (which had been translated from West Russian into Muscovite Middle Russian around 1630). In addition to the chancellery records, the *Sudebnik* (Court Handbook) of 1550 was a source for the chancelleries and for the 1649 monument.

By October 3, 1648, the Odoyevsky Commission had prepared a preliminary draft of half of the new code. In response to the June riots, Tsar Alexei changed the personnel of his government and summoned an Assembly of the Land to consider the new law code. The Odoyevsky Commission draft was read to the delegates to the Assembly of the Land, who apparently voted up or down each article. In addition, the delegates brought their own demands, which were incorporated into the new code and comprised about eighty-three articles of all the 968 articles in the code. From 77 to 102 articles originated in Byzantium, 170 to 180 in the *Lithuanian Statute* of 1588. From 52 to 118 came from the *Sudebnik* of 1550, and 358 can be traced to post-1550 (primarily post-1613) practice.

The code's 968 articles are grouped into twenty-five chapters. The *Sudebniki* of 1497, 1550, and 1589 had been arranged one article after another, but the Composite *Sudebnik* of 1606 was grouped into chapters (twenty-five of them), as was the *Lithuanian Statute* of 1588. The architecture of the code is also interesting, from "the highest, the sublime" (the church, religion: chapter 1; the tsar and his court: chapters 2 and 3) to "the lowest, the gross" (musketeers: chapter 23; cossacks: chapter 24; and illicit taverns: chapter 25). Although there are a handful of codification defects in the code, they are few in number and trivial. The entire document was considered by the Assembly of the Land and signed by most of the delegates on January 29, 1649. Those who withheld their signatures were primarily churchmen who objected to the code's semi-secularization of the church (see below). Almost immediately the scroll copy was sent to the printer, and twelve hundred copies were manufactured between April and May 20. The *Ulozhenie* was

the second lay book published in Muscovy. (The first was Smotritsky's *Grammar*, published in 1619.) The price was high (one ruble; the median daily wage was four kopeks), but the book sold out almost immediately, and another twelve hundred copies were printed, with some minor changes, between August 27 and December 21, 1649. They also sold out quickly. The *Ulozhenie* was subsequently reprinted eight times as an active law code, and it served as the starting point for the famous forty-five-volume Speransky codification of the laws in 1830. It has been republished eight times after 1830 because of its enormous historical interest. In 1663 it was translated into Latin and subsequently into French, German, Danish, and English.

Commentators have marveled that the Odoyevsky Commission was able to produce such a remarkable monument at all, let alone in so short a time. Until 1830, other codification attempts were made, but they all failed. Certainly the success of the code can be attributed largely to the preparation on the part of the Odoyevsky Commission: They brought a nearly finished document to the Assembly of the Land for approval and amendment. In contrast, Catherine II's Legislative Commission of 1767 failed miserably because it had no draft to work from, but started instead from abstract principles and went nowhere. The speed of the Odoyevsky Commission is also easy to account for: Each chapter is based primarily on an extraction of the laws from a specific chancellery's statute book or demands made at the Assembly of the Land. The Odoyevsky Commission made no attempt to write law itself or to fill lacunae in existing legislation.

The Law Code of 1649 is a fairly detailed record of its times, practices, and major concerns. Most noteworthy are the additions insisted on by the delegates to the Assembly of the Land, amendments which the government was too weak and frightened to oppose. Three areas are especially significant: the completion of the enserfment of the peasantry (chapter 11), the completion of the legal stratification of the townsmen (chapter 19), and the semi-secularization of the church (chapters 13, 14, and 19).

While the peasants were enserfed primarily at the demands of others (the middle service class provincial cavalry), the townsmen were stratified into a caste at their own insistence. Urban stratification and enserfment proceeded in parallel from the early 1590s on, but the resolutions in the

Ulozhenie were different. Serfs could be returned to any place of which there was record of their having lived in the past, but townsmen were enjoined to remain where they were in January 1649 and could be returned only if they moved after that time. Enserfment was motivated by provincial cavalry rent demands, while townsmen stratification was motivated by state demands for taxes, which were assessed collectively and were hard to collect when those registered in a census (taken most recently in 1646–1647) moved away. The townsmen got monopolies on trade and manufacturing, as well as on the ownership of urban property (this primarily dispossessed the church). Roughly the same rules applied to fugitive townsmen as fugitive serfs, especially when they married.

If one thinks in terms of victimization, the primary "victim" of the Law Code of 1649 (after the serfs) was the Orthodox Church. As mentioned, much of its urban property was secularized. Its capacity to engage in trade and manufacturing was compromised. The state laid down provisions for protecting the church in chapter 1, but this in and of itself states which party is superior and limits the "harmony" (from the Byzantine Greek *Epanogoge*) of the two. Chapter 12 discusses the head of the church, the patriarch, thus obviously making him subordinate to the state. Worst of all for the church was chapter 13, which created the Monastery Chancellery, a state office which in theory ran all of the church except the patriarchate. This measure especially secularized much of the church, and though it was repealed on Alexei's death in 1676, it was revitalized with a vengeance by Peter the Great's creation of the Holy Synod in 1721, when all of the church became a department of the state. The *Ulozhenie* also forbade the church from acquiring additional landed property, the culmination of a process which had begun with the confiscation of all of Novgorod's church property after its annexation by Moscow in 1478.

The Law Code of 1649 is a comprehensive document, the product of an activist, interventionist, maximalist state that believed it could control many aspects of Russian life and the economy (especially the primary factors, land and labor). Chapters 2 and 3 protected the tsar and regulated life at his court. The longest chapter, 10, is quite detailed on procedure. The major forms of landholding, service lands (*pomestye*) and hereditary estate lands, are discussed in chapters 16 and 17, respectively. Slavery is the subject of the code's second longest chapter, 20. Criminal law is covered in two chap-

ters, 21 (mostly of Russian origin) and 22 (mostly of Lithuanian and Byzantine origin), which were combined in the 1669 Felony Statute and represented the peak of barbarous punishments in Russia. Other subjects covered are forgers and counterfeiters (chapters 4 and 5), travel abroad (typically forbidden, chapter 6), military service (chapter 7), the redemption of Russians from foreign military captivity (chapter 8), various travel fees (chapter 9) and seal fees (chapter 18), the oath (chapter 14), and the issue of reopening resolved cases (chapter 15). Codes as comprehensive and activist as this one did not appear in Austria, Prussia, or France until more than a century later.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; KORMCHAYA KNIGA; MOROZOV, BORIS IVANOVICH; PEASANTRY; SERFDOM; SUDEBNIK OF 1497; SUDEBNIK OF 1550; SUDEBNIK OF 1589

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RICHARD HELLIE

LAY OF IGOR'S CAMPAIGN

A twelfth-century literary masterpiece, the *Lay of Igor's Campaign* was probably composed soon after the unsuccessful 1185 campaign of Prince Igor of Novgorod–Seversk and his brother Vsevolod of

Kursk against the Cumans (Polovtsians) of the steppe. The *Lay* (*Slovo o polku Igoreve*), by an anonymous author, minimizes narrative of facts (which were presumably fresh in the minds of the audience, and which are known to scholars from the Hypatian Chronicle and others) and instead evokes the heroic spirit of the time and the need for unity among the princes. Hence its title, *Slovo*, meaning a speech or discourse, not a story and not verse (the English translation "Lay" is misleading).

Though the text was heavily influenced by East Slavic folklore, it is nonetheless a sophisticated literary work. Its rhythmical prose approaches poetry in the density of its imagery and the beauty of its sound patterns. The images are taken mainly from nature and Slavic mythology. A solar eclipse, the calls of birds of omen, and creatures of myth (the Div) foreshadow Igor's defeat on the third day of battle. Trees and grass droop in sorrow for human disaster.

The technique is that of mosaic, of sparkling pieces juxtaposed to create a brilliant whole. Scenes and speeches shift with hardly any explicit transitions. To understand the message requires paying strict attention to juxtaposition. For example, the magic of Vseslav followed immediately by the magic of Yaroslavna and the apparent sorcery of Igor.

Very few Christian motifs appear; those that do are primarily toward the close. Instead, there are the frequent mentions of pagan gods and pre-Christian mythology. Even so, the *Lay* should not be considered a neo-pagan work; rather its bard seems to use this imagery to create an aura of olden times, the time of the grandfathers and their bard, Boyan. The principle of two historical levels, repeatedly invoked, serve the purpose of creating the necessary epic distance impossible for recent events by themselves, and also sets up a central theme: The princes of today should emulate the great deeds of their forefathers while avoiding the mistakes. Extolling Igor and his companions as heroes, the bard, mostly through the central speech of Grand Prince Svyatoslav, also calls for replacing their drive for personal glory with a new ethic of common defense.

The *Lay* was first published in 1800, reportedly from a sole surviving North Russian copy of the fifteenth or sixteenth century acquired by Count Alexei Musin–Pushkin. The supposed loss of the manuscript in the fire of Moscow in 1812 has made it possible for some skeptics over the years

to challenge the work's authenticity, speculating that it was a fabrication of the sixteenth century (Alexander Zimin) or even the 1790s (Andr̄eya Mazon). Up to a point, this has been a classic confrontation of historians and philologists, each group claiming priority for its own method and viewpoint. Much depends on how one views its relationship with *Zadonshchina*, which clearly bears some genetic connection to it, almost certainly as a later imitation of the *Lay*.

Despite the unproven doubts and suspicions of a few, the *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, in its language, imagery, style, and themes, is perfectly compatible with the late twelfth century, as was demonstrated by leading scholars such as Roman Jakobson, Dmitry Likhachev, Varvara Adrianova-Peretts, and many others. It remains one of the masterpieces of all East Slavic literature.

See also: FOLKLORE; ZADONSHCHINA

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NORMAN W. INGHAM

LAZAREV INSTITUTE

The Lazarev Institute (*Lazarevskii institut vos-tochnykh iazykov*) was founded in Moscow in 1815 by the wealthy Armenian Lazarev (Lazarian) family primarily as a school for their children. In 1827 the school was named the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages (Oriental in the nineteenth-century sense, including the Middle East and Northern Africa) by the State and placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Education. For the next twenty years the Lazarev Institute functioned as a special gymnasium that offered language courses in Armenian, Persian, Turkish, and Arabic, in addition to its regular curriculum in Russian. The student body was composed mostly of Armenian and Russian boys aged ten to fourteen. In 1844 there were 105 students: seventy-three Armenians, thirty Russians, and two others. In 1848 the Institute was upgraded to a lyceum and offered classes in the aforementioned languages for the upper grades. The Institute trained teachers for Armenian schools, Armenian priests, and, most

importantly, Russian civil servants and interpreters. The government, responding to the importance of the Institute's role in preparing men to administer the diverse peoples of the Caucasus, funded and expanded the program. Many Armenian professionals and Russian scholars specializing in Transcaucasia received their education at the Lazarev Institute. In 1851 Armenians, Georgians, and even a few Muslims from Transcaucasia were permitted to enroll in the preparatory division, where, in addition to various subjects taught in Russian, they also studied their native tongues. The Russian conquest of Daghestan and plans to expand further into Central Asia made the Lazarev Institute even more necessary. In 1872, following the Three-Emperors' League, Russia was once again free to pursue an aggressive policy involving the Eastern Question. The State divided the institution into two educational sections. The first served as a gymnasium, while the second devoted itself to a three-year course in the languages (Armenian, Persian, Arabic, Turkish, Georgian), history, and culture of Transcaucasia.

The Lazarev Institute had its own printing press and, beginning in 1833, published important works in thirteen languages. It also published two journals, *Papers in Oriental Studies* (1899–1917) and the *Emin Ethnographical Anthology* (six issues). Its library had some forty thousand books in 1913.

Following the Bolshevik Revolution, on March 14, 1919, the Council of the People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) renamed the Institute the Armenian Institute and, soon after, the Southwest Asian Institute. In 1920 it was renamed the Central Institute of Living Oriental Languages. A year later it was renamed the Moscow Oriental Institute. In October 1921, a section of the Institute was administered by Soviet Armenia and became a showcase devoted to Armenian workers and peasants. By the 1930s the Institute lost its students to the more prestigious foreign language divisions in Moscow and Leningrad. Its library collection was transferred to the Lenin Library of Moscow. In the last four decades of the USSR, the building of the Institute was home to the permanent delegation of Soviet Armenia to the Supreme Soviet. Following the demise of the USSR, the building of the Institute became the Armenian embassy in Russia.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; EDUCATION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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GEORGE BOURNOUTIAN

LAZAREVSKAYA, YULIANYA USTINOVNA

See OSORINA, YULIANYA USTINOVNA.

LEAGUE OF ARMED NEUTRALITY

Already annoyed by American privateer interference with Anglo-Russian maritime trade in the 1770s, Catherine the Great was even more frustrated by British countermeasures that intercepted and confiscated neutral shipping suspected of aiding the rebellious American colonies. In March 1780 she issued a Declaration of Armed Neutrality that became the basic doctrine of maritime law regarding neutral rights at sea during war. It defined, simply and clearly, the rights of neutral vessels, contraband (goods directly supportive of a military program), and the conditions and restrictions of an embargo, and overall defended the rights of neutrals (the flag covers the cargo) against seizure and condemnation of nonmilitary goods. Having already established herself in the forefront of enlightened rulers, Catherine invited the other nations of Europe to join Russia in arming merchant vessels against American or British transgression of these rights. Because of the crippling of American commerce, most of the infractions were by the British.

Coming at this stage in the War for Independence, the Russian declaration boosted American morale and inspired the Continental Congress to dispatch Francis Dana to St. Petersburg to secure more formal recognition and support. Although Russia had little in the way of naval power to back up the declaration, it encouraged France and other countries to aid the American cause. Britain reluctantly stood by while a few French and Dutch ships under the Russian flag entered American ports, bringing valuable supplies to the hard-pressed colonies. Even more supplies entered the United States via the West Indies with the help of a Russian adventurer, Fyodor Karzhavin. The military effect was minimal,

however, because the neutral European states hesitated about making commitments because of fear of British retaliation. By 1781, however, the United Provinces (the Netherlands), Denmark, Sweden, Austria, and Prussia had all joined the league.

The league was remembered in the United States, somewhat erroneously, as a mark of Russian friendship and sympathy, and bolstered Anglophobia in the two countries. More generally, it affirmed a cardinal principle of maritime law that continues in effect in the early twenty-first century. Indirectly, it also led to a considerable expansion of Russian-American trade from the 1780s through the first half of the nineteenth century.

See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Formed by the victorious powers in 1919, the League of Nations was designed to enforce the Treaty of Versailles and the other peace agreements that concluded World War I. It was intended to replace secret deals and war, as means for settling international disputes, with open diplomacy and peaceful mediation. Its charter also provided a mechanism for its members to take collective action against aggression.

Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany initially were not members of the League. At the time of the League's founding, the Western powers had invaded Russia in support of the anticommunist side in the Russian civil war. The Bolshevik regime was hostile to the League, denouncing it as an anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary conspiracy of the imperialist powers. Throughout the 1920s, Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin aligned the USSR with Weimar Germany, the other outcast power, against Britain, France, and the

League. German adherence to the Locarno Accords with Britain and France in 1925, and Germany's admission to the League in 1926, dealt a blow to Chicherin's policy. This Germanophile, Anglophobe, anti-League view was not shared by Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov, who advocated a more balanced policy, including cooperation with the League. Moreover, the USSR participated in the Genoa Conference in 1922 and several League-sponsored economic and arms control forums later in the decade.

Chicherin's retirement because of ill health, his replacement as foreign commissar by Litvinov, and, most importantly, the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany served to reorient Moscow's policy. The Third Reich now replaced the British Empire as the main potential enemy in Soviet thinking. In December 1933 the Politburo adopted the new Collective Security line in foreign policy, whereby the USSR sought to build an alliance of anti-Nazi powers to prevent or, if necessary, defeat German aggression. An important part of this strategy was the attempt to revive the collective security mechanism of the League. To this end, the Soviet Union joined the League in 1934, and Litvinov became the most eloquent proponent of League sanctions against German aggression. Soviet leaders also hoped that League membership would afford Russia some protection against Japanese expansionism in the Far East. Unfortunately, the League had already failed to take meaningful action against Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, and it later failed to act against the Italian attack on Ethiopia in 1935. Soviet collective security policy in the League and in bilateral diplomacy faltered against the resolution of Britain and France to appease Hitler.

When Stalin could not persuade the Western powers to ally with the USSR, even in the wake of the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, he abandoned the collective security line and signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact with Hitler on August 23, 1939. Subsequent Soviet territorial demands on Finland led to the Winter War of 1939–1940 and to the expulsion of the USSR from the League as an aggressor. However, Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 accomplished what Litvinov's diplomacy could not, creating an alliance with Britain and the United States. The USSR thus became in 1945 a founding member of the United Nations, the organization that replaced the League of Nations after World War II.

See also: CHICHERIN, GEORGY VASILIEVICH; LITVINOV, MAXIM MAXIMOVICH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; UNITED NATIONS; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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LEAGUE OF THE MILITANT GODLESS

One of the early Soviet regime's most ambitious attempts at social engineering, the League of the Militant Godless (*Soyuz voinstvuyushchikh bezbozhnikov*) was also one of its most dismal failures. Founded in 1925 as the League of the Godless, it was one of numerous volunteer groups created in the 1920s to help extend the regime's reach into Russian society. These organizations hoped to attract nonparty members who might be sympathetic to individual elements of the Bolshevik program. The word "militant" was added in 1929 as Stalin's Cultural Revolution gathered speed, and at its peak in the early 1930s, the League claimed 5.5 million dues-paying *bezbozhniki* (godless).

Organized like the Communist Party, the League consisted of cells of individual members at factories, schools, offices, and living complexes. These cells were managed by local councils subordinated to regional and provincial bodies. A League Central Council presided in Moscow. Despite the League's nominal independence, it was directed at each level by the corresponding Communist Party organization.

The League's mandate was to disseminate atheism, and, to achieve this goal, it orchestrated public campaigns for the closure of churches and the prohibition of church bell pealing. It staged demonstrations against the observance of religious holidays and the multitude of daily Orthodox practices.

The League also arranged lectures on themes such as the existence of God, Biblical miracles, astronomy, and so forth. The League's Central Council published a raft of antireligious publications in Russian and in the languages of national minorities. Larger provincial councils issued their own antireligious periodicals.

The League's rapid organizational rise seemed to embody the Bolshevik success in transforming Holy Russia into the atheistic Soviet Union. But appearances were misleading. In ironic obeisance to Marxist dialectics, the League reached its organizational peak in the early 1930s before collapsing utterly a few years later when, consolidation taking priority over Cultural Revolution, the Party withdrew the material support that had sustained the League's rise. The League's disintegration cast its earlier successes as a "Potemkin village" in the Russian tradition. In the League's case, the deception was nearly complete: Only a fraction of the League's nominal members actually paid dues. Many joined the League without their knowledge, as a name on a list submitted by a local party official. Overworked local party officials often viewed League activities as a last priority. The population largely ignored the League's numerous publications. Local antireligious officials often succeeded in drawing the ire of the local community in their ham-handed efforts to counter Orthodoxy. Indeed, the local versions of debates in the early and mid-1920s between leading regime propagandists and clergymen went so poorly that they were prohibited by the late 1920s.

The final irony was that whatever secularization occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, little of it can be attributed to the League. Orthodoxy's retreat in this period was due to the raw exercise of state power that resulted in the closure of tens of thousand of churches and the arrest of many priests. Urbanization and industrialization played their part, as did the flood of new spaces, images, and associations that accompanied the creation of Soviet culture. Only in this final element did the League play a role, and it was a very minor one. The League may have been a symbol of secularization but was hardly an agent of it.

After a brief revival in the late 1930s, the League faded once again into the background as World War II brought an accommodation with religion. It was formally disbanded in 1947, four years after the death of its founder and leader, Emilian Yaroslavsky. Yaroslavsky, an Old Bolshevik,

had been a leading propagandist in the 1920s and 1930s. An ideological chameleon, he survived two decades of ideological twists and turns and died a natural death in 1943 at the age of sixty-five.

Despite its ultimate failure, the League put into clear relief the regime's fundamental approach to the task of social transformation. Highlighting Bolshevism's faith in the power of organization and building on the tradition of Russian bureaucracy, the regime emphasized the organizational manifestation of a desired sentiment to such an extent that it eventually superseded the actual sentiment. The state of atheism in Soviet Russia was essentially the same as the state of the League, as far as the regime was concerned. As long as the League was visible, the regime assumed that it had achieved one of its ideological goals. Moreover, the atheism promoted by the League looked a great deal like a secular religion. Here the regime appeared to be taking the path of least resistance, by which fundamental culture was not changed but simply given a new gloss. This approach boded ill for the long-term success of the Soviet experiment with culture and for the Soviet Union itself.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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DANIEL PERIS

LEBED, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH

(1950–2002), Soviet, airborne commander, Afghan veteran, commander of the Fourteenth Army, Secretary of the Russian security council, and governor of Krasnoyarsk oblast.

Alexander Lebed graduated from the Ryazan Airborne School in 1973 and served in the Airborne

Forces. From 1981 to 1982 he commanded an airborne battalion in Afghanistan, and then attended the Frunze Military Academy from 1982 to 1985. In 1988 he assumed command of an airborne division, which deployed to various ethno-national hot spots within the USSR, including Tbilisi and Baku. An associate of General Pavel Grachev, the Commander of Airborne Forces, Lebed was appointed Deputy Commander of Airborne Forces in February 1991. In August, Lebed commanded the airborne troops sent to secure the Russian White House during the attempted August coup against Gorbachev. In a complex double game, Lebed neither secured the building nor arrested Yeltsin. In 1992 Pavel Grachev appointed him commander of the Russian Fourteenth Army in Moldova. Lebed intervened to protect the Russian population in the self-proclaimed Transdneistr Republic, which was involved in an armed struggle with the government of Moldova. Lebed became a hero to Russian nationalists. But in 1993 Lebed refused to support the Red-Browns opposing Yeltsin. In 1994 he spoke out against the Yeltsin government's military intervention in Chechnya, calling it ill prepared and ill conceived. In 1995 Lebed was retired from the military at President Yeltsin's order. In December 1995 he was elected to the State Duma. He then ran for president of Russia on the Congress of Russian Communities ticket with a nationalist and populist program and finished third (14.7% of the vote) in the first round of the 1996 election, behind Yeltsin and Zyuganov. Yeltsin brought Lebed into his administration as Secretary of the Security Council to ensure his own victory in the second round of voting. But Lebed proved an independent actor, and in August, when the war in Chechnya re-erupted, Lebed sought to end the fighting to save the Army, accepted a cease-fire, and signed the Khasavyurt accords with rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov. The accords granted Chechnya autonomy but left the issue of independence for resolution by 2001. Lebed's actions angered Yeltsin's close associates, including Minister of Internal Affairs Anatoly Kulikov, who engineered Lebed's removal from the government in October 1996. Yeltsin justified the removal on the grounds that Lebed was a disruptive force within the government. In 1998 Lebed ran successfully for the post of Governor of Krasnoyarsk Oblast. On April 28, 2002, he was killed in a helicopter crash outside Krasnoyarsk.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; TRANS-DNIESTER REPUBLIC

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LEFORTOVO

Lefortovo is a historic area in the eastern part of Moscow, on the left bank of the Yauzy River, named for the Lefortovsky infantry regiment, commanded by Franc Yakovlevicz Lefort, a comrade of Peter the Great, which was quartered there toward the end of the seventeenth century. In the 1770s and 1780s the soldiers occupied sixteen wooden houses. Nearby were some slaughterhouses and a public courtyard, where in 1880 the Lefortovo military prison was constructed (architect P. N. Kozlov). At the time it was intended for low-ranking personnel convicted of minor infractions. St. Nikolai's Church was built just above the entrance to the prison. Over the next hundred years several new buildings were added to the prison complex.

In tsarist times Lefortovo was under the jurisdiction of the Main Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice. After the revolution it became part of the network of prisons run by the Special Department of the Cheka. In the 1920s Lefortovo was under the OGPU (United Main Political Administration). In the 1930s, together with the Lubyanka Internal Prison and the Butyrskoi and Sukhanovskoi prisons, it was under the GUGB (Central Administrative Board of State Security) of the NKVD (People's Commissioner's Office for Internal Affairs) of the USSR. Suspects were tortured and shot in the former church of the prison, and tractor motors were run to drown out the awful sounds. With the closing of the Lubyanka Internal Prison in the 1960s, Lefortovo attained its present status as the main prison of the state security apparatus. In October 1993, Alexander Rutskoi and

Roman Khasbulatov, the organizers of the abortive putsch against Boris Yeltsin, were held in the Lefortovo detention isolator (solitary confinement) of the Ministry of Safety (MB) of the Russian Federation. In December 1993 and January 1994 the Lefortovo isolator passed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Safety to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). By the end of 1994 the FSB again created an investigatory administration, and in April 1997, after an eight-month struggle between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB, the isolator was again transferred to FSB jurisdiction.

The three-tier complex of the FSB's Investigative Administration, unified with the prison, is located adjacent to the Lefortovo isolator. According to the testimony of former inmates, there are fifty cells on each floor of the four-story cellblock. As of 2003 there were about two hundred prisoners in Lefortovo. The exercise area is located on the roof of the prison. Most of the cells are about 10 meters square and hold two inmates; there are also some cells for three, and a few for one. Lefortovo differs from other Russian detention prisons not only in its relatively good conditions but also for its austere regime. The inmates held here have been arrested on matters that concern the FSB, such as espionage, serious economic offenses, and terrorism, rather than ordinary crimes.

See also: GULAG; LUBYANKA; PRISONS; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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GEORG WURZER

LEFT OPPOSITION

Headed by Leon Trotsky, the Left Opposition (1923–1927) rallied against Bolshevik Party discipline on a wide array of issues. It became one of the last serious manifestations of intra-Party debate before Josef Stalin consolidated power and silenced all opposition.

Following the illness and death of Vladimir Lenin, the formation of the Left Opposition centered on Trotsky and the role he played in the

struggle for Party leadership and the debates over the future course of the Soviet economy. Throughout 1923, after three strokes left Lenin incapacitated, Stalin actively strengthened his position within the Party leadership and moved against several oppositionist tendencies. In October that same year, Trotsky struck back with a searing condemnation of the ruling triumvirate (Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and Stalin), publicly charging them with “secretarial bureaucratism” and demanding a restoration of Party democracy.

At the same time, proponents of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, including such luminaries as Yevgeny Preobrazhensky, Grigory Pyatakov, Timofey Sapronov, and V. V. Osinsky, coalesced around the Platform of the Forty-Six. Representing the position of the left, they attributed the Party's ills to a progressive division of the Party into functionaries, chosen from above, and the rank-and-file Party members, who did not participate in Party affairs. Further, they accused the leadership of making economic mistakes and demanded that the dictatorship of the Party be replaced by a worker's democracy.

Formulating a more comprehensive platform, Trotsky published a pamphlet entitled *The New Course* in January 1924. By this time, the Left Opposition had gained enough public support that the leadership made some concessions in the form of the Politburo's adoption of the New Course Resolution in December. Nonetheless, at the Thirteenth Party Congress in May 1924, the Left Opposition was condemned for violating the Party's ban on factions and for disrupting Party unity.

The Left Opposition's economic platform focused on the goals of rapid industrialization and the struggle against the New Economic Policy (NEP). Left Oppositionists, also known as Trotskyites because of Trotsky's central role, argued that encouraging the growth of private and peasant sectors of the economy under the NEP was dangerous because it would create an investment crisis in the state's industrial sector. Moreover, by favoring trade and private agriculture, the state would make itself vulnerable to the economic power of hostile social classes, such as peasants and private traders. In 1925, Preobrazhensky, the left's leading theoretician, proposed an alternative course of action with his theory of primitive socialist accumulation. Arguing that the state should shift resources through price manipulations and other market mechanisms, he believed that peasant producers and consumers should bear the burden of

capital accumulation for the state's industrialization drive. According to his plan, the government could achieve this end by regulating prices and taxes.

In a polity where loyalty and opposition were deemed incompatible, the Left Opposition was doomed from the start. Following the Thirteenth Party Congress denunciation, Trotsky renewed his advocacy of permanent revolution as Stalin promoted his theory of socialism in one country. The result was Trotsky's removal from the War Commissariat in January 1925 and his expulsion from the Politburo the following year. At the same time, Kamenev and Zinoviev broke with Stalin over the issue of socialism in one country and continuation of the NEP. In mid-1926, in an attempt to subvert Stalin's growing influence, Trotsky joined with Kamenev and Zinoviev in the Platform of the Thirteen, forming the United Opposition.

By 1926, however, it was already too late to mount a strong challenge to Stalin's growing power. Through skillful maneuvering, Stalin had been able increasingly to secure control over the party apparatus, eroding what little power base the oppositionists had. In 1927 Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev were removed from the Central Committee. By the end of that year the trio and all of their prominent followers, including Preobrazhensky and Pyatakov, were purged from the Party. The next year, Trotsky and members of the Left Opposition were exiled to Siberia and Central Asia. In February 1929 Trotsky was deported from the country, thus beginning the odyssey that ended with his murder by an alleged Soviet agent in Mexico City in 1940. Despite recantations and pledges of loyalty to Stalin, the remaining so-called Trotskyites could never free themselves of the stigma of their past association with the Left Opposition. Nearly all of them perished in the purges of the 1930s.

See also: RIGHT OPPOSITION; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH; UNITED OPPOSITION

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LEFT SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES

The Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Left SRs) were an offshoot of the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party, a party that had arisen in 1900 as an outgrowth of nineteenth-century Russian populism. Both the SRs and their later Left SR branch espoused a socialist revolution for Russia carried out by and based upon the radical intelligentsia, the industrial workers, and the peasantry. After the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, some party leaders in the emigration, such as Yekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Andrei A. Argunov, and Nikolai D. Avksentiev, offered conditional, temporary support for the tsarist government's war efforts. Meanwhile, under the guidance of Viktor Chernov and famous populist leader Mark Natanson, the Left SRs or SR-Internationalists, as they were variously called, insisted that the party maintain an internationalist opposition to the world war. These developments, mirrored along Social Democrats, caused conflicts within and almost split the party inside Russia. By mid-1915, the antiwar forces began to predominate among SR organizations that were just beginning to recover from police attacks after the war's outbreak. Much of the party's worker, peasant, soldier, and student cadres turned toward leftist internationalism, whereas prowar (defensist) support came primarily from the party's intelligentsia. By 1916, many SR (in effect Left SR) organizations poured out antigovernment and antiwar propaganda, took part in strikes, and agitated in garrisons and at the fronts. In all these activities, they cooperated closely with Bolsheviks, Left Mensheviks, and anarchists of similar outlook. This coalition and the mass movements it spurred wore down the incompetent tsarist state and overthrew it on March 12 (February 27, O.S.), 1917.

As SR leaders returned to the Russian capital, they reunified leftist and rightist factions and emphasized the party's multi-class approach. Chernov, who in 1914–1915 had helped form the Left

SR movement, now sided with the party moderates by approving SR participation in the Provisional Government and the Russian military offensive of June 1917. Until midsummer the party's inclusive strategy seemed to work, as huge recruitments occurred everywhere. The SRs seemed poised to wield power in revolutionary Russia. Simultaneously, leftists such as Natanson, Boris Kamkov, and Maria Spiridonova, noting the growing worker-soldier uneasiness with the party's policies, began to reshape the leftist movement and cooperated with other leftist parties such as the Bolsheviks and Left Mensheviks. In this respect, they helped recreate the wartime leftist coalition that had proved so effective against the tsarist regime. By late summer and fall, the Left SRs, acting as a de facto separate party within the SR party and working at odds with it, were doing as much as the Bolsheviks to popularize the idea of soviet and socialist power. During October–November, they opposed Bolshevik unilateralism in overthrowing the Provisional Government, instead of which they proposed a multiparty, democratic version of soviet power.

Even after the October Revolution, the Left SRs hoped for continued coexistence with other SRs within a single party, bereft, they hoped, only of the extreme right wing. When the Fourth Congress of the SR Party (November 1917) dashed those hopes by refusing any reconciliation with the leftists, the Left SRs responded by convening their own party congress and officially constituting themselves as a separate party. In pursuit of multiparty soviet power, during December 1917 they reaffirmed their block with the communists (the Bolsheviks used this term after October 1917) and entered the Soviet government, taking the commissariats of justice, land, and communications and entering the supreme military council and the secret police (*Cheka*). They favored the Constituent Assembly's dismissal during January 1918 but sharply opposed other communist policies. Daily debates between communist and Left SR leaders characterized the high councils of government. When Lenin promulgated the Brest–Litovsk Peace with Germany in March 1918 against heavy opposition within the soviets and his own party, the Left SRs resigned from the government but remained as a force in the soviets and the all-Russian soviet executive committee.

Having failed to moderate communist policies by working within the government, the Left SRs now appealed directly to workers and peasants, combining radical social policy with democratic

outlooks on the exercise of power. Dismayed by Leninist policy toward the peasantry, the economic hardships imposed by the German peace treaty, and blatant communist falsification of elections to the Fifth Congress of Soviets during early July 1918, the Left SR leadership decided to assassinate Count Mirbach, the German representative in Moscow. Often misinterpreted as an attempt to seize power, the successful but politically disastrous assassination had the goal of breaking the peace treaty. The Left SRs hoped that this act would garner wide enough support to counter-balance the communists' hold on the organs of power. Regardless, Lenin managed to placate the Germans and propagate the idea that the Left SRs had attempted an antisoviet coup d'état. Just as SRs and Mensheviks had already been hounded from the soviets, now the Left SRs suffered the same fate and, like them, entered the anticommunist underground. In response, some Left SRs formed separate parties (the Popular Communists and the Revolutionary Communists) with the goal of continuing certain Left SR policies in cooperation with the communists, with whom both groups eventually merged. Throughout the civil war, the Left SRs charted a course between the Reds and Whites as staunch supporters of soviet rather than communist power. They maintained a surprising degree of activism, inspiring and often leading workers' strikes, Red Army and Navy mutinies, and peasant uprisings. They helped create the conditions responsible for the introduction of the 1921 New Economic Policy, some of whose economic compromises they opposed. During the early 1920s they succumbed to the concerted attacks of the secret police. The Left SRs' chief merit, their reliance on processes of direct democracy, turned out to be their downfall in the contest for power with communist leaders willing to use repressive methods.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; SOCIALISM; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES

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MICHAEL MELANCON

LEGAL SYSTEMS

The Russian legal system—the judicial institutions and laws—has been shaped by many different influences, domestic as well as foreign. It constitutes just one of several legal systems at work within Russia. As befits any large, multiethnic society, many different legal systems have coexisted in Russia at various points in history. Prior to the twentieth century especially, many of the non-Slavic peoples of the Russian empire as well as Russian peasants relied on their religious or customary laws and institutions to regulate important aspects of life (e.g., family, marriage, property, inheritance).

PRINCIPALITIES AND MUSCOVY

As in Western Europe, the early history of Russian law is marked by an initial reliance on oral customary legal norms giving way in time to written law codes and judicial institutions heavily influenced by religious sources. The oldest documentary records of Russian customary law are several treaties concluded by Kievan Rus in the tenth century with Byzantium. These treaties included Russian principles of criminal law that, like their counterparts in Western Europe, were heavily reliant on a system of vengeance and monetary compensation for harm committed against another. One interesting feature of Russian customary law was that women enjoyed a higher, more independent status under Russian law than under contemporary Byzantine law.

The introduction of Christianity to Kievan Rus exposed the Russians both to the notion of written law as well as canon law principles imported from Byzantium. In the eleventh century, Russian customary law was set down in writing comprehensively for the first time in the *Russkaya Pravda*, which focused on criminal law and procedure and incorporated principles of blood feud and monetary

compensation for damages. Later versions of the *Russkaya Pravda* included elements of civil and commercial law, which were heavily drawn from German and Byzantine sources. Courts under the *Russkaya Pravda* consisted of tribunals of the elder members of the local community, rather than genuine state-sponsored courts. While some scholars maintain that the *Russkaya Pravda* was in force over all of ancient Russia, others argue that its effect was much more limited to only a few principalities. Where it was enforced, the *Russkaia Pravda* remained in effect until the seventeenth century.

During the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries, Russian law was modified to support the emerging Muscovite autocracy. In particular, the legal status of the peasants was reduced to serfdom. During this same period, several important written collections of law were adopted dealing with criminal, civil, administrative, and commercial law and procedure. Under the *Sudebnik* of 1497, torture was institutionalized as a normal tool of criminal investigations. The *Ulozhenie* of 1649, which remained the principal basis for much of Russian law for two centuries, consisted of 967 articles covering most areas of the law. The criminal law sections of the *Ulozhenie* were noted for introducing more severe punishments into Russian law (burying alive, burning, mutilation). These documents were not well-organized, systematized codes of law, but were merely collections of existing laws, decrees, and administrative regulations.

RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Beginning with Peter the Great, several tsars attempted to rationalize the Russian legal system by introducing Western innovations and bolstering their autocratic rule by improving the efficiency with which Russian courts went about their business. Toward this end, Peter established the Senate to supervise the courts and punish corrupt or incompetent judges as well as the office of the procurator-general, which was established in 1722 to oversee the Senate and to supervise the enforcement of laws and decrees. The office of the Russian procurator-general continues to this day.

One of the most intractable problems facing Russian legal reformers was the morass of unorganized and undifferentiated laws and decrees in effect. The Russian legal system sat on a foundation of out-of-date or half-forgotten laws, decrees, and procedures, and judges and government officials were hard-pressed to know which laws were in effect at any given moment. In the nineteenth cen-



A guard stands by the defendant in a 1992 murder trial in St. Petersburg. The accused is kept in a cage inside the courtroom.

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ture, Russian specialists under the direction of M. M. Speransky attempted to rationalize this material by collecting and distilling it into a fifteen-volume digest, the *Svod zakonov rossiiskoi imperii*, published in 1832.

The most significant tsarist-era legal reforms were adopted in 1864, when a modern, Western-style judicial system was introduced in the aftermath of the emancipation of the serfs. The new judicial system introduced professional judges and lawyers, trial by jury, modern evidentiary rules, justices of the peace, and modern criminal investigation procedures drawn from Continental models. Reaction to these liberal judicial reforms set in during the reign of Alexander II after the acquittal of several famous dissidents, including the assassin Vera Zasulich, and the independence of the courts in political cases was significantly eroded after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. Despite this reaction, the institutions established by the Judicial Reforms of 1864 remained in effect until 1917.

SOVIET REGIME

A decree adopted in late 1917, *On the Court*, abolished the tsarist judicial institutions, including the courts, examining magistrates, and bar association. However, during the first years following the Bolshevik Revolution, legal nihilists such as E. Pashukanis, who advocated the rapid withering away of the courts and other state institutions, contended with more pragmatic leaders who envisioned the legal system as an important asset in asserting and defending Soviet state power. The latter group prevailed. Vladimir Lenin, during the New Economic Policy, sought to re-establish laws, courts, legal profession, and a new concept of socialist legality to provide more stability in society and central authority for the Party hierarchy. The debate between the legal nihilists and their opponents was definitively resolved by Josef Stalin in the early 1930s. As Stalin asserted control over the Party and initiated industrialization and collectivization, he also asserted the importance of stabilizing the legal system. This process culminated in the 1936 constitution, which strengthened law

and legal institutions, especially administrative law, civil, family, and criminal law.

The broad outlines of the legal system established by Stalin in the 1930s remained in effect until the late 1980s. Reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, however, made significant changes in the Soviet judicial system. Gorbachev sponsored a lengthy public discussion of how to introduce *pravovoe gosudarstvo* (law-based state) in the USSR and introduced legislation to improve the independence and authority of judges and to establish the Committee for Constitutional Supervision, a constitutional court.

POST-SOVIET REFORMS

In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has adopted a wide array of legislation remaking many aspects of its judicial system, drawing heavily on foreign models. Most of the legislation that has been adopted was foreshadowed in the 1993 constitution and includes new laws and procedure codes for the ordinary courts and the arbitrazh courts, which are courts devoted to matters arising from business and commerce, new civil and criminal codes, and a new land code, finally adopted in 2001.

See also: COOPERATIVES, LAW ON; FAMILY LAW OF 1936; FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF 1906; GOVERNING SENATE; PROCURACY; RUSSIAN JUSTICE; STATE ENTERPRISE, LAW OF THE; SUCCESSION, LAW ON; SUDEBNIK OF 1497

MICHAEL NEWCITY

44; industrialists, 7; chancery clerks, 19; tribesmen, 54. Deputies brought instructions, or *nakazy*, from the bodies that selected them. Catherine's *Nakaz* (*Great Instruction*) was read at the opening sessions and provided a basis for some of the discussion that followed. The commission met in 203 sessions and discussed existing laws on the nobility, on the Baltic nobility, on the merchant estate, and on justice and judicial procedure. No decisions were made by the commission on these matters, and no code of laws was produced. The Legislative Commission was nevertheless significant: It gave Catherine an important source of information and insight into concerns and attitudes of different social groups, through both the *nakazy* and the discussions which took place, including a discussion on serfdom; it provided an opportunity for the discussion and dissemination of the ideas in Catherine's *Nakaz*; it led to the establishment of several subcommittees, which continued to meet after the prorogation of the commission, and which produced draft laws that Catherine utilized for subsequent legislation.

See also: CATHERINE II; INSTRUCTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF CATHERINE II

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LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF 1767–1768

In December 1766, Catherine II called upon the free "estates" (nobles, townspeople, state peasants, Cossacks) and central government offices to select deputies to attend a commission to participate in the preparation of a new code of laws. The purpose of the commission was therefore consultative; it was not intended to be a parliament in the modern sense. The Legislative Commission opened in Moscow in July 1767, then moved to St. Petersburg in February 1768. Following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in January 1769, it was prorogued and never recalled. The selection of deputies was a haphazard affair. The social composition of the assembly was: nobles, 205; merchants, 167; *odnodvortsy* (descendants of petty servicemen on the southern frontiers), 42; state peasants, 29; Cossacks,

LEICHOUDES, IOANNIKIOS AND SOPHRONIOS

Greek hieromonks, Ioannikios (secular name: Ioannes, 1633–1717) and Sophronios (secular name: Spyridon, 1652–1730).

The two brothers Leichoudes were born on the Greek island of Kephallenia. They studied philosophy and theology in Greek-run schools in Venice. Sophronios received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Padua in 1670. Between 1670 and 1683, they worked as preachers and teachers in Kephallenia and in Greek communities of the Ottoman Empire. In 1683 they reached Constantinople, where they preached in the Patriarchal court. Following a Russian request for teachers, they ar-

rived in Moscow in 1685. There they established the first formal educational institution in Russian history, the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, and participated in a heated debate known as the Eucharist conflict, principally against Sylvester Medvedev. They taught in the Academy until 1694, when they were removed for attempted flight after a scandal involving one of their relatives. After a brief stint as translators in the Muscovite Printing Office and as tutors of Italian, they were accused of heresy by one of their former students. Between 1698 and 1706, they were transferred to various monasteries, both in Moscow and in other towns, where they continued their authorial activities. In 1706 they were sent to Novgorod and established a school under the supervision of Metropolitan Iov. In 1707 Sophronios was recalled to Moscow to work in a Greek school there. Ioannikios taught in Novgorod until 1716, when he joined his brother in Moscow. After his brother's death, Sophronios continued his teaching activities until 1723, when he became archimandrite of the Solotsinsky monastery in Ryazan until his death. The two brothers authored or coauthored many polemical (anti-Catholic and anti-Protestant), philosophical, and theological works, sermons, panegyrics, orations, and, most important, textbooks for their students. A large part of these textbooks were adaptations of those used in Jesuit colleges. Through their educational activities, the Leichoudes, though Orthodox, imparted to their students the Jesuit interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy, and the Baroque culture of contemporary Europe. As such, they contributed to the Russian elite's westernization and its preparedness to accept Peter the Great's own westernizing reforms.

See also: ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SLAVO-GRECO-LATIN ACADEMY; WESTERNIZERS

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NIKOLAOS A. CHRISSIDIS

LEIPZIG, BATTLE OF

The "Battle of Nations" near Leipzig between allied Russian, Prussian, Austrian, and Swedish armies

against Napoleon's army from October 16 to 19, 1813.

Napoleon's army (approximately 200,000 troops, 747 field guns), concentrated near Leipzig, faced four allied armies, totaling 305,000 troops—125,000 of them Russian, 90,000 Austrian, 72,000 Prussians, 18,000 Swedes—and 1,385 field guns. The battle took place on a plain near Leipzig on October 16, mainly on the grounds of the Bohemian army (133,000 men, commanded by the Austrian field marshal Karl Schwarzenberg), which approached the city from the south. Napoleon tried to defeat the coalition armies one by one. He concentrated 122,000 men against the Bohemian army, and 50,000 under the command of marshal Michel Ney against the Silesian army (60,000 men, commanded by the Prussian general Gebhardt Blücher), attacking from the north.

The opposing sides' positions did not suffer much change by the end of the day. Casualties turned out to be relatively even (30,000 each), but the allies' casualties were compensated with the arrival of the North army (58,000 men, commanded by Karl-Juhan Bernadotte) and the Polish army (54,000 men, commanded by Russian general Leonty Bennigsen) on October 17. Meanwhile, Napoleon's army received a mere 25,000 men as a reinforcement.

On the morning of October 18, the allies attacked Napoleon's positions. As a result of a fierce battle, they gained no significant territorial advantage. The allies, however, sent only 200,000 men to battle, while 100,000 more were kept in reserve. The French, meanwhile, had nearly exhausted their ammunition. On the night of October 18, Napoleon's armies were drawn back to Leipzig, and began their retreat in the morning. In the middle of the day on October 19, the allies entered Leipzig.

Napoleon's losses at Leipzig amounted to 100,000 men killed, wounded, and taken captive, and 325 field guns. The allies lost approximately 80,000 men, of them 38,000 Russians. The allied victory at Leipzig led to the cleansing of the territories of Germany and Holland of Napoleon's forces.

See also: NAPOLEON I

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

LENA GOLDFIELDS MASSACRE

The Lena Goldfields Massacre of April 4, 1912, shook Russian society and rekindled the revolutionary and workers' movements after the post-1905 repression. The shooting occurred during a strike at the gold fields on the upper branches of the Lena River to the northeast of Lake Baikal. The Lena Goldfields Company, owned by prominent Russian and British investors, had recently established a monopoly of the region's mines, which produced most of Russia's gold. Individuals of the highest government rank held managerial positions in the company. The fact that Russia's currency was on the gold standard further enhanced the company's significance. Especially after the joint shocks of the Russo-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905, the ruble's health in association with renewed economic expansion vitally concerned the imperial government. When the strike broke out during late February 1912 in protest of generally poor conditions, the government and company officials in St. Petersburg naturally wished to limit the strike. These hopes were frustrated by a group of employees and workers, political exiles with past socialist and strike experience, who provided careful advice to the strikers. Consequently, the workers avoided overstepping the boundaries of legal strike activity. Company officials refused to meet the main strike demands, including a shorter workday and higher pay. Workers, whose patience had been tried by repeated company violations of the work contract and existing labor laws, as confirmed by the chief mining inspector and the governor of Irkutsk province, refused to end the strike without real concessions.

Working closely with company officials, the government sent a company of soldiers to join the small contingent already on duty near the mines and finally, after all negotiations failed, decided to break the five-week impasse by arresting the strike leaders. This ill-advised action carried out on April 3 only strengthened the workers' resolve. On April 4, a large crowd of unarmed miners headed for the administration building to petition for the release of the leaders. Alarmed by the sudden appearance

of four thousand workers, police and army officers ordered the soldiers to open fire. Roughly five hundred workers were shot, about half mortally. Subsequently, the official government investigative commission under Senator Sergei Manukhin blamed the company and high government officials both for the conditions that underlay the strike and for the shooting.

The shooting unleashed a firestorm of protest against the government and the company, including in the press and in the State Duma. Especially damaging were accusations of collusion between state and company officials aimed at using force to end the peaceful strike. Even groups normally supportive of the government levied a barrage of criticism. On a scale not seen since 1905, strikes broke out all over Russia and did not cease until the outbreak of World War I. The revolutionary parties also swung into action with leaflets and demonstrations. The oppositionist movement found its cause inadvertently aided when Minister of the Interior Nikolai Makarov asserted to the State Duma about the shooting: "Thus it has always been and thus it will always be." This phrase, which caused an additional firestorm of protest, seemed to symbolize the government's stance toward laboring Russia. Spurred by the shooting and the government's attitude, revolutionary activities again plagued the tsarist regime, now permanently stamped as perpetrator of the Lena Goldfields Massacre.

See also: OCTOBER REVOLUTION; REVOLUTION OF 1905; WORKERS

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LEND LEASE

Lend-lease was a system of U.S. assistance to the Allies in World War II. It was based on a bill of March, 11, 1941, that gave the president of the United States the right to sell, transfer into property, lease, and rent various kinds of weapons or

materials to those countries whose defense the president deemed vital to the defense of the United States itself. According to the system, the materials destroyed, lost, or consumed during the war should not be subject to payment after the war. The materials that were not used during the war and that were suitable for civilian consumption should be paid in full or in part, while weapons and war materials could be demanded back. After the United States entered the war, the concept of *lend lease*, originally a system of unidirectional U.S. aid, was transformed into a system of mutual aid, which involved pooling the resources of the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition (known as the concept of “pool”). Initially authorized for the purpose of aiding Great Britain, in April 1941 the Lend-Lease Act was extended to Greece, Yugoslavia, and China, and, after September 1941, to the Soviet Union. By September, 20, 1945, the date of cancellation of the Lend-Lease Act, American aid had been received by nearly forty countries.

During World War II, the U.S. spent a total of \$49.1 billion on the Lend-Lease Act. This included \$13.8 billion in aid to Great Britain and \$9.5 billion to the USSR. Repayment in kind—called “reverse lend-lease”—was estimated at \$7.8 billion, of which \$2.2 million was the contribution of the USSR in the form of a discount for transport services.

The Soviet Union received aid on lend-lease principles not only from the United States, but also from the states of the British Commonwealth, primarily Great Britain and Canada. Economic relations between them were adjusted by mutual aid agreements and legalized by special Allies’ protocols, renewable annually. The First Protocol was signed in Moscow on October, 1, 1941; the second in Washington (October 6, 1942); the third in London (September 1, 1943); and the fourth in Ottawa (April, 17, 1945). The Fourth Protocol was added by a special agreement between the USSR and the United States called the “Program of October 17, 1944” (or “Milepost”), intended for supplies for use by the Soviet Union in the war against Japan.

On the basis of those documents, the Soviet Union received 18,763 aircraft, 11,567 tanks and self-propelled guns, 7,340 armored vehicles and armored troop-carriers, more than 435,000 trucks and jeeps, 9,641 guns, 2,626 radar, 43,298 radio stations, 548 fighting ships and boats, and 62 cargo ships. The remaining 75 percent of cargoes imported into the USSR consisted of industrial equipment, raw material, and foodstuffs. A significant

portion (up to seven percent) of supplies was lost during transportation.

Most of the cargoes sent to the USSR were delivered by three main routes: via Iran, the Far East, and the northern ports Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. The last route was the shortest but also the most dangerous.

After the war the United State cancelled all lend-lease debts except that of the USSR. In 1972 the USSR and the United States signed an agreement that the USSR would pay \$722 million of its debt by July 1, 2001.

See also: FOREIGN DEBT; WORLD WAR II; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH, NORTHERN CONVOYS

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MIKHAIL SUPRUIN

LENIN ENROLLMENT *See* COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

LENINGRAD AFFAIR

The “Leningrad Affair” refers to a purge between 1949 and 1951 of the city’s political elite and of nationally prominent communists who had come from Leningrad. More than two hundred Leningraders, including many family members of those directly accused, were convicted on fabricated political charges, and twenty-three were executed. Over two thousand city officials were fired from their jobs. Hundreds from many other cities were jailed during this purge.

The “Leningrad Affair” derived largely from a power struggle between Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s two leading potential successors: Andrei Zhdanov, Leningrad’s party chief during the city’s lengthy wartime siege, and Georgy Malenkov, supported by the head of the political police, Lavrenti Beria. Zhdanov’s sudden death of apparent natural causes in the late summer of 1948 left his protégés from Leningrad vulnerable. In early 1949 Malenkov charged that the Leningraders were trying to create a rival Communist Party of Russia in conspiracy with another former Leningrad party chief, Alexei Kuznetsov. Malenkov used as pretexts a wholesale trade market that had been set up in Leningrad without Moscow’s permission, as well as alleged voting irregularities in a Leningrad party conference. The Leningrad party members were also charged with treason.

Aside from Kuznetsov, the most prominent victims of the “Leningrad Affair” were Politburo member and Gosplan chairman Nikolai Voznesensky and first secretary of the Leningrad party committee Pyotr Popkov. The three were shot along with others on October 1, 1950. The purge signaled a return to the violent and conspiratorial politics of the 1930s. It eliminated the Leningraders as contenders for national power and downgraded Leningrad essentially to the status of a provincial city within the USSR.

See also: BERIA; LAVRENTI PAVLOVICH; MALENKOV, GEORGY MAKSIMILYANOVICH; ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONVICH

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LENINGRAD, SIEGE OF

For 872 days during World War II, German and Finnish armies besieged Leningrad, the Soviet Union’s second largest city and important center

for armaments production. According to recent estimates, close to two million Soviet citizens died in Leningrad or along nearby military fronts between 1941 and 1944. Of that total, roughly one million civilians perished within the city itself.

The destruction of Leningrad was one of Adolf Hitler’s strategic objectives in attacking the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. On September 8, 1941, German Army Group North sealed off Leningrad. It advanced to within a few miles of its southern districts and then took the town of Schlisselburg along the southern shore of Lake Ladoga. That same day, Germany launched its first massive aerial attack on the city. Germany’s ally, Finland, completed the blockade by retaking territory north of Leningrad that the Soviet Union had seized from Finland during the winter war of 1939–1940. About 2.5 million people were trapped within the city. The only connection that Leningrad maintained with the rest of the Soviet Union was across Lake Ladoga, which German aircraft patrolled. Finland refused German entreaties to continue its advance southward along Ladoga’s eastern coast to link up with German forces.

Hitler’s plan was to subdue Leningrad through blockade, bombardment, and starvation prior to seizing the city. German artillery gunners, together with the Luftwaffe, killed approximately 17,000 Leningraders during the siege. Although supplies of raw materials, fuel, and food dwindled rapidly within Leningrad, war plants within the city lim- its produced large numbers of tanks, artillery guns, and other weapons during the fall of 1941 and continued to manufacture vast quantities of ammunition throughout the rest of the siege.

Most civilian deaths occurred during the winter of 1941–1942. Bread was the only food that was regularly available, and between November 20 and December 25, 1941, the daily bread ration for most Leningraders dropped to its lowest level of 125 grams, or about 4.5 ounces. To give the appearance of larger rations, inedible materials, such as saw dust, were baked into the bread. To make matters worse, generation of electrical current was sharply curtailed in early December because only one city power plant operated at reduced capacity. Most Leningraders thus lived in the dark; they lacked running water because water pipes froze and burst. Temperatures during that especially cold winter plummeted to –40 degrees Fahrenheit in late January. Residents had to fetch water from central mains, canals, and the Neva River. The frigid



Soviet troops launch a counterattack during the Nazi siege of Leningrad. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

winter, however, brought one advantage: Lake Ladoga froze solid enough to become the “Road of Life” over which food was trucked into the city, and some 600,000 emaciated Leningraders were evacuated.

During the spring and summer of 1942, those remaining in Leningrad cleaned up debris and filth from the previous winter, buried corpses, and planted vegetable gardens in practically every open space they could find. A fuel pipeline and electrical cable were laid under Ladoga, and firewood and peat stockpiled in anticipation of a second siege winter. The evacuation over Ladoga continued, and by the end of 1942 the city’s population was pared down to 637,000. Repeated attempts were made in 1942 to lift the siege; yet it was not until January 1943 that the Red Army pierced the blockade by retaking a narrow corridor along Ladoga’s southern coast. A rail line was extended into the city, and the first train arrived from “the mainland” on February 7. Nevertheless, the siege would endure for almost another year as German guns continued to pound Leningrad and its tenuous rail link

from close range. On January 27, 1944, the blockade finally ended as German troops retreated all along the Soviet front.

Leningrad’s defense held strategic importance for the Soviet Union. Had the city fallen in the autumn of 1941, Germany could have redeployed larger forces toward Moscow and thereby increased the chances of taking the Soviet capital. Leningraders who endured the horrific ordeal were motivated by love of their native city and country, fear of what German occupation might bring, and the intimidating presence of Soviet security forces. In just the first fifteen months of the war, 5,360 Leningraders were executed for a variety of alleged crimes, including political ones.

Relations between Leningrad’s leadership and the Kremlin were tempestuous during the siege ordeal. The city’s isolation gave it a measure of autonomy from Moscow, and the suffering Leningrad endured promoted the growth of a heroic reputation for the city. From 1949 to 1951 many of Leningrad’s political, governmental, industrial, and

cultural leaders were fired, and some executed, on orders from the Kremlin during the notorious Leningrad Affair.

See also: LENINGRAD AFFAIR; WORLD WAR II

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LENIN LIBRARY *See* RUSSIAN STATE LIBRARY.

LENIN'S TESTAMENT

Lenin's so-called Political Testament was actually a letter dictated secretly by Vladimir Ilich Lenin in late December 1922, which he intended to discuss at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923. The letter was initially known only to Lenin's wife Nadezhda Krupskaya and the two secretaries who took down its contents. Unfortunately, on March 10, 1923, Lenin suffered a stroke, which put an end to his active role in Soviet politics. It is widely believed that Krupskaya, fearing that its contents might cause further Party disunity, kept the testament under lock and key, until Lenin's death in January 1924. She then felt it safe enough to be read to delegates at the Thirteenth Congress. All those attending this Congress were sworn to keep the contents of the letter a secret. It was then suppressed in the Soviet Union, and so the document did not appear in English until 1926.

A number of versions are currently in circulation, each of which has been manipulated for political purposes, especially by those who wish to

criticize Josef Stalin or show how positively Leon Trotsky was viewed by Lenin. Nevertheless it is clear that Lenin was concerned in the Testament with potential successors and that most of all he favored Trotsky rather than his actual successor Stalin. The Testament of December 29 indicates it clear that Lenin wanted to avoid an irreversible split in the Party and provides a balanced assessment of all prospective candidates. With regard to Trotsky, Lenin notes that "[as] his struggle against the CC [Central Committee] on the question of the People's Commissariat has already proved, [he] is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present CC, but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work." Concerning Stalin, by contrast, Lenin points out that he "is too rude, and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a general secretary. That is why I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing (sic) another man in his stead who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, less capricious, and so forth." In a postscript dated March 5, 1923, Lenin criticizes Stalin for insulting Lenin's wife and adds that unless they receive a retraction and apology then "relations between us should be broken off." In relation to other members of the CC, Lenin points to the October episode in which Zinoviev and Kamenev objected to the idea of an immediate armed insurrection against the Provisional Government and also to Trotsky's Menshevik past, but he adds that neither should suffer any blame or personal consequence.

Lenin was therefore extremely worried about the degree of power Stalin had attained and thought this was dangerous for the future of the Party and Russia insofar as he was capable of abusing this power. He advocated that Stalin be removed from the post of general secretary. It is generally agreed by historians that Trotsky's failure to use the Testament was a major political mistake and an error that allowed Stalin to rise to power. But it is also conceded that Trotsky, in agreeing not to use it in this manner, was abiding by Lenin's wishes to avoid a split. Trotsky therefore put Party unity before his own ambitions.

See also: LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

LENIN'S TOMB

Shortly after the death of Vladimir Ilich Lenin in 1924, and despite the opposition of his wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, Soviet leaders built a mausoleum on Moscow's Red Square to display his embalmed body. The architect Alexei V. Shchusev designed two temporary cube-shaped wooden structures and then a permanent red granite pyramid-like building that was completed in 1929. The top of the mausoleum held a tribune from which Soviet leaders addressed the public. This site became the ceremonial center of the Bolshevik state as Stalin and subsequent leaders appeared on the tribune to view parades on November 7, May 1, and other Soviet ceremonial occasions. When Josef V. Stalin died in 1953, his body was placed in the mausoleum next to Lenin's. In 1961, as Nikita Khrushchev's attack on Stalin's cult of personality intensified, Stalin's body was removed from the mausoleum and buried near the Kremlin wall. Lenin and his tomb, however, remained the quintessential symbols of Soviet legitimacy.

Because of Lenin's status as unrivaled leader of the Bolshevik Party, and because of Russian traditions of personifying political power, a personality cult glorifying Lenin began to develop even before his death. The Soviet leadership mobilized the legacy of Lenin after 1924 to establish its own legitimacy and gain support for the Communist Party. Recent scholarship has disproved the idea that it was Stalin who masterminded the idea of embalming Lenin, instead crediting such figures as Felix Dzerzhinsky, Leonid Krasin, Vladimir Bonch-Bruевич, and Anatoly Lunacharsky. It has also been suggested that the cult grew out of popular Orthodox religious traditions and the philosophical belief of certain Bolshevik leaders in the deification of man and the resurrection of the dead through science. The archival sources underscore the contingency of the creation of the Lenin cult. They show that Dzerzhinsky and other Bolshevik lead-

ers consciously manipulated popular sentiment about Lenin for utilitarian political goals. Yet this would not have created such a powerful political symbol if it had not been rooted in the spiritual, philosophical, and political culture of Soviet leaders and the Soviet people. More than a decade after the fall of communism, Lenin's Tomb continued to stand on Red Square even though there were periodic calls for his burial.

See also: CULT OF PERSONALITY; KREMLIN; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; RED SQUARE

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KAREN PETRONE

LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH

(1870–1924), revolutionary publicist, theoretician, and activist; founder of and leading figure in the Bolshevik Party (1903–1924); chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the RSFSR/USSR (1917–1924).

The reputation of Vladimir Ilich Lenin (pseudonym of V.I. Ulyanov) has suffered at the hands of both his supporters and his detractors. The former turned him into an idol; the latter into a demon. Lenin was neither. He was born on April 22, 1870, into the family of a successful school inspector from Simbirsk. For his first sixteen years, Lenin lived the life of a child of a conventional, moderately prosperous, middle-class, intellectual family. The ordinariness of Lenin's upbringing was first disturbed by the death of his father, in January 1886 at the age of 54. This event haunted Lenin, who feared he might also die prematurely, and in fact died at almost exactly the same age as his father. Then, in March 1887, Lenin's older brother was arrested for terrorism; he was executed the following May. The event aroused Lenin's curiosity about what had led his brother to sacrifice his life. It also put obstacles in his path: As the brother of a convicted terrorist, Lenin was excluded from Kazan University. He eventually took a law degree,



Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin sitting alone at his desk.

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with distinction, by correspondence from St Petersburg University in January 1892. However, his real interests had already turned to serving the oppressed through revolution rather than at the bar.

All the indications suggest that Lenin was initially attracted to populism, and only later came under the sway of Marxism. He joined a number of provincial Marxist study circles, but first began to attract attention when he moved to the capital, St. Petersburg, and engaged in illegal political activities among workers and intellectuals. In February 1894, he met fellow conspirator Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, who became his lifelong companion. After his first visit to Western Europe, in 1895, to meet the exiled leaders of Russian Marxism, Lenin returned to St. Petersburg and helped set up the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. He was arrested in December 1896 and, after prison interrogation in St. Petersburg, was exiled to the village of Shushenskoe, in Siberia. Krupskaya, who was exiled separately, offered to share banishment with him. The authorities agreed, providing they married, which they did in July 1898. Siberian exile, though rigorous in many respects, was an interlude of relative personal happiness in Lenin's life. His lifelong

love of nature asserted itself in long walks, observation of social and animal life of the area, and frequent hunting expeditions. He read a great deal, communicated widely by letter with other socialists, and undertook research and writing. Direct political activity was not possible, and Lenin played no part in the formation, in 1898, of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDLP), to which he at first adhered to but from which he later split. His term of exile ended in February, 1900. In July of that same year, he left Russia for five years.

Up until that point much of Lenin's political writing, from his earliest known articles to his first major treatise, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, written while he was in Siberia, revolved around the dispute between Marxists and populists. The populists had proposed that Russia, given its commune-based peasant class and underdeveloped industry, could pass from its current condition of "backwardness" to socialism without having to first undergo the rigors of capitalist industrialization. Such a notion was an anathema to Lenin, who believed the Marxist axiom that socialist revolution could only follow from the overdevelopment of capitalism, which would bring about its own collapse. Lenin attacked the populist thesis in several articles and pamphlets. The main theme of his treatise on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* was that, in fact, capitalism was already well-entrenched in Russia, and therefore the question of whether it could be avoided was meaningless. Nonetheless, it remained obvious that Russia had only a small working class, and much of the rest of Lenin's life could be seen as an attempt to reconcile the actual weakness of proletarian forces in Russia with the country's undoubted potential for some kind of popular revolution, and to ensure Marxist and proletarian dominance in any such revolution.

THE EMERGENCE OF BOLSHEVISM (1902–1914)

Lenin worked to develop theoretical and practical means to accomplish these closely related tasks. The core of Lenin's activity revolved around the organization and production of a series of journals. He frequently described himself on official papers as a journalist, and he did, in fact, write a prodigious number of articles, as well as many longer works. In 1902, Lenin produced one of his most widely read and, arguably most misunderstood, pamphlets, *What Is to Be Done?*, which has been widely taken to be the founding text of a distinctive Lenin-



Lenin rallies the masses in this 1921 photo. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ist understanding of how to construct a revolutionary party on the basis of what he called “professional revolutionaries.” When it was first published, however, it was read as a statement of Marxist orthodoxy. Lenin asserted the primacy of political struggle, opposing the ideas of the economists, who argued that trade union struggle would serve the workers’ cause better than political revolution.

It was only in the following year, 1903, that Lenin began to break with the majority of the social-democratic movement. Again, received opinion, which claims Lenin split the party at the 1903 social-democratic party congress, oversimplifies the nature of the break. Lenin’s key resolution at the congress, in which he attempted to narrow the definition of party membership, was voted down. Later, by means many have judged foul, he garnered a majority vote on the issue of electing members to the editorial board of the party journal, *Iskra*, on which Lenin and his supporters predom-

inated. It was from this victory that the terms *Bolshevik* (majoritarians) and *Menshevik* (minoritarians) began to slowly come into vogue. However, the split of the party was only fully completed over the next few months, even years, of arid but fierce party controversies. Lenin’s bitter polemic *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Crisis in Our Party*, published in Geneva in February 1904, marks a clearer division and catalog of contentious issues than did *What Is to Be Done*. It was criticized not only by its target, Yuli Osipovich Martov, but also by Georgy Valentinovich Plekhanov, Pavel Axelrod, Vera Zaslulich, Karl Kautsky, and Rosa Luxemburg. Lenin’s remaining allies of the time included Alexander Bogdanov, Anatoly Lunacharsky, Grigory Zinoviev, and Lev Kamenev.

So much energy was involved in the dispute that the development of an actual revolutionary situation in Russia went almost unnoticed by the squabbling exiles. Even after Bloody Sunday (January 22, 1905) Lenin’s attention remained divided

between the revolution and the task of splitting the social democrats. With the latter aim in view, he convened a Third Party Congress (London, April 25 to May 10) consisting entirely of Bolsheviks. Only in August did Lenin's main pamphlet on revolutionary strategy, *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Russian Revolution*, appear. Inevitably, the wrong tactic—the identification of the revolution as bourgeois—was attributed to the Mensheviks. The correct, Bolshevik, tactic, was the recognition of “a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry,” which put less reliance on Russia's weak bourgeoisie. It also marked a significant effort by Lenin to incorporate the peasantry into the revolutionary equation. This was another way in which Lenin strove to compensate for the weakness of the working class itself, and the peasantry remained part of his strategy, in a variety of forms, for the rest of his life.

In the atmosphere of greater freedom prevailing after the issuing of the October Manifesto, which was squeezed out of the tsarist authorities under extreme duress and appeared to promise basic constitutional rights and liberties, Lenin returned to Russia legally on November 21, 1905. Even so, by December 17, police surveillance had driven him underground. He supported the heroic but catastrophically premature workers' armed uprising in Moscow in December. As conditions worsened he retreated to Finland and then, in December 1907, left the Russian Empire for another prolonged west European sojourn that lasted until April 1917. Even before the failure of the 1905 revolution, the party split continued to attract an inordinate amount of Lenin's attention. The break with Leon Trotsky in 1906 and Bogdanov in 1908 removed the last significant thinkers from the Bolshevik movement, apart from Lenin himself, who seemed constitutionally incapable of collaborating with people of his own intellectual stature. The break with Bogdanov was consummated in Lenin's worst book, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (1909), a naïve and crudely propagandistic blunder into the realm of philosophy.

Politically, Lenin had wandered into the wilderness as leader of a small faction that was situated on the fringe of Russian radical politics and distinguished largely by its dependence on Lenin and its refusal to contemplate a compromise that might reunite the party. Lenin was also distinguished by a ruthless morality of only doing that which was good for the revolution. In its name friendships were broken, and re-made, at a moment's notice.

Later, when in power, he urged occasional episodes of violence and terror to secure the revolution as he understood it, although, like a sensitive war leader, he did so reluctantly and only when he thought it absolutely necessary.

For the next few years Lenin was at his least influential. Had it not been for the backing of the novelist Maxim Gorky, it is unlikely the Bolsheviks could have continued to function. He had close support from Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev, Lev Borisovich Kamenev, Inessa Armand (with whom he may have had a brief sexual liaison), and from his wife Nadezhda Krupskaya. He also remained close to his family. When possible, he vacationed with them by the beaches of Brittany and Arcahon, or in the Swiss mountains. Lenin's love of nature, of walking and cycling, frequently counteracted the immense nervous stresses occasioned by his political battles. He was prone to a variety of illnesses, which acted as reminders of his father's early death, convincing him that he had to do things in a hurry. However, the second European exile was characterized by frustration rather than achievement.

FROM OBSCURITY TO POWER (1914–1921)

The onset of the First World War began the transformation of political fortune which was to bring Lenin to power. His attitude to the war was characteristically bold. Despite the collapse of the Second International Socialist Movement and the apparent wave of universal patriotism of August 1914, Lenin saw the war as a revolutionary opportunity and declared, as early as September 1914, that socialists should aim to turn it into a Europe-wide civil war. He believed that the basic class logic of the situation, that the war was fought by the masses to serve the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie, would eventually become clear to the troops who, being trained in arms, would then turn on their oppressors. He also wrote a major pamphlet, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. A Popular Outline* (1916). Returning to the theme of justifying a Marxist revolution in “backward” Russia, he argued that Russia was a component part of world capitalism and therefore the initial assault on capital, though not its decisive battles, could be conducted in Russia. Within months, just such an opportunity arose.

Lenin's transition from radical outcast to revolutionary leader began after the fall of tsarism in February 1917. A key moment was his declaration,

in the so-called *April Theses*, enunciated immediately on his return to Russia (April 16–17, 1917), that the party should not support the provisional government. By accident or design, this was the key to Bolshevik success. As other parties were sucked into supporting the provisional government, they each lost public support. After the Kornilov Affair, when the commander-in-chief, Lavr Kornilov, appeared to be spearheading a counter-revolution in August and September of 1917, it was the Bolsheviks who were the main beneficiaries because they were not tainted by association with the discredited provisional government which, popular opinion believed, was associated with Kornilov's apparent coup. Even so, it took immense personal effort by Lenin to persuade his party to seize their opportunity. Contrary to much received opinion and Bolshevik myth, the October Revolution was not carefully planned but, rather, improvised. Lenin was in still in hiding in Finland following proscription of the party after the July Days, when armed groups of sailors had failed in an attempt to overthrow the provisional government and the authorities took advantage of the situation to move against the Bolsheviks. He had been vague about details of the proposed revolution throughout the crucial weeks leading up to it, suggesting, at different moments, that it might begin in Moscow, Petrograd, Kronstadt, the Baltic Fleet, or even Helsinki. Only his own emergence from hiding, on October 23rd and 29th and during the seizure of power itself (November 6–7 O.S.) finally brought his party in line behind his policy. The provisional government was overthrown, and Lenin became Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars, a post he held until his death.

October was far from the end of the story. The tragic complexity of the seizure of power soon became apparent. The masses wanted what the slogans of October proclaimed: soviet power, peace, land, bread, and a constituent assembly. Lenin, however, wanted nothing less than the socialist transformation not only of Russia but of the world. Conflict was inevitable. By early 1918, autonomous workers and peasants organizations, including their political parties and the soviets themselves, were losing all authority. Ironically, at this moment one of Lenin's most libertarian, almost anarchist, writings, *State and Revolution*, written while he was in Finland, was published. In it he praised direct democracy and argued that capitalism had so organized and routinized the economy that it resembled the workings of the German post office.

As a result, he wrote, the transition to socialism would be relatively straightforward.

However, reality was to prove less tractable. Lenin began to talk of "iron discipline" as an essential for future progress, and in *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* (March–April 1918) proclaimed the concept of productionism—the maximization of economic output as the preliminary to building socialism—to be a main goal of the Soviet government. Productionism was an ideological response to Russia's Marxist paradox, a worker revolution in a "backward" peasant country. Indeed, the weakness of the proletariat was vastly accentuated in the first years of Soviet power, as industry collapsed and major cities lost up to two-thirds of their population through disease, hunger, and flight to the countryside.

Like the events of October, early Soviet policy was also improvised, though within the confines of Bolshevik ideology. Lenin presided over the nationalization of all major economic institutions and enterprises in a crude attempt to replace the market with allocation of key products. He also oversaw the emergence of a new Red Army; the setting up of a new state structure based on Bolshevik-led soviets; and a system of direct appropriation of grain from peasants, as well as the revolutionary transformation of the country. This last entailed the taking over of land by peasants and the disappearance from Soviet territory of the old elites, including the aristocracy, army officers, capitalists, and bankers. To the chaos of the early months of revolution was added extensive protest within the party from its left wing, which saw productionism and iron discipline as a betrayal of the libertarian principles of 1917. The survival of Lenin's government looked improbable. However, the outbreak of major civil war in July 1918 gave it a new lease of life, forcing people to choose between imperfect revolution, represented by the Bolsheviks, or out-and-out counter-revolution, represented by the opposition (called the Whites). Most opted for the former but, once the Whites were defeated in 1920, tensions re-emerged and a series of uprisings against the Soviet government took place.

THE FINAL YEARS (1922–1924)

Lenin's solution to the post-civil war crisis was his last major intervention in politics, because his health began to fail from 1922 onwards, exacerbated by the bullet wounds left after an assassination attempt in August 1918. The key problem in the crisis was peasant disaffection with the grain

appropriation system. Lenin replaced requisitioning by a tax-in-kind, which in turn necessitated the partial restoration of market relations. Nonetheless, the state retained the commanding heights of the economy, including large factories, transport, taxation, and foreign trade. The result was known as the New Economic Policy. It was Lenin's third attempt at a form of transition. The first, outlined in the *April Theses*, was based on "Soviet supervision of production and distribution," a system that had collapsed within the first months of Bolshevik power. The second, later called war communism, was based on iron discipline, state control of the economy, and grain requisitioning. Lenin believed his third solution was the correct one, arrived at through the test of reality. It was accompanied by intellectual and political repression and the imposition of a one-party state on the grounds that concession to bourgeois economic interests gave the revolution's enemies greater power that had to be counteracted by greater political and intellectual control by the party. Lenin remained enthusiastic about the NEP, and did not live to see the complications that ensued in the mid-1920s.

In his last writings, produced during his bouts of convalescence from a series of increasingly severe strokes beginning in May 1922, Lenin laid down a number of guidelines for his successors. These included a cultural revolution to modernize the peasantry (*On Co-operation*, January 1923) and a modest reorganization of the bureaucracy to get it under control ("Better Fewer but Better," March 1923, his last article). In his "Testament" (*Letter to the Congress*, December 1922), Lenin argued that the party should not, in future, antagonize the peasantry. Most controversially, however, he summed up the candidates for succession without clearly supporting any one of them. His criticism of Stalin—that he had accumulated much power and Lenin was not confident that he would use it wisely—was strengthened in January of 1923, after Stalin argued with Krupskaya. Lenin called for Stalin to be removed as General Secretary, a post to which Lenin had only promoted him in 1922. There was no suggestion that Stalin should be removed from the Politburo or Central Committee. In any case, Lenin was too ill to follow through on his suggestions, thereby opening up vast speculation as to whether he might have prevented Stalin from coming to power had he lived longer.

Lenin's last year was spent at his country residence near Moscow. In the company of Nadezhda Krupskaya and his sisters, he lived out his last

months being read to and taken on walks in his wheelchair. In October 1923 he even had enough energy to return for a last look around his Kremlin office, despite the guard's initial refusal to admit him because he did not have an up-to-date pass. However, his health continued to deteriorate, and he died on the evening of January 21, 1924.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; JULY DAYS OF 1917; KORNILOV AFFAIR; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA; LENIN'S TESTAMENT; LENIN'S TOMB; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; OCTOBER MANIFESTO; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; POPULISM; WAR COMMUNISM; WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

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CHRISTOPHER READ

LEONTIEV, KONSTANTIN NIKOLAYEVICH

(1831–1891), social philosopher, literary critic, and novelist.

Konstantin Nikolayevich Leontiev occupied a unique place in the history of nineteenth-century Russian social thought. He was a nationalist and a reactionary whose position differed in significant respects from the thinking of both the Slavophiles and the Pan-Slavists. Some historians refer to Leontiev's social philosophy as Byzantinism.

Leontiev led a varied life, in which he was in turn a surgeon, a diplomat, an editor, a novelist, and a monk. He was raised on a small family estate in the province of Kaluga. After studying medicine at the University of Moscow, he served as a military surgeon during the Crimean War. Following his military service, he returned to Moscow to continue the practice of medicine and to write a series of novels that enjoyed little success. He married a young, illiterate Greek woman in 1861, but continued to engage in a series of love affairs. His wife gradually descended into madness.

In 1863 Leontiev entered the Russian diplomatic service, which led to his assignment to posts in the Balkans and Greece. While serving in that region, he developed an admiration for Byzantine Christianity, which was to remain a dominant theme in his thinking. He was irresistibly attracted to the Byzantine monasticism that he observed during a stay at Mount Athos in 1871 and 1872. Leontiev arrived at the conviction that aesthetic beauty, not happiness, was the supreme value in life. He rejected all humanitarianism and optimism; the notion of human kindness as the essence of Christianity's social teaching was utterly alien to him. His stance was anomalous in that he lacked strong personal religious faith, yet advocated strict adherence to Eastern Orthodox religion. He believed that the best of Russian culture was rooted in the Orthodox and autocratic heritage of Byzantium, and not the Slavic heritage that Russia shared with Eastern Europeans. He thought that the nations of the Balkans were determined to imitate the bourgeois West. He hoped that despotism and obscurantism could save Russia from the adoption of Western liberalism and constitutionalism, and could give Russia and the Orthodox Christians of the Balkans the opportunity to unite on the basis of their common traditions, drawn from the Byzantine legacy.

Leontiev accepted Nikolai Danilevsky's conception that each civilization develops like an organism, and argued that each civilization necessarily passes through three phases of development, from an initial phase of primary simplicity to a second phase, a golden era of growth and complexity, followed at last by "secondary simplification," with decay and disintegration. He despised the rationalism, democratization, and egalitarianism of the West of his day, which he saw as a civilization fully in the phase of decline, as evident in the domination of the bourgeoisie, whom he held in contempt for its crassness and mediocrity. He thought it desirable to delay the growth of similar tendencies in Russia, but he concluded, with regret, that Russia's final phase of dissolution was inevitable, and saw some signs that it had already begun.

Leontiev did not hesitate to endorse harshly repressive, authoritarian rule for Russia in order to stave off the influence of the West and slow the decline as long as possible. He saw Tsarist autocracy and Orthodoxy as the powerful forces protecting tradition in Russian society from the dangerous tendencies toward leveling and anarchy. He glorified extreme social inequality as characteristic of a civilization's phase of flourishing complexity. Unlike the Slavophiles, Leontiev had little admiration for the Russian peasants, who in his view inclined toward dishonesty, drunkenness, and cruelty, and he repudiated the heritage of the reforms adopted by Alexander II. Toward the end of his life, he became increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of preserving autocracy and aristocracy in Russia.

After leaving the diplomatic service, Leontiev suffered from constant financial stringency, despite finding a position as an assistant editor of a provincial newspaper. His stories about life in Greece did not find a wide audience, although late in his life he did attract a small circle of devoted admirers. In 1891 he took monastic vows and assumed the name of Clement. He died in the Trinity Monastery near Moscow in the same year.

Leontiev was one of the most gifted literary critics of his time, though he was not widely appreciated as a novelist. In *Against the Current: Selections from the Novels, Essays, Notes and Letters of Konstantin Leontiev* (1969), George Ivask says that in Leontiev's long novels, "his narration is often capricious, elliptic, impressionistic, and full of lyrical digression depicting the vague moods of his superheroes, who express his own narcissistic ego." After Leontiev's death Vladimir Soloviev contributed to the recognition of Leontiev's erratic

brilliance, stimulating a revival of interest in Leontiev in the early twentieth century.

See also: BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; DANILEVSKY, NIKOLAI; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS

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ALFRED B. EVANS JR.

LERMONTOV, MIKHAIL YURIEVICH

(1814–1841), leading nineteenth-century Russian poet and prose writer.

Mikhail Yurievich Lermontov became one of Russia's most prominent literary figures. Based on the quality and evolution of his writing, some believe that if he had lived longer he would have surpassed the greatness of Alexander Pushkin. Lermontov's reputation is rooted equally in his poetry and prose. Fame came to him in 1834 when he wrote *Death of a Poet*, in which he accuses the Imperial Court of complicity in Pushkin's death in a duel.

The evolution of Lermontov's poetry reflected a change in emphasis from the personal to wider social and political issues. *The Novice* (1833) is known for its tight structure and elegant language. *The Demon* (1829–1839) became his most popular poem. Taking place in the Caucasus, it describes the love of a fallen angel for a mere mortal. *The Circassian Boy* (1833) reflects his strong scepticism in regard to religion and admiration of premodern life. *The Song of the Merchant Kalashnikov* (1837) is his greatest poem set in Russia. His best-known play is *The Masquerade* (1837), a stinging commentary on St. Petersburg high society.

Lermontov is considered to be the founder of the Russian realistic psychological novel, further developed by Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Leo Tolstoy. *A Hero of Our Time*, which is partly autobiograph-

ical, is his greatest work in this genre. The main character, Pechorin, is an example of a disenchanting and superfluous man, and his story provides a bitter critique of Russian society. In this novel Lermontov masterfully and realistically described the landscape of the Caucasus, the everyday life of the various tribes there, and a wide range of characters.

Lermontov was killed in a duel with a former classmate in 1841.

See also: GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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ZHAND P. SHAKIBI

LESKOV, NIKOLAI SEMENOVICH

(1831–1895), prose writer with an unmatched grasp of the Russian popular mentality; supreme master of nonstandard language whose stories and novels often contrast societal brutality against the decency of "righteous men" (*pravedniki*).

Nikolai Semenovich Leskov spent his youth in part on his father's estate and in part in the town of Orel, interacting with a motley cross-section of provincial Russia's population. Although lacking a completed formal education, he later boasted professional experiences ranging from criminal investigator to army recruiter and sales representative. His first short stories appeared in 1862.

From the beginning, Leskov's prose conveyed deep compassion for the underdog. Aesthetically, he brought the narrative tool of *skaz*—relating a story in colorful, quasi-oral language marked as that of a personal narrator—to a new degree of perfection. Among his best works are the novellas *Ledi Makbet Mtsenskogo uyezda* (*Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk*, 1865) and *Zapechetlenny angel* (*The Sealed Angel*, 1873); the former is a gritty tale of raw passions leading to cold-blooded murders, including infanticide, while the latter is the story of errant icon painters who encounter a miracle. *Soboryane* (*Cathedral Folk*, 1867–1872), a master-

ful novel-chronicle, depicts the Russian clergy in a respectful manner uncommon for its time; however, a subsequent spiritual crisis caused Leskov's ultimate break with the Orthodox Church. His fairytale "Levsha" (The Lefthander, 1881) became an instant popular classic, praising the rich talents of Russian rank-and-file folk while bemoaning their pathetic lot at the hands of an indifferent ruling class.

Leskov's unique, first-hand knowledge of Russian reality, in combination with uncompromising ethical standards, alienated him from both the liberal and the conservative mainstream. Throughout his career, he opposed nihilism and remained a "gradualist," insisting that Russia needed steady evolution rather than an immediate revolution.

Leo Tolstoy aptly called Leskov "the first Russian idealist of a Christian type."

See also: SKAZ

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PETER ROLLBERG

LESNAYA, BATTLE OF

The battle of Lesnaya, fought on October 9, 1708, between the Russian army of Peter the Great and a Swedish column under General Adam Ludvig Lewenhaupt, played an important role in the campaign of that year through its weakening of the Swedish army. Russia's aim was to resist the attempt of Charles XII, King of Sweden, to invade Russia. Charles marched through Poland, reaching Grodno (now western Belarus) by January 1708, and resumed the march eastward toward Moscow the following June. Peter's army retreated before him, laying waste the land and offering occasional resistance. At the Russian-Polish border, Charles realized that he could go no further east, as he was running out of supplies, so he turned south toward the Ukraine. At the same time, General Lewenhaupt was moving southeast from Riga to join his king with 12,500 men, sixteen guns, and several thousand carts filled with supplies for the Swedish army. As Lewenhaupt approached the village of Lesnaya, on the small river Lesyanka southeast of

Mogilev (now southeast Belarus), Peter brought up a flying corps of 5,000 infantry and 7,000 dragoons. Peter divided his forces into two columns, one commanded by himself, the other by his favorite, Alexander Menshikov. In a fortified camp made of the wagons, Lewenhaupt defended himself from noon on, until the Russian general Reinhold Bauer came up with another 5,000 dragoons. Around 7:00 P.M. the fighting stopped, and Lewenhaupt retreated south toward the main Swedish army, losing half his force and most of the supplies. Peter estimated the Russian losses at 1,111 killed and 2,856 wounded. The battle played an important role in sapping the strength of the Swedish army and provided Russia with an important psychological victory as well. To the end of his life Peter celebrated the day with major festivities at court.

See also: GREAT NORTHERN WAR; PETER I

PAUL A. BUSHKOVITCH

LEZGINS

The Lezgins are an ethnic group of which half resides in the Dagestani Republic. According to the 1989 census they numbered 240,000 within that republic, a little more than 11 percent of the population. All told, some 466,006 Lezgins lived in the Soviet Union, with most of the rest residing in Azerbaijan. Of the total, 91 percent regarded Lezgin as their native language and 53 percent considered themselves to be fluent in Russian as a second language. Within Dagestan the Lezgins are concentrated mainly in the south in the mountainous part of the republic.

The Lezgin language is a member of the Lezgin group of the Northeast Caucasian languages. In Soviet times they were gathered in the larger category of the Ibero-Caucasian family of languages. The languages within this family, while geographically close together, are not closely related outside of its four major groupings. This categorization has become understood more as a part of the Soviet ideology of *druzhba narodov* (friendship of peoples). The other Lezgin languages are spoken in Azerbaijan and Dagestan. They are generally quite small groups, and the term "Lezgin" as an ethnic category has sometimes served to cover the entire group. Ethnic self-identity, calculated with language and religion, has been a fluid concept.

The Lezgin language since 1937 has been written in a modified Cyrillic alphabet. Following the pattern of other non-Slavic languages in the Soviet Union, it had a Latin alphabet from 1928 to 1937. Before that it would have been written in an Arabic script. A modest number of books have been published in the Lezgin language. From 1984 to 1985, for example, fifty titles were published. This compares favorably with other non-jurisdictional ethnic groups, such as their fellow Dagestanis, the Avars, but less so with some nationalities that possessed some level of ethnic jurisdiction, such as the Abkhazians.

The Lezgins long gained a reputation as mountain raiders among people to their south, particularly the Georgians. Again, precision of identity was not necessarily a phenomenon in naming raiders as Lezgins. The Lezgins and the Lezgin languages were likely a part of the diverse linguistic composition of the Caucasian Kingdom of Albania. Much has been said of Udi in this context.

In the post-Soviet world the Lezgins have been involved in ethnic conflict in both Azerbaijan and Dagestan. They form a distinct minority in the former country and experience difficulty in the context of this new nation's attempt to define its own national being. In Dagestan the Lezgins, located in the mountains and constituting only 15 percent of the population, find themselves generally alienated from the centers of power. They are also in conflict with some of the groups that live more closely to them.

See also: DAGESTAN; ETHNOGRAPHY, RUSSIAN AND SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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PAUL CREGO

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR; known as the LDPSU during the last months of the Soviet period) was created in the spring of 1990, with active participation of the authorities and special services, as a controllable alternative to the

growing democratic movement. In the 1991 presidential elections, the liberal democratic leader, the political clown Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, won a surprising 6.2 million votes (7.8%) and took third place after victorious Boris Yeltsin and the main Communist candidate Nikolai Ryzhkov. In the 1993 Duma elections, the victories of the LDPR became a sensation; Zhirinovskiy alone, capitalizing on sentiments of protest, secured 12.3 million votes (22.9%). From there the LDPR was able to advance five candidates in single-mandate districts. Such resounding success—both on the party list and in the districts—would not befall the LDPR again, although in 1994 and 1995 Zhirinovskiy stirred up considerable energy for party formation in the provinces. In the 1995 elections, the LDPR registered candidates in 187 districts (more than the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, or KPRF) but received only one mandate and half its previous vote: 7.7 million votes (11.2%, second to the KPRF). In the 1996 presidential elections, Zhirinovskiy received 4.3 million votes (5.7%, fifth place). The LDPR held approximately fifty seats in the Duma from 1996 to 1999 which helped repay, with interest, the resources invested earlier in the party's publicity since, with the domination of the left in the Duma, these votes were able to tip the scales in favor of government initiatives. The LDPR turned into an extremely profitable political business project.

In the 1999 elections, the Central Electoral Commission played a cruel joke on the Liberal Democrats. The LDPR list, consisting of a large number of commercial positions, filled by quasi-criminal businessmen, was not registered. On the very eve of the elections, when Zhirinovskiy, hurriedly assembling another list and registering as the "Zhirinovskiy Bloc," launched the advertising campaign "The Zhirinovskiy Bloc Is the LDPR," the Central Electoral Commission registered the LDPR, but without Zhirinovskiy. The Liberal Democrats were saved from this fatal split (LDPR without Zhirinovskiy as a rival of the Zhirinovskiy Bloc) only by the intervention of the Presidium of the Supreme Court. In the 1999 elections, the Zhirinovskiy Bloc received 6 percent of the vote and finished fifth; half a year later, in the 2000 presidential elections, Zhirinovskiy himself finished fourth with 2.7 percent. The LDPR fraction in the Duma from 2000 to 2003 was the smallest; it began with 17 delegates and ended with 13. It was headed by Zhirinovskiy's son Igor Lebedev, as the party's head had become vice-speaker of the Duma.

Actively exploiting the nostalgia for national greatness (and for the USSR with its powerful army and special services, but without “Party nomenclatura”), “enlightened nationalism,” and anti-Western sentiments; castigating the “radical reformers” and denouncing efforts at breaking the country both from without and within, the LDPR enjoys significant support from surviving groups and strata that do not share the communist ideology. The populist brightness, spiritedness, and outstanding political and acting abilities of Zhirinovsky play an important role, bringing him into sharp contrast with ordinary Russian politicians. The LDPR has especially strong support among the military and those Russian citizens who lived in Russia’s national republics and SNG (Union of Independent States) countries among residents of bordering nations. The LDPR had its greatest success in regional elections from 1996 to 1998, when its candidates won as governor in Pskov oblast, mayor in the capital Tuva, parliament in Krasnodar Krai, and the Novosibirsk city assembly; a LDPR candidate came close to victory in the presidential elections in the Mari Republic as well. The LDPR results in the 1999–2002 term were significantly weaker, but with the expansion of NATO, the war in Iraq, and so forth, the LDPR ratings rose again. At its reregistration in April 2002, the LDPR declared nineteen thousand members and fifty-five regional branches.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; ZHIRINOVSKY, VLADIMIR VOLFOVICH

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NIKOLAI PETROV

LIBERALISM

Any discussion of Russian liberalism must start with a general definition of the term. The online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* emphasizes liberals’ advocacy of individual liberty and freedom from unjustified restraint. In the nineteenth century, liberalism had a strong economic strain, stressing industrialization and laissez-faire economics. With one notable exception, Russia’s first liberals were little concerned with economic affairs, as the country remained mired in a semi-feudal agrarian economy. And at all times, the quest for political liberty was at the heart of Russian liberalism.

While it is impossible to select a starting point that will satisfy everyone, an early figure in the quest for freedom was Alexander Radishchev, a well-educated and widely traveled Russian nobleman. He is best known for his *A Journey from Petersburg to Moscow* (1790) that vividly exposed the evils of Russian serfdom, an institution little different from slavery in the American south of the time. An enraged Empress Catherine the Great (r. 1762–1796) demanded his execution but settled for Radishchev’s banishment to Siberia. Pardoned in 1799, he was nonetheless a broken man who committed suicide in 1802. Yet Radishchev served as an inspiration to both radicals and liberals for decades to come.

In particular he inspired the Decembrist movement of 1825. This group of noble military officers attempted to seize power in an effort so confusing that they are known simply by the month of their failed coup. Five of the conspirators were executed, but many of them advocated the abolition of serfdom and autocracy, two hallmarks of early Russian liberalism.

Under Emperor Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855), virtually all talk of real reform earned the attention of the secret police. Yet some Russians found a way to express themselves; most important was the historian, Timofei Granovsky, who used his lectern to express his hostility to serfdom, advocacy of religious intolerance, and his admiration for parliamentary regimes. His influence was largely limited, however, to his pupils, including one of Russia’s most famous liberals, the philosopher and historian Boris Chicherin.

Chicherin’s political career began under the reform-minded Emperor Alexander II (r. 1855–1881) and included both theoretical and practical pursuits. The author of several books and innumer-

able articles and reviews, Chicherin was also a professor and an active politician. His liberalism included a vigorous defense of personal liberties protected by law and a consistent rejection of violence to achieve political change. He was the first prominent Russian liberal to defend a free market as a prerequisite for political liberty, squarely breaking with the emerging socialist movement.

Another important liberal was Ivan Petrunkevich. Following two attempts on the life of Emperor Alexander II, the government issued an appeal for public support against terrorism. In response, Petrunkevich declared in 1878 that the people must resist not only terror from below, but also terror from above. That same year, he met with five terrorists in an effort to unite all opponents of the status quo, an effort that failed because the terrorists rejected Petrunkevich's demand that they disavow violence. In an 1879 pamphlet he insisted upon the convocation of a constituent assembly to guarantee basic civil liberties. Despite frequent clashes with the government, Petrunkevich remained active in politics even after his exile following the Bolshevik revolution.

At the turn of the century, Russia was on the eve of revolution. Rapid industrialization under appalling conditions fostered a radical working class movement, while a surge in the peasant population produced widespread land hunger. At the same time a middle class of capitalists and professionals was emerging, and from it came many of Russia's leading liberals.

The last emperor, Nicholas II (1894–1917), proved singularly incapable of handling the Herculean task of ruling Russia. He quickly dashed any hopes liberals may have entertained for reform when he dismissed notions of diluting his autocratic power as “senseless dreams.” Nonetheless, the liberals remained active.

In 1901 they established their own journal, *Liberation*, and two years later an organization, the Union of Liberation. When Russia exploded in the Revolution of 1905, the Union coordinated a movement that ranged from strikes to terrorist assassinations. Nicholas made concessions that only fueled the rebellion and in April, liberals were demanding the convocation of a constituent assembly to create a new order. In October, Nicholas issued the October Manifesto, guaranteeing basic civil liberties and the election of a national assembly, the Duma, with real political power. By then the liberals had their own political party, the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets).

It seemed that liberalism's great opportunity had arrived. At the very least, several liberals achieved national prominence in the years after 1905. Pyotr Struve, an economist and political scientist, originally embraced Marxism, but by 1905, he espoused a radical liberalism that called for full civil liberties and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. He was elected to the Second Duma and supported Russia's entrance into the World War I. When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, Struve joined the unsuccessful opposition and soon left Russia for good.

The most prominent liberal of the late imperial period was the historian, Pavel Milyukov. In 1895 his political views cost him a teaching position, and he used the time to travel abroad, visiting the United States. His public lectures emphasized the need to abolish the autocracy and the right to basic civil liberties. But Milyukov also realized that liberalism was doomed if it failed to address the land issue in an overwhelmingly agrarian nation.

Milyukov supported Russia's participation in World War I, but by 1916 he was so exasperated with the catastrophic prosecution of the war that he publicly implied that treason had penetrated to the highest levels of the government. When the autocracy collapsed in February 1917, Milyukov became the foreign minister of the provisional government, the highest office ever reached by a Russian liberal. It did not last long. Under great pressure, in May he issued a promise to the allies that Russia would remain in the war to the bitter end. Antiwar demonstrations ensued, and Milyukov was forced to resign. He died in France in 1943.

Despite the efforts of Milyukov, Struve, and others, Russian liberalism increasingly fell between two stools. On the one hand were the revolutionaries who had nothing but contempt for liberals with their willingness to compromise with the imperial system. The regime's supporters, on the other hand, saw the liberals as little better than bomb-throwing revolutionaries. In a society as polarized as Russia was in 1914, with a political system as archaic as its leader was incompetent, any form of political moderation was likely doomed.

The Communists thoroughly crushed all opposition, but some brave individuals continued to call for human freedom, the most important being Andrei Sakharov. A physicist by training, he was a man of extraordinary intelligence and courage.

Admitted as a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences at the age of thirty-two, he was deprived of the lavish privileges accorded the scientific elite of the USSR on account of his subsequent advocacy of human rights and civil liberties. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, Sakharov returned to national prominence; he died almost exactly two years before the demise of the Soviet Union on Christmas 1991.

In the Russian Federation of the early twenty-first century, political terms such as *liberal*, *conservative*, *radical*, and so on are almost meaningless. But liberalism in its more traditional sense won a major victory in the 1996 presidential election when Boris Yeltsin defeated the Communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov. Yeltsin's liberal credentials were later much criticized, but he successfully defended freedom of speech, the press, and religion, and he initiated free market reforms. At the very least, liberalism became more powerful in Russia than any time in the past.

See also: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; MILYUKOV, PAUL NIKOLAYEVICH; NICHOLAS II; RADISHCHEV, ALEXANDER NIKOLAYEVICH; SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH

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HUGH PHILLIPS

Yevsei Grigorevich Liberman's education and career were erratic and undistinguished. He graduated from the law faculty at Kiev University in 1920 and then earned a candidate of sciences degree at the Institute of Labor in Kharkov. In 1930 he began to work in the Kharkov Engineering-Economics Institute. During World War II he was evacuated to Kyrgyzstan, where he held positions in the Ministry of Finance and the Scientific Research Institute of Finance. He returned to the Kharkov Engineering-Economics Institute after the war and in 1963 became a professor of statistics at Kharkov University. At various times he was also the director of a machinery plant and a consultant to machinery plants.

Liberman's personal experience in actual enterprises helped him to understand the shortcomings of the Soviet incentive system. As early as his doctoral dissertation in 1957, he suggested reducing the number of planning indicators for firms and focusing on profit instead. In 1962 he became a *cause célèbre* when he published an article in *Pravda* that proposed making profit the sole success indicator in evaluating enterprise performance. Since Liberman was not a significant player in economic reform circles, it is thought that others, such as Vasily Sergeevich Nemchinov, engineered publication of this article as a trial balloon. Thus he was more significant as a lightning rod around which controversy swirled than as a thinker with a sophisticated understanding of economics or of the complex task of transforming the Soviet administrative command system.

See also: NEMCHINOV, VASILY SERGEYEVICH

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ROBERT W. CAMPBELL

LIBERMAN, YEVSEI GRIGOREVICH

(1897–1983), economist who proposed making profit the main success indicator for Soviet enterprises.

LIGACHEV, YEGOR KUZMICH

(b. 1920), a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (December 1983 to mid-1990), and member of the Politburo (April 1985 to mid-1990).



Yegor Ligachev criticized Gorbachev's reforms and Yeltsin's leadership style. PACH/CORBIS-BETTMANN. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION..

Yegor Ligachev was a leading orthodox critic of many aspects of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's program of reforms. From 1985 until late 1988 he served as the party's informal second secretary responsible for the supervision of official ideology and personnel management. During this period, he clashed with Secretary Alexander Yakovlev over cultural and ideological policies and openly assailed the cultural liberalization fostered by glasnost and the growing public criticism of the USSR's past.

While Ligachev publicly endorsed perestroika in general terms, he opposed Gorbachev's efforts to limit party officials' responsibilities and to expand the legislative authority of the soviets. He was widely identified with the orthodox critique of perestroika provided by Nina Andreyeva in early 1988. At the Nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in mid-1988, Ligachev refused to publicly endorse Gorbachev's reform of the Secretariat and its subordinate apparatus. In September 1988 he lost his position as second secretary and was named director of the newly created agricultural commission of the Central Committee.

Ligachev was deeply disturbed by the collapse of Communist power in Eastern Europe and the flaccid response to those events on the part of the Gorbachev regime. Nor did he support the general secretary's decision to end the CPSU's monopoly of power in February 1990. In the spring of 1990 he moderated his critique of the regime in an apparent effort to win election as deputy general secretary at the Twenty-eighth Party Congress, but he lost the election by a wide margin. Following the reform of the Secretariat and Politburo at the congress he retired from both bodies. He did not fully condemn the attempted coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, but he vigorously denied charges of direct involvement in these events.

See also: ANDREYEVA, NINA ALEXANDROVNA; AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; GLASNOST; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PERESTROIKA

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JONATHAN HARRIS

LIKHACHEV, DMITRY SERGEYEVICH

(1906–1999), cultural historian, religious philosopher.

Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachev was known as a world-renowned academic, literary and cultural historian, sociologist, religious philosopher, prisoner of the gulag, and preservationist of all kinds of Russian culture. But he was much more. By the end of his life he had become one of the most respected citizens of Russia. As an academic, Likhachev was the preeminent expert of his generation on medieval Russian culture, and the literature of the tenth through seventeenth centuries in particular, perhaps the most prolific writer and researcher on Russian culture in the twentieth century. One of his obituaries described him as "one of the symbols of the twentieth century . . . [whose] life was devoted to education . . . the energetic service of the highest ideals of humanism, spirituality, genuine patriotism, and citizenship . . . consistently preaching eternal principles of moral-

ity and conscientiousness . . . a person of the rarest erudition and generous spirit, who educated a whole galaxy of worthy students" (*Kultura* No. 36, 7–13 October, 1999, 1). Another said, "[He] took the helm of the ship of Russian culture and steered it to a hopefully better world." He was a greatly talented historian and many of his more than one thousand publications were known throughout the world's academic community. By his life's end he had been granted honorary titles by sixteen national academies and European universities, as well as several high honors from his native land, including Hero of Soviet Labor. He served as a researcher in various Soviet academic institutions of renown, gained the title of university professor, and for his seminal work on the Russian classic, *Lay of Igor's Campaign*, was received into the Soviet Academy of Sciences. His very active life also led him to membership in the Russian Duma after the fall of the Soviet Union.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; HISTORIOGRAPHY; LAY OF IGOR'S CAMPAIGN

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JOHN PATRICK FARRELL

LISHENTSY See DISENFRANCHIZED PERSONS.

LITHUANIA AND LITHUANIANS

Located on the southeastern shore of the Baltic Sea, Lithuania has been an independent republic since 1991. Encompassing 66,200 square kilometers, it has a population (2001) of 3,491,000 inhabitants, of whom 67.2 percent live in cities and 32.8 percent in rural areas. Over 80 percent of the population is Lithuanian, about 9 percent Russian, and 7 percent Polish.

Lithuanians first established a government in the thirteenth century to resist the Teutonic Knights attacking from the West. In 1251 the Lithuanian ruler Mindaugas accepted Latin Christianity, and in 1253 received the title of king, but his successors were known as Grand Dukes. When Tatars overran the Russian principalities to the East, the Grand Duchy expanded into the territory that today makes up Belarus and Ukraine. At its height,

at the end of the fourteenth century, although the Lithuanians are a Baltic and not a Slavic people, Lithuania had a majority of East Slavs in its population, and for a time it challenged the Grand Duchy of Moscow as the "collector of the Russian lands."

Faced by Moscow's growing strength, Lithuanian leaders turned to Poland for help, and through a series of agreements made between 1385 and 1387, the two states formed a union, solidified by the marriage of the two rulers, Jagiello and Jadwiga, and by the reintroduction of Latin Christianity through the Polish structure of the Roman Catholic church. (Lithuania had reverted to paganism after Mindaugas's abdication in 1261.) Reinforced by the Union of Lublin in 1569, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth continued until the Partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. In 1795 the Third Partition of Poland brought Russian rule to most of what today constitutes Lithuania.

Russian authorities attempted to wean the Lithuanians from the Polish influences that had dominated during the period of the Commonwealth. The Russians banned the use of the name "Lithuania" (Litva) and administered the territory as part of the "Northwest Region." After the Polish uprisings of 1831 and 1863, the authorities helped Lithuanians in some ways but also tried to force them to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet. At the same time, the authorities limited the economic development of the region, which lay on the Russian-German border. Under these conditions, a Lithuanian national consciousness emerged, and with it the goal of cultural independence from the Poles and eventual political independence from Russia.

The Lithuanians received their opportunity in the course of World War I. On February 16, 1918, after almost three years of German occupation, the Lithuanian Council (Taryba) declared the country's independence, but a provisional government began to function only after the German defeat in November 1918. Russian efforts in 1919 to reclaim the region in the form of a Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic failed, and in May 1920 a Constituent Assembly met and formalized the state structure.

The First Republic's foreign policy focused on Lithuania's claim to the city of Vilnius as its historic capitol. The Poles had seized the city in 1920, and as a result, Lithuania tended to align itself with



Lithuania, 1992 © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

Germany and the Soviet Union as part of an anti-Versailles camp. In 1939, by the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression pact, Germany and the Soviet Union were to divide Eastern Europe, and Lithuania fell into the Soviet orbit. In 1940 Soviet forces overthrew the authoritarian regime that had ruled Lithuania since 1926, and Moscow directed the country's incorporation into the Soviet Union as a constituent republic.

The 1940s brought destruction and havoc to Lithuania. In 1940 and 1941, Soviet authorities deported thousands of Lithuanian citizens of all nationalities into the interior of the USSR. When the

Germans invaded in 1941, some local people joined with the Nazi forces in the massacre of the vast majority of the Jewish population of Lithuania. (In 1940 and 1941 Jews had constituted almost 10 percent of Lithuania's population.) When the Soviet army returned in 1944 and 1945, Lithuanian resistance erupted and continued into the early 1950s. Thousands died in the fighting, and Soviet authorities deported at least 150,000 persons to Siberia. (The exact number of killings and deportations is subject to considerable dispute.)

Under Soviet rule the Lithuanian social structure changed significantly. Before World War II,

the majority of Lithuanians were peasants, and even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, many urban dwellers still maintained some sort of psychological link with the land. The Soviet government, however, collectivized agriculture and pushed industrialization, moving large numbers of people into the cities and developing new industrial centers. By the 1960s, after the violent resistance had failed, more Lithuanians began to enter the Soviet system, becoming intellectuals, economic leaders, and party members. Emigré Lithuanian scholars often estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of Lithuanian party members were “believers,” while the majority had joined out of necessity.

In 1988, after Mikhail Gorbachev had loosened Moscow’s controls throughout the Soviet Union, the Lithuanians became a focus of the process of ethno-regional decentralization of the Soviet state. Gorbachev’s program of reform encouraged local initiative that, in the Lithuanian case, quickly took on national coloration. The Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika, now remembered as *Sajudis*, mobilized the nation first around cultural and ecological issues, and later, in a political campaign, around the goal of reestablishment of independence.

Gorbachev quickly lost control of Lithuania, and he successively resorted to persuasion, economic pressure, and finally violence to restrain the Lithuanians. After the Lithuanian Communist Party declared its independence of the Soviet party in December 1989, worldwide media watched Gorbachev travel to Lithuania in January to persuade the Lithuanians to relent. He failed, and after *Sajudis* led the Lithuanian parliament on March 11, 1990, to declare the reconstitution of the Lithuanian state, Gorbachev imposed an economic blockade on the republic. This, too, failed, and in January 1991, world media again watched as Soviet troops attacked key buildings in Vilnius and the Lithuanians passively resisted Moscow’s efforts to reestablish its authority. The result was a stalemate. Finally, after surviving the so-called “August Putsch” in Moscow, Gorbachev, under Western pressure, recognized the reestablishment of independent Lithuania.

See also: BRAZAUSKAS, ALGIRDAS; LANDSBERGIS, VYTAUTAS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; POLAND; VILNIUS

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ALFRED ERICH SENN

LITVINOV, MAXIM MAXIMOVICH

(1876–1951), old Bolshevik, leading Soviet diplomat, and commissar for foreign affairs.

Maxim Maximovich Litvinov was born Meer Genokh Moisevich Vallakh in Bialystok, a small city in what is now Poland. He joined the socialist movement in the 1890s and sided with Vladimir Lenin when the Social Democratic Party split into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. From 1898 to 1908, he smuggled guns and propaganda into the empire, but having achieved little, he emigrated to Britain. There he married an English woman and led a quiet, conventional life, even becoming a British subject. During the October Revolution, he served briefly as the Soviet representative to London but was expelled from Britain for “revolutionary activities” in October 1918. In Moscow he became a deputy commissar for foreign affairs and frequently negotiated with the Western powers for normal diplomatic relations, to little success. However, Litvinov did conclude a 1929 nonaggression pact with the USSR’s western neighbors, including Poland and the Baltic states.

From 1930 to 1939 Litvinov served as commissar for foreign affairs. In 1931 he negotiated a nonaggression treaty with France, an extremely anti-Soviet state that had become worried about an increasingly unstable Germany. Soon after Adolf Hitler came to power, Litvinov initiated alliance talks with France, finding a partner in Louis Barthou, the foreign minister. In December 1933, the Soviet Communist Party leadership formally approved Litvinov’s proposal both for a military alliance with France and for the Soviet Union’s

entrance into the League of Nations. Talks took a tortuous course, but in June 1934, Barthou and Litvinov agreed on a eastern pact of mutual assistance that would be guaranteed by a separate Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance.

For several reasons, however, these treaties proved ineffectual. First of all, Barthou was assassinated in October 1934, and Pierre Laval, an advocate of good relations with Germany, replaced him. Moreover, the British were hostile to close relations with Moscow, and France was generally unwilling to act without London's support. Finally, in 1937, Stalin ordered the decimation of the Red Army's leadership at the same time he was terrorizing the entire nation. To the already suspicious West, it seemed clear that the USSR could not possibly be a reliable ally. Litvinov realized the damage the Great Terror wrought on Soviet foreign policy but was powerless in domestic politics. Ignored and rebuffed at virtually every turn by the West, Litvinov was replaced by Stalin's close associate, Vyacheslav Molotov, in May 1939, four months before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

With the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941, Stalin appointed Litvinov ambassador to the United States. For the next two years, Litvinov constantly urged the West to open a second front in France. Angered at Litvinov's lack of success, Stalin recalled him in 1943. He served as a deputy commissar for foreign affairs, making many proposals to Stalin advocating Great Power cooperation after the war. This effort failed, and Litvinov eventually understood that Stalin saw security not in terms of cooperation with the West, but in the building of a bulwark of satellite states on the USSR's western border. Two months before his final dismissal in August 1946, Litvinov told the American journalist Richard C. Hottelet that it was pointless for the West to hope for good relations with Stalin. Perhaps the most remarkable and mysterious fact of Litvinov's long career is that he died a natural death.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH

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HUGH PHILLIPS

LIVING CHURCH MOVEMENT

Also known as the Renovatianist Movement, the Living Church Movement, a coalition of clergy and laity, sought to combine Orthodox Christianity with the social and political goals of the Soviet government between 1922 and 1946. The movement's names reflected fears that Orthodoxy faced extinction after the Bolshevik Revolution. Renovatianists hoped to renew their church through reforms in liturgy, practice, and the rules on clergy marriage.

The movement began in response to the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Parish priests in Petrograd formed the Group of Thirty-Two in 1905 and proposed a liberal program for church administration that would allow married parish priests, not just celibate monastic priests, to become bishops. This group joined advocates of Christian socialism in a Union for Church Regeneration that advocated the separation of church and state, greater democracy within the church, and the use of modern Russian instead of medieval Old Church Slavonic in the Divine Liturgy. Repressed after 1905, the reform movement reappeared in 1917 only to wither from lack of widespread Orthodox support.

The Living Church Movement appeared during the famine of 1921–1922, thanks in large part to Bolshevik suspicions that Orthodox bishops were plotting counterrevolution. The Politburo approved a plan for splitting the church through a public campaign to seize church treasures for famine relief. Bolshevik leaders secretly wanted to strip the church of valuables that might be used to finance political opposition. Patriarch Tikhon Bellavin and other bishops opposed the government's plan to seize sacred icons, chalices, and patens. A small group of clergy led by Alexander Vvedensky, Vladimir Krasnitsky, and Antonin Granovsky used covert government aid to set up a rival national Orthodox organization that supported confiscation of church valuables, expressed loyalty to the Soviet regime, and promoted internal church reforms.

When Patriarch Tikhon unexpectedly abdicated in May 1922, Living Church leaders formed a Supreme Church Administration and pushed for revolution in the church by imitating the successful tactics of the Bolsheviks. Renovatianists tried to force the church to accept radical reforms in liturgy, administration, leadership, and doctrine. Parish clergy responded favorably to proposed changes; bishops and laity overwhelmingly rejected them. Government authorities threatened, arrested,

and exiled opponents to the Living Church, thereby further eroding popular support for reform.

Internal divisions within the Supreme Church Administration also weakened the movement. Three competing renovationist parties emerged. The Living Church Group of Archpriest Krasnitsky promoted church revolution led by parish priests. This group was more interested in giving greater power to parish priests by allowing them to remarry and to become bishops than in changing canons and dogma. Bishop Granovskii organized a League for Church Regeneration that espoused democracy in the church. The league appealed to conservative lay believers because it promised them a greater voice in church affairs and defended traditional Orthodox beliefs and practices. A third renovationist party, the League of Communities of the Ancient Apostolic Church led by Archpriest Vvedensky, combined Granovsky's democratic principles and Krasnitsky's reform proposals with Vvedensky's passion for Christian socialism.

Infighting among renovationist groups threatened to destroy the movement, so the Soviet government forced them to reconcile. The reunified Living Church gained control over nearly 70 percent of Russian Orthodox parish churches by the time their national church council convened in May 1923. The council defrocked Patriarch Tikhon and condemned his anti-Soviet activity. It also approved limited church reforms, including the abolition of the patriarchate and the ordination of married bishops, and proclaimed the church's loyalty to the regime.

By June 1923 the Soviet government became worried over the strength of renovationism. The Politburo decided to release Tikhon from jail after he agreed in writing to acknowledge his crimes and to promise loyalty to the government. Orthodox believers and clergy immediately rallied to him. The reformers reorganized in order to stop defections to the patriarchate. All renovationist parties were banned, most reforms were abandoned, and the Supreme Church Administration became the Holy Synod led by monastic bishops. Granovsky and Krasnitsky refused to accept these changes and were pushed aside. Vvedensky joined the Holy Synod in a reduced role.

The Renovationist Movement lost support throughout the 1920s, despite this reorganization and an attempt to reunite the church by calling a second renovationist national church council in October 1925. Most Orthodox believers saw everyone

in the Living Church Movement as traitors who had sold out to the Communists. The movement declined dramatically throughout the 1930s as did the Orthodox church in general. The Living Church Movement experienced a short lived revival during the first years of World War II, when Soviet persecution of religion eased and Vvedensky became leader of the movement. In September 1943 Josef Stalin permitted senior patriarchal bishops to reinstate a national church administration. A month later, he approved a plan to merge renovationist parishes with the Moscow patriarchate. Vvedensky opposed this decision, but his death in July 1946 officially ended the Living Church Movement. For decades afterward, however, Orthodox believers used "Living Church" and "Renovationist" as synonyms for religious traitors.

See also: FAMINE OF 1921–1922; ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; TIKHON, PATRIARCH

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EDWARD E. ROSLOF

LIVONIAN WAR

The Livonian War (1558–1583), for the possession of Livonia (historic region that became Latvia and Estonia) was first between Russia and the knightly Order of Livonia, and then between Russia and Sweden and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The outbreak of war was preceded by Russian–Livonian negotiations resulting in the 1554 treaty on a fifteen-year armistice. According to this treaty, Livonians were to pay annual tribute to the Russian tsar for the city of Dorpat (now Tartu), on grounds that the city (originally known as "Yuriev") belonged formerly to Russian princes, ancestors of Ivan IV. Using the overdue payment of

this Yuriev tribute as a pretext, the tsar declared war on Livonia in January 1558.

As for Ivan IV's true reasons for beginning the war, two possibilities have been suggested. The first was offered in the 1850s by Russian historian Sergei Soloviev, who presented Ivan the Terrible as a precursor of Peter the Great in his efforts to gain harbors on the Baltic Sea and thus to establish direct economic relations with European countries. Until 1991 this explanation remained predominant in Russian and Soviet historiography; it was also shared by some Swedish and Danish scholars.

However, from the 1960s on, the thesis of economic (trade) interests underlying Ivan IV's decision to make war on Livonia has been subjected to sharp criticism. The critics pointed out that the tsar, justifying his military actions in Livonia, never referred to the need for direct trade with Europe; instead he referred to his hereditary rights, calling Livonia his patrimony (*votchina*). The alternative explanation proposed by Norbert Angermann (1972) and supported by Erik Tiberg (1984) and, in the 1990s, by some Russian scholars (Filyushkin, 2001), emphasizes the tsar's ambition for expanding his power and might.

It is most likely that Ivan IV started the war with no strategic plan in mind: He just wanted to punish the Livonians and force them to pay the contribution and fulfil all the conditions of the previous treaty. The initial success gave the tsar hope of conquering all Livonia, but here his interests clashed with the interests of Poland-Lithuania and Sweden, and thus a local conflict grew into a long and exhaustive war between the greatest powers of the Baltic region.

As the war progressed, Ivan IV changed allies and enemies; the scene of operations also changed. So, in the course of the war one can distinguish four different periods: 1) from 1558 to 1561, the period of initial Russian success in Livonia; 2) the 1560s, the period of confrontation with Lithuania and peaceful relations with Sweden; 3) from 1570 to 1577, the last efforts of Ivan IV in Livonia; and 4) from 1578 to 1582, when severe blows from Poland-Lithuania and Sweden forced Ivan IV to give up all his acquisitions in Livonia and start peace negotiations.

During the campaign of 1558, Russian armies, encountering no serious resistance, took the important harbor of Narva (May 11) and the city of Dorpat (July 19). After a long pause (an armistice

from March through November 1559), in 1560 Russian troops undertook a new offensive in Livonia. On August 2 the main forces of the Order were defeated near Ermes (now Ergeme); on August 30 an army led by prince Andrei Kurbsky captured the castle of Fellin (now Vilyandy).

As the collapse of the enfeebled Livonian Order became evident, the knighthood and cities of Livonia began to seek the protection of Baltic powers: Lithuania, Sweden, and Denmark. In 1561 the country was divided: The last master of the Order, Gottard Kettler, became vassal of Sigismund II Augustus, the king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania, and acknowledged sovereignty of the latter over the territory of the abolished Order; simultaneously the northern part of Livonia, including Reval (now Tallinn), was occupied by the Swedish troops.

Regarding Sigismund II as his principal rival in Livonia and trying to ally with Erik XIV of Sweden, Ivan IV declared war on Lithuania in 1562. A large Russian army, led by the tsar himself, besieged the city of Polotsk on the eastern frontier of the Lithuanian duchy and seized it on February 15, 1563. In the following years Lithuanians managed to avenge this failure, winning two battles in 1564 and capturing two minor fortresses in 1568, but no decisive success was achieved.

By the beginning of the 1570s the international situation had changed again: A coup d'état in Sweden (Erik XIV was dethroned by his brother John III) put an end to the Russian-Swedish alliance; Poland and Lithuania (in 1569 the two states united into one, Rzecz Pospolita), on the contrary, adhered to a peaceful policy during the sickness of King Sigismund II Augustus (d. 1572) and periods of interregnum (1572-1573, 1574-1575). Under these circumstances Ivan IV tried to drive Swedish forces out of northern Livonia: Russian troops and the tsar's vassal, Danish duke Magnus (brother of Frederick II of Denmark), besieged Revel for thirty weeks (August 21, 1570-March 16, 1571), but in vain. The alliance with the Danish king proved its inefficiency, and the raids of Crimean Tartars (for instance, the burning of Moscow by Khan Devlet-Girey on May 24, 1571) made the tsar postpone further actions in Livonia for several years.

In 1577 Ivan IV made his last effort to conquer Livonia; his troops occupied almost the entire country (except for Reval and Riga). Next year the war entered its final phase, fatal to the Russian cause in Livonia.

In 1578 Russian troops in Livonia were defeated by combined Polish–Lithuanian and Swedish forces near the fortress Venden (now Tsisis), and the tsar’s vassal, duke Magnus, joined the Polish side. In 1579 the Polish king, Stephen Bathory, a talented general, recaptured Polotsk; the following year, he invaded Russia and devastated the Pskov region, having taken the fortresses of Velizh and Usvyat and having burned Velikiye Luki. During his third Russian campaign in August 1581, Bathory besieged Pskov; the garrison led by prince Ivan Shuisky repulsed thirty–one assaults. At the same time the Swedish troops seized Narva. Without allies, Ivan IV sought peace. On January 15, 1582, the treaty concluded in Yam Zapolsky put an end to the war with Rzecz Pospolita: Ivan IV gave up Livonia, Polotsk, and Velizh (Velikiye Luki was returned to Russia). In 1583 the armistice with Sweden was concluded, yielding Russian towns Yam, Kopyrye, and Ivangorod to the Swedish side.

The failure of the Livonian war spelled disaster for Ivan IV’s foreign policy; it weakened the position of Russia towards its neighbors in the west and north, and the war was calamitous for the northwestern regions of the country.

See also: IVAN IV

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MIKHAIL M. KROM

LOBACHEVSKY, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(1792–1856), mathematician; creator of the first non-Euclidean geometry.

Nikolai Lobachevsky was born in Nizhny Novgorod to the family of a minor government official. In 1809 he enrolled in Kazan University, selecting mathematics as his major field. From Martin Bartels and Franz Bronner, German immigrant professors, he learned the fundamentals of trigonometry, analytical geometry, celestial mechanics, differential calculus, the history of mathematics, and astronomy. Bronner also introduced him to the current controversies in the philosophy of science.

In 1811 Lobachevsky was granted a magisterial degree, and three years later he was appointed instructor in mathematics at Kazan University. His first teaching assignment was trigonometry and number theory as advanced by Carl Friedrich Gauss. In 1816 he was promoted to the rank of associate professor. In 1823 he published a gymnasium textbook in geometry and, in 1824, a textbook in algebra.

Lobachevsky’s strong interest in geometry was first manifested in 1817 when, in one of his teaching courses, he dwelt in detail on his effort to adduce proofs for Euclid’s fifth (parallel) postulate. In 1826, at a faculty meeting, he presented a paper that showed that he had abandoned the idea of searching for proofs for the fifth postulate; in contrast to Euclid’s claim, he stated that more than one parallel could be drawn through a point outside a line. On the basis of his postulate, Lobachevsky constructed a new geometry including, in some opinions, Euclid’s creation as a special case. Although the text of Lobachevsky’s report was not preserved, it can be safely assumed that its contents were repeated in his “Elements of Geometry,” published in the *Kazan Herald* in 1829–1830. In the meantime, Lobachevsky was elected the rector of the university, a position he held until 1846.

In order to inform Western scientists about his new ideas, in 1837 Lobachevsky published an article in French (“*Geometrie imaginaire*”) and in 1840 a small book in German (*Geometrische Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Parallellinien*). His article “Pangeometry” appeared in Russian in 1855 and in French in 1856, the year of his death. At no time did Lobachevsky try to invalidate Euclid’s geometry; he only wanted to show that there was room and necessity for more than one geometry. After becoming familiar with the new geometry, Carl Friedrich Gauss was instrumental in Lobachevsky’s election as an honorary member of the Gottingen Scientific Society.

After the mid-nineteenth century, Lobachevsky’s revolutionary ideas in geometry began to attract serious attention in the West. Eugenio Beltrami in Italy, Henri Poincare in France, and Felix Klein in Germany contributed to the integration of non-Euclidean geometry into the mainstream of modern mathematics. The English mathematician William Kingdon Clifford attributed Copernican significance to Lobachevsky’s ideas.

On the initiative of Alexander Vasiliev, professor of mathematics, in 1893 Kazan University

celebrated the centennial of Lobachevsky's birth. On this occasion, Vasiliev presented a lengthy paper explaining not only the scientific and philosophical messages of the first non-Euclidean geometry but also their growing acceptance in the West. At this time, Kazan University established the Lobachevsky Prize, to be given annually to a selected mathematician whose work was related to the Lobachevsky legacy. Among the early recipients of the prize were Sophus Lie and Henri Poincaré.

In 1926 Kazan University celebrated the centennial of Lobachevsky's non-Euclidean geometry. All speakers placed emphasis on Lobachevsky's influence on modern scientific thought. Alexander Kotelnikov advanced important arguments in favor of close relations of Lobachevsky's geometrical propositions to Einstein's general theory of relativity. Lobachevsky also received credit for a major contribution to modern axiomatics and for proving that entire sciences could be created by logical deductions from assumed propositions.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

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ALEXANDER VUCINICH

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

The history of local government in Russia and Soviet Union can be characterized as a story of grand plans and the inability to fully implement these plans. The first serious attempt to establish this branch of government in Russia came during the reign of Peter I. Between 1708 and 1719 Peter introduced provincial reforms, in which the country was divided into fifty *guberniiu* (provinces). Each of the provinces was then subdivided into *uyezdy* (districts). Appointed administrators governed the provinces, while district administrators and councils assisting provincial administrators were elected among local gentry. Provincial and district government was to be responsible for local health, ed-

ucation, and economic development. In 1720-1721 Peter introduced his municipal reform. This was the continuation of the earlier, 1699 effort to reorganize municipal finances. Municipal administration was to be elected from among the townspeople, and it was to be responsible for day-to-day running of a town or city.

The results of Peter's reforms of local and municipal government were uneven. The basic subdivisions for the country (provinces and districts) survived the imperial period and were successfully adopted by Soviet authorities. The substance of the reforms—the elective principle and local responsibility—fell victim to local apathy and inability to find suitable officials.

Another attempt to reform local government in Russia took place during the reign of Catherine II. Catherine followed the policy of strengthening of gentry as a class, and under her Charter of Nobility of 1785, the gentry of each province was given a status of legal body with wide-ranging legal and property rights. The gentry, together with the centrally appointed governor, constituted local government in Russia under Catherine. In the same year, Catherine II granted a charter to towns, which provided for limited municipal government, controlled by wealthy merchants.

The truly wide-ranging local and municipal reforms were instituted during the reign of Alexander II. The 1864 local government reform established local (*zemstvo*) assemblies and boards on provincial and district levels. Representation in district *Zemstvos* was proportional to land ownership, with allowances for real estate ownership in towns. Members of district *Zemstvos* elected, among themselves, a provincial assembly. Assemblies met once per year to discuss basic policy and budget. They also elected *Zemstvo* boards, which, together with professional staff, dealt with everyday administrative matters. The *Zemstvo* system was authorized to deal with education, medical and veterinary services, insurance, roads, emergency food supplies, local statistics, and other matters.

Wide-ranging municipal reforms started in the early 1860s, when several cities were granted, on a trial basis, the right to draft their own municipal charter and elect a city council. The result of these experiments was the 1870 Municipal Charter. Under its provision, a town council was elected by all property owners or taxpayers. The council elected an administrative board, which ran a town between the elections.

The local government reforms of 1860s and 1870s were wide-ranging and significant. However, they still left significant inequalities in the system. Electoral rights were based on property ownership, and largest property owners—the gentry in the rural areas and the wealthy merchants in the cities—had the greatest representation in the local government. These inequalities increased under the successors of Alexander II—Alexander III and Nicholas II—when peasants and the non-Orthodox religious minorities were denied rights to elect and be elected.

The February Revolution of 1917 brought local and municipal government reforms of 1860s and 1870s to their widest possible extent. The lifting of all class-, nationality-, and religion-based restrictions on citizens' participation in government considerably widened local government electorate. The temporary municipal administration law of June 9 formulated accountability, conflicts of interest, and appeal mechanisms. As central government weakened between February and October Revolutions, the role of local government in providing services and basic security to the citizens increased. At the same time, the soviets, the locally based umbrella bodies of socialist organizations, came into existence. The soviets and old local administrations coexisted throughout the Russian Civil War. As Bolsheviks consolidated power, however, the old local administrations were dissolved, and local soviets assumed their responsibilities. Throughout early 1920s the local soviets were purged of non-Bolshevik representatives and, by the time of Lenin's death, they lost their practical importance as a seat of power in the Soviet Union. The structure of local soviets was similar to that of the provincial and district Zemstvos. They consisted of standing and plenary committees, which discussed matters before them and elected presidium and the chair of the soviet. Local soviets were tightly intertwined with local Communist Party structures and representatives of central government. This, together with their inability to raise taxes and tight central control, severely curtailed their effectiveness in such areas as public housing, municipal transport, retail trade, health, and welfare. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a move away from soviets and toward Western models of local government. However, the shape of this branch of government is yet to be decided in the post-Communist Russian Federation.

See also: ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; GUBERNIYA; SOVIET; TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS; ZEMSTVO

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IGOR YEYKELIS

LOMONOSOV, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH

(1711–1765), chemist, physicist, poet.

Mikhail Lomonosov was born in a small coastal village near Arkhangelsk. His father was a prosperous fisherman and trader. At age nineteen Lomonosov enrolled in the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy in Moscow, a religious institution where he learned Latin and was exposed to Aristotelian philosophy and logic. In 1736 he was one of sixteen students selected to continue their studies at the newly established secular university at the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. Immediately the Academy sent him to Marburg University in Germany to study the physical sciences under the guidance of Christian Wolff, famous for his versatile interest in the links between physics and philosophy. He also spent some time in Freiberg, where he studied mining techniques. He sent several scientific papers to St. Petersburg. After five years in Germany, he returned to St. Petersburg and began immediately to present papers on physical and chemical themes. In 1745 he was elected full professor at the Academy.

Lomonosov drew admiring attention not only as “the father of Russian science” but also as a major modernizer of national poetry. He introduced the living word as the vehicle of poetic expression. According to Vissarion Belinsky, who wrote in the middle of the nineteenth century: “His language is pure and noble, his style is precise and powerful, and his verse is full of glitter and soaring spirit.” According to Evelyn Bristol: “Lomonosov created a body of verse whose excellence was unprecedented in his own language.”

Lomonosov's work in science was of an encyclopedic scope; he was actively engaged in physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, meteorology, and navigation. He also contributed to population studies, political economy, Russian history, rhetoric, and



Portrait of poet and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov from the State Hermitage Museum collection. © REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF THE STATE HERMITAGE MUSEUM, ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA/CORBIS

grammar. He brought the most advanced scientific theories to Russia, commented on their strengths and weaknesses, and advanced original ideas. He sided with Newton's atomistic views on the structure of matter; questioned the existence of the heat-generating caloric, a popular crutch of eighteenth-century science; and endorsed and commented on Huygens's clearly manifested inclination toward the wave theory of light. He raised the question of the scientific validity of the notion of instantaneous action at a distance that was built into Newton's notion of universal gravitation, conducted experimental research in atmospheric electricity, made the first steps toward the formulation of conservation laws, suggested a historical orientation in the study of the terrestrial strata, and claimed the presence of atmosphere at the planet Venus. In the judgment of Henry M. Leicester, Lomonosov's scientific papers revealed "a remarkable originality and . . . ability to follow his theories to their logical ends, even though his conclusions were sometimes erroneous."

In a series of odes, Lomonosov combined his poetic gifts with his scientific engagement to pro-

duce scientific poetry. These odes dealt with scientific themes and were dedicated to the popularization of rationalist methods in obtaining socially valuable knowledge. "A Letter on the Uses of Glass," one such ode, relied on rich and poignant metaphors to portray the invincible power of scientific ideas of the kind advanced by Kepler, Huygens, and Newton. This poem, an ode in praise of the scientific world outlook, is the first Russian literary work to hail Copernicus's heliocentrism.

The appearance of Lomonosov's papers on physical and chemical themes in the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences journal *Novy Kommentary* (*New Commentary*) during the 1750s marked the beginning of a new epoch in Russia's cultural history. They were the first publications of scientific papers by a native Russian scholar to appear in the same journal with contributions by established naturalists and mathematicians of Western origin and training. The papers, presented in Latin, dealt with major scientific problems of the day and were noticed by reviewers in Western scholarly journals.

Few of his Russian contemporaries understood the intellectual and social significance of Lomonosov's achievements in science and of his enthusiastic advocacy of Baconian views on science as the commanding source of social progress. His relations with the members of the St. Petersburg Academy and with distinguished members of the literary community were punctuated by stormy conflicts, personal and professional. He showed a tendency to magnify the animosity, overt or latent, of German academicians toward Russian personnel and Russia's cultural environment. Particularly noted were his outbursts against G. F. Müller, A. L. Schlozer, and G. Z. Bayer, the founders of the Norman theory of the origin of the Russian state. On one occasion, he was sent to jail as a result of complaints by foreign colleagues regarding his abusive language at scientific sessions of the Academy. In the face of mounting complaints about his behavior, Catherine II signed a decree in 1763 forcing Lomonosov to retire; however, before the Senate could ratify the decree, the empress changed her mind. Part of Lomonosov's obstinacy stemmed from his desire to see increased Russian representation in the administration of the Academy. In fairness to Lomonosov, it must be noted that he had high respect for and maintained cordial relations with most German members of the Academy.

Lomonosov went through a series of skirmishes with theologians who protected the irrevoc-

cability of canonized belief from the challenges launched by science, and even wrote a hymn lampooning the theologians who stood in the way of scientific progress. While attacking theological zealots, he never deviated from a candid respect for religion—and he never alienated himself from the church. Small wonder, then, that two archimandrites and a long line of priests officiated at his burial rites. After his death, the church recognized him as one of Russia's premier citizens, and many learned theologians took an active part in building the symbolism of the Lomonosov legend.

In his time, and shortly after his death, Lomonosov was known almost exclusively as a poet; only isolated contemporaries grasped the intellectual and social significance of his achievements in science. A good part of his main scientific manuscripts languished in the archives of the St. Petersburg Academy until the beginning of the twentieth century. Lomonosov was known for having made little effort to communicate with Russian scientists in and outside the Academy. On his death, a commemorative session was attended by eight members of the Academy, who heard a short encomium delivered by Nicholas Gabriel de Clerc, a French doctor of medicine, writer on Russian history, newly elected honorary member of the Academy, and personal physician of Kirill Razumovsky, president of the Academy. While de Clerc praised Lomonosov effusively, he barely mentioned his work in science.

See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; EDUCATION; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; SLAVIC-GREEK-LATIN ACADEMY

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ALEXANDER VUCINICH

LORIS-MELIKOV, MIKHAIL TARIELOVICH

(1825–1888), Russian general and minister, head of Supreme Executive Commission in 1880–1881.

Mikhail Loris-Melikov was born in Tiflis into a noble family. He studied at the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in Moscow and at the military school in St. Petersburg (1839–1843). In 1843 he started his military service as a minor officer in a guard hussar regiment. In 1847 he asked to be transferred to the Caucasus, where he took part in the war with highlanders in Chechnya and Dagestan. He later fought in the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856. From 1855 to 1875 he served as the superintendent of the different districts beyond the Caucasus and proved a gifted administrator. In 1875 Loris-Melikov was promoted to cavalry general. From 1876 he served as the commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps. During the war with Turkey of 1877–1878 Loris-Melikov commanded Russian armies beyond the Caucasus, and distinguished himself in the sieges of Ardagan and Kars. In 1878 he was awarded the title of a count.

In April of 1879, after Alexander Soloviev's assault on emperor Alexander II, Loris-Melikov was appointed temporary governor-general of Kharkov. He tried to gain the support of the liberal community and was the only one of the six governor-generals with emergency powers who did not approve a single death penalty. A week after the explosion of February 5, 1880, in the Winter Palace, he was appointed head of the Supreme Executive Commission and assumed almost dictator-like power. He continued his policy of cooperation with liberals, seeing it as a way of restoring order in the country. At the same time, he was strict in his tactics of dealing with revolutionaries. In the underground press, these tactics were called "the wolf's jaws and the fox's tail." In April 1880 Loris-Melikov presented to Alexander II a report containing a program of reforms, including a tax reform, a local governing reform, a passport system reform, and others. The project encouraged the inclusion of elected representatives of the nobility, of *zemstvos*, and of city government institutions in the discussions of the drafts of some State orders.

In August 1880 the Supreme Executive Commission was dismissed at the order of Loris-Melikov, who believed that the commission had done its job. At the same time, the Ministry of Interior and the Political Police were reinstated. The third division of the Emperor's personal chancellery (the secret police) was dismissed, and its functions were given to the Department of State Police of the Ministry of the Interior. Loris-Melikov was appointed minister of the interior. In September 1880, at the initiative of Loris-Melikov, senators' inspections were

undertaken in various regions of Russia. The results were to be taken into consideration during the preparation of reforms. In January 1880 Loris-Melikov presented a report to the emperor in which he suggested the institution of committees for analyzing and implementing the results of the senators' inspections. The committees were to consist of State officials and elected representatives of *zemstvos* and city governments. The project later became known under the inaccurate name of "Loris-Melikov's Constitution." On the morning of March 13, 1881, Alexander II signed the report presented by Loris-Melikov and called for a meeting of the Council of Ministers to discuss the document. The same day the emperor was killed by the members of People's Will.

At the meeting of the Council of Ministers on March 20, 1881, Loris-Melikov's project was harshly criticized by Konstantin Pobedonostsev and other conservators, who saw this document as a first step toward the creation of a constitution. The new emperor, Alexander III, accepted the conservators' position, and on May 11 he issued the manifesto of the "unquestionability of autocracy," which meant the end of the reformist policy. The next day, Loris-Melikov and two other reformist ministers, Alexander Abaza and Dmitry Miliutin, resigned, provoking the first ministry crisis in Russian history.

Having resigned, but remaining a member of the State Council, Loris-Melikov lived mainly abroad in Germany and France. He died in Nice.

See also: ALEXANDER II; AUTOCRACY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION; ZEMSTVO

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

LOTMAN, YURI MIKHAILOVICH

(1922–1993), scholar, founder of the Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School.

Yuri Lotman was a widely cited scholar of Soviet literary semiotics and structuralism. He estab-

lished the Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School at Tartu University in Estonia. This school is famous for its *Works on Sign Systems* (published in Russian as *Trudy po znakovym sistemam*). Unusually prolific, he published some eight hundred works on a high scholarly level. He is sometimes compared to Mikhail Bakhtin, another well-known Russian scholar.

Lotman began teaching at the University of Tartu in 1954. Starting as a historian of Russian literature, Lotman focused on the work of Radishchev, Karamzin, and Vyazemsky and the writers linked to the Decembrist movement. His later books covered all major literary works, from the *Lay of Igor's Campaign* to the classic nineteenth-century authors such as Pushkin and Gogol, to Bulgakov, Pasternak, and Brodsky. From traditional philology Lotman shifted in the early sixties to cultural semiotics. His first key publication of that time, *Lectures on Structural Poetics* (1964), introduced the abovementioned series *Trudy po znakovym sistemam*, which was one of the main initiatives of the Tartu-Moscow school.

Lotman's theory of literature rests upon two closely related sets of fundamental concepts—those of semiotics and structuralism. Semiotics is the science of signs and sign systems, which studies the basic characteristics of all signs and their combinations: the words and word combinations of natural and artificial languages, the metaphors of poetic language, and chemical and mathematical symbols. It also treats systems of signs such as those of artificial logical and machine languages, the languages of various poetic schools, codes, animal communication systems, and so on. Each sign contains: a) the signifying material (perceived by the sense organs), and b) the signified aspect (meaning). For words of natural (ordinary) language, pronunciation or writing is the signifying aspect while content is the signified aspect. The signs of one system (for example, the words of a language) can be the signifying aspect for complex signs of another system (such as that of poetic language) superimposed on them.

Lotman defined structuralism as "the idea of a system: a complete, self-regulating entity that adapts to new conditions by transforming its features while retaining its systematic structure." He argued that any chosen object of investigation must be viewed as an interrelated, interdependent system composed of units and rules for their possible combinations. He defined culture itself as "the whole of uninherited information and the ways of its organization and storage." From the point of view of

semiotics, anything linked with meaning in fact belongs to culture. Since natural language is the central operator of culture, Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow school deemed natural language to be a primary modeling system containing a general picture of the world. Language was the most developed, universal means of communication—the “system of systems.” Lotman took keen interest in the way philosophical ideas, world views, and social values of a given period are enacted in its literature (via language). For Lotman, a period’s literary and ideological consciousness and the aesthetics of its trends and currents have a systemic quality. These categories are not a hodgepodge of convictions about the world and literature, but a hierarchic group of cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic values.

Critics might object to perceived “scientific optimism,” reductionism, and polemics of the Tartu-Moscow School. The ideological pressures within the USSR with which the school coped probably discouraged internal debates and explicit criticism of its own views.

See also: BAKHTIN, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH; EDUCATION; ESTONIA AND ESTONIANS

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

LOVERS OF WISDOM, THE

The Lovers of Wisdom (*Liubomudry*), writers based in Moscow during the 1820s, were strongly influenced by Romanticism and set out to explore the philosophical, religious, aesthetic and cultural implications of German Idealist philosophy. The Society for the Love of Wisdom met secretly in the apartment of its president, Vladimir Odoyevsky (ca. 1803–1869) from 1823 to 1825. While the Society formally disbanded following the Decembrist uprising, its members’ works continued to display unity of interest and purpose through the late 1820s. The group’s core consisted of Odoyevsky,

Dmitry Venevitinov (1805–1827), Ivan Kireyevsky (1806–1856), Alexander Koshelev (1806–1883), and Nikolai Rozhalin (1805–1834). But the number of people generally considered Lovers of Wisdom is much broader, including Alexei Khomyakov (1804–1860), Stepan Shevyrev (1806–1864), Vladimir Titov (1807–1891), Dmitry Struisky (1806–1856), Nikolai Melgunov (1804–1867), and Mikhail Pogodin (1800–1875).

In secondary literature, the Lovers of Wisdom have long been overshadowed by the Decembrists. While the Decembrists pursued political and military careers in St. Petersburg and allegedly conspired to force political reform, the Lovers of Wisdom bided their time at comfortably undemanding jobs at the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They indulged in speculation on the most abstract issues, with a bent toward mysticism. Even their choice of name, “Lovers of Wisdom” as opposed to “philosophers”, or *philosophes*, is thought to have marked their opposition to the progressive tradition of the radical Enlightenment.

Yet the Lovers of Wisdom thought of themselves as enlighteners in the broader sense. They aimed to reinvigorate Russian high culture by attacking the moral corruption of the nobility and promoting creativity and the pursuit of knowledge. They contrasted the superstition and petty-mindedness of the nobility to the moral purity of the “lover of wisdom,” who often appeared in their satires and oriental tales in the guise of a magus, dervish, brahmin, Greek philosopher, or sculptor, or a misunderstood Russian writer. Whether in short stories, metaphysical poetry, or quasi-philosophical prose works, Odoyevsky, Venevitinov, Khomyakov and Shevyrev emphasized the great spiritual and even religious importance of the young, creative individual, or genius. The special status of such individuals was only highlighted by their apparent moral fragility and vulnerability in a hostile environment.

The group was heavily indebted to Romanticism and to German Idealist philosophy. Admittedly, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s philosophy seems to have appealed in part because it was difficult to understand. As Koyré (1929) remarked, their Romanticism was characterized by a “slightly puerile desire to feel ‘isolated from the crowd,’ the desire for the esoteric, which is complemented by the possession of a secret, even if that secret consists only in the fact that one possesses one.” (p. 37). But their works also display a genuine

commitment to principles such as the fundamental unity of matter and ideas, and the notion that these achieve higher synthesis in the absolute, the spirit that guides the world. To them, creating a work of art, or striving for any kind of knowledge, brought the individual into contact with the absolute, lending the artist or intellectual special religious status.

Such views did not accord with Orthodox Christianity. The political authorities did not welcome them either. Yet the Lovers of Wisdom found ways of promoting their views in poetry and prose they published in journals and almanacs, especially in *Mnemozina* (1824–1825), edited by Odoevsky with the Decembrist Wilhelm Kyukhelbeker, and *Moskovsky vestnik* (1827–1830), edited by Pogodin. They also published translations from leading voices of Romanticism such as Goethe, Byron, Tieck and Wackenroder.

The closure of *Moskovsky vestnik* in 1830 marked the end of the Lovers of Wisdom as a group. But the death of Venevitinov, often considered their most talented member, in 1827, had already dealt them a blow, as did the departure of many key members from Moscow in the late 1820s. In the early 1830s, the group's members developed in new directions. Some of them, such as Kireyevsky and Khomyakov, eventually became leaders of the Slavophile movement, arguably the most coherent and original strain in nineteenth-century Russian thought.

See also: DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; KHOMYAKOV, ALEXEI STEPANOVICH; KIREYEVSKY, IVAN VASILIEVICH; ODOYEVSKY, VLADIMIR FYODOROVICH; POGODIN, MIKHAIL PETROVICH

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VICTORIA FREDE

LUBOK

Broadsides or broadsheet prints (pl. *lubki*).

Broadsides first appeared in Russia in the seventeenth century, probably inspired by German

woodcuts. Subjects were depicted in a native style. Captions complemented the printed images. The earliest *lubki* represented saints and other religious figures, but humorous illustrations also circulated that captured the parody spirit of *skomorok* (minstrel) performances of the era—especially the wacky wordplay of the theatrical entr'actes.

In the 1760s prints began to be made from metal plates, facilitating production of longer texts. Lithographic stone supplanted copper plates, but in turn gave way to cheaper and lighter zinc plates in the second half of the nineteenth century. Pedlars bought the pictures in bulk at fairs or in Moscow and sold them in the countryside. Originally acquired by nobles, the images were taken up by the merchantry, officials, and tradesmen before becoming the province of the peasantry in the nineteenth century, at which point *lubok*, in its adjectival form, came to mean “shoddy.” It was also in the nineteenth century that the term came to refer to cheap printed booklets aimed at popular audiences.

Lubki depicted historical figures, characters from folklore, contemporary members of the ruling family, festival pastimes, battle scenes, judicial punishments, and hunting and other aspects of everyday life, along with religious subjects. The prints decorated peasant huts, taverns, and the insides of lids of trunks used by peasants when they moved to cities or factories to work. The native style of the prints was adapted by Old Believers in the nineteenth century in their manuscript printing. Avant-garde artists in the early twentieth century drew inspiration from the style in their neo-primitivist phase. An “Exhibition of Icons and Lubki” was held in Moscow in 1913.

See also: CHAPBOOK LITERATURE; OLD BELIEVERS

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GARY THURSTON

LUBYANKA

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission on the Struggle Against Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation (VCHK, or Cheka) was founded by the Bolsheviks in December 1917. Headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, it was responsible for liquidating counterrevolutionary elements and remanding saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries to be tried by the revolutionary-military tribunal. In February 1918 it was authorized to shoot active enemies of the revolution rather than turn them over to the tribunal.

In March 1918 the Cheka established its headquarters in the buildings at 11 and 13 Great Lubyanka Street in Moscow. Between the 1930s and the beginning of the 1980s, a complex of buildings belonging to the security establishment grew up along Great Lubyanka Street. The building at No. 20 was constructed in 1982 as the headquarters of the KGB (Committee of State Security), now the FSB (Federal Security Bureau), for Moscow and the Moscow area.

The famous Lubyanka Internal Prison was situated in the courtyard of what is now the main building of the FSB on Lubyanka Street. Closed in the 1960s, it is at present the site of a dining room, offices, and a warehouse. All its prisoners were transferred to Lefortovo. In the time of mass reprisals, prisoners were regularly shot in the courtyard of the Lubyanka Prison. Automobile engines were run to drown out the noise. Suspects were brutally interrogated in the prison's basement.

In addition to the FSB headquarters, the buildings on Lubyanka Street also include a museum of the history of the state security agencies. The office of Lavrenty Beria, long-time chief of the Soviet security apparatus, has been kept unchanged and is open to visitors.

See also: BERIA, LAVRENTI PAVLOVICH; DZERZHINSKY, FELIX EDMUNDOVICH; GULAG; LEFORTOVO; MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR; PRISONS; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF



A statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky—the first head of the Soviet secret police—looms over Lubyanka Prison in Moscow. Following the failed August 1991 coup attempt by Communist Party hard-liners, this statue was torn down. © NOVOSTI/ISOVOTO

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GEORG WÜRZER

LUKASHENKO, ALEXANDER GRIGORIEVICH

(b. 1954), president of Belarus.

Alexander Grigorievich Lukashenko became president of Belarus on July 10, 1994, when he defeated Prime Minister Vyachaslav Kebich in the country's first presidential election, running on a platform of anti-corruption and closer relations with Russia. He established a harsh dictatorship as president, amending the constitution to consolidate his authority.

Lukashenko was born in August 1954 in the village of Kopys (Orshanske Rayon, Vitebsk Oblast), but most of his early career was spent in Mahileu region, where he graduated from the Mahileu Teaching Institute (his speciality was history) and the Belarusian Agricultural Academy. From 1975 to 1977, he was a border guard in the Brest area. He then spent five years in the army before returning to Mahileu, and the town of Shklau, where he worked as manager of state and collective farms, and also in a construction materials combine. He was elected to the Belarusian Supreme Soviet in 1990, where he founded a faction called Communists for Democracy. In the early 1990s he chaired a commission investigating corruption.

In April 1995, several months into his presidency, Lukashenko organized a referendum that replaced the country's state symbols and national flag with others very similar to the Soviet ones and elevated Russian to a state language. A second referendum in November 1996 considerably enhanced the authority of the presidency by reducing the parliament to a rump body of 120 seats (formerly there were 260 deputies), establishing an upper house closely attached to the presidency, and curtailing the authority of the Constitutional Court. Lukashenko then dated his presidency from late 1996 rather than the original election date of July 1994.

By April 1995, Lukashenko had established a community relationship with Boris Yeltsin's Russia, which went through several stages before be-

ing formalized as a Union state in late 1999. Under Vladimir Putin, however, Russia distanced itself from the agreement and in the summer of 2002 threatened to incorporate Belarus into the Russian Federation.

Lukashenko clamped down on opposition movements and imposed tight censorship over the media. His contraventions of human rights in the republic have elicited international concern.

See also: BELARUS AND BELARUSIANS

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DAVID R. MARPLES

LUKYANOV, ANATOLY IVANOVICH

(b. 1930), chair of the USSR Supreme Soviet during the August 1991 coup attempt.

Anatoly Lukyanov studied law at Moscow State University, graduating in 1953. While at the university, he chaired the University Komsomol branch, and Mikhail Gorbachev was deputy chair. Lukyanov joined the Party in 1955 and began a career within the Party apparatus. He was appointed to the Central Committee Secretariat in 1987. By 1988, Lukyanov was named a candidate member of the Politburo and first deputy chair of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The first USSR Congress of People's Deputies elected Lukyanov chairman of the newly reconfigured Supreme Soviet in 1990. This post allowed him to control the parliamentary agenda. He was repeatedly accused of stonewalling legislation he did not like and putting bills he supported to vote multiple times if they were voted down.

Despite his close personal links with Gorbachev, Lukyanov sided with opponents of Gorbachev's policies. The hard-line Soyuz faction particularly favored Lukyanov over Gorbachev. During his December 1990 resignation speech to the Congress, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze specifically criticized Lukyanov for interfering in Soviet-German relations and for his desire for a dictatorship.

As Gorbachev's new Union Treaty neared ratification in summer 1991, hard-line members of the Soviet leadership hierarchy staged a coup to overthrow Gorbachev and prevent adoption of the treaty. Though Lukyanov was not a member of the State Committee for the State of Emergency that briefly seized power August 19–21, 1991, he supported their efforts. Lukyanov was arrested following the coup's collapse, then amnestied in February 1994 and elected to the Russian Duma in 1995 and 1999, where he chaired the parliamentary committee on government reform.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH

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LUNACHARSKY, ANATOLY VASILIEVICH

(1875–1933), Bolshevik intellectual and early Soviet leader.

Born the son of a state councilor, Anatoly Lunacharsky joined the Social Democratic movement in 1898 and was soon arrested. As an exile in Vologda, he met Alexander Bogdanov. In Paris in 1904 both men joined the Bolshevik faction, but they left it again in 1911 after clashes with Lenin over philosophy. Bogdanov advocated empiriocriticism, claiming that only direct experience could be relied on as a basis for knowledge. Lunacharsky promoted God-building, an anthropocentric religion striving toward the moral unity of mankind. Lunacharsky rejoined the Bolshevik Party in August 1917 and became the first People's Commissar of Enlightenment (*Narkom prosveshcheniya*, or *Narkompros*), serving from October 1917 to 1929. A prolific writer on literature and the arts and an important patron of the intelligentsia, Lunacharsky was often regarded within the party as too "soft" for a Bolshevik. From the mid-1920s he was increasingly marginalized, and his last years at Narkompros were marked by fierce battles over education and culture as his soft line in policy was discredited with the onset of the Cultural Revolution. After his resignation from Narkompros, he

held various second-rank positions in cultural administration and spent much time abroad, partly for health reasons. In 1933 he was appointed ambassador to Spain, but died before assuming the position. His reputation plummeted after his death, but from the 1960s to the 1980s, thanks partly to the untiring work of his daughter, Irina Lunacharskaya, he became a symbol of a (pre-Stalinist) humanistic Bolshevism protective of the intelligentsia and committed to the advancement of high culture.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; CULTURAL REVOLUTION; EDUCATION; PROLETKULT

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SHEILA FITZPATRICK

LUZHKO V , Y U R I M I K H A I L O V I C H

(b. 1936), Russian politician and mayor of Moscow.

Yuri Luzhkov became a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1968 and remained a member until the party was outlawed in the wake of the failed coup of August 1991. He left a management career in the chemical industry to become a deputy to the Moscow City Council (Soviet) in 1977. In 1987, his political career took a great stride forward when Boris Yeltsin became First Secretary of the Moscow Communist Party organization. In keeping with the Soviet practice of assigning party members to multiple responsibilities, Luzhkov was appointed deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and first deputy to the chair of the Moscow City Executive Committee.

Luzhkov was appointed chair of the City Executive Committee following Gavriil Popov's election as mayor of Moscow in 1990. The following year he was elected Popov's vice mayor. During the August 1991 coup, he helped organize the defense



Yuri Luzhkov is sworn in for his second term as mayor of Moscow, December 29, 1996. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS

of the White House, the parliament building of the Russian Federation from which Boris Yeltsin organized the resistance to the efforts of conservatives within the CPSU to undo the Gorbachev reforms.

Following the collapse of the coup and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, a struggle emerged between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the legislature over the course of reform. Luzhkov, owing to his strong support for Yeltsin in the conflict, was made mayor by presidential decree when Popov was forced to resign. The decree was met with opposition within the Moscow City Council, which tried unsuccessfully on two occasions to unseat Luzhkov.

As his predecessor had done, Luzhkov threw his support behind Yeltsin in the confrontation with the Russian parliament. At the height of the conflict following Yeltsin's September 1993 decree dissolving the legislature, which resulted in an armed standoff, the mayor cut off utilities and

services to the parliament and deployed the city's police to forcibly disband meetings and demonstrations organized in support of the legislature.

Luzhkov remained mayor of Moscow, but his regime has not been without controversy. He has come under particular criticism for the manner in which privatization of municipal property has been carried out. On several occasions the press has charged the mayor with corruption, favoritism, and using his position for personal gain. Despite this, the city's relatively good economic situation in comparison with the rest of the country has made Luzhkov enormously popular with Muscovites. He was reelected with 88 percent of the vote in 1996.

However, the mayor's efforts to rid the city of those without residency permits has undermined his popularity with the rest of the country. When Luzhkov announced his candidacy to the 2000 presidential elections and formed the bloc Fatherland-All Russia, supporters of Vladimir Putin were able to organize a negative ad campaign, which quickly marginalized the mayor's bloc. Following Putin's electoral victory, Luzhkov moved to defend his political position by declaring his loyalty to the new president.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA; MOSCOW; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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TERRY D. CLARK

LYSENKO, TROFIM DENISOVICH

(1898–1976), agronomist and biologist.

Trofim Denisovich Lysenko was born in Karlovka, Ukraine, to a peasant family. He attended the Kiev Agricultural Institute as an extramural student and graduated as doctor of agricultural science in 1925. A disciple of horticulturist Ivan Michurin's work, Lysenko worked at the Gyandzha Experimental Station between 1925 and 1929 and coined his theory of vernalization in the late 1920s. His vernalization theory described a process where



Soviet geneticist Trofim Lysenko measures the growth of wheat in a collective farm near Odessa, Ukraine. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

winter habit was transformed into spring habit by moistening and chilling the seed.

During the agricultural crisis of the 1930s, Soviet authorities started supporting Lysenko's theories. By the mid-1930s Lysenko's dominance in agricultural sciences was clearly established as he founded agrobiolgy, a pseudoscience that promised to increase yields rapidly and cheaply. He became president of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1938 and director of the Institute of Genetics at the Academy of Sciences in 1940. Lysenko and his followers, Lysenkoites, have long been thought to have had a direct line to the Stalinist terror apparatus as they targeted geneticists that they thought opposed Lysenkoism, most famously noted scientist Nikolai Vavilov.

As Lysenko's political influence increased, he expressed his views more forcefully. His view of genetics was irrational and based neither on reason nor scientific experimentation. His theory of heredity rejected established principles of genetics, and he

believed that he could change the genetic constitution of strains of wheat by controlling the environment. For example, he claimed that wheat plants raised in the appropriate environment produced seeds of rye.

By 1948 education and research in traditional genetics had been completely outlawed in the Soviet Union. The 1948 August Session of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences gave the Lysenkoites official endorsement for these views, which were said to correspond to Marxist theory. From that moment, and until Josef Stalin's death, Lysenko was the total autocrat of Soviet biology. His position as Stalin's henchman in Soviet science has been compared to Andrei Zhdanov's role in culture during this time of high Stalinism.

In April 1952 the Ministry of Agriculture withdrew its support of Lysenko's cluster method of planting trees, but Lysenko was not publicly rebuked until after Stalin's death in 1953. Nikita Khrushchev tolerated criticism of Lysenkoism,

but it took eleven years to completely confirm the uselessness of agrobiolgy. It was only with Khrushchev's ousting from power in 1964 that Lysenko was fully discredited and research in traditional genetics accepted. He resigned as president of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1956, and his removal from the position of director of the Institute of Genetics in 1965 signified the full return of scientific professionalism in Soviet science. Lysenko kept the title of academician and held the position of chairman for science at the Academy of Science's Agricultural Experimental Station, located not far from Moscow, until he died in November 20, 1976.

See also: AGRICULTURE; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; VAVILOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

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RÓSA MAGNÚSDÓTTIR

MACARIUS See MAKARY, METROPOLITAN.


MACHINE TRACTOR STATIONS

The Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) were budget-financed state organizations established in rural areas of the Soviet Union beginning in 1930. Intended mainly as a mechanism to provide machinery and equipment (including repairs and maintenance) to the kolkhozes (collective farms), they also exerted state control over agriculture. Payment for the services of the Machine Tractor Stations was made in kind (product) by the farms. The emergence of the MTS was closely tied to the introduction of the collective farms and especially the continuing debate over organizational arrangements in the countryside, notably the appropriate scale or size of the collective farms. The original model of the Machine Tractor Stations was based upon experimental arrangements of the Shevchenko sovkhoz (state farm) in Ukraine. The Machine Tractor Stations were introduced rapidly. By the end of 1930 there were approximately 150 Machine Tractor Stations controlling approximately 7,000 tractors. By 1933 there were 2,900 stations controlling approximately 123,000 tractors, roughly 50 percent of all tractors in agriculture, the remaining tractors belonging to state farms. Overall, the growth of the tractor park was rapid, from some 27,000 units in 1928 to 531,000 units in 1940.

The Machine Tractor Stations became the dominant mechanism for providing equipment to the kolkhozes. While the stations themselves provided state support to kolkhozes, especially to those producing grain, the political departments of the MTS (the *politotdely*), established in 1933, became an important means for exercising political control over the collective farms. This control extended well beyond the allocation and use of machinery and equipment, and specifically involved the development of production plans after the introduction of compulsory deliveries in 1933. The MTS was, therefore, an integral part of kolkhoz operations, and conflict often arose between the two organizations.

The Machine Tractor Stations were abolished in 1958 during the Khrushchev era. However, their abolition and short-term replacement with the Repair Tractor Stations (RTS) was in fact a part of a much more significant process of continuing agricultural reorganization in the 1950s and thereafter.





The first tractors coming off the assembly line at the tractor works in Stalingrad. © HULTON ARCHIVE

In addition to changes within farms during the 1950s, there was continuing emphasis on consolidating farms, converting kolkhozes to sovkhozes, and changing the organizational arrangements above the level of the individual farms. In effect, state control came to be exercised through different organizations, for example, the Territorial Production Associations (TPAs). While the machinery and equipment were dispersed to individual farms, in effect the organizational changes in the agricultural sector during the post-Stalin era consisted largely of agro-industrial integration. The changes introduced during the 1950s were mainly reforms of Nikita Khrushchev, and they became a major factor in Khrushchev's downfall in 1964.

See also: COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

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MAFIA CAPITALISM

Mafia capitalism is a term that emerged to describe Russia's economic system in the 1990s. While the implied parallel goes to the classic protection rackets of the Sicilian mafia, the actual Russian practice was different. In order to reflect this, both scholars and journalists have taken to describing the Russian system of organized crime as "mafiya."

There are obvious similarities between mafia and mafiya, in the form of organized gangs imposing tribute on businesses. This is the world of extortion, hitmen, and violent reprisals against those who fail to pay up. In the case of mafiya, however, it mainly affects the small business sector. Major actors will normally have affiliations with private security providers that operate a "cleaner" business of charging fees for protection against arson and violent assault.

To foreign businesses in particular, the latter offers plausible deniability in claiming that no money is being paid to Russian organized crime.

Money paid to private security providers, or to officials “helping out” with customs or other traditionally “difficult” parts of public administration, may also frequently be offset against lower payments of taxes, customs, and other fees.

The real outcome is one where the Russian state and thus the Russian population at large suffer great damage. Not only is the government’s traditional monopoly on violence both privatized and decentralized into hands that are under no effective control by the authorities, but money destined to have been paid to the Russian government ends up instead in the coffers of security firms.

Moreover, businesses in Russia are subjected to demands for tribute not only from organized crime gangs, but also from a broad variety of representatives of the official bureaucracy. This far exceeds the corruption associated with mafia in many other parts of the world, and explains in part why, in the compilation of international indices on corruption, Russia tends to rank amongst the worst cases.

Russian entrepreneurs will typically be subjected to several visits per month, maybe even per week, by representatives of public bodies such as the fire department or the health inspectorate, all of which will expect to receive a little on the side.

The burden on the small business sector in particular should be measured not only in financial terms, as the tribute paid may be offset by tax avoidance. Far more serious is the implied tax on the time of entrepreneurs, which often tends to be the most precious asset of a small business. The number of hours that are spent negotiating with those demanding bribes will have to be taken from productive efforts.

The overall consequences of mafiya for the Russian economy are manifested in the stifling of private initiative and degradation of the moral basis of conducting business.

See also: CRONY CAPITALISM; ORGANIZED CRIME

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STEFAN HEDLUND

MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE

Officials from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) monitored workers in key occupations to ensure their adherence to party doctrine and loyalty to the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet army and navy, the CPSU maintained a shadow system of command parallel with the military chain of command. In the early days of the USSR, Party commanders (*politruks*) ensured the political reliability of regular officers and soldiers. As the Party became more secure in the political allegiance of the military, party commanders became “deputies for political work” (*zampolit*). These officers were directly subordinated to the unit commander, but they had access to higher party officials through a separate chain of command. By and large, the *zampolit* dealt with matters such as morale, discipline, living conditions, training, and political indoctrination. Security issues such as political reliability were the primary concern of the Special Section. The Main Political Directorate also scrutinized the content of military publications, including the official newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* and military publishing houses.

In the post-Soviet era, military discipline is handled by the Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work. Without the power of the Party behind this institution, problems such as discipline, desertion, crime, and others have become increasingly more serious.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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MAKAROV, STEPAN OSIPOVICH

(1849–1904), naval commander during Russo-Japanese War; prolific writer on naval affairs.

Vice Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov, commander of the Pacific Squadron of the Russian navy

during the Russo-Japanese War and the author of more than fifty works on naval tactics, technology, and oceanography, was born in Nikolaevsk on the Bug River and graduated from naval school at Nikolaevsk on the Amur in 1865. While still in school he was deployed with the Pacific Squadron in 1863, and after graduation he joined the Baltic Fleet. Serving on the staff of Vice Admiral A.A. Popov from 1871 to 1876, Makarov was involved in naval engineering projects, including studies of problems related to damage control.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Makarov commanded the *Grand Duke Konstantin* and successfully conducted mine/torpedo warfare against Turkish units in the Black Sea, using steam launches armed with towed mines and self-propelled torpedoes. In 1878 he took part in the unsuccessful effort to construct a mine-artillery position to prevent the British Royal Navy from entering the Turkish Straits and began the development of techniques for underway minelaying. He conducted a major study of the currents in the Turkish Straits during the late 1870s, commanded the riverine flotilla that supported General Mikhail Skobelev's Akhal-Tekke Campaign in Central Asia in 1880–1881, commanded the corvette *Vityaz* on a round-the-world cruise from 1886 to 1889, served with the Baltic Fleet during the early 1890s, and was inspector of naval artillery from 1891 to 1894. During the mid-1890s Makarov completed another round-the-world cruise. In December 1897 he published his essay "Discussions on Questions of Naval Tactics." Makarov wrote extensively on the impact of technology on naval tactics and was one of the foremost authorities on mine warfare at sea. During the late 1890s he directed the construction of the Baltic Fleet's first icebreaker, the *Ermak*. In 1899 he was appointed commander of the naval base at Kronstadt.

After the Japanese surprise attack in January 1904, Makarov assumed command of the Russian squadron at Port Arthur, immediately instituting measures to raise the morale of its crews. On April 13 Makarov ordered a sortie to support Russian destroyers engaged with Japanese vessels. Shortly after getting under way his flagship, the battleship *Petropavlovsk*, struck a mine that detonated the forward magazine. Vice Admiral Makarov died along with most of the ship's crew and the painter Vasily Vereshchagin.

See also: ADMIRALTY; BALTIC FLEET; BLACK SEA FLEET; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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MAKARY, METROPOLITAN

(c. 1482–1563), also known as Macarius; archbishop of Novgorod (1526–1542); metropolitan of Moscow and all Rus (1542–1563); prominent religious and political figure of the sixteenth century.

Makary's parentage is not known, and nothing is known about him before he was tonsured at the Pafnuty-Borovsk Monastery at the end of the fifteenth century. In February 1523, Metropolitan Daniel appointed Makary archimandrite of the Luzhetsk Monastery near Mozhaisk. He became archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov on March 4, 1526, the first archbishop to be appointed to that city since 1508. This appointment may have come about, at least in part, as a result of Makary's support of the divorce of Grand Prince Basil III from his wife Solomonia in 1525 and the subsequent marriage of the grand prince to Elena Glinskaya. As archbishop, Makary undertook reorganization of the monasteries and promoted missionary activity to the Karelo-Finnic population in the northern reaches of his jurisdiction. He also undertook a number of building and restoration projects, including the direction of the unsuccessful construction of the first water mill on the Volkhov River. The greater complexity of Novgorodian church architecture in the 1530s, such as tri-apse constructions and five-cupola designs, has been attributed to Makary's intervention. Makary also undertook a number of literary and mathematical activities, including updating the Novgorod Chronicle, compiling a menology, which became the prototype of the *Great Menology*, and calculating the date of Easter through the year 2072. In 1531 he participated in the council that tried the monks Maxim the Greek, Isaak Sobaka, and Vassian Patrikeyev for holding heretical views.

Makary replaced Ioasaf (Joseph) as metropolitan of Moscow and all Rus on March 16, 1542, and took over responsibility for the education and upbringing of the young Ivan IV. He continued as a close adviser of the tsar until the end of his own life. In 1547 Makary presided over the coronation

of Ivan as tsar (January), the marriage of Ivan to Anastasia (February), and (with Ivan) a church council (January–February) that canonized a number of Rus saints. Makary was badly injured in the Moscow fire in June of that year when he was being lowered from the Kremlin wall to escape the flames. Nonetheless, he continued to remain active in religious and political affairs while he recovered. In February 1549, along with Ivan, he presided over another church council that canonized more Rus saints. In June 1550, Makary and Ivan presided over the assembly that compiled the *Sudebnik* of 1550, the first major revision of the law code since 1497. During January and February 1551, Makary presided with Ivan over the *Stoglav* (Hundred-Chapter) church council, which codified the regulations of the Church similar to the way government laws had been codified the previous year in the *Sudebnik*. Also in 1551, Makary released Maxim the Greek from imprisonment and allowed him to move to the Trinity–St. Sergius Monastery in Zagorsk but would not allow him to return to Greece.

While Ivan IV was away on the campaign against Kazan from June through October 1552, Makary, along with Ivan's wife Anastasia and brother Yuri, was left in charge of running the civil affairs of the Muscovite state. By 1553, his first large literary compilation project as metropolitan, the *Great Menology*, was completed. Makary also presided over several significant heresy trials, including those of the archimandrite of the Chudov Monastery Isaak Sobaka (1549), the military servant Matvei Bashkin, the hegumen of the Trinity–St. Sergius Monastery Artemy (1553–1554), and the monk Feodosy Kosoi (1554–1555). Also in 1555, Makary established the archiepiscopal see of Kazan. In addition, Makary directed the introduction of a new style of icon painting, which combined political and ideological concepts with religious themes. This new style was manifested in the wall and ceiling paintings of the Golden Palace in the Kremlin. The state secretary Ivan Viskovaty criticized a number of the new icons for violating the established standards of Eastern Christian icon painting. As a result, Viskovaty was brought to trial before a Church council in 1553 presided over by Makary. Viskovaty's views were condemned, but he escaped punishment and maintained his position by recanting. During the remainder of his tenure in office, Makary concentrated on a number of construction projects, including the Cathedral of the Intercession of the Virgin on the Moat (1555–1561), popularly known as Basil the Blessed

after one of its chapels, as well as two major literary compilations, the *Book of Degrees* and the *Illuminated Compilation*.

As an ideologist, Makary is credited with formulating the Church-based justification for the Muscovite conquest of Kazan as well as solidifying into a formula the Church's anti-Tatar diatribes. The close relationship between the Church and the State that he fostered was in accord with Eastern Church political theory and received visible articulation in the style of icon painting he helped to introduce. Several important letters and speeches are attributed to Makary, although he cannot be considered a major literary figure. There exist several letters of his from the time he was archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov. In his speech at the coronation of Ivan IV in 1547, Makary, in his role as metropolitan, reminded the new tsar of his duty to protect the Church. His *Reply (Otvét)* to Tsar Ivan IV was written around 1550 shortly before the Stoglav Church Council. In it, Makary cites a number of precedents concerning the inalienability of Church and monastic lands, including the Donation of Constantine, the Rule of Vladimir, and the false charter (*yarlyk*) to Metropolitan Peter.

He ends the *Reply* with a plea to the tsar not to take away the "immovable properties" belonging to the Uspensky (Assumption) Cathedral, the seat of the metropolitan. In his speech after the conquest of Kazan, Makary depicted victory as the result of a long-term religious crusade and thereby articulated the Church-based justification for Muscovy's claim to Kazan.

Perhaps Makary's most remarkable achievement was the *Great Menology (Velikie minei-chety)*, which consisted of twelve volumes, one for each month, and which comprised a total of approximately 13,500 large-format folios. The *Great Menology* included full texts of almost all Church-related writings then known in Russia, including saints' lives, sermons, letters, council decisions, translations, condemnations of heretics, and so forth, all arranged in categories of daily readings. Makary had completed a shorter version of this menology while he was archbishop of Novgorod, and the resources of the Muscovite Church allowed him to expand it to comprehensive proportions.

During his tenure as metropolitan, two other major compendious works were begun that were completed only after his death. One was the *Book of Degrees (Stepennaya kniga)*, a complete rewriting

of the Rus chronicles to provide a direct justification for the ascendancy of the Muscovite ruling dynasty from Vladimir I. The other was the *Illuminated Compilation (Litsevoi svod)*, based on the Rus chronicles. Twelve volumes were projected, of which eleven volumes are extant with more than ten thousand miniatures.

Makary died on December 31, 1563. He was buried the next day in the Uspensky Cathedral in the Moscow Kremlin. Despite apparent attempts immediately after his death and in the seventeenth century to raise him to miracle worker (*chudotvorets*) status, Makary was not canonized until 1988.

See also: BOOK OF DEGREES; IVAN IV; KAZAN; METROPOLITAN; MUSCOVY; SUDEBNIK OF 1550; TRINITY-ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

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DONALD OSTROWSKI

MAKHNO, NESTOR IVANOVICH

(1889–1934), leader of an insurgent peasant army in the civil war and hero of the libertarian Left.

Born in Ukraine of peasant stock in Hulyai-Pole, Yekaterinoslav guberniya, Nestor Makhno (né Mikhnenko) became an anarchist during the 1905 Revolution. Makhno's father had died when he was an infant, so he worked as a shepherd from the age of seven and as a metalworker in his teens, attending school only briefly. In 1910, following his arrest two years earlier for killing a police officer, Makhno was condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment because of his youth. Freed in 1917 from a Moscow prison, where he had befriended the anarchist Peter Arshinov, Makhno returned to Hulyai-Pole to chair its soviet and organize revolutionary communes. In 1918, he

established a peasant army in southeastern Ukraine and during the Civil War proved himself to be a brilliant and innovative (if unorthodox) commander. Makhno's forces battled the Central Powers, Ukrainian nationalists, the Whites, and the Reds (although he also periodically collaborated with the latter). Makhno's Revolutionary Insurgent Army played a decisive role in defeating the Whites in South Russia in 1919 and 1920, utilizing techniques of partisan and guerilla warfare to dramatic effect. The Makhnovists also oversaw an enduringly influential anarchist revolution (the *Makhnovshchina*) in southern Ukraine, summoning non-party congresses of workers and peasants and exhorting them to organize and govern themselves. In 1920, having refused to integrate his forces with the Red Army and hostile to Bolshevik authoritarianism, Makhno became an outlaw on Soviet territory. In August 1921, Red forces pursued him into Romania. After suffering imprisonment there and in Poland and Danzig, Makhno settled in Paris in 1924. In 1926, he helped create Arshinov's Organizational Platform of Libertarian Communists, but broke with his former mentor when Arshinov came to terms with Moscow. Thereafter, Makhno devoted himself to writing. In 1934, in poverty and isolation, he died of the tuberculosis he had originally contracted in tsarist prisons, but his name and achievements are revered by anarchists the world over. He is buried in Père La Chaise Cemetery, Paris.

See also: ANARCHISM; CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922

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MALENKOV, GEORGY MAXIMILYANOVICH

(1902–1988), prominent Soviet party official.

Georgy Maximilyanovich Malenkov was born in Orenburg on January 13, 1902. In 1919 he joined the Red Army, where he worked in the political administration at various levels during the Russian civil war. In April 1920, he became a member of the Bolshevik Party, and during the following month he married Valentina Alexeyevna Golubtsova, a worker in the Central Committee (CC) apparatus.

Malenkov's career during the 1920s was typical of many during that period. He was a ruthless party official without any clear political views. He studied at the Moscow Higher Technical Institute between 1921 and 1925, during which time he was a member of a commission investigating "Trotskyism" among fellow students. In 1925 he became a technical secretary of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee.

During the early 1930s he worked in the Moscow party committee as the head of the section for mass agitation, conducting a purge of opposition members. Between 1934 and 1939 he ran the party organization for the Central Committee and reviewed party documents in preparation for the Great Purge beginning in 1936. Malenkov took an active role in various aspects of this purge, supervising particularly harsh actions in Belarus and Armenia in 1937.

In 1937 Malenkov was appointed a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (he was promoted to the Presidium in 1938), and in this same year became the deputy to Nikolai Yezhov, head of the NKVD. By 1939 Malenkov was also a member of the party Central Committee (CC), and shortly he became the head of the administration of party cadres and a CC secretary.

Before the outbreak of the war with Germany, Malenkov became a candidate member of the Politburo. During the war, he supplied planes to the Red Air Force, and he appears to have undertaken his tasks efficiently. Josef Stalin relied on Malenkov increasingly after 1943. In that year Malenkov headed a committee of the Soviet government for the restoration of farms in liberated areas, and after mid-May 1944, he was the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (second only to Stalin himself). From March 18, 1946, Malenkov was a member of the ruling Politburo.

During the ascendancy of Andrei Zhdanov after the war, Malenkov's career briefly declined. After the exposure of a scandal in the aviation industry, he lost both his deputy chairmanship of the government and his role as CC secretary controlling party personnel, in March and May 1946, respectively. Thanks to the intervention of Lavrenty Beria, however, he was able to recover both positions by August. In 1948 he took over the position of ideological secretary of the CC and was also given responsibility for Soviet agriculture, at that time the most backward sector of the Soviet economy.



Georgy Malenkov, Soviet prime minister, 1953–1955. COURTESY OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

During the late Stalin period, Malenkov once again played a leading role in new purges, including the Leningrad Affair and the exposure of the "Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee." The aging leader entrusted him to present the main report at the Nineteenth Party Congress (the first party congress in thirteen years). With Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, Malenkov became the chairman of the Council of Ministers (prime minister) and the main party secretary. On March 14, however, the latter position was given to Khrushchev.

Malenkov joined with Khrushchev to overcome a putsch by Beria in 1953, but then a power struggle between the two leaders developed. Malenkov eventually had to make a public confession regarding his failure to revive Soviet agriculture. By

February 1955, he was demoted to a deputy chairman of the government and given responsibility over Soviet electric power stations. Malenkov and former old-guard Stalinists Lazar Kaganovich and Vyacheslav Molotov resented Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech at the Twentieth Party Congress of February 1956. In 1957 the three engineered a majority vote within the Presidium for Khrushchev's removal. Khrushchev, however, was able to reverse the vote in a CC plenum, which saw the defeat of the so-called Antiparty Group. On June 29, Malenkov lost his positions in the Presidium and the Central Committee.

Though he was still relatively young, Malenkov's career was effectively over. He became the director of a hydroelectric power station in Ust-Kamengorsk, and subsequently of a thermal power station in Ekibastuz. In 1961, the Ekibastuz city party committee expelled him from membership, and Malenkov retired on a pension until his death in Moscow on January 14, 1988. He is remembered mainly as a loyal and unprincipled Stalinist with few notable achievements outside of party politics.

See also: ANTI-PARTY GROUP; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; LENINGRAD AFFAIR; PURGES, THE GREAT; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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DAVID R. MARPLES

MALEVICH, KAZIMIR SEVERINOVICH

(1878–1935), founder of the Suprematist school of abstract painting.

Kazimir Severinovich Malevich was initially a follower of Impressionism. He was influenced by Pablo Picasso and Cubism and became a member of the Jack of Diamonds group, whose members were the leading exponents of avant-garde art in pre-World War I Russia. According to the Suprematists, each economic mode of production generated not only a ruling class but also an official artistic style supported by that dominant social

class. Deviations from that official style were the products of subordinate classes. All art, prior to the rule of the proletariat, therefore, manifested the ideology of some class. But the revolution would bring about the destruction not merely of the bourgeoisie, but of all classes as such. Consequently, the art of the proletarian revolution must be the expression of not merely another style but of absolute, eternal, "supreme" values.

Constructivism was brought into Soviet avant-garde architecture primarily by Vladimir Tatlin and Malevich. Malevich's "Arkhitektonica," Tatlin's Monument to the Third International (the "Tatlin Tower"), and El Lissitzky's "Prouns" shaped in large measure the conceptualizations of the modernist architects as they sought a means to combine painting, sculpture, and architecture. Tatlin's stress on utilitarianism was challenged by Malevich's Suprematism, which decried the emphasis of technology in art and argued that artists must search for "supreme" artistic values that would transform the ideology of the people. Malevich thus contrasted the work of engineers, whose creations exhibited simple transitory values, with aesthetic creativity, which he proclaimed produced supreme values. Malevich warned: "If socialism relies on the infallibility of science and technology, a great disappointment is in store for it because it is not granted to scientists to foresee the 'course of events' and to create enduring values" (Malevich, p. 36). His "White on White" carried Suprematist theories to their logical conclusion. With the turn against modern art under Josef Stalin, Malevich lost influence and died in poverty and oblivion.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; CONSTRUCTIVISM; FUTURISM.

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MALTA SUMMIT

A summit meeting of U.S. President George W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev took place on December 2–3, 1989, on warships of the two countries anchored at Malta in the Mediterranean. The

meeting, the first between the two leaders, followed the collapse of communist bloc governments in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia (Romania would follow three weeks later). Soviet acceptance of this dramatic change, without intervention or even opposition, dramatically underscored the new outlook in Moscow.

President Bush, who had been reserved and cautious in his assessment of change in the Soviet Union during most of 1989, now sought to extend encouragement to Gorbachev. Most important was the establishment of a confident relationship and dialogue between the two leaders. No treaties or agreements were signed, but Bush did indicate a number of changes in U.S. economic policy toward the Soviet Union to reflect the new developing relationship. Malta thus marked a step in a process of accelerating change.

Two weeks after the Malta summit, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze paid an unprecedented courtesy visit to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels. Clearly the Cold War was coming to an end. Indeed, at Malta, Gorbachev declared that "the world is leaving one epoch, the 'Cold War,' and entering a new one."

Some historians have described the Malta Summit as the last summit of the Cold War; others have seen it as the first summit of the new era. In any case, it occurred at a time of rapid transition and reflected the first time when prospects for future cooperation outweighed continuing competition, although elements of both remained.

See also: COLD WAR; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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MANDELSHTAM, NADEZHDA YAKOVLEVNA

(1899–1980), memoirist and preserver of her husband Osip Mandelshtam's poetic legacy.

Nadezhda Yakovlevna Mandelshtam (née Khazina) is known primarily for her two books detailing life with her husband, the Modernist poet Osip Mandelshtam, and the years following his death in Stalin's purges. She grew up in Kiev in a tight-knit, intellectually gifted family, fondly recalled in three biographical sketches. With the onset of revolution and civil war, she enjoyed a bohemian existence as a painter in the artist Alexandra Ekster's studio.

In 1922 Nadezhda married Mandelshtam, and the two moved to Moscow and then to Leningrad in 1924. In 1925 her friendship with the poet Anna Akhmatova began. Osip Mandelshtam was arrested in Moscow in 1934 after writing a poem that denounced Josef Stalin. Nadezhda accompanied him into exile in Voronezh until 1937 and in 1938 was present when he was arrested and sent to the gulag where he died. She escaped arrest the same year.

For the next two decades, Nadezhda Mandelshtam survived by teaching English and moved frequently to avoid official attention. In 1951 she completed a dissertation in linguistics. She also began working on her husband's rehabilitation and researching his life and fate. Many of his poems survived because she committed them to memory. Her first book of memoirs, *Vospominaniia* (New York, 1970, translated as *Hope Against Hope*, 1970), was devoted to her final years with Osip Mandelshtam and to a broader indictment of the Stalinist system that had condemned him. The book, which circulated in the Soviet Union in *samizdat*, attracted attention and praise from Soviet and Western readers. Her second book, *Vtoraia kniga* (Paris, 1972, translated as *Hope Abandoned*, 1974), offended some Russian readers with its opinionated descriptions of various literary figures. Treatments of Nadezhda Mandelshtam's work have noted her success in achieving a strong and vibrant literary voice of her own even as she transmitted the cultural legacy of a previous generation.

See also: AKHMATOVA, ANNA ANDREYEVNA; GULAG; MANDELSHTAM, OSIP EMILIEVICH; PURGES, THE GREAT; SAMIZDAT

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MANDELSHTAM, OSIP EMILIEVICH

(1891–1938), Modernist poet and political martyr.

One of Russia's greatest twentieth-century poets, Osip Mandelshtam died en route to the gulag after writing a poem critical of Josef V. Stalin. Born to a cultured Jewish family in Warsaw, Mandelshtam spent his childhood in St. Petersburg, traveled in Europe, and, in 1909, began to frequent the literary salon of the Symbolist poet Vyacheslav Ivanov. In 1911, while enrolled at St. Petersburg University, he joined the Guild of Poets headed by Nikolai Gumilev and Sergei Gorodetsky and subsequently became a leading figure in a new poetic school called Acmeism. His collections *Kamen* (Stone, 1913), *Tristia* (1922), and *Stikhotvoreniia* (Poems, 1928) show a poet steeped in world culture and focused on themes such as language and time, concepts also addressed in his prose works. In 1922 Mandelshtam married Nadezhda Khazina, who later wrote memoirs of their life together.

Mandelshtam recognized that the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 threatened the cultural values he held dear, and in his poetry and essays of the 1920s he attempted to define the relationship of the poet to the age. Literary prose such as *Shum vremeni* (*The Noise of Time*, 1925) and *Egipetskaia marka* (*The Egyptian Stamp*, 1928) included autobiographical themes. By the late 1920s, Mandelshtam's lack of adherence to Soviet norms led to increasing difficulties in getting published. A trip to the Caucasus and Armenia in 1930 provided new inspiration for creativity. But in 1934, after writing a poem critical of Stalin, Mandelshtam was arrested in Moscow and sent to Voronezh for a three-year exile. During this period he wrote *Voronezhskie tetradi* (*Voronezh Notebooks*), preserved by his wife. In May 1938, Mandelshtam was arrested once again, sentenced to a Siberian labor camp, and considered a non-person by the Soviet government. He died the same year. In 1956 his rehabilitation began, and in the 1970s a collection of his poetry was published in the Soviet Union.

See also: GULAG; MANDELSHTAM, NADEZHDA YAKOVLEVNA; PURGES, THE GREAT

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JUDITH E. KALB

MANIFESTO OF 1763

Signed by Empress Catherine II, this lengthy, detailed document that invited foreign settlers to Russia, was published in St. Petersburg by the Senate on August 5, 1763. The official English version appears in Bartlett, *Human Capital* (1979). It evolved from several circumstances. In October 1762 the newly crowned empress ordered the Senate to encourage foreign settlement (except Jews) as a means to reinforce "the well-being of Our Empire." In response, a short manifesto of mid-December 1762 was translated into "all foreign languages" and printed in many foreign newspapers. Both manifestoes crystallized Russian government thinking about immigration in general by considering specific cases and problems amid European populationist discourse over many decades.

Catherine II championed "populationism" even before she gained the throne, probably from reading German cameralist works that postulated increasing population as an index of state power and prestige. Also, Peter the Great had formulated in a famous decree of 1702 the policy of recruiting skilled Europeans, and Catherine endorsed the Petrine precedent. The notion that Russia was underpopulated went back several centuries, an issue that had become acute with the empire's recent expansion, and the Romanov dynasty's rapid Europeanization. Cessation of the European phases of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) also suggested that the German lands might harbor a reservoir of capable individuals and families eager to settle Russia's huge empty, potentially rich spaces.

The impatient empress felt pressured to demonstrate her governing abilities by pursuing peaceful policies that her immediate predecessors had barely

begun. Moreover, she was determined to repair the economic–financial ravages of the war that had just ended. It was one thing to declare a new policy, however, and something else to institute it. In preparing the two manifestoes of 1762–1763 the Senate discovered many partial precedents and several concrete impediments to welcoming masses of immigrants. More than six months elapsed between the issuance of the two manifestoes, during which time governments were consulted and institutions formulated to care for the anticipated newcomers. It was decided that the manifesto should list the specific lands available for settlement and not exclude any groups. Drawing on foreign precedent and the suggestion of Senator Peter Panin, the manifesto of 1763 established a special government office with jurisdiction over new settlers, the Chancery of Guardianship of Foreigners. The first head, Count Grigory Orlov, Catherine’s common-law husband and leader of her seizure of the throne, personified the office’s high status. The new Russian immigration policy offered generous material incentives, promised freedom of religion and exemption from military recruitment, and guaranteed exemption from enserfment and freedom to leave. These provisions governed immigration policy until at least 1804 and for many decades thereafter. The manifesto of 1763 did not specifically exclude Jews, although Elizabeth’s regime banned them as “Killers of Christ,” for Catherine highly regarded their entrepreneurship and unofficially encouraged their entry into New Russia (Ukraine) in 1764.

European immigrants responded eagerly to the manifesto, some twenty thousand arriving during Catherine’s reign. Germans settling along the Volga were the largest group, especially the Herrnhut (Moravian Brethren) settlement at Sarepta near Saratov and Mennonite settlements in southern Ukraine. Because of the empire’s largely agrarian economy, most settlers were farmers. The expense of the program was large, however, so its cost-effectiveness is debatable. A century later many Volga Germans resettled in the United States, some still decrying Catherine’s allegedly broken promises.

See also: CATHERINE II; JEWS; ORLOV, GRIGORY GRIGORIEVICH; PALE OF SETTLEMENT

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JOHN T. ALEXANDER

MANSI

The 8,500 Mansi (1989 census), formerly called Voguls, live predominantly in the Hanti-Mansi Autonomous Region (*Okrug*), in the swampy basin of the Ob river. Their language belongs to the Ugric branch of the Finno-Ugric family. It has little mutual intelligibility with the related Hanti language, farther northeast, and essentially none with Magyar (Hungarian). Most Mansi have Asian features. One of the most distinctive features of Mansi (and Hanti) culture is an elaborate bear funeral ceremony, honoring the slain beast.

The Mansi historical homeland straddled the middle Urals, southwest of their present location on the Konda River. They offered spirited resistance to Russian encroachment during the 1400s, highlighted by prince Asyka’s counterattack in 1455. The Russians destroyed the last major Mansi principality, Konda, in 1591. Within one generation, Moscow ignored whatever capitulation treaties had been signed. As settlers poured into the best Mansi agricultural lands, the Mansi were soon reduced to a small hunting and fishing population. By 1750 most were forced to accept the outer trappings of Greek Orthodoxy, while practicing animism in secret. Russian traders reduced people unfamiliar with the notion of money and prices to loan slavery that lasted for generations.

When the Ostiako-Vogul National *Okrug* District—the present Hanti-Mansi Autonomous Oblast—was created in 1930, the indigenous population was already down to 19 percent of the total population. By 1989, the population had dropped to 1.4 percent, due first to a massive influx of deportees and then to free labor, after discovery of oil during the 1950s. The curse of Arctic oil impacted the natives, who were crudely dispossessed, as well as the fragile ecosystem. Gas torching and oil spills became routine.

Post-Soviet liberalization enabled the Hanti and Mansi to organize Spasenie Ugry (Salvation of Yugria, the land of Ugrians) that gave voice to indigenous and ecological concerns. Thirty-seven percent of the Mansi population (and few young

people) spoke Mansi in the early 1990s. A weekly newspaper, *Luima Serikos*, had a circulation of 240 in 1995. Novels on Mansi topics by Yuvan Sestalo (b. 1937) have many readers in Russia.

See also: FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NORTHERN PEOPLES

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REIN TAAGEPERA

MARI EL AND THE MARI

The Mari, or Cheremis, are an indigenous people of the European Russian interior; their language and that of the Mordvins compose the Volgaic branch of the Finno-Ugric language family.

As subjects of the Volga Bolgars and Kazan Tatars, medieval Mari tribes experienced cultural and linguistic influences mainly from their Turkic neighbors. Later on, Slavic contacts became prominent, and the Russian language became the principal source of lexical and syntactic borrowing. The early twentieth-century initiatives to create a single literary language did not come to fruition. Consequently, there are two written standards of Mari: Hill and Meadow. The speakers of various western, or Hill Mari, dialects constitute hardly more than 10 percent of the Mari as a whole.

In the basin of the Middle Volga, the medieval Mari distribution area stretched from the Volga-Oka confluence to the mouth of the Kazanka River. Under Tatar rule, the Mari were active participants in Kazan's war efforts. Apparently due to their loyalty and peripheral location, Mari tribal communities were granted home rule. However, the final struggle between the Kazan Khanate and Moscow brought an intraethnic cleavage: the Hill Mari sided with the Russians, whereas the Meadow Mari remained with the Tatars until the fall of Kazan in 1552.

The submission to Moscow was painful: The second half of the sixteenth century saw a series of

uprisings, known as the Cheremis Wars, which decimated the Meadow Mari in particular. The Russian invasions triggered population movements that also reshaped the Mari settlement area: a part of the Meadow Mari migrated to the Bashkir lands and towards the Urals. For about two hundred years, the resettlement was sustained by land seizures, fugitive peasant migrations, and Christianization policies. The outcome of all this was the formation of the Eastern Mari. In terms of religion, these Mari have largely kept their traditional "paganism," whereas their Middle Volga coethnics are mostly Orthodox, or in a syncretic way combine animism with Christianity.

The Mari ethnic awakening took its first steps with the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions. In 1920 the Bolsheviks established the Mari autonomous province. It was elevated to the status of an autonomous republic in 1936—the year of the Stalinist purges of the entire ethnic intelligentsia. Since 1992, the republic has been known as the Republic of Mari El.

At the time of the 1989 census, 324,000 Mari out of a total of 671,000 were residents of their titular republic. There the Mari constituted 43.2 percent of the inhabitants, whereas Russians made up 47.5 percent. Outside Mari El, the largest Mari populations were found in Bashkortostan (106,000) as well as in Kirov and Sverdlovsk provinces (44,000 and 31,000 respectively). Indicative of linguistic assimilation, 17 percent of the Mari considered Russian their native language during the 1994 microcensus.

In 2000 Mari El was a home for 759,000 people. Within Russia, it is an agricultural region, poor in natural resources and heavily dependent on federal subsidies. Within the republic's political elite, the Mari have mainly performed secondary roles, and this situation has deteriorated further since the mid-1990s. Because Russians outnumber the Mari, and because the Mari still lag behind in terms of urbanity, education, and ethnic consciousness, Russians dominate the republic's political life.

See also: FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST.

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SEPPÖ LALLUKKA

MARKET SOCIALISM

The economic doctrine of market socialism holds that central planners can make active and efficient use of “the market” as a mechanism for implementing socially desired goals, which are developed and elaborated through central planning of economic activity. Focusing on the elimination of private property and wealth, and on the central determination and control of all investment and development decisions, it posits that the planned determination and adjustment of producers’ and asset prices could allow markets to implement the desired allocations in a decentralized manner without sacrificing central or social control over outcomes or incomes. Thus egalitarian social outcomes and dynamic economic growth can be achieved simultaneously, without the disruptions and suffering imposed by poorly coordinated private investment decisions resulting in a wasteful business cycle.

The idea of market socialism arose from the realization that classical socialism, involving the collective provision and distribution of goods and services in natural form, without the social contrivances of property, markets, and prices, was not feasible, since rational collective control of economic activity requires calculations that cannot rely consistently on “natural unit” variables such as energy or labor amounts. It also became clear that the existing computing capabilities were inadequate for deriving a consistent economic plan from a general equilibrium problem. This led, in the Socialist Calculation Debate of the 1930s, to the suggestion (most notably by Oskar Lange) that a Socialist regime, assuming ownership of all means of production, could use markets to find relevant consumers’ prices and valuations while maintaining social and state control over production, income determination, investment, and economic development. Managers would be instructed to minimize costs, while the planning board would adjust producers’ prices to eliminate disequilibria in the markets for final goods. Thus, at a socialist market equilibrium, the classical marginal conditions of static efficiency would be maintained, while the

State would ensure equitable distribution of incomes through its allocation of the surplus (profit) from efficient production and investment in socially desirable planned development.

Another version of market socialism arose as a result of the reform experiences in east-central Europe, particularly the labor-managed economic system of Yugoslavia that developed following Marshal Tito’s break with Josef Stalin in 1950. This gave rise to a large body of literature on the “Illyrian Firm” with decentralized, democratic control of production by workers’ collectives in a market economy subject to substantial macroeconomic planning and income redistribution through taxation and subsidies. The economic reforms in Hungary (1968), Poland (1981), China after 1978, and Gorbachev’s Russia (1987–1991) involved varying degrees of decentralization of State Socialism and its administrative command economy, providing partial approximations to the classical market socialist model of Oskar Lange. This experience highlighted the difficulties of planning for and controlling decentralized markets, and revealed the failure of market socialism to provide incentives for managers to follow the rules necessary for economic efficiency. Faced with these circumstances, proponents of market socialism moved beyond state ownership and control of property to various forms of economic democracy and collective property, accepting the necessity of real markets and market prices but maintaining the classical socialist rejection of fully private productive property. The early debates on market socialism are best seen in Friedrich A. von Hayek (1935), while the current state of the debate is presented in Pranab Bardhan and John E. Roemer (1993).

See also: PERESTROIKA; PLANNERS’ PREFERENCE; SOCIALISM; STATE ORDERS

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RICHARD ERICSON

MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

As elsewhere in Europe, marriage and family life in Russia have varied across time and by social group, reflecting the complex interplay of competing ideals, changing patterns of social and economic organization, differing forms of political organization and levels of state intrusiveness, and the effects of cataclysmic events. If in the long run the outcome of this interplay of forces has been a family structure and dynamic that conform essentially with those found in modern European societies, the development of marriage and the family in Russia nevertheless has followed a distinctive path. This development can be divided into three broad periods: the centuries preceding the formation of the Russian Empire during the early eighteenth century, the imperial period (1698–1917), and the period following the Bolshevik Revolution and establishment of the Soviet state in October 1917. While the pace of development and change varied significantly between different social groups during each of these periods, each period nonetheless was characterized by a distinctive combination of forces that shaped marital and family life and family structures. In Russia's successive empires, moreover, important differences also often existed between the many ethno-cultural and religious groups included in these empires. The discussion that follows therefore concerns principally the Slavic Christian population.

PRE-IMPERIAL RUSSIA

Although only limited sources are available for the reconstruction of marital and family life in medieval Russia, especially for nonelite social groups, there appears to have been broad continuity in the structure and functioning of the family throughout the medieval and early modern periods. Family structures and interpersonal relations within marriage and the family were strongly shaped by the forms of social organization and patterns of economic activity evolved to secure survival in a harsh natural as well as political environment. Hence, constituting the primary unit of production and reproduction, and providing the main source

of welfare, personal status, and identity, families in most instances were multigenerational and structured hierarchically, with authority and economic and familial roles distributed within the family on the basis of gender and seniority. While scholars disagree over whether already by 1600 the nuclear family had begun to displace the multigenerational family among the urban population, this development did not affect the patriarchal character or the social and economic functions of either marriage or the family. Reflecting and reinforcing these structures and functions, the marriage of children was arranged by senior family members, with the economic, social, and political interests of the family taking precedence over individual preference. Land and other significant assets, too, generally were considered to belong to the family as a whole, with males enjoying preferential treatment in inheritance. Marriage appears to have been universal among all social groups, with children marrying at a young age, and for married women, childbirth was frequent.

After the conversion of Grand Prince Vladimir of Kievan Rus to Christianity in 988, normative rules governing marriage and the family also were shaped and enforced by the Orthodox Church, although the effective influence of the Church spread slowly from urban to rural areas. Granted extensive jurisdiction over marital and family matters first by Kievan and then by Muscovite grand princes, the Church used its authority to establish marriage as a religious institution and to attempt to bring marital and family life into conformity with its doctrines and canons. For example, the Church sought—with varying degrees of success—to limit the formation of marriages through restrictions based on consanguinity and age, to restrict marital dissolution to the instances defined by canon law, to limit the possibility of remarriage, and to confine sexual activity to relations between spouses within marriage for the purpose of procreation. At the same time, through its teachings, canonical rules, and ecclesiastical activities, the Church reinforced the patriarchal order within marriage and the family, thereby providing a religious sanction for established social structures and practices. Hence the extent to which the Church transformed or merely reinforced existing ideals of and relationships within marriage and the family remains disputed.

Although patriarchal attitudes and structures and a gendered division of labor also prevailed within elite households, the role of family and lin-

age in determining relative status within and between elite groups, access to beneficial appointments and the material rewards that followed from them, and the prospects for forming advantageous marriage alliances between families imparted distinctive characteristics to elite family life, especially after the late fifteenth century. The practice among the Muscovite elite of secluding women in separate quarters (the *terem*), for example, which reached its greatest intensity during the seventeenth century, appears to have been due largely to the desire to protect family honor and ensure the marriage utility of daughters in a context in which the elite was growing in size and complexity. Seclusion itself, however, considerably increased the politically important role of married women in arranging and maintaining family alliances. Similarly, the development of a system of service tenements in land to support the expansion especially of military servitors after the late fifteenth century led initially to a deterioration in the property and inheritance rights of elite women. Yet such women also often had principal responsibility for managing the estates and other affairs of husbands who frequently were away on military campaigns or carrying out other service assignments. Hence within the Muscovite elite, and quite likely among other social groups in pre-Petrine Russia as well, the normative ideal and legal rules supporting the patriarchal family often concealed a more complex reality. This ideal nonetheless provided a powerful metaphor that helped to legitimize and integrate the familial, social, and political orders.

IMPERIAL RUSSIA

The history of marriage and the family during the imperial period was marked both by a complex pattern of continuity and change and by sharp diversity between social groups, as the exposure of different groups to the forces of change varied significantly. Nonetheless, by the early twentieth century the long-term trend across the social spectrum was toward smaller families, the displacement of the multigenerational family by the nuclear family, a higher age at the time of first marriage for both men and women, declining birth rates, an increased incidence of marital dissolution, and, in urban areas, a decline in the frequency of marriage. Within the family, the structure of patriarchal authority was eroding and the ideal itself was under attack.

The groups that were exposed earliest and most intensively to the combination of forces lying

behind these trends were the nobility, state officialdom, the clergy, and a newly emergent intelligentsia and largely urban bourgeoisie. During the eighteenth century, for example, the nobility represented the main target and then chief ally of the state in its efforts to inculcate European cultural forms and modes of behavior and to promote formal education and literacy. Among the effects of such efforts was a new public role for women and the dissemination of ideals of marriage, family, and the self that eventually came to challenge the patriarchal ideal. By helping to produce by the first half of the nineteenth century a more professionalized, predominantly landless, and largely urban civil officialdom, as well as a chiefly urban cultural intelligentsia and professional bourgeoisie, changes in the terms of state service and the expansion of secondary and higher education both provided a receptive audience for new ideals of marriage and the family and eroded dependency on the extended family. By expanding the occupational opportunities not only for men but also for women outside the home, the development of trade, industry, publishing, and the professions had similar effects. Most of these new employment opportunities were concentrated in Russia's rapidly growing cities, where material and physical as well as cultural conditions worked to alter the family's role, structures, and demographic characteristics. For this reason, the marital and demographic behavior and family structures of urban workers also exhibited early change.

At least until after the late 1850s, by contrast, marriage and family life among the peasantry, poorer urban groups, and the merchantry displayed greater continuity with the past. This continuity resulted in large part from the strength of custom and the continued economic, social, and welfare roles of the multigenerational, patriarchal family among these social groups and, at least among the peasantry, from the operation of communal institutions and the coincident interests of family patriarchs (who dominated village assemblies), noble landowners, and the state in preserving existing family structures. Facilitated by the abolition of serfdom in 1861, however, family structures and demographic behavior even among the peasantry began slowly to change, especially outside of the more heavily agricultural central black earth region. In particular, the increased frequency of household division occurring after the emancipation contributed to a noticeable reduction in family size and a decline in the incidence of the multigenerational family by the last third of the



A young couple exchanges their marriage vows during an Orthodox ceremony in Chelyabinsk. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

century, although most families still passed through a cycle of growth and division that included a multigenerational stage. While marriage remained nearly universal, the age at first marriage also rose for both men and women, with the result that birth rates declined somewhat. The growth of income from local and regional wage labor, trade, and craft production and the rapid expansion of migratory labor contributed to all these trends, while also helping to weaken patriarchal structures of authority within the family, a process given further impetus by the exposure of peasants to urban culture through migratory labor, military service, and rising literacy. Although most peasant migrants to cities, especially males, retained ties with their native village and household, and consequently continued to be influenced by peasant culture, a significant number became permanent urban residents, adopting different family forms and cultural attitudes as a result. With the rapid growth of Russian cities and the transformation of the urban environment that took place after the late 1850s, family forms and demographic

behavior among the poorer urban social groups and the merchantry also began to change in ways similar to other urban groups.

Normative ideals of marriage and the family likewise exhibited significant diversification and change during the imperial period, a process that accelerated after the late 1850s. If closer integration into European culture exposed Russians to a wider and shifting variety of ideals of marriage, the family, and sexual behavior, the development of a culture of literacy, journalism and a publishing industry, and an ethos of civic activism and professionalism based on faith in the rational use of specialized expertise broadened claims to the authority to define such ideals. These developments culminated in an intense public debate over reform of family law—and of the family and society through law—after the late 1850s. Very broadly, emphasizing a companionate ideal of marriage, the need to balance individual rights with collective responsibilities and limited authority within marriage and the family, and the necessity of adapting state law and religious doctrines to changing social

and historical conditions, advocates of reform favored the facilitation of marital dissolution, equality between spouses in marriage, greater rights for children born out of wedlock, the recasting of inheritance rights based on sexual equality and the nuclear family, and the decriminalization of various sexual practices as well as of abortion. Many of these principles in fact were embodied in draft civil and criminal codes prepared by government reform commissions between 1883 and 1906, neither of which was adopted, and proposals to expand the grounds for divorce made by a series of committees formed within the Orthodox Church between 1906 and 1916 proved similarly unsuccessful. Socialist activists adopted an even more radical position on the reconstitution of marriage and the family, in some cases advocating the socialization of the latter. Opponents of reform, by contrast, stressed the social utility, naturalness, and divine basis of strong patriarchal authority within marriage and the family, the congruence of this family structure with Russian cultural traditions, and the role of the family in upholding the autocratic social and political orders. Although significant reforms affecting illegitimate children, inheritance rights, and marital separation were enacted in 1902, 1912, and 1914, respectively, deep divisions within and between the state, the Orthodox Church, and society ensured that reform of marriage and the family remained a contentious issue until the very end of the autocracy, and beyond.

SOVIET RUSSIA

With respect to marriage and the family, the long-term effect of the Soviet attempt to create a modern socialist society was to accelerate trends already present in the early twentieth century. Hence, by the end of the Soviet period, among all social groups family size had declined sharply and the nuclear family had become nearly universal, the birth rate had dropped significantly, marriage no longer was universal, and the incidence of marital dissolution had risen substantially. But if by the 1980s the structure and demographic characteristics of the Russian family had come essentially to resemble those found in contemporary European societies, the process of development was shaped by the distinctive political and economic structures and policies of Soviet-style socialism.

Soviet policies with respect to marriage and the family were shaped initially by a combination of radical ideological beliefs and political considera-

tions. Hence, in a series of decrees and other enactments promulgated between October 1917 and 1920, the new Soviet government introduced formal sexual equality in marriage, established divorce on demand, secularized marriage, drastically curtailed inheritance and recast inheritance rights on the basis of sexual equality and the nuclear family, and legalized abortion. The party-state leadership also proclaimed the long-term goal of the socialization of the family through the development of an extensive network of social services and communal dining. These measures in part reflected an ideological commitment to both the liberation of women and the creation of a socialist society. But they also were motivated by the political goals of attracting the support of women for the new regime and of undermining the sources of opposition to it believed to lie in patriarchal family structures and attitudes and in marriage as a religious institution. In practice, however, the policies added to the problems of family instability, homelessness, and child abandonment caused mainly by the harsh and disruptive effects of several years of war, revolution, civil war, and famine. For this reason, while welcomed by radical activists and some parts of the population, Soviet policies with respect to marriage and the family also provoked considerable opposition, especially among women and the peasantry, who for overlapping but also somewhat different reasons saw in these policies a threat to their security and self-identity during a period of severe dislocation. In important respects, Soviet propaganda and policies in fact reinforced the self-image that partly underlay the opposition of women to its policies by stressing the ideal and duties of motherhood. Yet the direction of Soviet policies remained consistent through the 1920s, albeit not without controversy and dissent even within the party, with these policies being embodied in the family codes of 1922 and 1926.

The severe social disruptions, strain on resources, and deterioration of already limited social services caused by the collectivization of agriculture, the rapid development of industry, the abolition of private trade, and the reconstruction of the economy between the late 1920s and the outbreak of war in 1941, however, led to a fundamental shift in Soviet policies with respect to marriage and the family. With its priorities now being economic growth and social stabilization, the Soviet state idealized the socialist family (which in essence closely resembled the family ideal of prerevolutionary liberal and feminist reformers), which was proclaimed to be part of the essential foundation of a socialist



Following Soviet tradition, a wedding party walks to Red Square to have pictures taken. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

society. A series of laws and new codes enacted between 1936 and 1944 therefore attempted both to strengthen marriage and the family and to encourage women to give birth more frequently: Divorce was severely restricted, children born out of wedlock were deprived of any rights with respect to their father, thus reestablishing illegitimacy of birth, abortion was outlawed, and a schedule of rewards for mothers who bore additional children was established. Although the goals of women's liberation and sexual equality remained official policy, they were redefined to accommodate a married woman's dual burden of employment outside the home and primary responsibility for domestic work. Economic necessity in fact compelled most women to enter the workforce, regardless of their marital status, with only the wives of the party-state elite being able to choose not to do so. Despite the changes in normative ideals and the law, however, the effects of Soviet social and economic policies in general and of the difficult material conditions resulting from them were a further reduction in average family size and decline in the

birth rate and the disruption especially of peasant households, as family members were arrested, migrated to cities in massive numbers, or died as a result of persecution or famine. The huge losses sustained by the Soviet population during World War II gave further impetus to these trends and, by creating a significant imbalance between men and women in the marriage-age population, considerably reduced the rate of marriage and complicated the formation of families for several decades after the war.

The relaxation of political controls on the discussion of public policy by relevant specialists after the death of Josef Stalin in 1953 contributed to another shift in Soviet policies toward marriage and the family during the mid-1960s. Divorce again became more accessible, fathers could be required to provide financial support for their children born out of wedlock, and abortion was re-legalized and, given the scarcity of reliable alternatives, quickly became the most common form of birth control practiced by Russian women. Partly as a result of these measures, the divorce rate within the Rus-

sian population rose steadily after the mid-1960s, with more than 40 percent of all marriages ending in divorce by the 1980s, and the birth rate continued to decline. But these trends also gained impetus from the growth of the percentage of the Russian population, women as well as men, receiving secondary and tertiary education, from the nearly universal participation of women in the workforce, from the continued shift of the population from the countryside to cities (the Russian population became predominantly urban only after the late 1950s), and from the limited availability of adequate housing and social services in a context in which women continued to bear the chief responsibilities for child-rearing and domestic work. These latter problems contributed to the reemergence in the urban population of a modified form of the multigenerational family, as the practices of a young couple living with the parents of one partner while waiting for their own apartment and of a single parent living especially with his or usually her mother appear to have increased. In the countryside, the improvement in the living conditions of the rural population following Stalin's death, their inclusion in the social welfare system, yet the continued out-migration especially of young males seeking a better life in the city also led to a decline in family size, as well as to a disproportionately female and aging population, which affected both the structure of rural families and the rate of their formation. Nonetheless, the ideals of the nuclear family, marriage, and natural motherhood remained firmly in place, both in official policy and among the population.

See also: ABORTION POLICY; FAMILY CODE OF 1926; FAMILY CODE ON MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY, AND GUARDIANSHIP; FAMILY EDICT OF 1944; FAMILY LAWS OF 1936; FEMINISM

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WILLIAM G. WAGNER

MARTOV, YULI OSIPOVICH

(1873–1923), founder of Russian social democracy, later leader of the Menshevik party.

Born Yuli Osipovich Tsederbaum to a middle-class Jewish family in Constantinople, Yuli Martov established the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class with Lenin in 1895. The following year, Martov was sentenced to three years' exile in Siberia. After serving his term, he joined Lenin in Switzerland where they launched the revolutionary Marxist newspaper *Iskra*. Martov broke with Lenin at the Russian Social Democratic Party's Second Congress in Brussels in 1903, when he opposed his erstwhile comrade's bid for leadership of the party and his demand for a narrow,

highly centralized party of professional revolutionaries, instead calling for a broad-based party with mass membership. Lenin labelled Martov's supporters the Menshevik (minority) faction; his own followers constituted the Bolsheviks (majority). While Lenin proclaimed that socialists should respond to a successful bourgeois revolution by taking immediate steps to prepare for their own takeover of government, Martov advocated abstention from power and a strategy of militant opposition rooted in democratic institutions such as workers' soviets, trades unions, cooperatives, or town and village councils. These "organs of revolutionary self-government" would impel the bourgeois government to implement political and economic reform, which would, in time, bring about conditions favorable to a successful, peaceful, proletarian revolution. After the outbreak of war, Martov was a founder of the Zimmerwald movement, which stood for internationalism and "peace without victory" against both the "defensism" of some socialist leaders and Lenin's ambition to transform the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war. Martov returned to Russia in mid-May 1917. His internationalist position and advocacy of militant opposition to bourgeois government brought him into open conflict with Menshevik leaders such as Irakly Tsereteli, who proclaimed "revolutionary defensism" and had days earlier entered a coalition with the Provisional Government's liberal ministers. The collapse of the first coalition ministry in early July prompted Martov to declare that the time was now ripe for the formation of a democratic government of socialist forces. On repeated occasions in subsequent months, however, his new strategy was rejected both by coalitionist Mensheviks and by Bolsheviks intent on seizing power for themselves. After November 1917, Martov remained a courageous and outspoken opponent of Lenin's political leadership and increasingly despotic methods of rule. Although the Bolsheviks repudiated his efforts to secure a role for the socialist opposition, Martov supported the new regime in its struggle against counterrevolution and foreign intervention. Regardless of this, by 1920 the Menshevik party in Russia had been destroyed, and most of its leaders and activists were in prison or exile. In this year Martov finally left Russia and settled in Berlin. There he founded and edited the *Sotsialistichesky vestnik* (Socialist Courier), a widely influential social democratic newspaper committed to mobilizing international radical opinion against the Bolshevik dictatorship and halting the spread of Comintern influence among democratic left-wing movements.

Martov died on April 4, 1923. As his biographer has written, Martov's honesty, strong sense of principle, and deeply humane nature precluded his success as a revolutionary politician, but in opposition and exile he brilliantly personified social democracy's moral conscience (Getzler, 1994).

See also: BOLSHEVISM; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MENSHEVIKS

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NICK BARON

MARXISM

Karl Marx was born in Trier in Prussia in 1818, and he died in London in 1883. The general approach embodied in Marx's theoretical writings and his analysis of capitalism may be termed historical materialism, or the materialist interpretation of history. Indeed, that approach may well be considered the cornerstone of Marxism. Marx argued that the superstructure of society was conditioned decisively by the productive base of society, so that the superstructure must always be understood in relation to the base. The base consists of the mode of production, in which forces of production (land, raw materials, capital, and labor) are combined, and in which relations among people arise, determined by their relationship to the means of production. As Marx said in the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in 1859, "The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general." Marx considered the superstructure to include the family, the culture, the state, philosophy, and religion.

In Marx's view, all the elements of the superstructure served the interests of the dominant class in a society. He saw the class division in any society beyond a primitive level of development as re-

flecting the distinction between those who owned and controlled the means of production, on the one hand, and those who lacked a share of ownership and therefore were compelled to labor in the process of production, on the other hand. That fundamental division had been reproduced in various forms in the stages of European history, from ancient slaveholding society through feudalism to capitalism. In capitalist society (which was the main subject of Marx's writings) the crucial axis of social conflict was between the capitalist class, or bourgeoisie, and the industrial working class, or proletariat. Marx attempted to demonstrate that the antagonism between those classes would continue to intensify, until the workers' revolution would destroy capitalism and usher in communism.

The dialectical mode of interpretation found a new application in Marx's analysis of the development of the capitalist economy. Marx claimed to have detected three "laws of capitalist development": the constant accumulation of capital, the increasing concentration of capital, and the increasing misery of the proletariat. Those laws spelled the progressive polarization of society between an expanding number of impoverished and exploited workers and a decreasing number of wealthy capitalists. As the system became more technologically advanced and productive, the mass of the people in the system would become more destitute and more desperate. The common experience of exploitation would forge powerful solidarity within the ranks of the proletariat, who at the height of the final crisis of capitalism would rise in revolution and expropriate the property of the capitalist class.

Marx wrote far more about capitalism than about the society that would follow the proletarian revolution. He made it clear, however, that he expected the revolution of the working class to socialize the means of production and create a dictatorship of the proletariat. That dictatorship would be the workers' state, but its existence would be temporary, as society moved from the first, transitional phase of communism to the higher phase, in which the full potential of communism would be realized, so that class differences would have disappeared, the state would have died off, and each person would contribute to society according to personal ability and receive material benefits according to need.

Before the end of the nineteenth century Marx's theory and his revolutionary vision had been em-

braced by the leaders of socialist parties in a number of European countries. The spread of Marxism's influence was soon followed by schisms in international socialism, however. By the end of World War I, a fundamental split had taken place between Lenin's version of Marxism in the Soviet Union (which after Lenin's death became known as Marxism-Leninism) and the democratically oriented socialism of major Western socialist parties, which stemmed from the revisionism of Eduard Bernstein. The legacy of that division was a rivalry between socialist and communist parties, which was to hamper the left-wing forces in continental European countries for several decades. Ironically, though Marx's theory suggested that proletarian revolutions would triumph in the most economically advanced capitalist nations, during the twentieth century successful revolutions under the banner of Marxism and in the name of the proletariat were carried off only in countries with mainly agrarian economies, in which industrialization was in its early stages and the working class was relatively small.

See also: COMMUNISM; DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM; DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT; SOCIALISM

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MASLENITSA

Derived from the word *maslo*, or "butter/oil," Maslenitsa was a pagan mythological being personifying death, gloom, and winter as well as a week-long festival that divided winter and spring seasons. The pagan festival was synchronized with Lent and is equivalent to the western European Shrovetide and carnival. Maslenitsa survived

among all Eastern Slavs, particularly Russians, who began celebrating it on a Sunday a week prior to Lent, the final day when meat was permitted in the diet according to Church practices. After the last meat meal, for the remainder of the week people consumed milk products and fish, but most commonly butter-covered *bliny*, or pancakes. The festival ended on the following Sunday, the day before Lent, and is known as the day of dispatching Maslenitsa or *Proshchenny Voskresenie* ("Forgiveness Sunday"), as people who had wronged others (alive or deceased) begged for absolution. This day was rounded off with the ritual destruction and burial of Maslenitsa, commonly represented in the form of a female effigy made of straw and dressed in woman's garb, in a bonfire, drowning in a river, or tearing apart. A wooden wheel, symbolizing the sun-disk, was also often burned alongside the effigy, leading to the idea that this festival was celebrated in connection with the spring equinox (usually on March 22) in pre-Christian times.

The annihilation of Maslenitsa symbolized the passing of the winter, spring renewal, and preparation for the new agrarian cycle as well as human and animal procreation. Family-marriage relations were tested among newlywed couples, who were publicly discussed, required to openly show affection, and put through trials testing their love and fidelity. Eligible singles who failed to wed the previous year were publicly ridiculed and punished. Virility of humans, plants, and animals were conjured up by performing magical rites, fist-fighting, dancing, loud singing, and sled-riding contests downhill or on troikas. The continued celebration of this pagan festival cloaked in a Christian holiday into modern times among the Eastern Slavs is a good example of dual faith (*dvoyeverie*) or syncretism.

See also: FOLKLORE; RUSSIANS

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MATERIAL BALANCES

Material balance planning substituted for the market as the mechanism for allocating goods in the Soviet economy. Gosplan, the State Planning Com-

mittee, was responsible each year for equating supply and demand for the thousands of raw materials and manufactured goods that were used domestically in production processes, allocated to satisfy consumer needs, or earmarked for export. The three-stage process of constructing the annual plan involved identifying the sources and uses for high-priority (funded commodities), medium-priority (planned commodities), and low-priority (decentrally planned) goods, and then establishing a balance between sources and uses. In the first stage, planners sent "control figures" down through the economic hierarchy to the enterprise. Control figures reflected the priorities of top political officials, specified initially as aggregate output targets or percentage growth rates for strategic sectors of the economy, and then disaggregated and matched with projected input requirements by Gosplan. In the second stage, Soviet enterprises provided a detailed listing of the input requirements necessary to fulfill their output targets. In the third stage, planners constructed a material balance that ensured an equilibrium between the planned output target and the material input requirements for all goods involved in the planning process.

In a market economy, prices adjust to eliminate surpluses or shortages; in the Soviet economy, planners adjusted physical quantities to equate supply and demand for each product. A material balance was achieved when the sources of supply (current production, Q_t , inventories, Q_{t-1} , and imports M_t) equaled the sources of demand (inter-industry demand, ID_t , household demand, FD_t , and exports, X_t). That is, a material balance existed on paper when, for each of the planned goods: $Q_t + Q_{t-1} + M_t = ID_t + FD_t + X_t$.

The mechanics of establishing a material balance in practice was impeded by several planning policies. First, planners set annual output targets high relative to the productive capacity of the firm. If tire manufacturers failed to meet monthly or quarterly production quotas, for example, this adversely affected downstream firms (producers of cars, trucks, tractors, or bicycles) that relied on tires to fulfill their output targets, and reduced the availability of tires to consumers for replacement purposes. Second, planners constructed a bonus system that allowed additional payments as high as 60 percent of the monthly wage if output targets were fulfilled. Knowing that output targets would be high, managers over-ordered requisite inputs and under-reported their productive capacity during the second stage of the plan-formulation process. Third,

when shortages arose, planners refrained from adjusting centrally determined prices of these “deficit” commodities (*defitsitny*). Instead, they used a priority system to restrict the availability of deficit goods to low-priority sectors, typically those sectors most closely involving goods demanded by consumers.

See also: FULL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING; GOSPLAN; TECH-PROMFINPLAN

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SUSAN J. LINZ

MATERIAL PRODUCT SYSTEM

For decades the Material Product System (MPS) was used in countries with centrally planned economies as a tool for analyzing economic processes at the macro level and policy making. Essentially, MPS performs the same functions as the System of National Accounts (SNA), but there are important differences between the two.

MPS divides the economy into two parts: material production, where national income (NMP) is created (industry, agriculture, construction, freight transportation, etc.), and the nonmaterial part of the economy. The concept of economic sectors and, hence, sectoral groupings, was entirely omitted in the MPS system. Such an approach toward estimation of macroeconomic indicators met the needs of planners and was instrumental in the process of centralized planning, centralized allocation of material resources, and tracking of plan fulfillment.

Essentially, MPS is a system of tables, of which the most important are the balance of production, consumption, and investment of the social product and national income; the balance of national wealth, the balance of fixed assets, and the balance of labor resources. A significant part of the MPS system was its series of input-output tables, which were compiled in the USSR beginning in 1959. In addition to the main MPS tables, there was a series of supplementary tables that gave a more detailed picture of certain aspects of the economic process.

The MPS as a system of aggregate macro indicators was an important tool for general assessment of the economic situation under the central planning system. Its drawback, however, was that it reflected economic processes in a somewhat inconsistent and partial manner. A large part of the economy, the so-called nonproductive sphere, was neglected in the balance of the national economy. In Soviet statistics, a methodologically sound and systematically integrated system of indicators was available only for the material production and distribution of material product. This significantly reduced the role of macro estimates as an instrument for analysis of economic developments.

Estimates of economic growth and international comparisons were also hindered by the lack of coordination between MPS indicators and financial flows. In the balance of state financial resources and the state budget, the financial resources of enterprises and organizations of both productive and nonproductive spheres are represented as a single entry. The balance of money income and expenditure of households shows the total money income of the population earned from both “productive” and “nonproductive” activities. The method used to derive this indicator is such that it is impossible to separate these two sources of revenue.

As a result, the macroeconomic indicators that reflect material resources are not balanced and comparable with the volume and the structure of financial resources. Also, export and import indicators in MPS are presented in a simplified way and differ from the similar indicators used in the balance of payments (SNA concept). Missing in the MPS approach are such indicators as disposable income, savings, and public debt.

The MPS system, which underwent some changes in the USSR in 1957, remained essentially the same for more than thirty years thereafter until the SNA system was introduced in the statistical practice of the countries in transition following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

See also: COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET

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MATRYOSHKA DOLLS

The *matryoshka*, a set of four to eight hollow wooden dolls of graduated size nesting inside each other, is the most familiar item of Russian folk art today and possibly one of the most ancient. Legends abound of similar nesting dolls in Siberia, executed in precious metals, and the rounded female figure was a familiar fertility symbol in pagan Russia. Yet the *matryoshka* may well be of comparatively recent origin, its form derived from a Japanese prototype that caught the eye of the

avant-garde artist Sergei Malyutin during the 1890s. Malyutin's patroness, Princess Tenisheva, was an active promoter of the folk art revival of this period; he sought out items with appeal for the Russian market that could be made at the crafts school on her estate, Talashkino. It was here that Malyutin designed the first known *matryoshka*.

The most ubiquitous *matryoshka* is the pink-cheeked peasant woman in native *sarafan*, her head covered with the traditional scarf. Variations soon appeared, however. Nests of dolls with the faces of famous writers, members of artistic circles, military heroes, or members of a family were created during the early twentieth century. A century later, though the original doll is still being produced, *matryoshka* painters have adapted to the modern market, creating nesting sets of Soviet political leaders, U.S. presidents, Russian tsars, literary figures, and famous Russian portraits. Modern *matryoshkas* by skilled artists, who often work in acrylic paint, command correspondingly high prices; though folk art in form, in execution they are works of high art.



Colorfully painted nesting dolls are essential souvenirs from a trip to Russia. PHOTOGRAPH BY SUSAN D. ROCK. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

See also: FOLKLORE

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PRISCILLA ROOSEVELT

MATVEYEV, ARTAMON SERGEYEVICH

(1625–1682), military officer, diplomat, courtier, boyar.

The son of a non-noble bureaucrat, Artamon Matveyev began his career at the age of thirteen as a court page and companion to the future Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. He soon became colonel of a musketeer regiment and traveled much of Russia and its borderlands on military and diplomatic missions. He helped negotiate the union of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, defended the tsar in the Copper Riots of 1662, and guarded many foreign embassies, including the clerics arriving to judge Patriarch Nikon in 1666 and 1667. By 1669, although still a musketeer colonel, he had become a *stolnik* (table attendant, a high court rank), *namestnik* (honorary governor-general) of Serpukhov, and head of the Ukrainian Chancellery (Malorossysky Prikaz).

Soon his fortunes rose even higher. After the death of Tsaritsa Maria Miloslavskaya, the tsar is said to have visited Matveyev's home and met the family's foster daughter Natalia Naryshkina, whom he married. This made Matveyev the tsar's de facto father-in-law, traditionally a very powerful position in Muscovite politics. He quickly added leadership of the Department of Foreign Affairs or Posolsky Prikaz (in effect becoming Russia's prime minister), several other diplomatic or regional departments, and the State Pharmacy to his Ukrainian Chancellery post. He skillfully formulated foreign policy and dealt with governments as diverse as England, Poland, the Vatican, Persia, China, and Bukhara. He also improved Russia's medical facilities, headed publishing, mining, and industrial ventures for the tsar, and organized the creation of a Western-style court theater.

Foreign visitors noted his diverse responsibilities. They often referred to him as "factotum," the man who does everything. They also remarked on his knowledge of and interest in their societies. A patron of education and the arts, he kept musicians

in his home, had his son taught Latin, and collected foreign books, clocks, paintings, and furniture. He remained close to the tsar, although he rose slowly through the higher ranks. At the birth of the future Peter the Great in 1672, he was made *okolnichy* (majordomo), and in 1674 he received the highest Muscovite court rank, boyar.

With the sudden death of Tsar Alexei in 1676, things changed. The succession of sickly fourteen-year-old Tsar Fyodor brought the Miloslavsky family back into power. Matveyev immediately began to lose posts, prominence, and respect. During his journey into "honorable exile"—provincial governorship in Siberia—he was convicted of sorcery. He was stripped of rank and possessions and exiled, first to the prison town of Pustozersk and later to Mezen. Tsar Fyodor's death and Peter's accession in 1682 brought Matveyev back to Moscow in triumph, but only days later he was killed when pro-Miloslavsky rioters surged through the capital.

Because of his decades of service, his prominence, fall, and dramatic death, and a collection of autobiographical letters from exile, Matveyev received frequent and generally favorable attention from Russian writers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their works ranged from scholarly biographies and articles to poems, plays, and children's books. He became less visible in the twentieth century, when Soviet historians lost interest in supporters of the old regime. To date there has been only fragmentary treatment of his life in English.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; BOYAR; COPPER RIOTS; NARYSHKINA, NATALIA KIRILLOVNA; NIKON, PATRIARCH; PETER I

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MARTHA LUBY LAHANA

MAXIM THE GREEK, ST.

(c. 1475–1556), Greek monk canonized in the Orthodox Church.

A learned Greek monk, translator, and writer resident in Muscovy who was imprisoned by Muscovite authorities and never allowed to return

home, Maxim had great moral and intellectual authority with contemporaries and posterity and was canonized in 1988. Born Michael Trivolis (Triboles) in the Greek city of Arta some twenty years after the Turkish capture of Constantinople, he went to Italy as a young man, where he was in contact with many prominent Renaissance figures. Under the influence of Savonarola he became a monk in the San Marco Dominican Monastery (1502), but two years later he returned to Greece, entering the Vatopedi monastery on Mount Athos under the monastic name of Maximos, rejecting Roman Catholicism and the humanist world of his youth, and concentrating upon the Eastern Orthodox theological tradition. In 1516 he was sent to Moscow to correct Russian ecclesiastical books. There he fell into disfavor with Grand Prince Vasily and Metropolitan Daniel, the head of the Russian Church, was twice convicted of treason and heresy (1525, 1531), and eventually died in Muscovy without being exonerated or regaining his freedom. During much of this time he translated biblical and Byzantine texts into Russian, and authored original compositions, including critical, historical, liturgical, philological, and exegetical works, demonstrations of his own orthodoxy and innocence, descriptions of the world (he was the first to mention Columbus's discovery of the New World), explication of the ideals and practice of monasticism, and a great deal else. He instructed Russian pupils in Greek, and inspired the study of lexicography and grammar.

Despite his official disgrace, Maxim's voluminous compositions were greatly revered and very influential in Old Russia; his biography and writings have been the subject of thousands of scholarly books and articles.

See also: DANIEL, METROPOLITAN; MUSCOVY; MONASTICISM; ORTHODOXY; POSSESSORS AND NON-POSSESSORS

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HUGH M. OLMSTED

MAYAKOVSKY, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

(1893–1930), poet, playwright.

Vladimir Mayakovsky was born in Bagdadi, Georgia (later renamed Mayakovsky in his honor). His father's death of tetanus in 1906 devastated the family emotionally and financially, and the themes of death, abandonment, and infection recurred in many of Mayakovsky's poems. As a student, Mayakovsky became an ardent revolutionary; he was arrested and served eleven months for his Bolshevik activities in 1909. In 1911 he was accepted into the Moscow Institute of Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture, where he met David Burlyuk, who was beginning to gather the Hylaeian group of artists and poets: Nikolai and Vladimir Burlyuk, Alexandra Exter, Viktor (Velemir) Khlebnikov, Alexei Kruchenykh, and Benedikt Livshits. In 1912 the group issued its first manifesto, "A Slap in the Face of Public Taste," the highly charged rhetoric that created a scandalous sensation announcing the arrival of Futurism in the artistic culture of Russia. The poets and artists of Hylaea, Mayakovsky in particular, were associated in the popular press with social disruption, hooliganism, and anarchist politics.

Mayakovsky was an enthusiastic supporter of the Bolshevik revolution; much of his artistic effort was devoted to propaganda for the state. He wrote agitational poems and, combining his considerable artistic skill with his ability to write short, didactic poems, constructed large posters that hung in the windows of the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA). He also wrote and staged at the Moscow State Circus a satirical play, *Mystery Bouffe*, which skewered bourgeois culture and the church. His most political poems, "150,000,000" (1919) and "Vladimir Ilich Lenin" (1924), became required reading for every Soviet schoolchild and helped create the image of Mayakovsky as a mythic hero of the Soviet Union, a position that Mayakovsky found increasingly untenable in the later 1920s. Mayakovsky remained a relentless foe of bureaucratism and authoritarianism in Soviet society; this

earned him official resentment and led to restrictions on travel and other privileges. On April 14, 1930, the combined pressures of Soviet control and a series of disastrous love affairs, most notably with Lili Brik, led to Mayakovsky's suicide in his apartment in Moscow.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; CIRCUS; FUTURISM

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MARK KONECNY

MAZEPA, HETMAN IVAN STEPANOVICH

(c. 1639–1709), Hetman (Cossack military leader) of Left-Bank Ukraine, 1687 to 1708.

Hetman Ivan Mazepa was raised in Poland and educated in the West, returning to Ukraine in 1663 to enter the service of the Polish-sponsored hetman Peter Doroshenko during the turbulent period of Ukrainian history known as the Ruin. In 1674 he transferred his allegiance to the Moscow-appointed hetman Ivan Samoilovich, whom he replaced when the latter fell from favor during Russia's campaign against the Crimean Tatars in 1687. He owed his promotion partly to the patronage of Prince Vasily Golitsyn.

In the 1680s to 1700s Mazepa remained loyal to Russia. In 1700 he became one of the first recipients of Peter I's new Order of St. Andrew. But he did not regard himself as permanently bound, as he governed in princely style and conducted a semi-independent foreign policy. In 1704, during the Great Northern War against Sweden, he occupied part of right-bank (Polish) Ukraine with Peter I's permission. However, Mazepa was under constant pressure at home to defend Cossack rights and to allay fears about Cossack regiments being reorganized on European lines. The final straw seems to have been Peter's failure to defend Ukraine against a possible attack by the Swedish-sponsored king of Poland, Stanislas Leszczynski. Mazepa

clearly believed that his obligations to the tsar were at an end: "We, having voluntarily acquiesced to the authority of his Tsarist Majesty for the sake of the unified Eastern Faith, now, being a free people, wish to withdraw, with expressions of our gratitude for the tsar's protection and not wishing to raise our hands in the shedding of Christian blood" (Subtelny).

At some point in 1707 or 1708, Mazepa made a secret agreement to help Charles XII of Sweden invade Russia and to establish a Swedish protectorate over Ukraine. In October 1708 he fled to Charles's side. Alexander Menshikov responded by storming and burning the hetman's headquarters at Baturin, a drastic action which deprived both Mazepa and the Swedes of men and supplies. Mazepa brought only 3,000 to 4,000 men to aid the Swedes, who were defeated at Poltava in July 1709. Mazepa fled with Charles to Turkey and died there.

Peter I regarded the defection of his "loyal subject" as a personal insult. Mazepa was "a new Judas," whom he (unjustly) accused of plans to hand over Orthodox monasteries and churches to the Catholics and Uniates. In his absence, Mazepa was excommunicated, and his effigy was stripped of the St. Andrew cross and hanged. He remains a controversial figure in Ukraine, while elsewhere he is best known from romanticized versions of his life in fiction and opera.

See also: COSSACKS; MENSHIKOV, ALEXANDER DANILOVICH; PETER I

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LINDSEY HUGHES

MEDVEDEV, ROY ALEXANDROVICH

(b. 1925), dissident historian.

Roy Medvedev is renowned as the author of the monumental dissident history of Stalinism, *Let*

History Judge, first published in English in 1972. The son of a prominent Soviet Marxist scholar who was murdered by Stalin in the 1930s, Medvedev pursued a teaching career before becoming a researcher in the Soviet Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Josef V. Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress (1956) spurred his interest in the Soviet past. Medvedev joined the Communist Party at this time. The further repudiation of Stalin at the Twenty-Second Congress (1961) impelled him to begin writing his anti-Stalinist tome, which was completed in 1968. Fearful that Stalin would be rehabilitated and repression renewed, Medvedev decided to publish it abroad. *Let History Judge* reflected the dissident thinking that emerged in the 1960s among intellectuals who, like Medvedev, sought a reformed, democratic socialism and a return to Leninism. Meanwhile, his opposition to any rehabilitation of Stalin led to his expulsion from the party. Medvedev was often subject to house arrest and KGB harassment under Leonid Brezhnev, but he managed to publish abroad numerous critical writings on Soviet history and politics. The liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachev allowed publication of a new edition of *Let History Judge* and Medvedev's return to the party and political life. The demise of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party allowed him to found a new socialist party and continue as a prolific, critical writer on Russian political life.

See also: DE-STALINIZATION; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT

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ROGER D. MARKWICK

MEDVEDEV, SYLVESTER AGAFONIKOVICH

(1641–1691), author, poet, and polemicist.

Simeon Agafonikovich Medvedev (monastic name: Sylvester) began his career as a secretary (*podyachy*) in one of the Muscovite chancelleries. In that capacity, he participated in diplomatic missions, until in the early 1670s he became a monk. A student of Simeon Polotsky, he acted as his teacher's

secretary and editor, and acquired connections in the court of Fyodor Alexeyevich (r. 1676–1682). After Polotsky's death, he assumed the mantle of his teacher as the court poet, first of Fyodor, and then of Sofia Alexeyevna (regent, 1682–1689). After 1678, he also worked as editor (*spravshchik*) in the Printing Office. During the 1680s, he was occupied with three main activities: working in the Printing Office, authoring polemics on the moment of transubstantiation (Eucharist conflict), and teaching in a school in the Zaikonospassky monastery. He repeatedly urged Sophia Alexeyevna to establish an Academy in Moscow, based on a plan (*privilegia*) that Polotsky may well have drawn up. When such an Academy was established in 1685 (the Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy), it was the Greek Ioannikios and Sophronios Leichoudes, and not Medvedev, who were chosen to head it. This, together with the Eucharist conflict, created enormous animosity between Sylvester and the Greek teachers. Patriarch of Moscow Joakim (in office 1672–1690) gradually but systematically undermined Medvedev, a monk who refused to obey him in the Eucharist conflict. While Sofia was in power, Medvedev felt well protected. After Peter I's coup in August 1689, Medvedev fled Moscow. He was arrested, brought to the Trinity St. Sergius Monastery, tortured, and obliged to sign a confession renouncing his previous errors regarding the Eucharist in 1690. Joakim's victory was complete. After a year of detention, Sylvester was also accused as a collaborator in a conspiracy against Peter the Great, Joakim, and their supporters. He was condemned to death and beheaded in 1691. Author of several polemical works on the transubstantiation moment, he also composed orations, poetry, and panegyrics. To him are also attributed works on Russian bibliography and an account of the musketeer rebellion of 1682.

See also: FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH; JOAKIM, PATRIARCH; ORTHODOXY; SLAVO-GRECO-LATIN ACADEMY

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NIKOLAOS A. CHRISIDIS

MEDVEDEV, ZHOES ALEXANDROVICH

(b. 1925), biochemist and author.

Zhores Alexandrovich Medvedev was born in Tbilisi, Georgia. He is the identical twin brother of

historian Roy Alexandrovich Medvedev. Zhores Medvedev graduated from the Timiryazev Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1950 and received a master's degree in biology from the Moscow Institute of Plant Physiology that same year. Between 1951 and 1962 he conducted research at the Timiryazev Academy and soon earned international acclaim for his work on protein biosynthesis and the physiology of the aging process.

In addition to his reputation as a biologist and a gerontologist, Medvedev is known for his criticism of the Lysenko regime in Soviet science. His book *The Rise and Fall of the Lysenko Regime* circulated in samizdat versions in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and was published in the West in 1969. Medvedev was forbidden to travel abroad and was kept under strict KGB surveillance. On May 29, 1970, Medvedev was arrested in his home and put into a mental hospital in the provincial town of Kaluga. He was kept there for two weeks while a psychiatric committee attempted to rationalize his confinement in medical terms.

On his first trip abroad, to London in 1973, Medvedev's Soviet citizenship was revoked, and he settled in London as an émigré. His Soviet citizenship was restored in 1990, and his numerous works have subsequently been published in Russia. Apart from numerous articles and papers on gerontology, genetics, and biochemistry, he has authored books on such important figures as Yuri Andropov and Mikhail Gorbachev and written on Soviet nuclear disasters and Soviet science in general.

See also: LYSENKO, TROFIM DENISOVICH; MEDVEDEV, ROY ALEXANDER

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RÓSA MAGNÚSDÓTTIR

MELNIKOV, KONSTANTIN STEPANOVICH

(1908–1974), a leading theoretician among modernist architects.

Konstantin Stepanovich Melnikov rose to fame in the West as a result of his design for the Soviet Pavilion at the Paris Exhibition of Decorative Arts in 1925, a building marked by its dramatic formal

simplicity and avoidance of decorative rhetoric, bold use of color, windowed front facade, and unusual exterior staircase that cut diagonally across the rectangular two-storied building. But his most impressive work in the Soviet Union was his club architecture, none more striking than the Rusakov Club, designed and built between 1927 and 1929 for the Union of Municipal Workers.

A graduate of the prestigious Moscow school of Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture, Melnikov in 1920 joined the Soviet parallel to the Bauhaus, the Higher State Artistic and Technical Studios (VKhUTEMAS), where the struggle for control over the direction of revolutionary architecture was fought until discussion was terminated by a new Stalinist orthodoxy. Melnikov refused to join either of the two competing architectural organizations, but remained closely associated with the Association of New Architects (ASNOVA), especially in his quest for a new “architectural language” for the age. Despite this association, his work influenced architects in both camps. Melnikov concerned himself with the functional demands of a building and with the rational organization of the composition. But he was most concerned with devising a unique expressive appearance that would unite spatial organization with innovative interior design, employing such forms that would make the buildings appear “as individualists against the general backdrop of urban building.” Melnikov's architectural language consisted of elementary geometric forms such as cylinders, cones, and parallelepipeds. It is the cylinder that forms the basis for Melnikov's own home, built between 1927 and 1929 on Krivoarbatsky Lane off Moscow's famed Arbat.

In 1937 Melnikov was accused of practicing the grotesquerie of formalism and of obstructing and perverting the resolution of the problem of the type and form of Soviet architecture. He was driven from architectural practice.

See also: ARCHITECTURE

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HUGH D. HUDSON JR.

MEMORIAL

Memorial, a self-described "international, historical-educational, human rights, and charitable society," was founded in Moscow in 1988. Its original inspiration lay in the work of scattered professional and amateur historians who had quietly and often covertly done independent research on Soviet history, realizing that their works might never see the light of day, at least in their lifetimes. In some cases they had given their work to the young Leningrad historian Arseny Roginsky, who from 1976 to 1981 included them in his anonymously produced *samizdat* (typewritten, self-published) journal *Pamyat*, or *Memory*. He then smuggled the journal abroad, where successive issues were published in Russian as separate volumes.

Memorial emerged in 1987, when individuals started to collect money to erect a monument to the victims of Josef Stalin's "great terror." This goal was achieved when a short tribute to these victims was carved on a boulder from a concentration camp near the Arctic Circle, and, on October 30, 1990, the boulder was installed in a square facing the Moscow headquarters of the KGB. In the meantime, Memorial had chosen the former dissident leader Andrei Sakharov as its honorary chairman and established groups in dozens of towns all over the USSR. However, official resistance to the new organization remained tenacious. Only in 1991 did the authorities give it the legal registration that it needed.

Memorial's mandate for historical research concerns all varieties of official persecution and discrimination conducted against individuals and groups during the Soviet era. Its researchers have sought access to governmental archives, rummaged through the buildings of abandoned concentration camps, and searched for the many unmarked and overgrown burial grounds that hold the remains of millions of prisoners who died in captivity. They have also solicited documents, letters, and oral history from surviving victims and witnesses. Apart from building up Memorial archives in Moscow and elsewhere, the researchers have had their work published by Memorial in Russian and other languages in hundreds of journals, newspapers, and books.

Memorial also researches current violations of human rights in Russia and other former Soviet republics, especially when these occur on a large scale. Examples are atrocities committed during the

two Chechnya wars, and continuing official discrimination against the Meskhi Turks, who were deported from southern Georgia in 1944.

Memorial's charitable work consists of helping victims of oppression and their relatives (e.g., materially and with legal problems).

Memorial's activities have been directed from Moscow by a stable core of individuals, including Roginsky, Nikita Okhotin, and Alexander Daniel. Its funding has primarily come from bodies such as the Ford Foundation, the Soros Foundation, and the Heinrich Boll Stiftung in Germany, and a few domestic sources.

Since the early 1990s most of public opinion in Russia has become indifferent or even hostile to the work of Memorial. However, its members derive hope from pockets of societal support and the launching in 1999 of an annual competition for essays on Memorial-type themes by high-school children that attracted 1,651 entries during its first year. Some members recall that, after the fall of Adolf Hitler in Germany, three decades went by before German society began seriously to confront the Nazi era and to create a more reliable national memory. A similar or longer period may be needed in the former USSR, before Russian society, in particular, can face up to myriad grim truths about the seven decades of communism. In the interim, Memorial has unearthed small pieces of truth about hundreds of deportations and millions of deaths.

See also: CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; HUMAN RIGHTS; SAKHAROV, ANDREI

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PETER REDDAWAY

MENDELEYEV, DMITRY IVANOVICH

(1834–1907), chemist; creator of the periodic table of elements.

Dmitry Mendeleev was born in Tobolsk, Siberia, where his father was the director of the local gymnasium. In 1853 he enrolled in the Main Pedagogical Institute in St. Petersburg, which

trained secondary school teachers. His early interest in chemistry focused on isomorphism—the groups of chemical elements with similar crystalline forms and chemical properties. In 1856 he earned a magisterial degree from St. Petersburg University and was appointed a private docent at the same institution. In 1859 a state stipend took him to the University of Heidelberg for advanced studies in chemistry. In 1861 he returned to St. Petersburg University and wrote *Organic Chemistry*, the first volume of its kind to be published in Russian. He offered courses in analytical, technical, and organic chemistry. In 1865 he defended his doctoral dissertation and was appointed professor of chemistry, a position he held until his retirement in 1890.

In 1868, with solid experience in chemical research, he undertook the writing of *The Principles of Chemistry*, a large study offering a synthesis of contemporary advances in general chemistry. It was during the writing of this book that he discovered the periodic law of elements, one of the greatest achievements of nineteenth-century chemistry. In quality this study surpassed all existing studies of its kind. It was translated into English, French, and German. In 1888 the English journal *Nature* recognized it as “one of the classics of chemistry” whose place “in the history of science is as well-assured as the ever-memorable work of [English chemist John] Dalton.”

An international gathering of chemists in Karlsruhe in 1860 had agreed in establishing atomic weights as the essential features of chemical elements. Several leading chemists immediately began work on establishing a full sequence of the sixty-four elements known at the time. Mendeleev took an additional step: he presented what he labeled the periodic table of elements, in which horizontal lines presented elements in sequences of ascending atomic weights, and vertical lines brought together elements with similar chemical properties. He showed that in addition to the emphasis on the diversity of elements, the time had also come to recognize the patterns of unity.

Beginning in the 1870s, Mendeleev wrote on a wide variety of themes reaching far beyond chemistry. He was most concerned with the organizational aspects of Russian industry, the critical problems of agriculture, and the dynamics of education. He tackled demographic questions, development of the petroleum industry, exploration of the Arctic Sea, the agricultural value of artificial fertilizers, and the development of a merchant navy in

Russia. In chemistry, he elaborated on specific aspects of the periodic law of elements, and wrote a large study on chemical solutions in which he advanced a hydrate theory, critical of Svante Arrhenius's and Jacobus Hendricus van't Hoff's electrolytic dissociation theory. At the end of his life, he was engaged in advancing an integrated view of the chemical unity of nature. Mendeleev saw the future of Russia in science and in a philosophy avoiding the rigidities of both idealism and materialism.

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ALEXANDER VUCINICH

MENSHEVIKS

The Menshevik Party was a moderate Marxist group within the Russian revolutionary movement. The Mensheviks originated as a faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP). In 1903, at the Second Party Congress, Yuli O. Martov proposed a less restrictive definition of party membership than Vladimir I. Lenin. Based on the voting at the congress, Lenin's faction of the party subsequently took the name Bolshevik, or “majority,” and Martov's faction assumed the name Menshevik, or “minority.” The party was funded by dues and donations. Its strength can be measured by proportionate representation at party meetings, but membership figures are largely speculative because the party was illegal during most of its existence.

Russian revolutionaries had embraced Marxism in the 1880s, and the Mensheviks retained Georgy Plekhanov's belief that Russia would first experience a bourgeois revolution to establish capitalism before advancing to socialism, as Karl Marx's model implied. They opposed any premature advance to socialism. A leading Menshevik theorist, Pavel Borisovich Akselrod, stressed the necessity of establishing a mass party of workers in order to assure the triumph of social democracy.

During the 1905 Revolution, which established civil liberties in Russia, Akselrod called for a "workers' congress," and many Mensheviks argued for cooperation with liberals to end the autocracy. Their Leninist rivals vested the hope for revolution in a collaboration of peasants and workers. Despite these differences, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks participated in a Unification Congress at Stockholm in 1906. The Menshevik delegates voted to participate in elections to Russia's new legislature, the Duma. Lenin initially opposed cooperation but later changed his mind. Before cooperation could be fully established, the Fifth Party Congress in London (May 1907) presented a Bolshevik majority. Akselrod's call for a workers' congress was condemned. Soon afterward the tsarist government ended civil liberties, repressed the revolutionary parties, and dissolved the Duma.

From 1907 to 1914 the two factions continued to grow apart. Arguing that the illegal underground party had ceased to exist, Alexander Potresov called for open legal work in mass organizations rather than a return to illegal activity. Fedor Dan supported a combination of legal and illegal work. Lenin and the Bolsheviks labeled the Mensheviks "liquidationists." In 1912 rival congresses produced a permanent split between the two factions.

During World War I many Mensheviks were active in war industries committees and other organizations that directly affected the workers' movement. Menshevik internationalists, such as Martov, refused to cooperate with the tsarist war effort. The economic and political failure of the Russian government coupled with continued action by revolutionary parties led to the overthrow of the tsar in February (March) 1917. The Mensheviks and another revolutionary party, the Socialist Revolutionaries, had a majority in the workers' movement and ensured the establishment of democratic institutions in the early months of the revolution. Since the Mensheviks opposed an immediate advance to socialism, the party supported the concept of dual power, which established the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet. In response to a political crisis that threatened the collapse of the Provisional Government, Mensheviks who wanted to defend the revolution, labeled defensists, decided to join a coalition government in April 1917. Another crisis in July did not persuade the Menshevik internationalists to join. Thereafter, the Mensheviks were divided on the

Revolution. The Provisional Government failed to fulfill the hopes of peasants, workers, and soldiers.

Because the Mensheviks had joined the Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks were not identified with its failure, the seizure of power by the Soviets in November brought the Bolshevik Party to power. Martov's attempts to negotiate the formation of an all-socialist coalition failed. Mensheviks opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed by the Bolsheviks, who now called themselves the Communist Party. Marginally legal, the Mensheviks opposed Allied efforts to crush the Soviet state during the civil war and, though repressed by the communists, also feared that counterrevolutionary forces might gain control of the government. Mensheviks established a republic in Georgia from 1918 to 1921. At the end of the civil war, some workers adopted Menshevik criticisms of Soviet policy, leading to mass arrests of party leaders. In 1922 ten leaders were allowed to emigrate. Others joined the Communist Party and were active in economic planning and industrial development. Though Mensheviks operated illegally in the 1930s, a trial of Mensheviks in 1931 signaled the end of the possibility of even marginal opposition inside Russia. A Menshevik party abroad operated in Berlin, publishing the journal *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik* under the leadership of Martov. Dan emerged as the leader of this group after Martov's death in 1923. To escape the Nazis the Mensheviks migrated to Paris and then to the United States in 1940, where they continued publication of their journal until 1965.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY; MARTOV, YURI OSIPOVICH; MARXISM; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; SOVIET MARXISM

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Alice K. Pate

MENSHIKOV, ALEXANDER DANILOVICH

(c. 1672–1729), soldier and statesman; favorite of Peter I.

Menshikov rose from humble origins to become the most powerful man in Russia after the tsar. Anecdotes suggest that his father was a pastry cook, although in fact he served as a non-commissioned officer in the Semenovskiy guards. Alexander served in Peter's own Preobrazhenskiy guards, and by the time of the Azov campaigns (1695–1696) he and Peter were inseparable. Menshikov accompanied Peter on the Grand Embassy (1697–1698) and served with him in the Great Northern War (1700–1721), rising through the ranks to become general field marshal and vice admiral. His military exploits included the battles of Kalisz (1706) and Poltava (1709), the sacking of Baturin (1708), and campaigns in north Germany in the 1710s. At home he was governor-general of St. Petersburg and president of the College of War.

The upstart Menshikov had to create his own networks, making many enemies among the traditional elite. He acquired a genealogy which traced his ancestry back to the princes of Kievan Rus and a dazzling portfolio of Russian and foreign titles and orders, including Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, Prince of Russia and Izhora, and Knight of the Orders of St. Andrew and St. Alexander Nevskiy. Menshikov had no formal education and was only semi-literate, but this did not prevent him from becoming a role model in Peter's cultural reforms. His St. Petersburg palace had a large library and its own resident orchestra and singers, and he also built a grand palace at Oranienbaum on the Gulf of Finland. In 1706 he married Daria Arsenieva (1682–1727), who was also thoroughly Westernized.

Menshikov was versatile and energetic, loyal but capable of acting on his own initiative. He was a devout Orthodox Christian who often visited shrines and monasteries. He was also ambitious and corrupt, amassing a vast personal fortune in lands, serfs, factories, and possessions. On several occasions, only his close ties with Peter saved him from being convicted of embezzlement. In 1725 he promoted Peter's wife Catherine as Peter's successor, heading her government in the newly created Supreme Privy Council and betrothing his own daughter to Tsarevich Peter, her nominated heir. After Peter's accession in 1727, Menshikov's rivals in the Council, among them members of the aristocratic Dolgorukiy clan, alienated the emperor

from Menshikov. In September 1727 they had Menshikov arrested and banished to Berezov in Siberia, where he died in wretched circumstances in November 1729.

See also: CATHERINE I; GREAT NORTHERN WAR; PETER I; PETER II; PREOBRAZHENSKY GUARDS

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LINDSEY HUGHES

MERCANTILISM

Mercantilism is the doctrine that economic activity, especially foreign trade, should be directed to unifying and strengthening state power. Though some mercantilist writers emphasized the accumulation of gold and silver by artificial trade surpluses, this "bullionist" version was not dominant in Russia.

The greatest of the Russian enlightened despots, Peter the Great, was eager to borrow the best of Western practice in order to modernize his vast country and to expand its power north and south. Toward this end, the tsar emulated successful Swedish reforms by establishing a regular bureaucracy and unifying measures. Peter brought in Western artisans to help design his new capital at St. Petersburg. He granted monopolies for fiscal purposes on salt, vodka, and metals, while developing workshops for luxury products. Skeptical of private entrepreneurs, he set up state-owned shipyards, arsenals, foundries, mines, and factories. Serfs were assigned to some of these. Like the state-sponsored enterprises of Prussia, however, most of these failed within a few decades.

Tsar Peter instituted many new taxes, raising revenues some five times, not counting the servile labor impressed to build the northern capital, canals, and roads. Like Henry VIII of England, he confiscated church lands and treasure for secular purposes. He also tried to unify internal tolls, something accomplished only in 1753.

Foreign trade was a small, and rather late, concern of Peter's. That function remained mostly in

the hands of foreigners. To protect the industries in his domains, he forbade the import of woolen textiles and needles. In addition, he forbade the export of gold and insisted that increased import duties be paid in specie (coin).

See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST; FOREIGN TRADE; PETER I

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

MERCHANTS

Kievan Russia supplied raw materials of the forest—furs, honey, wax, and slaves—to the Byzantine Empire. This trade had a primarily military character, as the grand prince and his retinue extorted forest products from Russian and Finnish tribes and transported them through hostile territory via the Dnieper River and the Black Sea. In the self-governing republic of Novgorod, wealthy merchants shared power with the landowning elite. Novgorod exported impressive amounts of furs, fish, and other raw materials with the aid of the German Hansa, which maintained a permanent settlement in Novgorod—the Peterhof—as it did on Wisby Island and in London and Bergen.

Grand Prince Ivan III of Muscovy extinguished Novgorod's autonomy and expelled the Germans. Under the Muscovite autocracy, prominent merchants acted as the tsar's agents in exploiting his monopoly rights over commerce in high-value goods such as vodka and salt. The merchant estate (*soslovie*) emerged as a separate social stratum in the Law Code (*Ulozhenie*) of 1649, with the exclusive right to engage in handicrafts and commerce in cities.

Peter I's campaign to build an industrial complex to supply his army and navy opened up new opportunities for Russian merchants, but his government maintained the merchants' traditional obligations to provide fiscal and administrative ser-

vices to the state without remuneration. From the early eighteenth century to the end of the imperial period, the merchant estate included not only wholesale and retail traders but also persons whose membership in a merchant guild entitled them to perform other economic functions as well, such as mining, manufacturing, shipping, and banking.

Various liabilities imposed by the state, including a ban on serf ownership by merchants and the abolition of their previous monopoly over trade and industry, kept the merchant estate small and weak during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Elements of a genuine bourgeoisie did not emerge until the early twentieth century.

Ethnic diversity contributed to the lack of unity within the merchant estate. Each major city saw the emergence of a distinctive merchant culture, whether mostly European (German and English) in St. Petersburg; German in the Baltic seaports of Riga and Reval; Polish and Jewish in Warsaw and Kiev; Italian, Greek, and Jewish in Odessa; or Armenian in the Caucasus region, to name a few examples. Moreover, importers in port cities generally favored free trade, while manufacturers in the Central Industrial Region, around Moscow, demanded high import tariffs to protect their factories from European competition. These economic conflicts reinforced hostilities based on ethnic differences. The Moscow merchant elite remained xenophobic and antiliberal until the Revolution of 1905.

The many negative stereotypes of merchants in Russian literature reflected the contemptuous attitudes of the gentry, bureaucracy, intelligentsia, and peasantry toward commercial and industrial activity. The weakness of the Russian middle class constituted an important element in the collapse of the liberal movement and the victory of the Bolshevik party in the Russian Revolution of 1917.

See also: CAPITALISM; ECONOMY, TSARIST; FOREIGN TRADE; GUILDS

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THOMAS C. OWEN

MESKHETIAN TURKS

The Meskhetian Turks are a Muslim people who originally inhabited what is today southwestern Georgia. They speak a Turkic language very similar to Turkish. Deported from their homeland by Josef V. Stalin in 1944, the Meskhetian Turks are scattered in many parts of the former Soviet Union. Estimates of their number range as high as 250,000. Their attempts to return to their homeland in Georgia have been mostly unsuccessful.

While other groups deported from the Caucasus region at roughly the same time were accused of collaborating with the Nazis, Meskhetian Turk survivors report that different reasons were given for their deportation. Some say they were accused of collaborating, others say they were told that the deportation was for their own safety, and still others were given no reason whatsoever. The deportation itself was brutal, with numerous fatalities resulting from both the long journey on crammed railroad cars and the primitive conditions in Central Asia where they were forced to live. Estimates of the number of deaths range from thirty to fifty thousand.

In the late 1950s Premier Nikita Khrushchev allowed the Meskhetian Turks and other deported peoples to leave their camps in Central Asia. Unlike most of the other deported peoples, however, the Meskhetian Turks were not allowed to return to their ancestral homeland. The Georgian SSR was considered a sensitive border region and as such was off limits. The Meskhetian Turks began to disperse throughout the Soviet Union, with many ending up in the Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz SSRs and others in Soviet Azerbaijan and southern European Russia. They were further dispersed in 1989 when several thousand Meskhetian Turks fled deadly ethnic riots directed at them in Uzbekistan.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Meskhetian Turks have tried to return to their ancestral homeland in newly independent Georgia, but they face strong opposition. Georgia already has a severe refugee crisis, with hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In addition, the substantial Armenian population of the Meskhetian Turks' traditional homeland does not want them back. The Georgians view the Meskhetian Turks as ethnic Georgians who adopted a Turkic language and the Muslim religion. They insist that any Meskhetian Turks who wish to return must officially declare themselves Georgian, adding Georgian suffixes to their names and educating their children in the Georgian language.

The Meskhetian Turks are scattered across the former Soviet Union, with the largest populations in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In southern European Russia's Krasnodar Krai, the local population of Meskhetian Turks, most of whom fled the riots in Uzbekistan, have received particularly rough treatment. The Meskhetian Turks of this region are denied citizenship and, according to Russian and international human rights organizations, frequently suffer bureaucratic hassles and physical assaults from local officials intent on driving them away. In 1999, as a condition of membership in the Council of Europe, the Georgian government announced that it would allow for the return of the Meskhetian Turks within twelve years, but despite international pressure it has taken little concrete action in this direction.

See also: DEPORTATIONS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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JUSTIN ODUM

MESTNICHESTVO

The practice of appointing men from eminent families to high positions in the military or government according to social status and service record.

Mestnichestvo or “precedence” refers to a legal practice in Muscovy whereby a military officer sued to avoid serving in a rank, or “place” (*mesto*), below a man whose family he regarded as inferior. The practice was open only to men in the most eminent families and arose in the second quarter of the sixteenth century as a result of rapid social change in the elite. Eminent princely families joining the grand prince’s service from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Khanate of Kazan, and Rus principalities challenged the status of the established Muscovite boyar clans. Thus *mestnichestvo* arose in the process of the definition of a more complex elite and was inextricably connected with the compilation of genealogical and military service records (*rodoslovyne* and *razryadnye knigi*).

Relative place was reckoned on the basis of family heritage and the eminence of one’s own and one’s ancestors’ military service. A complicated formula also assigned ranks to members of large clans so that individuals could be compared across clans. Litigants presented their own clan genealogies and service precedents in comparison with those of their rival and their rival’s kinsmen, often using records that differed from official ones. Judges were then called upon to adjudicate cases of immense complexity.

In practice few precedence disputes came to such detailed exposition in court because the state acted in two ways to waylay them. From the late sixteenth century the tsar regularly declared service assignments in a particular campaign “without place,” that is, not counting against a person’s or his clan’s dignity. Secondly, the tsar, or judges acting in his name, peremptorily resolved suits on the spot. Some were dismissed on the basis of evident disparity of clans (“your family has always served below that family”), while other plaintiffs were reassigned or their assignments declared without place. Tsars themselves took an active role in these disputes. Sources cite tsars Ivan IV, Mikhail Fyodorovich, and Alexei Mikhailovich, among others, castigating their men for frivolous suits. Significantly, only a tiny number of *mestnichestvo* suits were won by plaintiffs. Most resolved cases affirmed the hierarchy established in the initial assignment.

Some scholars have argued that precedence allowed the Muscovite elite to protect its status against the tsars, while others suggest that it benefited the state by keeping the elite preoccupied with petty squabbling. Source evidence, however, suggests that precedence rarely impinged on military preparedness or tsarist authority. If anything, the regularity with which status hierarchy among clans was reaffirmed suggests that precedence exerted a stabilizing affirmation of the status quo.

In the seventeenth century the bases on which precedence functioned were eroded. The elite had expanded immensely to include new families of lesser heritage, lowly families were litigating for place, and many service opportunities were available outside of the system of place. *Mestnichestvo* as a system of litigation was abolished in 1682, while at the same time the principle of hereditary elite status was affirmed by the creation of new genealogical books for the new elite.

See also: LEGAL SYSTEMS; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA

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NANCY SHIELDS KOLLMANN

METROPOLITAN

A metropolitan is the chief prelate in an ecclesiastical territory that usually coincided with a civil province.

The metropolitan ranks just below a patriarch and just above an archbishop, except in the contemporary Greek Orthodox Church, where since the 1850s the archbishop ranks above the metropolitan. The term derives from the Greek word for the capital of a province where the head of the episcopate resides. The first evidence of its use to designate a Churchman’s rank was in the Council of Nicaea (325 C.E.) decision, which declared (canon 4; cf. canon 6) the right of the metropolitan to confirm episcopal appointments within his jurisdiction.

A metropolitan was first appointed to head the Rus Church in 992. Subsequent metropolitans of Kiev and All Rus resided in Kiev until 1299 when

Metropolitan Maxim (1283–1305) moved his residence to Vladimir-on-the-Klyazma. His successor, Peter (1308–1326), began residing unofficially in Moscow. The next metropolitan, Feognost (1328–1353), made the move to Moscow official. A rival metropolitan was proposed by the grand duke of Lithuania, Olgerd, in 1354, and from then until the 1680s there was a metropolitan residing in western Rus with a rival claim to heading the metropolity of Kiev and all Rus.

Until 1441, the metropolitans of Rus were appointed in Constantinople. From 1448 until 1589, the grand prince or tsar appointed the metropolitan of Moscow and all Rus following nomination by the council of bishops. When the metropolitan of Moscow and all Rus was raised to the status of patriarch in 1589, the existing archbishops—those of Novgorod, Rostov, Kazan, and Sarai—were elevated to metropolitans. The Council of 1667 elevated four other archbishops—those of Astrakhan, Ryazan, Tobolsk, and Belgorod—to metropolitan status. After the abolition of the patriarchate in 1721 by Peter I, no metropolitans were appointed until the reign of Elizabeth, when metropolitans were appointed for Kiev (1747) and Moscow (1757). Under Catherine II, a third metropolitan—for St. Petersburg—was appointed (1783). In 1917, the patriarchate of Moscow was reestablished and various new metropolitanates created so that by the 1980s there were twelve metropolitans in the area encompassed by the Soviet Union.

See also: PATRIARCHATE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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DONALD OSTROWSKI

MEYERHOLD, VSEVOLOD YEMILIEVICH

(1874–1940), born Karl-Theodor Kazimir Meyerhold, stage director.

Among the most influential twentieth-century stage directors, Vsevolod Meyerhold utilized abstract design and rhythmic performances. His ac-

tor training system, “biomechanics,” merges acrobatics with industrial studies of motion. Never hesitating to adapt texts to suit directorial concepts, Meyerhold saw theatrical production as an art independent from drama. Born in Penza, Meyerhold studied acting at the Moscow Philharmonic Society (1896–1897) with theatrical reformer Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko. When Nemirovich co-founded the Moscow Art Theater with Konstantin Stanislavsky (1897), Meyerhold joined. He excelled as Treplev in Anton Chekhov’s *Seagull* (1898). Like Treplev, Meyerhold sought new artistic forms and left the company in 1902. He directed symbolist plays at Stanislavsky’s Theater-Studio (1905) and for actress Vera Kommissarzhevskaya (1906–1907).

From 1908 to 1918, Meyerhold led a double life. As director for the imperial theaters, he created sumptuous operas and classic plays. As experimental director, under the pseudonym Dr. Daper-tutto, he explored avant-garde directions. Meyerhold greeted 1917 by vowing “to put the October revolution into the theatre.” He headed the Narkompros Theater Department from 1920 to 1921 and staged *agitprop* (pro-communist propaganda). His Soviet work developed along two trajectories: He reinterpreted classics to reflect political issues and premiered contemporary satires. His most famous production, Fernand Crommelynck’s *Magnificent Cuckold* (1922), used a constructivist set and biomechanics. When Soviet control hardened, Meyerhold was labeled “formalist” and his theater liquidated (1938). The internationally acclaimed Stanislavsky sprang to Meyerhold’s defense, but shortly after Stanislavsky’s death, Meyerhold was arrested (1939). Following seven months of torture, he confessed to “counterrevolutionary slander” and was executed on February 2, 1940.

See also: AGITPROP; MOSCOW ART THEATER

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SHARON MARIE CARNICKE

MIGHTY HANDFUL

Group of nationally oriented Russian composers during the nineteenth century; the name was

coined unintentionally by the music and art critic Vladimir Stasov.

The “Mighty Handful” (*moguchaya kuchka*), also known as the New Russian School, Balakirev Circle, or the Five, is a group of nationalist, nineteenth-century composers. At the end of the 1850s the brilliant amateur musician Mily Balakirev (1837–1920) gathered a circle of like-minded followers in St. Petersburg with the intention of continuing the work of Mikhail Glinka. His closest comrades became the engineer Cesar Cui (1835–1918; member of the group beginning in 1856), the officers Modest Mussorgsky (1839–1881, member beginning in 1857), and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov (1844–1908, member beginning in 1861), and the chemist Alexander Borodin (1833–1887, member beginning in 1862). The spiritual mentor of the young composers, who shared their lack of professional musical training, was the music and art critic Vladimir Stasov, who publicly and vehemently promoted the cause of a Russian national music separate from Western traditions, in a somewhat polarizing and polemic manner. When Stasov, in an article for the *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti* (St. Petersburg News) about a “Slavic concert of Mr. Balakirev” on the occasion of the Slavic Congress in 1867, praised the “small, but already mighty handful of Russians musicians,” he had Glinka and Alexander Dargomyzhsky in mind as well as the group, but the label stuck to Balakirev and his followers. They can be considered a unit not only because of their constant exchange of ideas, but also because of their common aesthetic convictions. Strictly speaking, this unity of composition lasted only until the beginning of the 1870s, when it began to dissolve with the growing individuation of its members.

The enthusiastic music amateurs sought to create an independent national Russian music by taking up Russian themes, literature, and folklore and integrating Middle-Asian and Caucasian influences, thereby distancing it from West European musical language and ending the supremacy of the latter in the musical life of Russian cities. Balakirev, who had known Glinka personally, was the most advanced musically; his authority was undisputed among the five musicians. He rejected classical training in music as being only rigid routine and recommended his own method to his followers instead: composing should not be learned through academic courses, but through the direct analysis of masterpieces (especially those created by Glinka, Hector Berlioz, Robert Schumann, Franz Liszt, or Ludwig van

Beethoven, the composers most venerated by the Five). The St. Petersburg conservatory, founded in 1862 by Anton Rubinstein as a new central music training center with predominantly German staff was heavily criticized, especially by Balakirev and Stasov. Instead, a Free School of Music (*Bezplatnaya muzykalnaya shkola*) was founded in the same year, and differed from the conservatory in its low tuition fees and its decidedly national Russian orientation. Balakirev advised his own disciples of the Mighty Handful to go about composing great works of music without false fear.

In spite of comparatively low productivity and long production periods, due in part to the lack of professional qualifications and the consequent creative crises, in part to Balakirev’s willful and meticulous criticisms, and in part to the members’ preoccupation with their regular occupations, the composers of the Mighty Handful became after Glinka and beside Peter Tchaikovsky the founders of Russian national art music during the nineteenth century. An exception was Cui, whose compositions, oriented towards Western models and themes, formed a sharp contrast to what he publicly postulated for Russian music. The other members of the Balakirev circle successfully developed specific Russian musical modes of expression. The music dramas *Boris Godunov* (1868–1872) and *Khovanshchina* (1872–1881) by Mussorgsky and *Prince Igor* (1869–1887) by Borodin, in spite of their unfinished quality, are considered among the greatest historical operas of Russian music, whereas Rimsky-Korsakov achieved renown by his masterly accomplishment of the Russian fairy-tale and magic opera. The symphonies, symphonic poems, and overtures of Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakov, and Balakirev stand for the beginnings and first highlights of a Russian orchestral school. Understandably, many of the composers’ most important works were created when the Mighty Handful as a community had already dissolved. The personal crises of Balakirev and Mussorgsky contributed to the circle’s dissolution, as did the increasing emancipation of the disciples from their master, which was clearly exemplified by Rimsky-Korsakov. He advanced to the status of professional musician, became professor at the St. Petersburg conservatory (1871), and diverged from the others increasingly over time in his creative approaches. In sum, the Mighty Handful played a crucial role in the formation of Russian musical culture at the crossroads of West European influences and strivings for national independence. Through the intentional use of

historical and mythical Russian themes, the works of the Mighty Handful have made a lasting contribution to the national culture of recollection in Russia far beyond the nineteenth century.

See also: MUSIC; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS; RIMSKY-KORSAKOV, NIKOLAI ANDREYEVICH; STASOV, VLADIMIR VASILIEVICH

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MATTHIAS STADELMANN

MIGRATION

Across time and cultures individuals migrate to improve their lives, seek better opportunities, or flee unbearable conditions. In Russian history, migration highlights social stratification, underscores the importance of social management, and provides insight into post-Soviet population change. Migration motivations in Russia were historically influenced by direct governmental control, providing a unique case for assessing barriers to migration and a window into state and society relations.

The earliest inhabitants of the region now known as Russia were overrun by the in-migration of several conquering populations, with Cimmerians, Scythians (700 B.C.E.), Samartians (300 B.C.E.), Goths (200 C.E.), Huns (370 C.E.), Avars, and Khazars moving into the territory to rule the region. Mongol control (1222) focused on manipulating elites and extracting taxes, but not in-migration. When Moscow later emerged as an urban settlement, eastern Slavs spread across the European plain. Ivan III (1462–1505) pushed expansion south and west, while Ivan IV (1530–1584) pushed east towards Siberia. Restrictions on peasant mobility made migration difficult, yet some risked everything to illegally flee to the southern borderlands and Siberia.

The legal code of 1649 eradicated legal migration. Solidifying serfdom, peasants were now owned by the gentry. Restrictions on mobility could be circumvented. Ambitious peasants could become illegal

or seasonal migrants, marginalized socially and economically. By 1787 between 100,000 and 150,000 peasants resided seasonally in Moscow, unable to acquire legal residency, forming an underclass unable to assimilate into city life. Restricted mobility hindered the development of urban labor forces for industrialization in this period, also marked by the use of forced migration and exile by the state.

The emancipation of serfs (1861) increased mobility, but state ability to control migration remained. Urbanization increased rapidly—according to the 1898 census, nearly half of all urbanites were migrants. The Stolypin reforms (1906) further spurred migration to cities and frontiers by enabling withdrawal from rural communes. Over 500,000 peasants moved into Siberia yearly in the early 1900s. Over seven million refugees moved into Russia by 1916, challenging ideas of national identity, highlighting the limitations of state, and crystallizing Russian nationalism. During the Revolution and civil war enforcement of migration restrictions were thwarted, adding to displacement, settlement shifts, and urban growth in the 1920s.

The Soviet passport system reintroduced state control over migration in 1932. Passports contained residency permits, or *propiskas*, required for legal residence. The passport system set the stage for increased social control and ideological emphasis on the scientific management of population. Limiting rural mobility (collective farmers did not receive passports until 1974), restricting urban growth, the exile of specific ethnic groups (Germans, Crimean Tatars, and others), and directing migration through incentives for movements into new territories (the Far East, Far North, and northern Kazakhstan) in the Soviet period echoed previous patterns of state control. As demographers debated scientific population management, by the late Soviet period factors such as housing, wages, and access to goods exerted strong influences on migration decision making. Attempts to control migration in the Soviet period met some success in stemming urbanization, successfully attracting migrants to inhospitable locations, increasing regional mixing of ethnic and linguistic groups across the Soviet Union, and blocking many wishing to immigrate.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, migration restrictions were initially minimized, but migration trends and security concerns increased interest in restrictions by the end of the twentieth century. Decreased emigration control led to over



Nineteenth-century engraving shows a caravan of Russian peasants migrating. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

100,000 people leaving Russia yearly between 1991 and 1996, dampened only by restrictions on immigration from Western countries. Russia's population loss has been offset by immigration from the near abroad, where 25 million ethnic Russians resided in 1991. Legal, illegal, and seasonal migrants were attracted from the near abroad by the relative political and economic stability in Russia, in addition to ethnic and linguistic ties. Yet, the flow of immigrants declined in the late 1990s. Refugees registered in Russia numbered nearly one million in 1998. Internally, migration patterns follow wages and employment levels, and people left the far eastern and northern regions. Internal displacement emerged in the south during the 1990s, from Chechnya. By the late 1990s, the challenges of migrant assimilation and integration were key public issues, and interest in restricting migration rose. While market forces had begun to replace direct administrative control over migration in Russia by the end of the 1990s, concerns over migration and increasing calls for administrative interventions drew upon a long history of state management of population migration.

See also: DEMOGRAPHY; IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION; LAW CODE OF 1649; PASSPORT SYSTEM

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CYNTHIA J. BUCKLEY

MIKHAILOVSKY, NIKOLAI KONSTANTINOVICH

(1842–1904), journalist, sociologist, and a revolutionary democrat; leading theorist of agrarian Populism.

Born in the Kaluga region to an impoverished gentry family, and an early orphan, Nikolai Mikhailovsky studied at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute, which he was forced to quit in 1863 after taking part in activities in support of Polish rebels. From 1860 he published in radical periodicals, held a string of editorial jobs, and experimented at cooperative profit-sharing entrepreneurship. His early thought was influenced by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, whose work he translated into Russian. In 1868 he joined the team of *Otechestvennye zapiski* (Fatherland Notes), a leading literary journal headed by Nikolai Nekrasov, where he established himself with his essay, "What Is Progress?" attacking Social Darwinism, with his work against the utilitarians, "What Is Happiness?" and other publications, including "Advocacy of the Emancipation of Women." After Nekrasov's death (1877) Mikhailovsky became one of three coeditors, and the de facto head of the journal.

Mikhailovsky was the foremost thinker and author of the mature, or critical stage of populism (*narodnichestvo*). While early populists envisioned Russia bypassing the capitalist stage of development and building a just and equitable economic and societal order on the basis of the peasant commune, Mikhailovsky viewed this scenario as a desirable but increasingly problematic alternative to capitalist or state-led industrialization. The ethical thrust of Russian populism found its utmost expression in his doctrine of binding relationship between factual truth and normative (moral) truth, viewed as justice (in Russian, both ideas are expressed by the word *pravda*), thus essentially tying knowledge to ethics.

Together with Pyotr Lavrov, Mikhailovsky laid the groundwork for Russia's distinct sociological tradition by developing the subjective sociology that was also emphatically normative and ethical in its basis. His most famous statement read that

"every sociological theory has to start with some kind of a utopian ideal." In this vein, he developed a systematic critique of the positivist philosophy of knowledge, including the natural science approach to social studies, while working to familiarize the Russian audience with Western social and political thinkers of his age, including John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx. In "What Is Progress?" he argued for the "struggle for individuality" as a central element to social action and the indicator of genuine progress of humanity, as opposed to the Darwinian struggle for survival. According to Mikhailovsky, in society, unlike in biological nature, it is the environment that should be adapted to individuals, not vice versa. On this basis, he attacked the division of labor in capitalist societies as a dehumanizing social pathology leading to unidimensional and regressive rather than harmonious development of humans and, eventually, to the suppression of individuality (in contrast to the animal world, where functional differentiation is a progressive phenomenon). Thus he introduced a strong individualist (and, arguably, a libertarian) element to Russian populist thought, which had traditionally emphasized collectivism. He sought an alternative to the division of labor in the patterns of simple cooperation among peasants. He also worked toward a distinct theory of social change, questioning Eurocentric linear views of progress, and elaborated a dual gradation of types and levels of development (that is, Russia for him represented a higher type but a lower level of development than industrialized capitalist countries, and he thought it necessary to preserve this higher, or communal, type while striving to move to a higher level). In "Heroes and the Crowd" (1882), he provided important insights into mass psychology and the nature of leadership.

Under the impact of growing political repression, Mikhailovsky evolved from liberal critique of the government during the 1860s through short-lived hopes for a pan-Slav liberation movement (1875–1876) to clandestine cooperation with the People's Will Party, thus broadening the purely social goals of the original populism to embrace a political revolution (while at the same time distancing himself from the morally unscrupulous figures connected to populism, such as Sergei Nechayev). He authored articles for underground publications, and after the assassination of Alexander II (1881) took part in compiling the address of the People's Will's Executive Committee to Alexander III, an attempt to position the organization as a negotiating

partner of the authorities. In the subsequent crack-down on the movement, Mikhailovsky was banned from St. Petersburg (1882), and *Otechestvennye zapiski* was shut down (1884). Only in 1884 was he able to return to an editorial position by informally taking over the journal *Russkoye bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth). He then emerged as an influential critic of the increasingly popular Marxism, which he saw as converging with top-down industrialization policies of the government in its disdain for and exploitative approach to the peasantry. Simultaneously, he polemicized against Tolstovian anarchism and anti-intellectualism. In spite of the ideological hegemony of Marxists at the turn of the century, Mikhailovsky's writings were highly popular among the democratic intelligentsia and provided the conceptual basis for the neo-populist revival, represented by the Socialist Revolutionary and the People's Socialist parties in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. Moreover, his work resonates with subsequent Western studies in the peasant-centered "moral economy" of peripheral countries.

See also: INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM; MARXISM; NEKRASOV, NIKOLAI ALEXEYEVICH; POPULISM

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DMITRI GLINSKI

MIKHALKOV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

(b. 1945), film director, actor.

Nikita Mikhalkov is the best-known Russian director of the late-Soviet and post-Soviet period.

Mikhalkov was born in Moscow to a family of accomplished painters, writers, and arts administrators. His father was chief of the Soviet Writers' Union, and his brother, Andrei Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky, is also a successful director. Mikhalkov first came to national and international attention with his film *Slave of Love* (1976), which depicts the last days of prerevolutionary popular filmmaking. He made several more films about late-nineteenth-century elite culture, including *Unfinished Piece for Player Piano* (1977), *Oblomov* (1980), and *Dark Eyes* (1987). *Five Evenings* (1978) is a beautifully photographed, finely etched treatment of love and loss set just after World War II. *Urga* (aka *Close to Eden*, 1992) is a powerful portrait of economic transformation and cultural encounter on the Russian-Mongolian border. *Anna, 6-18* (1993) is a series of interviews with the director's daughter, which highlights the difficulties of growing up in late-communist society. *Burnt by the Sun* (1994), which won a U.S. Academy Award for best foreign language film, treats the complicated personal politics of the Stalinist period. *The Barber of Siberia* (1999) is a sprawling romantic epic with Russians and Americans in Siberia—an expensive multinational production which failed to win an audience. All of Mikhalkov's films are visually rich; he has a deft touch for lightening his dramas with comedy, and his characterizations can be subtle and complex.

Mikhalkov has also had a successful career as an actor. Physically imposing, he often plays characters who combine authority and power with poignancy or sentimentality. During the late 1990s, Mikhalkov became the president of the Russian Culture Fund and the chair of the Union of Russian Filmmakers.

See also: MOTION PICTURES

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JOAN NEUBERGER

MIKOYAN, ANASTAS IVANOVICH

(1895–1978), Communist Party leader and government official.

Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan occupied the summits of Soviet political and governmental life for more than five decades. One of Stalin's comrades, he was a political survivor. Armenian by birth, Mikoyan joined the Bolsheviks in 1915, playing a leading role in the Caucasus during the civil war (1918–1920). In 1922 he was elected to the Communist Party's Central Committee, by which time he was already working confidentially for Josef Stalin. After Vladimir Lenin's death (1924) he staunchly supported Stalin's struggle against the Left Opposition. His loyalty was rewarded in 1926 when he became the youngest commissar and Politburo member. Appointed commissar of food production in 1934, he introduced major innovations in this area. By 1935 he was a full member of the Politburo. While not an aggressive advocate of the Great Terror (1937–1938), Mikoyan was responsible for purges in his native Armenia. In 1942, after the German invasion, he was appointed to the State Defense Committee, with responsibility for military supplies. After Stalin's death (1953) he proved a loyal ally of Nikita Khrushchev, the only member of Stalin's original Politburo to support him in his confrontation with the Stalinist Anti-Party Group (1957). Mikoyan went on to play a crucial role in the Cuban missile crisis (1962), mediating between Khrushchev, U.S. president John F. Kennedy, and Cuban leader Fidel Castro, whom he persuaded to accept the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. He was appointed head of government in July 1964, three months before signing the decree dismissing Khrushchev as party first secretary. Under Leonid Brezhnev he gradually relinquished his roles in party and government in favor of writing his memoirs, finally retiring in 1975.

See also: ANTI-PARTY GROUP; ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; LEFT OPPOSITION; PURGES, THE GREAT

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ROGER D. MARKWICK

MILITARY ART

Military art is the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military actions on land, at sea, and within the global aerospace envelope.

Historically, Russian military theorists held that the primary function of military art was attainment of victory over an adversary with the least expenditure of forces, resources, and time. This postulation stressed a well-developed sense of intent that would link the logic of strategy with the purposeful design and execution of complex military actions. By the end of the nineteenth century, Russian military theorists accepted the conviction that military art was an expression of military science, which they viewed as a branch of the social sciences with its own laws and disciplinary integrity. Further, they subscribed to the idea, exemplified by Napoleon, that military art consisted of two primary components, strategy and tactics. Strategy described movements of main military forces within a theater of war, while tactics described what occurred on the battlefield. However, following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, theorists gradually modified their views to accommodate the conduct of operations in themselves, or *operatika*, as a logical third component lying between—and linking—strategy and tactics. This proposition further evolved during the 1920s and 1930s, thanks primarily to Alexander Svechin, who lent currency to the term “operational art” (*operativnoye iskusstvo*) as a replacement for *operatika*, and to Vladimir Triandafillov, who analyzed the nature of modern military operations on the basis of recent historical precedent. Subsequently, the contributions of other theorists, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Alexander Yegorov, and Georgy Isserson, along with mechanization of the Red Army and the bitter experience of the Great Patriotic War, contributed further to the Soviet understanding of modern military art. However, the theoretical development of strategy languished under Josef Stalin, while the advent of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II called into question the efficacy of operational art. During much of the Nikita Khrushchev era, a nuclear-dominated version of strategy held near-complete sway in the realm of military art. Only in the mid-1960s did Soviet military commentators begin to resurrect their understanding of operational art to correspond with the theoretical necessity for conducting large-scale conventional operations under conditions of nuclear threat. During the 1970s and

1980s emphasis on new reconnaissance systems and precision-guided weaponry as parts of an ongoing revolution in military affairs further challenged long-held convictions about traditional boundaries and linkages among strategy, operational art, and tactics. Further, U.S. combat experience during the Gulf War in 1990–1991 and again in Afghanistan during 2001 clearly challenged conventional notions about the relationships in contemporary war between time and space, mass and firepower, and offense and defense. Some theorists even began to envision a new era of remotely fought or no-contact war (*bezkontaknaya voynau*) that would dominate the future development of all facets of military art.

See also: MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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BRUCE W. MENNING

MILITARY DOCTRINE

In late Imperial Russia, a common basis for joint military action; in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, an assertion of military posture and policy.

The Soviet and Russian understanding of military doctrine is often a source of confusion because other societies usually subscribe to a narrower definition. For most Western military and naval establishments, doctrine typically consists of the distilled wisdom that governs the actual employment of armed forces in combat. At its best, this wisdom constitutes a constantly evolving intellectual construct that owes its origins and development to a balanced understanding of the complex interplay among changing technology, structure, theory, and combat experience.

In contrast, doctrine in its Soviet and Russian variants evolved early to reflect a common understanding of the state's larger defense requirements. The issue first surfaced after 1905, when Russian military intellectuals debated the necessity for a

"unified military doctrine" that would impart effective overall structure and direction to war preparations. In a more restrictive perspective, the same doctrine would also define the common intellectual foundations of field service regulations and the terms of cooperation between Imperial Russia's army and navy. In 1912, Tsar Nicholas II himself silenced discussion, proclaiming, "Military doctrine consists of doing everything that I order."

A different version of the debate resurfaced soon after the Bolshevik triumph in the civil war. Discussion ostensibly turned on a doctrinal vision for the future of the Soviet military establishment, but positions hardened and quickly assumed political overtones. War Commissar Leon Trotsky held that any understanding of doctrine must flow from future requirements for world revolution. Others, including Mikhail V. Frunze, held that doctrine must flow from the civil war experience, the nature of the new Soviet state, and the needs and character of the Red Army. Frunze essentially envisioned a concept of preparation for future war shaped by class relations, external threat, and the state's economic development.

Frunze's victory in the debate laid the foundations for a subsequent definition of Soviet and later Russian military doctrine that has remained relatively constant. Military doctrine came to be understood as "a system of views adopted by a given state at a given time on the goals and nature of possible future war and the preparation of the armed forces and the country for it, and also the methods of waging it." Because of explicit linkages between politics and war, this version of military doctrine always retained two aspects, the political (or sociopolitical) and the military-technical. Thanks to rapid advances in military technology, the latter aspect sometimes witnessed abrupt change. However, until the advent of Mikhail S. Gorbachev and perestroika, the political aspect, which defined the threat and relations among states, remained relatively static.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a recurring redefinition of the twin doctrinal aspects that emphasized both Russia's diminished great-power status and the changing nature of the threat. Nuclear war became less imminent, military operations more complex, and the threat both internal and external. Whatever the calculus, the terms of expression and discussion continued to reflect the unique legacy that shaped Imperial Russian and Soviet notions of military doctrine.

See also: FRUNZE, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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BRUCE W. MENNING

MILITARY-ECONOMIC PLANNING

In the world wars of the twentieth century, it was as important to mobilize the economy to supply soldiers' rations and equipment as it was to enlist the population as soldiers. Military-economic planning took root in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, after World War I. The scope of the plans that prepared the Soviet economy for war continues to be debated. Some argue that war preparation was a fundamental objective influencing every aspect of Soviet peacetime economic policy; there were no purely civilian plans, and everything was militarized to some degree. Others see military-economic planning more narrowly as the specialized activity of planning and budgeting for rearmament, which had to share priority with civilian economic goals.

The framework for military-economic planning was fixed by a succession of high-level government committees: the Council for Labor and Defense (STO), the Defense Committee, and, in the postwar period, the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK). The armed forces general staff carried on military-economic planning in coordination with the defense sector of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). Gosplan's defense sector was established on the initiative of the Red Army commander, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who pioneered the study of future war and offensive operations associated with the concept of deep battle. To support this he advocated ambitious plans for the large-scale production of combat aircraft and motorized armor. Tukhachevsky crossed swords at various times with Josef V. Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Kliment Voroshilov. The military-economic plans were less ambitious than he hoped, and also less coherent: Industry did not reconcile its production plans beforehand with the army's

procurement plan, and their interests often diverged over the terms of plans and contracts to supply equipment. To overcome this Tukhachevsky pressed to bring the management of defense production under military control, but he was frustrated in this too. His efforts ended with his arrest and execution in 1937.

Military-economic plans required every ministry and workplace to adopt a mobilization plan to be implemented in the event of war. How effective this was is difficult to evaluate, and the mobilization plans adopted before World War II appear to have been highly unrealistic by comparison with wartime outcomes. Despite this, the Soviet transition to a war economy was successful; the fact that contingency planning and trial mobilizations were practiced at each level of the prewar command system may have contributed more to this than their detailed faults might suggest.

During World War II the task was no longer to prepare for war but to fight it, and so the distinction between military-economic planning and economic planning in general disappeared for a time. It reemerged after the war when Stalin began bringing his generals back into line, and the security organs, not the military, took the leading role in organizing the acquisition of new atomic and aerospace technologies. Stalin's death and the demotion of the organs allowed a new equilibrium to emerge under Dmitry Ustinov, minister of the armament industry since June 1941; Ustinov went on to coordinate the armed forces and industry from a unique position of influence and privilege under successive Soviet leaders until his own death in 1984. It symbolized his coordinating role that he assumed the military rank of marshal in 1976.

See also: GOSPLAN; TUKHACHEVSKY, MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEVICH; USTINOV, DMITRY FEDOROVICH; WAR ECONOMY

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MARK HARRISON

MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA

Measured by large outcomes, the Imperial Russian military establishment evolved through two distinct stages. From the era of Peter the Great through the reign of Alexander III, the Russian army and navy fought, borrowed, and innovated their way to more successes than failures. With the major exception of the Crimean War, Russian ground and naval forces largely overcame the challenges and contradictions inherent in diverse circumstances and multiple foes to extend and defend the limits of empire. However, by the time of Nicholas II, significant lapses in leadership and adaptation spawned the kinds of repetitive disaster and fundamental disaffection that exceeded the military's ability to recuperate.

THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ARMY

The Imperial Russian Army and Navy owed their origins to Peter I, although less so for the army than the navy. The army's deeper roots clearly lay with Muscovite precedent, especially with Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich's European-inspired new regiments of foreign formation. The Great Reformer breathed transforming energy and intensity into these and other precedents to fashion a standing regular army that by 1725 counted 112,000 troops in two guards, two grenadier, forty-two infantry, and thirty-three dragoon regiments, with supporting artillery and auxiliaries. To serve this establishment, he also fashioned administrative, financial, and logistical mechanisms, along with a rational rank structure and systematic officer and soldier recruitment. With an admixture of foreigners, the officer corps came primarily from the Russian nobility, while soldiers came from recruit levies against the peasant population.

Although Peter's standing force owed much to European precedent, his military diverged from conventional patterns to incorporate irregular cavalry levies, especially Cossacks, and to evolve a military art that emphasized flexibility and practicality for combating both conventional northern European foes and less conventional steppe adversaries. After mixed success against the Tatars and Turks at Azov in 1695–1696, and after a severe reverse at Narva (1700) against the Swedes at the outset of the Great Northern War, Peter's army notched important victories at Dorpat (1704), Lesnaya (1708), and Poltava (1709). After an abrupt loss in 1711 to the Turks on the Pruth River, Peter dogged his Swedish adversaries until they came to terms

at Nystadt in 1721. Subsequently, Peter took to the Caspian basin, where during the early 1720s his Lower (or Southern) Corps campaigned as far south as Persia.

After Peter's death, the army's fortunes waned and waxed, with much of its development characterized by which aspect of the Petrine legacy seemed most politic and appropriate for time and circumstance. Under Empress Anna Ioannovna, the army came to reflect a strong European, especially Prussian, bias in organization and tactics, a bias that during the 1730s contributed to defeat and indecision against the Tatars and Turks. Under Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, the army reverted partially to Petrine precedent, but retained a sufficiently strong European character to give good account for itself in the Seven Years' War. Although in 1761 the military-organizational pendulum under Peter III again swung briefly and decisively in favor of Prussian-inspired models, a palace coup in favor of his wife, who became Empress Catherine II, ushered in a lengthy period of renewed military development.

During Catherine's reign, the army fought two major wars against Turkey and its steppe allies to emerge as the largest ground force in Europe. Three commanders were especially responsible for bringing Russian military power to bear against elusive southern adversaries. Two, Peter Alexandrovich Rumyantsev and Alexander Vasilievich Suvorov, were veterans of the Seven Years War, while the third, Grigory Alexandrovich Potemkin, was a commander and administrator of great intellect, influence, and organizational talent. During Catherine's First Turkish War (1768–1774), Rumyantsev successfully employed flexible tactics and simplified Russian military organization to win significant victories at Larga and Kagul (both 1770). Suvorov, meanwhile, defeated the Polish Confederation of Bar, then after 1774 campaigned in the Crimea and the Nogai steppe. At the same time, regular army formations played an important role in suppressing the Pugachev rebellion (1773–1775).

During Catherine's Second Turkish War (1787–1792), Potemkin emerged as the impresario of final victory over the Porte for hegemony over the northern Black Sea littoral, while Suvorov emerged as perhaps the most talented Russian field commander of all time. Potemkin inherently understood the value of irregular cavalry forces in the south, and he took measures to regularize Cossack service and bring them more fully under Russian military authority, or failing that, to abolish re-

calcitrant Cossack hosts. Following Rumyantsev's precedent, he also lightened and multiplied the number of light infantry and light cavalry formations, while emphasizing utility and practicality in drill and items of equipment. In the field, Suvorov further refined Rumyantsev's tactical innovations to emphasize "speed, assessment, attack." Suvorov's battlefield successes, together with the conquest of Ochakov (1788) and Izmail (1790) and important sallies across the Danube, brought Russia favorable terms at Jassy (1792). Even as war raged in the south, the army in the north once again defeated Sweden (1788–1790), then in 1793–1794 overran a rebellious Poland, setting the stage for its third partition.

Under Paul I, the army chafed under the imposition of direct monarchical authority, the more so because it brought another brief dalliance with Prussian military models. Suvorov was temporarily banished, but was later recalled to lead Russian forces in northern Italy as part of the Second Coalition against revolutionary France. In 1799, despite Austrian interference, Suvorov drove the French from the field, then brilliantly extricated his forces from Italy across the Alps. The eighteenth century closed with the army a strongly entrenched feature of Russian imperial might, a force to be reckoned with on both the plains of Europe and the steppes of Eurasia.

THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY NAVY

In contrast with the army, Muscovite precedent afforded scant inspiration for the Imperial Russian Navy, the origins of which clearly lay with Peter the Great. Enamored with the sea and sailing ships, Peter borrowed from foreign technology and expertise initially to create naval forces on both the Azov and Baltic Seas. Although the Russian navy would always remain "the second arm" for an essentially continental power, sea-going forces figured prominently in Peter's military successes. In both the south and north, his galley fleets supported the army in riverine and coastal operations, then went on to win important Baltic victories over the Swedes, most notably at Gangut/Hanko (1714). Peter also developed an open-water sailing capability, so that by 1724 his Baltic Fleet numbered 34 ships-of-the-line, in addition to numerous galleys and auxiliaries. Smaller flotillas sailed the White and Caspian Seas.

More dependent than the army on rigorous and regular sustenance and maintenance, the Imperial Russian Navy after Peter languished until the era of Catherine II. She appointed her son general ad-

miral, revitalized the Baltic Fleet, and later established Sevastopol as a base for the emerging Black Sea Fleet. In 1770, during the Empress' First Turkish War, a squadron under Admiral Alexei Grigorievich Orlov defeated the Turks decisively at Chesme. During the Second Turkish War, a rudimentary Black Sea Fleet under Admiral Fyedor Fyedorovich Ushakov frequently operated both independently and in direct support of ground forces. The same ground-sea cooperation held true in the Baltic, where Vasily Yakovlevich Chichagov's fleet also ended Swedish naval pretensions. Meanwhile, in 1799 Admiral Ushakov scored a series of Mediterranean victories over the French, before the Russians withdrew from the Second Coalition.

THE ARMY AND NAVY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

At the outset of the century, Alexander I inherited a sizeable and unaffordable army, many of whose commanders were seasoned veterans. After instituting a series of modest administrative reforms for efficiency and economy, including the creation of a true War Ministry, the Tsar in 1805 plunged into the wars of the Third Coalition. For all their experience and flexibility, the Russians with or without the benefit of allies against Napoleon suffered a series of reverses or stalemates, including Austerlitz (1805), Eylau (1807), and Friedland (1807). After the ensuing Tilsit Peace granted five years' respite, Napoleon's Grand Armée invaded Russia in 1812. Following a fighting Russian withdrawal into the interior, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov in September gave indecisive battle at Borodino, followed by another withdrawal to the southeast that uncovered Moscow. When the French quit Moscow in October, Kutuzov pursued, reinforced by swarms of partisans and Cossacks, who, together with starvation and severe cold, harassed the Grand Armée to destruction. In 1813, the Russian army fought in Germany, and in 1814 participated in the coalition victory at Leipzig, followed by a fighting entry into France and the occupation of Paris.

The successful termination of the Napoleonic wars still left Alexander I with an outsized and unaffordable military establishment, but now with the addition of disaffected elements within the officer corps. While some gentry officers formed secret societies to espouse revolutionary causes, the tsar experimented with the establishment of settled troops, or military colonies, to reduce maintenance costs. Although these colonies were in many ways only an extension of the previous century's

experience with military settlers on the frontier, their widespread application spawned much discontent. After Alexander I's death, unrest and conspiracy led to an attempted military coup in December 1825.

Tsar Nicholas I energetically suppressed the so-called Decembrist rebellion, then imposed parade-ground order. His standing army grew to number one million troops, but its outdated recruitment system and traditional support infrastructure eventually proved incapable of meeting the challenges of military modernization. Superficially, the army was a model of predictable routine and harsh discipline, but its inherent shortcomings, including outmoded weaponry, incapacity for rapid expansion, and lack of strategic mobility, led inexorably to Crimean defeat. The army was able to subdue Polish military insurrectionists (1830–1831) and Hungarian revolutionaries (1848), and successfully fight Persians and Turks (1826–1828, 1828–1829), but in the field it lagged behind its more modern European counterparts. Fighting from 1854 to 1856 against an allied coalition in the Crimea, the Russians suffered defeat at Alma, heavy losses at Balaklava and Inkerman, and the humiliation of surrender at Sevastopol. Only the experience of extended warfare in the Caucasus (1801–1864) afforded unconventional antidote to the conventional “paradomania” of St. Petersburg that had so thoroughly inspired Crimean defeat. Thus, the mountains replaced the steppe as the southern pole in an updated version of the previous century's north-south dialectic.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the navy, too, experienced its own version of the same dialectic. For a brief period, the Russian navy under Admiral Dmitry Nikolayevich Senyavin harassed Turkish forces in the Aegean, but following Tilsit, the British Royal Navy ruled in both the Baltic and the Mediterranean. In 1827, the Russians joined with the British and French to pound the Turks at Navarino, but in the north, the Baltic Fleet, like the St. Petersburg military establishment, soon degenerated into an imperial parading force. Only on the Black Sea, where units regularly supported Russian ground forces in the Caucasus, did the Navy reveal any sustained tactical and operational acumen. However, this attainment soon proved counterproductive, for Russian naval victory in 1853 over the Turks at Sinope drew the British and French to the Turkish cause, thus setting the stage for allied intervention in the Crimea. During the Crimean War, steam and screw-driven allied vessels attacked at will

in both the north and south, thereby revealing the essentially backwardness of Russia's sailing navy.

THE ARMY AND NAVY DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Alexander II's era of the Great Reforms marked an important watershed for both services. In a series of reforms between 1861 and 1874, War Minister Dmitry Alexeyevich Milyutin created the foundations for a genuine cadre- and reserve-based ground force. He facilitated introduction of a universal service obligation, and he rearmed, reequipped, and re-deployed the army to contend with the gradually emerging German and Austro-Hungarian threat along the Empire's western frontier. In 1863–1864 the army once again suppressed a Polish rebellion, while in the 1860s and 1870s small mobile forces figured in extensive military conquests in Central Asia. War also flared with Turkey in 1877–1878, during which the army, despite a ragged beginning, inconsistent field leadership, and inadequacies in logistics and medical support, acquitted itself well, especially in a decisive campaign in the European theater south of the Balkan ridge. Similar circumstances governed in the Transcaucasus theater, where the army overcame initial setbacks to seize Kars and carry the campaign into Asia Minor.

Following the war of 1877–1878, planning and deployment priorities wedded the army more closely to the western military frontier and especially to peacetime deployments in Russian Poland. With considerable difficulty, Alexander III presided over a limited force modernization that witnessed the adoption of smokeless powder weaponry and changes in size and force structure that kept the army on nearly equal terms with its two more significant potential adversaries, Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary. At the same time, the end of the century brought extensive new military commitments to the Far East, both to protect expanding imperial interests and to participate in suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (1900).

The same challenges of force modernization and diverse responsibilities bedeviled the navy, perhaps more so than the army. During the 1860s and 1870s, the navy made the difficult transition from sail to steam, but thereafter had to deal with increasingly diverse geostrategic requirements that mandated retention of naval forces in at least four theaters (Baltic, Northern, Black Sea, and Pacific), none of which were mutually supporting. Simultaneously, the Russian Admiralty grappled with is-

sues of role and identity, pondering whether the navy's primary mission in war lay either with coastal defense and commerce raiding or with attainment of true "blue water" supremacy in the tradition of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his Russian navalist disciples. Rationale notwithstanding, by 1898 Russia possessed Europe's third largest navy (nineteen capital ships and more than fifty cruisers), thanks primarily to the ship-building programs of Alexander III.

THE ARMY AND NAVY OF NICHOLAS II

Under Russia's last tsar, the army went from defeat to disaster and despair. Initially overcommitted and split by a new dichotomy between the Far East and the European military frontier, the army fared poorly in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Poor strategic vision and even worse battlefield execution in a Far Eastern littoral war brought defeat because Russia failed to bring its overwhelming resources to bear. While the navy early ceded the initiative and command of the sea to the Japanese, Russian ground force buildups across vast distances were slow. General Adjutant Alexei Nikolayevich Kuropatkin and his subordinates lacked the capacity either to fight expert delaying actions or to master the complexities of meeting engagements that evolved into main battles and operations. Tethered to an 8-thousand-kilometer-long line of communications, the army marched through a series of reverses from the banks of the Yalu (May 1904) to the environs of Mukden (February–March 1905). Although the garrison at Port Arthur retained the capacity to resist, premature surrender of the fortress in early 1905 merely added to Russian humiliation.

The Imperial Russian Navy fared even worse. Except for Stepan Osipovich Makarov, who was killed early, Russian admirals in the Far East presented a picture of indolence and incompetence. The Russian Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur made several half-hearted sorties, then was bottled up at its base by Admiral Togo, until late in 1904 when Japanese siege artillery pounded the Squadron to pieces. When the tsar sent his Baltic Fleet (rechristened the Second Pacific Squadron) to the Far East, it fell prey to the Japanese at Tsushima (May 1905) in a naval battle of annihilation. In all, the tsar lost fifteen capital ships in the Far East, the backbone of two battle fleets.

The years between 1905 and 1914 witnessed renewal and reconstruction, neither of which sufficed to prepare the tsar's army and navy for World



Nicholas II presents an icon to his troops as they depart for World War I. © SOVFOTO

War I. Far Eastern defeat fueled the fires of the Revolution of 1905, and both services witnessed mutinies within their ranks. Once the dissidents were weeded out, standing army troops were employed liberally until 1907 to suppress popular disorder. By 1910, stability and improved economic conditions permitted General Adjutant Vladimir Alexandrovich Sukhomlinov's War Ministry to undertake limited reforms in the army's recruitment, organization, deployment, armament, and supply structure. More could have been done, but the navy siphoned off precious funds for ambitious ship-building programs to restore the second arm's power and prestige. The overall objective was to prepare Russia for war with the Triple Alliance. Obsession with the threat opposite the western military frontier gradually eliminated earlier dichotomies and subsumed all other strategic priorities.

The outbreak of hostilities in 1914 came too soon for various reform and reconstruction projects to bear full fruit. Again, the Russians suffered from strategic overreach and stretched their military and naval resources too thin. Moreover, military leaders failed to build sound linkages between design and application, between means and objectives, and between troops and their command instances. These and other shortcomings, including

an inadequate logistics system and the regime's inability fully to mobilize the home front to support the fighting front, proved disastrous. Thus, the Russians successfully mobilized 3.9 million troops for a short war of military annihilation, but early disasters in East Prussia at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, along with a stalled offensive in Galicia, inexorably led to a protracted war of attrition and exhaustion. In 1915, when German offensive pressure caused the Russian Supreme Command to shorten its front in Russian Poland, withdrawal turned into a costly rout. One of the few positive notes came in 1916, when the Russian Southwest Front under General Alexei Alexeyevich Brusilov launched perhaps the most successful offensive of the entire war on all its fronts. Meanwhile, a navy still not fully recovered from 1904–1905 generally discharged its required supporting functions. In the Baltic, it laid mine fields and protected approaches to Petrograd. In the Black Sea, after initial difficulties with German units serving under Turkish colors, the fleet performed well in a series of support and amphibious operations.

Ultimately, a combination of seemingly endless bloodletting, war-weariness, governmental inefficiency, and the regime's political ineptness facilitated the spread of pacifist and revolutionary sentiment in both the army and navy. By the beginning of 1917, sufficient malaise had set in to render both services incapable either of consistent loyalty or of sustained and effective combat operations. In the end, neither the army nor the navy offered proof against the tsar's internal and external enemies.

See also: ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY; BALKAN WARS; BALTIC FLEET; CAUCASIAN WARS; COSSACKS; CRIMEAN WAR; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; GREAT REFORMS; NAPOLEON I; NORTHERN FLEET; PACIFIC FLEET; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; SEVEN YEARS' WAR; STRELTSY; WORLD WAR I

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BRUCE W. MENNING

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The Russian military industrial complex (*voenno-promyshlennyy kompleks*, or VPK), recently renamed the defense industrial complex (*oboronno-promyshlennyy kompleks*, or OPK), encompasses the panoply of activities overseen by the Genshtab (General Staff), including the Ministry of Defense, uniformed military personnel, FSB (Federal Security Bureau) troops, border and paramilitary troops, the space program, defense research and regulatory agencies, infrastructural support affiliates, defense industrial organizations and production facilities, strategic material reserves, and an array of troop reserve, civil defense, espionage, and paramilitary activities. The complex is not a loose coalition

of vested interests like the American military-industrial complex; it has a formal legal status, a well-developed administrative mechanism, and its own Web site. The Genshtab and the VPK have far more power than the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of defense, or the patchwork of other defense-related organizations.

The OPK consists of seventeen hundred enterprises and organizations located in seventy-two regions, officially employing more than 2 million workers (more nearly 3.5 million), producing 27 percent of the nation's machinery, and absorbing 25 percent of its imports. Nineteen of these entities are "city building enterprises," defense industrial towns where the OPK is the sole employer. The total number of OPK enterprises and organizations has been constant for a decade, but some liberalization has been achieved in ownership and managerial autonomy. At the start of the post-communist epoch, the VPK was wholly state-owned. As of 2003, 43 percent of its holdings remains government-owned, 29 percent comprises mixed state-private stock companies, and 29 percent is fully privately owned. All serve the market in varying degrees, but retain a collective interest in promoting government patronage and can be quickly commandeered if state procurement orders revive.

Boris Yeltsin's government tried repeatedly to reform the VPK, as has Vladimir Putin's. The most recent proposal, vetted and signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in October 2001, calls for civilianizing some twelve hundred enterprises and institutions, stripping them of their military assets, including intellectual property, and transferring this capital to five hundred amalgamated entities called "system-building integrated structures." This rearrangement will increase the military focus of the OPK by divesting its civilian activities, beneficially reducing structural militarization, but will strengthen the defense lobby and augment state ownership. The program calls for the government to have controlling stock of the lead companies (design bureaus) of the "system-building integrated structures." This will be accomplished by arbitrarily valuing the state's intellectual property at 100 percent of the lead company's stock, a tactic that will terminate the traditional Soviet separation of design from production and create integrated entities capable of designing, producing, marketing (exporting), and servicing OPK products. State shares in non-lead companies will be put in trust with the design bureaus. The Kremlin intends to use ownership as its primary control instrument, keeping

its requisitioning powers in the background, and minimizing budgetary subsidies at a time when state weapons-procurement programs are but a small fraction what they were in the Soviet past. Ilya Klebanov, former deputy prime minister, and now minister for industry, science, and technology, the architect of the OPK reform program, hopes in this way to reestablish state administrative governance over domestic military industrial activities, while creating new entities that can seize a larger share of the global arms market. It is premature to judge the outcome of this initiative, but history suggests that even if the VPK modernizes, it does not intend to fade away.

See also: KASYANOV, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH; MILITARY-ECONOMIC PLANNING; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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STEVEN ROSEFIELDE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Although the means have grown more sophisticated, the basic function of military intelligence (*voynnaya razvedka*) has remained unchanged: collecting, analyzing and disseminating information about the en-

emy's intentions and its ability to carry them out. Since the Soviet era, military intelligence has been classified according to three categories: strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic intelligence entails an understanding of actual and potential foes at the broadest level, including the organization and capabilities of their armed forces as well as the economy, population, and geography of the national base. Operational intelligence refers to knowledge of military value more directly tied to the theater, and is typically conducted by the staffs of front and army formations, while tactical intelligence is carried out by commanders at all levels to gather battlefield data directly relevant to their current mission.

Before the Great Reforms (1860s–1870s), Russian generals had three basic means of learning about their foes: spies, prisoners of war, and reconnaissance. Thus, at the Battle of Kulikovo (1381) Prince Dmitry Donskoy dispatched a reliable diplomat to the enemy's camp to study the latter's intentions, questioned captives, and personally assessed the terrain, all of which played a role in his famous victory over the Mongols. While capable commanders had always understood the need for good intelligence, until the early eighteenth century the Russian army had neither systematic procedures nor personnel designated to carry them out. Peter I's introduction of a quartermaster service (*kvartirmeisterskaya chast*) in 1711 (renamed the general staff, or *generalny shtab*, by Catherine II in 1763) laid the institutional groundwork. The interception of diplomatic correspondence, a vital element of strategic intelligence, was carried out by the foreign office's *Cabinet Noir* (Black Chamber, also known as the *shifrovalny otdel*), beginning under Empress Elizabeth I (r. 1741–1762). Interministerial rivalry often hampered effective dissemination of such data to the War Ministry.

It would take another century for military intelligence properly to be systematized with the creation of a Main Staff (*glavny shtab*) by the reformist War Minister Dmitry Milyutin in 1865. Roughly analogous to the Prussian Great General Staff, the Main Staff's responsibilities included central administration, training, and intelligence. Two departments of the Main Staff were responsible for strategic intelligence: the Military Scientific Department (*Voyenny ucheny komitet*, which dealt with European powers) and the Asian Department (*Aziatskaya chast*). Milyutin also regularized procedures for operational and combat intelligence in 1868 with new regulations to establish an intelligence section (*razvedivatelnoye otdelenie*) attached to

field commanders' staffs, and he formalized the training and functions of military attachés (*voennoye agenty*). The Admiralty's Main Staff established analogous procedural organizations for naval intelligence.

In 1903, the Army's Military Scientific Department was renamed Section Seven of the First Military Statistical Department in the Main Staff. Dismal performance during the Russo-Japanese War inevitably led to another series of reforms, which saw the creation in June 1905 of an independent Main Directorate of the General Staff (*Glavnoye Upravlenie Generalnago Shtaba*, or GUGSh), whose first over quartermaster general was now tasked with intelligence, among other duties. Resubordinated to the war minister in 1909, GUGSh would retain its responsibility for intelligence through World War I.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, Vladimir Lenin established a Registration Directorate (*Registupravlenie*, RU) in October 1918 to coordinate intelligence for his nascent Red Army. At the conclusion of the Civil War, in 1921, the RU was refashioned into the Second Directorate of the Red Army Staff (also known as the Intelligence Directorate, *Razvedupr*, or RU). A reorganization of the Red Army in 1925 saw the entity transformed into the Red Army Staff's Fourth Directorate, and after World War II it would be the Main Intelligence Directorate (*Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye Upravlenie*, GRU).

Because of the presence of many former Imperial Army officers in the Bolshevik military, the RU bore more than a passing resemblance to its tsarist predecessor. However, it would soon branch out into much more comprehensive collection, especially through human intelligence (i.e., military attachés and illegal spies) and intercepting communications. Despite often intense rivalry with the state security services, beginning with Felix Dzerzhinsky's Cheka, the RU and its successors also became much more active in rooting out political threats, whether real or imagined.

Both tsarist and Soviet military intelligence were respected if not feared by other powers. Like all military intelligence services, its record was nevertheless marred by some serious blunders, including fatally underestimating the capabilities of the Japanese armed forces in 1904 and miscalculating the size of German deployments in East Prussia in 1914. Yet even the best intelligence could not compensate for the shortcomings of the supreme commander, most famously when Josef Stalin refused to heed repeated and often accurate assessments of

Nazi intentions to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941.

See also: ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES; SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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DAVID SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE

MILITARY REFORMS

Military reform has been one of the central aspects of Russia's drive to modernize and become a leading European military, political, and economic power. Ivan IV (d. 1584) gave away *pomestie* lands to create a permanent military service class, and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (d. 1676) enserfed Russia's peasants to guarantee the political support of these military servitors. In the same period, Alexei, seeking to modernize his realm, invited Westerners to Russia to introduce advanced technical capabilities. But as the eighteenth century dawned, Russia found itself surrounded and outmatched by hostile enemies to its north, south, west, and, to a lesser extent, to its east. At the same time, perhaps Russia's most energetic tsar, Peter the Great (d. 1725), adopted a

grand strategy based on the goal of conquering adversaries in all directions. Such ambitions required the complete overhaul of the Russian nation. As a result, the reforms of Peter the Great represent the beginning of the modern era of Russian history.

Military reform, designed to create a powerful permanently standing army and navy, was the central goal of all of Peter the Great's monumental reforms. His most notable military reforms included the creation of a navy that he used to great effect against the Ottomans in the sea of Azov and the Swedes in the Baltic during the Great Northern War; the creation of the Guard's Officer Corps that became the basis of the standing professional officer corps until they became superannuated and replaced by officers with General Staff training during the nineteenth century; a twenty-five year service requirement for peasants selected by lot to be soldiers; and his codifying military's existence by personally writing a set of instructions in 1716 for the army and 1720 for the navy. While these reforms transformed the operational capabilities of the Russian military, Peter the Great also sought to create the social and administrative basis for maintaining this newly generated power. In 1720 he created administrative colleges specifically to furnish the army and navy with a higher administrative apparatus to oversee the acquisition of equipment, supplies, and recruits. Peter's final seminal reform, however, was the 1722 creation of the Table of Ranks, which linked social and political mobility to the idea of merit, not only in the military but throughout Russia.

The irony of Peter's culminating reform was that the nobility did not accept the Table of Ranks because it forced them to work to maintain what they viewed as their inherited birthright to power, privilege, and status. While no major military reforms occurred until after the 1853–1856 Crimean War, the work of Catherine II's (d. 1796) "Great Captains," Peter Rumyanstev, Grigory Potemkin, and Alexander Suvorov, combined with the reforming efforts of Paul I (d. 1801), created a system for educating and training officers and defined everything from uniforms to operational doctrine. None of these efforts amounted in scope to the reforms that preceded or followed, but together they provided Russia with a military establishment powerful enough to defeat adversaries ranging from the powerful French to the declining Ottomans. Realizing that the army was too large and too wasteful, Nicholas I (d. 1855) spent the balance of the 1830s and 1840s introducing administrative reforms to

streamline and enhance performance but, as events in the Crimea demonstrated, without success.

Alexander II's (d. 1881) 1861 peasant emancipation launched his Great Reforms and set the stage for the enlightened War Minister Dmitry Milyutin to reorganize Russia's military establishment in every aspect imaginable. His most enduring reform was the 1862–1864 establishment of the fifteen military districts that imposed a centralized and manageable administrative and command system over the entire army. Then, to reintroduce the concept of meritocracy into the officer training system, he reorganized the Cadet Corps Academies into Junker schools in 1864 to provide an education to all qualified candidates regardless of social status. In addition, in 1868 he oversaw the recasting of the army's standing wartime orders. The result of these three reforms centralized all power within the army into the war minister's hands. But Milyutin's most important reform was the Universal Conscription Act of 1874 that required all Russian men to serve first in the active army and then in the reserves. Modeled after the system recently implemented by the Prussians in their stunningly successful unification, Russia now had the basis for a modern conscript army that utilized the Empire's superiority in manpower without maintaining a costly standing army.

Milyutin's reforms completely overhauled Russia's military system. But a difficult victory in the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War and the debacle of the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated that Russia's military establishment was in need of further and immediate reform in the post-1905 period. In the war's aftermath, the army and the navy were overrun with reforming schemes and undertakings that ranged from the creation of the Supreme Defense Council to unify all military policy, to the emergence of an autonomous General Staff (something Milyutin intentionally avoided), to the 1906 appointment of a Higher Attestation Commission charged with the task of purging the officer corps of dead weight. By 1910, the reaction to military defeat had calmed down, and War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov sought to address future concerns with a series of reforms that simplified the organization of army corps and sought to rationalize the deployment of troops throughout the Empire. These reforms demonstrated the future needs of the army well, resulting in the 1914 passage of a bill (The Large Program) through the Duma designed to finance the strengthening of the entire military establishment.

After the imperial army disintegrated in the wake of World War I and the 1917 Revolution, and once the Bolsheviks won the Civil War, the process of creating the permanent Red Army began with the 1924–1925 Frunze Reforms. Mikhail Frunze, largely using the organizational schema of Milyutin's military districts, oversaw a series of reforms designed to provide the Red Army with a sufficiently trained cadre to maintain a militia army. Besides training soldiers as warriors, one of the central goals of these reforms was to provide recruits with Communist Party indoctrination, making military training a vital experience in the education of Soviet citizens. In the meantime, and despite the tragic consequences of the purges of the 1930s, Mikhail Tukhachevsky created a military doctrine that culminated with the Red Army's victorious deep battle combined operations of World War II.

See also: FRUNZE, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH; GREAT REFORMS; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; MILYUTIN, DMITRY ALEXEYEVICH; PETER I; TABLE OF RANK; TUKHACHEVSKY, MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEVICH

JOHN W. STEINBERG

MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

The Bolshevik Party, led by Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, seized power in November 1917. It immediately began peace negotiations with the Central Powers and took control of the armed forces. Once peace was concluded in March 1918 by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the demobilization of the old Russian imperial army began.

THE RED ARMY

Adhering to Marxist doctrine, which viewed standing armies as tools of state and class oppression, the Bolsheviks did not plan to replace the imperial army and intended instead to rely on a citizens' militia of class-conscious workers for defense. The emergence of widespread opposition to the Bolshevik seizure of power convinced Lenin of the need for a regular army after all, and he ordered Trotsky to create a Red Army, the birthday of which was recognized as February 23, 1918. As the number of workers willing to serve on a voluntary basis proved to be insufficient for the needs of the time, conscription of workers and peasants was soon introduced. By 1921 the Red Army had swelled to nearly five mil-

lion men and women; the majority, however, were engaged full-time in food requisitioning and other economic activities designed to keep the army fed and equipped as Russia's beleaguered economy began to collapse. Because they lacked trained leadership to fight the civil war that erupted in the spring of 1918, the Bolsheviks recruited and impressed former officers of the old army and assigned political commissars to validate their orders and maintain political reliability of the units.

The civil war raged until 1922, when the last elements of anticommunist resistance were wiped out in Siberia. In the meantime Poland attacked Soviet Russia in April 1920 in a bid to establish its borders deep in western Ukraine. The Soviet counteroffensive took the Red Army to the gates of Warsaw before it was repelled and pushed back into Ukraine in August. The Red Army forces combating the Poles virtually disintegrated during their retreat, and the Cossacks of the elite First Cavalry Army, led by Josef Stalin's cronies Kliment Voroshilov and Semen Budenny, staged a bloody anti-Bolshevik mutiny and pogrom in the process. The subsequent peace treaty gave Poland very favorable boundaries eastward into Ukraine.

The onset of peace saw the demobilization of the regular armed forces to a mere half million men. Some party officials wanted to abolish the army totally and replace it with a citizens' militia. As a compromise, a mixed system consisting of a small standing army and a large territorial militia was established. Regular soldiers would serve for two years, but territorial soldiers would serve for five, one weekend per month and several weeks in the summer. Until it was absorbed into the regular army beginning in 1936, the territorial army outnumbered the regular army by about three to one. For the rest of the decade the armed forces were underfunded, undersupplied, and ill-equipped with old, outdated weaponry.

During the 1920s most former tsarist officers were dismissed and a new cadre of Soviet officers began to form. Party membership was strongly encouraged among the officers, and throughout the Soviet period at least eighty percent of the officers were party members. At and above the rank of colonel virtually all officers held party membership.

A unique feature of the Soviet armed forces was the imposition on it of the Political Administration of the Red Army (PURKKA, later renamed GlavPUR). This was the Communist Party organization for which the military commissars worked. Initially every commander from battalion level on up to the



A group of young women Russian soldiers train for military service following the Bolshevik revolution. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

Army High Command had a commissar as a partner. After the civil war, commanders no longer had to have their orders countersigned by the commissar to be valid, and commissars' duties were relegated to discipline, morale, and political education. During the 1930s political officers were added at the company and platoon levels, and during the purges and at the outset of World War II commanders once again had to have commissars countersign their orders. Commissars shared responsibility for the success of the unit and were praised or punished alongside the commanders, but they answered to the political authorities, not to the military chain of command. Commissars were required to evaluate officers' political reliability on their annual attestations and during promotion proceedings, thus giving them some leverage over the officers with whom they served.

THE 1930S

The First Five-Year Plan, from 1928 to 1932, expanded the USSR's industrial base, which then began producing modern equipment, including tanks,

fighter aircraft and bombers, and new warships. The size of the armed forces rapidly increased to about 1.5 million between 1932 and 1937. The rapid expansion of the armed forces led to insurmountable difficulties in recruiting officers. As a stopgap measure, party members were required to serve as officers for two- or three-year stints, and privates and sergeants were promoted to officer rank. The training of officer candidates in military schools was abbreviated from four years to two or less to get more officers into newly created units. As a result the competence and cohesion of the leadership suffered.

In the 1930s Soviet strategists such as Vladimir K. Triandifilov and Mikhail Tukhachevsky devised innovative tactics for utilizing tanks and aircraft in offensive operations. The Soviets created the first large tank units, and experimented with paratroops and airborne tactics. During the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) Soviet officers and men advised the Republican forces and engaged in armored and air combat testing the USSR's latest tanks and aircraft against the fascists.

The terror purge of the officer corps instituted by Josef Stalin in 1937–1939 took a heavy toll of the top leadership. Stalin's motives for the purge will never be known for certain, but most plausibly he was concerned about a possible military coup. Although it is very unlikely that the military planned or hoped to seize power, three of its five marshals were executed, as were fifteen of sixteen army commanders of the first and second rank, sixty of sixty-seven corps commanders, and 136 of 199 division commanders. Forty-two of the top forty-six military commissars also were arrested and executed. When the process of denunciation, arrest, investigation, and rehabilitation had run its course in 1940, about 23,000 military and political officers had either been executed or were in prison camps. It was long believed that perhaps as many as fifty percent of the officer corps was purged, but archival evidence subsequently indicated that when the reinstatements of thousands of arrested officers during World War II are taken into account, fewer than ten percent of the officer corps was permanently purged, which does not diminish the loss of talented men. Simultaneous with the purge was the rapid expansion of the armed forces in response to the growth of militarism in Germany and Japan. By June 1941 the Soviet armed forces had grown to 4.5 million men, but were terribly short of officers because of difficulties in recruiting and the time needed for training. Tens of thousands of civilian party members,

sergeants, and enlisted men were forced to serve as officers with little training for their responsibilities. Despite the USSR's rapid industrialization, the army found itself underequipped because men were being conscripted faster than weapons, equipment, and even boots and uniforms could be made for them.

The end of the decade saw the Soviet Union involved in several armed conflicts. From May to September 1939, Soviet forces under General Georgy Zhukov battled the Japanese Kwantung Army and drove it out of Mongolia. In September 1939 the Soviet army and air force invaded eastern Poland after the German army had nearly finished conquering the western half. In November 1939 the Soviet armed forces attacked Finland but failed to conquer it and in the process suffered nearly 400,000 casualties. Stalin's government was forced to accept a negotiated peace in March 1940 in which it gained some territory north of Leningrad and naval bases in the Gulf of Finland. Anticipating war with Nazi Germany, the USSR increased the pace of rearmament in the years 1939–1941, and prodigious numbers of modern tanks, artillery, and aircraft were delivered to the armed forces.

WORLD WAR II

In violation of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact signed in 1939, Germany invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941. Much of the forward-based Soviet air force was destroyed on the ground on the first day of the onslaught. All along the front the Axis forces rolled up the Soviet defenses, hoping to destroy the entire Red Army in the western regions before marching on Moscow and Leningrad. By December 1941 the Germans had put Leningrad under siege, came within sight of Moscow, and, in great battles of encirclement, had inflicted about 4.5 million casualties on the Soviet armed forces, yet they had been unable to destroy the army and the country's will and ability to resist. Nearly 5.3 million Soviet citizens were mobilized for the armed forces in the first eight days of the war. They were used to create new formations or to fill existing units, which were reconstituted and rearmed and sent back into the fray. To rally the USSR, Stalin declared the struggle to be the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, comparable to the war against Napoleon 130 years earlier.

At the outset of the war, Stalin appointed himself supreme commander and dominated Soviet military operations, ignoring the advice of his generals. Stalin's disastrous decisions culminated in



Soviet tank regiment passes the Kremlin during the 1988 parade marking the anniversary of the October Revolution.

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the debacle at Kiev in September 1941, in which 600,000 Soviet troops were lost because he refused to allow them to retreat. As a result, Stalin promoted Marshal Georgy Zhukov to second in command and from then on usually heeded the advice of his military commanders.

The Soviet Army once again lost ground during the summer of 1942, when a new German offensive completed the conquest of Ukraine and reached the Volga River at Stalingrad. In the fall of 1942 the Soviet Army began a counteroffensive, and by the end of February 1943 it had eliminated the German forces in Stalingrad and pushed the front several hundred miles back from the Volga. July 1943 saw the largest tank battle in history at Kursk, ending in a decisive German defeat. From then on the initiative passed to the Soviet side. The major campaign of 1944 was Operation Bagration, which liberated Belarus and carried the Red Army to the gates of Warsaw by July, in the process destroying German Army Group Center, a Soviet goal since January 1942. The final assault on Berlin began in April 1945 and culminated on May 3. The war in Europe ended that month, but a short campaign in China against Japan followed, beginning in August and ending in September 1945 with the Japanese surrender to the Allies.

THE COLD WAR

After the war, the armed forces demobilized to their prewar strength of about four million and were assigned to the occupation of Eastern Europe. Conscription remained in force. During the late 1950s, under Nikita Khrushchev, who stressed nuclear rather than conventional military power, the army's strength was cut to around three million. Leonid Brezhnev restored the size of the armed force to more than four million. During the Cold War, pride of place in the Soviet military shifted to the newly created Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), which controlled the ground-based nuclear missile forces. In addition to the SRF, the air force had bomber-delivered nuclear weapons and the navy had missile-equipped submarines. The army, with the exception of the airborne forces, became an almost exclusively motorized and mechanized force.

The Soviet army's last war was fought in Afghanistan from December 1979 to February 1989. Brought in to save the fledgling Afghan communist government, which had provoked a civil war through its use of coercion and class conflict to create a socialist state, the Soviet army expected to defeat the rebels in a short campaign and then

withdraw. Instead, the conflict degenerated into a guerilla war against disparate Afghan tribes that had declared a holy war, or *jihad*, against the Soviet army, which was unable to bring its strength in armor, artillery, or nuclear weapons to bear. The Afghan rebels, or *mujahideen*, with safe havens in neighboring Iran and Pakistan, received arms and ammunition from the United States, enabling them to prolong the struggle indefinitely. The Soviet high command capped the commitment of troops to the war at 150,000, for the most part treating it as a sideshow while keeping its main focus on a possible war with NATO. The conflict was finally brought to a negotiated end after the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, with nearly 15,000 men killed in vain.

Gorbachev's policy of rapprochement with the West had a major impact on the Soviet armed forces. Between 1989 and 1991 their numbers were slashed by one million, with more cuts projected for the coming years. The defense budget was cut, the army and air force were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, naval ship building virtually ceased, and the number of nuclear missiles and warheads was reduced—all over the objections of the military high command. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, or openness, exposed the horrible conditions of service for soldiers, particularly the extent and severity of hazing, which contributed to a dramatic increase in desertions and avoidance of conscription. The prestige of the military dropped precipitously, leading to serious morale problems in the officer corps. Motivated in part by a desire to restore the power, prestige, and influence of the military in politics and society, the minister of defense, Dmitry Iazov, aided and abetted the coup against Gorbachev in August 1991. The coup failed when the commanders of the armored and airborne divisions ordered into Moscow refused to support it.

THE POST-SOVIET ARMY

The formal dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 led to the dismemberment of the Soviet armed forces and the creation of numerous national armies and navies. Conventional weapons, aircraft, and surface ships were shared out among the new nations, but the Russian Federation took all of the nuclear weapons. The army of the Russian Federation sees itself as heir to the traditions and heritage of the tsarist and Soviet armies. Although there are advocates of a professional force, the Russian army remains dependent on conscription to fill its ranks. Thousands of officers resigned from the armed forces

and thousands of non-Russians transferred their loyalty and services to the emerging armies of the newly independent states. The political administration was promptly abolished after the coup. During the 1990s, the new Russian army fought two small, bloody, and inconclusive wars in Chechnya, a former Soviet republic that sought independence from Moscow.

See also: ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY; AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; COLD WAR; MILITARY DOCTRINE; MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX; OPERATION BARBAROSSA; PURGES, THE GREAT; SOVIET-FINNISH WAR; WORLD WAR II

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ROGER R. REESE

MILYUKOV, PAUL NIKOLAYEVICH

(1859–1943), Russian historian and publicist; Russian liberal leader.

Milyukov was born in Moscow. He studied at the First Gymnasium of Moscow and the department of history and philology at Moscow University (1877–1882). His tutors were Vassily Kliuchevsky and Paul Vinogradov. After graduating from the university, Milyukov remained in the

department of Russian history in order to prepare to become a professor. From 1886 to 1895, he held the position of assistant professor in the department of Russian history at Moscow University. In 1892 he defended his master's thesis based on the book *State Economy and the Reform of Peter the Great* (St. Petersburg, 1892). In the area of historical methodology Milyukov shared the views of positivists. The most important of Milyukov's historical works was *Essays on the History of Russian Culture* (St. Petersburg, 1896–1903). Milyukov suggested that Russia is following the same path as Western Europe, but its development is characterized by slowness. In contrast to the West, Russia's social and economic development was generally initiated by the government, going from the top down. Milyukov is the author of one of the first courses of Russian historiography: *Main Currents in Russian Historical Thought* (Moscow, 1897). In 1895, he was fired from the Moscow University for his public lectures on the social movement in Russia and sent to Riazan, and then for two years (1897–1899) abroad.

In 1900 he was arrested for attending the meeting honoring the late revolutionary Petr Lavrov in St. Petersburg. He was sentenced to six months of incarceration, but was released early at the petition of Kliuchevsky before emperor Nicholas II. In 1902, Milyukov published a program article "From Russian Constitutionalists in the Osvobozhdenie" ("Liberation"), magazine of Russian liberals, issued abroad. Between 1902 and 1905, Milyukov spent a large amount of time abroad, traveling, and lecturing in the United States at the invitation of Charles Crane. Milyukov's lectures were published as *Russia and Its Crisis* (Chicago, 1905).

In 1905 Milyukov returned to Russia and took part in the liberation movement as one of the organizers and chairman of the Union of Unions. On August, 1905, he was arrested, but after a month-long incarceration was released without having been charged. In October of 1905 Milyukov became one of the organizers of the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party. His reaction towards the October Manifesto was skeptical and he believed it necessary to continue to battle the government. Due to formal issues, he could not run for a place in the First and Second Dumas, but he was basically the head of the Kadet Faction. From 1906, Milyukov was the editor of the *Rech* (*Speech*) newspaper, the central organ of the Kadet Party. From 1907, he was the chairman of the Party's central committee. From 1907 to 1912, he was a member of the third Duma, elected in St. Petersburg. He favored the tac-

tics of "the preservation of the Duma," fearing its dissolution by the tsar. He became a renowned expert in the matters of foreign policy. In the Duma, he gave seventy-three speeches, which total approximately seven hundred large pages. In 1912 Milyukov was reelected to the Duma, once again from St. Petersburg.

After the beginning of World War I, Milyukov assumed a patriotic position and put forth the motto of a "holy union" with the government for the period of the war. He believed it necessary for Russia to acquire, as a result of the war, Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In August of 1915, Milyukov, was one of the organizers and leaders of the oppositionist interparty Progressive Bloc, created with the aim of pressuring the government in the interests of a more effective war strategy. On November 1, 1916, Milyukov made a speech in the Duma that contained direct accusations of the royal family members of treason and harshly criticized the government. Every part of Milyukov's speech ended with "What Is This: Stupidity or Treason?" The speech was denied publication, but became popular through many private copies and later received the name of "The Attacking Sign."

After the February revolution Milyukov served as the foreign minister in the Provisional Government. Milyukov's note of April, 1917, declaring support for fulfilling obligations to the allies provoked antigovernmental demonstrations and caused him to retire. Milyukov attacked the Bolsheviks, demanding Lenin's arrest, and criticized the Provisional Government for its inability to restore order. After the October Revolution, Milyukov left for the Don, and wrote, at the request of general Mikhail Alexeyev, the Declaration of the Volunteer Army. In the summer of 1918, while in Kiev, he tried to contact German command, hoping to receive aid in the struggle against Bolshevism. Milyukov's "German orientation," unsupported by a majority of the Cadet Party, led to the downfall of his authority and caused him to retire as chairman of the party. In November of 1918, Milyukov went abroad, living in London, where he participated in the Russian Liberation Committee. From 1920, he lived in Paris. After the defeat of White armies, he proposed a set of "new tactics," the point of which was to defeat Bolshevism from within. Milyukov's "new tactics" received no support among most emigré Cadets and in 1921 he formed the Paris Democratic Group of the Party, which caused a split within the Cadets. In 1924 the group was modified into a Republican-Democrat Union. From 1921 to 1940 Milyukov

edited the most popular emigré newspaper *The Latest News* (Poslednie Novosti). He became one of the first historians of the revolution and the civil war, publishing *History of the Second Russian Revolution* (Sofia, 1921–1923), and *Russia at the Turning-point* (in two volumes, Paris, 1927).

In 1940, escaping the Nazi invasion, Milyukov fled to the south of France, where he worked on his memoirs, published posthumously. He welcomed the victories of the Soviet army and accepted the accomplishments of the Stalinist regime in fortifying Russian Statehood in his article "The Truth of Bolshevism" (1942). Milyukov died in Aix-les-Bains on March 31, 1943.

See also: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION HISTORIOGRAPHY; LIBERALISM; OCTOBER REVOLUTION

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

MILYUTIN, DMITRY ALEXEYEVICH

(1816–1912), count (1878), political and military figure, military historian, and Imperial Russian war minister (1861–1881).

General Adjutant Milyutin was born in Moscow, the scion of a Tver noble family. He completed the gymnasium at Moscow University (1832) and the Nicholas Military Academy (1836). After a brief period with the Guards' General Staff, he served from 1839 to 1840 with the Separate Caucasian Corps. While convalescing from wounds during 1840 and 1841, he traveled widely in Europe, where he decided to devote himself to the cause of reform in Russia. As a professor at the Nicholas Academy from 1845 to 1853, he founded the discipline of military statistics and provided the impulse for compilation of a military-statistical description of the Russian Empire. In 1852 and 1853 he published a prize-winning five-volume history of Generalissimo A. V. Suvorov's Italian campaign of 1799. As a member of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society he associated with a number of future reformers, including Konstantin Kavelin, P. P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky, Nikolai Bunge, and his brother, Nikolai Milyutin. An opponent of serfdom, the future war minister freed his own peasants and subsequently (in 1856) wrote a tract advocating the liberation of Russian serfs.

As a major general within the War Ministry during the Crimean War, Milyutin concluded that the army required fundamental reform. While serving from 1856 to 1860 as chief of staff for Prince Alexander Baryatinsky's Caucasian Corps, Milyutin directly influenced the successful outcome of the campaign against the rebellious mountaineer Shamil. After becoming War Minister in November 1861, Milyutin almost immediately submitted to Tsar Alexander II a report that outlined a program for comprehensive military reform. The objectives were to modernize the army, to restructure military administration at the center, and to create a territorial system of military districts for peacetime maintenance of the army. Although efficiency remained an important goal, Milyutin's reform legislation also revealed a humanitarian side: abolition of corporal punishment, creation of a modern military justice system, and a complete restructuring of the military-educational system to emphasize spiritual values and the welfare of the rank-and-file. These and related changes consumed the war minister's energies until capstone legislation of 1874 enacted a universal military service obligation. Often in the face of powerful opposition, Milyutin had orchestrated a grand achievement, although the acknowledged price included increased bureaucratic formalism and rigidity within the War Ministry.

Within a larger imperial context, Milyutin consistently advanced Russian geopolitical interests and objectives. He favored suppression of the Polish uprising of 1863–1864, supported the conquest of Central Asia, and advocated an activist policy in the Balkans. On the eve of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, he endorsed a military resolution of differences with Turkey, holding that the Eastern Question was primarily Russia's to decide. During the war itself, he accompanied the field army into the Balkans, where he counseled persistence at Plevna, asserting that successful resolution of the battle-turned-siege would serve as prelude to further victories. After the war, Milyutin became the *de facto* arbiter of Russian foreign policy.

Within Russia, after the Berlin Congress of 1878, Milyutin pressed for continuation of Alexander II's Great Reforms, supporting the liberal program of the Interior Ministry's Mikhail Loris-Melikov. However, after the accession of Alexander III and publication in May 1881 of an imperial manifesto reasserting autocratic authority, Milyutin retired to his Crimean estate. He continued to maintain an insightful diary and commenced his memoirs. The latter grew to embrace almost the entire history of nineteenth-century Russia, with important perspectives on the Russian Empire and contiguous lands and on its relations with Europe, Asia, and America.

See also: MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; GREAT REFORMS; MILITARY; SUVOROV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH

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LARISSA ZAKHAROVA

MILYUTIN, NIKOLAI ALEXEYEVICH

(1818–1870), government official and reformer.

Nikolai Milyutin was born into a well-connected noble family of modest means. One of his brothers, Dmitry, would serve as Minister of War

from 1861 to 1881. Nikolai entered government service at the age of seventeen and served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1835 until 1861. A succession of ministers, recognizing his industry and talent, had him draft major reports to be issued in their names. He was largely responsible for compiling the Urban Statute of 1846, which, as applied to St. Petersburg and then to other large cities, somewhat expanded the number of persons who could vote in city elections.

Until 1858, Milyutin was a relatively obscure functionary. In the next six years he was the principal author of legislation that fundamentally changed the Russian empire: the Statutes of February 19, 1861, abolishing serfdom; the legislation establishing elective agencies of local self-administration (*zemstva*), enacted in 1864; and legislation intended to end the sway of the Polish nobility after their participation in the insurrection of 1863. He exercised this influence although the highest position he held was Acting Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs from 1859 to 1861—"acting" because Alexander II supposed that he was a radical. He was dismissed as deputy minister as soon as the peasant reform of 1861 was safely enacted.

In the distinctive political culture of autocratic Russia, Milyutin demonstrated consummate skill and cunning as a politician. None of the core concepts of the legislation of 1861 was his handiwork. He was, however, able to persuade influential persons with access to the emperor, such as the Grand Duchess Yelena Pavlovna, to adopt and promote these concepts. He was able, in a series of memoranda written for the Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Lanskoï, to persuade the emperor to turn away from his confidants who opposed the emerging reform and to exclude the elected representatives of the nobility from the legislative process. And, as chairman of the Economic Section of the Editorial Commission, a body with ostensibly ancillary functions, he was able to mobilize a fractious group of functionaries and "experts" and lead them in compiling the legislation enacted in 1861.

Almost simultaneously he served as chairman of the Commission on Provincial and District Institutions. In that capacity he drafted the legislation establishing the *zemstvo*, an institution which enabled elected representatives to play a role in local affairs, such as education and public health. The reform was also significant because the regime abandoned the principle of *soslovnost*, or status based on membership in one of the hereditary es-

tates of the realm, which had been the lodestone of government policy for centuries. To be sure, the landed nobility, yesterday's serfholders, were guaranteed a predominant role, since there were property qualifications for the bodies that elected *zemstvo* delegates.

Concerning the "western region" (Eastern Poland), Milyutin rewrote the legislation of February 19 so that ex-serfs received their allotments of land gratis and landless peasants were awarded land, often land expropriated from the Catholic Church. He wished to bind the peasants, largely Orthodox Christians, to the regime and detach them from the Roman Catholic nobles, who had risen in arms against it.

Milyutin was well aware of the shortcomings of the reform legislation he produced. He counted on the autocracy to continue its reform course and eliminate these shortcomings. His expectations were not realized. It is the paradox and perhaps the tragedy of Milyutin that, despite his reputation as a "liberal," he saw the autocracy as the essential instrument to produce a prosperous, modern, and law-governed Russia.

See also: EMANCIPATION ACT; MILYUTIN, DMITRY ALEXEYEVICH; PEASANTRY; SERFDOM; ZEMSTVO

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DANIEL FIELD

MINGRELIANS

Mingrelians call themselves Margali (plural Margalepi) and are Georgian Orthodox. Mingrelian (like Georgian, Svan, and Laz) is a South Caucasian (Kartvelian) language; only Mingrelian and Laz, jointly known as Zan, are mutually intelligible.

The ancient Zan continuum along the Black Sea's eastern coast from Abkhazia to Rize was broken by Georgian speakers fleeing the Arab emirate (655–1122) in Georgia's modern capital Tiflis, so that Georgian-speaking provinces (Guria and Ajaria) now divide Mingrelia (western Georgian lowlands bounded by Abkhazia, Svanetia, Lechkhumi, Imeretia, Guria, and the Black Sea) from Lazistan (north-eastern Turkey). The Dadianis ruled post-Mongol Mingrelia (capital Zugdidi), which came under Russian protection in 1803, although internal affairs remained in local hands until 1857. Traditional home economy resembled that of neighboring Abkhazia.

A late-nineteenth-century attempt to introduce a Mingrelian prayer book and language primer using Cyrillic characters failed; it was interpreted as a move to undermine the Georgian national movement's goal of consolidating all Kartvelian speakers. In the 1926 Soviet census, 242,990 declared Mingrelian nationality, a further 40,000 claiming Mingrelian as their mother tongue. This possibility (and thus these data) subsequently disappeared; since around 1930, all Kartvelian speakers have officially been categorized as "Georgians." Today Mingrelians may number over one million, though fewer speak Mingrelian. Some publishing in Mingrelian (with Georgian characters), especially of regional newspapers and journals, was promoted by the leading local politician, Ishak Zhvania (subsequently denounced as a separatist), from the late 1920s to 1938, after which only Georgian, the language in which most Mingrelians are educated, was allowed (occasional scholarly works apart). While some Mingrelian publishing has restarted since Georgian independence, Mingrelian has never been formally taught. Stalin's police chief, Lavrenti Beria, and Georgia's first post-Soviet president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, were Mingrelians. The civil war that followed Gamsakhurdia's overthrow (1992) mostly affected Mingrelia, where Zviadist sympathizers were concentrated; even after Gamsakhurdia's death (1993), local discontent with the central authorities fostered at least two attempted coups, reinforcing longstanding Georgian fears of separatism in the area.

See also: ABKHAZIANS; CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; SVANS

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B. GEORGE HEWITT

MININ, KUZMA

(d. 1616), organizer, fundraiser, and treasurer of the second national liberation army of 1611–1612.

Kuzma Minin was elected as an elder of the townspeople of Nizhny Novgorod in September 1611, when Moscow was still occupied by the Poles. After the disintegration of the first national liberation army, Minin began to raise funds for the organization of a new militia. Its nucleus was provided by the garrison of Nizhny Novgorod and neighboring Volga towns, together with some refugee servicemen from the Smolensk region. At the request of Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, the military commander of the new army, Minin became its official treasurer. When the militia was based at Yaroslavl, in the spring of 1612, Minin was an important member of the provisional government headed by Pozharsky. After the liberation of Moscow in October 1612, Minin, together with Pozharsky and Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy, played a major role in convening the Assembly of the Land, which elected Mikhail Romanov tsar in January 1613. On the day after Mikhail's coronation, Minin was appointed to the rank of *dumny dvoryanin* within the council of boyars; he died shortly afterwards. Along with Pozharsky, Minin became a Russian national hero who served as a patriotic inspiration in later wars. In early Soviet historiography, his merchant status led him to be viewed as a representative of bourgeois reaction against revolutionary democratic elements such as cossacks and peasants. By the late 1930s he was again seen as a patriot, and his relatively humble social origin made him particularly acceptable as a popular hero during World War II.

See also: ASSEMBLY OF LAND; POZHARSKY, DMITRY MIKHAILOVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES; COSSACKS; MERCHANTS; PEASANTRY

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MAUREEN PERRIE

MINISTRIES, ECONOMIC

The industrial ministries of the Soviet Union were intermediate bodies that dealt directly with production enterprises. They played a key role in resource allocation and were directly responsible for the implementation of state industrial policy as developed and adopted by the Communist Party. In fact, ministers had two lines of responsibilities: one to the Council of Ministers, and the other, more important in the long run, to the Party's Central Committee. The most important ministers were members of Politburo. The ministries negotiated output targets and input limits with Gosplan, which was responsible for fulfilling the directives of the party and the Council of Ministers.

Once output and input targets were set, the ministries organized the activities of their enterprises to achieve output targets and stay within input limits. Normally the ministries petitioned Gosplan to reconsider their output and input target figures if plan fulfillment was threatened. This practice was called corrections (*korrektirovka*). Normally aimed at decreasing planned outputs, it was a common practice, although widely condemned by Party officials. The Council of Ministers had the formal authority to decide on these petitions, but in most cases the actual decision was left to Gosplan. The minister or his deputy and even heads of ministry main administrations (*glavki*) were members of the Council of Ministers and participated in its sessions. Most of the operational work of the ministries was done by the main administrations.

The industrial ministries were the fund holders (*fondodержатели*) of the economy. Gosplan and Gossnab (State Committee for Material Technical Supply) allocated the most important industrial raw materials, equipment, and semifabricates to the industrial ministries. Moreover, the ministries had their own supply departments that worked with Gossnab. Centrally allocated materials were called funded (*fondiruyemie*) commodities, which were allocated to the enterprises only by ministries. Enterprises were not legally allowed to exchange funded goods, although they did so.

The ministries existed at three levels. The most important were the All-Union ministries (*Soyuznoe ministerstvo*). Based in Moscow, All-Union ministries managed an entire branch of the economy, such as machine-building, coal, or electrical products. They concentrated enormous power and financial and material resources, and controlled the

most important sectors of the economy. Ministries of the military-industrial complex were concentrated in Moscow. They obtained priority funds and limits allocated by Gosplan. Similarly, the significance of corresponding ministers was very high—they were the direct masters of the enterprises located in all republics that constituted the Soviet Union.

At the second level were the ministries of dual subordination—the Union-Republican Ministry (*Soiuzno-respublikanskoe ministerstvo*). As a rule, their headquarters were in Moscow. While the capitals of individual republics were the sites of republic-specific branches that conducted everyday activities, plan approval and resource allocation were subordinated to Moscow. Among the dual subordination ministries were the ministries of the coal industry, food industry, and construction. For example, Ukraine produced a bulk of Soviet coal and food output; therefore Union-ministry branches were located in its capital, Kiev.

The republican ministries occupied the lowest level. They were controlled by the republican Councils of Ministers and the Republican Central Committees of the Communist Party. They produced primarily local and regional products.

There were also committees under the Council of Ministers that enjoyed practically the same rights as the ministries: for example, the State Committee on Radio and Television, or the notorious KGB, which nominally was a committee but probably enjoyed a wide scope of powers.

A typical ministry was run by the minister and by deputy ministers who supervised corresponding *glavki* that, in their turn, controlled all work under their jurisdiction. A special *glavk* was responsible for logistical aspects of the industry's performance; technical *glavki* were in charge of the planning of the industry's plant operations.

The ministries had authorized territorial representatives in major administrative centers of the Soviet Union who directly supervised the plant's operations. The ministry, however, was dependent on its subordinated enterprises for information. The enterprises possessed better local information and were reluctant to share this information with the ministry.

Ministries had their own scientific and research institutes and higher education establishments that trained professionals for the industry. The industrial ministries were expected to perform a wide va-

riety of tasks: to plan production, manage material and technical supply, arrange transportation, develop scientific policy, and plan capital investment.

The ministers were responsible for the performance of their enterprises as a whole; at the same time, the employees were not motivated and did not have any incentives to work creatively and to their full potential. The bulk of ministerial decision making was devoted to implementing and monitoring the operational plan after the annual plan had been approved. Under constant pressure to meet plan targets, industrial ministries exercised opportunistic behavior: that is, they bargained for lower output targets, demanded extra inputs, and exploited horizontal and vertical integration strategies to achieve more independence from centralized supplies.

During the later period of the Soviet Union, many attempts were made to improve the work of industrial ministries to make them more effective and efficient. However, these attempts were inconsistent, and the number of bureaucrats was hardly reduced. The giant administrative superstructure of the ministries was a heavy burden on the economy and played an increasingly regressive role. It was partially responsible for the economic collapse of Soviet economy. The ministerial bureaucracy continued to play an important role after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Russia, for example, former ministerial officials gained control of significant chunks of industry during the privatization process.

See also: COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY; GOSPLAN; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

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PAUL R. GREGORY

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE

The Ministry of Foreign Trade was a functional ministry subordinate to Gosplan and the Council

of Ministers that was responsible for foreign trade in the Soviet economy.

It was a functional ministry in that its jurisdiction cut across the responsibilities of the various branch ministries that managed production and distribution of products. It reported directly to Gosplan and the Council of Ministers. The operating units of the Ministry of Foreign Trade were the Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs), which controlled exports and imports of specific goods, such as automobiles, aircraft, books, and so forth.

Soviet enterprises generally had no authority or means to export or import to or from abroad. The relevant FTO responded to requests from enterprises under its jurisdiction and, if approved, conducted negotiations, financing, and all other arrangements necessary for the transaction. Imports and exports, and thus the FTOs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, were subject to the overall annual and quarterly economic plans. In this way, foreign trade was utilized to complement rather than to compete with the plan.

See also: COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; FOREIGN TRADE; GOSPLAN

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JAMES R. MILLAR

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The extent to which Russian regimes have depended upon the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD, *Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del*) is symbolized by its surviving the fall of tsarism and the end of the Soviet Union intact and with almost the same name. The ministry's ancestry runs as far back as the sixteenth century, when Ivan the Terrible established the Brigandage Office to combat banditry. However, a formal Ministry of Internal Affairs was not founded until 1802. From the first, its primary responsibility was to protect the interests of the state, and this was so even before it was made responsible for the Okhranka, or political police, in 1880. The close relationship between regular policing and

political control has been a central characteristic of the MVD throughout its existence.

The Bolsheviks came to power with utopian notions of policing by social consent and public voluntarism, but because of the new regime's authoritarian tendencies and the exigencies of the Civil War (1918–1921), it became necessary, by 1918, to transform the "workers' and peasants' militia" into a full-time police force; one year later the militia was militarized. Originally envisaged as locally controlled forces loosely subordinated to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the militia, in practice, were soon closely linked with the Cheka political police force and subject to central control. The NKVD was increasingly identified with political policing; in 1925, the militia and the Cheka's successor, the OGPU (Unified State Political Directorate), were combined, and in 1932 the NKVD was formally subordinated to the OGPU. Two years later, the roles were technically reversed, with the OGPU absorbed into the NKVD, but in practice this actually reflected the colonization of the NKVD by the political police.

The concentration of law enforcement in the hands of the political police well suited the needs of Josef V. Stalin during the era of purges and collectivization, but in 1941 the regular and political police were once again divided. Regular policing again became the responsibility of the NKVD, while the political police became the NKGB, the People's Commissariat of State Security. After the war, the NKVD regained the old title of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the NKGB became the MGB, Ministry of State Security. The political police remained very much the senior service, and for a short time (1953–1954) the MVD was reabsorbed into the MGB (which then became the Committee of State Security, KGB), but from this point the regular and political police became increasingly distinct agencies, each with a sense of its own role, history, and identity.

The police and security forces remained a key element of the Communist Party's apparatus of political control and thus the subject of successive reforms, generally intended to strengthen both their subordination to the leadership and their authority over the masses. In 1956, reflecting concerns among the elite about the power of the security forces, the MVD was decentralized. In 1960, the USSR MVD was dissolved, and day-to-day control of the police passed to the MVDs of the constituent Union republics. In practice, though, the law codes of the republics mirrored their Russian counterpart,

and the republican ministries were essentially local agencies for the central government. In 1968 the USSR MVD was reorganized in name as well as practice, after yet one more name change (Ministry for the Defense of Public Order, MOOP, 1962–1968).

The structure of the Ministry for Internal Affairs has not significantly changed, and thus the post-Soviet Russian MVD is similar in essence and organization, if not in scale. In 1991, Boris Yeltsin tried to merge the MVD and the security agencies into a new "super-ministry," but this was blocked by the Constitutional Court and the idea was dropped. Other reforms were relatively minor, such as the transfer of responsibility for prisons to the Justice Ministry.

As guarantor of the Kremlin's authority, the MVD controls a sizeable militarized security force, the Interior Troops (VV). At its peak, in the early 1980s, this force numbered 300,000 officers and men, and its strength of 193,000 in 2003 actually reflected an increase in its size in proportion to the regular army. In the post-Soviet era, most VV units are local garrison forces, largely made up of conscripts, but there are also small commando forces as well as the elite Dzerzhinsky Division, based on the outskirts of Moscow, which has its own armored elements and artillery.

See also: STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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MARK GALEOTTI

MIR

The word *mir* in Russian has several meanings. In addition to "community" and "assembly," it also means "world" and "peace." These seemingly diverse meanings had a common historical origin. The village community formed the world for the peasants,

where they tried to keep a peaceful society. Thus mir was, in all probability, a peasant-given name for a spontaneously generated peasant organization in early Kievan or pre-Kievan times. It was mentioned in the eleventh century in the first codification of Russian law, *Pravda Russkaya*, as a body of liability in cases of criminal offense.

Over time, the meaning of mir changed, depending on the political structure of the empire, and came to mean different things to different people. For peasants and others, mir presumably was always a generic term for peasant village-type communities with a variety of structures and functions. The term also denoted those members of a peasant community who were eligible to discuss and decide on communal affairs. At the top of a mir stood an elected elder.

Contrary to the belief of the Slavophiles, communal land redistribution had no long tradition as a function of the mir. Until the end of the seventeenth century, individual land ownership was common among Russian peasants, and only special land holdings were used jointly. All modern characteristics, such as egalitarian landholding and land redistribution, developed only as results of changes in taxation, as the poll tax was introduced in 1722 and forced upon the peasants by the landowners, who sought to distribute the allotments more equally and thus get more return from their serfs.

In the nineteenth century, mir referred to any and all of the following: a peasant village group as the cooperative owner of communal land property; the gathering of all peasant households of a village or a *volost* to distribute responsibility for taxes and to redistribute land; a peasant community as the smallest cell of the state's administration; and, most importantly, the entire system of a peasant community with communal property and land tenure subject to repartitioning. The peasant land was referred to as *mirskaya zemlia*.

Only at the end of the 1830s did a second term, *obshchina*, come into use for the village community. Unlike the old folk word mir, the term *obshchina* was invented by the Slavophiles with the special myth of the commune in mind. This term specifically designated the part of the mir's land that was cultivated individually but that was also redistributable. The relation between both terms is that an *obshchina* thus coincided with some aspects of a mir but did not encompass all of the mir's functions. The land of an *obshchina* either coincided with that of a mir or comprised a part of mir

holdings. Every *obshchina* was perforce related to a mir, but not every mir was connected with an *obshchina*, because some peasants held their land in hereditary household tenure and did not redistribute it. With increasing confusion between both terms, most educated Russians probably equated mir and *obshchina* from the 1860s onward. *Obshchina* was also used for peasant groups lacking repartitional land.

Although the mir was an ancient form of peasant self-administration, it was also the lowest link in a chain of authorities extending from the individual peasant to the highest levels of state control. It was responsible to the state and later to the landowners for providing taxes, military recruits, and services. The mir preserved order in the village, regulated the use of communal arable lands and pastures, and until 1903 was collectively responsible for paying government taxes. Physically, the mir usually coincided with one particular settlement or village. However, in some cases it might comprise part of a village or more than one village. As its meaning no longer differed from *obshchina*, the term mir came out of use at the beginning of the twentieth century.

See also: OBSHCHINA; PEASANT ECONOMY; PEASANTRY

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STEPHAN MERL

MIR SPACE STATION

The Mir ("world") space station was a modular space facility providing living and working accommodations for cosmonauts and astronauts during its fifteen-plus years in orbit around the Earth. The core module of Mir was launched on February 20, 1986, and the station complex was commanded to a controlled re-entry into the earth's atmosphere over the Pacific Ocean on March 23, 2001, where its parts either burned up or sank in the ocean.



The Russian Space Station MIR, photographed from the cargo bay of the U.S. Space Shuttle Atlantis. © AFP/CORBIS

The core module provided basic services—living quarters, life support, and power—for those staying aboard Mir. In subsequent years, five additional modules were launched and attached to the core to add to the research and crew support capabilities of the space station; the last module was attached in 1996.

More than one hundred cosmonauts and astronauts visited Mir during its fifteen years in orbit. One, Soviet cosmonaut Valery Polyakov, stayed

in orbit for 438 days, the longest human space flight in history. Beginning in 1995, the U.S. space shuttle carried out docking missions with Mir, and seven U.S. astronauts stayed on Mir for periods ranging from 115 to 188 days. These Shuttle-Mir missions were carried out in preparation for Russian-U.S. cooperation in the International Space Station program.

Toward the end of its time in orbit, there was an attempt to turn Mir into a facility operated on

a commercial basis: for instance, allowing noncosmonauts to purchase a trip to the station. However, Mir was de-orbited before such a trip took place.

The primary legacy of Mir is the extensive experience it provided in the complexities of organizing and managing long-duration human space flights, as well as insights into the effect of long stays in space on the human body. As the Mir station aged, keeping it in operating condition became a full-time task for its crew, and this limited its scientific output.

See also: INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION; SPACE PROGRAM

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JOHN M. LOGSDON

MNISZECH, MARINA

(1588–1614), Polish princess and Tsaritsa of Russia (1606).

Marina Mniszech was the daughter of Jerzy Mniszech (Palatine of Sandomierz), a Polish aristocrat who took up the cause of the man claiming to be Dmitry of Uglich in his struggle against Tsar Boris Godunov. The intelligent and ambitious Marina met the Pretender Dmitry in 1604, and they agreed to marry once he became tsar. After invading Russia and toppling the Godunov dynasty, Tsar Dmitry eventually obtained permission from the Russian Orthodox Church to marry the Catholic princess. In May 1606, Marina made a spectacular entry into Moscow, and she and Tsar Dmitry were married in a beautiful ceremony.

On May 17, 1606, Tsar Dmitry was assassinated, and Marina and her father were taken prisoner and incarcerated for two years. Tsar Vasily Shuisky released them in 1608 on the condition that they head straight back to Poland and not join up with an impostor calling himself Tsar Dmitry who was then waging a bitter civil war against Shuisky. In defiance, Marina traveled to Tushino, the second false Dmitry's capital in September 1608, and recognized the impostor as her husband, thereby greatly strengthening his credibility. Tsaritsa Marina even produced an heir, Ivan Dmitrievich. When

Marina's "husband" was killed in 1610, she and her lover, the cossack commander Ivan Zarutsky, continued to struggle for the Russian throne on behalf of the putative son of Tsar Dmitry. Forced to retreat to Astrakhan, Marina, Zarutsky, and Ivan Dmitrievich held out until after the election of Tsar Mikhail Romanov in 1613. Eventually expelled from Astrakhan's citadel, the three were hunted down in the Ural Mountain foothills and executed in 1614.

See also: DMITRY, FALSE; DMITRY OF UGLICH; OTREPEV, GRIGORY; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

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CHESTER DUNNING

MOISEYEV, MIKHAIL ALEXEYEVICH

(b. 1939), Army General Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1988 to 1991.

Mikhail Moiseyev, born January 2, 1939, in Amur Oblast, was raised in the Soviet Far East and attended the Blagoveshchensk Armor School. He joined the Soviet Armed Forces in 1961 and served with tank units. Moiseyev attended the Frunze Military Academy from 1969 to 1972 and rose rapidly to the Rank of General-Major in the late 1970s. He graduated from the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff as a gold medalist in 1982.

Moiseyev enjoyed the patronage of several senior officers in the advancement of his career, including General E. F. Ivanovsky, I. M. Tretyak, and Dmitri Yazov. In the 1980s Moiseyev commanded a combined arms army and then the Far East Military District. With the resignation of Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev in December 1988, Moiseyev was appointed chief of the Soviet General Staff, a post he held until August 22, 1991, when he was removed because of his support for the hardliners' coup. His tenure saw the culmination of intense arms control negotiations, including the

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; the de-establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization; and increased military activism in domestic politics. In 1992 Moiseyev defended his dissertation, "The Armed Forces Command Structure," at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff. He served as a military consultant to the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1992.

Following his retirement, Moiseyev joined the board of the Technological and Intellectual Development of Russia Joint-Stock Company. In December 2000 he founded a new political party, Union, which was supposed to attract the support of active and returned military and security officers under the slogan, "law, order, and the rule of law." President Vladimir Putin appointed Moiseyev to the governmental commission on the social protection of the military. In this capacity he has been involved in programs to provide assistance to retiring military personnel.

See also: ARMS CONTROL; AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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JACOB W. KIPP

MOLDOVA AND MOLDOVANS

The independent Republic of Moldova has an area of 33,843 square kilometers (13,067 square miles). It is bordered by Romania on the west and by Ukraine on the north, east, and south. The population of as of 2002 was approximately 4,434,000. Moldova's population is ethnically mixed: Moldovans, who share a common culture and history with Romanians, make up 64.5 percent of the total population. Other major groups include Ukrainians (13.8%), Russians (13%), Bulgarians

(2.0%), and the Turkic origin Gagauz (3.5%). Approximately 98 percent of the population is Eastern Orthodox.

Historically, the region has been the site of conflict between local rulers and neighboring powers, particularly the Ottoman Empire and Russian Empires. An independent principality including the territory of present-day Moldova was established during the mid-fourteenth century C.E. During the late fifteenth century it came under increasing pressure from the Ottoman Empire and ultimately became a tributary state. The current differentiation between eastern and western Moldova began during the early eighteenth century. Bessarabia, the region between the Prut and Dniester rivers, was annexed by Russia following the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-1812. Most of the remainders of traditional Moldova were united with Walachia in 1858, forming modern Romania.

While under Russian rule, Bessarabia experienced a substantial influx of migrants, primarily Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Gagauz. Bessarabia changed hands again once again in 1918, uniting with Romania as a consequence of World War I. Soviet authorities created a new Moldovan political unit, designated the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, on Ukrainian territory containing a Romanian-speaking minority to the east of the Dniester River. In June 1940, Romania ceded Bessarabia to the Soviet Union as a consequence of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, allowing formation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia.

Independence culminated a process of national mobilization that began in 1988 in the context of widespread Soviet reforms. In the first partly democratic elections for the Republican Supreme Soviet, held in February 1990, candidates aligned with the Moldovan Popular Front won a majority of seats. The Supreme Soviet declared its sovereignty in June 1990. The Republic of Moldova became independent on August 27, 1991. The current constitution was enacted on July 29, 1994.

Moldova's sovereignty was challenged by Russian-speaking inhabitants on the left bank of the Dniester (Trans-Dniestria), and the Gagauz population concentrated in southern Moldova. The Gagauz crisis was successfully ended in December 1994 through a negotiated settlement that established an autonomous region, Gagauz-Yeri, within Moldova. The Trans-Dniestrian secession remains unresolved. Regional authorities declared indepen-

dence in August 1990, forming the Dniester Moldovan Republic (DMR). Since a brief civil war in 1992, Trans-Dniestrian President Igor Smirnov has led a highly authoritarian government in the region, with the tacit support of the Russian Federation.

Trans-Dniestria has been a central issue in Moldovan foreign affairs. While officially neutral, Russian troops supported the separatists in the 1992 conflict. In August 1994 the Russian and Moldovan governments agreed on the withdrawal of Russian forces from the region within three years; this, however, did not occur. The situation has been complicated by the presence of a substantial Russian weapons depot in Trans-Dniestria. Despite the Trans-Dniestria issue, Moldova entered the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on a limited basis in April 1994 and has maintained positive, if guarded, relations with Russia since then. In 2001, Moldova and the Russian Federation concluded a bilateral treaty that named Russia as guarantor of the Trans-Dniestrian peace settlement.

Moldova's relationship with Romania has become increasingly difficult following independence. Romania was the first state to recognize Moldovan independence. Many Romanians supported unification with Moldova, which they consider an integral part of historic Romania. Romanian nationalists view Moldovan concessions to separatists and the Russian Federation as treason against the Romanian national ideal. This attitude led to a sharp decline in relations, especially following 1994 elections that brought more independence-oriented leaders to power in the capital city of Chişinău. Following the return to power of the Moldovan Communist Party in 2001, hostile rhetoric from official Moldovan sources regarding Romanian interference in Moldovan affairs increased, as did the anger of Romanian nationalists over Moldova's continued relationship with Russia.

The head of state of Moldova is the president of the Republic. The president is charged with guaranteeing the independence and unity, and overseeing the efficient functioning of public authorities. The president may be impeached by vote of two-thirds of the parliamentary deputies. The president can dissolve parliament if it is unable to form a government for a period of sixty days. The president names the prime minister following consultation with the parliamentary majority. Once selected, the prime minister forms a government and establishes a program, which is then submit-

ted to parliament for a vote of confidence. Until 2000 the president was chosen through a direct popular election. In that year, following a long-lasting deadlock between the executive and legislative branches, parliament passed legislation according to which the president is elected by the parliament.

The government of Moldova is made up of a prime minister, two deputy prime ministers, and approximately twenty ministers. Parliament is given the power to dismiss the government or an individual member through a vote of no confidence by a majority vote.

Moldova has a unicameral legislature made up of 101 deputies elected to four-year terms by means of a direct universal vote. Legislators are elected through a proportional representation closed list system, with a six percent threshold for participation. In a move that distinguished it from the vast majority of proportional representation systems, the Moldovans adopted a single national electoral district. The parliament passes laws, may call for referendum, and exercises control over the executive as called for in the constitution.

Moldovan economic conditions deteriorated disastrously in the post-communist period. The collapse of its agricultural exports to Russia badly hurt the rural sector. Simultaneously, the secession of the territory on the left bank of the Dniester dislocated industrial production throughout the republic. Without any significant energy resources, Moldova accrued massive external debts for oil and natural gas imports. Finally, the economic decline was also a consequence of its leaders' failure to provide any clear policy direction. A decade after independence, Moldova was poorer than any other country in Central Europe.

See also: COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES; GAGAUZ; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; TRANS-DNIESTER REPUBLIC

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WILLIAM CROWTHER

MOLOTOV, VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH

(1880–1986), Russian revolutionary and Soviet politician, often regarded as Stalin's chief lieutenant.

Vyacheslav Molotov was born at Kukarka, Nolin district, Vyatka province, on March 9, 1880. His father was the manager of the village store. Molotov's real name was Skryabin; he was the second cousin of the composer and pianist Alexander Skryabin (1872–1915). After attending the village school, he was educated at Kazan Real School from 1902, and became involved in the 1905 Revolution in Nolin district, joining the Bolshevik Party in 1906. Engaged in revolutionary agitation in Kazan, particularly among student groups, he was arrested in 1909 and exiled to Vologda province.

In 1911, at the end of his period of exile, he enrolled first in the shipbuilding department but soon transferred to the economics department at St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. He continued his revolutionary agitation, again especially among student groups, and from 1912 was involved in the production of the early numbers of *Pravda*, to which he contributed a number of articles. It was at this time he first called himself Molotov (from the word for "hammer") after the hero in Nikolai Pomyalovsky's 1861 novel. In 1915, having been sent by the party to Moscow, he was again arrested and exiled to Irkutsk province, but escaped in 1916. Returning to St. Petersburg to continue his revolutionary activity, he was one of the leading Bolsheviks there in March 1917. He was prominent during the early weeks of the Russian Revolution, again working for *Pravda* and serving on the St. Petersburg Soviet, but retired into the background with the return of Lenin and other senior leaders from exile.

Molotov was involved but did not play a leading part in the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917. In March 1918 Molotov became chairman of the *Sovnarkhoz* (Economic Council) for the northern provinces, thus assuming responsibility for economic affairs in the Petrograd area. In 1919, during the civil war, he was in command of a river steamer charged with spreading Bolshevik propa-

ganda in provinces newly liberated from the White armies. He then spent short spells as a party representative in Nizhny Novgorod and the Donbass.

Molotov now rapidly rose in the Bolshevik party. He was elected to the Central Committee in 1921, was first secretary from 1921 to 1922, preceding Josef Stalin's appointment as General Secretary, and continued to work in the Secretariat until 1930, having become a full member of the Politburo in 1926. During this period he became associated with Stalin, fully supporting him in his struggles against the opposition and becoming Stalin's chief agent in agricultural policy, particularly collectivization.

In December 1930, Molotov became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (*Sovnarkom*), a post sometimes regarded as equivalent to prime minister, where he was responsible for the implementation of a planned economy and Stalinist industrialization and related economic and social policies. During the later 1930s he was fully identified with the Stalinist repressions, and for a short time in 1936 he was personally in danger for committing Stalin too openly to a pro-German foreign policy.

From May 1939 until 1949 Molotov was foreign minister. In August 1939 he was responsible for negotiating the notorious Nazi-Soviet pact. In May 1941, shortly before the outbreak of war, Stalin replaced him as *Sovnarkom* chairman. Molotov remained as vice-chairman, and during the war he was also deputy chairman of the State Defence Committee (GKO) with special responsibility for tank production, as well as foreign minister. He was responsible for negotiating the wartime alliance with the United States and Great Britain in 1942; with Stalin he represented the USSR at the major wartime international conferences. He then headed the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco conference of 1945 that established the United Nations organization. Representing the USSR at the United Nations and at postwar foreign ministers' conferences until his dismissal as foreign minister in 1949, he earned a reputation as a blunt, determined, and vociferous opponent of Western policies.

After Stalin's death, Molotov was again foreign minister, from 1953 to 1956, but his relations with Khrushchev were never good, and he was dismissed from his important government offices as a leader of the Antiparty Group in 1957. He then served as Soviet ambassador to Mongolia from 1957 to 1960, and as USSR representative to the Interna-

tional Atomic Energy Commission in 1960 and 1961.

Expelled from the Communist Party in 1962, Molotov lived in retirement until his death in 1986. He was reinstated in the party in 1984. His wife, Polina Semenova (also known as Zhemchuzhina), whom he had married in 1921 and with whom he had two children, also achieved high party and government positions but was incarcerated from 1949 to 1953. Molotov admitted that he had voted in the Politburo for her arrest.

See also: ANTI-PARTY GROUP; BOLSHEVISM; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; REVOLUTION OF 1917; SOVNARKOM; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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DEREK WATSON

MONASTICISM

Monasticism organizes individuals devoted to a life of prayer based upon vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience. It has been an integral part of religious life in Russia since the conversion to Christianity in the late tenth century. Russian monasticism was characterized by the forms that existed in Byzantium, from the anchoritic or eremitical life of hermits to the cenobitic form of communal life; most monasteries, however, organized their life between these ideal types.

The Kievan Caves monastery, founded in the mid-eleventh century by Anthony, was the first important (if not typical) institution. Anthony began as a hermit living in a cave, though his holiness soon attracted others around him. In 1062 Theodosius (d. 1074) became abbot of the growing community and introduced the Studite Rule (the classic Byzantine cenobitic rule, requiring communal eating, labor, property, and worship). Under Theodosius, the monastery upheld high standards

of monastic life and participated in worldly affairs (including charity and politics). Although Theodosius would become a model for Russian monasticism—with his humility, authority, and balance of asceticism and activity—"princely monasticism" dominated Kievan Rus. Princely families founded such monasteries in or near cities, gave the communities their rule and endowments, and appointed abbots. These institutions were influential in ecclesiastical politics and as centers of learning and culture, but were not distinguished by exemplary monastic life. More than fifty monasteries existed in Rus before the Mongol invasion in 1240—though many were destroyed in its wake.

The second half of the fourteenth century witnessed a dramatic expansion of monastic life in Russia, inspired by Sergius of Radonezh (d. 1392). Sergius began as a hermit living in the forest, but, attracting followers, he established the Trinity monastery. Sergius became abbot in 1353 and introduced the Studite rule in 1377. He combined asceticism, humility, charity, and influence in political affairs (like Theodosius), together with contemplative prayer. Inspired by Sergius's example, a pattern emerged in which hermits settled in the forest searching for solitude; followers joined them; they established a monastery, with peasants settling nearby; and again a few monks set off into the uninhabited forest in search of solitude. Much of the Russian north was settled in this manner.

Between 1350 and 1450 some 150 monasteries were founded, and new communities continued to proliferate into the eighteenth century. Monasteries acquired land through purchase or donation, with many becoming major landowners. They played an important role in the economy and political unification of Muscovy in the fifteenth century. By the early sixteenth century their wealth had led to a decline in monastic discipline, giving rise to two differing reform movements. Nil Sorsky (d. 1508) advocated a "skete" style of life, in which monks lived in small hermitages and supported themselves. Nil emphasized contemplative, mystical prayer (based on Byzantine Hesychasm). Joseph of Volotsk (d. 1515) organized his monastery according to the cenobitic rule (demanding strict individual poverty) and emphasized corporate liturgical prayer. Joseph also justified monastery landownership, for this enabled charity and social engagement. Traditional historiography posited an intense political conflict over monastic landownership between two distinct ecclesiastical "parties" (Nil's non-possessors and Joseph's possessors).

Recent research, however, suggests that the conflict has been exaggerated. Small hermitages continued to exist into the seventeenth century, often operating independently of central church control (including resistance to Nikonian liturgical reforms). Ecclesiastical authorities mistrusted and tried to subordinate them to larger monasteries. Thus the tradition inspired by Nil Sorsky gradually died out.

Beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, the state attempted to gain control over monastic landholding due to competition for land and the tax-exempt status of ecclesiastical property. The Law Code of 1649 forbade monasteries from acquiring new estates and established the Monastery Chancellery, which placed the administration of monastic estates under state control (until its abolition in 1677). The eighteenth century witnessed the greatest assertion of state authority over monasticism. Peter the Great initiated measures to restrict the growth of monasticism and make it more socially "useful," and he reestablished the Monastery Chancellery from 1701 to 1720. Peter's successors continued efforts to restrict recruitment, leading to a decline in the number of monks and nuns from 25,000 to 14,000 between 1724 and 1738. The state's assault finally culminated in 1764 when Catherine the Great confiscated all monastic estates. Her secularization reform resulted in the closure of more than half of all monasteries (decreasing from 954 to 387) and a drastic reduction of monastic clergy (leaving fewer than six thousand by the end of the eighteenth century).

Despite the devastating impact of secularization, monasticism experienced a remarkable revival in the nineteenth century and again played a vital role in religious life. By 1914, the number of monasteries rose to 1,025 and the number of monastic clergy reached nearly 95,000. In part, the expansion of monasticism in the nineteenth century was due to the revival of hesychastic contemplative spirituality, inspired by the Ukrainian monk Paisy Velichkovsky (d. 1794). In addition to the repetition of the Jesus prayer and other contemplative practices, placing oneself under the guidance of a spiritual elder (*starets*) was integral to hesychasm. In the nineteenth century, the role of the starets expanded beyond the walls of the monastery. Famous elders such as Serafim of Sarov (d. 1833) or those of the Optina Hermitage attracted tens of thousands of laypeople, including important intellectual figures (Ivan Kireyevsky, Nikolai Gogol, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Leo Tolstoy). A dramatic rise in pilgrimage to monasteries (in combination with

renewed permission to acquire land) led to a significant growth in monastic wealth. Though anti-clerical intellectuals frequently criticized this wealth, many larger monasteries were actively engaged in charity. In the second half of the century, the number of women joining monastic communities rose dramatically; by the century's end, female monastics far exceeded men. In contrast to male monasticism (which focused on contemplative spirituality), female monasticism was particularly devoted to charitable activity (operating schools, orphanages, hospitals, etc.).

The twentieth century, by contrast, was a succession of crises. Between 1900 and 1917, church and monastic leaders heatedly debated reform measures and the social role of monasticism. After 1917, monasteries were among the Bolsheviks' first targets. While most monasteries were closed by 1921, others transformed themselves into agricultural collectives and survived until collectivization (1928–1929). By 1930 all monasteries in the Soviet Union were officially closed, and former monks and nuns were frequent victims of the purges of 1937 and 1938. In the rapprochement between church and state during World War II, some monasteries were allowed to reopen (or stay open, if located in newly acquired territories). From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, eighteen monasteries and convents existed in the Soviet Union. Today the Moscow Patriarchate reports 480 functioning monasteries.

See also: CAVES MONASTERY; JOSEPH VOLOTZK, ST.; KIRIL-BELOZERO MONASTERY; MONASTERIES; NIL SORSKY, ST.; ORTHODOXY; PATRIARCHATE; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SERGIUS, ST.; SIMONOV MONASTERY; SLOVICKI MONASTERY; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

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SCOTT M. KENWORTHY

MONETARY OVERHANG

Monetary overhang consists of the liquidity that quantity-constrained consumers may accumulate in excess of the money they would accumulate if commodities were freely available in the market.

Prices in the Soviet-type consumer goods market were in principle supposed to be set so that supply and demand would balance both in the aggregate and for each consumer good. Deficits caused by below-equilibrium prices were not a goal. But in practice many prices—particularly those for basic essentials like food, housing and many services—were set low either as a consumption subsidy or for ideological reasons. Also, because price stability was a goal, prices were not adjusted often enough to respond to changes in producer cost and consumer preferences. While there was excess supply for some goods, typically many goods were in short supply and were not freely available in the market. Consumers faced quantity constraints; they possibly accumulated money in excess of the amount they would have wished to have. This excess money or forced savings is called monetary overhang.

The economics of monetary overhang remain contested. While the existence of short supply for individual goods is generally accepted, whether there was undersupply in the aggregate remains somewhat debatable. The existence of the gray economy and kolkhoz (open collective farm) markets, where prices were freely determined by supply and demand, might be expected to have balanced aggregate demand and supply. But perhaps such consumer goods markets were too limited in size to have the necessary effect. Also, consumers who accumulate monetary overhang might be expected to diminish their labor efforts. Thus, forced savings would lower economic

growth. But perhaps that was not institutionally possible.

Empirical research into monetary overhang is hampered both by theoretical problems and by deficient statistics. It is estimated that the share of forced savings in total Russian monetary savings increased from 9 percent in 1965 to 42 percent in 1989. This was largely caused by retail price subsidies, which swelled to 20 percent of state budget expenditure in the late 1980s. Undersupply caused queuing, black markets, bribery, and quality deterioration. Few consumer goods were freely available by 1991.

Monetary overhang can also be seen as repressed inflation: In the absence of price controls, prices would rise to equilibrium levels. In principle, monetary overhang could be abolished before price liberalization by increasing consumer goods supplies, by bringing new commodities and assets to markets (for instance, through privatization), or by a confiscatory monetary reform. In practice, monetary overhang was abolished in transition economies through price liberalization, which turned repressed inflation into open inflation and destroyed the value of savings, both voluntary and forced. This was the case in Russia. The partial price liberalization of January 1992 brought about an annual inflation of 2,400 percent. Many consumers suffered badly, but price liberalization was popular overall, as the consequences of repressed inflation were well known.

See also: BLACK MARKET; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; REPRESSED INFLATION; WAGES

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PEKKA SUTELA

MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET

The early Marxists expected that money would die away under socialism, made unnecessary by the



Soviet kopeks and rubles. © DALLAS AND JOHN HEATON/CORBIS

abolition of markets, the use of central planning based on nonmonetary units, the replacement of scarcity by abundance, and the worldwide acceptance of socialism. Since none of this came to pass, a monetary system remained, but it was a very peculiar monetary system. In contrast to a market economy, where money-based exchange is fundamental and money plays an active role, under central management money adapts itself to planned production flows and is basically passive.

In a market economy, money has three functions: It is a means of exchange, a measure of value, and a store of value. A whole set of institutions supports these functions. In the Soviet economy, the ruble fulfilled these functions only in a limited way. The set of monetary institutions was similarly restricted.

Money circulation was strictly divided into two spheres. In the state sector, enterprises could legally use only noncash money, in practice transfers

through a state-owned banking system. Only transfers sanctioned by a corresponding plan assignment could be legally made, and it was generally impossible to use the banking system for nonsanctioned transactions. The banking system was thus an important control mechanism. Households, on the other hand, lived in a cash economy facing mostly fixed-price markets for labor and consumer goods. There were also legal, more or less free-priced markets such as the kolkhoz markets for foodstuffs as well as illegal, often cash-based markets. To control the economy, Soviet planners put great emphasis on maintaining this duality. By and large, they succeeded. Under perestroika, enterprises found ways to convert noncash to cash money. This contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system.

The ruble was not a means of exchange in the state sector. It was not freely convertible to goods, except for goods allocated in the plan for each en-

terprise. For households, money was the basic means of exchange, but only goods produced according to plan were legally available (with the relatively small exception of the *kolkhoz* markets). Because of the frequent shortages, households did not rely on money as the only means of exchange but also used such allocation mechanisms as barter, queuing, and bribery.

As a store of value, money was useless to enterprises, but it was important for households because few other assets were available. In addition to gold and precious stones, one could invest in state bonds, but these were used to mop up excess liquidity. People had little confidence about keeping their wealth in rubles because of the recurring periods of very high inflation—during the civil war, in the early 1930s, during World War II, and afterwards—and also because of the frequent confiscatory money reforms. As foreign currencies were almost unavailable, and possessing them was a serious crime, households used any other store of value, and lacking them, cut down their efforts to earn money. The limited convertibility of the ruble into commodities, together with periods of very high inflation and monetary reform, made money a defective measure of value.

The Soviet Union had a monobank system consisting of a single state bank (Gosbank) that combined the functions of a central bank, a commercial bank, and a savings bank. Gosbank was not autonomous; it was a financial-control agency under the Council of Ministers. Acting as a central bank, it created narrow money (cash in circulation outside the state sector) by authorizing companies to pay wages according to accepted wage plans. Acting as a commercial bank, it issued short-term credit to companies, in accordance with the plan, for working capital. More important, it kept close track of transfers between enterprises to make sure that only transactions sanctioned by an accepted plan took place. Originally, there was a formally separate savings bank, but it was incorporated into Gosbank in 1963. It used the savings of the population to finance budget deficits. A couple of other banks existed for a short time, but like the savings bank were not independent.

The banking system and the budget system were the two pillars of the monetary system. The budget system had three layers—central, regional, and municipal—but, like the Soviet state, it too was unitary. Tax revenue mostly consisted of commodity-specific taxes separating retail and wholesale prices, company-specific profit taxation,

usually confiscating any “excessive” revenue companies might have, and foreign trade taxes, used to separate domestic and foreign prices. As state revenue was thus based on fees specifically tailored for commodities, companies, and foreign markets, the system should perhaps not be called taxation at all. Wages were, in principle, set by the state, but there was little use for income taxation.

State revenue was used to pay state-sector wages and for investment, subsidies, and other public expenditure, including the military. To hide the extent of military expenditure and cover up the deficiencies of social services, state finances were always among the best-kept secrets of the Soviet state. This was especially so toward the end of the period, when there was much justified suspicion that the state, unable to cover expenditure by revenue, was actually engaged in the monetization of budget deficits. This created a monetary overhang with several undesired consequences, among them a popular withdrawal of work effort.

During the war communism of 1918 to 1921, Soviet Russia went through a hyperinflation that destroyed the ability of money to fulfill any of its functions. To what degree this came about by design so as to reach full communism immediately, to what degree by default due to inability to control the monetary system during a civil war, is still debated. Along with the partial rehabilitation of markets in the early 1920s, a successful money reform was made by introducing a parallel currency. The establishment of the centrally managed economy again drove the monetary system into turmoil, but in a few years it had found its new contours. World War II intervened before there had been sufficient time for monetary and financial policy to establish themselves. By the mid-1950s the situation had stabilized, but at the same time the need to reform the economic system was increasingly recognized. The reform proposals, based on the idea of indirect centralization, had little room for monetary or other macroeconomic questions. Not unexpectedly, the partial implementation of such thinking during the late 1980s left post-Soviet Russia in a situation of near hyperinflation with a financial system almost in collapse.

See also: BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; GOSBANK; WAR COMMUNISM

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PEKKA SUTELA

MONTENEGRO, RELATIONS WITH

Over the course of several centuries, Russia developed what could be termed a “special relationship” with Montenegro (located in the western Balkans) and its largely Serb Orthodox population. Modern Montenegro began to emerge as a result of the collapse of the Serbian empire in the fourteenth century. Occupying land characterized by rugged karst mountains, Montenegrins stubbornly resisted Turkish attempts to subdue their mountain redoubts. Until the secularization of the Montenegrin state in 1852, Montenegro’s clans were loosely ruled by *vladike* (prince-bishops)—Orthodox metropolitans who exercised temporal as well as ecclesiastical authority, and who occasionally managed to make the long, difficult journey to Russia to be formally consecrated in office. After the election of Vladika Danilo I in 1696, succession was restricted to members of his family, the Petrovici, who continued to rule Montenegro until World War I.

Beginning with Peter the Great, Russian rulers bestowed financial awards upon Montenegro and its rulers as an expression of their friendship and as payment for various services rendered in support of Russia’s numerous military ventures against the Turks. In the course of the eighteenth century, Russian envoys visited Montenegro, and some Montenegrin youth acquired military training in Russia. The first “modern history” of Montenegro was published by Bishop Vasilije in Russia in 1754. The Russians appealed to the common ethnic and religious heritage of the two peoples and claimed that the war against the Turks was a crusade to rescue the Orthodox Christians of the Balkans from the “Muslim yoke.” For their part, Montenegrins responded enthusiastically to these overtures. The nature of the relationship was such that for more than six years during the reign of Vladika Sava (1735–1781), a monk called Šćepan Mali (Stephen the Small) claiming to be Peter III, the murdered husband of Catherine the Great, successfully established himself as the effective ruler of Montenegro. As one British writer later observed, “Russia was a name to conjure with.”

Even so, the extent of St. Petersburg’s support for Montenegro was necessarily determined by greater Russian geostrategic interests. Accordingly, Montenegro was awarded nothing in the peace treaties ending Russo–Turkish wars in 1711, 1739, 1774, and 1792. The famous bargain struck by Catherine II and Joseph II of Austria in 1781 would have yielded much of the western Balkans to the Habsburg rule, as would have the Austro-Russian Reichstadt Agreement of 1876.

As a result of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin (which replaced the Treaty of San Stefano of the same year), Montenegro secured formal international recognition of its independence as well as territorial aggrandizement. For the next thirty years, Russo–Montenegrin relations were generally cordial, and Nicholas I Petrovic-Njegol (1860–1918), Montenegro’s last prince and only king, took steps to keep them that way. Two of his daughters married Russian grand dukes (Peter and Nikolai Nikolayevitch) and served as spokeswomen for Montenegrin interests in the Russian capital. Nicholas carefully followed political trends in St. Petersburg. His introduction of a constitution in 1905 was a partial echo of the tsar’s reluctant decision to grant a *duma*. For its part, Russia contributed large sums of money to Montenegro royal and state coffers, and engaged in a series of projects designed to promote Montenegrin welfare. Russia subsidized not only the Montenegrin army, but also Montenegrin schools, including a famous girls’ school founded by the Empress Marie Alexandrovna. Russians also served as nurses in a largely Russian-financed hospital.

On balance, Russia was Montenegro’s most generous great-power sponsor in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Tsar Alexander III once asserted that Nicholas of Montenegro was his only friend, and the Montenegrins reciprocated this affection by shouting their famous slogan “We and the Russians—100 million strong!” Nevertheless, the Montenegrin ruler alienated his Russian benefactors on numerous occasions.

In 1908 Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia–Hercegovina, incurring the wrath of Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro. In 1910 Russia, along with all other European great powers, approved the elevation of Prince Nicholas to the dignity of king. In 1912, Russian diplomats worked behind the scenes to help forge the Balkan League, consisting of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. The First Balkan War ensued, launched by Montenegro

in October of the same year. In May 1913 Russia reluctantly joined other European powers in pressuring King Nicholas to withdraw his forces from the Albanian fortress city of Scutari, conquered by Montenegrin troops in April.

In August 1914, Montenegro joined Serbia and Russia in the World War I. One year later, in December 1915, Austro-Hungarian forces occupied Montenegro. Subsequently, official Russian influence was largely limited to Russian representation at the Montenegrin court-in-exile, first in Bordeaux, then in Paris. With the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution, official Russo-Montenegrin relations came to an end, and King Nicholas appealed to the Western Allies in a futile attempt to secure the restoration of the Montenegrin kingdom. At war's end, in December 1918, Montenegro was incorporated into the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia).

After World War I, however, Russian/Soviet influence continued to manifest itself in Montenegro. In initial elections for a Yugoslav constituent assembly, over a third of those Montenegrins voting supported communist candidates. During World War II, many Montenegrins joined the Communist-led Partisan movement headed by Josip Broz Tito. After Tito's split with Stalin in 1948, Montenegro remained a center for limited, underground pro-Cominformist (i.e., pro-Soviet) activity for many years.

See also: BALKAN WARS; CONGRESS OF BERLIN; SERBIA, RELATIONS WITH; YUGOSLAVIA, RELATIONS WITH; WORLD WAR I

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JOHN D. TREADWAY

MORDVINS

The largest Finno-Ugrian nationality in Russia (over a million), the Mordvins are divided into the Erzia and the Moksha sub-ethnic communities. They are a highly dispersed nationality, with over 70 percent of Mordvins residing outside their republic.

The Mordvins are an ancient people indigenous to the area between the Volga, Oka, and Sura rivers. They are first mentioned as Mordens in the writings of the sixth-century Gothic historian Jordanes. Of the surviving Volga nationalities they were the first to encounter the Russians even before 1103, in the first recorded skirmish in the Russian Chronicles. With the conquest of Kazan in 1552, all Mordvins came under Russian rule.

Their history under the tsars is one of expropriations of lands, harsh exploitation, assault on native animist beliefs, and periodic conversion campaigns that led to rebellion and flight. Native leaders were killed in futile uprisings or enticed to the Russian side, leaving the Mordvins a dispersed nation of illiterate peasants. By the seventeenth century, the Mordvin homeland had become central Russian territory and the Mordvins there a minority; those fleeing eastward were soon overtaken by the Russian advance. By the end of the nineteenth century, all Mordvins were listed as Russian Orthodox and were considered "sufficiently russified" not to require special schools or translations in their language. Yet the language-based 1897 census recorded 1,023,841 Mordvins.

Under the Soviets, despite their dispersion, lack of a common language, and a weak national self-consciousness, the Mordvins achieved significant cultural progress. While attempts to forge a common language failed, both Erzia and Moksha became literary languages widely used in education and publishing. In 1934, the Mordvins acquired their own Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (26,200 square kilometers) with its capital in Saransk, albeit the majority were Russians and most Mordvins were left outside. However, by the late 1930s, national revival was halted as the elite was decimated in the purges and Soviet nationality policy shifted to emphasizing the Russian language and culture. The Mordvin population, which had slowly risen to 1,456,300 in 1939, continued to erode, dropping to 1,153,500 in the last Soviet census of 1989.

Since perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Mordvins have been trying to stage a national revival. However, despite new freedoms, conditions are unfavorable. Less than 30 percent of the Mordvins live in their republic, where they are a minority and among the poorest. The new national organizations are narrowly based and suffer from separatist demands from militant Erzias. However, hope is still to be found in their relatively

large number, the support of fellow Finno-Ugrians abroad, and the world community's concern for endangered cultures and languages.

See also: FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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ISABELLE KREINDLER

MOROZOVA, FEODOSYA PROKOPEVNA

(1632–1675), aristocratic martyr of the Old Believers.

Feodosya Morozova, one of the most remarkable characters of the seventeenth century, was born on May 21, 1632, to Prokopy Sokovnin, a relative of Tsaritsa Maria Miloslavskaya, and his wife Anisya. In 1649 Feodosya was married to Gleb Morozov, brother of the famous Boris Morozov, favorite and tutor of Tsar Alexei Mikhaylovich.

In 1650 Morozova's only child Ivan was born. When her husband died in 1662, one of Muscovy's largest properties came under her control. It is not clear when Morozova first made contact with the Old Believers, who refused Patriarch Nikon's church reforms of the middle of the century. Nikon's most ardent opponent, Archpriest Avvakum, returned in February 1664 from his banishment in Siberia to Moscow and took up residence in Morozova's home. Tsar Alexei ordered the confiscation of her possessions in August 1665, but on the insistence of the tsaritsa they were returned in October 1666.

During the second exile of Avvakum after 1666, Morozova continued her correspondence with the Archpriest and made her house a meeting place for the Old Believers. She prepared writings against the "Nikonian heresy" and missed no opportunity to raise her voice against the official church. Besides

the exiled Avvakum, a certain Melanya was of great importance to Morozova. She put herself under the authority of Melanya, whom she regarded as her spiritual "mother," and sought her teaching and advice. At the end of 1670 Morozova took the veil and chose the religious name Feodora.

With the death of Tsaritsa Maria Miloslavskaya in 1669, the Old Believers lost a valuable protectress. When Morozova refused to attend the wedding of the tsar with his second wife Natalya Naryshkina on January 22, 1671, she deeply offended the sovereign. In November 1671 she was arrested along with her sister, Princess Evdokia Urusova. Morozova's estate and landstocks were distributed among the boyars, while all the valuables were sold and proceeds paid into the state treasury. Her twenty-one-year-old son died shortly after her arrest—of grief, as Avvakum noted.

The tsar tried repeatedly to convince Morozova and Urusova to return to the official church, but both refused categorically, even under severe torture. As long as Morozova was imprisoned in or around Moscow, she was able to maintain communication with the Old Believers. A strong, proud, and impressive personality of highest rank, she attracted many noblewomen, who flocked to the monastery to see her. Although she was relocated several times, her numerous admirers persisted in visiting her. Finally, at the end of 1673 or in the beginning of 1674, the alarmed tsar had her transferred to the prison of Borovsk, some 90 kilometers away from Moscow, where she was soon joined by her sister. The two women were held under severe conditions in an earthen hole. In April 1675 the situation worsened, as they were put on starvation rations. Urusova died on September 11 that year, and Morozova on November 1.

Soon after her death, Morozova's life and martyrdom were described by a contemporary, possibly her elder brother. This remarkable literary document is known as the *Tale of Boyarina Morozova*.

See also: AVVAKUM; NIKON; OLD BELIEVERS

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NADA BOSKOVSKA

MOROZOV, BORIS IVANOVICH

(1590–1661), lord protector and head of five chancelleries under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.

Boris Ivanov syn Morozov was an important, thoughtful leader, but he also stands out as an exceptionally greedy figure of the second quarter of the seventeenth century. His cupidity provoked uprisings in early June 1648 in Moscow and then in a dozen other towns, forcing Tsar Alexei to convoke the well-known Assembly of the Land of 1648–1649, the product of which was the famous Law Code of 1649.

Morozov in some ways personified the fact that early modern Russia (Muscovy) was a service state. He was not of princely (royal) origins; his ancestors had been commoners who rose through service to the ruler of Muscovy. Thus his patronymic would have been Ivanov Syn (son of Ivan), rather than Ivanovich, which would have been the proper form were he of noble origin.

By 1633 Morozov was tutor to the heir to the throne, the future Tsar Alexei. He and Alexei married Miloslavskaya sisters. After Alexis came to the throne, Morozov became head of five chancelleries (*prikazy*, the “power ministries”: Treasury, Alcohol Revenues, Musketeers, Foreign Mercenaries, and Apothecary) and de facto ruler of the government (Lord Protector). He observed that there were too many taxes and came up with the apparently ingenious solution of canceling a number of them and concentrating the imposts in an increased tax on salt. Regrettably Morozov was not an economist and probably could not comprehend that the demand for salt was elastic. Salt consumption plummeted—and so did state revenues—while popular discontent rose.

As Morozov took over the government, he brought a number of equally corrupt people with him. They abused the populace, provoking a rebellion in June 1648. The mob tore one of his coconspirators to bits and cast his remains on a dung heap. Another was beheaded. Tsar Alexei intervened on behalf of Morozov, whose life was spared on the condition that he would leave the government and Moscow immediately. This arrangement helped to calm the mob. Morozov was exiled on June 12 to the Kirill-Beloozero Monastery, but he returned to Moscow on October 26. He never again played an official role in government, though he was one

of Alexis’s behind-the-scenes advisers throughout the 1650s.

Morozov’s greed led him to appropriate vast estates for himself. They totalled over 80,000 *desiatinas* (216,000 acres) with over 55,000 people in 9,100 households; this made him the second wealthiest Russian of his time. (The wealthiest individual was Nikita Ivanovich Romanov, Tsar Mikhail’s uncle, who led the opposition to Morozov’s government.) In 1645 the government, in response to a middle service class provincial cavalry petition, promised that the time limit on the recovery of fugitive serfs would be repealed as soon as a census was taken. The census was taken in 1646–1647, but the statute of limitations was not repealed. All the while Morozov’s extensive correspondence with his estate stewards reveals that he was recruiting peasants from other lords and moving such peasants about (typically from the center to the Volga region) to conceal them. Morozov was also active in the potash business: he ordered his serfs to cut down trees, burn them, and barrel the ashes for export.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; BOYAR; CHANCELLERY SYSTEM; ENSERFMENT; LAW CODE OF 1649

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RICHARD HELLIE

MOROZOV, PAVEL TROFIMOVICH

(c. 1918–1932), young man murdered in 1932 who became a hero for the Pioneers (members of the Soviet organization for children in the 10 to 14 age group); celebrated in biographies, pamphlets, textbooks, songs, films, paintings, and plays.

Soviet accounts of the life of Pavel Morozov are mythic in tone and often contradictory. All agree that he was born in the western Siberian village of Gerasimovka, about 150 miles from Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg), probably in December 1918. He and

his younger brother Fyodor were murdered on September 3, 1932. The Morozov murders were taken up by the local press about two weeks after they happened; in late September 1932, the central children's press became aware of the case, and reporters were dispatched to Siberia to investigate and to press for justice against the boys' supposed murderers. In December 1932, the boys' grandparents, their uncle, their cousin, and a neighbor stood trial; four of the five were sentenced to execution.

Like most child murders, the death of the two Morozov brothers provoked outrage; equally typically, press coverage dwelt on the innocence and goodness of the victims. But since the murders also took place in an area that was undergoing collectivization, they acquired a specifically Soviet political resonance. They were understood as an episode in the "class war": A child political activist and fervent Pioneer had been slaughtered by kulaks, wealthy peasants, as a punishment for exposing these kulaks' activities.

Additionally, it was reported that Pavel (or, as he became known, "Pavlik") had displayed such commitment to the cause that he had denounced his own father, the chairman of the local collective farm, for providing dekulakized peasants with false identity papers. His murder by his relations was an act of revenge, and an attempt by them to prevent Pavlik from pushing them into collectivization. All in all, Pavlik came to exemplify virtue so resolute that it preferred death to betrayal of principle. Learning about his life was an important part of the teaching offered the Pioneers; the anniversaries of his death were commemorated with pomp, and statues of Pavlik went up all over the Soviet Union.

But indoctrination did not lead to the emergence of millions of "copycat Pavliks." Memoirs and oral history suggest that most children found the story disturbing, rather than inspiring, even during the 1930s. And during the World War II, attention switched to another type of child hero: the boy or girl who refused to convey information, even under torture. To the postwar generations, Pavlik was a nasty little *stukach*, squealer. Learning about his life was a chore, and he had far less appeal than the Komsomol war heroine Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya. Indeed, surveys indicate that by 2002, the eightieth anniversary of his death, many respondents either could not remember who Pavlik was, or remembered his life inaccurately (e.g., "a hero of the Great Patriotic War"). Statues of him had disappeared (the Moscow statue in 1991), and streets had been renamed. Though the Pavlik Mo-

rozov museum in Gerasimovka was still open, few visitors bothered to call there.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FOLKLORE; PURGES, THE GREAT

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CATRIONA KELLY

MOSCOW

Moscow is the capital city of Russia and the country's economic and cultural center.

Moscow was founded by Prince Yuri Vladimirovich Dolgoruky in 1147 on the banks of the Moscow River. Its earliest fortifications were raised on the present-day site of the Kremlin. Located in Russia's forest belt, the city was afforded a limited degree of protection from marauders from the south. Its location adjacent several rivers also made it a good trade center. By 1325, following the sacking of Kiev and the imposition of the Mongol Yoke, Moscow's princes obtained the sole right to rule over the Russian territories and collect tribute for the Golden Horde. The head of the Russian Orthodox church relocated to Moscow in recognition of the city's growing authority. A prince of Moscow, Ivan III, ultimately rid Russia of Mongol rule, following which the city became the capital of the expanding Muscovite state, which reunited the Russian lands by diplomacy and military conquest from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

During the period of expansion, the young state was thrown into chaos when Ivan IV passed away without leaving an heir. His unsuccessful efforts to regain access to the Baltic Sea and Black Sea had left the state further exhausted. In the ensuing power struggle, the country was invaded by several foreign armies before the Russian people were able once again to gain control of Moscow and elect a new tsar, marking the beginning of the Romanov dynasty (1613–1917).

In 1713, Peter the Great moved the Russian capital to St. Petersburg, which he had built on the Baltic Sea as "Russia's window to the West."

Moscow, which Peter loathed for its traditional Russian ways, remained a major center of commerce and culture. Further, all Russian tsars were crowned in the city, providing a link with the past. Recognizing the city's historical importance, Napoleon occupied Moscow in 1812. He was forced from the city and defeated by the Russian Army as foreign invaders before him had been.

The Bolsheviks moved the capital of Russia back to Moscow when German forces threatened Petrograd (previously St. Petersburg) in 1918. When the Germans left Russian land later that year, the capital remained in Moscow and has not been moved since.

During the Soviet era, a metro and many new construction projects were undertaken in Moscow as the city grew in population and importance. At the same time, many cultural sites, particularly churches, were destroyed. As a consequence, Moscow lost much of its architectural integrity and ancient charm. In an effort to recover this, the Russian government has engaged in a number of restoration projects in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. One of the most important has been the rebuilding of the Savior Cathedral, which was meant to mark the city's spiritual revival.

With a population of approximately 8.5 million people (swelling to more than 11 million on workdays), Moscow is the largest city in Russia and its capital. The Kremlin houses the Presidential Administration while both chambers of the national legislature are located just off of Red Square. The prime minister and his most important deputies have their offices in the White House, the building on the banks of the Moscow River that formerly was the location of the Russian Federation's legislature. The various ministries of the government, which report to the prime minister, are located throughout the city.

The city's government historically has occupied a high profile in national politics. This is particularly true of the mayor, who is directly elected by the city's residents for a four-year term. The mayor appoints the Moscow city government and is responsible for the administration of the city. Among the city's administrative responsibilities are managing more than half of the housing occupied by Muscovites, managing a primary health-care delivery system, operating a primary and secondary school system, providing social services and utility subsidies, maintaining roads, operating a public transportation system, and policing the city.

Legislative power lies with the Moscow City Duma, but the mayor has the power to submit bills as well as to veto legislation to which he objects. The city's citizens elect the City Duma in direct elections for a four-year term. It comprises thirty-five members elected from Moscow's electoral districts.

Not only is Moscow the country's political capital, it is also the country's major intellectual and cultural center, boasting numerous theaters and playhouses. Its attractions include the world-renowned Bolshoi Theater, Moscow State University, the Academy of Sciences, the Tretyakov Art Gallery, and the Lenin Library. Only St. Petersburg rivals it architecturally.

Not surprisingly, given its political and cultural importance, Moscow is Russia's economic capital as well, attracting a substantial portion of foreign investment. The city is the country's primary business center, accounting for 5.7 percent of industrial production. More importantly, it serves as the home for most of Russia's export-import industry as well as a major hub for international and national trade routes. As a consequence, the standard of living of Muscovites is well above that of the rest of the country. All of this owes in large part to the substantial degree of economic restructuring that has occurred in the city since 1991 in response to the introduction of a market economy. There has been particularly strong growth in finance and wholesale and retail trade.

The growth of Moscow's economy has not come without problems. Muscovites are increasingly concerned about crime as well as the plight of pensioners and the poor. They are also concerned about the strain being placed on the city's transportation system, increasing environmental pollution caused by the increased use of automobiles, and the degradation of the city's infrastructure, including its schools and health care system.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; ARCHITECTURE; BOLSHOI THEATER; KREMLIN; LUZHKOVA, YURI MIKHAILOVICH; MOSCOW ART THEATER; MUSCOVY; ST. PETERSBURG; YURY VLADIMIROVICH

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TERRY D. CLARK

MOSCOW AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY

A voluntary association chartered in 1819, the Moscow Agricultural Society was a forum for discussing agricultural policy. Its membership came mainly from the serf-owning nobility and included prominent Slavophiles of the 1850s. In the 1830s Finance Minister Egor Kankrin provided a small financial subsidy, but the society's main support came from its members. Its meetings, exhibitions, and publications were devoted to issues of agricultural innovation, such as new crops and species of livestock and new methods of crop rotation. Its earliest activities included a model farm (*khutor*) near Moscow and an agricultural school. After the end of serfdom in 1861, the society's focus turned to economic and administrative questions: taxation, the agricultural role of the new *zemstvo* organs of local government, the provision of agricultural credit, the creation of a Ministry of Agriculture. It cooperated with the Free Economic Society and other organizations in a multivolume study of handicraft trades (1879–1887), advocated expansion of grain exports through the construction of railroad lines and storage facilities, and promoted the mechanization of agriculture. The Moscow Agricultural Society corresponded with agricultural societies in other countries, and with local affiliates in various parts of Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth century some of its members advocated abolition of the peasant commune and the encouragement of private land ownership and a market economy. Others helped create the All-Russian Peasant Union in 1905, and later the moderate League of Agrarian Reform. The organization was dissolved after 1917, but its library was preserved in the Central State Agricultural Library of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

See also: AGRICULTURE; FREE ECONOMIC SOCIETY; PEASANTRY; SLAVOPHILES; ZEMSTVO

ROBERT E. JOHNSON

MOSCOW ART THEATER

Celebrating its centennial anniversary in 1998, The Moscow Art Theater (MAT) represents a twentieth-century bastion of theatrical art. MAT insured the dramatic career of Anton Chekhov, introduced European trends in stage realism to Russia, and solidified the role of the director as the artistic force

behind dramatic interpretation and the united efforts of designers. MAT also significantly reformed the procedures by which plays were rehearsed and set new standards for ensemble acting that ultimately influenced theaters around the world. The majority of its productions created realistic illusions, replete with sound effects, architectural details, and archeologically researched costumes and sets.

Following the 1882 repeal of the 1737 Licensing Act, which had made Russian theater an imperial monopoly, playwright Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko (head of Moscow's acting school, the Moscow Philharmonic Society) and actor Konstantin Stanislavsky (founder of the renowned theater club, The Society of Art and Literature) founded MAT as a shareholding company. Nemirovich instigated their first legendary meeting in 1897. The enterprise opened in 1898 as The Moscow Publicly Accessible Art Theater, its name embracing the founders' idealistic hopes of providing classic Russian and foreign plays at prices that the working class could afford and fostering drama that educated the community. The first company comprised thirty-nine actors—Nemirovich's most talented students, notably Olga Knipper, later Chekhov's wife; Vsevolod Meyerhold, the future theatricalist director; and Ivan Moskvín, who still performed his popular 1898 role of Tsar Fyodor on his seventieth birthday in 1944—joined with Stanislavsky's most successful amateurs, including his wife Maria Lilina and Maria Andreyeva, the future Bolshevik and wife to Maxim Gorky.

Within a few seasons, financial difficulties and lack of governmental funding forced the founders to raise ticket prices, to drop "Publicly Accessible" from their name, and reluctantly to accept the patronage of the wealthy merchant Savva Morozov. In 1902 Morozov financed the construction of their permanent theater in the art nouveau style and equipped it with the latest lighting technology and a revolving stage.

Following the 1917 revolution, MAT's realistic productions attracted support from the liberal Commissar of Enlightenment, playwright Anatoly Lunacharsky, and Lenin (who was said to have especially admired Stanislavsky's performance as the fussy Famusov in Alexander Griboyedov's *Woe from Wit*). In 1920, MAT became The Moscow Academic Art Theater, its new adjective betokening state support. At this time, Lunacharsky also intervened on behalf of the destitute Stanislavsky in order to secure for him and his family a house with two rooms for rehearsals.

During the 1930s, Stanislavsky strenuously objected to the appointment of Mikhail Geits (1929) as MAT's political watchdog and to governmental pressure to stage productions with insufficient rehearsal. Believing in Stalin's good intentions, Stanislavsky naively appealed to the Soviet leader, winning a pyrrhic victory. Stalin placed MAT under direct governmental supervision in 1931, changing its name to The Gorky Moscow Academic Art Theater one year later, despite the fact that none of Maksim Gorky's plays had been staged since 1905. Under Stalinism, MAT received special privileges denied other artists, in return for public proof of political loyalty. Because of its past dedication to realism, MAT's history could easily be seen as constituting the vanguard of Socialist Realism. Stalin thus turned the company into the single most visible model for Soviet theater, and Stanislavsky's system of actor training, purged of its spiritual and symbolist components, into the sole curriculum for all dramatic schools. Press campaigns ensured this interpretation of MAT's work, even as Stanislavsky's continuing evolution as an artist threatened the view. Given Stanislavsky's international renown, Stalin could not afford the public scandal that would result from his arrest. Instead, Stalin "isolated" Stanislavsky from his public image, maintaining the ailing old man in his house, the site of his internal exile (1934–1938).

Nemirovich and Stanislavsky administered the theater jointly from its inception until 1911 when Stanislavsky's experimental stance toward acting and his growing interest in symbolist plays created unbearable hostility between them. Thereafter, Nemirovich managed the theater until his death in 1943, and Stanislavsky moved his experiments into a series of adjunct studios, some of which later became independent theaters. Stanislavsky continued to act for MAT until a heart attack in 1928, to direct until his death in 1938, and to influence MAT from the sidelines, as he had in 1931. He administered MAT only in Nemirovich's absence, most notably in 1926 and 1927, when Nemirovich toured in the United States. Among the theater's subsequent administrators, actor and director Oleg Yefremov (1927–2000) had the greatest impact on the company. He had studied with Nemirovich at the Moscow Art Theater's school, and founded the prestigious *Sovremennik* (Contemporary) Theater in 1958, and spoke to the conscience of the country after Stalin's death. He reinvigorated MAT's psychological realism in acting while he relaxed its history of realistic design. When he took charge of MAT in 1970, he found an unwieldy company of

more than one hundred actors. In 1987, with perestroika ("reconstruction") occurring in the Soviet Union, Yefremov decided to reconstruct the company by splitting MAT in two. Yefremov retained The Chekhov Art Theater in the 1902 art nouveau building, and actress Tatyana Doronina took charge of The Gorky Art Theater. While Yefremov focused on reviving artistic goals, Doronina made The Gorky a voice for the nationalists of the 1990s. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the Art Theater and all of Russia's theaters struggled to survive. Not only did the loss of governmental subsidies create extraordinary financial instability, but the traditional audiences, who looked to theater for subversive political discussion, deserted theaters for television news. In 2000, Yefremov's student, actor-director Oleg Tabakov, took reluctant charge of the theater's uncertain future.

In its first twenty seasons (1898–1917), MAT revolutionized theatrical art through the production of a repertoire of more than seventy plays. The theater opened in 1898 with two major works: Alexei Tolstoy's *Tsar Fyodor Ionnovich*, which brought mediaeval Russia vividly to life with archeologically accurate designs, and Chekhov's *The Seagull*, which added psychological realism in acting to illusionistic stage environments. MAT premiered all of Chekhov's major plays between 1898 and 1904, with Stanislavsky's staging of *The Three Sisters* (1901) hailed as one of the company's greatest triumphs. Realistic productions, characterized by careful detailing in costumes, properties, sets, and acting choices, predominated. MAT produced more plays by Henrik Ibsen than by any other playwright, with *An Enemy of the People* (1900) providing Stanislavsky with one of his greatest roles. Even Ibsen's abstract play, *When We Dead Awaken*, was directed realistically by Nemirovich (1901). For Gorky's *The Lower Depths* (1902) MAT used representational detail to create a social statement about the underclass. Nemirovich especially furthered the cause of stage realism, often overburdening plays with inappropriate illusion. His unwieldy realistic production of William Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* (1903) garnered much criticism.

Stanislavsky's growing interest in abstracted styles led to MAT's production of a series of symbolist plays. Notable among these were Stanislavsky's stagings of Leonid Andreyev's *The Life of Man* (1907), which featured stunning stage effects developed by its director, and Maurice Maeterlinck's fantasy, *The Blue Bird* (1908), as well as Gordon Craig's theatricalist production of Shakespeare's

Hamlet (1911). 1907 saw the two MAT styles collide uncomfortably when Nemirovich presented his overly naturalistic version of Ibsen's *Brand* alongside Stanislavsky's abstracted production of Knut Hamsun's *The Drama of Life*. When Stanislavsky began to apply his new ideas about acting to Ivan Turgenev's *A Month in the Country* (1909), he utilized abstraction both in the symmetrical set design and in the actors' use of static gestures in order to focus on inner states. This production caused a permanent rift between Stanislavsky and the company.

Although MAT greeted the 1917 revolution optimistically, it lost economic viability. Its first postrevolutionary production was Lord Byron's *Cain* in 1920, interpreted by Stanislavsky as a metaphor of the postrevolutionary civil war. MAT struggled to find the necessary funds and materials to realize the production. In order to survive financially, half of the company toured Europe and the United States from 1924 to 1926 with their most famous realistic productions, among them *Tsar Fyodor Ionovich* from 1898 and Chekhov's *The Cherry Orchard* from 1904. This tour solidified the international fame of Stanislavsky and MAT. In the late 1920s, MAT participated in the general theatrical trend toward a Soviet repertoire. Stanislavsky staged Mikhail Bulgakov's controversial view of White Russia in *The Days of the Turbins* (1926) and Vsevolod Ivanov's *Armored Train 14-69* (1927). During the 1930s and 1940s, under the yoke of Socialist Realism, MAT's work lost its verve, its productions becoming undistinguished. In the 1970s, Yefremov reinvigorated the company by employing talented actors and revived its repertoire by staging new plays, such as Mikhail Roshchin's portrait of young love in *Valentin and Valentina* (1971) and Alexander Vampilov's *Duck Hunting* (1979), in which Yefremov played the fallen hero.

See also: CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; MEYERHOLD, VSEVOLOD YEMILIEVICH; MOSCOW; SILVER AGE; SOCIALIST REALISM; STANISLAVSKY, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH; THEATER

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SHARON MARIE CARNICKE

MOSCOW BAROQUE

Moscow Baroque was the fashionable architectural style of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, combining Muscovite (Russo-Byzantine) traditions with Western decorative details and proportions; the term also sometimes applied to new trends in late seventeenth-century Muscovite painting, engraving, and literature.

The term *Moscow Baroque* (*moskovskoe barokko*) came into use among Russian art historians in the 1890s and 1900s as a way of categorizing the distinctive style of architecture which flourished in and around Moscow from the late 1670s, and in the provinces into the 1700s. In the 1690s, Peter I's maternal relatives the Naryshkins commissioned many sumptuous churches in the style; hence the supplementary art historical term "Naryshkin Baroque," which is sometimes erroneously applied as a general term for the style. Some of the early examples of Moscow Baroque are reminiscent of mid-seventeenth-century Muscovite churches in their general shape and coloration—cubes constructed in red brick with white stone decorations and topped with one or five domes—but the builders had evidently assimilated a new sense of symmetry and regularity in their ordering of both structural and decorative elements. Old Russian ornamental details were replaced almost entirely by Western ones based on the Classical order system: half-columns with pediments and bases, window surrounds of broken pediments, volutes, carved columns, and shell gable motifs. One of the best concentrations of Moscow Baroque buildings was commissioned by the regent Sophia Alexeyevna in the 1680s in the sixteenth-century Novodevichy Convent in Moscow, which includes the churches of the Transfiguration, Dormition, and Assumption, with a refectory, belltower, nuns' cells, and crenellations on the convent walls in matching materials and style. Similar constructs can be found in the Monastery of St. Peter (Vysokopetrovsky) on Petrovka Street in Moscow. Civic buildings were constructed on the same principles: for example,

Prince Vasily Golitsyn's Moscow mansion (1680s) and the Pharmacy on Red Square (1690s). A number of these projects were carried out by the architectural section of the Foreign Office.

In the 1690s builders regularly incorporated octagonal structures, producing the so-called octagon-on-cube church. One of the finest examples, the Intercession at Fili, built for Peter's uncle Lev Naryshkin in 1690–1693, with its soaring tower of receding octagons, gold cupolas, and intricately carved limestone decoration, bears witness to both the Naryshkins' wealth and their Westernized tastes. Inside, all the icons were painted in a matching "Italianate" style and set in an elaborately carved and gilded iconostasis. This and other churches such as the Trinity at Troitse-Lykovo, Boris and Gleb in Ziuzino, and Savior at Ubory, with their tiers of receding octagons, also owe something to distant prototypes in Russian and Ukrainian architecture (the wooden architecture of the former and the dome configuration of the latter), while the new sense of harmony in their design and planning evokes the Renaissance. The style spread beyond Moscow.

Analogous developments can be seen in allegorical prints of the period, embellished with a characteristic Baroque mix of Christian and Classical imagery, most of which originated in Ukraine. A characteristic example is Ivan Shchirsky's engraving (1683) of Tsars Ivan and Peter hovering above a canopy containing a double eagle, with Christ floating between them and, above Christ, a winged maiden, the Divine Wisdom (Sophia). In icons painted in the Moscow Armory and in workshops in Yaroslavl, Vologda, and other major commercial centers, influences from Western art can be seen in the use of light and shade and decorative details such as scrolls, putti-like angels, ornate swirling cloud and rock motifs, dramatic gestures, and even some borrowings from Catholic iconography: for instance, saints with emblems of their martyrdom; blood dripping from Christ's hands and side. In poetry, syllabic verse and Baroque motifs and devices were imported from Poland and practiced by such writers as Simeon Polotsky, court poet to Tsar Alexis, and Polotsky's pupil Silvester Medvedev.

Art historians have debated whether Moscow Baroque was a direct derivative of Western Baroque, represented a spontaneously generated and original form of baroque, or was the decadent, over-ornate last phase of the "classical" forms of Russo-Byzantine art. It may be best to

view it as an example of the belated influence of the Renaissance upon traditional art and architecture, which picked up elements from both contemporary and slightly earlier Western art. No Russian architects are known to have visited the West during this period, and there is scant evidence of Western architects working in Russia. However, Russian craftsmen did have access to foreign books and prints in the Armory, Foreign Office workshops, and other libraries, while contacts with Polish culture, both direct and via Ukraine and Belarus, were influential, especially in literature.

The term *Moscow Baroque* is not generally applied to the architecture of early St. Petersburg, although many buildings constructed in the reigns of Peter I and his immediate successors had much in common with the preceding style: for instance, the use of octagonal structures and the white decorative details against a darker background. In Moscow and the provinces, Moscow Baroque remained popular well into the eighteenth century.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; GOLITSYN, VASILY VASILIEVICH; MEDVEDEV, SYLVESTER AGAFONIKOVICH; POLOTSKY, SIMEON; SOPHIA

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LINDSEY HUGHES

MOSCOW, BATTLE OF

The Battle of Moscow was a pivotal moment in the early period of the World War II, in which Soviet forces averted a disastrous collapse and demonstrated that the German army was, in fact, vulnerable. The battle can be divided into three general segments: the first German offensive, from September 30 to October 30, 1941; the second German offensive, from November 16 to December 5, 1941;

and the Soviet counteroffensive, from December 5, 1941, to April 5, 1942.

The German attack on Moscow began on September 30, 1941, under the code name "Typhoon." The German High Command hoped to seize the Soviet capital before the onset of winter, surmising that the fall of Moscow would presage the fall of the Soviet Union. With this goal in mind they arrayed a massive force against the Soviet capital, concentrating 1,800,000 troops, 1,700 tanks, 14,000 cannons and mortars, and 1,390 aircraft against Moscow. Led by General Heinz Guderain, this enormous army quickly took advantage of the weakened and retreating Soviet forces to capture several towns on the approaches to the capital in the first week of the campaign. By October 15, the German army, having circumvented the Soviet defensive lines and taken the key towns of Kaluga and Mozhaisk, was within striking distance of the capital.

The lightning speed with which the Germans reached the outskirts of the capital spawned a panic in Moscow as many Muscovites, fearing a German takeover of the city, began to flee to the east. For several days, local authority crumbled completely, and Moscow seemed on the verge of chaos. Even as the capital teetered on the edge of collapse, however, several factors combined to slow the German onslaught. First, the German forces had begun to outpace their supply lines. Second, Josef V. Stalin and the Soviet High Command appointed General Georgy Zhukov as the commander of the Western Front. Fresh from his triumph stabilizing the defensive lines surrounding Leningrad, Zhukov moved to do the same for Moscow, and the Red Army began to stiffen its defense of the capital. Third, the German supply line problems gave the Red Army time to bring reserves from the Far East to Moscow. Until these reserves could be put in place, however, the city's defense leaders ordered ordinary Muscovites organized into *opolchenie*, or home guard units, into the breaches in the capital's defensive lines. These units, often quickly and poorly trained, paid a high price to shore up Moscow's defenses.

Once the German supply had regrouped, German forces mounted another attack in late November. Initially the German forces scored several successes in the areas of Klin and Istra to the northwest and around Tula to the south. The tenacity of the Soviet defense and severity of the Russian winter, however, slowed the German advance and allowed time for Soviet forces to recover

and even begin to mount limited counterattacks by early December.

Emboldened by their success in stemming the German onslaught, the Soviet command attempted a more concerted attack against the German invaders on December 5–6, 1941. With the aim of driving the Germans back to Smolensk, Stalin and Zhukov opened a 560-mile front stretching from Kalinin, north of the capital, to Yelets in the south. The ambitious operation quickly met with success as the Red Army, bolstered by units from Central Asia, drove the Germans back twenty to forty miles, liberating Kalinin, Klin, Istra, and Yelets and breaking the German encirclement attempt at Tula. In many places German forces retreated quickly, weakened by their supply problems and their exposure to the Russian winter. Soviet forces, despite their advances, could never capitalize on their initiative. While the Red Army advanced as much as 200 miles into German-held territory on the German flanks to the north and south of Moscow, they had great difficulty dislodging German forces from the Rzhev-Gzhatsk-Viazma salient due west of the capital. By late January their resistance had stiffened to the point that the Red Army's advance began to stall. Although the Soviet offensive continued to grind its way westward, it had lost momentum. This stalemate continued until April 1942 when the Soviet command called a halt to the offensive. It was not until the spring of 1943 that the Red Army finally drove the Germans back from Moscow.

The Battle of Moscow was important for several reasons. It was the first real setback that German forces had absorbed since World War II began in 1939. Despite the fact that Moscow was on the verge of collapse in mid-October 1941, Soviet forces proved that the German army was not invincible. Also, the struggle for the Soviet capital revealed a new breed of Soviet commanders who came to prominence in the defense of the capital. Commanders such as Zhukov, Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Boldin, and Dmitry Lelyshenko demonstrated their competence during this critical period and became the backbone of the Soviet military command for the remainder of the war. Finally, the defense of the capital was an important moral victory for the Soviet command and people alike, and made an indelible impression on the Soviet nation and on the other countries participating in World War II.

See also: MOSCOW; WORLD WAR II; ZHUKOV, GEORGY KONSTANTINOVICH

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ANTHONY YOUNG

MOSCOW OLYMPICS OF 1980

The city of Moscow hosted the Summer Olympic Games from July 19 to August 3, 1980. The International Olympic Committee awarded Moscow the games in 1974, in the hopes that international competition might contribute to détente. But superpower politics had a direct impact on these games. Under the leadership of the United States, sixty-two nations boycotted the Moscow Olympics to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during December of 1979. The Soviet government, along with its allies, retaliated by boycotting the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games. Great Britain, France, and Italy supported the condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but participated in the games.

The Moscow Olympic games were the first held in a socialist country. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, visibly aged, opened the games. The Soviet leadership intended to use the games to showcase the advantages of the socialist system. Toward that end the government ordered that the Moscow streets and parks be cleaned and that petty criminals and prostitutes be rounded up. Government officials also hoped that Soviet athletes would dominate the games. They were not disappointed. The USSR won 195 medals, including 80 gold; the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) won 126 medals, including 47 gold; followed by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Cuba in that order. Eighty-one nations had participated in the Moscow games, and the USSR and its East European and other socialist allies won the vast majority of the medals. Soviet fans demonstrated poor sportsmanship by constantly jeering Polish and East German competitors. Since 1952, when the USSR first participated in the Olympic games, government officials recognized how gold, silver, and bronze medals



The Olympic flag is carried out of the Lenin Stadium at the closing ceremony of the 1980 summer Olympic Games.

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might be translated into propaganda achievements for the nation.

Some of the notable individual achievements of the games included gymnast Nadia Comaneci of Romania winning two medals; Soviet swimmer Vladimir Salnikov becoming the first to break fifteen minutes in the 1,500 meters; Teofilo Stevenson, a Cuban boxer, becoming the first boxer to win three gold medals in his division; Soviet gymnast Alexander Dityatin winning eight medals; Miruts Yifter of Ethiopia winning the 5,000- and 10,000-meter runs in track; and Britain's Sebastian Coe outkicking countryman Steve Ovett in the 1,500 run. At the closing ceremony, it was said that the mascot of the Moscow Olympics, Misha the Bear, had a tear in his eye.

See also: AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; SPORTS POLICY; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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MOSKVIN, IVAN YURIEVICH

Seventeenth-century Cossack and explorer of Russia's Pacific coast.

The Cossack adventurer Ivan Yurievich Moskvitin was one of the many explorers and frontiersmen who took part in the great push eastward that transformed Siberia during the reigns of tsars Mikhail (1613–1645) and Alexei (1645–1676).

In 1639 Moskvitin left Yakutsk at the head of a squadron of twenty Cossacks, seeking to confirm the existence of what local natives called the "great sea-ocean." Proceeding east, then southward, Moskvitin encountered the mountains of the Jug-Jur Range, which forms a barrier separating the Siberian interior from the Pacific coastline. Moskvitin threaded his way through the mountains by following the Maya, Yudoma, and Ulya river basins.

Tracing the Ulya to its mouth brought Moskvitin to the shore of the Sea of Okhotsk. He and his men were therefore the first Russians to reach the Pacific Ocean by land. The party also built a fortress at the mouth of the Ulya, Russia's first Pacific outpost. Until 1641, Moskvitin charted much of the Okhotsk shoreline. Mapping an overland route to the eastern coast and establishing a presence there were key moments in Russia's expansion into Siberia and Asia.

See also: EXPLORATION; SIBERIA

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JOHN MCCANNON

MOTION PICTURES

The statement "Cinema is for us the most important of all arts" has been attributed to Vladimir

Lenin. This statement, whether apocryphal or not, became the motto of the Soviet motion picture industry. Because of the central part the movies played in Soviet propaganda, the motion picture industry had an enormous impact on culture, society, and politics.

EARLY RUSSIAN CINEMA, 1896–1918

The moving picture age began in Russia on May 6, 1896, at the Aquarium amusement park in St. Petersburg. By summer of that year, the novelty was a featured attraction at the popular provincial trading fairs. Until 1908, however, the vast majority of movies shown in Russia were French. That year, Alexander Drankov (1880–1945), a portrait photographer and entrepreneur, opened the first Russian owned and operated studio, in St. Petersburg. His inaugural picture, *Stenka Razin*, was a great success and inspired other Russians to open studios.

By 1913, Drankov had been overshadowed by two Russian-owned production companies, Khanzhonkov and Thiemann & Reinhardt. These were located in Moscow, the empire's Hollywood. The outbreak of war in 1914 proved an enormous boon to the fledgling Russian film industry, since distribution paths were cut, making popular French movies hard to come by. (German films were forbidden altogether.) By 1916 Russia boasted more than one hundred studios that produced five hundred pictures. The country's four thousand movie theaters entertained an estimated 2 million spectators daily.

Until 1913 most Russian films were newsreels and travelogues. The few fiction films were mainly adaptations of literary classics, with some historical costume dramas. The turning point in the development of early Russian cinema was *The Keys to Happiness* (1913), directed by Yakov Protazanov (1881–1945) and Vladimir Gardin (1881–1945) for the Thiemann & Reinhardt studio. This full-length melodrama, based on a popular novel, was the legendary blockbuster of the time.

Although adaptations of literary classics remained popular with Russian audiences, the contemporary melodrama was favored during the war years. The master of the genre was Yevgeny Bauer (1865–1917). Bauer's complex psychological portraits, technical innovations, and painterly cinematic style raised Russian cinema to new levels of artistry. Bauer worked particularly well with actresses and made Vera Kholodnaya (1893–1919) a legend. Bauer's surviving films—which include

Twilight of a Woman's Soul (1913), *Child of the Big City* (1914), *Silent Witnesses* (1914), *Children of the Age* (1915), *The Dying Swan* (1916), and *To Happiness* (1917)—provide a vivid picture of a lost Russia.

The revolutionary year 1917 brought joy and misgiving to filmmakers. Political, economic, and social instability shuttered most theaters by the beginning of 1918. Studios began packing up and moving south to Yalta, to escape Bolshevik control. By 1920, Russia's filmmakers were on the move again, to Paris, Berlin, and Prague. Russia's great actor Ivan Mozhukhin (1890–1939, known in France as “Mosjoukine”) was one of few who enjoyed as much success abroad as at home.

SOVIET SILENT CINEMA, 1918–1932

The first revolutionary film committees formed in 1918, and on August 27, 1919, the Bolshevik government nationalized the film industry, placing it under the control of Narkompros, the People's Commissariat for Enlightenment. Nationalization represented wishful thinking at best, since Moscow's movie companies had already decamped, dismantling everything that could be carried.

Filmmaking during the Civil War of 1917–1922 took place under extraordinarily difficult conditions. Lenin was acutely aware of the importance of disseminating the Bolshevik message to a largely illiterate audience as quickly as possible, yet film stock and trained cameramen were in short supply—not to mention projectors and projectionists. Apart from newsreels, the early Bolshevik repertory consisted of “agit-films,” short, schematic, but exciting political messages. Films were brought to the provinces on colorfully decorated agit-trains, which carried an electrical generator to enable the agitki to be projected on a sheet. Innovations like these enabled Soviet cinema to rise from the ashes of the former Russian film industry, leading eventually to the formation of Goskino, the state film trust, in 1922 (reorganized as Sovkino in 1924).

Since most established directors, producers, and actors had already fled central Russia for territories controlled by the White armies, young men and women found themselves rapidly rising to positions of prominence in the revolutionary cinema. They were drawn to film as “the art of the future.” Many of them had some experience in theater production, but Lev Kuleshov (1899–1970), who had begun his cinematic career with the great prerevolutionary director Bauer, led the way, though he was still a teenager.



Poster advertising the 1925 Soviet film *Strike*. © SWIM INK/CORBIS

By the end of the civil war, most of Soviet Russia's future filmmakers had converged on Moscow. Many of them (Kuleshov, Sergei Eisenstein, and their “collectives”) were connected to the Proletkult theater, where they debated and dreamed.

Because film stock was carefully rationed until the economy recovered in 1924, young would-be directors had to content themselves with rehearsing the experiments they hoped to film and writing combative theoretical essays for the new film journals. The leading director-theorists were Kuleshov, Eisenstein (1898–1948), Vsevolod Pudovkin (1893–1953), Dziga Vertov (1896–1954, born Denis Kaufman), and the “FEKS” team of Grigory Kozintsev (1905–1973) and Leonid Trauberg (1902–1990). Kuleshov wrote most clearly about the art of the cinema as a revolutionary agent, but Eisenstein's and Vertov's theories (and movies) had

an impact that extended far beyond the Soviet Union's borders.

The debates between Eisenstein and Vertov symbolized the most extreme positions in the theoretical conflicts among the revolutionary avant-garde of the 1920s. Eisenstein believed in acted cinema but borrowed Kuleshov's idea of the actor as a type; he preferred working with non-professionals. Vertov privileged non-acted cinema and argued that the movie camera was a "cinema eye" (*kino-glaz*) that would catch "life off-guard" (*zhizn vrasplokh*)—yet he was an inveterate manipulator of time and space in his pictures. Eisenstein believed in a propulsive narrative driven by a "montage of attractions," with the masses as the protagonists, whereas Vertov was decisively anti-narrative, believing that a brilliantly edited kaleidoscope of images best revealed the contours of revolutionary life.

Eisenstein's first two feature films, *Strike* (1925) and *Battleship Potemkin* (1926), enjoyed enormous success with critics and politicians but were much less popular with the workers and soldiers whose interests they were supposed to service. The same was true of Vertov's pictures. The intelligentsia loved *Forward, Soviet!* and *One-Sixth of the World* (both 1926), but proletarians were nonplussed.

Kuleshov, Pudovkin, Kozintsev, and Trauberg (who directed as a team) were more successful translating revolutionary style and content for mass audiences because they retained plot and character at the heart of their films. *The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks* (1924), one of Kuleshov's earliest efforts, appeared as a favorite film in audience surveys through the end of the 1920s. The same was true of Pudovkin's *Mother* (1926), a loose adaptation of Maxim Gorky's famous novel. Kozintsev and Trauberg's *The Overcoat* (1926) is a good example of the extremes to which young directors pushed the classical narrative.

Despite this wealth of talent, Soviet avant-garde films never came close to challenging the popularity of American movies in the 1920s. Douglas Fairbanks's and Charlie Chaplin's pictures drew sell-out audiences. In response to the pressures to make Soviet entertainment films—and the need to show a profit—Goskino and the quasi-private studio Mezhrabpom invested more heavily in popular films than in the avant-garde, to the great dismay of the latter, but to the joy of audiences. The leading popular filmmaker was Protazanov,

who returned to Soviet Russia in 1923 to make a string of hits, starting with the science fiction adventure, *Aelita* (1924).

Also very successful with the spectators were the narrative films of younger directors such as Fridrikh Ermler (1898–1967, born Vladimir Breslav), Boris Barnet (1902–1965), and Abram Room (1894–1976). Ermler earned fame for his trenchant social melodramas (*Katka's Reinettes Apples*, 1926 and *The Parisian Cobbler*, 1928). Barnet's intelligent comedies such as *The Girl with the Hatbox* (1927) sparkled, as did his adventure serial *Miss Mend* (1926). Room was perhaps the most versatile of the three, ranging from a revolutionary adventure, *Death Bay* (1926), to a remarkable melodrama about a ménage à trois, *Third Meshchanskaya Street* (1927, known in the West as *Bed and Sofa*).

It must be emphasized that moviemaking was not a solely Russian enterprise, although distribution politics often made it difficult for films from Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia to be considered more than exotica. The greatest artist to emerge from the non-Russian cinemas was certainly Ukraine's Alexander Dovzhenko (1894–1956), but Armenia's Amo Bek-Nazarov (1892–1965) and Georgia's Nikolai Shengelaya (1903–1943) made important contributions to early Soviet cinema as well.

In 1927, as the New Economic Policy era was coming to a close, Soviet cinema was flourishing. Cinema had returned to all provincial cities and rural areas were served by cinematic road shows. There was a lively film press that reflected a variety of aesthetic positions. Production was more than respectable, about 140 to 150 titles annually. Six years later, production had plummeted to a mere thirty-five films.

Many factors contributed to the crisis in cinema that was part of the Cultural Revolution. First, in 1927, sound was introduced to cinema, an event with significant artistic and economic implications. Second, proletarianist organizations such as RAPP, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, and ARRK, the Association of Workers in Revolutionary Cinematography were infiltrated by extremist elements who supported the government's aims to turn the film industry into a tool for propagandizing the collectivization and industrialization campaigns. This became apparent at the first All-Union Party Conference on Cinema Affairs in 1928. Third, in 1929, Anatoly Lunacharsky, the leading proponent of a diverse cinema, was ousted as commissar

of enlightenment, and massive purges of the film industry began that lasted through 1931.

These troubled times saw the production of four great films, the last gasp of Soviet silent cinema: Ermler's *The Fragment of the Empire*, Kozintsev and Trauberg's *New Babylon*, Vertov's *The Man with the Movie Camera* (all 1929), and the following year, Dovzhenko's *Earth*.

STALINIST CINEMA, 1932–1953

By the end of the Cultural Revolution, it was clear to filmmakers that the era of artistic innovation had ended. Movies and their makers were now “in the service of the state.” Although Socialist Realism was not formally established as aesthetic dogma until 1934, (reconfirmed in 1935 at the All-Union Creative Conference on Cinematographic Affairs), politically astute directors had for several years been making movies that were only slightly more sophisticated than the agit-films of the civil war.

In the early 1930s, a few of the great artists of the previous decade attempted to adapt their experimental talents to the sound film. These efforts were either excoriated (Kuleshov's *The Great Conqueror* and Pudovkin's *The Deserter*, both 1933) or banned outright (Eisenstein's *Bezhin Meadow*, 1937). Film production plummeted, as directors tried to navigate the ever-changing Party line, and many projects were aborted mid-production. Stalin's intense personal interest and involvement in moviemaking greatly exacerbated tensions.

Some of the early cinema elite avant-garde were eventually able to rebuild their careers. Kozintsev and Trauberg scored a major success with their popular adventure trilogy: *The Youth of Maxim* (1935), *The Return of Maxim* (1937), *The Vyborg Side* (1939). Pudovkin avoided political confrontations by turning to historical films celebrating Russian heroes of old in *Minin and Pozharsky* (1939), followed by *Suvorov* in 1941. Eisenstein likewise found a safe historical subject in the only undisputed masterpiece of the decade, *Alexander Nevsky* (1938). Others, such as Dovzhenko and Ermler, seriously compromised their artistic reputations by making movies that openly curried Stalin's favor. Ermler's *The Great Citizen* (two parts, 1937–1939) is a particularly notorious example.

New directors, most of them not particularly talented, moved to the forefront. Novices such as Nikolai Ekk and the Vasiliev Brothers made two of the enduring classics of Socialist Realism: *The Road to Life* (1931) and *Chapayev* (1934). Another rela-

tive newcomer, Ivan Pyrev, churned out Stalin-pleasing conspiracy films such as *The Party Card* (1936), about a woman who discovers her husband is a traitor, before turning to canned socialist comedies, of which *Tractor Drivers* (1939) is the most typical.

Some of the new generation managed to maintain artistic standards. Mikhail Romm's revisionist histories of the revolution, *Lenin in October* (1937) and *Lenin in 1918* (1939), which placed Stalin right at Lenin's side, were the first major hits in his distinguished career. Mark Donskoy's three-picture adaptation of Maxim Gorky's autobiography, beginning with *Gorky's Youth* (1938) also generated popular acclaim. The most beloved of the major directors of the 1930s was, however, Grigory Alexandrov. Alexandrov, who had worked as Eisenstein's assistant until 1932, successfully distanced himself from the maverick director, launching a series of zany musical comedies starring his wife, Lyubov Orlova, in 1934 with *The Jolly Fellows*.

When the German armies invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the tightly controlled film industry easily mobilized for the wartime effort. Considered central to the war effort, key filmmakers were evacuated to Kazakhstan, where makeshift studios were quickly constructed in Alma-Ata. With very few exceptions—Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible* (1944–1946) being most noteworthy—moviemaking during the war years focused almost exclusively on the war. Newsreels naturally dominated production. The fiction films that were made about the war effort were quite remarkable compared to those of the other combatant nations in that they focused on the active role women played in the partisan movement. One of these, Ermler's *She Defends Her Motherland* (1943), which tells the story of a woman who puts aside grief for vengeance, was shown in the United States during the war as *No Greater Love*.

The postwar years, until Stalin's death in 1953, were a cultural wasteland. Film production nearly ground to a halt; only nine films were made in 1950. The wave of denunciations and arrests known as the anti-cosmopolitan campaign roiled the cultural intelligentsia, particularly those who were Jewish such as Vertov, Trauberg, and Eisenstein. Eisenstein's precarious health was aggravated by the extreme tensions of the time and the disfavor that greeted the second part of *Ivan the Terrible*. He became the most famous casualty among filmmakers, dying of a heart attack in 1948 at the age of only fifty. Cold War conspiracy melodramas



Movie still of a battle scene from Sergei Eisenstein's classic *Alexander Nevsky* (1938). © BETTMANN/CORBIS

dominated movie theaters (not unlike McCarthy era films in the United States a few years later), along with ever more extravagant panegyrics to Stalin. Georgian director Mikhail Chiaureli's first ode to Stalin, *The Vow* (1946), was followed by *The Fall of Berlin* (1949), which Richard Taylor has aptly dubbed "the apotheosis of Stalin's cult of Stalin."

SOVIET CINEMA FROM THE THAW THROUGH STAGNATION, 1953–1985

By the mid-1950s, filmmakers were confident that the Thaw—as Khrushchev's relaxation of censorship was known—would last long enough for them to express long-dormant creativity. The move from public and political toward the private and personal became a hallmark of the period. Thaw pictures were appreciated not only at home, but also abroad, where they received numerous prizes at international film festivals. There was now a human face to the Soviet colossus.

The greatest movies of the period rewrote the history of World War II, the Great Patriotic War. Mikhail Kalatozov's *The Cranes Are Flying* (1957) won the Palme d'Or at Cannes in 1958, signaling that Soviet cinema was once again on the world stage after nearly thirty years. *Cranes* is the story of a woman who betrays her lover, a soldier who is killed at the front, to marry his cousin, a craven opportunist. There is no upbeat ending, no neat resolution. The same can be said of Sergei Bondarchuk's *The Fate of a Man* and Grigory Chukhrai's *The Ballad of a Soldier* (both 1959). In the former, a POW returns home to find his entire family dead; in the latter, a very young soldier's last leave home to help his mother is movingly recorded.

A film that is often considered the last important movie of the Thaw also launched the career of the greatest film artist to emerge in postwar Soviet cinema. This was *Ivan's Childhood* (1962, known in the United States as *My Name Is Ivan*), a stun-

ning antiwar film that won the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival. The director was Andrei Tarkovsky (1932–1986). By the time Tarkovsky began work on *Andrei Rublev* in the mid-1960s, Khrushchev had been ousted, and Leonid Brezhnev's era of stagnation had begun. Cultural iconoclasm was no longer tolerated, and Tarkovsky's dystopian epic about medieval Russia's greatest painter was not released in the USSR until 1971, although it won the International Film Critics' prize at Cannes in 1969. Tarkovsky toiled defiantly in the 1970s to produce three more Soviet films, *Solaris* (1972), *The Mirror* (1975), and *Stalker* (1980). He emigrated to Europe in 1984 and died of cancer two years later.

Filmmaking under Brezhnev was generally unremarkable, although two films, Bondarchuk's *War and Peace* (1966) and Vladimir Menshov's *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears* (1979) each won the Oscar for Best Foreign Film. The most interesting movies (such as Alexander Askoldov's *The Commissar*, 1967) were shelved, not to be released until the late 1980s as part of Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost*. Among the exceptions to the mundane fare were Larisa Shepitko's tale of World War II collaboration, *The Ascent* (1976), and Lana Gogoberidze's *Several Interviews on Personal Questions* (1979), which sensitively explored the drab, difficult lives of Soviet women.

The best-known director to have started his career during the Brezhnev era is Nikita Mikhalkov (b. 1945). Son of Sergei Mikhalkov, a Stalinist writer of children's stories, the younger Mikhalkov first made a name for himself as an actor. Mikhalkov achieved his greatest successes in the 1970s and 1980s with his "heritage" films, elegiac recreations of Russian life in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often adapted from literary classics, among them *An Unfinished Piece for Player Piano* (1977), *Oblomov* (1979), and *Dark Eyes* (1983).

RUSSIAN CINEMA IN TRANSITION, 1985–2000

When Gorbachev announced the advent of perestroika and *glasnost* in 1986, the Union of Cinematographers stood at the ready. After a sweeping purge of the union's aging and conservative bureaucracy, the maverick director Elem Klimov (b. 1933) took the helm. Although Klimov had made a number of movies under Brezhnev, he did not emerge as a major director until 1985, with the re-

lease of his stunning antiwar film *Come and See*. Under Klimov's direction, the union began releasing the banned movies of the preceding twenty years, in effect rewriting the history of late Soviet cinema.

The film that most captured the public's imagination in that tumultuous period was Georgian, not Russian. Tengiz Abuladze's *Repentance* (1984, released nationally in 1986) is a surrealistic black comedy-drama that follows the misdeeds of the Abuladze family, provided a scathing commentary on Stalinism. Although a difficult film designed to provoke rather than entertain, *Repentance* packed movie theaters and sparked a national debate about the legacy of the past and the complicity of the survivors.

Television also became a major venue for filmmakers. Gorbachev's cultural policies encouraged publicistic documentaries that exposed either the evils of Stalin and his henchmen or the decay and degradation of contemporary Soviet life. Fiction films such as *Little Vera* (Vasily Pichul, 1988), *Intergirl* (Pyotr Todorovsky, 1989), and *Taxi Blues* (Pavel Lungin, 1990) followed suit by telling seamy tales about the Soviet underclass.

The movie industry began to fragment even before the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Union of Cinematographers decentralized in mid-1990, and Goskino and Sovexportfilm, which provided central oversight over film production and distribution, had completely lost control by the end of 1990. The early 1990s saw the collapse of native film production in all the post-Soviet states. Centralization and censorship had long been the bane of the industry, but filmmakers had no idea how to raise money for their projects—and were even more baffled by being expected to turn a profit. Market demands became known as "commercial censorship." Filmmakers also had to contend for the first time with competition from Hollywood, as second-rate American films flooded the market.

The Russian cinema industry began to rebound in the late 1990s. It now resembled other European cinemas quite closely, meaning that national production was carefully circumscribed, focusing on the art film market. Nikita Mikhalkov emerged the clear winner. By the turn of the century he became the president of the Russian Filmmakers' Union, the president of the Russian Cultural Foundation, and the president of the only commercially successful Russian studio, TriTe. He established a fruitful partnership with the French company Camera One,

which coproduced his movies and distributed them abroad. He took enormous pride in the fact that *Burnt by the Sun*, his 1995 exploration of the beginnings of the Great Terror, won the Oscar for Best Foreign Picture that year, only the third Russian-language film to have done so, and certainly the best.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, therefore, it seems that the glory days of Russian cinema are past. This past, however, has earned Russian and Soviet films and filmmakers an enduring place in the history of global cinema.

See also: AGITPROP; ALEXANDROV, GRIGORY ALEXANDROVICH; BAUER, YEVGENY FRANTSEVICH; CHAPAYEV, VASILY IVANOVICH; CULTURAL REVOLUTION; EISENSTEIN, SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH; MIKHAILOV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; ORLOVA, LYUBOV PETROVNA; SOCIALIST REALISM; TARKOVSKY, ANDREI ARSENEVICH; THAW, THE

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DENISE J. YOUNGBLOOD

MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS

On July 1, 1991, nine well-known close associates of Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR, and Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), called for the establishment of a Movement for Democratic Reform to unite all those who supported human rights and a democratic future for the USSR. The appeal was signed by Arkady Volsky, Gavril Popov, Alexander Rutszkoi, Anatoly Sobchak, Stanislav Shatalin, Eduard Shevardnadze, Alexander Yakovlev, Ivan Silayev, and Nikolai Petrakov. It endorsed the development of a market economy and the maintenance of the USSR in some form, and declared that a founding Congress would be convened in September to decide whether or not to form a political party.

Alexander Yakovlev explained that the movement sought to overcome the Party apparatus's resistance to the democratization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and he openly appealed to reformist Communists to join the movement. President Gorbachev endorsed its formation (many believed that it had been established to provide him with an alternative political base in the event of a formal split in the CPSU). The Central Committee of the CPSU was skeptical of the movement, and the Communists in the military openly attacked it.

After the abortive coup against President Gorbachev in August 1991, the leaders of the movement were named to important political posts sought to fill the gap created by the dissolution of the CPSU and openly recruited reformist leaders of the Party as well as members of the "military industrial complex."

The founding Congress of the movement was finally convened in December 1991, just days after the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Congress called for the formation of a broad coalition of democratic movements and parties, endorsed market reforms, sought the support of emerging entrepreneurs, and supported the CIS with some misgivings.

In February 1992 the original movement was replaced by the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RMDR), and Gavril Popov was chosen as its chairman. In June 1992 he resigned from his position as mayor of Moscow to devote more time to the development of the movement as a "democratic opposition" to the Yeltsin regime.

The RMDR became increasingly critical of the Yeltsin regime's economic policies in 1992 and 1993. It nominated a significant number of candidates for the first elections to the state duma in December 1993. Although it endorsed much of the new Constitution, it was sharply critical of the growth of bureaucracy, the process of privatization, and the continued power of the Communist *nomenklatura*. It advocated sharp reduction of the bureaucracy, the decentralization of economic power, distribution of land to all citizens, local controls over energy, and a clear demarcation of authority between president, parliament, and government. It received almost 9 percent of the vote in St. Petersburg, but failed to gain the 5 percent of the vote needed for representation in the state duma.

After the elections of December 1993 RMDR repeatedly assailed the entire reform model of the Yeltsin regime and sought partners to establish an effective democratic opposition. In September 1994 it formed an alliance with Democratic Russia, and in 1995 it worked with other similar organizations to create a Social Democratic Union (SDU) to contest the 1995 elections. After the SDU's defeat in the elections, the RMDR disappeared from public view.

See also: AUISUST 1991 PUTSCH; POPOV, GAVRIL KHARITONOVICH; RUTSKOI, ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH; SHATALIN, STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH; SHEVARNADZE, EDUARD AMVROSIEVICH; SOBCHAK, ANATOLY ALEXANDROVICH; VOLSKY, ARKADY IVANOVICH; YAKOVLEV, ALEXANDER NIKOLAYEVICH

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JONATHAN HARRIS

MOVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY

The movement, In Support of the Army, War Industry, and War Science (DPA) was founded in July 1997 on the initiative and with the guidance of the chair of the Duma defense committee, Lev Rokhlin, a hero of the war in Chechnya. With the degradation of the army, it soon became a significant anti-government force. After the murder of Rokhlin a year later, his successor as chair of the committee, Viktor Ilyukhin, became head of the party. Ilyukhin was famous for having brought a legal action, during his days as prosecutor, against Mikhail Gorbachev. Next in line to Ilyukhin was Colonel General Albert Mashakov, former commander of the Privolga military district, candidate in the 1991 presidential elections, and notorious for his anti-Semitic statements (he once suggested, for instance, that the DPA should be unofficially called the DPZh, or "Movement Against Jews"). Among the strategies considered by the Left on the eve of the 1999 elections, the "three-columns" idea would have had the DPA at the head of one column. Another strategy called for the formation of a bloc of national-patriotic forces consisting of the DPA, the Russian Popular Movement, the Union of Compatriots "Fatherland," and the Union of Christian Rebirth. The second idea had the DPA join a united oppositional bloc with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). A third proposal, the one adopted, had the DPA enter the elections independently. The first three places on the DPA list were taken by Ilyukhin, Makashov, and Yuri Saveliev, rector of the Petersburg Technical University, whose popularity rested on his having fired a professor from the United States because of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The DPA list disappeared, but Ilyukhin and one other candidate were elected to the Duma.

In the early twenty-first century the DPA has little influence and is essentially a satellite of the Communist Party. Ilyukhin, its leader, is a member of the Central Committee of the CPRF. He takes entirely radical positions and plays a certain role in the leadership of the National Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR).

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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NIKOLAI PETROV

MSTISLAV

(1076–1132), Vladimir Monomakh's eldest son, grand prince of Kiev, and the progenitor of the dynasties of Vladimir in Volyn and of Smolensk.

In 1088 Mstislav Vladimirovich's grandfather Vsevolod appointed him to Novgorod, but in 1093 his father (Monomakh) sent him to Rostov and Smolensk. In 1095 he returned to Novgorod where he ruled for twenty years. In 1096 his father ordered him to campaign against Oleg Svyatoslavich of Chernigov, who was pillaging his Suzdalian lands. Mstislav's most important victory was defeating Oleg and making him attend a congress of princes in 1097 at Lyubech, where he was reconciled with Monomakh and Svyatopolk of Kiev.

In 1117 Monomakh, now grand prince of Kiev, summoned Mstislav to Belgorod where, it appears, he made Mstislav coruler. He also designated Mstislav his successor in keeping with his agreement with the Kievans, who had promised to accept Mstislav and his descendants as their hereditary dynasty. Monomakh therewith violated the system of lateral succession allegedly introduced by Yaroslav the Wise. When Monomakh died on May 19, 1125, Mstislav succeeded him. Two years later, when Vsevolod Olgovich usurped Chernigov from his uncle Yaroslav, Mstislav violated the lateral order of succession again by confirming Vsevolod's usurpation and thus winning his loyalty. Whereas Monomakh had driven the Polovtsy to the river Don, in 1129 Mstislav drove them even beyond the Volga. In 1130, in keeping with Monomakh's policy of securing his family's control over the other princely families, Mstislav exiled the disloyal princes of Polotsk to Constantinople and replaced them with his own men. Thus, before he died, he controlled, directly or through his brothers or his

sons, Kiev, Pereyaslavl, Smolensk, Rostov, Suzdal, Novgorod, Polotsk, Turov, and Vladimir in Volyn. Moreover, Vsevolod of Chernigov was his son-in-law. Mstislav, called "the Great" by some, died on April 15, 1132, and was buried in the Church of St. Theodore, which he had built.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; ROTA SYSTEM; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

MURAVIEV, NIKITA

(1796–1843), army officer who conspired to overthrow Nicholas I.

Nikita Muraviev was one of the army officers involved in the Decembrist movement to overthrow Tsar Nicholas I. He is best known for the constitution he drafted for a new Russian state. Although he did not actually participate in the uprising on December 14, 1825, he was condemned to death when it failed. His sentence was later commuted to twenty years at hard labor in the Nerchinsk mines. He died in Irkutsk Province.

In 1813, after studying at Moscow University, Muraviev embarked on a military career, and in 1816 he joined with other aristocratic young officers in organizing a secret society called the Union of Salvation. Led by Paul Pestel, it was renamed the Union of Welfare a year later. Stimulated by the French Revolution (1789) and the Napoleonic Wars (1812–1815), the officers had been influenced by the liberal ideas of French and German philosophers while serving in Europe or attending European universities. The new Russian literature, with its moral and social protest against Russia's backwardness, also was an important influence, especially the works of Nikolai Novikov, Alexander Radishchev, and the poets Alexander Pushkin and Alexander Griboyedov. The Arzamas group, an informal literary society founded around 1815, attracted several men who later became Decembrists, including Nikita Muraviev, Nikolai Turgenev, and Mikhail Orlov.

Economic stagnation, high taxation, and the need for major reforms motivated Muraviev and the other Decembrists to take action. They advocated the establishment of representative democracy but disagreed on the form it should take: Muraviev favored a constitutional monarchy; Pestel, a democratic republic. To get rid of tsarist agents and members who were either too dictatorial or too conservative, the organizers dissolved the Union of Welfare in 1821 and set up two new groups: The Northern Society, centered in St. Petersburg, was headed by Muraviev and Nicholas Turgenev, an official in the Ministry of Finance. The more radical Southern Society was dominated by Pestel. During the interregnum between Alexander I and Nicholas I, the two societies plotted the coup.

Muraviev was the ideologist for the Northern Society, drafting propaganda and a constitution that was found among his papers following his arrest. The uncompleted constitutional project reveals the strong impact of the American constitution. Like Pestel, he envisioned a republic: "The Russian nation is free and independent. It cannot be the property of a person or a family. The people are the source of supreme power. And to them belongs the sole right to formulate the fundamental law." Muraviev advocated a constitutional monarchy along the lines of the thirteen original states of North America, separation of powers, civil liberties, and the emancipation of the serfs. Although his constitution guaranteed the equality of all citizens before the law, the landed classes were recognized as having special rights and interests. Thus Muraviev rejected Pestel's idea of universal suffrage; only property-holders would be allowed to vote and to seek elective office.

What distinguishes Muraviev's draft constitution is its advocacy of federalism, an idea not echoed by any major political movement in Russia until the twentieth century. Muraviev argued that "vast territories and a huge standing army are in themselves obstacles to freedom." Too much of a nationalist to call for the breakup of the empire, however, Muraviev urged that Russia adopt a federalist system as a way to reconcile "national greatness with civic freedom."

The Decembrist uprising failed because of the plotters' incompetence and lack of mass support. Some defected, and others, at the last minute, failed to carry out their assignments. Five of their leaders, including the poet Kondraty Ryleyev, were executed. Despite the stricter censorship Nicholas I imposed after the crushed rebellion, the memory of the De-

cembrists inspired many writers and revolutionaries, especially the political refugee Alexander Herzen, who established the journal *The Bell* (*Kolokol*) in London in 1857 to "propagate free ideas within Russia."

See also: DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; EMPIRE, USSR AS; NICHOLAS I

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

MUSAVAT

Founded in secrecy in October 1911, Musavat (Equality) ultimately grew into the largest, longest-lived Azerbaijan political party. The founders of the party were former members of Himmat (Endeavor) party, Azerbaijan's first political association, led by Karbali Mikhailzada, Abbas Kazimzada, and Qulan Rza Sharifzada. Formation of Musavat was a response to their disillusionment with the 1905 Russian Revolution. They were also inspired by a common vision of Turkic identity and Azeri nationalism.

Musavat attracted many of its followers from among Azerbaijan's bourgeoisie-intelligentsia, students, entrepreneurs, and other professionals; the party also included workers and peasants among its ranks. In 1917 a new party evolved from the initial merger of these former Himmatists and the Ganja Turkic Party of Federalists, as reflected in the organization's name, the Turkic Party of Federalists-Musavat. At this stage Musavat came under the leadership of Mammad Rasulzade and consisted of two distinct factions, the Left or Baku faction and the Right or Ganja faction. These factions differed on economic and social ideology such as land reform, but closed ranks on two crucial issues, one being secular Turkic nationalism. The other was the vision of Azerbaijan as an autonomous republic and part of a Russian federation of free and equal states. In April 1920, when Azerbaijan came under Soviet domination, the native intelligentsia were afforded some amount of accommodation in accordance with the Soviet nationalist program supervised by Josef Stalin. However, the accommodation only extended to the left wing of the Musavat party.

Members of the right wing were subsequently imprisoned or killed. By 1923 the Musavat came under pressure from communist apparatchiks to dissolve the organization. Musavat members fortunate enough to flee formed exile communities in northern Iran or Turkey and remained abroad for the duration of the Soviet era. The self-proclaimed successor of the Musavat party, Yeni Musavat Partiyasi (New Musavat Party) was reestablished in 1992. Its leadership was drawn from the Azerbaijan Popular Front, an umbrella group representing a broad spectrum of individuals and groups opposed to the communist regime in the waning years of the Soviet Union and active in the post-Soviet transition. In the early twenty-first century Musavat is currently in the forefront of the opposition movement in competition with the Popular Front. Yeni Musavat is characterized as the party of the Azeri intelligentsia and is led by Isa Gambar. The key planks of the party platform are the liberation of land captured by Armenian forces in the Karabakh conflict and forcing the resignation of Heidar Aliev's regime, which it views as corrupt and illegitimate.

See also: AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS

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GREGORY TWYMAN

MUSCOVY

The Russian realm that centered around Moscow until approximately 1713 to 1721 is known as Muscovy. Historians differ about when to set its beginning. Moscow is first mentioned in a chronicle under the year 1147 as part of Yuri Dolgoruky's domain. Its first important prince was Alexander Nevsky's son Daniel (d. 1303). Between 1301 and 1304, he and his son Yuri (d. 1325) seized three towns from neighboring Ryazan and Smolensk, thereby making Moscow an important

center of power within the grand principality of Vladimir. Yuri's brother Ivan I (d. 1341), who obtained the right to collect tribute for the Mongols from other Rus principalities and persuaded the head of the church to reside in Moscow, established Moscow's preeminent position in northern Rus. Moscow's territory continued to expand under his grandson Dmitry Donskoy (r. 1359-1389) and Dmitry's progeny down to the end of Daniel's subdynasty in 1598, with only a few minor setbacks. Highlights of this growth included the incorporation of Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal under Basil I (r. 1389-1425), Tver, Severia, and Novgorod under Ivan III (r. 1462-1505), Pskov, Smolensk, and Ryazan under Basil III (r. 1505-1533), the Volga khanates Kazan and Astrakhan under Ivan IV (r. 1533-1584), and western Siberia under Fyodor Ivanovich I (1584-1598). Under Alexei (r. 1645-1676), Russia extended its power across Siberia to the Pacific Ocean, recovered territory lost to Poland-Lithuania between 1611 and 1619, added eastern Ukraine, and became in area the world's largest contiguous state. By the time Peter I (r. 1682-1715) moved the capital to St. Petersburg in 1713, he had reacquired eastern Baltic territory lost to Sweden in 1611 to 1617 and added some more. He renamed his realm the Russian Empire in 1721.

Internationally, Moscow developed from a subordinate tributary of the Qipchak khanate (Golden Horde) to a free successor state in the 1480s, and then to ruler of the lands of other khanates, starting in the 1550s. Aiming for semantic equality with other fully sovereign states with imperial pretensions, such as the Ottoman, Persian, and Holy Roman empires, Moscow had to accept parity with Poland-Lithuania and Sweden until the Battle of Poltava in 1709. Refusing a humiliating rank within the overall European state system and its diplomatic hierarchy, Muscovy remained ceremonially if not operationally aloof, but with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, it became the first European state to make a formal agreement with China.

CHURCH AND CULTURE

Muscovy's church moved from being the center of an often all-Rus metropolitanate of the patriarchate of Constantinople, to an autocephalous eastern Rus or Russian entity after 1441—the only regional Orthodox church ruled essentially by sovereign Orthodox rulers—to a patriarchate of its own in 1589 with a sense of pan-Orthodox responsibilities, and after 1654 to one actually dominating the Kievan

metropolitanate, which had been separate since 1441. Starting in the 1470s, the renovation and enlargement of Moscow's Kremlin and its major churches and palaces gave Muscovy a capital worthy of its pretensions, and in 1547 Ivan IV was crowned officially as tsar as well as grand prince. While remaining under the guise of being devotionally and ritually distinct, Muscovy borrowed elements of material and intellectual culture from western Europe and around 1648 initiated some Western-influenced education.

ECONOMY

Muscovy's economy was based primarily on agriculture, including flax and cloth made from it; forest products, especially furs, but also wax and honey; fishing; and the production of salt and simple metal goods. The opening of direct English and then Dutch trade with the Russian far north, starting in the 1550s, led to the production of hemp and cordage. Arkhangelsk (founded in 1583) and Astrakhan served as major ports of entry and export, but much of Muscovy's foreign trade went overland. The rise of gun powder technology stimulated both the manufacture of cannon in the 1500s and a native potash industry, especially in the 1600s. In the 1630s Dutch concessionaires opened up Russia's first European-style mining operations. In 1649 Russia ended nearly a century of special trading privileges for the English. Unifying the monetary system in the 1530s, but lacking good sources of specie, Muscovy resorted to re-stamping or melting down and re-minting foreign silver coins and therefore required a trade surplus.

SOCIETY

From the start, Moscow's princes, boyars, and higher military servitors were at the top of the social hierarchy. As Muscovy expanded, the reliable incorporated princely elites joined the Moscow boyars, while incorporated provincial boyars and elite warriors became regionally based military servitors with some opportunity to advance on the social ladder. Among the major changes over time were the rise of economically active, estate- and enterprise-owning rural monasteries, starting in the late 1300s and continuing through the 1600s; the centralizing of the general obligation to serve via the *pomestie* system, starting in the late 1400s; the rise of cossacks on the southern frontiers of the realm in the 1500s; the binding down of urban and rural plebeians to their communities by the late 1500s; and the conversion of peasants on church, court,

boyar, and servitor estates into serfs by 1649. By about 1580, boyars and military servitors had their own special courts and constituted, for Europe, a unique, obligatory-service nobility. The *gosti*, a privileged elite of merchants, undertook commerce on behalf of the state as well as themselves, and sometimes made forced contributions to the central treasury. Cossacks both served the state well and sometimes rebelled, as under Stenka Razin in 1670 to 1671.

STATE

Muscovy's state polity developed under professional state secretaries (*diak*) from the sovereign's household administration, starting especially in the latter 1400s. Ivan III issued the first national law code (*Sudebnik*) in 1497. By the 1530s Moscow began to assign local fiscal and policing tasks to local elites. By the 1550s there were separate departments (*izba*, later *prikaz*) for foreign affairs, military assignments, military estates, banditry, and taxation, and such offices continued to expand. Ivan IV summoned Muscovy's first ad hoc national assembly (*Zemsky Sobor*) in 1566. During the period of political instability and crises from 1565 to 1619, the governing elites learned the value of managing the central state offices, and in the seventeenth century directly controlled most of them. Provincial bodies, for their part, proved their worth in the national revival of 1611 to 1613 (during the Time of Troubles) in spearheading the expulsion of the Poles and the establishment of a new dynasty. The vastly expanded law code (*Ulozhenie*) of 1649 became the foundation of Russian law down to 1833. How the sovereigns, the boyar council, the major boyar clans and generals, the state secretaries, and the leading prelates and merchants actually made policy remains a mystery, due to want of reliable documentation, but most foreign observers considered Muscovy to be a tyranny or despotism, not a legally limited European-style monarchy.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; ASSEMBLY OF LAND; BASIL I; BASIL III; BOYAR; DANIEL METROPOLITAN; DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH; FYODOR IVANOVICH; GOSTI; GRAND PRINCE; IVAN I; IVAN IV; LAW CODE OF 1649; PETER I; SUDEBNIK OF 1497; TIME OF TROUBLES; YURI DANILOVICH

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

MUSEUM, HERMITAGE

Sitting on the bank of the Neva River in St. Petersburg, the Hermitage Museum houses one of the world's preeminent collections of artwork. Among its three million treasures are works by Leonardo da Vinci, Rembrandt, Cézanne, and Picasso. The holdings range from Scythian gold to Impressionist paintings. The word *Hermitage* is often used interchangeably with *Winter Palace*, but historically they are distinct facilities. Built during the reign of Empress Elizabeth, between 1754 and 1762, the Winter Palace was the official residence of the tsars. The Palace contains the imperial throne room and grand staterooms such as the Hall of St. George.

During the late eighteenth century Empress Catherine II oversaw the construction of four additional buildings. Between 1765 and 1766 Yuri Velten began the Small Hermitage, a pavilion near Palace Square, as Catherine's intimate retreat from court life. Vallin de la Mothe expanded the Small Hermitage from 1767 until 1769 with a second pavilion connected by Hanging Gardens. Beyond the Small Hermitage to the east lies the New Hermitage (1839–1851) on Palace Square. Along the Neva riverbank is the neoclassical Large Hermitage, designed by Yuri Velten and built between 1771 and 1787 to house Catherine's paintings, library, and copies of the Vatican's Raphael Loggias. The Winter Canal runs along the east side of the Large Hermitage and a gallery spans the canal and connects the Neoclassical Theater (built 1785–1787 and designed by Giacomo Quarenghi) to the rest of the complex.

Nicholas I ordered the New and Large Hermitages to be opened to the public and a new entrance was constructed away from the Palace in



The Hermitage Museum complex includes the magnificent former Winter Palace and its art collection. © YOGI, INC./CORBIS

1852. Following the demise of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, the Bolshevik government combined the Hermitage and Winter Palace into one large complex that was designated as a public museum. The Bolsheviks nationalized the private collections of many wealthy Russians, further enhancing the collection.

During the nine-hundred-day Nazi siege of Leningrad (the city's Soviet-era name), the museum was bombed nineteen times. Many holdings were evacuated to the Urals for safety, while curators moved into the facility to protect the remaining treasures. Twelve air-raid shelters were constructed in the basement, and at one point twelve thousand people were living in the museum complex. They planted vegetables in the Hanging Gardens in order to feed themselves.

The eventual Soviet victory over Germany allowed many priceless works of art to fall into Soviet hands, because Hitler had ordered the seizure of artwork from museums and private collections in occupied lands. Some paintings were immediately placed on display in the USSR, while others were hidden away and only revealed after the fall of the Soviet Union. Restitution of these trophies of war became a contentious issue in Russian politics. While some political leaders thought restitution would be morally and legally correct as well as positive for Russian–European relations, other politicians insisted that they are legitimate reparation for the immense damage and suffering the Soviet people experienced during World War II.

See also: CATHERINE II; LENINGRAD, SIEGE OF; NATIONALISM IN THE TSARIST EMPIRE; RASTRELLI, BARTOLOMEO; WINTER PALACE

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

MUSIC

The history of music in Russia is closely connected with political and social developments and is characterized by a fruitful tension between reception of and dissociation from the West. As elsewhere, the historical development of music in Russia is densely interwoven with the general history of the country. Political, social, and cultural structures and processes in the imperial and Soviet eras wielded a strong influence on musical forms. Even though aesthetic and creative forces always developed a dynamic of their own, they remained inextricable from the power lines of the political and social system.

The beginning of Russian art music is inseparably linked to a politically induced cultural event in Kievan Rus: the Christianization of the East Slavs under Grand Duke Vladimir I in 988. With religion came sacred music from Byzantium. It was to set the framework for art music in Russia up to the seventeenth century. Condemned by the church as the work of Satan, secular music could hold its own in Old Russia only in certain areas. Whereas the general population mainly cultivated traditional forms of folk music, the tsars, dukes, and nobility were entertained by professional singers and musicians.

The forceful orientation toward Western ways of life under Peter I introduced a new era of Russian history of music following European patterns. After Peter had opened the “window to the West,” the sounds of the music of Western Europe, together with its producers, irresistibly found their way into the tsarist court and Russian aristocracy. In the eighteenth century the Italian opera held a key position in Europe. The ambitious court in St. Petersburg brought in the big names of Italian musical culture, including numerous composers and musicians. Since the time of Catherine II the repertory of the newly founded theaters included the first music theater works of Russian composers as well as Italian and French operas. In spite of their native-language librettos, the Russian works were, of course, modelled on the general European style of the Italians. As in many other European countries, the forming of an independent, original, Russian music culture took place in the nineteenth century, which was characterized by “national awakening.” Through an intensive integration of European musical forms and contents on the one hand and the adaptation of Russian and partly Oriental folk music on the other, Russian composers created an impressive, specifically Russian art music.

The rich ambivalence of dependence on and distance from Middle and Western Europe can already be found in the operas of Mikhail Glinka, who, regardless of some predecessors, is considered the founder of Russian national music. Among his followers a dispute arose concerning how far a genuine Russian composer should distance himself from Western culture. The circle of the Mighty Handful of Mily Balakirev and his followers—still consisting of highly talented amateurs—decidedly adhered to the creation of Russian national music. Other composers like the cosmopolitan virtuoso Anton Rubinstein or Peter Tchaikovsky, who received his professional training in Russia at the Petersburg conservatory founded in 1862, had fewer reservations about being inspired by the West, though Tchaikovsky, too, wrote genuine Russian music. The work of these pioneers was continued well into the early twentieth century by such composers as Alexander Glazunov, Sergei Rachmaninov, and Alexander Skryabin. The latter, however, in his later compositions made a radical turn from the nineteenth-century mode of musical expression and became a leading figure of multifaceted Russian modernism.

In 1917 a political event again marked a turning point in Russian music life: the Bolshevik October Revolution. Although in the 1920s the Soviet state made considerable room for the most varied aesthetic conceptions, by the mid-1930s the doctrine of “Socialist Realism” silenced the musical avant-garde. Optimistic works easy to understand were the overriding demand of the officials; alleged stylistic departures from the norm could entail sanctions. Nevertheless, composers like Dmitry Shostakovich, Sergei Prokofiev, and others achieved artistic greatness through a synthesis of conformity and self-determination. Although the opportunities for development remained limited until the end of the Soviet Union, Russian musical life always met a high standard, which markedly manifested itself not only in the compositions, but in the outstanding performing artists of the twentieth century (e.g., David Oistrakh, Svyatoslav Richter).

Soviet popular music also succeeded, against ideological constraints, in finding its own, highly appreciated forms of expression. While the 1920s were still dominated by traditional Russian and gypsy romances as well as Western operetta songs, in the 1930s a genuine Soviet style of light music developed. Isaak Dunayevsky created the so-called mass song, which combined cheerful, optimistic

music with politically useful texts. His style set the tone of popular music in Stalin’s time, even if the sufferings of war furthered the reemergence of more dark and somber romances. Jazz could not establish itself in Soviet musical life until the late 1950s. Russians had welcomed early trends of jazz with great enthusiasm, but the official classification of American-influenced music as capitalist and hostile hindered its development in the Soviet Union until Stalin’s death. Later, rock music faced similar problems. Only the years of perestroika allowed Russian rock to emancipate itself from the underground. Until then, the officially promoted hits, widely received by Soviet society, were a blend of mass song, folk music elements, and contemporary pop. In contrast to the unsuspected shallowness of these songs, the so-called bards (e.g., Bulat Okudzhava or Vladimir Vysotsky) did not hesitate to address human problems and difficulties of everyday life in their guitar songs. Probably these poet-singers left behind the most original legacy in Soviet popular music, whereas the other currents of musical entertainment distinguished themselves through their interesting synthesis of Western impulses and Russian characteristics, a central thread in Russian music culture of the modern age.

See also: BALALAIKA; DUNAYEVSKY, ISAAKOSIPOVICH; FOLK MUSIC; GLINKA, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH; MIGHTY HANDFUL; NATIONALISM IN ARTS; PROKOFIEV, SERGE SERGEYEVICH; RACHMANINOV, SERGE VASILIEVICH; SHOSTAKOVICH, DMITRI DIMTRIEVICH; STRAVINSKY, IGOR FYODOROVICH; TCHAIKOVSKY, PETER ILYICH

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MUSKETEERS See STRELSKY.

MYASOEDOV AFFAIR

On March 20, 1915, the Russian Army Headquarters announced the execution of Sergei A. Myasoedov, a gendarme officer, for espionage only days after his arrest and hasty conviction by military court. The event was a major scandal in the press and is significant for a number of reasons. First, it occurred in the midst of a series of Russian losses on the German section of the front, losses that marked the beginning of what would become known as the Russian Great Retreat that led Russia out of all the Polish provinces and parts of what are now Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Myasoedov, who had plenty of enemies in the army command, security services, and elsewhere, was likely set up as a convenient scapegoat for the extensive Russian losses at the front. After his execution, a wave of arrests targeted anyone who had been associated with him.

If the execution was meant to calm public opinion, it probably had the opposite effect. A series of raids, arrests, and deportations led by the unofficial head of the domestic military counterintelligence service, Mikhail Dmitriyevich Bonch Bruyevich, and especially the hysterical accusations of spying that the Army Chief of Staff Nikolai Yanushkevich leveled against Jews, Germans, and foreigners in the front zones added to what became a wave of

popular spy mania that became a constant and important feature of domestic politics for the rest of the war.

Only two months after the arrest of Myasoedov, Moscow erupted into one of the largest riots in Russian history—directed against Germans and foreigners. The scandal also undermined the position of the minister of war, Vladimir A. Sukhomlinov, who had been a close associate of Myasoedov. In fact, the entire episode may also have been part of political intrigues to try to undermine Sukhomlinov, who was forced to resign in June 1915 under a cloud of rumors of his own treasonous acts. Perhaps most importantly, the scandal lent credence to rumors of treason among members of the Russian elite. Such rumors continued to grow through the rest of the war, and came to center on the empress Alexandra, Rasputin, and various individuals with German names in the Russian court, government, and army command. These rumors did a great deal to undermine respect for the monarchy and contributed to the idea that the monarchy stood in the way of an effective war effort—in short, that it would be a patriotic act to overthrow the monarchy.

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; OCTOBER REVOLUTION

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ERIC LOHR

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NAGORNO-KARABAKH

A mountainous region at the eastern end of the Armenian plateau in the south Caucasus and originally part of the Artsakh province of historic Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh (“Mountainous Karabakh”) region kept its autonomy following the loss of Armenian statehood in the eleventh century. Its right to self-government was formally recognized from 1603 onward by the Persian shahs, giving it a special place in Armenian history.

Nagorno-Karabakh was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1806, following the first Russo-Persian war. While this meant the dissolution of the region’s autonomy, Russia was able to portray itself as the savior of Christians in the region, facilitating Russia’s full occupation of the eastern Transcaucasus by 1828.

During the tsarist era, Nagorno-Karabakh was made part of the Elisavetbol province, which included the plains of Karabakh to the east, linking the region to the economy as well as history of the Azeri population and giving it a special place in the development of modern Azerbaijani culture. Following the withdrawal of Russian troops from the southern Caucasus during World War I and the proclamation of independence by Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1918, the two republics fought over the region, which was then considered a disputed territory by the League of Nations. Great Britain, briefly in charge of the region following the defeat of Turkey, facilitated its incorporation in Azerbaijan. Following the Sovietization of the two republics, Nagorno-Karabakh was made part of Azerbaijan as the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKAO, 4,800 square kilometers), despite the wishes of its majority Armenian population.

While the NKAO enjoyed relative stability until 1988—the Soviets placed an army base in Stepanakert, the capital of the region—there were intermittent protests by Armenians against Azerbaijani policies of cultural, economic, and ethnic discrimination. Armenians continued to consider the inclusion of the region in Azerbaijan as an unjust concession to Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis considered the special status an unfair concession to Armenians.

According to the last Soviet census taken in 1989, NKAO had a population of 182,000, of which 140,000 were Armenian and 40,000 Azeris.

In 1988, following glasnost and perestroika, Soviet Armenians joined NKAO Armenians in de-



manding the unification of the region with Armenia, leading to pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijan and the expulsion of about 170,000 Azeris from Armenia and of 300,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan in 1989 and 1990. Following the declaration of independence of Azerbaijan from the USSR in 1991, NKAO declared its own independence from Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan dissolved the autonomous status of the region. The Azerbaijani decision in 1991 to use military means and blockades to force the region into submission led to a war from 1992 to 1994 that ultimately involved Armenia. Azerbaijan lost the NKAO as well as seven Azeri-populated provinces around the region. The conflict created close to 400,000 Armenian and 700,000 Azeri refugees and internally displaced persons, including those evicted from their homes in both republics.

A cease-fire mediated in 1994 has been maintained since. But negotiations, including those conducted by the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have failed to resolve the problem of the future status of the region. Russia, suspected by Azerbaijanis as the party responsible for the conflict and the lack of progress in its resolution, has been involved in the negotiations both as a major regional actor and as a member and subsequently co-chair of the Minsk Group.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN

NAGRODSKAYA, EVDOKIA APOLLONOVNA

(1866–1930), fiction writer.

Evdokia Apollonovna Nagrodsкая was a remarkably candid and avant-garde fiction writer

in turn-of-the-century Russia. She was the daughter of Avdotia Yakovlevna Panayeva (1819–1893), a journalist, prominent salon hostess, and mistress of the poet Nikolai Alexeyevich Nekrasov (1821–1877), a coworker of Evdokia's father, Apollon Golovachev, who worked for the "thick journal" *Sovremennik*. Thus raised in an intellectual environment, Nagrodsкая wrote poetry and several novels, including *The White Colonnade* (*Belaya Kolonnada*) in 1900, *The Bronze Door* (*Bronzovaya dver*) in 1911, *Evil Spirits* (*Zlye dukhi*) in 1916, and *The River of Times* (*Reka vremen*) in 1924.

Nagrodsкая is best known, however, for her novel *The Wrath of Dionysus* (*Gnev Dionisa*), which became a bestseller in 1910, although it shocked readers unaccustomed to taboo topics like illicit love, female sexuality, and homosexuality. The novel was published in ten editions and was translated into French, Italian, German, and English. Ultimately the novel became a silent movie in theaters across two continents. The heroine of the story is Tatiana Kuznetsova, a painter who cheats on her supportive but boring fiancé when she meets a dashing, brilliant Englishman named Edgar Stark during a train ride. She begins an affair, but when Stark becomes too possessive, jealous even of her art, she pulls away. Accidentally impregnated by Stark, however, she later decides to stay with him and the baby. Another key character is her homosexual friend Latchinov. The highlight of the story is a dialog between Tatiana and Latchinov, in which the latter confronts Tatiana with her own homosexuality, explaining that she (a masculine woman) and Stark (an effeminate man) are inverted members of their respective genders, and thus complement each other as "normal" men and women do. Suffering from a terminal disease, Latchinov reveals to her his own sexual (but unconsummated) love for Stark, and bids her farewell.

See also: NEKRASOV, NIKOLAI ALEXEYEVICH

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

NAKHICHEVAN

As part of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Nakhichevan Republic is located in South Asia, west of Azerbaijan proper and separated from this main territory by the narrow strip of Armenia. The landmass of Nakhichevan is 5,500 square kilometers, occupying the southern slopes of the Darlagez range and the southwestern slopes of the Zangezur Mountains. The Araz river valley extends between these two ranges. Almost 75 percent of the territory is located at an elevation of 1,000 meters. Gapydjik, located in the Zangezur range, is the highest peak in the region at 3,904 meters. The region is also known for its volcanic domes and its frequent, severe earthquakes.

The republic is rich in mineral deposits including marble, gypsum, lime, and sulfur. There are abundant mineral springs including Badamli, Sirab, Nagajir, and Kiziljir.

Nakhichevan's climate is continental, its temperature ranging from 26 degrees Celsius in summer months to -6 degrees Celsius in winter. The pre-Arazian plains region can be described as semiarid. The higher elevations of the mountainous areas are characterized as tundra, typically cold and dry. Precipitation is considerably light throughout the region, with 200 to 300 millimeters annually recorded in the plains region. Periodic flash flooding occurs due to topography and sparse vegetation. Aside from the Araz, there are about forty smaller rivers in the country fed by rain and the mountain runoff of melting snows.

According to legend, Noah's ark is said to have first touched land along the submerged peaks of the Zangezur Mountains before reaching Mount Ararat. The Republic's name is derived from this legend, as "Nakhichevan" is a corruption of *Nukhtchikhan*, the colony of Noah. Like the surrounding region, Nakhichevan sits at a strategic crossroads and has been subject to military intervention throughout much of its history. In the mid-eighteenth century, after successive battles for supremacy between Iran and Russia, Nakhichevan came under Russian control, in accordance with the treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828. In 1924 Josef Stalin designated Nakhichevan an autonomous republic, a status it maintains today within Azerbaijan.

The economy, based on agriculture, food processing, and mining, has suffered substantially since 1988 with loss of markets and imports due

to the Karabakh conflict. While trade corridors are being restored to neighboring Iran and Turkey, economic recovery is slow. Since 2000 almost three-quarters of the state budget has been provided by the central government in Baku.

See also: AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS

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GREGORY TWYMAN

NAKHIMOV, PAVEL STEPANOVICH

(1802–1855), commander of Black Sea Fleet in Crimean war.

Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov was born into a naval family in Gorodok, Smolensk province. In 1818 he completed his studies in the Naval Cadet Corps and served aboard ships in the Baltic fleet. From 1822 to 1825 Nakhimov participated in a round-the-world cruise aboard the frigate *Kreiser-36*. Nakhimov served aboard Vice-Admiral Geiden's flagship *Azov-74* at the battle of Navarino on October 21, 1827. During the subsequent 1828–1829 Russo-Turkish War, Nakhimov served in the Russian Mediterranean squadron blockading the Dardanelles, commanding a corvette. Following the end of the war Nakhimov returned to the Baltic fleet base at Kronshtadt. In 1834 Nakhimov was transferred to the Black Sea Fleet, where he was given command of a ship of the line. During the 1840s Nakhimov participated in numerous amphibious landings on the eastern Black Sea Caucasian coast, where the Russian military constructed a chain of coastal forts to interdict arms smuggling to Muslim rebels. Nakhimov was promoted to rear admiral in 1845. Seven years later Nakhimov was promoted to vice admiral and given command of a fleet division. As relations between the Russian and Ottoman empires worsened in the early 1850s, Nakhimov argued for an aggressive naval policy toward the Ottoman Empire. On November 30, 1853,

Nakhimov led a squadron into Sinope harbor on the southern Black Sea coast. Using shell-firing artillery instead of smoothbore cannons, his ships annihilated the Ottoman squadron moored there, producing outrage in Europe. Following the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, Nakhimov was appointed commander of the Black Sea Fleet and military governor of Sevastopol port in February 1855. Nakhimov supervised the offloading of artillery from the fleet's warships to be integrated in a series of land fortifications under the direction of engineer E. I. Tottleben. Nakhimov was mortally wounded by enemy fire on the Malakhov redoubt on July 10, 1855, and interred in the Vladimir church. A monument was raised to Nakhimov in 1898 in Sevastopol on the forty-fifth anniversary of the Sinope battle. The Imperial Navy honored his memory by naming ships in his honor; an *Admiral Nakhimov* cruiser was sunk by her crew after the Tsushima battle on May 27, 1905. Despite the USSR's disavowal of much of its imperial history, the Soviet government on March 3, 1944, established a first- and second-class Nakhimov military order for valor for officers; a Nakhimov medal for lower ranks was also established, and naval cadets attended Nakhimov naval academies. The post-Soviet navy also has a Kirov-class *Admiral Nakhimov* cruiser (formerly *Kalinin*, renamed in 1992).

See also: BLACK SEA FLEET; CRIMEAN WAR; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; SINOPE, BATTLE OF

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JOHN C. K. DALY

NAPOLEON I

The Russian people first discovered Napoleon as the young and bright general who stood out during the military campaigns of Italy in 1796–1797 and of Egypt in 1798–1799. By that time, he was deeply admired in Russia for his military genius by both civilians and soldiers such as Alexander Suvorov, who saw in him a "new Hannibal." Later on, Napoleon's victories over European armies reinforced the myth of his military invincibility, until the retreat of Berezina in October–November 1812.

Politically, the coup d'état by which Napoleon came to power in October 1799 (Eighteenth Brumaire) at first reassured the tsar Paul and the conservative and liberal elites, who saw in this new authoritarian regime the end of disorders and excesses brought by the French Revolution. But this feeling did not last: Napoleon's proclamation of his First Consulate for life on August 4, 1802, followed by the establishment of the Empire on May 18, 1804, triggered strong negative reactions. For liberals, including the young tsar Alexander I, who acceded to the throne in March 1801, Napoleon became a tyrant who betrayed the Enlightenment ideas through personal interest. For the conservatives, the self-crowned man lacked legitimacy, and his huge political ambitions were dangerous for the European balance.

Alexander first chose to ignore the Napoleonic threat. In 1801 the young tsar decided to maintain Russia outside the European conflict and adopted a pacifist diplomacy: On October 8, 1801, a peace treaty was officially signed with France. But this position became increasingly difficult to maintain when France started to pose a serious threat to Russian interests in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans. So in 1805, Alexander decided to join Austria and Britain in the Third Coalition. The tsar wanted to play a major role in the international theater, lead the fight against Napoleon, and, after the victory, promote a new European order, liberated from the tyrant. However, the military operations were a disaster for Russia, and on December 2, 1805, the battle of Austerlitz was a personal humiliation for Alexander, who, as commander of the Russian forces, ignored General Mikhail Kutuzov's advice not to enter battle before the arrival of more troops.

After the defeat of Friedland on June 14, 1806, judging that his forces were unable to continue fighting, the tsar decided to pursue peace with Napoleon. Napoleon was in favor of an agreement with Russia, as his focus had shifted to political control of Central Europe and the war against Britain. On July 7–9, 1807, several treaties were signed at Tilsit between the two emperors. The terms were difficult for Prussia, which was partitioned. The Polish provinces forming the Duchy of Warsaw under Saxony and the provinces west of the Elbe were combined to make the Kingdom of Westphalia, which had to pay an indemnity. Russia suffered no territorial losses but had to recognize Napoleon's dominant position in Europe and take part in the continental blockade of British trade. In compensation Russia obtained peace, freedom of action in East-



Napoleon I and Alexander I at Tilsit studying a map of Europe. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

ern Europe, and the opportunity to gain Finland from Sweden militarily (1808–1809), Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire (with the Bucharest treaty in 1812), and Georgia from Persia (by the Gulistan treaty in 1813).

Despite these large successes, Russia remained hostile toward Napoleon. In 1805 the Orthodox Church declared Napoleon the Antichrist. And for most of the Russian elite who had been raised with French language and culture, Napoleon was the archetypal expression of Barbary, not a Frenchman but a “damned Corsican.”

Despite its renewal on September 27, 1808, at Erfurt, the Russian-French alliance was indeed fragile. The two countries had opposite views on the Polish question and were rivals in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. The Continental blockade became more and more expensive for that Russian economy and was denounced by Alexander in December 1810.

These tensions led Napoleon to initiate a war that he expected to be short. He invaded the Russ-

ian territory on June 24, 1812, with an army of more than 400,000 men. On June 28, the French were already in Vilna, and on August 18 they entered Smolensk, forcing the Russians to retreat.

For the Russian people, the invasion was a national trauma, not only because of the brutality of the war—in one day, at the battle of Borodino, on September 7, 1812, the Russians lost 50,000 men and the French 40,000—but also because of its blasphemous dimension: Napoleon did not hesitate to use churches as stables. On September 14, when Napoleon entered the sacred capital, Moscow the Mother, he found the city empty and devastated by fires, which went on for five days. The burning of Moscow was a terrible shock, and it generated feelings of resentment from the Russian people toward Alexander. But soon it united all the Russians, whatever their social class, in a patriotic and mystic struggle against the invader. Napoleon’s promise to liberate the Russian peasants from serfdom had no effect on the people, who, along with the tsar and his elite, sensed the urgency of a physical, moral, and spiritual danger.

For Napoleon, the situation was impossible: On the one hand the lack of supplies prevented him from going any farther; on the other hand, he was unable to force Alexander to negotiate. On October 16, the retreat of the Grand Army began in difficult conditions. Subject to cold, hunger, and typhus, attacked by the partisan movement and by peasants on their way back, less than 10 percent of the Grand Army was able to leave the Russian territory in December 1812.

The French defeat was a fatal blow to the Napoleonic adventure and made Alexander the conqueror of Napoleon and the "savior of Europe." In February 1815, Napoleon tried to regain his lost power, but the adventure did not last, and the Hundred Days did not harm Alexander's prestige. The tsar personally took part in the Congress of Vienna and engaged in the construction of a new political and geopolitical order in Europe. During the congress, Alexander's Russia took great advantage of the victory over Napoleon from both diplomatic and territorial points of view. But beyond this geopolitical concrete outcome, the collective and messianic triumph over the invader constituted in Russia a major step toward the birth of a modern national identity.

See also: ALEXANDER I; AUSTERLITZ, BATTLE OF; BORODINO, BATTLE OF; KUTUZOV, MIKHAIL ILIARONOVICH; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH; FRENCH WAR OF 1812; TILSIT, TREATY OF; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF; WAR OF THE THIRD COALITION

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MARIE-PIERRE REY

NARIMANOV, NARIMAN

(1870–1925), renowned educator, author, medical doctor, long-time Bolshevik, and head of the first

soviet government of Azerbaijan from 1920 to 1922.

In Soviet interpretations, Narimanov loomed large as the key native Bolshevik who supported sovietization of his homeland, Azerbaijan. He chaired the first Soviet of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), which was established with the Red Army's overthrow of the independent government on April 28, 1920. Narimanov was not in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku at this time, and it is not clear that he supported this means of installing soviet power. Documents released in the late 1980s indicate that Narimanov's vision of soviet rule in Azerbaijan was closer to an anticolonial program leading to native rule than to a means for the dominance of an industrial proletariat that, in Azerbaijan, was largely Russian. During the first years of soviet power, Narimanov found himself increasingly at odds with the nonnative leaders of the Transcaucasian party, especially Stalin's protégé, Sergo Ordzhonikidze. Narimanov's opposition to key policies, among them the merging of the three republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia into a Transcaucasian Federation (Zakfederaltsiia, or ZSFSR), led to his removal in 1922 from Baku. His prominence was such that his removal was euphemized as a "promotion" to a post in Moscow.

Narimanov's prerevolutionary record as an educator and writer led him to take a hand in cultural policies in the early soviet period. He supported the Latinization policy for the Azerbaijani Turkish alphabet, which was an indigenous proposal, but which Moscow favored. He backed school reform projects that came from Russia's Commissariat of Enlightenment. His speeches to teachers' conferences, however, revealed that his ultimate goal was wide popular participation in government for Azerbaijani "toilers." His use of that term rather than "proletariat," coupled with his support for rural schools, suggest that he hoped for Azerbaijani villagers to have a genuine partnership in governing with urban workers, both Azerbaijani and other.

Narimanov died in Moscow on March 19, 1925, allegedly of a weak heart. His body was cremated, which has no precedent in Azerbaijani (Muslim) tradition. Some scholars believe he may have been poisoned. His ashes were interred in the Kremlin wall.

See also: AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS; SOVNARKOM; TRANSCAUCASIAN FEDERATIONS

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AUDREY ALTSTADT

NARKOMINDEL See PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF NATIONALITIES.

NARODNICHESTVO See POPULISM.

NARVA, BATTLES OF

The first battle of Narva on November 30, 1700, was Peter the Great's first major defeat in the Great Northern War. Immediately after the Russian declaration of war in August 1700, Peter marched his army into Swedish territory to try to capture the port town of Narva in northeastern Estonia, and on September 16 laid siege to the city with some 34,000 men. Meanwhile Charles XII, the King of Sweden, defeated Peter's ally Denmark and brought his army to Estonia to relieve the siege. By November 27 the Russians heard that the Swedes were approaching, and the next day Peter left the army to join the approaching Russian reinforcements. The Russian army deployed in a curved line running from south to northwest of Narva under the command of the recently arrived Belgian officer Duke Eugene de Croy. The traditional Russian gentry cavalry under the boyar Boris Sheremetev held the left (southern) flank near the Narova river. Generals Adam Weyde (a Dutchman) and prince Ivan Trubetskoy held the center, and general Avtomon Golovin the right with the guards regiments, also by the river. After approaching the Russian line in a blinding snowstorm, Charles attacked the Russian center about one o'clock in the afternoon, his right under general Welling smashing Weyde's troops and the Swedish left under General Carl Gustaf Rehnsköld overrunning Trubetskoy. Only some of Golovin's and Sheremetev's men were able to escape, with Russian losses at least eight thousand killed. Peter's army, only recently created along European lines, was smashed. The battle established the eighteen-year-old king of Sweden's military reputation.

Peter returned to Novgorod with the remains of his army, which he rebuilt in the ensuing years

while Charles was preoccupied in Poland. In July 1704 the Russian army returned to besiege Narva, held by a small Swedish garrison under general Horn. On August 20, 1704, Narva fell to Peter's generals, Sheremetev, now field marshal, and the Austro-Scottish general Baron Georg Ogilvy. This victory strengthened Russia's hold on the Baltic provinces and further weakened Sweden in its struggle with Peter.

See also: GREAT NORTHERN WAR; PETER I; SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH

PAUL A. BUSHKOVITCH

NARYSHKINA, NATALIA KIRILLOVNA

(1652–1694), second wife of Tsar Alexei (r. 1645–1676); mother of Peter I.

Natalia was the daughter of a minor nobleman who served for a time in Smolensk, but was related by marriage to the up-and-coming official Artamon Matveyev, later head of the Foreign Office, who may have brought her to the attention of the recently bereaved Tsar Alexei. In 1671 she became the tsar's second wife, giving birth to Peter (1672–1725), Natalia (1673–1716), and Fyodora (1674–1678.) Widowed in 1676, during the early years of the reign of her stepson Theodore Alexeyevich (1676–1682), Natalia and her children were marginalized; however, when Theodore died in 1682, nine-year-old Peter was elected tsar with the patriarch's support, and Natalia prepared to act as regent. She was thwarted by Tsarevna Sofia Alexeyevna and her party, who secured the election of Tsarevich Ivan Alexeyevich as Peter's co-tsar. The fact that Natalia feared for her son's life during the riots of 1682 and felt vulnerable during Sofia's regency may have made her over-protective. After Sofia was ousted in 1689 and the Naryshkins and their clients assumed leading posts, there was a clash of wills between mother and son over such issues as Peter's sailing expeditions and his failure to attend official receptions. The only known portraits show Natalia in nun-like widow's garb with head modestly covered. She exerted the traditional influence of a tsaritsa, raising the fortunes of her clan and their clients, operating her own patronage networks, and undertaking public activities such as alms-giving, visiting shrines, and attending appropriate court ceremonies, but the business of government remained in male hands. Natalia

died in January 1694 and was laid to rest in the Ascension Convent in the Kremlin. She remains a shadowy figure.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; PETER I

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LINDSEY HUGHES

NATIONAL LIBRARY OF RUSSIA

The oldest state public library in Russia, the National Library of Russia is the second largest library in the Russian Federation, after the Russian State Library, with holdings of more than thirty-three million volumes, and a national center of librarianship, bibliography, and book studies.

Founded in St. Petersburg in 1795 by Empress Catherine II as the Imperial Public Library, the origins of the National Library of Russia lie in Catherine's devotion to the philosophy of the Enlightenment in the early period of her reign. She envisioned a library that would serve as a repository for all books produced in the Russian empire, books published in Russian outside the empire, and books about Russia published in foreign languages, and that would be open to the Russian public for the purpose of general social enlightenment. The library officially opened to the public on January 2, 1814. The nucleus of the original collection was the collection, brought to St. Petersburg from Warsaw in 1795, of Counts Józef Andrzej and Andrzej Stanislaw Zaluski, eminent Polish aristocrats and bibliophiles. In 1810 Tsar Alexander I signed a special statute designating the library as a legal depository entitled to receive two mandatory copies of imprints produced in the Russian empire. Throughout its history, the library has had an enormous influence on the political, cultural, and scientific life of Russia.

From 1845 to 1861 the library administered the Rumyantsev Museum that was later moved to Moscow and eventually became the Russian State Library. In March 1917 the Imperial Public Library was renamed the Russian Public Library. With the consolidation of Soviet power its status was rede-

fined, and in 1925 its name changed to State Public Library in Leningrad, as it was designated the national library of the RSFSR, while the V. I. Lenin State Library of the USSR (later the Russian State Library) assumed the function of all-union state library. In 1932 it was renamed Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library, and a Soviet title of honor was added to its name in 1939. The library continued to function during the siege of Leningrad from 1941 to 1944, despite the evacuation of valuable materials. The Zaluski collection was returned to Poland between 1921 and 1927 and destroyed during World War II. In 1992, after the dissolution of the USSR, the facility acquired the name Russian National Library and became one of two national libraries in the Russian Federation.

The library possesses the world's most complete collection of Russian books and periodicals. Among the highlights of the collections are Slavonic incunabula and other early printed works produced within and outside of Russia, including two-thirds of all known sixteenth-century Cyrillic imprints, and all the known publications of Frantsysk Skaryna; the largest collection of books from the Petrine era printed in civil script; and the *Free Russian Press* collection of approximately 15,000 illegal publications dating from 1853 to 1917. The Manuscript Division holds the world's richest collection of Old Russian and Slavonic manuscripts from the eleventh to the seventeenth century. The number of its manuscripts exceeds 400,000, in more than fifty languages. Among the library's other treasures are some 250,000 foreign imprints about Russia produced before 1917, approximately 6,000 incunabula reflecting the growth of printing in western Europe in the fifteenth century, and the personal library of Voltaire, consisting of some 7,000 volumes. It possesses archives of more than 1,300 public figures, writers, scholars, artists, composers, architects, and others, including Peter I, Catherine II, Nicholas II, Mikhail Kutuzov, Alexander Suvorov, Gavriil Derzhavin, Ivan Krylov, Vasily Zhukovsky, Alexander Griboyedov, Nikolai Gogol, Mikhail Lermontov, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Vissarion Belinsky, Alexander Herzen, Anna Akhmatova, Alexander Blok, Zinaida Gippius, Dmitry Merezhkovsky, Joseph Brodsky, Ivan Kramskoy, Boris Kustodiev, Ilya Repin, Vasily Stasov, Mikhail Glinka, Modest Mussorgsky, Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, Peter Tchaikovsky, Fyodor Chaliapin, and Michel Fokine.

The main building, completed in 1801 on the corner of Nevsky Prospect and Sadovaya Street, was designed in the classical style by Yegor Sokolov.

Additions to the building were made over the years, and a large facility was completed in 1998 on Moskovsky Prospect. By virtue of its long-standing role as custodian of Russia's cultural heritage, the library holds a unique place in Russian history and is recognized as one of the foremost cultural institutions of the Russian Federation.

See also: ARCHIVES; CATHERINE II; EDUCATION; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; RUSSIAN STATE LIBRARY

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JANICE T. PILCH

NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS

After the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, artists throughout Europe increasingly turned their attention to defining national identities. Although art and culture had performed this task prior to Napoleon, the events of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries provided a focus for a renewed attention to nationalism in the arts. Russia proved no exception to this cultural trend, and particularly after 1812, Russian cultural figures began to articulate ideas about Russianness. These definitions were varied in nature, but all sought to depict what made Russia unique. During the century after Napoleon's defeat, Russian culture came into its own, as literature, art, music, architecture, decorative arts, and popular culture experienced profound changes. The attempt to articulate Russian nationalism provided a dominant theme of these diverse products, and the figures who addressed it include a who's who of Russian artistic giants: Pushkin, Repin, and Mussorgsky are just a few of the names associated with Russian nationalism in the arts.

SOURCES OF NATIONALISM

Like the other European artists who responded to the Napoleonic era with an outburst of nationalism, Russians defined this identity in terms of Rus-

sian uniqueness. Artists looked to Russia's past and its present situation to find inspiration. In particular, several events shaped the way in which Russian nationalism developed in the arts. Peter the Great's "cultural revolution" loomed large in the minds of nineteenth-century Russian cultural figures. At issue was whether or not Peter's attempts to Westernize Russia placed it on the right historical development or destroyed a more organic culture. After the war against Napoleon, this debate heated up, for many Russians came to think that the West, and particularly France, no longer served as a model worth imitating. Russian elites began to look to the period before Peter the Great as a source of inspiration. Old Muscovy represented a more authentic Russia, one idealized by some as a time when the country remained unspoiled by Western influences. This debate crystallized after Peter Chaadayev published his *First Philosophical Letter* in 1836, a momentous year for Russian culture and for the expression of nationalism within it. In the letter, Chaadayev argued that Russia's position between East and West created a state that had contributed nothing to the world. Russia, in Chaadayev's view, had no history. The letter in turn gave birth to the Westernizer-Slavophile debate that dominated Russian philosophy for several decades, and it also added fuel to the search for Russian nationalism expressed in the arts.

A second important theme that helped to give shape to Russian artistic nationalism was the "peasant question." In part this query stemmed from the debate over Petrine reforms, for Russian intellectuals after 1812 began to turn their attention to the peasantry as the repository of authentic Russian culture. Other events and debates that provided inspiration for Russian artists included the role of religion in Russian life; the wars against Turkey throughout the nineteenth century; Russian expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia; the Crimean War and Great Reforms; and debate over the role of classical versus traditional forms of culture. In short, Russian nationalism in the arts developed at the same time as that of other European countries, but took the forms it did because of Russian events, traditions, and intellectual debates.

FORMS AND FIGURES OF NATIONALISM: LITERATURE, ART, AND MUSIC

From art to popular culture, Russia's nineteenth-century culture gave expression to ideas of Russianness. Although eighteenth-century writers and

intellectuals developed ideas about Russian national consciousness, it took events such as Napoleon's 1812 invasion to fuel a nationwide, century-long explosion of art in the search of nationalism. Literature in many respects took the lead in this quest.

The work of Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837) helped to establish Russian as a literary language and the idea that the writer should play a social role. Pushkin's importance in the expression of Russian national identity rested as much with the myth associated with him as with his verses and writings themselves. Russia's cultural self-definition in many respects centered on the figure of Pushkin, and the cult surrounding him lasted through the Soviet period and beyond. Of his numerous writings, his epic poem "The Bronze Horseman" (1833) dealt the most directly with Russian identity, and it captured many of the ambiguities of Peter's legacies. By the time of his 1837 death, Pushkin had helped to inspire other writers to search for definitions of Russian nationhood.

Important literary figures that featured prominently in the evolving articulation of Russianness include some of the giants of nineteenth-century world literature. Mikhail Lermontov (1814–1841) wrote about Russian expansion in the Caucasus in his novel *A Hero of Our Time* (1840), while his earlier poetry such as "Borodino" (1837) captured the importance of the 1812 battle. Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852) became famous for stories of his native Ukraine, but his tales of St. Petersburg and its bureaucracies helped to establish the "Petersburg myth" central to debates about Peter the Great's legacy. His play *The Inspector General* was hailed as a masterpiece when it appeared in 1836, when even Nicholas I praised it. Ivan Turgenev's (1818–1883) *A Hunter's Sketches* (1847) caused a sensation when it first appeared for its frank portrayal of Russian serfs. These writings in turn inspired the "age of the novel," which was associated above all with Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) and Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881). Tolstoy's *War and Peace* (1869) became the defining literary expression of the war against Napoleon, while his *Anna Karenina* (1877) dissected the important society issues of its time. Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment* (1866) furthered the "Petersburg myth," while his works such as *The Possessed* (1871–1872) and *The Brothers Karamazov* (1880) described the revolutionary movements in Russia and their impact. These writings motivated the next great wave of literature that explored Russian society after the Great Reforms, particularly in the works of Anton Chekhov

(1860–1904), whose plays capture the rural gentry's problems coping in the postemancipation era; and Andrei Bely's symbolist masterpiece, *Petersburg* (1913), which again redefined the Petrine capital as an apocalyptic site struggling with modernization.

Art proved no less important to the articulation of nationalism in nineteenth-century Russia. The driving force behind all artistic production in Russia was the Imperial Academy in St. Petersburg. The Academy stressed classical themes, and as a result, very few paintings with exclusively Russian subjects appeared before the 1850s. The major exception to this trend was Alexei Venetsianov (1780–1847), who first came to prominence through his nationalist caricatures published during the war of 1812. Although not trained in the Academy, Venetsianov was influenced by it in his early artistic life. After the war, however, he painted idealized scenes of Russian rural life, including such works as *The Threshing Floor* (1820). Venetsianov's work and the school he founded, along with the writings of Pushkin, Gogol, and others, helped to inspire future artists who depicted Russia's landscape as a source of its identity. Alexei Savrasov (1830–1897), Ivan Shishkin (1832–1898), and Isaak Levitan (1860–1890) all painted scenes from Russia over the course of the century, and their works defined the landscape on its own terms.

Outside of landscape art, the dictates of the Academy ruled over Russian artistic life. Although classical imagery dominated, works such as Karl Briullov's *The Last Days of Pompei*, which was exhibited in 1836 and much discussed as a symbol of Russian decline, were hailed as harbingers of a new national art. In 1863, however, a group of Academy students refused to follow the rigid demands of the school and broke away from it, revolutionizing Russian art and its articulation of nationalism in the process. The group called themselves the *peredvizhniki*, or "the wanderers," and they dedicated themselves to painting scenes from Russian contemporary and historical life. Ilya Repin (1844–1930), the most famous, was a former serf whose depictions of peasant life such as *Barge Haulers on the Volga* (1870) redefined the "peasant question" in the wake of the 1861 emancipation. Other artists, such as Vasily Surikov (1848–1916), painted scenes from Muscovy and the Petrine era. The work of the *peredvizhniki* found support from powerful patrons such as Pavel Tretyakov, whose private gallery became the basis for the museum of Russian art in Moscow that bears his name.

Music was the third part of the cultural trioka that defined Russian national identity during the nineteenth century. Musical life revitalized itself after 1812 and took off during the 1860s. Romantic and patriotic tunes developed during the first half of the century and found their greatest expression in the works of Mikhail Glinka (1804–1857). Glinka's opera *A Life for the Tsar* debuted in 1836 and told the story of the peasant Ivan Susanin, who sacrificed his life during the Times of Troubles to save the young Mikhail Romanov. The opera was hailed as the beginnings of a national school in Russian music.

Glinka's works paved the way for the foundation of the Russian Musical Society in 1859. The society, founded by the brothers Nikolai and Anton Rubinstein, in turn established conservatories in St. Petersburg and Moscow. The conservatories stressed European musical techniques and training, and their most famous student was Petr Tchaikovsky (1840–1893). Almost immediately after the founding of the conservatories, a group of composers known as the Mighty Handful, or just "the five," rebelled against the stress on European music. Their musical scores instead included folk songs and Russian religious music. The most famous and consistent practitioner of this approach was Modest Mussorgsky (1839–1881), whose best-known works are the historical operas *Boris Godunov* (1869) and *Khovanshchina* (1886), which told the stories of the tragic Muscovite tsar and events early in the reign of Peter the Great, respectively. Mussorgsky used the work of Pushkin as the libretto for the former and claimed that the paintings of Repin inspired the latter. Tchaikovsky, although derided as not Russian enough by the Mighty Handful, also composed works that in turn became associated with the musical expression of Russianness. His ballets *Swan Lake* (1875–1876), *Sleeping Beauty* (1888–1889), and *The Nutcracker* (1891–1892) remain among the most popular and most performed in Russia and abroad, while his "1812 Overture" (1880) is synonymous with patriotic music throughout the world.

Although literature, art, and music served as the most important media through which Russian artists articulated their views on national identity, other cultural forms did the same. By the early twentieth century, the Russian ballet of Sergei Diaghilev, featuring music by Igor Stravinsky and sets designed by artists of the Russian avant garde, became an important tool for expressing ideas of Russianness, particularly abroad. Throughout the century, churches, monuments, and other architectural sites literally

built upon ideas of Russian history and culture, from the Alexandrine column dedicated to 1812 in St. Petersburg to the millennium memorial in Novgorod that commemorated the founding of the Russian state. Even decorative arts, including jewelry and porcelain, helped to pioneer the "Russian Style" (*russky stil*) by the late 1800s.

Popular culture also dealt with themes of Russian nationalism and Russia's past. *Lubki*, prints and chapbooks that originated during the seventeenth century, circulated throughout Russia and served as important sources for the expression of national identity and for the dissemination of ideas promoted in other artistic forms. Russian folk art and music was rediscovered by numerous artists over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and helped to inspire works from Mussorgsky's melodies to Wassily Kandinsky's canvases. Moreover, the works of all the artists mentioned above became more widely known through the growth of newspapers, journals, museums, and cultural life throughout Russia.

Russian nationalism expressed in the arts contained a multitude of ideas. For some, "Russia" represented a European state that had developed its own sense of identity since Peter the Great. For others, "Russia" had produced a unique culture that blended East with West. Although no consensus on Russian national identity existed, Russian cultural figures from Pushkin to Tolstoy to Mussorgsky all strove to define it in their own way and all left important manifestations of Russianness in their works.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; BALLET; CHAADAYEV, PETER YAKOVLEVICH; MIGHTY HANDFUL; MUSIC; SLAVOPHILES; WESTERNIZERS

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STEPHEN M. NORRIS

NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

The triumph of the October Revolution and collapse of the Russian empire increased national movements among the different nationalities that lived in the country. The Bolshevik government based its nationalities policy on the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology. According to these principles, all nations should disappear with time, and nationalism was considered a bourgeois ideology. However, the Bolshevik leaders saw that the revolutionary potential inherent in nationalism could advance the revolution, and thus supported the ideas of self-determination of the nations.

The Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia, proclaimed one month after the October Revolution on November 21, 1917, recognized four major principles:

1. equality and sovereignty of the peoples of the Russian empire;
2. the right of nations to self-determination;
3. abolition of all privileges based on nationality or religion;
4. freedom and cultural development for national minorities (i.e., dispersed nationalities and those living outside their historic territories).

But, after the official declaration of the principles, the Soviet government resisted the realization of these ideals. Even in the cases of Finland and Poland, whose right to independence was acknowledged by Vladimir Lenin before the revolution, acceptance of their independence was given by the Bolsheviks only reluctantly, after several attempts to reverse independence failed. During the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, Bolshevik leaders tried to install a pro-Soviet Polish government, however, they lost the war and thus did not achieve their goal. Of all the different nations which coexisted uneasily in the Russian empire, only Poland, Finland and Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) received independence after the October Revolution. However, the Baltic countries remained independent only until 1940, when the Soviet Army occupied their territory.

After the October Revolution, Soviet leaders had hoped for the sparking of a socialist revolution throughout the world. Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky proposed the doctrine of “Permanent Revolution” that would spread from country to country. However, this was not to be the reality. By the beginning of the 1920s it became obvious even to the Soviet leaders that autonomous nations would remain.

The final goal of the Soviet national policy was the integration of all national groups into a universal (communist) empire. However, their short and medium-term strategies were completely different, so far as they encouraged the emergence of sub-imperial nationalities, in hopes that such maturation was a necessary historical stage which had to be traversed before proletarian internationalism could become fully effective.

INTERNATIONAL RESISTANCE TO THE SOVIET REGIME

Different nations of the former Russian empire believed that the collapse of the monarchy gave them a chance for independence. The establishment of Soviet power in the national republics was strongly resisted. The Russian empire had the reputation as

the “prison of nations,” thus, nationalities that were newly liberated from the one yoke after the February 1917 revolution did not rush into another bondage. But the resistance of the various nations was not strong enough to defend their independence. When the Ukraine National Republic declared independence in 1918, Soviet Russia began its aggression against the newly minted country. The resulting civil war in Ukraine continued for more than three years and ended with the annexation of Ukraine by Russia.

As the Soviet regime was established in Central Asia, native military units called *Basmachi* reclaimed those territories from the communists. During the fall of 1921 most of eastern Bukhara was under control of the Basmachi rebels. The Basmachi movement was divided, and its lack of unified leadership contributed to its defeat. But the resistance of the Central Asian nations against the Soviet regime continued until the middle of the 1920s.

FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union was formally established on December 30, 1922. The largest nations of the Soviet Union were allowed their own national republics while the smaller nations had either autonomy or national districts in the territory of national republics and were considered national minorities.

The Soviet Constitution of 1924 established the various levels of national-territorial autonomy and a two-chamber Supreme Soviet (Parliament). The Soviet of the Union was elected from the equally populated electoral districts. The Soviet of Nationalities was formed of delegates elected from the national republics and regions, with each national-territorial unit having equal status and electing the same number of delegates.

THE POLICY OF KORENIZATSIA

From the 1920s to the first half of the 1930s the main thrust of the national policy in the Soviet Union was of *korenizatsia* (indigenization, from the term *korennoi narod*, meaning “indigenous people”). This policy focused on the promotion of each nation’s leadership cadre and support for development of national languages and cultures. The high authorities believed that the policy of *korenizatsia* would encourage non-Russian nationalities to support the Soviet regime. The plan had some limited success. The Soviet central government received support from the national communists and part of

the non-Russian population. After their poor treatment in the Russian empire, national minorities favored the internationalism and national equality in the Soviet Union. The policy of *korenizatsia* had long-lasting effects and promoted national cultures and national consciousness among the different nations. Thus in the national republics the national languages were made compulsory in schools and offices, national theaters were opened, and books and newspapers were printed in local languages. However, many nations were more or less assimilated into Russian culture and resisted the policy of *korenizatsia*. Many parents resisted sending their children to the national schools and in the national republics there was considerable resistance to the official use of the national languages. *Korenizatsia* was especially difficult for the Russian population of the national republics considering that they were used to being the politically dominant population in the Russian empire. Furthermore, Russian nationalists could not tolerate their new status as equals of the other nationalities of the Soviet Union.

THE RISE OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

From the second half of the 1930s the national policy of the Soviet Union lost its internationalist coloring. The Soviet leaders enhanced the role of the Russian nation and diminished the relative importance of all others. However, during the Soviet era, all nations became of the victims of sovietization and even Russians were not exempt from this policy. Peasant communities were destroyed, religious institutions devastated, and even the best of the national literatures, music, and art were forbidden for their “anti-socialist contents.”

Many Soviet political campaigns affected specific nationalities more than others. For example, the collectivization and mass deportations of rich peasants to Siberia devastated the Ukraine. There the local population had more severely resisted collectivization, and Soviet authorities forcibly took all crops from the peasants. The result of this policy was horrible starvation in Ukraine in 1932–1933 that took the lives of six to seven million people. Another example was the forced settlement of the nomadic population, which decimated the Kazakhs. Also, purges of the national cadres greatly affected the Jews. By the end of the 1930s almost all Jews were dismissed from leading positions in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in the government.

During and after World War II, Soviet authorities encouraged the rise of Russian nationalism. In a victory speech, Josef Stalin talked about the special qualities of the Russian people that achieved victory in the war. The new Soviet national anthem emphasized the role of the Great Russia in the creation of the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the 1940s all leaders of the national republics and regions were merely puppets of Moscow and showed complete obedience to the general national policy of the Soviet government.

At the same time there was an increase in chauvinism in the Soviet Union. In the official Soviet ideology there appeared the term “unreliable” nationalities. Accused nationalities were the subject of deportation and collective punishment, based on allegations of collaboration with the Nazis. As the result of this policy, the Volga Germans, Chechens, Crimean Tartars and dozens of smaller nationalities were deported from their homelands to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Under Stalin, fifty-six nationalities, involving about 3.5 million people, were deported to Siberia and Central Asia.

After World War II the Jewish intelligentsia was persecuted during the political campaign of struggle against “cosmopolitanism.” Almost all those who were accused of cosmopolitanism and pro-Western orientation were Jewish. This accusation was followed by loss of employment and by imprisonment. In 1952 the elite of the Jewish intelligentsia, including prominent scientists and Yiddish writers and poets, were secretly tried, convicted, and executed. The anti-Jewish campaign reached its height in the Soviet Union in 1952 with the investigation of the “Jewish doctors’ plot.” Jewish doctors were accused of intentionally providing incorrect treatments and poisoning the leaders of the Communist Party. These political campaigns provoked mass hysteria and the rise of anti-Semitism among the local population. The growing anti-Semitism was supposed to be a prelude to the planned deportation all Soviet Jews to Birobidzhan in the Far East. Only the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, saved the Jewish population from deportation.

NATIONALITIES POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION: POST-STALIN PERIOD, 1953–1991

First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev rehabilitated the repressed nationalities and allowed most of them to return to their original homes. The main exceptions were the Crimean

Tartars and Volga Germans, because their lands had been taken over by Russians and Ukrainians. However, the national policy of Khrushchev was not consistent. In 1954 he presented the Crimea to Ukraine as “a gift” in spite of the fact that the majority of the population in Crimea was Russian.

During Leonid Brezhnev’s leadership the slogan Friendship of Nations became the rule and all national conflicts were explained as hooliganism. Further, all publications about national conflicts were forbidden in the Soviet Union. However, the friendship of nations existed more on paper than in reality. After some liberalization and decreasing repression during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years, the national intelligentsia attempted to discuss national problems and explore their histories and cultures. However, the Soviet leaders continued to consider nationalism as a bourgeois phenomena and many representatives of the national intelligentsia, who called for national independence, were arrested and exiled in Siberia. Soviet leaders had a double standard toward Russian nationalism versus the nationalism of the other nations of the Soviet Union. Thus the expression of Russian superiority over other nations was permitted. Movies, paintings, and novels were created about the heroic Russian past. The official Soviet ideology called the Russian nation the “older brother” of all nationalities of the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile expressions of national feelings by the non-Russian nations were suppressed. Even demonstrations of respect for some distinguished national figures from the past were forbidden. Thus Soviet authorities forbade gatherings near the monument of the distinguished nineteenth-century Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, nor could flowers be put on his monument on anniversary of his birth. Many members of the Ukrainian national intelligentsia spent years in prison and in exile during Brezhnev’s time in power. Ukraine was the second largest republic of the Soviet Union in population after the Russian Federation, and a significant part of the Ukrainian population wanted independence. During World War II Ukrainian nationalists organized military units that fought against both the Nazis and the Soviet Army. Thus Ukrainian nationalism was considered by the Soviet rulers as one of the most serious threats to national unity and was severely suppressed.

The population of the Baltic republics, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, often expressed their anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiments during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev times. Soviet authority

used a “stick and carrot” policy toward these countries. The active nationalists from these countries were imprisoned and sent to exile. At the same time the Soviet government made larger investments in the economic development of the Baltic countries compared with those of the other national republics. The authorities attempted to maintain higher standards of living in these countries and thus decrease the dissatisfaction of the population. However, the people of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia looked at Russians as occupiers and were usually hostile toward the Soviet regime. The Baltic countries were the first to declare their independence during the time of perestroika (1985–1991).

The nationalist-oriented part of the Jewish population participated in the Zionist movement and fought for the right of emigration to Israel. A small percentage of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union emigrated to Israel, the United States, and other countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. However, this emigration was severely restricted by Soviet authorities, who treated the emigrants as traitors to the Motherland.

In the last years of the Soviet Union national conflicts increased in the Caucasus republics. Bloody anti-Armenian pogroms occurred in the Nagorno Karabakh region and in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. In Georgia violent conflict occurred between the Georgian and Abkhazian population.

The Soviet nations never harmoniously coexisted. Brezhnev’s slogan of Friendship of Nations was an empty propaganda claim. The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was cemented by the military power of the communist government, and by fear of repression and persecution of the most active national elements in the Soviet regime. As soon as liberalization appeared with Gorbachev’s perestroika policy, the Soviet republics one by one declared their independence. Still the central Soviet government strongly resisted decentralization of the country during the late 1980s. By the order of Soviet leaders, troops were used against civilians in Latvia and Lithuania. But the end of the Soviet empire was fast approaching. The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 and many nations of the former union began a new chapter in their history as independent countries.

See also: EMPIRE, USSR AS; LANGUAGE LAWS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATION AND NATIONALITIES; RUSSIFICATION

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VICTORIA KHITERER

NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE

The Russian Empire penetrated Europe as Europe’s age of nationalism began. The retreat of Napoleon Bonaparte after his failed invasion brought Russia into the heart of Europe. The Congress of Vienna (1815), which reestablished a European order after Napoleon’s defeat, brought Russia’s border’s farther west than ever before. The ancient Polish capital, Warsaw, was added to the Polish lands taken by Russia in the partitions of the late eighteenth century. The diplomatic settlement established Russia as a great European power, if not as a great European nation. Although Tsar Alexander I was then something of a liberal autocrat, national legitimation would never have entered his mind. The mod-

ern idea of the nation as a people inhabiting a territory and deserving of a state ruling in their name was alien at the time, and would long remain so. Between 1815 and 1917, national ideas reached Russia from its western and southern frontiers, providing some with the hope of change, and others with a tool of reaction.

TENTATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1815–1830

Nationalism can be a method of rule by those who already hold power. Yet during the early nineteenth century, even the suggestion of popular sovereignty was inimical to the tsars' prerogative of absolute personal power. Any emphasis on the Russian peasantry as a political class would have challenged the right to rule of the Romanov dynasty, as well as the prerogatives of the largely foreign elite that administered the growing imperial state. In any event, as seen from St. Petersburg, nationalism was a force associated with revolution, a challenge to traditional rule rather than a way to bolster it. This was the lesson of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.

As an ideology of change, nationalism was a challenge to the monarchies and empires of *ancien régime* Europe, yet it found few adherents in Russia during the first half of the nineteenth century. The uneducated peasantry was tied to the communal system of land ownership, an isolated world of limited horizons. Few were able to see the peasants as people, let alone as a political nation, before the emancipation decree of 1861. The church, an agent of national revival elsewhere in imperial Europe, was subordinate to the Russian state and aligned with the principles of dynastic and autocratic rule. The nobility, elsewhere in eastern Europe the bearer of historical national consciousness, was in Russia associated with the state, for the Russian state created by Peter I and Catherine I had transformed it into a new cosmopolitan service class.

After 1815, the Russian Empire held the absolute majority of the world's Poles, and about 10 percent of the Polish population was noble. Napoleon, exploiting Polish hopes for statehood, had established a duchy of Warsaw. This quasi-state was revived and enlarged at the Congress of Vienna as the Kingdom of Poland. Although Poland's former eastern lands were absorbed by the Russian Empire, Polish nobles even there held social and economic power. Institutions of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, such as the university at Wilno, the Lithuanian Statutes, and the Uniate

Church, functioned with little interruption. Alexander ruled these eastern lands as tsar, but the Kingdom of Poland as constitutional monarch.

The Polish gentry, the leading class in the departed Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, considered itself a historical nation. Before the commonwealth was dismembered by the partitions, much of the middle gentry had been resolutely conservative, perceiving central power as the greatest threat to their traditional rights. In Russia, the same inclination turned the middle gentry into radicals, attentive to the constitution as the source of the tsar's right to rule Poland as king. The 1830 uprising was premised on social-contract thinking: Since the tsar (Nicholas I) was not fulfilling his obligations as king of Poland, his subjects had the right and duty to rebel. The uprising was national in some sense, since the gentry saw itself as the nation; it was certainly democratic, in that the Polish Diet saw itself as representing a European republic struggling against despotism; but it was not modern nationalism, for its participants neither legitimated their claims on a popular basis nor aroused passions against an enemy nation.

ROMANTIC AND OFFICIAL NATIONS, 1831–1855

The defeat of the 1830 uprising created the conditions for a sophisticated discussion of the nation by Russian subjects. Poland's ten thousand political emigrés were highly literate, politically engaged, and determined to explain their military and political defeat. Many of the emigrés, and most of the leading figures, were of historical Lithuanian origin. Back in Russia, the 1830s and 1840s saw the end of traditional Lithuanian institutions, such as the university and the Statutes. The Uniate Church was merged with the Russian Orthodox Church in 1839. For the Polish emigration as a whole, the old commonwealth remained the touchstone of political thought. But in time a new generation arose that had no actual memory of the old order and reimagined it in ways that reflected various ideas of nationality.

The nationalist politics of Poles in the Parisian emigration can be divided into two main currents: republican and monarchist. Joachim Lelewel, once a professor at Wilno, propounded a democratic republicanism that drew its optimism from a belief in the pacifism of Slavic peoples. Unlike Russians with similar ideas, Lelewel believed that this pacifism could be destroyed by autocratic rule. The Polish Democratic Society, founded in 1832 on French models, soon fell under Lelewel's influence. The

leader of the monarchists was Adam Czartoryski, a great Lithuanian magnate and onetime minister to Alexander I. Czartoryski was a liberal constitutionalist who advocated monarchy on pragmatic grounds. One of his disciples, Józef Bem, led the Hungarian insurrection in Transylvania in 1848. Other Poles justified monarchy in terms of national development. Karel Hoffman argued that a monarch was needed to create cities and middle classes. Janusz Woronicz theorized that a true monarchy mediated between a self-aware nation and the exercise of power. In his view, the partitioning powers were not true monarchies, because they did not represent nations. By the end of the 1830s, the monarchial Party of May 3 had fifteen-hundred members.

The 1830s and 1840s also witnessed intense philosophical discussion of the nation by Russian subjects. The Polish nationalist philosophers of the day generally came from the Polish Kingdom and wrote dissertations at German universities. German philosophy was fashionable in Russia, but the Poles actually completed philosophy doctorates in Germany. Their work was more systematic than that of their Russian contemporaries, and influenced philosophical discussion (especially within Left Hegelianism) rather than simply refracting it through local conditions. Polish philosophy was more open to French ideas than German philosophy, and more open to German ideas than French philosophy. Polish philosophers tended to replace the state with the nation in Hegelian dialectic and supported philosophies in which action was constitutive of the nation. Most of them combined academic philosophy with practical work. The best-known were August Cieszkowski and Karol Libelt.

Polish Romantic poets of the epoch were also concerned with the nation. It should be stressed, however, that many of their preoccupations were unintelligible to later generations of modern nationalists. Adam Mickiewicz's interest in mysticism or Juliusz Słowacki's fascination with spirit are difficult to reconcile with secular ideologies of any kind, even if a simplified form of Mickiewicz's messianism did become a common trope. *Pan Tadeusz*, the most beautiful and most prosaic of Mickiewicz's major works, became a national poem two generations or so after its completion in 1834. Mickiewicz and Słowacki were regarded as national figures of the first rank during their lives, but their career as national bards was mainly posthumous. As nationalism came to be associated with the language of the folk, poetry came to matter less for

its content than for its form. At the time, the poets (like the philosophers and the politicians) saw the national mission as part of a European or universal regeneration. Polish emigrés were the only group in Europe to remember the Russian Decembrists and recall the predicament of other peoples under imperial rule.

The Decembrists, of course, had opposed the ascendance of Nicholas I in 1825. Nicholas was a man of imposing prejudices against Poles and Jews, and was capable of great hatred against whole nations from time to time, but he was no modern nationalist. His reign (1825–1855) is generally seen in the early twenty-first century as reactionary, as it was by Polish rebels in 1830. Insofar as there was a philosophy of rule during Nicholas's reign, it might be sought in the Official Nationality of his education minister, Sergei Uvarov. *Nationality* was the third term in Uvarov's famous trio: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality. Uvarov meant nationality to be subordinate to the first two principles of rule. The Russian nation was the group meant to submit to the tsar according to the teachings of the church. Uvarov's educational program was thus a kind of reverse Enlightenment. Education was not meant to create individuals capable of independent judgment, but rather a collective understanding that the ruled are to be judged by the ruler.

The printing press allowed an emerging group of literate Russians to interpret national ideas according to their own lights. The generation of the 1830s and 1840s, like those that followed, read Nikolai Karamzin's *History of the Russian State* (published 1816–1826). Two renegade Poles led the way in these years in spreading simple national ideas through the press: Faddei Bulgarin, editor of the *Northern Bee*, and Osip Senkovsky, editor of the *Reader's Library*. The mere existence of such periodicals guaranteed that discussions of the nation, even if not at all revolutionary, were unacceptable in Uvarov's limited vision. The press mediated between the dynastic interpretation of official nationality prevalent in St. Petersburg and the rival Romantic conceptions emerging around Moscow University. Slavophiles interpreted Uvarov's trio in their own way: Autocracy left room for the autonomous commune, Orthodoxy was a shield against Catholicism and Protestantism, and Nationality mandated attention to the peasant. This Romantic patriotism, although not meant to undermine Official Nationality, differed on one essential point. Whereas Official Nationality gave priority to the state and sought to consolidate

Peter's achievement, the Slavophiles began to emphasize the people and to critique Peter's cosmopolitan project. Nonetheless, they had little in common with the Polish Romantics of the same generation. Both made reference to the past in the hope of overcoming a crisis of the present. But where the Slavophiles spoke of the unspoiled commune, the Poles imagined a restored commonwealth. The Polish dilemma was statelessness; the Russian dilemma was backwardness.

STATE AND NATION, 1855–1881

This fact was brought home by the humiliation of the Crimean War. The new tsar, Alexander II, accepted that military defeat justified state reform, and that state reform required the emancipation of the serfs. The twenty years after the emancipation proclamation of 1861 saw the emergence of a new group of prosperous peasants in many parts of the empire, and this group recast the national question, especially on the borderlands. Yet the immediate reaction to reform was rebellion. Reforms initiated in Warsaw led to a revolution of rising expectations, the failure of which accelerated the development of modern ideas of nationality in Poland, Russia, and the lands between. Although there were a few lonely exceptions, such as Alexander Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin, literate Russian society as a whole reacted to the Polish Uprising of 1863 with disgust and antipathy. In this atmosphere, Mikhail Katkov became quite influential. His new journal, *Moscow News*, publicized the idea that the rebellion was a war of nations and compromise would be deadly for Russia. Katkov endorsed the policies of Mikhail N. Muraviev in Lithuania, because Muraviev also cast the struggle in nationalist terms: Russians against Poles and their Jewish allies. Katkov's exposition of the 1863 uprising marked a transition from the Romanticism of his youth to the pessimism of his later years. His writings expressed to his twelve thousand readers the painful disappointment of the Slavophile on learning that others might reject Russia, and the emerging conviction that state power might yet put matters right.

Similar views found a scholarly articulation in the pan-Slavism of Nikolai Danilevsky. He resolved certain apparent tensions in the earlier Slavophile scheme by arguing that the state embodied the ideals of Christianity and the peasant tradition, and peace-loving Slavs needed to use force to unite them. A new civilization founded on these principles would emerge, Danilevsky contended in *Rus-*

sia and Europe (1869), when Constantinople fell to Russia. Danilevsky also applied his argument about force to the problem of Slavs who rejected Russian rule. Poland, which he compared to a hideous tarantula, could perhaps be coerced into seeing reason. Pan-Slavism was put to the test by international politics during the second half of the 1870s, when Russia made war against the Ottoman Empire in the name of the Serbs and Bulgarians. The disappointing terms of the Treaty of Berlin brought home the objective limits of Pan-Slavism as an international mission.

Populism was another initiative that failed to pass the test of political reality. Fired by a faith in the essential goodness of the peasant, the *narodniki* went "to the people" in the early 1870s. Had their message been heeded, Russian populism might have followed the path of similar movements toward the ethnic nationalism that many enlighteners embraced farther west. In the event, most of the young people who remained in politics after this failure moved to the hard left, imagining (as in Vera Zaslulich's famous correspondence with Karl Marx) that the peasant commune was itself proto-communist. Populist ideas took a different turn where the commune was less established, as in Ukraine, for example. Ukraine had played a crucial role in Russian national history, providing Muscovy's ideologues in the seventeenth century and many of its civil servants in the eighteenth. As Karamzin initiated the new trend toward a Moscow-centric history of the empire during the 1810s and the 1820s, as Romantic ideas reached St. Petersburg during the 1830s and the 1840s, and as the Crimean War brought a sharper Russian nationalism during the 1850s, Ukrainian intellectuals in Kharkiv and Kyiv began to see the Ukrainians and the Russians as separate peoples. The poetry of Taras Shevchenko confirmed not only the distinctive Ukrainian language but the definable place of Ukraine between Russia and Poland. The partitions of Poland had brought right-bank Ukraine into the Russian Empire, and during the 1860s and the 1870s not a few members of the Polish gentry (e.g., the historian Volodymyr Antonovych) chose Ukrainian populism and indeed Ukrainian identity. This Polish influence was cited in the Valuev Decree of 1863, which restricted the use of the Ukrainian language. The 1876 Ems Decree, which prohibited the publication of Ukrainian books, induced many Ukrainian intellectuals to emigrate to Austrian Galicia. The most important example was perhaps Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, Antonovych's student, and the greatest historian of Ukraine.

Politicized Ukrainians in Kyiv generally stayed on the left, and anticipated that national questions would be resolved within a reformed Russian state.

Similar patterns soon emerged in other Christian national revivals, such as the Georgian and the Armenian. Georgia boasted an ancient civilization, a solid state tradition, and a mature national literature. Its position as a weak Christian country in the Caucasus had moved its nobles to accept Russian overlordship in 1783. Although some of them had conspired against Russia in 1832, a generation later the Georgian nobility was a model service class. Its traditional position was eroding because there were now many wealthy peasant farmers, Armenian merchants were extending their hold on the better districts of cities, and Russian bureaucrats were arriving in large numbers. A new Georgian intelligentsia, educated in St. Petersburg, tried to protect the endangered Georgian language during the 1870s. Insofar as this tendency was political, it involved no more than vaguely socialist leanings mixed with the hope for national autonomy in the empire. The Armenians were also Christian but had their own church; they too had a historically prominent class, but it was the merchants; and they were even more dispersed among Muslims than the Georgians. The Armenians had good reasons for being loyal to the empire, because they stood to lose much in any conflict with the Georgians or the Muslims. For the Armenians, as for many other established national groups in the borderlands, the use of national questions by the center after 1881 was an unwelcome sign of future trouble.

NATIONAL OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM, 1881–1905

Alexander III, who ascended to the throne after his father's assassination in 1881, was more amenable to Russian nationalist ideas than his predecessors. During his reign, national ideas were no longer associated with revolution (as during the early nineteenth century) or with reform (as during the middle of the nineteenth century), but rather with reaction. The 1878 trial of Vera Zasulich for attempting to kill the police chief of St. Petersburg had discredited reform even before another socialist murdered the tsar three years later. During the 1880s, Russian nationalism was an updated and secularized version of the old claim that the Russian nation existed by virtue of its Orthodoxy and its submission to the tsar. Under Alexander III and his successor, Nicholas II, a secular conception of the superiority of the Russians supplemented the

traditional divine right to rule. Rule was by now an end in itself, since both external crusades and internal reforms were no longer seriously considered. Cultural Russification was advanced as policy on the grounds that Russians would be better subjects than others, but the tsars ruled in the meantime by turning one group against another. There was a shadow of liberalism here, because the beneficiaries were often peasant nations oppressed for centuries by a traditional gentry elite. In this situation, the peasant nations had, at least for a time, some grounds for optimism: the non-Russian gentry and the Russians themselves had very little.

The most important exponent of this improvisational pessimism was Konstantin Pobedonostsev. As over-procurator of the Holy Synod from 1880 to 1905, Pobedonostsev discriminated against Old Believers, religious minorities, and Jews. He was most influential, however, as tutor to the last two tsars, Alexander III and Nicholas II. He came closest to direct power in the aftermath of Alexander II's assassination, when he drafted the manifesto that delayed reform in the name of the people. For Pobedonostsev, this was no contradiction, since absolutism was Russian and therefore represented the Russian people. Pobedonostsev claimed that Russia was the greatest of nations, and the others were the froth of foreign intrigues. In practice, however, he knew that non-Russians did not share this view and would not wish to become Russian. His policies were grounded in historical temporizing, in the hope that suppressing rival nations now would allow a Russian victory later. Pessimism of this kind was common by the 1880s. One could still find exceptional figures, such as Fyodor Dostoyevsky, who still believed in universal missions. Yet officers and bureaucrats were steeped in a nationalism more like Pobedonostsev's, facing as they did in practice the problems he perceived from on high. Especially in the borderlands, Russian officials had to reconcile their positive view of Russian culture with the essentially negative task of Russification.

At the periphery, Russification involved a triangle consisting of Russia, the traditional local power, and a rising peasant nation. In one pattern, visible in the Baltic region, Russia supported (to a very limited extent) the peasants against the gentry. In Finland, for example, the local hegemony of Swedes was challenged by the introduction of Finnish schools in 1873 and the equal status granted to the Finnish language in 1886. Within a generation, however, the Finnish movement had oriented itself against the Russian state, Finns prov-

ing to be as zealous as Swedes in resisting the full incorporation of their kingdom into the Russian Empire. In the lands now known as Estonia and Latvia, Baltic Germans lost much of their traditional authority, some of it to new national movements. During the 1870s, the 1880s, and the 1890s, Estonian and Latvian patriots tended to expect Russian support against local Germans. In both cases, the quick emergence of a propertied farmer class and the rapid creation of a cultural canon signified a new historical self-consciousness. An Estonian daily newspaper began publishing in 1891, and a Latvian in 1877. In Lithuania the gentry had been Polish, and the Lithuanian movement emerged after the defeat of the 1863 uprising. Lithuanians were seen as a passive and loyal element, but some of the children of prosperous peasants (and some Polish nobles) took Russification and university education in St. Petersburg as a prompting to return to the Lithuanian folk. The first modern Lithuanian periodical appeared in 1883.

The failure of the 1863 uprising in Poland inclined many patriots to reject traditional paths such as emigration, speculative philosophy, and Romantic poetry in favor of a sober appreciation of the national predicament. The hope for rescue from abroad, touchingly portrayed by the novelist Boleslaw Prus in *The Doll* (1887–1889), had now faded as well. In the former Kingdom of Poland, now officially the Vistula Land and nothing more, positivists such as Prus and Alexander Świętochowski urged greater attention to the physical sciences, economics, and pedagogy. They wrote of the possibility of social renewal (a code, under censorship, for national rebirth) through work at society's foundations. Theirs was a national idea designed to create a national society in the absence of a state. Both its limitations in practice and its emphasis on science made it an effective springboard to the Marxism of the next generation. Some of these Marxists, such as Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, joined the Polish Socialist Party of Józef Pilsudski, founded in 1892. This party treated national independence as a prerequisite of social revolution, and Kelles-Krauz supported its program with the first serious sociological study of nationalism. The positivists' attention to the non-gentry classes of society was a model for the National Democrats, whose movement (founded in 1893) added conspiracy and explicit national content to the earlier program of informal mass education. By 1899 the National Democrats had organized some three thousand educational circles. In 1903 their leader, Roman Dmowski, published a polemical tract en-

titled *Thoughts of a Modern Pole*, which criticized the traditional leaders of Polish society, the gentry and the post-gentry intelligentsia, and proclaimed a fierce competition between ethnic nations as the wave of the future. Dmowski excluded Jews from the future national community; with time (and later electoral disappointments) anti-Semitism became a central message of National Democracy. Dmowski said little about independence, since he thought the Russian Empire a useful shelter from the powerful German culture; despite this tack he must be considered one of the early modern nationalists of the Russian Empire. Like all Polish activists, Dmowski had to account for the division of Poland lands and people among the three partitioning powers, Germany and Austria as well as Russia.

The problem of division was far deeper in the case of other groups, such as Muslims. There were probably more Muslims in the Russian Empire than in the Ottoman, but the latter was a more logical starting point for any national politics. Beginning in the early 1880s, Muslims in Russia had to respond to the more active program of cultural Russification. An interesting reaction was that of Ismail Bey Gaspirali, who believed that Muslims had to learn Russian to resist Russification and secure their proper place in the empire. In his 1881 work, *Muslims of Russia*, he promoted a national press and a national intelligentsia. Like his Georgian and Armenian contemporaries, Gaspirali was a cosmopolitan who concluded from travel and education that merely cultures were endangered. Himself a Crimean Tatar, he wished to reach Muslims throughout the empire, and his books and newspapers were indeed widely read in Baku and Kazan. The Volga Tatars began a movement of religious and social reform with some limited national content. Shihabeddin Merjani wrote the first history in the Volga Tatar dialect, and, in fact, was the first to call the Muslims of the region Tatars. Like the Muslims, the Armenians found themselves on both sides of the Russian–Ottoman border. Armenian national politics in Russia were initially directed to support for Armenians repressed on the Ottoman side. Penetration by Armenian revolutionaries served as a pretext for massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1894–1896. All of this left Armenians loyal to St. Petersburg. Their immediate Caucasian neighbors, the Georgians, faced internal challenges, and responded with nationally aware socialism.

The Jews were so dispersed that any sort of territorial politics seemed utopian. Since the Con-

gress of Vienna, about half of the world's Jews had been Russian subjects. During the 1880s, at a time when Russian nationalism still left considerable room for certain groups to hope for reform, Jews were immediately touched by its pessimism. Earlier discussions among journalists and liberals about equal status for Jews and Russians were halted by the 1863 uprising, in which Jews were seen (by Ivan Aksakov, for example) as allies of the Poles. The pogroms that followed Alexander II's assassination in 1881 (in Yelizavetgrad, Kiev, Odessa, Warsaw, and elsewhere) convinced many Jews that emigration from Russia was their best hope. The official association of Jews with revolution (by Pobedonostsev, for example) and the expulsion of Jews from Kiev (1886) and Moscow (1891) convinced others. The leaders of the emigrationist movement organized themselves at Katowice in 1884. Yet flight to Palestine was initially an apolitical aspiration, since the emphasis was placed on the practical task of leaving Russia. The emergence of Theodor Herzl's brand of Zionism transformed the personal and the practical into the idealistic and the political, and is usually marked as the beginning of modern Jewish nationalism. Its First Basel Congress (August 1897) called for "a home for the Jewish people in Palestine," a Jewish state. This ideal was influential, but was an imperfect fit with the immediate needs of the world's largest Jewish community. The failure of Herzl's high diplomacy, and then his death in 1904, left room for alternative Zionist ideas: socialist Zionism (Ber Borochov and Po'alei Zion), the revival of Hebrew in Russia (associated with Ahad Ha-'Am), and Zionism aware of neighboring national revivals (exemplified by Yitzhak Gruenbaum and Vladimir Jabotinsky, among many others). That said, the internationalist socialism of the Bund (founded in 1897) was far more attractive to young Jews with Haskalah, or secular, education, and played a more important role in Russian politics. From 1901 the Bund advocated national cultural autonomy within a postrevolutionary Russian state. During the Revolution of 1905, it was one of several socialist and leftist parties working in this direction.

MASS MOVEMENTS AND RUSSIAN RETRENCHMENT, 1905–1917

The Revolution of 1905 was the baptism of a new Russian nationalism, not entirely dependent upon the state, and modern enough to pay attention to the Russian people. Before 1905 there was nothing like a Russian national movement, and the people were excluded from political discussions on the

right. The revolution prompted monarchists to appeal to the people to support the tsar, and modern nationalists who spoke of a "Russia for the Russians," to cite Alexei Kuropatkin's pamphlet about tasks for the Russian army. Russian liberals believed that reform would create a nation that would strengthen the state within its present borders; national liberals such as Peter Struve spoke of a Russian nation in the making. As a social force Russian nationalism was most important in the west, especially in Ukraine, where Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians were blamed for the instability. Polish socialists did indeed work with the Bund to exploit the revolution: but it had begun, awkwardly, in St. Petersburg, as a result of the war against Japan. Non-socialist Polish parties appealed for the Polonization of schools and for a national assembly. A few Ukrainian parties also requested an assembly, and the Ukrainian Bohdan Kistiakovs'kyi was an interesting proponent of federalism.

National autonomy within existing borders was the typical national demand of minorities in 1905. Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians all held national congresses and pressed for reform on these lines. Muslims petitioned for legal nondiscrimination at a congress of 1905. Many Turkish nationalists, such as Yusuf Akchura, soon emigrated to the Ottoman Empire to support the Young Turks project in Istanbul. Muslims in Russia sought a reconciliation of the religious and the secular, but did not yet see the secular as necessarily national. Education in the Arab world or in St. Petersburg still appeared to be a complementary and necessary part of this project. Musa Jarulla Bigi, who was secretary of the Muslim congresses between 1905 and 1917, studied in both places. Armenians had seen their church's lands confiscated by the state in 1903, but internecine violence with Azerbaijani Turks in 1905 left most of them loyal subjects of Russia. The Dashnak movement, founded to support the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, won temporary popularity in Russia by defending the Armenians in Baku and elsewhere in 1905. Georgian socialists initiated some strike actions in 1905 and mediated between the Armenians and the Azerbaijani Turks, but nothing like a Georgian separatist nationalism emerged at this time. Armenian and Georgian socialists alike generally supported some form of cultural autonomy.

The new parliament (or State Duma), established by Nicholas II in 1905, was the only institution that might have channeled these various national sentiments into a reform of the state. Pol-

ish nationalists led by Roman Dmowski made the most concerted effort to profit from this institution; the Polish Circle they organized was national in composition and goals. Yet their only legislative victory was the return of the Polish language to Polish schools, and this was quickly reversed. Only the First and Second Dumas were vaguely representative; from 1907 the goal of the electoral laws was to ensure the election of a Duma "Russian in spirit." Prime Minister Peter Stolypin embodied the great irony of Russian nationalism: on the one hand, he changed the electoral law because he believed that Poles would win wherever they ran; on the other, he claimed that Russian nationality was itself a powerful attractive force. Stolypin famously urged Dmowski to admit that being a Russian subject was the greatest of blessings. The only nationalism represented in the Third and Fourth Dumas was Russian. In 1912 the Duma created a new Chelm district, intending to encourage Uniate converts to Roman Catholicism in the region to convert to Orthodoxy. Here was the use of autocracy to identify nationality with Orthodoxy, or at least the deployment of state power to remove attractive national alternatives. Dmitry Sipiagin had earlier considered Polish-Russian population exchanges as a possible solution to the Chelm problem. Forced population movements became policy during World War I, as Russia removed Germans and Jews from its western territories.

Even in 1914, one would have been hard pressed to find much organized national opposition to the Russian Empire. Opposition to the war was not usually articulated in national terms. Nation-states were created in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, once imperial power had been discredited and broken. Russian nationalism was the ideology of Anton Denikin and other White officers, but they were defeated by the Bolsheviks. Living in Cracow (in Austria) in 1912, Vladimir Lenin had come to appreciate European national movements and contemplated their exploitation by a socialist revolution. In 1913 he defined "self-determination" to mean either national independence or nothing at all, forcing a choice on nationally aware socialists while making a show of flexibility. Once in power, Lenin collapsed the two alternatives, promoting Soviet republics with national names. In 1913, Lenin had asked Josef Stalin to critique the proposed nationality policy of the Austrian socialists. Stalin's response was important in political if not intellectual terms: He defined nations as stable communities and spoke of national psychologies. These views seemed to gain impor-

tance in his mind as he gained personal power, and can be linked to his national policy during the 1930s. Lenin and Stalin were unusual Russian subjects, but their assimilation of nationalism was determinative of the fate of many of the peoples of the former Russian Empire.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; JEWS; KARAMZEN, NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH; LANGUAGE LAWS; NATIONALITIES POLICY, TSARIST; NATION AND NATIONALITY; OFFICIAL NATIONALITY; PANSLAVISM; POLES; POPULISM; RUSSIFICATION; SLAVOPHILES; UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS

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TIMOTHY SNYDER

NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

The centerpiece of Bolshevik nationality policy before they came to power in 1917 was the right of

nations to self-determination. As outlined by Vladimir I. Lenin in his 1916 work *The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, this constituted the "right to free political secession" for all nationalities without qualification. In the same work, Lenin distinguished between different types of national movement, characterizing the Russian Empire as one of the areas where "the twentieth century has especially developed bourgeois-democratic national movements and sharpened the national struggle" (Lenin, 1964, p.151). Therefore national movements could play an important role in the democratic movement to overthrow tsarism, but at the same time Lenin explicitly argued that the right to secede ought in itself to be sufficient to persuade national minorities of the security of their national rights in a democratic state. While supporting the right of nations to self-determination, the Bolsheviks would not necessarily argue in favor of the right of secession being exercised. In any case in a socialist state, the clear economic and political advantages of remaining part of a larger state combined with the guarantees provided by the right to secede and the natural international class unity of the proletariat would ensure that, in most cases, national minorities would choose to remain within the larger state. This argument has led many historians to conclude that the right of nations to self-determination was purely a slogan designed to attract the maximum support from national minorities for Lenin's aim of socialist revolution, and was meaningless when it came to the practicalities of a multinational Soviet state.

SELF-DETERMINATION TO FEDERALISM, 1917–1923

The principle of self-determination was invoked by the Soviet government in recognizing the independence of Finland at the end of 1917, but was not applied in its literal form thereafter. Nevertheless, it continued to dominate debates on the national question at Bolshevik Party conferences and congresses up until 1921. These arguments were a continuation of long-standing objections to Lenin's policy on the part of a significant group in the party leadership led by Yuri Pyatakov, Nikolai Bukharin, and Karl Radek. They argued that the internationalism of the working class meant that the continued existence of nations in a socialist society was inconceivable, that in the short term they were purely a distraction from the class struggle, and that recognition of national rights simply gave suc-

cor to divisive bourgeois nationalists. A particularly heated debate between this group and Lenin at the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919 led to a compromise resolution that introduced a new qualification to the right to self-determination: The question of who should represent the will of the nation on this matter would depend on the level of historical development of that nation. The implication was that for more developed nations, especially those already within the Soviet system, the national will would be expressed by the proletariat through their representative bodies, the Soviets themselves. Even in this qualified form, no nation was given the opportunity to exercise self-determination, and by 1920 the commissar (equivalent to minister) for nationality affairs, Josef Stalin, had declared self-determination a counterrevolutionary slogan.

Nevertheless, these debates were highly significant. The internationalist arguments of Bukharin and Pyatakov were deployed by substantial numbers of Russian communists working in non-Russian areas and enjoyed widespread support among both leading and rank-and-file Bolsheviks. In fact, it is doubtful whether Lenin ever enjoyed majority support for his policy within his own party. In the non-Russian regions, disputes between Russian and local national administrators and Party officials were frequent. Although these disputes more often than not centered on practical matters such as land distribution or the status of languages, the latter group frequently invoked the spirit of self-determination in support of their demands, while the former were often ready to dismiss their opponents as bourgeois nationalists. Underlying all the arguments about self-determination, then, was disagreement over whether separate national rights should be recognized in any form. Lenin's aversion to Great Russian Chauvinism meant that when the center was called on to intervene in such disputes, as often happened, it was more often than not the local nationals who received the more favorable decision. The predominance of Russians in the regional Bolshevik Party structures, however, ensured that even these interventions could be ignored.

Lack of clarity as to the status of national minorities helped to perpetuate these divisions. Initially the Bolsheviks had no clear blueprint for the organization of their multinational Soviet state. The principles behind Lenin's policy provided some sort of framework: national minorities who had been oppressed under the tsars must be assured that they would not continue to be treated in the same

way; they should as far as possible run their own local institutions and be responsible for cultural matters, and they should enjoy the same linguistic and educational rights as Russians, assisted by the center where needed. Lenin also agreed with the need for some kind of national autonomy, various forms of which had been proposed by European Marxists since the beginning of the twentieth century. Within these broad parameters, policy was largely improvised in the key period between the end of the civil war in 1920 and the formation of the Soviet Union in 1924.

Shortly after the October 1917 revolution, a Commissariat for Nationality Affairs (or Narkomnats) was formed under Stalin's leadership. Narkomnats was responsible only for the smaller nationalities located within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR); until 1924, the larger nationalities of Ukraine, Belorussia and Transcaucasia had formally separate Soviet republics, linked to the RSFSR by treaties but in practice all dominated by the centralized Bolshevik Party. In a 1913 article, "Marxism and the National Question," Stalin had argued for territorial national autonomy, opposing the nonterritorial cultural autonomy espoused by the Austrian Marxists Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. The first autonomous republic, the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Republic, was created in February 1919 and eventually provided the model for a series of autonomous republics and autonomous regions that proliferated across the RSFSR between 1920 and 1922. Their status was formally defined in separate treaties, but in general the republics and regions were responsible for matters of local government, education, culture, and agriculture, while the center retained authority over industry, the military, and foreign affairs.

In 1922, the unsatisfactory constitutional status of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Transcaucasian Soviet Republics was addressed. As Stalin argued, the formal separate status of these republics meant that they could pass their own laws, but if the leadership in Moscow objected, they could have these laws repealed by recourse to the disciplinary procedures of the Bolshevik Party, whose members controlled all the republics. The solution proposed by Stalin was to incorporate these republics into the system of autonomous republics of the RSFSR, which he himself had been instrumental in creating. In September 1922, Lenin objected that it was unacceptable to incorporate such important nationalities on the same basis as the

smaller ones of the RSFSR and to subject them to the authority of a state whose title implied they would become a part of Russia. Instead, he proposed that they should join a new formation on the same footing as the USSR, in a federative union of equals. The title of the new federation was eventually decided on as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or Soviet Union. Lenin was by this time almost entirely incapacitated by illness, but had time to win this argument and then had to rely on others to carry his policy through. Until recently, most historians have taken this episode as evidence that Lenin stood for a more liberal position in regard to the non-Russians, while Stalin was a ruthless centralizer. More recently it has been argued either that in reality there were no significant differences between the two, or at least that they were not so far apart on this particular point.

The USSR officially came into being on January 1, 1924, consisting of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Belorussian SSR, and the Transcaucasian Federation, itself made up of the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani SSRs (which were later given entirely separate status). In 1925 Central Asia, previously part of the RSFSR as the Turkestan and Kirghiz Autonomous Republics, was divided into separate republics, with further later reorganizations resulting in the five Central Asian SSRs, the Kazakh, Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirghiz. Following World War II, newly acquired Soviet territory formed the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Moldovan SSRs, making a total of fifteen union republics and dozens of autonomous republics and regions for the remainder of the Soviet period. Federalism between a number of national territories, which had been rejected outright by Lenin and others before 1917, thus became the central organizing principle of the Soviet state by 1924.

Within this constitutional framework, for most of the 1920s the Soviets pursued a range of policies aimed at promoting the national, economic, and cultural advancement of the non-Russians: priority to the local language, a massive increase in native language schools, development of national cultures, and staffing the Soviet administration as far as possible with local nationals. Collectively, these policies were known as *korenizatsiya*, or "rooting." Although widely opposed by local Russian (and some non-Russian) communists, these policies were generally successful in establishing local national leaderships and strengthening national identities associated with particular territories that

formed the basis for what later became the post-Soviet independent states.

Economic investment in the non-Russian regions, with the aim of creating or reinforcing a native proletariat and raising the general level of development of the minorities, was one of the key elements of policy emerging from the discussion at the Twelfth Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in April 1923. During the period of the New Economic Policy (1921–1929), some progress was made in this direction, with the construction of a number of factories and processing plants in Central Asia providing an important impetus to the industrialization of the region. Overall, however, levels of economic investment in the borderlands did not significantly exceed those in central Russia. During the more rapid industrialization of the 1930s, a pattern emerged of concentrating the production of raw materials in the republics, such as cotton in Central Asia and coal in Ukraine, which were then processed in plants and factories in the RSFSR before the final goods were distributed across the Soviet Union. Some commentators have interpreted this as evidence of a deliberate colonial policy, based on comparisons with British practices in India, which served to tie the republics irrevocably into a state of economic dependency on the Soviet Union.

THE STALIN ERA

Stalin did little to change this system during the early years of his power. However, there were early signs of a change in policy direction. In 1928 and 1929 a series of show trials and purges affected leading intellectuals and politicians in Ukraine, Belorussia, Tatarstan, Crimea, and Kazakhstan. Many of those arrested or demoted had been beneficiaries of the policies of *korenizatsiya*, and were now charged with fuelling anti-Soviet nationalism directly or indirectly. A more profound shift was evident in 1930 and 1931 when two leading historians, the Marxist Mikhail Pokrovsky and the Ukrainian national historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, were discredited. Both were associated with an approach to history that had portrayed the Russian Empire as the unremitting oppressor of the non-Russians. As the 1930s progressed, the official version of history shifted to one where the Russian Empire had brought progress and civilization to backward peoples, and where for the first time former Russian tsars and military leaders could be portrayed as national heroes. Whereas previously nationality policy had discriminated against Rus-

sians and frequently denied them national rights allowed to others, now the superiority of the Russian culture and people was increasingly celebrated. This ideological shift was reflected on the ground in the partial abandonment of *korenizatsiya* policies from 1932 onward and an increasing dominance of Russians in the non-Russian regions. By the end of the decade all of the national leaders of the 1920s had been purged and in many cases replaced by Russians. The semiofficial position of Russian as the *lingua franca* of the Soviet Union was acknowledged by a law of 1938 that made the study of Russian as a second language compulsory in all non-Russian schools.

These changes have often been interpreted as evidence for a policy of outright Russification. But national cultures continued to be celebrated, albeit in a more “folky” form, the constitutional status of republics remained untouched, and local national politicians and the national language continued to play a major role in the life of the republics. In fact, the historian Terry Martin (2000) has identified a shift to a “primordial” view of nations during the 1930s, which implied that nations were permanent and could therefore never merge or be subsumed by the Russian nation. The emphasis in propaganda was rather on a Brotherhood of Nations in which the Russians would play the leading role. This emphasis gained ground during and immediately after World War II, when Stalin famously proposed a toast to “the health of our Soviet people, and in the first place the Russian people . . . the most outstanding nation of all the nations of the Soviet Union” (Stalin, vol.16, p.54).

The shift in nationality policy of the 1930s has to be seen in the broader context. It was a period of massive upheaval for all the peoples of the USSR. The collectivization of agriculture meant the destruction of traditional peasant cultures, most keenly felt by those such as the Kazakhs who had previously been nomadic and were now forced to settle. Huge numbers of people moved from the countryside to the towns and from one region to another in the course of industrialization, with the consequence that territories where one nationality had earlier been dominant in the overall population now found their numbers diluted by an influx of people from other national backgrounds, particularly Russians and other Slavs. In addition, the threat of a major war raised the fear among the leadership of the Soviet Union splitting along national lines in the event of an invasion, which required a propaganda shift emphasizing the unity

rather than the diversity of Soviet nations. A final factor in the change was the clearly expressed disillusionment of Russians living in non-Russian areas, who had felt discriminated against in the allocation of jobs and land.

The new identification of nations as primordial had further implications. If nations were primordial, then all members of a particular nation shared collective traits and characteristics, which could be positive or negative. In the tense international situation of the late 1930s these traits could include a tendency to be unreliable or treacherous in the event of war. Already in Stalin's Great Terror, specific actions had been targeted against Poles, Germans, and Finns. In 1937, as tensions with Japan rose, every single ethnic Korean was deported from a large area of the Far East. Between 1941 and 1944, the Germans of the Volga region and the Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Meshketian Turks of Transcaucasia, together with the Tatars of the Crimea, were labeled as treacherous and were deported from their homelands. Every man, woman, and child was loaded into cattle trucks and transported by train to Siberia or Kazakhstan where they were deposited with little provision for their livelihood. Some one and one-half million people in all were treated in this way. Lacking food, water, and sanitation for days or weeks on end, up to half died during the journey, while others perished of disease or hunger soon after arrival at their new destinations. The territories from which they had been deported were simply renamed or disappeared, as if these nations had never existed. But far from eliminating these nations, the experience provided them in many cases with a deeper identity and a myth of survival and hatred of the Soviet system that characterized them later on. Many were rehabilitated by Khrushchev in 1956 and gradually returned to their homelands, while others, like the Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and Volga Germans had to wait longer and could only return illegally.

Policy towards other nationalities was more positive during the war years, although Jews, Ukrainians, and Belorussians suffered disproportionately from the Nazi invasion and occupation. The need to mobilize the entire Soviet population for the war effort led to a number of concessions. National units in the Red Army, abolished only in 1938, were restored, and the heroic exploits of some of them were particularly prominent in propaganda. National heroes, especially military ones, who had been discredited in the official histories of

the 1930s, were praised. A looser attitude to religion and culture restored the symbols and practices associated with many nationalities. In general Soviet propaganda stressed the unity and brotherhood of all the nations of the Soviet Union, but with the important qualification that the leading role was assigned to the Russians.

The settlement agreed by the Allies at the end of the war brought substantial new territory under Soviet control. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had been independent since the Russian Civil War of 1917–1922, were first occupied by the Red Army and incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 under the terms of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact. Rapid steps towards the Sovietization of these republics were taken, and were resumed after the interruption of the Nazi occupation of 1941–1945. The nationalization of industry, redistribution of landed estates followed by collectivization, introduction of Soviet school and university curricula, and imposition of the Soviet political system were all carried out with no regard for the independent traditions of the region. The process involved the deportation or execution of more than 300,000 individuals of suspect backgrounds—former members of political parties, army officers, high-ranking civil servants, clergymen, estate owners, or political opponents from the pre-independence period. These deportations were followed up by a deliberate policy of immigration of Russians into Latvia and Estonia in particular, significantly shifting the demographic makeup. In response to Sovietization, national partisan units, some of which were formed to fight against the Nazi occupation, continued to trouble the Soviet authorities until as late as 1952.

During the postwar years, appeals to Russian national sentiment took a further twist in the form of overt anti-Semitism. In 1948 a propaganda campaign against "cosmopolitanism" made little secret of the identity of the real targets. Over the next five years, thousands of Jewish intellectuals, cultural figures, and political leaders were arrested and imprisoned or executed. In 1953 a number of leading doctors, most of them Jewish, were arrested and charged in the so-called Doctors' Plot to kill off Soviet leaders. There is some evidence that at the same time plans were being laid to deport Jews from the western parts of the Soviet Union in an operation similar to, but on a larger scale than, the wartime national deportations. These plans were shelved, and most of the doctors' lives spared, only by the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953. The rapid abate-

ment of anti-Jewish activities and propaganda from this date gives some persuasiveness to the argument that the campaign was based primarily on Stalin's personal anti-Semitism, but Soviet policy in the Middle East and the suspicion that Jewish organizations would gain in influence at home and abroad as a result of the sympathy arising from the Holocaust have also been offered as explanations. In any case anti-Semitism was deeply ingrained in large sections of Russian society, and could easily be mobilized again, as it was during the 1960s and 1970s, though to a lesser extent than during the late Stalin years. During the Brezhnev period, the status of Soviet Jews received international publicity through the fate of the *refuseniks*—those Jews who had been refused permission to emigrate to Israel.

STALIN SUCCESSION AND THE KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV ERAS, 1953–1985

The non-Russian nationalities of the USSR played an important role in the competition to succeed Stalin as leader. NKVD (secret police) head Lavrenti Beria, like Stalin a Georgian, gained the ascendancy initially, and one of his first acts was to privately condemn Stalin for departing from Leninist principles in nationalities policy. He replaced the Russian Konstantin Melnikov with the Ukrainian Aleksei Kirichenko as party leader in Ukraine, and made several other personnel changes that established the principle that the first Party secretary in each Union republic should belong to the local nationality, a policy that was generally observed until 1986. "Activating remnants of bourgeois-nationalist elements in the Union republics" was one of the charges laid against Beria on his arrest during the summer of 1953, but nevertheless the republics continued to enjoy a position of relative advantage. Nikita Khrushchev, as general secretary of the CPSU, used his powers of appointment to promote former colleagues from Ukraine, where he had served during the 1930s, into important positions at the center. He also showed favoritism toward Ukraine in granting it control of the Crimean peninsula in 1954, and increased the number of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the CPSU from sixteen in 1952 to fifty-nine in 1961. Their votes ultimately proved important in defeating Khrushchev's rivals in the Politburo. Khrushchev also gave all of the republics more say over economic matters by decentralizing a number of economic ministries, as well as the Ministry of Justice, to the republic level.

Having beaten off his rivals in 1957, Khrushchev turned many of these reforms on their head. Economic ministries were reorganized once more to the detriment of the republics. A new form of words creeping into the regime's Marxist-Leninist ideology signaled a clear shift in nationalities policy. Instead of describing relations between the nationalities of the USSR as a "Brotherhood of Nations," Khrushchev now began to talk about the "merger of nations" into one Soviet nation. This nation would be based around Slavic culture and the Russian language. Khrushchev took care not to alienate entirely the Ukrainian population, who were easily the second largest nationality, by including them (and to a lesser extent Belorussians) alongside Russians as the more important of the nationalities.

An important policy change was taken in this direction in the context of a general reform of the education system, which Khrushchev introduced in theses announced in November 1958. Article 19 of the theses, while acknowledging the longstanding Leninist principle that each child should be educated in his or her mother tongue, insisted that the question of which languages children should learn or be instructed in was a matter of parental choice. This move was widely opposed in the republics, especially those of Transcaucasia and the Baltics. It meant that Russian immigrants into the republics no longer had to study the local language as a second language, while it also opened the door to Estonians, Azerbaijanis, and others to send their children to Russian schools. Nevertheless, Khrushchev insisted on all the republics introducing legislation to reflect this change. In those republics that failed to do so, Latvia and Azerbaijan, broad purges of the Communist Party leadership were carried out on Moscow's instructions and new legislation forced through.

What the republican leaders feared was that the status of the republic's language would be eroded, provoking an initial popular backlash and opening the door in the long term to the abolition of the national federal system. It is perhaps no coincidence that the republics that displayed most opposition to the reform—Latvia, Estonia, and Azerbaijan—were those where the numerically dominant position of the local nationality in the population as a whole had come under the most pressure. Following the first major period of internal migration in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, several further waves of migration occurred. Immediately after World War II, as thousands of Estonians, Latvians,

and Lithuanians were deported from their republics, even greater numbers of Russians moved the other way over a number of years, especially into Latvia and Estonia, where the proportion of Estonians in the total population fell from 88 percent in 1939 to 61.5 percent in 1989. Under Khrushchev, large-scale internal migration was associated with the Virgin Lands campaigns and other policies, while the dominance of republican nationalities was further undermined by later waves of migration.

The changing demographic structure of the USSR might help to explain Khrushchev's new emphasis on the "merger of nations." If particular policies and the demands of modernization entailed a geographically more mobile population, it made sense for everyone to have command of a single language and to owe their primary loyalty to the Soviet state rather than to a particular republic or nationality. The sum total of Khrushchev's policies, then, could be regarded as aiming at a more systematic Russification of the entire population than had ever been attempted by Stalin.

If this was the intention, at least in the short term the actual impact of Khrushchev's policies was minimal in the Union republics. Schools continued to operate much as they had before. For the smaller nationalities of the RSFSR, the impact was more telling. The number of languages used in schools in the RSFSR declined from forty-seven during the early 1960s to seventeen by 1982, most of which were only used in the early grades before instruction switched to Russian. In the longer term, mother-tongue education eventually declined in the larger republics as well, especially Ukraine and Belorussia, and the constitutional status of republican languages was also undermined in a number of cases.

During Leonid Brezhnev's tenure as general secretary of the CPSU (1964–1982), the republics were nonetheless subjected to less drastic policy and personnel changes than under Khrushchev. Typically, republican leaders remained in office for much longer, as illustrated by Uzbek first secretary Sharaf Rashidov, who retained his position from 1959 to 1983. This longevity allowed the republican leaders to build up their own networks of power, which were often associated with endemic corruption, but also meant they could pursue the interests of their republics without interference, so long as they did not cross acceptable boundaries. This happened in Ukraine in 1963, when First Secretary Petr Shelest was dismissed for allegedly pursuing

a policy of over-zealous promotion of Ukrainian identity and culture. The regime continued to pursue Russification policies to an extent sufficient to provoke the creation of numerous underground nationalist groupings, which were to emerge at the head of much broader movements at the end of the 1980s.

GORBACHEV AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

Shortly after assuming the general secretaryship of the CPSU in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev declared that the Soviet Union had decisively resolved the national question. Events were to disillusion him quickly. When he tried to replace the Kazakh first secretary, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, with a Russian, Gennady Kolbin, in December 1986, the response was widespread rioting on the streets of Alma Ata, the capital of the Kazakh Republic. Gorbachev's reaction was to tread a more cautious line, repealing a number of unpopular language laws, and reforming the Council of Nationalities, which represented the republics at the highest level. Initially, he even gave encouragement to national-minded intellectuals in the Baltic republics, hoping to use them to help force through experimental market reforms in the region. But his failure to instigate an overall consistent policy towards nationalities only served to fuel the explosion of national unrest, which erupted in violent conflict between Azeris and Armenians in Azerbaijan in 1988, and the emergence of national "Popular Fronts," which arose in the Baltic republics during the same year and spread across almost all major nationalities by the end of the decade.

This eruption led to varying responses from Gorbachev, who at times seemed to be making concessions to the national movements, but at other times resorted to repression, leading to bloodshed by government forces in the Georgian capital Tbilisi and the Lithuanian capital Vilnius (although Gorbachev's direct involvement in these events has never been established). The Popular Fronts won spectacular successes in Soviet elections and came to dominate the government in Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia. These republics declared first sovereignty, then independence. Other republics followed with declarations of sovereignty (meaning that their own republican laws would take precedence over the laws of the USSR). The decisive blow against the federal USSR came during the summer of 1990 when the RSFSR itself, led by Boris Yeltsin, declared sovereignty. In his rivalry

with Gorbachev, Yeltsin was prepared to give every encouragement to national movements, including the Russian one.

Although a referendum organized by Gorbachev early in 1991 showed overwhelming support for maintaining some form of Union among most non-Russians, and Gorbachev himself was working on the terms of a new, much looser, Union Treaty aimed at holding the republics together at the time of the failed coup in August of that year, he was probably already resigned to the independence of the Baltic republics, and it was likely that other republics would follow them. The coup proved the final nail in the coffin as it encouraged other republican leaders to pursue their own paths, and the USSR was formally dissolved at midnight on December 31, 1991.

While the Bolsheviks and their successors were guided by general principles in their treatment of non-Russian nationalities, no single coherent nationalities policy existed for the Soviet period as a whole. Not only did the guiding principles change over time, but they were applied to different degrees to different nationalities, creating a picture far more complex than it is possible to describe here in detail. The size of the nationality, its proportion in the overall population of each republic, the historical strength of national identity, the existence of co-nationals or coreligionists outside the borders of the USSR, and their proximity to Moscow or strategic borderlands were all factors contributing to these differences. Perhaps most important of all, especially in the later Soviet period, was the closeness of individual leaders to the key figures in Moscow and their adeptness at the kind of bargaining that characterized the later years. Ultimately, one of the reasons for the demise of the USSR was the attempt to apply general nationalities policies to the three Baltic republics, which had a quite different historical experience from the other nationalities. But from the earliest days there was an inconsistency in the application of policies that favored national development on the one hand and the demands of a centralized, ideologically and culturally unified state on the other, causing tensions that contributed in no small part to the instability that preceded the downfall of the system.

See also: COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES; EMPIRE, USSR AS; KORENIZATSYA; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; OFFICIAL NATIONALITY; RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC; RUSSIFICATION; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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JEREMY SMITH

NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

At the end of the nineteenth century the huge Russian Empire extended from western Poland to the Pacific Ocean, from the Kola peninsula in the Polar Sea to the Caspian Sea and to Central Asia. It comprised regions with different climate, soil, and vegetation and a heterogeneous population with different economies, ways of life, and cultures. Among its inhabitants there were adherents of Christianity (of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Armenian variants), Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Shamanism. In ethnic terms, Orthodox Eastern Slavs (Russians, 44%; Ukrainians, 18%; and Belorussians, 5%), which officially were considered as three branches of one Russian people, predominated with two-thirds of the total population. Nevertheless Muslims, mostly speaking Turkic languages (11%), Poles (7%), Jews (4%), and

dozens of other groups represented strong minorities and (with the exception of the Jews and other diaspora groups) majorities in their core regions.

The tsarist government never formulated a consistent nationalities policy. The policies toward the non-Russians of the empire were of great diversity according to its heterogeneity and the respective time period. Before the beginning of the age of nationalism (i.e., in Russia before the nineteenth century), even the term *nationality* is highly questionable. In the premodern period, national and ethnic categories were not considered important by the tsarist government. Russia was a supranational empire marked by the official term *Rossyskaya imperia*, distinct from the ethnic term *russkaya* (Russian). Its main concerns were the loyalty of all subjects to the ruler and their social/estate status.

In the historiography on tsarist nationalities policies, these distinctions have not always been kept in mind. Historians of the non-Russian nationalities have drawn a rather uniform picture of an oppressive, colonialist, assimilationist, and nationalist policy that from the very beginning consciously aimed at destroying national cultures and identities. On the other hand the imperial Russian and later the Soviet historiography (after 1934) and some of Russian historiography after 1991 usually idealized tsarist rule and its “mission civilisatrice” among non-Russians. In Western historiography there are also controversies about the long-term aims of tsarist nationalities policies. One group advocates a general goal of cultural Russification, at least since the reign of Catherine II; others differentiate between epochs and peoples and usually restrict the term *Russification* to the short period between 1881 and 1905.

Although during the Middle Ages most Russian principalities, especially the city republic of Novgorod, had comprised non-Slavic groups (Karelians, Mordvins, Zyryans/Komi, etc.), it was the conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 by Ivan IV that laid the ground for the polyethnic Russian empire and for a first phase of tsarist nationalities policies. In the war declared to be a crusade against infidels, the Russian troops killed or expelled all Tatars from their capital, and priests began to baptize Muslims by force. Violent protest movements of Tatars and Cheremis (Mari) were suppressed by military campaigns.

The broad resistance, however, caused a fundamental change of policies towards the population of the former Khanate. The tsar’s main goals—the

maintenance of stability and loyalty and economic profit—were served better by pragmatism than by force. So the missionary efforts among Muslims and animists were stopped for more than a century. Moscow now guaranteed the status quo not only of the religions, but also of the land and duties of the taxable population (together with the Tatar tax, *yasak*) and of the landed property and privileges of the loyal noble Tatars. Many Muslim Tatars were co-opted into the imperial nobility, which already since the fifteenth century had included Tatar aristocrats. Muslim Tatar landowners were even allowed to have Russian peasants as their serfs, whereas Russian nobles were strictly forbidden to have non-Christian serfs. So in opposition to the majority of Russian peasants, enserfed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Tatar, Mordvin, Chuvash, Cheremis (Mari), and Votiak (Udmurt) peasants remained personally free “*yasak men*” (*yasachnye lyudi*) and later state peasants. The lands owned by the Tatar khan and Tatar nobles who were killed or had fled to the East were occupied by the Russian state, Russian nobles, and peasants. They settled in significant numbers in the southern and southeastern parts of the former Kazan Khanate, where, as early as the end of the seventeenth century, Russians outnumbered the native peoples. The towns of the Khanate were also populated by Russians, and the trade and culture of the Muslim Tatars were ruralized.

The two lines of military repression and of pragmatic flexibility following the submission of the non-Russian population served as a model for Russian premodern nationalities policies. Tsarist policies were based on cooperation with loyal non-Russians and a retention of the status quo, regional traditions, and institutions. This facilitated the transfer of power and the establishment of legitimacy. In order for non-Russian aristocrats to be co-opted into the imperial nobility, they needed to have a social position and a way of life that corresponded to that of the Russian nobility. So, among the elites of the Siberian native peoples, who were subjugated by force during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, only a small group of western Siberian Tatars became nobles. Nevertheless, Russian officials sought cooperation with the chieftains of Siberian tribes, who became heads of the local administration and had to guarantee the delivery of the *yasak*. The main aim of Russian policies towards the Siberian native peoples was the exploitation of furs, especially the valuable sable. With a pragmatic policy the government tried to further these economic goals. The shamanist reli-

gion was not persecuted, and missionary efforts of the church were not allowed. However, the regional administrators and the Russian trappers, Cossacks, merchants, and adventurers often did not obey these instructions, and they committed numerous acts of violence against the native peoples.

After the conquest of Kazan and of Astrakhan (1556), Russia gained control over the Volga valley and began to exert pressure on nomadic tribes. Leaders of the Nogai Tatars, the Bashkirs, and (from 1655) the Kalmyks swore oaths of loyalty to the tsar, which were interpreted by Moscow (and by the imperial and Soviet historiographies) as eternal subjugation of their tribes and territories. From the perspective of the steppe nomads, however, these oaths were only temporary and personal unions that did not apply to other clans or tribes. These different interpretations caused diplomatic and military conflicts between the sedentary Russian state and the nomad polities.

Similar problems of interpretation occurred in the case of the Dnieper Cossacks who swore allegiance to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich in 1654. The Russian government regarded the agreement of Pereyaslav as a voluntary submission and the definitive incorporation of Ukraine into Russia; in the late Soviet Union it was labeled as voluntary reunion of Ukraine with Russia. For Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his Cossacks (and for many Ukrainian historians), however, it was only a temporary military alliance and a temporary Muscovite protectorate. In 1667 Ukraine was divided between Russia and Poland-Lithuania, and its Eastern part on the left bank of the Dnieper (with Kiev on the right bank) became part of the Muscovite state. The so called Hetmanate of the Dnieper Cossacks retained much autonomy within Russia, with its socio-political structure under the rule of an elected hetman and its independent army guaranteed. As in the case of the loose protectorates over some of the steppe nomads, military-strategic concerns seem to have been decisive for the cautious policy of the Russian government.

The pattern of pragmatic flexibility that dominated tsarist “nationalities” policies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was fundamentally altered by the Westernization of Russia promoted by Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725). The goal of transforming Russia into a systematized, regulated, and uniform absolutist state based on the Western European model and the adoption of the Western concept of a European “mission civilisatrice” in the East left no room for special rights and traditions of

non-Russians. In 1718 cooperation with Tatar Muslim landowners was ended, and they were required to convert to Christianity. The majority of them, remaining faithful to Islam, lost their (Russian) peasants and were degraded to state peasants or merchants. Following the example of Western missions, the majority of animists of the Volga-Ural region and of Siberia were converted to Orthodoxy during the first half of the eighteenth century. Although conversion was enforced with the help of economic pressure and violence, the majority of the Muslims reacted with fierce resistance. In the 1730s and 1740s the Russian army subdued the Muslim Bashkirs in the Southern Ural. However, between 1773 and 1775 Bashkirs and Volga Tatars again were among the most important supporters of the Pugachev uprising. Simultaneously Russian pressure on the Kalmyks increased, and in 1771 more than 100,000 Kalmyks moved eastward, though only a small part of them reached their ancient homeland in western Mongolia.

While during the first half of the eighteenth century tsarist nationalities policies in the East became more repressive, in the Baltic provinces of Livonia and Estonia, conquered in 1710, Peter the Great continued to apply the traditional policy of preservation of the status quo and of cooperation with foreign elites. The privileges and corporate rights of the Baltic German landowners and townsmen were guaranteed, as were the Lutheran Church and the German language in administration and justice. The German Baltic nobles were co-opted into the imperial nobility and served the tsar as military officers, administrators, diplomats, and scholars. The Baltic provinces with their Central European structures and their educated upper class even constituted a model for a Westernized Russia.

Catherine II (r. 1762–1796) furthered the administrative homogeneity of the empire and curtailed the autonomy of the Baltic provinces, but her successors again guaranteed the traditional rights and privileges of the Baltic Germans. Catherine also abolished the autonomy of the Ukrainian Hetmanate and destroyed the host of the formerly independent Zaporozhian Cossacks on the lower Dnieper. Russia had begun to integrate the Hetmanate into the empire after the alliance of Hetman Ivan Mazepa with the Swedish king Charles XII, defeated by the Russians at Poltava in 1709. Nonetheless the tsars continued to cooperate with the loyal Cossack elite, which became a landowning nobility and in 1785 was partially co-opted into the imperial nobility. After a century of Ukrainiza-

tion of Russian culture through graduates of the Kievan Mohyla Academy, Ukrainian culture was Russified from the end of the eighteenth century. After the victory against the Ottoman Empire in 1774, the subjugation of the Khanate of Crimea in 1783, and the annexation of the steppe regions north of the Black Sea, Russia no longer required the military skills of Ukrainian Cossacks. The former Hetmanate was now integrated into the administration, social structure, and culture of Russia. The fertile Southern steppe was first colonized by privileged German and Orthodox South Slav settlers, and in the following decades by Ukrainian and Russian peasants.

The three partitions of Poland (1772–1795) brought large numbers of Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, and Lithuanians under tsarist rule. After having abolished the political structure of the nobles' republic and incorporated the large territory into the imperial administration, Catherine II followed the traditional pattern of cooperation with loyal non-Russian elites. She co-opted many of the numerous loyal Polish nobles into the imperial elite and confirmed their landholdings (with many Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian serfs) and their social privileges. She granted self-administration to the towns and recognized the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish language. The tolerance of enlightened absolutism, however, did not apply to the Uniate Church, which was officially dissolved in 1839.

After 1772 Russia had to deal with a great number of Jews for the first time in its history. In the first years the politics of enlightened absolutism proclaimed tolerance and granted equality to the Jews, who were incorporated into the estates of townspeople. But from the 1780s on, and especially from 1804, the Jews of Russia faced discrimination. They were allowed to settle only in the so-called pale of Jewish settlement in the west of the empire and had to pay double taxes. Under Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) the Jews lost other former rights.

In 1815 the Congress of Vienna established a Kingdom of Poland, often referred to as Congress Poland, which embraced the central provinces of former Poland-Lithuania and was united with the Russian Empire. The new hereditary king of Poland, Tsar Alexander I (r. 1801–1825), granted the kingdom a constitution that was the most liberal in Europe at the time, an almost complete autonomy with a separate army and self-government and a guarantee for the Polish language and the Catholic

religion. These were unusual concessions that are explained by the international situation, the striving for independence of many Poles, and a possible role of the kingdom as a model for reforms in Russia. However, conflicts soon arose between the Russian government and Polish nobles who aimed at restoring the old kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. The Polish uprising of November 1830 and the following war with Russia put an end to the Kingdom of Poland. After the defeat of the Poles, Russia gave up cooperation with the “traitorous” Poles and integrated Poland into Russian administration.

In 1809 and 1812, respectively, Finland and Bessarabia were annexed by Russia. The Grand Duchy of Finland was granted a great measure of autonomy through guarantees of the status quo, the Lutheran religion, and the rights and privileges of the population. The Swedish nobility of Finland was co-opted into the imperial nobility, and many of its members served in the Russian army and navy. In contrast to the Polish nobility, they remained loyal to the tsar during the nineteenth century and maintained their social position within the empire. The large autonomy Finland was granted for the first time in 1809 laid the groundwork for the creation of a Finnish nation-state. Bessarabia, the territory between Dniester and Pruth, annexed in 1812 from the Ottoman Empire, was also guaranteed wide autonomy, which, however, was considerably curtailed in 1828. Although St. Petersburg co-opted the Romanian elite into the imperial nobility, the legal and administrative status quo of the former Ottoman province did not fit into the Westernized model of rule in Russia.

In its western peripheries, the tsarist government had to deal with societies that were influenced by the Renaissance, Catholicism, and Protestantism, and by Western legal systems and traditions of estates and urban and regional autonomy—societies that were usually more advanced in terms of education and economic development than the Russians. The empire profited from the special skills of its subjects; for instance, of the Baltic Germans, Poles, and Finns in the army, navy, and bureaucracy; of the Jews and Armenians in trade; and of all of them in education and scholarship.

As pressure on non-Russians in the West became greater under Catherine II, the repressive policy toward non-Christians in the East was lifted, and Russia again looked for cooperation with Muslim elites. Volga Tatar and Crimean Tatar aristocrats were co-opted into the nobility, and Catherine II tried to use Volga Tatar merchants and mullahs

as mediators in the relations with Kazakhstan and Central Asia. She also created special religious administrations for the Muslims of the empire.

The conquest of the Caucasus region in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century brought new Muslim and Christian groups under Tsarist rule. The Muslim khanates and Georgian kingdoms lost their political self-government and were integrated into the administrative structures of the empire. After the final annexation of southern Caucasia in 1828, Russia began to cooperate with its elites. Many of the very numerous Georgian and Muslim aristocrats were co-opted into the imperial nobility, and the Armenian merchants into the urban estates. So the social and economic status quo was respected. While the autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church was abolished, the privileges of the Armenian Gregorian Church and the (mostly Shiite) Muslims were guaranteed. The mountaineers (*gortsy*) of the Caucasus rose up against tsarist rule and under Imam Shamil fought a holy war of more than thirty years against Russia. The tsarist armies that fought the Caucasian wars with great brutality succeeded only in 1864 “pacifying” the ethnic groups of Dagestan, the Chechens, and the Circassians. Hundreds of thousands of Caucasians were killed or forced to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire. After the conquest of the North Caucasus, the Russian government respected the religious and social status quo and cooperated with loyal non-Russian Muslim elites. On the other hand the government promoted Russian and Ukrainian colonization in the northern Caucasus, which became a source for new conflicts.

The evolutionist thinking of the European Enlightenment led to a new classification of peoples according to their alleged degree of civilization. Non-sedentary ethnic groups were regarded as inferior subjects, and they were combined in the new legal estate category of *inorodtsy* (aliens, allogenes) in 1822. During the first half of the nineteenth century most Siberian indigenes and the recently subjugated Kazakh nomads were integrated into the category of *inorodtsy*. They retained their social organization, their belief systems, and certain rights of local autonomy, but were second-class subjects only. After the military conquest of Central Asia from the 1860s to the 1880s, other Muslim nomads (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen), as well as the sedentary Muslims of its south, were integrated into the estate of *inorodtsy* (here called *tuzemtsy*). Here, for the first time, the tsarist government did not accept sedentary foreign aristocrats and mer-

chants as equals. In Central Asia, Russia followed a policy of noninterference, and the Muslim population retained many of its administrative, legal, social, and religious rights. Russia's main interests in Central Asia were strategic (the "Great Game" with Great Britain) and economic (such as the cultivation of cotton). While most of the Central Asian territory was integrated into the imperial administration, the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva were not annexed to Russia, but formally kept their independence as a Russian protectorate.

The tsarist policy in Central Asia followed a typical colonial pattern. The region was a supplier of raw materials and a market for finished products. The fertile soils of the northern Kazakh steppe in the last decades of tsarist Russia were colonized by millions of European (mostly Russian and Ukrainian) settlers, and the nomads were driven away from their summer pastures. This caused many conflicts, which culminated in an armed uprising in Central Asia in 1916. There was a great cultural gap between the indigenous population of Central Asia and the Russians. The native peoples—not only the nomads, but also the settled Muslims—were segregated from Europeans and regarded as inferiors by Russians. This policy reflected the influence of European colonialism and imperialism. Russia as a European power had to fulfill its "mission civilisatrice" among the "uncivilized" Asians, who in reality were the heirs of a high civilization much older than the Russian.

In the west of the empire, the traditional pattern of rule was altered after the 1860s. First, this change was caused by the Great Reforms aiming at systematization and homogenization of the administrative, juridical, social, and educational structures. The reforms clashed with traditional privileges and rights of autonomy of the regional elites, who often perceived them as measures of Russification. Second, as a result of the growing number of educated Russians, the government was no longer dependent on the special services of non-Russians in the army, bureaucracy, education, and trade. Third, it was nationalism that undermined the foundations of the Russian empire and changed the character of tsarist policy.

The crucial problem from 1830 to 1914 was the Polish question. It heavily influenced tsarist policies in general and especially nationalities policies. Poland was strategically and economically important, and the Poles were the most numerous non-Russian (i.e., non-East Slavic) and non-Orthodox nationality of the empire. The Polish re-

bellions destroyed the traditional bases of tsarist policies. After 1863 Russia renounced cooperation with the Polish nobility and began to rule over Poland without its assistance. The subsequent repressive policy not only against disloyal Polish rebels, but against all signs of Polishness, including the language, the Catholic Church, and even the name Poland, can be interpreted both as punishment and as measures to ensure law and order. Tsarism did not aim at a full assimilation of the Polish nation, but the repressive Russification policy severely hampered the development of Polish culture and society in the Russian Empire.

The change of nationalities policies after 1863 had severe impact on the Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians. Their national movements, which had just begun to develop, were thought to be a "Polish intrigue" organized by Polish and Jesuit agitators. In reality they were directed primarily against the social and cultural dominance of the Polish nobility. The printing of publications in Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian (in the last case in Latin letters) was prohibited, and the (moderate) activities of the national movements were stopped.

Thus, after 1863 the tsarist government openly pursued the goal of linguistic Russification for the first time. In the case of the Ukrainians and Belorussians, who were regarded as Russians, it aimed at strengthening their genuine Russianness against Polish influences. This policy on the whole was successful, and the Ukrainian and Belorussian national movements were severely hampered. In the case of Poles and Lithuanians, however, the extreme measures, especially against the Catholic Church, led to protest and contributed to the national mobilization of the Lithuanian and Polish peasants.

The Polish uprising of 1863 was also an important catalyst of Russian nationalism. Although the tsarist government regarded Russian nationalism with suspicion, because it called into question traditional legitimacy and the autocratic monopoly on power, nationalism not only mobilized great parts of educated society but made its way into the bureaucracy and had increasing influence on policy making. After 1863, in a spiral of mutual challenge and response, Russian nationalism and tsarist repression escalated.

In the following decades the repressive policy was extended to elites who for a long time had been models of great loyalty to the dynasty. Now their non-Russianness came to be regarded as potential

disloyalty. During the reign of Alexander III (1881–1894) a policy of standardization and administrative and cultural Russification was initiated in the Baltic provinces and provoked the resistance of the Baltic Germans. During the 1890s Finland became the object of the policy of forceful integration, which unleashed national mobilization not only of the old Swedish-speaking elite, but of the broad Finnish masses. From 1881 on, the government enforced discriminatory measures against Jews, who were suspected of being revolutionaries and traitors and who were scapegoated. Anti-Semitism became an important part of Russian integral nationalism, although the tsarist government did not organize the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1881 and of 1903 to 1906. In Transcaucasia from the 1870s Russification measures alienated the Georgian noble elite and, after the 1880s, the Armenian Church and middle class.

In the last third of the nineteenth century, the tsarist government renounced cooperation with most of the co-opted loyal nobilities (Poles, Baltic Germans, Finlanders, Georgians) and loyal middle classes (Jews, Armenians). With the rise of ethnic nationalism and growing tensions in foreign policy, loyalty was expected only from members of the Russian nation and not from non-Russian elites, who were regarded with growing suspicion. On the whole the repressive measures against non-Russians in the western and southern periphery had counterproductive results, strengthening national resistance and enlarging national movements.

However, the tsarist policy toward most of the ethnic groups of the East remained basically unchanged. It is true that state and church tried to strengthen Orthodox faith and “Russianness” among the Christianized peoples of the Volga-Ural-Region, but the so-called Ilminsky system, which introduced native languages into missionary work, was above all a defensive measure against the growing appeal of Islam. By creating literary languages and native-language schools for many small ethnic groups, it furthered in the long run their cultural nationalism. In the last fifty years of tsarism, there were only cautious missionary activities and virtually no Russificatory measures among the Muslims of the empire.

In 1905 peasants and workers in the western and southern peripheries were the most active promoters of the revolution. The revolution unleashed a short “spring of nations” that embraced nearly all ethnic groups of the empire. The removal of most political and some cultural restrictions and

the possibility of political participation in the first two State Dumas (1906–1907) caused widespread national mobilization. Although the tsarist government soon afterward restricted individual and collective liberties and rights, it could not return to the former policy of repression and Russification. The violent insurrections of Latvian, Estonian, and Georgian peasants and of Polish, Jewish, Latvian, and Armenian workers made clear that turning away from cooperation with the regional elites had proved to be dangerous for social and political stability. The tsarist government tried to split non-Russians by a policy of divide and rule and partially returned to the coalition with loyal, conservative forces among non-Russians. On the other hand it was influenced by the rising ethnic Russian nationalism, which was used to integrate Russian society and to bridge its deep social and political cleavages. Despite the many unresolved political, social, economic, and ethno-national problems, the government managed to hold together the heterogeneous empire until 1917. The national questions were not among the main causes for the collapse of the tsarist regime in February 1917, but they became crucial for the dissolution of the empire after October 1917.

See also: ILMINSKY, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; NATIONALISM IN THE TSARIST EMPIRE; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATION AND NATIONALITY; OFFICIAL NATIONALITY; RUSSIFICATION; SLAVOPHILES

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ANDREAS KAPPELER

NATION AND NATIONALITY

The concepts of nation and nationality are extremely difficult to define. According to one important view, a nation is a sovereign people—a voluntary civic community of equal citizens; according to another, a nation is an ethnic community bound by common language, culture, and ancestry. Civic nations and ethnic nations as defined here are ideals that do not exist in reality, for most nations combine civic and ethnic characteristics, and either civic or ethnic features may predominate in any given community. In national communities where citizenship is seen as a major unifying force, the term *nationality* usually denotes citizenship; in nations whose unity rests largely on common culture and ancestry, *nationality* generally refers to ethnic origin.

There is little agreement about the balance between ethnic and civic components within nations, or between subjective characteristics, such as memory and will, and objective elements, such as common language or territory. Most scholars hold that nations are modern sociopolitical constructs, by-products of an industrializing society. But the nature of the links between modern nations and earlier types of communities (e.g., premodern ethnic groups) is hotly contested.

Several definitions of *nation* have existed in Russia since the late eighteenth century, and there was no serious effort to regularize the terminology for discussing the issue of nationality until the 1920s and 1930s. Although the concept of nation was developed in Western Europe and was not applicable to Russia for much of the nineteenth century, the question of what constituted a nation and nationality were debated passionately.

PREREVOLUTIONARY PERIOD

In the prerevolutionary period, several different words were used in intellectual and political discussions of what constituted a nation in the context of the Russian Empire: *narod*, *narodnost*, *natsionalnost*, *natsiya*, and *plemya*. Despite some efforts to differentiate these terms, they were generally used interchangeably.

In the 1780s and the 1790s, under the impact of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, a few liberal Russian intellectuals began to use the word *narod* (people) in the meaning most closely approximating the French definition of a nation as a sovereign people. For literary figures like Nikolai Novikov and Alexander Radishchev, nobility and peasantry were united in the *narod*. They recognized, of course, that such a community was not a reality in Russia but an ideal to be achieved someday. Liberal periodicals of the time proudly printed the word with a capital *N*. The understanding of *narod* as referring only to the peasantry was a later invention of the so-called Slavophiles of the 1830s and the 1840s, whose ideas were strongly influenced by German Romanticism, which held that folk tradition was the embodiment of the spirit of the nation. The Slavophiles also explicitly separated and juxtaposed the *narod* and the upper classes, whom they termed “society” (*obshchestvennost*), arguing that society, because Europeanized, was cut off from the indigenous national tradition.

In 1819, the poet Peter Vyazemsky coined the term *narodnost* in reference to national character. A search for manifestations of *narodnost* in literature, art, and music began. In 1832, the government responded to this growing interest in the national question by formulating its own view of Russia’s essential characteristics. The future minister of enlightenment, Count Sergei Uvarov, stated that the three pillars of Russia’s existence were Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (*narodnost*, i.e., national character manifested in the folk tradition).

Whereas the Slavophiles looked for manifestations of *narodnost* in Orthodox Christianity and peasant culture, the Westernizer and literary critic Vissarion Belinsky insisted, in the 1840s, that the educated classes—the product of Peter the Great’s Europeanizing policies—were the bearers of a modern national tradition. Belinsky was thus arguing against the Slavophiles as well as Uvarov. He also offered a more precise definition of the words used to describe nation and nationality. For him, *narodnost* referred to a premodern stage in people’s de-

velopment, whereas *natsionalnost* and *natsiya* described superior developmental stages. Belinsky concluded that “Russia before Peter the Great had only been a *narod* [people] and became a *natsiya* [nation] as a result of the impetus which the reformer had given her” (Kara-Murza and Poliakov 1994, p. 25).

Other authors adopted Belinsky’s distinction between *narod* and *natsiya*, but the interchangeable usage prevailed. Even the word *plemya* (tribe), which in the twentieth century was applied to primitive communities, often meant a nation in the nineteenth. Thus, in the 1870s and the 1880s, politicians and intellectuals justified government policies of linguistic Russification in the imperial borderlands by referring to the national consolidation of “the French and German tribes.” Nor did Belinsky’s search for Russian national tradition in the Europeanized culture of the educated classes have a significant following. Instead, the exclusion of the upper classes from the *narod* by the early Slavophiles was further developed by the writer and socialist thinker Alexander Herzen in the late 1840s and the early 1850s and by members of the populist movement in the 1870s. After the February Revolution of 1917, in the discourse of elites as well as in popular usage, the upper classes, termed *burzhui* (the bourgeoisie), were excluded from the nation.

The concepts of nation and nationality began to influence tsarist government policies around the time of Alexander II’s reforms in the 1860s. At the turn of the twentieth century, the government began to use the language-based idea of nationality (*narodnost*), rather than religion, as a criterion to distinguish Russians from non-Russians and to differentiate different groups of non-Russians. *Nardnost* based on language was one of the categories in the all-Russian census of 1897.

The question of how to define the boundaries and membership of a nation or nationality was as much debated by intellectuals, scholars, and government officials in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries as it is in the early twenty-first century. The bibliographer Nikolai Rubakin’s survey of the debate on the national question in Russia and Europe (1915) divided the definitions of a nation into three categories: psychological—nations are defined by a subjective criterion, such as the will to belong voluntarily to the same community, as exemplified by the French tradition; empirical—nations are defined by objective characteristics, such as language, customs, common his-

tory, sometimes common religion and laws, as exemplified by the German tradition; and economic materialist—nations are a modern construct typical of capitalism, as maintained by Marxists. Rubakin also separately mentioned two other definitions, one equating nation and state, and the other defining nation racially as a community of individuals related by blood. In his view, all of the definitions, except for the psychological one, were expounded in the writings of Russian thinkers. The most influential of them were the concept of nationality based on language and the view that the Europeanized upper classes did not rightfully belong to the national community.

SOVIET PERIOD

How nation and nationality were defined became exceedingly important in the Soviet period, because, from the earliest days of the communist regime, nationality became a central category of policymaking for the new government. The founders of the Soviet state, Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin, followed Karl Marx's perception of nations as historically contingent and modern rather than primordial communities. In 1913, Stalin affirmed that "a nation is not racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994, p. 18). Yet the Soviet leaders admitted the reality of nations and recognized their aspiration for self-determination. Although Lenin and Stalin followed Marx's belief in the eventual disappearance of nations in the post-capitalist world, they accepted that nations would continue to exist for some time and that their aspirations would need to be satisfied during the construction of socialism. In an unprecedented experiment, the Bolshevik government institutionalized ethnoterritorial federalism, classified people according to their ethnic origins, and distributed privileges as well as punishments to different ethnically defined groups.

These policies required criteria for defining nations and nationalities more specific than those in effect before the October Revolution. The new criteria were developed in the 1920s and 1930s in preparation for the all-union censuses of 1926, 1937, and 1939. In 1913, Stalin had described a nation (*natsiya*) as "a stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994, p. 20). In the 1920s, it became apparent that the application of this definition would exclude certain distinct groups from being recog-

nized and recorded in the census. Therefore, in 1926 the less precise category of *narodnost* was accepted for the census. Given that various groups were seen as denationalized (i.e., they used Russian rather than the original native language of their community), a *narodnost* could also be defined by customs, religious practices, and physical type. At the same time, people's self-definitions in relation to nationality were taken into account. By 1927, 172 nationalities had received official status in the USSR. Policies aimed at satisfying their "national aspirations" were central to the communist reconstruction of society.

In the 1930s, the number of officially recognized nationalities was drastically reduced, on the grounds that the adoption of the *narodnost* category had allowed too many groups to receive official recognition. The 1937 and 1939 censuses used a different category, nationality (*natsionalnost*); in order to qualify for the status of *natsionalnost*, communities had not only to possess a distinct culture and customs but also to be linked to a territory and demonstrate "economic viability." In turn, *narodnost* began to refer only to smaller and less developed communities. By 1939, a list of fifty-nine major nationalities (*glavnye natsionalnosti*) was produced.

In another important development, the 1930s were marked by a departure in official discourse from the view of nations as modern constructs toward an emphasis on their primordial ethnic roots. This development was a result of the government's "extreme statism." By using sociological categories as the basis for organizing, classifying, and rewarding people, the communists were obliged to treat as concrete realities factors that, as they themselves recognized, were actually artificial constructs. This approach, in which nationality was not a voluntary self-definition but a "given" determined by birth, culminated in the introduction of the category of "nationality" (meaning not citizenship but ethnic origin inherited from parents) in Soviet passports in 1932.

The view of nations as primordial ethnic communities was reinforced in the 1960s and 1970s by the new theory of the "ethnos," defined by the Soviet ethnographer Yuly Bromlei as "a historically stable entity of people developed on a certain territory and possessing common, relatively stable features of culture . . . and psyche as well as a consciousness of their unity and of their difference from other similar entities" (Tishkov 1997, p. 3). For Bromlei, the ethnos attains its highest form in

the nation. Only communities with their own union or autonomous republics were considered socialist nations.

The same period was marked by a debate about the "Soviet narod," whose existence as a fully formed community was postulated by Leonid Brezhnev in 1974. The Soviet narod was defined as the historical social unity of the diverse Soviet nationalities rather than a single nation. Some ethnographers claimed, however, that a united nation with one language was being created in the USSR.

In the post-communist period, the view of nations as primordial ethnosocial communities continued to be strong. Also widespread was the perception that only one nation can have a legitimate claim on any given territory. Views of this kind are at the root of the ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, a competing definition of the nation as a voluntary civic community of equal citizens, regardless of ethnic origin, is gathering strength. Constitutions and citizenship laws in the newly independent states of the former USSR reflect the tensions between these conflicting perceptions of nationhood.

See also: ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; ETHNOGRAPHY, RUSSIAN AND SOVIET; LANGUAGE LAWS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SLAVOPHILES

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VERA TO LZ

NATO *See* NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

NAVARINO, BATTLE OF

The Battle of Navarino on October 20, 1827, resulted from a joint Anglo-French-Russian effort to mediate the Greek-Ottoman civil war. The three countries decided to intervene in the increasingly brutal conflict, which had been raging since 1821, and on October 1, 1827, British vice admiral Edward Codrington took command of a combined naval force. Codrington ordered his squadron to proceed to Navarino Bay on the southwestern coast of the Peloponnese, where an Ottoman-Egyptian fleet of three ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, forty-two corvettes, fifteen brigs, and fifty transports under the overall command of Ibrahim Pasha was moored.

Before entering the bay, the allied commanders sent Ibrahim an ultimatum demanding that he cease all operations against the Greeks. Ibrahim was absent, but his officers refused, and they opened fire when the allies sailed into the bay on the morning of October 20. In the intense fighting that ensued, the *Azov*, the Russian flagship, was at one point engaged simultaneously by five enemy vessels. Commanded by Mikhail Petrovich Lazarev, the *Azov* sank two frigates and damaged a corvette. The battle was over within four hours. The Ottoman-Egyptian fleet lost all three ships of the line along with twenty-two frigates and seven thousand sailors. Only one battered frigate and fifteen small cruisers survived. The Russian squadron left fifty-nine dead and 139 wounded.

In the aftermath, the recriminations began almost immediately. The duke of Wellington, Britain's prime minister, denounced Codrington's decision to take action as an "untoward event." From the British standpoint, the annihilation of the Turkish-Egyptian fleet was problematic, because it strengthened Russia's position in the Mediterranean. Shortly after the battle Codrington was recalled to London. Tsar Nicholas I awarded the Cross of St. George to Vice Admiral L. P. Geiden, the commander of the Russian squadron, and promoted Lazarev to rear admiral. The *Azov* was granted the Ensign of St. George, which in accordance with tradition would be handed down, over the generations, to other vessels bearing the same name. The Russian squadron recovered from the battle and repaired its ships at Malta. During the Russo-Turkish War of

1828 to 1829, Geiden took command of Rear Admiral Peter Rikord's squadron from Kronstadt. The Russian fleet now numbered eight ships of the line, seven frigates, one corvette, and six brigs. Geiden and Rikord blockaded the Dardanelles and impeded Ottoman-Egyptian operations against the Greeks. After the war's end, Geiden's squadron returned to the Baltic.

See also: GREECE, RELATIONS WITH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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JOHN C. K. DALY

NAVY *See* BALTIC FLEET; BLACK SEA FLEET; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; NORTHERN FLEET; PACIFIC FLEET.

NAZARBAYEV, NURSULTAN ABISHEVICH

(b. 1940), Communist Party, Soviet, and Kazakh government official.

Born into a rural family of the Kazakh Large Horde in the Alma-Ata region, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbaev finished technical school in 1960, attended a higher technical school from 1964 to 1967, and married Sara Alpysovna, an agronomist-economist. He joined the Communist Party (CPSU) in 1962, began working in both the Temirtau City Soviet and Party Committee in 1969, and advanced rapidly thereafter. In 1976 he graduated from the external program of the CPSU Central Committee's Higher Party School, and from 1977 to 1979 he led the Party's Karaganda Committee. Nazabayev's abilities as a "pragmatic technocrat," and the support of such patrons as the Kazakh Party's powerful first secretary Dinmukhammed Kunayev and Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov and Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov in Moscow ensured his election as a secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee in 1979,



Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of independent Kazakhstan.

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to the Soviet Party's Central Auditing Commission from 1981 to 1986, to chairmanship of the Kazakh SSR's Council of Ministers in 1984, and to the CPSU Central Committee in March 1986.

In the riots following Kunaev's ouster in December 1986, Nazarbayev sought to control student demonstrators. Rather than harming his career, his stance won him considerable support among Kazakh nationalists, and loyalty to Mikhail Gorbachev ensured his place on the Soviet Central Committee. Elected to the new Congress of People's Deputies, he quickly became the Kazakh Party's first secretary when ethnic riots again broke out in June 1989. From February 1990 he also was chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet, which elected him the Kazakh SSR's president in April. He joined the Soviet Politburo in that July but, after briefly temporizing during the August 1991 putsch, left the Soviet Party the following September. He presided over the Kazakh Party's dissolution in Oc-

tober, and then won a massive electoral victory on December 1, 1991. As president, Nazarbaev oversaw formation of an independent Republic of Kazakhstan and its entry into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Despite deep ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions; continuing economic crisis; Russian neglect; and bitter political disputes within the elite, he maintained Kazakhstan's unity and position within the CIS. To this end he replaced the parliament with a People's Assembly in 1995, and a referendum extended his term until 2000. Surprising the opposition by calling new elections, Nazarbaev became virtual president-for-life in January 1999 and, with his family dynasty, dominates a powerful cabinet regime that often constrains, but has not abolished, Kazakh civil liberties.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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DAVID R. JONES

NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939

The Nazi-Soviet Pact is the name given to the Treaty of Non-Aggression signed by Ribbentrop for Germany and Molotov for the USSR on August 23, 1939.

In August 1939, following the failure of attempts to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain and France for mutual assistance and military support to protect the USSR from an invasion by Adolf Hitler, the Soviet Union abandoned its attempts to achieve collective security agreements, which was the basis of Maxim Maximovich Litvinov's foreign policy during the 1930s. Instead, Soviet leaders sought an accommodation with Germany. For German politicians, the dismissal of Litvinov and the appointment of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov

as commissar for foreign affairs on May 3, 1939, was a signal that the USSR was seeking a rapprochement. The traditional interpretation that Molotov was pro-German, and that his appointment was a direct preparation for the pact, has been called into question. It seems more likely that in appointing Molotov, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin was prepared to seize any opportunity that presented itself to improve Soviet security.

Diplomatic contact with Germany on economic matters had been maintained during the negotiations with Great Britain and France, and in June and July of 1939, Molotov was not indifferent to initial German approaches for an improvement in political relations. On August 15, the German ambassador proposed that Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, should visit Moscow for direct negotiations with Stalin and Molotov, who in response suggested a non-aggression pact.

Ribbentrop flew to Moscow on August 23, and the Treaty of Nonaggression was signed in a few hours. By its terms the Soviet Union and Germany undertook not to attack each other either alone or in conjunction with other powers and to remain neutral if the other power became involved in a war with a third party. They further agreed not to participate in alliances aimed at the other state and to resolve disputes and conflicts by consultation and arbitration. With Hitler about to attack Poland, the usual provision in treaties of this nature, allowing one signatory to opt out if the other committed aggression against a third party, was missing. The agreement was for a ten-year period, and became active as soon as signed, rather than on ratification.

As significant as the treaty, and more notorious, was the Secret Additional Protocol that was attached to it, in which the signatories established their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. It was agreed that "in the event of a territorial and political rearrangement" in the Baltic states, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia were in the USSR's sphere of influence and Lithuania in Germany's. Poland was divided along the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San, placing Ukrainian and Belorussian territories in the Soviet sphere of influence, together with a part of ethnic Poland in Warsaw and Lublin provinces. The question of the maintenance of an independent Poland and its frontiers was left open. In addition, Germany declared itself "disinterested" in Bessarabia.



USSR foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov (right), German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (left), and Josef Stalin (center) at the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, August 23, 1939. © CORBIS

The treaty denoted the USSR's retreat into neutrality when Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and Great Britain and France declared war. Poland collapsed rapidly, but the USSR delayed until September 17 before invading eastern Poland, although victory was achieved within a week. From November 1939, the territory was incorporated in the USSR. Estonia and Latvia were forced to sign mutual assistance treaties with the USSR and to accept the establishment of Soviet military bases in September and October of 1939. Finnish resistance to Soviet proposals to improve the security of Leningrad through a mutual assistance treaty led to the Soviet-Finnish War (1939–1940). Lithuania was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence in a supplementary agreement signed on September 28, 1939, and signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR in October. Romania ceded Bessarabia following a Soviet ultimatum in June 1940.

It is often argued that, in signing the treaty, Stalin, who always believed that Hitler would attack the USSR for *lebensraum*, was seeking time to prepare the Soviet Union for war, and hoped for a considerably longer period than he received, for Germany invaded during June of 1941. Considerable efforts were made to maintain friendly relations with Germany between 1939 and 1941, including a November 1940 visit by Molotov to Berlin for talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop.

The Secret Protocol undermined the socialist foundations of Soviet foreign policy. It called for the USSR to embark upon territorial expansion, even if this was to meet the threat to its security presented by Germany's conquest of Poland. This may explain why, for a long period, the Secret Protocol was known only from the German copy of the document: The Soviet Union denied its existence, a position that Molotov maintained until his

death in 1986. The Soviet originals were published for the first time in 1993.

In all Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, during August 1987, during the *glasnost* era, demonstrations on the anniversary of the pact were evidence of resurgent nationalism. In early 1990 the states declared their independence, the first real challenge to the continued existence of the USSR.

See also: GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; MOLOTOV, VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH; WORLD WAR II

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DEREK WATSON

NEAR ABROAD

The term *near abroad* is used by the Russian Federation to refer to the fourteen Soviet successor states other than Russia. During the Yeltsin era Russia had to cope with the collapse of Communism and the transition to a market economy, and the end of the Cold War and the loss of superpower status. This caused a national identity crisis that engendered key shifts in Russian foreign policy toward what it designates the near abroad. (The fourteen republics do not call themselves "near abroad.") Should Russia assert itself as the dominant power throughout the territories of the ex-USSR in its desire to protect Russians living abroad? Or alternatively, now that the Cold War was over, should Russia adopt a position enabling reduced prospects of nuclear war and the possibility of the expansion of NATO to include the near abroad countries? This uncertainty, compounded by widespread economic, social, and political instability, affected Russian objectives toward the near abroad. Three different approaches emerged. First, the integrationalists and reformers (such as Andrei Kozyrev) argued that Russia's expansionist days were over and that it must therefore identify more closely with the West, promote Russia's integration into world economy, and ensure that the European security system includes Russia. This means taking a soft, noninterventionist stance on the near

abroad. Second, Centrists and Eurasianists (including Victor Chernomyrdin and Yevgeny Primakov) stressed the need to take into account Russia's history, culture, and geography and to ensure that Russia's national interest is protected. They sought to gain access to the military resources of the successor states, seal unprotected borders, and contain external threats, namely Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. For these reasons Centrists and Eurasianists wanted to forge links or build bridges between Russia and Asia (namely Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and China). Finally, the traditionalists and nationalists (such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Gennady Zyuganov) are anti-Western and pro-Russian/Slavophile. They advocate a neo-imperialist Russian policy that seeks to restore the old USSR (Zyuganov) or at least build stronger links between Russia and other Slavic nations (Zhirinovskiy). Such politicians have frequently made reference to alleged abuses of the rights of ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking populations in near abroad countries to justify such a stance.

Throughout the 1990s, reactions to key issues relating to the near abroad varied considerably. Thus nationalists tended to oppose NATO enlargement, criticize Western policy toward the Balkans and Iraq, and be concerned about the fate of Russians abroad, whereas liberals favored growing Western involvement in the ex-USSR and a moderate stance on the near abroad. Russians in general were concerned about the nuclear weapons left in successor states (i.e., Ukraine), with the role of ex-USSR armed forces, and with the possibility that conflicts in successor states (including Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan) may spread to Russia. Despite the West's initial fears and Russian criticism of NATO's Eastern enlargement, it still went ahead, because Yeltsin preferred to mend fences with Ukraine and improve relations with China and Japan. Also some of his government colleagues (e.g., Primakov) preferred closer relations with Belarus, while others such as Anatoly Chubais wanted closer relations with the West (via IMF, etc.). Furthermore, Yeltsin wanted to retain Western support for Russia's drive toward market and liberal democracy, so he was willing to sacrifice old "spheres of influence" and adopt a less aggressive stance on the near abroad. Yeltsin realized that Russia, weakened by the loss of its superpower status, was no longer able to police the ex-USSR. As a consequence, Yeltsin largely ignored the near abroad in favor of alliances with other powers resentful of American supremacy (e.g., China, India). Through-

out the 1990s, Yeltsin pursued a Gorbachev-style policy concerning the West and continued to cut ties with the East while maintaining a watchful eye over the near abroad, a new area of concern, given the presence of up to 30 million ethnic Russians in these countries. Wherever possible Yeltsin sought to maximize Russian influence over the other former Soviet republics. Vladimir Putin has continued to walk the tightrope between assertiveness and integration, taking into account the nature of the new world order of the twenty-first century.

See also: CHERNOMYRDIN, VIKTOR STEPANOVICH; KOZYREV, ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH; PRIMAKOV, YEVGENY MAXIMOVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

NECHAYEV, SERGEI GERADIEVICH

(1847–1882), Russian revolutionary terrorist.

Sergei Nechayev epitomizes the notion of using any means, however ruthless, to further revolution. He is perhaps best known for his coauthorship of what is commonly known as the *Catechism of a Revolutionary* (1869). From its initial sentence, "The revolutionary is a doomed man," to its twenty-sixth clause, calling for an "invincible, all-shattering force" for revolution, the *Catechism* has inspired generations of revolutionary terrorists. A public reading of the brief tract and the investigation of the murder of a member of his own organization at the trial of his followers in 1871 gave Nechayev instant notoriety. The notion that the end justified any means repelled most Russian revolutionaries, but others, then and later, admired

Nechayev's total commitment to revolution. One of his admirers was Vladimir Lenin. Fyodor Dostoyevsky demonized Nechayev in the guise of Peter Verkhovensky in *The Possessed* (1873), but Rodion Raskolnikov in *Crime and Punishment* (1866) has more psychological features in common with the real person.

Born in Ivanovo, a Russian textile center, the gifted Nechayev had little hope of realizing his ambitions there. In 1866 he moved to St. Petersburg, where he obtained a teaching certificate. He quickly involved himself in the lively student movement in the city's institutions of higher education, and he joined radical circles. The regime's policies had driven the most committed revolutionaries underground, where they formed conspiracies to assassinate Alexander II and to incite the peasants to revolt. In 1868 and 1869 Nechayev began to show his ruthlessness in his methods of recruitment. When a police crackdown occurred in March 1869, he fled to Switzerland to make contact with Russian emigrés, who published the journal *The Bell* in Geneva. Nechayev falsified the extent of the movement and his role in it in order to gain the collaboration of Mikhail Bakunin and Nikolai Ogarev, who, with Alexander Herzen, published the journal. The romantic Bakunin especially admired ruthless men of action, and his connection with Nechayev foreshadowed future relationships between the theorists of revolution and unsavory figures. Before Nechayev's return to Russia in September 1869, he and Bakunin wrote the *Catechism of a Revolutionary* and several other proclamations heralding the birth of a revolutionary conspiracy, the People's Revenge. Bakunin's tie with Nechayev figured in the former's expulsion from the First International in 1872.

With vast energy and unscrupulous methods, Nechayev involved more than one hundred people in his conspiracy. Its only notable achievement, however, was the murder of Ivan Ivanov, who had tried to opt out. Nechayev and four others lured Ivanov to a grotto on the grounds of the Petrov Agricultural Academy in Moscow, where they murdered him on November 21, 1869. Nechayev escaped to Switzerland and remained at large until arrested by Swiss authorities in August 1872. They extradited him to Russia, where he was tried for Ivanov's murder and imprisoned in 1873. Nechayev died in the Peter and Paul Fortress in 1882.

Some historians have presented Nechayev as an extremist who harmed his cause, while others have studied him as a clinical case. Early Soviet histori-

ans admired him as a Bolshevik type. In the period of glasnost and after, Russian writers saw in Nechayev a forerunner of Stalin and other pathologically destructive dictators.

See also: BAKUNIN, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH; DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; HERZEN, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH; TERRORISM

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NEKRASOV, NIKOLAI ALEXEYEVICH

(1821–1878), one of Russia's most famous poets.

Painfully aware of the injustice of serfdom, Nikolai Nekrasov (the “master poet of the peasant masses”) was the first poet to make the “People” (*narod*) the focal point of his poetry—especially the downtrodden, who became the symbol of national suffering and exploitation. In one of his masterpieces, the satiric folk epic *Who Can Be Happy and Free in Russia?* (written between 1873 and 1877), seven peasants try endlessly to guess the answer to the question in the title. Nekrasov also served for thirty years as editor of *Sovremeniik* (*The Contemporary*), a journal he bought in 1847. Ivan Turgenev, Alexander Herzen, Vissarion Belinsky, and Fyodor Dostoevsky gladly sent their writings to him, and soon Nekrasov became a leading intellectual figure of the time. Censorship was at its height at the beginning of his career, intensified by the French Revolution of 1848 and later the Crimean War (1854–1856), and Nekrasov was only able to write freely after the death of Nicholas I and the accession of the liberal Alexander II.

The decade from 1855 to 1865 was one of the bright periods in Russian literature. Serfdom was abolished (1861), *Sovremeniik's* readership steadily increased, and Nekrasov published some of his finest poems, including “The Peasant Children,” “Orina, the Mother of a Soldier,” “The Gossips,”

“The Peddlers,” and “The Railway.” Some contemporaries criticized Nekrasov for his didacticism and prosiness. The enthusiastic response of radical revolutionaries to his poetry confirmed their suspicion that he was primarily a propagandist. But Nekrasov, as he wrote to Leo Tolstoy, believed that the role of a writer was to be a “teacher” and a “representative for the humble and voiceless.”

Nekrasov's empathy for the poor and oppressed stemmed from his life experiences. He was the son of a noble family that had lost its wealth and land. His father, an officer in the army, had eloped with the daughter of a Polish aristocrat, inducing her to give up her wealth. The couple settled in Yaroslav Province on the Volga River, where the young Nekrasov could hear and see convicts pass on their way to Siberia. His father, who had become the local police chief, often took Nekrasov with him on his rounds, during which the boy heard the condescending way he spoke to peasants and witnessed the cruel corporal punishments he inflicted on them. When Nekrasov was seventeen, his father sent him to St. Petersburg to join the army, cutting off his funds when he disobeyed and tried to enter the university instead. It took the poet three years of near-starvation before he could make enough money from his writing to survive.

See also: GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; POPULISM

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

NEMCHINOV, VASILY SERGEYEVICH

(1894–1964), Soviet statistician, mathematical economist, and reformer.

Though originally trained as a statistician, Nemchinov became one of the most versatile and productive members of the Soviet economics es-

tablishment. During the early period of his career, his specialty was agricultural economics and statistics, on which he published a number of important theoretical works. He developed methods for measuring livestock herds and grain harvests from aerial observations, which were intended to remove human error but led ironically to the scandalous exaggeration of Soviet grain harvests. In 1940 he became director of the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy in Moscow. He was elected academician of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences in 1940, and of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1946.

Nemchinov was often in political trouble. In 1948, in the struggle with Trofim Lysenko over genetics, he harbored a number of modern geneticists in the Timiryazev Academy and defended them against the Lysenko forces. As a result, he was forced out as Academy director and was even removed from his position in the statistics department. He went home to await arrest, but the Soviet Academy of Sciences stood by him, and he was appointed chairman of a new Council on Productive Forces. He remained an important figure in the Academy, holding, for example, the position of academician-secretary of the department of economic, philosophical, and legal sciences from 1954 to 1958.

The final phase of his career centered on the introduction of mathematical methods into Soviet economics. In 1958, he organized in the Academy of Sciences the first laboratory devoted to the application of mathematical methods in economics, which later became the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute. He was the driving force in setting up the first conference on mathematical methods in economic research and planning in 1960. He headed the scientific council on the use of mathematical methods and computer technology in economic research and planning in the Academy and organized the faculty of mathematical methods of analysis of the economy at Moscow State University. His role in developing linear programming methods and economic models was rewarded posthumously in 1965 by the conferral of the Lenin Prize.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; LYSENKO, TROFIM DENISOVICH

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NEMTSOV, BORIS IVANOVICH

(b. 1959), prominent liberal politician and leader of the Union of Right Forces.

Born in Sochi, Boris Ivanovich Nemtsov received a doctorate in physics in 1990. From 1990 to 1993 he was a member of the Congress of People's Deputies, serving on the Council for Legislative Affairs. In 1991 President Boris Yeltsin made him the governor of Nizhny Novgorod.

Nemtsov quickly moved to transform the province into a cutting-edge experiment in free-market economics. Obtaining a license to open a business in post-communist Russia plunged would-be entrepreneurs into a nightmare of bureaucratic corruption. Nemtsov made it possible to register new businesses by mail, and allowed the project to go forward if the petitioner received no answer within a reasonable amount of time. Equally innovative in agricultural affairs, Nemtsov enabled members of collective farms to acquire individual plots, and he introduced tax breaks for struggling businesses. To deal with the inefficient Soviet practice whereby industrial enterprises had to provide housing and other social services for employees, the new governor encouraged companies to raise wages instead so that their workers could afford to pay for rent and utilities. These policies and Nemtsov himself proved immensely popular, and he was elected governor outright in 1995, receiving 60 percent of the vote. Nemtsov was so popular, in fact, that the Yeltsin camp of reformers briefly considered running him for president in 1996 against the communist Gennady Zyuganov. Nothing came of this, but in 1997, after Yeltsin's reelection, Nemtsov reluctantly accepted the office of first deputy prime minister.

In Moscow Nemtsov and his colleagues launched a program of economic "shock therapy." The new deputy minister was charged with making bidding for government contracts more open and competitive, forcing railroads and electricity suppliers to cut their prices, reducing household utility rates by 30 percent, and overhauling the Pension and Securities Insurance Fund. Little wonder Nemtsov called his job "politically suicidal" (Aron, 2000, p. 367).

Nemtsov began by making all government contracts valued at more than 900 million rubles, including military contracts, subject to competitive bidding. He then plunged into the state's sale of 25 percent of Svyazinvest, the national telecom-

munications enterprise. Nemtsov publicly declared that the sale would be a national test of the government's ability to take on the notorious "oligarchs" who had looted many of Russia's assets in the years after communism.

The losers in the bidding for Svyazinvest used their media outlets to open a blistering campaign against the government, but more serious was a sharp drop in global oil prices, a vital source of government income. Simultaneously a financial crisis that had begun in Asia spread to Russia, causing investors to flee from emerging market economies. By the spring of 1998 Russia was on the verge of economic collapse, and in March Yeltsin dismissed his entire cabinet, including Nemtsov. The following year Nemtsov was elected to the Duma of the Russian Federation.

See also: BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMIC; KIRIYENKO, SERGEI VLADILENOVICH; PRIVATIZATION; SHOCK THERAPY; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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HUGH PHILLIPS

NENETS

The Nenets are the most numerous of Russia's northern peoples, numbering about 35,000, and one of the most northerly. Their homelands stretch along the Arctic coast, from northeastern Europe to the Taymyr Peninsula. Most Nenets are concentrated in the Nenets Autonomous District and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District. Much of their territory is tundra; and their economy, based on large-scale reindeer pastoralism, has been the main adaptation to this harsh environment. The Nenets language belongs to the Samoyedic branch of the Uralic languages. Language retention among Nenets is higher than among most other northern peoples, due to the remoteness of their settlements and their continuing nomadism.

Western Nenets have a long history of contact with Russians, some paying tribute to Novgorod by the thirteenth century, and to the Tatars shortly thereafter. As Russians began to colonize Siberia in



A Nenets woman and her two children from Antipayuta settlement, northern Russia. © JACQUES LANGEVIN/CORBIS SYGMA

the mid-seventeenth century they met occasional fierce resistance from Nenets groups. They also incorporated Nenets into state-building projects, resettling some to Novaya Zemlya in the nineteenth century, in an effort to ensure sovereignty over those islands.

The Soviets began to establish reindeer-herding collective farms in Nenets territory in 1929. Repression of wealthy herders followed, as did the confiscation of their reindeer and the general sedentarization of children, elderly, and some women. Nenets opposed such moves in several uprisings, which the Soviets quelled, then covered up. However, given the minimal prospects for developing this part of the Arctic, the Soviets generally encouraged the continuation of traditional Nenets activities.

Nenets homelands are particularly rich in oil and gas deposits. As technology improved by the latter twentieth century, making exploitation of these resources viable even given the harsh Arctic climate, development ensued. The greatest challenges for the Nenets became the construction of gas wells and pipelines across their reindeer pastures. Reindeer herds at the beginning of the twenty-first century exceeded pasture carrying capacity, and pasture destruction due to hydrocarbon development has exacerbated this problem. Development also encouraged massive in-migration into Nenets

homelands by non-Nenets peoples. In post-Soviet years, these gas-rich areas experienced less out-migration than other northern areas.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Nenets have actively pursued their rights, creating regional Nenets organizations for this purpose. Reindeer-herding leaders have established ties with herders in Finland, Sweden, and Norway to pursue complementary agendas of economic development and environmental protection.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NORTHERN PEOPLES; SIBERIA

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GAIL A. FONDAHL

NEOCLASSICISM

Neoclassicism is often termed simply classicism in Russia as, unlike those European countries which had experienced the Renaissance, Russia was exploring the classical vocabulary of ancient Greece and Rome for the first time. Classical motifs had appeared in Russia in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries but it was not until the 1760s that a coherent classical revival emerged, fueled by the work of scholars such as Johann Joachim Winckelmann, whose publications were generating a more comprehensive understanding of the forms and functions of classical art. The effect of this growing veneration for the noble grandeur of classical forms is evident in the Marble Palace (1768–1785) in St. Petersburg by Antonio Rinaldi, in which the flamboyant exuberance of the Baroque is partially displaced by a more dignified restraint. Jean-Baptiste Vallin de la Mothe also applied neoclassical principles in his design for the Academy of Arts (1765–1789), itself a prime conduit of European artistic debates. The low dome, rusticated basement, and giant order of columns and pilasters serve as a visual reminder of the classical ideal to which the Academy's students were expected to aspire.

During Catherine II's reign, neoclassicism flourished in the private sphere, notably in the work that the Scottish architect Charles Cameron undertook at Tsarskoye Selo after his arrival in Russia in 1779. Cameron, who greatly admired the studies of the antique by Andrea Palladio and Charles-Louis Clérisseau and had himself published drawings of Roman baths, decorated his interiors at Tsarskoye Selo with glass or ceramic columns and molded plaster reliefs inspired by recently-discovered classical sites. Cameron went on to work for Catherine's son Paul at Pavlovsk, where his Temple of Friendship (1780–1782) in the park correctly deployed the Greek Doric order for the first time in Russia. The classical revival was also gathering momentum in the work of the Italian architects Vincenzo Brenna and Giacomo Quarenghi, who had worked with the great neoclassical artist Anton Raphael Mengs in Rome. The Hermitage Theater (1783–1787), one of Quarenghi's masterpieces, is articulated with giant engaged Corinthian columns, niches, and statuary, while the great curved form of the auditorium is visible from the outside.

Russian as well as foreign architects were working in the neoclassical style. Vasily Bazhenov, who had studied abroad as one of the first two recipients of a travel scholarship from the Academy of Arts, designed an enormous new palace complex for the Moscow Kremlin in 1768. While never realized for financial reasons, it would have applied the language of classicism on a monumental scale. His contemporary Matvei Kazakov never studied abroad, as Bazhenov had done, but brought Moscow neoclassicism to its apogee in the Senate in the Kremlin (1776–1787). Like its near contemporary in London, William Chambers's Somerset House, the Senate building uses the authority of classical forms to signify power and public purpose.

Under Alexander I, neoclassicism, also known in this period as the Alexandrian or Empire style, became increasingly prominent in the public domain. Designed by the serf-architect Andrei Voronikhin, the Mining Institute (1806–1811) in St. Petersburg included a twelve-column Doric portico and pediment based on the Temple of Poseidon at Paestum, while Thomas de Thomon reconstructed the Stock Exchange (1805–1810) as a Greek temple. The most ambitious project was Adrian Zakharov's new Admiralty (1806–1823), in which strong geometric masses and classical ornamentation coexist with specifically Russian refer-

ences. The great central pavilion is decorated with free-standing and low-relief sculptures and an open colonnade, and yet is topped by a golden spire which recalls that of the old Admiralty, while the frieze over the portal depicts Neptune presenting a trident to Peter the Great. These allegorical and structural references to the Russian past result in a distinctly national interpretation of the neoclassical style.

Not that the language of classicism was always suitable for Russian aims. The awkward proportions of the Cathedral of St. Isaac (1819–1859) by Auguste Montferrand is testimony to how disastrous some attempts to design an Orthodox church in a classical style could be. Far more successful during Nicholas I's reign is the work of Carlo Rossi, whose concern with entire architectural ensembles in St. Petersburg underlines his flair for the classical organization of space, for example in the streets, squares, and buildings that he designed to complement his Alexandrinsky Theatre (1828–1832), or in the General Staff Building (1819–1829), which completed Palace Square. This interest in town planning reverberated in provincial towns such as Odessa, where boulevards parallel to the cliff-top benefit from the dramatic views over the Black Sea.

Painting and sculpture made a less distinguished contribution to neoclassicism in Russia than architecture, but certain artists stand out. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Mikhail Kozlovsky produced some notable sculpture on classical themes, and his monument to General Suvorov portrayed the military leader rather improbably as an athletic young Mars. Ivan Martos, who had studied with Mengs in Rome, also attempted to invest his work with both Russian meanings and references to antiquity in his statue of Minin and Pozharsky (1804–1818) on Red Square, in which seventeenth-century heroes are clothed in a hybrid of classical tunics and the traditional Russian garb of long, belted shirts worn over trousers. Martos deployed the extravagant rhetorical gestures typical of much ancient sculpture, a device continued in Boris Orlovsky's statues of Marshal Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly in front of the Cathedral of the Virgin of Kazan in St. Petersburg. On a more intimate note, Fyodor Tolstoy designed bas-relief sculptures reminiscent of the work of the English neoclassical sculptor John Flaxman, while his acclaimed portrait medallions commemorating the Napoleonic War filtered patriotic sensibilities through the classical tradition of coin and medal design.

In painting, Anton Losenko's Vladimir and Rogneda of 1770 initiated a tradition of depicting Russian historical subjects in the so-called Grand Manner, the approved Academic approach which drew heavily on the classical practice of idealization, by the nineteenth century academic history painters were expected to work in the neoclassical style. In Fyodor Bruni's painting *Death of Camilla, the Sister of Horatio* (1824), the classical hero, who has placed civic virtue above familial sentiment, strikes a suitably grandiloquent pose in the center of a composition arranged like a bas-relief. But the pictorial devices of neoclassicism were already being tempered by Romantic sensibilities, as is evident in Orest Kiprensky's *Portrait of Alexander Pushkin* (1827) and Karl Bryullov's *The Last Day of Pompeii* (1830–1833). Kiprensky may include a classical statuette in his portrait, and Bryullov may have chosen a classical subject, but the emphasis is now on the Romantic values of subjectivity and personal emotion, as opposed to the harmonic proportion and physical perfection of classical art.

See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; ARCHITECTURE; CATHERINE II; KREMLIN; MOSCOW BAROQUE

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ROSALIND P. GRAY

NERCHINSK, TREATY OF

The Treaty of Nerchinsk was a Sino-Russian peace treaty negotiated and signed at the Siberian border point of Nerchinsk in August and September 1689.

Armed conflict in the Far East of Russia rose out of the advance of Russian colonists to Dahuria during the middle of the seventeenth century, since the Manchus claimed the Amur basin. The growing tension came to a head in the sieges of the fortress of Albazin in 1685 and 1686, when the Manchus ultimately forced the Russians to surrender. In a bid to settle the problem, in 1685 the Russian government appointed Fyodor Alexeyevich Golovin as its first ambassador plenipotentiary to China. His brief was to delineate a border on the Amur and gain the Russians a secure right to trade in the river valley.

After two weeks of negotiations with Songgotu and T'ung Kuo-kang, a peace treaty was signed in September 1689 and the preconditions created for a stable trading relationship. The Russians ended up ceding all rights to the Amur valley, as well as to Albazin, but gained a regularized and potentially lucrative commercial relationship. The Chinese, having secured the areas near the Ch'ing dynasty's ancestral home, permitted the Russians to keep Nerchinsk, recognizing its potential for trade. Merchants from either side were to be permitted to visit the other with proper passports. The arrival of the Manchu delegation for the negotiations also marked the beginning of large-scale border trade: At least 14,160 rubles' worth of goods were imported that year from China through the new frontier trading post.

The treaty envisaged Russian caravans traveling to Beijing once every three years, but during the decade following Nerchinsk, such trips were made more or less annually. In 1696 alone, 50,000 rubles' worth of furs were exported via Nerchinsk.

The treaty put an end to Sino-Russian armed conflict for 165 years.

See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; FOREIGN TRADE

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JARMO T. KOTILAINE

NERONOV, IVAN

(1591–1670), ardent worker for church reform, first in the provinces and later in Moscow. He opposed Nikon and church reforms he implemented and suffered for his opposition.

Neronov was of humble birth, but learned to read. He entered a church near Ustiug as a reader and chanter. Appalled by the lax manners and morals of the local clergy, Neronov complained to Patriarch Filaret, manifesting his zeal for religious reform. By the mid-1620s, Neronov had relocated to a village in the Nizhny Novgorod region. Many of those who would be energetic supporters of church reform in the second half of the seventeenth century were connected with this region. During the Smolensk War (1632–1633), Neronov moved to Moscow. In the mid-1640s he was associated with the Zealots of Piety, a circle of church reformers centered on the court and led by Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich's confessor, Stefan Vonifatiev. In 1649 he was named archpriest of the Kazan Cathedral in Moscow. Early in 1653 Neronov was among the first to challenge the revised liturgical books printed under Patriarch Nikon. Retribution was swift: By the end of 1653 Neronov had been defrocked and exiled in chains to a monastery near Vologda. There he took monastic vows and assumed the name Grigory. Called before the Church Council of 1666, Neronov renounced his opposition to the new liturgies. Subsequently he was made archimandrite of a monastery near Moscow, where he lived out his days seeking reform within his monastery.

See also: CHURCH COUNCIL; MONASTICISM; PATRIARCHATE; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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CATHY J. POTTER

NESSELRODE, KARL ROBERT

(1770–1862), Russian foreign minister equivalent, 1814–1856; chancellor, 1845–1856.

A baptized Anglican son of a Catholic Westphalian in Russia's diplomatic service, a Berlin

gymnasium graduate, and briefly in the Russian navy and army, Karl Nesselrode began his diplomatic career in 1801. Posted in Stuttgart, Berlin, and the Hague and attracted to the conservative equilibrium ideas of Friedrich von Gentz even more than Metternich was, Nesselrode became an advocate of the Third Coalition, yet assisted in the drawing up the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) and served in Paris. He played a major role in the forging of the 1813–1814 coalitions and the first Treaty of Paris (1814) and became Alexander I's chief plenipotentiary at Vienna (1814–1815). Sharing the direction of Russia's foreign affairs from 1814 to 1822 with the more liberal state secretary for foreign affairs, Ioannes Capodistrias, Nesselrode participated in the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822). His European approach to the Eastern Question won over Alexander and led to the compromises after the Greek Rebellion of 1821.

Nesselrode's wide knowledge, clarity, complete loyalty to the crown, and earlier briefings of Nicholas I before 1825 led to retention by the latter in 1826. Though Nicholas often directed policy himself, Nesselrode remained the single most influential Russian in external affairs. He shepherded the London Protocol (with Britain, 1826) and the Convention of Akkerman (with Turkey, 1827), convinced Nicholas I to accept the moderate Treaty of Adrianople (with Turkey, 1829), and helped dissuade Nicholas from trying to depose Louis-Philippe of France (1830). Partially behind the defensive Russo-Turkish Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833), he promoted the Conventions of Münchengrätz and Berlin (1833), which associated Austria and Prussia with a status quo policy regarding the Ottoman Empire.

Nesselrode subsequently helped prevent rising tensions with Britain from turning violent in 1838 by blocking a scheme to send warships into the Black Sea and removing Russia's belligerently anti-British envoy to Tehran. Promoting compromises with Britain during the entire Eastern crisis of 1838–1841, Nesselrode blocked support of Serbian independence in 1842–1843 and limited the damage from Nicholas's indiscretions during his 1844 visit to England. Fearful of liberalization in Central Europe, Nesselrode supported the full restoration of monarchical power and the status quo there in 1848 and 1850 against both popular and Prussian expansionist aspirations.

During the Eastern Crisis of 1852–1853, Russia's nationalists achieved the upper hand. Nessel-

rode alerted the emperor about the dangers of undue pressure on the Ottomans but abetted the deceptions perpetrated by Russia's mission in Istanbul and his own ministry's Asiatic Department. Although he was one of the best "spin doctors" of his era, his eighteenth-century logic, devotion to the 1815 settlement, and impeccable French prose could not prevail over the determination of Nicholas and the nationalists to risk war with Britain and France and have their way with Turkey regarding the Holy Places and Russia's claimed protectorate over the Ottoman Orthodox. Nor could he convince Austria to back Russia, but in the course of the Crimean War he continuously promoted a compromise and helped convince Alexander II to end hostilities in 1856.

See also: ALEXANDER I; CRIMEAN WAR; NICHOLAS I; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

NET MATERIAL PRODUCT

Net material product (NMP), the approach to national accounts based on Material Product System (MPS), was introduced in the USSR in the 1920s. Harmonized in 1969 by the Statistical Commission of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), it was adopted by all centrally planned economies.

The central indicator of the (Western) System of National Accounts (SNA) is gross domestic product (GDP), which is a basic measure of a country's overall economic performance. For planned economies, the role of the main indicator in the MPS is assigned to the net material product.

NMP covers material production (industry, agriculture, construction) and also includes material services that bring material consumer goods

from producers to consumers (transport and trade) and maintain the capital stock (maintenance and repairs). Nonmaterial services, such as health, education, administration, business, and personal services, are not included in productive activities; therefore, the central indicator NMP encompasses only the total income generated in the material branches, and the distinction is kept between “intermediate” and “final” products and between consumption and accumulation.

The division of services into “material” and “nonmaterial” originates from a theoretical proposition of Karl Marx’s writings. Marx, in the classical tradition of Adam Smith, considered as productive only activities that yield tangible, material goods.

Numerous incidental differences exist between GDP and NMP, including the treatment of business travel expenses, which are intermediate consumption in the SNA but labor compensation, and therefore part of the sectoral NMP, in the MPS. Cultural and welfare services provided by enterprises to employees are also intermediate consumption in the SNA but final consumption in the MPS. Some losses on fixed capital, the borderline between current and capital repair, and other relatively small items are treated differently. SNA has displaced MPS in all transition economies.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; MARXISM

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MISHA V. BELKINDAS

NEVSKY, ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH *See*
ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH.

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

As the civil war wound down in late 1920 and famine caused millions of deaths, peasant rebellions broke out against the compulsory grain procurements (*prodrazverstka*), which had been extracted by

force and had led to reduced plantings. Strikes occurred in Petrograd and elsewhere. Late that winter an uprising occurred at Kronstadt, the naval base near the northern capital. Fearing counterrevolution from within, Vladimir Ilich Lenin accepted a “retreat” at the Tenth Party Congress in March, 1921. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), Russia would have a mixed economy “seriously and for a long time,” as Lenin said. It would be based on an alliance (*smychka*) between the workers and the peasants.

Requisitions from the peasantry would be replaced by a tax in kind (*prodnalog*) based on the rural household’s level of income and its number of dependents. (By 1923–1924, by which time the inflation was halted, this tax was converted to cash.) Peasants would be free to market any surplus left after mandatory deliveries, which were reduced from the quotas imposed in 1920–1921. Some effort was made to establish scientific farms and to persuade peasants to enter cooperatives, but few did until the forced collectivization of 1928–1929. Rural, interregional, and retail trade was freed, somewhat reluctantly, and taken up by privateers, known universally as “nepmen.” Prices were effectively free, despite the government’s efforts to fix them for such monopolized commodities as tobacco, salt, kerosene, and matches. Trade unions became voluntary, and workers were free to seek whatever employment they could find.

In 1921 the Soviet government decided to lease back or sell back most medium- and small-sized enterprises to private owners or cooperatives. The largest 8.5 percent of them, called the “commanding heights,” were retained. They employed six-sevenths of all the industrial workers and produced more than nine-tenths of all industrial output even at the peak of NEP in 1925–1926. These larger factories were coordinated by the Supreme Council of National Economy (*Vesenkha*) and its “trusts.” Banks, railroads, and foreign trade also remained in the hands of the state. But the state had insufficient fuel and materials to keep the larger plants open. Unemployment grew. Efforts to attract foreign concessionaires to provide timber, oil, and other materials were mostly unavailing. The sixty-eight foreign concessions that existed by 1928 provided less than 1 percent of industrial output. Foreign capitalists were rather reluctant to invest in a hostile and chaotic environment with a Bolshevik state that had defaulted on all tsarist debts, confiscated foreign property, and declared its intentions to overthrow the capitalist order worldwide.

To achieve some measure of efficiency the state now required industrial enterprises to operate on commercial principles (*khozraschet*), paying wages and other bills and to sell, even at distressed prices relative to the rising relative price of foodstuffs. By 1923–1924, the government balanced its budget by levying excise taxes, enterprise and personal taxes on income and property, and a forced bond issue. The tsarist vodka monopoly was reintroduced, to the dismay of many. Centralized expenditures, especially on education, were cut, and school fees introduced. All this allowed stabilization of the new currency (*chervonets*), which had replaced the ruined ruble or *sovznak* notes used before.

The NEP period was also the golden era of Soviet economics, with many different points of view, mathematical and sociological, permitted to publish and debate. Nikolai Kondratiev, Alexander Chayanov, Yevgeny Preobrazhensky, Grigory Feldman, Stanislav Strumilin, and the young Vasily Leontiev, inventor of input–output analysis, were active at this time. In addition to theoretical matters, the industrialization debate centered on whether Russia's peasant economy could produce enough voluntary savings to permit industrialization beyond the recovery phase. That debate, and most free inquiry, would end in 1928. Political freedom had already been closely limited to the Bolsheviks alone; by 1922 publications had to pass prior censorship.

In practice, planning was still rudimentary. There was no operational program for command allocations, as there would be during the 1930s, but the “balance of national economy,” patterned on German wartime experience, served as a kind of forecast for key sectors and basis for discussion of investment priorities.

These policies were strikingly successful in allowing the Soviet economy to regain its prewar levels of agricultural and industrial production by 1926–1927. School enrollment exceeded the prewar numbers. But food marketings, both domestic and export, were down significantly, probably owing to the higher cost and relative unavailability of manufactured goods the peasants wanted to buy and also the breakup of larger commercial farms during the Revolution and civil war. Yet by 1927 reduced grain marketings convinced many in the Party (particularly the so-called left opposition) that administrative methods would be needed in addition to market incentives. Even though this was largely due to a mistaken price and tax policy by the government—comparable to the earlier Scissors Crisis—the authorities now began to use “extraordinary

measures” to seize grain early in 1928. This policy and its consequences effectively ended the NEP, for once it was decided that industrialization and military preparedness required more investments than could be financed from voluntary savings in this largely peasant country, the way was open for Josef Stalin to pursue a radical course of action, once advanced by his enemies Leon Trotsky and his allies on the left.

See also: COMMANDING HEIGHTS OF THE ECONOMY; GOODS FAMINE; GRAIN CRISIS OF 1928; SCISSORS CRISIS; TRUSTS, SOVIET; WAR COMMUNISM

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

NEW-FORMATION REGIMENTS

The term *new-formation* (“western-model,” “foreign-model,” or “western-formation”) regiment refers to military units organized in linear formations, utilizing gunpowder weapons and tactics developed in the West. These regiments consisted of eight to ten companies, each ideally numbering 100 (infantry) to 120 (cavalry and dragoons) soldiers, though few regiments were at full strength. The colonel and lieutenant colonel commanded the first and second companies of the regiment, though de facto command of the colonel's company was given to a first (lieutenant) captain. Captains or lieutenants (either Russian or European) commanded the remaining companies. Other personnel included ensigns, sergeants, and corporals, at the company level, and administrative officers, such as captains of arms, quartermasters, camp masters, clerks, priests, drummers, and buglers. The regiments featured combined arms: muskets, pikes, artillery, grenadiers,

and engineers (sappers, miners). The predominant organizational features of the new-formation regiment were its hierarchical command structure and its relative tactical flexibility.

New-formation regiments participated in the major campaigns of the seventeenth century. The first regiments were formed prior to the Smolensk War (1632–1634). The state employed European officers to train and arm Russians to fight in the Western manner, which represented a significant departure from the former practice of hiring entire regiments of foreign troops. The impact of these officers is reflected in the fact that the Treaty of Polyanovka (1634) ordered Russia's foreign mercenary commanders to leave Muscovy after the war, though Alexander Leslie, Adam Gell-Seitz, and others returned to help reorganize Muscovy's regiments again during the 1640s.

Between 1630 and 1634 ten regiments were formed, comprising seventeen thousand men, nearly half of the Russian army at Smolensk. During the Thirteen Years' War, new-formation regiments constituted a significant portion of Russia's armed forces: fifty-five infantry and twenty cavalry regiments. The cost of these regiments was greater than traditional forces because the state supported their supply and salary needs.

The regiments in the 1630s were formed from marginal groups, such as landless gentry, Cossacks, Tatars, and free people (*volnye liudi*, unattached to towns, estates, or communes). Increased income and status associated with state service motivated these groups to assimilate into the new-formation regiments. During the 1650s and 1660s the new-formation regiments included more and more peasants and townsmen, whom the Russians conscripted to offset heavy wartime losses. The nature of the soldiers serving in the new-formation regiments changed over time, though they continued to include marginal groups. Later in the century (1680s–1690s), the new-formation regiments continued to be a stage for retraining traditional forces.

The state continued to hire European officers to command new-formation regiments throughout the seventeenth century. Russians also held command positions in the regiments, most predominantly in ranks below colonel. Tensions existed among the foreign and Russian officers, especially regarding administration and implementation of the regiments. The foreign officers brought with them their military experience and technical

literature to train their regiments. Since few printed military manuals were available in Russian, the foreign officers' contribution to military reform is immeasurable. Nonetheless the state distributed a translation of Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen's *Kriegskunst zu Fuss (Military Art of Infantry)* to the colonels for use in training, and the state also received input from European officers—in the form of reports and letters—about the training and equipment needs of the regiments.

See also: SMOLENSK WAR; THIRTEEN YEARS' WAR

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W. M. REGER IV

NEW POLITICAL THINKING

The phrase "New Political Thinking" (or, simply, "New Thinking") was introduced in the Soviet Union early in the Gorbachev era. While to some observers it seemed no more than a new twist to Soviet propaganda, in fact it represented an increasingly radical break with fundamentals of Soviet ideology.

The New Thinking linked Soviet domestic political reform with innovation in foreign policy. Gorbachev was in a minority within the Soviet leadership in espousing ideas that were radically new in the Soviet context. However, he was able to draw on intellectual support from research institutes in which fresh ideas had surfaced but had hitherto lacked political support where it mattered—at the top of the Communist Party hierarchy. With the institutional resources of the general secretaryship at his disposal, Gorbachev was able to give decisive support to innovative thinkers and to legitimize new concepts. Initially, as in Gorbachev's 1987 book, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, the new ideas were already revising previous Soviet ideology in significant ways; but a year or two later they had gone much fur-

ther, amounting to a conceptual revolution that shook the Soviet system to its foundations.

It was in 1987 that Gorbachev first used the term “pluralism” in a positive sense, albeit in a qualified form as “socialist pluralism” or a “pluralism of opinion.” Hitherto, “pluralism” had always been a pejorative term in the Soviet lexicon, condemned as an alien and bourgeois notion. Once the taboo on praising pluralism had been broken, articles on the need to develop pluralism within the Soviet Union began to appear, often without the “socialist” qualifier. By 1990 Gorbachev himself was advocating “political pluralism.” Another concept on which an anathema had been pronounced for many years was “market,” but again—for example, in his 1987 book—Gorbachev embraced the idea of a “socialist market.” Before long other contributors to the growing debates in the Soviet Union were advocating a market economy, some of them explicitly differentiating this from socialism as they understood it.

The New Political Thinking could, in its earliest manifestations, be seen as a new Soviet ideology, a codified, albeit genuinely innovative, body of correct thinking. It gave way, however, to a growing freedom of speech and of debate both within the Communist Party and in the broader society—a new political reality that partly resulted from the boldness of the intellectual breakthrough.

Among the new concepts that were given Gorbachev’s official imprimatur between 1985 and 1988 were the principle of a state based on the rule of law, the idea of checks and balances, glasnost (openness or transparency), perestroika (literally reconstruction, but a term that became a synonym for the radical reform of the Soviet system), democratization (which initially meant freer discussion within the Communist Party but by 1988—at the Nineteenth Party Conference—had come to embrace the principle of contested elections for a new legislature), and civil society.

The New Political Thinking represented no less of a break with the Soviet past in its foreign policy dimension. A class approach to international relations was explicitly discarded in favor of the idea of all-human interests and universal values. The idea of global interdependence superseded the zero-sum-game philosophy of *kto kogo* (who will crush whom). Whereas in the past the “struggle for peace” had often been a thin disguise for the pursuit of Soviet great-power interests, the new thinking endorsed by Gorbachev stressed that in the

nuclear age peace was the only rational option if humankind was to survive. This provided justification for a new and genuinely cooperative approach to international relations.

See also: DEMOCRATIZATION; GLASNOST; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PERESTROIKA

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ARCHIE BROWN

NEWSPAPERS

The first news sheet issued with some regularity in Russia was *Sankt Peterburgskie vedomosti* (*St. Petersburg Herald*), a biweekly published by the Imperial Academy of Sciences, beginning in 1727. Until the Great Reforms of 1861–1874, nearly all newspapers in Russia were official bulletins issued by various government institutions. To the extent that there was a print-based public sphere in pre-Reform Russia, it was dominated by the “thick journals” that published literary criticism and philosophical speculation.

The relaxing of censorship and limits on private publications during the Great Reforms, advances in printing technology, and the spread of literacy in Russian cities led to the development of a mass-market, commercial press by the 1880s. Daily papers targeting various markets covered stock-market news and foreign affairs, as well as the more sensational topics of crime, sex scandals, and natural disasters. As Louise McReynolds has demonstrated, Russian commercial mass newspapers resembled their counterparts in North America and Western Europe in appealing to and fostering nationalist sentiment.

By World War I “copeck” (penny) newspapers in Moscow and St. Petersburg achieved circulations comparable to those of mass circulation organs in the United States and Western Europe. The most popular newspaper in the Russian Empire in 1914 was *Russkoe slovo* (*Russian Word*), with a circulation of 619,500.

After the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917, they created an entirely new kind of mass press. By the summer of 1918 the Soviet government had shut down all non-Bolshevik newspapers on their territory. Bolshevik newspapers during the years of revolution and civil war (1917–1921) aimed to mobilize the populace in general and Party members in particular for war. Resources were scarce, and typical civil war newspaper editions were only two pages long. The state funded the press throughout the Soviet era.

The Bolsheviks shared with most Russian intellectuals of the revolutionary era a profound contempt for the sensationalistic urban copeck newspapers that aimed to entertain a mass audience. They created a mass press that was supposed to educate, guide, and mobilize readers, not entertain them. Other important functions of Soviet newspapers were the gathering of intelligence on popular moods and the monitoring of corruption in the Party or state apparatus. To fulfill these tasks, the newspapers solicited and received literally millions of readers’ letters, some of which were published. The editorial staff also forwarded letters denouncing crime and corruption to the appropriate police or prosecutorial organs. They used letters to compose reports on popular attitudes that were sent to all levels of party officialdom.

The role of direct censorship in Soviet newspaper production has been overemphasized. Agenda-setting by party and state organs was more important. The role of official censors in controlling press content was negligible. Soviet journalists were generally self-censoring, and they followed agendas set by the Communist Party’s Central Committee and other official institutions.

Illegal newspapers were central to Bolshevik Party organization in the prerevolutionary years. This heritage of underground political culture contributed to a Soviet fetishization of newspapers as the mass medium *par excellence*. As a result of this fetishization, Communist propaganda officials and journalists were slow to understand and effectively use the media of radio and television. By the 1970s, Soviet means and methods of mass persuasion and

mobilization were far inferior to those developed by advertising agencies and governments in the wealthy liberal democracies.

See also: CENSORSHIP; IZVESTIYA; JOURNALISM; PRAVDA; THICK JOURNALS

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MATTHEW E. LENOE

NEW STATUTE OF COMMERCE

The New Commerce Statute (a translation of the Russian *Novotorgovy ustav* of April 22, 1667; *ustav* might also be translated as “regulations”) was the Russian expression of Western mercantilism and was sponsored by boyarin Afanasy Lavrentievich Ordin-Nashchokin (1605–1680), a former governor of Pskov, the westernmost of Russia’s major cities, who in 1667 was head of the Chancellery of Foreign Affairs. The 1667 document was an expansion of the Commerce Statute (or Regulations) of 1653, which introduced a unified tariff schedule while repealing petty transit duties and increasing protectionist duties against foreigners. The 1667 regulations remained in force until replaced by the Customs Statute of 1755.

The 1667 document regulated both internal trade and trade relations with foreigners. In a 1649 petition to the government, the Russian merchants lamented that they could not compete with the foreign merchants, who were forbidden to engage in internal Russian trade (where they had been giving favorable credit terms to local, smaller Russian merchants) and were restricted to the port cities at times when fairs were being held. The foreigners were accused of selling shoddy goods, which was forbidden. Foreigners were forbidden to sell any goods retail in the provinces or in Moscow, or any Russian goods among themselves upon pain of confiscation of the merchandise. Internal customs du-

ties of 5 percent were to be collected from Russians on sales of weighed goods (ad valorem sales) and 4 percent from unweighed goods. A duty of 10 percent was to be collected on salt and 15 percent on liquor. Excepting liquor, foreigners had to pay a 6 percent duty on their foreign goods sold to authorized Russian wholesalers. A foreigner had to pay a 10 percent export duty, except when he paid for the goods with gold and silver currency. The export of gold and silver from Muscovy was forbidden. Local officials (acknowledged by Moscow as likely to be corrupt) were ordered repeatedly in the statute not to interfere with commerce. Much paperwork was required to ensure compliance with the 1667 regulations.

See also: FOREIGN TRADE; MERCHANTS; ORDIN-NASHCHOKIN, AFANASY LAVRENTIEVICH.

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RICHARD HELLIE

NICARAGUA, RELATIONS WITH

The Soviet Union had no diplomatic or economic relations with Nicaragua before the Somozas' fall in 1979. Contacts were through Communist Party organizations such as the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), founded in 1937 and illegal until 1979. While not opposing revolutionary violence in principle, the Communists believed that conditions in Nicaragua were not ripe for armed revolt. A member of the Party who had visited the USSR in 1957, Carlos Fonseca Amador, broke with the PSN on this issue. He called for insurrection and founded the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) in 1961.

The Sandinistas led the revolutionary upheaval that overthrew the Somozas in 1979. They took full control of Nicaragua and ignored the communists (PSN). Unlike other Soviet satellites, the Sandinistas left about half of the economy in private hands, and agriculture was not collectivized. The FSLN leader, Daniel Ortega, lacked the authority in the Council of State that Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev had in the Soviet Politburo.

In spite of the fact that the Sandinistas' success meant defeat for the local Communists, Moscow

quickly established good relations with the Sandinista government. Soviet economic and military aid approached billions of rubles, far less than to Cuba. While offering political, economic, and military support, Moscow sought to limit Nicaragua as an economic and strategic burden. Cuba actively supported the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and abroad.

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration was backing an armed paramilitary force, the contras, which sought to overthrow the Sandinistas. The United States also aided a right-wing regime in El Salvador besieged by revolutionary forces supposedly encouraged by the Sandinistas. Both U.S. efforts were inconclusive.

Early in 1990 President George Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev began cooperating in the region, as they were in Eastern Europe, to end these conflicts. Central American countries, the United Nations, and the two great powers negotiated a regional settlement. The United States stopped supporting the contras, the Sandinistas agreed to free elections, and the USSR mollified Cuba. Later Ortega was defeated in the elections for the Nicaraguan presidency, and Moscow was no longer an actor on the Central American scene.

See also: CUBA, RELATIONS WITH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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COLE BLASIER

NICHOLAS I

(1796–1855), tsar and emperor of Russia from 1825 to 1855.

Nicholas Pavlovich Romanov came to power amid the Decembrist Revolt of 1825 and died during the Crimean War. Between these two events, Nicholas became known throughout his empire and the world as the quintessential autocrat, and his Nicholaevan system as the most oppressive in Europe.

When Nicholas I was on his deathbed, he spoke his last words to his son, soon to become Alexander II: "I wanted to take everything difficult, everything serious, upon my shoulders and to leave you a peaceful, well-ordered, and happy realm. Providence decreed otherwise. Now I go to pray for Russia and for you all." Earlier in the day, Nicholas ordered all the Guards regiments to be brought to the Winter Palace to swear allegiance to the new tsar. These words and actions reveal a great deal about Nicholas's personality and his reign. Nicholas was a tsar obsessed with order and with the military, and his thirty years on the throne earned him a reputation as the Gendarme of Europe. His fear of rebellion and disorder, particularly after the events of his ascension to the throne, would affect him for the remainder of his reign.

EDUCATION, DECEMBER 1825, AND RULE

Nicholas I was not intended to be tsar, nor was he educated to be one. Born in 1796, Nicholas was the third of Paul I's four sons. His two elder brothers, Alexander and Constantine, received upbringings worthy of future rulers. In 1800, by contrast, Paul appointed General Matthew I. Lamsdorf to take charge of the education of Nicholas and his younger brother, Mikhail. Lamsdorf believed that education consisted of discipline and military training, and he imposed a strict regimen on his two charges that included regular beatings. Nicholas thus learned to respect the military image his father cultivated and the necessity of order and discipline.

Although Nicholas received schooling in more traditional subjects, he responded only to military science and to military training. In 1814, during the war against Napoleon, he gave up wearing civilian dress and only appeared in his military uniform, a habit he kept. Nicholas also longed during the War of 1812 to see action in the defense of Russia. His brother, Alexander I, wanted him to remain in Russia until the hostilities ended. Nicholas only joined the Russian army for the victory celebrations held in 1814 and 1815. The young Nicholas debuted as a commander and was impressed with the spectacles and their demonstration of Russian political power. For Nicholas, as Richard Wortman has noted, these parades provided a lifelong model for demonstrating political power.

After the war, Nicholas settled into the life of a Russian grand duke. He toured his country and Europe between 1816 and 1817. In 1817 Nicholas married Princess Charlotte of Prussia, who was

baptized as Grand Duchess Alexandra Fyodorovna. The following year, in April 1818, Nicholas became the first of his brothers to father a son, Alexander, the future Alexander II. For the next seven years, the family lived a quiet life in St. Petersburg's Anichkov Palace; Nicholas later claimed this period was the happiest of his life. The idyll was only broken once, in 1819, when Alexander I surprised his brother with the news that he, and not Constantine, might be the successor to the Russian throne. Alexander and Constantine did not have sons, and the latter had decided to give up his rights to the throne. This agreement was not made public, and its ambiguities would later come back to haunt Nicholas.

Alexander I died in the south of Russia in November 1825. The news of the tsar's death took several days to reach the capital, where it caused confusion. Equally stunning was the revelation that Nicholas would succeed Alexander. Because of the secret agreement, disorder reigned briefly in St. Petersburg, and Nicholas even swore allegiance to his older brother. Only after Constantine again renounced his throne did Nicholas announce that he would become the new emperor on December 14.

This decision and the confusion surrounding it gave a group of conspirators the chance they had sought for several years. A number of Russian officers who desired political change that would transform Russia from an autocracy rebelled at the idea of Nicholas becoming tsar. His love for the military and barracks mentality did not promise reform, and so three thousand officers refused to swear allegiance to Nicholas on December 14. Instead, they marched to the Senate Square where they called for a constitution and for Constantine to become tsar. Nicholas acted swiftly and ruthlessly. He ordered an attack of the Horse Guards on the rebels and then cannon fire, killing around one hundred. The rest of the rebels were rounded up and arrested, while other conspirators throughout Russia were incarcerated in the next few months.

Although the Decembrist revolt proved ineffective, its specter continued to haunt Nicholas. His first day in power had brought confusion, disorder, and rebellion. During the next year, Nicholas pursued policies and exhibited characteristics that would define his rule. He personally oversaw the interrogations and punishments of the Decembrists, and informed his advisors that they should be dealt with mercilessly because they had violated the law. Five of the leaders were executed; dozens

went into permanent Siberian exile. At the same time he pursued justice against the Decembrists, Nicholas established a new concept of imperial rule in Russia, one that relied upon the parade ground and the court as a means of demonstrating power and order. Within the first few months of his rule, he initiated ceremonies and reviews of military and dynastic might that became hallmarks of his reign. Above all, the Decembrist revolt convinced Nicholas that Russia needed order and firmness and that only the autocrat could provide them.

The Nicholaevan system of government built upon these ideas and upon the tsar's mistrust for the Russian gentry in the wake of the Decembrist Revolt. Nicholas placed a circle of ministers in important positions and relied on them almost exclusively to govern. He also used His Majesty's Own Chancery, the private bureau for the tsar's personal needs, to rule. Nicholas divided the Chancery into sections to exert personal control over the functions of governing—the First Section continued to be responsible for the personal needs of the tsar, the Second Section was established to enact legislation and codify Russian laws, and the Fourth was responsible for welfare and charity. The Third Section, established in 1826, gained the most notoriety. It had the task of enforcing laws and policing the country, but in practice the Third Section did much more. Headed by Count Alexander Beckendorff, the Third Section set up spies, investigators, and gendarmes throughout the country. In effect, Nicholas established a police state in Russia, even if it did not function efficiently.

It was through the Second Section that Nicholas achieved the most notable reform of his reign. Established in 1826 to rectify the disorder and confusion within Russia's legal system that had manifested itself in the Decembrist revolt, the Second Section compiled a new Code of Law, which was promulgated in 1833. Nicholas appointed Mikhail Speransky, Alexander I's former advisor, to head the committee. The new code did not so much make new laws as collect all those that had been passed since the last codification in 1648 and categorize them. Published in forty-eight volumes with a digest, Russia had a uniform and ordered set of laws.

Nicholas came to epitomize autocracy in his own lifetime, largely through the creation of an official ideology that one of his advisers formulated in 1832. Traumatized by the events of 1825 and the calls for constitutional reform, Nicholas believed fervently in the necessity of Russian autocratic rule. Because he had triumphed over his



Equestrian portrait of Nicholas I by Alexander Petrovich Schwabe. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS

opponents, he searched for a concrete expression of the superiority of monarchy as the institution best suited for order and stability. He found a partner in this quest in Count Sergei Uvarov (1786–1855), later the minister of education. Uvarov articulated the concept of Official Nationality, which in turn became the official ideology of Nicholas's Russia. It had three components: Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality.

Uvarov's formula gave voice to trends within the Nicholaevan system that had developed since 1825. For Nicholas and his minister, an ordered system could function only with religious principles as a guide. By invoking Orthodoxy, Uvarov also stressed the Russian Church as a means to instill these principles. The concept of Autocracy was the clearest of the principles—only it could guarantee the political existence of Russia. The third concept was the most ambiguous. Although usually translated as "nationality," the Russian term used was *narodnost*, which stressed the spirit of the Russian people. Broadly speaking, Nicholas wanted

to emphasize the national characteristics of his people, as well as their spirit, as a principle that made Russia superior to the West.

Nicholas attempted to rule Russia according to these principles. He oversaw the construction of two major Orthodox cathedrals that symbolized Russia and its religion—St. Isaac’s in St. Petersburg (begun in 1768 and finished under Nicholas) and Christ the Savior in Moscow (Nicholas laid the cornerstone in 1837 but it was not finished until 1883). He dedicated the Alexander column on Palace Square to his brother in 1834 and a statue to his father, Paul I, in 1851. Nicholas also held countless parades and drills in the capital that included his sons, another demonstration of the might and timelessness of the Russian autocracy. Finally, Nicholas cultivated national themes in performances and festivals held throughout his empire. Most prominently, Mikhail Glinka’s *A Life for the Tsar* (1836) became the national opera, while General Alexander Lvov and Vasily Zhukovsky’s “God Save the Tsar” became Russia’s first national anthem in 1833.

Nicholas also dealt with two other areas of Russian society. The first involved local government and ruling over such a vast country, long a problem for Russian monarchs. Nicholas oversaw a reform in the local government in 1837 that granted more power to the governors. More importantly, Nicholas expanded the Russian bureaucracies and training for the civil service. The Nicholaevan system thus became synonymous with bureaucrats, as the writings of Nikolai Gogol brilliantly depict.

The second pressing concern was serfdom. Nicholas appointed a secret committee in 1835 that tackled the question of reform, and even abolition, of serfdom. Led by Paul Kiselev (1788–1872), the committee recommended abolition, but its conclusions were not implemented. Instead, Nicholas declared serfdom an evil but emancipation even more problematic. He had Kiselev head a Fifth Section of the Chancery in 1836 and charged him with improving farming methods and local conditions. Finally, Nicholas passed a law in 1842 that allowed serf owners to transform their serfs into “obligated peasants.” Few did so, and while continued committees recommended abolition, Nicholas halted short of freeing Russia’s serfs. By 1848, therefore, Nicholas had established a system of government associated with Official Nationality, order, and might.

WAR, 1848, AND THE CRIMEAN DEBACLE

Nicholas defined himself and his system as a militaristic one, and the first few years of his rule also witnessed his consolidation of power through force. He continued the wars in the Caucasus begun by Alexander I, and consolidated Russian power in Transcaucasia by defeating the Persians in 1828. Russia also fought the Ottoman Empire in 1828–1829 over the rights of Christian subjects in Turkey and disagreements over territories between the two empires. Although the fighting produced mixed results, Russia considered itself a victor and gained concessions. One year later, in 1830, a revolt broke out in Poland, an autonomous part of the Russian Empire. The revolt spread from Warsaw to the western provinces of Russia, and Nicholas sent in troops to crush it in 1831. With the rebellion over, Nicholas announced the Organic Statute of 1832, which increased Russian control over Polish affairs. The Polish revolt brought back memories of 1825 for Nicholas, who responded by pushing further Russification programs throughout his empire. Order reigned, but nationalist reactions in Poland, Ukraine, and elsewhere would ensure problems for future Russian rulers.

Nicholas also presided over increasingly oppressive measures directed at any forms of perceived opposition to his rule. Russian culture began to flourish in the decade between 1838 and 1848, as writers from Mikhail Lermontov to Nikolai Gogol and critics such as Vissarion Belinsky and Alexander Herzen burst onto the Russian cultural scene. Eventually, as their writings increasingly criticized the Nicholaevan system, the tsar cracked down, and his Third Section arrested numerous intellectuals. Nicholas’s reputation as the quintessential autocrat developed from these policies, which reached an apex in 1848. When revolutions broke out across Europe, Nicholas was convinced that they were a threat to the existence of his system. He sent Russian troops to crush rebellions in Moldavia and Wallachia in 1848 and to support Austrian rights in Lombardy and Hungary in 1849. At home, Nicholas oversaw further censorship and repressions of universities. By 1850, he had earned his reputation as the Gendarme of Europe.

In 1853, Nicholas’s belief in the might of his army set off a disaster for his country. He provoked a war with the Ottoman Empire over continued disputes in the Holy Land that brought an unexpected response. Alarmed by Russia’s aggressive policies, England and France joined the Ot-

toman Empire in declaring war. The resulting Crimean War led to a humiliating defeat and the exposure of Russian military weakness. The war also exposed the myths and ideas that guided Nicholaevan Russia. Nicholas did not live to see the final humiliation. He caught a cold in 1855 that grew serious, and he died on February 18. His dream of creating an ordered state for his son to inherit died with him.

Alexander Nikitenko, a former serf who worked as a censor in Nicholas's Russia, concluded: "The main shortcoming of the reign of Nicholas consisted in the fact that it was all a mistake." Contemporaries and historians have judged Nicholas just as harshly. From Alexander Herzen to the Marquis de Custine, the image of the tsar as tyrant circulated widely in Europe during Nicholas's rule. Russian and Western historians ever since have largely seen Nicholas as the most reactionary ruler of his era, and one Russian historian in the 1990s argued "it would be difficult to find a more odious figure in Russian history than Nicholas I." W. Bruce Lincoln, Nicholas's most recent American biographer (1978), argued that Nicholas in many ways helped to pave the way for more significant reforms by expanding the bureaucracies. Still, his conclusion serves as an ideal epitaph for Nicholas: He was the last absolute monarch to hold undivided power in Russia. His death brought the end of an era.

See also: ALEXANDER I; ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA; AUTOCRACY; CRIMEAN WAR; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; NATIONAL POLICIES, TSARIST; LIVAROV, SERGEI SEMENOVICH

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NICHOLAS II

(1868–1918), last emperor of Russia.

The future Nicholas II was born at Tsarskoe Selo in May 1868, the first child of the heir to the Russian throne, Alexander Alexandrovich, and his Danish-born wife, Maria Fedorovna. Nicholas was brought up in a warm and loving family environment and was educated by a succession of private tutors. He particularly enjoyed the study of history and proved adept at mastering foreign languages, but found it much more difficult to grasp the complexities of economics and politics. Greatly influenced by his father, who became emperor in 1881 as Alexander III, and by Konstantin Pobedonostsev, one of his teachers and a senior government official, Nicholas was deeply conservative, a strong believer in autocracy, and very religious. At the age of nineteen, he entered the army, and the military was to remain a passion throughout his life. After three years service in the army, Nicholas was sent on a ten-month tour of Europe and Asia to widen his experience of the world.

In 1894 Alexander III died and Nicholas became emperor. Despite his broad education, Nicholas felt profoundly unprepared for the responsibility that was thrust upon him and contemporaries remarked that he looked lost and bewildered. Within a month of his father's death, Nicholas married; he had become engaged to Princess Alix of Hesse in the spring of 1894 and his accession to the throne made marriage urgent. The new empress, known in Russia as Alexandra, played a crucial role in Nicholas's life. A serious and devoutly religious woman who believed fervently in the autocratic power of the



Coronation of Nicholas II, Russian engraving. THE ART ARCHIVE/BIBLIOTHÈQUE DES ARTS DÉCORATIFS PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

Russian monarchy, she stiffened her husband's resolve at moments of indecision.

The couple had five children, Olga (b. 1895), Tatiana (b. 1897), Maria (b. 1899), Anastasia (b. 1901), and Alexei (b. 1904). The birth of a son and heir in 1904 was the occasion for great rejoicing, but this was soon marred as it became clear that Alexei suffered from hemophilia. Their son's illness drew Nicholas and Alexandra closer together. The empress had an instinctive aversion to high society, and the imperial family spent most of their time at Tsarskoe Selo, only venturing into St. Petersburg on formal occasions.

While Nicholas's reign began with marriage and personal happiness, his coronation in 1896 was marked by disaster. Public celebrations were held at Khodynka on the outskirts of Moscow, but the huge crowds that had gathered there got out of

hand and several thousand people were crushed to death. That night the newly crowned emperor and empress appeared at a ball, apparently oblivious to the catastrophe. The image of Nicholas II enjoying himself while many of his subjects lay dead gave his reign a sour start.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Nicholas followed his father's policies for much of his first decade as monarch, relying on the men who had advised Alexander III, especially Sergei Witte, the minister of finance and the architect of Russia's economic growth during the 1890s. Russian industry grew rapidly during the decade, aided by investment from abroad and particularly from France, assisted by a political alliance between the two countries signed during the last months of Alexander III's reign. Russia was also expanding in

the Far East. The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, linking European Russia with the empire's Pacific coast, had begun in 1891, and this resurgence of Russian interest in the region worried Japan. The twin developments of industrialization and Far Eastern expansion both came to a head early in the twentieth century. In 1904, Japan launched an attack on Russia. Nicholas II believed this was no more than "a bite from a flea," but his confidence in Russia's armed forces was misplaced. The Japanese inflicted a crushing and humiliating defeat on them, forcing the army to surrender Port Arthur in December 1904 and destroying the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1905

The emperor was stoical about Russia's military failure, but by the time peace negotiations began in the summer of 1905, the war with Japan was no longer the central problem. On January 9, 1905, a huge demonstration took place in St. Petersburg, calling for better working conditions, political changes, and a popular representative assembly. Although the demonstrators were peaceful, troops opened fire on them, killing more than a thousand people on what came to be known as "Bloody Sunday." This opened the floodgates of discontent. Workers throughout the Russian Empire went out on strike to show sympathy with their 1905 slain compatriots. As spring arrived, peasants across Russia voiced their discontent. There were more than three thousand instances of peasant unrest where troops were required to subdue villagers.

Nicholas II's reaction was confused. Believing that he had a God-given right to rule Russia and must pass his patrimony on unchanged to his heir, he tried to put down the revolts by force and resisted any attempt to erode his authority. But this tactic did not stem the surge of urban and rural discontent, and the fragility of the regime's position was brought home to him by the assassination of his uncle, the governor-general of Moscow, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, in February. Against his natural instincts, the emperor agreed to a series of concessions, culminating in October with the establishment of an elected legislature, the Duma. Nicholas resented this encroachment on his autocratic prerogatives and resentfully blamed it on Witte, the chief author of the October Manifesto. "There was no other way out," Nicholas wrote to his mother immediately afterwards "than to cross oneself and give what everyone was asking for." The emperor's character is shown in sharp focus



Nicholas II leads Russian soldiers marching off to World War I.

© BETTMANN/CORBIS

by the events of 1905. Nicholas was a determined man who knew his own mind and had a clear sense of where his duty lay. But he was stubborn and very slow to recognize the need for change.

Nicholas found it difficult to accept that his powers had been limited, and he tried to act as though he were still an autocrat. He was encouraged in this by the government's ability to put down the rebellions across Russia. The appointment in April 1906 of a new minister of the interior, Peter Stolypin, marked the beginning of a policy of repression combined with reform. Elevated to prime minister in the summer of 1906 because of his success in quelling discontent, Stolypin recommended a wide range of reforms. Nicholas II, however, did not agree on the need for reform. Once an uneasy calm had been reestablished across the empire, he concluded that further change was unnecessary. Nicholas wanted to return to the pre-1905 situation and to continue to rule as an autocrat. The 1913 celebration of the tercentenary of the Ro-



Nicholas II in full military dress. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

manov dynasty gave ample illustration of his view of the situation—he and the empress posed for photographs dressed in costumes styled to reflect their ancestors in the seventeenth century. Nicholas wanted to hark back to an earlier age and reclaim the power held by his forebears.

WORLD WAR I

The test of World War I exposed Nicholas's weaknesses. The dismal performance of the Russian armies in the early stages of the war brought his sense of duty to the fore and he took direct charge of the army as commander-in-chief, although his ministers tried to dissuade him, arguing that he would now be personally blamed for any further military failures. Nicholas was, however, convinced that he should lead his troops at this critical moment, and after August 1915 he spent most of his time at headquarters away from Petrograd (as St. Petersburg had been renamed when

the war began). This had important consequences for the government of the empire. The empress was one of the main conduits by which Nicholas learned what was happening in the capital, and in his absence she became increasingly reliant on Rasputin, a "holy man" who had gained the trust of the imperial family through the comfort he was able to offer the hemophiliac Alexei. The empress, already isolated from Petrograd society, grew even more distant during the war and was highly susceptible to Rasputin's influence. She wrote to Nicholas frequently at headquarters, giving him the views of "Our friend" (as she termed Rasputin) on ministerial appointments and other political matters. The emperor too was a lonely figure as the war progressed. He had alienated much of Russia's moderate political opinion even before 1914, and the regime's refusal to countenance any participation in government by these parties, even as the military situation worsened, had caused attitudes to harden on both sides. Wider popular opinion also turned against the emperor. Alexandra's German background gave rise to a widespread belief that she wanted a Russian defeat, and this, allied with increasingly extravagant rumors about Rasputin, served to discredit the imperial family.

ABDICATION AND DEATH

When demonstrations and riots broke out in Petrograd at the end of February 1917, there was no segment of society that would support the monarchy. Nicholas was at headquarters at Mogilev, four hundred miles south of the capital, and his attempt to return to Petrograd by train was thwarted. Military commanders and politicians urged him to allow parliamentary rule, but even at this critical moment, Nicholas clung to his belief in his own autocracy. "I am responsible before God and Russia for everything that has happened and is happening," he told his generals. His failure to make immediate concessions cost Nicholas his throne. By the time he was willing to compromise, the situation in Petrograd had so deteriorated that abdication was the only acceptable solution. On March 2 he gave up the throne, in favor of his son. After medical advice that Alexei was unfit, he offered the throne to his brother, Mikhail. When he refused, the Romanov dynasty came to an end.

In the aftermath of the revolution, negotiations took place to enable Nicholas and his family to seek exile in Britain. These came to nothing because the British government feared a popular reaction if it

offered shelter to the Russian emperor. Nicholas was placed under arrest by the new Provisional Government at Tsarskoe Selo, but in August 1917, he and his family were moved to the town of Tobolsk in the Urals, 1,200 miles east of Moscow. After the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917, the position of the imperial family became much more precarious. The outbreak of the civil war raised the possibility that the emperor might be rescued by opponents of the Bolshevik government. At the end of April 1918, Nicholas II and his family were moved to Yekaterinburg, the center of Bolshevik power in the Ural region, and in mid-July orders came from Moscow to kill them. Early in the morning of July 17, they were all shot. Their bodies were thrown into a disused mine-shaft and remained there until after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1998, their remains were brought back to St. Petersburg and interred in the Peter-Paul fortress, the traditional burial place of Russia's imperial family.

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; REVOLUTION OF 1905; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

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PETER WALDRON

NIHILISM AND NIHILISTS

Nihilism was a tendency of thought among the Russian intelligentsia around the 1850s and 1860s; nihilists, a label that was applied loosely to radicals in the intelligentsia from the 1860s to the 1880s.

Although the term *intelligentsia* came into widespread use only in the 1860s, the numbers of educated young Russians of upper- or middle-class origins had been growing for some decades before that time, and under the influence of the latest

Western philosophical and social theories, the Russian intelligentsia had included members with increasingly radical ideas in each new generation after the 1840s. "Nihilism" was a term that was first popularized by the novelist Ivan Turgenev in 1862 (though it had been used in Russia and abroad for several decades before that time) to characterize the rebellious and highly unconventional youths who had appeared in Russia by the late 1850s. The nihilists rejected the idealism and relative optimism of the heroes of a previous generation of the Russian intelligentsia, who had been led by the essayist Alexander Herzen and the literary critic Vissarion Belinsky. Nihilism, with its "critical realism," gave intellectual respectability to a rebellion against the established values and conventions of polite society that defended the institutions of family, nobility, church, and state. Many of the young nihilists belonged to the growing numbers of the *raznochintsy*, or the people of various ranks in society, such as the sons and daughters of priests, lower officials, and others of strata below the aristocracy.

One of the models for the nihilists was Dmitry Pisarev, a literary critic who attacked the world's most famous products of art and literature and took an extreme position in favor of naturalistic realism and scientific utilitarianism. The most famous prototype of the nihilist was the character of Bazarov in Turgenev's novel *Fathers and Sons* (*Otsy i deti*), who repudiated all conventional values and standards. That novel aroused a storm of controversy with its depiction of a schism between the idealistic Russian liberals of the preceding generation and the apparently amoral nihilists of the younger generation. While leading figures of the previous generation who had endorsed liberal principles and socialist ideals had held out the hope of gradual reform in society and improvements in the moral consciousness of individuals, the nihilists called for revolutionary changes, with the complete destruction of established institutions. It is often said that the rise of nihilism in the intelligentsia reflected the weakness of social roots and affiliation with the traditions of the past among many young members of the intelligentsia. Turgenev himself continued to be sympathetic toward gradual reforms, but Pisarev welcomed the label of nihilist as a form of praise.

The nihilists flaunted their unconventionality and supposedly hardheaded realism. As Adam Yarmolinsky describes in *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism* (1962), "to the conserv-

atives frightened by the threatening effects of the new freedom, nihilism connoted atheism, free love, sedition, the outraging of every decency and accepted belief by men, and as often, by the unwomanly 'emancipated' woman." And yet the term "nihilism" was a misnomer from the start. Though the nihilists were often described as people who no longer believed in anything, in actuality they believed in their own ideas with passionate and indeed fanatical intensity. The nihilists believed that "the emancipation of the person," or the emergence of independent, critically thinking individuals, whose outlook had replaced sentimental idealism with scientific rigor and realism, was the means of leading the way to a new society, since it was possible for only an exceptional minority to achieve enlightenment. The nihilists were influenced by theories that had come from Western Europe, including German philosophy and French socialist thought, but they were most impressed by new discoveries and theories in the realm of the natural sciences, so that they virtually worshiped science, which they saw as guiding individuals of the new type who would usher in a new society.

Nihilism was soon succeeded by populism among the radical intelligentsia. The distinction between nihilism and populism is blurred in many accounts, as indeed it was in the writings of many observers from the 1860s to the 1880s, who referred to Nikolai Chernyshevsky, the great hero of the populists, as a nihilist. In reality, although the populists were deeply influenced by the nihilists, there were sharp differences between the two schools of thought. While the nihilists had glorified the minority of supposedly brilliant, bold, and unconventional intellectuals, and felt disdain for the unenlightened majority in society, the populists idealized the Russian peasants as morally superior, and were theoretically committed to learning from the peasants, who for a new generation of radicals constituted the *narod* (the people). While the populists agreed that revolutionary change was necessary, they believed that the peasant commune could be the basis for a uniquely Russian form of socialism. The nihilists had never developed any coherent program for political change. This may explain in part why they were succeeded by the populists, even though the populist strategy for transformation had some gaps of its own.

See also: BAZAROV, VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH; INTELLIGENTSIA; PISAREV, DMITRY IVANOVICH; POPULISM; TURGENEV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH

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ALFRED B. EVANS JR.

NIJINSKY, VASLAV FOMICH

(1889–1950), Russian dancer and choreographer.

The most famous Russian male dancer, Vaslav Fomich Nijinsky was also a choreographer, though madness cut short his career. Nijinsky, like his colleague Anna Pavlova, achieved international fame through his appearances with Sergei Diaghilev's Ballets Russes in Paris, beginning in 1909. Trained at the Imperial Theater School in St. Petersburg, Nijinsky joined the Imperial Ballet in 1907, but left the troupe in 1911, his international career already well established. Onstage, Nijinsky's somewhat sturdy frame became a lithe instrument of unprecedented lightness and elevation. Noted for seemingly effortless leaps, Nijinsky's photographs also reveal the dancer's uncanny ability to transform himself from role to role. Nijinsky's first choreography, for *L'Après-midi d'un Faune* (1912), to Debussy's music, scandalized Paris with its eroticism, though the ballet's true innovation lay in its turn from the virtuosity for which Nijinsky had become famous. Nijinsky's choreography for Igor Stravinsky's *Le Sacre du printemps* (1913) went even farther in demonstrating the choreographer's disdain for the niceties of ballet convention and his embrace of primitivism. Asymmetrical and unlovely, the work was dropped from the Ballets Russes repertory after some nine performances.

Nijinsky, once the lover of Diaghilev, married in 1913 and was dismissed from Diaghilev's company. After itinerant and often unsuccessful performances during World War I, Nijinsky was diagnosed a schizophrenic in 1919. The remaining years of the great dancer's life were spent mostly in sanatoriums.

See also: BALLET; BOLSHOI THEATER; DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH; PAVLOVA, ANNA MATVEYEVNA

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TIM SCHOLL

NIKITIN, AFANASY

Famed Russian merchant and autobiographer; exact dates of birth and death unknown.

Afanasy Nikitin was a Russian merchant from Tver who left a diary of his travels to Iran and India during a four-year period between 1466 and 1475. The traveler's own account remains the primary source of information on his personal history and the purpose of his long journey. Under the title *The Journey Beyond Three Seas*, Afanasy's travel record is a document of great interest, both to historians studying the interactions of medieval Russians with the Muslim East, and in general as one of the first autobiographical accounts in the literature. It has been repeatedly published in the original Russian with annotations and translated into many languages.

Afanasy's notes describe how he left Tver, intending to join a trade expedition headed for the Caucasian principality of Shirvan. On the way, his party was robbed of their goods. He was rescued by the Shah of Shirvan, but, despite the high risk, decided to continue his journey to Derbent, a market familiar to him, and then to Baku, rather than return to Tver empty-handed. He went on to cross the Caspian Sea, continued his travels across Iran, and then crossed the Indian Ocean to the Deccan. After surveying the markets, customs, and courts of the Bahmani and Vijayanagar empires, he made his way back to Russia, crossing the Black Sea. Somewhere in the region of Smolensk, he met an untimely death. Merchants brought his notes to Vasily Mam'yev, secretary to Grand Prince Ivan III of Moscow. The L'vov chronicler reports that he received Afanasy's notes in 1475 and incorporated them into his annalistic record, but was unable to locate any further information on the traveler.

The first historians to study his notes saw Afanasy as a daring explorer and patriot. Looking

at the journey in commercial perspective, however, historian Janet Martin concludes that although Afanasy did travel farther than other Russian travelers of his era, and visited places they did not, his notes reveal him as a cautious, even conservative merchant who made a series of discrete, limited decisions to continue his journey on the basis of information about markets conveyed by merchants that he met. He initially planned to take advantage of a lull in hostilities between Muscovy and the Great Horde to bring furs to the Caucasus and the lower Volga, a venture which had good prospects for high profits. His journey to Iran followed a well-established trade route, with extended stops at towns known for their bazaars. Afanasy indicates that his decision to continue to India was based on information from Muslim merchants whom he met in Iran. His notes on India, a market unfamiliar to Russian merchants, contain the most detailed information on goods and markets, as well as advice on finding shelter and warnings about the high customs fees exacted against Christians and the pressures to convert to Islam. This information would have been of great value to merchants considering such a venture. Only when he concluded that further travel would not bring new opportunities for commerce did he decide to return to Russia.

Long passages in creolized Arabic containing prayers and expression of fears about the traveler's inability to practice Christianity in India have inspired a variety of hypotheses. Nikolai Trubetsky characterized Afanasy's notes as a lyrical tale of a committed Orthodox Christian who suffered from his religious isolation, but kept the faith of his homeland; the foreign terms and phrases added local color to the narrative, shaping its unique artistic structure, while concealing the traveler's most intimate thoughts from all but a handful of readers. Others questioned Afanasy's faith. Yuri Zavadovsky noted Afanasy's extensive knowledge of Muslim prayers and of the requirements for conversion to Islam. Afanasy's reports of his own behavior suggested to historian Gail Lenhoff that he was a social convert to Islam. This decision to convert appears to have been initially dictated by commercial interests, since Muslims did not have to pay taxes or customs duties and could trade more freely in the Deccan markets. His conversion obligated him to pray in Arabic and to observe Muslim customs in public. The increasing proportion of Arabic prayers in the autobiography and the existence of a final prayer of thanks to Allah for surviving a storm, uttered as he approached Christian soil and duly recorded in his diary, could

indicate that by the end of his journey Afanasy had assimilated the Muslim faith.

See also: FOREIGN TRADE; ISLAM; MERCHANTS

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GAIL LENHOFF

NIKON, PATRIARCH

(1605–1681), patriarch of Moscow and all Russia; implemented a program of church reform that inspired vociferous opposition, ultimately culminating in the schism and the emergence of Old Belief.

Nikita Minich or Minov (as a monk, Nikon) was born to a peasant couple in the village of Veldemanov near Nizhny Novgorod. His mother died shortly after his birth, and the child was sent to a local tutor who taught him to read. As a youth, he continued his studies at the Makariev Zheltovodsky monastery, not far from Nizhny Novgorod. The author of Nikon's *Life* reports that the young man was an avid student and attracted to the monastic life. Nonetheless, in 1625 he obeyed his dying father's request to return home. He married a year later and obtained a position as a deacon at a nearby village church. Soon he was ordained a priest, and he and his wife moved to Moscow.

In 1636 Minich persuaded his wife to enter a convent. He himself departed for the Anzersky skete in the far north. Upon arrival he took monastic

vows and the name Nikon. In 1649 a disagreement with the elder Eliazar prompted Nikon to transfer to the Kozheozersky monastery. Within three years he was made abbot. In 1646 Nikon traveled to Moscow on monastery business. There he attracted the attention of the young Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. The tsar ordered him to remain in Moscow and made him abbot of the New Savior monastery. Energetic and talented, Nikon soon became a confidant and spiritual advisor of the tsar. He also became an important figure in the Zealots of Piety, the circle of reformers gathered around the tsar's confessor, Stefan Vonifatiev.

In March 1649, Nikon was named metropolitan of the important of see of Novgorod. He maintained contact with the reformers in Moscow and sought to implement their program in Novgorod. *Mnogoglasie*, the practice of simultaneously performing different parts of the liturgy in order to complete it more quickly, was abolished. Greek and Kievan chants replaced the traditional style of singing. Metropolitan Nikon's sermons at the episcopal cathedral attracted great crowds. In 1650 severe grain shortages caused famine and inflation in Novgorod. The people responded with violence, and Nikon played an important role in bringing the situation under control without bloodshed.

In the spring of 1652, Metropolitan Nikon was entrusted with the task of traveling to the Solovetsky monastery, collecting the relics of St. Philip, and returning with them to Moscow. The translation of St. Philip's relics exemplified the views of the Zealots of Piety. As metropolitan of Moscow, St. Philip had died a martyr's death for publicly rebuking the cruel and unchristian acts of Tsar Ivan IV ("the Terrible"). St. Philip's example highlighted the duty of the clergy to remind the laity, including tsars, of their Christian duties. The translation of his relics emphasized the dignity and importance of the church. Nikon was on the return path to Moscow when he received a letter from Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, informing him that Patriarch Joasif had died and assuring him that he would be selected as the next patriarch. A church council convened and duly elected Nikon. On July 25, 1652, Nikon was consecrated patriarch of Moscow and all Russia.

Nikon was chosen patriarch to direct a reform program advocated by the Zealots of Piety and supported by the tsar. If all reformers concurred on the need to elevate popular piety and reform popular religious practices, the revision of the liturgical books to bring them into conformity with

contemporary Greek practice and the exercise of power within the church were more sensitive issues. Consecrated patriarch, Nikon moved decisively to advance the liturgical reform with all possible speed. In February 1653 a revised edition of the *Psalter* was printed, minus two articles present in earlier editions. An instruction calling for sixteen full prostrations during a Lenten prayer was modified, and a section teaching that the sign of the cross should be made with two fingers was removed. Correctors (*spravshchiki*) at the government Printing Office, men long associated with the work of the Zealots of Piety, protested the changes. They promptly were removed from their posts and replaced by supporters of Nikon. By the end of the year, Patriarch Nikon assumed direct control of the Printing Office.

In addition, according to later accounts of Nikon's opponents, shortly after the appearance of the new *Psalter*, the patriarch sent a communication to Ivan Neronov, archpriest of the Kazan Cathedral, calling attention to the revisions and ordering that they be introduced into the liturgy. Confronted with what he perceived to be an error, Neronov prayed for guidance and then discussed the order with his associates, including Archbishop Paul of Kolomna and the archpriests Avvakum, Daniil, and Login. Avvakum and Daniil gathered evidence against the revisions in the newly printed *Psalter* and presented a petition to the tsar. The tsar ignored it. By the end of 1653 the archpriests Login and Neronov had been defrocked and exiled. Avvakum escaped defrocking through the personal intervention of the tsar but was transferred to the distant post of Tobolsk.

Patriarch Nikon's reform activities were not limited to liturgical reform. During the six years of his active patriarchate, he worked to bring the church under episcopal control, freeing the clergy and church affairs from the interference of secular authorities and creating a hierarchy of authority flowing from the patriarch to the laity. As contemporaries noted, however, Nikon freed the prelates and other clergy from secular powers only to subordinate them to his own. Too often he neglected to consult a church council before he acted, provoking resentment and resistance where he needed support. Nikon also was energetic in the area of monastic reform, sternly punishing those who flouted the monastic rule. Perhaps Nikon's more important contributions in this area were the three monasteries he founded: the Monastery of the Cross, the Monastery of the Iveron Mother of God,

and the Monastery of the Resurrection (or New Jerusalem). Richly endowed, both materially and spiritually, the latter two were centers of learning as well as piety. All were subordinated directly to Nikon. Finally, Nikon did not ignore the shortcomings in the popular practice and celebration of religion. He initiated campaigns against the wandering minstrels and jesters, with their profane music and ribald jokes, and also against icons he deemed painted in an improper manner. Such campaigns manifested his zeal to dignify popular piety and reform popular religious practices, but they often offended the powerful as well as the humble.

Scholars have disagreed as to whether Nikon's goal was to assert the superiority of church over state, or simply to achieve the symphony between church and state that is the Byzantine ideal. In reality, Nikon's power depended on the tsar's favor. As long as Nikon enjoyed the confidence and support of the tsar, those whom he offended in his zeal were powerless against him. By 1658, however, the tsar's attitude towards Nikon had cooled. On July 10, 1658, feeling snubbed by the tsar's failure to invite him to an important state reception, Nikon celebrated the liturgy in the Cathedral of the Dormition, donned simple monastic garb, announced to those assembled that he would no longer be patriarch, and walked away.

Nikon's action was without precedent. After two years, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich convened a church council to address the situation. All agreed that a new patriarch should be chosen, but no consensus could be achieved on what to do with Nikon. Nikon complicated the matter by asserting that he had renounced the patriarchal throne but not his calling, and that he alone had the power to establish a new patriarch.

In 1666, after lengthy exchanges, the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch agreed to travel to Moscow to participate in a church council to resolve the affair. Before the eastern patriarchs arrived, delegates assembled and reaffirmed the correctness of the reform program itself. Those who opposed the reform were condemned as heretics. Thus officially began the church schism. The eastern patriarchs arrived, and on November 7 another church council convened for the purpose of deciding the case of Nikon. On December 12, 1666, Nikon was found guilty of abandoning the patriarchal throne; of slandering the tsar, the Russian Church, and all the Russian people as heretics; of insulting the eastern patriarchs; and of deposing

and exiling bishops without a church council. He was removed officially as patriarch, stripped of his priestly functions, demoted to the rank of a simple monk, and exiled to the Ferapontov monastery in the far north. In 1676 he was transferred to the Kirillov monastery, also in the north. In 1681, as a result of the intercession of Tsar Fyodor Alexeyevich, Nikon was given permission to return to Moscow. He died on the return journey, on August 17, 1681, and was buried in the Monastery of the Resurrection.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; AVVAKUM PETROVICH; OLD BELIEVERS; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; ZEALOTS OF PIETY

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CATHY J. POTTER

NIL SORSKY, ST.

(c. 1433–1508), ascetic master and editor-copyist.

Brother of the state secretary Andrei Maykov (active 1450s–1490s), Nil entered the Kirillov-Belozersk monastery in the 1440s or 1450s, went to Mt. Athos at some time for special training, and in 1470 was a leading Kirillov elder. Dissatisfied with materialism and secular interests there, he founded the Sorsky Hermitage on a Kirillov property, where he enforced a strict, self-supporting regimen and taught the Athonite, hesychastic mode of prayer. By favoring monastic dispensation of

only spiritual alms, he avoided the amassing of goods and dependent labor required for material charity. In 1489, Archbishop Gennady of Novgorod sought out Nil, who helped produce Joseph of Volok's anti-heretical, theological polemics.

Nil's disciples included his traveling companion Innokenty Okhlyabinin, founder of another hermitage based on Nil's precepts; the Kirillov elders Gury Tushin and German Podolny, one a bibliophile, the other an opponent of condemning heretics; the disgraced prince-boyar Vassian Patrikeyev, the most strident "Non-possessor" during 1511–1531; and two of Joseph's leading acolytes.

Nil's expert book-copying, most notably an authoritative collection of saints lives, was distinguished by use of Greek originals to make corrections. His polished corpus of well-respected writings include the regulatory *Tradition (Predanie)* for his hermitage; an eleven-discourse, patristic-based *Rule (Ustav)* for "spiritual activity"; and didactic epistles to German, Gury, and Vassian. The leitmotifs are nonattachment, stillness with mythical prayer, and combating the eight pernicious "thoughts" (the Catholic seven deadly sins plus despondency). Contemporary writings do not show that Nil himself opposed and protested the execution of heretics or advocated confiscation of monastic villages, as later claimed and still widely believed.

Locally venerated, Nil has been seen as Russia's great elder and as relatively liberal for his day. He was added as a saint to official church calendars only in modern times.

See also: CHURCH COUNCIL; KIRILL-BELOOZERO MONASTERY; POSSESSORS AND NON-POSSESSORS; MONASTICISM; ORTHODOXY; SAINTS

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NKVD *See* STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF.

NOGAI

The Nogai, known as *Mangit ulus* in contemporary sources, was a loosely forged tribal union of nomadic Turkic (Kipchak-Uzbek) pastoralists claiming descent from Nogai (d. 1299), the founder of the Golden Horde. Sunni Muslim, Nogai khanate was formed in 1391, when the Tatar general Edigü, the leader of the Mangit Mongol tribe, seceded from the political orbit of the Golden Horde. Initially, Nogai lands stretched from the left bank of the lower Volga to the Ural River. The capital Saraichik, the only town in the khanate, was situated on the lower Ural in Central Asia. With Muscovite incorporation of the khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556), the Nogai Horde divided into three parts: the Great Nogai Horde, occupying the original core of the khanate's lands, apparently became Muscovite vassals; the Lesser Nogai Horde, located along the right bank of the Volga-Kuban-Azov region, submitted to the Crimean Khanate; and the Altıul Horde, which occupied the Emba basin. Due to famine and pressures from nomadic Kalmyks to the east in the 1570s through the early 1600s, the Great and Lesser Nogai Hoards reunited and joined the Ottoman-Crimean alliance. During Catherine II's (r. 1762–1796) wars with the Ottomans, most of the remnants of the Nogai were incorporated into the Russian Empire.

Because of its decentralized government, diverse trading partners, and conflicting allegiances with the other Mongol khanates, Muscovy, and the Ottomans, the Nogai had contradictory foreign policies that complicated their relations with other states in the region. However, since they wielded great military power, good diplomatic relations with the Nogai were sought after by the rival powers in the area. Aside from being occasional allies of the Muscovites, they were also key suppliers of horses, forwarding up to fifty thousand per delivery. In exchange, the Muscovites provided the Nogai with weapons, grain, textiles, and other goods that nomadic economies could not produce themselves. From the 1550s, the Nogai also acted as Muscovy's intermediaries in relations with Central Asia.

See also: ASTRAKHAN, KHANATE OF; CATHERINE II; GOLDEN HORDE; KALMYKS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

NOMENKLATURA

The term *nomenklatura* was often used in the USSR throughout the Stalin and post-Stalin periods to designate members of Soviet officialdom. The term was not generally known in the West until the 1960s. Members of the *nomenklatura* included Communist Party officials (particularly Party secretaries at any level of the Party organization), government officials, and senior officers in the Soviet armed forces who were Party members. Almost all members were, in fact, Communist Party members. At a minimum, the Party controlled access to *nomenklatura* jobs. Most often the term was used to describe full-time professional Party officials, also known as *apparatchiki*, since mere rank-and-file Party members did not hold important executive posts.

No definite tally of the number of the *nomenklatura* was ever published officially. But Russian and Western scholars generally agree that their numbers exceeded 500,000. Yet the entire membership of the Communist Party amounted on average to only about 7 percent of the Soviet population.

Wherever they served throughout the multinational Soviet Union, most of the *nomenklatura* were Russians, Ukrainians, or Belorussians. Almost always, native *nomenklatura* members posted in any of the non-Slavic Republics among the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR were supervised ultimately by ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, or Belorussians.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

NORMANIST CONTROVERSY

The Normanist Controversy is the most tendentious issue in early Russian history. It centers on the degree of influence Scandinavians had on the foundation of Kievan Rus and early Rus law, government, language, paganism, and trade. Normanist scholars argue for varying degrees of Scandinavian influence, and their opponents are anti-Normanists.

The controversy's origins date to the mid-eighteenth century, when historians, many of ethnic German background, began to publish the medieval Russian sources. It initially focused on the ethnic attribution of the Rus tribe (Greek *Ros*, Arabic *ar-Rus*), the name for Rurik and his clan, who were allegedly invited by a confederation of Slavic and Finnic tribes to rule over them in 862. The first Normanist scholars (Bayer, Müller, Schlötzer) argued that the Rus were a tribe deriving their name either from their homeland, Roslagen in central Sweden, or from the Finnic word for Swedes, *Ruotsi*. Further, they noted the Norse personal names in the 911 and 940 treaties between the Rus and Byzantium, Constantine Porphyrogenitus's listing of both Slavic and Norse names for the Dnieper cataracts, and more than fifty Norse words in the Russian language. Norse origins were also ascribed to early Rus law and the pagan Slavic pantheon. Mikhail Lomonosov and other early anti-Normanists argued that the Rus were Slavs who were named after a right-bank tributary of the Dnieper, the Ros River.

Nineteenth-century debates were shaped by German and Russian nationalism and the publication of more sources on the Rus, such as the medieval Arab and Persian geographical accounts (Ibn Khurdadbeh, Ibn Rusta, Ibn Fadlan), which mention a people called the ar-Rus who traded along the Russian river systems. The ar-Rus differed from other fair-skinned peoples of the north, including the Slavs (Saqalib). Although this theory is compelling, the medieval Islamic authors appeared to use ar-Rus as an occupational descriptive rather than an ethnic indicator, since they had not been to Rus themselves and could therefore not distinguish a Scandinavian from other peoples of the north. Nineteenth-century research also showed no more than sixteen Norse words in Russian, the independent development of Rus law and Scandinavian law, and a common Indo-European origin of both the Scandinavian and Slavic gods and languages.

Having exhausted the written texts, the Normanist and anti-Normanist schools stood firmly entrenched in the early twentieth century. The new scientific archaeology and innovations in the methodology of historical numismatics, however, revealed fresh source material, and henceforth the Normanist Controversy became an archaeological and numismatic question. In 1914, Swedish archaeologist T. J. Arne argued for a mass Viking-age Scandinavian colonization of Eastern Europe. Arne's theories remained largely unchallenged until the 1940s, when anti-Normanism, in part a reaction to the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, was proclaimed official Soviet state dogma. Post-war USSR witnessed a golden age for Soviet archaeology, with the state sponsorship of thousands of archaeological excavations. Key to the anti-Normanist position were the excavations at Gnezdovo and Staraya Ladoga, near Smolensk and Novgorod respectively. Normanists considered both to be Scandinavian settlements, but Soviet archaeologists (Artsikhovskiy, Avdusin, Ravdonikas) claimed minimal evidence for Scandinavian residence at these sites. Soviet scholars did not deny the passage of Scandinavians through Russia for purposes of international trade between northern Europe and the Islamic caliphate; they simply rejected that a mass Scandinavian colonization took place or that the colonists founded the Kievan state.

The 1970s onward has witnessed a convergence between the extremes of the Normanist and anti-Normanist positions. More recent excavations at sites with Scandinavian material and long-distance trade goods (Islamic silver dirhams, Eastern beads), indicate that Scandinavians maintained an active exchange network in the late eighth and ninth centuries with the Near East and, in the tenth century, mainly with Central Asia. Based on the current state of research, therefore, it is possible to reconstruct the following chronology of Scandinavian activity in eastern Europe. From the 760s, Scandinavians lived part of the year at Staraya Ladoga on the lower Volkhov River, where goods were reloaded from large seagoing vessels to smaller craft more appropriate for the journey along eastern Europe's often-treacherous rivers. By the early ninth century, when trade with the Near East was fully underway, other settlements formed to the south of Ladoga along the entire Volkhov River, which serviced the north-south trade. In the 860s, *Rurikovo gorodishche*, the Volkhov's largest settlement, with strong Scandinavian and West Slavic elements and precursor to Novgorod, was founded.

To the west, a second albeit less archaeologically discernible trade route with a few Scandinavian finds begins to the south of Lake Peipus at Izborsk, Kamno, and Pskov, possibly from the beginning of the ninth century. Both routes connect to the south and east, to the watersheds of the Western Dvina, Dnieper, and Volga rivers.

Archaeological and numismatic evidence implies that the 860s and 870s were a turbulent period: the burning down of Staraya Ladoga and Pskov, a smaller fire at Rurikovo gorodishche, and a marked increase in the deposition of coin hoards, suggesting times of danger. At the same time, the written sources speak of the invitation to Rurik and the unsuccessful Viking attack on Constantinople in 860. Finally, in the 880s and 890s there occurred a major decline in the import of silver and beads from the Near East. However, in around 900 new routes were opened with Central Asia, which provided an unprecedented new source of silver and other goods. Additionally, at this time Staraya Ladoga and Rurikovo underwent expansion, Scandinavian-style graves appeared to the southeast of Lake Ladoga, and the Lake Peipus trade was concentrated at a reconstructed Pskov.

A strong Scandinavian presence has become evident to the south, with the beginning of settlement and the cemeteries at Gnezdovo, and further south at Shestovitsa on the middle Dnieper River. Such phenomena are contemporary with the Russian Primary Chronicle's account of the Rus expansion to Kiev beginning in the late ninth century and Rus attacks on Byzantine territories including Constantinople in 907/911 and 940. The revival of the Rus trade with the Islamic East is seen also in the hundreds of hoards of mostly Central Asian dirhams deposited in eastern Europe's soil during the tenth century. Thomas Noonan estimates that during the tenth century more than 125 million dirhams from Central Asia alone were exported to northern Europe, which were exchanged for products of the northern forests, such as furs, honey, wax, sword blades, walrus ivory, and slaves. From the 950s, however, a silver crisis in Central Asia and the subsequent decline in the export of silver initiated a re-orientation in Rus trade, with silver thenceforward coming to Kievan Rus from western and central Europe. By the late tenth century, archaeological signs of Scandinavian activity diminish, even though the Russian Primary Chronicle and Icelandic sagas speak of Scandinavians enlisting as mercenaries in the courts of Kievan Rus and Byzantium throughout the eleventh century. One must bear in mind,

however, that there were never many Scandinavians on the territory of eastern Europe at any given time, with no more than two hundred Scandinavian graves found there for a more than two-hundred year period.

Taken as a whole, the archaeological, numismatic, and textual evidence clearly shows Scandinavian influence during the pre-Kievan and Kievan periods. The main question, however, remains: What role did the Scandinavians actually play in the Kievan state-building process? Prior to the arrival of Scandinavians and Slavs to northwestern Russia in the eighth and ninth centuries, the region was sparsely populated by small groups of Finno-Ugric hunters and gatherers. There were simply no wealthy peoples to colonize or raid, in contrast with the burgeoning Anglo-Saxon or Carolingian states. In this light, it is more prudent to place Scandinavian activity in an inclusive model of inter-ethnic economic cooperation, such as one of regional survival strategies developed by Noonan. Early medieval European Russia was home to many ethnic groups, all practicing different survival strategies, all of which were essential to the development of the Kievan Rus economy and state. The Finno-Ugric tribes of the northern Russian forests were consummate hunters who supplied the furs sought after by foreign and domestic markets. The Slavic agriculturalists, migrating from the fertile lands of southwestern Ukraine, brought advanced farming techniques and tribal administrative experience. Nomadic Turkic pastoralists residing in the Rus steppe zone introduced mounted-fighting tactics to the Slavic population. Finally, the Scandinavians contributed the long-distance shipping, commercial practices, and a military organization (including weapons) that facilitated the Islamic and Byzantine trade. Using older, more localized routes, the Scandinavians helped to create a commercial system that united all of European Russia for the first time in its history. Thus, the joining of these diverse economic strategies created conditions for the emergence of a powerful state in a territory that was both geographically and climatically daunting to maintain given the rudimentary communication and transportation systems of the early Middle Ages.

The Scandinavians, therefore, played an important role in the creation of the Kievan state, but they were only part of a complex ethno-cultural process. Normanists and anti-Normanists have benefited progressively from nineteenth-century advances in Indo-European linguistics, studies in

comparative religion, and modern archaeological and numismatic research. The Normanist Controversy is placed into proper perspective by moving away from the emphasis placed on this one group by the medieval chroniclers and, instead, viewing it in the light of modern research that examines the development of eastern Europe as a whole.

See also: GNEZDOVO; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; VIKINGS

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HEIDI M. SHERMAN

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective defense/collective security organization based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between North America and Europe. It was created in response to the growing Soviet threat in Europe after World War II, including the communist takeovers in eastern and central Europe, pressure on Norway, Greece, and Turkey, and the 1948 blockade of Berlin. The Washington Treaty establishing NATO was signed on April 4, 1949, by

Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. NATO's membership was subsequently enlarged, bringing in Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1955, Spain in 1982, and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. In 2002 NATO invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join the alliance in 2004.

At the core of NATO's mutual defense commitment is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an attack on one or more members of the alliance will be considered an attack on all. Also central are Article 2, which speaks of the members' commitment to their shared values and free institutions; Article 4, which provides for consultations if a member's security is threatened; and Article 10, which gives the members the option to invite additional states to join the alliance.

Headquartered in Brussels, NATO is an inter-governmental organization. Its decisions require consensus. The permanent ambassadors of the member-states meet in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), chaired by the secretary general. The NAC and other senior policy committees, such as the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), meet at regular intervals. At least twice per year NATO holds foreign ministers' meetings. Meetings also occur at the level of defense ministers, and when key decisions are to be taken NATO holds summits of the heads of state.

The military structures of NATO are headed by the Military Committee, which meets regularly at the level of the chiefs of defense of the member-states. The committee's daily work is conducted by their permanent military representatives. NATO's two principal strategic commands are the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) with headquarters (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) with headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. These key commands are supported by a number of regional commands. Allies who are members of the military structures contribute forces to NATO's integrated military structures, but some of the members do not participate in them. France withdrew from NATO's military structures in 1966 (it remains a full member of its political structures); Spain joined NATO in 1982 but remained outside its military component until 1997; Iceland has no armed forces and is represented at the military level by a civilian.

When NATO was established, the first secretary general, Lord Ismay, allegedly quipped that its mission in Europe was “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” During the Cold War, the principal function of NATO was to provide common defense against the Soviet bloc. NATO also ensured that American and European security remained interconnected, and provided a formula for the reintegration of postwar Germany into the Western security system. Finally, NATO provided a platform for consultations on issues outside the alliance, both formal and informal.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some argued that NATO had completed its mission and ought to be dissolved. However, the alliance has endured and undergone considerable transformation. It assumed “out-of-area” responsibilities by intervening in the Balkans, providing stabilization forces in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), and intervening and providing stabilization forces there (KFOR) in Kosovo. It also offered assistance to the United States during the 2001 campaign in Afghanistan and contributed to peacekeeping afterwards.

The new 1999 Strategic Concept, which outlines NATO’s broad goals and means, has made conflict prevention and crisis management the fundamental security tasks of the alliance. Another NATO task since 1990 has been to stabilize post-communist central and eastern Europe. Through the Partnership for Peace program (PfP), which allows NATO to cooperate with nonmembers; the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which assisted applicants preparing for the 2002 round of enlargement; and greater cooperation with Russia in the new institutional setting of the NATO-Russia Council, the alliance has contributed to the post-communist transition. The landmark in this process was the 1999 enlargement that brought Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance. Three years later, at a summit in Prague, NATO invited an additional seven members to join in 2004.

The future of NATO is unclear. Critics argue that NATO has outlived its usefulness as a defense organization and has become merely a political forum with residual military structures. They point to the fact that in the fifty-plus years of NATO’s history, the core Article 5 has been invoked only once, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States; yet U.S. military operations against Islamic terrorists have not been conducted as NATO operations. A contribut-

ing factor in the progressive downgrading of NATO’s military value has been the widening capability gap between the United States and its European allies. In addition, the allies have found it difficult at times to reach consensus on the area of operations, with the Americans arguing for a global role, while the Europeans take a more traditional regional view. Fissures within NATO surfaced publicly during the 2003 war with Iraq, with France and Germany openly opposing the U.S. position. The American decision to rely on the “coalition of the willing” raised questions about the long-term viability of the alliance.

The proponents of NATO argue that it is too early to proclaim its end as the premier Euro-Atlantic security organization. They point out that NATO has responded to change by undertaking fundamental reforms, seeking to adjust its structures and its military capabilities. At the Prague summit on November 21 and 22, 2002, the alliance established the NATO Response Force (NRF) of twenty thousand for deployment into crisis areas, becoming fully operational in 2006. The nations at the summit set goals for reorganizing their armed forces in order to increase their mobility and allow sustained operations outside their territory. The next important step in reforming NATO was taken at the defense ministers’ meeting in Brussels on June 12 and 13, 2003: NATO approved a new military command structure to reflect its new missions and its transition to smaller forces. The new command structure envisions the creation of a new Allied Command Operations, based at SHAPE in Mons. SACLANT will cease to exist, replaced by the Allied Command Transformation to oversee the restructuring of NATO’s military. The number of commands will be reduced from twenty to eleven, and their responsibilities redefined.

These structural changes, combined with the development of “niche capabilities” by the member-states, suggest that, given political consensus, NATO may yet reinvent itself with a new division of tasks and specializations in place. The long-term viability of the alliance will also be affected by whether the emerging defense capabilities of the European Union complement or duplicate NATO’s. Most important, the future of NATO will be determined by the future state of transatlantic relations.

See also: COLD WAR; WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

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ANDREW A. MICHTA

NORTHERN CONVOYS

“Northern Convoys” is the widely used name of one of the shortest and most dangerous routes of transportation of lend-lease cargoes to the USSR by its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition from 1941 to 1945. Running from Scottish and Icelandic ports to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, they extended for 2,000 miles (3,219 kilometers) and took ten to twelve days to cross. Until the end of 1942, Northern Convoys that went to the USSR had “PO” index; those returning from the USSR, “OP”; the subsequent Northern Convoys carried indices “JW” and “RA.” The defense of cargo transports was carried out by the Allied, mainly British, Navy. In 1941 the route was passed by seven convoys to the USSR (from trial “P” or “Derwish” in August 1941 up to PO-6), and four convoys to Great Britain.

During the spring of 1942, in order to cut the Allies’ northern sea route, the Nazi German headquarters sent large fleets and aircraft forces to occupied Norway. As a result, in July 1942, almost the entire convoy PO-17 was defeated (twenty-three of thirty-six transports were sunk). Thirteen of forty cargo ships were lost in September 1942 in PO-18. In total, from 1941 to 1945, forty-one Northern Convoys, which consisted of 839 transports, were sent to the northern Soviet ports, of

which 741 arrived safely. Sixty-one were lost, and thirty-seven returned to their own ports. Thirty-six Northern Convoys of 738 transports were sent from Soviet ports; of these, 699 reached their ports of destination, thirty were lost, and eight turned back. In addition, thirteen transports were lost during single passages and on berths in ports. While covering Northern Convoy 22, Allied fighting ships, including two cruisers and seven destroyers, were sunk.

In total, four million tons of cargo were delivered to the Soviet northern ports of the USSR, including 4,909 aircraft, 7,764 tanks, and 1,357 guns. Northern Convoys have added one more heroic page to a history of World War II and fighting cooperation of the USSR with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

See also: NORTHERN FLEET; WORLD WAR II

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MIKHAIL SUPRUN

NORTHERN FLEET

The Northern Fleet is the largest of the four Russian naval fleets. It differs from the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets in that it (like the Pacific Fleet) has operated nuclear-powered vessels for more than forty years. In fact, two-thirds of Russia’s nuclear-powered vessels are assigned to the Northern Fleet at the Kola Peninsula. The others are based at Pacific Fleet bases near Vladivostok. The Northern Fleet is organized into departments with separate spheres of responsibility. Other duties are divided among government committees and ministries. While the navy is responsible for the nuclear submarines and the three shipyards that service and maintain them, the State Committee for the Defense Industry (Goskomoboronprom) maintains the other shipyards. The Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) is responsible for the nuclear fuel used in naval reactors, and the Ministry of Transport is in charge of shipments of new and spent nuclear fuel by railroad.

Before the Soviet collapse in 1991, nuclear submarines from the Northern and Pacific Fleets regularly patrolled the east and west coasts of the United States, the South China Sea, and outside the Persian Gulf. During the early twenty-first century, however, Russian nuclear submarines are rarely seen in these waters. The number of nuclear-powered submarines in operation in the Northern Fleet decreased from 120 during the late 1980s to less than forty in 2001. The Northern Fleet has six naval bases and shipyards on the Kola Peninsula to serve its nuclear vessels: Severomorsk, Gadzhievo, Gremikha, Vidyaevo, Sayda Bay, and Zapadnaya Litsa. Its main base and administrative center is Severomorsk, a city with a population of 70,000 situated 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) north of Murmansk on the eastern side of the Murmansk Fjord. Three nuclear-powered *Kirov*-class battle cruisers are based in Severomorsk: *Admiral Ushakov*, *Admiral Nakhimov*, and *Peter the Great*. However, no nuclear submarines are permanently stationed there. Safonovo, a rural town in the Severomorsk area, is the repair center for nuclear submarines and surface vessels, including the largest Northern Fleet submarines, such as the *Typhoon* class.

The strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula became apparent to Russian military planners with the rise of German naval power in the Baltic Sea and the outbreak of World War I. Recognizing the need for access to ice-free harbors in the north, Russia built a modern port in Alexandrovsk (today called Polyarny) at the mouth of the Murmansk Fjord in 1899. A naval force dedicated to the northern region was established shortly after the outbreak of World War I. In 1917, a railroad line was built to Murmansk, connecting the rest of Russia to an ice-free port open year round. Not until Josef Stalin's visit to Polyarny during the summer of 1933 was the Soviet Fleet of the Northern Seas actually established, however. Renamed the Northern Fleet in 1937, it consisted (before World War II) of just eight destroyers, fifteen diesel-powered submarines, patrol boats, minesweepers, and some smaller vessels. During World War II, supplies from the Western Allies were transported by convoy to Murmansk and then taken by railroad to military fronts in the south. A major naval buildup began after World War II in an effort to catch up with the United States. The first Soviet nuclear submarine (the *K-3 Leninsky Komsomol*) was commissioned to the Northern Fleet on July 1, 1958, just four years after the commissioning of the first American nuclear submarine, the *Nautilus*. During the period from 1950 to 1970, the Northern Fleet

grew from the smallest to the largest and most important of the four Soviet fleets.

See also: BALTIC FLEET; BLACK SEA FLEET; PACIFIC FLEET

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NORTHERN PEOPLES

Russia's Northern Peoples (*Malochislennye narody severa*, literally, "numerically small peoples of the north") constitute a distinct legal category of native peoples who live in the north, number less than fifty thousand each, and pursue traditional ways of life. During the early Soviet period, such a category was created as the focus for a special set of policies, informed by the state's belief that, due to the "backwardness" of these peoples, they needed special protection and help to reach the stage of communism. The number of peoples belonging to this group varied over time, but at the end of the Soviet period it included twenty-six peoples: Sami, Khanty, Mansi, Nenets, Enets, Nganasan, Selkup, Tofalar, Evenki, Even, Yukagir, Chukchi, Chuvans, Eskimos, Aleut, Koryak, Itelmen, Dolgan, Ket, Negidal, Nanai, Ulchi, Oroki, Orochi, Udege, and Nivkhi. Together, these peoples numbered slightly under 182,000 in 1989.

The Northern Peoples inhabit an immense swath of Russia, from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Sea, the Chinese border, and Sakhalin Island. They belong to numerous language groups, and have distinctive cultures, traditions, and adaptations to diverse ecosystems. At the outset of the Soviet era, most pursued traditional activities that included reindeer herding, hunting, fishing, and marine mammal hunting. Most were nomadic and



A group of Dolgans stand together at their camp near the village of Syndassko, Russia, in 1993. © JACQUES LANGEVIN/CORBIS SYGMA

lived in small kin-based groups. Most were organized into clans, although these had been disrupted by the twentieth century. During the tsarist period, most had been subjugated, and were required to pay a tribute of furs (*yasak*) to the state. Some missionary activity had occurred, but most groups remained largely animistic.

The Soviets brought sweeping changes to the Northern Peoples, introducing compulsory schooling (first in their own languages, but soon afterward in Russian) and health care; imposing collective farms, confiscating reindeer and hunting equipment; and repressing leaders, wealthier individuals, and shamans. The Soviets also settled as much of the population as possible in newly created villages. These policies radically disturbed the local family structures and the transmission of knowledge from elder to younger generations. Alcohol abuse and violent death became rampant, and by the end of the Soviet period, life expectancy of the Northern Peoples averaged a generation less than the (already low) Russian level. At the same time, the state nurtured a small indigenous intelligentsia, including doctors, teachers, writers, artists,

and political leaders. Within these leaders the state engendered the larger, composite identity of “Northern Peoples,” laying the foundation of a common, pan-native response, once the political climate allowed for such.

The late Soviet policy of *glasnost* enabled the Northern Peoples to publicly address their horrific situation for the first time. A strong nativist movement ensued, with the organization of the Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) in 1990. Native leaders lobbied for laws that would protect native rights, with special focus on the issue of native lands, which had been subject to extensive resource extraction and environmental degradation. Key federal legislation outlining native rights and mechanisms for land claims was finally adopted in 1999–2001. One outcome of the legislation has been the increase in the number of peoples included in the designation; several groups who were not considered distinct peoples during the Soviet period, among them the Shors, Teluets, and Kereks, have achieved recognition as Northern Peoples since 1991. The number of native persons claiming membership in the overall

group has also increased, largely due to revitalized pride in native identity. While political reforms have encouraged native political development, economic reforms, including reduced northern subsidies, have severely challenged Northern Peoples' livelihoods.

See also: EVENKI; CHUKCHI; DOLGANS; KHANTY; KORYAKS; MANSI; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NENETS; SAMI

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GAIL A. FONDAHL

NORWAY, RELATIONS WITH

Geographically driven relations between northern Norway and the Russian Arctic coast predate the Slavic and Scandinavian colonization of the northern periphery of Europe starting in the twelfth century. Norwegian Vikings referred to the White Sea region as Bjarmeland, and had at least sporadic contacts with the local inhabitants by 900 C.E. Norwegian trading expeditions to the northern Dvina estuary took place regularly until the early thirteenth century, and there were at least occasional journeys into the Russian interior. A 1276 law code refers to Norwegian commercial expeditions via the Baltic to Novgorod.

Interest in the northern fisheries attracted a growing number of settlers to the Arctic coast in the Middle Ages. Commercial and military interaction in the area included raids that sometimes esca-

lated to open warfare. The Norwegian–Novgorodian peace treaty of 1326 reaffirmed the status quo and ensured free shipping and trade. No formal border was demarcated and many regions were *de jure* placed under joint administration in the fourteenth century. Some Norwegian settlers may have lived on the Kola Peninsula early on, and the Norwegians claimed control over the peninsula for centuries, notwithstanding its steady Russification. The Russian word *murmashy*, referring to the northern Kola coast, is derived from *nordmann* ("Norwegian").

The Norwegian fortress of Vardøhus near the present-day border was built around 1300, whereas the main economic center on the Russian side came to be the Orthodox Solovki Island monastery in the White Sea. The first Russian town in the region, Kola (near the present-day Murmansk), was not founded until 1583, but soon had a Norwegian guesthouse. Perhaps during the fifteenth century, but definitely by the 1550s, another Orthodox monastery was founded in the ill-defined border region of the Pechenga Valley. The monks regularly traded with Vardøhus. Norwegian merchants, often from the ports of Bergen (with historic monopoly rights over the northern waters) and Trondheim, regularly attended the Russian border market of Keger, as well as Kola. However, trade with the Murman coast appears to have stagnated during the seventeenth century and been limited to local products. Merchants from Bergen and Trondheim periodically also visited the Russian port of Arkhangelsk, especially to ship sporadic Russian grain subsidies to Denmark–Norway. Conflicting territorial claims made border disputes quite common during the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century, and the Norwegian castellan of eastern Finnmark made symbolic visits to Kola to demand tribute from the local population until 1813.

Regular commercial contacts between the neighboring coastal regions, with Vardøhus as the main center, were well established by the late seventeenth century, driven primarily by Russians. Russian flour, cloth, hides, and tallow became important products for the northern Norwegian economy. By the 1760s, Russian vessels made annual trips to the Finnmark and Troms coasts, and Russian fishing in northern Norwegian waters was common. This was countenanced with some limitations by the Danish government because of its good relations with Russia. Norwegians are known to have settled in northern Russia starting in the

eighteenth century. The interaction between Norwegians and Russians produced a unique local pidgin language known as *russenorsk*, "Russian Norwegian." The regime of open borders continued until an 1826 treaty delineated the frontier and granted two-thirds of the shared territory to Russia.

Trade in northern Norway was gradually liberalized in 1789 as part of a plan to stimulate the region's economic development. New port towns were built and direct Russian trade with Norwegian fishermen was formally authorized. Most remaining restrictions were eliminated in 1839, and regular steamship traffic between northern Russia and Finnmark began during the 1870s. Up to 350 Russian ships visited northern Norway each year during the course of the eighteenth century. Attempts to control Russian trade and fishing in Norway became more serious during the period when Norway was under Swedish rule. All foreign fishing was formally banned in 1913.

Political relations became more tense during the nineteenth century because of Russian concern about perceived Norwegian expansionism in the Arctic. In contrast, the Norwegian administration in the United Kingdom of Sweden-Norway often found itself moderating the growing Swedish Russophobia. However, its pragmatism was repeatedly tempered by fears that Russia might be eyeing some of the ice-free harbors of Finnmark. The accelerating Russian settlement on the Kola Peninsula and the steady stream of immigrants to northern Norway from Russian-controlled Finland heightened the sense of alarm during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Norwegian popular mood began to favor a more nationalistic policy in the north. Systematic Norwegianization was seen as a way to effectively control the ethnically mixed territory. Russia was perceived negatively because of its authoritarianism even though it was the only great power lending active support to Norwegian independence in 1905, albeit clearly with a view to weakening Sweden. Newly independent Norway unsuccessfully sought to regain control of the Russian borderlands at the Versailles Conference.

The October Revolution led to a freeze in Russian-Norwegian relations, with devastating consequence to some northern Norwegian communities, as well as a geographic separation when Finland gained control of the Pechenga-Petsamo region. Although the Finnish threat in some ways replaced the weakened Bolshevik regime as a source of concern, diplomatic relations between Norway and the Soviet state were not established until 1924. The

Norwegian government actively sought to curb the activities of leftist pro-Soviet organizations and reinforced the garrisons in northern Norway. During World War II the Norwegian government-in-exile was very worried about Soviet territorial ambitions in northern Norway. Its fears seemed confirmed when the Red Army temporarily occupied eastern Finnmark in 1944. The Soviets also claimed some of the Norwegian-controlled northern Atlantic islands (Bear Isle, Spitsbergen).

Norwegian Russophobia and a sense of vulnerability after the German occupation led to a strong cross-party consensus in favor of NATO membership in 1949. Although it continued to distrust the Soviets, the Oslo government adopted a pragmatic stance, de-emphasizing the defense of Finnmark and prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons in the country. Intergovernmental relations remained formal, and most Norwegian-Russian interaction was localized to the northern border regions. Perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union did a great deal to restore the historically close ties between northern Russia and Finnmark, and during the early twenty-first century there are many lively economic, political, and cultural ties.

See also: COLD WAR; FINLAND; SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH; VIKINGS

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JARMO T. KOTILAINE

NOVGOROD, ARCHBISHOP OF

The archbishop was the highest ecclesiastical office and symbolic head of the city—Lord Novgorod the Great. The chronicles refer to him as *vладыка*, a term meaning "lord," or "ruler," reflecting his duties as the representative of the city. He resided within the

city's fortress (*detinets*), met with Western ambassadors and Russian princes, mediated disputes in the city, and officiated in the city's main Cathedral of St. Sophia.

The Novgorodian office of bishop traditionally dates to the reign of Vladimir, who brought in Ioakim of Cherson in 989, but there is little firm evidence of its existence until the mid-1030s, when Luka Zhidyata served. The bishop received tithes from fines and wergild payments, but from the late 1130s onward a fixed income from the prince's treasury was set. Landholding, however, constituted the basis of the church's wealth, and by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Novgorodian Church was the largest landholder, employing religious and secular workers and even hiring soldiers.

Following Novgorod's independence from Kiev in 1136, the first election of the bishop occurred in 1156 when the "people of the entire town," perhaps in a meeting of an assembly (*veche*), chose Arkady. However, the ability of Novgorod to select its own archbishop did not make the Church independent of the metropolitan, who still confirmed candidates. After Arkady's death in 1163, Ilya was appointed (not elected) first archbishop of Novgorod in 1165. The next election of an archbishop occurred in 1186 when townsmen, prince, hegumens, and priests selected Gavriil, Ilya's brother. After 1186 it became customary for the townspeople, prince, and clergy to elect their archbishops in a *veche*, but it is not clear whether all free Novgorodians participated. When there was no clear candidate the city utilized lots (for example, in 1229 and 1359): Three names were placed on the altar of St. Sophia and one would be chosen.

Sometime during the thirteenth century the archbishop came to preside over the Council of Lords (*Sovet gospod*), the highest executive and judicial body. It consisted of some fifty to sixty members, including the sitting lord mayor and chiliarch (commander of troops), former lord mayors, and current mayors of the five boroughs. The meetings took place within the archbishop's quarters, and later in the archbishop's Palace of Facets, constructed in 1433. The Novgorodian Judicial Charter notes that referral hearings convened in the archbishop's quarters.

The archbishop did not directly control the city's monasteries, which fell under the jurisdiction of one of the five district hegumens (heads of monasteries). The monasteries were ultimately un-

der the jurisdiction of the archimandrite, who also was chosen by the *veche*.

Moscow conquered Novgorod in 1478, and two years later Grand Prince Ivan III arrested and imprisoned Archbishop Theophilus. Ivan forced Theophilus to resign and replaced him with Genadius in 1484, bringing the archbishopric more firmly under the metropolitan of Moscow. In 1489 Ivan confiscated most of the archbishop's estates and half the lands of the six wealthiest monasteries. These lands became the basis of Moscow's system of military service landholdings (*pomeste*).

See also: BIRCHBARK CHARTERS; CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, NOVGOROD; NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; POSADNIK; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; VECHE.

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LAWRENCE N. LANGER

NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER

The Novgorod Judicial Charter exists in a sixteenth-century fragment but was likely first compiled around 1471. By then Novgorod faced a growing military threat from Moscow. In 1456 Moscow imposed the Treaty of Yazhelbitsy, which limited Novgorod's independence in foreign policy, forced the city to cede important territories, and imposed a heavy indemnity payment. Novgorod retained its internal administrative structure, but the city became torn politically between pro-Lithuanian and pro-Muscovite factions. Moscow decisively defeated Novgorod at the Shelon River and imposed a huge indemnity of sixteen thousand rubles. Grand Prince Ivan III received Novgorodian delegations at the mouth of the Shelon and concluded a peace based on the earlier Yazhelbitsy Treaty. The Charter was probably drawn up at this time or soon thereafter, as it reflects Novgorod's administrative structure and liberties before Ivan's arrests of some leading Novgorodians in late 1475 and 1476, and his annexation of the city in 1478.

The Charter records that the archbishop, leading political officers, and urban free population (mayors [*posadniki*], chiliarchs [*tysyatski*], boyars,

well-to-do or ranking men [*zhiti lyudi*], merchants, and taxable population) from all five boroughs, who, having met in Yaroslav's court in an assembly (*veche*), and having conferred with Grand Prince Ivan III and his son, agreed to the provisions of the Charter. The incomplete Charter abruptly ends in the midst of Article 42. Much of the Charter concerns the prerogatives of the city's judicial system. Significantly, the first four articles asserted the rights of the courts of the archbishop, mayor, and chiliarch. The archbishop conducts his court according to the canons of the Church, and the chiliarch retains the independence of his court. The mayor, however, must conduct his judicial proceedings with that of the grand prince's lieutenant (*namestnik*). Although this appears as a limitation of the mayor's prerogatives, it likely reflects longstanding practice, as the text notes that they are to direct the court jointly in accordance with traditional custom. On the other hand, Article 5 affirmed the prohibition against removing the mayor, chiliarch, lieutenant of the archbishop, and all their judges from their courts. The grand prince's lieutenants and judges (*tyuny*, who were probably slaves) retained a customary right of review.

Heavy fines were exacted according to status for slandering or intimidating the mayor, chiliarch, any of the other judges, or the decisions of trial by combat (the latter a common feature of the Pskov Judicial Charter). Boyars paid fifty rubles, the well-to-do (non-aristocratic wealthy merchants and landowners) twenty rubles, and the remaining free urban population (*molodshi*, or young ones) ten rubles to the grand prince and Novgorod. These were all prohibitive fines designed to preserve the integrity of the courts. Cases were to be tried and completed within a month, but land disputes could take up to two months; the Charter also stipulated the fees the courts and their officials received.

Court procedures required the two litigants (or their representatives) and no others to confront one another and conduct their cases. Participants including all judges had to kiss the cross, attesting to their truthfulness and Christian faith. Failure to kiss the cross resulted in the loss of the case. Sons could kiss the cross on behalf of their widowed mothers; if a son refused, then the widow could kiss the cross in her home in the presence of the bailiffs. Character witnesses could be called, but the Pskov populace and slaves could not serve as character witness, although a slave could testify against another slave. Litigants were normally given two weeks to rebut witnesses. Boyars and the wealthy

conducted referral hearings within the archbishop's residence, which meant that they were probably under the jurisdiction of the Council of Lords. The Charter carefully regulated procedures concerning postponements.

Of particular interest are the Charter's references to the administrative subdivisions of the city. Each borough, street, hundred, or row could send two people to a court or investigation. Unfortunately, the Charter does not clarify the social composition or administrative responsibilities of the urban divisions, which have been the subject of much historical debate. Novgorod consisted of five boroughs, which were divided into hundreds, streets, and rows. The boroughs were under the jurisdiction of boyars, and the hundreds were originally administered by a complex arrangement of princely and urban officials that, by the late twelfth century, was dominated by the city's boyars. The streets and rows may have reflected the interests or administration of the general population of lesser merchants and craftsmen.

See also: NOVGOROD THE GREAT; PSKOV JUDICIAL CHARTER; SUDEBNIK OF 1497

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NOVGOROD THE GREAT

Novgorod the Great was a city-state located in northwestern Russia, existing from the mid-tenth century to its annexation by Muscovy in 1478.

Although Novgorod was named in the Laurentian redaction of the *Primary Chronicle* as the political seat occupied by Rurik in 862, archaeological evidence indicates that the city was founded in the mid-tenth century. Located on the Volkhov River near its origins at Lake Ilmen, the city quickly emerged as a leading commercial center. Shortly after Prince Vladimir adopted Christianity for Kievan Rus, Novgorod became the seat of a bishopric and became a major ecclesiastic and cultural center. Its political institutions represented an alternative to

the strong princely regime developing in north-eastern Russia. At the peak of its power, Novgorod controlled lands stretching from the Baltic Sea to the White Sea and the northern Urals Mountains, but it was subjugated by Muscovy in 1478.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND HISTORY

As Kievan Rus formed, Novgorod emerged as the second most important city of that state. Kiev's princes appointed their sons or other close associates to govern Novgorod. Thus, when Svyatoslav died in 972, his son Vladimir was serving as prince in Novgorod. Similarly, when Vladimir died in 1015, his son Yaroslav was ruling Novgorod. Both Svyatoslav and Vladimir were able to use troops from Novgorod and Scandinavia to secure their own positions as princes of Kiev. Although it has been argued that Prince Yaroslav of Kiev intended Novgorod to become the hereditary seat of his son Vladimir, most scholars concur that Novgorod continued to be ruled by appointees of the Kievan princes. This arrangement distinguished Novgorod from the other major towns of Kievan Rus, towns which, during the eleventh century, became patrimonies of different branches of the Rurikid dynasty.

In 1136 the Novgorodians asserted their right to name their own prince. For the next century they selected princes from the Rurikid dynastic lines that ruled in Chernigov, Smolensk, and Vladimir-Suzdal and that competed for power in Kievan Rus. Novgorod's affiliation with a particular dynastic branch frequently gave its princes advantages over their competitors. Novgorod consequently also became an object of contention among the rival dynastic branches, which sought to influence Novgorod's choice of prince through political, economic, and military pressure. In 1148–1149 and again in 1169 Novgorod clashed violently with Suzdalia, which was able to block supplies, including food, to the city. By the second quarter of the thirteenth century, princes from Vladimir-Suzdal had gained dominance in Novgorod.

In the absence of a single branch of the dynasty permanently ruling the city and its associated lands, Novgorod developed a political system that was unique within the lands of Rus. Princes exercised considerable authority and were responsible for defending the city. But they were obliged to reside outside the city and to govern in conjunction with the city's administrators, its mayor (*posadnik*) and militia commander (*tysyatsky*), who were elected from Novgorod's wealthy, landowning

elite, known as the Novgorodian boyars. In addition, the city irregularly convened a town assembly, or *veche*. The bishops of Novgorod, elevated to archbishops in 1165 and regarded as significant unifying influences in the city, also participated in the city's administration, its diplomatic affairs, its economic activities, and its judicial system. The functions of these offices and institutions and division of authority among them remain imperfectly understood; scholars have therefore characterized Novgorod variously as a republic with its popular town assembly and as an oligarchy politically dominated by a few boyar families.

The Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus in the period from 1238 to 1240 did not reach Novgorod. But in 1259, the Mongols accompanied by Prince Alexander Nevsky (r. 1252–1263), who had led the defense of Novgorod from the Swedes at the Neva River in 1240 and from the Teutonic Knights at Lake Peipus in 1242, forced Novgorod to submit to a census and pay tribute. Novgorod continued to recognize the grand princes of Vladimir, all of whom were also princes of Moscow after the mid-fourteenth century, as its own.

During the fourteenth century local officials played a greater role in the city's governance and administration. Tensions between them and their princes developed as disputes arose over the princes' demands for tribute payments and control of territories in Novgorod's northern empire, including the North Dvina land, which Grand Prince Vasily I (r. 1389–1425) unsuccessfully tried to seize in 1397. The conflicts between Novgorod and Moscow reached critical proportions in the fifteenth century. Novgorod occasionally, in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, turned to Lithuania for a prince and resisted making tribute payments to Moscow. In 1456 Grand Prince Vasily II (r. 1425–1462) defeated Novgorod militarily. The ensuing Treaty of Yazhelbitsy curtailed Novgorod's autonomy, particularly in foreign affairs. When Novgorod nevertheless sought closer relations with Lithuania in 1470–1471, Grand Prince Ivan III defeated Novgorod at the Battle of Shelon (1471). In 1478 he removed the symbolic *veche* bell, replaced Novgorod's local officials with his own governors, and effectively annexed Novgorod to Muscovy.

COMMERCE

Novgorod's political importance derived from its commercial strength. Its location on the Volkhov River, which flowed northward into Lake Ladoga, gave it access through the Baltic Sea to Scandinavia

and northern Europe. It thus became the northern Rus terminus of the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks,” which followed the Dnieper River to Kiev and beyond to the Black Sea and Byzantium. Novgorod was also linked by waterways and portages to the Volga River, the route to Bulgar on the Volga, Khazaria, the Caspian Sea, and the Muslim East.

Novgorod’s commerce was the main source of silver for the Russian lands. In the tenth century, silver dirhams were imported from the Muslim East. Some were reexported to the Baltic region; others circulated in the lands of Rus. From the eleventh century, when the Islamic silver coins were no longer available, Novgorod imported silver from its European trading partners. In addition, Novgorod imported European woolen cloth, weapons, metals, pottery, alcoholic beverages, and salt. From the east and Byzantium it imported silks and spices, gems and jewelry, and glassware and ceramic pottery.

Novgorod not only functioned as a transit center, reexporting imported goods; it also traded its own goods, chiefly wax, honey, and fur. By the end of the twelfth century Novgorod extended its authority over a vast northern empire stretching to the White Sea and to the Ural Mountains. It collected tribute in fur from the region’s Finno-Ugric populations; its merchants traded with them as well. By these means it secured a supply of luxury fur pelts for export. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it also exported large quantities of squirrel pelts.

During the tenth and eleventh centuries Novgorod’s main European trading partners were Scandinavians. By the twelfth century they had established their own trading complex around the Church of St. Olaf on the market side of the city. From the twelfth century, German merchants, who established their own trading depot at Peterhof, were successfully competing with the Scandinavians for Novgorod’s trade. In the 1130s Prince Vsevolod transferred control over weights and measures—the fees collected for weighing and measuring goods that were sold in the marketplace—and judicial authority over trade disputes to Novgorod’s bishop, the wax merchants’ association, which was associated with the Church of St. John, and the *tysyatsky*.

Novgorod’s commerce survived the invasion of the Mongols, who encouraged the transport of imported and domestic goods as tribute and as commercial commodities down the Volga River to their

capital at Sarai. Although disputes led to occasional interruptions in Novgorod’s trade with the Hansa, as in 1388 to 1392 and in 1443 to 1448, it persisted until 1494, when Grand Prince Ivan III closed Peterhof.

SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Novgorod was one of the largest cities in the lands of Rus. In the twelfth century it covered an area of over one thousand acres. With the exception of the area containing the Cathedral of St. Sophia, which was set within a citadel from the mid-eleventh century, Novgorod was an open city until the late fourteenth century or early fifteenth century, when a town wall was built. The Volkhov River divided the city into two halves, the Sophia side on the west bank and the market side on the east. It was further subdivided into five boroughs (*kontsy*) and streets.

Novgorod’s population in the early eleventh century is estimated to have been between ten and fifteen thousand and to have doubled by the early thirteenth century. Estimates for the fifteenth century range from twenty-five to fifty thousand. The wealthiest and most politically active and influential strata in Novgorod’s society were the boyars and great merchants. Lower strata included merchants of more moderate means, a diverse range of artisans and craftsmen, unskilled workers, and slaves. Clergy also dwelled in and near the city. Peasants occupied rural villages in the countryside subject to Novgorod.

Civil strife repeatedly occurred within the city. In the extreme, riots broke out, and victims were thrown off the bridge into the Volkhov River. But more commonly, order was maintained by the combined princely-local administration that regulated business and adjudicated legal disputes. The populace relied on formal documentation issued by city officials for business transactions, property sales and donations, wills, and other legal actions. Birchbark charters, unearthed in archaeological excavations, attest that it was common for Novgorodians to communicate about daily personal, household, and business activities in writing. The bishops’ court also was a center of chronicle writing.

The urban population dwelled in a wooden city. Roads and walkways were constructed from split logs. Urban estates owned by boyars and wealthy merchants lined the roads. While they dwelled in

the central residential buildings on the estates, shopkeepers, craftsmen, and other dependents lived and worked in smaller houses in the courts, which also included nonresidential buildings and were surrounded by wooden fences. Although the city boasted a drainage system, the accumulation of refuse required repeated repaving of the roads; frequent fires similarly required the reconstruction of buildings. Many of the town's craftsmen were correspondingly engaged in logging, carpentry, and other trades involving wood.

Some buildings, especially churches, were of masonry construction. The Cathedral of St. Sophia, built in 1045–1050 from undressed stone set in pink-colored mortar and adorned with five domes, was the first such structure built in Novgorod. Sponsored by Prince Vladimir Yaroslavich, it became the bishop's cathedral, the centerpiece of the Sophia side of the city. From the beginning of the twelfth century, princes, bishops, and wealthy boyars and merchants were patrons of dozens of masonry churches. Generally smaller than the Cathedral of St. Sophia, they were located on both sides of the river and also in monasteries outside the city. Novgorodian and visiting artists and artisans designed and built these churches and also painted icons and frescoes that decorated their interiors. By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they had developed distinctive Novgorodian schools of architecture and icon painting.

The boyars and wealthy merchants of the city also owned landed estates outside the city. Although women generally did not participate in public and political affairs, they did own and manage property, including real estate. Among the best known of them was Marfa Boretskaya, who was one of the wealthiest individuals in Novgorod on the eve of its loss of independence. On those provincial estates, peasants and nonagricultural workers engaged in farming, animal husbandry, fishing, hunting, iron and salt manufacture, beekeeping, and related activities. Although it was not uncommon for the region's unfavorable agricultural conditions to produce poor harvests, which occasionally caused famine conditions, the produce from these estates was usually not only sufficient to feed and supply the population of the city and its hinterlands, but was cycled into the city's commercial network. After Ivan III subjugated Novgorod, he confiscated the landed estates and arrested or exiled the boyars and merchants who had owned them. He seized landed properties belonging to the archbishop and monasteries as well.

See also: BIRCHBARK CHARTERS; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD, ARCHBISHIOP OF; NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER; POSADNIK; ROUTE TO GREEKS; RURIKID DYNASTY; VIKINGS

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JANET MARTIN

NOVIKOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(1744–1818), writer, journalist, satirist, publisher, and social worker.

Nikolai Ivanovich Novikov was a prominent writer, journalist, publisher, and social worker who began the vogue of the satirical magazine. Catherine II's efforts to proliferate ideas of the Enlightenment had injected new vigor in Russian writers in the early 1760s. Hoping to demonstrate to the West that Russia was not a despotic state, she established a "commission for the compilation of a new code of laws" in 1767 and published "instructions" for the commission in major European languages—a treatise entitled *Nakaz dlya komissii po sochineniyu novogo ulozheniya*. She also began the publication in early 1769 of a satirical weekly modeled on the English *Spectator* entitled *All Sorts and Sundries* (*Vsyakaya vsyachina*) and urged intellectuals to follow her example. For a brief period, all editors were freed from preliminary censorship.

An enthusiastic believer in the Enlightenment, Nikolai Novikov accepted the challenge and published a succession of successful journals—*Truten* (*The Drone*, 1769–1770), *Pustomelya* (*The Tattler*) in 1770, *Zhivopisets* (*The Painter*) in 1772, and others. Novikov became a pioneer in the journalistic movement in the 1770s and 1780s, and the works of prose appearing in his journals amounted to both a new literary phenomenon for Russian culture and a new form for the expression of public opinion. He took Catherine's "instructions" seriously and cultivated works that delved deeply into questions of political life and social phenomena that formerly lay within the sole jurisdiction of the tsarist bureaucracy—topics that could be considered before only in secret and with official approval. In addition to editing and publishing four periodicals and a historical dictionary, *The Library of Old Russian Authors* (1772–1775) in thirty volumes, Novikov also took over the Moscow University Press in 1778. His publishing houses operated first in St. Petersburg and then in Moscow, offering a prodigious quantity of books designed to spread Enlightenment ideas at a modest price. Novikov dedicated himself and his fortune to the advancement of elementary education as well, publishing textbooks and even the first Russian magazine for children.

Novikov can be viewed as a tragic figure in Russian history. Abruptly in 1774 Catherine II blocked publication of his journals because of their sharp attacks on serious social injustice. By imperial order she stopped further books from being produced. In 1791 she closed his printing presses. Regarding education as her own bailiwick, she was probably irked by Novikov's successful activities. Novikov's association with the Freemasons also alienated her. A middle-of-the-road theorist rather than a purist, Novikov was sometimes caught in a paradox between his keen appreciation of European Enlightenment and his high regard for the ancient Russian virtues. Freemasonry seemed to offer a way out of the paradox to a firm moral standpoint.

Catherine II, however, had always opposed secret societies, which had been outlawed in 1782 (although Freemasonry had been exempted). Her predecessor Peter III, whom she had skillfully dethroned, had been favorably disposed towards Freemasonry. Equally, her political rival and personal enemy, the Grand Duke Paul, was a prominent Freemason. Further, since the break with England, Russian Freemasonry had come under the

influence of German Freemasonry, of which Frederick the Great, the archenemy of Catherine, was a dominant figure. To Catherine, it must have seemed that everyone she disliked intensely was a Freemason.

Novikov was arrested but never tried and was sentenced by imperial decree to detention in the fortress of Schlüsselburg for fifteen years. He was released when Paul became emperor in 1796, but retired from public life in disillusionment to study mysticism. He never could engage fully in Moscow's literary world again.

See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; JOURNALISM

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

NOVOCHERKASSK UPRISING

On June 1, 1962, in response to a sharp increase in the price of butter and meat, a strike erupted at the Novocherkassk Electric-Locomotive Works, which employed 13,000 workers. The stoppage immediately spread to neighboring industrial enterprises. Efforts of the local authorities to halt the strike proved fruitless. So alarmed was the central government headed by Nikita Khrushchev that six of the top party leaders were sent to deal with the situation. Although a negotiated settlement was not ruled out, several thousand troops, as well as tank units, were deployed.

The following day, thousands of workers marched into town to present their demands for price rollbacks and wage increases. During the confrontation between the strikers and the government forces, shooting broke out that resulted in twenty-four deaths and several score serious injuries. Hundreds were arrested, and a series of trials followed. Seven strikers were condemned to death, and many more were imprisoned for long terms. The regime effectively covered up what had occurred. Outside the USSR, little was known about the events until

Alexander Solzhenitsyn devoted several pages to them in *The Gulag Archipelago*. In the last years of the Gorbachev era, information was published in Soviet media for the first time.

The Novochoerkassk events, which became known as “Bloody Saturday,” contributed to the demise of the USSR. Never daring to raise food prices again, the leadership was compelled to subsidize agriculture even more heavily, thus severely unbalancing the economy. Moreover, as information about the massacre of strikers became known, the legitimacy of what has long been proclaimed “the workers’ state” was decidedly undermined.

See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; SOLZHENITSYN, ALEXANDER ISAYEVICH

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SAMUEL H. BARON

NOVOSIBIRSK REPORT

The Novosibirsk Report was a document that helped provide the technical background for Gorbachev’s perestroika policy.

The document that became known as the “Novosibirsk report” was written by Tatiana Zaslavskaya for a conference that was held in the western Siberian city of Novosibirsk in 1985. The organizers of that conference had a limited number of copies of her report made for participants in the conference. Within a short time, however, copies of the report were handed over to Western journalists in Moscow, ensuring that the document would become widely known and hotly debated. Communist Party officials sharply reprimanded Zaslavskaya and Abel Aganbegian, the chief organizer of the conference, for the unorthodox conclusions that she had offered. After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the kind of thinking found in Zaslavskaya’s writings was endorsed by the highest leadership of the Party–state regime. Zaslavskaya became one of Gorbachev’s advisers, the head of the Soviet Sociological Association, and a member of the Congress of People’s

Deputies of the USSR. She has become a legendary figure among Russian sociologists.

Zaslavskaya’s report for the conference in Novosibirsk in 1983 was of great significance in Soviet intellectual history because it challenged principles that had been fundamental to the social sciences since they were imposed by Josef Stalin in the 1930s. Stalin had asserted that in a socialist society, in contrast to capitalist society, there was a basic consistency between the forces of production (including natural resources, labor, and technology) and the relations of production (the mechanisms of managing the economy). Zaslavskaya argued that in the Soviet Union, the level of technology and the skills and attitudes of the workforce had undergone enormous change since the 1930s, while the centralized institutions that managed the economy had changed very little, setting the system up for crisis unless basic changes were made. Stalin had also authored the doctrine of the moral and political unity of Soviet society, based on the assumption that there were no fundamental conflicts among classes or groups in the USSR. Zaslavskaya pointed out that there were groups with a vested interest in resisting changes in the system of management of the economy, and that reform would arouse conflicts among groups with mutually opposed interests. She also repudiated the habit of regarding workers as “labor resources” analogous to machines, and called for greater attention to the “human factor” in production, which would require consideration of the values and attitudes of workers, including their desire for a form of management that would give them greater independence. Zaslavskaya’s reasoning provided the background for the drive for radical restructuring of the Soviet system, though she assumed that reform would take place within the framework of a socialist economy.

See also: PERESTROIKA; ZASLAVSKAYA, TATIANA IVANOVNA

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ALFRED B. EVANS JR.

NOVOSILTSEV, NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH

(1761–1836), friend and adviser to Emperor Alexander I.

Nikolai Nikolayevich Novosiltsev was the illegitimate son of a woman whose brother, Alexander Sergeevich Stroganov, was an important government official. Stroganov took the boy in and raised him in a household known for its hospitality and refinement, although, according to a contemporary, he was “brought up by his generous uncle like a poor relation” (Saunders, p. 5).

Novosiltsev served in the army from 1783 to 1795, and during this time apparently made the acquaintance of the future emperor Alexander I. In 1796, when Alexander’s father, Paul I, ascended to the throne, Alexander asked Novosiltsev to draw up a “programmatically introduction” to the constitutional reforms Alexander was then considering. The document has been lost, but it appears to have focused on the education of those who would someday represent the empire’s vast population. In 1798 Novosiltsev helped Alexander found the *St. Petersburg Journal* and became a frequent contributor. Paul, meanwhile, was becoming suspicious of Novosiltsev’s liberalism and his influence on Alexander, so in 1797 the young man left Russia for Britain. He spent four years there attending university lectures and meeting such notables as Jeremy Bentham.

In 1801, when Paul was murdered and Alexander became emperor, Novosiltsev returned to Russia, where he became a member of Alexander’s Unofficial or Secret Committee, which regularly met with the emperor over the next two years to discuss plans for reform. Novosiltsev persuaded the committee to review the domestic situation and various departmental reforms and then draft a constitution. Within a matter of weeks Alexander began to voice doubts about the project. In an August 1801 memorandum to Alexander, Novosiltsev revealed the limits to his proposed reform program, stating that the Senate, an appointed body established by Peter the Great to govern the empire while the tsar was away, would be unable to implement and manage reform. Only the ruler could bring about the “Natural Rights, the Lawful Freedom and the security of each member of society.” In a similar vein Novosiltsev urged Alexander to reject a proposal to introduce the right of habeas corpus, arguing that since a future situation may require

it to be suspended, it would be best to not enact it at all.

In 1801 Novosiltsev was appointed chairman of a new commission on laws, and from 1802 to 1808, as assistant to the minister of justice, he helped draw up the Statute on Free Cultivators, a singularly ineffective effort to emancipate some of the serfs. From 1803 to 1810 he was president of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. In 1804 he undertook a diplomatic mission to Britain to obtain an alliance against Napoleon. The British were offended by his vanity and arrogance and viewed with bewilderment or hostility his proposals dealing with the Ottoman Empire and a German Confederation. The talks failed to produce a treaty until Napoleon’s annexation of Genoa in 1805 forced Russia and Britain into an alliance.

After the defeat of Napoleon, Novosiltsev served as Russia’s imperial-royal commissioner for Poland, which was then a constitutional monarchy under Alexander. In 1820, at the emperor’s request, Novosiltsev prepared a constitutional charter for Russia. Its key feature was decentralization and a genuinely federal structure. The empire was to be divided into twelve “vice-regencies” with elected assemblies at the local and national levels. The document, which also emphasized personal and civil liberties, was never implemented, and its effect on Alexander, if any, is unclear. His successor, Nicholas I, found the charter “most objectionable” and ordered all copies destroyed.

Novosiltsev has been described as an aggressively ambitious but poorly educated man. He was covetous of a place in Russian society, but he felt excluded from it. He was without doubt a talented and intelligent person, but he was unable to bridle his arrogance and cynicism, especially as administrator of Poland and as a diplomat.

See also: ALEXANDER I; NAPOLEON I; PAUL I; POLAND

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HUGH PHILLIPS

NOVOZHILOV, VIKTOR VALENTINOVICH

(1892–1970), Soviet economist who made important contributions to the revival of modern economics in the Soviet Union, especially via the concept of opportunity cost.

Novozhilov was educated at Kiev University, finishing in 1915. While still a student, he wrote two serious economic works, one of which was awarded a gold medal in 1913. Among his teachers were two famous economists, Yevgeny Yevgenievich Slutsky and Mikhail Ivanovich Tugan-Baranovsky. He taught at universities in Ukraine until 1922, when he went to Leningrad. There he taught and worked for the rest of his life. He was often in political trouble for his economic views, and had a very difficult time getting his work published. In the post-Stalin years, however, he gained authority and influence, and in 1965 he received the Lenin Prize (along with Vasily Sergeevich Nemchinov and Leonid Vitaliyevich Kantorovich). In November 1965, he moved to the Leningrad branch of the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute. He was elected a full member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Novozhilov was one of the most creatively significant of the Soviet economists. His most notable scientific contribution concerned the capital intensity issue, which grew out of his participation over many years in the work of institutes designing new plants and technologies. It was on the basis of this experience that he wrote his doctoral dissertation, titled *Methods of Measuring the National Economic Effectiveness of Project Variants*, a theme which ultimately led him to a general opportunity-cost theory of value and allocation.

Novozhilov was a rarity in Soviet economics, a representative of the prerevolutionary intelligentsia who managed to preserve its values in the Soviet environment. He was a man of sterling character and attractive personality, an erudite scholar with a cosmopolitan view of the world, and an accomplished violinist and painter. He understood English, though he did not feel comfortable speaking it.

See also: SLUTSKY, YEVGENY YEVGENIEVICH; TUGAN-BARANOVSKY, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH

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ROBERT W. CAMPBELL

NOVY MIR

Novy Mir (*New World*), a literary, critical, and political journal based in Moscow, was founded in 1925 as part of an official initiative to revivify the Russian tradition of the thick journal in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. True to that tradition, *Novy Mir* published political and social commentaries along with its staple of fiction, poetry, and literary criticism. Having come into being during the mid-1920s, during the last few years of relative cultural openness in the young Soviet Union, the journal published works by the most prominent writers of the day. The major works of literature published in the journal during this period were Maxim Gorky's novel *The Life of Klim Samgin* (*Zhizn Klima Samgina*) and Alexei Tolstoy's *Road to Calvary* (*Khozhdenie po mukam*).

Like Soviet culture as a whole, from the early 1930s until Stalin's death in 1953, what *Novy Mir* could publish was severely limited by the strictures of the official doctrine of Socialist Realism, which dictated that all publications must actively support the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. Following the death of Stalin in 1953, however, *Novy Mir* soon established itself as the most prestigious literary journal of the post-Stalin period. Under the editorship of the poet Alexander Tvardovsky, the journal ushered in the ensuing period of cultural liberalism with the publication of the groundbreaking article by the critic Vladimir Pomerantsev, "On Sincerity in Literature" (*Ob iskrennosti v literature*), which called for the "unvarnished" portrayal of reality in Soviet literary works. Tvardovsky's first tenure as editor of the journal ended when, in reprisal for his publication of politically questionable works, he was replaced by the prose writer Konstantin Simonov in 1954. Simonov himself, however, fell victim to the uncertain cultural "thaw" of the times and was deposed as editor in the wake of his 1956 publication of Vladimir Dudintsev's controversial novel, *Not by Bread Alone* (*Ne khlebom edinyim*). Tvardovsky was reappointed editor in 1958 and led the journal through its most illustrious period.

The journal, with its distinctive pale blue cover, became the leading literary periodical of the cultural relaxation under Khrushchev. Its most historically resonant publication of this period was Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novella, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (*Odin den Ivana Denisovicha*), in 1962. During the years of cultural stagnation under Brezhnev, the limits of the allowable in Soviet literature and culture again tightened. Tvardovsky struggled to maintain *Novy Mir's* liberal profile until he was forced by increasing political pressure to resign from the editorship in 1970. The journal came into its own again during the glasnost period. The prose writer Sergei Zalygin assumed the editorship of the journal in 1986 and, like Tvardovsky before him, steered the journal to a leading role in the liberalization of Soviet culture under Gorbachev. The landmark *Novy Mir* publications of the glasnost period included the appearance in 1988 of Pasternak's novel *Doctor Zhivago*, which had been rejected for publication in the journal in 1950s. *Novy Mir* also served as the primary outlet for Solzhenitsyn's previously banned publications during this period. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a market economy in Russia, *Novy Mir*, like other major Soviet publications, has struggled to adjust to the changing economic and cultural situation.

See also: GLASNOST; GORKY, MAXIM; INTELLIGENTSIA; PASTERNAK, BORIS LEONIDOVICH; SIMONOV, KONSTANTIN MIKHAILOVICH; SOCIALIST REALISM; THAW, THE; THICK JOURNALS; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH; SOLZHENITSYN, ALEXANDER ISAYEVICH

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CATHARINE NEPOMNYASHCHY

NYSTADT, TREATY OF

The Treaty of Nystadt was signed on August 30 (September 10, O.S.), 1721, in the Finnish town of Nystadt. It ended the twenty-one year Great Northern War between Russia and Sweden. The treaty was the result of several years of negotiations between the warring parties. The clauses were:

1. "Eternal peace" was established on land and sea
2. All hostilities were committed to oblivion, except for the crimes of the Russian Cossacks who had aided the Swedes
3. All military action ceased
4. Sweden agreed to cede to Russia Livonia (Lifliandia), Estonia (Estliandia), Ingermanland (Ingria), part of Karelia with Vyborg district, with the towns of Riga, Dünamünde, Pernau, Reval (Tallinn), Dorpat, Narva, Vyborg, Kexholm, and the islands of Oesel, Dago, and Meno
5. Russia agreed to evacuate Finland (invaded in 1713–1714) and to pay Sweden two million thalers compensation
6. Sweden was granted entitlement to trade in Riga, Reval, and Arensburg, and to purchase grain duty-free
7. Russia agreed not to interfere in Swedish domestic affairs
8. The border was defined in detail
9. The former Swedish provinces annexed to Russia were to retain all their privileges and rights unwaveringly
10. The Protestant faith was to enjoy the same freedoms as Orthodoxy
11. Claims to landed estates in Livonia and Estonia were to be settled, and
12. Swedish citizens with claims to land could retain their estates only if they swore allegiance to the Russian crown
13. Russian troops still in Livonia were to be provisioned, but they were required to take all their weapons and supplies when they left, and to return archives and documents
14. Prisoners of war were to be returned (unless they wished to stay)
15. The kingdom of Poland, as an ally of both signatories, was included in the treaty, but Sweden was free to conclude a separate treaty with Poland
16. There was to be free trade between Sweden and Russia
17. Swedish merchants were allowed to maintain warehouses in Russian towns and ports
18. The parties agreed to help each other in case of shipwrecks and
19. To greet ships of both nations with the usual friendly shots
20. Ambassadors and envoys were to pay their own expenses, but the host power would provide escorts
21. Other European powers were given the option to enter the treaty within three months

22. Quarrels and disputes were to be settled equitably, without breaching the peace
23. Traitors, murderers, and criminals would be extradited
24. The treaty was to be ratified in three weeks in Nystadt

The treaty was published in Russian in large print runs of five thousand copies in 1721 and twenty thousand copies in 1723, following the authorization of the map showing the new borders. It sealed both Russia's rising status as a leading player in European politics and Sweden's decline as a major military power, marking its disappearance from the southern shores of the Baltic, to the advantage of Denmark, Prussia, and Russia. It also underlined Poland's status as a client state. At the official celebrations in St. Petersburg in October 1721, Peter accepted the titles Great, Emperor, and Father of the Fatherland from the Senate, further arousing the belief in some European countries that

Russian influence was to be feared "more than the Turks." Except for the changes related to Finland, the treaty defined Russia's Baltic presence for the rest of the imperial era. The acquisition of ports brought Russia both economic and strategic advantages as well as an influx of highly educated Baltic German personnel to work in the imperial civil service.

See also: GREAT NORTHERN WAR; PETER I; SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH

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LINDSEY HUGHES

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OBROK

Rent in kind or money (quitrent).

Obrok was land rent paid by a peasant to his lord either in kind or in money. Although there is disagreement about its status prior to the Mongol conquest, scholars agree that from the mid 1200s to the end of the 1400s, rents in kind dominated the economy after the Mongol invasion destroyed the urban market and caused a precipitous population decline.

As a market reemerged in the late 1400s and 1500s, dues paid in money increased significantly. But by the end of the fifteenth century, the new money dues were forcibly converted into more profitable labor dues (*barshchina*). The latter became predominant on seigniorial estates into the early eighteenth century.

By the last third of the 1700s, market development and major agricultural expansion into the black soil region produced regional economic specialization. Rent in cash and in kind came to predominate in the non-black soil region, which extended north from Moscow. Fifty-five percent of the serfs in the region were on obrok. Increasingly the payments were in cash, which was earned largely from nonagricultural wages. This overall proportion remained relatively stable down to the emancipation, even though there was a strong shift from labor dues to cash payments near the capital as wages rose.

There has been a major controversy over what happened to the level of cash payments in the last hundred years of serfdom. Clearly, the nominal value of the payments increased rather sharply. But when adjustments are made for inflation and price increases, Western, Soviet, and post-Soviet scholars agree the increase was fairly moderate.


See also: BARSHCHINA; SERFDOM

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OBRUCHEV, NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH

(1830–1904), imperial Russian general staff officer, military statistician, planner and chief of the Main Staff.

General-Adjutant Nikolai Obruchev was born in Warsaw, the son of an officer of modest means. He completed the First Cadet Corps in 1848 and the Nicholas Military Academy in 1854. Subsequently, as professor at the Academy, he was a founder of Russian military statistics. In 1858 he became the first editor of the military professional monthly *Voyenny sbornik (Military Collection)*, but was soon removed for the printing of articles critical of Russian logistics in the Crimean War. In 1863, under War Minister Dmitry Milyutin's tutelage, he became the secretary of the Military Academic Committee within the Main Staff. From this position he supported creation of an independent general staff and actively advanced Milyutin's military reforms. Obruchev played a major role in planning for the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. His subsequent plans for the military preparation of Russian Poland in the event of war against the Dual Alliance were influential until 1914.

Although Obruchev's scheme for a lightning war against Turkey was never realized, he was posted to the Caucasus theater in July 1877, where he successfully planned the rout of the Turkish army. Several months later in the Balkan theater, he devised a plan for winter operations across the Balkan divide that led to Turkish capitulation in early 1878. After Alexander II's assassination in 1881, Obruchev became War Minister Peter Semenovich Vannovsky's chief of the Main Staff. In this capacity Obruchev oversaw the rearmament of the Russian Army, the fortification of the western military frontier, and preparations for a possible amphibious operation against the Bosphorus. He assumed an especially important role in working out the Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1892. Despite Nicholas II's inclinations, he opposed Russian military intervention in the Far East during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Obruchev retired from active service in 1897 and died in his wife's native France in June 1904. An outstanding planner and an adroit soldier-diplomat, Obruchev left his stamp during the last quarter of the nineteenth century on virtually every important facet of Russian preparation for future war.

See also: MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILYUTIN, DMITRY ALEXEYEVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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OBSHCHINA

Usually translated as “community,” this term refers primarily to a landholding group of peasants in pre-1917 Russia.

Pre-emancipation serfs, in common with state and other nonbound peasants, still had a large degree of freedom to organize their own affairs within the limits of the village itself. The obshchina represents the village as it looked inward—an economic unit based on the land it worked. It differed from what might be called the peasant mir (literally, “world” or “society”), representing the village as it looked outward. The mir assembly carried out the administrative, legal, and fiscal affairs of the village.

While not modern in its outlook, for many, if not most peasants, the obshchina was fairly well suited to carry out the necessary, limited functions of distributing land (and thus taxes and other dues) among people whose society was based largely, though implicitly, on a labor theory of value. The common but not universal obshchina practice of periodic redistribution of land, based on manpower and thus taxpaying ability, gave rise to much discussion among Russian intellectuals. The subject of widespread Romantic, philosophical, religious, economic, and political theorizing throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the real-life obshchina was never the idealized, optimally Christian body of the Slavophiles nor the proto-communist organization of the peasant-oriented revolutionaries known as *narodniki* (populists). It was often guilty (from majority self-interest) of stymieing rational agrarian practices, but not always the culprit that Marxists blamed for peasant immiserization, socioeconomic inequality, and the obstructed development of a progressive class mentality. Living in an institution with social strengths and some economic weaknesses, most obshchina peasants sought not to maximize earnings or profits—as liberal economists would have them—nor

to escape Marx's "idiocy of rural life," but to "satisfy" their lives (in H. Simon's concept), that is, to achieve and maintain a satisfactory standard of living.

See also: MIR; PEASANT ECONOMY

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STEVEN A. GRANT

OCCULTISM

Occult books of fortune-telling, dreams, spells, astrology, and speculative mysticism entered medieval Russia as translations of Greek, Byzantine, European, Arabic, and Persian "secret books." Their prohibition by the Council of a Hundred Chapters (*Stoglav*) in 1551 enhanced rather than diminished their popularity, and many have circulated into our own day.

The Age of Reason did not extirpate Russia's occult interests. During the eighteenth century more than 100 occult books were printed, mostly translations of European alchemical, mystical, Masonic, Rosicrucian, and oriental wisdom texts. Many were published by the author and Freemason Nikolai Novikov.

As the nineteenth century began, Tsar Alexander I encouraged Swedenborgians, Freemasons, mystical sectarians, and the questionable "Bible Society," before suddenly banning occult books and secret societies in 1822. The autocracy and the church countered the occultism and supernaturalism of German Romanticism with an increasingly restrictive system of church censorship, viewing the occult as "spiritual sedition."

Nevertheless, Spiritualism managed to penetrate Russia in the late 1850s, introduced by Count Grigory Kushelev-Bezborodko, a friend of Daniel Dunglas Home (1833–1886), the famous medium who gave seances for the court of Alexander II. Their coterie included the writers and philosophers Alexei Tolstoy, Vladimir Soloviev, Vladimir Dal,

Alexander Aksakov, and faculty from Moscow and St. Petersburg Universities.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Russia, like Europe, experienced the French "Occult Revival," a reaction against prevailing scientific positivism. Spiritualism, theosophy, hermeticism, mystery cults, and Freemasonry attracted the interest of upper- and middle-class Russian society and configured decadence and symbolism in the arts.

Theosophy, founded in New York in 1875 by Russian expatriate Elena Blavatsky (1831–1891), was a pseudo-religious, neo-Buddhist movement that claimed to be a "synthesis of Science, Religion, and Philosophy." It appealed to the god-seeking Russian intelligentsia (including, at various times, Vladimir Soloviev, Max Voloshin, Konstantin Balmont, Alexander Skryabin, Maxim Gorky). A Christianized, Western form of theosophy, Rudolf Steiner's anthroposophy, attracted the intellectuals Andrey Bely, Nikolai Berdyayev, and Vyacheslav Ivanov.

Russian Freemasonry revived at the end of the nineteenth century. Masons, Martinists, and Rosicrucians preceded the mystical sectarian Grigory Rasputin (1872–1916) as "friends" to the court of Tsar Nicholas II. After the Revolution of 1905–1906, Russian Freemasonry became increasingly politicized, eventually playing a role in the events of 1916–1917.

The least documented of Russia's occult movements was the elitist hermeticism (loosely including philosophical alchemy, gnosticism, kabbalism, mystical Freemasonry, and magic), heir of the Occult Revival. Finally, sensational (or "boulevard") mysticism was popular among all classes: magic, astrology, Tarot, fortune-telling, dream interpretation, chiromancy, phrenology, witchcraft, hypnosis.

More than forty occult journals and papers and eight hundred books on occultism appeared in Russia between 1881 and 1922, most of them after the censorship-easing Manifesto of October 17, 1905. After the Bolshevik coup, occult societies were proscribed. All were closed by official decree in 1922; in the 1930s those members who had not emigrated or ceased activity were arrested.

In the Soviet Union, occultists and *ekstra-sensy* existed underground (and occasionally within in the Kremlin walls). The post-1991 period saw the return of theosophy and anthroposophy, shaman-

ism, Buddhism, Hare Krishnas, Roerich cults, neopaganism, the White Brotherhood, UFOlogy, and other occult trends.

See also: FREEMASONRY; PAGANSIM; RELIGION

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MARIA CARLSON

OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS

During the October 1993 events, Boris Yeltsin's forcible dissolution of parliament took Russia to the edge of civil war. Seen as decisive and essential by his supporters, the dissolution was a radically divisive action, the consequences of which continued to reverberate through Russian society in the early twenty-first century.

In 1992 and 1993 a deep divide developed between the executive and legislative branches of government. The root cause of this was President Yeltsin's decision to adopt a radical economic reform strategy, urged on him by the West, for which he and his government were not able to generate sustained parliamentary support. Faced with resistance from the legislators, Yeltsin made only minimal concessions and on most issues chose to confront them. This subjected Russia's new political and judicial institutions to strains that they could not adequately handle. In addition, the confrontation became highly personalized, with the principal figures forcefully manipulating institutions to benefit themselves and their causes.

Apart from Yeltsin, key individuals on the executive side of the confrontation were Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. They were the ministers most responsible for launching and implementing the radical economic reforms known as shock therapy. Leading the majority in parliament was its speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, a former ally of Yeltsin and an inexperienced and manipulative politician of high ambition. Over time, he was in-

creasingly joined by Yeltsin's similarly ambitious and inexperienced vice-president, former air force general Alexander Rutskoi.

On March 20, 1993, Yeltsin made a first attempt to rid himself of parliament's opposition. Declaring the imposition of emergency rule, he said that henceforth no decisions of the legislature that negated decrees from the executive branch would have juridical force. However, the Constitutional Court ruled his action unconstitutional, some of his ministers declined to back him, and the parliament came close to impeaching him. Yeltsin backed off.

At this time, Khasbulatov and the Constitutional Court's chairman, Valery Zorkin, separately sought to engage Yeltsin in a compromise resolution of the "dual power" conflict. The proposed basis was the so-called zero option. The centerpiece of this approach was simultaneous early elections to both the presidency and the parliament. However, Yeltsin had no desire to share power substantively, even with a newly elected parliament.

In taking this stance, he sought and obtained the support of Western governments by repeatedly inflating the negligible threat of a communist revanche. He also got some qualified backing from the Russian public, when an April 1993 referendum showed that a small majority of the population trusted him, and an even smaller majority approved of his socioeconomic policies.

On September 21, Yeltsin announced that to resolve the grave political crisis he had signed decree 1400, which annulled the powers of the legislature. Elections would be held on December 12 for a parliament of a new type. And the same day a referendum would be held on a completely new constitution.

In response, the Supreme Soviet immediately voted to impeach Yeltsin and, in accordance with the constitution, to install Vice President Alexander Rutskoi as acting president. Rutskoi proceeded to annul decree 1400 (whereupon Yeltsin annulled Rutskoi's decree) and precipitously appointed senior ministers of nationalist and communist views to his own government, thus alienating many centrists. On September 23, with pro-government deputies boycotting the proceedings, the congress confirmed Yeltsin's impeachment by a vote of 636 to 2.

The next ten days were occupied by a war of words between the rival governments, as they



Pro-Yeltsin soldiers watch the Soviet parliament building as it burns. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

sought to build support around Russia, and by official acts of harassment, like switching off the electricity in the parliament's building, known as "the White House." Although most Russians remained passive, adopting the attitude "a plague on both your houses," small groups demonstrated for one or the other camp, or sent messages. According to Yeltsin's government, 70 percent of the regional soviets supported the parliament. From five locations around Moscow, Kremlin representatives solicited visits from wavering deputies and offered them—if they would change sides—good jobs, cash payments equal to nearly \$1,000, and immunity from future prosecution.

On September 27, Yeltsin explicitly rejected the zero option. Three days later the Orthodox patriarch suggested that the church should mediate. The two sides agreed and began talks the next day. However, on October 3, events moved rapidly to their denouement. The exact sequence of events remains murky. A march organized by purported supporters of parliament was mysteriously allowed through a cordon around the White House. Then, apparently,

hidden Kremlin snipers fired on it. Then Rutskoi, instead of calling on the crowd to defend the White House, urged it to storm the city hall, the Kremlin, and the Ostankino television center. Thereafter, acts of violence on both sides, and an unexplained episode of the Kremlin not at first defending Ostankino, ensured that events got out of control and many people were killed. Throughout, the Yeltsin team appeared to use cunning methods to create a situation in which it would appear that parliament's side, not its own, had used violence first.

That night, the Kremlin team, not wanting to order the army in writing to open fire, had great difficulty persuading key military leaders to go take action. However, the next day a light tank bombardment of the White House softened up the by now depleted body of parliamentarians, who soon surrendered. Twenty-seven leaders were arrested, only to be amnestied four months later. According to the Kremlin, a total of 143 people were killed during the confrontation. However, an impartial investigation by the human rights group Memorial gave an estimate of several hundred.

Over the next three months Yeltsin exercised virtually dictatorial powers. He shut down the Constitutional Court; abolished the entire structure of regional, city, and district legislatures; and banned certain nationalist and communist parties and publications. With minimal public debate, he pushed through a new constitution that was officially approved by referendum on December 12, although widespread charges of falsified results were not answered and the relevant evidence was destroyed. He also broke the promise he gave in September to hold a new presidential election in June 1994, and postponed the event by two years.

Although in September 1993 most of the parliament's leaders were no less unpopular than Yeltsin and his government, and although Russia would probably have been ruled no better—more likely worse—if they had won, Yeltsin's resort in October to violence instead of compromise seriously undermined Russia's infant democracy and the legitimacy of his government.

See also: CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; RUTSKOI, ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER REDDAWAY

OCTOBER GENERAL STRIKE OF 1905

The general strike of October was the culminating event of the 1905 Revolution and the most inclusive and consequential of several general strikes that took place in 1905, resulting in the announcement of the Manifesto of October 17. It was initiated first and foremost by workers in larger industrial enterprises, many of whom nursed unsatisfied demands from strikes earlier in the year. Although the ripeness of workers to strike in many diverse working situations across the empire was

paramount, the call of the All-Russian Union of Railroad Workers for a national rail strike on October 4 provided a timely impetus. The railroaders' strike gave them control of Russia's means of communication, allowing them to spread word of the strike throughout the empire, while their immobilization of rail traffic forcibly idled many trades and industries.

Although workers and the urban public generally found themselves at different stages of organizational and political development in October, a unique synergy arose that stirred them all to greater effort. The spread of the strikes from the generally more unified and mobilized factory workers to artisans, small businesses, and white-collar workers of the city centers lent the October strike its general character and explained its success. In St. Petersburg, the strike's most important site in terms of its political outcome, the participation of tram drivers, shop clerks, pharmacists, printers, and even insurance, zemstvo, and bank employees, meant that the center of the capital closed down, bringing the strike directly into the lives of most citizens by encompassing the broadest array of occupations and the broadest social spectrum of all the strikes in 1905.

Many of the worker strikes supplemented their factory demands with demands for political rights and liberties, so that the labor strikes blended seamlessly with the broader, ongoing political protests of the democratic opposition. University students in particular, but also secondary schoolers and educated professionals, promoted the strike with gusto and imagination, especially in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other university towns. Students opened their lecture halls to public meetings, where workers met the wider urban public for the first time and where much support for the strike was generated. The volume of this protest gave pause to the police and the government, providing an even greater margin of de facto freedom of speech and assembly. Many craft and service workers took the opportunity to organize their first trade unions. Several political parties, including the Kadet or Constitutional Democratic Party, were organized in this interval. Slower moving populations, such as peasants, soldiers, and policemen, drew inspiration from the widespread protests and began to demand their rights.

The revolutionary organizations prospered from the upsurge of labor militancy in October, recruiting new members and becoming better known among rank-and-file workers. Revolutionary or-

ganizers, especially Mensheviks, were indispensable in the creation and leadership of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, informal bodies of elected factory delegates organized in about fifty locales during 1905, especially in October, to lead and assist strikers over entire urban and industrial areas. The Soviet of St. Petersburg, the most celebrated of these organs of direct democracy, went beyond strike leadership to pursue a revolutionary agenda in the capital. Its arrest on December 3 cut short its political promise, but its brief career and its flamboyant second president, Leon Trotsky, inspired similar organs in later revolutions around the world.

In response to the January strikes, the tsarist government had granted an elected assembly to discuss, but not implement, legislation (the "Bulygin Duma"). To maintain the integrity of autocratic rule, several of Emperor Nicholas's ministers began to advocate a unified government, headed by a prime minister. Sensing the country's mood in early October and led by the respected Count Sergei Yu. Witte, they advised Nicholas to grant political and civil rights, legislative authority, and an expanded electorate. Nicholas hesitated between liberalization and forceful repression of the strikers; after deliberating several days, he reluctantly agreed to the former. The Manifesto of October 17 was the most significant political act of the 1905 Revolution. It provoked powerful, euphoric expectations of a total transformation of Russian life. These expectations remained over the long run, themselves transforming Russian politics and culture, though in the short run the promise of a constitutional state divided the opposition and enabled the government to restore the authority of the autocracy by early 1906 through a bloody repression not possible in October.

See also: BLOODY SUNDAY; DUMA; NICHOLAS II; REVOLUTION OF 1905; WORKERS

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GERALD D. SURH

OCTOBER MANIFESTO

The October Manifesto was published at the peak of Revolution of 1905, following the general strike of October of 1905 in which 2 million people took to the streets and railroads were blocked. The government considered two possible solutions to the crisis: a military dictatorship and liberal reforms to win popular support. Those who supported reforms were led by Sergei Witte, who wrote a report urging Tsar Nicholas II to grant a constitution, a representative assembly, and civil freedoms. On October 27 (October 14 O.S.) Nicholas ordered that the main points of the report were to be listed in the form of a manifesto. The draft was written overnight by Prince Alexei Obolensky. Nicholas signed it on October 30 (October 17 O.S.), and the next day it was published in the newspaper *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik* (*Governmental Courier*).

The October Manifesto gave the ruling body permission to use every means to end disorders, disobedience, and abuse, and gave the "highest government" the responsibility to act, in accordance with the tsar's "unbendable" will, to "Grant the population the undisputable foundation for civil freedom on the basis of protection of identity, freedom of conscience, speech, assemblies and unions." Voting rights were promised, "to some extent, to those classes of the population that, at present, do not have the right to vote," and it was proclaimed as an "undisputable rule that no law can be passed without the approval of the Duma and for the possibility of supervision of the lawfulness of the actions of the administration to be given to the national representatives." The manifesto concluded by calling upon "all true sons of Russia to end . . . the unimaginable revolt" and, along with the emperor, "to concentrate all forces on restoring peace and quiet on the homeland."

The October Manifesto was highly controversial. There were mass meetings and demonstrations

welcoming its promise of freedom in the regional capitals and many other cities. Similarly, there were mass meetings and demonstrations, often violent, calling for an autocracy of “patriots” and condemning the manifesto as perpetrated by revolutionaries and Jews. In the three weeks after the manifesto was issued, there were outbreaks of violence in 108 cities, 70 small towns, and 108 villages, leaving at least 1,622 dead, and 3,544 crippled and wounded.

The liberal reaction to the manifesto was mixed. Right-wing liberals saw it as a realization of their political hopes and united as the Union of October 17. Left-wing liberals, joining together to organize the Constitutional Democratic Party, believed that further reforms were needed, and their leader, Paul Milyukov, stated that nothing changed and the struggle would continue. Left-wing parties and leaders saw the manifesto as a sign of the government’s weakness; its capitulation under revolutionary pressure showed that the pressure on the government had to be intensified.

The political program embodied in the manifesto began to take effect on October 19, 1905, with the appointment of a government headed by Witte. Between October 1905 and March 1906 the government published a series of orders regarding political amnesties, censorship, modification of the State Council, and other matters. All of these were incorporated in the second edition of the *Fundamental Laws*, passed on April 23, 1906.

The most important outcome of the October Manifesto was the creation of a bicameral representative institution and the legalization of political parties, trade unions and other social organizations, and a legal oppositionist press.

See also: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DUMA; FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF 1906; OCTOBER GENERAL STRIKE OF 1905; REVOLUTION OF 1905; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

OCTOBER REVOLUTION

During the October 1917 Russian Revolution, the liberal, western-oriented Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky, which was established following the February 1917 Russian Revolution that overthrew Tsar Nicholas II, was removed and replaced by the first Soviet government headed by Vladimir Lenin. The October Revolution began in Petrograd (now St. Petersburg), then the capital of Russia, and quickly spread to the rest of the country. One of the seminal events of the twentieth century in terms of its worldwide historical impact, the October Revolution is also one of the most controversial and hotly debated historical events in modern times.

Most western historians, especially at the height of the Cold War, viewed the October Revolution as a brilliantly organized military coup d’état without significant popular support, carried out by a tightly knit band of professional revolutionaries brilliantly led by the fanatical Lenin. This interpretation, severely undermined by western “revisionist” social history in the 1970s and 1980s, was rejuvenated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Gorbachev era, even though information from newly declassified Soviet archives reinforced the revisionist view. At the other end of the political spectrum, for nearly eighty years Soviet historians, bound by strict historical canons designed to legitimate the Soviet state and its leadership, depicted the October Revolution as a broadly popular uprising of the revolutionary Russian masses. According to them, this social upheaval was deeply rooted in Imperial Russia’s historical development and shaped by universal laws of history as formulated by Karl Marx and Lenin. There are kernels of truth and considerable distortion in both of these interpretations.

WAR AND REVOLUTION

The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 found Russian politics and society in great flux. To be



Leaders of the Bolshevik party are pictured around their leader, Vladimir Lenin. Top row (from left): Rykov, Radek, Pokrovsky, Kamenev; middle row: Trotsky, Lenin, Sverdlov; bottom row: Bukharin, Zinoviev, Krylenko, Kollontai, Lunacharsky. Stalin is not included in this 1920 collage. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

sure, the autocratic tsarist political system had somehow managed to remain intact throughout the revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Even the Revolution of 1905, which resulted in the creation of a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament (the Duma), had left predominant political authority in the hands of Tsar Nicholas II. The abolition of serfdom by Alexander II in 1861 had freed the Russian peasantry, the vast bulk of the empire's population, from personal bondage. However, the terms of the emancipation were such that most peasants remained impoverished. Moreover, a fundamental land reform program initiated by Peter Stolypin in 1906 was so complex that, irrespective of the long-term prospects, when it was interrupted by the war in 1914, the Russian countryside was in particularly great turmoil.

In the late nineteenth century, enlightened officials such as Sergei Witte had reversed govern-

ment opposition to industrialization and spearheaded a program of rapid economic development. However, the pace of this development was too slow to meet Russia's needs, and the industrial revolution resulted in the crowding of vast numbers of immiserated workers into squalid, rat-infested factory ghettos in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other major Russian cities. It is small wonder, then, that in the opening years of the twentieth century, the major Russian liberal and socialist political parties that were destined to play key roles in 1917 took shape and began to attract popular followings. Likewise, it is no surprise that the Russian government was suddenly faced with a growing, increasingly ambitious and assertive professional middle class, waves of peasant rebellions, and burgeoning labor unrest.

Framed against these political and social realities, the significant degree of popular support enjoyed by the Russian government at the start of

the war, in so far as it was visible, must have been heartening to Nicholas II. The Constitutional Democratic or Kadet Party, Russia's main liberal party, officially proclaimed a moratorium on opposition to the monarchy and pledged its unqualified support for the war effort. Beginning in early 1915, when the government's extraordinary incompetence became fully apparent, the Kadets, despite their anguish, made use of the Duma only to call for the appointment of qualified ministers (rather than demand fundamental structural change). With good reason, they calculated that a political upheaval in the existing circumstances would be equally damaging to the war effort and prospects for the eventual creation of a liberal, democratic government. Members of the populist Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party and the moderate social democratic Menshevik Party were split between "defensists," who supported the war effort, and "internationalists," who sought an immediate cessation of hostilities and a compromise peace without victors or vanquished. Only Lenin advocated the fomenting of immediate social revolution in all of the warring countries; however, for the time being, efforts by underground Bolshevik committees in Russia to kindle popular opposition to the war failed.

The February 1917 Revolution, which grew out of prewar instabilities and technological backwardness, along with gross mismanagement of the war effort, continuing military defeats, domestic economic dislocation, and outrageous scandals surrounding the monarchy, resulted in the creation of two potential Russian national governments. One was the Provisional Government formed by members of the Duma to restore order and to provide leadership pending convocation of a popularly elected Constituent Assembly based on the French model. The Constituent Assembly was to design Russia's future political system and take responsibility for the promulgation of other fundamental reforms. The second potential national government was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and its moderate socialist-led Executive Committee. Patterned after similar "worker parliaments" formed during the Revolution of 1905, in succeeding weeks similar institutions of popular self-government were established throughout urban and rural Russia. In early summer 1917, the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the First All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies formed leadership bodies, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the

All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies, to represent soviets around the country between national congresses. Until the fall of 1917, when it was taken over by the Bolsheviks, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet strived to maintain order and protect the revolution until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. This was also true of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies. The Soviet, led by the moderate socialists, made no effort to take formal power into its own hands, although it was potentially stronger than the Provisional Government because of its vastly greater support among workers, peasants, and lower-level military personnel. This support skyrocketed in tandem with popular disenchantment with the economic results of the February Revolution, the effort of the Provisional Government to continue the war effort, and its procrastination in convening the Constituent Assembly.

"ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!"

At the time of the February Revolution, Lenin was in Switzerland. He returned to Petrograd in early April 1917, demanding an immediate second, "socialist" revolution in Russia. Although he backed off this goal after he acquainted himself with the realities of the prevailing situation (including little support for precipitous, radical revolutionary action even among Bolsheviks), his great achievement at this time was to orient the thinking of the Bolshevik Party toward preparation for the replacement of the Provisional Government by a leftist "Soviet" government as soon as the time was ripe. Nonetheless, in assessing Lenin's role in the October Revolution, it is important to keep in mind that he was either away from the country or in hiding and out of regular touch with his colleagues in Russia for much of the time between February and October 1917. In any case, top Bolshevik leaders tended to be divided into three distinct groups: Lenin and Leon Trotsky, among others, for whom the establishment of revolutionary soviet power in Russia was less an end in itself than the trigger for immediate worldwide socialist revolution; a highly influential group of more moderate national party leaders led by Lev Kamenev for whom transfer of power to the soviets was primarily a vehicle for building a strong alliance of left socialist groups which would form a socialist coalition government to prepare for fundamental social reform and peace negotiations by a socialist-friendly Constituent Assembly; and a middle group of independent-minded

leaders whose views on the development of the revolution fluctuated in response to their reading of existing conditions.

Then too, events often moved so rapidly that the Bolshevik Central Committee had to develop policies without consulting Lenin. Beyond this, circumstances were frequently such that structurally subordinate party bodies had perforce to develop responses to evolving realities without guidance or contrary to directives from the center. Also, in 1917 the doors to membership were opened wide, and the Bolshevik organization became a genuine mass political party. In part as a result of such factors, Bolshevik programs and policies in 1917 tended to be developed democratically, with strong inputs from rank-and-file members, and therefore reflected popular aspirations.

Meanwhile, the revolution among factory workers, soldiers, sailors, and peasants had a dynamic of its own. At times, the Bolsheviks followed the masses rather than vice versa. For example, on July 14 (July 1 O.S.) the Bolshevik Central Committee, influenced by party moderates, began preparing for a left-socialist congress aimed at unifying all internationalist elements of the "Social Democracy" (e.g., Menshevik-Internationalists and Left SRs) in support of common revolutionary goals. Yet only two days later, radical elements of the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee and Party Military Organization (responsive to their ultra-militant constituencies) helped organize the abortive July uprising, against the wishes of Lenin and the Central Committee, who considered such action premature.

The July uprising ended in an apparent defeat for the Bolsheviks. Lenin was forced into hiding, numerous Bolshevik leaders were jailed, and efforts to form a united left-socialist front were temporarily ended. Still, in light of the success of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution, perhaps the main significance of the July uprising was that it reflected the great popular attraction for the Bolshevik revolutionary program, as well as the party's strong links to Petrograd's lower classes, links that would prove valuable over the long term.

What was the Bolsheviks' program? Contrary to conventional wisdom, in 1917 the Bolsheviks did not stand for a one-party dictatorship (neither in July nor at any time before the October Revolution). Rather, they stood for democratic "people's power," exercised through an exclusively socialist, soviet, multiparty government, pending convoca-

tion of the Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks also stood for more land to individual peasants, "workers' control" in factories, prompt improvement of food supply, and, most important, an early end to the war. All of these goals were neatly packaged in the slogans "Peace, Land, and Bread!" "All Power to the Soviets!" and "Immediate Convocation of the Constituent Assembly!" The interplay and political value of these two key factors—the attractiveness of the Bolshevik platform and the party's carefully nurtured links to revolutionary workers, soldiers, and sailors—were evident in the fall of 1917, after the left's quick defeat of an unsuccessful rightist putsch led by the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General Lavr Kornilov (the so-called Kornilov affair).

THE BOLSHEVIKS COME TO POWER

Following the ill-fated July uprising, Lenin, alienated by moderate socialist attacks on the Bolsheviks and by their support of the Provisional Government and dismissive of the soviets' revolutionary potential, tried unsuccessfully to persuade the party leadership to abandon its emphasis on transfer of power to the soviets and shift its strategy to a unilateral seizure of power. Subsequently, in the aftermath of the Kornilov affair, during which Lenin remained in hiding, he briefly reconsidered this position and allowed for a peaceful transition to soviet power. However, this moderation was fleeting. Isolated from day-to-day developments and decision making in the Russian capital, and evidently influenced primarily by clear signs of deepening social unrest at home and abroad, at the end of September (mid-September O.S.) Lenin decided that the time had come for another revolution in Russia: a socialist revolution that would serve as the catalyst for popular rebellions in other European countries. In two emphatic letters to Bolshevik committees in Petrograd written from a hideout in Finland, he now demanded that the party organize an armed uprising "without losing a single moment."

These letters were received in Petrograd at a time when prospects for peaceful creation of an exclusively socialist government suddenly brightened. After passage by the Petrograd Soviet of a momentous Bolshevik resolution to this effect proposed by Kamenev, the Bolsheviks won majority control of that key body. Trotsky became its chairman. Around the same time, the Bolsheviks also gained control of the Moscow Soviet. Moreover, the Bolshevik leadership was just then focused on trying

to persuade the Democratic State Conference, a national conference of “democratic” organizations convened to reconsider the government question, to abjure further coalition with the Cadets and to establish exclusively socialist rule. A hastily convened secret emergency meeting of the party Central Committee unceremoniously rejected Lenin’s directives within hours of their receipt. For the Bolsheviks, this was just as well. Not long after the October Revolution, Lenin himself acknowledged this. The party was saved from likely disaster by the stubborn resistance of national and lower-level Bolsheviks on the spot who, like Kamenev, were primarily concerned with building the broadest possible support for the formation of an exclusively socialist government or were skeptical of Lenin’s strategy of mobilizing the masses behind an “immediate bayonet charge” independent of the soviets.

In part as a consequence of their continuing interaction with workers, soldiers, and sailors, these leaders on the scene possessed a more realistic appreciation than Lenin of the limits of the party’s influence and authority among the Petrograd lower classes, as well as of their allegiance to soviets as legitimate democratic organs in which all genuinely revolutionary groups would work to fulfill the revolution. They were forced to recognize that by appearing to usurp the prerogatives of the soviets they risked losing a good deal of their hard-won popular support and suffering a defeat as great as, if not greater than, the one they had suffered in July. Therefore, after hopes that the Democratic State Council would initiate fundamental political change were dashed, they reoriented their tactics toward the formation of an exclusively socialist government at another All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, which at the insistence of leftist delegates to the Democratic State Conference was scheduled for early November (late October O.S.). At the same time, the Bolshevik Central Committee initiated steps to convene an emergency party congress just prior to the start of the soviet congress. This was to be the forum in which the party’s revolutionary tactics, and the closely related question of the nature and makeup of a future government, were to be decided.

Meanwhile, Lenin had moved to the Petrograd suburbs and intensified pressure for immediate revolutionary action. As a result, on October 23 (October 10 O.S.), the Bolshevik Central Committee, with Lenin in attendance, resolved to make the seizure of power “the order of the day.” However, in the days immediately following, it became clear

that most Petrograd workers and soldiers would not participate in a unilateral call to arms against the Provisional Government by the Bolsheviks prior to the start of the national Congress of Soviets, scheduled to open on November 7 (October 25 O.S.). Kamenev, the leader of party moderates, was so alarmed by the possibility that the party would act precipitously that he virtually disclosed the Central Committee’s decision in *Novaia zhizn* (*New Life*), the Left Menshevik newspaper edited by the writer Maxim Gorky.

Consequently, with considerable wavering caused largely by pressure for bolder direct action from Lenin, the Bolshevik leadership in Petrograd pursued a strategy based on the following general principles: (1) that the soviets (because of their stature in the eyes of workers and soldiers), and not party groups, should be employed for the overthrow of the Provisional Government; (2) that for the broadest support, any attack on the government should be masked as a defensive operation on behalf of the soviet; (3) that action should therefore be delayed until a suitable excuse for giving battle presented itself; (4) that to undercut potential resistance and to maximize the possibility of success, every opportunity should be utilized to subvert the authority of the Provisional Government peacefully; and (5) that the formal removal of the existing government should be linked with and legitimized by the decisions of the Second Congress of Soviets. At the time, Lenin mocked this approach. However, considering the development of the revolution to that point, as well as the views of a majority of leading Bolsheviks around the country, it appeared as a natural, realistic response to the prevailing correlation of forces and popular mood.

Between November 3 and 6 (October 21–24 O.S.), a majority of Bolshevik leaders staunchly resisted immediate revolutionary action in favor of preparing for a decisive struggle against the Provisional Government at the congress. Among other things, in the party’s press and at huge public rallies they attacked the policies of the Provisional Government and reinforced popular support for the removal of the Provisional Government by the Congress of Soviets. Moreover, they reached out to the Menshevik–Internationalists and Left SRs. Simultaneously, using as an excuse the Provisional Government’s announced intention of transferring the bulk of the Petrograd garrison to the front, and cloaking every move as a defensive measure against the counterrevolution, they utilized the Bolshevik-



Red Guards marching through the streets of Moscow in 1917. © CORBIS

dominated Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet (MRC), established to monitor the government's troop dispositions, to take control of most Petrograd-based military units. Weapons and ammunition from the city's main arsenals were distributed to supporters. Although the MRC did not cross the boundary between moves that could be justified as defensive and moves that might infringe on the prerogatives of the congress, for practical purposes the Provisional Government was disarmed without a shot being fired.

In response, early on the morning of November 6 (October 24 O.S.), only hours before the scheduled opening of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, a majority of which was poised to vote in favor of forming an exclusively socialist, Soviet government, Kerensky took steps to suppress the left. Orders were issued for the rearrest of leading Bolsheviks who had been detained after the July uprising and released at the time of the Kornilov Affair. Loyalist military school cadets and

shock battalions from the suburbs were called to the Winter Palace, the seat of the government, and the main Bolshevik newspaper, *Rabochii put* (*Workers' Path*), was shut down. Not until these steps had been taken, and even then only after Lenin's personal direct intervention in the party's headquarters at Smolny, did the military action against the Provisional Government begin, action that Lenin had been demanding for a month. This occurred before dawn on November 7 (October 25 O.S.). At that time, all pretense that the MRC was simply defending the revolution and attempting primarily to maintain the status quo pending expression of the congress's will was abruptly dropped. Rather, an open, all-out effort was launched to confront congress delegates with the overthrow of the Provisional Government prior to the start of their deliberations.

During the morning of November 7, military detachments supporting the MRC seized strategically important bridges, key government buildings,



Soldiers fire rifles in Palace Square outside the Winter Palace. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

rail and power stations, communication facilities, and the State bank without bloodshed. They also laid siege to the Winter Palace, defended by only meager, demoralized, and constantly dwindling forces. Kerensky managed to flee to the front in search of troops before the ring was closed. The “storming of the Winter Palace,” dramatically depicted in an Eisenstein film, was a Soviet myth. After nightfall, the historic building was briefly bombarded by cannon from the Fortress of Peter and Paul and occupied with little difficulty, after which remaining members of the government were arrested.

The Soviet Congress was faced with a *fait accompli*. Lenin proclaimed the demise of the Provisional Government even before the congress opened that night. The thunder of cannon punctuated its first sessions. The effect was precisely what Lenin hoped for and what Bolshevik moderates, Menshevik-Internationalists, and Left SRs feared.

The Mensheviks, SRs, and even the Menshevik-Internationalists responded to Bolshevik violence by walking out of the congress. Lenin now superintended passage of the revolutionary Bolshevik program by the rump congress and the appointment of an interim Soviet national government (the Soviet of People’s Commissars or *Sovnarkom*) made up exclusively of Bolsheviks.

Still, as delegates departed Smolny at the close of the Second Congress on the morning of November 9 (October 27 O.S.), the vast majority of them, most Bolsheviks included, expected that all genuine revolutionary groups would unite behind the interim government they had created and that it would quickly be reconstructed according to the Bolshevik pre-October platform: that is, as an exclusively socialist, Soviet coalition government reflecting the relative strength of the various socialist parties originally in the congress and supportive of its revolutionary decrees. Important exceptions to



Revolutionaries unfurl the red flag in Moscow in 1918. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

Bolshevik leaders holding this views included Lenin and Trotsky who, having successfully engineered the overthrow of the Provisional Government before the start of the Congress of Soviets, were now most concerned to retain complete freedom of action at virtually any price. Most departing delegates also believed that the new government would in any case yield its authority to the Constituent Assembly, scheduled to be elected at the end of November.

Among political parties seeking to restore a broad socialist alliance and to restructure the Sovnarkom in the immediate aftermath of the Second Congress, most prominent were the Menshevik-Internationalists and the Left SRs; the latter were especially important to the success of the revolution because of their growing strength among peasants in the countryside, where Bolshevik influence was critically weak. Among labor organizations seeking to play a similar role was the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Union of Railway Workers (Vikzhel). Vikzhel announced that it would declare an immediate nationwide rail stoppage if the Bolsheviks did not participate in negotiations to

create a homogeneous socialist government responsible to the soviets and including all socialist groups.

Under Vikzhel's aegis, intensive talks were held in Petrograd November 11–18 (October 29–November 5 O.S.). With Kamenev in charge of negotiations for the Bolsheviks, they began auspiciously. Indeed, on November 2 even the Bolshevik press reported that the discussions were on the verge of success. However, they ultimately foundered, primarily because of such factors as the impossibly high demands made by the moderate socialists (essentially requiring repudiation of Soviet power and most of the accomplishments of the Second Congress, as well as the exclusion of Lenin and Trotsky from any future government), the defeat by Soviet forces of an internal insurrection and of loyalist Cossack units outside Petrograd, and the consolidation of Soviet power in Moscow. These factors immeasurably strengthened Lenin's and Trotsky's hands, enabling them to torpedo the Vikzhel talks. During the run-up to the Constituent Assembly in December, Bolshevik moderates made a valiant bid to steer the party's delegation toward

support of its right to define Russia's future political system. However, by then the moderates had been squeezed out of the party leadership, and this effort also failed. All of this made a long and bitter civil war inevitable.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

The October Revolution cannot be adequately characterized as either a military coup d'état or a popular uprising (although it contained elements of both). Its roots are to be found in the peculiarities of prerevolutionary Russia's political, social, and economic development, as well as in Russia's wartime crisis. At one level, it was the culminating event in a drawn-out battle between leftists and moderates: on the one hand, an expanding spectrum of left socialist groups supported by the vast majority of Petrograd workers, soldiers, and sailors dissatisfied by the results of the February revolution; and on the other, the increasingly isolated liberal-moderate socialist alliance that had taken control of the Provisional Government and national Soviet leadership during the February days. By the time the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened on November 7 (October 25 O.S.), the relatively peaceful victory of the former was all but assured. At another level, the October Revolution was a struggle, initially primarily within the Bolshevik leadership, between proponents of a multiparty, exclusively socialist government that would lead Russia to a Constituent Assembly in which socialists would have a dominating voice, and Leninists, who ultimately favored violent revolutionary action as the best means of striking out on an ultra-radical, independent revolutionary course in Russia and triggering decisive socialist revolutions abroad.

Muted for much of 1917, this conflict erupted with greatest force in the wake of the February Revolution, in the immediate aftermath of the July uprising, and during the periods immediately preceding and following the October Revolution. Such factors as the walkout of Mensheviks and SRs from the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, prompted by the belated military operations pressed by Lenin and precipitated by Kerensky; the adoption of the Bolshevik program at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets; the intransigence of the moderate socialists at the Vikzhel talks; and the Bolsheviks' first military victories over loyalist forces decisively undermined the efforts of moderate Bolsheviks to achieve a multiparty, socialist

democracy and facilitated the rapid ascendancy of Leninist authoritarianism. In this sense, the October Revolution extinguished prospects for the development of a Western-style democracy in Russia for the better part of a century. Also, in the immediate post-revolutionary years, it led to the catastrophic Russian civil war. Finally, it laid the foundation for Stalinism and the Cold War. However, despite these outcomes, the October revolution was in large measure a valid expression of popular aspirations.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; JULY DAYS; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; REVOLUTION OF 1905; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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ALEXANDER RABINOWITCH

OCTOBRIST PARTY

The Octobrist Party was founded in 1906 by Russian moderate liberals, taking its name from the October Manifesto. Unequivocal support for the new constitutional system and rejection of compulsory

land expropriation except in extreme state need distinguished it from the major left party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets), which represented more radical liberal opinion.

In the elections to the First and Second Dumas (1906–1907), the Octobrist Party fared relatively poorly while parties to its left had strong showings. The government, finding itself unable to work with the first two Dumas, dissolved them. Alexander Guchkov, the Octobrists' first leader, during the Second Duma softened some of the party's positions, thus enabling cooperation with the government. Loyalty to the new constitutional system and willingness to work with the government to achieve its full implementation and accompanying social reform were now the broad guiding principles of the party. Dissolving the Second Duma, Peter Stolypin, chairman of the Council of Ministers (1906–1911), restricted the voting franchise which lessened the voting power of the peasants and working classes. His goal was to limit the number of radical left deputies and increase Octobrist Party representation so that it could provide a solid base of support for the government in the Duma. Stolypin found himself in a difficult position in the Duma, stuck between the right with its hatred for the new system and the radical left. In the 1907 elections to the Third Duma the Octobrist Party more than tripled its representation, receiving 153 seats.

The party's unity and its relationship with the government depended on the latter's dedication to the spirit of the constitutional system and policy of reform. The great increase in the party's numbers made maintenance of unity between its left and right wings problematic.

Initially the Stolypin–Octobrist alliance worked relatively well, especially in regard to peasant reform. However, by 1909 conservatives fearful of the institutionalization of the new system by the Stolypin–Octobrist partnership worked to break it. The Naval General Staff crisis was the first step in this direction. The Octobrists regarded Nicholas II's rejection, with the urging of conservatives, of a bill concerning the Naval General Staff that had already been passed by both houses of parliament, as a violation of the spirit of the October Manifesto. Conservative attacks on Stolypin and increased fragmentation within the party forced Stolypin to turn increasingly to the right, thereby placing his relationship with the Octobrists and their unity under additional strain.

In 1911 the conservatives in the State Council, with the help of Nicholas II, rejected the Western Zemstvo Bill already passed by the Duma. Stolypin, infuriated by constant conservative attempts to block his policies, forced Nicholas II to disband the parliament provisionally, as allowed by Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, and make the bill law by decree. The Octobrists, although they had supported this bill, considered Stolypin's step to be a betrayal and undermining of the constitutional system. They went into opposition.

In elections to the Fourth Duma (1912), the Octobrists, while remaining the largest party, saw their share of the vote collapse to ninety-five. Morale in the party was at an all-time low, reflecting the overall disappointment with the gradual but successful emasculation of the constitutional system by conservatives and Nicholas II.

Octobrist unity cracked in 1913 when Guchkov, admitting that attempts to cooperate with the government to achieve needed reform had failed, urged adoption of a more aggressive stance toward the government, which since the assassination of Stolypin in 1911 had showed few signs of continuing reform. While the Central Committee supported this step, the larger body of deputies split on this issue. Disappointed with lack of party backing for such a move, some twenty-two deputies formed the Left Octobrists. The majority formed the Zemstvo Octobrists under the leadership of M.V. Rodzyanko, the party's leader. Some ten to fifteen remained uncommitted to either side. The party ceased to have any real power.

The weakening and fragmentation of the Octobrist Party mirrored the collapse of Russia's experiment with constitutional monarchy.

See also: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; NICHOLAS II; OCTOBER MANIFESTO; STOLYPIN, PETER ARKADIEVICH

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ZHAND P. SHAKIBI

ODOYEVSKY, VLADIMIR FYODOROVICH

(1804–1869), romantic and gothic fiction writer, pedagogue, musicologist, amateur scientist, and public servant.

A Russian thinker with encyclopedic knowledge whom contemporaries dubbed “the Russian Faust” (a character in one of his novels), Vladimir Odoevsky was mentioned in his day in the same breath as Alexander Pushkin and Nikolai Gogol. He is perhaps best known for the philosophical fantasy *Russian Nights* (*Russkie nochi*), published in 1844. In 1824–1825 he edited, with Wilhelm Küchelbecker, four issues of the influential periodical *Mnemosyne*. Its purpose was to champion Russian literature and German philosophy at a time when everyone else seemed fascinated with French ideas. Odoevsky contributed works such as “The City Without a Name” (1839) to Nekrasov’s influential magazine *Sovremennik* (*Contemporary*). In 1823 he founded a group called “Lovers of Wisdom” (*Lyubomudry*, a literal translation of the Greek word “philosophy”). Propounding ideas of philosophic realism, the group was dissolved soon after the Decembrist uprising in 1825, even though the group’s pursuits truly were only philosophical, not political. The failed rebellion deeply affected Odoevsky, because—like the poet Pushkin—he had many friends among the Decembrists, including his cousin, the poet and guards’ officer, Alexander Odoevsky (1802–1839), and the writer Wilhelm Küchelbecker (1797–1846), both of whom were imprisoned and exiled after the uprising.

A Slavophile of sorts, Odoevsky believed in the decline of the West and the future greatness of Russia. He met regularly with other Slavophile thinkers, such as Ivan Kireyevsky, Alexander Koshelev, Melgunov, Stepan Shevyrev, Mikhail Pogodin (the last two were professors at Moscow State University), and the young poet Dmitry Venevitinov.

In the 1830s Odoevsky was preoccupied with political questions, antislavery, anti-Americanism, Russian messianism, the innate superiority of Russia over the West, and criticisms of Malthus, Bentham, and the Utilitarians. The novel *Russian Nights* contains a mixture of these ideas. Odoevsky proposed a revealing subtitle, which his editor later rejected: “Russian Nights, or the Indispensability of a New Science and a New Art.” Throughout the novel the main characters grapple with topics such as the meaning of science and art, logic, the sense of human existence, atheism and

belief, education, government rule, the function of individual sciences, madness and sanity, poetic creation, Slavophilism, Europe and Russia, and mercantilism.

Odoevsky also cherished music and musicians, composing chamber music as early as his teens and writing critical appraisals of composers such as Mikhail Glinka. He was devoted to the history and structure of church singing and collected notational manuscripts to preserve them for future generations. As he wrote in one of his letters: “I discovered the definite theory of our melodies and harmony, which is similar to the theory of medieval Western tunes, but has its own peculiarities.”

Odoevsky excelled the most in the genre of the short story, particularly ones geared toward children. Two stories rank among the best in children’s fare: “Johnny Frost” and “The Town in a Snuff Box.” Generally, Odoevsky’s fiction reflects two main tendencies. First, he expresses his philosophical convictions imaginatively and often fantastically. His stories typically move from a recognizable setting to a mystical realm. Secondly, he injects commentary on the shortcomings of social life in Russia, usually in a satiric mode.

See also: GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; LOVERS OF WISDOM, THE; SLAVOPHILES

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

OFFICIAL NATIONALITY

In 1833, Sergei Uvarov, in his first published circular as the new minister of education, coined the tripartite formula “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” as the motto for the development of the Russian Empire. The three terms also became the main ingredients of the doctrine that dominated the era

of Emperor Nicholas I, who reigned from 1825 to 1855, and that came to be called "official nationality." About two dozen periodicals, scores of books, and the entire school system propagated the ideas and made them the foundation for guiding Russia to modernity without succumbing to materialism, revolutionary movements, and blind imitation of foreign concepts.

The meaning of Orthodoxy and autocracy were clear. The Orthodox faith had formed the foundation of Russian spiritual, ethical, and cultural life since the tenth century, and had always acted as a unifying factor in the nation. It also proved useful in preaching obedience to authority. Autocracy, or absolute monarchy, involved the conviction that Russia would avoid revolution through the enlightened leadership of a tsar, who would provide political stability but put forth timely and enlightened reforms so that Russia could make constant progress in all spheres of national life. Political theory had long argued, and Russia's historical lessons seemed to demonstrate, that a single ruler was needed to maintain unity in a vast territory with varied populations.

The third term in the tripartite formula was the most original and the most mysterious. The broad idea of nationality (*narodnost*) had just become fashionable among the educated public, but there was no set definition for the concept. In 1834, Peter Pletnev, a literary critic and professor of Russian literature at St. Petersburg University, noted: "The idea of nationality is the major characteristic that contemporaries demand from literary works . . .," but, he went on, "one does not know exactly what it means." A variety of schools of thought on the subject arose in the 1830s and 1840s.

The romantic nationalists, led by Michael Pogodin and Stephen Shevyrev of Moscow University and the journal *The Muscovite*, celebrated Russia's absolutist form of government, its uniqueness, its poetic richness, the peace-loving virtues of its denizens, and the notion of the Slavs as a chosen people, all of which supposedly bestowed upon Russia a glorious mission to save humanity and made it superior to a "decaying" West. The Slavophiles, led by Moscow-based landowners including the Aksakov and Kireyevsky brothers, opposed such western concepts as individualism, legalism, and majority rule, in favor of the notion of *sobornost*: a community, much like a church council (*sobor*), should engage in discussion, with the aim of achieving a "chorus" of unanimous decision and thus preserving a spirit of harmony, and

brotherhood. The people then would advise the tsar, through some type of land council (*zemsky sobor*), a system, the Slavophiles believed, that was the "true" Russian way in all things. The Westernizers, in contrast, sympathized with the values of other Europeans and assumed that Russian development, while traveling by a different path, would occur in the context of the liberal tradition that valued the individual over the state. All three groups, however, agreed on the necessity for emancipation, legal reform, and freedom of speech and press.

The doctrine of official nationality represented the government's response to these intellectual currents, as well as to the wave of revolutions that had spread through much of the rest of Europe beyond Russia's borders. The proponents of this doctrine, however, did not speak with one voice. For instance, because of their support for the existing state, the romantic nationalists are often defined as proponents of official nationality. However, the most influential group, sometimes called dynastic nationalists, included Emperor Nicholas I and the court, and their views were propagandized in the far-flung journalistic enterprises of Fadei Bulgarin, Nicholas Grech, and Osip Senkovsky. Their understanding of *narodnost* was based on patriotism, a defensive doctrine used to support the status quo and Russia's great-power status. For them, "Russianness," even for Baltic Germans or Poles, revolved around a subject's loyalty to the autocrat. In other words, they equated the nation with the state as governed by the dynasty, which was seen as both the repository and the emblem of the national culture.

Sergei Semenovich Uvarov's own views of nationality straddled the many schools of thought. He shared the bulk of the opinions of the dynastic nationalists, patronized the romantic nationalists and their journal, praised the Slavophiles for their Orthodox spirit, and accepted some Westernizing tendencies in Russia's historical development. But this architect of official nationality espoused a doctrine that lacked appeal and vitality. Instead of regarding the people as actively informing the content of nationality, Uvarov believed that the state should define, guide, and impose "true" national values upon a passive population. In a word, his concept of *narodnost* excluded the creative activity of the *narod* and made it synonymous with loyalty to throne and altar. The doctrine, while it achieved the stability which was its aim, proved anachronistic and did not survive Nicholas I and Uvarov, both of whom died in 1855.

See also: NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NATION AND NATIONALITY NICHOLAS I; SLAVOPHILES; UVAROV, SERGEI SEMENOVICH; WESTERNIZERS

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CYNTHIA HYL A WHITTAKER

OGARKOV, NIKOLAI VASILEVICH

(1917–1994), marshal, chief of the Soviet General Staff, Hero of the Soviet Union, (1917–1944).

Nikolai Ogarkov was one of the outstanding military leaders of the Soviet General Staff, who combined technical knowledge with a mastery of combined arms operations. He was born on October 30, 1917, in the village of Molokovo in Tver oblast and graduated from an engineering night school in 1937. In 1938 he joined the Red Army and graduated from the Kuybyshev Military Engineering Academy in 1941. Ogarkov served as combat engineer with a wide range of units on various fronts throughout World War II. After the war he completed the advanced military engineering course at the Kuybyshev Military Engineering Academy. Ogarkov advanced rapidly in command and staff assignments and graduated in 1959 from the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff. Thereafter he commanded a motorized rifle division in East Germany and held command and staff postings in various military districts. In 1968 he assumed the post of deputy chief of the General Staff and head of the Operations Directorate, where he was involved in planning the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. In 1974 he assumed the post of first deputy chief of the General Staff, and then chief of the General Staff in 1977. Ogarkov held that post until 1984. During his tenure he oversaw the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and was the voice of the Soviet government in the aftermath of the shooting down of the Korean airliner, KAL

007. He was an articulate advocate of the Revolution in Military Affairs, which he believed was about to transform military art. He stressed the impact of new technologies associated with automated command and control, electronic warfare, precision strike, and weapons based on new physical principles upon the conduct of war. His advocacy of increased defense spending contributed to his removal from office in 1984. Ogarkov died on January 23, 1994.

See also: AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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JACOB W. KIPP

OGHUZ *See* TORKY.

OKOLNICHY

Court rank used in pre-Petrine Russia.

The term *okolnichy* (pl. *okolnichie*) meaning “someone close to the ruler,” is derived from the word *okolo* (near, by). The sources first mention an *okolnichy* at the court of the prince of Smolensk in 1284. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, *okolnichie* acted as administrators, judges, and military commanders, and as witnesses during compilation of a prince’s legal documents. When a prince was on campaign, *okolnichie* prepared bridges, fords, and lodging for him. *Okolnichie* usually came from local elite families. By the end of the fifteenth century, the rank of *okolnichy* became part of the hierarchy of the Gosudarev Dvor (Sovereign’s Court), second after the rank of boyar. Unlike boyars, who usually performed military service, *okolnichie* carried out various administrative assignments in the first half of the sixteenth century. Later, the *okolnichie* conceded their administrative functions to the secretaries.

Under Ivan IV, the majority of okolnichie belonged to the boyar families who had long connections with Moscow. For most elite courtiers, with the exception of the most distinguished princely families, service as okolnichie was a prerequisite for receiving the rank of boyar. The rank of okolnichy also served as a means of integrating families of lesser status into the elite. By the end of the sixteenth century, the distinction between boyars and okolnichie was based largely on genealogical origin and seniority in service. From the middle of the seventeenth century, the number of okolnichie increased because of the growing size of the court. Many historians believe that all okolnichie were admitted to the royal council, the Boyar Duma, though in fact only a few of them attended meetings with the tsar.

See also: BOYAR; BOYAR DUMA

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SERGEI BOGATYREV

OKUDZHAVA, BULAT SHALOVICH

(1924–1997), Russian poet, singer, and novelist.

Bulat Okudzhava's parents were both professional Party workers. In 1937 they were arrested; the father was executed and the mother imprisoned in the Gulag until 1955. At age seventeen Okudzhava volunteered for the army, saw active service, and was wounded. After the war he graduated from Tbilisi University, then became a schoolteacher in Kaluga. In 1956 he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and moved to Moscow. He worked as a literary journalist, and joined the Union of Writers in 1961. He made his name as a prose writer with the controversially unheroic war story "Goodbye, Schoolboy," and followed this with a series of historical novels depicting various episodes from nineteenth-century gentry life.

In the late 1950s Okudzhava pioneered "guitar poetry" songs performed by the author to his own

guitar accompaniment. This genre drew on long-established traditions of Russian drawing-room art song ("romance"), student song, and gypsy song, as well as that of the French chansonniers, who became well known in Russian intellectual circles in the late 1950s (Okudzhava's favorite was Georges Brassens). Okudzhava cultivated an amateur-sounding performance manner. In actual fact, he was an extremely gifted natural melodist, creating dozens of original and unforgettable tunes. Okudzhava's songs are suffused with nostalgic, agnostic sadness. They deal with three principal themes: love, war, and the streets of Moscow. In his treatment of love he is an unrepentant romantic, idealizing women and portraying men as subordinate and flawed. In his treatment of war he is anti-heroic, emphasizing fear, loss, and mankind's seeming inability to find a more humane way of settling disputes. In his treatment of Moscow he looks back to a time before the city became a Soviet metropolis, when it offered refuge for the vulnerable and sensitive in its courtyards and neighborhoods, especially the Arbat district. His treatment of war and Moscow were particularly at odds with official notions about these matters. At about the time that Okudzhava created his basic corpus of songs, the tape recorder became available to private citizens in the USSR, and the songs were duplicated in immense numbers, completely bypassing official controls.

By the mid-1960s Okudzhava had become, after Vladimir Vysotsky, the most genuinely popular figure in the literary arts in Russia. He was unique in that, while he remained a member of the Party and the Union of Writers, his work was published abroad (without permission) and circulated unofficially in Russia, while continuing to be published officially in the USSR. Shielded by his popularity and his fundamental patriotism, he was never subjected to severe repression. From the mid-1980s until his death he was something of a Grand Old Man of Russian literature, the doyen of the "men of the 1960s." In 1994, his novel *The Closed Theatre*, a barely fictionalized account of his parents' life and fate through the eyes of their son, won the Russian Booker Prize.

See also: JOURNALISM; MUSIC; UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS

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GERALD SMITH

OLD BELIEVER COMMITTEE

In 1820, Emperor Alexander I convened a secret committee to guide him in policies regarding the Old Believers (also known as Old Ritualists or *raskolniki*—schismatics). The secret committee included some of the most important churchmen and ministers in Russia, including the minister of religion and education (Prince Vasily Golitsyn) and Archbishop Filaret Drozdov, later to become metropolitan of Moscow and the preeminent prelate of mid-nineteenth-century Russia. Originally given the task of finding an appropriate form of toleration within the Russian legal system, the committee quickly broke into liberal and conservative factions. Internal politics of the committee, added to the emperor's own vacillating desire for a "spiritual revolution" in Russia, weakened its ability to make significant changes. Ascendance of conservative members pushed the committee's views from tolerance of the Old Belief to more stringent enforcement of punitive laws against them. After the death of Emperor Alexander, the secret committee became mostly a forum for discussion of anti-Old Believer policies in the Russian government. It continued to exist into the reign of Alexander III, whose landmark law of 1883 finally revised the legal status of Old Believers in the Russian empire.

See also: ALEXANDER I; FILARET DROZDOV, METROPOLITAN; OLD BELIEVERS; ORTHODOXY

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ROY R. ROBSON

OLD BELIEVERS

The term Old Believers (or Old Ritualists) includes a number of groups that arose as a result of Rus-

sian church reforms initiated between 1654 and 1666. Old Believers desired to maintain the traditions, rites, and prerogatives of Russian Orthodoxy, whereas Nikon, patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, wanted to make Russian practices conform to those of the contemporary Greek Orthodox Church. Nikon's opponents, conscious of both a departure from tradition and an encroachment of central control over local autonomy, refused to change practices.

ORIGINS OF THE MOVEMENT

The reforms took two general forms—textual and ritual. In the first, a group of editors changed all Russian liturgical books to conform with their contemporary Greek counterparts, rather than old Russian or old Greek versions. The most famous of these was the change in spelling of "Jesus" from "Isus" to "Iisus." While the Old Believers rejected all innovation, the symbolic centerpiece of resistance was the sign of the cross. Traditionally, Russians put together their thumb, fourth, and fifth fingers in a symbol of the Trinity. The second finger was held upright, to confirm Jesus' form as perfect man; the middle finger was bent to the level of the second, symbolizing Jesus' Godly form that bent down to become human. These two fingers touched the body during the sign of the cross, showing that both natures of Jesus (human and divine) existed on the cross. In Greek practice, the fingers were reversed—thumb, second, and third fingers were held together and touched the body, while the fourth and fifth fingers were held down toward the palm. When Nikon obliged his flock to change their hands, it seemed that he wanted them to discount the icons in their churches and the instructions in their psalm books, which explicitly showed the old Russian style of the sign. In fact, the Stoglav Council, convened exactly a century earlier, had condemned anything but the "two-fingered sign."

The implementation of reforms were draconian. Ivan Neronov and Avvakum Petrovich, who had been part of Nikon's circle, challenged the patriarch. Sometimes left alone, at other times persecuted, Nikon's opponents included some of the most respected churchmen in Muscovy. In an unusual move, Neronov was finally allowed to continue using the old books for his services, but Avvakum was exiled to Siberia and finally burned at the stake for his extreme anti-reform posture. Even women were not spared—the boyarina Feodosia Morozova was carried out of Moscow to the Borovsk Monastery, where she perished in jail.

For each of the famous anti-reformists, thousands more pious Russians simply paid no heed to the calls for reform and continued to pray according to the old style. Their existence underlined the limit of Nikon's other goal, which was to limit the expansion of central control of religious affairs to the patriarch alone, taking away local prerogatives. The vast majority of Old Believers simply refused to accept either the reforms or the centralization that Nikon imposed on his flock. The traditionalists, of course, perceived themselves as true Orthodox, and called followers of the reformed ritual "new believers" or "Nikonians." Much of this early history, however, is still poorly understood. Recent scholarship has shown that the Old Belief did not coalesce into a movement until perhaps a generation after the schism. Because local concerns tended to override any broader organization of Old Believers, the leadership of the Old Belief probably had only limited authority over a small core of supporters.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

For the Old Believers, the possible loss of sacramental life splintered the movement shortly after the 1666 schism. Since no bishops consecrated new hierarchs according to the old ritual, Old Believers quickly found themselves bereft of canonical clergy. Old Believer communities solidified into a number of *soglasiya*, translatable as "concord." The differences among the concords lay not so much in doctrinal issues as in sacramental procedures and interaction with the state.

Old Believers developed a spectrum of views on the sacraments. Half-Old Believers, for example, accepted some Russian Orthodox sacramental life but prayed regularly only with other half-Old Believers. Many such half-Old Believers never openly aligned themselves with any specific concord but instead maintained a secret allegiance to the Old Belief. Although scores of small, locally formed groups sprang up, they tended to wither and die, leaving few traces of their history.

The priestly Old Believers (*popovtsy*), on the other hand, at some point in their history came to accept clergy from new-rite sources. These priestly Old Believers included the Belokrinitsy and the *beglopovtsy* (fugitive-priestly), the latter accepting clergy consecrated in the state-sponsored church. Furthest from the church were the priestless Old Ritualists—the Pomortsy, Fedoseyevtsy, Filippovtsy, and Spasovtsy—all of whom firmly believed that the sacramental life had been taken up into heaven,

just as Elijah had ridden his fiery chariot away from a sinful world, only to return in the last days. Priestless Old Believers were more likely to reject accommodation with the state than their priestly coreligionists, sometimes even eschewing the use of money or building permanent homes. While some Old Believers lived openly in their communities, others traveled from place to place, preaching and living off alms.

In broad terms, Old Believer communities on the local level were organized according to similar patterns, regardless of concord. Clergy (priests, preceptors, and abbots) usually came from within the community or from one nearby, and all members of the concord elected the group's clerical leadership. Democratic management of religious affairs found precedent in both the autonomous organization of pre-Nikon parishes and in the monastic rule maintained at the Solovki Monastery in Russia's extreme north. This monastery, a dramatic holdout against the Russian Orthodox church, saw its continued expression in the Vyg and Leksa monastic settlements that, in turn, established the Pomortsy concord.

LEGAL AND SOCIAL STATUS IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA

Reaction against Old Believers emanated from both the Russian Orthodox Church and the secular state. In pushing through his ritual and textual changes, Patriarch Nikon relied heavily on his relationship with Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to suppress popular opposition. The history of the Old Belief's early years tells of numerous confrontations between agents of the state and Old Believers. At times, they were subjected to corporal punishment such as having a tongue cut out, being burnt at the stake, or even being smoked alive "like bacon." Sometimes, however, death came at the hands of Old Believers themselves. On some occasions, Old Believers burned themselves alive in their churches rather than accept the ritual changes of the revised Russian Orthodox Church. Although this was the most extreme form of resistance and did not happen often, it did provide an effective and surprisingly frequent deterrent to state seizure of Old Believer groups. Self-immolation continued even into the period of Peter I, a whole generation after the first reforms.

Peter I's position regarding the Old Believers was mixed. Old Believers were not tolerated as political opponents of the state, especially of Peter's



Woodcut ordered by Peter I to encourage men to shave their beards and to ridicule Old Believers who refuse to shave.

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Western-looking reforms. He implemented a double poll tax on Old Believers and even imposed a tax on the beards that Old Believers refused to shave, as well as the traditional clothing that they would not exchange for Western European dress. In matters advantageous to the state, however, Peter I allowed Old Believers to live as they wished. For example, he refused to persecute Old Believers in the Vyg community while they were producing ore.

Even when allowed to exist, Old Believers often suffered under separate laws and governmental decrees, some of which were secret and therefore not published. The situation of the Old Believers improved dramatically, however, during the reign of Peter III, who tolerated them. During the rule of Catherine II, the great Old Believer centers of Preobrazhenskoe and Rogozhskoe were founded. In these centers, curiously known only as “cemeteries,” Old Believers created large complexes of chapels, churches, bell towers, and charitable institutions, such as hospitals and almshouses. Pre-

obrazhenskoe and Rogozhskoe became the focus of Old Believer merchant and industrial development for succeeding generations.

Meanwhile, the church itself had softened its attitude about the Old Ritual. In 1800, it created the *edinoverie*, an arm of the official church that continued to use the old rite. Although initially successful, the *edinoverie* never swayed the majority of priestly Old Believers, and even fewer of the priestless Old Believers, who had become convinced that priesthood would be lost until the Second Coming of Christ.

With the succession of Nicholas I to the throne, Old Believers once more found their legal status eroded. Even by the end of Alexander’s reign, the state had already begun again to refer to Old Believers as *raskolniki* (schismatics). This name had earlier been dropped as too judgmental. As Nicholas worked out a new relationship between church and state, he began to close the Old Believers’ places of worship, seize their property, and harrass the faithful. By 1834, the gains made by Old Believers before 1822 had been completely lost.

The policy of the next tsar, Alexander II, toward Old Believers proved much more liberal than that of his father. Although laws from Tsar Nicholas’s period curtailing Old Believer freedom stayed on the books, the state generally stopped enforcing them. Old Believers again flourished both in Moscow and in the far reaches of the empire. The Russian Orthodox Church remained an adamant opponent of the schism but began to pursue expanded missionary activity to the Old Believers, rather than engage in direct persecution.

The succession of Alexander III further revised the Old Believers legal status. Study of the Old Ritualist question increased during the early years of Alexander III’s administration and culminated in the law on Old Believers of May 1883. This new law served as the capstone to imperial policy on the Old Belief until the revolutionary changes of 1905. At that time, against the wishes of the Russian Orthodox Church, the emperor granted full toleration of all religious groups through his edict of April 17, 1905. In the late imperial period, this date would be celebrated by Old Believers as the beginning of a silver age of growth and wide public acceptance.

No one knows how many Old Believers lived in Russia. The first census of the empire had convinced Old Believers that to be counted was tantamount to being enrolled in the books of Antichrist.

Moreover, Old Believers realized that being counted made them more easily subject to the double poll tax. Thus, Old Believers rarely cooperated with imperial authorities during enumerations. The Old Believers could hide from the authorities simply by calling themselves members of the Russian Orthodox Church, especially if they had bribed the local priest to enroll them on parish registers. The question of numerical strength in relation to gender remains sketchy at best. The figure of ten percent of the total population, however, has been regarded as authoritative for the imperial period.

Old Believers tended to live either in Moscow or on the outskirts of European Russia. Often far from imperial power, Old Believer communities tended to include active roles for women and devised self-help programs to insure economic survival. The wealth of Old Believer merchants and industrialists has been noted many times, but even the most modest Old Believer communities usually made provisions for mutual aid, rendering their settlements more prosperous-looking than other Russian villages. Old Believer industrialists were also widely reported to give preferential treatment, good benefits, and high pay for co-religionists working at their factories. Russian Orthodox authorities even claimed that the Old Believers lured poor adherents of the established church, including impoverished pastors, into the arms of the schism.

OLD BELIEVERS IN THE SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET PERIOD

The situation for Old Believers in post-1917 Russia has not been thoroughly studied, though some generalizations can be made. In many cases, churches were closed and their believers persecuted, especially in the period of the cultural revolution. Activists were jailed or sent to the Gulag camps, as were many other religious believers. In other cases, Old Believers followed a path of partial accommodation with the state, much like the practices of some Russian Orthodox. Taking advantage of Soviet laws, some Old Believer communities used their previous history of persecution and tradition of communal organization to appeal for churches to stay open. This strategy had mixed results. A few major centers were allowed to exist in Moscow, for example, and, after World War II, in Riga, but others were closed or destroyed.

Old Belief was weakened significantly during the communist period. Ritual life regularly became covert, rather than public. After having been baptized as children, Old Believers often ceased to take

part in church rituals as they grew older. Some, especially in the urban centers, became Communist Party members, perhaps to revive their religious life in retirement. Older women, with little to lose politically or economically, attended churches more openly and frequently than working men and women.

Many Old Believers, however, retreated into their old practices of secrecy in worship, use of homes instead of officially sanctioned churches, and even flight into the wilderness. Rural Old Believers continued to be skeptical of outsiders, especially communists, and tried to retain ritual distance between the faithful and the unbelievers. Sometimes, illegal or informal conferences debated the problems of secular education, military service, and intermarriage. In the most extreme cases, Old Believer families moved ever farther into Siberia, sometimes even crossing into China. Notably, Old Believers also emigrated to Australia, Turkey, the United States, and elsewhere, continuing a trend that had begun in the late nineteenth century.

The period of glasnost and perestroika created significant international scholarly and popular interest in the Old Believers, though that has waned during the years of economic difficulty following the breakup of the USSR. In post-communist Russia, Old Believers have become bolder and more public, reviving publications, building churches, and reconstituting community life. They have fought to have the Old Belief recognized by the government as one of Russia's historical faiths, hoping to put the Old Belief on par with the Russian Orthodox Church as a pillar of traditional (i.e., noncommunist) values. Old Believers have continued to struggle with the demands of tradition in a rapidly changing political, social, cultural, and economic environment.

See also: ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH; AVVAKUM PETROVICH; CHURCH COUNCIL, HUNDRED CHAPTERS; NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVER COMMITTEE; ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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OLD STYLE

Until January 31, 1918, Russia used the Julian calendar, while Western Europe had gradually changed to the Gregorian calendar after its introduction by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582. Orthodox Russia, associating the Gregorian calendar with Catholicism, had resisted the change. As a result, Russian dates lagged behind contemporary events. In the nineteenth century, Russia was twelve days behind the West; in the twentieth century it was thirteen days behind. Because of the difference in calendars, the revolution of October 25, 1917, was commemorated on November 7. To minimize confusion, Russian writers would indicate their dating system by adding the abbreviation "O.S." (Old Style) or "N.S." (New Style) to their letters, documents, and diary entries. The Russian Orthodox Church continues to use the Julian system, making Russian Christmas fall on January 7.

See also: CALENDAR

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son Igor into Oleg's care. It is not known whether Oleg succeeded Rurik in his own right or as the regent for Igor. In 882 he assembled an army of Varangians and East Slavs and traveled south from Novgorod, capturing Smolensk and Lyubech. At Kiev, he tricked the boyars Askold and Dir into coming out to greet him. Accusing them of having no right to rule the town because they were not of princely stock as he and Igor were, he had them killed. Oleg became the prince of Kiev and proclaimed that it would be "the mother of all Rus towns." He waged war against the neighbouring East Slavic tribes, made them Kiev's tributaries, and deprived the Khazars of their jurisdiction over the middle Dnieper. Oleg thus became the founder of Rus, the state centered on Kiev.

In 907 Oleg attacked Constantinople. Although some scholars question the authenticity of this information, most accept it as true. His army, constituting Varangians and Slavs, failed to breach the city walls but forced the Greeks to negotiate a treaty. One of Oleg's main objectives was to obtain the best possible terms for Rus merchants trading in Constantinople. He was thus the first prince to formalize trade relations between the Rus and the Greeks. In 911 (or 912) he sent envoys to Constantinople to conclude another more juridical treaty. The two agreements were among Oleg's greatest achievements. According to folk tradition, he died in 912 after a viper bit him when he kicked his dead horse's skull. Another account says he died in 922 at Staraya Ladoga.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; RURIKID DYNASTY; VIKINGS

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MARTIN DIMNIK

OLEG

(died c. 912), first grand prince of Kiev, asserted his rule over the East Slavic tribes in the middle Dnieper region and concluded treaties with Constantinople.

When Rurik was on his deathbed in 879 he gave his kinsman Oleg "the Sage" control over his domains in northern Russia and placed his young

OLGA

(d. 969), Kievan grand princess and regent for her son Svyatoslav.

Under the year 903, the *Primary Chronicle* reports that Oleg, Rurik's kinsman and guardian to his son Igor, obtained a wife for Igor from Pskov by the name of Olga. It is unclear whether Igor was

actually the son of Rurik, the semi-legendary founder of the Kievan state, but, as Igor and Olga's son Svyatoslav was born in 942, it is very likely that the chronology in the text is faulty and that the marriage did not take place in 903. Legend has it that Olga was of Slavic origin, but evidence is again lacking.

On a trip to collect tribute from an East Slavic tribe called the Derevlians (forest dwellers) in 945, Igor was killed, and the Derevlians decided that Mal, their prince, should marry Olga, who was serving as regent for her minor son. Olga pretended to go along with the plan, but then violently put down their uprising by means of three well-planned acts of revenge, after which she destroyed the Derevlian capital Iskoresten. The chronicle account of Olga's revenge is formulaic, based on folklore-like riddles that the opponent must comprehend in order to escape death. The tales are clearly intended to demonstrate Olga's wisdom. From 945 to 947, after her defeat of the Derevlians, Olga established administrative centers for taxation, which eliminated the need for collecting tribute. During her regency she significantly expanded the land holdings of the Kievan grand princely house.

Olga was the first member of the Rus ruling dynasty to accept Christianity. Scholars have debated when and where she was converted, as the sources give conflicting accounts, but there is some evidence that she became a Christian in Constantinople in 954 or 955 and was hosted by Constantine Porphyrogenitus as a Christian ruler during a subsequent visit in 957. According to the *Primary Chronicle* account, which is likely intended to mirror her rejection of Mal, Olga eludes a marriage proposal from Constantine by resorting once again to cunning, although this time her actions are nonviolent and motivated by Christian chastity rather than revenge.

Despite considerable effort, Olga was unable to establish Christianity in Rus, and failed to secure help to that end either from Byzantium or the West. In 959 after her Byzantine efforts had yielded no results, she requested a bishop and priest from the German king, Otto I. Although a mission under Bishop Adalbert was sent after much delay, it was not well received and departed soon afterwards. When her regency ended, Olga continued to play an influential role, as Svyatoslav was frequently away on military campaigns.

Olga died in 969 and was eventually canonized by the Orthodox Church. The *Primary Chronicle*

does not report where she was buried, but Jakov the Monk writes in his *Memorial and Encomium to Vladimir* that her remains later lay in the Church of the Holy Theotokos (built in 996) and that their uncorrupted state indicated that God glorified her body because she glorified Him. One of the most enduring images associated with Olga is first encountered in the *Sermon on Law and Grace* (mid-eleventh century) by Metropolitan Hilarion, but repeated often in later works. In praising Olga and Vladimir, Hilarion compares them to the first Christian Roman emperor, Constantine, and his mother Helen, who discovered the Holy Cross.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; RURIKID DYNASTY; SVYATOSLAV I; VLADIMIR, ST.

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DAVID K. PRESTEL

OPERA

Opera reached Russia in 1731, when an Italian troupe from Dresden visited Moscow. In 1736 it was established at the tsarist court in St. Petersburg. Early Russian opera was mostly in Italian and French. Works in Russian were usually set in Russia, but representations of Russian history on the operatic stage began only in 1790 with *The Early Reign of Oleg*, a collaboration of the court composers Vasily Pashkevich (a Russian), Carlo Canobbio, and Giuseppe Sarti (both Italians) on a Russian libretto written by Catherine II.

The popularity of the court theaters in the early nineteenth century made their stages a possible venue of propaganda. This potential was fully realized in Mikhail Glinka's first opera (1836), with a libretto written by Baron Rosen, secretary of the



Soviet opera singers perform *Rock Flower* in 1950. © YEVGENY KHALDEL/CORBIS

successor to the throne. Initially named for its protagonist, Ivan Susanin, the opera was renamed *A Life for the Tsar* when Glinka dedicated it to Nicholas I (Soviet legend had it that the new title was imposed against Glinka's will). In its wholesale affirmation of the doctrine of "official nationality" as proclaimed by Nicholas, the opera became a symbol of Russian autocracy.

Opera was now the most popular form of entertainment in Russia, but apart from Glinka there

were no notable domestic composers. To satisfy the demand, a new Italian troupe was established in St. Petersburg in 1843. Its repertory was the same as that of other Italian enterprises abroad; except for censorial changes to libretti, there was nothing Russian about it. This artistic showcase, cherished not only by the aristocracy but also by the radical intelligentsia, slowed down the development of Russian opera (and Russian music in general). Russian musicians, then mostly amateurs (composers and performers alike), even suffered from legal dis-

crimination: Until 1860, “musician” was not a recognized profession; moreover, for a long time a limit was imposed on the yearly income of Russians (but not of foreigners) in the performing arts, and Russian composers were expressly forbidden to write for the Italian company. Only after the establishment of conservatories in the 1860s did Russian opera become really competitive; performance standards rose, and gradually a Russian repertory accumulated.

The first successful Russian opera after Glinka was Alexander Serov’s *Rogneda* (1865). Its fictional plot unfolds against the background of the “baptism of Russia” in 988. As affirmative of the official view on Russian history as *A Life for the Tsar*, it earned its creator a lifelong pension from Alexander II. Soon after, three composers from the “Mighty Handful” embarked on operas based on Russian history: Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov’s *The Maid of Pskov* (based on Ivan IV, after Lev Mey, 1873), Modest Musorgsky’s *Boris Godunov* (after Alexander Pushkin’s play, 1874), and Alexander Borodin’s *Prince Igor* (premiered posthumously, 1890). While *Prince Igor* affirmed autocracy, the other two works did not; furthermore, their protagonists were Russian tsars, whose representation on the operatic stage was forbidden. The ban was partly lifted, which made the production of the two operas possible. It remained in force for members of the House of Romanov, however, and that is why, in Musorgsky’s second historical opera, *Khovanshchina* (unfinished; produced posthumously in 1886), the curtain falls before an announced appearance of Peter I; the same happens with Catherine II in Peter Tchaikovsky’s *The Queen of Spades* (1891). The representation of Orthodox clergy was also forbidden; while the Jesuits in *Boris Godunov* presented no problem, the Orthodox monks had to be recast as “hermits,” and a scene set in a monastery was omitted. But before 1917 no Russian composer ever withdrew an opera instead of complying with the censor’s demands, nor did anyone try to circumvent the censorship by having a banned Russian opera performed abroad.

After the accession of Alexander III, the crown’s monopoly of theaters was revoked (1882), and private opera companies emerged; Savva Mamontov’s in Moscow became the most famous. In 1885 the Italian troupe was disbanded. Russian opera took over its representative and social functions as well as its repertory. While opera continued to be a favorite of the public, leading Russian composers gradually lost interest in it, turning to ballet and

instrumental genres instead. Fairy-tale operas were favored over depictions of Russian history, but Rimsky-Korsakov’s last opera, *The Golden Cockerel* (after Pushkin, Moscow 1909), is often seen as a satire on Russian autocracy.

Censorship was restored after the 1917 revolution, although it took a different turn. *A Life for the Tsar* was banned until revised as *Ivan Susanin* with a new libretto by Sergei Gorodetsky (Moscow 1939). Other pre-1917 operas underwent minor modifications. There were also new operas interpreting history in Soviet terms and even “topical” operas intended to educate the public. Ivan Dzerzhinsky’s “song opera” *Quiet Flows the Don* (Moscow 1934, after Mikhail Sholokhov’s novel) was held up as a model against Dmitry Shostakovich’s anarchic *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District* (1934; not based on history, but in a realistic historical setting), which was banned in 1936. Josef Stalin’s megalomania shows through Sergei Prokofiev’s *War and Peace* (after Leo Tolstoy’s novel). Composed in response to the German invasion of 1941, this most ambitious of Soviet operas was revised several times and was staged uncut only after the deaths of Stalin and Prokofiev (Moscow 1959).

During the Stalinist era an effort was made to establish national operatic traditions in the various Soviet republics. Russian composers were sent to the republics to collaborate with local composers on operas based on local folklore (and sometimes on local history) that generally sound like Rimsky-Korsakov.

In the post-Stalinist decades, major composers rarely tried their hand at opera. In the late 1980s Alfred Schnittke wrote *Life with an Idiot*, a surrealist lampoon on Vladimir Lenin after a story by Viktor Yerofeyev. It was premiered abroad (Amsterdam 1992), but in Russian and with a cast including “People’s Artists of the USSR.” Since the fall of the Soviet Union the musical has superseded opera as the leading theatrical genre. It even serves as a medium for patriotic representations of Russian history, such as *Nord-Ost*, the show staged in Moscow whose performers and audience were taken hostage by Chechen terrorists in 2002.

Outside Russia, Russian history has rarely served as the subject matter for opera. The earliest example is Johann Mattheson’s *Boris Goudenow* (*sic*, Hamburg 1710), while the best-known is Albert Lortzing’s *Tsar and Carpenter* (Leipzig 1837). Lortzing’s comic opera exploits the sojourn of Peter I in the Netherlands disguised as a carpenter’s appren-

tice. Because of its depiction of a tsar from the Romanov dynasty, it did not reach the Russian stage until 1908.

See also: GLINKA, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH; MIGHTY HANDFUL; MUSIC; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS; RIMSKY-KORSAKOV, NIKOLAI ANDREYEVICH; TCHAIKOVSKY, PETER ILYICH; THEATER

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ALBRECHT GAUB

OPERATION BARBAROSSA

“Operation Barbarossa” was the name given by the Germans to their invasion of the Soviet Union, starting June 22, 1941. The operation was named after the medieval Holy Roman emperor Frederick Barbarossa, whom legend claimed would return to restore Germany’s greatness.

In the last half of 1941 Germany and its allies conquered the Baltic states, Belarus, almost all of Ukraine, and western Russia. They surrounded Leningrad and advanced to the gates of Moscow. The Red Army lost millions of soldiers and thousands of tanks and aircraft as it reeled back from the German onslaught. Nevertheless the Soviet government was able to evacuate entire factories from threatened areas to Siberia and Central Asia. It was able to raise and arm new armies to face the Ger-

mans and finally halt their advance. Helped by Germany’s ruthless policy in conquered Slavic areas, the Soviet government was able to rally the population against the invader. By December 1941 the Red Army was able to mount a successful counteroffensive against the overextended Germans.

The initial German attack in 1941 involved three million troops and three thousand tanks but nevertheless achieved strategic surprise, catching the Soviet air force on the ground and most troops far from their operational areas. In spite of the unmistakable signs of a military build-up along the border, German reconnaissance flights over the western Soviet Union, and warnings from sources as diverse as communist spies and the British government, the Soviet government refused to mobilize for war. It preferred to avoid any action that might spark an accidental conflict, and this inaction proved disastrous once the war began.

In the first months of the war German armored spearheads sliced through the unprepared, disorganized Red Army, encircling entire armies near Minsk, Kiev, and Viazma. The German success came at a great price, though. Casualties mounted, and supply lines became more tenuous as they lengthened. Soviet resistance stiffened as the Red Army deployed new tanks (T-34 and KV-1) and artillery (Katyusha rockets) that were technically much better than their German counterparts. Soviet reinforcements also poured in from the Far East after the Soviet spy Richard Sorge reported that Japan planned to move south against the United States and Great Britain rather than attack Siberia. A final factor in the USSR’s survival was the weather. Optimistic German planners expected to complete the conquest of Russia before the onset of the autumn rains. The delay in the start of the invasion due to the Balkans campaign, the unknown depth of the Red Army’s reserves, and its unexpectedly strong resistance meant that the German army faced winter in the field without suitable clothing or equipment.

It also faced a Soviet population mobilized for resistance. Soviet propaganda publicized German atrocities against the civil population and lauded the suicidal bravery of pilots who crashed their planes into German bombers and of foot soldiers who died blowing up enemy tanks. Restrictions against the Orthodox Church were loosened, and church leaders joined party leaders in defiantly calling for a Holy War (the name of a popular song) against the foe. While the Soviet Union suffered enormous damage in 1941, it was not defeated.

See also: GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; SORGE, RICHARD; WORLD WAR II

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A. DELANO DUGARM

OPRICHNINA

Tsar Ivan IV's personal domain between 1565 and 1572, and by extension the domestic policy of that period.

The term *oprichnina* (from *oprich*, "separate") denoted a part of something, usually specific landholdings of a prince or a prince's widow. Ivan IV (the Terrible, or Grozny) established his Oprichnina after he unexpectedly left Moscow in December 1564. He settled at Alexandrovskaya sloboda, a hunting lodge northeast of Moscow, which became the Oprichnina's capital. Ivan IV accused his old court of treason and demanded the right to punish his enemies. He divided the territory of his realm, his court, and the administration into two: the Oprichnina under the tsar's personal control; and the *Zemshchina* (from *zemlya*, "land"), officially under the rule of those boyars who stayed in Moscow.

The servitors were divided between the *Zemshchina* and the Oprichnina courts on the basis of personal loyalty to the tsar, but the courts were largely drawn from the same elite clans. The Oprichnina court was headed by Alexei and Fyodor Basmanov-Pleshcheev, Prince Afanasy Vyazemsky, and the Caucasian Prince Mikhail Cherkassky, brother-in-law of Ivan IV. They were succeeded in around 1570 by the high-ranking cavalrymen Malyuta Skuratov-Belsky and Vasily Gryaznoy. The Oprichnina army initially consisted of one thousand men; later its numbers increased five- to sixfold. Most of them came from the central part of the country, although there were also many non-Muscovites (Western mercenaries, Tatar and Caucasian servitors) in the Oprichnina. Both the leading Muscovite merchants (the Stroganovs) and the English Muscovy Company also sought admission to the Oprichnina.

To maintain the Oprichnina army, the tsar included in his domain prosperous peasant and urban communities in the north, household lands in various parts of the country (mostly in its central districts), mid-sized and small districts with numerous conditional landholdings, and some quarters of Moscow. The northern lands produced revenues and marketable commodities (furs, salt), the household lands provided the Oprichnina with various supplies, and the regions with conditional landholdings supplied servitors for the Oprichnina army. The territory of the Oprichnina was never stable, and eventually included sections of Novgorod. The authorities deported non-Oprichnina servitors from the Oprichnina lands and granted their estates to the *oprichniki* (members of the Oprichnina), but the extent of these forced resettlements remains unclear.

The Oprichnina affected various local communities in different ways. The *Zemshchina* territories bore the heavy financial burden of funding the organization and actions of the Oprichnina; some *Zemshchina* communities were pillaged and devastated. In early 1570, the tsar and his oprichniki sacked Novgorod, where they slaughtered from three thousand to fifteen thousand people. At the same time, the lower-ranking inhabitants of Moscow escaped Ivan's disgrace and forced resettlements. For taxpayers in the remote north, the establishment of the Oprichnina mostly meant a change of payee.

The tsar sought to maintain a close relationship with the clergy by expanding the tax privileges of important dioceses and monasteries and including some of them in the Oprichnina. In exchange, he demanded that the metropolitan not intervene in the Oprichnina and abolished the metropolitan's traditional right to intercede on behalf of the disgraced. The Oprichnina's victims included Metropolitan Philip Kolychev, who openly criticized the Oprichnina (deposed 1568, killed 1569) and Archbishop Pimen of Novgorod, the tsar's former close ally (deposed and exiled 1570).

The Oprichnina policy was a peculiar combination of bloody terror and acts of public reconciliation. The social background of its victims ranged from members of the royal family and prominent courtiers, including some leaders of the Oprichnina court, to rank-and-file servitors, townsmen, and clergy. Indictments and repressions, however, were often followed by amnesties. The mass exile of around 180 princes and cavalrymen to Kazan and the confiscation of their lands (1565) were counterbalanced when they were pardoned and their

property partially restored. As a gesture of spiritual reconciliation with the executed, the tsar ordered memorial services in monasteries for more than three thousand victims. The Oprichnina involved the ritualization of executions and peculiar symbolism that alluded to the tsar and his *oprichniki* as punitive instruments of divine wrath. The *oprichniki* dressed in black, acted like a pseudo-monastic order, and carried dog's heads and brooms to show they were the "dogs" of the tsar who would sweep treason from the land.

The tsar abolished the Oprichnina in 1572 after its troops proved ineffective during a raid of Tatars on Moscow. Together with the Livonian War, famines, and epidemics, the Oprichnina led to the country's economic decline. During the Oprichnina, Ivan IV thought to strengthen his personal security by taking to extremes such Muscovite political traditions as disgraces, persecution of suspects, and forced resettlements. The Oprichnina revealed the vulnerability of the social and legal mechanisms for personal protection when confronted by authorities exceeding the political system's normal level of violence. Transgressions and sudden changes in policy contributed to the image of the tsar as an autocratic ruler accountable only to God. The court system, however, survived the turmoil of the Oprichnina. Despite the division of the realm and purges, members of established clans maintained their positions in the court hierarchy and participated in running the polity throughout the period of the Oprichnina.

Some historians believe that the main force behind the Oprichnina was Ivan IV's personality, including a possible mental disorder. Such interpretations prevailed in the Romantic historical writings of Nikolai Karamzin (early nineteenth century) and in the works of Vasily Klyuchevsky, foremost Russian historian of the early twentieth century. The American historians Richard Hellie and Robert Crummey offered psychoanalytical explanations for the Oprichnina, surmising that Ivan IV suffered from paranoia. Priscilla Hunt and Andrei Yurganov saw the Oprichnina as an actualization of the cultural myth of the divine nature of the tsar's power and eschatological expectations in Muscovy. According to other historians, the Oprichnina was a conscious struggle among certain social groups. In his classic nineteenth-century Hegelian history of Russia, Sergei Solovyov interpreted the Oprichnina as a political conflict between the tsar acting in the name of the state and the boyars, who guarded their hereditary privileges. In

the late nineteenth century, Sergei Platonov took those views further by arguing that the Oprichnina promoted service people of lower origin and eliminated the hereditary landowning of the aristocracy. In the mid-twentieth century, Platonov's conception was questioned by Stepan Veselovsky and Vladimir Kobrin, who reexamined the genealogical background of the Oprichnina court and the redistribution of land during the Oprichnina. According to Alexander Zimin, the Oprichnina was aimed at the main separatist forces in Muscovy: the church, the appanage princes, and Novgorod. Ruslan Skrynnikov accepted a modified multi-phase version of Platonov's views.

See also: AUTOCRACY; IVAN IV

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SERGEI BOGATYREV

ORDIN-NASHCHOKIN, AFANASY LAVRENTIEVICH

(c. 1605–1680), military officer, governor, diplomat, boyar.

Afanasy Lavrentievich Ordin-Nashchokin was born to a gentry family near Pskov in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, probably around 1605. He received an unusually good education for a Russian of the time, learning mathematics and several languages, and entered military service at fifteen. Exposed at a young age to foreign customs, he put his insights and ideas to good use throughout his life. In 1642 he helped settle a border dispute with Sweden, honing his talents for careful

preparation, thorough investigation, and skillful negotiation. Next he led a mission to Moldavia, gaining experience and valuable information on the Poles, Turks, Cossacks, and Crimeans who populated the tsar's southern borders. For most of the 1650s he served as a military officer and governor of several regions in western Russia. While working to draw the local population to Moscow's side and achieving diplomatic agreements with Courland and Brandenburg, he also pondered ways to improve Russia's military, economic, and political standing. In 1658 he was able to achieve some of his greater goals in negotiating the three-year Valtiesar truce with Sweden, gaining Russia peace, free trade, Baltic access, and all the territories it had conquered in the region. For this coup Ordin-Nashchokin received the rank of *dummy dvoryanin* (consiliar noble).

In 1660 his son Voin, likewise educated in foreign languages and customs, fled to Western Europe. A grieving and humiliated Ordin-Nashchokin requested retirement, but the tsar was reluctant to lose his able statesman and refused to hold the father accountable for his son's actions. Ordin-Nashchokin continued to negotiate for peace with Poland and to govern Pskov, becoming *okolnichy* (a high court rank) in 1665.

The peak of his career came in 1667 when he signed the Andrusovo treaty, ending a long war with Poland and establishing guidelines for a productive peace. For this achievement he was made boyar (the highest Muscovite court rank) and head of the Department of Foreign Affairs (Posolsky Prikaz). The same year he dispatched envoys to nearly a dozen countries to announce the peace and offer diplomatic and commercial ties with Russia. He also drew up the New Commercial Statute, aimed at stimulating and centralizing trade and industry and protecting Russian merchants. Over the next four years as head of Russia's government he enacted administrative reforms; supervised the construction of ships; established regular postal routes between Moscow, Vilna, and Riga; expanded Russia's diplomatic representation abroad; and began the compilation of translated foreign newspapers (*kuranty*). The number and character of his innovations have sometimes led to his description as a precursor of Peter the Great.

By 1671, however, his day was passing. Always outspoken and demanding, he began to irritate the tsar with his contentiousness. Worse, his views of international politics—he perceived Poland as Russia's natural ally, Sweden as its natural foe—

no longer fit Moscow's immediate interests. Artamon Matveyev, the more flexible new favorite, was ready to step in. In 1672 Ordin-Nashchokin retired to a monastery near Pskov to be tonsured under the name Antony. In 1679 he briefly returned to service to negotiate with Poland, but soon retreated to his monastery and died the next year.

See also: ANDRUSOVO, PEACE OF; BOYAR; MATVEYEV, ARTAMON SERGEYEVICH; OKOLNICHY; TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667

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MARTHA LUBY LAHANA

ORDZHONIKIDZE, GRIGORY KONSTANTINOVICH

(1886–1937), leading Bolshevik who participated in bringing Ukraine and the Caucasus under Soviet rule and directed industry during the early five-year plans.

Grigory Konstantinovich ("Sergo") Ordzhonikidze was born in Goresha, Georgia, to an impoverished gentry family. In 1903, while training as a medical assistant, he joined the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and in 1906 met Josef Stalin, with whom he formed a close, lifelong association. After a time in prison and exile, Ordzhonikidze traveled to Paris where in 1911 he met Vladimir Lenin and studied in the party school. In January the following year, Ordzhonikidze became a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee and organizer of its Russian Bureau. Returning to Russia, he was again arrested in April 1912 and spent the next five years in prison and then Siberian exile. During 1917 Ordzhonikidze was a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. After the Bolshevik takeover, he participated in the civil war in Ukraine and southern Russia and played a leading role in extending Soviet power over Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Geor-

gia. A close ally of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze was promoted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1921. He remained in charge of the Transcaucasian regional Party organization until 1926, when he became a Politburo candidate member, chairman of the Party's Central Control Commission and commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin). During the First Five-Year Plan, Ordzhonikidze organized the drive for mass industrialization. In 1930 he was promoted to full Politburo membership and in 1932 was appointed commissar for heavy industry. During the mid-1930s, Ordzhonikidze sought to use his proximity to Stalin to temper the Soviet leader's increasing use of repression against party and economic officials. Although Ordzhonikidze's sudden death in early 1937 was officially attributed to a heart attack, it is more likely that, in an act of desperate protest at the impending terror, he committed suicide.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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NICK BARON

ORGANIZED CRIME

The term *Russian mafia* is widely used, but Russian-speaking organized crime is not all Russian, nor is it organized in the same ways as the Italian mafia. Russian-speaking organized crime emerged in the former Soviet Union, and during the decade after the collapse it became a major force in transnational crime.

Because Russia's immense territorial mass spans Europe and Asia, it is easy for organized crime groups to have contacts both with European and Asian crime groups. Russia's crime groups have a truly international reach and operate in North and South America as well as in Africa. Thus they have been among the major beneficiaries of globalization. Russia's technologically advanced economy has given Russian organized crime a technological edge in a world dominated by high tech-

nology. Moreover, the collapse of the social control system and the state control apparatus have made it possible for major criminals to operate with impunity both at home and internationally.

During the 1990s, Russian law enforcement declared that the number of organized crime groups was escalating. Between 1990 and 1996, it rose from 785 to more than 8,000, and membership was variously estimated at from 100,000 to as high as three million. These identified crime groups were mostly small, amorphous, impermanent organizations that engaged in extortion, drug dealing, bank fraud, arms trafficking, and armed banditry. The most serious forms of organized crime were often committed by individuals who were not identified with specific crime groups but engaged in the large-scale organized theft of state resources through the privatization of valuable state assets to themselves. Hundreds of billions of Russian assets were sent abroad in the first post-Soviet decade; a significant share of this capital flight was money laundering connected with large-scale post-Soviet organized crime involving people who were not traditional underworld figures. In this respect, organized crime in Russia differs significantly from the Italian mafia or the Japanese Yakuza—it is an amalgam of former Communist Party and Komsomol officials, active and demobilized military personnel, law enforcement and security structures, participants in the Soviet second economy, and criminals of the traditional kind. Chechen and other ethnic crime groups are highly visible, but most organized crime involves a broad range of actors working together to promote their financial interests by using violence or threats of violence.

In most of the world, organized crime is primarily associated with the illicit sectors of the economy. Although post-Soviet organized crime groups have moved into the drug trade, especially since the fall of the Taliban, the vast wealth of Russian organized crime derives from its involvement in the legitimate economy, including important sectors like banking, real estate, transport, shipping, and heavy industry, especially aluminum production. Involvement in the legitimate economy does not mean that the crime groups have been legitimized, for they continue to operate with illegitimate tactics even in the legitimate economy. For example, organized criminals are known to intimidate minority shareholders of companies in which they own large blocks of shares and to use violence against business competitors.



Russian anti-Mafia investigators perform a routine ID check at a Moscow market. © PETER BLAKELY/CORBIS SABA

Crime groups also engage in automobile, drug, and arms smuggling. The involvement of former military personnel has given particular significance to sales of military technology to foreign crime groups. Weapons obtained from Russian crime groups have been used in armed conflicts in many parts of the world, including Africa and the Balkans. Foreign crime groups, especially in Asia, see Russia as a new source of supply for weapons.

There is, in addition, a significant trade in stolen automobiles between Western Europe and the European parts of Russia. From Irkutsk west to Vladivostok, the cars on the road are predominantly Japanese, some of them stolen from their owners.

Tens of thousands of women have been trafficked abroad, often sold to foreign crime groups that in turn traffic them to more distant locales. Women are trafficked from all over Russia by small-scale criminal businesses and much larger entrepreneurs via an elaborate system of recruitment, transport facilitators, and protectors of the

trafficking networks. Despite prevention campaigns, human trafficking is a significant revenue source for Russian organized crime.

Russia's vast natural resources are much exploited by crime groups. Many of the commodities handled by criminals are not traded in the legitimate economy. These include endangered species, timber not authorized for harvest, and radioactive minerals subject to international regulation.

Despite the government's repeated pledges to fight organized crime, the leaders of the criminal organizations and the government officials who facilitate their activities operate with almost total impunity. Pervasive corruption in the criminal justice system has impeded the prosecution of Russian organized criminals both domestically and internationally. Thus organized crime will continue to be a serious problem for the Russian state and the international community.

See also: MAFIA CAPITALISM; PRIVATIZATION

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ORGBURO

The organizational bureau (or Orgburo) was one of the most important organs in the CPSU after the Politburo. The Orgburo was created in 1919 and had the power to make key decisions about the organizational work of the Party. The key role of the Orgburo was to make all the important decisions of an administrative and personnel nature by supervising the work of local Party committees and organizations and overseeing personnel appointments. For instance, the Orgburo had the power to select and allocate Party cadres. The Orgburo was elected at plenary meetings of the Central Committee. There was a great degree of overlap between the Politburo and the Orgburo with many key Party figures being members of both organs. In its early days Josef V. Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich were all Orgburo members. The Politburo often confirmed Orgburo decisions, but it also had the power to veto or rescind them. Nevertheless, the Orgburo was extremely powerful in the 1920s and retained significant scope for autonomous action until its functions, responsibilities, and powers were transferred to the Secretariat in 1952.

Since the declassification of Soviet archives, scholars can now access the protocols of the Communist Party's Orgburo, the transcripts of many of its meetings, and all of the preparatory documentation. The latter are crucial insofar as they give scholars insight into Party life from the New Economic Policy period until the end of the Stalin era.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; POLITBURO

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ORGNABOR *See* ADMINISTRATION FOR ORGANIZED RECRUITMENT.

ORLOVA, LYUBOV PETROVNA

(1902–1975), film actress.

The most beloved movie actress of the 1930s, Lyubov Petrovna Orlova trained as a singer and dancer in Moscow. She began her career in musical theater in 1926 and made her film debut in 1934. Although she worked with other Soviet directors, Orlova's personal and professional partnership with Grigory Alexandrov led to her greatest successes on screen. As the star of Alexandrov's four wildly successful musical comedies—*The Jolly Fellows* (1934), *The Circus* (1936), *Volga-Volga* (1938), and *The Shining Path* (1940)—Orlova became a household name in the USSR.

Although in her early thirties when she began her movie career, Orlova nonetheless specialized in ingenue parts. She was the role model for a generation of Soviet women. They admired her wholesome good looks, her energy, her cheeriness, her zest for life, and her spunkiness in the face of adversity. She was also said to be Stalin's favorite actress, not surprising given his love for movie musicals. Interestingly, given Orlova's importance as the cinematic exemplar of Soviet womanhood, she also played Americans several times in her career. The most famous example was her portrayal in *The Circus* of Marion Dixon, the entertainer who fled the United States with her mixed-race child, but also worth noting is her role as "Janet Sherwood" in Alexandrov's *Meeting on the Elba* (1949).

In 1950 Orlova was honored as a People's Artist of the USSR, her nation's top prize for artistic achievement, but she acted in only a few pictures after that, and died in 1975. In 1983 Orlova's husband, Grigory Alexandrov, produced a documentary about her life entitled *Liubov Orlova*.

See also: ALEXANDROV, GRIGORY ALEXANDROVICH; MOTION PICTURES

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ORLOV, GRIGORY GRIGORIEVICH

(1734–1783), count, prince of the Holy Roman Empire, soldier, statesman, imperial favorite.

Second eldest of five brothers born to a Petrine officer and official, Grigory Orlov had looks, size, and strength. His early years are little known before he won distinction at the battle of Zorndorf in 1758, where he fought the Prussians despite three wounds. He accompanied Count Schwerin and captured Prussian adjutant to St. Petersburg, where both met the "Young Court" of Grand Princess Catherine and Crown Prince Peter Fyodorovich. In the capital Orlov gained repute by an affair with the beautiful mistress of Count Pyotr Shuvalov. By 1760 intimacy with Catherine facilitated promotion to captain of the Izmailovsky Guards and paymaster of the artillery, crucial posts in Catherine's coup of July 11, 1762. Two months earlier she had secretly delivered their son, Alexei Grigorievich Borinskoi (1762–1813).

The Orlov brothers were liberally rewarded by the new regime. All became counts of the Russian Empire. Grigory became major general, chamberlain, and adjutant general with the Order of Alexander Nevsky, a sword with diamonds, and oversight of the coronation. He figured prominently in the reign as master of ordnance, director general of engineers, chief of cavalry forces, and president of the Office of Trusteeship for Foreign Colonists. Such political connections with Catherine did not bring marriage, however, because of opposition at court and her reluctance. He patronized many individuals and institutions, such as the scientist polymath Lomonosov, the Imperial Free Economic Society,

the Legislative Commission of 1767–1768, and projects to reform serfdom. He publicly (and unsuccessfully) invited Jean-Jacques Rousseau to take refuge in Russia. He sat on the new seven-member imperial council established in 1768 to coordinate foreign and military policy in the Russo-Turkish war, where he favored a forward policy, volunteering his brother Alexei to command the Baltic fleet in Mediterranean operations.

This conflict spawned an incursion of bubonic plague culminating in the collapse of Moscow amid riots in late September 1771. Orlov volunteered to head relief efforts, restored order, reinforced antiplague efforts, and punished the rioters. Projecting composure in public, Orlov privately doubted success until freezing weather finally arrived. He was triumphantly received by Catherine at Tsarskoye Selo in mid-December with a gold medal and a triumphal arch hailing his bravery.

In 1772 Orlov headed the Russian delegation to negotiate with the Turks at Focsani, but he broke off the talks when his terms were rejected and, learning of his replacement in Catherine's favor, rushed back to Russia only to be barred from court. From his Gatchina estate he negotiated a settlement: a pension of 150,000 rubles, 100,000 for a house, 10,000 serfs, and the title of prince of the Holy Roman Empire. He kept away from court until May 1773, maintaining cordial relations with Catherine, on whom he bestowed an enormous diamond that she placed in the imperial scepter (and actually paid for). He supported her amid the crisis of Paul's majority and the Pugachev Revolt. With Potemkin's emergence as favorite in early 1774, however, Orlov and Catherine had a stormy falling out; he withdrew from public life and traveled abroad.

Upon return to Russia Orlov married his young cousin, Ekaterina Nikolayevna Zinovieva (1758–1781), whom the empress appointed lady-in-waiting and awarded the Order of Saint Catherine. She died of consumption in Lausanne, hastening Orlov's slide into insanity before death. Orlov's career advertised the rewards of imperial favor and consolidated the family's aristocratic eminence.

See also: CATHERINE II; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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JOHN T. ALEXANDER

ORTHODOXY

Orthodoxy has been an integral part of Russian civilization from the tenth century to the present.

The word *Orthodox* means right belief, right practice, or right worship. Also referred to as Russian Orthodoxy or Eastern Orthodoxy, all three terms are synonymous in Orthodox self-understanding. Orthodoxy uses the vernacular language of its adherents, but its beliefs and liturgy are independent of the language used. The Russian Church is Eastern Orthodox because it maintains sacramental ties (intercommunion) with the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. This differentiates it from Oriental Orthodox groups such as the Nestorians, Monophysites, and Jacobites who broke with Byzantium over doctrinal and cultural differences between the fifth and eighth centuries. The distinctive characteristics of Orthodoxy in comparison with other expressions of Christianity explain some unique features of Russian historical development.

THEOLOGY

Orthodox theology is generally characterized by a strong emphasis on incarnation. It upholds Christian dogma related to the life, teachings, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, as expressed through Christian tradition shaped by the Bible (both Old and New Testaments), the earliest teachings of the Christian leaders in the second to fourth centuries (the Church Fathers), and the decisions of seven ecumenical or all-church councils held between the fourth and eighth centuries. God is understood to be creator of the universe and a single being who finds expression in the Trinity or three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Although the essence of God is unknowable to human beings, they can gain knowledge of God through nature,

the revelation of Christ, and Christian tradition. God is described as eternal, perfectly good, omniscient, perfectly righteous, almighty, and omnipresent.

Human beings are described as possessing both body and soul and having been originally made in the image and likeness of God. The image of God remains, although the divine likeness is seen as corrupted by original sin, a spiritual disease inherited from Adam and Eve, the first humans. Thus, Orthodox doctrine does not support the idea of total human depravity as defined by the fourth-century western theologian St. Augustine of Hippo. The goal of human existence in Orthodox theology is deification, often described using the Greek term *theosis*. Humans are understood to be striving for the restoration of the divine likeness, becoming fully human and divine following the example of Christ.

Incarnational theology is expressed in popular practice as well as in dogma. Holy images or icons express incarnation through religious paintings that provide a window into the redeemed creation. The subjects of icons are God, Jesus, biblical scenes, the lives of saints, and the Virgin Mary, who is referred to as *Theotokos* (God bearer). Icons are holy objects that are always venerated for the images they represent. Some icons also are believed to have divine power to protect or heal. Miracle-working icons are sites of divine immanence, where the energies of God are physically accessible to the Orthodox believer. Immanence is also seen in holy relics, graves, and even natural objects such as rocks, fountains, lakes, and streams.

LITURGY AND WORSHIP

The Orthodox faith is expressed through the *Divine Liturgy*—a term synonymous with Eucharist, Mass, or Holy Communion in Western Christianity—and other services. All Orthodox services center around the prayers of the faithful; for Orthodox believers, worship is communal prayer. Monasticism had a particularly strong influence on the Russian liturgical tradition. From the sixteenth century, worship in parish churches imitated the long, complex forms found in monasteries. The structure of the Orthodox liturgy has unbroken continuity with the earliest forms of Christian worship and has remained basically unchanged since the ninth century, just before the conversion of Russia. Russian as a written language traces its origins to the work of two brothers, Cyril and Methodius, who were missionaries to the Slavs in the ninth century. The Russian Orthodox Church has maintained the lan-

guage and forms of worship that it received from Byzantium during the tenth century, including the use of Old Church Slavic as a liturgical language. As a result, the Russian Orthodox liturgy sounds archaic and at times even incomprehensible to modern Russians.

Orthodox worship includes the seven sacraments defined by the Roman Catholic Church (baptism, chrismation, Eucharist, repentance, ordination, marriage, and anointing of the sick). Orthodox theologians frequently note, however, that their church's sacramental life is not limited to those seven rites. Many other acts, such as monastic tonsure, are understood to have a sacramental quality. Baptism is the rite of initiation, performed on infants and adults by immersion. Chrismation, also known as confirmation in the West, involves being anointed with holy oil and signifies reception of the gift of the Holy Spirit. The Eucharist lacks any theological interpretation of transubstantiation or consubstantiation. Instead, the transformation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ is explained as a mystery beyond human understanding. Communicants receive both bread and wine, which are mixed together in the chalice and served to them by the priest on a spoon. Repentance involves confession of sin to a priest followed by an act of penance (in Russian, *epitimia*). Ordination is the sacrament for inducting men into clerical orders. The Orthodox ceremony of marriage is distinctive in its use of crowns placed on the heads of the bride and groom. Anointing of the sick, as known as unction, is not reserved for those who are dying but can be used for anyone who is suffering and seeks divine healing.

CLERGY

Orthodox believers are served by three types of clergy: bishops, priests, and deacons. All clergy are male and are differentiated by the color of their liturgical vestments, which are in turn related to their form of ecclesiastical service. Married priests and deacons who serve in parishes are called the white clergy (*beloye dukhovenstvo*), while those who take monastic vows are known as the black clergy (*chernoye dukhovenstvo*). Men who wish to marry must do so before being ordained. They cannot remarry, either before or after ordination, and their wives cannot have been married previously.

Marital status decides clergy rank. Married clergymen can be either priests or deacons who are ordained by a single bishop and can serve in either monasteries or parish churches. Priests assist bish-

ops by administering the sacraments and leading liturgical services in places assigned by their bishop. Deacons serve priests in those services. As long as his wife is alive, a member of the white clergy cannot rise to the episcopacy. Should his wife die, he must take monastic vows and, with very rare exceptions, enter a monastery. Bishops are chosen exclusively from the monastic clergy and must be celibate (either never married or widowed). A new bishop is consecrated when two or three bishops lay hands upon him. He then becomes part of the apostolic succession, which is the unbroken line of episcopal ordinations that began with the apostles chosen by Jesus. Bishops can rise in the hierarchy to archbishop, metropolitan, and patriarch, but every bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church is understood to be equal to every other bishop regardless of title.

HISTORY

The rise of Kiev in the ninth century as the center of Eastern Slavic civilization was accompanied by political centralization that promoted the adoption of Orthodox Christianity. The process of Christianization began with the conversion of individual members of the nobility, most notably Princess Olga, the widow of Grand Prince Igor of Kiev. Her grandson, Prince Vladimir, officially adopted Orthodoxy in 988 and enforced mass baptisms into the new faith. Vladimir's motives for this decision to abandon the animistic faith of his ancestors remain unclear. He was probably influenced both by a desire to strengthen ties with Byzantium and by a need to unify his territory under a common religious culture. The story of Vladimir's purposefully choosing Orthodox Christianity over other faiths—a story that is difficult to substantiate despite its inclusion in the Russian Primary Chronicle—plays an important role in Russian Orthodoxy's sense of divine election. Christianity spread steadily throughout the Russian lands from the tenth to thirteenth centuries, aided by state support and clergy imported from Byzantium. Close cooperation between political and ecclesiastical structures thus formed an integral part of the foundations of a unified Russian civilization. Slavic animistic traditions merged with Orthodox Christianity to form *dvoyeverie* ("dual faith") that served as the basis for popular religion in Russia.

The years of Tatar rule (the Mongol Yoke, 1240–1480) gave an unexpected boost to the spread of Orthodox Christianity among the Russian peoples. The collapse of the political structure that ac-

accompanied the fall of Kiev forced the church to become guardian of both spiritual and national values. Church leaders accepted the dual task of converting the populace in the countryside, where Orthodoxy had only slowly spread, and promoting a new political order that would avoid the internecine political squabbles among princes that had led to the Mongol defeat of Russia. The church accomplished its political goals by backing leaders such as Prince Alexander Nevsky for his defense of Russia against western invaders (he was canonized for his efforts). Conversion of the masses took place largely through the efforts of monastic communities that spread throughout Russia during the period of Mongol domination. Hesychastic or quietist spirituality based on meditative repetition of the Jesus Prayer fed the proliferation of monasteries under the influence of St. Sergius of Radonezh (1314–1392), founder of the Holy Trinity Monastery outside Moscow. Monastic leaders gained significant political influence, as evidenced by St. Sergius's blessing of Prince Dmitry Donskoy as he marched his army to victory over the Mongols at Kulikovo Pole in 1380.

Moscow emerged as the true political and religious center of Russia by the middle of the fifteenth century. The senior bishop of Russia acknowledged his support for the Muscovite princes and their drive to reunify the Russian state by moving to Moscow in 1326. The Russian Orthodox hierarchy declared independence from Byzantium after the Council of Florence–Ferrara (1439–1443) where Constantinople tried in vain to solicit western military aid in return for acceptance of Roman Catholic policies and dogma. Church leaders promoted a messianic vision for Muscovite Russia after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Having broken Mongol domination, Muscovy understood its role as the only independent Orthodox state to mean that it must defend the true faith. The description of Moscow as “the Third Rome” captured this messianic mission when it came into use at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Russian political power grew increasingly independent from Orthodoxy in the Muscovite state, however, and church leaders struggled with the consequences. During the early 1500s, a national church council sided with abbots who argued for the rights of their monasteries to accumulate wealth (“possessors”) and against monastic leaders who advocated strict poverty for monks (“non-possessors”). The possessor position promised greater political influence for the church. Tensions

between secular and ecclesiastical power increased under Tsar Ivan IV (“the Terrible,” 1530–1584), although the Stoglav Council held in 1551 issued strict rules for everyday Orthodox life. The struggle for succession to the throne following Ivan's death also brought religious instability by the end of the century. Success in elevating the Moscow metropolitan to the rank of patriarch in 1589 added to the church's influence in defending Russia from foreign invaders and internal chaos during the Time of Troubles (1598–1613). Rivalry developed between secular and ecclesiastical powers by the middle of the seventeenth century when Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich disagreed with the prerogatives claimed by Patriarch Nikon. Nikon's position was undermined by the Old Believer schism (*raskol*) that resulted from his attempts to reform Russian Orthodoxy following contemporary Greek practice. Nikon was exiled and eventually deposed on orders from the tsar, who with other Russian nobles of the time became fascinated with Western lifestyles and religion. Limitations on the power of institutional Orthodoxy increased through the second half of the seventeenth century.

Orthodoxy in the imperial period (1703–1917) was heavily regulated by the state. The authoritarian, Westernized system of government implemented by Peter I (“the Great”) and his successors meant that secular Russian society lived side-by-side with traditional Orthodox culture. The Moscow patriarchate was replaced with a Holy Synod in 1721. Church authority was limited to matters of family and morality, although the church itself was never made subservient to the state bureaucracy. Western ideas had a striking influence on the clergy, who became a closed caste within Russian society due to new requirements for education. Church schools and seminaries were only open to the sons of clergy, and these in turn tended to marry the daughters of clergy. The curriculum for educating clergy drew heavily on Catholic and Protestant models, and clergy often found themselves at odds with both parishioners and state authorities. Monastic power declined due to government-imposed limitations on the numbers of monks at each monastery and the secularization of most church lands in 1763. Monastic influence recovered in the nineteenth century with the emergence of saints embraced by Russian believers who saw them as models for piety and social involvement. An intellectual revival in Orthodoxy took place at this time, when writers including Alexei Khomyakov, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Vladimir Soloviev sought to combine Orthodox traditions

and Western culture. Various leaders in church and state also embraced pan-Slavism with an eye toward Russian leadership of the whole Orthodox world.

Twentieth-century developments shook Russian Orthodoxy to its core. The revolutions of 1905 and 1917 weakened and then destroyed the governing structures upon which the institutional church depended. The emergence of a radically atheistic government under Lenin and the Bolsheviks promised to undermine popular Orthodoxy. Nationalization of all church property was quickly followed by the separation of church from state and religion from public education. Orthodox responses included the restoration of the Moscow patriarchate by the national church council (*sobor*) of 1917–1918 as well as an attempt by some parish priests to combine Orthodoxy and Bolshevism in a new Renovatianist or Living Church. In reality, the institutional church was unable to find any defense against the ideologically motivated repression of religion during the first quarter century of the Soviet regime. Neither confrontation nor accommodation proved effective within emerging Soviet Russian culture that emphasized the creation of a new, scientific, atheistic worldview. The Stalin Revolution of the 1930s accompanied by the Great Terror led to mass closures of churches and arrests of clergy.

Orthodoxy remained embedded in Russian culture, however, as seen by its revival during the crisis that accompanied Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Soviet policy toward the Russian Orthodox Church softened for nearly two decades during and after World War II, tightened again during Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign (1959–1964), and then loosened to a limited extent under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982). Mikhail Gorbachev turned to the church for help in the moral regeneration of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. This started a process of reopening Orthodox churches, chapels, monasteries, and schools throughout the country. The collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated that process even as it opened Russia to a flood of religious movements from the rest of the world. Orthodoxy in post-communist Russia struggles to maintain its institutional independence while striving to establish a position as the primary religious confession of the Russian state and the majority of its population. It faces the dilemma of accepting or rejecting various aspects of modern, secular culture in light of Orthodox tradition.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; DVOEVERIE; HAGIOGRAPHY; METROPOLITAN; MONASTICISM; PATRIARCHATE; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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EDWARD E. ROSLOF

ORUZHEINAYA PALATA *See* ARMORY.

OSETINS

The Osetins are an Iranian nationality of the central Caucasus. They speak a language from the Eastern Iranian group of the Indo-European language family. The three major ethnic and linguistic subdivisions of the Osetins are the Taullag, Iron, and Digor groups. The territories they inhabit straddle the primary land routes across the central Great Caucasus mountain range.

Their remote origins can be traced to Iranian-speaking warrior and pastoralist groups such as the Scythians and Alans. Byzantine, Armenian, and Georgian sources from the seventh through thirteenth centuries suggest that the Alans became a major power in the central Caucasus, and linguistic and ethnographic evidence links the modern Osetins to the Alans. In the tenth century the Alans often allied with the Byzantine Empire. Over the next two centuries Christian missionaries gained wide influence among the Alans. In the upper Kuban, Teberda, Urup, and Zelenchuk river valleys many churches and monasteries were constructed. By the twelfth century Kypchaks became the main power in the region, and the Alans were eclipsed by their Turkic neighbors. During the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century Alans took refuge high in the mountains and abandoned their centers in the territory of modern-day Karachaevo-Cherkessia. At some point before the mid-sixteenth century, the Osetins came under the domination of princes in Kabarda.

As Russian influence in the central Caucasus began to grow in the mid-eighteenth century, Osetin elders sought political alliances and trade ties with the imperial government. In 1774 negotiations between an Osetian delegation and the imperial government recognized the incorporation of Osetia into the Russian empire. In subsequent decades imperial authorities facilitated the relocation of loyal Osetins from the mountains to settlements and forts in the plains between Vladikavkaz and Mozdok. Beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century Russian Orthodox missionaries worked to revitalize Christianity among the Osetins, who had remained nominally Christian but practiced a combination of pagan and Christian rituals. The construction of military road networks through Osetia in the nineteenth century

facilitated the economic development of the central Caucasus and the extension of Russian rule to Georgia and Chechnya. During the Russian Revolution and civil war, both Red and White armies vied for control of Vladikavkaz, the main political and economic center of the region. A South Osetian autonomous region was established in 1922 within the Georgian Soviet Republic, and a North Osetian autonomous region was established in 1924 within the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Although their territories were occupied by German forces during the World War II, the Osetins were considered reliable by the Soviet regime and, with the exception of some Muslim Digors, they avoided deportation to Central Asia. During the Gorbachev period Osetins began to pressure for unification of the two autonomous republics into a single entity. In 1991 attempts by Georgian authorities to suppress local autonomy led to a war between Georgian and South Osetian militias. In 1992 conflicts also broke out in the suburbs of Vladikavkaz between Osetin and Ingush groups. While Northern Osetia became a republic of the Russian Federation and renamed itself Alania in the 1990s, the precise juridical status of Southern Osetia within Georgia remained unresolved.

Traditionally Osetins residing in the mountains subsisted on stock-raising, and Osetins inhabiting the plains pursued agriculture. In the late nineteenth century many Osetins began to migrate to cities in search of employment, and by the last decades of the twentieth century the majority of Osetins lived in urban areas. In the twentieth century the Osetin population grew from 250,000 to more than 600,000. An Osetin literary language based upon the Iron dialect was developed during the imperial period, and Osetins were one of the few groups in the North Caucasus to possess a standardized literary language and to have developed literature in their native tongue before the revolution.

See also: CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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BRIAN BOECK

OSORINA, YULIANYA USTINOVNA

(d. 1604), noblewoman, local saint of Murom.

Yulianya Osorina is known through the *Life [or Tale] of Yulianya Lazarevskaya*, a remarkable document of the seventeenth century. Written by the saint's son Druzhina Osorin in the 1620s or 1630s, it stands out among *vitae* (lives of saints) in that it is tied to precise historical time and events. Most striking is its subject: an ordinary laywoman, the only Russian saint who was not a martyr, ruler, or nun.

Yulianya was born into a family of the upper ranks of the service nobility. Her father, Ustin Nedyurev, was a cellarer of Ivan IV; her mother was Stefanida Lukina from Murom. Orphaned at the age of six, Yulianya was brought up by female relatives and proved to be a serious, obedient, and God-loving child. At the age of sixteen she was married to the wealthy servitor Georgy Osorin. The *Life* throws some light on the wide scope of duties expected of a noblewoman of that time. Osorina's parents-in-law passed on to her the supervision of all household affairs; in the frequent absence of her husband she ran the estate and managed family affairs: for instance, giving an adequate burial and commemoration to her mother- and father-in-law. The *Life* shows no trace of the alleged seclusion that has been usually postulated for Muscovite women of some status.

Yulianya began helping widows and orphans in her youth and continued the commitment after marriage. During her widowhood she intensified the charity work, giving away all but the most basic material necessities. Having donated all her belongings in the years of the terrible famine (1601–1603), she died in poverty on January 2, 1604.

The genre of the *Life* has been disputed widely. In 1871 Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky was the first to describe it as a secular biography. The Soviet scholar Mikhail Osipovich Skripil shared this view and chose for his 1948 edition the title *Tale of Ulianya Osorina*, abolishing traditional headings such as *Life of Yulianya Lazarevskaya*. On the other hand, Western scholars T. A. Greenan and Julia Alissandratos, as well as the Russian philologist T. R. Rudi, insist on the hagiographic character of the work. Different signs of saintliness can be found in the *Life*: For instance, when Yulianya died, "everyone saw around her head a golden circle just

like the one that is painted around the heads of saints on icons." When in 1615 her son was buried and her coffin opened, "they saw it was full of sweet-smelling myrrh," which turned out to be healing. According to Greenan, the *Life* is firmly rooted in Russian religious tradition, especially in the popular fourteenth-century collection *Izmaragd*, which emphasizes the possibility of salvation in the world, a central theme in the *Life*.

The *Life* was meant both to edify and to advance the cause of Yulianya. Though there is no indication of an official sanctification, she has been worshipped as a saint since the latter half of the seventeenth century in and around the village of Lazarevo, near Yulianya's burial site in Murom. She is commemorated on October 15 and January 2. Her relics are preserved in the Murom City Museum.

See also: HAGIOGRAPHY; RELIGION; SAINTS

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NADA BOSKOVSKA

OSTARBEITER PROGRAM *See* WORLD WAR II.

OSTROMIR GOSPEL

The Ostromil Gospel is an eleventh-century Gospel book, and the earliest dated Slavic manuscript.

According to its postscript, the Ostromir Gospel was copied by the scribe Gregory for the governor (*posadnik*) of Novgorod, Ostromir, in 1056 and 1057. The manuscript contains 294 folios, and each folio is divided into two columns. Gospels or evangeliaries were books of Gospel readings arranged for use in specific church services. In the Slavic tradition they were called *aprakos* Gospel, which derives from the Greek for "holy day." Because of their important function in the celebration of the liturgy, they were very frequently copied. There are two types of evangeliaries. Short evangeliaries contain readings for all days of the cycle from Palm Sunday until Pentecost and for Saturday and Sunday for the remainder of

the year. Full evangeliaries have Saturday and Sunday readings for Lent as well as for all days of the week for the rest of the year. The Ostromir Gospel is the oldest of the short evangeliaries. It is notable for its East Slavic dialect features, its remarkable miniatures depicting three of the Gospel writers, and its dignified uncial writing, which was often used in copying biblical texts. Some scholars have maintained that the Ostromir Gospel goes back to an East Bulgarian reworking of an earlier Macedonian Glagolitic text, while others deny a Glagolitic connection. The pioneering Russian philologist Alexander Vostokov produced an influential edition of the Ostromir Gospel in 1843 (reprint 1964). Facsimile editions were published in St. Petersburg/Leningrad in 1883 and 1988. First preserved in the St. Sophia cathedral in Novgorod and then in one of the Kremlin churches in Moscow, the Ostromir Gospel is now located in the Russian National Library in St. Petersburg (formerly the State Public Library).

See also: KIEVAN RUS; RELIGION

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DAVID K. PRESTEL

OSTROVSKY, ALEXANDER NIKOLAYEVICH

(1823–1886), playwright and advocate of dramatists' rights.

Alexander Nikolayevich Ostrovsky wrote and coauthored some fifty plays, translated foreign plays into Russian, and worked tirelessly to improve conditions for actors, dramatists, and composers. Half a dozen of his works form the core repertory for the popular theater movement, a series of initiatives to advance enlightenment and acculturation that steadily expanded theater production and attendance in Russia from the 1860s to World War I.

Young Ostrovsky studied languages, ancient and modern, with tutors and his stepmother, a Swedish baroness. While a student at Moscow University, he regularly attended performances at the Maly Theater. A civil service position, as clerk in the Commercial Court, acquainted him with the

subculture of the Russian merchantry in the "Over-the-River" district south of the Kremlin in the 1840s. Merchants then seemed exotic to educated Russians because, like the peasants, they had resisted Westernization, maintained the patriarchal family life and customs prevalent from the sixteenth century, and held a strictly formal attitude toward legality. Ostrovsky's first published work, revised as *It's a Family Affair—We'll Settle It Ourselves* (1849) brought him to the attention of the publisher of the journal *The Muscovite*, and he became its editor in 1850. In his "Slavophile period" Ostrovsky set out to explore with a circle of friends what was good and unique about Russians. They studied and sang folk songs and frequented taverns, especially at festival times, to savor the witty repartee between factory hands and performers.

Ostrovsky would go on to write historical plays that let him exploit the pithy Russian of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that predated the language's syntactical remodeling and massive borrowing of foreign words. In this way, and by focusing on cultural enclaves that had survived into the modern period, Ostrovsky mined the equivalent of an Elizabethan linguistic vein for dramatic purposes. A new regime in politics brought him an unparalleled opportunity to steep himself in the living residue of Old Russian. After the Crimean War, Alexander II's Naval Ministry commissioned professional writers to go to various river ports and describe the local people and manners. Ostrovsky, assigned a section of the Volga, traveled there in 1856 and 1857. He noted on index cards hundreds of unfamiliar words and expressions with examples of usage. As he traveled, he observed how the steamship and other innovations were undercutting ancient patterns of courtship and family organization and overturning assumptions about the world.

His best-known play, *The Storm* (1859), which drew on this experience, won the prestigious Uvarov prize for literature. It shows the old ways—at their harmonious best and despotic worst—compromised by a transportation revolution that was shrinking space and accelerating time, and urbanization that promoted civic life as a value while redefining public and private space. Commercial prosperity and a scientific outlook increasingly sanctioned individual autonomy and rights.

From the beginning, Ostrovsky wrote in a realist style, freely depicting the rude manners and behavior observable in actual life. For a time this caused censors to deny permission to perform his plays. But as cultural nationalism advanced, his



Playwright Alexander Ostrovsky.

portrayal of strengths set in relief by flaws and crudeness became irresistible. His true-to-life situations made his plays enormously accessible. He seemed to define "Russianness" by showing individuals confronting concrete social and ethical dilemmas as they moved beyond the traditional culture, where custom dictated behavior.

In 1881 he drafted a proposal for a Russian national theater, which appealed to Alexander III's Great Russian chauvinism by arguing that the existence of a Russian school of painting and Russian music gave reason to hope for a Russian school of dramatic art. He claimed that an already extant body of Russian plays demonstrated the ability to teach the "powerful but coarse peasant multitude that there is good in the Russian person, that one must look after and nurture it in oneself."

When Ostrovsky died at Shchelykova, his country estate located between the Volga towns of Kostroma and Kineshma, he was at his desk trans-

lating one of Shakespeare's plays into Russian. In the Soviet period a community for retired actors would be built on the property. His plays continue to be performed in Russia to enthusiastic audiences. The richness of their language and the deft incorporation of folk songs and dances in the works of his Slavophile period ensure their survival, even as the historical nuances of authority and status that motivate much of the action recede from living memory.

See also: SLAVOPHILES; THEATER

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GARY THURSTON

OTREPEV, GRIGORY

(c. 1580–1606), Russian monk who supposedly became the false Tsar Dmitry.

Yuri Bogdanovich Otrepev, the son of an infantry officer, became the monk Grigory as a teenager and eventually entered the prestigious Miracles Monastery in the Moscow Kremlin. There he became a deacon, and his intelligence and good handwriting soon brought him to the attention of Patriarch Job (head of the Russian Orthodox Church), who employed Grigory as a secretary.

In 1602 a group of monks, including Grigory and the future Tsar Dmitry, fled to Poland-Lithuania. Their departure greatly upset Tsar Boris Godunov and Patriarch Job. When one of the runaways identified himself as Dmitry of Uglich (the youngest son of Tsar Ivan IV who supposedly died as a child), the Godunov regime launched a propaganda campaign identifying "False Dmitry" as Grigory Otrepev. Stories were fabricated that Grigory had become a sorcerer and tool of Satan or that he had committed crimes while in the service of the Romanov family (opponents of Tsar Boris). Although no credible witnesses ever came forward to verify that Grigory and "False Dmitry" were the

same person, Tsar Dmitry's enemies never tired of claiming that he was really Otrepev.

The sensational image of the evil, debauched, and bloodthirsty monk Grigory pretending to be Tsar Dmitry continues to haunt modern scholarship. Many historians have accepted at face value the most lurid propaganda manufactured by Dmitry's enemies, but careful study of the evidence reveals that it is impossible to merge the biographies of Grigory and "False Dmitry." Grigory Otrepev was last seen by an English merchant shortly after the assassination of Tsar Dmitry in 1606; then he disappeared.

See also: DMITRY, FALSE; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

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CHESTER DUNNING

OUR HOME IS RUSSIA PARTY

Our Home Is Russia (*Nash Dom—Rossiya*, or NDR) was a sociopolitical movement and a ruling party from 1996 to 1998. Formed in the spring of 1995 according to a plan of the president's administration as one of two ruling parties—the party of the "right hand," with the prime minister at the head—it immediately launched forward. The NDR movement's council, founded in May 1995 with Victor Chernomyrdin at the head, included thirty-seven heads of regions, a few ministers, and heads of large industrial enterprises and banks. The federal NDR list for the Duma elections was headed by Chernomyrdin, the famous film director Nikita Mikhailov, and General Lev Rokhlin, a Chechnya war hero. Subsequently both the prime minister and the film director renounced the mandates, and Rokhlin, entering the Duma, soon came into opposition against

Boris Yeltsin and he then left the NDR fraction; and founded the Movement in Support of the Army. The NDR list received seven million votes (10.1%, third place) and forty-five Duma seats; this was taken as defeat of the ruling party. In the single-mandate districts, out of 108 proposed candidates, ten were elected. In the 1996 presidential elections, NDR backed Yeltsin.

With Chernomyrdin leaving the prime ministership in the spring of 1998, NDR entered a period of crisis. The effort on the part of the young ambitious leader of the NDR fraction in the Duma, Vladimir Ryzhkov, to turn NDR from a party of heads into a neoconservative political party of "values" proved unsuccessful. Discussions of merging with the blocs *A Just Cause* and *Voice of Russia* and the movement *New Force* were fruitless as well. Allies of NDR in the elections amounted to the weak *Forward, Russia* of Boris Fyodorov and the Muslim movement *Medzhlis*. The programmatic positions of NDR amount to moderate-reformist ideas and a declaration of conservative-liberal values. The federal list was headed by Chernomyrdin and the Saratov governor Dmitry Ayatskov. NDR did not make it into the Duma, as it received 0.8 million votes (1.2 percent). Nine NDR candidates from single-mandate districts, including Chernomyrdin and Ryzhkov, entered the pro-government fraction *Unity* and the group *People's Deputy*. In May 2000, the eighth and last congress of NDR, which at the time had 125,000 members, decided to form part of the party *Unity*, created on the foundation of the movements *Unity*, *All Russia*, and *NDR*.

See also: CHERNOMYRDIN, VIKTOR STEPANOVICH; MOVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY; UNITY (MEDVED) PARTY

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NIKOLAI PETROV

PACIFIC FLEET

The Pacific Fleet is headquartered in Vladivostok, capital of the Maritime (Primorsky) Territory. Not surprisingly, given Russia's status as a Pacific nation with vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the Pacific Fleet is one of Russia's most powerful naval forces. The city of Vladivostok, established in 1860, occupies most of Muraviev-Amursky Peninsula, named after the governor general of Eastern Russia during the mid-nineteenth century. Two bays, Amursky and Ussurysky, wrap the peninsula, mirroring with their names two great rivers of the Russian Far East, the Amur, and the Ussury, its tributary.

Beginning in the 1600s, Russian explorers first reached Siberia's eastern coastline and founded the city of Okhotsk (1647). Until the mid-1800s, however, China's dominance of the southern regions of eastern Siberia restricted Russian naval activities. The construction of the port city of Vladivostok intensified Russia's need for adequate transportation links. Tsar Alexander III drew up plans for the Trans-Siberian Railway and began building it in 1891. Despite the enormity of the project, a continuous route was completed in 1905, stimulated by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War a year earlier. Vladivostok became Russia's main naval base in the east after Port Arthur (located in Chinese territory and ceded to Russia in 1898) fell in January 1905 during the war. After World War I, Japan seized Vladivostok and held the key port for four years, initially as a member of the Allied interventionist forces that occupied parts of Russia after the new Bolshevik government proclaimed neutrality and withdrew from the war. At the end of World War II, Stalin broke the neutrality pact that had existed throughout the war in order to occupy vast areas of East Asia formerly held by Japan. It was through Vladivostok, moreover, that some of the Lend-Lease aid, the most visible sign of U.S.-Soviet cooperation during World War II, passed on its way to Murmansk.

The Pacific Fleet includes eighteen nuclear submarines that are operationally subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and based at Pavlovsk and Rybachy. The blue-water striking power of the Pacific Fleet lies in thirty-four nonnuclear submarines and forty-nine principal surface combatants. The Zvezda Far Eastern Shipyard in Bolshoi Kamen, a couple of hours north of Vladivostok, serves as the chief recycling facility for the Fleet, although it is in disrepair. The Pacific Fleet's additional home ports



include Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadan, and Sovetskaya Gavan. As far as air power is concerned, the Pacific Fleet consisted during the mid-1990s of 250 land-based combat aircraft and helicopters. Two bomber regiments stationed at Alekseyevka constituted its most powerful strike force. Each regiment consisted of thirty supersonic Tu-22M Backfire aircraft. The land power of the Pacific Fleet consisted of one naval infantry division and a coastal defense division. The naval infantry division included more than half of the total manpower in the Russian naval infantry. During the mid-1990s, the Pacific Fleet infantry was reorganized into brigades.

During the late 1990s, a joint headquarters was established commanding the land, naval, and air units stationed on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Despite funding shortfalls during the early twenty-first century, the Russian Pacific Fleet continues to demonstrate its resolve to increase combat readiness. Russian Pacific Fleet submarines carry out missions of regional security, strategic deterrence, protection of strategic assets, and training for anti-surface warfare.

See also: BALTIC FLEET; BLACK SEA FLEET; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; NORTHERN FLEET; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

PAGANISM

Due to the concerted efforts of both the eastern and western churches, Christianity largely replaced Slavic paganism during the course of the ninth and tenth centuries. There are primarily three sources for information about Slavic paganism: written

accounts, archaeological discoveries, and ethnographic evidence. As literacy was introduced to the East Slavs only with their conversion to Christianity in 988 C.E., and the written sources were most often compiled by Christian monks or missionaries, much of what is known about East Slavic paganism from written accounts is of questionable accuracy. The sources begin with the Byzantine historian Procopius (sixth century) and include Arab travel accounts, reports of Christian missionary activity, and references in the *Primary Chronicle* and the *First Novgorod Chronicle*. Archaeological evidence has provided some information on pagan temples, particularly among the West Slavs on the island of Rügen in the Baltic Sea. In addition, what may have been a temple to Perun, god of thunder, was excavated near Peryn, south of Novgorod in 1951, and several sites that were likely associated with cult practices have been found at Pskov, in the Smolensk region, and Belarus. Generally, however, archaeological sites are able to provide more information about material culture than about the spiritual life of a preliterate people. Ethnographic material was not systematically collected until the nineteenth century, which makes it difficult to separate genuine information from later accretions. One can summarize, based on evidence from all these sources, however, that early Slavic religion was animistic, in that it personified natural elements. It also deified heavenly bodies and recognized the existence of various spirits of the forest, water, and household. Ritual sacrifice was likely used to appease the pagan deities, and amulets were used to ward off evil. In accordance with widespread Indo-European practice, the early Slavs likely cremated their dead, but even before the Christian era burial was also practiced. Chernaya Mogila, a burial site in Chernigov that dates from the tenth century provides strong evidence for a belief in the afterlife, as three members of a princely family were interred with the horses, weapons, and utensils that they would need for existence in the next world.

Procopius makes reference to a Slavic god who is the ruler of everything, but evidence for a larger pantheon comes much later. The twelfth-century *Primary Chronicle* relates how Prince Vladimir set up idols in the hills of Kiev to Perun, "made of wood with a head of silver and a mustache of gold," as well as to Khors, Dazhbog, Stribog, Simargl, and Mokosh. In the entries for 907 and 971 C.E., the chronicle reports that the Rus swore by their gods Perun and Volos, the god of the flocks. Perun is

associated with thunder and the oak tree, thought to be a favorite target of the lightning bolts unleashed by the thunder god. Much less is known about the other gods mentioned in the chronicle. Khors seems to refer to the sun and, as Jakobson points out, is closely connected with Dazhbog, the “giver of wealth,” and Stribog, “the apportioner of wealth.” Simargl appears to be a form of Simorg, the Iranian winged monster, who is at times depicted as a winged dog. The only female in the pantheon is Mokosh, whose name is probably derived from moist, and who is likely a personification of Moist Mother Earth. Some scholars view Mokosh as a remnant of the Great Goddess cult, which struggled against the patriarchal religion of the Varangians (Vikings). The god Volos, identified in the peace treaties as the god of cattle, may be connected with death and the underworld. The association with cattle possibly comes from the efforts of Christian writers to connect him with St. Blasius, a martyred Cappadocian bishop who became the protector of flocks. Although not listed in Vladimir’s pantheon, the god Rod, with his consort Rozhanitsa, is mentioned in other East Slavic sources as a type of primordial progenitor.

After the conversion of Rus, elements of paganism continued in combination with Christian beliefs, a phenomenon that has been called “dvoeverie” or “dual belief” in the Slavic tradition. References to pagan deities occasionally occur in Christian era texts, most notably as rhetorical ornamentation in such works as the *Slovo o polku Igoreve*. Syncretism is also apparent in the transformation of Perun into the Old Testament Elijah, who was taken to heaven in a fiery chariot.

See also: DVOEVERIE; KIEVAN RUS; OCCULTISM; VIKINGS

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DAVID K. PRESTEL

PAKISTAN, RELATIONS WITH

An affinity between Pakistan and the Soviet Union would have seemed natural, given the Pakistan’s status as a British colony (until 1947) and the Soviet Union’s role as supporter of nations oppressed by capitalist imperialists. However, in 1959 Pakistan—along with Turkey and Iran—joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was engineered by President Dwight Eisenhower’s energetic secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. The security treaty replaced the Baghdad Pact and was intended to provide a southern bulwark to Soviet expansion toward the Indian Ocean and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. CENTO also enabled the United States to aid Pakistan and cement a close security relationship with the country that has thus become the cornerstone of U.S. policy in South Asia for more than three decades. This relationship reinforced Moscow’s efforts to maintain close relations with Pakistan’s rival, India. Beginning in June 1955 with Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to Moscow, and First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s return trip to India during the fall of 1955, the foundations were laid for cordial Soviet-Indian relations. While in India, Khrushchev announced Moscow’s support for Indian sovereignty over the Kashmir region. Leading to the eventual partition of British India in 1947, contention between Hindus and Muslims has focused on Kashmir for centuries. Pakistan asserts Kashmiris’ right to self-determination through a plebiscite in accordance with an earlier Indian pledge and a United Nations resolution. This dispute triggered wars between the two countries, not only in 1947 but also in 1965 (Moscow maintained neutrality in 1965). In December 1971, Pakistan and India again went to war, following a political crisis in what was then East Pakistan and the flight of millions of Bengali refugees to India. The two armies reached an impasse, but a decisive Indian victory in the east resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

New strains appeared both in Soviet-Pakistani relations after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan supported the Afghan resistance, while India implicitly supported Soviet occupation. Pakistan accommodated an influx of refugees (more

than 3.2 million people) resulting from the Soviet occupation (December 1979–February 1989). In the following eight years, the USSR and India voiced increasing concern over Pakistani arms purchases, U.S. military aid to Pakistan, and Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In May 1998 India, and then Pakistan, conducted nuclear tests.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Pakistan's relations with Washington grew strained, while its relations with Moscow improved. Although Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, agreed to provide the United States with bases in Pakistan for launching military operations against Pakistan's erstwhile ally—the Taliban—in Afghanistan, his actions fueled electoral successes of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan who opposed his pro-U.S. stance. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin played a key mediation role in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. In February 2003, Musharraf met with Putin in Moscow to discuss trade and defense ties. This was the first official state visit by a Pakistani leader to Moscow since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s. Pakistan and India massed about a million troops along the UN-drawn Line of Control that divides their sectors of the state officially called Jammu and Kashmir—raising international fears of a possible nuclear war.

See also: AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

PALEKH PAINTING

Palekh painted lacquer boxes, popularly thought to be a traditional Russian folk art, were actually a product of the Soviet period. Palekh painting, a delicate and elegant miniature style, is done on the lids

of lacquered, *papier-mâché* black boxes with crimson interiors. The subjects depict Russian fairy tales, legends, and folk heroes, and during the Soviet period also included scenes of rural life, industrialization, and Soviet leaders and heroes. Palekh boxes, originally created for Soviet citizens, developed a worldwide reputation after being sold at international arts and crafts fairs.

The term *palekh* comes from the most famous of the three villages (Kholui, Mstera, and Palekh) in which Palekh painting originated. Ivan Golikov, a Palekh icon painter, derived the inspiration for this style from lacquered boxes he saw at the Kustar Museum in 1921. Golikov and others applied egg tempera, rather than oil, to *papier-mâché* boxes and, employing techniques used in icon painting, created objects that resembled traditional folk art. The Artel of Early Painting, a craft collective for Palekh painters founded by Golikov and his colleagues, was established in Palekh in 1924 (artels also existed in Khuloi and Mstera). Palekh painting became an integral part of Soviet applied arts with the establishment of a four-year training program. Exhibitions dedicated to Palekh boxes were held throughout the 1930s. Academic articles on this medium, and artistic debates discussing the appropriate style and content of Palekh painting, continued from the 1930s to the 1960s. Since the 1970s, Palekh painted boxes and brooches have been viewed as the quintessential tourist souvenir from Russia.

See also: FOLKLORE

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K. ANDREA RUSNOCK

PALE OF SETTLEMENT

As a result of the Napoleonic Wars and the acquisition of the central and eastern provinces of Poland by the Russian Empire during the late eighteenth century, the area extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea became known as the Russian "Pale of Settlement." Originally established by Catherine the Great in 1791, the Pale (meaning "border") eventually covered roughly 286,000 square miles (740,700 square kilometers) of territory and grew

to include twenty-five provinces (fifteen Russian and ten Polish), including Kiev, Grodno, Minsk, Lublin, Bessarabia, and Mogilev. Along with the favorable acquisition of Polish land, the Russian government was faced with a population of ethnic groups that came with the various territories. Although the territories consisted of various groups, including Byzantine Catholics, Germans, Armenians, Tartars, Scots, and Dutchmen, it was the large number of Jews (10% of the Polish population) that was most troubling to the tsars.

In 1804, intending to protect the Russian population from the Jewish people, Alexander I issued a decree that prevented Jews from living outside the territories of the Pale, the first of many statutes designed to limit the freedoms of Russia's new Jewry. With more than five million Jews eventually living and working within its borders, Russian lawmakers used the confines of the Pale as an opportunity to limit Jewish participation in most facets of social, economic, and political life. With few exceptions, Jews were forced to reside within the Pale's overcrowded cities and small towns called shtetls, restricted from traveling, prevented from entering various professions (including agriculture), levied with extra taxation, forbidden to receive higher education, and kept from engaging in various forms of trade to subsidize their livelihood. Although Jews in the Pale were destined to endure a life of poverty and restriction, most managed to make their way into the local economies by working as tailors, cobblers, peddlers, and small shopkeepers. Others, who were less fortunate, survived only by committed mutual aid efforts and strong local networks of support.

As the Russian Empire started experiencing the early stages of industrialization during the 1880s, the Pale began to witness a steady decline in its agricultural, artisanal, and petty entrepreneurial economies. Because of this transition, many independent producers of goods and services could no longer subsist and were forced to find jobs in factories. Very few, especially the Jewish artisans and tailors, were able to continue producing independently or as middlemen to larger manufacturing plants. By the start of the twentieth century, the manufacturing sector was increasingly becoming the primary source of employment in the Pale, with wage laborers producing cigarettes, cigars, knit goods, gloves, textiles, artificial flowers, buttons, glass, bricks, soap, candy, and various other goods. It was ultimately the deteriorating economy within the Pale, coupled with years of anti-Semitism, that

served as catalyst for more than two million Jews to emigrate to America between 1881 and 1914. Not long after this exodus, the Pale of Settlement was abolished with the overthrow of the tsarist regime in 1917.

See also: ALEXANDER I; BESSARABIA; CATHERINE II; JEWS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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DIANA FISHER

PALEOLOGUE, SOPHIA

(d. 1503) niece of the last two Byzantine emperors and the second wife of Grand Prince Ivan III of Moscow.

Sophia Paleologue (Zoe) improved the Russian Grand Prince's international standing through her dynastic status and promoted Byzantine symbolism and ceremony at the Russian court.

Zoe Paleologue was the daughter of Despot Thomas of Morea, the younger brother of the Byzantine emperors John VIII and Constantine IX, and Catherine, daughter of Prince Centurione Zaccaria of Achaea. After the conquest of Morea by the Ottoman Turks in 1460 and her parents' subsequent death, Paleologue became a ward of the Uniate cardinal Bessarion, who gave her a Catholic education in Rome as a dependent of Pope Sixtus IV.

After protracted negotiations with the Russian Grand Prince, who saw an opportunity to increase his prestige in a marital union with a Byzantine princess, the Vatican offered Paleologue in a betrothal ceremony to one of Ivan III's representatives on June 1, 1472. During Paleologue's trip to Russia, the Byzantine princess assured the Russian populace in Pskov of her Orthodox disposition by abjuring Latin religious ritual and dress and by venerating icons. Paleologue married Ivan III on November 12, 1472, in an Orthodox wedding ceremony in the Moscow Kremlin and took the name Sophia.

Paleologue gave birth to ten children, one of which was the future heir to the Russian throne,

Basil III. The existence of Ivan Molodoy, the surviving son of Ivan III's union with his first wife, Maria of Tver, and natural successor to the throne, caused friction between the grand prince and Paleologue. According to contemporary Russian chronicles, Paleologue intrigued against Ivan Molodoy and his wife, Elena Voloshanka. Paleologue's situation at court deteriorated even more after Voloshanka gave birth to a son, Dmitry Ivanovich. The untimely death of Ivan Molodoy in 1490 inspired rumors that Paleologue had poisoned him. The focus of Paleologue's and Voloshanka's dynastic struggle shifted to Dmitry Ivanovich. Ivan III's decision to make Dmitry his heir in 1497 caused Paleologue and her son Basil to revolt. Although Ivan III disgraced Sophia and crowned Dmitry as his successor in the following year, the Byzantine princess emerged victorious in 1499, when Basil was made Grand Prince of Novgorod and Pskov. Conspiring with the Lithuanians, Paleologue put pressure on her husband to imprison Voloshanka and her son Dmitry and to proclaim Basil Grand Prince of Vladimir and Moscow in 1502.

In pursuing her political and dynastic goals, Paleologue exploited traditional Byzantine methods to advertise her claims. In a liturgical tapestry she donated to the Monastery of Saint Sergius of Radonezh in 1498, she proclaimed her superior heritage by juxtaposing her position as Tsarevna of Constantinople with the grand princely title of her husband. By exploiting Byzantine religious symbolism, in the same embroidery she expressed her claim that Basil III was the divinely chosen heir to the Russian throne. While there has been no substantiation for the claim of some scholars that Paleologue was responsible for the introduction of wide-ranging Byzantine ideas and practices at the Russian court, the Byzantine princess's knack for political messages draped in religious language and imagery undoubtedly left a lasting mark on medieval Russian culture.

See also: BASIL III; IVAN III

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ISOLDE THYRÊT

PALLAS, PETER-SIMON

(1741–1811), explorer, geologist, botanist.

Peter-Simon Pallas was born in Berlin, where he received his formal education. He also spent some time in Holland and England working in museums with rich collections in natural history. One of his early studies dealing with polyps and sponges was published in the Hague in 1761 and immediately attracted wide professional attention, not only because of the richness and originality of the presented empirical data, but also with its precisely stated general theoretical propositions. In 1763 Pallas became a member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, and a year later he led an exploratory expedition to the Caspian and Baikal areas, concentrating on both natural history and ethnography. Published in three volumes between 1771 and 1778, under the title *Travels through Various Provinces in the Russian Empire*, and written in German, the study was immediately translated into Russian, and then into French, Italian, and English. Pallas guided several other exploratory expeditions; the trip to Southern Russia, with a heavy concentration on Crimea, proved especially enlightening. All these studies manifested not only Pallas's observational talents but also his profound familiarity with contemporary geology, botany, zoology, mineralogy and linguistics. His *Flora Rossica* provided a systematic botanical survey of the country's trees.

Pallas's studies extended beyond the limits of traditional natural history. He pondered the general processes and laws related to geology: For example, he presented a theory of the origin of mountains in intraterrestrial explosions. He also made a technically advanced study of regional variations in the Mongolian language, articulated a transformist view of the living forms, which he later abandoned, and, responding to a suggestion made by Catherine II, worked on a comparative dictionary. He also made a historical survey of land tracts discovered by the Russians in the stretches

of ocean between Siberia and Alaska. In the journal of the *Free Economic Society*, established in the age of Catherine II, he published a series of articles on relations of geography to agriculture.

Most of Pallas's studies offered no broad scientific formulations; their strength was in the richness and novelty of descriptive information. Charles Darwin referred to Pallas in four of his major works, always with the intent of adding substance to his generalizations. Georges Cuvier, by contrast, credited Pallas with the creation of "a completely new geology." Pallas's writings appealed to a wide audience not only because, at the time of the Enlightenment, there was a growing interest in the geographies and cultures of the world previously unexplored, but also because they were masterworks of lucid and spirited prose.

Together with the great mathematician Leonhard Euler, Pallas was a major contributor to the elevation of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences to the level of the leading European scientific institutions.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

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ALEXANDER VUCINICH

PAMYAT

The Pamyat (Memory) society was established in 1978 to defend Russian cultural heritage. Pamyat came to adopt extreme rightist platforms, particularly under the direction of Dmitry Vasilyev from late 1985. It rose to prominence as the most visible and controversial Russian nationalist organization of the *neformaly* (informal) movement in the USSR during the late 1980s. Although not representative of all strains of Russian nationalist thought, Pamyat was representative of a broad xenophobic ideology that gained strength in the perestroika years.

At the heart of Pamyat's platform was the defense of Russian traditions. Pamyat ideologues de-

plored both Soviet-style socialism and western democracy and capitalism. They held tsarist autocracy as the ideal model of statehood. Much of their ideology drew on the ideas of the Black Hundreds, which organized pogroms against Jews in Tsarist Russia. This reactionary ideology contained a strong Orthodox Christian element. Alongside provisions for the recognition of the place of Orthodoxy in Russian history, Pamyat made demands for the priority of Russian citizens in all fields of life.

In 1988 Pamyat had an estimated twenty thousand members and forty branches in cities throughout the Soviet Union. It later splintered into a number of anti-Semitic and xenophobic groups. Competing factions emerged, the two most prominent being the Moscow-based National-Patriotic Front Pamyat and the National-Patriotic Movement Pamyat. This factional conflict belied an ideological symmetry; both groups emphasized the importance of Russian Orthodoxy and blamed a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy for everything from killing the tsar to "alcoholizing" the Russian population. The success of Pamyat's xenophobic platforms sparked debates about the negative consequences of glasnost and perestroika.

Factional disputes, crude national chauvinism and contradictory political platforms led many Russian nationalists to distance themselves from Pamyat. Pamyat and its many splinter groups were largely discredited and their influence much reduced by the time the USSR collapsed in 1991. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that Pamyat was a forerunner of post-Soviet Russian national chauvinist and neo-fascist groups.

See also: NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

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ZOE KNOX

PANSLAVISM

Panslavism in a general sense refers to the belief in a collective destiny for the various Slavic peoples—

generally, but far from always, under the leadership of Russia, the largest Slavic group or nation. Thus the seventeenth-century author of *Politika* (*Politics*), Juraj Krizanac (1618–1683) is often regarded as a precursor of Pan Slavism because he urged the unification of all Slavs under the leadership of Russia and the Vatican. His writings were largely unknown until the nineteenth century. The Czech philologist Pavel Jozef Safarik (1795–1861) and his friend, poet Jan Kollar, regarded the Slavs historically as one nation. Safarik believed that they had once had a common language. However, despite his belief in Slavic unity, he turned against Russia following the suppression of the Polish rebellion in 1830 and 1831. The Ukrainian national bard, Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861), also hoped for a federation of the Slavic peoples.

In a narrower and more common usage, however, *Panslavicism* refers to a political movement in nineteenth-century Russia. Politically, Pan Slavism would not have taken the shape it did without the Russian claims of tutelage over the Slavic populations of the declining Ottoman Empire. Intellectually, however, Pan Slavism drew on the nationalist ideas of people such as Mikhail Pogodin (1800–1875), the most important representative of “Official Nationality” and especially of the Slavophiles. Slavophilism focused critically on Russia’s internal civilization and its need to return to first principles, but it bequeathed to Pan Slavism the idea that Russia’s civilization was superior to that of all of its European competitors. Of the early Slavophiles, Alexei Khomyakov (1804–1860) wrote a number of poems (“The Eagle”; “To Russia”), which can be considered broadly Pan Slav, as well as a “Letter to the Serbs” in the last year of his life, in which he demanded that religious faith be “raised to a social principle.” Ivan Aksakov (1823–1886) actually evolved from his early Slavophilism to full-blown Pan Slavism over the course of his journalistic career.

The advent of Alexander II and the implementation of the so-called Great Reforms began the long and complex process of opening up a public arena and eventually a public opinion in Russia. Ideas stopped being the privilege of a small number of cultivated aristocrats, and the 1870s saw a reorientation from philosophical to more practical matters, if not precisely to politics, a shift that affected both Slavophiles and Westernizers. It is against this background that one needs to view the eclipse of classical Slavophilism and the rise of Pan Slavism.

It is plausible to date the beginning of Pan Slavism as a movement—albeit a very loose and undisciplined one—to the winter of 1857–1858, when the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee was created to support the South Slavs against the Ottoman Empire. A number of Slavophiles were involved, and the Emperor formally recognized the organization, upon the active recommendation of Alexander Gorchakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1861 Pogodin became president and Ivan Aksakov secretary and treasurer, and for the next fifteen years the Committee was active in education, philanthropy, and a sometimes strident advocacy journalism.

In 1867 the committee organized a remarkable Pan Slav Congress, which went on for months. It involved a series of lectures, an ethnographic exhibition, and a number of banquets, speeches, and other demonstrations of welcome to the eighty-one foreign visitors from the Slavic world—teachers, politicians, professors, priests, and even a few bishops. But the discussions clearly demonstrated the suspicions that many non-Russians entertained of their somewhat overbearing big brother. No Poles attended, nor did any Ukrainians from the Russian Empire. Even to the friendly Serbs the Russian demands for hegemony seemed excessive.

Pan Slav agitation was growing at the turn of the decade, partly due to the bellicose *Opinion on the Eastern Question* (1869) by General Rostislav Andreyevich Fadeev (1826–1884). In that same year appeared a more interesting Pan Slav product, *Russia and Europe*, by Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky (1822–1885). It charted the maturation and decay of civilizations and foresaw Russia’s Pan Slav Empire triumphing over the declining West. The aims of the Slavic Benevolent Committee seemed closest to fulfillment during the victorious climax to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, when Constantinople appeared within the grasp of Russian arms. Yet, despite the imperial patronage that the Committee had enjoyed for over a decade, the government drew back from the seizure of Constantinople, and then was forced by the European powers at the Congress of Berlin (1878) to minimize Russian gains. Aksakov’s subsequent tirade about lost Russian honor resulted in the permanent adjournment of the Committee. Pan Slav perspectives lingered, but the movement declined into political insignificance during the course of the 1880s.

See also: NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; OFFICIAL NATIONALITY; SLAVOPHILES

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ABBOTT GLEASON

PARIS, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF 1856

Facing an empty treasury, a new French naval ordinance that might pierce the Kronstadt walls, and possible Swedish and Prussian hostilities, Alexander II and a special Imperial Council accepted an Austrian ultimatum and agreed on January 16, 1856, to make peace on coalition terms and conclude the Crimean War. Even before Sevastopol fell (September 12, 1855), Russia had accepted three of the Anglo-French-Austrian Four Points of August 1854: guarantee of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity; general European (not exclusively Russian) protection of the Ottoman Christians; and freeing of the mouth of the Danube. The details of the third point, as well as reduction of Russian Black Sea preponderance and additional British particular conditions, completed the agreement. The incipient entente with Napoleon III, who all along had hoped to check Russian prestige without fighting for British imperial interests, was a boon to Russia.

Russia was ably represented in the Paris congress (February 25–April 14) by the experienced extraordinary ambassador and privy councillor Count Alexei F. Orlov and the career diplomat and envoy to London, Filip Brunov. They were joined at the table by some of the key statesmen in the diplomatic preliminaries of the war from Turkey,

England, France, and Austria, as well as Camillo Cavour of Piedmont-Sardinia. Russia's chief concession was to remove its naval presence from the Black Sea, but they worked out the details of its neutralization directly with the Turks, not their British allies. The affirmation of the 1841 Convention, which closed the Turkish Straits to warships in peacetime, was actually more advantageous to Russia, which lacked a fleet on one side, than to Britain, which had one on the other. Russia's sole territorial loss was the retrocession of the southern part of Bessarabia to Ottoman Moldavia, the purpose of which was to secure the Russian withdrawal from the Danubian Delta.

In addition, the Russians agreed to the demilitarization of the land Islands in the Baltic, a provision that held until World War I. The Holy Places dispute, the diplomatic scrape which had led directly to the war preliminaries, was settled on the basis of the compromise effected in Istanbul in April 1853 by the three extraordinary ambassadors, Alexander Menshikov, Edmond de la Cour, and Stratford (Canning) de Redcliffe, before Russia's diplomatic rupture with Turkey. The Peace Treaty was signed on March 20, 1856.

The British at first did not treat the Russians as complying and kept some forces in the Black Sea. However, the 1857 India Mutiny, due in part to Russian-supported Persian pressure on Afghanistan, led to British withdrawal and facilitated the unimpeded success of Russia's long-standing campaign to gain full control of the Caucasus.

As some contemporary observers noted, adherence to the naval and strategic provisions of the treaty depended upon Russian weakness and coalition resolve. During the Franco-German war of 1870–1871, Alexander Gorchakov announced that Russia would no longer adhere to the "Black Sea Clauses" mandating demilitarization, and a London conference accepted this change. During the Turkish War of 1877–1878, Russia re-annexed Southern Bessarabia to the chagrin of its Romanian allies.

See also: CRIMEAN WAR; NICHOLAS I; SEVASTOPOL

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

PARIS, FIRST AND SECOND TREATIES OF

After the disastrous military campaigns of 1813 marked in particular by the severe defeat of Leipzig, Napoleon's political and military power was on the decline. The emperor was unable to avoid the entry of the Allied powers in Paris on March 31, 1814, and was forced to abdicate in April 1814. On May 30, 1814, following the restoration of Louis XVIII, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, the plenipotentiary of the new king, signed the first Treaty of Paris with representatives of King George III of England; of François I, emperor of Austria; of King Frederic-William III of Prussia; and of Tsar Alexander I. This treaty, which put an end to the war between France and the Fourth Coalition and to the French hegemony in Europe, covered both territorial and geopolitical matters.

France retained its boundaries of January 1, 1792. Thus it was allowed to keep Avignon and the Comtat-Venaissin, a large part of Savoy, Montbéliard, and Mulhouse, but had to surrender Belgium and the left bank of Rhine as well as territories annexed in Italy, Germany, Holland, and Switzerland. No indemnity was requested, and England gave back all the French colonies except for Malta, Tobago, St. Lucia in the Antilles, and the Isle of France in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Allied powers had to withdraw from French territory. Last, the treaty included secret clauses that ceded the territory of Venetia to Austria and the port of Genoa to the Kingdom of Sardinia.

On the political level, the treaty called for a general congress to be held at Vienna to settle all questions about boundaries and sovereignty and to confirm the decisions taken by the Allied powers: Switzerland was to be independent, Holland was to be united under the House of Orange, Germany was to become a federation of independent states, and Italy was to be composed of sovereign states.

The relative leniency of the treaty was largely due to the diplomatic ability of Talleyrand; yet, despite its moderation, the document was badly received by the French public opinion and it contributed to the discredit of the Bourbons.

At the time the treaty was signed, Napoleon I was prisoner on the island of Elba and separated from his family. He escaped from the island and landed on March 1, 1815, at Golfe Juan with nine hundred faithful soldiers. He tried to take advantage of his strong popularity to drive Louis XVIII off the throne and restore his own personal power.

But that attempt lasted only one hundred days and collapsed with the catastrophic defeat at Waterloo on June 18, 1815. Napoleon had to abdicate again and was sent to the island of Sainte-Hélène, where he died on May 5, 1821.

Following this final abdication, a new treaty was signed in Paris on November 20, 1815. It was much tougher than the previous one; the cost of the one hundred days was high. France was confined to its former boundaries of 1790. It was authorized to keep Avignon and the Comtat-Venaissin, Montbéliard and Mulhouse, but lost the duchy of Bouillon and the German fortresses of Philippeville and Marienbourg given to the Netherlands, Sarrelouis and Sarrebruck attributed to Prussia, Landau given to Bavaria, the area of Gex attached to Switzerland, and a large part of Savoy given to the king of Piedmont. Regarding the colonies, the loss of Malta, St. Lucia, Tobago, and of the Isle of France was confirmed. A financial cost was added to this territorial cost: the French state had to pay an indemnity of 700 million francs and to undergo in its northeast frontier areas a military occupation. This occupation was limited to five years and 150,000 men but had to be paid by the French budget.

Despite its severity, the second Treaty of Paris was faithfully respected by King Louis XVIII; this respect allowed France to get rid of the foreign occupation as early as 1818—two years earlier than expected—and to play again at that date a significant role in the international relations.

See also: ALEXANDER I; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH; NAPOLEON I

MARIE-PIERRE REY

PARTY CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES

Party congresses, the nominal policy-setting conclaves of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were held at intervals ranging from one to five years, and extended from the First, in 1898, to the last, the Twenty-Eighth, in 1990. Made up since the 1920s of two- to five thousand delegates from the party's local organizations, party congresses were formally empowered to elect the Central Committee, to determine party rules, and to enact resolutions that laid down the party's basic programmatic guidelines. Party conferences, from the

Table 1.

Communist Party Congresses and Conferences			Delegates	
Number	Date	Locale	(Voting)	(Non-voting)
1 st Congress	March 1898	Minsk	9	
2 nd Congress	July 1903	Brussels and London	43	14
3 rd Congress	April 1905	London	24	14
1 st Conference	December 1905	Tammerfors	41	
4 th Congress	April 1906	Stockholm	112	
2 nd Conference	November 1906	Tammerfors	32	ca. 15
5 th Congress	May–June 1907	London	336	
3 rd Conference	July (August) 1907	Kotka (Finland)	26	
4 th Conference	November 1907	Helsingfors	27	
5 th Conference	January 1909	Paris	16	2
6 th Conference	January 1912	Prague	12	4
“March Conference”	March 1917	Petrograd	ca. 120	
7 th Conference	April 1917	Petrograd	133	18
6 th Congress	August 1917	Petrograd	157	110
7 th Congress	March 1918	Moscow	47	59
8 th Congress	March 1919	Moscow	ca. 300	?
8 th Conference	December 1919	Moscow	45	73
9 th Congress	March 1920	Moscow	554	162
9 th Conference	September 1920	Moscow	116	125
10 th Congress	March 1921	Moscow	ca. 700	ca. 300
10 th Conference	May 1921	Moscow	?	
11 th Conference	December 1921	Moscow	125	116
11 th Congress	March–April 1922	Moscow	520	154
12 th Conference	August 1922	Moscow	129	92
12 th Congress	April 1923	Moscow	408	417
13 th Conference	January 1924	Moscow	128	222
13 th Congress	May 1924	Moscow	748	416
14 th Conference	April 1925	Moscow	178	392
14 th Congress	December 1925	Moscow	665	641
15 th Conference	October–November 1925	Moscow	194	640
15 th Congress	December 1927	Moscow	898	771
16 th Conference	April 1929	Moscow	254	679
16 th Congress	June–July 1930	Moscow	1268	891
17 th Conference	January–February 1932	Moscow	386	525
17 th Congress	January–February 1934	Moscow	1225	736
18 th Congress	March 1939	Moscow	1569	466
18 th Conference	February 1941	Moscow	456	138
19 th Congress	October 1952	Moscow	1192	167
20 th Congress	February 1956	Moscow	1349	81
21 st “Extraordinary” Congress	January–February 1959	Moscow	1269	106
22 nd Congress	October 1961	Moscow	4408	405
23 rd Congress	March–April 1966	Moscow	4620	323
24 th Congress	March–April 1971	Moscow	4740	223
25 th Congress	February–March 1976	Moscow	4998	non-voting
26 th Congress	February–March 1981	Moscow	4994	non-voting
27 th Congress	February–March 1986	Moscow	ca. 5000	non-voting
19 th Conference	June 1988	Moscow	4976	non-voting
28 th Congress	July 1990	Moscow	4863	non-voting

SOURCE: Courtesy of the author.

first in 1905 to the nineteenth in 1988, were smaller and less authoritative gatherings, usually held midway in the interval between congresses. Like the congresses, they issued policy declarations in the form of resolutions, but did not conduct elections to the top party leadership.

Before the Revolution of 1917 and for the first few years thereafter, party congresses and con-

ferences were marked by lively debate. The transcripts of those proceedings, published at the time and republished during the 1930s, are important sources concerning the problems the country faced and the viewpoints of the various party leaders and factions. With the ascendancy of Josef Stalin, however, party congresses and conferences became creatures of the central party leadership. As

described by the concept of the circular flow of power, local officials who were de facto appointed by the center handpicked their delegations to the national congress, which in turn endorsed the makeup of the Central Committee and the central leadership itself, thus closing the circle.

PREREVOLUTIONARY PARTY CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES

The meeting that is traditionally considered the First Party Congress was an ephemeral gathering in Minsk in March 1898 of nine Marxist undergrounders who managed to proclaim the establishment of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP) before they were arrested by the tsarist police. Before the Revolution, there were four more congresses and numerous conferences, distinguished by struggles between the Bolshevik and Menshevik wings of the party that led up to their ultimate split. The Second Party Congress, convened in Brussels in July 1903 with fifty-seven participants but forced to move its proceedings to London under threat of arrest, was the first true congress of the RSDWP. It saw the outbreak of the Bolshevik-Menshevik schism when Vladimir Lenin tried to impose his definition of party membership as a core of professional revolutionaries rather than the broad democratic constituency favored by the Menshevik leader Yuly Martov.

The next congress, later counted by the communists as the Third, was an all-Bolshevik meeting in London in April 1905, with just twenty-four voting delegates plus invited guests. The First Party Conference (as counted by the communists) was a gathering in December 1905 of forty Bolsheviks and a lone Menshevik in the city of Tammerfors (Tampere) in Russian-ruled Finland. They endorsed reunification with the Mensheviks and supported boycotting the tsar's new Duma (over Lenin's objections). At this meeting, Stalin made his initial appearance at the national level and first met Lenin face-to-face.

Following the abortive revolutionary events of 1905, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks came together in Stockholm in April 1906 for the Fourth Party Congress (by the Bolshevik enumeration), styled the Unification Congress, with a Menshevik majority among the 112 voting delegates. The two factions met together again in London in April and May 1907; this Fifth Party Congress was the last embracing both wings, and the last before the Revolution.

Small meetings later considered by the Bolsheviks as their Second through Fifth Party Conferences were held between 1906 and 1909, mostly in Finland, with Bolshevik, Menshevik, and other Social-Democratic groups represented. These gatherings continued to revolve around the questions of party unity and parliamentary tactics.

In 1912, going their separate ways, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks held separate party conferences. Twelve Bolsheviks plus four nonvoting delegates (including Lenin) met in Prague in January of that year for what they counted as the Sixth Party Conference. Excluding not only the Mensheviks but also the Left Bolsheviks denounced by Lenin after the Fifth Party Conference in 1909, this gathering established an organizational structure of Lenin's loyalists (including Grigory Zinoviev), to whom Stalin was added soon afterwards as a co-opted member of the Central Committee. The Sixth Party Conference was the real beginning of the Bolshevik Party as an independent entity under Lenin's strict control.

FROM THE REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR II

Shortly after the fall of the tsarist regime in the February Revolution of 1917 (March, New Style), but before Lenin's return to Russia, the Bolsheviks convened an All-Russian Meeting of Party Workers of some 120 delegates. Contrary to the stand Lenin was shortly to take, this March Conference, of which Stalin was one of the leaders, leaned toward cooperation with the new Provisional Government and reunification with the Mensheviks. For this reason, the March Conference was expunged from official communist history and was never counted in the numbering.

A few weeks later the Bolsheviks met more formally in Petrograd, with 133 voting delegates and eighteen nonvoting, for what was officially recorded as the Seventh or April Party Conference. On this occasion, by a bare majority, Lenin persuaded the party to reject the Provisional Government and to oppose continued Russian participation in World War I. Unlike postrevolutionary party conferences, the Seventh elected a new Central Committee, with nine members, including Lev Kamenev and Yakov Sverdlov along with Lenin, Zinoviev, and Stalin.

The Sixth Party Congress, all-Bolshevik, with 157 voting delegates and 110 nonvoting, was held in the Vyborg working-class district of Petrograd

in August 1917 under semi-clandestine conditions, after the Provisional Government tried to suppress the Bolsheviks following the abortive uprising of the July Days. Lenin and other leaders were in hiding or in jail at the time, and Stalin and Sverdlov were in charge. The congress welcomed Leon Trotsky and other left-wing Mensheviks into the Bolshevik Party, and Trotsky was included in the expanded Central Committee of twenty-one. However, the gathering could hardly keep up with events; it made no plans directed toward the Bolshevik seizure of power that came soon afterwards.

Four congresses followed the Bolshevik takeover in quick succession, all facing emergency circumstances of civil war and economic collapse. The Seventh, dubbed "special," was convened in Moscow in March 1918, with only forty-seven voting delegates, to approve the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ending hostilities with Germany and its allies. Lenin delivered a political report of the Central Committee, a function thereafter distinguishing the party's chief, while Nikolai Bukharin submitted a minority report for the Left Communists against the treaty (a gesture last allowed in 1925). After bitter debate between the Leninists and the Left, the treaty was approved, and Russia left the war. However, Bukharin was included in the new Central Committee of fifteen members. The Seventh Party Congress also formally changed the party's name from Russian Social-Democratic Party (of Bolsheviks) to Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). All subsequent party congresses continued to be held in Moscow.

The Eighth Party Congress met in March 1919 at the height of the civil war, with around three hundred voting delegates. It adopted a new revolutionary party program, approved the creation of the Politburo, Orgburo, and Secretariat, and saw its Leninist majority beat down opposition from the Left, who opposed the trend toward top-down authority in both military and political matters. The first postrevolutionary party conference, the Eighth, was held in Moscow (like all subsequent ones) in December 1919. It updated the party's rules and heard continued complaints about centralism in government.

Three months later, at the Ninth Party Congress in March 1920, Lenin and Trotsky and their supporters again had to fight off the anti-centralizers of the Left on both political and economic issues. Such protest was carried much farther at the Ninth Party Conference, which met in September 1920.

The "Group of Democratic Centralists" denounced bureaucratic centralism and won a sweeping endorsement of democracy and decentralism, unfortunately undercut by their acquiescence with respect to organizational efficiency and a new control commission.

This spirit of reform was soon smothered at the Tenth Party Congress, meeting in March 1921 with approximately seven hundred voting delegates. After some three hundred of its participants were dispatched to Petrograd to help suppress the Kronstadt Revolt, the congress voted in several crucial resolutions over the futile opposition of the small left-wing minority. It condemned the "syndicalist and anarchist deviation" of the Workers' Opposition, banned organized factions within the party in the name of unity, and supported the tax in kind, Lenin's first step in introducing the New Economic Policy. The Central Committee was expanded to twenty-five, but Trotsky's key supporters were dropped from this body as well as from the Politburo, Orgburo, and Secretariat.

Party congresses and conferences during the 1920s marked the transformation from a contentious, policy-setting gathering to an orchestrated phalanx of disciplined yes-men. This progression took place as Stalin perfected the circular flow of power through the party apparatus, guaranteeing his control of congress and conference proceedings. The Eleventh Party Congress, which met in March and April 1922, was the last with Lenin's participation. It focused on consolidating party discipline and strengthening the new Central Control Commission to keep deviators in line. Immediately after the Eleventh Party Congress, the Central Committee designated Stalin to fill the new office of General Secretary.

The Twelfth Party Congress took place in April 1923 during the interregnum between Lenin's incapacitation in December 1922 and his death in January 1924. Trotsky, Stalin, and Zinoviev were all jockeying for advantage in the anticipated struggle to succeed the party's ailing leader. Debate revolved particularly around questions of industrial development and policy toward the minority nationalities, while Stalin maneuvered to cover up Lenin's break with him and pack the Central Committee (expanded from twenty-seven to forty) with his own supporters.

The Tenth and Eleventh Party Conferences in 1921 and the Twelfth in 1922 were routine affairs, but the Thirteenth proved to be a decisive milestone.

At this gathering just before Lenin's death, the left opposition faction supporting Trotsky was condemned as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Stalin demonstrated his mastery of the circular flow of power by allowing only three oppositionists among the voting delegates.

By the time of the Thirteenth Party Congress in May 1924, the Soviet political atmosphere had changed even more. Lenin was dead; the triumvirate of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev was trumpeting the need for discipline and unity; and opposition had been virtually outlawed. Stalin's party apparatus had ensured that among the 748 voting delegates there was not a single voice to represent the opposition, and Trotsky, merely one of the 416 nonvoting delegates, temporarily recanted his criticisms of the party. The Central Committee was expanded again, to fifty-two, to make room for even more Stalin loyalists, especially from the regional apparatus.

The Fourteenth Party Conference, held in April 1925, endorsed Stalin's theory of socialism in one country and condemned Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. It marked the high point of the New Economic Policy (NEP) by way of liberalizing policy toward the peasants. However, this emphasis contributed to growing tension between the Stalin-Bukharin group of party leaders and the Zinoviev-Kamenev group.

At the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925 these two groups split openly. The so-called Leningrad Opposition, led by Zinoviev and Kamenev and backed by Lenin's widow Nadezhda Krupskaya, rebelled against Stalin's domination of the party and took with them the sixty-two Leningrad delegates. Kamenev openly challenged Stalin's suitability as party leader, but the opposition was soundly defeated by the well-disciplined majority. The NEP, especially as articulated by Bukharin, was for the time being reaffirmed, although subsequent Stalinist history represented the Fourteenth Congress as the beginning of the new industrialization drive. The Central Committee was expanded again, to sixty-three.

Acrimony between the majority and the newly allied Zinovievists and Trotskyists was even sharper at the Fifteenth Party Conference of October–November 1926. Kamenev now denounced Stalin's theory of socialism in one country as a falsification of Lenin's views. Nevertheless, the opposition was unanimously condemned as a "Social-Democratic" (i.e., Menshevik) deviation.

When the Fifteenth Party Congress met in December 1927, the left opposition leaders Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev had been dropped from the party's leadership bodies, and Trotsky had been expelled from the party altogether. At the congress itself, the opposition was condemned and its followers were expelled from the party as well. At the same time, the congress adopted resolutions on a five-year plan and on the peasantry that subsequently served as legitimation for Stalin's industrialization and collectivization drives. Eight more members were added to the Central Committee, not counting replacements for the condemned oppositionists, bringing the total to seventy-one (a figure that held until 1952).

By the time of the Sixteenth Party Conference in April 1929, the Soviet political scene had changed sharply again. Stalin had defeated the Right Opposition led by Bukharin, government chairman Alexei Rykov, and trade-union chief Mikhail Tomsky, and was initiating his five-year plans and forced collectivization. The main task of the conference was to legitimize the First Five-Year Plan (already approved by the Central Committee), backdating its inception to the beginning of the annual economic plan that had already been in force since October 1928. A new party purge, in the older sense of weeding out undesirables from the membership, was also authorized by the conference.

The Sixteenth Party Congress, held in June and July 1930, could hardly keep up with events. Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky had been condemned and had recanted, although the congress allowed them to keep their Central Committee seats for the time being. The congress unanimously acclaimed the program of the Stalin Revolution in industry and agriculture. The industrialization theme was echoed by the Seventeenth Party Conference of January–February 1932; it approved the formulation of the Second Five-Year Plan, to commence in January 1933 (even though by that time the First Five-Year Plan would have been formally in effect for only three years and eight months).

When the Seventeenth Party Congress convened in January–February 1934, collectivization had been substantially accomplished despite the catastrophic though unacknowledged famine in the Ukraine and the southern regions of the Russian Republic. Following the accelerated termination of the First Five-Year Plan, the Second had begun. The congress was dubbed "the Congress of Victors," while Stalin addressed the body to reject the philosophy of egalitarianism and emphasize the au-

thority of individual managers and party leaders. Yet there was surreptitious opposition over the harshness of Stalin's program, and behind-the-scenes talk of replacing him with Leningrad party secretary Sergei Kirov. In the end, nearly three hundred delegates out of 1,225 voted against Stalin in the slate of candidates for the Central Committee. Stalin got his revenge in the purges of 1936 through 1938, when the party apparatus was decimated and more than half of the people who had been congress delegates in 1934 were arrested and executed.

The Eighteenth Party Congress came only after a lapse of over five years, in March 1939. An almost entirely new Central Committee was installed, Nikita Khrushchev achieved membership in the Politburo, and the Third Five-Year Plan was belatedly approved. Stalin further revised Marxist ideology by emphasizing the historical role of the state and the new intelligentsia. A follow-up party conference, the Eighteenth, was held in February 1941; it endorsed measures of industrial discipline, but was mainly significant for the emergence of Georgy Malenkov into the top leadership. The institution of the party conference then fell into abeyance, until Mikhail Gorbachev revived it in 1988.

FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNIST PARTY RULE

After the Eighteenth Party Congress, none was held for thirteen years, during the time of war and post-war recovery. When the Nineteenth Party Congress finally convened in October 1952, the question of succession to the aging Stalin was already impending. Stalin implicitly anointed Malenkov as his replacement by designating him to deliver the political report of the Central Committee. At the same time, the party's leading organs were overhauled: the Politburo was renamed the Party Presidium, with an expanded membership of twenty-five (including Leonid Brezhnev), and the Orgburo was dissolved. The congress also officially changed the party's name from All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) to Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

By the time of the Twentieth Party Congress, convened in February 1956, Stalin was dead, Khrushchev had prevailed in the contest to succeed him, and the Thaw, the abatement of Stalinist terror, was underway. Nevertheless, Khrushchev proceeded to astound the party and ultimately the world with his Secret Speech to the congress, de-

nouncing Stalin's purges and the cult of personality. To this, he added a call, in his open report to the congress, for peaceful coexistence with the noncommunist world. The congress also established a special bureau of the Central Committee to superintend the business of the party in the Russian Republic, which, unlike the other union republics, had no distinct Communist Party organization of its own.

In January–February 1959 Khrushchev convened the Extraordinary Twenty-First Party Congress, mainly for the purpose of endorsing his new seven-year economic plan in lieu of the suspended Sixth Five-Year Plan. As an extraordinary assembly, the congress did not conduct any elections to renew the leadership.

At the Twenty-Second Party Congress of October 1961, with its numbers vastly increased to 4,408 voting and 405 nonvoting delegates, Khrushchev introduced more sensations. Along with renewed denunciation of the Anti-Party Group that had tried to depose Khrushchev in 1957, and condemnation of the ideological errors of communist China, the congress approved the removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin mausoleum on Red Square. The congress also issued a new party program, the first to be formally adopted since 1919, with emphasis on Khrushchev's notions of egalitarianism and of overtaking capitalism economically.

Four party congresses were held under Leonid Brezhnev's leadership, all routine affairs with little change in the aging party leadership. The Twenty-Third Party Congress in March–April 1966 emphasized political stabilization. It reversed Khrushchev's innovations by changing the name of the party presidium back to Politburo and by abolishing the party bureau for the Russian Republic, but took no new initiatives regarding either Stalinism or the economy. The Twenty-Fourth Party Congress convened in March–April 1971, a year later than originally planned; further economic growth was stressed, but the issue of decentralist reforms was straddled. The Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in February–March 1976 was distinguished only by more blatant glorification of General Secretary Brezhnev, as the 4,998 delegates (no nonvoting delegates from this time on) heard him stress tighter administrative and ideological controls in the service of further economic growth. Continuity still marked the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress in February–March 1981: Brezhnev was in his dotage

and his entourage was dying off, and economic inefficiency and inertia, especially in agriculture, remained at the center of attention. The years spanned by the Twenty-Third through the Twenty-Sixth Congresses were aptly known afterwards as the era of stagnation.

With the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, attended by approximately five thousand delegates in February–March 1986, the dissolution of the Communist Party dictatorship in the Soviet Union had begun. Gorbachev had taken over as General Secretary after Brezhnev's death and the brief administrations of Yury Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, and had undertaken a sweeping renovation of the aging leadership. At the congress itself, more than three-fourths of the delegates were participating for the first time, and the new Central Committee elected by the congress had more new members than any since 1961. Gorbachev's main themes of socialist self-government and acceleration in the economy were dutifully echoed by the congress, without intimating the extent of changes soon to come.

An even more significant meeting was Gorbachev's convocation in June 1988 of the Nineteenth Party Conference, the first one since 1941, and a far larger gathering than under the old practice, with 4,976 delegates. Faced with growing opposition by conservatives in the party organization, Gorbachev could not rely on the circular flow of power, but had to campaign for the election of pro-reform delegates—without much success. He had hoped to give the conference the authority of a party congress to shake up the Central Committee, but had to defer this step. Nevertheless, as Gorbachev himself noted, debate at the conference was more frank than anything heard since the 1920s. The outcome was endorsement of sweeping constitutional changes that shifted real power from the party organization to the government, with a strong president (Gorbachev himself) and the elected Congress of People's Deputies.

In July 1990, as Gorbachev's reform program was peaking, the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress convened with 4,863 delegates. It proved to be the last party congress before the collapse of Communist rule and the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the freer political space allowed by Gorbachev's steps toward democratization, including surrender of the party's political monopoly, the party had broken into factions: the conservatives led by Party Second Secretary Yegor Ligachev, the radical re-

formers led by the deposed Moscow Party Secretary Boris Yeltsin, and the center around Gorbachev. At the congress, the conservatives submitted to Gorbachev in the spirit of party discipline, but Yeltsin demonstratively walked out and quit the party. Nonetheless, calling for a new civil society in place of Stalinism, Gorbachev presided over the most open, no-holds-barred debate since the communists took power in 1917. He radically shook up the Communist Party leadership, restaffed the Politburo as a group of union republic leaders, and terminated party control of governmental and managerial appointments maintained under the old "nomenklatura" system. For the first time, congress resolutions were confined to the internal organizational business of the party, and steered clear of national political issues. Barely more than a year later, in August 1991, the conservatives' attempted *coup d'état* against Gorbachev discredited what was left of Communist Party authority and set the stage for the demise of the Soviet Union.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; KAMENEV, LEV BORISOVICH; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MENSHEVIKS; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON; ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH

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ROBERT V. DANIELS

PARTY OF RUSSIAN UNITY AND ACCORD

The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (Partiya Rossiyskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya, or PRES) was founded for the 1993 elections as a regional variant of the ruling party. Its founder, a visible politician of the early Boris Yeltsin period, deputy prime minister Sergei Shakhrai, was at the time the head of the State Committee on Federal and Nationalist Issues, whose apparatus was used in the provinces as a base for party construction. Even the constituent assembly of the PRES in October 1993 took place not in Moscow but in Novgorod. The party proclaimed as its goal the preservation of Russia's unity through securing equal rights of the subjects of the Russian Federation. The PRES list at the 1993 elections was headed by Shakhrai; Alexander Shokhin, deputy prime minister and an economist; and Konstantin Zatulin, chair of the association Entrepreneurs for a New Russia. Two federal ministers were included on it as well: Yuri Kalmykov and Gennady Melikian, and also the future public figures Valery Kirpichnikov (minister of regional politics in 1998–1999), Vladimir Tumanov (chair of the Constitutional Court in 1995–1996), and

others. The list received 3.6 million votes (6.7%, seventh place), mainly in the national republics, and eighteen mandates; four PRES candidates in single-mandate districts were elected. The PRES fraction started out with thirty Duma delegates and ended with twelve, due to disagreement over the Chechnya question as well as interfractional maneuvering. During the 1995 campaign, PRES first joined with Our Home Is Russia (NDR), but then made its own list with Shakhrai at the head and registered twenty-three candidates in the districts. However, Shakhrai's political stardom was already on the decline, and when he left the State Committee on Federal and Nationalist Issues, he lost his base in the provinces. The list received 246,000 votes (0.4%), and in the majority districts only Shakhrai won, joining with the group Russian Regions. In the 1999 elections, the PRES did not participate independently. Shakhrai, joining with Yuri Luzhkov, was included in the original version of the Fatherland—All Russia (OVR) list, but excluded at the bloc's congress. In May 2000 the PRES merged into Unity when the latter was restructured from a movement into a party.

See also: SHAKHRAI, SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH; UNITY (MEDVED) PARTY

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NIKOLAI PETROV

PASSPORT SYSTEM

For the first time since the revolution, the Soviet regime introduced an internal passport system in December 1932. Most rural residents were not given passports, and peasants acquired the automatic right to a passport only during the 1970s. The OGPU/NKVD (Soviet military intelligence service and secret police), which administered the passport system, initially issued these documents to

persons over sixteen years of age who lived in towns, workers' settlements, state farms, and construction sites. They were required to obtain and register their passport with the police, who would then issue the necessary residence permit.

People who did not qualify for a passport were evicted from their apartments and denied the right to live and work within city limits. The categories of people who were denied a passport and urban residence permit included: the disenfranchised, kulaks or the dekulakized, all persons with a criminal record, persons not engaged in socially useful work, and family members of the aforementioned categories. The stated purpose of the new passport system was to relieve the urban population of persons not engaged in socially useful labor, as well as hidden kulak, criminal, and other antisocietal elements.

Some scholars note that the passport law emerged in response to the massive urban migration that followed the 1932 famine. The resulting movement of peasants from the countryside into the cities strained the urban rationing and supply systems. The selective distribution of passports offered a solution to this crisis by restricting urban residency and limiting access to city services and goods. Other scholars emphasize that the passport system was established to manage the urban population. Passports emerged as an instrument of repression and police control. By issuing passports, the state could more precisely identify, order, and purge the urban population. Nonetheless, scholars agree that the system of internal passports and urban residence permits sought to remove unreliable elements from strategic cities, limit the flow of people into these cities, and relieve the pressure on the urban rationing and supply systems.

Passports categorized the Soviet population into distinct groups with varying rights and privileges. The internal passport recorded citizens' social position or class, occupation, nationality, age, sex, and place of residence. The identity fixed on a person's passport determined where that individual could work, travel, and live. Only those with certain social, ethnic, and occupational identities were allowed residency in privileged cities, industrial sites, and strategic border and military areas. The passport also tied individuals to geographic areas and restricted their movements.

In the process of assigning passports, Soviet police removed dangerous, marginal, and anti-Soviet elements from the major cities. Many people fled

the cities as passports were being introduced, fearful that they would be arrested by the police as socially harmful elements. Passportization operations were also used to purge the western borderlands of Polish, German, Finnish, and other anti-Soviet groups.

In the initial phases, the internal passport and urban registration system often functioned in an irregular and erratic manner. Many people circumvented the system by forging passports, and others lived in towns without a valid passport.

See also: FAMINE OF 1932-1933; KULAKS; MIGRATION; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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GOLFO ALEXOPOULOS

PASTERNAK, BORIS LEONIDOVICH

(1890-1960), poet, writer, translator.

Boris Leonidovich Pasternak was the most prominent figure of his literary generation, a great poet deeply connected with his age. His work unfolded during a period of fundamental changes in Russian cultural, social, and political history. It is therefore no wonder that many of his works, and most notably his novel, *Doctor Zhivago*, are imbued with the spirit of history and relate its effect on the lives, thoughts, and preoccupations of his contemporaries. In 1958 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for his achievements in lyrical poetry and the great Russian epic tradition.


Pasternak was born in Moscow into a highly cultured Jewish family. His father, Leonid Pasternak, was a well-known impressionist painter and professor at the Moscow School of Painting; his mother was an accomplished pianist. During his formative years, Pasternak studied music and philosophy but abandoned them for literature. At the

beginning of his literary career, he was associated with the artistic avant-garde, and his modern sensibility was strongly expressed in his first two volumes of poetry, *Twin in the Clouds* (1914) and *Above the Barriers* (1916), and in his early experiments in fiction (1911–1913). Most of Pasternak's works written between 1911 and 1931 explore possibilities far beyond realism and are characterized by dazzling metaphorical imagery and complex syntax reminiscent of Cubo-Futurist poetry, associated especially with Vladimir Mayakovsky. Pasternak's cycle, *My Sister-Life*, published in 1922, is recognized as his most outstanding poetic achievement.

Pasternak's initial support of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 vanished when the new regime revealed its authoritarian and ruthless features. Like many other Soviet writers during the 1920s, Pasternak felt pressured by the authorities, who were in the process of establishing control over literature, to portray the revolutionary age in epic form. Despite his contempt for the party's promotion of the epic, and his disappointment over the decline of lyrical poetry, Pasternak realized that, in order to survive as a poet, he had to adjust to the new cultural-political climate and try the epic genre. During the course of the 1920s, therefore, Pasternak wrote four epics: *Sublime Malady* (1924), *The Year Nineteen Five* (1927), *Lieutenant Schmidt* (1926), and *Spektorsky* (published in installments between 1924 and 1930). There is a perceptible stylistic and thematic difference between Pasternak's previous works and his epic poems.

During the early 1930s, Pasternak was lifted into the first rank of Soviet writers. He was the only poet of his generation who was allowed to publish. Osip Mandelstam was out of favor with the government, Anna Akhmatova was not publishing, Mayakovsky and Sergei Yesenin committed suicide, and Marina Tsvetaeva was living abroad. Pasternak was the sole poet whom the government was initially willing to tolerate. During this period, he completed only one cycle of poetry, *Second Birth* (1932), a book whose optimistic title and tone Pasternak himself soon came to dislike as a collection for which he had compromised his poetic standards, and in which he had simplified the language for the sake of a mass readership.

Starting in 1932, the Central Committee of the Communist Party abolished all literary schools and associations and moved decisively toward consolidating its control over all writers' activities and their artistic production. In 1934 the Party established the Union of Soviet Writers and implemented



Author and poet Boris Pasternak. © JERRY COOKE/CORBIS

the official new artistic method of "socialist realism" that demanded from the artist "truthfulness" and "an historically concrete portrayal of reality in its revolutionary development." Writers were now treated as builders of a new life and "engineers of human souls." Pasternak's modernist autobiography *Safe Conduct* was banned in 1933 and not published again until the 1980s.

The most oppressive period in Soviet history began in 1936, and a reign of terror marked the next few years. Many of Pasternak's friends became victims of the Great Terror. The poet himself fell from grace and survived by mere chance. He nearly abandoned creative writing, devoting himself almost exclusively to translations. While this relieved him from the pressure of having to write pro-Stalinist poetry during the worst years of the Great Terror, it also pushed him into an increasingly peripheral position. Translating became a means of material survival for him during the darkest years of Soviet history, and his translations from this period alone would assure Pasternak a notable place in the history of Russian literature.

During World War II Pasternak published only two collections of poetry, *On Early Trains* (1943), and *Earth's Vastness* (1945). Both collections were written in the vein of socialist realism, with all traces of Pasternak's early avant-garde poetics obliterated. The official critical reception of *On Early Trains* was warm, but Pasternak himself found it embarrassing and repeatedly apologized for the small number and eclectic selection of poems.

After the war, Stalin launched a campaign against antipatriotic and cosmopolitan elements in Soviet society. This campaign came to be known as *zhdanovshchina*, after Andrei Zhdanov, the secretary of the Central Committee, who obligingly unleashed a slanderous campaign against some major cultural figures. Zhdanov's scapegoats in literature became the satirist Mikhail Zoshchenko and the poet Akhmatova. Pasternak's work came under attack too, and he ended up writing almost nothing during *zhdanovshchina*. Translations provided his major creative outlet.

After Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet culture experienced a period of liberalization known as the Thaw. It was precipitated by the so-called Secret Speech delivered by the new first secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. In this speech, Khrushchev exposed Stalin's crimes and denounced his personality cult. It was at that time that Pasternak attempted to publish his novel *Doctor Zhivago* (written between 1945 and 1955). No Soviet publisher, however, was willing to publish this work, because of its controversial portrayal of the Revolution. Pasternak sent the manuscript to an Italian publisher, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, who offered to publish it. *Doctor Zhivago* thus first appeared in Italian, without official Soviet approval, in November 1957 and became an overwhelming success. Over the next two years the novel was translated into twenty-four languages.

In 1958 Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize in literature. This honor played a double role in Pasternak's literary career: on the one hand, it established his international literary stature, while on the other it made him the target of a vicious ideological campaign unleashed against him by the Soviet authorities. The fact that the poet had been nominated previously for the Nobel Prize for his poetry—specifically in 1947 and again in 1953—did not seem to bear any significance for the cultural bureaucrats. Pasternak was expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers and accused of betraying his country and negatively portraying the Social-

ist revolution and Soviet society—by people who, for the most part, never even read *Doctor Zhivago*. Under enormous psychological pressure and the threat of deportation to the West, Pasternak was forced to decline the Nobel Prize. But the attacks against him never stopped. *Doctor Zhivago* was published in the Soviet Union only posthumously, in 1988. During the last decade of his life, Pasternak's most distinct poetic achievement was *When the Weather Clears*, a collection of poetry from 1959. It shows him moving toward an increasingly contemplative mood and linguistic simplicity. Pasternak died in his dacha in Peredelkino in 1960.

Pasternak was the only great literary figure of his generation whose works continued to be published throughout his career. Although he had to pay a price, both artistic and personal, for his poetic freedom, he generally managed to preserve his moral and artistic integrity. Pasternak's work continues the best traditions of Russian literature and is permeated with devotion to individual freedom, moral and spiritual values, intolerance of oppressive governments, and a concern with the present and future of Russia. What distinguishes Pasternak's contribution to Russian literature is the life-affirming and resilient nature of his work and its remarkable power to present everyday reality in a unique and vibrant vision.

See also: CENSORSHIP; UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS

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LARISSA RUDOVA

PATRIARCHATE

In 1589 the metropolitan of Moscow, head of the Orthodox Church in Russia, received the new and higher title of patriarch. This title made him equal in rank to the four other patriarchs of the Eastern Church: those of Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople. Patriarch Jeremias II of Constantinople bestowed the new title on Metropolitan Job, who had been metropolitan since 1586.

The establishment of the Moscow patriarchate was the result of a complex arrangement between Boris Godunov, de facto regent of Russia in the time of Tsar Fyodor (r. 1584–1598), and the Greeks. The new title implied the acceptance by the Greek church of the autocephaly (autonomy) of the Russian church and considerably reinforced the prestige of the Russian church and state. In return the Greeks found a protector for the Orthodox peoples of the Ottoman Empire and a strong source of financial support for their church. Building on the powers and position of the earlier metropolitans, the patriarchs of Moscow were the leading figures in the church in Russia until the abolition of the office after the death of the last patriarch in 1700. The power of the patriarch came not only from his authority over the church, but also from his great wealth in land and serfs in central Russia. As the Russian church, like the other Orthodox churches, was a conciliar church, the power of the patriarchs was limited by the power of the tsar as well as by the requirement that, when making important decisions, a patriarch call a council of the bishops and most influential abbots.

Job, the first patriarch, supported Boris Godunov as regent and later as tsar. The defeat of Boris by the first False Dmitry at the beginning of the Time of Troubles led to the ouster of Job in 1605. The Greek bishop Ignaty replaced him that year, only to be expelled in turn after the Moscow populace turned against the False Dmitry. The new patriarch Germogen (1606–1612) was one of the leaders of Russian resistance to Polish occupation during the later years of the Troubles. Only after the final end of the Troubles and the election of Mikhail Romanov as tsar was the situation calm enough to permit the choosing of a new patriarch. This was tsar Mikhail's father, Patriarch Filaret (1619–1633). An important boyar during the 1590s, he had been exiled by Boris Godunov and forced to enter a monastery. Imprisoned in Poland during the Troubles, in 1619 he was allowed to return home, where the Greek patriarch of Jerusalem, Theo-

phanes; the Russian clergy; and tsar Mikhail chose him to lead the church. Filaret quickly settled several disputed points of liturgy and began to rebuild the Russian church after the desolation of the Time of Troubles. Much of the time during his patriarchate was occupied with matters having to do with relations with the Orthodox of the Ukraine and Belorussia under Polish Catholic rule. Filaret also played a major role in Russian politics.

Under patriarchs Joseph I (1634–1640) and Joseph (1640–1652) the church was quiet. Only in the last years of Joseph's patriarchate did new currents arise, the Zealots of Piety under the leadership of Stefan Vonifatev, spiritual father to Tsar Alexei (r. 1645–1676). The Zealots wanted reform of the liturgy and more preaching, with the aim of bringing the Christian message closer to the laity. Iosif was skeptical of their efforts, and their triumph came only after his death under the new patriarch Nikon (1652–1666, d. 1681). Nikon accepted the Zealots' program, but his liturgical reforms led to a schism in the church and the formation of groups known as Old Ritualists or Old Believers. Conflict with tsar Alexei led Nikon to abdicate in 1658, and he was formally deposed at a church council in 1666, which also condemned the Old Ritualists. The short patriarchates of Joseph II (1667–1672) and Pitirim (1672–1673) were largely devoted to efforts to defeat the Old Ritualists and restore order after the eight-year gap in church authority. Their successor Patriarch Joakim (1674–1690) was a powerful figure reminiscent in some ways of Nikon. He attempted to reorganize the diocesan system of the church, found schools, and suppress the Old Ritualists, an increasingly fruitless effort. Russia's first European-type school, the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, was set up with his patronage in 1685. He supported the young Peter the Great in overthrowing his half-sister, the regent Sophia, in 1689. The last patriarch, Adrian (1690–1700), usually considered a cultural conservative, was actually a complex figure who supported some of the new currents in Russian culture coming from Poland and the Ukraine. His relations with Peter the Great were never warm, and, when he died, Peter did not permit the church to replace him, and placed the Ukrainian Metropolitan of Ryazan, Stefan Yavorsky, as administrator of the church without the patriarchal title. Ultimately, Peter abolished the position and organized the Holy Synod in 1719, a committee of clergy and laymen and under a layman, to take the place of the patriarch. The Synod headed the Orthodox church in Russia until 1917.

Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, voices within the Orthodox Church called for the reestablishment of the patriarchate. Such a move would mean the lessening of state control over the church and the beginning of separation of church and state, so both the government and many conservative churchmen opposed it. The collapse of the tsarist regime in March 1917 made such a radical change not only possible but necessary. Consequently, the Synod organized a council of the Russian church, which opened in August 1917. Its work continued after the Bolshevik seizure of power, and elected Tikhon, the metropolitan of Moscow, to the dignity of patriarch on November 21, 1917. Patriarch Tikhon's fate was to head the church during the Russian Civil War and the early years of Soviet power. Tikhon was sympathetic to the White anti-Bolshevik cause and was faced with a radically anticlerical and explicitly atheist revolutionary regime. He suffered imprisonment and harassment from the state, as well as internal dissent in the church. Upon his death in 1925, the church was in no position to replace him. The ensuing decades saw fierce antireligious propaganda by the Soviet authorities and massive persecution. Most churches in the USSR were closed, and thousands of priests and monks were imprisoned and executed.

In 1943 Josef Stalin suddenly decided to once again legalize the existence of the Orthodox church. He met with the few remaining members of the hierarchy to explain the new policy and permitted a council of the church to choose a new patriarch. The choice was Sergei, metropolitan of Moscow, senior living bishop and erstwhile prerevolutionary rector of the St. Petersburg Spiritual Academy. The elderly Patriarch Sergei died early in 1944, and in 1945 Alexei, metropolitan of Leningrad, replaced him, continuing to lead the church until his death in 1970. In these years the Soviet state permitted a modest revival of worship and religious life, but also placed the church under the watchful eye of the state Council on the Russian Orthodox Church, headed in 1943–1957 by Major General Georgy Karpov of the KGB. Patriarch Alexei endured the last major attack on the church under Nikita Khrushchev as well as the *modus vivendi* of the later Soviet years. His successors were patriarchs Pimen (1970–1990) and Alexei II (beginning in 1990).

See also: ALEXEI I, PATRIARCH; ALEXEI II, PATRIARCH; FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH; HOLY SYNOD; JOAKIM, PATRIARCH; JOB, PATRIARCH; METROPOLITAN; NIKON, PATRIARCH; PIMEN, PATRIARCH; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SERGEI, PATRIARCH; TIKHON, PATRIARCH

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PAUL A. BUSHKOVITCH

PAUL I

(1754–1801), tsar of Russia 1796–1801.

Tsar Paul I (Paul Petrovitch) was born on September 20, 1754. He was officially the son of Tsarevitch Peter and his wife Catherine, but more probably the son of Sergei Saltykov—chamberlain at the court and lover of Catherine since 1752. At his birth, the child was taken away from his parents by his great-aunt, ruling Empress Elizabeth, who brought him to her court, supervised his education, and surrounded him with several tutors such as the old count Nikita Panin. He was eight in July 1762 when, six months after Elizabeth's death and his father's coronation as Peter III, his mother acceded to the throne as Catherine II by a coup that first led to the deposition of the tsar and then to his assassination, intended or not, by Alexei Orlov, one of the main leaders of the conspiracy. From that time on Catherine II, who feared his popularity, kept the child far away from power; Paul Petrovitch grew up in relative loneliness that contributed to make him distrustful. In September 1773, he married Princess Wilhelmine of Hesse-Darmstadt who died in April 1776 while delivering her first baby. In September of that same year, pushed by his mother who wanted an heir, he married Princess Sophia Dorothea of Württemberg (Maria Fiodorovna), who would give birth to ten children. Empress Catherine took away the first two boys, Alexander (born in December 1777) and Constantin (born in April 1779); she personally took care of their education and later intended to appoint Alexander as her heir, instead of Paul.

From September 1781 to August 1782, Paul and his wife made an eleven-month tour that brought them to all the European courts and allowed the future tsar to discover European political models and ways of life.

After returning to Russia, still deprived of their older sons and of any power, Paul and Maria Fiodor-

ovna lived at Gatchina, a large estate given to them by Catherine. At Gatchina, the tsarevitch had his own court and a personal small army, composed of 2,400 soldiers and 140 officers. Isolated, fascinated by the Prussian model, Paul began to show an abnormal obsession for military parades and processions and started to tyrannize his soldiers. But at the same time, he established a hospital where peasants could receive free medical care, founded a school for the children of his serfs, and was tolerant of the Lutheran faith of his Finnish serfs.

On November 5, 1796, the death of Catherine made him tsar at the age of forty-two. He made many decisions—more than two thousand ukases in five years—that revealed the rejection of his mother's heritage, but they were not always consistent. In domestic policy, he first issued on April 1797 a decree establishing the principle of male primogeniture for succession to the throne, so as to eliminate any political turmoil. He proclaimed a general amnesty, freed all of Catherine's political prisoners, including the thinker Nikolai Novikov, and liberated the twelve thousand Poles kept in Russian jails since the last Polish war of independence led by Tadeusz Kociuszko. His hate for Catherine's immoral behavior and way of governing brought him to exile his mother's lovers and to cut down court expenses. His piety led him to forbid landowners from forcing serfs to work on Sundays and on religious feasts, while his mistrust of the nobility led him to impose a new tax on nobles' estates. All these measures, as well as the reorganization of the Russian military service according to the Prussian model and the reintroduction of corporal punishment for nobles, made him very unpopular quickly among the aristocracy.

At the same time, deeply hostile to the French Revolution and anxious about its potential impact on the Russian Empire, he heavily censored intellectual and political productions, rejecting the symbols of a French liberal influence in all spheres, even in the more superficial ones such as fashion. Relying on a growing bureaucracy, he reinforced the autocratic regime, condemning random innocents to Siberia or jail to show his unlimited power. He also systematically repressed peasant riots and extended serfdom to the Southern colonies. His domestic policy was therefore a mixture of generous and tyrannical measures.

In foreign policy, his choices were much more consistent. He pursued his mother's policy of ex-



Emperor Paul I by Vladimir Lukic Borovikovsky. © THE STATE RUSSIAN MUSEUM/CORBIS

pansionism in the Far East and Caucasus: in 1799, he chartered a Russian-American Company to favor Russian economic and commercial expansion in the North Pacific; and in December 1800 he annexed the kingdom of Georgia. As to war in Europe, he first chose to abstain but finally decided in 1798–1799 to join the Second Coalition against Napoleon I, together with Great Britain, Naples, Portugal, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire. Russian troops obtained brilliant successes: in winter 1798–1799, Admiral Fyodor Ushakov took the Ionian Islands from the French armies and established a republic occupied by the Russians. Meanwhile, General Alexander Suvarov won impressive battles in Italy (Cassano and Novi) and Switzerland in 1798–1800. And in November 1798, opposing Napoleon's claim to the Island of Malta, Paul agreed to become the protector and Great-Master of the Order of Malta. But in 1800, irritated by the suspicious behavior of his Austrian and British allies and convinced that an alliance with Napoleon could favor the Russian national interests, Paul abruptly

changed his mind. He led Russia into a rapprochement with France and a war against Britain; to this end, in January 1801 he launched a military expedition toward India. These last decisions were perceived as dangerous and even foolish by a faction of the court. Encouraged by Charles Whitworth, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, and with the passive complicity of Tsarevitch Alexander, several figures close to the tsar, such as Nikita Panin the young, Count Peter von Pahlen, general governor of St. Petersburg, and Leontii Bennigsen, led a conspiracy that culminated with Paul's brutal assassination in March 1801.

See also: CATHERINE II; NOVIKOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

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MARIE-PIERRE REY

PAVLIUCHENKO, LYUDMILA MIKHAILOVNA

(1916–1974), soldier, historian, and journalist.

A World War II heroine who became champion sniper with 309 kills to her credit, including thirty-six enemy snipers, Pavlyuchenko was the first Soviet citizen received at the White House. She retired at the rank of major after serving in the No. 2 Company, Second Battalion, 54th Razin Regiment, 25th "V.I. Chapayev" Division of the Independent Maritime Army, and was awarded the status of Hero of the Soviet Union on 25 October 1943.

Born in Belaya Tserkov, Pavliuchenko completed high school while working in the Arsenal factory in Kiev, where she mastered small arms in a military club. She also trained as a sniper at the paramilitary Osoaviakhim (loosely translated as "Society for the Promotion of Aviation and Chemical Defense") and took up hang-gliding and parachuting. After enrolling at the State University of Kiev, she successfully defended her master's thesis on Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

Pavliuchenko volunteered for military service during the summer of 1941 and became an expert sniper for the Independent Maritime Army in Odessa and Sevastopol. Invited by Eleanor Roosevelt, she toured North America in August 1942 and was presented with a Winchester rifle in Toronto. In 1943 she completed the Vystrel Courses for Officers. On graduating from Kiev University in 1945, she became a military historian and journalist. Affected with a concussion and wounded four times, Pavliuchenko died prematurely and was buried at the prestigious Novodevichye Cemetery in Moscow.

See also: AVIATION; WORLD WAR II

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KAZIMIERA J. COTTAM

PAVLOVA, ANNA MATVEYEVNA

(1881–1931), the most famous of Russian ballerinas.

Anna Matveyevna Pavlova (patronymic later changed to Pavlovna) began her career in the St. Petersburg Imperial Theaters in 1898, which ended amidst her usual flurry of performing in 1930, only weeks before her death. Pavlova's rise to the rank of ballerina in the Imperial Theaters (by 1906) was rapid, though her artistic breakthrough came the following year, when she appeared in several short works choreographed by Michel Fokine. Two of these works (*Les Sylphides* and *Le Pavillon d'Armide*) would join the roster of Serge Diaghilev's Ballets Russes (as would their star performers, Pavlova and Vaslav Nijinsky). Both the ballets and dancers achieved unprecedented fame in that company's Paris season of 1909. Pavlova debuted another Fokine composition in St. Petersburg in 1908, a solo that would become her signature work and that remains strongly identified with her: *The Swan*, to music of Camille Saint-Saëns. Popularly known as the dying swan, this evanescent figure suited Pavlova's physical type and stage temperament. Pavlova excelled in ethereal, romantic roles such as



Prima ballerina Anna Pavlova is considered one of the premier dancers of the twentieth century. © CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

"Giselle," and would later create for herself a multitude of roles in which she portrayed butterflies, roses, snowflakes, dragonflies, poppies, leaves, and various other delicate creatures. After achieving international stardom with Diaghilev's Ballets Russes, Pavlova struck out on her own, first negotiating an enviable contract with the Imperial Theaters, and subsequently abandoning the Russian stage to settle in London. In twenty years of touring the globe, Pavlova came to personify the peripatetic Russian ballerina, the touring star whose only home was the stage.

See also: BALLET; NIJINSKY, VASLAV FOMICH

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TIM SCHOLL

PAVLOV, IVAN PETROVICH

(1849–1936), Russian physiologist and Nobel Prize winner.

Ivan Pavlov was born in Ryazan. His father, a local priest, wanted him to attend the theological seminary, but Pavlov's interest in natural sciences led him to enroll in St. Petersburg University in 1870. In 1883 he completed his doctoral dissertation and in 1890 became professor and head of the physiology division of the St. Petersburg Institute of Experimental Medicine, where he remained until 1925. Pavlov's work on the functioning of the digestive system earned him the Nobel Prize in 1904. His originality lay in his approach to physiology, which considered the coordinated functioning of the organism as a whole, as well as his innovative surgical technique, which allowed him to observe digestion in live animals.

Pavlov's most well known research involved the study of conditioned reflexes. In his famous experiment, he placed a dog in a room free of all distractions. He found that the dog, accustomed to hearing a bell ring when being fed, would eventually salivate at the sound of the bell alone. Pavlov also applied his findings to the human nervous system. His work advanced the understanding of physiology and influenced international developments in medicine, psychology, and pedagogy.

Pavlov did not support the Bolshevik Revolution and in 1920 asked for permission to leave with his family. Vladimir Lenin, aware of the international prestige Pavlov brought to science in the Soviet Union, personally intervened to guarantee the resources for Pavlov to continue his research. In 1935, the International Congress of Physiologists awarded Pavlov the distinction of world senior physiologist. He died of pneumonia in Leningrad at the age of eighty-seven.

See also: EDUCATION

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SHARON A. KOWALSKY

PAVLOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH

(1937–2003), prime minister.

Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov was Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's minister of finance when perestroika was in full swing during the 1980s and the last prime minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics before its collapse. Discharged on August 22, 1991 by President Gorbachev's decree for his role in the coup attempt that month, Pavlov was arrested a week later, imprisoned for sixteen months, and finally amnestied in May 1994. He died on March 30, 2003, at the age of sixty-five.

For most of his career, Pavlov occupied positions in the Russian SFSR and USSR related to finance. Having joined the Communist Party in 1962, he headed the Finance Department in the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) in 1979. After working briefly as first deputy finance minister in Nikolai Ryzhkov's government in 1986, Pavlov became chairman of the State Committee for Prices from August 1986 to June 1989. With approval of the party leadership, Pavlov reformed prices, withdrawing high-denomination notes from circulation overnight. This act caused a financial crisis and a great measure of unpopularity for him. Frustrated by his inability to maintain a grip on the ruble's value, while allowing the Soviet economy some small exposure to the free market, Pavlov blamed a plot by western banks for his decision to withdraw the bank notes. As the Soviet economy grew increasingly unstable and inflation skyrocketed, Pavlov tried other unpopular economic measures, but soon realized that the political and economic crisis was out of his control. The contradictions between Gorbachev's desire to reform the Soviet Union and keep it intact came to a head in August 1991. While the president was resting on the Black Sea, KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov formed the "State Committee for the State of Emergency" and placed Gorbachev under house arrest.

Along with eleven other men, Pavlov joined the emergency committee on August 19, 1991. This was no doubt Pavlov's least distinguished moment. Rather than conducting himself as a viable substitute for the supposedly ill president, Pavlov stayed in bed, claiming that he was too sick. His co-conspirators later said that he spent much of the three days of the attempted coup drunk.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; PERESTROIKA

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

PEASANT ECONOMY

The term *peasant economy* refers to modes of rural economic activity with certain defined characteristics. The first characteristic is that the basic unit of production is the household; therefore, the demographic composition of the household was of paramount importance in determining the volume of output, the percentage of output consumed by the household, and, thus, the net remainder to be used for investment or savings. Second, the majority of household income is derived from agricultural production, that is, the household is dependent upon its own labor. Third, because the household depended upon agricultural production for survival, peasant households were assumed to be conservative and resistant to changes that would threaten their survival. In particular, a school of thought called the "moral economy" arose, which argued that peasant households would resist the commercialization of agriculture because it violated their values and beliefs—their moral economy—and attempted to replace the patterns of interaction among personal networks in the villages with impersonal transactions based on market principles.

Perhaps the greatest theorist of the peasant economy was a Russian economist named Alexander Chayanov, who lived from 1888 to 1939. Chayanov published a book entitled *Peasant Farm Organization*, which postulated a theory of peasant economy with application for peasant economies beyond Russia. He argued that the laws of classical economics do not fit the peasant economy; in other words, production in a household was not based upon the profit motive or the ownership of the means of production, but rather by calculations made by households as consumers and workers. In modern terminology, the family satisfied rather than maximized profit.

According to Chayanov, the basic principle for understanding the peasant economy was the balance between the household member as a laborer and as a consumer. Peasant households and their members could either increase the number of hours they worked, or work more intensively, or sometimes both. The calculation made by households whether to work more or not was subjective, based upon an estimate of how much production was needed for survival (consumption) and how much was desired for investment to increase the family's productive potential. Those estimates were balanced against the unattractiveness of agricultural labor. Households sought to reach an equilibrium between production increases and the disutility of increased labor. In short, households increased their production as long as production gains outweighed the negative aspects of increased labor. This principle of labor production in the peasant economy led Chayanov to argue that the optimal size of the agricultural production unit varied according to the sector of production at a time the official policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was pushing for large collective farms. As a result of this disagreement with Marxist economists and the Party line, Chayanov was arrested in 1930 and executed in 1939.

Josef Stalin's collectivization, begun in 1929, fundamentally changed the basis of the Russian peasant economy by forcibly incorporating households into large farms, the latter becoming the basic production unit of Soviet agriculture. Moreover, production decisions were removed from the household and were no longer based upon the demographic composition of the household.

Even during the Stalin period, however, peasant resistance to mass collectivization and food shortages forced a compromise that allowed continued small-scale agricultural production by households in kitchen gardens or so-called private plots, and the sale of a portion of their produce at farm markets, which were free from state control. Consequently, peasant agriculture did not disappear with collectivization and continues to survive in Russia during the early twenty-first century, but on a much reduced scale.

See also: CHAYANOV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; PEASANTRY; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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STEPHEN K. WEGREN

PEASANTRY

The original agriculturists of the northern Eurasian plain lived a communal, seminomadic existence, based on slash-and-burn cultivation. By the time of Kievan Rus, the defining characteristics of a peasantry were in already in evidence: an agricultural population bound by trade and tribute to a wider world, but in an incomplete and dependent way. Princes imposed taxes and compulsory services, but only with the rise of Muscovy (from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries) were peasants enserfed—permanently bound to their lords or lands. Despite periodic revolts, this condition continued until 1861.

Peter I inaugurated a campaign of Westernization that imitated European modes of life and government. Perhaps ironically, in an age when Western Europe was abandoning serfdom, these initiatives increased the exploitation, as well as the traditionalism, of Russian peasants. St. Petersburg's Italianate palaces were built with conscripted peasant labor, and Russia's new Western-style army and bureaucracy were supported by a range of new taxes, among them the "soul tax" that was now demanded of peasants on top of the dues they paid their lords. Exploitation, however, was often indirect. The village commune (*obshchina*) distributed lands and obligations among its members, serving as a buffer between peasants and the outside world.

Although peasants generally regarded the cities and the Europeanized elite with suspicion, they were not totally isolated from urban society. Permanently bound to the soil, they could still depart temporarily to earn money in crafts, trade, or wage employment. In some provinces more than half the adult males engaged in work away from villages. A few even became millionaires.

Peasant agriculture flourished among the Slavic (and mainly Orthodox Christian) population of the Russian Empire. During the eighteenth century arable cultivation expanded into the steppe grass-



Russian peasant women in the 1930s show their support for efforts to strengthen the collective farm system. © AUSTRIAN ARCHIVES/CORBIS

lands of the south and southeast, and some serf-owners tried to introduce new crops and systems of cultivation into these regions. Most, however, left peasants to organize and cultivate the land according to traditional norms. Under communal tenure, which flourished among Russian peasants but not among Ukrainians and other non-Russians, each household received strips of land in many different fields. The number of these could be increased or decreased to match a family's ability to work. Grains were planted in a fixed rotation, and crop yields were often disappointing, even in areas of higher fertility.

Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1855) convinced its leaders to modernize, and the result was a vast array of reforms, foremost among them emancipation of the serfs in 1861. For the sake of social stability, former serf owners were generously compensated, retaining a substantial share of the

land. Freed peasants had to reimburse the state for their land. The commune kept the job of distributing lands and tax obligations. This arrangement produced little innovation and less prosperity, though migration to Western Siberia during the later nineteenth century did offer some hopeful signs of change. At the end of the nineteenth century crop yields grew more rapidly than the population, and the Russian Empire became a major exporter of grain and other agricultural products.

In the general census of 1897, the empire had a population of 125,000,000, of whom roughly three-fourths were legally classified as peasants, and an even greater proportion resided in rural areas. Peasant unrest was endemic, and in the revolution of 1905–1907 peasants rose up to confiscate private lands and drive off their former lords. Harsh punishment was followed by a new ("Stolypin") land reform promoted by Prime Minister Peter

Stolypin, designed to replace communal tenure with private ownership, but the outbreak of World War I prevented its full implementation. In 1917, unrest returned. Private lands were seized and redistributed and manor houses destroyed. The village commune took on a new life.

At this time peasants were roughly eighty percent of Russia's population, impoverished, tradition-minded, and suspicious of outsiders. Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik (Communist) Party tried to enlist them in its revolution, but needed their grain and labor power more than their goodwill. During the Civil War of 1917–1922 and later during the industrialization drive of the 1930s the Party resorted to confiscation and coercion. Poor and landless peasants were thought to be natural allies of the urban proletariat, but efforts to promote class warfare in the villages produced instability and food shortages. Under Josef Stalin's leadership collective agriculture was forcibly introduced, but instead of producing efficiency it caused disruption and starvation, with the loss of millions of lives. After several years of turmoil peasants were assured the right to cultivate small private plots alongside their duties to the collective farm (*kolkhoz*). Throughout the following decades these plots produced a vastly disproportionate share of the country's food.

The Soviet Union became an urban industrial society, but its rural roots were poorly nourished. At the time the USSR ceased to exist, some twenty-five percent of Russia's population continued to live on the land, resistant (for the most part) to privatization or economic reform.

See also: AGRICULTURE; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; ENSERFMENT; PEASANT ECONOMY; SERFDOM

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ROBERT E. JOHNSON

PEASANT UPRISINGS

Also known as "Peasant wars"; peasant uprisings in broad usage, were a number of rural-based rebellions from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, a typical form of protest in Russia against socioeconomic, religious, and cultural oppression and, occasionally, against political power holders.

Peasant uprisings in the narrow sense belong to the period of serfdom. Most of them followed a significant worsening of the conditions of the peasantry. The four major rebellions of this period were led by: 1) Ivan Bolotnikov, 1606–1607; 2) Stepan ("Stenka") Razin, 1667–1671; 3) Kondrat Bulavin, 1707–1708; and 4) the largest of all, by Yemelyan ("Yemelka") Pugachev, 1773–1775. The leadership in each case was largely symbolic, as an inherent feature of peasant wars was anarchic spontaneity with little organization, subordination, and planning.

The geographic center of the uprisings was in Southern Russia, between the Don and the Volga rivers and between the Black and the Caspian seas. However, they spread over wider territories and, in the case of the Bolotnikov rebellion, involved a battle in the vicinity of Moscow (which the rebels lost, in December 1606). The key initiative was played by Cossacks (Razin and Bulavin were Cossack atamans, and Pugachev a prominent Cossack as well). The rank and file included serfs and free peasants, as well as ethnic and religious minorities (e.g., Tatars in the Razin rebellion and Bashkirs in the Pugachev rebellion; ethnically Russian Old Believers in the Razin, Bulavin, and Pugachev rebellions). The Bolotnikov uprising, as part of the Time of Troubles, also involved impoverished or discontented gentry, some of whom, however, parted company with the rebels at a crucial stage. The religious and cultural aspect of the uprisings reflected discontent with top-down autocratic reforms along foreign patterns. Some also view the uprisings as a cultural response of the Cossack frontier to excess regulation by the imperial center.

Rebel demands are known from their own documents (e.g., "Seductive Letters" issued by Razin) and government reports. These demands involved land redistribution, the change of peasants' status from serfs to Cossacks, and often the elimination of the privileged classes. None of the uprisings was directed against the institution of monarchy; some rebels allied themselves with contenders to the throne (e.g., Bolotnikov with one of the Pseudo-

Dmitrys and then with another self-styled tsarevich, Peter), while Bulavin and Pugachev claimed their own rights to the tsar's scepter. On the territories occupied by rebels, peasants were declared free of servitude and debt, and Cossack-style self-rule was decreed. The uprisings were characterized by mass casualties and brutality on both sides. All of them were violently suppressed and their leaders executed; in the longer run, they may have spurred policy changes and reform efforts emanating from the top.

The most famous Pugachev rebellion was distinguished by the fact that its leader claimed to be Tsar Peter III (the actual tsar was murdered a decade earlier, in 1762, in a coup that brought his wife, Catherine II, to power). He issued his first manifesto in this capacity in September 1773. Pugachev promised to give peasants "back" their freedom "stolen" from them by the gentry, making them into Cossacks. The army of his followers counted about twenty-five thousand people. This rebellion was the first one of the manufacturing era, and was joined by serfs laboring at the manufactures in the Urals. Its suppression was followed in the short run by the strengthening and further spread of the institution of serfdom, as well as the incorporation of Cossacks into the state bureaucracy. During the nineteenth century, peasant uprisings never rose to the scale of wars. A major uprising in 1861 in the Kazan region reflected discontent with the conditions attached to the emancipation of the serfs.

Peasant guerrilla culture in Russia (as in some other countries) involved the operation of a parallel, or shadow community beyond the reach of the state, abruptly revealing itself in mass action. Guerrilla tactics followed by peasant rebels played a role in the twentieth-century revolutions (both on the Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik side), due to the numerical and cultural influence of peasantry (or recent peasants among urban workers and the intelligentsia). These tactics were also employed in defense against foreign invasions (the 1812 Patriotic War and World War II).

Scholars emphasizing the continuity of peasant resistance over centuries view the revolutions of 1905–1907 and 1917 as a resumption of peasant wars, in a different socioeconomic environment. Some of them consider the 1917–1933 period as "the Great Peasant War" suppressed by Josef Stalin through artificially organized famine and collectivization of the peasantry.

Peasant wars figured prominently in Russian folklore and modern arts. Alexander Pushkin, in characterizing a "Russian rebellion" as "senseless and merciless," perpetuated the view of peasant wars as destructive explosions, characterized by savage brutality on both sides, after seemingly endless patience of the oppressed. Revolutionary democrats of the Populist tradition cultivated a heroic image of peasant rebels, while orthodox Marxists dismissed them as anarchists and enemies of the modernizing state.

See also: BOLOTNIKOV, IVAN ISAYEVICH; COSSACKS; DMITRY, FALSE; PEASANTRY; PUGACHEV, EMELIAN IVANOVICH

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DMITRI GLINSKI

PECHENECS

During the late ninth century, under the pressure from the Torky and Khazars, the Pechenegs, a nomadic Turkic-speaking tribal confederation, migrated from the Volga-Ural region and occupied the area stretching from the Don-Donets to the Danube. Like other nomads inhabiting the southern Russian steppe from around 965 to around 1240, the Pechenegs did not create a true state. Politically, they were united into eight tribal unions, each occupying one of the four provinces (running in strips from north to south) on each side of the Dnieper. Disunited, the Pechenegs never threatened the existence of the Rus state. The Pechenegs raided

Rus territories and traded such items as livestock for goods unavailable in nomadic economies (grain and luxury goods). At other times, they acted as Rus allies in military campaigns, as in the 944 Rus war against Byzantium. From 980 onward, they likewise served as mercenaries in the conflicts between Rus princes. The Byzantines also used the Pechenegs to counter the Rus. Thus, in 972, while returning to Kiev from his Byzantine campaign, the Pechenegs killed Prince Svyatoslav, probably on the request of the Byzantines. The Pechenegs' one major attack on Kiev was decisively repulsed by Yaroslav the Wise in 1036. Defeated and under pressure from the Torky, most Pechenegs migrated toward the Balkans, where they were massacred by Byzantine-Cuman forces in 1091. The few who remained joined the Rus border guards known as Chernye klobuky or Black Hoods. Until around 1010, the Pechenegs probably practiced shamanist-Täri religion, but thereafter began to convert to Islam.

See also: KHAZARS; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

PEKING, TREATY OF

The Treaty of Peking (November 14, 1860) confirmed and extended the territorial gains Russia had wrested from China in the Treaty of Aigun (1858). By its terms, the eastern boundary between the two empires was set along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. The Ussuri boundary gave Russia possession of what became the Maritime Province (Primorskii Krai). Vladivostok, the major city of the Russian Far East, was established in this territory, providing direct access to the Sea of Japan and through the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, the Treaty of Peking was the foundation of Russia's attempts to become a Pacific power. The treaty also established, for the

first time, a Russo-Chinese boundary line in the west (Central Asia) according to Russian demands, and provided for the opening of Russian consulates in Urga (Mongolia) and Kashgar (Xinjiang). The entire border was opened to free trade between the two empires.

General Nikolai Ignatiev, appointed Russia's minister to China in 1859, took advantage of the Second Opium War, an Anglo-French conflict with China, to advance Russia's imperial interests. At a moment of supreme danger to the Qing court, whose capital Beijing the Anglo-French forces had already occupied and ransacked, Ignatiev offered his services as mediator to the beleaguered Chinese. He urged them to accede to the demands of the Anglo-French expeditionary force while promising to intercede with his fellow Westerners on behalf of the Chinese. In exchange for his services, which were actually superfluous, he demanded and received China's acceptance of Russia's own territorial, diplomatic, and commercial demands.

By the Treaty of Peking, Russia became a full-fledged player in the Western imperialist assault upon China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and sowed the seeds of Chinese anger that matured during the twentieth century.

See also: AIGUN, TREATY OF; CHINA, RELATIONS WITH

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STEVEN I. LEVINE

PELEVIN, VIKTOR OLEGOVICH

(b. 1962), novelist and short-story writer.

Born in Moscow to a military family, Viktor Olegovich Pelevin received his education at the

Moscow Energy Institute and the Gorky Institute of World Literature (Moscow). Praised and panned by critics ever since his work first gained public recognition during the early 1990s, Pelevin has been a controversial figure in the Russian literary establishment. Nonetheless, he is one of the most important figures in the world of post-Soviet letters. Pelevin is virtually the only serious writer in contemporary Russia to gain a wide readership, appealing in particular to the burgeoning youth counterculture.

Pelevin's works can be classified broadly as satire, but the author's concerns are more cultural and metaphysical than political. His first short novel, *Omon Ra* (1992), tells the story of a young man who dreams of being a cosmonaut, only to discover that the entire Soviet space program is a government-perpetrated fraud masking the country's inability to launch a single rocket. Pelevin's second novel, *The Life of Insects* (1993), reveals the preoccupation with Eastern mysticism and hallucinogenic drugs that characterize both his subsequent novels and many of the short stories collected in *The Blue Lantern* (1991) and *The Yellow Arrow* (1998). His 1996 novel *Buddha's Little Finger* combines an absurdist approach to Soviet cultural heroes with an equally ironic satire of Western popular culture (Arnold Schwarzenegger makes a brief appearance). In 1999 he published *Babylon*, which reflects his ongoing fascination with computer culture and virtual reality. *Babylon* is populated both by real human beings and digitally constructed simulacra, and the resemblance between the two is enhanced by Pelevin's longstanding rejection of the traditions of Russian psychological realism.

See also: SCIENCE FICTION; SOCIALIST REALISM

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ELIOT BORENSTEIN

PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF NATIONALITIES

While the tsarist empire had no specific ministry to deal with the non-Russian peoples, upon coming to power the Bolsheviks established a People's Commissariat of Nationalities, with Josef Stalin at its head, in its first government. Soviet policy toward the nationalities was based on both ideology and pragmatism. Both Vladimir Lenin and Stalin upheld the Marxist (and liberal) principle of the right of nationalities to self-determination, even in the face of opposition from many of their comrades. Lenin and Stalin believed that nationalism arose from non-Russians' distrust (*nedoverie*) of an oppressive nationality, such as the Russians. Secure in their faith that "national differences and antagonisms between peoples are vanishing gradually from day to day" and that "the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster," the Bolshevik leaders were prepared to grant autonomy, cultural and language rights, and even territory to non-Russian peoples in order to stave off separatism and chauvinist nationalism. Even as national Communist leaders in Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and elsewhere took over the development of their national populations, the Commissariat of Nationalities (abbreviated as Narkomnats) managed the affairs of dozens of peoples in the Russian Soviet Socialist Federation and beyond.

Immediately after taking power, the Bolsheviks issued a series of declarations on "the rights of the toiling and exploited peoples," "to all Muslim toilers of Russia and the East," and on the disposition of Turkish Armenia. Most importantly, with little real ability to effect its will in the peripheries, the Soviet government made a strategic shift in response to the growing number of autonomies and accepted by January 1918 the principle of federalism. In each national area the government promoted programs to favor the local indigenous peoples, a kind of cultural affirmative action. Not only were native languages supported, but indigenous leaders, if they were loyal to the Communist enterprise, were also supported. Within the Commissariat there were separate sub-commissariats for Jewish, Armenian, and other nationalities' affairs—even a Polar Subcommittee for the "small peoples of the north." The newspaper *Zhizn' national'nostei* was the official house organ of the Commissariat.

As commissar, Stalin was often absent from the affairs of his Commissariat. Yet on important

occasions he settled decisive issues, as in 1921 when he supported the inclusion of the Armenian region of Mountainous Karabakh in the neighboring state of Azerbaijan. Stalin favored the formation of a Transcaucasian Federation of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, against the desires of many local Bolsheviks, particularly among the Georgians. On this issue, and the even more important question of how centralized the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be, Stalin came into conflict with Lenin, who was far more suspicious of the "Great Power chauvinism" of the Russians and favored more rights for the non-Russians. Both men, however, supported the general line known as *korenizatsya*, which sought to indigenize the areas in which non-Russian peoples lived by developing local cultures, political elites, and national languages.

Activists from Narkomnats were involved in setting up autonomous regions for non-Russian peoples, establishing newspapers, publishing pamphlets, and fostering literacy. Many of them saw themselves as protectors of the weak, a bulwark against the potential destruction of native cultures. But at the same time the government's policies betrayed a kind of paternalism directed toward "backward" or "primitive" peoples who were, in many cases, not considered able to run their own affairs. Officials in Moscow acknowledged at times that they knew little about the peoples in more remote reaches of their vast country. Much linguistic and ethnographic work had still to be done to evaluate just which group belonged to which nationality, and Narkomnats assisted in developing Soviet anthropology and ethnography. In a real sense government intervention and the work of intellectuals helped draw the lines of distinction that later took a reality of their own between various peoples.

With the formation of the Soviet Union in early 1924, the Commissariat of Nationalities was dissolved, and its activities shifted to the new Soviet parliament. But by that time the broad and lasting contours of Soviet nationality policy had been worked out. Only during the 1930s, with the growing autocratic power of Stalin, the radical social transformations of his "revolution from above," and the fear of approaching war in Europe was the policy of *korenizatsya* moderated in favor of a more Russophilic and nationalist policy.

See also: KORENIZATSYA; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

PEOPLE'S CONTROL COMMITTEE

The Soviet leadership used several organizations to ensure popular compliance with its policies, ideology, and morality. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Central Party Control Committee ensured Party discipline by verifying the thoughts and actions of Party members and candidates. Simultaneously, Rabkrin (the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate) used workers and peasants to supervise local administrators.

Josef Stalin gradually subordinated the Central Control Commission to the Party's Central Committee and ultimately himself. In 1923 he merged it with the Workers and Peasant's Inspectorate. From the beginning, the Central Control Commission was given a broad and vague mandate, allowing excesses and abuse of power. Not only did it investigate cases of poor work performance, failure to meet production quotas, corruption, or even drunkenness, but it found violations as needed when Stalin's purges began during the 1930s.

As part of his de-Stalinization campaign following Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev announced he was going back to the party's Leninist roots. While maintaining a tamer Party disciplinary structure, Khrushchev also recreated the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, now known as the Party-State Control Committee (PSCC). Using thousands of volunteers to supplement its small permanent staff, the PSCC was designed as more of a grassroots organization working to ensure fulfillment of the five-year plans. Instead of top-down

surveillance, Khrushchev saw the Committees as a way of channeling factory-level information to top planners, such as hidden stockpiles of goods or resources.

Following Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, the committee was renamed in December 1965, becoming the People's Control Committee. It continued to rely on volunteers—about ten million in 1980—to monitor government and economic activities. In addition, the Committee's chair, Alexander Shelepin, was removed, as Party leaders feared he held too many powerful posts at once. He was succeeded by Pavel Kovanov, who was replaced by Gennadiy Ivanovich Voronov in 1971. Voronov was replaced in 1974 by Alexei Shkolnikov.

Following his election as general secretary in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev began to restructure the PCC in accordance with his overall reform program. He appointed Sergei Manykin to chair the PCC in March 1987. Among the changes ordered was to reduce the number of inspections, because they were disruptive and actually contributed to inefficiency. In 1989 the organization was reconfigured as the USSR People's Control Committee under the newly constituted USSR Supreme Soviet. Professional staff replaced the volunteers. In June 1989, Manykin was replaced by Gennady Kolbin, who launched an ambitious program to link inspection reports to proposed legislation in the Supreme Soviet. Kolbin also sought to ensure that punishments were actually implemented, not overturned by appeals to a party patron.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; DE-STALINIZATION; PERESTROIKA; PURGES, THE GREAT; RABKRIN.

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

PEOPLE'S HOUSES

(*Narodnye doma*), cultural-educational centers for the working classes that usually contained a reading room, lecture hall, tea room, and theater.

The movement to construct people's houses or people's palaces with cultural and educational facilities for the working classes began in Britain during the second half of the nineteenth century and soon spread to Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Austria, and other countries.

In Russia the first people's houses were built by the semiofficial Guardianships of Popular Temperance, which operated under the auspices of the Finance Ministry. During the 1890s the Russian Finance Ministry began introducing a state liquor monopoly to regulate liquor sales and increase state revenues. The Ministry set up local Guardianships of Popular Temperance to monitor adherence to the liquor laws. The Guardianships were also instructed to encourage moderate drinking habits among the population by disseminating information on the dangers of excessive drinking, providing facilities for the treatment of alcoholism, and organizing "rational recreations" as an alternative to the tavern.

By the early 1900s the Guardianships of Popular Temperance were running people's houses in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, and other cities. St. Petersburg's imposing Emperor Nicholas II People's House was the largest recreational facility in the Russian Empire. It contained a dining hall, tea room, lending library, reading rooms, an observatory, a clinic for the treatment of alcoholics, a museum devoted to alcoholism, a cinema, a 1,500-seat theater, and an opera house. Besides performances of drama and opera, the Nicholas II People's House organized scientific and religious lectures, evening adult classes, gymnastic exercises, classes in choral singing and folk music, and activities for children. From 1900 to 1913 almost two million people annually attended the entertainments at the Nicholas II People's House, which was famed for its spectacular productions of historical plays and fantasy extravaganzas. Leading actors and artists sometimes appeared on the stage of the Nicholas II People's House, where Fyodor Shalyapin, Russia's greatest opera singer, gave a free concert for workers in 1915.

Zemstvos, dumas, and literacy societies also constructed people's houses throughout Russia. The Kharkov Literacy Society built a people's house in 1903; the Moscow дума opened a municipal people's house with a theater in 1904. The liberal philanthropist Countess Sofia Panina opened her Ligovsky People's House in 1903 in a poor district of St. Petersburg; there workers could attend evening courses, and Pavel Gaideburov and Nadezhda

Skarskaya ran a very successful theater. By 1913 there were at least 222 people's houses in the Russian Empire. During World War I, when prohibition against alcohol was enacted, interest in people's houses increased, but the Petrograd and Moscow dumas' ambitious plans for extensive networks of people's houses were never realized due to the financial strains of the war.

The Russian people's houses primary aim was to promote sobriety among the lower classes by offering them "rational recreations" in the form of theater performances, lectures, reading rooms, excursions, and other sober pursuits. Although their impact on popular alcohol consumption is doubtful, the people's houses did offer the common people modest educational opportunities and a diverse variety of affordable theatrical entertainments. After the October Revolution the people's houses were reorganized under the Soviet regime as "palaces of culture" and workers' clubs but continued many of the same activities as before.

See also: ALCOHOLISM; ALCOHOL MONOPOLY

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E. ANTHONY SWIFT

PEOPLE'S PARTY OF FREE RUSSIA

The People's Party of "Free Russia" (Narodnaya Partiya "Svobodnaya Rossiya," or NPSR) has its origins in the democratic wing of the Communist Party, which formed in July 1991 into the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia (DPKR) as part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Serving as its base was the group Communists for Democracy in the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) (the leader was Alexander Rutskoi, elected Russia's vice president in June 1991), and the Democratic Movement of Communists (Vasily Lipitsky's group). After the August 1991 putsch and the dissolution of the CPSU, the DPKR in its first congress was renamed the People's Party of

"Free Russia," and was headed by Rutskoi and Lipitsky. It flourished from 1991 to 1993, when it was considered a potential ruling party. Moving in March 1992 into constructive opposition to the course of the Boris Yeltsin-Yegor Gaidar administration, the NPSR reached an agreement with the Democratic Party of Russia, on the basis of which the bloc Civic Union was formed.

In the 1993 conflict between Yeltsin and the delegates, Rutskoi sided with the latter and landed in prison after the attack on the White House. After his amnesty in May 1994, the party changed its name again, this time to the Russian Social-Democratic People's Party (RSDNP). Its main goals were the creation of conditions for free and thorough development of the citizens of Russia; elevation of their welfare; guarantee of citizens' rights and freedoms; and establishment of a civic society, a social-market economy, and a lawful government. Leaders had different ideas for the party's development: Rutskoi called upon the delegates to participate in the creation of the social-patriotic movement Power, whereas Lipitsky supported the idea of transforming the RSDNP into a social-democratic party of the Western European variety. In March 1995, the split became fact in congress, after which both sides essentially ceased existing. Rutskoi's group began working in the social-patriotic movement Power, and Lipitsky's in the Russian Social-Democratic Union.

In the 1995 elections, Lipitsky's supporters participated in the bloc Social-Democrats (0.13% of the vote), and Power pushed forward its federal list, on account of which a new split occurred in the leadership of the movement, and a number of politicians left it. The new list of Power with Rutskoi at the head received 1.8 million votes (2.6%), while in Rutskoi's homeland, Kursk, it received more than 30 percent. In 1996, Power was unable to collect the required number of signatures for its presidential candidate Rutskoi, and it joined with the bloc of popular-patriotic forces headed by Genady Zyuganov. Soon afterward, Rutskoi was elected first as cochair of the Popular-Patriotic Union of Russia, and then, with its support, governor of Kursk Oblast. He resigned as chair of Power and fell into conflict with the NPSR and Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). In 1998, Power, under the chairmanship of Konstantin Zatulin, entered the movement Fatherland of Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and on the very eve of elections it split yet again and disappeared from the political scene.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; DEMOCRATIC PARTY; RUTSKOI, ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH; ZYUGANOV, GENNADY ANDREYEVICH.

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NIKOLAI PETROV

PEOPLE'S WILL, THE

The People's Will was the most famous illegal revolutionary organization in late nineteenth-century Russia. This "party," as it was termed, represented the culmination of the rapidly evolving revolutionary movement of the 1870s, the decade when radical members of the intelligentsia first made contact on a significant scale with Russian peasants and workers, the *narod*, or common people. The ideology of this movement was a peasant-oriented socialism known as *narodnichestvo* (populism). The umbrella group Land and Freedom (*Zemlya i Volya*), which linked most of the radical circles at the time, split in 1879 over frustration at government repression and the lack of effective peasant response to the group's propaganda initiatives. Those radicals who were determined to incorporate the new tactic of terrorism into their activity formed a party called the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya). By terrorism they meant primarily the targeting of hated government officials for assassination. This extreme measure was variously justified as a means of exerting pressure on the government for reform, as the spark that would ignite a vast peasant uprising, and as the inevitable response to the regime's use of violence against the revolutionaries.

The People's Will was headed by an Executive Committee, including such famous figures as Andrei Zhelyabov and Sofia Perovskaya. Day-to-day activities were supervised by special subgroups in charge of propaganda and organization of three critical groups—workers, students, and military

officers—and included underground printing operations; keeping an eye on police infiltration efforts; and planning and carrying out assassinations. In addition to well-organized groups in St. Petersburg and Moscow, there was a growing number of provincial organizations, mostly circles of students and workers. The participation of a small number of women represented a noteworthy development. While historians have tended to identify the People's Will with its small but well-defined Executive Committee, the organization in fact encompassed a broad range of members and supporters, numbering in the thousands, as well as many sympathizers. More peaceful activities, however, were overshadowed by the aura of drama and violence surrounding the party's daring struggle against the tsarist regime, culminating in the assassination of the tsar, Alexander II, on March 1, 1881. In the predictable aftermath, five members of the People's Will were hanged and many more imprisoned.

Contrary to the standard historiographical treatment, the People's Will did not disappear from the scene following March 1, but rather continued to exist in a more widespread and decentralized form. Radicals calling themselves *narodovoltzy* (supporters of the People's Will) continued to engage in propaganda and organizing activities among students and workers in provincial towns and industrial centers, as well as in St. Petersburg and Moscow, throughout the 1880s and into the 1890s. By this time, *narodovoltzy* were taking second place in the revolutionary movement to radicals who identified themselves as social democrats (Marxists). The populist tradition experienced a revival with the formation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party during the early twentieth century. In a sense, however, both revolutionary parties of the period leading up to the 1917 revolution, the Social Democrats as well as the Socialist Revolutionaries, can be considered the heirs of the People's Will, whose banner, at a crucial stage, symbolized the revolutionary movement in Russia.

See also: LAND AND FREEDOM PARTY; POPULISM

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PERESTROIKA

Perestroika was the term given to the reform process launched in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. Meaning "reconstruction" or "restructuring," *perestroika* was a concept that was both ambiguous and malleable. Its ambiguity lay in the fact that it might convey no more than a reorganization of existing Soviet institutions and thus be a synonym for reform of a modest kind or, alternatively, it could signify reconstruction of the system from the foundations up, thus amounting to transformative change. The vagueness and ambiguity were initially an advantage, for even the term *reform* had become taboo during the conservative Leonid Brezhnev years after the Soviet leadership had been frightened by the Prague Spring reforms of 1968.

Perestroika had the advantage of coming without political and ideological baggage. Everyone could—in the first two years, at least, of the Mikhail Gorbachev era—be in favor of it. Its malleability meant that under this rubric some urged modest change that in their view was enough to get the economy moving again while others who wished to transform the way the entire system worked were able to advance more daring arguments, taking cover under the umbrella of *perestroika*. Within Gorbachev's own top leadership team, both Yegor Ligachev and Alexander Yakovlev expressed their commitment to *perestroika*, but for the latter this meant much more far-reaching political reform than for the former. Once political pluralism had by 1989 become an accepted norm, *perestroika* as a concept had largely outlived its political utility.

For Gorbachev himself the term "perestroika" meant different things at different times. Initially, it was a euphemism for "reform," but later it came to signify systemic change. Gorbachev's views underwent a major evolution during the period he held the post of General Secretary of the Central

Committee of the CPSU and that included the meaning he imparted to *perestroika*. In an important December 1984 speech before he became Soviet leader, Gorbachev had said that one of the important things on the agenda was a "perestroika of the forms and methods of running the economy." By 1987 the concept for Gorbachev was much broader and clearly embraced radical political reform and the transformation of Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev's thinking at that time was set out in a book, *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World*. While the ideas contained were far removed from traditional Soviet dogma, they by no means yet reflected the full evolution of Gorbachev's own position (and, with it, his understanding of *perestroika*). In 1987 Gorbachev was talking about radical reform of the existing system. During the run-up to the Nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party, held in the summer of 1988, he came to the conclusion that the system had to be transformed so comprehensively as to become something different in kind. In 1987 he still spoke about "communism," although he had redefined it to make freedom and the rule of law among its unfamiliar values; by the end of the 1980s, Gorbachev had given up speaking about "communism." The "socialism," of which he continued to speak, had become socialism of a social democratic type.

Perestroika became an overarching conception, under which a great many new concepts were introduced into Soviet political discourse after 1985. These included such departures from the Marxist-Leninist lexicon as *glasnost* (openness, transparency), *pravovoe gosudarstvo* (a state based on the rule of law), checks and balances, and pluralism. One of the most remarkable innovations was Gorbachev's breaking of the taboo on speaking positively about pluralism. Initially (in 1987) this was a "socialist pluralism" or a "pluralism of opinion." That, however, opened the way for others in the Soviet Union to talk positively about "pluralism" without the socialist qualifier. By early 1990 Gorbachev himself had embraced the notion of "political pluralism," doing so at the point at which he proposed to the Central Committee removing from the Soviet Constitution the guaranteed "leading role" of the Communist Party.

Even *perestroika* as understood in the earliest years of Gorbachev's leadership—not least because of its embrace of *glasnost*—opened the way for real political debate and political movement in a system which had undergone little fundamental political change for decades. In his 1987 book, *Perestroika*,



Mikhail Gorbachev reacts to the announcement of foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze' planned resignation at a Congress of the People's Deputies meeting held December 20, 1990. BORIS YURCHENKO/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Gorbachev wrote: "Glasnost, criticism and self-criticism are not just a new campaign. They have been proclaimed and must become a norm in the Soviet way of life . . . There is no democracy, nor can there be, without glasnost. And there is no present-day socialism, nor can there be, without democracy." Such exhortation was alarming to those who wished to preserve the Soviet status quo or to revert to the status quo ante. It was, though, music to the ears of people who wished to promote the more rapid democratization of the Soviet system, even to advocate moving further and faster than Gorbachev at the time was prepared to endorse.

If perestroika is considered as an epoch in Soviet and Russian history, rather than a concept (though conceptual change in a hitherto ideocratic system was crucially important), it can be seen as one in which a Pandora's box was opened. The system, whatever its failings, had been highly effective in controlling and suppressing dissent, and it

was far from being on the point of collapse in 1985. Perestroika produced both intended and unintended consequences. From the outset Gorbachev's aims included a liberalization of the Soviet system and the ending of the Cold War. Liberalization, in fact, developed into democratization (the latter term being one that Gorbachev used from the beginning, although its meaning, too, developed within the course of the next several years) and the Cold War was over by the end of the 1980s. A major aspect of perestroika in its initial conception was, however, to inject a new dynamism into the Soviet economy. In that respect it failed. Indeed, Gorbachev came to believe that the Soviet economic system, just like the political system, needed not reform but dismantling and to be rebuilt on different foundations.

The ultimate unintended consequence of perestroika was the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Liberalization and democratization turned what Gorbachev had called "pre-crisis phenomena" (most

notably, economic stagnation) during the early 1980s into a full-blown crisis of survival of the state by 1990–1991. Measuring such an outcome against the initial aims of perestroika suggests its failure. But the goals of the foremost proponents of perestroika, and of Mikhail Gorbachev personally, rapidly evolved, and democratization came to be given a higher priority than economic reform. At the end of this experiment in the peaceful transformation of a highly authoritarian system, there were fifteen newly independent states and Russia itself had become a freer country than at any point in its previous history. Taken in conjunction with the benign transformation of East-West relations, these results constitute major achievements that more than counterbalance the failures. They point also to the fact that there could be no blueprint for the democratization of a state that had been at worst totalitarian and at best highly authoritarian for some seven decades. Perestroika became a process of trial and error, but one that was underpinned by ideas and values radically different from those which constituted the ideological foundations of the unreformed Soviet system.

See also: DEMOCRATIZATION; GLASNOST; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; NEW POLITICAL THINKING

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ARCHIE BROWN

PERMANENT REVOLUTION

“Permanent Revolution” was Leon Trotsky’s explanation of how a communist revolution could

occur in an industrially backward Russia. According to classical Marxism, only a society of advanced capitalism with a large working class was ripe for communist revolution. Russia met neither prerequisite. Further, Karl Marx conceived of a two-stage revolution: first the bourgeois revolution, then in sequence the proletarian revolution establishing a dictatorship for transition to communism. Trotsky argued that the two-stage theory did not apply. Rather, he said, Russia was in a stage of uneven development where both bourgeois and proletarian revolutions were developing together under the impact of the advanced West.

Trotsky predicted that once revolution broke out in Russia it would be in permanence as the result of an East–West dynamic. The bourgeois majority revolution would be overthrown by a conscious proletarian minority that would carry forward the torch of revolution. However, a second phase was necessary: namely, the proletarian revolution in Western Europe ignited by the Russian proletariat’s initiative; the West European proletariat now in power rescues the beleaguered proletarian minority in Russia; and the path is opened to the international communist revolution.

Trotsky’s theory seemed corroborated in the 1917 Russian revolution. Tsarism was overthrown by a bourgeois Provisional Government in February which the Bolsheviks then overthrew in October. However, the second phase posited by Trotsky’s theory, the West European revolution, did not materialize. The Bolsheviks faced the dilemma of how to sustain power where an advanced industrial economy did not exist. Was not Bolshevik rule doomed to failure without Western aid?

Usurping power, Josef Stalin answered Trotsky’s theory with his “socialism in one country.” Curiously, his recipe was similar to a strategy Trotsky earlier proposed, namely, command economy, forced industrialization, and collectivization. With the communist collapse in Russia in 1991 both Trotsky’s and Stalin’s theories became moot.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; MARXISM; SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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CARL A. LINDEN

PEROVSKAYA, SOFIA LVOVNA

(1853–1881), Russian revolutionary populist, a member of the Executive committee of “Narodnaya Volya” (“People’s Will”), and a direct supervisor of the murder of emperor Alexander II.

Sofia Perovskaya was born in St. Petersburg to a noble family; her father was the governor of St. Petersburg. In 1869 she attended the Alarchin Women’s Courses in St. Petersburg, where she founded the self-education study group. At age seventeen, she left home. From 1871 to 1872 she was one of the organizers of the Tchaikovsky circle. Her remarkable organizational skills and willpower never failed to gain her leading positions in various revolutionary societies. To prepare for “going to the people,” she passed a public teacher’s exam and completed her studies as a doctor’s assistant. In January 1874 she was arrested and detained for several months in the Peter and Paul Fortress and faced the Trial of 193 (1877–1878), but was proven innocent. She joined the populist organization *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom) and took part in an unsuccessful armed attempt to free Ippolit Myshkin, who was proven guilty at the Trial of 193. During the summer of 1878 she was once again arrested, and exiled to Olonetskaya province, but on the way there she fled and assumed an illegal status. In June 1879 Perovskaya took part in the Voronezh assembly of *Zemlya i Volya*, soon after which the organization split into *Narodnaya Volya* (People’s Will) and *Cherny Peredel* (The Black Reparition). From the autumn of 1879, she was a member of the executive committee of *Narodnaya Volya*. In November 1879 she took part in the organization of the attempt to blow up the tsar’s train near Moscow. She played the role of the wife of railroad inspector Sukhorukov (*Narodnaya Volya* member Lev Gartman): The underground tunnel that led to the railroad tracks where the bomb was planted came from his house. By mistake, however, it was the train of the tsar’s entourage that got blown up. During the spring of 1880, Perovskaya took part in another attempt to kill the tsar in Odessa. In the preparation of the successful attempt on March 13, 1881, on the Yekaterininsky channel in St. Petersburg, she headed a watching squad, and after the party leader Andrei Zhelyabov (Perovskaya’s lover) was arrested, she headed the operation until it was completed, having personally drawn the plan of the positions of the grenade throwers and given the signal to attack. Hoping to free her arrested com-

rades, after the murder Perovskaya did not leave St. Petersburg and was herself arrested. At the trial of *pervomartovtsy* (participants of the murder of the tsar), Perovskaya was sentenced to death and hanged on April 15, 1881, on the Semenovskiy parade ground in St. Petersburg, becoming the first woman in Russia to be executed for a political crime.

See also: ALEXANDER II; LAND AND FREEDOM PARTY; PEOPLE’S WILL, THE

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

PERSIAN GULF WAR

The Persian Gulf War of 1990 and 1991 began as the high point of Soviet-American cooperation in the postwar period. However, by late December 1990, a chilling of Soviet-American relations had set in as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sought to play both sides of the conflict, only to have the USSR suffer a major political defeat once the war came to an end.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze joined U.S. secretary of state James Baker in severely condemning the Iraqi action, and the United States and USSR jointly supported numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions demanding an Iraqi withdrawal and imposing sanctions on Iraq for its behavior.

Nonetheless, while supporting the United States (although not committing Soviet forces to battle), Gorbachev also sought to play a mediating role between Iraq and the United States, in part to salvage Moscow’s important economic interests in that country (oil drilling, oil exploration, hydroelectric projects, and grain elevator construction, as well as lucrative arms sales), and in part to bolster his political flank against those on the right of the Soviet

political spectrum (many of whom were later to stage an abortive coup against him in August 1991), who were complaining that Moscow had “sold out” Iraq, a traditional ally of the USSR and one with which Moscow had been linked by a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation since 1972.

Responding to these pressures, Gorbachev twice sent a senior Soviet Middle East Expert, Yevgeny Primakov, to Iraq to try to mediate on Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, albeit to no avail. Instead, the Soviet specialists working in Iraq were swiftly taken hostage in advance of the January 15, 1991, United Nations deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal.

In late December 1990, as it became more and more apparent that the U.S.-led coalition would begin its attack against Iraq on January 15, Shevardnadze suddenly resigned as Soviet foreign minister in the face of mounting pressure from Soviet right-wing forces. His replacement, Alexander Bessmertnykh, was far less pro-U.S., and his remarks utilized the old Soviet jargon of “balance of power” rather than Gorbachev’s “balance of interests” terminology. Nonetheless, this did not inhibit the coalition attack on Iraq that took place on January 15 and that thoroughly defeated Saddam Hussein’s forces and drove them out of Kuwait by the end of February 1991. Gorbachev’s behavior during the fighting, as he sought the best possible deal for Hussein from the United States, resembled that of a trial lawyer seeking to plea bargain for his client under increasingly negative conditions. This was particularly evident in his peace plan of February 21, which provided for a lifting of sanctions against Iraq before it had fully withdrawn its troops from Kuwait. The United States, however, neither accepted Gorbachev’s entreaties nor paid much attention to the increasingly hostile warnings of Soviet generals as U.S. troops advanced.

By the time the war ended, Washington had emerged as the dominant power in the Middle East, while the USSR lost much of its influence both in the Middle East and in the world. After the war, the United States consolidated its military position in the Persian Gulf and reinforced its relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, while Moscow sat on the diplomatic sidelines.

Given Moscow’s diminished position in the region and in the world as a whole after the Gulf War, Gorbachev tried to salvage the USSR’s prestige to the greatest degree possible. Thus, besides trying to reinforce relations with Iran, he sought

to retain a modicum of influence in Iraq by opposing U.N. intervention following the postwar massacres of Iraqi Shiites and Kurds by Hussein’s forces. Primakov, whose influence in the Russian government was rising, stated that he believed Hussein “has sufficient potential to give us hope for a positive development of relations with him.”

Nonetheless, Gorbachev’s attempts to protect Hussein availed him little. Less than a year after the end of the Gulf War, the USSR collapsed, and Gorbachev fell from power.

See also: IRAQ, RELATIONS WITH; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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ROBERT O. FREEDMAN

PESTEL, PAVEL IVANOVICH

(1793–1826), a leader of the Decembrist movement.

Pavel Ivanovich Pestel, the son of Ivan Borisovich Pestel and Elisaveta Ivanovna von Krok, was born in Moscow into a family of German and Lutheran background. He was sent to Dresden at the age of twelve to be educated, and on his return four years later he joined the Corps of Pages in St. Petersburg, where he began to study political science. On graduating Pestel entered the army and in

time joined several secret societies. The most important of these was the Society of Salvation, founded in 1817 and later renamed the Society of Welfare. Several of Pestel's fellow officers had been in Paris and Western Europe during the war against Napoleon, and from them he became familiar with the ideas of the French Revolution. Transferred to the southern Russia in 1818, Pestel organized a local branch of the Society of Welfare, where he and his friends discussed such ideas as constitutional monarchy and republican government, as well as the means by which the imperial family might be coerced into accepting the former or made to abdicate in favor of the latter.

Pestel left two unfinished works, *Russkaia Pravda* (*Russian Truth*) and *Prakticheskie nachala politicheskoy ekonomy* (*Practical Principles of Political Economy*). The first outlines a program for political reform in Russia; the second, a rambling essay on economics, expresses admiration for the prosperity made possible by political freedom in the United States. Pestel's ideas, especially in their tendency to favor radical solutions to the problem of Russia's political backwardness, relied heavily on the ideas of the French writer Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, but they had other French and German sources as well.

When Alexander I died in December 1825 there was some confusion about the succession. There was also confusion among those who were plotting a revolt. The more radical revolutionaries were in the south under Pestel's leadership. Betrayed by informants in the Southern Society, Pestel was arrested on December 13, the same day that three thousand soldiers demonstrated in Senate Square in St. Petersburg on behalf of Alexander I's brother, Constantine, who had already given up his claim to the throne in favor of his brother, Nicholas. Pestel's colleague Sergei Muraviev-Apostol attempted to lead a revolt, but it was crushed by imperial troops. Pestel was found guilty of treason and executed in 1826 with four of his fellow revolutionaries, Muraviev-Apostol, Peter Kakhovsky, Mikhail Bestuzhev-Ryumin, and Kondraty Ryleyev.

See also: DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; RYLEYEV, KONDRATY FYODOROVICH

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PAUL CREGO

PETER I

(1672–1725), known as Peter the Great, tsar and emperor of Russia, 1682–1725.

The reign of Peter I is generally regarded as a watershed in Russian history, during which Russia expanded westward, became a leading player in European affairs, and underwent major reforms of its government, economy, religious affairs, and culture. Peter is regarded as a “modernizer” or “westernizer,” who forced changes upon his often reluctant subjects. In 1846 the Russian historian Nikolai Pogodin wrote: “The Russia of today, that is to say, European Russia, diplomatic, political, military, commercial, industrial, scholastic, literary—is the creation of Peter the Great. Everywhere we look, we encounter this colossal figure, who casts a long shadow over our entire past.” Writers before and after agreed that Peter made a mark on the course of Russian history, although there has always been disagreement about whether his influence was positive or negative.

CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH

The only son of the second marriage of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of Russia (r. 1645–1676) to Nathalie Kirillovna Naryshkina, Peter succeeded his half-brother Tsar Fyodor Alexeyevich (1676–1682) in May 1682. In June, following the bloody rebellion of the Moscow musketeers, in which members of his mother's family and government officials were massacred, he was crowned second tsar jointly with his elder, but severely handicapped, half-brother Ivan V. Kept out of government during the regency of his half-sister Sophia Alexeyevna (r. 1682–1689), Peter pursued personal interests that later fed into his public activities; these included meeting foreigners, learning to sail, and forming “play” troops under the command of foreign officers, which became the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky guards. On Tsar Ivan's death in 1696, Peter found himself sole ruler and enjoyed his first military victory, the capture of the Turkish fortress at Azov, a success which was facilitated by a newly created fleet on the Don river. From 1697 to 1698 he made an unprecedented tour of Western Europe

with the Grand Embassy, the official aim of which was to revive the Holy League against the Ottomans, which Russia had entered in 1686. Peter traveled incognito, devoting much of his time to visiting major sites and institutions in his search for knowledge. He was particularly impressed with the Dutch Republic and England, where he studied shipbuilding. On his return, he forced his boyars to shave off their beards and adopt Western dress. In 1700 he discarded the old Byzantine creation calendar in favor of dating years in the Western manner from the birth of Christ. These symbolic acts set the agenda for cultural change.

THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR, 1700–1721

After making peace with the Ottoman Empire in 1700, Peter declared war on Sweden with the aim of regaining a foothold on the Baltic, in alliance with Denmark and King Augustus II of Poland. After some early defeats, notably at Narva in 1700, and the loss of its allies, Russia eventually gained the upper hand over the Swedes. After Narva, King Charles XII abandoned his Russian campaign to pursue Augustus into Poland and Saxony, allowing Russia to advance in Ingria and Livonia. When he eventually invaded Russia via Ukraine in 1707–1708, Charles found his troops overextended, under-provisioned, and confronted by a much improved Russian army. Victory at Poltava in Ukraine in 1709 allowed Peter to stage a successful assault on Sweden's eastern Baltic ports, including Viborg, Riga, and Reval (Tallinn) in 1710. Defeat by the Turks on the river Pruth in 1711 forced him to return Azov (ratified in the 1713 Treaty of Adrianople), but did not prevent him pursuing the Swedish war both at the negotiating table and on campaign, for instance, in Finland in 1713–1714 and against Sweden's remaining possessions in northern Germany and the Swedish mainland. The Treaty of Nystadt (1721) ratified Russian possession of Livonia, Estonia, and Ingria. During the celebrations the Senate awarded Peter the titles Emperor, the Great, and Father of the Fatherland. In 1722–1723 Peter conducted a campaign against Persia on the Caspian, capturing the ports of Baku and Derbent. Russia's military successes were achieved chiefly by intensive recruitment, which allowed Peter to keep armies in the field over several decades; training by foreign officers; home production of weapons, especially artillery; and well-organized provisioning. The task was made easier by the availability of a servile peasant population and the obstacles which the Russian terrain and cli-



Peter I in battle at Poltava. © THE STATE RUSSIAN MUSEUM/CORBIS

mate posed for the invading Swedes. The navy, staffed mainly by foreign officers on both home-built and purchased ships, provided an auxiliary force in the latter stages of the Northern War, although Peter's personal involvement in naval affairs has led some historians to exaggerate the fleet's importance. The galley fleet was particularly effective, as exemplified at Hango in 1714.

DOMESTIC REFORMS

Many historians have argued that the demands of war were the driving force behind all Peter's reforms. He created the Senate in 1711, for example, to rule in his absence during the Turkish campaign. Among the ten new Swedish-inspired government departments, created between 1717 and 1720 and known as Colleges or collegiate boards, the Colleges of War, Admiralty, and Foreign Affairs consumed the bulk of state revenues, while the Colleges of

Mines and Manufacturing concentrated on production for the war effort, operating iron works and manufacture of weapons, rope, canvas, uniforms, powder, and other products. The state remained the chief producer and customer, but Peter attempted to encourage individual enterprise by offering subsidies and exemptions. Free manpower was short, however, and in 1721 industrialists were allowed to purchase serfs for their factories. New provincial institutions, based on Swedish models and created in several restructuring programs, notably in 1708–1709 and 1718–1719, were intended to rationalize recruitment and tax collection, but were among the least successful of Peter's projects. As he said, money was the "artery of war." A number of piecemeal fiscal measures culminated in 1724 with the introduction of the poll tax (initially 74 kopecks per annum), which replaced direct taxation based on households with assessment of individual males. Peter also encouraged foreign trade and diversified indirect taxes, which were attached to such items and services as official paper for contracts, private bathhouses, oak coffins, and beards (the 1705 beard tax). Duties from liquor, customs, and salt were profitable.

The Table of Ranks (1722) consolidated earlier legislation by dividing the service elite—army and navy officers, government and court officials—into three columns of fourteen ranks, each containing a variable number of posts. No post was supposed to be allocated to any candidate who was unqualified for the duties involved, but birth and marriage continued to confer privilege at court. The Table was intended to encourage the existing nobility to perform more efficiently, while endorsing the concept of nobles as natural leaders of society: Any commoner who attained the lowest military rank—grade 14—or civil grade 8 was granted noble status, including the right to pass it to his children.

Peter's educational reforms, too, were utilitarian in focus, as was his publishing program, which focused on such topics as shipbuilding, navigation, architecture, warfare, geography, and history. He introduced a new simplified alphabet, the so-called civil script, for printing secular works. The best-known and most successful of Peter's technical schools was the Moscow School of Mathematics and Navigation (1701; from 1715, the St. Petersburg Naval Academy), which was run by British teachers. Its graduates were sent to teach in the so-called cipher or arithmetic schools (1714), but these failed to attract pupils. Priests and church schools continued to be the main suppliers of primary ed-

ucation, and religious books continued to sell better than secular ones. The Academy of Sciences is generally regarded as the major achievement, although it did not open until 1726 and was initially staffed entirely by foreigners. In Russia, as elsewhere, children in rural communities, where child labor was vital to the economy, remained uneducated.

THE CHURCH

The desire to deploy scarce resources as rationally as possible guided Peter's treatment of the Orthodox Church. He abolished the patriarchate, which was left vacant when the last Patriarch died in 1700, and in 1721 replaced it with the Holy Synod, which was based on the collegiate principle and later overseen by a secular official, the Over-Procurator. The Synod's rationale and program were set out in the *Spiritual Regulation* (1721). Peter siphoned off church funds as required, but he stopped short of secularizing church lands. He slimmed down the priesthood by redeploying superfluous clergymen into state service and restricting entry into monasteries, which he regarded as refuges for shirkers. Remaining churchmen accumulated various civic duties, such as keeping registers of births and deaths, running schools and hospitals, and publicizing government decrees. These measures continued seventeenth-century trends in reducing the church's independent power, but Peter went farther by reducing its role in cultural life. Himself a dutiful Orthodox Christian who attended church regularly, he was happy for the Church to take responsibility for the saving of men's souls, but not for it to rule their lives. His reforms were supported by educated churchmen imported from Ukraine.

ST. PETERSBURG AND THE NEW CULTURE

The city of St. Petersburg began as an island fort at the mouth of the Neva river on land captured from the Swedes in 1703. From about 1712 it came to be regarded as the capital. In Russia's battle for international recognition, St. Petersburg was much more than a useful naval base and port. It was a clean sheet on which Peter could construct a microcosm of his New Russia. The Western designs and decoration of palaces, government buildings, and churches, built in stone by hired foreign architects according to a rational plan, and the European fashions that all Russian townspeople were forced to wear, were calculated to make foreigners

feel that they were in Europe rather than in Asia. The city became a “great window recently opened in the north through which Russia looks on Europe” (Francesco Algarotti, 1739). Peter often referred to it as his “paradise,” playing on the associations with St. Peter as well as expressing his personal delight in a city built on water. The central public spaces enjoyed amenities such as street lighting and paving and public welfare was supervised by the Chief of Police, although conditions were less salubrious in the backstreets. Nobles resented being uprooted from Moscow to this glorified building site. Noblewomen were not exempt. They were wrenched from their previously sheltered lives in the semi-secluded women’s quarters or *terem* and ordered to abandon their modest, loose robes and veils in favor of Western low cut gowns and corsets and to socialize and drink with men. Some historians have referred to the “emancipation” of women under Peter, but it is doubtful whether this was the view of those involved.

PETER’S VISION AND METHODS

Peter was an absolute ruler, whose great height (six foot seven inches) and explosive temper must have intimidated those close to him. His portraits, the first thoroughly Westernized Russian images painted or sculpted from life, were embellished with Imperial Roman, allegorical, military, and naval motifs to underline his power. Yet he sought to deflect his subjects’ loyalty from himself to the state, exhorting them to work for the common good. A doer rather than a thinker, he lacked formal education and the patience for theorizing. Soviet historians favored the image of the Tsar-Carpenter, emphasizing the fourteen trades that Peter mastered, of which his favorites were shipbuilding and wood turning. He also occasionally practiced dentistry and surgery. Ironically, Peter often behaved in a manner that confirmed foreign prejudices that Russia was a barbaric country. Abroad he frequently offended his hosts with his appalling manners, while Western visitors to Russia were perplexed by his court, which featured dwarfs, giants, and human “monsters” (from his Cabinet of Curiosities), compulsory drinking sessions, which armed guards prevented guests from leaving, and weird ceremonies staged by the “All-Mad, All-Jesting, All-Drunken Assembly,” which, headed by the Prince-Pope, parodied religious rituals. Throughout his life Peter maintained a mock court headed by a mock tsar known as Prince Caesar, who conferred promotions on “Peter Mikhailov” or “Peter Alexeyev,” as Peter liked to be known as he

worked his way through the ranks of the army and navy.

One of the functions of Peter’s mock institutions was to ridicule the old ways. Peter constantly lamented his subjects’ reluctance to improve themselves on their own initiative. As he wrote in an edict of 1721 to replace sickles with more efficient scythes: “Even though something may be good, if it is new our people will not do it.” He therefore resorted to force. In Russia, where serfdom was made law as recently as 1649, the idea of a servile population was not new, but under Peter servitude was extended and intensified. The army and navy swallowed up tens of thousands of men. State peasants were increasingly requisitioned to work on major projects. Previously free persons were transferred to the status of serfs during the introduction of the poll tax. Peter also believed in the power of rules, regulations, and statutes, devised “in order that everyone knows his duties and no one excuses himself on the grounds of ignorance.” In 1720, for example, he issued the General Regulation, a “regulation of regulations” for the new government apparatus. Not only the peasants, but also the nobles, found life burdensome. They were forced to serve for life and to educate their sons for service.

ASSOCIATES AND OPPONENTS

Despite his harsh methods, Peter was supported by a number of men, drawn from both the old Muscovite elite and from outside it. The most prominent of the newcomers were his favorite, the talented and corrupt Alexander Menshikov (1673–1729), whom he made a prince, and Paul Yaguzhinsky, who became the first Procurator-General. Top men from the traditional elite included General Boris Sheremetev, Chancellor Gavril Golovkin, Admiral Fyodor Apraksin and Prince Fyodor Romodanovsky. The chief publicist was the Ukrainian churchman Feofan Prokopovich. It is a misconception that Peter relied on foreigners and commoners.

Religious traditionalists abhorred Peter, identifying him as the Antichrist. The several revolts of his reign all included some elements of antagonism toward foreigners and foreign innovations such as shaving and Western dress, along with more standard and substantive complaints about the encroachment of central authority, high taxes, poor conditions of service, and remuneration. The most serious were the musketeer revolt of 1698, the Astrakhan revolt of 1705, and the rebellion led by the

Don Cossack Ivan Bulavin in 1707–1708. The disruption that worried Peter most, however, affected his inner circle. Peter was married twice: in 1689 to the noblewoman Yevdokia Lopukhina, whom he banished to a convent in 1699, and in 1712 to Catherine, a former servant girl from Livonia whom he met around 1703. He groomed the surviving son of his first marriage, Alexei Petrovich (1690–1718), as his successor, but they had a troubled relationship. In 1716 Alexei fled abroad. Lured back to Russia in 1718, he was tried and condemned to death for treason, based on unfounded charges of a plot to assassinate his father. Many of Alexei's associates were executed, and people in leading circles were suspected of sympathy for him. Peter and Catherine had at least ten children (the precise number is unknown), but only two girls reached maturity: Anna and Elizabeth (who reigned as empress from 1741 to 1761). In 1722 Peter issued a new Law of Succession by which the reigning monarch nominated his own successor, but he failed to record his choice before his death (from a bladder infection) in February (January O.S.) 1725. Immediately after Peter's death, Menshikov and some leading courtiers with guards' support backed Peter's widow, who reigned as Catherine I (1725–1727).

VIEWS OF PETER AND HIS REFORMS

The official view in the eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth was that Peter had "given birth" to Russia, transforming it from "non-existence" into "being." Poets represented him as Godlike. The man and his methods were easily accommodated in later eighteenth-century discourses of Enlightened Absolutism. Even during Peter's lifetime, however, questions were raised about the heavy cost of his schemes and the dangers of abandoning native culture and institutions. As the Russian historian Nikolai Karamzin commented in 1810: "Truly, St. Petersburg is founded on tears and corpses." He believed that Peter had made Russians citizens of the world, but prevented them from being Russians. Hatred of St. Petersburg as a symbol of alien traditions was an important element in the attitude of nineteenth-century Slavophiles, who believed that only the peasants had retained Russian cultural values. To their Westernizer opponents, however, Peter's reforms, stopping short of Western freedoms, had not gone far enough. In the later nineteenth century, serious studies of seventeenth-century Muscovy questioned the revolutionary nature of Peter's reign, underlining that many of Peter's reforms and poli-

cies, such as hiring foreigners, reforming the army, and borrowing Western culture, originated with his predecessors. The last tsars, especially Nicholas II, took a nostalgic view of pre-Petrine Russia, but Petrine values were revered by the imperial court until its demise.

Soviet historians generally took a bipolar view of Peter's reign. On the one hand, they believed that Russia had to catch up with the West, whatever the cost; hence they regarded institutional and cultural reforms, the new army, navy, factories, and so on as "progressive." Territorial expansion was approved. On the other hand, Soviet historians were bound to denounce Peter's exploitation of the peasantry and to praise popular rebels such as Bulavin; moreover, under Stalin, Peter's cosmopolitanism was treated with suspicion. Cultural historians in particular stressed native achievements over foreign borrowings. In the 1980s–1990s some began to take a more negative view still, characterizing Peter as "the creator of the administrative-command system and the true ancestor of Stalin" (Anisimov, 1993). After the collapse of the USSR, the secession of parts of the former Empire and Union, and the decline of the armed forces and navy, many people looked back to Peter's reign as a time when Russia was strong and to Peter as an ideal example of a strong leader. The debate continues.

See also: ALEXEI PETROVICH; CATHERINE I; ELIZABETH; FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH; MENSHIKOV, ALEXANDER DANILOVICH; PATRIARCHATE; PEASANTRY; SERFDOM; ST. PETERSBURG; TABLE OF RANKS

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LINDSEY HUGHES

PETER II

(1715–1730), emperor of Russia, May 1727 to January 1730.

Son of Tsarevich Alexis Petrovich and Princess Charlotte of Wolfenbüttel, and grandson of Peter I, the future Peter II had an unfortunate start in life. His German mother died soon after his birth, and in 1718 his father died in prison after being tortured and condemned to death for treason. Peter I did not mistreat his grandson, but feared him as a possible rallying point for conservatives. He did not groom him as his heir, and a new Law on Succession (1722) rejected primogeniture and made it possible for the ruler to nominate his successor. During the reign of his step-grandmother, Catherine I (1725–1727), young Peter found himself under the protection of Prince Alexander Menshikov, who betrothed him to his daughter Maria and persuaded Catherine to name him as her successor, in the hope of stealing ground from the old nobility and gaining popularity by restoring the male line. On the day of Catherine's death, Peter was proclaimed emperor.

For the rest of Peter's short life it was a question of who could manipulate him before he developed a mind of his own. At first Menshikov kept the emperor under his wing, but, following a bout of illness in the summer of 1727, Menshikov was marginalized then banished by members of the powerful Dolgoruky clan, backed by the emperor's grandmother, Peter I's ex-wife Yevdokia. Peter II was crowned in Moscow on March 8 (February 25 O.S.), 1728. His chief adviser was now Prince Alexis

Grigorevich Dolgoruky, but the power behind the government was Heinrich Osterman. Both men were members of the Supreme Privy Council. After his coronation Peter stayed in Moscow, where he devoted much of his time to hunting. Portraits show a handsome boy dressed in the latest Western fashion. His short reign has sometimes been associated with a move to reject many of Peter's reforms, but there is no evidence that Peter II or his circle planned to return to the old ways, even if magnates welcomed the opportunity to spend more time on their Moscow estates. According to one source, young Peter wished to "follow in the steps of his grandfather." He did not get the chance. In fall 1729 he was betrothed to Prince Dolgoruky's daughter Catherine, but the wedding never took place. On January 29 (January 18 O.S.), 1730, he died from smallpox, without nominating a successor. The last of the Romanov male line, he was buried in the Archangel Cathedral in Moscow.

See also: CATHERINE I; MENSHIKOV, ALEXANDER DANILOVICH; ROMANOV DYNASTY

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LINDSEY HUGHES

PETER III

(1728–1762), emperor of Russia, January 5, 1762, to July 9, 1762.

The future Peter III was born Karl Peter Ulrich in Kiel, Germany, in February 1728, the son of the duke of Holstein and Peter I's daughter Anna Petrovna, who died shortly after his birth. His paternal grandmother was a sister of Charles XII of Sweden; this relation gave him a claim to the Swedish throne. In 1742 his aunt, the Empress Elizabeth (reigned 1741–1762 [1761 O.S.]), brought him to Russia to be groomed as her heir. Raised a Lutheran with German as his first language, he received instruction in Russian and the Orthodox religion, to which he converted. In 1745 he was married to the fifteen-year-old German Princess Sophia of Anhalt Zerbst, the future Catherine II ("the Great"). On Christmas Day 1761 (O.S.), Elizabeth died, and Peter succeeded her.



Emperor Peter III, husband of Catherine the Great. © ARCHIVO
ICNOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS

Catherine II's *Memoirs* drew a bleak picture of her marriage, recording bizarre details of Peter court-martialing rats, bringing hunting dogs to bed, and spying on Empress Elizabeth through a hole in the wall. Moreover, she hinted strongly that the marriage was never consummated and that her first child, the future Emperor Paul (born 1754), was in fact the son of her lover. Peter was an "absurd husband," in fact, not a husband at all. Contemporary accounts corroborate the essence, if not all the details, of Catherine's portrait of her husband. Peter seems to have been immature, impulsive, and unpredictable. He had a keen interest in military affairs, particularly drill and fortification, and played the violin quite well, but he also loved dolls and puppets and enjoyed crude practical jokes and drinking. Surviving portraits indicate an unprepossessing appearance.

But a ruler has never been denied his rightful throne merely on account of being "absurd," child-like, and plain. On the contrary, powerful courtiers could easily accommodate and even welcomed such monarchs. Although Peter brought a number of Ger-

mans from Holstein into his council, influential figures from Elizabeth's regime such as D. V. Volkov, A. I. Glebov, and members of the Vorontsov clan remained powerful. There was even some support for Peter's controversial personal decision to make peace with Prussia, "out of compassion for suffering humanity and personal friendship toward the King of Prussia." The treaty of May 5 (April 24 O.S.) 1762 restored all the territories taken by Russia during the Seven Years War. Peace triggered Peter's most famous edict, the manifesto releasing the Russian nobility from compulsory state service, issued on February 29 (February 8 O.S.), 1762, which Peter himself probably played little part in drafting. With the prospect of many officers returning from active service, it suited the government to save salaries and re-deploy personnel. The manifesto declared that compulsory service was no longer needed, because "useful knowledge and assiduity in service have increased the number of skillful and brave generals in military affairs, and have put informed and suitable people in civil and political affairs." But this was not an invitation to wholesale desertion. There were restrictions on immediate release: Nobles must educate their sons and, on receipt of the monarch's personal decree, rally to service. Those who had never served were to be "despised and scorned" at court.

Other measures issued during Peter's short reign included a reduction in the salt tax, a temporary ban on the purchase of serfs for factories, and some easing of restrictions on peasants entering and trading in towns. Sanctions were lifted on Old Believers who had fled into Poland. The Secret Chancery was abolished and some of its functions transferred to the Senate. In fulfillment of a decision already made under Elizabeth, the two million peasants on church estates were transferred to the jurisdiction of the state College of Economy, a measure that did not constitute liberation but was regarded as an improvement in the peasants' status. In conjunction with the emancipation of the nobility, this measure increased speculation that Peter might have been planning to liberate the serfs.

None of these measures saved Peter III. He demoted the Senate, thereby alienating some top officials. Confiscating its peasants alienated the church. The decision to end the war with Prussia suited some influential men, but most opposed Peter's further plans to win back Schleswig, formerly the possession of his Holstein ancestors, with Prussian support. He disbanded the imperial bodyguard, and there were rumors that he intended to replace the

PETER AND PAUL FORTRESS

The Peter and Paul Fortress was established in May 1703, the third year of the Great Northern War with Sweden, which would last until 1721. Having reduced Swedish positions along the Neva River from Lake Ladoga, Peter I needed a fortified point in the Neva estuary to protect Russia's position on the Gulf of Finland. Some twenty thousand men were conscripted to surround the island with earthen walls and bastions, and by November the fortress of Sankt Piter Burkh—"Saint Peter's Burg"—was essentially completed. It was named in honor of the Russian Orthodox feast day of Saints Peter and Paul (June 29).

Peter intended the fortress at the center of his city to serve not only a military function, but also as a symbol of his union of state and religious institutions within a new political order in Russia. To implement this reformation in the architecture of Saint Petersburg and its fortress, Domenico Trezzini, the most productive of the Petrine architects, capably served Peter. After the completion of the earthen fortress, Peter ordered a phased rebuilding with masonry walls. In May 1706, the tsar assisted with laying the foundation stone of the Menshikov Bastion, and for the rest of Trezzini's life (until 1734) the design and building of the Peter-Paul fortress, with its six bastions, would remain one of his primary duties. The major sections of the fortress, including the six bastions—were named either for a leading participant in Peter's reign, such as Alexander Menshikov, or for a member of the imperial house, not excluding Peter himself.

Within the fortress the dominant feature is the Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul, designed by Trezzini in a radical departure from traditional Russian church architecture. Trezzini created an elongated structure, whose baroque dome on the eastern end is subordinate to the tower and spire over the west entrance. The tower was the focus of Peter's interest and had priority over the rest of the structure, which was not completed until 1732. By 1723, the spire, gilded and surmounted with an angel holding a cross, reached a height of 367 feet (112 meters), which exceeded the bell tower of Ivan the Great by 105 feet (32 meters).

On the interior, the large windows that mark the length of the building provide ample illumination for the banners and other imperial regalia. It is not clear whether this great hall was origi-

existing guards, now required to wear Prussian uniforms, with men from Holstein. His fate was further sealed by his alleged contempt for Orthodoxy. It was rumored that he did not observe fasts and that he intended to convert Russia to Lutheranism. Such accusations were exaggerated by Peter's opponents, who now focused on replacing him with his more popular wife, who was beginning to fear for her own safety. On July 5 (June 28 O.S.), 1762, Catherine seized power with the support of guards regiments led by her lover Grigory Orlov. "All unanimously agree that Grand Duke Peter Fyodorovich is incompetent and Russia has nothing to expect but calamity," she declared. After vain efforts to rally support, Peter abdicated and was taken to a residence not far from Peterhof palace. On July 16 (July 5 O.S.) he died, officially of colic brought on by hemorrhoids, although rumors hinted at murder by poison, strangulation, suffocation, beating, or shooting. His escort later admitted that an "unfortunate scuffle" had occurred, but nothing was proven and no one charged. Even if Peter was not killed on Catherine's explicit orders, his death, while not arousing her regret, often came back to haunt her.

The somewhat mysterious circumstances of Peter III's death and the promising nature of some of his edicts later made his a popular identity for a series of pretenders to the throne, culminating in the Pugachev revolt in 1773 and 1774. Following Catherine II's death in 1796, Emperor Paul I, who never doubted that Peter was his father, had his parents buried side by side in the Peter and Paul Cathedral.

See also: CATHERINE II; ELIZABETH

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LINDSEY HUGHES

nally intended to serve as a burial place for the Romanov tsars; but with the death of Peter the Great, this function was assumed from the Archangel Cathedral in the Kremlin. The centerpiece of the interior is the gilded icon screen, designed by Ivan Zarudnyi and resembling the triumphal arches erected to celebrate Peter's victories. The frame was carved between 1722 and 1726 by craftsmen in Moscow and assembled in the cathedral in 1727. Some of the cathedral's ornamentation was lost after a lightning strike and fire in 1756, although prompt response by the garrison preserved the icon screen and much of the interior work.

The eighteenth century witnessed the construction of many other administrative and garrison buildings within the fortress, including an enclosed pavilion for Peter's small boat and the state Mint. At the turn of the nineteenth century the fortress became the main political prison of Russia. Famous cultural and political figures detained there include Alexander Radishchev, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Nikolai Chernyshevsky. In 1917, the garrison sided with the Bolsheviks and played a role in the shelling of the Winter Palace. During the early twenty-first century the fortress serves primarily as a museum.

See also: MENSHIKOV, ALEXANDER DANILOVICH; PETER I

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PETER THE GREAT *See* PETER I.

PETRASHEVSKY, MIKHAIL *See* BUTASHEVICH-PETRASHEVSKY, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH.

PETRASHEVTSY

Given the oppressive power of the state under Nicholas I and the weakness of civil society in Russia, the political ferment that rocked Europe dur-

ing the 1840s took the relatively subdued form of discussion groups meeting secretly in private homes. The most important of such groups met on Friday evenings in the St. Petersburg home of a young official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mikhail Butashevich-Petrashevsky, from late 1845 until the group was disbanded by the police in a wave of repression following the revolutions that erupted in Western Europe in 1848. More than one hundred members of the group were arrested and interrogated, and twenty-one of the leading figures were condemned to death. In an infamous instance of psychological torture, on December 22, 1849, the condemned men were led to the scaffold and hooded, and the firing squad ordered to shoulder arms, before an imperial adjutant rode up with a last-minute reprieve commuting the sentences to imprisonment or banishment. Among those sent to Siberia was the novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky, who later depicted the members of the group in his novel *The Possessed*.

The meetings of the Petrashevtsy, as the police labeled the men who met in Petrashevsky's home, were open to invited guests as well as regular members. Thus, over the course of the group's existence, several hundred men took part in the discussions. Some attendees were wealthy landowners or eminent writers or professors, such as the poets Alexei Pleshcheyev and Apollon Maikov and the economist V. A. Milyutin. The majority, however, were of modest means and held middle- or low-ranking positions in state service or were students or small-scale merchants. Serious about political ideas, they amassed a large collection of works in several languages on political philosophy and economics. While Petrashevsky himself was committed to the utopian socialism of Charles Fourier, and socialist thought was the dominant theme of the discussions, members of the group held a range of ideological and tactical approaches to the problem of transforming Russian society. Their most important project was the publication in 1845 and 1846 of *A Pocket Dictionary of Foreign Terms*, an effort to propagate their ideas through political articles disguised as dictionary entries. The censors eventually realized the subversive nature of the dictionary and ordered it confiscated, but not in time to prevent the sale of part of the second, more radical, edition.

The Petrashevtsy were not opposed in principle to a violent overthrow of the tsar's government, but in practice most saw little hope of a successful revolution in Russia and therefore advocated partial reforms such as freedom of speech, freedom of

press, and reform of the judicial system. The more radical members, led by Nikolai Speshnev, hoped to transform the group into a revolutionary organization that would prepare the ground for an armed revolt. Through subsidiary discussion circles that branched off from the original group, such as the one to which the novelist Nikolai Chernyshevsky belonged while a university student, the Petrashevtsy played an important role in propagating socialist ideas in Russia.

See also: CHERNYSHEVSKY, NIKOLAI GAVRILOVICH; DOS-TOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; NICHOLAS I

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KATHRYN WEATHERSBY

PETROV, GRIGORY SPIRIDONOVICH

(1868–1925), Orthodox priest and a leading proponent of Christian social activism.

Grigory Petrov was born in Iamburg, St. Petersburg province. He was educated at the diocesan seminary and the St. Petersburg Ecclesiastical Academy (1887–1891), and on graduating became a priest in a St. Petersburg church.

Petrov was also active as a writer. In his most successful work, *The Gospel as the Foundation of Life* (1898), he argued that Christian believers were required to apply the literal teachings of Jesus to every aspect of their lives in order to begin building the Kingdom of God here on earth. Petrov knew of the American Social Gospel movement, but his ideas were shaped by his encounters with new conceptions of pastorship and Christian activism then developing among the clergy of St. Petersburg.

Petrov's writings found a ready audience and made him famous. In 1903, however, conservatives began to attack his ideas in the ecclesiastical press, and as a result in 1904 the church dismissed Petrov from his pulpit and banned him from public speaking. Nevertheless, Petrov continued to write.

He became interested in Christian politics and was an activist during the Revolution of 1905. He established the newspaper *God's Truth* in Moscow in 1906 and was elected to the first Duma as a Constitutional Democrat.

Petrov never served in the Duma, however, because he was charged before an ecclesiastical court with false teaching. Although exonerated, he was confined to a monastery under church discipline. Despite popular sympathy for Petrov, the church defrocked him in 1908 and banned him from the capital and from public employment. He then became a journalist for a liberal newspaper, *The Word*. After the revolutions of 1917 he emigrated to Serbia, and then in 1922 to France. He died in Paris in 1925.

Petrov's main importance was in his contribution to the development of a modern, liberal understanding of Christianity in the Russian Orthodox context.

See also: ORTHODOXY

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JENNIFER HEDDA

PETRUSHKA

Petrushka was a Russian puppet theater spectacle and also the name of its main character (cf. the English Punch).

The play *Petrushka* seems to derive from a native older Russian buffoon and minstrel tradition and the Western European puppet theater tradition with its roots in the Italian commedia dell'arte. Possible evidence of the Petrushka play in Russia is found as early as 1637 in an engraving and description by a Dutch traveler, Adam Olearius. From around the 1840s to the 1930s, the Petrushka show was one of the most popular kinds of improvisational theater in Russia, often performed at fairs and carnivals and on the streets on a temporary wooden stage (*balagan*). The show was presented by two performers, one of whom manipulated the puppets, while the other played a barrel-organ. Recorded textual variants from the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries depict the adventures of Petrushka, a dauntless prankster and joker, who uses his wit as well as a vigorously wielded club to get the better of his adversaries, who often represent established authority. The themes tend to be sexist and violent. Petrushka is usually dressed in a red caftan and pointed red cap, and has a hunchback, a large hooked nose, and a prominent chin. The most popular scenes involve Petrushka and a handful of characters, among them his fiancée or wife, a gypsy horse trader, a doctor or apothecary, an army corporal, a policeman, the devil, and a large fluffy dog. Igor Stravinsky's ballet *Petrushka* (1911) is probably the most famous adaptation of this puppet theater show.

See also: FOLKLORE; FOLK MUSIC; STRAVINSKY, IGOR FYODOROVICH.

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PATRICIA ARANT

PETTY TUTELAGE

Petty tutelage in the Soviet economy meant that the day-to-day operations of enterprises could be (and frequently were) directly influenced or controlled by decisions or actions of the industrial ministry to which the enterprise was subordinate. While Soviet enterprise managers ultimately were responsible for producing the goods identified by planners, industrial ministry officials exercised control over the firm in a number of ways. First, the industrial ministry annually allocated the plan targets among the enterprises subordinate to it, thereby defining changes in output requirements by firm over time. That is, ministry officials were responsible for disaggregating the targets they received from Gosplan, the State Planning Committee, and preparing the annual enterprise plan, the *techpromfinplan*. Second, industrial ministry officials distributed the financial resources provided to them by state committees to individual firms. Financial resources included funds for wages and in-

vestment purposes. Third, each industrial ministry redistributed profits earned by firms subordinate to them among these same firms. Finally, ministry officials responded to requests from enterprise managers to change or "correct" output plan targets or input allocations over the course of the planning period if circumstances precluded successful plan fulfillment.

During perestroika, numerous policies were adopted to reduce petty tutelage by industrial ministry officials over Soviet enterprise operations. Some view the reduction of ministerial tutelage and the corresponding increase in decision-making authority by enterprises as a cornerstone of perestroika. Ministry officials were to cease exercising routine daily control over enterprises and focus instead on long-term issues such as promoting investment and technological advance. However, performance measures applied to the industrial ministry remained linked to the performance of their firms, and the ministry retained control over funds and resources to be allocated to Soviet enterprises. Consequently, in practice, it is unlikely that petty tutelage declined.

See also: GOSPLAN; TECHPROMFINPLAN

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PHOTOGRAPHY

The development of photography in Russia during the nineteenth century followed a history similar to that of other European countries. After Louis-Jacques-Mandé Daguerre and William Henry Fox Talbot made public their methods for capturing images on light-sensitized surfaces in 1839, I. Kh. Gammel, corresponding member to the Russian Academy of Sciences, visited both inventors to learn more about their work and collected samples of daguerreotypes and calotypes for study by Russian scientists. The Academy subsequently commissioned Russian scientists to further investigate both

processes. As elsewhere, Russian experimenters quickly introduced a variety of refinements to the initial processes.

Photography found immediate popular success in Russia with the establishment of daguerreotype portrait studios in the 1840s. The similarity of the photograph to the Orthodox icon (an image that is believed to be a direct and truthful record of a physical being) heightened the early reception of photography and resulted in the persistence of portraiture as a major genre in Russia. While the first generation of photographers was largely foreign, native practitioners soon appeared. Some, such as Sergei Levitsky, achieved international recognition for their role in the development of photography. A personal acquaintance of Daguerre, Levitsky established studios in both France and Russia, serving as court photographer for the Romanovs and Napoleon III. During the later nineteenth century, Russian photography became institutionalized with the establishment of journals, professional societies, and exhibitions.

While photography was initially largely rejected as an art, it became widely accepted with the emergence of Realism. Russian photographers used the camera to capture the changing social landscape that accompanied the liberation of the serfs and growing urbanization. Simultaneously, ethnographic photography became an important genre with the expansion of the Russian Empire and the opening of Central Asia. Numerous photographic albums and research projects documented the peoples, customs, landscape, and buildings of diverse parts of the Russian Empire. With the rise of Symbolism, a younger generation of pictorialist photographers rejected the photograph as document in pursuit of more aestheticizing manipulated images.

At the turn of the century, technological developments led to the appearance of popular illustrated publications and the emergence of modern press photography. The Bulla family established the first Russian photo agency; they documented such events as the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and the 1917 Revolutions. The growing commercial availability of inexpensive cameras and products rendered photography more pervasive in Russia. However, with the commercialization of photography, Russian practitioners became increasingly dependent upon foreign equipment and materials. With the outbreak of World War I, photographers were largely cut off from their supplies,

and the ensuing crisis severely limited photographic activity until the mid-1920s.

After the October Revolution, Russian photography followed a unique path due to the ideological imperatives of the Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks quickly recognized the propaganda potential of photography and nationalized the photographic industry. During the civil war, special committees collected historical photographs, documented contemporary events, and produced photopropaganda. In the early 1920s, Russian modernist artists, such as Alexander Rodchenko, experimented with the technique of photomontage, the assembly of photographic fragments into larger compositions. With the growing politicization of art, photomontage and photography soon became important media for the creation of ideological images. The 1920s also witnessed the foundation of the Soviet illustrated mass press. Despite a shortage of experienced photojournalists, the development of the illustrated press cultivated a new generation of Soviet photographers. Mikhail Koltsov, editor of the popular magazine *Ogonek*, laid the groundwork for modern photojournalism in the Soviet Union by establishing national and international mechanisms for the production, distribution, and preservation of photographic material. Koltsov actively promoted photographic education and the further development of both amateur and professional Soviet photography through the magazine *Sovetskoye foto*.

During the First Five-Year Plan, creative debates emerged between modernist photographers and professional Soviet photojournalists. While both groups shunned aestheticizing pictorialist approaches and were ideologically committed to the development of uniquely Soviet photography, differences arose concerning creative methods, especially the relative priority to be given to the form versus content of the Soviet photograph. These debates stimulated the further development of Soviet documentary photography. The illustrated magazine *USSR in Construction* (*SSSR na stroike*; 1930–1941, 1949) was an important venue for Soviet documentary photography. Published in Russian, English, French, and German editions, it featured the work of top photographers and photomontage artists. Like the nineteenth-century ethnographic albums, *USSR in Construction* presented the impact of Soviet industrialization and modernization in diverse parts of the USSR in film-like photographic essays. As the 1930s progressed, official Soviet photography became increasingly lackluster and formulaic. Published photographs

were subjected to extensive retouching and manipulation—not for creative ends, but for the falsification of reality and history. An abrupt change took place during World War II, when Soviet photojournalists equipped with 35-millimeter cameras produced spontaneous images that captured the terrors and triumphs of war.

Soviet amateur photography flourished in the late 1920s with numerous worker photography circles. Amateur activity was stimulated by the development of the Soviet photography industry and the introduction of the first domestic camera in 1930. Later that decade, however, government regulations increasingly restricted the activity of amateur photographers, and the number of circles quickly diminished. The material hardships of the war years further compounded this situation, practically bringing amateur photographic activity to a standstill. With independent activity severely circumscribed, Soviet photography was essentially limited to the carefully controlled area of professional photojournalism.

During the Thaw of the late 1950s, the appearance of new amateur groups led to the cultivation of a new generation of photographers engaged in social photography that captured everyday life. Their activity, however, was largely underground. By the 1970s, photography played an important role in Soviet nonconformist and conceptual art. Artists such as Boris Mikhailov appropriated and manipulated photographic imagery in a radical critique of photography's claims to truth. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many photographic publications and industrial enterprises gradually disappeared. While professional practitioners quickly adapted to the new market system and creative photographers achieved international renown, the main area of activity was consumer snapshot photography, which flourished in Russia with the return of foreign photographic firms.

See also: CENSORSHIP; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS

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ERIKA WOLF

PIMEN, PATRIARCH

(1910–1990), patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church from June 2, 1971, to May 3, 1990.

Sergei Mikhailovich Izvekov took monastic vows in 1927 and worked with church choirs in Moscow. Later, as Patriarch Pimen, his excellent musical sense led him to forbid singers to embellish the liturgy with operatic flourishes.

During World War II Pimen allegedly concealed his monastic vows and served as an army officer in communications or intelligence. When discovered, he was incarcerated, and his political vulnerability was said to have figured in the Soviet authorities' decision that he could be controlled as patriarch. More friendly sources recount his heroism in protecting his men with his own body under bombardment. His official biography omits his military service.

Judgments of Pimen as patriarch are mixed. He was accused of being withdrawn, passive, and increasingly infirm. On the other hand, he was a gifted poet, radiated spirituality, and was said to have defended the integrity of the Church against corrupting modernism and reckless innovation. Pimen's moment came when Communist General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev decided to greet the millennium of Russia's conversion to Christianity by improving relations with the Church. Gorbachev received Pimen on April 29, 1988, and more than eight hundred new parishes were permitted to open that year. Sunday schools, charitable works, new seminaries and convents, and other concessions to church needs followed. Whether these tangible benefits justified Pimen's political collaboration with the Soviet regime is a controversial question.

See also: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; RUSSIFICATION

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NATHANIEL DAVIS

PIROGOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(1810–1881), scientist, physician, proponent of educational reform.

Nikolai Pirogov was born in Moscow where his father managed a military commissary. After graduating from the medical school of Moscow University, he enrolled at the Professors' Institute at Dorpat University to prepare for teaching in institutions of higher education. In Dorpat he specialized in surgical techniques and in pathological anatomy and physiology. After five years at Dorpat, he went to Berlin University in search of the latest knowledge in anatomy and surgical techniques. While in Berlin he was appointed a professor at Dorpat, where he quickly acquired a reputation as a successful contributor to anatomy and an innovator in surgery. In 1837–1839 he published *Surgical Anatomy of Arterial Trunks and Fasciae* in Latin and German.

In 1841 Pirogov accepted a teaching position at the Medical and Surgical Academy in St. Petersburg, the most advanced school of its kind in Russia. He lectured on clinical service in hospitals and pathological and surgical anatomy. His major work published under the auspices of the Medical and Surgical Academy was the four-volume *Anatomia Topographica* (1851–1854) describing the spatial relations of organs and tissues in various planes. He was also the author of *General Military Field Surgery* (1864), relying heavily on his experience in the Crimean War (1853–1855). In recognition of his scholarly achievement, the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences elected him a corresponding member.

Tired of petty academic quarrels and intrigues, Pirogov resigned from his professorial position in 1856. In the same year he published "The Questions of Life," an essay emphasizing the need for a reorientation of the country's educational system. The article touched on many pedagogical problems of broader social significance, but the emphasis was on an educational philosophy that placed equal emphasis on the transmission of specialized knowledge and the acquisition of general education fortified by

increased command of foreign languages. He also pointed out that, because of the low salaries, Russian teachers were compelled to look for additional employment, which limited their active involvement in the educational process. In his opinion, one of the most pressing tasks of the Russian government was to make the entire school system accessible to all social strata and ethnic groups.

The government not only listened to Pirogov's plea for a broader humanistic base of the educational system, but in the same year appointed him superintendent of the Odessa school district. Two years later, he became the superintendent of the Kiev school district. In his numerous circulars and published reports he advocated a greater participation of teachers' councils in decisions on all aspects of the educational process.

Apprehensive of the long list of his liberal reforms, the Ministry of Public Education decided in 1861 to ask Pirogov to resign from his high post in education administration. His dismissal provoked a series of rebellious demonstrations by Kiev University students.

Pirogov's government service, however, did not come to an end. In 1862 he was assigned the challenging task of organizing and supervising the education of Russian students enrolled in Western universities. In 1866 the government again retired him; the current minister of public education thought that the supervision of foreign education could be done more effectively by a "philologist" than by a "surgeon."

In 1881 a large group of scholars gathered in Moscow to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Pirogov's engagement in science. Four years later, an even larger group founded the Pirogov Society of Russian Physicians with a strong interest in social medicine. It was not unusual for the periodic conventions of the Society to be attended by close to two thousand persons.

See also: EDUCATION

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ALEXANDER VUCINICH

PISAREV, DMITRY IVANOVICH

(1840–1868), noted literary critic, radical social thinker, and proponent of “rational egoism” and nihilism.

Born into the landed aristocracy, Dmitry Ivanovich Pisarev studied at both Moscow University and St. Petersburg University, concentrating on philology and history. From 1862 to 1866, Pisarev served as the chief voice of the journal *The Russian Word* (*Russkoye slovo*), a journal somewhat akin to *The Contemporary* (*Sovremennik*), which was published and edited by the poet Nikolai Nekrasov (1821–1878). In 1862 Pisarev was imprisoned in the Petropavlovsk Fortress for writing an article criticizing the tsarist government and defending the social critic Alexander Herzen, editor of the London-based émigré journal *The Bell* (*Kolokol*). Ironically, Pisarev’s arrest marked his own rise to prominence, coinciding with the death of Nikolai Dobrolyubov in 1861 and arrest of Nikolai Chernyshevsky in 1862. During his incarceration for the next four and one-half years, Pisarev continued to write for the *The Russian Word*, including several influential articles exhibiting his literary panache: “Notes on the History of Labor” (1863), “Realists” (1864), “The Historical Ideas of Auguste Comte” (1865), and “Pushkin and Belinsky” (1865). His articles on Plato and Prince Metternich, and especially the article “Scholasticism of the Nineteenth Century” brought him fame as a literary critic.

Pisarev differed from other, more liberal, social reformers of the first half of the decade, since he stressed individual-ethical aspects of socioeconomic reforms, such as family problems and the difficult position of women in society. When Chernyshevsky’s novel *What is to Be Done* (*Chto delat?*) came out in 1863, Pisarev praised it as a utilitarian tract focusing on the positive aspects of nihilism (generally, the view that no absolute values exist). At the same time, Pisarev criticized Chernyshevsky for his intellectual timidity and failure to develop his ideas far enough. According to Pisarev, a functional society did not need literature (“art for art’s sake”), and literature, therefore, should simply merge with journalism and scholarly investigation as descriptions of reality. He even assaulted the reputation of Alexander Pushkin, claiming that the poet’s work hindered social progress and should be consigned to the dustbin of history.

Rather than scorn Ivan Turgenev’s novel *Fathers and Sons* (*Otsy i deti*), written in 1862, as

Chernyshevsky did, claiming it castigated the radical youth, Pisarev strongly identified with the novel’s hero Bazarov—a nihilist who believes in reason and has a scientific understanding of society’s needs, but rejects traditional religious beliefs and moral values. “Bazarov,” Pisarev wrote, “is a representative of our younger generation; in his person are gathered together all those traits scattered among the mass to a lesser degree.” To Pisarev, Bazarov’s “realism” and “empiricism” reduced all matters of principle to individual preference. Turgenev’s hero is governed only by personal caprice or calculation. Neither over him, nor outside him, nor inside him does he recognize any regulator, any moral law. Far above feeling any moral compunction against committing crimes, the new hero of the younger generation would hardly subordinate his will to any such antiquated prejudice.

Pisarev’s readers gleaned in the author himself some of these same extremist, nihilist tendencies. However, while Pisarev was an extremist intellectual, he was an honest one. He eloquently advocated such practical social types as Bazarov—activists for the intelligentsia, that is, people who could play the role of a “thinking proletariat.” Yet Pisarev himself did not advocate a political revolution. He believed society, and above all the mass of the people, could be transformed through socioeconomic change. He simply denounced whatever stood in the way of such peaceful change more trenchantly than any of his predecessors had. Thus this urging to attack anything that seemed socially useless sounded more revolutionary than it really was.

Upon his release from prison, Pisarev contributed articles to the journals *The Task* (*Delo*) and *Notes of the Fatherland* (*Otechestvennye zapiski*). Although he drowned in the Gulf of Riga in 1868, at the age of twenty-eight, his ideas continued to influence other writers, notably Fyodor Dostoyevsky. In *Crime and Punishment* (*Prestuplenie i nakazanie*) Dostoyevsky’s hero Raskolnikov (from the word *raskol* or “split”) shows what occurs when one flaunts moral principles and takes a human life. In *The Possessed* (*Besy*) Dostoyevsky shows his reader the worst ways in which human beings can abuse their freedom. Several characters in this novel act on horrifying beliefs, leaving numerous dead bodies in their wake. Raskolnikov’s views pale next to the shocking behavior of the “demons” whom Dostoyevsky feared most: human beings who lose their perspective and let the worst side of their natures predominate.

See also: DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; INTELLIGENTSIA; NIHILISM AND NIHILISTS; TURGENEV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

PLANNERS' PREFERENCES

The term “planners’ preferences” was introduced by Abram Bergson, in his study (1961) of Soviet national income, to capture the idea that the Soviet economy was ultimately directed by the top leadership of the Communist Party, rather than by consumer sovereignty as in market economies. The preferences of said leadership provide the determining orientation and socially desired objectives of a socialist economic plan designed to govern all economic activity over a defined period. As such, the term refers to the objective function used in economic analyses to “rationalize” the decisions and actions of producers and distributors of economic goods and services in a planned or Soviet-type economy. These objectives are to replace the objectives implicit in the market aggregation of consumers’ and users’ preferences in a properly functioning market economic system. Such preferences (tastes, needs, and desires), together with income constraints, determine the demands for goods and services. These demands, together with technological possibilities for supply, then determine the market prices offered for these goods and services, and hence underlie the market prices (key coordinating and incentive signals) in a market economy. Similarly, planners’ preferences are supposed to underlie planned prices and production and distribution

commands in a centrally planned economy, capturing the rationale of, and rationality behind, the comprehensive economic plan. In principle they can reflect social and collective objectives beyond any individual or organizational preference ordering, and hence capture and optimally respond to “externalities” of a social, political, or environmental nature. As such, they are sometimes used to describe the objective function in a formal welfare economic analysis of policy issues or problems. In the practice of centrally planned economies, however, they appear largely to reflect the interests and objectives of the dictator or (later) ruling elite (*nomenklatura*), when not merely serving as an ex post facto rationalization for observed planning decisions.

See also: BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMIC; MARKET SOCIALISM

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RICHARD ERICSON

PLATON (LEVSHIN)

(1737–1812), Orthodox metropolitan of Moscow.

Born the son of a church sexton in the village of Chasnikovo near Moscow, Peter Levshin (the future Metropolitan Platon) attended the Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy in Moscow before taking monastic vows at the St. Sergius–Holy Trinity Lavra in 1758. He adopted the name Platon and within three years had become rector of the Lavra seminary.

Platon’s eloquence and learning attracted Empress Catherine II (r. 1762–1796), who in 1763 appointed him tutor to her son and heir, Paul. Platon’s lectures for the tsarevich were published in 1765 under the title *Orthodox Teaching; or, a Short Course in Christian Theology*. Translated into German and English, this work earned Platon an international reputation as an Orthodox thinker.

In 1766 Platon became a member of the Holy Synod, the ruling council of the Russian Orthodox Church. Consecrated archbishop of Tver in 1770,

he was appointed archbishop of Moscow in 1775, a post he retained for the rest of his life. Platon proved to be an effective administrator. Immediately upon taking office, he revamped the ecclesiastical bureaucracy by issuing new rules for clerical superintendents. He also worked to improve the education and material living standards of the secular clergy. In his effort to create an enlightened clergy, Platon added modern foreign languages, medicine, history, and geography to the seminary curriculum. In recognition of his achievements, Catherine promoted him to the rank of metropolitan in 1787.

By then, however, Platon's relationship to the empress had begun to deteriorate. In 1785 Catherine II had ordered him to investigate Nikolai Novikov (1744–1816), a Freemason and prominent publisher. To her dismay, Platon declared Novikov an exemplary Christian. Despite Platon's finding, Catherine had Novikov arrested a few years later in 1792. That same year, she granted Platon permission to enter a partial retirement by moving to Bethany, his monastic retreat on the grounds of the Holy Trinity Lavra.

During the reign of Emperor Paul (r. 1796–1801), Platon negotiated the return to the state church of some Old Believers (religious dissenters who had broken with the Orthodox Church because they rejected the liturgical innovations of Patriarch Nikon [r. 1652–1658]). The Old Believers accepting this compromise, known as the *yedinoverie*, or union, agreed to recognize the legitimacy and authority of the state church in exchange for the right to follow pre-Nikonian rituals and practices. As an ecumenical effort by the Russian Orthodox Church, the union failed to win over many adherents.

Platon died in 1812, shortly after hearing of Napoleon Bonaparte's retreat from Moscow. An excellent administrator and inspired preacher, he did not use his position to voice social criticism. Instead, he sought to make the church more effective in a limited ecclesiastical sphere through education and regulation. Platon's collected works, which include his autobiography and a short history of the Russian Orthodox Church, fill twenty volumes.

See also: NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVERS; ORTHODOXY

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J. EUGENE CLAY

PLATONOV, SERGEI FYODOROVICH

(1860–1933), Russian historian.

Born in Chernigov, Sergei Platonov graduated from a private gymnasium in St. Petersburg (1878) and the Department of History and Philology of St. Petersburg University (1882). His tutor was Konstantin Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who recommended that he be allowed to remain at the university in order to "prepare to be a professor." Platonov was influenced also by the works of Vasily Klyuchevsky. He belonged to the "St. Petersburg school" of Russian historiography, which paid special attention to the study and publication of historical sources. In 1888 Platonov defended his master's thesis on the topic of *Old Russian Legends and Tales About the Seventeenth-Century Time of Troubles as a Historical Source* (published in the same year and honored with the Uvarov Award of the Academy of Sciences).

Despite not yet having earned a doctorate, in 1889 Platonov headed the Department of Russian History of St. Petersburg University. In 1899 Platonov defended his doctorate thesis by presenting a monograph, *Studies in the History of the Troubles in the Muscovite State in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. This work was Platonov's masterpiece, based on a scrupulous analysis of sources. Platonov sought to "show, with facts, how . . . a modern state was being formed." The main purpose of the "political mishaps and social tension" of the early seventeenth century was, according to Platonov, the replacement of the boyar aristocracy with the nobility. He defined the *Oprichnina* of Ivan the Terrible, which became one of the initial causes of the Time of Troubles, not as the "whim of a timid tyrant," but as a thought-out system of actions aimed at destroying the "appanage aristocracy." Platonov was also one of the first to show that one of the aspects of the Time of Troubles was the tension between the nobility and the serfs over land and freedom.

Platonov earned wide acclaim through the repeatedly republished *Lectures on Russian History* (1899) and the *Russian History Textbook For Middle School* (in two parts, 1909–1910). From 1900 to

1905, Platonov was the dean of the History and Philology Department of St. Petersburg University, and from 1903 to 1916 he served as the director of the Women's Pedagogical Institute.

Despite his negative opinions of the October Revolution, Platonov continued to work actively in several scholarly institutions. From 1918 to 1923, he was the head of the Petrograd branch of the Main Directorate of Archival Affairs. From 1918 he served as the chairman of the Archaeographical Commission of the Academy of Sciences. In 1920 Platonov was elected as a member of the Academy of Sciences. Platonov worked in the Academy of Sciences as the director of the Pushkin House (1925–1928) and the Library of the Academy of Sciences (1925–1929). The peak of his academic career was his election as the head (academic secretary) of the Department of Humanities and a member of the presidium of the Academy of Sciences in March 1929.

During the 1920s Platonov published biographies of Boris Godunov (1921), Ivan the Terrible (1923), and Peter the Great (1926) and the monographs *The Past of the Russian North* (1923) and *Muscovy and the West in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (1925). Platonov opposed the nihilist views on history before the Russian revolution and the purely negative depiction of the actions of Russian tsars.

From 1929 to 1931 Platonov was the central figure of the so-called Academic Affair. The formal explanation for the persecution of scholars was the presence of political documents, including the act of resignation of Nicholas II, in the Library of the Academy of Science. The real motive of the Soviet regime in the Academic Affair was to bring the Academy under its control. In November 1929 the Politburo decided to release Platonov from all positions that he held. On January 12, 1930, Platonov was arrested. He was accused of being a member of the International Union of Struggle Toward the Rebirth of Free Russia, a monarchist organization fabricated by the prosecutors. According to the OGPU (secret police), the purpose of this fictional organization was to overthrow the Soviet regime and establish a constitutional monarchy; Platonov was the supposed future prime minister.

While in custody Platonov was expelled from the Academy of Sciences. In August 1931 he was sentenced by the OGPU to five years of exile and deported, with his two daughters, to Samara. He died in Samara.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; PUSHKIN HOUSE

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

PLEHVE, VYACHESLAV KONSTANTINOVICH

(1846–1904), leader of imperial police then minister in governments of Tsar Alexander III and Tsar Nicholas II.

As a conservative statesman in late imperial Russia, Vyacheslav Plehve (von Plehwe) was a key figure in the tsarist regime's struggle against revolution. An experienced prosecutor, he was tapped in 1881 to head the imperial police following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. His success in arresting the perpetrators and destroying the People's Will terrorist organization, combined with his remarkable energy and talent, led to appointments as Assistant Minister of the Interior (1885–1894), Minister State-Secretary for Finland (1894–1902), and Minister of the Interior (1902–1904).

Assuming the post of minister in the wake of widespread peasant disorders and his predecessor's murder by revolutionaries, Plehve sought above all to reimpose order and control. With the help of former Moscow police chief Sergei Zubatov, he extended throughout Russia a network of "security sections" (*okhrany*), which used covert agents to penetrate revolutionary and labor groups. He fired

Zubatov when his police-sponsored worker organizations triggered widespread strikes in 1903. He repressed the liberal press and the *zemstvo* organs of local self-government, leading to bitter clashes with leading public figures. His heavy-handed tactics alienated both the Russian public and his government colleagues, especially arch-rival Sergei Witte, the talented Finance Minister whose efforts to modernize Russia were seen by Plehve as contributing to unrest. But he won the support of Tsar Nicholas II, who relieved Witte of his ministry in August 1903, and he backed aggressive ventures that helped provoke the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. He also cracked down on subject nationalities such as Finns, Armenians and Jews; his alleged efforts to divert public anger from the government toward the Jews may have contributed to the Kishinev anti-Jewish pogrom of 1903. Ironically, this so incensed the Jewish police agent Evno Azef, who had managed to infiltrate the terrorists, that he helped them arrange Plehve's murder in July 1904. Plehve thus died a failure, disparaged by both contemporaries and later historians.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NICHOLAS II; ZUBATOV, SERGEI VASILIEVICH

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EDWARD H. JUDGE

tensive revolutionary activity, he fled abroad in 1880 and spent most of the rest of his life in Switzerland. Becoming disillusioned with populist ideology, and drawn instead to Marxian thought, in 1883, together with a few friends, he formed the first Russian Marxist organization, the Emancipation of Labor Group. In two major works, *Socialism and Political Struggle* and *Our Differences* Plekhanov endeavored to adapt Marxian ideas to Russian circumstances. Rather than the peasants, the nascent proletariat would constitute the principal revolutionary force. But a socialist revolution was out of the question for his backward homeland, he believed. Accordingly, Russia was destined to experience two revolutions: the first to establish a “bourgeois-democratic” political system; the second, after industrial capitalism and the proletariat had become well developed, to create a socialist society.

During the 1890s, numbers of able individuals, including Vladimir Lenin, rallied to Plekhanov's banner. In 1903, they convened a congress to establish a Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party. At its birth, the party split into two factions, the Bolsheviks (led by Lenin) and the Mensheviks. Initially Plekhanov sided with Lenin, but soon broke with him and thereafter usually sided with the Mensheviks.

During the Revolution of 1905, Plekhanov's theory was tested and found wanting. When world war broke out in 1914, unlike most Russian socialists Plekhanov supported Russia and its allies against Germany. He returned to Russia after the overthrow of tsarism in 1917. He vigorously attacked Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who were pressing for a second, socialist revolution. Because his views conflicted with those of the radicalized anti-war masses, he gained little support. With a broken heart, Plekhanov died in May 1918.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MARXISM; MENSHEVIKS; REVOLUTION OF 1905

SAMUEL H. BARON

PLEKHANOV, GEORGY VALENTINOVICH

(1856–1918), the “Father of Russian Marxism.”

Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov was born into a minor gentry family, in Tambov Province. In 1876 he abandoned his formal education to devote himself entirely to the underground populist movement. It sought to instigate a peasant revolution that would overthrow the tsarist regime and create an agrarian socialist society. After years of in-

PLENUM

A plenum, or plenary session, is a meeting of any organization, group, association, etc., which all members are expected to attend. During the Soviet period, the term *plenum* referred specifically to a

meeting of all members of a Communist Party committee at a national, regional, or local level. According to the Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Central Committee was required to hold a plenum at least once every six months, attended by both full and candidate members. At the first plenum after a Party Congress, the Central Committee elected the Politburo, Secretariat, and General Secretary. Other plenums usually coincided with important party or state events, such as a meeting of the Supreme Soviet or a significant international incident. During the three- to five-day session, members heard reports on party matters and approved prepared resolutions. Though originally intended by Vladimir Lenin to serve as the party's supreme decision-making body between Party Congresses—proof of the party's collective leadership—the Central Committee plenum became a more ceremonial than deliberative body by the mid-twentieth century. The plenum's main function was to endorse Politburo decisions. Infrequently, the Central Committee plenum was called on to resolve Politburo conflict; for example, a 1964 plenum removed Nikita Khrushchev from power. Proceedings remained secret, but a formal statement was issued at the end of a plenum. All decisions approved at the plenum became formal party policy. Party plenums at lower levels (e.g., regional or local) convened more often than the Central Committee, endorsing party directives and deciding how best to implement them.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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JULIE K. DEGRAFFENRIED

POBEDONOSTSEV, KONSTANTIN

(1827–1907), conservative statesman, professor and chair of civil law at Moscow University (1860–1865), senator, chief procurator of the Holy Synod (1880–1905).

Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev has often been seen as one of the primary conservative influences on Alexander III and Nicholas II. Although

the “grey eminence” undoubtedly exerted influence upon domestic policy and was influential in bringing about a new version of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality,” historians have disputed the degree of his direct influence on policy formation.

Pobedonostsev, son of a Moscow University professor, grew up in Moscow in an atmosphere of scholarship, discipline, and close family ties. He was the youngest of eleven children, and his father closely supervised his early education before sending him off to the School of Jurisprudence from 1841 to 1846. Pobedonostsev graduated second in his class and upon graduation was assigned a position in the eighth department of the Senate in Moscow. He worked diligently in his position while also pursuing scholarly research and writing. Throughout his life Pobedonostsev remained a prolific writer, publishing articles on law, education, philosophy, and religion in book form and in journals such as *Grazhdanin (The Citizen)*, *Moskovskie Vedomosti (Moscow News)* and *Russky Vestnik (Russian Newsletter)*. In 1853 he became secretary of the seventh department of the Senate, and in 1855 he served as secretary to two Moscow departments. By 1859 he had received a lectureship in Russian civil law at Moscow University.

His scholarship, publications, translations, and reputation as an interesting and respected professor brought him to the attention of the court in 1861, and he was asked to tutor Grand Duke Nicholas Alexandrovich, heir to the throne. In that capacity he went on a tour of Russia with the heir and his entourage in 1863. According to several scholars, this journey profoundly influenced Pobedonostsev's view of Russia and his ideas about its future. When Nicholas died in 1865, Pobedonostsev was asked to tutor Grand Duke Alexander and became executive secretary to the first department of the Senate. Although Pobedonostsev was honored by his appointments and felt bound by duty to accept them, he apparently missed Moscow and felt uncomfortable in court life. According to Pobedonostsev's biographer, Robert Byrnes, this appointment “removed him from the library, the study, and the classroom and placed him in a position in which he was to develop a most inflexible political and social philosophy and to exert profound influence upon the course of Russian history” (p. 35). Pobedonostsev served in the senate from 1868 and in the State Council from 1872. He received his most important post, Ober Procurator of the Holy Synod, in 1880 and was to remain in it until his retirement in 1905.

Pobedonostsev worked closely with education ministers as well and was instrumental in developing policies he hoped would prevent radicalism in the universities. Contemporaries and historians have usually felt that Pobedonostsev worked for the appointment of Ivan Delyanov (Minister of Education, 1882–1898) and that together they worked toward establishing a quota system in order to restrict the numbers of non-Russian and non-Orthodox students admitted to Russian universities. He also reestablished a separate network of primary schools, which came under the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod rather than the Ministry of Education. Despite concerns about the level of education that could be delivered in church schools, Pobedonostsev believed that the moral benefits of church schools would outweigh any intellectual deficiencies.

Pobedonostsev has been considered one of the “most baleful influences on the reign” of Nicholas II and the ultra-conservative and reactionary force behind many of Alexander III’s and Nicholas II’s manifestos. Peter Banks, minister of finance from 1914 to 1917, noted that Pobedonostsev was the teacher who had the most influence on the tsar. Despite Pobedonostsev’s reputation as an arch-conservative, he was actively involved in work on preparing the liberal judicial statute of 1861. He also read widely, communicated with Boris Chicherin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Slavophile thinkers, and was aware of the intellectual debates of his day.

The year 1881 was a significant one for Pobedonostsev and for Russia. After the assassination of Alexander II, Pobedonostsev became one of the strongest forces arguing against the Mikhail Loris-Melikov constitution and Western-style reforms. He was responsible for drafting the manifesto that Alexander III read in April 1881 pledging to “preserve the power and justice of autocratic authority . . . from any pretensions to it.” Pobedonostsev is usually assumed to be the writer responsible for Nicholas II’s “senseless dreams” speech in 1895 when he proclaimed “it is known to me that voices have been heard of late in some zemstvo assemblies of persons carried away by senseless dreams of the participation of zemstvo representatives in the affairs of internal government.”

If the height of Pobedonostsev’s influence was after the assassination of Alexander II, his influence had significantly waned by 1896. His last years were quiet ones. He had never enjoyed court life, and in his later years he went out even less frequently. He did not officially retire until 1905, but

by then younger men had been appointed, Nicholas II had ascended to the throne, and many of Pobedonostsev’s policies were once again being disputed. Pobedonostsev died of pneumonia in 1907. By the time of his death, other statesmen had assumed power, and his funeral was little noticed, with only a few in attendance.

See also: ALEXANDER III; HOLY SYNOD; NICHOLAS II; SLAVOPHILES

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MICHELLE DENBESTE

PODGORNY, NIKOLAI VIKTOROVICH

(1903–1983), party and government leader.

Nikolai Podgorny rose to political prominence under Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s, only to play a key role in his ousting in October 1964. Ukrainian by birth and an engineer by vocation, Podgorny started his career in the Ukrainian sugar industry in the 1930s. Throughout the war he held a number of posts responsible for food production, particularly in the Ukraine, where he developed close links with Khrushchev. After the war, his career path shifted to the party. By 1953, the year Josef Stalin died, he was Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Podgorny’s star rose as Khrushchev rose to power. In 1956, the year Khrushchev denounced Stalin, Podgorny was elected to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee. Khrushchev personally nominated him for Ukrainian Communist Party First Secretary in 1957 and for the powerful post of CPSU Central Committee Secretary in 1963, by which time he was also a full member of the CPSU’s leading body, the Presidium. While somewhat conservative, Podgorny was an enthusiastic supporter of some of Khrushchev’s more “hare-brained schemes” (the accusation used to justify his dismissal in October 1964), such as the division of the party into industrial and agricultural sections. Nevertheless, Podgorny, like almost all Khrushchev’s Ukrainian appointees, turned against his patron, colluding with Leonid Brezhnev in seeking Central Committee support to remove Khrushchev as party First Secretary. Podgorny went on to become Soviet head

of state, but rivalry with party secretary Brezhnev saw his demise in 1977.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; CHANCELLERY SYSTEM; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

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ROGER D. MARKWICK

PODYACHY

The clerk (*pod'yachy*), who wrote, filed, and handled government documents of the seventeenth-century Russian central and provincial administration.

Little-known during the 1500s, chancellery clerks expanded: 575 in 1626, but 2,762 in 1698. After 1700, their numbers plunged. Divided in three salary groups (senior, middle, junior) by service record and seniority, clerks' pay varied from 0.5 to fifty rubles; the mean decreased from 11.5 to 9.5 rubles. Most earned from one to ten rubles. Pay was also in service land and kind. Clerks could receive supplements for special assignments, holidays, and other needs, and resort to bribery. Signatory (*pod'yachy so pripisyuu*) and document (*pod'yachy so spravoy*) clerks were elite senior clerks. Clerk novitiates between ages ten and fifteen learned skoropis (cursive longhand) and documentary formulae, and acquired office sense; many were washed out. During the 1600s, the number of clerks working without regular pay, thanks to budgetary constraints, increased significantly.

Numbers varied from 446 in the Service Land Chancellery to one in several smaller chancelleries; median and mean figures per chancellery were ten and nine (1620s) and twenty-three and fifty-two (1680s). Between three percent and ten percent were promoted to *dyak*. Not part of the Moscow service group, they were nonetheless respected for their expertise. Central clerks were dispatched into the field (land surveys, military headquarters duty, diplomatic service, etc.); mortality was high.

The number of provincial clerks varied from 750 (1640s) to nearly 1,900 (1690s). They worked

under the town military governor (*voyevoda*), subordinated to the chancelleries. Working in Moscow and the provinces, the private scribe (*ploshchadnoy pod'yachy*) read and wrote private documents for a fee.

See also: CHANCELLERY SYSTEM; DYAK

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PODZOL

Podzols are subarctic soils of the cold, humid northern coniferous forest (*taiga*), found between the mixed forests of the temperate zone and the tundras of the arctic zone. Known as spodosol in the Seventh Approximation Soil Classification system, podzol derives from the Russian terms *pod*, or "under," and *zol*, or "ash." Very infertile because of the leaching of basic soil nutrients (calcium, sodium, potassium, magnesium, and so on), podzols are composed of layers known as horizons. The A-horizon comprises a shallow needleleaf litter zone, a narrow strongly acidic humus zone, and a broader ash-grey to chalky leached (A-2) horizon made up of silica, or sand. Beneath this infertile horizon is the zone of illuviation, or B-horizon, in which the leached nutrients of the A-horizon accumulate. Beyond the B-horizon is a totally inorganic C-horizon composed of weathered bedrock. Without substantial fertilization, podzols are suitable only for the growing of berries and root crops.

See also: CLIMATE; GEOGRAPHY

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POGODIN, MIKHAIL PETROVICH

(1800–1875), prominent Russian historian, journalist, and publisher.

A Slavophile and professor of Russian history at Moscow University (1835–1844), Mikhail Pogodin wrote a seven-volume history of Russia (1846–1857) and a three-volume study entitled *The Early History of Russia* (1871). His conservative journal *The Muscovite* (1841–1856) defended the policies of Tsar Nicholas I.

Pogodin began life in humble circumstances, as the son of a serf, but his ultranationalist views helped to boost him to prominence. His association with the secret society Lovers of Wisdom (*Lyubomudry*) at Moscow University also helped his career. Founded in 1823 toward the end of the reign of Alexander I by Prince Vladimir Odoyevsky (1803–1869) and others, this society was, to some extent, a continuation of the Masonic Astrea Lodge. The circle—consisting of a dozen members who met in secret—tended to disregard politics and propound the philosophic ideas of Friedrich von Schelling and other Romantic thinkers. The society published the journal *Mnemosyne* until it was dissolved soon after the Decembrist uprising in 1825.

Pogodin believed that the natal gentry-style aristocracy had compromised and outlived itself. He wrote that Nicholas I, who died in 1855, had imposed upon Russia “the quiet of a graveyard, rotting and stinking, both physically and morally.” As a Pan-Slavist, he often suggested that God’s hand was at work in Russian history, preparing the nation for a great mission of peace and order. He compared the conquest of Siberia by Yermak in 1581 with that of South America by Hernando Cortéz. “We have discovered one third of Asia,” he wrote in 1837. “Is that not worthy of celebration like America’s discovery by Christopher Columbus?”

During the 1850s, Pogodin got into a debate with Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804–1873) over the legacy of Kievan Rus. Pogodin developed the untenable thesis that the Great Russians originally inhabited the Kiev region and that only after the Mongols forced them to flee to the northeast during the eleventh and twelfth centuries did the Ukrainians (“Little Russians”) migrate into the area. According to Pogodin, the Ukrainians arrived much later from somewhere in the Carpathian Mountains. Pogodin’s views were expanded on by the philologist Alexei Sobolevsky.

The oldest school of thought about the legacy of Kievan Rus claims that the first leaders and organizers of the state were the Varangians, a group of Scandinavians who raided the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea during the ninth century and penetrated into Eastern Europe toward Byzantium along the Dnieper River. This Norman (Normanist) theory rests mainly on a literal interpretation of the Primary Chronicle (*Tale of Bygone Years*, or *Povest vremennykh let*), a document written by monks of the Kievan Monastery that covers the period up to 1118.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Ukrainian historians challenged the Normanist theory, downplaying the Varangian influence on the formation of Rus. They argued that Ukrainians were autochthonous (indigenous) in their territories and that the principality of Galicia-Volhynia was the successor to the Kievan state.

However, the tsarist autocracy constantly censored these revisionists, which, besides Maksymovych, included Mykola Kostomarov, Volodymyr Antonovych, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Dmytro Bahalii, Dmytro Doroshenko, and Mykola Chubaty. Nonetheless, the Normanist theory, with certain modifications, remains the basis of Western historiography of Russia and Ukraine.

Despite Pogodin’s humble beginnings, his portrait was painted by the famous artist Vasily Perov (1834–1882), and he was buried with other luminaries in the Novodevichy Cemetery.

See also: NORMANIST CONTROVERSY; SLAVOPHILES

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

POGROMS

Pogrom, a Russian word that originally had several meanings, such as “beating,” “defeat,” “smashing,” or “destruction,” has come to be identified with violent attacks on the persons and property of one ethnicity by large crowds of other ethnicities, in particular, attacks on Jews by ethnic Russians. The first occurrence that historians generally agree was a pogrom took place in Odessa in 1821, and pogroms against Armenians took place in Azerbai-

jan in 1988 and 1990. Most pogroms in Russian history, however, took place in three major waves: 1881–1884, following the assassination of Alexander II; 1903–1906, following the announcement of the October Manifesto; and 1919–1921, during the Russian Civil War. In the first wave, more than 250 pogroms were recorded, mostly within the Pale of Settlement in present-day Ukraine. Beginning in April 1881, the largest and most violent were in the large cities, but then radiated out through the countryside, often along the railroad lines. Most pogroms occurred in the spring and summer of 1881, with ever smaller numbers in the next three years. These were less violent than later waves, with probably only forty deaths in 1881. The next wave began in 1903 with the infamous Kishinev pogrom, accelerated through the dislocations of war and revolution, and reached a great crescendo at the end of 1905. In the two weeks after the October Manifesto, it is estimated that seven hundred pogroms occurred throughout Russia, leaving nine hundred dead and eight thousand wounded. Unlike other waves, pogroms occurred at this time in many places outside of the Pale of Settlement, including small cities with an insignificant or non-existent Jewish population; in the latter cases, students and political activists were often the major targets.

The classic explanation of these pogroms was that either the tsarist regime, or forces close to and supportive of the regime, encouraged these pogroms as a way of directing popular discontent away from the government and onto a visible minority group. While still widely held today, this explanation has been convincingly challenged in recent years by historians who have pointed out the complex and varied reactions the regime had to pogroms, the lack of archival evidence for such a conspiracy, the regime's deep fear of any sort of popular violence, and a general belief that the Russian government was incapable of organizing such widespread and, in the case of October 1905, simultaneous disturbances. However, if the old conspiracy theory is breaking down, no consensus explanation has emerged to replace it. The last great wave of pogroms, in 1919–1921, was the bloodiest and the most atypical, occurring after the fall of the imperial regime and during conditions of bitter strife in which violence of every kind was unrestrained. Concentrated in Ukraine, all parties to the conflict carried out pogroms at one point or another, but the most organized and bloodiest were perpetrated by the White Volunteer Army. Condoned by officers and carried out by Cossacks, with some loot-

ing by peasants, these pogroms may account for 150,000 deaths.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; JEWS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; OCTOBER MANIFESTO; PALE OF SETTLEMENT

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DAVID PRETTY

POKROVSKY, MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEVICH

(1868–1932), leading Soviet historian of the 1920s and early 1930s, chief administrator of the social sciences, and a principal enforcer of Marxist orthodoxy.

Mikhail Pokrovsky served as Vice-Commissar of Education; Chairman of the Presidium of the Communist Academy and Chairman of its Society of Marxist Historians; Full Member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (briefly before his death); and was also a member of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and held numerous other positions.

Pokrovsky studied history at the Imperial Moscow University under the supervision of Vasily Klyuchevsky and Pavel Vinogradov. In 1905 he embraced Marxism as a creed and methodology. As a result of revolutionary activities, he spent the years from 1907 to 1917 in exile, mostly in France. There he produced his most important scholarly works, notably his five-volume *History of Russia since Ancient Times*. In it he stated his major thesis: Russian history manifested the same pattern of development as did other European societies in that capitalism was a natural outcome of class conflict and not a foreign implant. Russian autocracy, a mere variant of European absolutism, was created by and served the interests of merchant capitalism. The latter was an ill-defined category that Pokrovsky

borrowed from Karl Marx. This thesis placed Pokrovsky at odds with most other Russian historians, who asserted that Russian autocracy, unlike European absolutism, had the power to fashion social relationships; it was, in a certain sense, "supra-class." Most of Pokrovsky's numerous subsequent writings reiterated this thesis and attacked the non-Marxist historians who did not share it.

Pokrovsky returned to Russia in August 1917 and held prominent positions in the Moscow Soviet. After the Bolsheviks took power he largely confined his activities to the pedagogical, scholarly and propaganda institutions of the Soviet government and the Communist Party. He was the party-designated leader of what was called the historical front, an array of institutions designed to establish the hegemony of Marxist doctrine and to circumscribe and finally eliminate all non-Marxist doctrines and convert or silence their adherents.

Pokrovsky elaborated a theory of cultural revolution that justified the provisional pluralism implied by the policies mentioned above: the building of communism with the hands of non-communists, at least in the short term. The policy and his theory began to flounder during the late 1920s. His concept of merchant capitalism and his leadership of the historical front came under attack from a faction of rival historians. Hastening to get in step with Josef Stalin, Pokrovsky aggressively attacked non-Marxist scholars as class enemies, but his theory of merchant capitalism clashed with Stalin's theory of socialism in one country. In 1931 Stalin upheld the authority of Pokrovsky. His "school" (i.e., associates and former students) dominated the scholarly and propaganda apparatus until 1936. In that year Stalin signaled a vituperative campaign against the ideas of Pokrovsky: he was branded as anti-Marxist and petty bourgeois, largely because his works were devoid of nationalist sentiment. Pokrovsky had helped to devise the repressive instruments that were used against him posthumously. Almost his entire school was physically annihilated. Because Pokrovsky was an anti-Stalin symbol, he received a partial rehabilitation in the years of Nikita Khrushchev's predominance. During the early twenty-first century his name has almost entirely lost its symbolic weight.

See also: MARXISM; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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GEORGE ENTEEN

POLAND

Relations between Poles and Russians have never been easy. Despite their close linguistic and ethnic ties, differences rather than similarities characterize the relationship between them. In religious denomination, political tradition, worldview, even the alphabets in which they write their related languages, Poles and Russians are clearly distinct. Russia took its form of Christianity during the late ninth century from Byzantium while Poland was christened by emissaries from the pope almost a century later. Russia came to be the very essence of autocratic rule under Ivan IV and the Romanovs, while Poland developed in an opposite direction, toward a highly decentralized polity linked with Lithuania and dominated by the nobility. Throughout history, Poland has tended to see itself as the easternmost outpost of Western values and traditions: unlike Russia, Poland participated in the Renaissance and Reformation. Defining themselves as Europeans, Poles have often depicted their Eastern neighbors as barbarians and schismatics. Russians returned the favor, describing Poles as flighty, hysterical, and treacherous.

MUSCOVY AND POLAND-LITHUANIA

The first significant clashes between the Polish state and Muscovy occurred after the Union of Lublin (1569). During the 1550s and 1560s Muscovy had pursued an aggressive westward policy, seizing some Lithuanian lands. When Muscovite political authority dissolved into anarchy during the Time of Troubles during the early seventeenth century, Poland was ready to fish in troubled Russian waters. Polish nobles and Jesuits supported the first

“False Dmitry,” who claimed to be Ivan IV’s son and triumphantly entered Moscow in 1605. In great part because of the large Polish retinue and openly Catholic sympathies of “Dmitry,” he was soon deposed and murdered. But Polish interference in confused Muscovite politics continued. Most spectacularly, King Sigismund III of Poland succeeded in having his son Wladyslaw proclaimed tsar in 1610. The Polish presence in Moscow was not to last; by 1613 the Poles had been slaughtered or forced to flee, and Mikhail Romanov was elected tsar.

As Russia recovered and expanded under the Romanovs, Poland grew weaker. Poland’s highly decentralized government and elected king meant that the central government could not impose its will on the provinces. Increasingly, power devolved to the local magnates, further weakening the center. The anti-Polish rebellion of Bohdan Khmelnit-sky in 1648 allowed Muscovy to extend its power into the Ukraine with the Treaty of Pereiaslavl (1654). Additional Polish territory, including the cities of Smolensk and Kiev, was lost to the Russians during the following decade.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The eighteenth century witnessed further Polish descent into anarchy. Already during the 1690s Polish king Jan Sobieski had complained of his inability to force the Polish magnates to obey him. Worse was to come. The fact that Polish kings were elected allowed Poland’s neighbors to put up their own candidates in the hope of influencing future policy. Poland also had the misfortune to be placed geographically between three rising absolutist states—Prussia, Russia, and Habsburg Austria. In 1764, St. Petersburg succeeded in placing its candidate on the Polish throne. Stanisław-August Poniatowski, a former lover of Catherine the Great, was to be the last Polish king.

PARTITIONS AND RUSSIAN RULE

The impetus toward partition came not from Russia, but from Poland’s western neighbor, Prussia. That state’s ambitious ruler, Frederick II (“the Great”) suggested a dividing up of Polish territory to prevent destabilizing “anarchy.” In the first Partition of Poland (1772), Russia absorbed some thirteen percent of the commonwealth’s territory. The shock of the partition fueled a push for serious political reforms, including a strengthening of the central government and the king. The partitioning powers, including Russia, feared a strong Poland.



A 1772 drawing shows Polish King Stanisław trying to hold onto his crown while Poland is split between Catherine II and Frederick II. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

They were particularly disturbed by the fruitful efforts of the Four-Years-Sejm, including the Polish constitution of May 3, 1791. Once again using the excuse of Polish anarchy, Prussia and Russia seized more Polish territory in the Second Partition of 1793, calling forth a Polish national uprising. However, the heroic efforts of insurrectionist Tadeusz Kosciuszko could not prevent the Third Partition of 1795, after which Poland disappeared from the European map for more than a century.

After the Napoleonic wars, borders between the partitioning powers were altered significantly, bringing a large portion of ethnic Poland under Russian rule. The majority of Poles thus became subjects of the Russian tsar. Tsar Alexander I afforded the Kingdom of Poland considerable rights and autonomy. The Poles enjoyed their own coinage, legal system, army, legislature, and constitution. Disagreements between Warsaw and St. Petersburg over the limits of Polish autonomy exploded into the open during the November Upris-



Russian troops in Warsaw after the January insurrection of 1863–1864. © HULTON-DELITSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

ing of 1830, which lasted well into the following year. After Nicholas I put down this insurrection, he abolished the Kingdom of Poland's legislature, constitution, and army. Still, legal and administrative differences existed between Russian and Polish provinces—though these differences would be considerably narrowed after the crushing of the subsequent January 1863 uprising.

The final half century of Romanov rule over much of historic Poland has generally been characterized as a period of Russification. Certainly, St. Petersburg viewed Poles en masse as at least potentially disloyal subjects, and Polish culture was kept on a very tight leash. Poles in the Russian Empire could not use their native tongue in education at any level except the most elementary—and even here Russian was often introduced. In the so-called Western Provinces (present-day western Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus) even speaking Polish in public could lead to fines or worse. Still, there was no systematic attempt to Russify the Polish nation in the sense of total cultural (or religious) assimilation.

Rather, Russification amounted to a severe limiting of Polish civil and cultural rights in this period.

WORLD WAR I AND INDEPENDENCE

The outbreak of World War I transformed relations between the partitioning powers and Poles. Now securing the loyalty of Poles became a paramount consideration for both Russia and the Central Powers. The Russian commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, issued a manifesto in mid-August 1914, holding out the postwar promise of a unified Polish state under the Romanov scepter. In the end, force of arms decided the issue: By autumn 1915 Russian armies had for the most part been pushed out of ethnic Poland. With the Bolsheviks' coming to power in October 1917 and the subsequent Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), all hopes of continued Russian—or Soviet—domination over Poland came to an end. In late 1918 Poland regained its independence.

Relations between Poland and the fledgling Soviet state got off to a very bad start. Moscow was

vitaly interested in exporting revolution to Western Europe, most likely by way of Poland. Further, the unclear borders between Poland and its neighbors to the east presented a serious potential for conflict. Historically, Poles had been very prominent as landowners and townspeople in these border regions between ethnic Poland and ethnic Russia. Thus Poles figure in early Soviet propaganda as portly mustachioed noblemen bent on enslaving Ukrainian or Belarusian peasants. Between 1919 and 1921 Soviet Russia and newly independent Poland clashed on the battlefield, the Poles occupying Kiev and, at the opposite extreme, the Red Army getting all the way to the Vistula River in central Poland. In March 1921, both sides, exhausted for the moment, signed the Peace of Riga.

The USSR was not satisfied with the treaty's terms. In particular, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Belarusians and Ukrainians ended up on the Polish side of the frontier, providing the USSR with a would-be constituency for extending the border westward. Nor did relations between Poland and the USSR improve in the interwar period. The two primary politicians of interwar Poland, Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski, both despised and feared the Soviet state. The Communist Party was outlawed in Poland, and many Polish communists fled to the USSR, often straight into the Gulag. Even Adolf Hitler's coming to power in 1933 did not bring the USSR and Poland closer. Rather, the later 1930s witnessed the Great Purges in the USSR and a downward spiral in Polish politics toward an increasingly vicious form of Polish chauvinism and official anti-Semitism.

Poland was stunned by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. This agreement between Josef Stalin's USSR and Hitler's Germany demonstrated that their mutual enmity toward the Polish state outweighed ideological differences. The pact allowed Hitler to invade on September 1, 1939, and the Red Army, following a secret protocol, occupied eastern Poland later that month. Once again Poland disappeared from the map. When the Polish state was resurrected in 1945, it was devastated. The large and vibrant Polish Jewish community had been all but wiped out during the Holocaust, some three million non-Jewish Poles had lost their lives, and the capital city Warsaw was a wasteland, systematically destroyed by the Germans in retaliation for the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944. Polish nationalists and some Western writers contend that the Red Army, by that time nearing the eastern outskirts of the city, could have

prevented the Nazi devastation of the city. Others argue that the Red Army had been successfully repulsed by the Germans. In any case, the failure of the Soviets to move into Warsaw allowed the Nazis to massacre Polish fighters who might very well have opposed the imposition of communist rule.

PEOPLE'S POLAND

Having liberated Poland from the Nazis, Stalin was determined to see a pro-Soviet government installed there. Despite the tiny number of native Polish communists and little support for communist or pro-Soviet candidates, intimidation and rigged voting placed a Stalinist Polish government, led by Bolesław Bierut, in power in 1948. Bierut launched a crash industrialization drive, attempted to collectivize Polish agriculture, and jailed many Catholic clergymen. After Bierut's death in 1956, leadership passed to the more flexible Władysław Gomułka who allowed Poles a considerable amount of cultural and economic leeway while reassuring Moscow of People's Poland's stability.

Unfortunately for Gomułka, Poles compared their economic and cultural situation not with that in the USSR, but with conditions in the West. As the 1960s progressed, the relative backwardness of Poland compared with Germany or the United States only increased. Domestically, internal party tensions led to an ugly state-sponsored anti-Semitic episode in 1968, during which Poland's few remaining Jews—most highly assimilated—were hounded out of the country. Thus, Gomułka's position was already weak before the notorious price hikes on basic foodstuffs of December 1970 that led to rioting and his replacement by Edward Gierek. Gierek promised prosperity, but was never able to deliver. In 1980, price increases caused civil disturbances and his resignation.

The discontent of 1980 also spawned something quite new: the Polish trade union Solidarity. This first independent trade union in a communist bloc country appeared in late 1980, was banned just more than one year later, and was resurrected—more properly, relegalized—during the late 1980s. Solidarity represented a novel phenomenon for a People's Democracy: a popular and independent trade union that brought together intellectuals and workers. The outlawing of Solidarity by General Wojciech Jaruzelski in December 1981 was a desperate measure taken, according to Jaruzelski himself, to forestall an actual Soviet invasion of the country. One may doubt Jaruzelski's account, but

tensions between the USSR and Poland certainly ran high, and the threat of invasion cannot be entirely discounted. Ultimately, however, Jaruzelski's attempt to save People's Poland failed. Early in 1989 Solidarity was relegalized and in summer of that year the communists handed over power to Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first noncommunist prime minister since the 1940s. The refusal of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to intervene in Polish affairs made possible this peaceful transfer of power.

Relations between Poland and Russia during the 1990s have been remarkably positive, considering the amazing changes brought by that decade. Despite grumbling and even saber rattling from Moscow over Poland's plans to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the end NATO expansion took place in 1999 without a hitch. At the same time, economic and cultural links between Moscow and Warsaw have weakened considerably as Poland has turned toward the West both institutionally (NATO, European Union) and culturally (learning English instead of Russian). Still, the correct if not always cordial relations between the two countries during the 1990s give reason for hope that the two largest Slavic nations will finally be able to both live together and prosper.

See also: CATHOLICISM; LITHUANIA AND LITHUANIANS; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; ORGANIC STATUTE OF 1832; POLES; POLISH REBELLION OF 1863; POLISH-SOVIET WAR; SARMATIANS; TIME OF TROUBLES

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THEODORE R. WEEKS

POLAR EXPLORERS

From its earliest days, Russia was concerned with Arctic settlement and development. Actual exploration began during the eighteenth century and continued, although Russia took little part in the classic race for the North and South poles. Interest heightened after 1920, as the USSR transformed itself into a key player in North polar exploration. After 1956, the USSR became an important force in Antarctic research.

Russian migration to the Arctic coast began during the eleventh century. Further settlement was tied to the foundation of religious communities (such as the Solovetsky Monastery, built in 1435); demand for furs and precious metals; the search for the Northeast Passage (in Russian, the Northern Sea Route); the establishment of ports such as Arkhangelsk (1584); and Russia's eastward expansion into Siberia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Scientific and exploratory work got underway during the 1700s and 1800s. On behalf of the Russian government, Danish captain Vitus Bering, with Alexei Chirikov as his second-in-command, launched his Kamchatka (1728–1730) and Great Northern (1733–1749) expeditions. Afterward, the Admiralty and Academy of Sciences sponsored many voyages and expeditions, surveying or exploring Spitsbergen, Novaya Zemlya, the New Siberian Islands, Wrangel Island, and Franz Josef Land. The colonization of Alaska and incorporation of the Russian-American Company (1799) necessitated greater familiarity with the Arctic. Key figures from this period include Fyodor Rozmyslov (d. 1771), Vasily Chichagov (1726–1809), Matvei Gedenshtrom (1780–1843), Academy of Sciences president Fyodor Litke (1797–1882), and Alexander Sibiryakov (1844–1893). The latter sponsored the first successful crossing of the Northeast Passage: Adolf Erik Nordenskjöld's 1878–1879 voyage in the *Vega*.

During the late 1800s and early 1900s, as international audiences thrilled to the daring exploits

of explorers like Peary and Scott, Russian polar work focused on scientific, commercial, and military concerns. Admiral Stepan Makarov formed a Russian icebreaker fleet, while naval officer Alexander Kolchak, later famous as a White commander during the Russian civil war, explored the Arctic. Early twentieth-century expeditions under Ernst Toll, Vladimir Rusanov, Georgy Brusilov, and Georgy Sedov ended in tragedy. By contrast, in 1914, Yan Nagursky became the first pilot successfully to fly an airplane above the Arctic Circle. In 1914–1915, Boris Vilkitzky completed the second traversal of the Northeast Passage.

Under the Soviet regime, polar exploration and development fell to agencies such as the All-Union Arctic Institute (VAI) and, after 1932, the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route (GUSMP). Prominent Arctic scientists included Vladimir Vize, Georgy Ushakov, and Rudolf Samoilovich of the VAI, as well as Otto Schmidt, head of GUSMP. The USSR made impressive headway during the 1920s and 1930s in building an economic and transportation infrastructure in the polar regions. This was also an era of spectacular public triumphs, including the rescue of Umberto Nobile and the crew of the dirigible *Italia* (1928); participation in the Arctic flight of the airship *Graf Zeppelin* (1931); the *Sibiryakov's* first single-season crossing of the Northeast Passage (1932); the airlift of the *Chelyuskin's* crew and passengers, who survived two months on the Arctic ice after their ship sank (1933–1934); the flights of Valery Chkalov and Mikhail Gromov over the North Pole on their way to the United States (1937); the first airplane landing at the North Pole (1937); and the establishment of the first research outpost at the North Pole, the SP-1, under the leadership of Ivan Papanin (1937–1938). In 1941 the Soviets also accomplished the first airplane landing at the Pole of Relative Inaccessibility. There was, of course, an ugly underside to Soviet achievement in the Arctic: Not only was much Soviet polar work characterized by inefficiency and periodic mishaps, both major and minor, but it was closely linked to the steady expansion of forced labor in the GULAG system.

Soviet polar exploration resumed after World War II. A new generation of researchers, including A.A. Afanasyev, Vasily Burkhanov, Mikhail Somov, Alexei Treshnikov, Boris Koshechkin, and others, came to the forefront. A second North Pole outpost (SP-2) was established in 1950, and until the late 1980s, the USSR operated at least two SP stations at any given time. In 1977, the atomic ice-

breaker *Arktika* became the first surface vessel to reach the North Pole.

As for the Antarctic, Russian mariners Fabian Bellingshausen (1770–1852) became, in 1820, one of the first three explorers knowingly to sight the Antarctic continent (the first person to sight Antarctica remains a matter of debate). The USSR did not engage in serious exploration of the Antarctic until 1956. During the International Geophysical Year of 1957–1958, the USSR was one of twelve nations to establish stations in Antarctica. In 1959, the USSR signed the Antarctic Treaty, which went into effect in 1961. As with the Arctic, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 made it difficult for the Russians to continue Antarctic research, although Russia still maintains stations there year-round.

See also: BERING, VITUS JONASSEN; CHIRIKOV, ALEXEI ILICH

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JOHN MCCANNON

POLES

The Poles represent the northwestern branch of the Slavonic race. They speak Polish, a member of the Western Slavic branch of the Indo-European language family. It is most closely related to Belorussian, Czech, Slovak, and Ukrainian. From the very earliest times the Poles have resided on the territory between the Carpathians, Oder River, and North Sea. Bolesław I “Chrobny” or the Brave (967–1025) united all the Slavonic tribes in this region into a Polish kingdom, which reached its zenith at the close of the Middle Ages and slowly declined during the mid to late eighteenth century. Hostility to Polish nationalism formed a common bond between the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian governments. Thus, Poland was partitioned four

times. The first partition (August 1772) divided one-third of Poland between the three above-named countries. The second partition (January 1793) was mostly to the advantage of Russia; Austria did not acquire land. In the third partition (October 1795), the rest of Poland was divided up between the three autocracies. After the defeat of Napoleon and collapse of his puppet state, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1814), a fourth partition occurred (1815), by which the Russians pushed westward and incorporated Warsaw. Until then Warsaw had been situated in Prussian Poland from 1795 to 1807. Potent anti-Russian sentiment has long prevailed among the Poles who are predominantly Catholic, especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as evidenced by four popular uprisings against the Slavic colossus to the east: 1768, 1794, 1830–1831, and 1863. According to the 1890 census about 8,400,000 Poles resided in the Russian Empire.

Finally in 1918, an independent Poland was reconstituted. Later in August 1939 a pact was signed between Adolf Hitler's Germany and Josef Stalin's Soviet Union, which contained a secret protocol authorizing yet a fifth partition of Poland: "In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San." The next month Hitler's Germany invaded Poland; the Red Army did not interfere.

After more than four decades of the Cold War, during which Poland was a Soviet "satellite" and belonged to the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, partially free elections were held in 1989. The Solidarity movement won sweeping victories; Lech Wałęsa became Poland's first popularly elected post-Communist president in December 1990. In 1999 Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, along with Hungary and the Czech Republic. It is scheduled to enter the European Union in 2004.

See also: NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; POLAND

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

POLICE *See* STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF.

POLISH REBELLION OF 1863

After decades of harsh limits on Polish autonomy, many Poles were hopeful that the situation would improve after the 1855 coronation of Alexander II. There were indeed concessions: Martial law was lifted, an amnesty was declared for all political prisoners, a new Archbishop of Warsaw was named (the position had been vacant since 1830), and censorship was made somewhat less restrictive. In 1862 a Pole named Aleksander Wielopolski was made governor of the Polish Kingdom, in an attempt to cooperate with the aristocratic elite and marginalize more radical national separatists and democratic revolutionaries. All these attempts at conciliation failed, as patriotic demonstrations broke out in late 1861 and intensified throughout 1862. The Russians tried to suppress these protests with deadly force, but that only generated more anger among the Poles, and the unrest spread.

Wielopolski tried to quash the disturbances on the night of January 23 by organizing an emergency draft into the army targeted at the young men who had been leading the demonstrations. This, too, failed, as it prompted the national movement leaders to proclaim an uprising (which was being planned in any case). The rebels proclaimed the existence of the "Temporary National Government," which would lead the revolt and (they hoped) pave the way for a true independent Polish government afterwards.

The "January Uprising" (as it is known in Poland) was fought primarily as a guerrilla war, with small-scale assaults against individual Russian units rather than large pitched battles (which the Poles lacked the forces to win). Over the next one and one-half years, 200,000 Poles took part in

the fighting, with about 30,000 in the field at any one moment.

After the revolt was crushed, thousands of Poles were sent to Siberia, hundreds were executed, and towns and villages throughout Poland were devastated by the violence. All traces of Polish autonomy were lost, and the most oppressive period of Russification began.

See also: POLAND

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BRIAN PORTER

POLITBURO

The Politburo, or Political Bureau, was the most important decision-making and leadership organ in the Communist Party, and has commonly been seen as equivalent to the cabinet in Western political systems. For most of the life of the Soviet system, the Politburo (called the Presidium between 1952 and 1966) was the major focus of elite political life and the arena within which all important issues of policy were decided. It was the heart of the political system.

The Politburo was formally established at the Eighth Congress of the Party in March 1919 and held its first session on April 16. Formed by the Central Committee (CC), the Politburo was to make decisions that could not await the next meeting of the CC, but over time its smaller size and more frequent meeting schedule meant that effective power drained into it and away from the CC. There had been smaller groupings of leaders before, but these had never become formalized nor had they taken an institutional form. The establishment of the Politburo was part of the regularization of the leading levels of the Party that saw the simultaneous creation of the Orgburo and Secretariat, with these latter two bodies meant to ensure the implementation of the decisions of leading Party organs, in practice mostly the Politburo.

From its formation until late 1930, the Politburo was one arena within which the conflict between Josef Stalin and his supporters on the one

side and successive groups of oppositionists among the Party leadership was fought out, but with the removal of Mikhail Tomsky in 1930, the last open oppositionist disappeared from the Politburo. Henceforth the body remained largely controlled by Stalin. Its lack of institutional integrity and power is illustrated by the fact that various of its members were arrested and executed during the terror of the mid- to late 1930s. After World War II, the Politburo ceased even to meet regularly, being effectively replaced by ad hoc groupings of leaders that Stalin mobilized on particular issues and when it suited him.

Following Stalin's death in 1953, the leading Party organs resumed a more regular existence, although Nikita Khrushchev's style was not one well suited to the demands of collective leadership; he often sought to bypass the Presidium. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the Politburo became more regularized, and the overwhelming majority of national issues seem to have been discussed in that body, although an important exception was the decision to send troops into Afghanistan in 1979. For much of the Mikhail Gorbachev period, too, the Politburo was at the heart of Soviet national decision making, although the shift of the Soviet system to a presidential one and the restructuring of the Politburo at the Twenty-Eighth Congress in 1990 effectively sidelined this body as an important institution.

The Politburo was always a small body. The first Politburo consisted of five full and three candidate (or nonvoting) members; at its largest, when it was elected at the Nineteenth Congress in 1952 and was probably artificially large because Stalin was planning a further purge of the leadership (it was also envisaged that there would be a small, inner body), it comprised twenty-five full and eleven candidate members. Generally in the post-Stalin period it had between ten and fifteen full and five to nine candidates. Membership has tended to include a number of CC secretaries, leading representatives from state institutions (although the foreign and defense ministers did not become automatic members until 1973) and sometimes one or two republican party leaders. Gorbachev changed this pattern completely in 1990 by making all republican party leaders members of the Politburo along with the general secretary and his deputy, and eliminating candidate membership. It was overwhelmingly a male institution, with only two women (Ekaterina Furtseva and Alexandra Birjukova) gaining membership, and it was always dominated by ethnic Slavs, especially Russians.

While the frequency of Politburo meetings is somewhat uncertain for much of its life, it seems to have met on average about once per week in the Brezhnev period and after, with provision for a further meeting if required. Meetings were attended by all members plus a range of other people who might be called in to address specific items on the agenda. In addition, some issues were handled by circulation among the members, thereby not requiring explicit discussion at a meeting. No public differences of opinion between Politburo members were aired before the breakdown of many of the rules of Party life under Gorbachev, and public unanimity prevailed. It is not clear that votes were actually taken; issues seem to have been resolved through discussion and consensus. Whatever the process, the Politburo was the central leadership site of the Party and the Soviet system as a whole.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PRESIDIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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GRAEME GILL

POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

Following years of one-party politics in the Soviet Union, post-communist Russia experienced a burst of party development during the 1990s. Still, Russia's party system remains underdeveloped. Although political parties run candidates in national parliamentary elections, Russia's first two presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, chose not to affiliate themselves with political parties. Russia's constitution gives the president the power to form the government without reference to the balance of party strength in the parliament. Politicians in the State Duma usually affiliate themselves with parties or party-like factions, but almost no parties have well-developed organizational bases among the electorate. Most voters have only dim conceptions of the policy positions of the major political

parties. New parties constantly form and dissolve. The function often ascribed to political parties in developed democracies—that of linking voters' interests with the policy decisions of government—is scarcely visible in Russia. Nonetheless, a rudimentary party system was in place by the late 1990s.

Russia's parties may be characterized as falling into five major types. On the left are Marxist-Leninist parties. The most prominent example is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, headed by Gennady Zyuganov. The CPRF is characterized by a militantly anti-capitalist stance, which it combines with appeals to Russian statist, nationalist, and religious traditions. It is the strongest political party in Russia both in its membership and in the number of votes it attracts in elections (it can count on the support of about 20 to 25 percent of the electorate). It also enjoys a distinct ideological identity in voters' minds. Despite its large following, however, it has been unable to exercise much influence in policy making at the national level. Other parties on the left are still more radical in their ideologies and call for a return to Soviet-era political and economic institutions; some expressly advocate a return to Stalinism.

A second group of parties can be called "social democratic." They accept the principle of private ownership of property. At the same time, they call for a more interventionist social policy by the government to protect social groups made vulnerable by the transition from communism. The party headed by Grigory Yavlinsky, called Yabloko, is an example. Yabloko attracts 7 to 10 percent of the vote in national elections. Other parties that identify themselves as social democratic—including a party organized by former president Mikhail Gorbachev—have fared poorly in elections.

A third group of parties strongly advocate market-oriented policies. They press for further privatization of state assets, including land and industrial enterprises. They also seek closer integration of Russia with the West and the spread of values such as respect for individual civil, political, and economic liberties. The most prominent example of such a party is the Union of Rightist Forces, which drew around 8 percent of the vote in the 2000 parliamentary election.

A fourth group of parties appeal to voters on nationalist grounds. Some call for giving ethnic Russians priority treatment in Russia over ethnic minorities. Others demand the restoration of a

Russian empire. They denounce Western influences such as individualism, materialism, and competitiveness. Some believe that Russia's destiny lies with a Eurasian identity that straddles East and West; others take a more straightforwardly statist bent and call for restoring Russian military might and centralized state power. Nationalist groups are numerous and skillful at attracting attention, but tend to be small. However, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia gained some successes in elections during the 1990s (22% in 1993, 12% in 1995).

The fifth group may be called "parties of power." These are parties that actively avoid taking explicit programmatic stances. They depend instead on their access to state power and the provision of patronage benefits to elite supporters. Their public stance tends to be centrist, pragmatic, and reassuring. The major party of power in the 2000 election was "Unity," which benefited from an arms-length association with Vladimir Putin. The problem for parties of power is that they have little to offer voters except their proximity to the Kremlin; if their patrons reject them or lose power, they quickly fade from view.

Many voters can identify a party that they prefer over others, but Russian voters on the whole mistrust parties and feel little sense of attachment to them. Likewise most politicians, apart from Communists, feel little loyalty or obligation to parties. The conditions favoring the development of a party system—a network of civic and social associations able to mobilize support behind one or another party, and a political system in which the government is based on a party majority in parliament—remain weak in Russia. It is likely that the development of a strong, competitive party system will be a protracted process.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; UNION OF RIGHT FORCES; YABLOKO.

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POLL TAX *See* SOUL TAX.

POLOTSKY, SIMEON

(1629–1680), major religious and cultural figure at the Russian court from 1664 until his death in 1680.

Simeon Polotsky, born Samuil Petrovsky-Sitnianovich, was a Belorussian monk from Polotsk. He introduced new forms of religious literature derived from Western models, and created the first substantial body of poetry in Russian.

Native to a largely Orthodox area of the Polish-Lithuanian state during a period of intense Catholic-Orthodox rivalry, Samuil Sitnyanovich entered the Kiev Academy around 1650, where he received a typical Western education from Ukrainian Orthodox teachers. He mastered Polish and Latin as well as the neo-Aristotelian curriculum dominant in Polish and Ukrainian schools. He continued his education at the Jesuit academy in Wilno. The Russo-Polish War of 1653–1667 that followed on the Ukrainian Cossack revolt of 1648 restored Orthodoxy to power in Polotsk, and Samuil returned to his native town. In 1656 he became a monk with the name Simeon in the local Bogoyavlenie Monastery; he also became a teacher in a school for Orthodox boys. During these early years he wrote both verse and declamations in Polish and Latin as well as Slavonic. On his first trip to Moscow in 1660 with a delegation of Polotsk clergy he presented Tsar Alexei Mikhaylovich with a series of verse greetings and other compositions for court occasions. Long commonplace in Poland and the West, such court poetry was unknown in Russia. With the revival of Polish military fortunes toward the end of the war, Polotsk returned to Catholic rule and Simeon left for Moscow in 1664, never to return.

In Moscow Simeon played a major role in the cultural and religious life of the court. After the Church Council of 1666–1667, he prepared the official reply to the claims of the Old Ritualists that that liturgical reforms of Patriarch Nikon were

heretical (*Zhezl pravleniia/The Staff of Governance*, Moscow, 1668). In 1667 and 1670 he was tutor to the heirs to the throne, Tsarevich Alexei (d. 1670) and the future tsar, Fyodor (1672–1682), and also kept a school in the Zaikonospassky Monastery on Red Square. Simeon continued to write occasional verse for the court and church, celebrating important events and people. Many of these poems seem to have been declaimed in public, though they remained unpublished at his death. He was also a prolific writer of sermons, two large volumes of which appeared after his death, one of sermons at church festivals (*Obed dushevny/The Soul's Dinner*, Moscow 1681) and the other of sermons for particular occasions, such as funerals of prominent boyars (*Vecheria dushevnyaya/The Soul's Supper*, Moscow, 1683). The sermons, delivered in churches in and around the Kremlin to the Russian elite, encouraged a shift in religious experience away from the central preoccupation with liturgy toward the inner experience of Christianity and its moral teachings.

Simeon's work introduced new genres to literature, poetry to court life, and a new style to Orthodox spirituality in Russia. His most important pupil was Silvester Medvedev (1641–1691), and he was popular both at court and in the church. Patriarch Ioakim (1674–1690), however, was less favorable, apparently distrusting the religious implications of his Western orientation. Simeon was a major influence for a generation after his death, but his baroque forms and Slavonic style soon rendered him too old-fashioned for later Russian poets and preachers. Nineteenth-century literary scholars, who looked askance at baroque style and genres such as court poetry, paid little attention to Simeon. Twentieth-century appreciation of the Baroque allowed him recognition as a major cultural figure, and the broader publications of his poetry have given him a greater audience. Historians of religion have recognized his pivotal role in the reorientation of Orthodoxy in the years preceding the great cultural changes of the time of Peter the Great.

See also: ORTHODOXY

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POLOVTSY

Polovtsy, a nomadic Turkic-speaking tribal confederation (Polovtsy in Rus sources, Cumans in Western, Kipchaks in Eastern) began migrating in about 1017 or 1018 from eastern Mongolia and occupied the area stretching from Kazakhstan to the Danube by 1055. Politically disorganized and lacking a unified policy in their relations with Rus, various Polovtsian tribes became involved in Rus inter-princely conflicts and, at times, fought as Rus allies against other Polovtsy. Dynastic intermarriages often solidified Polovtsy-Rus political unions. Rus sources note two distinct Polovtsy: "Wild" (Rus enemies) and "Non-Wild" (Rus allies). Most Rus-Polovtsy confrontations resulted from their differing economies. As agriculturalists, the Rus desired to convert the steppe into cultivated lands, while the nomadic Polovtsy required the steppe for grazing animals. Consequently, conflict was inevitable: Rus sources often speak of Polovtsian raids on lands settled by Rus and subsequent Rus counterattacks. However, because of the political disunity of both sides, no permanent peace was ever reached, and by the 1230s and 1240s, both were conquered and absorbed into the Mongol Empire.

Polovtsy had settlements, probably occupied by impoverished Polovtsy and Rus migrants who practiced agriculture. Located between Rus and the Black Sea, Polovtsy controlled trade between the two regions and directly participated in commercial activities. For their livestock, they received agricultural products and luxury items from Rus. Controlling much of the Crimea (particularly Sudak), the Polovtsy engaged in the sale of slaves and furs to Byzantium and the Islamic East. While some Polovtsy may have converted to Christianity and Islam, the overwhelming majority retained their shamanist-Täri religion.

See also: CRIMEA; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; KHAZARS; KIEVAN RUS; POLYANE; VIKINGS.

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POLTAVA, BATTLE OF

The Battle of Poltava was the defining battle of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), fought on June 27, 1709, between the Swedish and Russian armies along the River Vorskla to the north of the Ukrainian city of Poltava.

After the rejection of a Russian peace offer in 1707, the Swedish King Karl (Charles) XII spent much of the summer of 1708 in Lithuania waiting for supplies for an assault on Russia. However, in September he decided to move down to the Ukraine where he expected to gain the support of the Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa. In the meantime, Tsar Peter I managed to defeat the Swedish forces Charles had been waiting for (the battle of Lesnaia, September 28, 1708) and seized the supplies. The Swedish forces suffered a great deal during the cold winter of 1709 and were regularly attacked by Russian units. Even though the Swedish forces had been besieging Poltava since April 1709, they were severely weakened by the time Peter was ready to attack.

Three days before the battle Charles XII was immobilized by a leg wound caused by a stray bullet and was thus unable to personally lead the Swedish forces into battle. It had, moreover, become apparent that no help would be arriving in time from either the Polish-Lithuanian forces of Stanislaw Leszczyński or other Swedish units. In spite of this, a Swedish victory presented the prospect of easing supply problems, of helping Leszczyński, and—possibly—of inducing Ottomans and Tatars to commit to the Swedish side. Moreover, a Swedish withdrawal would have presented serious risks.

The Swedish force of 22,000–28,000 responded to a Russian challenge with a major assault, although Peter—at the helm of a much larger force

of some 45,000 men—appears to have viewed Poltava as primarily a defensive encounter. However, confusing orders left part of the Swedish force attacking Russian T-shaped redoubts rather than the main camp. These Swedish units, led by Carl Gustav Roos, lost contact with the main force as well as two-fifths of their men. They eventually retreated and were forced to surrender. The other two-thirds of the Swedish force successfully regrouped for an attack on the camp awaiting Roos. The Swedes, however, lost their momentum during the two-hour wait, whereas the Russians were revitalized by news of the surrender. A Russian force of 22,000 men and sixty-eight field guns now attacked the remaining four thousand Swedes led by Adam Ludvig Lewenhaupt. Disorganization and inferior numbers ultimately led to a chaotic Swedish retreat. The Swedes lost 6,901 dead or wounded and 2,760 captured. The Russian losses were 1,345 dead and 3,290 wounded.

Three days after the battle, Charles went into exile in the Ottoman Empire and the Swedish force of 14,000–17,000 surrendered at Perevolochna. Even though the Treaty of Nystad was only concluded twelve years later, the defeat suffered at Poltava marks the end of Sweden as a great power.

See also: GREAT NORTHERN WAR

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POLYANE

Polyane is one of the Eastern Slavic tribes that inhabited the Kievan Rus state, as noted in the *Russian Primary Chronicle*.

According to the *Russian Primary Chronicle*, the Polyane occupied the middle Dnieper River region: Kiev, the capital of the Rus state, as well as Vyshgorod, Vasilev, and Belgorod. The Polyane received their name (meaning "people of the field") on account of their settlement in the open terrain of the middle Dnieper. With its *chernozem* soils, the middle Dnieper was ideal for agriculture, the primary

economy of the Polyane. Archaeologists believe that the Polyane belonged to a larger group of Slavs, known as Duledy, who migrated east from south-eastern Europe sometime during the sixth to seventh centuries. By the eighth to ninth centuries, the Polyane settled both sides of the middle Dnieper and came to form their own ethnic identity. During the ninth century, the middle Dnieper was under the control of the Khazar state, to which the Polyane paid tribute in furs. Kiev itself functioned as the western-most military outpost and a commercial center for the Khazars. During the late ninth century, the Rus prince Oleg (legendary reign 880–913) allegedly incorporated the middle Dnieper and the Polyane into the expanding Rus state, although evidence suggests that it was Grand Prince Igor (r. 924–945) who brought the two under Rus control around 930. While predominantly Slavic, the Polyane appear to have had Iranian, Turkic, and Finno-Baltic ethnic elements. Evidence for this is found through archaeological and linguistic studies of the Polyane and from *Chronicle* descriptions of their pre-Christian religious practices.

See also: IGOR; KHAZARS; KIEVAN RUS; OLEG; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; VIKINGS

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POMESTIE

Pomestie, “service landholding,” was a parcel of land (hopefully inhabited by rent-paying peasants, later serfs [see Serfdom]) in exchange for which the holder (not owner) had to render lifelong service to the state, typically military service, but occasionally service in the government bureaucracy. Ideally, when the service ended, the landholder had to surrender the *pomestie* to another serviceman. The *pomestie* was granted for use only to support the serviceman and his family (including slaves) by peasant rent payments to him in lieu of cash. It has been calculated that this was far more efficient than paying servicemen entirely in cash: the trans-

action costs of collecting taxes, taking them to Moscow, and then paying them to the servicemen were likely to result in a fifty percent loss, whereas there was no such shrinkage when the rent and taxes did not go through Moscow. Occasionally *pomestie* is translated a “military fief,” but this is totally misleading. There was no feudalism in Russia. The *pomestie* was granted directly by the government’s Service Land Chancellery (*Pomestny prikaz*) to a specific serviceman for his support in lieu of support of other kinds (such as cash, or feeding in barracks). There were no reciprocal rights and obligations between the Service Land Chancellery and the serviceman, and there was no subinfeudation.

The *pomestie* bears at least superficial resemblance to forms of land tenure elsewhere, especially the Byzantine *pronoia* and the Persian *ikhta*. It is dubious, however, that the Russian *pomestie* was borrowed from either, and it seems likely that it was an autonomous creation by the Russians themselves.

The origins of the *pomestie* are shrouded in the mists of the early Muscovite Middle Ages. The first recorded use of the term was in 1499, but the phenomenon definitely existed before then. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, servitors (probably military) at the Muscovite court may occasionally have been given temporary grants of land in exchange for service, but that was an extraordinarily uncertain form of compensation and therefore cannot have been used often. Until the 1450s all peasants were free and could not be compelled to pay rent to anyone [see Enserfment], and they could move at a moment’s notice. Thus no system of compensating servicemen by conditional grants of land developed at that time.

The origins of the *pomestie* system (and also the service state) can be traced to Moscow’s annexation of Novgorod in 1478. Some elite Novgorodian laymen and churchmen preferred either to remain independent or to have Lithuania as a suzerain rather than Moscow. Those people were purged after 1478 and either executed or forcibly resettled elsewhere. Their vast landholdings were confiscated by Moscow and parceled out to loyal cavalry servicemen (*pomeshchiki*) for their support. The census books compiled subsequently by Moscow indicate that each serviceman was probably assigned land occupied by roughly thirty peasant households. It is fairly certain that the servicemen did not live directly on their land grants,

but in groups nearby. A third party collected the traditional rent and gave it to the servicemen. Thus the servicemen had no direct connection with “their” peasants and no control over them. Moscow soon discovered that this was an efficient way to assure control over newly annexed territory while simultaneously maximizing the size of the army. As Moscow annexed other lands, it handed them out to servicemen as pomestie estates. The pomestie came to embody the essence of the service state. Each eligible serviceman had an entitlement (*oklad*) based on his service. If he could locate land up to the limit of his entitlement, it was his. This was an effective incentive system, and servicemen strove mightily to increase their entitlements.

Two or three generations later, during the reign of Ivan IV (“the Terrible”), several important events occurred concerning the pomestie. For one, the government advanced the service state significantly in 1556 by decreeing that all holders of service estates (pomestie) and hereditary estates (*votchiny*) had to render the same quantity of military service (i.e., provide one mounted cavalryman per one hundred *cheti* of land actually possessed). Second, it is probable that during Ivan’s reign sons began to succeed to their fathers’ service landholdings when their fathers died or could no longer render the required lifetime service. Third, during Ivan’s *Oprichnina*, service landholders were given control over their peasants, including the right to set the level of rent payments (a change that caused massive peasant flight from the center to the expanding frontiers [see Colonial Expansion]). And fourth, the *Oprichnina* exterminated so many owners of hereditary estates that it appeared as though outright ownership of land was on the verge of extinction.

The holders of pomestie estates were primarily members of the provincial middle service class cavalry who began to live directly on their service landholdings somewhere during the middle of the sixteenth century. This experience, combined with the developments of the reign of Ivan IV, convinced them that they had the right to consider the pomestie as their personal property, which not only could be left to their male heirs, but also could be alienated like *votchina* property: sold, donated to monasteries, given to anyone, used as a dowry, and so forth. This project became the goal of a middle service class “political campaign,” somewhat akin to the political campaign to enserf the peasantry. Such aspirations totally violated the initial purpose of the pomestie and undermined the basic principles of the service state. The Law Code of 1649 care-

fully retained the distinction between the pomestie (chapter 16, nearly all of whose sixty-nine articles are postdated 1619) and the *votchina* (chapter 17), but the distinctions were fading in reality. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the pomestie essentially became hereditary property, but service still was compulsory and holders could not freely alienate it. During the Thirteen Years War (1654–1667), new formation military units began to replace the obsolescent middle service class cavalry, and after 1667 the service state nearly disintegrated. With it went the principle that service was compulsory from pomestie land.

Peter the Great restored the service state in 1700, and all landholders and landowners had to render military service again. But the uniqueness of the pomestie was lost in 1714 when it and the *votchina* were juridically merged into a single form of land ownership.

See also: DVORIANSTVO; ENSERFMENT; LAW CODE OF 1649; SERFDOM; SYN BOYARSKY; VOTCHINA

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RICHARD HELLIE

PONOMAREV, BORIS KHARITONOVICH

(1905–1995), party official and historian.

Boris Ponomarev was a leading Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) ideologue who for three decades (1954–1986) headed the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, the body responsible for relations with foreign communist parties. Ponomarev joined the Bolsheviks in 1919. A civil war veteran (serving from 1918 to 1920), he graduated from Moscow State University in 1926. From 1933 to 1936, at a time when historiography was coming under party control, he was deputy director of the CPSU’s Institute of Red Professors. He was on the executive committee of the Comintern, the Soviet-dominated organization of international communist parties, in its last years (1936–1943), and later head of the Comintern’s successor, the Cominform (1946–1949).

In 1954 he became head of the International Department. He was elected to the Central Committee in 1956. A party historian, he was elected a candidate member of the Academy of Sciences in 1959, becoming a full Academician in 1962. After Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Josef Stalin at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956, Ponomarev led the team of historians who wrote the new, official *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (1959), which replaced Stalin's notorious *Short Course* history (1938). But Stalin's portrait continued to hang on Ponomarev's office wall. Appointed a secretary of the Central Committee in 1961, he eventually rose to the rank of candidate member of the Politburo in 1972. Never comfortable with reform, Ponomarev, in 1986, was removed as head of the International Department by Mikhail Gorbachev, who retired him from the Central Committee in April 1989.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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ROGER D. MARKWICK

POPOV, ALEXANDER STEPANOVICH

(1859–1905), prominent mathematician and physicist.

Russia claims that Alexander Stepanovich Popov invented the radio before the Italian scientist Guglielmo Marconi. Determining who was the official inventor of the radio is complicated by nationalistic pride, inadequate documentation of events, and differing interpretations of what constitutes inventing the radio. By what most persons in the West consider objective analysis of the facts known, however, Marconi's work invariably is recognized as having priority over Popov's. However, Popov's numerous achievements do merit both recognition and respect. Popov was the chair of the Department of Physics at St. Petersburg University in 1901 and director of the St. Petersburg Institute of Electrical Engineering in 1905. On May 7, 1895,

Popov demonstrated that a receiver could detect the electromagnetic waves produced by lightning discharges in the atmosphere many miles away. Popov's receiver consisted of a "coherer" made of metal filings, together with an antenna, a relay, and a bell. The relay was used to activate the bell that both signaled the occurrence of lightning and served as a "decoherer" (tapper) to ready the coherer to detect the next lightning discharge. The value this instrument could have in weather forecasting was obvious. In 1865 the Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell had predicted that electromagnetic waves existed. In 1888 a German scientist Heinrich Hertz had proven that electromagnetic waves definitely did exist. Still, no one had yet found any practical use for these electromagnetic or "Hertzian" waves.

Almost a year after his first experiment, Popov conducted another public experiment on March 24, 1896 that demonstrated the transmission and reception of information by wireless telegraphy. On that day the Russian Physical and Chemical Society convened at St. Petersburg University. Wireless telegraph signals, transmitted a distance of more than 800 feet (243 meters) from another building on the campus, were audible to all in the meeting room. One professor stood at the blackboard and recorded the alphabetical letters represented by the Morse code signals. The letters spelled out the name "Heinrich Hertz."

Unfortunately this experiment was never officially recorded. Meanwhile Guglielmo Marconi filed an application for the patent on wireless telegraphy on June 2, 1896, and his first public demonstration occurred in July of that year. Although both of Popov's experiments took place before Marconi filed the patent, it is widely known that Marconi had already made considerable breakthroughs prior to Popov's March 24, 1896, experiment, including the transmission and reception of simple messages. Nevertheless, Popov's achievements were recognized. In 1900 he was awarded a Gold Metal at the Fourth World Congress of Electrical Engineering.

See also: TELEVISION AND RADIO

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

POPOV, GAVRIIL KHARITONOVICH

(b. 1936), economist and democratic reformer; mayor of Moscow.

Gavriil Popov was born and educated in Moscow. While studying at Moscow State University (MGU), he headed the Komsomol organization. He joined the economics faculty at MGU in 1959, eventually becoming dean in 1977. In his academic career, Popov authored numerous articles and books focusing on economic management and was editor of the Academy journal *Voprosi Ekonomiki* (*Economic Questions*) from 1988 to 1991.

Popov moved from economic research and advising to political activism, consulting with government on management reforms starting in the mid-1960s. The apex of his political career occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s. After joining the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, Popov founded and co-chaired the Inter-Regional Deputies' Group (MDG) with Boris Yeltsin, Yury Afanasiev, and Andrei Sakharov. The MDG advocated democratic reforms; Popov adopted a pragmatic stance relative to other leaders in the group. In March 1990, reformers won control of the Moscow City Council, and Popov was elected chairman. He resigned from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in July 1990.

In June 1991, Popov became the first popularly elected mayor of Moscow, with Yuri Luzhkov as his vice-mayor. After opposing the August coup attempt, he pursued reforms such as privatization of housing and retail establishments. He resigned from the post of mayor in June 1992, and subsequently formed electorally unsuccessful organizations. His Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (RDDR) did not win enough votes to gain party-list seats in the 1993 Duma elections. He later joined with other politicians to form the Social Democrats, a party that participated in the 1995 and 1999 elections and likewise failed to gain seats. Popov founded Moscow International University and became its president. He continues to publish commentaries on public policy issues.

See also: INTER-REGIONAL DEPUTIES' GROUP; MOSCOW

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ERIK S. HERRON

POPOV, PAVEL ILICH

(1872–1950), author of the first “balance of the national economy,” the forerunner of the tool of economic analysis now known as input-output.

Pavel Popov went to St. Petersburg in 1895 to enter the university, but once there he was diverted to participation in the revolutionary movement. He was arrested and spent the years 1896 to 1897 in prison. Exiled to Ufa gubernia, he began to study statistics and in 1909–1917 worked in the Tula zemstvo as a statistician. After the February Revolution he became head of the department of the agricultural census in the Ministry of Agriculture in the provisional government. After the Bolsheviks came to power in 1918, he became the first chairman of the Central Statistical Administration. He was an able organizer and, among other things, oversaw development of the first “balance” of inputs and outputs. He continued as chairman of the Central Statistical Administration until 1926, and then had a long, apparently untroubled, career in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Gosplan until his death. During the early, statistical, stage of his career, he published some books and reports but apparently nothing after he became associated with Gosplan. Thus, apart from the input-output work, his contribution to Soviet economics was as an organizer rather than as an economic thinker or theorist.

See also: CENTRAL STATISTICAL AGENCY; GOSPLAN

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ROBERT W. CAMPBELL

POPULAR FRONT POLICY

Comintern policy during the mid-1930s that encouraged cooperation between communist and

non-communist parties in order to stop the spread of fascism.

During the 1930s, Soviet foreign policy changed several times in response to the evolving political situation in Europe. At the beginning of the decade, Josef Stalin would not allow cooperation between communist and noncommunist parties. This policy had particularly tragic results in Germany, where enmity between communists and socialists divided the opposition to the Nazis. After Adolf Hitler's rise to power and his adoption of an aggressive anti-Soviet foreign policy, Stalin began to fear the spread of fascism to other European countries and the possible creation of an anti-Soviet bloc. In response to this potential threat, the Soviet Union changed policy and promoted collective security among non-fascist states. In 1934 the USSR joined the League of Nations and the following year signed a mutual defense treaty with France and Czechoslovakia. Stalin realized that the program of the Communist International had to be brought into line with the new Soviet foreign policy, and a Comintern congress was called for the summer of 1935 in order to accomplish this transformation.

The Seventh Comintern Congress met in Moscow in July–August 1935. Five hundred delegates representing sixty-five communist parties participated and elected Georgi Dimitrov, a Bulgarian communist, as general secretary of the Comintern. In this capacity, Dimitrov delivered the keynote address and outlined the new policy. Declaring that “fascism has embarked upon a wide offensive,” Dimitrov called for the creation of a united anti-fascist front that included support for anti-fascist government coalitions. While maintaining that capitalism remained the ultimate enemy, Dimitrov argued that the immediate threat to the workers came from the fascists and that all communists should participate in the campaign to stop the spread of this dangerous movement. Whereas communists and communist parties previously had opposed all bourgeois and capitalist governments, and considered fascism simply a variant of capitalism, members of the Comintern were now being told to support bourgeois governments and to postpone the struggle against capitalism.

The Popular Front concept had its greatest impact in Spain, France, and China. In Spain, the election of a Popular Front coalition in February 1936 led to civil war. After three years the forces of the fascist General Francisco Franco took power. In France, where the prospect of a fascist victory

frightened the Soviet Union, a Popular Front government came to power in June 1936. Like all French governments of the time, it remained weak, and it fell after only one year. In China, the prospect of cooperation between the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and the communist forces of Mao Zedong led the Japanese military to launch a preemptive strike during the summer of 1937.

In the end the Popular Front concept was not about an ideological shift in communist perceptions of the world, but a tactical Stalinist response to the specific threat of fascism as perceived during the mid-1930s. The defense of the Soviet Union took precedence over all other considerations, and in 1939 the Popular Front was abandoned with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

See also: LEAGUE OF NATIONS; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939

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HAROLD J. GOLDBERG

POPULISM

Scholars differ on the question of when the tendency known as populism (*narodnichestvo*) was most significant in Russian social and political thought. Some suggest that populism was prominent from 1848 to 1881; others, that it was a revolutionary movement in the period between 1860 and 1895. Soviet scholars primarily focused on the 1870s and 1880s. There is also disagreement about what populism represented as an ideology. There are three ways of looking at it: as a reaction against Western capitalism and socialism, as agrarian socialism, and as a theory advocating the hegemony of the masses over the educated elite.

As this should make evident, populism meant different things to different people; it was not a single coherent doctrine but a widespread movement in nineteenth-century Russia favoring such goals as social justice and equality. Populism in Russia is generally believed to have been strongly influenced by the thinking of Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Chernyshevsky, who during the 1850s and 1860s argued that the peasant commune (*mir*) was crucial to Russia's transition from capitalism to socialism via a peasant revolution.

There were three strands in the Russian populist movement. The first, classical populism, was associated with Peter Lavrovich Lavrov (1823–1900), a nobleman by birth who had received a military education and later became a professor of mathematics. Lavrov was an activist in the student and intellectual movement of the 1860s, and a consequence was forced to emigrate from Russia in 1870. His experience in the Paris Commune during the 1870s convinced him of the need for change, especially in the aftermath of the Great Reforms of the 1860s. In his *Historical Letters* (1868–1869), Lavrov stated that human progress required a revolution that would totally destroy the existing order. Again in his *Historical Letters* (1870) and in his revolutionary journal *Vpered* (*Forward*) from 1870 to 1872, Lavrov argued that intellectuals had a moral obligation to fight for socialism, and in order to achieve this goal they would have to work with the masses. As he saw it, preparation for revolution was the key. In *The State in Future Society*, Lavrov outlined the establishment of universal suffrage, the emergence of a society in which the masses would run the government, and above all, the introduction of the notion of popular justice.

The second type of Russian populism was more conspiratorial, for it grew out of the failure of the classical variant to convert the majority of the Russian people to socialism via preparation and self-education. The major thinkers here were Peter G. Zaichnevsky (1842–1896), Sergei G. Nechaev (1847–1883), and Peter Nikitich Tkachev (1844–1885). Zaichnevsky, in his pamphlet *Young Russia*, called for direct action and rejected the possibility of a compromise between the ruling class (including liberals) and the rest of society. He argued that revolution had to be carried out by the majority, using force if necessary, in order to transform Russia's political, economic, and social system along socialist lines. Not surprisingly, Zaichnevsky's ideas are often seen as a blueprint for the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Nechaev pointed to two lessons that

could be learned from the failure of classical populism: first, the need for tighter organization, stricter discipline, and better planning, and second, the effort to go to the people had proved that the intelligentsia were very remote from the masses. In his *Catechism of a Revolutionary*, Nechaev argued that individual actions must be controlled by the party and advocated a code for revolutionaries in which members were dedicated, committed to action not words, adhered to party discipline, and above all, were willing to use every possible means to achieve revolution. Finally, Tkachev, who is probably the most significant of the three chief conspiratorial populists, advocated a closely knit secret organization that would carry out a revolution in the name of the people. For obvious reasons, he is often described as the forerunner of Vladimir Lenin or as the first Bolshevik. All three of these thinkers envisioned a revolution by a minority on behalf of the majority, followed by agitation and propaganda to protect its gains. The similarity to the events around the 1917 October Revolution is evident.

Populists of the classical and conspiratorial varieties rejected terrorism as a method, and Tkachev maintained that it would divert energy away from the revolution. The terrorist wing of Russian populism, however, insisted that agitprop and repeated calls for revolution would accomplish nothing, and therefore direct action was essential. This position was associated with the two main groups that grew out of the Land and Freedom (*Zemlya i Volya*) organization, People's Will (*Narodnaia Volya*), and Black Partition (*Cherny Peredel*). The failure of the earlier populist movements and the situation in late nineteenth-century Russia (i.e., no political parties or real trade unions, government intervention in every area of life) led to a direct attack on the state, culminating in the assassination of Alexander II in March 1881. Although the clamp-down and greater censorship that followed this event reduced the degree of terrorism, they did not eliminate it altogether, as shown by the emergence of a workers' section and young People's Will after 1881.

The populists did not accept the idea that the Russian people had a unique character or destiny. Instead they emphasized Russia's backwardness, but in their view it was not necessarily a disadvantage, because backwardness would enable Russia to avoid the capitalist path and embark upon agrarian socialism based on a federal structure of self-governing units of producers and consumers. When this did not come to pass, some populists

turned to more extreme measures, such as terrorism. All in all, the lessons learned from the failure of populism paved the way for a gradual move toward the emergence of social democracy in Russia during the 1890s.

See also: GREAT REFORMS; LAND AND FREEDOM PARTY; PEOPLE'S WILL, THE; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

PORT ARTHUR, SIEGE OF

Originally constructed by the Chinese as a fortress in 1892, Port Arthur (modern Lushun) protected an important naval base and roadstead at the foot of the Liaotung Peninsula. In the great-power race for Chinese bases and influence that followed the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895, Russia in 1898 obtained a twenty-five-year lease on Port Arthur's naval facilities and the surrounding territory. In an age of coal-burning vessels, Port Arthur was an important fueling station that would enable the growing Russian Pacific Squadron to interdict Japanese naval communications in the Yellow Sea and beyond.

Short of resources, the Russians only began seriously improving Port Arthur in 1901. The Japanese surprise attack that opened the Russo-Japanese War on the night of February 8–9, 1904, caught Russian naval units and Port Arthur unprepared. Admiral Heihachiro Togo's fleet soon bottled up the Russian squadron, while a Japanese army advanced overland from Dairen (Ta-lien) to lay siege to the Russian ground defenses. Although poorly led, the Russian defenders withstood four major assaults

before the Japanese seizure of 203 Meter Hill enabled artillery observers to subject the warships in the port to accurate siege mortar fire. They were soon pounded to pieces. The garrison capitulated on January 2, 1905, thus freeing the besieging army to reinforce the four Japanese field armies already operating against Adjutant General Alexei N. Kuropatkin's army group near Mukden.

Port Arthur was both a symbol of heroic Russian resistance and a distraction that goaded Kuropatkin to decisive field action earlier and farther south than he had originally planned. On the Russian home front, the fall of Port Arthur added fuel to the fire of popular disturbances that culminated in the Revolution of 1905.

See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH; KUROPATKIN, ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

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BRUCE W. MENNING

PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF

Signed September 5 (August 23 O.S.), 1905, in Portsmouth, Maine, this treaty terminated the Russo-Japanese war. U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt had offered to mediate between the warring parties, fearing that continued fighting would destabilize the Far East and jeopardize U.S. commercial interests in China. (Roosevelt went on to win the Nobel Prize for Peace for his efforts.)

Russia recognized Japan's interests in Korea, and ceded its lease over the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin island and control of the Southern Manchurian railroad to Chang-chun. Russia also pledged that Manchuria would remain a part of China.

The treaty ended any Russian hope of establishing protectorates over Manchuria and Korea. In addition, it represented the first defeat of a European Great Power by an Asian state during the modern age.

The fall of Port Arthur, the defeat of the Russian Army at Mukden, the destruction of the Russian Baltic Fleet at Tsushima, and the outbreak of the 1905 Revolution convinced the government of Tsar Nicholas II that the war had to end. Count Sergei Witte was sent as plenipotentiary with orders to secure the best possible deal for Russia. A cunning negotiator, Witte skillfully used the U.S. press to swing international opinion against Japan. He also realized that Japan lacked the resources to follow up on its initial military victories and that he could afford to prolong the talks. In the end, Japan dropped its demands for a sizable indemnity and the complete evisceration of Russia's position in the Far East. Witte's diplomacy helped to compensate for Russia's military weakness.

Nevertheless, the Treaty of Portsmouth was perceived as a defeat for Russia and diminished its international stature, notably in the 1908 Bosnia crisis. Josef Stalin was to justify the Soviet entry into the war against Japan in 1945 in part on the grounds of reversing the 1905 "defeat."

See also: RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

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NIKOLAS GVOSDEV

PORUKA *See* COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY.

POSADNIK

A term meaning "mayor," the leading political figure of Novgorod and Pskov.

In Novgorod the *posadnik* was second only to the archbishop, the symbolic ruler of the city. The term derives from the verb *posaditi*, to sit, and reflects the practice of Kievan princes who "sat" their representatives, often family members, as princes of Novgorod.

Toward the end of the tenth century the Novgorodian *posadnik* was separated from the governing prince, and after 1088 was chosen by a *veche* (assembly or gathering). Following Novgorod's independence from Kiev in 1136, princely power

slowly declined as princes had to share their authority with the mayor. The boyar elite of Novgorod and Pskov dominated the office of mayor.

At first only one mayor in Novgorod was chosen for life. In the fourteenth century a collective mayoralty developed (*posadnichestvo*) consisting of six mayors, one for each of the five districts (two from Prussian Street), and one who served as Lord Mayor (*stepenny posadnik*). In 1354 the term of Lord Mayor was shortened to one year, and after 1387 the office rotated among Novgorodian borough mayors. In 1416 and 1417 the term was reduced to six months, while the number of borough mayors increased to eighteen. In 1423 the borough mayors grew to twenty-four, and in the second half of the fifteenth century to thirty-four. Current and former Lord Mayors, together with the chiliarch (the leader of a thousand men or troops) and sitting borough mayors, comprised Novgorod's Council of Lords. The mayoralty disappeared with the fall of Novgorod to Moscow in 1478.

See also: BOYAR; NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VECHÉ

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LAWRENCE N. LANGER

POSSESSORS AND NON-POSSESSORS

Possessors and non-possessors were purported rival monastic and church factions, c. 1480–1584.

The binary opposition *stiazhatel/niestiazhatel* (literally, acquirer/non-acquirer; translated as "Possessor"/"Non-possessor" in the literature) is misleading. The possessions of cenobites theoretically belonged to their cloister, while hermitages were dependent upon the wealthy monasteries.

The real justification for the movable and landed wealth of the church lay in its economic, political, cultural, ceremonial, and charitable functions. The practical politics of ecclesiastical wealth involved several confiscations of Novgorodian church lands under Ivan III, the concrete provisions

of new or revised immunity charters, and the state, church, and combined legislation of 1550–1551, 1562, 1572, 1580, and 1584, which both protected and limited monastic land. By the early 1500s a new juncture of developments favored state confiscation of lands: the state needed military service lands, and a faction of monks condemned monastic opulence, with some advocating state management of church lands.

The leading “Possessors” were well-placed figures who mobilized coworkers, disciples, employees, and consultants: Archbishop Gennady of Novgorod (r. 1484–1504); the founder-abbot Joseph of Volotsk (d. 1515); the latter’s successor and then Metropolitan of Moscow, Daniel (r. 1515–1522–1539); Archbishop of Novgorod and then Metropolitan of Moscow, Macarius (r. 1526–1542–1563); and several other prelates, mostly trained in the Iosifov-Volokolamsk Monastery. They defended church lands and Orthodoxy and created an inquisition of sorts. They also promoted commemorations, reformed and rationalized monasteries, strengthened episcopal administration and missionary activity, nationalized regional saints, patronized religious art, allowed allegorical innovations, commissioned a few scientific translations, attempted to introduce printing, contributed original compilations of history, hagiography, and canon law, and aided the state and court with ceremonies, ideology, military chaplains, colonizing clergy, and canon-legal decisions.

The “Non-possessors” are harder to pin down. Vassian Patrikeyev (active from 1505 to 1531 and personally influential from 1511 to 1522) and those in charge of his literary legacy also expressed heated opposition to execution of even relapsed and obdurate heretics, while Artemy of Pskov (active 1540s–1550s) disputed that the people on trial were genuine heretics. Other erudite critics of monastic wealth, Maxim the Greek (active in Russia, 1517–1555) and Yermolai-Yerazm (active 1540s–1560s), did not take a stand on these two issues. Furthermore, the roles of Vassian and his “Trans-Volgan” mentor Nil Sorsky (d. 1508) in politicizing the latter’s stringent hesychastic spiritual principles are not clear. Recent textual analysis questions the traditional assumption, in place by 1550, that Nil had counseled Ivan III at a synod in 1503 to confiscate monastic villages, and shows that Nil, like Maxim, Ermolai-Erazm, and Artemy, staunchly defended Orthodoxy. As individuals, some “Non-possessors” made outstanding contributions to Russian spiritual, literary, and legal culture and

political thought, but as a group they carried little weight.

“Possessors” more or less dominated the Russian Church during 1502–1511, 1522–1539, and 1542–1566. The Josephites—Iosifov monastery elders and alumni prelates—were a formidable and often disliked “Possessor” faction, and not only by Kirillov-Belozersk Monastery elders, who patronized the northern Trans-Volgan hermitages. If Nil and Joseph collaborated against dissidence, Vassian and the Josephites were at loggerheads. Daniel had both Maxim and Vassian condemned and imprisoned for heresy. Later Macarius did the same to Artemy and maybe sponsored a purge of hermitages suspected of harboring dissidents.

See also: DANIEL, METROPOLITAN; IVAN III; JOSEPH OF VOLOTSK, ST.; MAKARY METROPOLITAN; MAXIM THE GREEK, ST.; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

POSTAL SYSTEM

The first regular postal routes in Russia (Moscow-Voronezh and later Moscow–St. Petersburg) were established at the start of the eighteenth century. In 1741 the service was expanded and intended to encompass all provinces of the empire. In reality, postal services were largely concentrated in European Russia, and mail was only delivered to one central location in a town, often a tavern. Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, it became possible to send parcels through the mail as well as letters. Between 1830 and 1840, larger urban centers began to create systems for mail delivery within their confines, and this development spurred an increase not only in the number of mail distribution points within a given city but also in the number of letters being sent. In 1848 the first prestamped envelopes appeared, and periodicals began to be distributed by mail. Postal services were gradually extended to some larger villages in Russia starting in the 1870s.

During the eighteenth century, postal affairs were in the hands of the Senate, but in 1809 they were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1830 a Main Postal Administration was established as a separate government organ, and it was superseded from 1865 to 1868 by a new Ministry of Post and Telegraph. After 1868 the postal system again became part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The turmoil of the Russian Revolutions and Civil War greatly affected the postal system. Services had to be reestablished gradually as outlying areas were subdued by the Bolsheviks. At the center, a new ministry, The People's Commissariat of Post and Telegraph (Narkompochtél) was established, but it was not until the mid-1920s that services were restored across the country. In 1924 the "circular-post" was set up, whereby horse-drawn carts were used to distribute mail and sell postal supplies along regular routes. Within a year, the network had 4,279 routes with more than 43,000 stopping points, and it covered 275,000 kilometers (170,900 miles). Permanent village postmen emerged in larger settlements as well in 1925, and they became responsible for home delivery when that aspect of the postal service was created in 1930.

In 2002 the postal system was divided administratively into ninety-three regional postal departments with 40,000 offices and 300,000 employees. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the postal system has declined dramatically. Letters routinely take weeks to arrive, and a sizeable number of customers are beginning to bypass the postal system in favor of private courier services. In order to remain profitable, many post offices have had to branch out into a wide array of services, including offering Internet access or renting some of their space to other retail outlets. The Russian government has also begun to consider the idea of merging the regional departments into a single joint-stock company to be called "Russian Post."

See also: MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

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ALISON ROWLEY

POTEMKIN, GRIGORY ALEXANDROVICH

(1739–1791), prince, secret husband of Catherine II, statesman, commander, imperial viceroy, eccentric.

Grigory Potemkin's life contains many mysteries. His year of birth and paternity are both disputed. His father, Alexander Vasilievich Potemkin (c. 1690–1746), an irascible retired army officer from the Smolensk region, courted young Daria Skuratova (1704–1780) while she was still married. Grigory was the fifth born and sole male of seven children. A Moscow cousin provided care for the family after the father's death. At school in Moscow, Potemkin displayed remarkable aptitude in classical and modern languages and Orthodox theology. Clerical friends led him to consider a church career. Potemkin entered the Horse Guards while continuing school at age sixteen. In 1757 he was one of a dozen students presented at court by Ivan Shuvalov, curator of Moscow University. Despite a gold medal, his academic career ceased with expulsion for laziness and truancy. He began active service with the Guards in Petersburg, participating in Catherine's coup of July 1762, for which he was promoted to chamber-gentleman and granted six hundred serfs. Accidental loss of an eye—mistakenly blamed on his patrons, the Orlov brothers—lent mystique to his robust physique and ebullient personality. He became assistant procurator of the Holy Synod in 1763 and spokesman for the non-Russian peoples at the Legislative Commission of 1767–1768. On leave from court for active army service in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, he fought with distinction under Field Marshal Peter Rumyantsev from 1769 to December 1773. At Petersburg he dined at court in autumn 1770, enhancing a reputation for devilish intelligence and wit, hilarious impersonations, and military exploits.

After Catherine's break from Grigory Orlov in 1772–1773, she sought a fresh perspective amid multiple crises. In December 1773 she invited Potemkin to Petersburg to win her favor. Installation as official favorite swiftly followed. He sat beside her at dinner and received infatuated notes several times per day. He was made honorary sub-colonel of the Preobrazhensky Guards, member of the Imperial Council, vice-president (later president) of the War Department, commander of all light cavalry and irregular forces, and governor-general of New Russia, and given many decorations capped

by Catherine's miniature portrait in diamonds—only Grigory Orlov had another. Potemkin helped to conclude the war on victorious terms, to oversee the end of the Pugachev Revolt, and to craft legislation strengthening provincial government against renewed disorders.

Apparently the lovers arranged a secret wedding in Petersburg on June 19, 1774. They spent most of 1775 in Moscow to celebrate victories over the Turks and Pugachev, ceremonies that Potemkin choreographed. Catherine supposedly gave birth to Potemkin's daughter, Elizaveta Grigorevna Temkina (a tale debunked in Simon Montefiore's biography). From early 1776, despite elevation to Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, Potemkin drifted away as a result of persistent quarrels over power and rivals. In New Russia he supervised settlement and arranged annexation of the Crimea, finally accomplished with minimal bloodshed in 1783 and renamed the Tauride region. This was part of the Greek Project that Potemkin and Catherine jointly pursued in alliance with Austria and that foresaw expulsion of the Turks from Europe and reconstitution of the Byzantine Empire under Russian tutelage. The couple constantly corresponded about all matters of policy and personal concerns, especially hypochondria. She regretted his ailments however petty, but when she fell into depression from favorite Alexander Lanskoï's death in 1784, Potemkin rushed back to direct her recovery. He planned the flamboyant Tauride Tour of 1787 that took her to Kiev, then by galley and ship to the Crimea, and then back via Moscow. This inspired the myth of "Potemkin villages," a term synonymous with phony display. He was awarded the surtitle of Tavrishesky ("Tauride") during the tour.

The Turks declared war in August 1787, Potemkin taking supreme command of all Russian forces in the south. He panicked for some weeks when the new Black Sea fleet was scattered by storms and Ottoman invasion threatened, but Catherine kept faith in his military abilities, and Potemkin led Russia to land and sea victories that eventually won the war in 1792. He missed the final victory, however, dying theatrically in the steppe outside Jassy on October 16, 1791.

See also: CATHERINE II; PUGACHEV, EMELIAN IVANOVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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POTEMKIN MUTINY

The Potemkin Mutiny that took place during the 1905 Russian Revolution on board of battleship *Knyaz Potemkin Tavricheskiy* of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on June 14–25, 1905.

The *Potemkin*, commissioned in 1902, was commanded by Captain Golikov. On June 14, while at sea on artillery maneuvers, its sailors protested over the quality of meat that was brought on board that day for their supper. The ship's doctor inspected the meat and declared it fit for human consumption.

The sailors, dissatisfied with this verdict, sent a deputation, headed by Grigory Vakulenchuk, a sailor and a member of the ship's Social Democrat organization, to Golikov. There was a confrontation between the delegation and Commander Gilyarovsky, the executive officer, who killed Vakulenchuk. This sparked a revolt, during which Golikov, Gilyarovsky, and other senior officers were killed or thrown overboard. Afanasy Matushenko, a torpedo quartermaster and one of leaders of the ship's Social Democrats, took command.

On June 15, the *Potemkin* arrived at Odessa, where the crew hoped to get support from striking workers. At 6 A.M., the body of Vakulenchuk was brought to the Odessa Steps, a staircase that connected the port and the city. By 10 A.M., some five thousand Odessans gathered there in support of the sailors. The gathering was peaceful throughout the day, but toward evening there was rioting, looting, and arson throughout the harbor front. By 9:30 P.M., loyal troops occupied strategic posts in the port and started firing into the crowd.

On June 16, authorities allowed the burial of Vakulenchuk, but refused sailors' demand for amnesty. That day, the *Potemkin* shelled Odessa with its six-inch guns. On June 17, mutiny broke out on the battleship *Georgi Pobedonosets* and other

ships of the Black Sea Fleet. However, by June 19 this mutiny was put down.

On June 18 the *Potemkin* set out from Odessa to the Romanian port of Constanza, where sailors' request for supplies was refused. The ship left the port the following day, but returned on June 25, after failing to secure supplies in Feodosia. The sailors surrendered the ship to Romanian authorities and were granted safe passage to the country's western borders.

The Potemkin mutiny was a spontaneous event, which broke the plans by socialist organizations in the Black Sea Fleet for a more organized rebellion. However, it tapped into widespread disaffection on the part of the Russian people over their conditions during the reign of Nicholas II. The mutineers found sympathy among the people of Odessa. While the mutiny was crushed, it, together with other events in the 1905 Russian Revolution, provided an important impetus to constitutional reforms that marked the last years of the Russian Empire.

See also: BLACK SEA FLEET; REVOLUTION OF 1905

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IGOR YEYKELIS

POTSDAM CONFERENCE

The Potsdam Conference was the last of the wartime summits among the Big Three allied leaders. It met from July 17 through August 2, 1945, in Potsdam, a historic suburb of Berlin. Representing the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain respectively were Harry Truman, Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill (who was replaced midway by Clement Atlee as a result of elections that brought Labor to power). Germany had surrendered in May; the war with Japan continued. The purpose of the Potsdam meeting was the implementation of the agreements reached at Yalta. The atmosphere at Potsdam was often acrimo-

nious, presaging the imminent Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West. In the months leading up to Potsdam, Stalin took an increasingly hard line on issues regarding Soviet control in Eastern Europe, provoking the new American president and the British prime minister to harden their own stance toward the Soviet leader.

Two issues were particularly contentious: Poland's western boundaries with Germany and German reparations. When Soviet forces liberated Polish territory, Stalin, without consulting his allies, transferred to Polish administration all of the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse (western branch) Rivers. While Britain and the United States were prepared to compensate Poland for its territorial losses in the east, they were unwilling to agree to such a substantial land transfer made unilaterally. They would have preferred the Oder-Neisse (eastern branch) River boundary. The larger territory gave Poland the historic city of Breslau and the rich industrial area of Silesia. Reluctantly, the British and Americans accepted Stalin's *fait accompli*, but with the proviso that the final boundary demarcation would be determined by a German peace treaty.

Reparations was another unresolved problem. The Soviet Union demanded a sum viewed by the Western powers as economically impossible. Abandoning the effort to agree on a specific sum, the conferees agreed to take reparations from each power's zone of occupation. Stalin sought, with only limited success, additional German resources from the British and American zones. Agreements reached at Potsdam provided for:

- Transference of authority in Germany to the military commanders in their respective zones of occupation and to a four-power Allied Control Council for matters affecting Germany as a whole.
- Creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers to prepare peace treaties for Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania and ultimately Germany.
- Denazification, demilitarization, democratization, and decentralization of Germany.
- Transference of Koenigsberg and adjacent area to the Soviet Union.

Just prior to the conference, Truman was informed of the successful test of the atomic bomb in New Mexico. On July 24 he gave a brief account of the weapon to Stalin. Stalin reaffirmed his commitment to declare war on Japan in mid-August.

While the conference was in session, the leaders of Britain, China, and the United States issued a proclamation offering Japan the choice between immediate unconditional surrender or destruction.

Though the facade of allied unity was affirmed in the final communiqué, the Potsdam Conference marked the end of Europe's wartime alliance.

See also: TEHRAN CONFERENCE; WORLD WAR II; YALTA CONFERENCE

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JOSEPH L. NOGEE

POZHARSKY, DMITRY MIKHAILOVICH

(1578–1642), military leader of the second national liberation army of 1611–1612.

Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky belonged to the Starodub princes, a relatively minor clan. He came to prominence as a military commander during the reign of Vasily Shuisky. While recovering from wounds sustained during service in the first national liberation army of 1611, Pozharsky was invited to lead the new militia, which was being organized by Kuzma Minin at Nizhny Novgorod. In March 1612 he led an army from Nizhny to Yaroslavl, where he remained for four months as head of a provisional government that made military and political preparations for the liberation of Moscow from the Poles. The capital was still besieged by Cossacks under Ivan Zarutsky, who supported the claim to the throne of tsarevich Ivan, the infant son of the Second False Dmitry and Marina Mniszech; others, including Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy, swore allegiance to a Third False Dmitry who had appeared in Pskov. Pozharsky himself, perhaps to neutralize the threat

from the Swedes who had occupied Novgorod, seemed to favor the Swedish prince Charles Philip. Pozharsky left Yaroslavl only after Zarutsky and Trubetskoy had renounced their candidates for the throne. Following Zarutsky's flight from the encampments surrounding Moscow, Pozharsky and Trubetskoy liberated the capital in October 1612 and headed the provisional government, which convened the Assembly of the Land that elected Michael Romanov as tsar in January 1613. Pozharsky was made a boyar on the day of Michael's coronation, and he performed a number of relatively minor military and administrative roles during Michael's reign. Along with Minin, Pozharsky was subsequently regarded as a national hero and served as a patriotic inspiration in later wars.

See also: ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; COSSACKS; MININ, KUZMA; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

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MAUREEN PERRIE

PRAVDA

Pravda (the name means "truth" in Russian) was first issued on May 5, 1912, in St. Petersburg by the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party. Its aim was to publicize labor activism and expose working conditions in Russian factories. The editors published many letters and articles from ordinary workers, their primary target audience at the time.

Pravda was a legal daily newspaper subject to postpublication censorship by the tsarist authorities. These authorities had the power to fine the paper, withdraw its publication license, confiscate a specific issue, or jail the editor. They closed the



Nikolai Bukharin and Maria Ulyanova, sister of Lenin, at work at the Communist Party newspaper, *Pravda*. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

paper eight times in the first two years of its existence, and each time the Bolsheviks reopened it under another name (“Worker’s Truth,” etc.). In spite of police harassment the newspaper maintained an average circulation of about forty thousand in the period 1912 to 1914, probably a higher number than other socialist papers (but small compared to the commercial “penny newspapers”). About one-half of *Pravda*’s circulation was distributed in St. Petersburg. After the authorities closed the paper on July 21, 1914, it did not appear again until after the February Revolution of 1917.

Pravda reopened on March 5, 1917, and published continuously until closed down by Russian Republic president Boris Yeltsin on August 22, 1991. From December 1917 until the summer of 1928 the newspaper was run by editor in chief Nikolai Bukharin and Maria Ilichna Ulyanova, Lenin’s sister. When Bukharin broke with Josef

Stalin over collectivization, Stalin used the *Pravda* party organization to undermine his authority. Bukharin and his supporters, including Ulyanova, were formally removed from the editorial staff in 1929. By 1933 the newspaper, now headed by Lev Mekhlis, was Stalin’s mouthpiece.

Throughout the Soviet era access to *Pravda* was a necessity for party members. The paper’s primary role was not to entertain, inform, or instruct the Soviet population as a whole, but to deliver Central Committee instructions and messages to Soviet communist cadres, foreign governments, and foreign communist parties. Thus, as party membership shifted, so did *Pravda*’s presentation. In response to the influx of young working-class men into the Party in the 1920s, for example, editors simplified the paper’s language and resorted to the sort of journalism that they believed would appeal to this audience—militant slogans, tales of

heroic feats of production, and denunciation of class enemies.

Pravda also produced reports on popular moods. This practice began in the early 1920s as Bukharin and Ulianova played a leading role in organizing the worker and peasant correspondents' movement in the Soviet republics. Workers and peasants (many of them Party activists) wrote into the newspaper with reports on daily life, often shaped by the editors' instructions. Newspapers, including *Pravda*, received and processed millions of such letters throughout Soviet history. Editors published a few of these, forwarded some to prosecutorial organs, and used others to produce the summaries of popular moods, which were sent to Party leaders.

After the collapse of the USSR nationalist and communist journalists intermittently published a print newspaper and an online newspaper under the name *Pravda*. However, the new publications were not official organs of the revived Communist Party.

See also: JOURNALISM; NEWSPAPERS

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PREOBRAZHENSKY GUARDS

The Preobrazhensky Regiment and its slightly junior counterpart, the Semenovskiy Life Guard Regiment, trace their histories to 1683, when Peter the Great as tsarevich created two "play regiments." Named after villages near Moscow, the regiments initially consisted of Peter's boyhood cronies and miscellaneous recruits who engaged in war games in and around the mock fortress of Pressburg. The

regiments attained formal status in 1687, followed in 1700 by official appellation as Guards. More than guarantors of the tsar's physical security, these regiments served as models for the emergence of a standing regular Russian army. With adjustments, Peter structured them on the pattern of European-style units that Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich had first introduced into Russian service. As they evolved, the guards became officer training schools for an assortment of gentry youths and foreigners who remained reliably close to the throne. In setting the example, the tsar himself advanced through the ranks of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, serving notably in 1709 as a battalion commander at Poltava. Non-military missions for guards officers and non-commissioned officers often extended to service as a kind of political police for the sovereign. By 1722, Peter's guards (with cavalry) numbered about three thousand troops, and his Table of Ranks recognized their elite status by according their complement two-rank seniority over comparable grades in the regular army.

During the half-century after Peter's death, a mixture of tradition, proximity to the throne, elite status, and gentry recruitment propelled the Preobrazhensky Regiment into court politics. Every sovereign after Peter automatically became chief of the regiment; therefore, appearance of the ruler in its uniform symbolized authority, continuity, and mutual acceptance. Meanwhile, because Peter had made gentry service mandatory, noble families often registered their male children at birth on the regimental list, thus assuring early ascent through the junior grades before actual duty. In effect, the Guards became a bastion of gentry interests and sentiment, and various parties at court eventually drew the Preobrazhensky Regiment into a series of palace intrigues and coups. Officers of the regiment played conspicuous roles in the palace coups of 1740 and 1741 that overthrew successive regents for the infant Ivan VI in final favor of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna. Members of the regiment displayed an even higher profile during the coup of July 1762 that deposed Peter III in favor of his German-born wife, who became Empress Catherine II. She counted prominent supporters within the regiment, and she pointedly dressed as a Preobrazhensky colonel during the campaign on the outskirts of the capital to arrest her husband. On re-entry into St. Petersburg, Catherine personally rode at the head of the regiment. Yet, whatever the level of guards' participation in this and previous coups, there was never any genuine impulse to create an alternative military government; solicitous

attention from the traditional monarchy seemed adequate recompense for guards' conspiratorial complicity.

The onset of Catherine II's reign marked the zenith of the Preobrazhensky's role as power broker, although association with the regiment continued to retain symbolic significance. To forestall repetition of events, a new generation of military administrators increasingly recruited non-noble subjects with outstanding physical characteristics as rank-and-file guards, while Tsar Paul I subsequently diluted the guards with recruits from his Gatchina corps. Moreover, other sources of officer recruitment, including the cadet corps, soon supplanted the guards. Only in 1825, during the Decembrist revolt, when a Preobrazhensky company was the first unit to side with Tsar Nicholas I, was there more than brief allusion to a political past. Subsequently, the Preobrazhensky Regiment remained the bearer of a proud combat tradition that included distinguished service in nearly all of imperial Russia's wars. The sons of illustrious families vied for appointment to its officer cadre, while the tsars continued to wear its distinctive dark green tunic on ceremonial occasions.

See also: CATHERINE II; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; PETER I

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PREOBRAZHENSKEY, YEVGENY ALEXEYEVICH

(1886–1937), Russian revolutionary, oppositionist, and Marxist theorist.

Born in Bolkhov, Orel province, Yevgeny Preobrazhensky began his political activism at age fifteen as a Social Democrat and later became a Bolshevik and a regional leader. Together with Nikolai Bukharin, Preobrazhensky led the Left Communist opposition to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany (1918). In 1920 he became one of three secretaries of the Bolshevik Party, together with Nikolai Krestinsky and Leonid Serebryakov,

all later active in the Trotskyist Opposition. The three were removed from these posts in 1922, when Josef Stalin was made General Secretary of the Party Central Committee.

In 1923 Preobrazhensky authored the "Platform of the Forty-Six," which attacked the growing bureaucratization and authoritarianism of the Party apparatus. Also in 1923 he published *On Morality and Class Norms*, in which he attacked the apparatus's growing privileges. From this point Preobrazhensky became a close ally of Leon Trotsky and a leader of the various Trotskyist oppositions. Following the suppression of the 1927 Joint Opposition, he was expelled from the Party in 1928, but in 1929 became one of the first Trotskyists to recant his views and return to the Party fold. He was arrested in 1935 and testified against Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev at the first Moscow show trial in 1936. He was scheduled to be a defendant in the second trial in 1937, but refused to confess and was shot in secret in that same year. He was rehabilitated during Gorbachev's *perestroika*.

Preobrazhensky was a major theorist and one of the Soviet Union's leading economists of the 1920s. He opposed Stalin's and Bukharin's policy of "Socialism in One Country" and the slow pace of industrialization. In his major work, *The New Economics*, he put forward the theory of primary socialist accumulation, in which he argued that successful industrial development had to extract resources from the peasant economy. However, he resolutely opposed the use of force to achieve this, and by 1927 had concluded that only a revolution in the advanced countries of Western Europe could save the Soviet Union from a political and economic impasse. While he purported to welcome Stalin's solution to this dilemma (forced collectivization and industrialization), in 1932 he published his second theoretical masterpiece, *The Decline of Capitalism*. This was a serious analysis in its own right of the Great Depression, but it contained a less-than-veiled attack on Stalin's five-year plans and the policy of developing heavy industry at the expense of consumption.

See also: BUKHARIN, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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PRESIDENCY

The presidency is the most powerful formal political institution in post-communist Russia. Except for the ceremonial title given to the head of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Union did not have a presidency until its waning years, although the adoption of one was discussed under Josef Stalin and again under Nikita Khrushchev. New proposals resurfaced in the late 1980s, prompting intense debate among Communist Party elites about the efficacy of introducing an institution that could challenge the party's authority. Despite concerns about the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies approved the Soviet presidency in 1990. The first presidential election was to be held by the legislature, with subsequent popular elections. Mikhail Gorbachev became president in March 1990, receiving 71 percent of the votes in the Congress of People's Deputies.

The union republics began electing presidents before the dissolution of the USSR. In June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was chosen as Russia's first president in an election that pitted him against five competitors. In his first term, following the breakup of the USSR, Yeltsin faced a recalcitrant parliament that opposed many of his initiatives. The conflict between the executive and legislative branches culminated in Yeltsin's issuing a decree that dissolved parliament on September 21, 1993. Parliament rejected the decree and declared Vice President Alexander Rutskoi to be acting president. The forces opposing Yeltsin assembled armed supporters, occupied the Russian White House, and attempted to take control of the main television network. Pro-

Yeltsin forces attacked the White House and crushed the parliamentary rebellion in early October 1993.

The constitutional crisis led to the formal strengthening of the presidency, codified in the 1993 constitution. Rather than a pure presidential system, the Russian Federation adopted a semi-presidential system in which the president is the popularly elected head of state, and the prime minister, nominated by the president, is the head of government. The president is elected to a four-year term using a majority-runoff system that requires a majority vote to win in the first round of competition. If no candidate gains a majority, a runoff is held between the top two candidates from the first round. The president wields substantial formal powers and thus has more authority than the leaders in parliamentary and many other semipresidential systems. Among other things, the president can veto laws, make decrees, initiate legislation, call for referenda, and suspend local laws that contravene the constitution. The president is limited to two consecutive terms in office.

Yeltsin was reelected president in July 1996, after defeating the candidate of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennady Zyuganov, in the second round of competition. Yeltsin resigned from the presidency on December 31, 1999. Vladimir Putin served briefly as acting president and then was elected in March 2000. Putin reasserted presidential authority, strengthening central control over the regions, challenging powerful business interests, and extending control over the press.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL

In March 1990, when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union lost its political monopoly and Mikhail Gorbachev was elected president of the

USSR, he created a new Presidential Council to replace the Politburo as the major policy-making body in the Soviet Union. The council's task, according to the newly revised Soviet constitution, was to determine the USSR's foreign and domestic policy. This was a major institutional innovation. The Presidential Council was to be independent of the Communist Party, which at this stage was viewed as incapable of reform, and was intended to challenge the power of the Defense Council (subsequently abolished) and to increase and reinforce Gorbachev's new presidential power. Gorbachev's choice of members to compose the Council was very controversial. The sixteen members, only five of whom were Politburo members, included Chingiz Aitmatov, a Kyrgyz writer; Vadim Bakatin, minister of the interior; Valery Boldin, head of the Central Committee General Department; KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov; Anatoly Lukyanov, chair of the Supreme Soviet; Yuri Maslyukov, chairman of the state planning commission; Yevgeny Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union; Valentin Rasputin, the nationalist writer and only non-communist; Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov; Stanislav Shatalin, economist; Eduard Shevardnadze, the foreign minister; Alexander Yakovlev, a senior secretary of the Central Committee and minister without portfolio; Venyamin Yarin, leader of the United Workers Front; and Marshal Dmitry Yazov, minister of defense. Depending upon which source one consults, the council also included two of the following: Yuri Osipian, physicist; Georgy Revenkov, chair of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet; and Vadim Medvedev. The council experiment did not work because the members could not act collectively and the council's policies were rarely put into practice. As a result, making the necessary changes in the Soviet constitution, Gorbachev abolished the Presidential Council in November 1990. The council was resurrected several times during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin but had no clearly defined functions and little political clout.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; POLITBURO; PRESIDENCY

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

PRESIDIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET

The Russian word *soviet* means "council." The Supreme Soviet beginning in 1936 was the pre-1991 equivalent of the Parliament or Congress in democratic countries. It consisted of two chambers. The upper chamber (the Council of Nationalities) consisted of representatives ("people's deputies") of the hundred-plus nationalities of the USSR; the lower chamber (the Council of the Union) represented the population at large on a per-capita representative basis. Initially they were elected for four-year terms, then, beginning in 1977, for five-year terms. There were eleven convocations (following eleven elections) of the Supreme Soviet between December 12, 1937, and March 26, 1989, which met in eighty-nine sessions. The Supreme Soviet met for only a few days semiannually to vote unanimously for the government's (in reality, the Communist Party's) program. It elected the Presidium, which was a standing body that had more functions; as well as nominally formed the government, including the Council of Ministers of the USSR; chose the procurator general (chief prosecutor, equals attorney general) of the USSR; and appointed the Supreme Court of the USSR.

The Brezhnev Constitution of 1977 converted the Supreme Soviet into a fuller legislative and control organ elected by the Congress of the Council of Nationalities and Council of the Union. The Supreme Soviet itself appointed the Council of Ministers, the Control Commission, the chief prosecutor, and chose the Presidium from among its members.

In 1989 the old Supreme Soviet was converted into the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, a standing body with 2,250 deputies, one-third elected from equal territories, one-third from nationality regions, and one-third from social organizations. Five such congresses met between 1989 and 1991. From its members it chose by secret ballot a new Supreme Soviet, in accord with a law of December 1, 1988, which was subordinate to it. The new Supreme Soviet had the same two chambers as before with 266 deputies in each.

Table 1.

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet	
Individual	Dates in Office
Mikhail I. Kalinin	1938-1946
Nikolai M. Shvernik	1946-1953
Klimentii E. Voroshilov	1953-1960
Leonid I. Brezhnev	1960-1964
Anastas I. Mikoian	1964-1965
Nikolai V. Podgorny	1965-1977
Leonid I. Brezhnev	1977-1982
Iurii V. Andropov	1983-1984
Konstantin U. Chernenko	1984-1985
Andrei A. Gromyko	1985-1988
Mikhail S. Gorbachev	1988-1989

SOURCE: Courtesy of the author.

The heads of the Presidium were the nominal heads of state of the Soviet Union: Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin (1938–1946), Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik (1946–1953), Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov (1953–1960), Leonid Ilich Brezhnev (1960–1964 and 1977–1982), Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan (1964–1965), Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny (1965–1977), Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov (1983–1984), Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko (1984–1985), Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko (1985–1988), and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev (1988–1989). Most of them were figureheads, for power actually lay in the Communist Party, and the state authorities were its rubber stamps. However, when Brezhnev in 1977 decided to combine the jobs of head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and of the USSR (followed in this by Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev), the heads of the Presidium were the most important figures in the Soviet Union. The Presidium also had the office of first assistant to the head, but this office was so insignificant that it was not created until 1944, and then was not appointed from 1946 to 1977.

The men who made the Presidium work were its secretaries: A. F. Gorkin (1938–1953 and 1956–1957), N. M. Pegov (1953–1956), M. P. Georgadze (1957–1982), and T. N. Menteshashvili (1982–1989).

To the extent that the Soviet service state (q.v.) functioned efficiently or not, the Presidium secretaries deserve much of the credit or blame. They embodied the meritocratic principles of the service state and the last two, as Georgians, personified the multinational nature of the Soviet empire.

Occasionally the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR met together, as happened on March 5, 1953, from 10 to 10:40 P.M., when they adopted resolutions on governmental organization after Stalin's death.

The Supreme Soviets met only a few days annually, and its Presidium carried on its business in the intervals. (The two organs paralleled the Communist Party's All-Union Congresses and the Politburo. In theory, the CPSU made policy; the government carried it out.) According to Article 119 of the 1977 Constitution, the Presidium had thirty-seven members. The chairman was nominally in charge; then there were fifteen vice-chairs, one for each republic, who were present more for decoration than for work. Then there was the secretary, the workhorse of the Presidium, and twenty others who had area responsibilities corresponding to the ministries that ran the USSR. The presidium had a long list of functions, only some of which can be mentioned here. It set the dates for the election of the Supreme Soviet and convened its sessions. It was responsible for the government observing the Constitution and that all laws were constitutional. It had the task of interpreting the laws when dispute arose. The Presidium instituted and awarded orders and medals, including military ones. It ruled on matters of citizenship. It formed the Council of Defense and appointed and dismissed the leaders of the armed forces. It was the body that could proclaim martial law, declare war and peace, and order the mobilization of the armed forces. It ratified foreign treaties and dealt with diplomatic matters. Article 121 of the Constitution authorized the Presidium to create and disband governmental ministries and to appoint and fire ministers.

See also: CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES; CONSTITUTION OF 1977; COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; SUPREME SOVIET

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RICHARD HELLIE

PRIKAZY *See* CHANCELLERY SYSTEM.

PRIMAKOV, YEVGENY MAXIMOVICH

(b. 1929), orientalist, intelligence chief, foreign minister, and prime minister under Boris Yeltsin.

Born in Kiev, Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov grew up in Tbilisi; his father disappeared in the purges. Trained as an Arabist, Primakov worked in broadcasting in the 1950s and then became a Middle East correspondent for *Pravda* (and perhaps a covert foreign intelligence operative). In the 1970s he assumed academic posts as deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), then as director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, and in 1985 as director of IMEMO.

In 1986 Primakov became a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and a foreign policy advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev. He was chosen in June 1989 to chair the Congress of People's Deputies, the lower house of the Supreme Soviet formed pursuant to Gorbachev's new constitution. His party status rose accordingly: full Central Committee member in April 1989 and candidate member of the Politburo in September. He was a leading contributor to the "New Thinking" regarding international cooperation that was identified with Gorbachev.

Primakov condemned the attempted coup by hard-line communists in August 1991; Gorbachev then made him First Deputy Chairman of the KGB and head of foreign intelligence. He was one of the few Gorbachev appointees to be retained in office by Russian President Boris Yeltsin after the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991.

Appointed foreign minister in January 1996, Primakov was a realistic and cool professional. He was a strong defender of Russian national interests, as opposed to the pro-Western stance of his predecessor Andrei Kozyrev, and often manifested pro-Arab sympathies. Espousing a "multipolar" world, he nonetheless avoided direct confrontation with the West and bargained for a Russian presence at NATO as it was expanding eastward. Later he criticized the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia but kept open a Russian role in the Kosovo settlement.

Following the August 1998 economic and political crisis, Primakov emerged as a compromise candidate for prime minister. Overwhelmingly confirmed by the Duma in September, he was the most popular politician in Russia. His model for eco-



Russian statesman Yevgeny Primakov served Boris Yeltsin as foreign minister, prime minister, and spy master. PHOTOGRAPH BY ALEXANDER ZEMLIANICHENKO. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

nom stabilization was President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal in the United States.

As prime minister, Primakov soon aroused the jealousy of the ailing Yeltsin and alarmed the president's family and cronies by investigating corruption. Yeltsin emerged from a long period of torpor and dismissed Primakov in May 1999 in favor of Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin. In reply, Primakov accepted the leadership of the "Fatherland-All Russia" bloc to oppose Yeltsin's forces in the Duma elections of December 1999, and was a strong contender for the presidency in the elections due the following year. But in August Yeltsin replaced Prime Minister Stepashin with Vladimir Putin, who set up his own party, Unity, and capitalized on the war in Chechnya to forge ahead of Primakov's people. Primakov withdrew as a presidential contender in order to run for speaker of the new Duma; however, Putin made a deal with the communists to keep Gennady Seleznyov as speaker

and marginalize Primakov. Those maneuvers notwithstanding, in the March 2000 election Primakov endorsed Putin, who subsequently tapped him for occasional diplomatic missions. In 2001 Primakov retired from the presidency of Fatherland-All Russia as it was preparing to merge with Unity.

See also: FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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ROBERT V. DANIELS

PRIMARY CHRONICLE

The compilation of chronicle entries known as the *Povst' vremennykh let* (*PVL*) is a fundamental source for the historical study of the vast eastern European and Eurasian lands that include major parts of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as extensive parts of the Russian Federation and Poland. As the single most important source for the study of the early Rus principalities, it contains the bulk of existing written information about the area inhabited by the East Slavs from the ninth to the twelfth century, and has been the subject of many historical, literary, and linguistic analyses. The *PVL* in various versions appears at the beginning of most extant chronicles compiled from the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries

The *PVL* may have been compiled initially by Silvestr, the hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery in Vydobichi, a village near Kiev, in 1116. The attribution to Silvestr is based on a colophon in copies of the so-called Laurentian branch where he declares, "I wrote down this chronicle," and asks to be remembered in his readers' prayers (286,1–286,7). It is possible that Silvestr merely copied or edited an already existing complete work by the Kiev Caves Monastery monk mentioned in the heading (i.e., "The Tale of Bygone Years of a monk of the Feodosy Pechersky Monastery [regarding] from

where the Rus lands comes and who first in it began to rule and from where the Rus land became to be"), but it is also possible that this monk merely began the work that Silvestr finished. An interpolation in the title of the sixteenth-century Khlebnikov copy has led to a popular notion that Nestor was the name of this monk and that he had completed a now-lost first redaction of the complete text. But that interpolation is not reliable evidence, since it may have been the result of a guess by the interpolator, in which case the name of the monk referred to in the title or when he compiled his text is not known. So the simplest explanation is that Silvestr used an earlier (perhaps unfinished) chronicle by an unknown monk of the Caves Monastery along with other sources to compile what is now known as the *PVL*. Silvestr's holograph does not exist; the earliest copy dates to more than 260 years later. Therefore, researchers have to try to reconstruct what Silvestr wrote on the basis of extant copies that are hundreds of years distant from its presumed date of composition.

There are five main witnesses to the original version of the *PVL*. The term "main witness," refers only to those copies that have independent authority to testify about what was in the archetype. Since most copies of the *PVL* (e.g., those found in the Nikon Chronicle, Voskresenskii Chronicle, etc.) are secondary (i.e., derivative) from the main witnesses, they provide no primary readings in relation to the archetype. The five main witnesses are:

1. Laurentian (RNB, F.IV.2), dated to 1377;
2. Radziwill (BAN, 34. 5. 30), datable to the 1490s;
3. Academy (RGB, MDA 5/182), dated to the 15th century;
4. Hypatian (BAN, 16. 4. 4), dated to c. 1425;
5. Khlebnikov (RNB, F.IV.230), dated to 16th century.


In addition, in a few places, the Pogodin Chronicle fills in lacunae in the Khlebnikov copy:

6. Pogodin (RNB, Pogodin 1401), dated to early 17th century.

One can also draw textual evidence from the corresponding passages in the later version of the Novgorod I Chronicle. To date, there are no lithographs or photographic facsimiles of any manuscript of the Novgorod I Chronicle. The three copies of the published version of Novg. I are:

1. Commission (SPb IRI, Arkh. kom. 240), dated to 1450s;
2. Academy (BAN 17.8.36), dated to 1450s;

Figure 1.



3. Tolstoi (RNB, Tolstovoi F.IV.223), dated to 1820s.

One can also utilize certain textual readings from the corresponding passages of Priselkov's reconstruction of the non-extant Trinity Chronicle.

The *stemma*, or family tree, shows the genealogical relationship of the manuscript copies.

Although various theories have been proposed for the stages of compilation of the *PVL*, little agreement has been reached. The sources that the compiler(s) utilized, however, are generally recognized. The main source to 842 is the *Chronicle of Georgius Hamartolu* and to 948 the *Continuation of Symeon the Logothete*. Accounts of the ecumenical councils could have been drawn from at least three possible sources: (1) a Bulgarian collection, which served as the basis for the *Izbornik of 1073*; (2) the *Chronicle*

of Hamartolus; and (3) the *Letter of Patriarch Photius to Boris, Prince of Bulgaria*. Copies of treaties between Byzantium and Rus appear under entries for 907, 912, 945, and 971. The *Creed of Michael Syncellus* was the source of the Creed taught to Volodimir I in 988. Metropolitan Hilarion's *Sermon on Law and Grace* is drawn upon for Biblical quotations regarding the conversion of Volodimir I. There are also excerpts from the *Memoir and Eulogy of Volodimir* that are attributed to the monk James. *The Life of Boris and Gleb* appears in the *PVL* but in a redaction different from the independent work written by Nestor. Quotations in the *PVL* attributed to John Chrysostom seem to be drawn from the *Zlatoustruiu* (anthology of his writings). Subsequently two references are made in the *PVL* to the *Revelations of Pseudo-Methodius of Patara*. Various parts of the *PVL* draw on the *Paleia* (a synopsis of Old Testament history with interpretations).

In the entries for 1097 to 1100, there is a narrative of a certain Vasily who claims to have been an eyewitness and participant in the events being described. Volodimir Monomakh's *Testament* and *Letter to Oleg* appear toward the end of the text of the chronicle. Finally, oral traditions and legends seem to be the basis for a number of other accounts, including the coming of the Rus'.

Although the text of the *PVL* has been published a number of times including as part of the publication of later chronicles, only recently has a critical edition based on a *stemma codicum* been completed.

See also: BOOK OF DEGREES; CHRONICLES; KIEVAN RUS; RURIKID DYNASTY

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PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATION

Primary Party Organization (PPO) was the official name for the lowest-level organization in the structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. PPOs were set up wherever there were at least three Party members, and every member of the Party was required to belong to one. PPOs existed in urban and rural areas, usually at Party members' places of work, such as factories, state and collective farms, army units, offices, schools, and universities. The highest organ of a PPO was the Party meeting, which was convened at least once per month and elected delegates to the Party conference at the raion or city level. In the larger PPOs, a bureau was elected for a term of up to one year to conduct day-to-day Party business. But if a PPO had fewer than fifteen members, they elected a secretary and deputy secretary rather than a bureau. Occupants of the post of PPO secretary or PPO bureau head had to have been Party members for at least a year. PPO secretaries were usually paid or

released from their regular work if their cell included more than 150 Party members. Although the PPO may seem insignificant in comparison to the higher organs of the CPSU, it performed crucial political and economic functions, such as admitting new members; carrying out agitation and propaganda work (e.g., educating Party members in the principles of Marxism-Leninism), and ensuring that Party discipline was maintained. Finally, PPOs were vital to the fulfillment of Party objectives (e.g., meeting planned quotas and production targets).

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

PRIME MINISTER

The prime minister (or premier) was the chief executive officer of the Soviet government. The position was formally known as the chairman of the Council of Ministers (also known as the Sovnarkom, 1917–1946, and the Cabinet of Ministers, 1990–1991). The prime minister led sessions of the Council of Ministers and the more exclusive and secretive Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The prime minister was charged with overall responsibility for managing the centrally planned command economy and overseeing the extensive public administration apparatus.

Representing one of the most powerful positions in the Soviet leadership hierarchy, the post of prime minister carried automatic full membership in the Politburo, the top executive body in the political system. The prime minister's seat was frequently the object of intense intra-party factional conflicts to control the economic policy agenda.

The Soviet Union's first prime minister was Bolshevik Party leader Vladimir Lenin, who chaired the Sovnarkom, the principal executive governing body at that time. Lenin, who was not fond of extended debates, began the practice of policy making through an inner circle of ministers. Following Lenin's death in 1924, the positions of government head and Party leader were formally separated from one another.

Alexei Rykov, an intellectual with economic expertise, was appointed prime minister, overseeing the administration of the mixed-market New Economic Policy (NEP). In the late 1920s, as party sentiment turned against the NEP, leadership contender Josef Stalin maneuvered to dislodge Rykov from this post. Next, Prime Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, a staunch ally of Stalin, presided over and spurred on the ambitious and tumultuous state-led industrialization and collectivization campaigns of the 1930s. In 1939, with war looming, Molotov was dispatched to the foreign ministry, and Stalin claimed the position, accumulating even greater personal power.

When Stalin died in 1953, it was deemed necessary once again to separate the posts of Party and government leadership. Georgy Malenkov, who had managed the wartime economy as de facto premier, was officially promoted to prime minister. Malenkov attempted the diversion of resources away from military industry to the consumer sector, but was forced to resign by political rivals. The prime minister's post was occupied next by Nikolai Bulganin, whose expertise lay in military matters. In 1958 Communist Party leader Nikita Khrushchev appointed himself prime minister, in violation of Party rules.

Following Khrushchev's removal in 1964, the prime minister's position became more routinized within the leadership hierarchy, though the Politburo had the last say on economic policy. As industry developed and the economy grew more complex, the responsibilities of the prime minister became increasingly technocratic, requiring greater command of economic issues and firsthand managerial experience. Prime ministers in the late Soviet period struggled unsuccessfully with the challenge of devising economic strategies to regenerate growth from the declining command economy.

Individuals holding the post of prime minister included: Vladimir Lenin (1917–1924), Alexei Rykov (1924–1929), Vyacheslav Molotov (1930–1939), Josef Stalin (1939–1953), Georgy Malenkov (1953–1955), Nikolai Bulganin (1955–1958), Nikita Khrushchev (1958–1964), Alexei Kosygin (1964–1980), Nikolai Tikhonov (1980–1985), Nikolai Ryzhkov (1985–1990), and Valentin Pavlov (1990–1991).

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; POLITBURO; SOVNARKOM

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GERALD M. EASTER

PRIMITIVE SOCIALIST ACCUMULATION

Primitive Socialist Accumulation was a concept developed by the Soviet economist Yevgeny Preobrazhensky to analyze the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s.

Adam Smith and other classical economists preferred to “previous” or “primitive” accumulation of capital to explain the rise of specialization of production and the division of labor. Specialized production required the prior accumulation of capital to support specialized workers until their products were ready for sale. Previous accumulation occurred through saving, and the return to capital represented the reward for saving. Karl Marx parodied this self-congratulatory thesis, arguing instead that primitive capitalist accumulation represented no more than “divorcing the producer [i.e., labor] from the means of production.” It was the process of creating the necessary capitalist institutions: private monopoly ownership of the means of production and wage labor.

Preobrazhensky sought to develop a comparable concept for capital accumulation in the Soviet Union of the 1920s. The NEP meant that private small-scale capitalist enterprises, including peasant farms, coexisted with the state's control of the “commanding heights” of the economy. To attain socialism the socialized sector had to grow more rapidly than the private sector. Preobrazhensky therefore set about to determine what institutional relations were necessary to attain this end. Primitive socialist accumulation was his answer.

As for capitalist accumulation, force would need to be the agent of primitive socialist accumulation, and it was to be applied by the revolutionary socialist state in the form of tax, price, and financial policies to expropriate the surplus value created in the private sector and transfer it to the socialist sector, thereby guaranteeing its differential growth. Under what he called “premature socialist conditions” that characterized the USSR,

Preobrazhensky recommended nonequivalent exchange, that is, the turning of the terms of trade against the peasantry and other private enterprises, as the main means to collect and transfer the surplus. During the transition, workers in socialist enterprises would experience “self-exploitation.” Over time, therefore, primitive socialist accumulation would eliminate the private sector.

Although the concept appears to be consistent with Marx’s use of it in the analysis of capitalism, Preobrazhensky’s theory was roundly criticized by Nikolai Bukharin and other Bolshevik theorists, probably because he used the term “exploitation” in prescribing a socialist economic policy.

See also: MARXISM; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PREOBRAZHENSKY, YEVGENY ALEXEYEVICH; SOCIALISM

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JAMES R. MILLAR

PRISONS

Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century monasteries and fortresses often served as prisons (*tyurma* from German *turm* = tower). The Russian prisons in about 1850 were mostly overcrowded wood buildings that had not been built for the purpose of the accommodation of prisoners, many of whom left the prisons with destroyed health. Russian authorities were more likely to use other forms of punishment, such as whipping and other corporal punishment for small offences and hard labor and exile to Siberia for serious crimes. As early as the eighteenth century there were fruitless attempts at prison reform. In 1845 the tsar compiled a new Code of Punishments that featured a hierarchy of incarcerations including preliminary prisons, strait houses, correctional prisons, and punitive prisons. According to the model of the Pentonville Prison in England, the isolation of the prisoner was viewed as a condition for his improvement.

There was no uniform prison management. Supervision was exercised by the ministry of the interior (MVD), the Department of Justice, and the respective governors. The public prosecutor’s office was responsible for the well being of the prisoners. The prison question became topical by the penal reform of April 17, 1863: Corporal punishment was deemed antiquated and prison sentences became more typical. Now for smaller offenses the punishment was up to seven days of custody. This reform led, therefore, to a quick increase of the prison population and chaos in management. In the 1860s and 1870s various committees dealt with reform of the prison system. In 1877 a newly formed committee called Grot petitioned for a new hierarchy of punishment with seven steps, from fines up to the death penalty. The prisoners were to be separated except for work details. It was suggested a Main Prison Administration (GTU) should be established within the Ministry of the Interior, to be



The towers of a makeshift mosque and Russian Orthodox chapel are visible behind inmates at a prison colony in Udarny, Russia, 2001. PHOTOGRAPH BY MAXIM MARMUR/ASSOCIATED PRESS.

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Prisoners eating in a cafeteria, Norilsk, Russia, July 1991. © DAVID TURNLEY/CORBIS

responsible for all questions of the Russian prison system. The suggestions of the Grot committee became law on February 27, 1879. At this time there were about seven hundred prisons with a capacity of 54,253 inmates, but actually 70,488 persons were housed there. In the next few decades, significant efforts were undertaken in the repair of old prisons and the construction of new ones. Between 1879 and 1905, the GTU succeeded in improving the conditions in the Russian prisons, during which time, in 1895, the GTU was transferred from the MVD to the Department of Justice. As a result of the waves of arrests after the revolution of 1905, the number of prisoners doubled from 1906 to 1908. After the February 1917 revolution the GTU was renamed the Main Administration of Places of Incarceration (GUMZ), and many prisoners who had been granted amnesty were re-arrested.

In April 1918 the new People's Commissioner's Office for Justice (NKYu) dissolved the GUMZ and formed the Central Penal Department (TsKO). Soon there developed in parallel to the activity of the

NKYu a system of places of incarceration of the VChK (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission on Struggle against Counterrevolution, Sabotage and Speculation). In the prisons of the TsKO were housed the usual criminals; the VChK was responsible for putative and real opponents of the revolution. A principal purpose of prisons was the re-education of the delinquent; accordingly the TsKO was renamed the Central Working Improvement Department (TsITO) in October 1921. Hunger was common in TsITO facilities.

In early 1922 the VChK was integrated into the People's Commissioner's Office for Internal Affairs (NKVD). On July 1, 1922, the handing over of all places of incarceration from the NKYu to the NKVD was effected and the prison management was re-organized in the Main administration of Places of Incarceration (GUMZ NKVD). Additionally, the secret police (United State Political Administration, OGPU) had prisons under its jurisdiction. In the time of the Big Terror many prisoners were in the gulag. Under the new people's commissioner,

Beriya, all prisoners able to work were removed from the prisons; in the Soviet Union after Stalin relatively few were incarcerated.

On May 7, 1956, the MVD of the USSR issued regulations for inmates, distinguishing between a "general" and an "austere" regime, the latter for prison who systematically violated regulations. On October 8, 1997, the penal enforcement system was subordinated by an Ukas of the president of the Russian Federation, moving again to the Department of Justice, where a State Administration for the Penal Enforcement (GUIN) was founded. Regardless of jurisdiction, however, the prisons continue to receive inadequate funding and, as they were in 1850, continue to be overcrowded, with inmates often afflicted with communicable diseases.

See also: GULAG; LEFORTOVO; LUBYANKA; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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GEORG WURZER

PRISON SONGS

Given Russia's vast prison population, prison songs always constituted a considerable part of popular culture. Interestingly enough, in contemporary Russian prisons themselves, prison songs are not as popular as is commonly thought. As experienced prisoners explain, if the person likes to sing, he or she may receive the nickname "Tape recorder" and may be "turned on" at any moment, meaning that anyone may ask him or her to sing at any moment for someone's pleasure. This subordinate position brings down the status of the convict who thus cannot be very popular or prestigious. But in normal life outside of prison, these songs acquired tremendous popularity starting from the second half of the twentieth century.

Contemporary prison songs originate from the older traditions of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, such as brigand songs of those in active opposition to the state and social authorities,

drawling songs of hard-labor convicts, and thieves' cant as a creature of urban environment closely related to the genre of city romance. The latter became widespread at the turn of the twentieth century due to rapid social changes and marginalization of Russian society in the years of the Revolution. The most popular song of the period, *Murka*, tells a dramatic story of an undercover policewoman killed by her criminal lover for her betrayal.

From the second half of the twentieth century, prison songs occupied a leading position in Soviet underground culture. In the 1960s the most popular bards, such as Vladimir Vysotsky, Alexander Galich, and others, attracted intelligentsia by singing prison songs, thus giving a form of expression of hidden protest against the regime. In their songs prison is associated with the state as a whole; it is implied that under this regime everyone is a convict, whether past, present, or future. Rich metaphorical content, antistate motivation, and strong heroic poetics made these songs the sign of the time when the truth about the regime became known with gulag prisoners first being rehabilitated after Stalin's death. This tradition stems from the political, not the criminal, environment and was closely connected to the dissident movement of the time.

In contrast to the dissident content of prison songs of the 1960s and 1970s, contemporary prison songs emphasize the criminal element more and are targeted at a specific audience with a clear criminal past and present. Recently these songs successfully entered the popular music industry. These songs are based on the most popular genre of contemporary prison folklore such as ballads. Most of them are "humble" songs: They aim at compassion for the lot of any marginal personality, such as thieves, prostitute, and social outcasts. Their subject is misery, tragic accident, or cruel destiny. Several verses of the ballad cover the entire life of the hero with its happiness, tears, love and betrayal, crime, and custody. Another type of song, by contrast, aims to unite people who share asocial values as a group claiming brotherhood and heroism of a few against conventional authorities.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GULAG; PRISONS

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JULIA ULYANNIKOVA

PRIVATIZATION

Privatization may be pursued with different aims in mind. The *political* aim is to break away from the past and create a new class of capitalists as quickly as possible. The *efficiency* aim is to create a better management system for the enterprises, and to set up a market environment. If this aim is dominant, it requires complex institution-building and thus precludes rapid completion of the process. Privatization may have a *financial* aim: in this case the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should be sold at their highest value so as to bring revenues to the state. Finally, an *equity* aim may involve returning property to those who had been deprived of it by the nationalization process (an aim pursued in some Central European countries), giving priority to employees for buying shares in their enterprises, or even giving away state assets to the citizens.

In Russia, privatization began in January 1992, together with the implementation of the stabilization program, and assumed the form of liberalization of small-scale trade (street vending). This "small privatization" was conducted at a quick pace in the services sector, which consisted of trade, catering, services to households, construction, individual transportation activities, and housing. It was often marred by racketeering and crime. The small-scale state enterprises (which had already been transferred to the local authorities in 1991) were sold to citizens, local entrepreneurs, and/or employees, basically through auctions. At the same time, as prices and individual activities were liberalized, it became immediately possible to create new, small-scale businesses, especially in fields where human capital was the main requirement, such as consulting, engineering, private teaching, and computer services. Actually, such activities were already privately conducted in the Soviet era within the shadow economy.

The main challenge lay in the privatization of the big SOEs, or *large-scale privatization*. The Russian government was clearly privileging the political objective, and hence opted for a quick mass privatization scheme. It also favored equity considerations, so that the people would benefit from the divestment of the state. In June 1992, the mass privatization program was adopted, and in October the voucher system was launched. All Russian citizens received 10,000 rubles' worth of privatization vouchers (equivalent then to 50 U.S. dollars), immediately redeemable in cash, or exchangeable against shares in the enterprises selected for priva-

tization that had been transformed into joint stock companies. These enterprises were sold at direct public auctions. The staff (employees and management) could opt for three variants, of which the most popular was the allocation of 51 percent of the shares to the employees at a discounted price. Seventy percent of the enterprises were thus privatized by the end of June 1994; past this deadline the vouchers were no longer valid. The second wave of large-scale privatization proceeded much more slowly and was far from complete in 2002. It had to be based upon sales to foreigners or domestic buyers. It was slowed by several factors: the Russian financial crisis of 1998, which led to a collapse of the banking sector; the scandals linked with the outcomes of the first wave, when several notorious deals evidenced the dominant role of insiders who managed to acquire large assets with very little cash; and, finally, the enormous stakes of the second wave, which involved privatization of the energy sector (oil, gas, and electricity) and the telecommunications sector.

Who owned the Russian enterprises? The most prominent owners were the oligarchs, who controlled the largest firms of the energy and raw materials sector, but who became less powerful after Boris Yeltsin's resignation in 1999. More generally, the former *nomenklatura* of the Soviet system, along with a small number of newcomers, took advantage of a privatization process lacking transparency and clear legal rules. Restructuring of enterprises and improving of corporate governance did not proceed along with the change in ownership. Privatization was close to completion in Russia as of 2002, when 75 percent of the GDP was created by the private sector. However, the private sector had yet to function according to the rules of a transparent market.

See also: ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; LIBERALISM; SHOCK THERAPY; TRANSITION ECONOMIES.

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MARIE LAVIGNE

PROCURACY

The prosecutor's office in the Russian Federation plays a pivotal role in law enforcement, including criminal investigations and prosecution, representation of the state's interests in civil disputes, supervision of the functioning of prisons and places of detention, and investigation of citizens' grievances.

The Procuracy was introduced in 1722 by Peter the Great in an effort to create a public law system similar to those in Western Europe. However, in practice, the Procuracy focused primarily on supervising the prompt and full execution of the tsar's edicts. Catherine II extended procuratorial supervision to regional and local levels, where procurators served as the "eyes of the tsar" in monitoring the activity of provincial governors and other officials. This function was widely resented by provincial governors and was eliminated by the legal reforms of 1864.

A decree of November 24, 1917, of the Council of People's Commissars abolished the Procuracy and all other tsarist legal institutions in favor of more informal control mechanisms. In 1922 the Bolshevik government reestablished the Procuracy to serve as the "eyes of the state," insuring full and complete cooperation in executing the policies of the state and the Communist Party.

During the Stalin era the Procuracy, under the leadership of Procurator-General Andrei Vyshinsky, aggressively pursued suspected opponents of Stalin's regime and secured their speedy imprisonment or execution. The Procuracy's jurisdiction was also extended to non-legal matters, such as overseeing the successful implementation of industrialization and collectivization.

After Stalin's death in 1953, the Procuracy shifted its emphasis from coercion and repression to prosecuting ordinary criminals and supervising legality in the operations of various governmental agencies. The Procuracy grew in power and prestige during the post-Stalin period. By the 1980s it employed more than 18,000 lawyers and supervised an additional 18,000 criminal investigators; together they comprised more than one-quarter of the Soviet Union's legal profession.

Prosecutors were slow in responding to Gorbachev's reforms, viewing them as a threat to their wide-ranging authority. The Procuracy managed to defend its privileged position in the Russian legal system even after the demise of the USSR. A

new "Law on the Procuracy of the Russian Federation" was enacted in 1995. The law enshrined the Procuracy as a single, unified, and centralized institution charged with "supervising the implementation of laws by local legislative and executive bodies, administrative control organs, legal entities, public organizations, and officials, as well as the lawfulness of their acts." While the Procuracy's jurisdiction remained broad, it lost power to supervise the operation of the courts, which was transferred to the Ministry of Justice.

The powers of the Procuracy have been further restricted by the new criminal procedure code, which was enacted in July 2002. According to the code, prosecutors may no longer issue search warrants or order suspects to be detained. In addition, prosecutors must appear in court to present the state's case, rather than rely on an extensive dossier compiled during the preliminary investigation. These and other restrictions were undertaken to limit the Procuracy's privileged status in criminal prosecutions, engender a more adversarial process, and elevate the status and independence of the courts.

See also: LEGAL SYSTEMS

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GORDON B. SMITH

PRODNALOG

"Food Tax."

The word *prodnalog* comes from the nouns "food" (*prodovolstvie*) and "tax" (*nalog*). It is translated as "food tax," or "tax in kind." The food tax was an instrument of state policy to collect food and was used twice during the Soviet period. The first introduction of the food tax was in 1921, during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP). During the period of war communism (1918–1921), the Soviet state used forced requisitions to confis-

cate food from peasant households. As a result of forced requisitions, peasants reduced the acreage they cultivated and the volume of food they produced. The food they produced was often hidden from the state, so the net result was national famine and starvation in the cities, which in turn led to massive de-urbanization from 1918 to 1920.

In March 1921, with the introduction of the New Economic Plan (NEP), the Communist Party changed its strategy toward the peasantry and adopted a food tax, replacing food requisitions. The food tax specified target quotas of food that were to be delivered to the state. After the delivery quota was met, any food grown by the peasantry could be used as desired—for sale through legalized private channels, for livestock, or for consumption. Delivery quotas for the food tax were established well below the levels of forced confiscation, thereby lessening the burden on peasants, providing them stability in their calculations, and giving them incentives to produce as much as they could. The result was a rebound in agricultural production by the mid-1920s. In 1924 the food tax was replaced by a monetary tax on peasant households.

The second usage of the food tax occurred in 1991. Once again, the stimulus was the state's inability to obtain sufficient food for the urban population. In 1991 the government of the Russian Republic adopted a food tax that was to be fulfilled in addition to the state order (*goszakaz*). The size of the state order averaged around 30 percent of production, and the food tax added another 40 percent. The tax was assessed on state and collective farms and other agricultural enterprises. Newly created peasant farms were exempt from the food tax. In order to enforce this tax, penalties for non-compliance consisted of monetary fines, or the withholding of fuel, machinery, and other needed inputs. However, as Communist Party strength diminished in the countryside and throughout society in 1991, penalties for noncompliance were often absent, and the food tax was not successful. It was abolished in 1992.

See also: AGRICULTURE; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PRODRAZVERSTKA

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STEPHEN K. WEGREN

PRODRAZVERSTKA

Grain requisitions from peasant households by the Soviet state during the period of war communism (1918–1921). These grain requisitions were compulsory, although official policy stated that food deliveries were to come from peasant surpluses of food. In reality, state policy took two main forms: very low prices paid to peasants for their grain, so that the requisition essentially amounted to confiscation; or outright confiscation of all the grain possessed by the peasantry, with no payment. The policy of grain requisition was used as an instrument of class warfare in the countryside, setting poor and middle peasants against rich peasants, the so-called kulaks. The policy of *prodrazverstka* was bitterly opposed by the vast majority of peasants and led to widespread violence in the countryside against the committees of poor peasants (*kombedy*) that worked for the Soviet state to seize grain that was being hoarded by peasant households. In response to the confiscation of their grain, peasant households drastically reduced the acreage cultivated and the amount of grain produced, which led to mass starvation and famine throughout the nation.

Grain requisitions were replaced with a food tax during the period of the New Economic Policy (1921–1928). However, *prodrazverstka* was reintroduced during the collectivization drive of the 1930s and expanded to include not only grains but other food commodities as well. The policy of food requisitions became an integral part of the planned economy, evolving into a system of state orders (*goszakazy*) in which state and collective farms were required to sell defined volumes of their production to state procurement agents, such as state-owned food processors, at state-regulated prices. State orders remained in effect until the end of the Soviet Union.

See also: AGRICULTURE; PEASANTRY; PRODNALOG

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PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT

A Production Sharing Agreement is made between two or more independent enterprises and/or government agencies that specifies the way in which and for what period of time the signatories will share in the output of a particular commodity.

The production sharing agreement (PSA) offers an alternative to the joint venture as a way for two or more economic entities to collaborate on the development and production of a commodity. Russian officials and business entrepreneurs have been reluctant to allow foreign firms to acquire direct ownership and managerial control over domestic resources and firms. The Russian government has also been reluctant to privatize valuable domestic resources completely, especially with respect to oil and gas reserves and companies. The PSA is the principal way for foreign firms to invest in Russia and for the Russian government to maintain a degree of control over valuable resources. Under a standard form of PSA, the entity that invests in a development project is the first to capture the investment from revenues generated by the forthcoming output.

The Russian Duma has been reluctant to condone foreign ownership, or, in some cases, even foreign participation in the economy. Legislation governing PSAs was not passed in the Duma until late 1998 under the government of Yevgeny Primakov. In certain fields PSAs must be approved by the Duma. In the oil and gas industries, the PSA is the single most important form of collaboration between the government and the oil companies and with foreign oil and gas companies as well.

See also: FOREIGN TRADE; PRIMAKOV, YEVGENY MAXIMOVICH

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JAMES R. MILLAR

PROKOFIEV, SERGEI SERGEYEVICH

(1891–1953), composer and pianist, one of the most important figures of the early Russian modernism, later of Socialist Realism.

Sergei Sergeyevich Prokofiev studied at the Petersburg conservatory from 1904 to 1914. By 1915 he was already one of the outstanding figures of modern Russian music. In his early works, Prokofiev employed new modes of expression while audibly referring to the musical language of the late nineteenth century. Prokofiev followed various stylistic courses. He was known as a radical exponent of provocative new music and also distinguished himself through his neoclassical experiments. Later he would be known precisely for his synthesis of the unusual and the familiar, of complexity and simplicity, of constructive rationality and melodious emotionalism.

In 1918, hoping for greater artistic perspectives, Prokofiev left Russia for the United States. After mixed experiences there, he left in 1922 to settle in Paris. Prokofiev was not a “classical” emigrant: He assumed Soviet citizenship in 1924 and often travelled to the Soviet Union to give concerts. Finally, in 1936, the artist returned to Russia with his family. His decision can be attributed to a deep longing for his home country, a diffuse sympathy for the political developments there, a marked interest in the privileged position of an exceptional artist in the Soviet state, and a sense of invulnerability. It was not difficult for Prokofiev to fulfil the ideological standards of “Socialist Realism,” given the melodious simplicity of his work. He had long ago given up his futuristic inclinations and instead tried to realize a new rhythmic-motoric, tonally tense, poignant style. Yet in 1948 even Prokofiev was severely criticized by the Soviet government, which perceived “formalistic distortions and anti-democratic tendencies” in the works of leading Soviet composers. Prokofiev criticized himself, and until his death (on the same day as Stalin’s) he attempted to reconcile his own stylistic conceptions with the party line.

See also: MUSIC; SOCIALIST REALISM

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MATTHIAS STADELMANN

PROKOPOVICH, FEOFAN

(1681–1736), prelate, philosopher, writer, and liaison between the Russian Orthodox Church and Protestantism.

Born to a merchant family in Kiev but orphaned early, Feofan received an education at the Kiev Academy, one of the few institutions for ecclesiastical education at the time. Like other gifted students of the time, he nominally converted to the Uniate (Eastern Catholic) faith in order to qualify for studies in Rome—in his case, at a Jesuit institution, the College of St. Athanasius. In 1701 he left Rome, imbued with a profound animosity toward Catholicism and, his critics would later charge, uncritical fondness for Protestantism. In any case, in 1702 he returned to Kiev with an exceptionally strong training in philosophy and theology. After repudiating his Catholic faith of convenience, he embarked on a brilliant career in the Russian Orthodox Church. He first made his mark at the Kiev Academy, where he became not only its rector but also a prolific writer, his works including a five-act “tragicomedy” *Vladimir* that ridiculed paganism and superstition. In 1709, in the presence of Peter, he delivered a sermon celebrating the Russian victory at Poltava; such perorations caught the emperor’s eye, earned him a summons to St. Petersburg, and led to his elevation to the episcopate (first in 1718 as the bishop of Pskov, and then in 1720 as archbishop of Novgorod).

During these years Feofan became one of Peter’s more erudite ideologists and propagandists. Drawing upon European political theory and exalting the just and creative power of the ruler, Feofan was a principal architect of Peter’s new conception of dynamic autocracy. Feofan played a key role in composing a number of state documents, from the “Preface” to the *Naval Charter* (1719) to the famous *Truth about the Monarch’s Will* (1722), defending Peter’s right—and duty—to override custom and designate the most qualified person as his successor. Feofan also served as a key liaison with the Protestant world, reinforcing the suspicions of contemporaries and impelling Orthodox historians to dismiss him as a mere “Protestant.” By far his most important work was the *Ecclesiastical Regulation* (1721), drafted at Peter’s behest. Significantly, this critical document—which served as the institutional charter of the Russian Church until 1917—contained much more than a mere justification of Peter’s decision to replace the patriarchate with a collegial board (first called the

Spiritual College but renamed the Holy Synod). Namely, the *Ecclesiastical Regulation* adumbrated an ambitious program to bring enlightenment and extinguish superstition in the Church, chiefly by improving ecclesiastical administration, establishing seminaries to educate parish clergy, and extirpating superstition among the laity. Feofan played a key role in the new Synodal administration and, simultaneously, authored several important works, including a treatise on the patriarchate, a catechism, and a tract critical of monasticism.

Peter’s death in 1725 initially left Feofan vulnerable to a concerted attack by conservatives, but in 1730 the astute prelate once again gained favor by siding with the new monarch, Anna, against a coterie of magnates seeking to limit her authority. He thus enjoyed considerable influence in church affairs until his death on September 8, 1736.

See also: HOLY SYNOD; PETER I; PROTESTANTISM

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GREGORY L. FREEZE

PROLETKULT

An acronym for “proletarian cultural-educational organizations,” Proletkult was a loosely structured cultural organization that first took shape in Petrograd (now St. Petersburg) a few days before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. It began as a loose coalition of clubs, factory committees, workers’ theaters, and educational societies devoted to the cultural needs of the working class. By 1918, when the organization held its first organizational conference under Soviet power, it had expanded into a national movement with a much more ambitious purpose: to define a unique proletarian culture that would inform and inspire revolutionary Russian society.

The Proletkult’s most important theorist was a left-wing Bolshevik intellectual named Alexander

Bogdanov. Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Bogdanov emerged as an articulate critic of Vladimir Lenin. Bogdanov contended that in order for a proletarian revolution to succeed, the working class had to develop its own ideology and proletarian intelligentsia to take and wield power. His insistence on working-class autonomy put him at odds with Lenin's interpretation of revolutionary change. Bogdanov's influence was clearly evident in the Proletkult's political stance; its leaders insisted that the organization remain separate from government cultural agencies and the Communist Party.

At its peak in the fall of 1920, the Proletkult claimed a mass following of almost half a million people spread over three hundred local groups. These figures must be viewed with caution because they cannot be verified by existing records. Moreover, they imply a kind of cohesion that the organization did not possess during the chaotic years of the Russian civil war (1917–1922), when the Bolshevik regime was fought for its survival. Certainly, not all participants understood that they were supposed to be creating original forms of proletarian culture. Probably even fewer were aware of the national leadership's demand for independence from the Soviet state and Communist Party.

Much of the organization's work during the Civil War continued the activities of prerevolutionary adult education schools called People's Homes (*narodnye doma*) and people's universities. Proletkult participants took part in literacy and foreign language classes, as well as lectures on current events and recent scientific achievements. They also attended musical concerts, plays, and readings offered by professional artists. In addition, the organization sponsored classes in music, literature, and the visual arts. A number of important artists from middle- and upper-class backgrounds took part in the Proletkult's many workshops, including the symbolist writer Andrew Bely, and the avant-garde painter Olga Rozanova. Some came for the salary and rations that teaching positions provided. Others found a sympathetic environment for artistic experimentation. The future film director Sergei Eisenstein, for example, transformed the First Workers' Theater in Moscow into one of the nation's most inventive stages.

Proletkult studios nurtured new talent, such as the actress Judith Glizer, who went on to a very successful theatrical and film career. However, the best-known proletarian artists associated with the Proletkult had already begun their creative work

before the Revolution. Writers were particularly prevalent. The poetry, plays, and stories of authors such as Vladimir Kirillov, Michael Gerasimov, and Paul Bessalko formed the creative center of Proletkult publications. Eventually they left the organization to form an influential writers' circle called The Smithy (*Kuznitsy*), which was an important contributor to debates on the place of art in Soviet society during the 1920s.

Although much of the Proletkult's work was on a rudimentary educational level, its demands for autonomy put it on a collision course with the Communist Party. In December 1920, Lenin issued a devastating critique of the organization, attacking not only its independence but also the very idea of a unique proletarian culture. In short order, the Proletkult was made into a subsection of the governmental cultural agency, the Commissariat of Enlightenment. In an attempt to stabilize the economy after the conclusion of the Civil War, the government slashed funds for all cultural projects. These steps drastically reduced the organization's size and influence.

During the 1920s, the Proletkult continued to operate on a small scale in Moscow, Leningrad, and a few provincial cities. In the creative arts, it was overshadowed by newer professional organizations, such as the Proletarian Writers' Union, which claimed to represent workers' cultural interests. Instead, the organization invested most of its energy in providing services to trade union clubs. During the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), it saw a brief period of growth. However, in April 1932, the Communist Party summarily closed down the Proletkult along with all other cultural associations that assumed special ties to workers. From now on, the Communist Party decreed, Soviet artistic works had to appeal to all social classes, not just the proletariat. The Proletkult's final demise marked an important step on the path to socialist realism.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH

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LYNN MALLY

PROPP, VLADIMIR IAKOVLEVICH

(1895–1970), folklorist, best known for *Morphology of the Folktale*, a structuralist analysis and fundamental work on the theory of narrative.

Vladimir Iakovlevich Propp was born and educated in St. Petersburg, where he received a degree in philology. After teaching Russian and German for a short time, he concentrated exclusively on folklore, chairing the Folklore Department of Leningrad State University from 1863 to 1964.

Morphology of the Folktale (1928) was an attempt to reduce all folktales to one structure. Dissatisfied with the classification system in the *Aarne-Thompson Tale Type Index*, Propp proposed a different tale unit, a plot element he called the function. He found that all the tales in Alexander N. Afanasev's *Russkie narodnye skazki* (Russian fairy tales) had the same thirty-one functions appearing in the same order, and that the actors in the tales could be reduced to a *dramatis personae* of seven. *Morphology of the Folktale* became known in the West through Claude Lévi-Strauss, who criticized Propp's construct and favored a different approach, and Alan Dundes, who showed that it applied beyond European tales.

Propp's next book, *The Historical Roots of the Magic Tale* (1946), sought to show that folktales originated in ritual, especially initiation and funeral rites. In 1948, along with other Soviet scholars, Propp came under official attack. His *Morphology* was criticized for being too formalist, and his *Historical Roots* was said to be too dependent on Western scholarship and too willing to place Russian narrative in a global context. While he was never arrested and retained his university position, Propp shifted his focus, and his *Russian Heroic Epic* (1958) is a more Marxist interpretation, linking epic to stages of socioeconomic development. In his final major work, *Russian Agrarian Holidays* (1963), Propp returned to his earlier methodology and elucidated common elements in calendrical ritual.

See also: FOLKLORE

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PROSTITUTION

Until the mid-eighteenth century, Russian authorities treated prostitution as a crime against morality and public decorum, and enacted laws and decrees to keep prostitutes invisible and isolated. Nevertheless, contemporary observers often remarked the presence of prostitutes in Moscow and, by the early eighteenth century, in the new capital of St. Petersburg. In the late 1700s prostitutes became regarded more as sources of venereal disease, and policies changed accordingly. The first attempts to reduce the medical danger associated with prostitutes took place during the reign of Catherine the Great, with the designation of a hospital in St. Petersburg for their confinement.

The nineteenth century brought the rise of a system of medical and police regulation to control prostitutes in terms of both their public behavior and the threat they represented to public health. In 1843 Tsar Nicholas I's minister of internal affairs subjected prostitution to surveillance based on a European model of inscription, inspection, and incarceration. Ministry guidelines called for licensing brothels, registering streetwalkers, regular medical examinations for women identified as prostitutes, and compulsory hospitalization for those apparently suffering from venereal disease. Prostitution remained officially illegal, but the ministry's regulations superseded the law so long as prostitutes registered their trade and brothels were under police supervision. Thus, medical-police regulation was in place even before Russia's serfs had been emancipated and before Russia's cities grew in response to policies promoting industrialization in the late nineteenth century.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Russia's burgeoning civil society considered both prostitu-

tion and its regulation major social and political problems. Physicians, jurists, feminists, socialists, temperance advocates, philanthropists, and elected local authorities seized on this issue to advance their political agendas and to aid working-class women. Nonetheless, despite charges that regulation fostered police corruption, oppressed women from the lower classes, and made little sense in light the lack of an effective cure for venereal diseases and the lack of controls over prostitutes' clients, medical-police surveillance remained official policy until the Provisional Government that emerged in February 1917 declared its abolition. The Bolsheviks also rejected regulation, heeding its critics and, like other socialist theorists, considering prostitution a transient symptom of industrial capitalism.

Prostitution, however, did not disappear during the Soviet era; it remained a viable source of income and favors. During the Civil War of 1917–1922, authorities were known to treat prostitutes as “labor deserters,” but a more laissez-faire attitude emerged during the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1921–1928), with its toleration of private trade. Under the presumption that prostitutes could be rehabilitated through manual labor, the Soviet government dispatched former prostitutes to sanitariums and made a distinction between prostitutes, who were regarded as victims, and other individuals who profited from the sex trade. Yet authorities still associated prostitutes with disease and disorder; repression became the practice once NEP ended. Soviet officials claimed that prostitution disappeared, but it simply went underground, prosecuted under categories pertaining to labor desertion and illegal income.

Not until the 1980s, during the relative openness of Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure, was prostitution again acknowledged as a social problem. Economic instability, persistent gender inequality, and prostitution's attraction as a source of income all combined to increase the numbers of prostitutes in late- and post-Soviet Russia. Correspondingly, some municipal authorities resurrected regulation, presuming that it would prevent the spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.

See also: FEMINISM; GLASNOST

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LAURIE BERNSTEIN

PROTAZANOV, YAKOV ALEXANDROVIC

(1881–1945), film director.

A highly successful moviemaker both before and after the revolutions of 1917, Yakov Alexandrovich Protazanov began his career in 1907 as an actor and scriptwriter, becoming a director in 1911. In 1913 he and Vladimir Gardin co-directed the biggest box-office sensation of early Russian cinema, *The Keys to Happiness*, based on Anastasia Verbitskaya's best-selling novel.

Protazanov was the master of the cinematic melodrama. While he preferred to adapt his screenplays from popular literature, he also scored major hits with classics like *War and Peace* (1915), *The Queen of Spades* (1916), and *Father Sergius* (1918). His last Russian “sensation” before he emigrated to France in 1920 was *Satan Triumphant* (1917), which Soviet critics considered the epitome of bourgeois decadence.

Protazanov quickly established himself in the West and made six pictures before he returned to Soviet Russia in 1923. He worked for Mezhrabpom-Rus, a quasi-independent company that focused on profits as well as politics. Protazanov's skillfully made, highly entertaining, and superficially politicized blockbusters gave the studio the profits it needed to support the more revolutionary (but less profitable) work of young Soviet filmmakers like Vsevolod Pudovkin.

Protazanov's most important Soviet movies were *Aelita* (1924), *His Call* (1925), *The Tailor from Torzhok* (1925), *The Case of the Three Million* (1926), *The Forty-First* (1927), and *Don Diego and Pelageia*

(1928). Throughout the 1920s, Protazanov displayed a finely tuned talent for social satire. He also introduced talented actors such as Nikolai Batalov, Igor Ilinsky, Anatoly Ktorov, and Yulia Solntseva to the Soviet screen.

Satire was definitely out of favor in the political climate of the 1930s. In the final decade of his long career in the movies, Protazanov marshalled his skills as an actor's director to make "realist" movies, returning to the classics for his most notable success, *Without a Dowry* (1937). Protazanov's history is one of the more remarkable survival tales in Soviet cinema.

See also: MOTION PICTURES; VERBITSKAYA, ANASTASIA ALEXEYEVNA

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DENISE J. YOUNGBLOOD

PROTESTANTISM

Protestantism originally derived from the sixteenth-century Reformation movement begun in western Europe by Martin Luther and John Calvin.

The Reformation, the movement that gave rise to Protestantism, was particular to western Christendom. Russia, as a part of eastern Orthodox Christendom, never experienced an analogous development. Consequently Protestantism in Russia was an imported phenomenon rather than an indigenous product.

Two forms of Protestantism in Russia can be identified. The older form was introduced to Russia by European non-Russian ethnic groups. A later form emerged in the nineteenth century when ethnically Slavic people embraced teachings of European Protestants. Converts to the older form comprised people who moved at various times from Europe to Russia or who were conquered by Russian western expansion. Converts to the later form derived from missionary activity among Russians in the aftermath of the Alexandrine reforms of the

mid-nineteenth century that produced groups who were variously called Shtundists, Baptists, Evangelical Christians, Adventists, and, in the twentieth century, Pentecostals.

Protestantism entered Muscovy during the reign of Ivan IV. Initially viewing Protestants favorably, the tsar permitted building two Protestant churches, one Lutheran and one Calvinist, in Moscow. But he came to view Protestantism as heretical and in 1579 ordered both churches destroyed. Protestantism was relegated to an enclave outside the city that came to be known as the "German suburb."

Russia's Protestant population grew in the eighteenth century when Russia conquered Estonia and Latvia, where many Lutherans lived, and when German colonists of Lutheran and Mennonite persuasions settled in south Russia at the invitation of Catherine II. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Protestant notions received some high-level support from Emperor Alexander I, who was fascinated with German pietism.

Only in the aftermath of the abolition of serfdom did Protestantism win substantial adherents within the Slavic population of Russia. This was the result of preaching activity—in St. Petersburg by the English Lord Radstock and in the Caucasus by Baltic Baptists—and of the influence of German colonists in the Ukraine. Russian Protestantism was institutionalized in the Russian Baptist Union in 1884. The official response to this development was expressed in harsh persecution predicated on Chief Procurator Konstantin Pobedonostev's declaration, "there are not, and there cannot be, any Russian Baptists."

Protestants benefited from the tsarist declaration of religious tolerance of 1905 and even more from the Bolshevik declaration of separation of church and state of 1917. By 1929 there were up to one million Protestants in the Soviet Union, less than 1 percent of the population.

Communist antireligious policy limited legal protestant activity between 1929 and 1989 to one formally recognized structure, the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB), and scattered autonomous congregations of such denominations as Lutherans and Methodists, primarily in the Baltic republics, and German Baptists in Siberia. AUCECB claimed to comprise five thousand protestant congregations.

After 1991, Protestants expanded their activity within Russian society. At the end of 2000 the Russian Ministry of Justice reported that there were about 3,800 officially registered Protestant congregations in Russia, out of more than 20,000 religious organizations in the Russian Federation. These included 1,500 congregations of Baptists, 1,300 Pentecostals, 560 Adventists, and 200 Lutherans. Sociological surveys estimated that Protestants, at approximately one million, constituted about two-thirds of one percent of the total population of the Russian Federation.

See also: CATHOLICISM; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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PAUL D. STEEVES

PROPOPOV, ALEXANDER DMITRIEVICH

(1866–1918), minister of the interior, 1916–1918.

A member of an upper-class family, mentioned in Russian historical records from mid-sixteenth century, Alexander Dmitrievich Protopopov had an honorable, if not distinguished, career in the *zemstvo* (local self-government), and he also served in the third and fourth Duma, indeed as vice president from 1914. A left-wing Octobrist by party affiliation, Protopopov was active in the formation of the Progressive Bloc of deputies. His appointment as minister of the interior in September 1916 was not inappropriate, and it could even be considered as an effort by Nicholas II to go beyond narrow court circle and extreme rightist ideologies. Yet it proved to be a total disaster for two reasons: It foregrounded Protopopov's connection with the notorious Rasputin, and it coincided with the onset of mental illness. The emperor wanted to dismiss his new minister, but he was blocked by the empress,

the chief protectress of all connected with Rasputin. And so, in the words of one historian, "a man verging on insanity remained at the head of the Ministry of Interior until the Revolution. This case gives the measure of the decadence of the bureaucratic system."

See also: NICHOLAS II; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH

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NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The Provisional Government is most often remembered for its weakness and its inability to prevent the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 or to manage the mass movements that ensured the victory of Vladimir Lenin. The experience and meaning of the Provisional Government are not well understood, however, and indeed the same might be said for the February Revolution as a whole. Certain basic facts about the Provisional Government should be stated at the outset. It was the product of a long and intricate process of prerevolutionary party and parliamentary politics that came to a head during World War I just prior to the outbreak of the revolution. It was a government that went through several transformations, from a largely liberal cabinet to a coalition of liberals, socialists, and populists, and finally to a crisis-driven statist cabinet led by Alexander Kerensky that barely could express its moderately socialist ideological underpinnings.

The Provisional Government was formed during the February days as a result of negotiations between the Temporary Duma Committee and the Petrograd Soviet. The Provisional Government was in fact an executive authority, or cabinet, headed by a minister president, that governed through the inherited ministerial apparatus of the old regime. It had legislative authority as well. Although the Provisional Government claimed power and the mantle of legitimacy, it was never clear during its brief eight-month existence whether this legitimacy

derived from the Revolution or from inherited continuities of power or a mixture of the two. The first Provisional Government was clearly a product of the old regime Duma and its factional politics. But the new government chose not to base its authority on a Duma elected under prerevolutionary laws (its leadership, in any case, did not want to share power with certain Duma eminences and parties), and in official terms, at least, the Duma was pushed to the sidelines with no official status in the new governing structures (though it did continue to operate during 1917).

The First Provisional Government cabinet consisted largely of Cadets (Andrei Shingarev, Paul Miliukov), but it included Progressists (Mikhail Tereshchenko), Octobrists (Alexander Guchkov), and one nominal Socialist Revolutionary, Alexander Kerensky. The minister president was Prince Georgy Lvov, a romantic activist who had made his mark during the war as head of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos and Towns and the Red Cross. As minister of foreign affairs, Miliukov stood firmly on the side of the Allies in their demand for Russia's continued participation in the war. Miliukov believed in the war aims of the tsar's government because he championed the state above all (albeit a rule-of-law state) and detested German authoritarianism and imperialism, so it was no leap to continue fighting alongside the democratic Western powers. Guchkov, as minister of war, shared this view and attempted to stave off what turned out to be a mass army mutiny during the course of 1917.

The first Provisional Government enunciated its revolutionary program in a declaration on March 8. The primary goal was to establish the rule of law and representative government based upon universal suffrage, self-government, and breaking the traditional power of the bureaucracy and police. The declaration also called for freedom of conscience and religion, reform of the judiciary and education, and lifting of the onerous restrictions upon the empire's nationalities. The final form of Russia's statehood was to be determined at a Constituent Assembly. The Provisional Government, in its various cabinets, tried to attain these goals. However, the revolution was unforgiving and the range of problems was so great that the government found itself adopting statist positions as it tried to maintain authority, prepare for the late spring offensive promised to the Allies, and adjudicate the multitude of social and political demands unleashed by the revolution.

Continuation of the war brought on the first government power crisis in April, and this led to the formation of the first of a series of coalition cabinets that included socialist ministers from the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary parties. Effective Bolshevik propaganda and use of symbolic fields of discourse for revolutionary ends made these more moderate socialists, now co-opted within the boundaries of power, look responsible for the deepening crisis in every sphere of public life. The Provisional Government implemented reforms in self-government, labor relations, and the judiciary. It established a grain monopoly and set the stage for many subsequent Bolshevik administrative and economic policies. Thus it was hardly a "bourgeois" government, but it was made to look so. Perhaps its greatest domestic failures were its inability to solve the land question on short notice and in the midst of revolution and, of course, its weak and perhaps idealistic approach to modern nationalism and the explosive new desires of the empire's non-Russians for self-determination. Its efforts in these and other areas were inadequate to stem the revolutionary tide.

The government finally collapsed under the strange leadership of Alexander Kerensky. A Socialist Revolutionary, he came to power in July in the midst of what turned out to be a failed military offensive. His leadership was marked by ill-conceived adventurism (the Kornilov Affair) and a clear desire to act as and represent himself as an executive strong man.

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; KERENSKY, ALEXANDER FYODOROVICH; KORNILOV AFFAIR; OCTOBER REVOLUTION

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DANIEL ORLOVSKY

PRUSSIA, RELATIONS WITH

Tracing Russia's relations with Prussia is complicated by the fact that Prussia only slowly took shape as a nation. A reasonable starting point is during the reign of Peter the Great and the Great Northern War fought with Sweden for supremacy in northern Europe. King Frederick I sympathized with the Russians but could not afford financially to open hostilities; he moreover was distracted by the wars to his west involving most of Europe against Louis XIV of France. In 1714, Prussia felt compelled to enter the Northern War when Charles XII of Sweden attacked the fortress of Stralsund on Prussia's border. At the end of the war, Prussia, with Russia's blessings, acquired both banks of the lower Oder River and the first-class port city of Stettin.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, relations deteriorated considerably. Frederick II embarked on a major war with Austria for Silesia. The Russian Empress, Elizabeth, sided with Austria and her armies inflicted severe defeats on Prussia in 1758–1759. Upon her death in 1762, Peter III ascended to the throne and as a great admirer of Frederick, withdrew Russia from the war. Partly as a result of this move, Peter was soon assassinated and replaced by Catherine the Great. Catherine and Frederick, with the collusion of Empress Maria Theresa of Austria, were able to agree on taking territory from the extraordinarily weak state of Poland. The result was that by 1795, Poland ceased to exist to the aggrandizement of the three powers. Henceforth, Russia and Prussia would have a mutual interest in the suppression of the Poles.

The Napoleonic wars drew Russia and Prussia closer, both being the victims of Bonaparte's ambitions. When Prussia signed an alliance with Napoleon in 1812, King Frederick William III assured Emperor Alexander I, that, if war came, Prussia's participation would be purely nominal. The next year, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Britain pledged not to conclude a separate peace with France. At the Congress of Vienna, Russia and Prussia supported their respective claims to Poland and Saxony, something that provoked an alliance of Britain, Austria, and France. The crisis passed when Russia accepted about half of Poland and Prussia took two-fifths of Saxony. One of the most important consequences of the Napoleonic wars was a conviction on the part of the Prussians that they owed their national survival to Russia.

The Polish issue flared again in 1830, this time in revolution. After some negotiations, Emperor Nicholas I launched a full-scale invasion. The Poles appealed without success for Austrian aid but they knew there was no point looking to Prussia. As Russian arms triumphed, Poles who fled into Prussia were disarmed and returned to Russian forces.

At the same time the "eastern question," that is, the fate of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, became central to Russian foreign policy. This led eventually to the Crimean War but Prussia played little role in the initial stages of the affair. Nicholas went so far in 1833 as to inform the Prussians that they need not concern themselves with Near Eastern matters.

However, the revolutions of 1848 strained the relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg. Nicholas was the ultimate supporter of legitimacy and he was irritated when King Frederick William IV retained the constitution he had accepted, Nicholas believed, under duress. Nicholas also disliked his brother-in-law's sympathy for the national aspirations of German liberals. The animosity came to a head in 1848 over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. These two states rebelled against Danish rule and sought admission into the German confederation. Prussia sent its army to drive out the Danes and Nicholas saw this as an affront to the order established by the Congress of Vienna. He threatened war if Prussia did not speedily withdraw its troops. By 1850, the matter was settled and the Danes enjoyed a complete victory. Even worse, Nicholas and Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria forced Prussia to drop its proposal for a Prussian-led union of the German peoples.

The Crimean War did much to ease this antagonism. Of all the powers, Prussia was the only one who did not actively fight or criticize the Russians. On the other hand, all but Austria went to war with Russia. If conflict should flare between Prussia and Austria, the former could reasonably assume Russia's position would not be a repeat of 1850. Such was the thinking of Prussia's new minister president, Otto von Bismarck. While serving as Prussia's ambassador to St. Petersburg, Bismarck went out of his way to ingratiate himself with his hosts. In 1863, the year after Bismarck came to power in Berlin, he actively cooperated with the Russians in repressing yet another Polish uprising.

When he provoked war with Austria in 1866, he did not even need to consult the Russians beforehand so certain he was of their support.

In 1868, two years before Bismarck completed the unification of Germany through a war with France, he ensured himself of Russian support. Specifically, Alexander II promised that if Prussia and France went to war, he would mobilize 100,000 men on the Austrian border to ensure that Vienna could not intervene on the side of France. Thus Russia played an important role in the Prussian-led unification of Germany. And Russia would pay a high price for this in 1914–1918.

See also: GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; GREAT NORTHERN WAR; POLAND; SEVEN YEARS' WAR; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF; WORLD WAR I

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heavily on an uprising of the Balkan Christians in Wallachia and Moldavia to redress the numerical imbalance. However, Wallachian support did not materialize, leaving the Russian armies without crucial supplies and reinforcements.

The fighting raged from July 9–11. The Russian situation quickly became critical because Peter had earlier sent the Russian cavalry to the Ottoman rear for the purpose of capturing or destroying Ottoman supplies. The outnumbered Russian infantry made a stand at Stanelishte on the banks of the Pruth without cavalry support. The Russians were completely surrounded by the larger Turkish force. Short of food and water, and with no possibility of breaking through the encircling Ottoman forces, the Russians opened negotiations.

The Treaty of Pruth was signed July 12, 1711, between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The treaty dictated that Russia give up the fortresses of Azov and Taganrog, lose its permanent ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, and dismantle both its forts on the lower Dnieper and its Black Sea fleet. In addition, Russian troops were to leave Poland and King Charles XII of Sweden would be permitted to return to Sweden without Russian interference. In return, the defeated Russian army received the right to retreat unhindered to Russian territory. The effect of this treaty was to nullify the military gains Peter had accrued against the Ottoman Empire throughout his reign.

See also: PETER I; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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PRUTH RIVER, CAMPAIGN AND TREATY OF

The Campaign of Pruth River was the Russian response to a declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire in November 1710. By June 1711, the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal Count Boris Sheremetev and Tsar Peter the Great arrived at the Pruth River in Ottoman territory. The Russians had about 38,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry. The Ottoman forces, led by Grand Vizier Baltadji Mehmed Pasha, numbered about 120,000 infantry and 80,000 cavalry. Peter was counting

PSKOV JUDICIAL CHARTER

The Pskov Judicial Charter consists of 120 articles. The preamble states that the Charter was copied from charters of Grand Prince Alexander and Prince Constantine. Most scholars believe the Charter dates back to Alexander Mikhailovich of Tver' (prince of Pskov between 1327 and 1337). Later additions were made by Alexander of Rostov (governed sporadically between 1410 and 1434) and Constantine Dmitrievich (served three times as

prince between 1407 and 1414) with further redactions made in 1462 and 1474–1475. The Charter notes that the provisions were blessed by the priests of the five cathedrals in a meeting of the assembly (*veche*) in 1397, but the fifth cathedral was not founded until 1462. In 1397 Novgorod and Pskov concluded an “eternal peace,” and it is possible that a redaction was made to formalize Pskov’s independence, which existed *de facto* since 1348. Article 108 stipulates that only the *veche* may make changes in the Charter.

Princes played important roles in judicial proceedings, particularly for theft, and received judicial fines for such crimes as murder. The prince, mayor (*posadnik*), and Novgorodian archbishop all had independent courts. The prince and the mayor had to hold joint courts in the prince’s quarters and not in the *veche*. The Charter consistently admonishes the courts to kiss the cross, judge justly, protect the innocent, and condemn the guilty. Mayors, before leaving office, must conclude all litigation on their docket.

The Charter provides for the death penalty for robbery within the central fortress, stealing horses, treason, or arson. Execution is also mandated for the third offense of theft within the *posad*, the area outside the fortress. The Council of Lords (*gosпода*), the highest administrative and judicial body, decided conflicts over land and forests, and could direct litigants to settle their dispute by duel (trial by combat). Duels were utilized for a wide variety of cases and could end in the death of one of the parties. The old and the weak, the clergy, and women could hire substitutes to fight a man, but duels were permitted between women. Duels were also common in later Muscovite law, despite the opposition of the Church to such practice.

Written and physical evidence and eyewitness testimony were important, as was the kissing of the cross and the giving of oaths, which carried great weight in judicial proceedings. In property disputes, four or five witnesses might be called to testify, but absent such corroborating witnesses, the taking of an oath was sufficient to exonerate a defendant.

The Charter offered certain protections to craftsmen, the poor, and women. A master craftsman had the right to sue for unpaid wages. Even indentured laborers (singular, *zakupen*) and herdsmen could sue for their property or grain before the Council of Lords. A widow whose husband died without leaving a last will had the usufruct of the

property, unless she remarried. Women could inherit property and leave behind their own wills. The Charter enjoined children to feed their parents, or forfeit their rights to an inheritance.

The Charter gives particular attention to tenant farmers (*izorniki*), who could contest the claims of their lords over loans. Lords were required to produce as many as four or five witnesses to support their claims. Tenant farmers, gardeners, and fishermen could not leave their villages except on St. Philip’s Fast (November 14), a provision that anticipated the limitations imposed on peasant movement in the Muscovite Law Code (*sudebnik*) of 1497. Conflicts over tenant farmers who left their villages legally, or lords who terminated their contracts with a farmer, were resolved by each receiving one-half of the harvest. Lords could recover their loans by seizing the property of tenant farmers who fled illegally. The Charter also provided for inheritance rights of tenant farmers, while it protected a lord’s right to recover his loans.

The Charter outlines the duties of bailiffs and their fee schedules. Court procedure required only the two litigants to appear in court to speak for themselves. Women and children, along with monks, nuns, the elderly, and the deaf could have spokesmen. Mayors in particular were forbidden from supporting claimants in court.

The Charter also carefully delineates procedures concerning suits over loans, collateral guarantees, and interest payments, all of which reflect the commercial character of the city. It allowed master craftsmen to sue their apprentices over the cost of their training. Creditors and debtors retained their rights to sue one another over their agreements. Many of these cases would appear before the Council of Lords. There are also provisions regulating brawls that broke out at feasts. Each fraternity (*bratchina*), an association perhaps of craftsmen, had jurisdiction over its own members.

See also: NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; POSADNIK

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PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES

Public opinion research had a long and checkered career in Soviet times, alternately encouraged then frowned upon from the 1950s through the 1980s. After the fall of the Communist Party and dissolution of the Soviet Union, attitudinal research began to play a much more important role in public life in Russia (as elsewhere in the former USSR). The Moscow-based All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM)—renamed the All-Russian Center under the same acronym—continued its existence, now as a quasi-state body. But the monopoly held mostly by VTsIOM and sociologists working at the Academy of Sciences (AN) had already been broken in the late 1980s with the establishment of new, private polling firms.

Among the first of these independent companies was Vox Populi (headed by Boris Grushin, formerly at VTsIOM); ROMIR (directed by Yelena Bashkirova, formerly a researcher at the AN's Institute of Sociology [ISAN]); and CESSI (directed by Vladimir Andreyenkov, former chief of methodology at ISAN). The Center for Human Values—also staffed by former ISAN researchers—and Moscow State University also conduct public opinion research.

As public opinion studies became more important in the political and social life of the country, these companies had to evolve as well. Their practices changed to meet world standards. Sampling methodology, interviewing techniques, and data workup all rose in quality to satisfy the demands of both domestic and, increasingly, foreign clients. The number of primary and secondary sampling units, and sampling points, often tripled or quadrupled in order to provide greater variance. Interviewing through self-administered questionnaires—standard in Soviet times—gave way to face-to-face interviews in the homes or workplaces of respondents. Data entry and weighting improved substantially also.

Other offshoots of ISAN or VTsIOM, such as INDEM, headed by Georgy Satarov, and the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), with Alexander Oslon in charge, played a second role. As Russian presidents Boris Yeltsin and especially Vladimir Putin increasingly took public opinion into account in deciding domestic policy, they turned to experts like Satarov, Grushin, and Oslon for counsel.

Public opinion research in Russia today takes many forms. Most common is the nationwide survey of adult Russians chosen by random sampling.

A typical sample size is 1,500 to 2,000 adults, but some samples are larger. Other polls are of elites only, with much smaller samples drawn from political leaders (in the government or in parties) at the central and local level; state economic managers and private entrepreneurs; military officers; media figures; and members of the cultural and scientific intelligentsia. A third form of research involves (typically) 8 to 10 focus groups, in 3 to 5 cities; these small groups (usually of 8 to 12 people) of predetermined composition discuss in depth one or two important issues in an agenda set by the research firm and its client.

Many research firms disseminate their poll results widely—in newspapers or their own publications, through news agencies, and on television. Even more important, several have their own Web sites and put up current (and archived) poll results. Unfortunately, much information about sample sizes, dates of interviewing, and margins of sampling error are not usually given in popular citations of the research, severely limiting the usefulness of the findings.

See also: DEMOCRATIZATION; ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; GLASNOST

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PUGACHEV, EMELIAN IVANOVICH

(c. 1742–1775), Russian cossack rebel and imperial impostor, leader of the Pugachevshchina.

Emelian Pugachev headed the mass uprising of 1773–1774 known as *Pugachevshchina* (loosely translated as “Pugachev’s Dark Deeds”). The bloodiest rebellion against central state authority and serfdom between 1618 and the Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, it disrupted an immense territory and momentarily threatened the Muscovite heartland. Thousands of individuals from disparate social groups and ethnicities challenged Catherine II’s legitimacy and aggravated international tension from prolonged Russo-Turkish hostilities. Many suspected upper-class, religious, or foreign inspiration behind the upheaval, widely reported by the European press. Particularly provocative was Pugachev’s impersonation of Peter III (1728–1762), which recalled Catherine’s usurpation of power.

The revolt originated among the Yaik (Ural) cossacks, a frontier “warrior democracy” that re-

sisted pressure from state expansion. Disputes over the elected leadership led to government suppression of a cossack mutiny in January 1772, which left the community divided and resentful. Pugachev, a Don cossack fugitive, visited the area in late 1772. A typical primitive rebel, Pugachev was illiterate and his biography obscure. His imposture was not original; he was one of some seven pretenders since 1764. Shrewd, energetic, and experienced in military affairs, he was also charismatic. It is unclear whether he initiated renewed revolt or was persuaded to lead it by the cossacks.

About sixty rebels issued a first manifesto in late September 1773, presumably dictated by Pugachev or cossack scribes, calling on cossacks, Kalmyks, and Tatars to serve Peter III in pursuit of glory, land, and material reward. The rebels focused on frontier freedom or autonomy, but Peter III's name lent national stature to the burgeoning movement. Within weeks their forces exceeded two thousand besieging the fortress of Orenburg and spreading the revolt into the Ural Mountains with specific appeals to diverse social and ethnic groups. Turkic Bashkirs joined in force as the regional rebellion evolved into three chronological-territorial phases.

The Orenburg–Yaitsk phase lasted from October 1773 until April 1774, when the rebel sieges of Orenburg, Yaitsk, and Ufa were broken, Pugachev barely escaping. Shielded by spring roadlessness, the rebels replenished ranks while fleeing northward through the Urals. This second phase culminated in the plunder of Kazan on July 23 before the horde was defeated and scattered. With rebel whereabouts unknown, panic seized Moscow, but news of peace with the Turks soon allayed fears.

Pugachev fled southward down the Volga, exterminating the nobility and government officials—the third and final phase. This rampage sparked many local outbreaks sometimes called “Pugachevshchina without Pugachev.” The main rebel force was decisively defeated south of Tsaritsyn on September 5. To save themselves, some cossacks turned Pugachev over to tsarist authorities at Yaitsk on September 26, 1774. After lengthy interrogation he was beheaded and then quartered in Moscow on January 21, 1775. To erase reminders of the revolt, Yaitsk, the river, the cossacks, and Pugachev's birthplace were all renamed, his wife and children exiled. Late in life Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837) popularized Pugachev in history and fiction. “The Captain's Daughter” became an instant classic, famously declaiming “God save us

from seeing a Russian revolt, senseless and merciless.” But agrarian anarchist dissidents found inspiration in Pugachev for grassroots rebellion. After 1917 the Soviet regime endorsed Pugachev's fame, recasting the revolt as a peasant war against feudal society and autocratic government.

See also: CATHERINE II; PEASANTRY; PETER III; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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
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PUGO, BORIS KARLOVICH

(1937–1991), Party official involved in the 1991 coup attempt against Boris Yeltsin.

Born in Latvia, Boris Karlovich Pugo was a Communist Party and state functionary whose career was shaped by Leonid Brezhnev's “mature socialism.” This was a time of ossification in the leadership and mounting economic crisis that gave way to attempts to reform the system from within under the direction of Yuri Andropov, former head of the KGB, and then, after a brief interval, to more systemic reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev. Like many leaders of the Brezhnev era, Pugo began his career as an official in the Komsomol. His career was closely connected with Soviet power in his native Latvia, where he served as head of the local KGB and later as first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party.

Pugo came to prominence with the advent of glasnost and perestroika. In 1988 he was appointed chairman of the powerful CPSU Control Commis-



Interior Minister Boris Pugo bows his head during the press conference held by the leaders of the August 1991 coup. He committed suicide days later. © SHEPARD SHERBELL/CORBIS SABA

sion in Moscow, a post he held for two years. This was a time of struggle within the Communist Party, for Gorbachev's effort to use it as a vehicle for reform had failed and only managed to split the Party along pro- and anti-reform lines. In the Baltic republics even the local Communist parties were joining in the call for independence by the summer of 1990. In December, Gorbachev appointed Pugo minister of internal affairs.

The appointment came at a time of crisis for perestroika. There were increasing calls for independence in the Baltic republics. Opponents of reform in Moscow, such as the "Black Colonel" Viktor Alksnis, were calling for a crackdown against anti-Soviet elements, especially in the Baltic republics. Hardliners argued that the impending war between the United States and Iraq would distract international opinion from a Soviet crackdown. As one of his first acts as minister of internal affairs, Pugo took a leading role in the attempt to reassert Soviet power in the Baltic republics. The crackdown in Vilnius, poorly organized and indecisive, collapsed in the face of popular resistance in the republics and Gorbachev's failure to support it publicly.

In August 1991 Pugo joined in the desperate attempt by the State Committee for the State of Emergency to remove Gorbachev and prevent the approval of a new union treaty that would bring about a radical shift in power from all-union institutions to the constituent republics, especially the Russian Federation under its popularly elected president, Boris Yeltsin. The so-called putsch in which the committee attempted to seize power was poorly organized and badly prepared. Within a matter of days it collapsed. Boris Pugo committed suicide on August 22, together with his wife, Valentina. His suicide note contained a brief explanation of his actions: "I put too much trust in people. I have lived my life honestly."

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; SOYUZ FACTION

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PURGES, THE GREAT

The term *Great Purges* does not accurately designate the chaotic chain of events to which it is applied and was never used by the Soviet authorities. The regime tried to cover up the large-scale violence it had deployed between the summer of 1936 and the end of 1938. Although scholars apply the term *purges* to this period, many of them agree that the appellation is misleading. It implies that the Bolshevik attempts to eliminate the system's presumed enemies were a carefully planned, faithfully executed series of punitive operations, and this was far from being the case. The terror of 1936 to 1938 emerged without clear design—it targeted ill-defined categories of people and it proceeded haphazardly. Although purges victimized around 1.5 million individuals, they did not succeed in ridding the country of the problems they were supposed to stamp out.



Workers in a Leningrad turbine shop listen to a report on the trial and execution of Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and fourteen others convicted of plotting against Stalin. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

FEAR OF OPPOSITION

The Bolsheviks were convinced that the USSR was threatened by internal adversaries. They never hesitated to attribute discontent among the people to instigation by irreconcilably hostile elements, and they frequently did not even trust fellow militants. In the course of the 1930s, failure was increasingly imputed to deliberate sabotage.

There was barely a sector of life where the regime's initiatives succeeded. Collectivized agriculture did not feed the country properly, industry did not work according to plans, the Communist Party and the state administration did not carry out important directives. Peasants on collective farms did their best to avoid work, officeholders in the countryside vacillated between compromising with rural ways and taking brutal measures, workers were hard to discipline, managers invented ways to seem to be doing their jobs, officials in all institutions eagerly covered up for incompetent colleagues and the true state of affairs. The Bolsheviks were unwilling to acknowledge that the masses were only reacting to the outcome of the regime's policies, and top decision-makers were unable to grasp that subordinates were following their own example of not speaking out about inextricable issues, leaving problems unsolved, blaming whipping boys for their own miscalculations, and lavishing praise on achievements that were more than dubious. The elite never came close to recognizing

that the monopoly of the Party-state in nearly every domain left no room for checks and balances, and that attempts to improve the situation could not bring results as long as they were entrusted to the very establishment whose practices had to be corrected. The leaders could not see that the regime's difficulties were part-and-parcel of the system and could not be overcome without changing it completely.

Unwilling to accept responsibility for the system's failures, the Bolsheviks intensified the search for hidden enemies. Even top leaders were convinced that intractable problems were due to subversion. They projected the secretive character of their own dealings onto controlled aspects of the Party and state apparatus, and imagined conspiratorial intrigues behind the USSR's accumulating troubles. For Bolsheviks, there was no question but that the remnants of the prerevolutionary elite, adherents of defunct parties, and former kulaks represented a threat. They also suspected erstwhile oppositionists of disloyalty. Many of the Trotskyites and other deviationists of the 1920s had the same revolutionary credentials as their persecutors and thus were seen as dangerous rivals for legitimate authority. Josef V. Stalin feared that they might try to claim power if the situation worsened.

Although thousands of deviationists remained in the Communist Party until 1937, many others

were expelled during membership screenings in 1935 and 1936. Starting in 1935, secret directives instructed the NKVD to detect their terrorist intentions, even if they were in exile and detention. A show trial highlighted the terrorist designs of the deviationist leaders Lev B. Kamenev and Grigory E. Zinoviev in August 1936, and this date is seen as the starting point of the Great Purges.

THE PURGES BEGIN

The trial of Lev B. Kamenev and Grigory Y. Zinoviev and subsequent directives from the Central Committee triggered a vigilance campaign within the Party. The campaign targeted not only the opposition, but also Party members who had criticized the Party or whose work and lifestyle brought discredit to the Bolsheviks. The failures of agriculture, construction, industry, and other branches of the economy provided a legion of opportunities to denounce workers and managers. Poor results, errors, and accidents were reclassified as intentional sabotage. There were plenty of motives to level accusations of poor discipline, since the campaign came during a severe crop failure and in the wake of a Stakhanovist drive that had disorganized production and undermined workplace safety. Leading cadres were reluctant to dig too deeply into conditions in their workplaces, and it was safer to single out alleged Trotskyites as scapegoats, for the Party already had a tendency to blame them for nearly every shortcoming.

Sabotage is more accurately described as the regime's daily routine. Inefficiency, abuses, and heavy-handed handling of subordinates and the population disrupted the proper functioning of the Party, the state, and the national economy. The charge of oppositionist schemes was more problematic. It was used to justify the elimination of imprisoned Party members who had been dissidents in the 1920s. It was also used to stigmatize anyone who could be blamed for the regime's shortcomings without having to indicate any fault other than alleged sympathy, association, or even simple acquaintance with Trotskyites. Insinuations of this sort obscured Party efforts to correct official misconduct, facilitated scapegoating, and deflected blame onto the most vulnerable cadres. But there was hardly any other feasible way to dissociate the regime from its misdeeds and to suggest that the culprits were foreign or hostile to the Soviet ideal.

The scapegoats singled out in this way were made to answer for the defects of the Soviet sys-

tem. Since many officeholders were at least partly responsible for the difficult living and working conditions imposed on them, the masses were not impervious to the argument that their superiors were enemies of the people. Quite a few citizens were ready to take up this argument against unpopular bosses as a way of venting their discontent and avenging past mistreatment and humiliations.

The leaders of the purges often emphasized that the alleged enemies were Party members in order to exploit tensions within the Party, in government agencies, and in other administrations. A show trial in January 1937 abundantly featured charges of wrecking and treason against Yuri L. Piatakov, deputy commissar of heavy industry and former member of the Central Committee, and other prominent figures in economic management and foreign affairs. Those who engineered this attack on leading Communists also tried to mobilize support in the lower ranks of the Party. The plenum of the Central Committee in February and March 1939 decided to reelect officeholders by secret ballot. It also decided to use the secret ballot at forthcoming elections for the Supreme Soviet, where, for the first time since the Revolution, all citizens were supposed to vote and have the right to be run for office. High officials at the plenum warned that subversive elements were likely to take advantage of the election campaign. They were aware of the discontent among the masses that had surfaced in public discussions about the recently adopted constitution, and especially that some people were attempting to invoke their constitutionally guaranteed rights to reclaim confiscated property and to freely practice religion.

The Party elections were expected to eliminate disruptive practices and boost the regime's reputation by replacing unruly and unpopular cadres. The targeted members did everything possible to ensure their reelection, because fallen communists risked jail—or worse. Networks of mutual aid were set in motion to rescue colleagues whose defeat would have endangered the position of everyone connected to them. While many targeted communists were saved, others were irreparably damaged when the police stepped in. By the summer of 1937, the winners of the intra-Party elections increasingly faced charges of having deceived the Party faithful. By that time, Party members alarmed by the increasing popular unrest had convinced the top leadership that it was necessary to launch an extensive purge. The crackdown came suddenly. No arrangements had been made to prepare concentration

camps for the arrival of several hundred thousands of prisoners.

Seen as a preventive strike before the elections to the Supreme Soviet, the massive operation targeted a wide spectrum of so-called class enemies: kulaks, members of dissolved parties, ecclesiastics, sectarians, recidivist criminals. Moscow ordered the regional administrations to shoot, imprison, or deport specific quotas of enemies. Three-member boards (troikas) handed down summary sentences. This operation had hardly begun when another terror campaign was initiated. The new campaign was ostensibly aimed at ethnic Poles accused of being agents of the Polish government, but it was soon extended to other minorities, most of whom were not even mentioned in the central directives. No limits were set on the number of victims of this cleansing. Both operations were expected to end in December 1937, on the eve of the elections.

At first glance, it was easy to identify people on the basis of their past activities or political affiliations, especially former oppositionists. Nonetheless, it was impossible to know what constituted *deviation* because the term applied to attitudes as well as behaviors. In the same way, there was no guarantee that only declassed people and believers were dissatisfied with the regime. Moreover, there was no guarantee that potential subversion by foreign governments could be countered by massacring their ethnic kin.

OUTCOME

The Great Purges resulted in chaos. About 100,000 Party members were arrested, often tortured to confess to concocted charges, and sent before the firing squad or to camps. But it soon became evident that many of them were victims of overzealous officials, some of whom were themselves later purged. The mass terror took almost a year more than projected. This was partly because zealous cadres sought to demonstrate their vigilance by requesting new quotas from Moscow for additional arrests and shootings. The names of purported accomplices were frequently obtained by cruelly mistreating the detainees. People were sometimes punished because of a foreign-sounding name or simply because anyone could be accused of being a German, Japanese, Latvian, or Greek spy. The campaign took on a life of its own. Even when it was halted in November 1938, scheduled executions continued in some regions.

More than 680,000 people were killed in 1937 and 1938, and about 630,000 were deported to

Siberia. Nevertheless, two years after the purge the number of persons listed as politically suspect by the secret police exceeded 1,200,000. But official misconduct, incompetence, and networks of solidarity did not change, despite the massive change in the leading personnel. The national economy and the administration suffered from the loss of valuable specialists, and the hunt for enemies in the army decapitated the high command and decimated the officer corps. Many of the victims were sincerely devoted to the principles of Bolshevism.

The Great Purges are usually associated with Joseph V. Stalin and his police chiefs, Nikolai I. Yezhov and Lavrenty P. Beria. But their true origin lay in the Soviet regime's inability to utilize modern techniques for managing institutions, political processes, and social relations. The purges showed that indiscriminate campaigns, police operations, and violence would play an important role as policy instruments and take priority over economic and administrative incentives to enlist popular support. They also showed the disastrous consequences of the system's lack of independent watchdog agencies that could, if necessary, restrain the Party-state's actions. The intent behind the purges bore some resemblance to social engineering, but the sociopolitical framework led to an outcome that had little in common with the original aims.

See also: BERIA, LAVRENTI PAVLOVICH; GULAG; KOMANEV, LEV BORISOVICH; SHOW TRIALS; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; YEZHOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH

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GABOR T. RITTERSPORN

PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

(1799–1837), considered Russia's greatest poet, author of lyrics, plays, prose, and the novel in verse *Eugene Onegin*.

Of the Russian poets, none is mentioned by Russians with more reverence than Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin. His work has been set to opera by Mikhail Glinka, Modest Mussorgsky, Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, and Peter Tchaikovsky; his lyrics have been memorized by young schoolchildren throughout the former Soviet Union; and leading poets of the twentieth century, such as Anna Akhmatova, Marina Tsvetaeva, and Alexander Blok, emphasized his impact on their work and lives. Pushkin may indeed have opened the door for the later part of the so-called Golden Age of Russian literature. At the 1880 ceremony following the unveiling of the Pushkin statue in Moscow, Ivan Turgenev credited Pushkin with giving birth to the Russian literary language; Fyodor Dostoyevsky, in an impassioned, near-hysterical speech, declared Pushkin superior to Shakespeare.

Such reverence is certainly merited, but reverence has its dangers. The author of the novel in verse *Eugene Onegin*, the historical play in verse *Boris Godunov*, the cryptic yet fluid "Belkin Tales," the brilliant "Little Tragedies" (four plays in blank verse, three of which deal with crimes of passion) the stylized folktale "Ruslan and Lyudmila," the tense, fatalistic story "Queen of Spades," and hundreds of lyrics, a master of style who absorbed and transformed European literary traditions and gave Russian folklore an unprecedented poetic expression, Pushkin attained quasi-mythological status in the twentieth century, becoming a hero figure for the Soviet establishment and dissidents alike. Yet Pushkin was a complex figure: profoundly solitary yet immersed in the social life of the aristocracy; devoted to his friends but easily incited to violence. His female characters, such as Tatiana in *Eugene Onegin*, have remarkable depth and soul, but he himself was primarily attracted to physical beauty in women, and brought about his own early death partly on account of this. These contradictions in his character, while perhaps limiting his

literary offering, account in part for its richness; his work is both immediate and layered, both sincere and wry.

Pushkin was born in Moscow in 1799. His father Sergei descended from boyars, one of whom, mentioned in Pushkin's *Boris Godunov*, had been a supporter of the False Dmitry during the Time of Troubles. Pushkin's mother Nadezhda was the granddaughter of Abram Gannibal, an African slave. Abram had been brought from Africa as a gift for Peter I, who favored him and sent him to Paris for military education. With the accession of Elizabeth to the throne, Abram rose through the ranks to the status of general, but was retired following Elizabeth's death. Pushkin took pride in his African heritage, referring to it often in his lyrics. Abram's daughter Mariya, Pushkin's grandmother, not only played the role of surrogate parent to Pushkin, whose own parents gave him little attention or affection, but also recounted family history, to be reflected later in Pushkin's unfinished novel *The Blackamoor of Peter the Great*.

Pushkin's parents embraced the lifestyle of the aristocracy, though they could not afford it. Sergei, an adept conversationalist with a vast knowledge of French literature, invited some of Russia's leading literary figures to the household, including the historian Nikolai Karamzin and poets Konstantin Batyushkov and Vasily Zhukovsky. Pushkin and his sister and brother grew up surrounded by literati. However, Pushkin's childhood was unhappy. Pushkin was the least favored child, perhaps in part because of his African features and awkward manner. Only his grandmother and his nanny Arina Rodionova nurtured him emotionally; the latter told him folk tales and entertained him with gossip, and served later as the model for Tatiana's nanny in *Eugene Onegin*.

In 1811 Pushkin's parents sent him to boarding school, the Lyceum, newly established by Alexander I in a wing of his palace in Tsarskoye Selo. There Pushkin received a first-rate education (though he was not a stellar student) in a relaxed and nurturing environment, and formed friendships that would prove lifelong, with classmates Ivan Pushchin, Anton Delvig, Wilhelm Kyukhelbecker, and others. While at the Lyceum, Pushkin enjoyed a social life filled with pranks and light romantic encounters, and he amazed his teachers and classmates with his verse. The aged poet Gavryl Derzhavin, upon hearing Pushkin recite his "Recollections in Tsarskoye Selo" during an examina-



Portrait of Alexander Pushkin. THE BETTMAN ARCHIVE

tion in 1815, recognized sixteen-year-old Pushkin as his poetic successor.

Pushkin graduated from the Lyceum in 1817. From there he moved to Petersburg, where he spent his days sleeping late, taking walks, and attending parties in the evenings. Erratic and excitable, he made public scenes at the theater on several occasions. He frequented houses of prostitutes and had a number of romantic affairs. He was a member of the literary circle "The Green Lamp," whose members, including Pushchin and Delvig, were also involved in secret political activities aimed at reform. Pushkin was not invited to join in the secret meetings, but he did write lyrics challenging the tsarist autocracy, including his ode "Freedom" (1817), "Noelles" (1818), and "The Village" (1819). The lyrics caused a stir; Pushkin was ordered to appear before Count Miloradovich, governor-general of St. Petersburg. Following that meeting in 1820, the tsar sent Pushkin into exile in the form of military service in South Russia under Lieutenant General Inzov.

Pushkin's exile was in many ways pleasant. He befriended General Rayevsky and his family and traveled with them around Caucasus and Crimea.

He then spent nearly three years in Kishinev, where he wrote the verse tales "The Prisoner of the Caucasus" (1820–1821), "The Bandit Brothers" (1821–1822), and "The Fountain of Bakchisaray" (1821–1823). In addition, he wrote the scathing, mock-religious "Gavriliada" (1821) and began his novel in verse *Eugene Onegin* (1823–1831). During this time Pushkin was captivated by Lord George Gordon Byron, particularly his *Childe Harold*.

In July 1823 he was transferred to Odessa, where he had a lively social life, attended theater, and had affairs with two married women. He finished "The Fountain of Bakchisaray" and chapter one of *Eugene Onegin*, and began "The Gypsies."

From 1824 to 1826 he was exiled to his mother's estate of Mikhailovskoye in North Russia. There he finished "The Gypsies" and wrote the historical play in verse *Boris Godunov*, "Graf Nulin," and chapter two of *Eugene Onegin*.

In November 1825, while Pushkin was still in Mikhailovskoye, Alexander I died. The confusion over the successor provided the opportunity for secret political societies (called the Decembrists after the event) to rise up in armed rebellion against the aristocracy before Nicholas was proclaimed emperor. The uprising took place in Petersburg in December 1825 and involved poet Kondraty Ryleev, Colonel Pavel Pestel, Pushchin, Kyukhelbecker, and others. Pushkin, while not present or involved, was implicated, as some Decembrists quoted his poetry in support of their movement. Ryleev and Pestel were sentenced to death, Pushchin and Kyukhelbecker to hard labor.

In the spring of 1826 Pushkin petitioned Tsar Nicholas I for a release from exile. He met with the tsar and was granted release, but restrictions continued as before. He was under constant scrutiny, and his most minute activities were reported to the tsar.

In 1829 Pushkin met and proposed to Natalia Goncharova, a society beauty. They were formally engaged on May 18, 1830. Pushkin was given permission to publish *Boris Godunov*. In September 1830 Pushkin went to Boldino in east-central Russia to make wedding arrangements. Because of the outbreak of asiatic cholera, he was forced to stay three months there. This time was the most productive of his life. As part of an overall transition from poetry to prose, he wrote the magnificent *Tales of Belkin*, a collection of stories in taut, swift-moving prose, revolving around mistaken identity

and, according to Andrej Kodjak (1979), containing an encoded message concerning the Decembrist uprising. Other works during this period include his "Little Tragedies" ("The Avaricious Knight," "Mozart and Salieri," "The Stone Guest," and "Feast in the Time of the Plague"), as well as "The Little House in Kolomna," "The Tale of the Priest and his Workman Balda," the last chapter of *Eugene Onegin*, and some of his finest lyrics, including "The Devils." He married Goncharova in February 1831, shortly after the unexpected death of Delvig, his closest friend after Pushchin.

Pushkin's marriage to Goncharova proved unhappy. She had little appreciation for his work, and he was unable to finance her extravagant lifestyle. Pushkin was beset with financial worries, and wrote little (including "Tale of the Golden Cockerel" (1834), the cycle of poems "Stone Island" (*Kamenny ostrov*, 1836) and his novel *The Captain's Daughter* (1836). He published a quarterly journal *The Contemporary*, which added to his troubles and did not fare well.

Natalia Goncharova loved mingling with the high aristocracy and playing society coquette; her many admirers included the tsar. The flirtation took on more serious tones when Baron Georges Charles d'Anthès, a French exile living in St. Petersburg under the protection of the Dutch ambassador, began to pursue her in earnest. A duel between d'Anthès and Pushkin took place on February 10, 1837. Pushkin, severely wounded, died two days later.

Of Pushkin's works, *Eugene Onegin* is the best known in the West, though by no means his sole masterpiece. Written over the course of eight years, it consists of eight chapters, each chapter broken into numbered stanzas in iambic tetrameter. Narrated by a stylized version of Pushkin himself, it portrays a Byronic antihero, Eugene Onegin, a bored society dandy who rejects the sincere and somber Tatiana. Onegin then flirts casually with Tatiana's sister Olga, provokes a duel with his friend Vladimir Lensky, a second-rate poet infatuated with Olga, and kills Lensky in the duel. After some travels, Onegin returns to Petersburg to find out that Tatiana has married a wealthy general. He falls in love with her, but she rejects him out of loyalty to her husband. The work holds immense popular and scholarly appeal thanks to the playfulness and perfection of the verse, the layers of confession and commentary, the appeal of the heroine, and the complex element of prophecy of Pushkin's own death.

See also: DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; DERZHAVIN, GAVRYL ROMANOVICH; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; PUSHKIN HOUSE

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DIANA SENECHAL

PUSHKIN HOUSE

Pushkin House (*Pushkinsky Dom*), the Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences (abbreviated in Russian *IRLI RAN*), was founded in St. Petersburg, in 1905 and named after Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin (1799–1837).

The idea of creating a new monument to Russia's premiere poet came about during the celebration of his centenary in 1899 and the Pushkin Exhibit organized by the Academy in May of that year. By 1907 the task of this monument supported by literary societies, theaters, and other groups from around Russia had evolved into gathering manuscripts, artifacts, and collections of works of prominent Russian authors. The acquisition of Pushkin's personal library in 1906 with government funds laid the foundation for the institute's library. At this time Pushkin House occupied temporary space at the Academy's main building while the search for a permanent location continued. World War I and the February and October Revolutions delayed the process but also increased the institute's holdings, especially those of the manu-

script department. Among important additions were the archives, saved from the burning building of the gendarmes' headquarters in February 1917, of the tsar's secret police, documenting police surveillance of Pushkin and other nineteenth-century writers; Pushkin and Lermontov museum collections transferred in 1917 from the Lyceum in Tsarskoye Selo for safekeeping; and the Paris museum collection of A. F. Onegin contracted for in 1909 and transferred to Pushkin House in 1927, after the owner's death. Pushkin House became a member institute of the Academy in 1918 and eventually received its own building in 1927, the old customs house at 2 Tuchkov Embankment (now Makarov Embankment). Thanks in part to the protection of Soviet writer Maxim Gorky, Pushkin House was able to continue acquiring manuscripts and literary memorabilia in the 1920s and 1930s. Publishing of scholarly works on Russian literature, source texts, textology, bibliography and the study of literary history, catalogs, and periodicals got underway in the 1920s. Since then, the academic editions of complete works by authors such as Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Gogol, and Lermontov produced by the institute have been considered authoritative and are used and cited by scholars around the world.

Pushkin House continued to operate during the siege of Leningrad during World War II, although most of the manuscripts and staff were evacuated to cities in the country's interior. The institute returned to the job of preparing specialists after the war and continues to train graduate and post-graduate students in Russian literature, awarding degrees in Russian literature (Ph.D. equivalent and professorship). The structure of the institute is divided into ten departments, including medieval Russian literature, oral poetry and audio archive, modern Russian literature (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), Pushkin department, new Russian literature (twentieth century), Russian and foreign literary ties, manuscript department and medieval manuscript repository, library, and literary museum. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Pushkin House, like most government institutions, experienced serious funding deficits but rapid expansion of cooperation with foreign scholars and universities that led to foreign grants, joint publishing projects, exchanges, and international conferences.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; EDUCATION; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; UNIVERSITIES

VANESSA BITTNER

PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

(b. 1952), second president of the Russian Federation.

Vladimir Putin was appointed acting president of the Russian Federation on December 31, 1999, and on March 26, 2000, he was elected to the presidency. Putin was born in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). He attended school there and practiced judo, eventually becoming the city champion. As a boy, Putin dreamed of joining the secret police (KGB). When he was seventeen he went to KGB headquarters and asked a startled officer what he should do to "join up." He was told to attend the university and major in law. Putin took his advice and attended Leningrad State University. In his second semester one of his teachers was Anatoly Sobchak, a man who would play a major role in his life. In 1974 Putin was offered a job in the KGB but told he had to wait a full year before entering the organization. In 1976 Putin was assigned to the First Directorate, the section engaged in spying outside of the USSR. In 1983 he married Ludmila Schkrebneva, a former airline hostess. Putin had hoped to be stationed in West Germany, but instead, in 1985, he was assigned to Dresden, in East Germany. While it is unclear what he did there, all indications are that he focused on recruiting visiting West German businessmen to spy for the USSR. In any case, he left as a lieutenant colonel, suggesting that his spying career was less than spectacular.

In May 1990 Putin's former professor Anatoly Sobchak was elected mayor of St. Petersburg, and he asked Putin, who was well aware that both the USSR and the KGB were falling apart, to come work for him. Putin agreed, left the KGB, and by all accounts impressed everyone he met with his ability to "get things done." He was efficient, effective, honest, and decent to the people he interacted with, characteristics that were in short supply at that time. When Sobchak lost the mayoralty in the election of July 1996, Putin quit, but unknown to him he had been noticed by Anatoly Chubais, who helped him obtain a job with Paul Borodin, who ran the presidential staff in the Kremlin. As a result, he moved to Moscow.

Few people would have given the rather faceless and bland Putin much chance of being noticed by President Boris Yeltsin. Yet he did stand out, perhaps because he was so efficient. Equally important, he did not appear to be seeking higher office.

Yeltsin took note of Putin and in 1998 appointed him head of the Federal Security Service, formerly the KGB. Then, on August 16, 1999, Yeltsin surprised the world by making Putin prime minister and designating him as his successor. If that was not enough, Yeltsin once again surprised the world on December 31, 1999 by resigning and making Putin acting president. On March 26, 2000, Putin stood for election and won a majority in the first round.

Putin was a new kind of president. While Boris Yeltsin had presided over the collapse of communism and in that sense was a revolutionary leader, Putin saw the job differently. Russia had been through enough turmoil and conflict since the collapse of the USSR. Besides, the country was in a mess. The economy had come close to collapse, corruption and social problems were rampant, cynicism toward the central government was at an all-time high, and on the international level, Russia was almost irrelevant with U.S.-Russian relations at an all-time low. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that Russia was considered by many to be “the sick man of Europe.”

Putin’s approach to these many problems contrasted markedly with Yeltsin’s. He was very organized and structured, and as his Millennium Speech (January 1, 2000) made clear, he stood in stark contrast to his Soviet predecessors. He told the Russian people the truth about the depth and seriousness of the country’s problem. In addition to taking this straightforward approach, Putin believed that the only way Russia could survive as a viable nation was to rebuild the Russian state. So he immediately began to reestablish Moscow’s control over the country’s governors, many of whom were paying little attention to the central government. First, he took on the Federation Council, the parliament’s upper house, where the regional governors held considerable power. By the time Putin was through, considerable power had been shifted to Moscow. Then he set up seven “super” districts, headed by personally selected “super” governors, to oversee the regional officials. He even succeeded in firing one of the country’s most corrupt and strongest governors, Yegeny Nazdratenko of Primorski Krai.

The Putin style of governance avoided spectacular, high-profile actions. Instead, he preferred to work behind the scenes whenever possible. In his view, there had already been too much of the kind of high-profile activity associated with Yeltsin.



Ex-KGB agent Vladimir Putin became Russia’s second president.

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Russia was tired of that sort of thing, which in the end generally made very little difference in the life of the average citizen. Military reform provides an example of Putin’s approach. How to restructure Russia’s armed forces had been a subject of discussion ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union—and even before then. When Putin appointed Sergei Ivanov, one of his closest associates, as defense minister, there was some expectation that he would immediately try to institute major changes. In fact, that did not happen. Instead, Putin pushed the Defense Ministry to make changes, and it has gradually responded.

Putin’s style of governance was not repressive, but neither was it democratic in the way the term was understood in the West. Instead, he followed a course of what might be called “managed democracy.” He set the parameters of what was permitted and what was prohibited. As long as citizens remained within the parameters, they would have all the freedom they wanted. But if they went beyond the parameters, they would be in trouble. For



President Vladimir Putin speaks during a 2002 meeting with Kyrgyzstan president Askar Akayev. PHOTOGRAPH BY ALEXANDER ZEMLIANICHENKO/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

example, when Putin took on the media, he made it clear that the “chaotic” press and television of the Yeltsin period was unacceptable. While the media remained free in comparison to the Soviet era, the situation was a far cry from the independent news coverage of the 1990s.

Putin did not have a grand plan for the restructuring of society. He was a problem-solver. Rather than instituting a full-scale reform of the judicial system, for instance, he raised the salaries of judges and increased the money available to the police. The same was true of an even more serious problem, the tax system. The government was bankrupt because no one was paying taxes. Putin dealt with the problem by introducing a 13 percent flat tax to be paid by everyone, and the system seemed to work relatively well. There were still major problems in both areas, but as was typical of Putin, important if partial changes had been implemented.

Putin was also an effective diplomat. When George W. Bush became president of the United

States, it looked as if U.S.–Russian relations were going nowhere. Putin showed he had patience. When the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York occurred on September 11, 2001, he was the first foreign leader to call President Bush and express his condolences. He also stood by the United States during the subsequent war in Afghanistan. Most surprising, however, was his ability to remain a close friend and ally of the United States even though he opposed the American invasion of Iraq. In contrast to the Washington–Paris relationship, Washington and Moscow remained close allies despite their differences over Iraq.

Putin also demonstrated that he knew how to make use of events. For example, he used the September 11 attacks to force Russia’s anti-American general staff to change its approach to dealing with the United States. On September 24, 2001, just prior to his visit to the United States, he met with the country’s generals and admirals, and made it clear that cooperation was the order of the day. The military quickly fell into line and cooperation between the two sides was as close as it had ever been.

Many observers wondered whether Putin’s partial but determined approach would provide the political, military, social, and economic stability Russia needed to reenter the ranks of the world’s major powers. When his presidency began, Putin was unknown, and few believed he could do anything other than be a KGB thug. Within a short time, without taking the repressive actions that many expected, he had begun to reestablish the Russian state and to restore its status as an important player in the international arena. The economy had begun to turn around, even if it continued to be too heavily based on oil.

See also: SOBCHAK, ANATOLY ALEXANDROVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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DALE HERSPRING

PYTATAKOV, GEORGY LEONIDOVICH

(1890–1937), a leading Bolshevik in Ukraine who opposed Vladimir Lenin's policy on a nation's right to self-determination.

An extraordinary economic administrator, Georgy Pytatakov held numerous important political positions including deputy chairman of Gosplan (1922); deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) (1923); chairman of the State Bank (1929); deputy chairman of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry (1930); and member of the Supreme Economic Council (1930).

In the 1920s Pytatakov allied with Leon Trotsky and ultimately became a leading figure in the Left Opposition (the so-called Trotskyite opposition). From 1922 to 1926 Pytatakov advocated rapid industrialization and supported Yevgeny Preobrazhensky's theory of "primitive socialist accumulation." In a public bid for rank-and-file support for the Left's position, Pytatakov took part in a demonstration at a Moscow factory Party meeting in 1926. He was subsequently removed from his

position at VSNKh for being an oppositionist and sent abroad. The following year he was expelled from the Party.

In 1928 Pytatakov recanted his position and applied for readmission into the Party. It was granted the following year, along with an appointment to head the State Bank. Beginning in 1929 he published articles hailing Josef Stalin's genius and condemning oppositionists. However, this could not erase the stigma of his association with the Left Opposition. In 1936 he was arrested as a Trotskyite and, along with Karl Radek, was a central figure in the second Moscow Show Trial in 1937. Under torture and drugs, he confessed, was found guilty, and shot immediately after the trial.

See also: LEFT OPPOSITION; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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KATE TRANSCHEL

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QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE AND QUINTUPLE ALLIANCE

The Quadruple Alliance was signed in November 1815 by Russia, Britain, Austria, and Prussia, following the long series of wars that began in the aftermath of the French Revolution and concluded with the defeat of Napoleon. It was essentially a continuation of the Treaty of Chaumont of 1814, in which the four powers vowed to defeat France and remain allied for twenty years to keep France in check. At the time Russia was the preeminent military power in Europe. From 1813 to 1814, Europeans had watched with a mixture of amazement and horror as Russian soldiers drove Napoleon's Grand Army out of their country and, joined by Prussia, Britain, and finally Austria, all the way to Paris. Britain ruled the seas, but no army rivaled Russia's, and fear of this new power was keen in Austria and Britain until its disastrous defeat in the Crimean War.

The individual most responsible for the complete destruction of Napoleon's power was Emperor Alexander I (r. 1801–1825). The other continental powers had been willing to negotiate a settlement with Napoleon, but Alexander had insisted on total victory. Since at least 1805 he had been convinced that only Russia and Britain had the resources to vanquish Napoleon and reestablish order in Europe based on a new treaty system.

With the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the victorious powers faced two related problems: how to contain France, and how to prevent revolution. In November, the British foreign secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, proposed a continuation of the alliance system, bolstered by a system of great-power congresses to deal with crises as they arose. Alexander's vague response was a "Holy Alliance" of Christian monarchs who would treat one another with Christian brotherhood and charity. This proposal had no practical effect.

Castlereagh had his way, and in the Quadruple Alliance the victorious powers pledged to maintain the political system established at the Congress of Vienna for the next twenty years, by force if necessary, and to meet periodically to consult on the maintenance of order and stability. The foreign secretary declared that Britain would never intervene militarily in the internal affairs of another state. When Alexander pressed him to promise support for the restored Bourbon monarchy in France,



Castlereagh refused. This did much to fuel Alexander's suspicions of British policy.

As Alexander's anti-British feelings grew, he came to regard France in a more favorable light. Prodded by his advisers, particularly Corfiote Capodistriasi, he concluded that if France were admitted into the Quadruple Alliance, it could become a counterweight to Britain and, to a lesser extent, Austria, especially if Prussia continued to follow Russia's diplomatic lead.

The result was the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. Ostensibly convened to end the military occupation of France, it really had the goal of restoring France into the great-power system. Its outcome was twofold: France joined the alliance, which became the Quintuple Alliance, but the Quadruple Alliance was reconfirmed because the victors, despite their mutual distrust, were still fearful of a resurgent France. Over the next few

decades, however, fear of Russian power and expansionism would seize all the great powers except Prussia, until they united to defeat Russia in the Crimean War.

See also: CRIMEAN WAR; HOLY ALLIANCE; NAPOLEON I; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF

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HUGH PHILLIPS

RABBINICAL COMMISSION

The Rabbinic Commission (1848–1910) was a consultative body under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (specifically the Department of Spiritual Affairs for Foreign Faiths), organized to deal with matters of the Jewish faith. Its creation conformed to the general state policy of centralizing the religious administration of foreign confessions in a single department. Its primary duties were to answer inquiries from the state about Jewish laws and customs, to supervise the activities of rabbis, and to examine controversial Jewish divorce suits. While the state had created this institution to gather information about internal Jewish life, the Commission gradually transformed into a higher court of appeals for private divorce cases (which remained under rabbinical jurisdiction until 1917) and a vehicle for preserving traditional religious and family values.

The changing profile of the Commission's members reflected the transformation in its mission and identity. The first session (1852) included obscure individuals who were well versed neither in the Russian language nor Jewish law: the merchant Bernshtein (Odessa), D. Orshansky (Poltava), Shimel Merkel (Kovno province), and Dr. Cherolzon (Oszeisky province). They examined queries about the censorship of Jewish books, Hasidic sects, the Jewish oath, registration, and marriage of Jewish soldiers. The second meeting (1857) involved more prominent Jews: Dr. Abraham Neumann (Riga), the merchant Yekutiel-Zisl Rapoport (Minsk), the merchant Chlenov, (Kremenchug), and Rabbi Yakov Barit (Vilna). Among other topics, they discussed the establishment of state schools for Jewish girls.

In addition to the previous members, the third session (1861–1862) included Itskhok Eliagu (Eliyahu) Landau (Kiev), German Barats (Vilna), and A. Maidevsky (Poltava), Iosef Evzel Gintsburg, and two learned Jews from the Ministry of the People's Education—Iosif Zeiberling (St. Petersburg) and Samuel Iosif Fin (Vilna). The Commission examined ten cases on Jewish religious life and its first divorce case.

The fourth session (1879) was an "assembly of rabbis without rabbis." Apart from state rabbi German Faddeyevich Blyumenfeld (Odessa) and Dr. Avraham Harkavy (an Orientalist), the others were secular professionals: Hirsh Shapiro (Kovno), Zelman Lyubich (Minsk), Meier Levin (Pinsk), Baron Goratsy Gintsburg (Kiev), and I. I. Kaufman (Odessa). They examined eight cases of divorce and bigamy.



The fifth session (1893–1894) reflected the aggressive campaign of the Jewish Orthodox leadership to reassert their authority and preserve tradition. It involved four enlightened Jews (German Barats, Iakov Gottesman, Samuil Simkhovich, Avraam Katlovker) and three prominent Orthodox leaders: rabbis Tsvi Rabinovich (Vilna), Samuel Mogilever (Grodno), and theologian Yuriya Mileikovsky (Mogilev). They examined twenty-seven cases on marriage, divorce, and religious rituals.

The final sixth session (1910) was a victory for the Orthodox camp, which promised to wean Jews from revolutionary activities. Save for one jurist, Moisie Mazor (Kiev), the others were rabbis: Yehuda Leib Tsirelson (Kishinev), Khaim Soloveichik (Brest-Litovsk), Oizer Grodzensky (Vilna), Sholom Shneerson (Liubavich), Shmuel Polinkovsky (Odessa), and Mendel Khein (Nezhin). They examined twenty-three cases on marriage and divorce, as well as questions about burials, cemeteries, spelling of Jewish names, oaths, and censorship of books.

Although the Rabbinic Commission only met six times, it addressed key religious and family issues that plagued Russian Jewry. The shift in influence from the enlightened to Orthodox camp brought a reassertion of traditional values, including the refusal to modify Jewish law to suit modern expectations. The state ceased to convene the Rabbinic Commission as the empire descended into war and revolution.

See also: JEWS

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CHAE RAN Y. FREEZE

RABKRIN

Rabkrin is the contracted name of Narodnyi Kommissariat Raboche–Krest'ianskoi Inspektsii (The People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection), the Soviet governmental institution responsible between 1920 and 1934 for overseeing state administration.

On February 7, 1920, the Soviet Central Executive Committee established Rabkrin to succeed the People's Commissariat for State Control (estab-

lished December 3, 1917). It was charged with ensuring the effectiveness of government administration and monitoring the implementation of state decrees. The former commissar of state control, Josef Stalin, remained in charge of Rabkrin until he was replaced in April 1922 by A. D. Tsyurupa.

The Soviet leadership soon became concerned that Rabkrin was failing to halt the growth of bureaucraticism, mismanagement, and corruption in the government apparatus. In April 1923, Rabkrin was merged with the Communist Party's Central Control Commission under Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev. The new body was given the broad task of supervising and rationalizing the administration of all party, state, and economic functions. From November 1926 to November 1930, Stalin's close ally, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, headed the joint control agency, which became a powerful political weapon for the consolidation of Stalin's power. In 1928, it was charged with overseeing implementation of the First Five-Year Plan, and played a major role in promoting unrealistically ambitious industrial planning and militaristic campaign methods of economic administration. In November 1930, Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev succeeded as head of the joint control agency until October 1931, when he was replaced by Yan Ernestovich Rudzutak. To strengthen the power of the economic commissariats, the Seventeenth Party Congress (1934) dissolved Rabkrin and transferred its functions to an emasculated Commission for State Control, attached to Sovnarkom and separate from the new Commission for Party Control subordinated to the Central Committee.

See also: CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION; SOVNARKOM; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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NICK BARON

RACHMANINOV, SERGEI VASILIEVICH

(1873–1943), one of the most famous of Russian composers.

Sergei Vasilievich Rachmaninov was born in Oneg, Russia. He first established himself with his much-performed *Prelude in C Sharp Minor*, presented

with Rachmaninov at the piano in the Moscow Conservatory auditorium in 1892. A few years later he composed his famous *Piano Concerto No. 2 in C Minor*. Soon after these successes he was appointed conductor at the Bolshoi Theater. Among his other works were an opera (*Aleko*, 1892), *The Bells* (a dramatic choral symphony composed in 1910), three instrumental symphonies, three other piano concertos, the *Vocalise* (two versions, 1916 and 1919) and other songs, the *Rhapsody on a Theme by Paganini* (1934), and the *Symphonic Dances* (1940).

With the coming of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917, Rachmaninov exiled himself first to Germany, then to the United States. In the United States he had conducted his first (in 1909) but by no means only concert tour. His several succeeding appearances in New York City's Carnegie Hall won him early fame. Critics remarked at the unusual span of his hands as his fingers raced through the rich chords and arpeggios.

After his departure from Russia, Rachmaninov's writing remained outstanding. Found in the repertoires of orchestras worldwide, the *Symphony No. 3 in A Minor* (1936) is a stunning work whose structure is studied in music school composition classes. Some of Rachmaninov's music was included in film scores. Among these was the eerie music of "Isle of the Dead" in a 1945 film with Boris Karloff. Various parts of his other works turn up in many films.

Rachmaninov's music is considered Romantic while bearing traces of typically Russian themes and style of composition. Although banned in Soviet Russia for more than seventy years, Rachmaninov's music is as much admired in his homeland as the music of Tchaikovsky, Musorgsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, or Stravinsky. Beginning just before the demise of Communist rule in the early 1980s, Rachmaninov's music again adorned the repertoires of Russian orchestras.

See also: BOLSHOI THEATER; MIGHTY HANDFUL; MUSIC

ALBERT L. WEEKS

RADEK, KARL BERNARDOVICH

(1885–1939), revolutionary internationalist and publicist.

Born Karl Sobelsohn to Jewish parents in Lvov, Karl Radek dedicated his life to international revo-

lution and political writing. He was active in socialist circles from age sixteen and in 1904 joined the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. Before World War I, Radek moved comfortably among Europe's Marxist revolutionaries. He became a member of the German Social Democratic Party's left wing in 1908, and wrote on party tactics and international affairs for the party's press.

Radek opposed World War I and was active in the Zimmerwald movement, an international socialist antiwar movement organized in 1915. He joined the Bolsheviks after the 1917 Revolution and was a delegate to the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, although he opposed the treaty and supported the Left Communist opposition. Nonetheless, in 1918, he became the head of the Central European Section of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and helped to organize the founding congress of the German Communist Party. In 1919, he was elected to the Bolshevik Party's Central Committee and became the Comintern secretary. He was removed from this post in 1920, but remained a member of the Comintern's executive committee and the Central Committee, and was active in German communist affairs until 1924.

In 1924, Radek sided with Trotsky's Left Opposition and in consequence was removed from the Central Committee. That same year he also opposed changes in Comintern policy and thus was removed from its executive committee. He was expelled from the Party in 1927 and exiled. After recanting his errors in 1929, he was readmitted to the Party and became the director of the Central Committee's information bureau and an adviser to Joseph Stalin on foreign affairs. Radek helped to craft the 1936 Soviet constitution, but later that year he was arrested and again expelled from the Party. At his January 1937 Moscow show trial, he was convicted of being a Trotskyist agent and sentenced to ten years in prison. He died in 1939.

Radek published routinely in the Soviet press and authored several books on Comintern and international affairs.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST INFORMATION BUREAU; COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; LEFT OPPOSITION; PURGES, THE GREAT; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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WILLIAM J. CHASE

RADISHCHEV, ALEXANDER NIKOLAYEVICH

(1749–1802), poet, thinker, and radical critic of Russian society.

Alexander Nikolayevich Radishchev was arrested for sedition by Catherine II in 1790 for the publication of a fictional travelogue. Newly promoted from assistant director to director of the St. Petersburg Customs and Excise Department, he had benefited from Catherine's earlier enthusiasm for the European Enlightenment. Following service as a page at the Imperial Court from 1762 to 1767, he had been selected as one of an elite group of students sent to study law at Leipzig University, where he had absorbed the progressive thinking of the leading French *philosophes*. After completing his studies in 1771 he returned to Russia, where he responded to Catherine's encouragement for translating the works of the European thinkers of the Enlightenment. His first literary venture, in 1773, was a translation of Gabriel Bonnot de Mably's *Observations sur l'histoire de la Grèce*, which idealized republican Sparta. Radishchev's first significant original work, published in 1789, was his memoir, *Zhitie Fedora Vasilevicha Ushakova* (*The Life of Fedor Vasilevich Ushakov*), recalling idealistic conversations with a fellow student in Leipzig on oppression, injustice, and the possibilities for reform. This was a prelude for *Puteshestvie iz Peterburga v Moskvu* (*A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*), in which an observant, sentimental traveler discovers the various deficiencies in contemporary Russian society.

At each staging post, an aspect of the state of Russian society is revealed. For example, at Tosna, the traveler observes feudalism; at Liubani, it is forced peasant labor. Chudovo brings unchecked bureaucratic power to his attention; he learns of autocracy at Spasskaya Polest; and at Vydropsk his attention is taken by the imperial court and courtiers. Other stops along the road illuminate issues such as religion, education, health, prostitu-

tion, poverty, and censorship in an encyclopedic panorama of a sick society. No single cure is proposed for Russia's ills, but the underlying message is that wrongs must be righted by whatever means prove to be effective.

Deeply affected by the French Revolution of 1789, Catherine now read the work as an outrageous attempt to undermine her imperial authority. An example was made of Radishchev in a show trial that exacted a death sentence, later commuted to Siberian exile. He was permitted to return to European Russia in 1797, but he remained in exile until 1801. Crushed by his experiences, he committed suicide the following year. His *Journey* remained officially proscribed until 1905. Its author's fate, however, as much as the boldness of its criticism, had won Radishchev the reputation of being the precursor of the radical nineteenth-century intelligentsia.

See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; INTELLIGENTSIA

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W. GARETH JONES

RADZINSKY, EDVARD STANISLAVICH

(b. 1936), playwright, author, popular historian, and television personality.

A man of the 1960s, Edvard Radzinsky was born in Moscow to the family of an intellectual. He trained to be an archivist but began writing plays during the late 1950s. During the 1960s and the 1970s Radzinsky dominated the theatrical scene in Moscow and gained international recognition. His early plays explored the themes of love, commitment, and estrangement (*101 Pages About Love; Monologue About a Marriage; "Does Love Really Exist?" Asked the Firemen*). In the final decades of stagnation under mature socialism, Radzinsky wrote a cycle of historical–philosophical plays exploring the

themes of personal responsibility, the struggle between ideas and power, and the roles of victim and executioner (*Conversations with Socrates; I, Lunin; and Theater in the Time of Nero and Seneca*). In the same period he also wrote several grotesques that drew their inspirations from great literary themes and myths: *The Seducer Kolobashkin* (the Faust legend) and *Don Juan Continued* (Don Juan in modern Moscow).

Radzinsky refused to define his dramatic imagination by the political events of 1917 and looked to a larger intellectual world. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, he shifted his creative efforts to literature, writing *Our Decameron* on the deconstruction of the Soviet intellectual life and history, as well as writing unconventional biographies of Nicholas II (*The Last Tsar*), Stalin, and Rasputin. In each work Radzinsky enjoyed access to new archival sources and wrote for a popular audience. His works became international bestsellers. Some historians criticized the special archival access he obtained through his close ties with the government of Boris Yeltsin. Others noted his invocation of mystical and spiritual themes in his treatment of the murder of the tsar and his family. Radzinsky has shown a profound interest in the impact of personalities on history but is much opposed to either a rationalizing historicism or an ideology-derived historical inevitability. Radzinsky became a media celebrity thanks to his programs on national television about riddles of history. In 1995 he was elected to the Academy of Russian Television and was awarded state honors by President Yeltsin. Appointed to the Government Commission for the Funeral of the Royal Family, Radzinsky worked diligently to have the remains of Nicholas II and his family buried in the cathedral at the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg.

See also: NICHOLAS II; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; THEATER

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JACOB W. KIPP

RAIKIN, ARKADY ISAAKOVICH

(1911–1987), stage entertainer, director, film actor.

Arkady Raikin ranks as one of the most popular and acclaimed stage entertainers of the Soviet era. He was particularly well known for his uncanny ability to alter his appearance through the use of makeup, and his witty, satirical monologues and one-man sketches endeared him to several generations of fans. As a young man Raikin worked for a short time as a lab assistant in a chemical factory, but his real passion was acting. He enrolled in the Leningrad Theater Institute, and upon his graduation in 1935 he found employment with the Leningrad Theater of Working-Class Youth (TRAM). He also found his way into the movies, and in 1938 he starred in *The Fiery Years* and *Doctor Kaliuzhnyi*. He also appeared in films later in his life and wrote and directed the 1974 television film *People and Mannequins*.

But Raikin devoted the bulk of his creative energies to entertaining on the stage. In 1939 he joined the prestigious Leningrad Theater of Stage Entertainment and Short Plays (Leningradsky teatr estrady i miniatyur), and in 1942 he became artistic director of the theater. He remained affiliated with this theater for the remainder of his career, even after it moved to Moscow in 1982, where it was renamed the State Theater of Short Plays. Raikin also found success as master of ceremonies for stage shows that allowed him to entertain audiences.

His many awards included People's Artist of the USSR (1968), Lenin Prize (1980), and Hero of Socialist Labor (1981). In 1991 the Russian government honored him by issuing a postage stamp in his name, and the Satyricon Theater (formerly the State Theater of Short Plays) was named in Raikin's honor in 1991.

See also: MOTION PICTURES; THEATER

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ROBERT WEINBERG

RAILWAYS

The first Russian railways, built as early as 1838, were tsarist whimsies that ran from St. Petersburg to the summer palaces of Tsarskoye Selo and Pavlovsk. Emperor Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) ordered the construction of these and the Moscow–St. Petersburg line, which, according to legend, the tsar designed by drawing a line on a map between the two cities using a straight-edge and pencil. One hundred fifty years later, the railway system had expanded to almost 150,000 kilometers (90,000 miles), or almost two-thirds the length of the network serving the United States. With 2.3 times the territory of the United States, however, the net density of the Soviet Union's rail system was only about one-fourth as concentrated. It was, and is, a system of trunk lines with very few branches, which supplied only minimum service to major sources of tonnage.

Naturally, this spartan system was severely strained at any given time. Soviet freight turnover was more than 2.5 times as great as that of the United States, making it the most densely used rail network in the world. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, Soviet railways carried 55 percent of the globe's railway freight (in tons per kilometer) and more than 25 percent of its railway passenger-kilometers. Compared to other domestic transportation alternatives, Soviet railways had no comparison: They hauled 31 percent of the tonnage, accounted for 47 percent of the freight turnover (in billions of ton-kilometers), and circulated almost 40 percent of the inter-city passenger-kilometers.

REGIONAL RAIL SYSTEMS AND COMMODITIES

In the Russian Federation of the early twenty-first century, the leading rail cargoes, ranked according to tonnage, comprise coal, oil and oil products, ferrous metals, timber, iron ore and manganese,

grain, fertilizers, cement, nonferrous metals and sulfurous raw materials, coke, perishable foods, and mixed animal feedstocks. The most conspicuous Russian carrier is the Kemerovo Railway, which hauls more than 200 million tons of freight per year, two-thirds of which is coal from the mines of the Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbas), Russia's greatest coal producer. When the West Siberian and Kuznetsk steel mills operate at full capacity, the Kemerovo Line also carries iron and manganese, iron and steel metals, fluxing agents, and coke. Rounding out the freight structure are cement and timber.

The only other railway that ships more than 200 million tons of freight is the Sverdlovsk, or Yekaterinburg, Railway in the Central Urals. The system's most important cargoes include timber from the nearby forests; ferrous metals from iron and steel mills at Nizhniy Tagil, Serov, Chusovoy and others; and petroleum products from the refineries at Perm and Omsk. Other heavily used railways comprise the October (St. Petersburg), Moscow, North Caucasus, South Ural, and Northern lines, each shipping more than 140 million tons per year. The much-heralded Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) Railway, which became fully operational in December 1989, remains Russia's most lightly used network. Three-fifths of the freight it transports is coal from the South Yakutian Basin.

REGIONAL BOTTLENECKS

In terms of combined freight and passenger turnover (ton- and passenger-kilometers), the world's most heavily used segment of railroad track stretches between Novokuznetsk in the Kuzbas and Chelyabinsk in the southern Urals. Parts of the Kemerovo, West Siberian, and South Urals railways each maintain a share of this traffic. While touring the Soviet Union in 1977, geographer Paul Lydolph observed train frequencies on this segment as often as one every three minutes in different locations and at various times during the day. By the 1990s, operating at 95 percent of its capacity, the West Siberian arm of the Trans-Siberian Railway was critically overloaded. Ironically, 40 percent of the freight cars were usually empty: Had these cars not been on the track, the West Siberian line would have been running at only 48 percent of capacity! Such was the waste inherent in the Soviet centrally planned command economy.

Since 1991, because of the alterations in the freight-rate structure—the Soviet system was heav-

ily subsidized to keep the rates artificially low—and the post-Soviet depressed economy throughout Russia, particularly in coal mining, iron and steel, and other bulk sectors, both the Kemerovo and West Siberian railway networks have witnessed sharp declines in usage. They continue to represent bottlenecks, but these were much less severe than the ones they became in the Soviet period. The worst bottlenecks in the post-Soviet era occur in ports—both river and sea—and at junctions. The absolute worst are found in Siberia and the Russian Far East, where traffic is heavy, there are few lines, and management traditionally has been lax.

POST-SOVIET PROBLEMS

Since 1991, railway headaches have been less associated with capacity and more with costs. In the early 1990s, the Yeltsin government introduced free-market principles and eliminated the artificial constraints on prices and freight rates that had prevailed in the USSR. The de-emphasis on the military sector, which controlled at least one-fourth of the Soviet economy, proved to be a devastating blow to heavy industry and rail transport. The multiplier effect diffused throughout the economy of the Russian Federation, and soon fewer goods and less output required circulation, and those needing it had to be sent it at burdensome rates. Spiraling inflation and underemployment brought many industries to the edge of bankruptcy. Those industries that survived often were deep in debt to the railroads, which carried the output simply because they had nothing else to carry. Soon the railroads, which were themselves in debt to their energy suppliers, began to demand payment from the indebted industries. This engendered a vicious cycle wherein everyone was living on IOUs: industries owed the railways, which owed the energy suppliers, who in turn owed the mining companies that owed the miners, who could not buy the products of industry.

By 1991, the Soviet rail network was 35 to 40 percent electrified, and much of this electricity came from coal-fired power plants. When the railways could not pay their energy bill, coal miners did not get paid. Since 1989, miners' strikes over wages and perquisites have often crippled the electrified railways. At times the miners have blocked the track to protest their privations. Since the year 2000, this vicious cycle has been alleviated because of high international prices on petroleum and natural gas. The resultant increase in foreign exchange income



Vladivostok is the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway. © WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS

has brought some relief to the Russian economy. Wage arrears have been eliminated at least temporarily, and the economy, including the Russian railways, appears to have turned the corner.

See also: BAIKAL-AMUR MAGISTRAL RAILWAY; INDUSTRIALIZATION; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

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RAIONIROVANIE

Having inherited from the tsarist government a large number of territorial divisions and subdivisions, the Soviet leadership attempted to reduce their numbers and simplify their bureaucracies. Undertaken in the 1920s, this project to reorganize the internal administrative map of Soviet Russia was called *raionirovanie*, which can be translated as regionalization. Soviet planners implemented raionirovanie not only as a way of rationalizing administrative structures, but as an essential tool for the centralized planning of economic activity.

Before the reforms, Soviet central officials regarded the territorial divisions they inherited as cumbersome and archaic obstacles to economic growth. The basic divisions in tsarist administration were the province (*guberniya*), county (*uezd*), rural district (*volost*), and village (*selo*). Their number expanded quickly in the first five years of the new regime, fueling Bolshevik concerns about bureaucracy—the perils of an expanding, unruly, and unresponsive state administration. Specialists in Gosplan (the State Planning Commission) desired to reshape territorial administration to conform to their vision of the economic needs of the country. Its planners designed new territorial units that sought to follow the contours of regional agricultural and industrial economies, based on natural resources, culture, and patterns of production.

As a result of raionirovanie, the country's provinces were replaced by regions (*oblast* or *krai*), which were divided into departments (*okrugs* replaced the counties), which were themselves divided into districts (*raions*, which replaced the old rural counties.) In light of a scarcity of trained administrators, each of these new units was larger than the old, and therefore had less contact with the population. The first areas subject to regionalization were the Urals, the Northern Caucasus, and Siberia, between 1924 and 1926. Raionirovanie continued in other areas of the country throughout the decade, and was largely complete by 1929. The process of creating regional economic planning agencies under the direct, centralized leadership of Moscow became a part of the essential infrastructure of the Five-Year plans, first adopted in 1928.

Objections to regionalization were raised by the Commissariat of Nationalities and local leaders in the autonomous and national republics, especially in Ukraine, on the grounds that the centrally designed plans overlooked diversity in local culture and tradition as they sought to rationalize and centralize administration while maximizing economic growth. Indeed, regionalization sought to eliminate much of what remained of the tsarist administration in the countryside and the provinces. Beyond the reorganization of territorial subdivisions, names of cities, towns, and capitals were changed, as were traditional borders, and, so planners hoped, loyalties to the old ways. Similar to Napoleonic-era bureaucratic reforms in France, the ultimate aim was not only to rationalize administration and economy, but to reshape popular mentalities in line with conditions in a new, post-revolutionary era.

See also: LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET

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RAPALLO, TREATY OF

The Treaty of Rapallo was signed by Germany and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic on April 16, 1922.

As part of a plan to encourage economic recovery after World War I, the Allies invited Germany and Soviet Russia to a European conference in Genoa, Italy, in April 1922. Lenin accepted the invitation and designated Foreign Minister Georgy Chicherin to lead the Soviet delegation. Accompanied by Maxim Litvinov, Leonid Krasin, and others, Chicherin stopped in Berlin on his way to Italy and worked out a draft treaty. The German government, still hopeful for a favorable settlement at Genoa, refused to formalize the treaty immediately. In Genoa, the Allied delegations insisted that the Soviet government recognize the debts of the pre-revolutionary governments. The Soviets countered with an offer to repay the debts and compensate property owners if the Allies paid for the destruction caused by Allied intervention. While these negotiations remained deadlocked, the German delegation worried that an Allied-Soviet treaty would

leave Germany further isolated. When the Soviet delegation proposed a private meeting, the Germans accepted, and the Russian-German treaty was signed by Chicherin and German foreign minister Walter Rathenau.

The two sides agreed to drop all wartime claims against each other, to cooperate economically, and to establish diplomatic relations. The Treaty of Rapallo surprised the Western powers. Germany ended its isolation with an apparent shift to an Eastern policy, while Soviet Russia found a trading partner and won normalization of relations without resolving the debt issue. This special relationship between Soviet Russia and Germany, including some military cooperation, lasted for ten years.

See also: GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; WORLD WAR I

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RAPP *See* RUSSIAN ASSOCIATION OF PROLETARIAN WRITERS.

RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH

(1869–1916), mystic and holy man who befriended Nicholas II and attained considerable power in late Imperial Russia.

Born at Pokrovskoye, Siberia, January 10, 1869, Rasputin was the son of Yefim, a prosperous, literate peasant. Young Grigory was alternately moody and mystical, drunken and rakish. Marriage did not settle him, but a pilgrimage to Verkhoture Monastery, as punishment for vandalism (1885), was decisive. The hermit Makary persuaded Grigory to become a *strannik* (wanderer, religious pilgrim). Rasputin also met the *khlysty* (flagellants, Pentecostalists); though not a member (as often charged), he embraced some of their ideas.

Rasputin's captivating personality, his eyes, and a memory for biblical passages made him a local religious authority. Grigory never held a formal position in the Church, but people recognized him as a *starets* (elder, wise counselor). His spiritual gifts apparently included healing. Although of



Grigory Rasputin, photographed in 1916. THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSÉE DES 2 GUERRES MONDIALES PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

medium height and build, and not handsome, Rasputin's sensitive, discerning manner attracted women and brought him followers and sexual conquests. His pilgrimages included Kiev, Jerusalem, and Mt. Athos. Charges of being a *khlyst* forced Rasputin to leave Pokrovskoye for Kazan in 1902. By then, his common-law wife Praskovya had borne him three children.

Rasputin impressed important clergy and lay-people in Kazan, and they made possible his first trip to St. Petersburg in 1903. He captivated church and social leaders, and on a second visit, he met Nicholas II. For a year, his friendship with the royal family was based upon their interest in peasants with religious interests and messages. Rasputin first alleviated the sufferings of their hemophiliac son Alexei in late 1906. For the next ten years, Rasputin served the tsarevich unfailingly in this capacity. Joseph Fuhrmann's biography reviews the theories offered to explain this success, concluding that Rasputin exercised healing gifts through prayer. Robert Massie explores hypnosis, rejecting the suggestion that hypnosis alone could suddenly stop severe hemorrhages.

Rasputin exercised some influence over church-state appointments before World War I. The high point of his power came when Nicholas assumed command at headquarters away from St. Petersburg, in August 1915. This elevated his wife's importance in government. Alexandra, in turn, relied

upon Rasputin's advice in appointments, though neither controlled policies. As difficulties and defeats mounted, Russians became convinced that Rasputin and Alexandra were German agents, and that Nicholas was their puppet. Fearing this would topple the dynasty, Felix Yusupov organized a conspiracy resulting in Rasputin's murder in Petrograd on December 17, 1916. Rasputin was poisoned, severely beaten, and shot three times, and yet autopsy reports disclosed that he died by drowning in the Neva River. Rasputin was buried at Tsarskoye Selo until revolutionary soldiers dug up the body to desecrate and burn it on March 9, 1917.

Rasputin favored Jews, prostitutes, homosexuals, and the poor and disadvantaged, including and, in particular, members of religious sects. He understood the danger of war, and did what he could to preserve peace. But Rasputin was selfish and shortsighted. He took bribes and was party to corruption and profiteering during the war. Rasputin ended as a womanizer and hopeless drunk, who undermined the regime of Nicholas II and hastened its collapse.

See also: ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; NICHOLAS II

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JOSEPH T. FUHRMANN

RASTRELLI, BARTOLOMEO

(1700–1771), Italian architect who defined the high baroque style in Russia under the reigns of Anne and Elizabeth Petrovna.

Bartolomeo Francesco Rastrelli spent his youth in France, where his father, the Florentine sculptor and architect Carlo Bartolomeo Rastrelli, served at the court of Louis XIV. After the death of the Sun King in 1715, the elder Rastrelli left Paris with his son

and arrived the following year in St. Petersburg. Recent research suggests that the young architect did not return to Italy for study but remained in Petersburg, where he worked on a number of palaces during the years between the death of Peter (1725) and the accession of Anne (1730). Rastrelli's rise in importance occurred during the reign of Anne, who commissioned him to build a number of palaces in both Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Despite the treacherous court politics of the period, Rastrelli not only remained in favor after the death of Anne (1740), but gained still greater power during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna (1741–1761), for whom he built some of the most lavish palaces in Europe. Rastrelli's major projects for Elizabeth included a new Summer Palace (1741–1743; not extant), the Stroganov Palace (1752–1754), the final version of the Winter Palace (1754–1764), and the Smolny Convent with its Resurrection Cathedral (1748–1764). In addition, Rastrelli greatly enlarged the existing imperial palaces at Peterhof (1746–1752) and Tsarskoe Selo (1748–1756).

With the accession of Catherine II, who disliked the baroque style, Rastrelli's career suffered an irreversible decline. He had received the Order of St. Anne from Peter III and promotion to major general at the beginning of 1762, but after the death of Peter in July, Ivan Betskoi replaced Rastrelli as director of imperial construction and granted him extended leave to visit Italy with his family. Although Rastrelli returned the following year, he had in effect been given a polite dismissal with the grant of a generous pension. He died in 1771 in St. Petersburg.

See also: ANNA IVANOVNA; ARCHITECTURE; CATHERINE II; ELIZABETH; WINTER PALACE

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RATCHET EFFECT

The ratchet effect in the Soviet economy meant that planners based current year enterprise output plan

targets on last year's plan overfulfillment. Fulfilling output targets specified in the annual enterprise plan, the *techpromfinplan*, was required for Soviet enterprise managers to receive their bonus, a monetary payment equaling from 40 to 60 percent of their monthly salary. Typically, output plan targets were high relative to the resources allocated to the enterprise, as well as to the productive capacity of the firm. If managers directed the operations of the enterprise so that the output targets were overfulfilled in any given plan period (monthly or quarterly), the bonus payment was even larger. However, planners practiced a policy of "planning from the achieved level," the ratchet effect, so that in subsequent annual plans, output targets would be higher. Higher plan targets for output were not matched by a corresponding increase in the allocation of materials to the firm. Consequently, overfulfilling output plan targets in one period reduced the likelihood of fulfilling output targets and receiving the bonus in subsequent periods.

Planners estimated enterprise capacity as a direct function of past performance plus an allowance for productivity increases specified in the plan. Knowing that output targets would be increased, that is, knowing that the ratchet effect would take effect, Soviet enterprise managers responded by over-ordering inputs during the planning process and by continually demanding additional investment resources to expand productive capacity. For Soviet enterprises, cost conditions were not constrained by the need to cover expenses from sales revenues. In other words, Soviet managers faced a "soft budget constraint." The primary risk associated with excess demand for investment was the increase in output targets when the investment project was completed. However, the new capacity could not be included as part of the firm until it was officially certified by a state committee. By the time this occurred, the manager typically had another investment project underway.

In response to the ratchet effect, Soviet enterprise managers also tended to avoid overfulfilling output targets even if it were possible to produce more than the planned quantity. Several options were pursued instead. Managers would save the materials for future use in fulfilling output targets, or unofficially trade the materials for cash or favors to other firms. Managers would produce additional output, but not report it to planning authorities, and then either hold or unofficially sell the output. Due to persistent and pervasive shortages in the Soviet economy, and the uncertainty

associated with timely delivery of both the quantity and quality of requisite material and technical supplies, the incentive to unofficially exchange materials or goods between firms was very high, and the risk of detection and punishment was very low. Despite the comprehensive nature of the annual enterprise plan, Soviet managers exhibited a substantial degree of autonomy in fulfilling output targets.

During perestroika, policy makers lengthened the plan period to five years in order to eliminate the pressures of the ratchet. However, in an environment without a wholesale market, enterprise managers were dependent upon their supplier enterprises to meet their plan obligations, and fulfilling annual output plan targets remained the most important determinant of the bonus payments. In practice, lengthening the plan period did not eliminate the ratchet effect.

See also: ENTERPRISE, SOVIET; HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS

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RAZIN REBELLION

Of the four great rebellions that Russia experienced between 1600 and 1800, the rebellion led by the Don Cossack Stepan (Stenka) Razin has evoked the most popular feeling. It did not involve the most territory nor the widest diversity of population, but it lasted the longest, and the name of Stenka Razin has come to signify the very essence of Russian folk spirit.

Stepan Razin's life as a rebel began abruptly at the age of thirty-seven, in April of 1667, when he led a group of fellow Cossacks from their Don River settlements to the Volga River for the purpose of brigandage. The rebellion on the Lower Volga started as a Cossack attack on a fleet of tsarist ships sailing to Astrakhan. This success whetted the appetite of the experienced frontier warriors for further conquest. The state offered no resistance, despite the brigands' obvious intentions. In fact, government troops at garrisons in Tsaritsyn,

Chernyi Yar, and in Astrakhan occasionally joined the rebels in looting and pillaging the rich commerce of the Lower Volga. In the spring of 1668, after wintering at Yaitsk, Razin ventured into the Caspian Sea, lured by the bountiful traffic of the Shah of Persia. As many as one thousand Cossacks took part in this campaign, which struck not only at the shipping on the Caspian, but also attacked commercial settlements and towns of the Caucasus along the western shore, from Derbent south to Baku. After wintering along the southern shore in Persia, Razin's band resumed the campaign in 1669 along the eastern shore among the settlements of the Turkmen population of Central Asia. They then decided to return to the Don in the fall of 1669, with the riches and memories of their long and exhilarating adventure that provided the material for songs and legends that would be handed down for generations.

In March of 1670, Razin announced to the Cossack assembly (*krug*) that he intended to return to the Volga, but instead of sailing against the Turks or the Persians to the south, this time he pledged to go "into Rus against the traitorous boyars and advisers of the Tsar." After once again securing Tsaritsyn, Chernyi Yar, and Astrakhan by leaving comrades in charge of these fortress towns at the mouth of the Volga, Razin's band moved quickly up the river. In June and July, the townfolk of Saratov and Samara opened their gates to the Cossacks, and the garrisons surrendered and joined the rebel army. Razin again left Cossacks in charge to supervise the looting and pillaging, while he set out for the next fortified town, Simbirsk. (This town was called Ulianovsk for six decades in the twentieth century, commemorating it as the birthplace of Lenin.)

Razin was forced to lay siege to Simbirsk. After four unsuccessful assaults in September 1670, and threatened by the approach of a major tsarist force, Razin retreated down the Volga in early October. In the meantime, a massive uprising, involving tens of thousands of Russians and native non-Russians (Mordvinians, Chuvash, Cheremiss, and Tatars) erupted in a forty thousand square mile expanse of land called the Middle Volga region. For two months, local rebels controlled virtually all of the territory within a rectangle bordered roughly on four corners by the major towns of Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Simbirsk, and Tambov. The type of protest, the levels of violence, the character of leadership, and the extent of popular interaction reflected the socioeconomic realities of the

vast region as they appeared on the eve of Razin's arrival. Local issues determined the pattern and ensured the stunning success of the Middle Volga rebellion in the first two months. At the same time, these regional particulars eventually determined the failure of the complex and uncoordinated insurgency in the ensuing two or three months. The uprising was finally crushed in January of 1671 by the combined efforts of five Tsarist armies coordinated by Prince Yuri Dolgorukov from a command post in the midst of the region at Arzamas. In the spring of 1671, a group of Cossacks betrayed the location of Razin's camp on the Don to the Cossack chieftain (*ataman*), Kornilo Yakovlev. Yakovlev's forces captured Stenka Razin in May and brought him in an iron cage to Moscow, where he was tried and condemned for leading the rebellion, was anathematized by the Russian Orthodox Church, and on June 6 was hanged not far from Red Square and the Kremlin just across the Moscow River.

Thus the state succeeded eventually in destroying Stepan Razin and in imposing its will upon the townfolk, peasantry, the military, and the rambunctious Russian and non-Russian Volga frontier population. The rebellion solved nothing in the long run, and very little in the short run. Nonetheless, the name of Stenka Razin would live forever as a reminder of this exciting time, and as an enduring promise of relief to the oppressed. The Razin Rebellion expresses a profound truth about the meaning of Russia and its history. That truth is exhilarating and romantic, but at the same time it is violent, bloody, and hopelessly tragic.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; COSSACKS; ENSERFMENT; PEASANT UPRISINGS

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RAZNOCHINTSY

Raznochintsy were people of various ranks, a judicial category of population consisting of educated individuals from classes and estates in Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This included members of the clergy, merchants, petty townspeople, peasantry, minor officials, and impoverished nobility who had received an education and left their former estates.

From the 1840s the raznochintsy had a significant influence on the development of Russian society and culture, and became the main social stratum for the formation of the Russian intelligentsia in the 1860s.

The development of capitalism in Russia after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 demanded more educated people. After the opening of university education for the middle class, the number of educated people in the Russian empire rapidly increased. Thus increased the number of raznochintsy. Raznochintsy worshiped education and had a cult of science, believing that the main principles of life should be materialism, utilitarianism, and scientism. They thought that art should serve utilitarian purposes. The hero of the novel *Fathers and Sons* (1862), by Ivan Turgenev, Evgeny Bazarov was a typical raznochinet and nihilist. He believed only in the value of science and denied the worth of art and poetry.

Among the raznochintsy at that time was wide spread nihilism (from the Latin nihil meaning nothing). They denied the traditional values of the society, such as marriage and private property, and derided sentimentalism. They created their own morality and style of life. They called themselves "developed individuals," "thinking realists," "new people" and "critically thinking individuals." The women nihilists had short haircuts and smoked cigarettes. They often live in communes and participated in various groups and societies, where they discussed political and social problems. Raznochintsy usually chose independent liberal professions such as writers, journalists, teachers, scientists, and scholars rather than toiling in government service.

The Russian writers and literary critics Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolai Chernyshevsky and Nickolai Dobrolubov were raznochintsy. The "Letter to Gogol" by Belinsky became the "... testament and gospel" of (the Russian) radicals.

Intolerance and unwillingness to accept compromise was very typical for nihilists, the generation of raznochintsy of the 1850s and 1860s. Denying traditional values of the hypocritical society, they were very intolerant of the contrary opinions and created their own system of restrictions and limitations. Some historians explain the radicalism of raznochintsy by their social origins: many of them were the sons of provincial priests and former seminarians, and they were idealists and dreamt about creation of an ideal and fair state. Due to their radicalism, raznochintsy played a central role at the crucial moment in the formation of the revolutionary intelligentsia. By the 1870s nihilism as a social phenomenon almost disappeared and gradually raznochintsy transformed into part of the Russian intelligentsia.

See also: INTELLIGENTSIA; NIHILISM AND NIHILISTS

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REDEMPTION PAYMENTS

One of Alexander II's reforms was the emancipation of twenty million serfs in 1861. The Russian government paid former serf-holders for land that was then issued in allotments to the newly freed serfs. The peasants, however, were obligated to pay the government back for this land (plus interest) through what were called redemption payments. Each peasant household generally got less land (and less desirable land) in the emancipation settlement than it had tilled before emancipation, and the redemption payments were often in excess of the rental cost of the allotment.

The traditional peasant commune (mir or obshchina) was given the responsibility of assuring that its members would pay their redemption debt. The communes accomplished this by limiting the

rights of peasants to leave the commune prior to paying off their debt, and by redistributing land between households in the commune. This method of periodic redistribution ensured that each household had the resources to make its redemption payments, but continued a pattern of a peasants holding many small strips of land rather than one contiguous field. It further required that all peasants retain the primitive three-field system of crop rotation, and discouraged individual peasants from improving their holdings.

Peasants never accepted the redemption debt as legitimate, and many communes accumulated large arrears, which periodically were written off and then accumulated again. By 1905 the government realized that the payments were more of an irritation to the peasantry than they were worth as a source of income, and on November 3 of that year an imperial decree abolished them, partly as a vain attempt to forestall growing peasant unrest that led to the 1905 revolution.

See also: ENSERFMENT; EMANCIPATION ACT; GREAT REFORMS; MIR; OBSHCINA; PEASANTRY; SERFDOM

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A. DELANO DUGARM

RED GUARDS

Red Guards (also called Workers' Militia) were volunteer armed bands formed by industrial workers in the cities during the Russian Revolution of 1917. They played an important role in the turmoil of 1917, in the Bolshevik seizure of power, and in securing the new Soviet government. The term *Red Guard* originated in Finland during the Revolution of 1905 and reemerged in 1917, especially after April, to signify the more politically militant armed workers.

Volunteer armed workers' bands were formed during and after the February Revolution by industrial workers at factories to protect and advance the interests of the industrial workers during the revolution, to maintain public safety, and to guard against counterrevolution. They were loosely or-

ganized (mostly self-organized), chose their own leaders, and were independent of all political parties and the new Provisional Government. They attracted the more militant members of the working class and gravitated politically toward the radical end of the spectrum (thus the tendency in later writing to associate them with the Bolsheviks, even though Socialist Revolutionaries [SRs], anarchists, and even Mensheviks participated, along with non-party elements). Indeed, they were a symbol of the most emphatic worker self-organization and self-assertion. Their organizational base was the factory, and their loyalty was to it and to the factory committees and the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies, in Petrograd (the capital) and other cities. The government and more moderate socialists were suspicious of them but unable to suppress them.

The Red Guard grew in size and militancy during the summer and early fall as political tensions increased, the economic situation worsened, and workers sensed that the gains they had made after February were slipping away. Industrial workers increasingly saw the Red Guards as essential to protecting their economic and political interests. By the October Revolution, Red Guard detachments totaled about 150,000 to 175,000 men across the country, about 25,000 to 30,000 of them in Petrograd. The Red Guards and the Bolsheviks found common ground in the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" and the call for radical social reforms and an end to the war. As a result, a close working relationship developed between them.

The Red Guards played an important role in the October Revolution and the first few months of the new Bolshevik regime. In Petrograd they joined with soldiers to secure the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the proclamation of "Soviet power"—the new Bolshevik government. Red Guard bands played a similar role in the transfer of power in Moscow and provincial cities. They fought the initial armed efforts to overthrow the Bolsheviks and provided the new government with much-needed armed coercion. The Red Guards were an important part of expeditionary forces sent from Petrograd and Moscow in late 1917 and early 1918 to secure control over outlying regions. Some Red Guard detachments were incorporated into the new Red Army in 1918, others withered away, and the Soviet government formally abolished the Red Guard in April 1918. The essential features of the Red Guard and workers' militias—self-organization, local orientation, and elected leaders—were not suited to the demands of civil war or the new Communist era.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; WORKERS

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REX A. WADE

RED SQUARE

Red Square, like the Moscow Kremlin on which it borders, is one of the best known locales of modern world culture. Associated with military parades, aggressive rhetoric, and the Lenin mausoleum, Red Square came to symbolize Soviet power from 1918 until the demise of the Soviet Union. The term "red" in fact derives not from political sources but from a former meaning of the Russian word *krasnaia*: "beautiful."

From the earliest days of Moscow's existence in the twelfth century, some form of trading area probably existed to the east of the fortified center (kremelin) of the settlement. By the second half of the fourteenth century, evidence suggests that there was a more clearly defined area devoted to trade and located near the main, east towers of the Kremlin, whose log walls were at that time being rebuilt in limestone by Prince Dmitry Ivanovich. This space was enlarged for defensive purposes by the decree of Ivan III after the great fire of 1493, which destroyed many ramshackle trading booths.

The sixteenth century witnessed dramatic changes in the form and meaning of Red Square. Between 1508 and 1516, Basil III ordered that a large moat be dug along the east wall of the Kremlin, which had been rebuilt of strong brick under the supervision of Italian engineers. The highest sections of the wall faced Red Square, which had no natural defensive barrier, whereas the Moscow and Neglinnaia Rivers flowed along the other two sides of the Kremlin triangle. Between 1535 and 1538, the construction of brick walls around the larger trading district of Kitai gorod (Chinatown, lying to the east of the Kremlin) gave Red Square its own defensive system, and the moat was soon drained. Within a few years of the conquest of Kazan by Ivan IV in 1552, work began on the most renowned of Moscow's architectural monuments, the Cathedral of the Intercession on the Moat, pop-

ularly called Saint Basil's (1555–1561). With the consecration of this complex structure, Red Square gained a focal point that has remained to this day.

The first ruler to attempt to bring order into the chaotic trading zone of Red Square was Boris Godunov, who in 1595 ordered the construction of brick trading rows on the east side of the square. These rows, designated Upper, Middle, and Lower, faced the east wall of the Kremlin and descended almost to the bank of the Moscow River. Tsar Boris also commanded the rebuilding of Lobnoe mesto, the site from which state proclamations were read. First mentioned in 1547, this wooden platform was rebuilt as a circular limestone form with a low parapet. From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the area near Lobnoe mesto became notorious as a place of state executions.

The deliverance of Moscow from the Time of Troubles (1598–1613, an interregnum that included the occupation of the city by Polish forces) in the early seventeenth century was commemorated by the construction of the Church of the Kazan Mother of God (consecrated in 1636, razed in 1936, rebuilt in 1990–1993). In the same period, Red Square was repaved with flat logs, and during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, its north boundary was given a more imposing form with the construction of the brick Resurrection Gate (1680; razed in 1931 and rebuilt between 1994 and 1996). By the latter part of the eighteenth century, Catherine the Great embarked on another campaign to rid the square of wooden structures. As part of this process, the trading rows were expanded and Lobnoe mesto was shifted eastward to its present position.

In 1804 the square was repaved with cobblestones, but not until the rebuilding of Moscow after the 1812 fire was the dry moat filled and planted with trees. With the surge in Moscow's economic and cultural significance in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Red Square underwent a fundamental change that included the building of the Historical Museum (1874–1883) and the expansion of the Upper and Middle Trading Rows (1888–1893 and 1889–1891, respectively).

After the shift of the Soviet capital to Moscow in 1918, Red Square became the site of the country's major demonstrations and its cobblestones were replaced with flat, granite paving blocks. The Lenin Mausoleum, first built of wood (1924) and then in its current form (1930), became the most visible symbol of the regime. On November 7,

1941, ranks of soldiers marched past the mausoleum tribune directly to the front during the deciding phase of the Battle of Moscow. During the postwar period the world's attention continued to be riveted by the Red Square parades, but perhaps the most startling event occurred on May 28, 1987, when Mathias Rust, a teen-aged German pilot, landed a small plane in the center of Red Square. The repercussions of this act, which Rust proclaimed a gesture of peace, extended not only to the Defense Ministry but to the entire Soviet governing apparatus.

In the post-Soviet area, Red Square continued to be a place of public demonstrations and tours. Although debates have continued about the role of certain features, such as the Lenin Mausoleum, Red Square seems to be one of the few areas of Moscow that will retain its present form into the twenty-first century.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; CATHEDRAL OF ST. BASIL; KREMLIN; MOSCOW

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WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

RED TERROR

Initiated in 1918, Red Terror was a state policy of the Bolshevik government to suppress, intimidate, or liquidate real or potential adversaries of the regime. It started on September 5, when the survival of the Bolshevik regime was threatened by foreign and domestic foes. Individual guilt did not matter; belonging to a suspect social class did. It was, in other words, a class-based approach not to justice but to settling accounts with potential enemies. Its first victims were former tsarist officers, policemen, aristocracy, opposition parties' leaders, and property owners who had enjoyed privileges under the old regime. In 1918 about fifteen thousand were executed. In 1919, other social groups were targeted: former landlords, entrepreneurs, and Cossacks, attacked for their suspected anti-Bolshevik attitudes. In 1920 the policy was extended to peasants in re-

bellious provinces, along with thousands of captured White Russian officers and their families. White Russians were the counterrevolutionaries; the color white was a symbol of the old order and the color red was a symbol of revolution and communism.

Red Terror was carried out by a new institution, called the Cheka (an abbreviation of the Russian for "extraordinary commission"). The Cheka was a state institution, subordinate only to the Communist Party Central Committee. It was a political police force that did not enforce the law but instead administered systematic terror arbitrarily. Local Chekas, especially in the Ukraine, were notorious for their cruelty, and for mass executions carried out in the summer of 1919. It was a party instrument for the conduct of legalized lawlessness. Settling of accounts and personal gain were often motives for denunciation. New concepts entered the lexicon, among them "enemies of the people," "hidden enemies," and "suspect social origin." The long term consequence of Red Terror was a disregard for individual guilt or innocence, the institutionalization of a class-based approach to justice, the designation of "suspect social groups," fear and intimidation of entire population and, subsequently, an even greater wave of state-sponsored terror under Josef Vissarionovich Stalin.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; DZERZHINSKY, FELIX EDMUNDOVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; TERRORISM

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REFERENDUM OF APRIL 1993

The Referendum of April 1993 was the first and second-to-last referendum in new Russia, if one counts the national vote on the constitution in December 1993. It was held as a result of opposition between President Boris Yeltsin and the Congress of People's Deputies. Yeltsin, who was highly popular at the time, relied on direct mandate, which he received two years earlier in the elections, and the Congress made active efforts at limiting his power, changing the constitution in its favor. Not one of the referendum questions provided for direct action; thus they were only significant as cards in a political game.

There were four referendum questions:

1. Do you have confidence in Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation? ("yes": 58.7%; "no": 39.3%);
2. Do you approve of the socioeconomic political policy conducted by the president of the RF (Russian Federation) and by the RF government since 1992? ("yes": 53%; "no": 44.5%);
3. Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections for the president of the RF? ("yes": 49.5%, or 31.7% of all voters, "no": 47%, or 30.1% of voters);
4. Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections for RF delegates? ("yes": 67.2%, or 43% of voters; "no": 30.1%, or 19.3% of voters).

With 64 percent participation, all questions but the third (concerning early presidential elections) had a majority of "yes" votes; however, less than half the voters responded to the questions concerning early presidential and RF delegate elections. The last point is significant in that, according to a decision of the Constitutional Court, the third and fourth questions, affecting the Constitution, required a constitutional majority. For this reason the referendum had a purely psychological impact, though a great one at that. It showed that with increasing conflict, neither the executive nor the representative branches of power enjoyed the support of the absolute majority of the population. Despite all the burdens of economic reform, the president and the government he formed still had a signifi-

cant store of popular confidence. Taking into account Chechnya, where the referendum did not take place, and Tatarstan, where participation was little over 20 percent, voters in 28 out of 89 regions, including 14 national formations, did not express confidence in the president.

Appealing to popular support that he received in the referendum, Yeltsin first accelerated the process of revising of the new, "presidential" constitution, and in the fall he resolved the conflict with the representative branch by means of force. The congress was dismissed, and a vote was scheduled for the new constitution, as well as elections to parliament on the basis of this new constitution.

See also: CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES; CONSTITUTION OF 1993; OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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NIKOLAI PETROV

REFERENDUM OF DECEMBER 1993

A referendum of December 12, 1993, ratified a new constitution for the Russian Federation, which had long been sought by President Boris Yeltsin. The collapse of the USSR in late 1991 made the ratification of a new constitution most urgent. As the USSR no longer existed as a legal entity, its laws technically no longer had legal force. To fill this void, President Yeltsin and the parliament concurred that the constitution and laws of the former RSFSR would continue to be observed until a new constitution could be adopted. This was a necessary but unsatisfactory situation, since the 1978 Constitution of the Russian Federation was the product of the Brezhnev era and reflected the values of the now repudiated communist system.

Throughout the period from 1991 to 1993, Yeltsin quarreled with the parliament over the outlines of a new constitution. In particular, progress toward approving a new constitution was delayed by heated disputes over three major issues: the allocation of powers between the executive branch and the legislative branch, the allocation of powers between central and subnational institutions, and the process for ratifying a new constitution. The deadlock was finally broken on September 21, 1993, when Yeltsin issued a decree dissolving the parliament. Anti-Yeltsin members of parliament refused to disband but were evicted by force on October 4, as Yeltsin ordered troops to fire on the Russian White House.

The violent events of October 1993 cleared the way for new elections to be held on December 12, in which voters were asked to approve a draft constitution favorable to the president and also to elect a new lower house of parliament (Duma), called for in the draft.

President Yeltsin issued a decree on October 15 calling for a plebiscite on his draft constitution. The document was made public on November 9, leaving only one month for debate and discussion. Yeltsin's choice of terminology "plebiscite" rather than "referendum" was not accidental. According to the 1990 Law on Referenda, issues affecting the constitution required the support of a majority of all registered voters, rather than a majority of all those voting.

Voter turnout for the December 12 referendum was low compared to previous elections. Only 54.8 percent of eligible voters turned out, and of those, only 58.4 percent supported the new constitution. Had ratification of the new constitution depended on the referendum, it would have lost, since only about 31 percent of all eligible voters supported the new constitution. However, Yeltsin declared a victory for the new constitution in the plebiscite, and the document became generally regarded as the legitimate Constitution of the Russian Federation.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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GORDON B. SMITH

REFERENDUM OF MARCH 1991

On March 17, 1991, a referendum was held in the Soviet Union in which voters were asked the following question: "Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?" The referendum was sponsored by the Soviet president, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who hoped it would make clear that despite rising separatist sentiments in many parts of the USSR, a majority of Soviet citizens wanted the country to remain unified. The six union republics where separatist aspirations were strongest—Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia (Moldova)—boycotted the referendum. However, their populations made up only approximately 7 percent of the total USSR population. Overall turnout was 80.0 percent, and 76.4 percent of those participating voted "yes." In Russia, turnout was 75.4 percent, with 71.3 percent voting "yes," while in Ukraine turnout was 83.5 percent, with 70.2 percent voting "yes" (the lowest percentage among all union republics). In all six republics with traditionally Muslim majorities, well over 90 percent voted "yes."

The results were initially interpreted as a victory for Gorbachev and other defenders of the union. However, the significance of the referendum was undermined by the ambiguity of the question. It was unclear, for example, what was meant by "a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics." In addition, some of the participating republics added supplemental questions to the ballot. In Russia, for example, voters were asked to endorse the establishment of a directly elected Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) president, which was understood as an opportunity to support the leader of the Russian government and Gorbachev's principal rival at the time, Boris Yeltsin. In Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, voters were asked whether they supported their republic's sovereignty as part of a new union, while in Kazakhstan the wording of the referendum was changed by substituting "equal sovereign states" for "equal sovereign republics." In each case, the electorate approved the supplemental questions. Thus the referendum failed to resolve the Soviet Union's crisis of territorial integrity. Nine months later, the USSR passed into history as a legal entity. Nevertheless, in the long term the referendum left a legacy of post-independence resentment in those areas where

the electorate had voted in favor of a preserved union; many people felt that the USSR's dissolution had been opposed by the great majority of Soviet voters.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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REFUSENIKS

Beginning in the mid-1960s, a movement began among Soviet Jews seeking permission to emigrate to Israel. Despite an agreement to allow emigrations, Soviet authorities subjected most of those who sought to leave to a campaign of intimidation: Soviet citizenship might be revoked; many were fired from their jobs; they were harassed, their phones were bugged, and they faced hostile interrogations. The most vocal activists, such as Anatoly (later Natan) Sharansky and Vladimir Slepak, were arrested on charges of treason and espionage and sent to psychiatric hospitals or labor camps. Although eventually, in the 1970s and again in the Gorbachev era, tens of thousands of Jews were allowed to leave, many were denied exit visas for months, years, and even decades on grounds of national security or political animosity. These unfortunates became known as "refuseniks," and their plight, both in itself and as shorthand for the plight of Soviet Jewry in general was a *cause célèbre* in the West and a sticking point in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Jews had always faced pervasive discrimination in the USSR, but several factors coincided in the 1960s to crystallize Jewish national consciousness and stimulate a drive to emigrate. Some were the same factors that spurred the dissident movement. The Khrushchev-era Thaw produced new interest in Jewish culture. The trial of Andrei

Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel in 1966 signaled a crackdown on the intelligentsia, a disproportionate number of whom were Jews. The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia convinced many that their hopes for reform were pipe dreams.

Other factors were specific to the Jewish question. Jewish groups in the West began to organize around the issue of Soviet antisemitism and to make contact with Soviet Jews. Most importantly, Israel's stunning victory in the Six-Day War (1967) stirred the imagination of Soviet Jews and made them listen more attentively to Israel's call, while the vicious and scurrilous anti-Zionist campaign that followed made Jews feel that there was no place for them in the USSR.

Large-scale Jewish emigration began in earnest in 1971. Nearly 13,000 left that year, followed by 32,000 in 1972. Most of the early immigrants went to Israel. The flow of émigrés ebbed in the mid-1970s, then soared to a high of 50,000 in 1979, with more than half going to the United States before slowing to a trickle following the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow under the repressive hands of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Why did the Soviet government allow Jews to emigrate at all? One theory cites external factors, including intense pressure from Jewish and human-rights organizations in the West, Soviet attempts to win concessions in the era of détente, and legal measures such as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in the United States, which tied most-favored-nation trading status to a country's emigration policies. Another theory gives primary credit to internal factors: the pressure of Jewish nationalism itself, a desire to rid the country of troublemakers, the hope of using emigration to plant spies in capitalist countries. Both theories presume that Soviet emigration policy was coherent and followed a set of clear goals articulated at the top. Archival documents reveal the contrary; the central authorities had little expertise on the issue and reacted on the spur of the moment to biased reports from self-interested bureaucracies.

In 1987, after initial hesitation, Mikhail Gorbachev allowed the majority of refuseniks to leave as perestroika and glasnost gathered steam. With the fall of the Soviet Union, most restrictions on emigration were rescinded, and the Jewish exodus became a flood.

See also: ISRAEL, RELATIONS WITH; JEWS; SINYAVSKY-DANIEL TRIAL; THAW, THE

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REGIONALISM

Regionalism is the idea or practice of dividing a country into smaller units for political, economic, social, and cultural purposes. Politically, regionalism is linked to decentralized or federalist governments. Regionalism is both cultural and political, as its political success is linked to the development of a regional culture. From 1759 to the 1860s, Russian regionalism was primarily cultural. After 1861, Siberian regionalism combined cultural with political demands. Under the Soviets, regionalism retreated to a mainly cultural sphere of action. After 1991, regionalism became a major political force.

In the eighteenth century, regional studies arose from the center's interest in geography and from the periphery's traditions of chronicle writing and regional pride. In the Petrine era, Vasily Tatishchev established regional geography in theory and practice by organizing expeditions to explore the regions. During the eighteenth century, medieval chronicles evolved into more secular histories of a town or region. In 1759 Vasily Krestinin founded the first Russian local historical society, the Society for Historical Investigations, in Arkhangelsk. Krestinin's work on Arkhangelsk history merged the statist genre of descriptive geography with the chronicle traditions of the Russian north. Regional journals, such as *The Solitary Bumpkin* (*Uyedinnyy Poshekhnets*) (Yaroslavl, 1786–1787) and *Irtysk* (Tobolsk, 1789–1791), also helped to foster a regional identity. The establishment of provincial newspapers in all European provinces in 1837 furthered the process.

In the 1850s and 1860s, Siberian regionalism (*oblastnichestvo*) combined the scholarship of federalist historian Afanasy Shchapov and the political activity of Nikolai Yadrintsev, for which the latter and his group were arrested for separatism and exiled to Arkhangelsk until 1874. Siberian regionalists argued that Siberia was a colony of Moscow and demanded political rights. After 1905, Siberian regionalists were elected to the Duma and discussed

the idea of a Siberian regional duma. The provincial statistical committees, established in 1834, the *zemstvo* (1864), and the provincial scholarly archival commissions (1884) all published widely on regional issues.

After the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks set out to centralize the country. During the civil war, regions such as Siberia and Kaluga proclaimed their independence. By the end of the civil war, however, political regionalism was under attack. The most viable regionalist institution was the *sovnarkhozy*, or the regional economic councils. In 1932 they were eliminated. Until Gorbachev, there was little room for political regionalism. Moscow appointed regional leaders and, apart from some passive resistance, they were obedient. Culturally, the 1920s were the golden age of regional studies (*krayevedenie*), but that ended in 1929 and 1930, when the Academy of Sciences and the Central Bureau of Regional Studies and their regional affiliates were purged. In 1966, the Society for Preservation of Monuments of History and Culture was established, with the right to open provincial branches, which helped to create an institutional base for regional studies.

In 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the regions began to rise in political power. Legally, there were eighty-nine regions within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The RSFSR was unusual in that it was a federation within the larger federation of the Soviet Union. Its administrative divisions can be grouped into two main categories: the mainly non-Russian ethnically-based republics and the ethnically Russian territorially based regions. In 1990 the "parade of sovereignties" began, as the Union Republics (republics of the Soviet Union) became independent states. The RSFSR declared its sovereignty on June 12, 1990. Boris Yeltsin, who had just been elected chair of the RSFSR's Supreme Soviet, hoped to make Gorbachev's leadership of the Soviet Union redundant by ending the Soviet Union. In August 1990, Yeltsin told the heads of two of the RSFSR's autonomous republics to "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow." In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, despite Gorbachev's efforts to save it with the Union Treaty. The RSFSR's autonomous republics had been about to sign the Union Treaty both as members of the RSFSR and as Union Republics. Later, several of the autonomous republics argued for their sovereignty as independent states. After 1991 there were two rounds of treaties to bind the eighty-nine "subjects" (as all the administrative divisions were

termed) together as the Russian Federation. The first was the Federation Treaties, which divided powers between the center and the republics and regions in an often ambiguous manner. The 1993 Russian Constitution superseded the Federation Treaties, setting off the second round of treaties, which often allowed conflicting laws to coexist. Yeltsin's administration was marked by an increase in regionalism, as regional elites gained power while the central state collapsed. Yeltsin signed a series of bilateral treaties with the subjects, ceding central power and producing an ad hoc system of asymmetrical freedom.

Vladimir Putin has made curbing regionalism a main priority of his presidency. One of his primary interests has been to create a single legal space in the Russian Federation by ensuring that the law of the subjects can no longer contradict federal law. To this end, he has created seven super regions superimposed over the other eighty-nine and staffed by presidential appointees. In general, Putin's desire for a strong central state is not easily reconciled with regionalist demands for a more decentralized government.

See also: FEDERATION TREATIES; GEOGRAPHY; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; SOVNARKHOZY; UNION TREATY; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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SUSAN SMITH-PETER

REITERN, MIKHAIL KHRISTOFOROVICH

(1820–1890), financial official during the reign of Alexander II.

As minister of finances, state secretary, member of the State Council, and chairman of the Council of Ministers, Count Mikhail Khristoforovich Reiteren oversaw Russia's finances during the epoch of the Great Reforms. Reiteren was born in the city of Poreche in Smolensk guberniya. His father, a Livonian-German nobleman who distinguished himself in Russian military service, died when the boy was thirteen, leaving his widow to raise fourteen children. Mikhail attended the prestigious Imperial Lyceum at Tsarskoe Selo on a scholarship and graduated in 1839. Like most of his classmates, he embarked upon a career in state service, joining the Ministry of Finance in 1840. Three years later he transferred to the Ministry of Justice, where he remained until 1854, when he joined the staff of the chief of the Main Naval Staff, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich (the second son of Emperor Nicholas I).

As one of the so-called Konstantinovtsy, the circle of reform-minded officials around the grand duke, Reiteren carried out a variety of special commissions and inspections, and championed a series of innovations that included cutting the number of state-owned enterprises, abolishing obligated labor, and contracting with private firms. He was largely responsible for the Naval Ministry's establishing a pension fund for naval officers. In 1855 Reiteren went abroad to study finance and administrative practices in Prussia, the United States, France, and England. His reports stressed the utility of private capital in the development of the national economy. On his return in 1854, he was appointed to the special committees on railroad development and the banking system. The latter led to the founding in 1860 of Russia's first central bank, the State Bank. Reiteren subsequently returned to the Ministry of Finances as a senior official and in 1861 was named to the Commission on Financing Peasant Affairs, which worked out the financial arrangements for the emancipation of the serfs.

In 1862 Alexander II appointed Reiteren minister of finances, a post he held until 1878. During his tenure he fostered greater glasnost in Russian state finances (including the first published budget in 1862) and reformed the tax system to include more indirect taxation, such as excise taxes on spirits and salt. He sought unsuccessfully to restore the convertibility of Russia's paper rubles into gold and silver, and in addition worked to balance the budget but did not succeed until in the sixth year of his tenure. Reiteren was keen to sustain the empire's credit rating on international financial markets, but

his efforts were frustrated by the economic consequences of the Polish Rebellion of 1863. Reiter promoted private railroad construction, shaped the policies of the State Bank to enhance private investment, and drafted legislation for joint stock companies. His tenure witnessed a great expansion of Russian railroads from a little more than a thousand miles in 1862 to close to fourteen thousand by 1878. He favored both the integration of the national economy into the world economy and the development of Russian industry as necessary to ensure the empire's welfare and security. In 1876, as war loomed with Turkey, Reiter warned Alexander II that the conflict would threaten Russia's credit and finances, offering to resign when Alexander II nonetheless decided upon war. At the emperor's request, he remained in office until the conflict was over and resigned in June 1878.

Reiter remained a member of the State Council, and in 1881 Alexander III appointed him chairman of the Council of Ministers, a post he held until 1886, when he retired because of poor health.

See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST; GREAT REFORMS; RAILWAYS

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JACOB W. KIPP

RELIGION

Russia has been multireligious from its very inception. When Kiev Rus adopted Eastern Orthodoxy in 988, a gradual Christianization began, advancing slowly from urban elites to the lower classes and countryside. Pagan belief and practice persisted, however, and was sometimes incorporated into Orthodox ritual. Prerevolutionary historians termed the resulting syncretism "dual faith" (*dvoyeveriye*), emphasizing the survival of paganism and superficiality of the Orthodox veneer. While simplistic, that reductionist view of popular religion suggests the complexity of religious cultures, the institutional backwardness of the church, and the daunting geographic scale of the task it faced. Not until the eighteenth century did the church, in any real sense, construct the administrative tools needed to standardize and regulate popular Orthodoxy.

By that time the empire was exploding in size and religious diversity. Although medieval Russia had absorbed peoples of other faiths (such as the Muslim Tatars), religious pluralism became a predominant feature in the modern period. The state annexed vast new territories of Siberia and eastern Ukraine (in the seventeenth century) and then added an array of new lands and peoples in the eighteenth (Baltics, western Ukraine, Belarus) and nineteenth centuries (the Caucasus, Poland, Finland, and Central Asia). That expansion increased the size and complexity of the non-Orthodox population exponentially. Although, according to the census of 1897, the population remained predominantly Eastern Orthodox (69.3%), the empire had substantial numbers of non-Orthodox believers (often concentrated in geographic areas): Muslims (11.1%), Catholics (9.1%), Jews (4.2%), Lutherans (2.7%), Old Believers (1.8%), and various other Christian and non-Christian groups. Indeed, the figures on the non-Orthodox side are understated: the census failed to record adherents of persecuted movements seeking to evade legal trouble.

This waxing religious pluralism posed a serious problem for a regime once imbued with a messianic identity as the Third Rome. Although the process of accommodation commenced in the seventeenth century, it sharply accelerated in the eighteenth, as the regime sought to recruit foreign mercenaries, specialists, and colonists. To reaffirm the precedence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the government adopted the principle of static religious identity: each subject was to retain the original faith (the sole permissible form of conversion being to Orthodoxy, with conversion from Orthodoxy criminalized as apostasy). For state officials devoted to *raison d'état* what mattered most was stability, not salvation—much to the chagrin of Orthodox zealots. Indeed, that secularity prevailed in the imperial manifesto of April 17, 1905, which, in a futile attempt to quell the revolution of 1905, granted freedom of religious belief. After an interlude of broken promises and rising tensions, the February Revolution finally brought full religious freedom (including freedom of official religious affiliation and practice).

That freedom was short-lived: Once the Bolshevik regime came to power in October 1917, it persecuted religious groups, with the assumption that such superstition would promptly wither away. Dismayed by signs of a religious revival, in 1929 the party unleashed a massive assault on all religions, systematically closing houses of worship



Procession of clergy outside Moscow's city walls, 1867. © AUSTRIAN ARCHIVES/CORBIS

and subjecting not only clergy but also believers to repression. To no avail: The January 1937 census revealed that 55.3 percent of those over age 14 declared themselves believers. That impelled the regime to redouble its efforts. In 1937–1941, hundreds of thousands were arrested and large numbers executed.

Although World War II forced the Stalinist regime to tolerate the reestablishment of many religious organizations, these encountered growing pressure that continued past Stalin's death in 1953. The post-Stalinist regimes proved indefatigable in efforts to efface the remnants of superstition. They did achieve a reduction in organized religion: the number of religious organizations in the USSR declined by a third (from 22,698 in 1961 to 15,202 in 1985).

Even if religious organizations had dwindled, the government proved far less effective in com-

bating religious observance. Indeed, data from the latter period of Soviet rule showed clear signs of religious revival. In the case of baptism, for example, even if the aggregate figures between 1979 and 1984 decreased (by 6.7%), authorities could not fail to notice increases in some non-Russian republics (19.9% in Georgia, for example) and even in the RSFSR (1.5%). Baptism rates, moreover, skyrocketed among non-Orthodox Christians, with increases of 43.6 percent among Lutherans, 33.3 percent among Methodists, and 52.1 percent among Mennonites. Data about monetary contributions—an increase of 17.8 percent between 1979 and 1984—gave the regime further cause for worry. These funds allowed established religions to bolster their central administrations (45.9% of funds), expand support for clergy (14.3%), and spend more on religious artifacts and literature (17.4%).

Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the mid-1980s brought a significant improvement in the

status and activism of religion. That, doubtless, was a key factor behind the stunning 36.6 percent increase in religious groups in the Soviet Union (from 12,438 in 1985 to 16,990 in 1990); in the RSFSR, the rate of growth was only slightly slower—32.6 percent (from 3,003 in 1985 to 3,983 in 1990). The expansion of organized religion hardly abated after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991: In the Russian Federation, the number of registered religious organizations rose fivefold (to 20,200 on December 31, 2000).

That growth has been somewhat troubling for the Russian Orthodox Church. Although a majority of the citizens in the Russian Federation profess some vague allegiance to Orthodoxy, observants are relatively few (4.5%), and still fewer attend services on a regular basis. Still more alarming has been the exponential growth of non-Orthodox religious groups, especially Christian evangelical and Pentecostal movements. In an effort to contain cult movements, the law on religious organizations (October 1997) posed barriers to the registration of new religious groups, that is, those that had emerged within the last fifteen years, chiefly from foreign missions. Nevertheless, by the closing deadline for registration on December 31, 2000, Russian Orthodoxy claimed only a slight majority (10,913) of the 20,200 religious organizations in the Russian Federation; the rest consisted of Muslim (3,048), Evangelicals (1,323), Baptists (975), Evangelical Christians (612), Seventh-Day Adventists (563), Jehovah's Witnesses (330), Old Believers (278), Catholics (258), Lutherans (213), Jews (197), and various smaller groups.

See also: CATHOLICISM; HAGIOGRAPHY; ISLAM; JEWS; MONASTICISM; ORTHODOXY; PAGANISM; PROTESTANTISM; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SAINTS

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GREGORY L. FREEZE

RENOVATIONISM *See* LIVING CHURCH MOVEMENT.

REPIN, ILYA YEFIMOVICH

(1844–1930), Russia's most celebrated realist painter.

The future master of realism, whose genius with the canvas put him on par with the literary and musical luminaries of Russia's nineteenth century, Ilya Yefimovich Repin arose from truly inauspicious surroundings. His father, a peasant, was a military colonist in the Ukrainian (then, "Little Russia") town of Chuguev. His talent manifested itself early, and at age twenty, he entered St. Petersburg's Academy of Arts. His first major piece, *The Raising of Jarius's Daughter*, won him the gold medal in academic competition, and with it, a scholarship to study in France and Italy. Although the Impressionists at that time were beginning their critical reappraisal of representation, Repin remained a realist, although his use of light shows that he did not escape the influence of the new style. Upon his return to Russia, he developed a nationalist strain in his paintings that reflected the political mood of his era. In this work, he connected the realism of style with that of politics, bringing his viewers' attentions to the arduous circumstances under which so many of their fellow citizens labored, reflected in his first major work beyond the Academy, *Barge Haulers on the Volga*.

Although Repin was never specifically a political activist, he was nonetheless involved with other artists in challenging the conservative, autocratic status quo. For example, he joined with other painters who, calling themselves the *peredvizhniki*, or "itinerants," revolted against the system of patronage in the arts and circulated their works throughout the provinces, bringing art to the emergent middle classes. Moreover, they chose compositions that depicted their surroundings, as opposed to the staid classicism of mythology; Repin shifted from *Jarius's Daughter* to Russian legends, exemplified by several versions of Sadko, a popular figure from medieval, merchant Novgorod. More impressive, though, were those among his works that evoked the reality of all aspects of contempo-

rary life, from the revolutionary movement to Russia's colonial enterprise, from *The Student-Nihilist* to *The Zaporozhian Cossacks*.

Repin also excelled as a portrait painter because he was able to communicate the psychology of his subjects. For example, his portrait of the tortured Modest Mussorgsky stuns with its ability to bring out varied aspects of the composer's personality. Repin's oeuvre includes portraits of most prominent liberals of his era, from Leo Tolstoy to Savva Mamantov, as well as the archconservative Konstantin Pobedonostsev. His paintings of historical figures, *Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan* and *Tsarevna Sophia Alexeevna in the Novodevichy Convent*, likewise stand out for their capacity to evoke the emotional.

Repin returned to the Academy of Arts in 1894, directing a studio there until 1907 and serving briefly as director (1898–1899). In 1900 he moved to an estate in the Finnish village of Kuokalla, outside of St. Petersburg, where a constant stream of visitors engendered a famously stimulating atmosphere. When Finland received its independence from the Russian Empire in 1918, Repin chose to remain there. The reacquisition of Kuokalla by the Soviet army in 1939 resulted in the renaming of the village to "Repino," a museum to the artist.

See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS

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LOUISE McREYNOLDS

RE P R E S S E D I N F L A T I O N

The Soviet State Price Committee (Goskomtsen) set prices for 27 million products during the post World War II era. It compiled data on the unit labor and capital cost of each good, and added a profit mark up. The resulting prime cost-based prices were supposed to be permanently fixed, but many were revised every decade or so to reflect changes

in labor and non-labor input costs. These adjustments should have been small, because the state raised wages gradually, and improved technologies reduced material input costs. Some sectors like machine building, where productivity growth was especially rapid, even reported falling unit input costs, creating a condition called "repressed deflation" during the interval between the establishment of the initial price and its revision. Had the Soviet Union been a competitive market economy, characterized by rapid technological progress and state wage fixing, strong deflationary pressures would have caused prices to fall continuously.

However, many prominent Soviet economists such as Grigoriy Khanin contend that it was inflation, not deflation that was repressed by the Soviet brand of price fixing. They argue that while prices were supposed to be fixed, enterprise managers driven by a desire to maximize bonuses tied to profits, circumvented the authorities, causing intermediate input prices and therefore unit costs to rise. Had the Soviet Union been a competitive market economy, strong cost-push inflationary pressures would have forced prices to steadily rise.

Some Soviet economists, such as Igor Birman, have claimed that repressed inflation was exacerbated by weak monetary discipline and soft budgetary constraints, which allowed firms to spend more than they were authorized. The purchasing power of these offending enterprises, and of the public, therefore exceeded the cost of goods supplied. This created inflationary excess demand that was easily observed in empty shop shelves, rapidly increasing savings deposits, and the public conviction that money was worthless because there weren't enough things to buy.

The evidence for this position is inconclusive, because goods were often distributed in worker canteens instead of shops, and there could have been many alternative reasons why bank savings rose. Nonetheless, the consensus holds that the USSR was, in some important sense, an economy of shortage, in a state of monetary disequilibrium that subverted effective planning and contributed to the system's undoing. Although repressed inflation may have seemed innocuous because Soviet growth between 1950 and 1989 was always positive, most specialists consider it to have been an insidious source of destabilization.

Repressed inflation was specific to the Soviet period, and has not carried over into the post-communist epoch, because prices are no longer

fixed or controlled. Price liberalization produced a bout of hyper-inflation in 1992, only partly explained by the so-called Soviet "ruble overhang," but the problem subsequently subsided.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS; MONETARY OVERHANG; RATCHET EFFECT

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STEVEN ROSEFIELDE

REVOLUTION OF 1905

The immediate background to the first Russian revolution, which, despite its designation as the "Revolution of 1905," actually began in 1904 and ended in 1907, was the unexpected and humiliating defeat of Russia by the Japanese. The defeat emboldened the liberals, who in the fall and winter of 1904–1905 unleashed the so-called banquet campaign for constitutional change. Meeting in twenty-six cities, the liberals called for civil liberties, amnesty for political prisoners, and a democratically elected constituent assembly. The banquets were a prelude to the dramatic events of Bloody Sunday (January 9, 1905), when government troops fired on peaceful marchers (organized by Father Gapon, founder of the Assembly of the Russian Factory and Mill Workers of the City of St. Petersburg) who wished to present Tsar Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) with a petition for political and social reforms similar to those advocated by liberals (significantly, without any demand for abolition of the monarchy or introduction of socialism).

In light of the peaceful tactics and reformist platform of the marchers, it is not surprising that the massacre of 130 people and the wounding of some three hundred provoked widespread outrage. Within a few weeks, many industrial workers throughout the empire went on strike to protest the government's conduct, assuming the role of a viable political force for the first time. Students at universities and high schools followed suit soon

afterward, disorders broke out among minorities seeking cultural autonomy and political rights, peasants attacked landlords' estates, members of the middle class defied governmental restrictions on public meetings and the press, and on several occasions soldiers and sailors mutinied. The entire structure of society appeared on the verge of collapse.

Incapable of coping with the growing unrest, the government alternated between strident assertions of the autocratic principle and vague promises of reform, satisfying no one. The revolution peaked in October, when a general strike, spontaneous and unorganized, brought the government to its knees. Once workers in Moscow walked off their jobs, the strike spread quickly throughout the country, even drawing support from various middle-class groups. Numerous cities came to a standstill. After about ten days, in mid-October, Tsar Nicholas, fearing total collapse of his regime, reluctantly issued the October Manifesto, which promised civil liberties and the establishment of a legislature (duma) with substantial powers. Most significantly, the tsar agreed not to enact any law without the approval of the legislature. In conceding that he was no longer the sole repository of political power, Nicholas did what he had vowed never to do: He abandoned the principle of autocracy.

During the Days of Liberty, the period immediately succeeding the issuance of the October Manifesto, the press could publish whatever it pleased, workers could form trade unions, and political parties could operate freely. It was a great victory for the opposition, but in a matter of days it became evident that the revolutionary crisis had not been overcome. The tsar made every effort to undo his concessions. Large numbers of supporters of the monarchy, enraged at the government's concessions, violently and indiscriminately attacked Jews and anyone else deemed hostile to the old regime. In the opposition, the St. Petersburg Soviet (council of workers' deputies) grew increasingly militant. The upshot was that the Days of Liberty came to an end within two months in a torrent of government repression provoked by the uprising of Moscow workers. Led by Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries, this uprising was brutally quashed by the authorities within ten days.

Nevertheless, the elections to the duma took place. On the whole they proceeded fairly, with some twenty to twenty-five million participant voters. To the government's surprise, the over-



Massacre at Tiflis Municipal Council, October 1905. THE ART ARCHIVE/DOMENICA DEL CORRIERE/DAGLI ORTI (A)

whelming majority of the elected deputies belonged to opposition parties. The newly formed Octobrist Party, satisfied with the political changes introduced by the October Manifesto, held only thirteen

seats; the extreme pro-tsarist right held none. On the other hand, the Kadets, or Constitutional Democrats, who favored a parliamentary system of government, held 185 seats, more than any other

party, and dominated the proceedings of the legislature. Predictably, relations between the Duma and the government quickly soured because of the legislature's demands for a constitutional order and for agrarian measures involving compulsory distribution of privately owned land to land-hungry peasants. On July 1906 the government dissolved the Duma. The deputies protested the action at a meeting in Vyborg, Finland, and called for passive resistance, but to no avail. The Second Duma, which met on February 20, 1907, and was more radical than the first, met a similar fate on June 3 of that year. This marked the end of the Revolution of 1905. At this point the authorities changed the electoral law by depriving many peasants and minorities of the vote, ensuring the election of a conservative Duma.

Never before had any European revolution been spearheaded by four popular movements: the middle class, the industrial proletariat, the peasantry, and national minorities (who demanded autonomy or, in a few cases, independence). But because of the disagreements and lack of coordination among the various sectors of the opposition, and because the government could still rely on the military and on financial support from abroad, the tsarist regime survived. Nevertheless, Russia had changed significantly between 1904 and 1907. The very existence of an elected Duma, whose approval was necessary for the enactment of most laws, diminished the power of the tsar and the bureaucracy. The landed gentry, the business class, and the upper stratum of the peasantry, all of whom continued to participate in the elections of the Duma, now exercised some influence in public affairs. Moreover, trade unions and various associations of cooperatives that had been allowed to form during the revolutionary turbulence remained active, and censorship over the press and other publications was much less stringent. In short, Russia had taken a modest step away from autocracy and toward the creation of a civil society.

See also: AUTOCRACY; BLOODY SUNDAY; BOLSHEVISM; CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DUMA; LIBERALISM; NICHOLAS II; OCTOBER GENERAL STRIKE OF 1905; OCTOBER MANIFESTO; OCTOBRIST PARTY; WORKERS

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ABRAHAM ASCHER

REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

A summit meeting of U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev took place in Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11–12, 1986. This second meeting of the two leaders was billed as an “interim summit” and was not carefully prepared and scripted in advance as was customary.

The Reykjavik summit unexpectedly became a remarkable far-reaching exploration of possibilities for drastic reduction or even elimination of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev took the initiative, advancing comprehensive proposals dealing with strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Agreement seemed at hand for reductions of at least 50 percent in strategic offensive arms. When Reagan proposed a subsequent elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles, Gorbachev counterproposed eliminating all strategic nuclear weapons. Reagan then said he would be prepared to eliminate all nuclear weapons—and Gorbachev promptly agreed.

This breathtaking prospect was stymied by disagreement over the issue of strategic defenses. As a condition of his agreement on strategic offensive arms, Gorbachev asked that research on ballistic missile defenses be limited to laboratory testing. Reagan was adamant that nothing be done that would prevent pursuit of his Strategic Defense Ini-

tative (SDI). The meeting ended abruptly, with no agreement reached.

Many saw the failure to reach accord as a spectacular missed opportunity, while others were relieved that what they saw as a near disaster had been averted. Subsequent negotiations built on the tentative areas of agreement explored at Reykjavik and led to agreements eliminating all intermediate-range missiles (the INF Treaty in 1987) and reducing intercontinental missiles (the START I Treaty in 1991). Thus, although the Reykjavik summit ended in disarray, in retrospect the exchanges there constituted a breakthrough in strategic arms control.

See also: ARMS CONTROL; STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

RIGA, TREATY OF (1921) *See* SOVIET-POLISH WAR.

RIGHT OPPOSITION

The Right Opposition, sometimes called Right Deviation, represents a moderate strand of Bolshevism that evolved from the New Economic Policy (NEP). Headed by Nikolai Bukharin, the party's leading theoretician after Vladimir Ilich Lenin's death, the Right Opposition also included Alexei Rykov, Mikhail Tomsy, Felix Dzerzhinsky, and A. P. Smirnov. In part reacting against the harsh policies of War Communism, the right urged moderation and cooperation with the peasantry to achieve socialism gradually. It favored industrialization, but at a pace determined by the peasantry, and prioritized the development of light industry over heavy industry.

Until early 1928 the platform of the right coincided with the policies of the Soviet government and the Politburo. This is not surprising given that Rykov was chairman of the Council of People's

Commissars (Sovnarkom) from 1924 to 1930, and Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, and their then ally Josef Stalin held a majority in the Politburo until 1926. Participating in the struggles for power following Lenin's death, the right opposed Leon Trotsky and his policies, as well as Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and eventually the United Opposition. Toward the end of the 1920s, as Stalin increasingly secured control over the party apparatus, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were expelled from the Politburo and replaced by Stalin's handpicked successors, thereby enhancing the position of the right.

Their good fortune changed, however, following the decisive defeat of the Left Opposition at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927. Having supported Bukharin and the right's position on the cautious implementation of the NEP, Stalin, in 1928, abruptly reversed his position and adopted the rapid industrialization program of the left. He and his new majority in the Politburo then attacked the Right Opposition over various issues including forced grain requisitions, the anti-specialist campaign, and industrial production targets for the First Five-Year Plan. Outnumbered and unable to launch a strong challenge against Stalin, the Right Opposition sought an alliance with Kamenev and Zinoviev, for which the Right Opposition was subsequently denounced at the Central Committee plenum in January 1929.

Under attack politically, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy signed a statement acknowledging their "errors" that was published in *Pravda* in November 1929. Nonetheless, Bukharin was removed from the Politburo that same month. The following year Rykov and Tomsy were also expelled from the Politburo. By the end of 1930 the trio was removed from all positions of leadership, and moderates throughout the party were purged; this officially marked the defeat of the Right Opposition. Having already destroyed the Left Opposition, Stalin was now the uncontested leader of the Soviet Union.

The Great Purges of the late 1930s brought further tragedy to the leaders of the defunct Right Opposition. With his arrest imminent, Tomsy committed suicide in 1936. Two years later Bukharin and Rykov were arrested and tried in the infamous show trials of 1938. Despite the fact that they could not possibly have committed the crimes that they were accused of, and that their confessions were clearly secured under torture, both were found guilty and executed.

See also: BUKHARIN, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; LEFT OPPOSITION; RYKOV, ALEXEI IVANOVICH; TOMSKY, MIKHAIL PAVLOVICH; UNITED OPPOSITION

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KATE TRASCHEL

RIMSKY-KORSAKOV, NIKOLAI ANDREYEVICH

(1844–1908), prominent Russian composer who contributed to the formation of a Russian national music in the nineteenth century.

Nikolai Andreyevich Rimsky-Korsakov, a naval officer by training, came to study professionally as a member of Mily Balakirev's amateur circle of composers ("Mighty Handful"). An active composer under Balakirev's guidance since 1861, he became a professor of composition and instrumentation at the St. Petersburg conservatory ten years later. Rimsky-Korsakov is regarded as one of the most significant composers and musicians of Russia in the nineteenth century.

Together with Balakirev and Alexander Borodin, who numbered among his closest creative partners in the 1860s, Rimsky-Korsakov developed a specific Russian idiom in orchestral music. As an opera composer, although he wrote a few historical operas, Rimsky-Korsakov especially stands for the Russian fairy and magic opera, the genre of which he brought to a culmination. Of high though not undisputed merit were the completions, revisions, and instrumentations of opera torsos of Borodin and Musorgsky, even if Rimsky-Korsakov partly neglected the composers' original intentions. Finally, he made significant contributions to musical education. Not only did his textbook of harmony become the widely acknowledged standard in Russia, but he also acted as a teacher and example for outstanding Russian composers. His support of students in the Revolution of 1905 (leading

to his dismissal as professor) and his opera "The Golden Cockerel" (1907), which was condemned by censorship, because it could be interpreted as criticism of tsarist rule, contributed to his renown and reputation as an artist with political revolutionary leanings. Furthermore, as one of the masters of Russian national music in the nineteenth century, he achieved enormous importance and influence in the cultural history of the Soviet Union, particularly since the cultural changes toward Great Russian patriotism under Stalin.

See also: MIGHTY HANDFUL; MUSIC; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS

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MATTHIAS STADELMANN

RODZIANKO, MIKHAIL VLADIMIROVICH

(1859–1924), an anti-Bolshevik who led the conservative faction of the Octobrist Party in the pre-revolutionary legislative Duma and served as president of that body from 1911 to 1917, then emigrated in 1920 to Yugoslavia, where he completed a memoir, *The Reign of Rasputin*.

Devoutly Orthodox, conservative, nationalist, and loyal to the tsar, Mikhail Rodzianko also believed in the semiconstitutional system established in 1906 and strove to make it work. He never grasped that Nicholas II at heart rejected the new order. The Duma leader was therefore always puzzled when the tsar ignored Rodzianko's pleas to rid the court of Rasputin's pernicious influence and to form a competent ministry.

An archetype of the old order, he came from a prosperous landed family, received an elite education, served in the army, and then became a district marshal of nobility and zemstvo executive. Chosen for the State Council in 1906 and elected to the Third Duma in 1907, Rodzianko became Duma president in 1911. He actively promoted the war effort after 1914, and in 1916 warned the tsar that incompetent ministers were undermining the struggle against the Central Powers and endangering the survival of the monarchy itself.

During the Revolution of 1917, Rodzianko urged the tsar to appoint a government in which

the people would have confidence and which he hoped to head. As the revolution deepened he reluctantly agreed to help persuade Nicholas to abdicate. Because of his political conservatism, he was not asked, however, to serve in the new Provisional Government.

As a believer in both the tsardom and constitutionalism, he could only watch in dismay as Russia sank into radical revolution and civil war. In emigration he found himself reviled by monarchists as having betrayed the tsar, and rejected by liberals as having failed to be reformist enough.

See also: DUMA; NICHOLAS II; OCTOBRIST PARTY; REVOLUTION OF 1905

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JOHN M. THOMPSON

ROERICH, NICHOLAS KONSTANTINOVICH

(1874–1947), artist, explorer, and mystic.

Born in St. Petersburg and educated at the Academy of Arts, Roerich established himself as a painter of scenes from Slavic prehistory. Works such as *The Messenger* (1897), *Visitors from Overseas* (1901–1902), and *Slavs on the Dnieper* (1905) combined a bold use of color with Roerich's expertise as a semi-professional archaeologist. Roerich joined the World of Art Group and designed sets and costumes for Sergei Diaghilev's *Ballets Russes*. His greatest fame resulted from his designs for *Prince Igor* (1909) and *The Rite of Spring* (1913), the libretto of which he cowrote with Igor Stravinsky.

In 1918, Roerich and his family left Soviet Russia for Scandinavia, England, then the United States. In New York, Roerich and his wife, Helena, founded a spiritual movement: Agni Yoga, an offshoot of Theosophy. Roerich's followers included Henry Wallace, Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of

agriculture (and later vice-president). His backers built a museum for him in Manhattan and sponsored him on two expeditions to Asia. From 1920 onward, Roerich's painting took on an Asiatic, mystical character, featuring gods, gurus, and Himalayan mountainscapes.

Roerich visited India in 1923. From 1925 to 1928, he and his family completed a mammoth trek through Ladakh, Chinese Turkestan, the Altai Mountains, the Gobi Desert, and Tibet. Ostensibly leading an American archaeological, ethnographic, and artistic expedition, the Roerichs also secretly visited Moscow, and the true purpose of their journey remains a matter of debate. Roerich established a research facility in the Himalayan village of Naggur, India, and lobbied for the passage of an international treaty to protect art in times of war. This effort gained him two nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1934–1935, Roerich, bankrolled by Wallace and the U.S. government, traveled to Manchuria and Mongolia. The expedition stirred up great scandal, leading Wallace and most of Roerich's supporters to break with him by 1936. Roerich's U.S. assets were seized. The Roerichs remained in India, supporting the freedom movement there and befriending its leaders, such as poet Rabindranath Tagore and Jawaharlal Nehru. Roerich died in 1947. Nehru, the new leader of independent India, gave his eulogy.

Roerich's occultism and the mysteries surrounding his expeditions have shaped both popular and academic understanding of his life. Western scholars acknowledge the importance of his early art, but have criticized his later works; they have tended to be suspicious about the political and mystical motives underlying his expeditions. After the late 1950s, Soviet scholars reinstated Roerich as an important figure in the Russian artistic canon, but downplayed his occultism and controversial actions. Non-academic writing on Roerich is either hagiographic—Agni Yoga has a worldwide following, and the Russian movement has enjoyed tremendous popularity since 1987—or lurid and sensationalistic, accusing Roerich of espionage and collaboration with the Soviet secret police. Since the early 1990s, emerging evidence indicates that the Roerichs believed a new age was imminent and that one of its necessary preconditions was the establishment of a pan-Buddhist state linking Siberia, Mongolia, Central Asia, and Tibet. The Roerichs also sought to involve themselves in the struggle between Tibet's key political figures, the Panchen (Tashi) Lama and Dalai Lama. Rather than

straightforward espionage, the purpose of Roerich's expeditions seems to have been the fulfillment of these grandiose, but ultimately quixotic, ambitions.

See also: BALLET; OCCULTISM

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JOHN MCCANNON

ROMANIA, RELATIONS WITH

Founded in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia gained their autonomy from the Hungarian kings with the election of native princes. The status of these principalities was comparable to that of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, and they shared allegiance to the patriarch of Constantinople. During the fifteenth century, the chief threat they faced was Turkish expansionism in the Balkans. Their earliest contact with Moscow occurred when Ivan III negotiated a marriage alliance with Steven the Great of Moldavia (1457–1604). His daughter, Elena, became the bride of Ivan the Young, whose son Dmitry became heir to the throne.

THE LIBERATION OF ROMANIAN LANDS FROM THE TURKS

As the power of the Romanian princes declined and those of the grand dukes increased, the former tried to switch their allegiance from Constantinople to Moscow. Such contacts encouraged Nicholas Milescu, a Moldavian boyar, to serve Tsar Alexei as ambassador to China. The earliest attempt at signing a treaty of alliance with Russia was made by Prince Dmitry Cantemir of Moldavia, who invited Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725) to deliver the country from the Turks. The liberation failed with Peter's defeat on the River Pruth in 1711, but it opened a career for Dmitry at St. Petersburg as a

Westernizer, and for his daughter, Maria, who dedicated herself to emancipating the Russian women.

The true liberator of Romanian lands was Catherine the Great (r. 1762–1796) who, in three campaigns against the Turks, reached the Dniester River. The Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774) gave Russia formal influence in the principalities, with two consuls at Bucharest and Jassy. French interference with these provisions occasioned the Russo-Turkish War of 1802–1812, which gave Russia the Bessarabian half of Moldavia. Although the Greek revolution of 1821 began in Moldavia, Tsar Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) denounced it because of the anti-revolutionary stance of the Holy Alliance (an informal agreement among Christian monarchs to preserve European peace). Russia's greatest gain occurred following the Treaty of Adrianople, when Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) established a protectorate over both Romanian provinces, thus taking over the nominal Turkish suzerainty. Although native Romanian princes continued to be elected, power now resided with the two Russian proconsuls who were headquartered in Bucharest and Jassy.

Russia demanded that the new generations be schooled at St. Petersburg, but Romanians preferred the schools in Paris, where many of their young people participated in the 1848 revolution against the July monarchy. When they returned home and attempted to continue that revolution in the Romanian capitals, Russia suppressed the movement and reoccupied the provinces under more stringent conditions. The Congress of Paris, which followed the Crimean War (1853–1856), suppressed the Russian protectorate, internationalized Danubian navigation, reunited Bessarabia with Romania, and attempted to revise the constitution of both states. The Romanians took the initiative of electing Alexander Ion Cuza in 1859 as prince of the United Principalities, as Moldavia and Wallachia were now called, but this arrangement disturbed Austria and Turkey more than it did Russia.

The overthrow of Cuza in a military coup, and the advent of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen in 1866, was greeted positively by Austria after he visited Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855–1881) at Livadia in 1869. The Bosnian crisis that led to the Balkans war of independence (1877–1878) gave Russia the opportunity to avenge its defeat in 1856. Initially neutral during this war, Romania nonetheless gave Russia a right of passage to Bulgaria, albeit with misgivings. However, when Grand Duke Nicholas ran into difficulties at Plevna, in Bulgaria, he ap-

pealed to Prince Charles for military assistance, and placed him in command of the Russo-Romanian forces, which were ultimately victorious. At the Congress of Berlin (1878), where postwar negotiations took place, Russia demanded retrocession of southern Bessarabia in exchange for recognition of Romania's independence.

Relations between Romania and Russia improved when the heir to the Romanian throne, Ferdinand of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, married Princess Marie, a forceful personality and the granddaughter of Tsar Alexander and Queen Victoria. In February 1914 Prince Ferdinand visited St. Petersburg to arrange another political marriage, this time between his son Prince Carol with one of Tsar Nicholas' daughters. During the summer the entire imperial family sailed to Constanta to further the marital alliance, but it came to naught because it incurred protests from Vienna.

With the outbreak of World War I, King Charles felt bound by treaty to join the Central Powers (Prussian and Austria) against Russia, but politicians of all the parties that had been affected by Hungary's repression of the Romanians in Transylvania forced a declaration of neutrality. Wooed both by Russia, which supported Romania's claim to Transylvania, and by the Central Powers who offered the return to Romania of Bessarabia, Romania's prime minister Ion Bratianu ultimately declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary, largely because he was impressed by Russian general Alexei Brusilov's victories in Poland. In 1916, the joint German-Bulgarian offensive forced the Romanian army to withdraw to Moldavia, where Russian troops helped them to stabilize the front. However, the fall of Russia's Provisional Government under Alexander Kerensky in November 1917 and the advent of the Bolsheviks to power in Russia undermined resistance and led to the Russo-German Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (December 1917), which the Romanians refused to attend.

Plans to evacuate the Romanian royal family to Russia were scrapped, although the Romanian gold reserves that had been sent ahead to Moscow for this purpose were never returned. When the pro-German government of Marghiloman finally surrendered in the Treaty of Bucharest, Southern Dobrogea was ceded to Germany's ally, Bulgaria, and southern Bessarabia was returned to Romania. Within the province there raged civil war between the Red army, Ukrainian partisans, and Romanian nationalists who had convened a council and proclaimed independence from Russia.

Great Romania of the interwar years formally came into existence as a result of the Conference of Paris in 1918. The cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was signed at the Treaty of Sevres, but was never recognized by the newly reconstituted Soviet Union. Romania initially had no contact with the Soviets, and a *cordon sanitaire* was maintained by a network of alliances (known as the "little entente"), with French backing (1921). Diplomatic relations were finally reopened in 1934 due to the efforts of Romania's long-serving foreign secretary, Nicolae Titulescu, who worked against the wishes of the newly crowned King Carol II. Conscious of Hitler's increasing threat to European security at this time, Titulescu worked out a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union on the eve of the Munich crisis of 1938. This pact allowed the Soviet airforce to cross Romanian territory in defense of Czechoslovakia, but Stalin never took advantage of this offer, having secretly allied himself with Hitler at that time.

When Hitler and Russia attacked and then divided Poland, neutral Romania gave refuge to the remnants of the Polish opposition forces, most of whom had come from the Russian zone and later fought alongside the French and British, much to Stalin's annoyance. With the fall of France, Romania also fell within the German orbit, leading to the dictatorship of Marshall Ion Antonescu. The dismantling of Romania began with the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, which ceded Bessarabia and northern Bucovina to the Soviet Union (August 2, 1940). It therefore was inevitable that Antonescu would join the Wehrmacht in its attack on the Soviet Union (June 1941). The Romanian army occupied Odessa, which became the capital of "Transnistria," a newly created territory that was administrated but never formally annexed by the Romanian authorities. The siege of Stalingrad, in which 300,000 Romanians were killed or wounded, provided a decisive turning point for Romania's participation in the war, and persuaded Marshall Antonescu and King Michael to withdraw from the fighting. Though Molotov preferred negotiating with Antonescu, it was King Michael who, on August 23, 1944, did a political "about-face" and ordered the Romanian army to attack the Germans. The breakdown of the Romanian front greatly facilitated the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, hastened the Allied push to Berlin, and ultimately shortened the war in Europe.

In spite of Allied promises not to change the country's social structure, Romania's fate was

sealed by an agreement between Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin, in which 90 percent of Romania's territory was ceded to the Soviets. A Stalinist regime was established in the annexed territory, with Stalin's protégé, Ana Pauker, placed in charge. The Treaty of Paris (1947) confirmed the cession of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to Russia and northern Dobrogea to Bulgaria. Northern Transylvania, which had been taken by Hitler and given to the Hungarians, was returned to Romania at the insistence of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. Romania faced severe economic and financial conditions as a result of war reparations claims made by the Soviets, and the country was never formally recognized for their ultimate support of the Allied cause during the final years of the war.

With the forced abdication of King Michael in December 1947, the People's Republic of Romania was initially organized upon the Soviet model. Agriculture was collectivized, industry nationalized, the language Slavicized, and the former ruling class exterminated in Soviet-run labor camps. In 1952, even before Stalin's death, the secretary general of the Communist Party in Romania, Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, began purging those who were deemed to have been Stalinist supporters, and he attempted to construct a Romanian socialist state. The Polish and Hungarian crisis of 1956 and Nikita Krushchev's denunciation of Stalin triggered Romania's further disengagement from the Soviet bloc. Although cofounders of the Warsaw Pact and member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Dej also sought admission to the United Nations and UNESCO; refused to be involved in the Soviet conflicts with the Chinese, Yugoslavs, or Albanians; retained good relations with Israel; vetoed Khrushchev's plans to make Romania an agricultural state; and, in 1958, eliminated the Soviet army of occupation.

Dej's successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, who came to office in 1965, created the Romanian Socialist Republic and added to the Presidency of the Council the title of President of the Republic, becoming the leading political official in the state. Although obligated to resume Romania's alliance with the USSR, Ceausescu also established diplomatic relations with West Germany and strengthened contact with France and the United States by hosting Charles de Gaulle in 1968 and Richard Nixon in 1969. He also visited the Queen of England and re-established trade relations with the West.

During the Czech crisis of 1968, Ceausescu joined Tito in repealing Leonid Brezhnev's doctrine

of the right of intervention and refused to allow Romania's participation in military exercises with members of the Warsaw Pact. He went so far as to question Russia's right to occupy Bessarabia. Ceausescu also ignored Mikhail Gorbachev's attempt to soften his dictatorial rule over Romania, despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and that event's implications for the fate of the now crumbling Soviet Union. This precipitated a bloody revolution and, ultimately, Ceausescu's death. Post-communist Romania has made considerable progress with democratization and, with Moscow's consent, joined NATO in 2002.

See also: CRIMEAN WAR; PARIS, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF 1856; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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RADU R. FLORESCU

ROMANOVA, ANASTASIA

(d. 1560), first wife of Russia's first official tsar, Ivan IV, and dynastic link between the Rurikid and the Romanov dynasties.

Anastasia Romanova, daughter of a lesser boyar, Roman Yuriev-Zakharin-Koshkin, and his wife, Yuliania Fyodorovna, became Ivan IV's bride after an officially proclaimed bride-show. After her wedding in November 1547, Romanova had difficulty producing royal offspring. Her three daughters died in infancy, and her eldest son, Dmitry Ivanovich, died as a baby in a mysterious accident during a pilgrimage by his parents in 1553. Her second son, Ivan Ivanovich (born in 1554), suffered an untimely end in 1581 at the hands of his own father. The incident caused the transfer of power after Ivan IV's death to Romanova's last son, the sickly Fyodor Ivanovich (1557–1598), whose childlessness set the stage for the Time of Troubles and the emergence of the Romanov dynasty. After a prolonged illness, Romanova passed away in August 1560 and was buried in the Monastery of the Ascension in the Kremlin, much mourned by the common people of Moscow.

Scholars generally emphasize Romanova's positive influence on Ivan IV's disposition, her pious and charitable nature, and her dynastic significance as the great-aunt of Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov. This view, however, is largely based on later sources and thus reflects more the tsarina's image than her actual person. Recent research on Romanova's pilgrimages to holy sites and embroideries from her workshop suggests that Romanova actively shaped her role as royal mother by promoting the cults of Russian saints who were credited with the ability to promote royal fertility and to protect royal children from harm.

See also: IVAN IV; ROMANOV DYNASTY; RURIKID DYNASTY

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ISOLDE THYRÊT

ROMANOVA, ANASTASIA NIKOLAYEVNA

(1901–c. 1918), youngest daughter of Tsar Nicholas II and Tsarina Alexandra Fedorovna.

Anastasia Nikolayevna's place in history derives less from her life than from the legend that she somehow survived her family's execution. The mythology surrounding her and the imperial family remains popular in twentieth-century folklore.

Following the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, members of the royal family were imprisoned, first at the Alexander Palace outside Petrograd and later in the Siberian city of Tobolsk. Finally Nicholas and his immediate family were confined to the Ipatiev House in the Urals city of Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk). According to official accounts, local communist forces executed Nicholas, Alexandra, their five children, and four retainers during the night of July 16, 1918. Because no corpses were immediately located, numerous individuals emerged claiming to be this or that Romanov who had miraculously survived the massacre. Most claimants were quickly dismissed as frauds, but one "Anastasia" seemed to have better credentials than the others.

The first reports of this "Anastasia" came in 1920 from an insane asylum in Berlin, where a

young woman was taken following an attempt to drown herself in a canal. Anna Anderson, as she came to be known, was far from the beautiful lost princess reunited with her grandmother, as Hollywood retold the story. Instead, she was badly scarred, both mentally and physically, and spent the remainder of her life rotating among a small group of patrons, eventually marrying historian John Mahanan and settling in Charlottesville, VA, where she remained until her death on February 12, 1984.

No senior surviving member of the Romanov family ever formally recognized Anderson as being Anastasia. Instead, her supporters came largely from surviving members of the royal court, many of whom were suspected of using Anderson for financial gain. Anderson did file a claim against tsarist bank accounts held in a German bank. Extensive evidence was offered on her behalf, from eyewitness testimony to photographic comparisons. The case lasted from 1938 to 1970, and eventually the German Supreme Court ruled that her claim could neither be proved nor disproved.

Interest in Anderson's case revived in 1991, following the discovery of the Romanov remains outside Yekaterinburg. Two skeletons were unaccounted for, one daughter and the son. Anderson's body had been cremated, but hospital pathology specimens were later discovered and submitted for DNA testing in 1994. Although the results indicated that Anderson was Franziska Schanzkowska, a Polish factory worker, Anderson's most die-hard supporters still refused to accept the results. The Yekaterinburg remains were interned in the Cathedral of the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg on July 17, 1998, eighty years after the execution.

See also: NICHOLAS II; ROMANOV DYNASTY

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

ROMANOV DYNASTY

Ruling family of Russia from 1613 to 1917; before that, a prominent clan of boyars in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries.

The origins of the Romanovs are obscured by later (post-1613) foundation myths, though it appears certain enough that the founder of the clan was Andrei Ivanovich Kobyla, who was already a boyar in the middle of the fourteenth century when he appears for the first time in historical sources. Because of the way the line of descent from Andrei Kobyla divided and subdivided over time, there has often been confusion and misidentification of the last names of this clan before it became the ruling dynasty in 1613 under the name Romanov. Andrei Kobyla's five known sons were the progenitors of numerous boyar and lesser servitor clans, including the Zherebtsovs, Lodygins, Boborykins, and others. The Romanovs—as well as the Bezzubtsevs and the Sheremetev boyar clan—descend from the youngest known son of Andrei Kobyla, Fyodor, who had the nickname “Koshka.” The Koshkin line, as it would become known, would itself subdivide into several separate clans, including the Kolychevs and the Lyatskys. The Romanovs, however, derive from Fyodor Koshka's grandson Zakhary, a boyar (appointed no later than 1433) who died sometime between 1453 and 1460. Zakhary lent his name to his branch of the clan, which became known as Zakharins. Zakhary's two sons, Yakov and Yuri, were both prominent boyars in the last quarter of the fifteenth century (and for Yakov, into the first decade of the sixteenth). Yuri's branch of the family took the name Yuriev. Yuri's son, Roman, from whom the later Russian dynasty derives its name, was not a boyar, but he is mentioned prominently in service registers for the second quarter of the sixteenth century. Roman's son Nikita was one of the most important boyars of his time—serving as an *okolnichy* (from 1559) and later as a boyar (from 1565) for Ivan the Terrible. Nikita served in the Livonian War, occupied prominent ceremonial roles in various court functions including royal weddings and embassies, and, on the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584, took a leading part in a kind of regency council convened in the early days of Ivan's successor, Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich. Nikita retired to a monastery in 1585 as the monk Nifont. Roman Yuriev's daughter Anastasia married Tsar Ivan the Terrible in 1547, a union that propelled the Yuriev clan to a central place of power and privilege in the court and probably accounts for the numerous and rapid promotions to boyar rank of many of Nikita's and Anastasia's relatives in the Yuriev clan and other related clans. It was also during this time that the Yurievs established marriage ties with many of the other boyar clans at court, solidifying their political position through kinship-based

alliances. With the marriage of Anastasia to Ivan, the Yuriev branch of the line of descent from Andrei Kobyla came firmly and finally to be known as the Romanovs.

The transformation of the Romanovs from a boyar clan to a ruling dynasty occurred only after no fewer than fifteen years of civil war and interregnum popularly called the Time of Troubles. During the reign of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich (1584–1598), Nikita's son Fyodor became a powerful boyar; and inasmuch as he was Tsar Fyodor's first cousin (Tsar Fyodor's mother was Anastasia Yurieva, Fyodor Nikitich's aunt), he had been considered by some to be a good candidate to succeed to the throne of the childless tsar. The election to the throne fell in 1598 on Boris Godunov, however, and by 1600, the new tsar began systematically to exile or forcibly tonsure members of the Romanov clan. Scattered to distant locations in the north and east, far from Moscow, the disgrace of the Romanovs took its toll. In 1600 Fyodor Nikitich was tonsured a monk under the name Filaret and was exiled to the remote Antoniev-Siidkii monastery on the Dvina River. His brothers suffered exile and imprisonment as well: Alexander was sent to Usolye-Luda, where he died shortly thereafter; Mikhail was sent to Nyrob, where he likewise died in confinement; Vasily was sent first to Yarensk then to Pelym, dying in 1602; Ivan was also sent to Pelym, but would be released after Tsar Boris's death in 1605. Fyodor Nikitich's (now Filaret's) sisters and their husbands also suffered exile, imprisonment, and forced tonsurings. Romanov fortunes turned only in 1605 when Tsar Boris died suddenly and the first False Dmitry assumed the throne. The status of the clan fluctuated over the next few years as the throne was occupied first by Vasily Shuisky, the “Boyar Tsar,” then by the second False Dmitry, who elevated Filaret to the rank of patriarch.

When finally an Assembly of the Land (*Zemsky sobor*) was summoned in 1613 to decide the question of the succession, numerous candidates were considered. Foreigners (like the son of the king of Poland or the younger brother of the king of Sweden) were quickly ruled out, though they had their advocates in the Assembly. Focus then turned to domestic candidates, and then in turn to Mikhail Romanov, the sixteen-year-old son of Filaret, who was elected tsar. Debate among historians has since ensued about the reasons for this seemingly unlikely choice. Some point to the kinship ties of the Romanovs with the old dynasty through Anastasia's marriage to Ivan the Terrible, or to the gen-



A 1914 portrait of Nicholas II, his wife, and children. Clockwise from left: Olga, Maria, Empress Alexandra Fedorovna, Anastasia, Tsarevich Alexei, and Tatiana. POPPERFOTO/ARCHIVE PHOTOS/HULTON/ARCHIVE. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

eral popularity of the Yuriev clan during Ivan's violent reign. Others point to the fact that Mikhail Romanov was only sixteen and, according to some, of limited intelligence, indecisive, and sickly, and therefore presumably easily manipulated. Still others point to the Cossacks who surged into the Assembly of the Land during their deliberations and all but demanded that Mikhail be made tsar, evidently because of the close ties between the boy's father (Filaret) and the Cossack supporters of the second False Dmitry. A final and persuasive argument for the selection of Mikhail Romanov in 1613 may well be the fact that, in the previous generation, the Yuriev-Romanov clan had forged numerous marriage ties with many of the other boyar clans at court and therefore may have been seen by the largest number of boyars attending the Assembly of the Land as a candidate "of their own."

At the time of Mikhail Romanov's election, his father Filaret was a prisoner in Poland and was released only in 1619. On his return, father and son ruled together—Filaret being confirmed as patriarch

of Moscow and All Rus and given the title "Great Sovereign." Mikhail married twice, in 1624 to Maria Dolgorukova (who promptly died) and to Yevdokia Streshneva in 1626. Their son Alexei succeeded his father in 1645 and presided over a particularly turbulent and eventful time—the writing of the Great Law Code (*Ulozhenie*), the Church Old Believer Schism, the Polish Wars, and the slow insinuation of Western culture into court life inside the Kremlin. Alexei married twice, to Maria Miloslavskaya (in 1648) and to Natalia Naryshkina (in 1671). His first marriage produced no fewer than thirteen known children, including a daughter, Sophia, who reigned as regent from 1682 to 1689, and Tsar Ivan V (r. 1682–1696). His second marriage gave Tsar Alexei a son, Peter I ("the Great"), who ruled as co-tsar with his half brother Ivan V until the latter's death in 1696, then as sole tsar until his own death in 1725.

Succession by right of male primogeniture had been a long-established if never a legally formulated custom in Muscovy from no later than the fifteenth

century onward. The first law of succession ever formally promulgated was on February 5, 1722, when Peter the Great decreed that it was the right of the ruler to pick his successor from among the members of the ruling family without regard for primogeniture or even the custom of exclusive male succession. By this point, the dynasty had few members. Peter's son by his first marriage (to Yevdokia Lopukhina), Alexei, was executed by Peter in 1718 for treason, leaving only a grandson, Peter (the future Peter II). Peter the Great also had two daughters (Anna and the future Empress Elizabeth) by his second wife, Marfa Skavronska, better known as Catherine I. Peter had half sisters—the daughters of Ivan V, his co-tsar, including the future Empress Anna—but even so, the dynasty consisted of no more than a handful of people. Perhaps ironically, Peter failed to pick a successor before his death, but his entourage selected his widow Catherine as the new ruler over the obvious rights of Peter's grandson. This grandson, Peter II, took the throne next, on Catherine's death in 1727, but he died in 1730; and with his passing, the male line of the Romanov dynasty expired. Succession continued through Ivan V's daughter, Anna, who had married Karl-Friedrich of Holstein-Gottorp. Their son, Karl-Peter, succeeded to the throne in 1762 as Peter III. Except for the brief titular reign of the infant Ivan VI (1740–1741)—the great grandson of Ivan V who was deposed by the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna (ruled 1741–1762)—all Romanov rulers from 1762 onward are properly speaking of the family of Holstein-Gottorp, though the convention in Russia always was to use the style "House of Romanov."

The law on dynastic succession was revised by the Emperor Paul I (ruled 1796–1801) after he was denied his rightful succession by his mother, Catherine II ("the Great," ruled 1762–1796). Catherine, born Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst, had married Karl-Peter (the future Peter III) in 1745. After instigating a palace coup that ousted Peter (and later consenting to his murder), Catherine assumed the throne herself. When Paul ascended the throne on her death, he promulgated a law of succession in 1796 that established succession by male primogeniture and female succession only by substitution (that is, only in the absence of male Romanovs). This law endured until the end of the empire and continues today as the regulating statute for expatriate members of the Romanov family living abroad.

Romanov rulers in the nineteenth century were best known for their defense of the autocratic system and resistance to liberal constitutionalism and

other social reforms. Paul's sons Alexander I (ruled 1801–1825), the principal victor over Napoleon Bonaparte, and Nicholas I (ruled 1825–1855) each resisted substantive reform and established censorship and other limitations on Russian society aimed at stemming the rise of the radical intelligentsia. Nicholas I's son, Alexander II (the "Tsar-Liberator," ruled 1855–1881) inherited the consequences of the Russian defeat in the Crimean War and instituted the Great Reforms, the centerpiece of which was the emancipation of Russia's serfs. Alexander II was assassinated in March 1881, and his successors on the throne, Alexander III (ruled 1881–1894) and Nicholas II (ruled 1894–1917), adopted many reactionary policies against revolutionaries and sought to defend and extend the autocratic form of monarchy unique to Russia at the time.

The anachronism of autocracy, the mystical-religious leanings of Nicholas II and his wife, Alexandra Feodorovna, and, perhaps most important, the string of defeats in World War I, forced Nicholas II to abdicate in February 1917. Having first abdicated in favor of his son Alexei, Nicholas II edited his abdication decree so as to pass the throne instead on to his younger brother, Mikhail—an action that in point of fact lay beyond a tsar's power according to the Pauline Law of Succession of 1796. In any event, Mikhail turned down the throne, ending more than three hundred years of Romanov rule in Russia. Nicholas and his family were immediately placed under house arrest in their palace at Tsarskoye Selo, near St. Petersburg, but in July they were sent into exile to Tobolsk. With the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, Nicholas and his family were sent to Ekaterinburg, where Bolshevik control was firmer and where, under the threat of a White Army advance, they were executed on the night of July 17, 1918. On days surrounding this, executions of other Romanovs and their relatives (includingmorganatic spouses) were carried out. In 1981, Nicholas II, his wife and children, and all the other Romanovs who were executed by the Bolsheviks were glorified as saints (or more properly, royal martyrs) by the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.

After the abdication of Nicholas and the Bolshevik coup, many Romanovs fled Russia and established themselves in Western Europe and America. Kirill Vladimirovich, Nicholas II's first cousin, proclaimed himself to be "Emperor of All the Russias" in 1924; nearly all surviving grand dukes recognized his claim to the succession, as did that part of the Russian Orthodox Church that had

fled revolutionary Russia and had set itself up first in Yugoslavia, then in Germany, and finally in the United States. Kirill's son Vladimir assumed the headship of the dynasty (but not the title "emperor") on his father's death in 1938, though his claim was less universally accepted. Today the Romanov dynasty properly consists only of Leonida Georgievna, Vladimir's widow; his daughter Maria; and her son Georgy, and Princess Ekaterina Ioanovna. The question of the identity of Anna Anderson, who claimed to be Anastasia Nikolayevna, the youngest daughter of Nicholas II, was finally and definitively put to rest with the results of a DNA comparison of Anderson with surviving Romanov relatives. Other lines of descent in the Romanov family exist as well, but are disqualified from the succession due to the prevalence of morganatic marriages in these lines, something that is prohibited by the Pauline Law of Succession. The question of who the rightful tsar would be in the event of a restoration remains hotly contested in monarchist circles in emigration and in Russia.

See also: ALEXANDER I; ALEXANDER II; ALEXANDER III; ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; ANNA IVANOVNA; CATHERINE I; CATHERINE II; ELIZABETH; FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH; IVAN V; IVAN VI; NICHOLAS I; NICHOLAS II; PAUL I; PETER I; PETER II; PETER III; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; SOPHIA; TIME OF TROUBLES

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RUSSELL E. MARTIN

ROMANOV, GRIGORY VASILIEVICH

(b. 1923), first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee during the Brezhnev years.

Grigory Romanov was born on February 9, 1923, to Russian working-class parents. He served in the Red Army during World War II. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1944, and received a night-school diploma in ship building in 1953. Romanov almost immediately went to work within the Leningrad party apparatus, climbing through the ranks from factory, to ward, to city, and ultimately to oblast-level positions. He served as first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee from 1970 to 1983, and was known for encouraging production and scientific associations, as well as the forging of links between such groups to implement new technologies. As a result, Leningrad achieved enviable production levels under Romanov. He was named a candidate member of the Politburo in 1973, and was promoted to full membership in 1976. Romanov advanced to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat in June 1983, with responsibility for the defense industry. Though mentioned as a candidate for the office of general secretary, his many years spent outside the Moscow left Romanov unable to build allies in the Politburo.

Once Gorbachev had claimed the general secretary post in March 1985, he began purging his rivals from the top leadership, and Romanov was among them. Despite his innovations in Leningrad, Romanov was a conservative, not inclined to alter the complacency—and corruption—of the Brezhnev era. Romanov was formally relieved of his duties on July 1, 1986.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; POLITBURO

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH

(1596–1645), tsar of Russia from 1613 to 1645 and first ruler of the Romanov Dynasty.

Born in 1596, Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov was the son of Fyodor Nikitich Romanov and his wife



Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov, the first Romanov tsar.

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Ksenia Ivanovna Shestova. His family had long served as boyars in the court of the Muscovite rulers. The Romanovs, while still known as the Yurievcs, were thrust into the center of power and politics in 1547, when Anastasia Romanovna Yurieva, Mikhail's great aunt, married Tsar Ivan IV ("the Terrible"). This union produced Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich, the last of the old Riurikovich rulers of Russia, who died in 1598 without heirs. The extinction of the tsarist line left the succession in question, but the throne finally went to Boris Godunov, a prominent figure in Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich's court.

FROM GODUNOV TO THE ROMANOV DYNASTY

The reign of Boris Godunov was a difficult time for the Romanov clan. Many members were exiled and forcibly tonsured (required to become monks or nuns) by the new tsar, including Mikhail's father

and mother, who took the monastic names Filaret and Marfa, respectively. The young Mikhail, then only nine years old, similarly was exiled, at first in rather harsh conditions at Beloozero, then in somewhat better circumstances on the family's own estates, in both cases living with relatives.

Fortunes changed definitively for the better for Mikhail only after 1605, with the unexpected death of Tsar Boris and the brief reign of the First False Dmitry. Mikhail was reunited with his mother, and took up residence in Moscow before moving in 1612 to the Ipatev Monastery near Kostroma, where his mother's family had estates. In the next year, an Assembly of the Land (Zemsky Sobor) was summoned to elect a new tsar for the throne that, by then, had lain vacant for three years. After having ruled out any foreign candidates (the younger brother of the Swedish king, Karl Phillip, had enjoyed some support among segments of the boyar elite), the assembly began to discuss native candidates. At length, the assembly elected Mikhail to be tsar, and with this election the three hundred year reign of the House of Romanov began.

WHY MIKHAIL ROMANOV?

Historians have long speculated on the reasons the election might have fallen on Mikhail in 1613. Some have pointed to his youth (he was only sixteen years old at the time); or to his inexperience in political matters; or to his supposed weak will and poor health. These rationales suggest that perhaps the electors in the Assembly of the Land saw in him someone who could easily be manipulated to suit their own clan interests. Others have pointed to the role of the Cossacks, who, according to contemporary sources, rushed into the assembly and demanded, at the point of a pike, that Mikhail be recognized as the "God-annointed tsar." The fact that the Romanovs appear in some later accounts to have maintained their good name and enjoyed some popularity even through the darkest and most violent phases of Ivan the Terrible's reign, may also have worked to their advantage in 1613. It must be acknowledged, however, that some of these sources were compiled after 1613, and thus may reflect Romanov self-interest.

Some sources have claimed that Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich, as death approached in 1598, nominated Fyodor Nikitich, Mikhail's father, to succeed him on the throne—a nomination that was, evidently, ignored after the tsar's death. One fact, often overlooked in treatments of Mikhail's life and reign, is that the Romanov boyar clan—Mikhail's ancestors—

were remarkably successful during the decades after the 1547 marriage of Anastasia Yurieva and Ivan the Terrible at forging numerous marriage alliances between their kin and members of most of the other important boyar clans at court. These marriages linked the Romanovs directly with a sizeable portion of the boyar elite. This web of kinship to which the Romanovs belonged, plus the other factors mentioned, may have made the young Mikhail a viable and highly desirable candidate for the throne, since electing him would tend to secure the high ranks and privileged positions of the boyars, most of whom were already Mikhail's relatives.

EARLY CHALLENGES

For whatever reason he was elected, Mikhail's early years on the throne were nonetheless rocky. Novgorod and Pskov still lay under Swedish occupation until a final peace was concluded and a military withdrawal obtained by the Treaty of Stolbovo (1617). Mikhail's father still languished in a Polish prison, released only in 1619, after peace with Poland was finally concluded at the Treaty of Deulino (1618). Rivals for the throne still roamed the countryside, particularly in the south—some proclaiming themselves to be yet another Tsarevich Dmitry. Zarutsky's band of Cossacks proved to be still a menace, supporting the widow of the First False Dmitry.

The security and legitimacy of the new dynasty were hardly fixed by the election in 1613. Matters improved with the return of Mikhail's father in 1619. Having been forcibly tonsured a monk earlier, he had been proclaimed patriarch by the Second False Dmitry; and on his return to Moscow he was formally and officially installed in that office. From then to his death in 1633, Filaret ruled in all respects jointly with his son, and had even been given the unique title of Great Sovereign. The competent governance of Filaret and, after his death, of other Romanov relatives, plus the absence of successional squabbles, gradually produced the stability that, by the end of Mikhail's reign, helped to firmly establish Romanov dynasticism in Russia and the peaceful succession of Mikhail's son, Alexei, to the throne.

ENSURING THE DYNASTIC SUCCESSION

Mikhail Romanov's family life was full of intrigue and failures. In 1616, Mikhail picked Maria Ivanovna Khlopova from several prospective brides, and he seems genuinely to have felt fondness for her. His mother, however, was dead set against the match,

as were his mother's relatives, Mikhail and Boris Saltykov, the former of whom was among the chief figures of the court. The Saltykov brothers appear to have had another candidate in mind for Mikhail, and so they conspired to ruin the match by poisoning Maria, causing her to have a fit of vomiting. Maria and her family were immediately dispatched to Tobolsk, in Siberia, as punishment for their presumed conspiracy to conceal a serious illness from the tsar (one that, it was believed, might have implications for the reproductive capacity of the new bride).

Further efforts to marry Mikhail off to a foreign bride ensued and matches were proposed (with the daughter of the grand duke of Lithuania, the daughter of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and with the sister of the elector of Brandenburg), but all failed. An investigation of the Khlopov affair was opened up in 1623, and shortly thereafter the truth of the Saltykov conspiracy was discovered and the two brothers were disgraced and sent into exile. Even so, no serious reconsideration of the Khlopov match ever materialized, for Mikhail's mother remained adamantly opposed to the match.

In 1624 Mikhail married Maria Dolgorukova, possibly the young girl that had been the original choice of the Saltykovs, but she died within a few months of the wedding. Mikhail next married (in 1626) Evdokia Streshneva, with whom he had six daughters and three sons, including his heir, Alexei. In the last year of his life he attempted to marry off one of his daughters, Irina, to Prince Waldemar, the natural son of the king of Denmark, Christian IV. Waldemar's refusal to convert to Orthodoxy doomed the marriage project, but the controversy stimulated a fertile theological and political debate about baptism and the confessional lines between Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy. Mikhail died on July 12, 1645, on his name-day (St. Mikhail Malein, not, as is often assumed and asserted, St. Mikhail the Archangel).

See also: ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; COSSACKS; DMITRY, FALSE; FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; ROMANOV DYNASTY; SIBERIA; STOLBOVO, TREATY OF; TIME OF TROUBLES

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RUSSELL E. MARTIN

ROMANTICISM

Unlike the Enlightenment, a cultural movement that was imported into Russia from the West and thus, in the words of the poet Alexander Pushkin, "moored on the banks of the conquered Neva" (referring to the river that flows through St. Petersburg), Romanticism had a more indigenous quality, building on the earlier cultural tradition of sentimentalism. The awakening of the heart experienced by Russian society in the second half of the eighteenth century resulted in an oversensitive, reflective personality—a type that persisted in the next generation and evolved into the superfluous man epitomized by Pushkin in the character of Eugene Onegin in the poem of the same name, and by Mikhail Lermontov in Pechorin, the protagonist of *A Hero of Our Time*. The full-fledged Romantic type was born in Russia during the reign of Alexander I (1801–1825), which witnessed Napoleon's invasion and subsequent fall and the Russian army's triumphant entry into Paris. These cataclysmic events powerfully enhanced, in the conscience of a sensitive generation, a fatalistic conception of change to which both kingdoms and persons are subject—a conception shared by Alexander. At the same time, an idea of freedom and happiness "within ourselves"—notwithstanding the doom of external reality—was put forward with unprecedented strength. The Alexandrine age saw an extraordinary burst of creativity, especially in literature.

WESTERN INFLUENCES

Russian Romanticism was strongly influenced by cultural developments in the West. Vasily Zhukovsky's masterly translations and adaptations from German poetry are representative of the transitional 1800s and early 1810s. Later, British literary influence became dominant. "It seems that, in

the present age, a poet cannot but echo Byron, as well as a novelist cannot but echo W. Scott, notwithstanding the magnitude and even originality of talent," wrote the poet and critic Peter Vyazemsky in 1827. More philosophical authors such as Vladimir F. Odoyevsky persistently looked to German thought for inspiration; Schelling was particularly important. The evolution of French literature was also keenly followed: Victor Hugo (but hardly the dreamy Lamartine) aroused much sympathy in the Russian Romantics. A seminal event was the sojourn in St. Petersburg and Moscow of the exiled Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz. However, the study of European models only convinced Russian authors and critics that Romanticism necessarily implied originality. "Conditioned by the desire to realize the creative originality of the human soul," Romanticism owes its formation "not just to every individual nation, but, what is more, to every individual author," wrote Nikolai Polevoy, a leading figure in the Russian Romantic movement. Characteristically, Pushkin struggled to dispel the image of Russian Byron, while Lermontov explicitly declared his non-Byronism.

CONTROVERSIES

The Russian Romantic movement consolidated. In the late 1810s, the Classic-Romantic controversy broke out, continuing throughout the 1820s and 1830s. Russian literary journals took sides. Academic circles, too, were engaged in the controversy: Nikolai Nadezhdin's Latin dissertation on Romantic poetry is a case in point. The Classicists claimed that Romanticism sought anarchy in literature and in the fine arts, whereas "Art, generally, is obedience to rules." Indeed, the Romantics, especially in their poetic declarations, blissfully proclaimed the lawlessness of artistic creation. In theoretical discussions, however, they did not simply reject the classical rigidities, but undertook to formulate alternative laws, loosely, those of nature, beauty, and truth. A more specific agreement was difficult to reach, not just on specific issues such as the principles of Romantic drama, but also on the very meaning of Romanticism. Vladimir Nabokov has identified at least eleven various interpretations of "Romantic" current in Pushkin's time. As might be expected, the internal controversy emerged in the Romantic camp. The polemics, piercing other than purely theoretical issues, often involved angry exchanges. Literary alliances were vulnerable, as in the case of Pushkin and Nikolai Polevoy. Yet, the early nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable tendency, on the part of the authors, artists, and

musicians, to form circles, attend salons, and group around enlightened patrons.

CROSSING BORDERS

In this kind of atmosphere, crossing of borders between different arts was common. Vasily Zhukovsky produced brilliant drawings; Lermontov nearly abandoned writing for the sake of painting; Vladimir Odoevsky was a musicologist as well as a poet and novelist; the playwright Alexander Griboyedov, a talented composer. As art historian Valery Turchin points out, it was the musician rather than the poet who was eventually promoted, in the view of the Romantics, to the role of the supreme type of artistic genius. This precisely reflected the Romantics' quest for the spiritual, for music, of all the arts, was considered the least bound by materiality. Arguably, Romanticism was a later phenomenon in Russian music than in literature and art. Anyway, a contemporary of Pushkin, the composer Mikhail Glinka, renowned for his use of Russian folk tradition, was a major contributor to the Romantic movement. The painter Orestes Kiprensky commenced his series of Romantic portraits during the very dawn of literary Romanticism. Somewhat later emerged the Romantic schools of landscape and historical painting. Even in architecture, the art most strongly bound by matter, new trends showed up against the neoclassical background: neogothicism, exotic orientalism, and, finally, the national current exemplified in Konstantin Ton's churches. During the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855) Romanticism began to be diffused in the more general quest for history and nationality.

SLAVOPHILISM

The important offshoot of this development was Slavophilism. Nicholas I typified the new epoch in the same way as Alexander I had typified the previous age. In his youth, Nicholas had received a largely Romantic education. He was an admirer of Walter Scott and was inclined to imitate the kings of Scott's novels. Characteristically, Pushkin, during the reign of Nicholas, persistently returns to the twin themes of nobility and ancestry, lamenting (in a manner closely resembling Edmund Burke) the passing of the age of chivalry. The dominant mood of the period, however, was nationalistic and messianic, and here again the Romantics largely shared the inclinations of the tsar. Notably, it was Peter Vyazemsky who coined the word *narodnost* (the Russian equivalent of "nationality"), which became part of the official ideological formula ("Or-

thodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality"). Odoevsky argued that because of their "poetic organization," the Russian people would attain superiority over the West even in scientific matters. Pushkin welcomed the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1831, interpreting it in Panslavic terms. Nonetheless, there was an unbridgeable psychological rift between the tsar and the Romantic camp, which had its origin in the catastrophe of December 1825. Several of the Decembrists (most importantly, Kondraty Ryleyev, one of the five executed) were men of letters and members of the Romantic movement. Throughout the reign, a creative personality faced fierce censorship and remained under the threat of persecution. Many could say with Polevoy (whose ambitious Romantic enterprise embraced, beside literature, history and even economics, but whose *Moscow Telegraph*, Russia's most successful literary journal, was closed by the government): "My dreams remained unfulfilled, my ideals, unexpressed." The split between ideal and reality was the central problem for Romanticism universally, but in Russia this problem acquired a specifically bleak character.

See also: GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; LERMONTOV, MIKHAIL YURIEVICH; ODOYEVSKY, VLADIMIR FYODOROVICH; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; SLAVOPHILES; ZHUKOVSKY; VASILY ANDREYEVICH

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YURI TULLIPENKO

ROSTISLAV

(d. 1167), grand prince of Kiev and the progenitor of the Rostislavichi, the dynasty of Smolensk.

After Rostislav's father Mstislav Vladimirovich gave him Smolensk around 1125, he freed it from

its subordination to southern Pereyaslavl, fortified it with new defensive walls, founded churches, and patronized culture. Around 1150, despite opposition from Metropolitan Kliment (Klim) Smolyatich and the bishop of Pereyaslavl, he also freed the Church of Smolensk from its dependence on Pereyaslavl by making it an autonomous eparchy. Manuel, a Greek, was its first bishop, and the Church of the Assumption, built by Rostislav's grandfather Vladimir Vsevolodovich "Monomakh," became his cathedral. Rostislav also issued a charter (*gramota*) enumerating the privileges of the bishop and the church in Smolensk. The document is valuable as a source of ecclesiastical, social, commercial, and geographic information.

Rostislav had political dealings with neighbouring Polotsk and Novgorod, but his most important involvement was in Kiev. After 1146 he helped his elder brother Izyaslav win control of the capital of Rus. Following the latter's death in 1154, the citizens invited Rostislav to rule Kiev with his uncle Vyacheslav Vladimirovich, but his uncle Yury Vladimirovich "Dolgoruky" replaced him in the same year. Although Rostislav regained Kiev in 1159, his rule was not secured until 1161, when his rival Izyaslav Davidovich of Chernigov died. As prince of Kiev, he asserted his authority over the so-called kernel of Rus and placated many of the princes. He failed, however, to stop the incursions of the Polovtsy. He died on March 14, 1167, and was buried in Kiev.

See also: IZYASLAV MSTISLAVICH; KIEVAN RUS; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

ROSTOVTSEV, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH

(1870–1952), Russian–American historian and archaeologist of Greek and Roman antiquity.

Mikhail Ivanovich Rostovtsev was born in Kiev and educated at the Universities of Kiev and St. Petersburg. He taught at St. Petersburg University, and in the Higher Women's Courses until 1918,

rising to become a professor in 1912. His career before the revolution shows the international nature of academic life: He published widely in English, French, and German as well as Russian.

Rostovtsev refused to serve either in the Provisional Government or in the Communist government, and in emigration published extensive polemics against the Communists. In 1918 Rostovtsev fled Russia, first to Oxford (1918–1920), and then to the United States where he was professor first at the University of Wisconsin (1920–1925) and then Yale University (1925–1944).

Rostovtsev's academic interests were extensive. Trained as a philologist, he wrote monographs on Roman tax farming and land tenure. As an art historian he also published important works on the art and history of south Russia that traced cultural influences in Scythian art from Greece to the borders of China. From 1928 to 1936 he led Yale's excavations at Dura-Europos in Syria.

His greatest fame, however, rests on two large monographs: *Economic and Social History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926) and *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford, 1941). In both these works he emphasizes the role of the urban bourgeoisie in the development of the two related cultures, and their decline due to state intervention and outside attacks.

See also: EDUCATION; UNIVERSITIES

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A. DELANO DUGARM

ROTA SYSTEM

Also known as the "ladder system," the rota system describes a collateral pattern of succession, according to which princes of the Rurikid dynasty ascended the throne of Kiev, the main seat of Kievan Rus. The system prevailed from the mid-eleventh century until the disintegration of Kievan Rus in the thirteenth century. It also determined succession for the main seats in secondary principalities within Kievan Rus and survived in the northern Rus principalities into the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The design for the rota system has been attributed to Prince Yaroslav the Wise (d. 1054), who in his "Testament" or will divided his realm among his sons. He left Kiev to his eldest son. He assigned secondary towns, which became centers of principalities that comprised Kievan Rus, to his younger sons and admonished them to obey their eldest brother as they had their father. Although the Testament did not provide a detailed order for succession, the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historians Sergei Soloviev and Vasily Klyuchevsky concluded that it set up an arrangement for the entire Rurikid dynasty to possess and rule the realm of Kievan Rus. It created a hierarchy among the princely brothers and, in later generations, cousins that was paralleled by a hierarchy among their territorial domains. It anticipated that when the prince of Kiev died, he would be succeeded by the most senior surviving member of his generation, who would move from his seat to Kiev. The next prince in the generational hierarchy would replace him, with each younger prince moving up a step on the ladder of succession. When all members of the eldest generation of the dynasty had died, succession would pass to their sons. For a prince to become eligible for the Kievan throne, however, his father must have held that position.

The rota system was revised by a princely agreement concluded at Lyubech in 1097. The agreement ended the practice of rotation of the princes through the secondary seats in conjunction with succession to Kiev. Instead, a designated branch of the dynasty would permanently rule each principality within Kievan Rus. The princes of each dynastic branch continued to use the rota system to determine succession to their primary seat. The exceptions were Kiev itself, where rotation among the eligible members of the entire dynasty resumed after 1113, and Novgorod, which selected its own prince after 1136.

Succession to the Kievan throne was, nevertheless, frequently contested. Scholars have interpreted the repeated internecine conflicts and their meaning for the existence and functionality of the rota system in a variety of ways. Some regard the rota system to have been intended to apply only to Yaroslav's three eldest sons and the three central principalities assigned to them. Others have argued that the system was not fully formulated by Yaroslav, but evolved as the dynasty grew, took possession of a greater expanse of territory, and had to confront, by diplomacy and by war, unforeseen complications in determining "seniority." Others

contend that the Rurikid princes had no succession system, but threatened or used force to determine which prince would sit on the Kievan throne.

Despite the conflicts over succession, which have been cited as an indicator of a weak political system and a lack of unity within the ruling dynasty, the rota system has also been interpreted as a constructive means of accommodating competing interests and tensions among members of a large dynasty. It enabled the dynasty to provide a successor to the Kievan throne in an age when high mortality rates tended to reduce the number of eligible princes. It also emphasized the symbolic centrality of Kiev even as the increasing political and economic strength of component principalities of Kievan Rus undermined the unity of the dynastic realm.

After the Mongol invasions of 1237 through 1240 and the disintegration of Kievan Rus, the rota system continued to prevail in the northeastern Rus principalities until Yuri (ruled 1317–1322) and Ivan I Kalita (ruled 1328–1341) of Moscow, whose father had not held the position, became grand princes of Vladimir. Their descendants monopolized the position and replaced the rota system with a vertical succession system, according to which the eldest surviving son of a reigning prince was heir to the throne.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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JANET MARTIN

ROUTE TO GREEKS

The key commercial and communication route between Kievan Rus and Byzantium, and called "The Way From the Varangians [Vikings] to the Greeks"

in the Russian *Primary Chronicle*, this riverine route began in the southeastern Baltic at the mouth of the Western Dvina, connecting to the upper Dnieper at portage areas near Smolensk, and continued through Kiev to the lower Dnieper, where it entered the Black Sea, finally terminating in Constantinople. An alternative route in the north passed from Smolensk portages to the Lovat, which led to Lake Ilmen and, via the Volkhov and Novgorod, on to Lake Ladoga and thence, by way of the Neva, to the Gulf of Finland and the eastern Baltic. While segments of this route were used from the Stone Age onward, it did not achieve its fullest extent until the late ninth and early tenth centuries when Rus princes unified the waterways and adjoining lands under the Rus state.

In the mid-tenth century, the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus described (*De administrando imperio*) the southern part of the route, noting the existence of seven cataracts in the lower Dnieper, passable only by portage, and the attendant dangers of Pecheneg attacks. According to Constantine, the Slavs—from as far north as Novgorod—cut *monoxyła* (dugouts) during the winter and floated them downstream to Kiev in spring. There, these boats were rebuilt and equipped with oars, rowlocks, and “other tackle.” In early summer, the Rus filled these boats with goods to sell in Constantinople and rowed downstream to the island of St. Aitherios (Berezan) in the mouth of the Dnieper, where they again re-equipped their boats with “tackle as is needed, sails and masts and rudders which they bring with them.” Thereafter, they sailed out into the Black Sea, following its western coast to Constantinople. With the Rus-Byzantine commercial treaties of 907, 911, 944, and 971, Rus traders were common visitors in Constantinople, where they stayed for as long as six months annually, from spring through the summer months, at the quarters of St. Mamas.

The Rus traded furs, wax, and honey for Byzantine wine, olive oil, silks, glass jewelry and dishware, church paraphernalia, and other luxuries. During the tenth century and perhaps a bit later, the Rus also sold slaves to the Byzantines. Rus and Scandinavian pilgrims and mercenaries also traveled to the eastern Mediterranean via this route. On several occasions in the tenth century and in 1043, the Rus used this route to invade Byzantium.

During inter-princely Rus disputes, the route was sometimes closed, as at the turn of the twelfth

century when Kiev blockaded trade with Novgorod. On occasion, nomadic peoples south of Kiev also blocked the route or impeded trade, and Rus princes responded with military expeditions. With the occupation of Constantinople by Latin Crusaders in 1204, Rus merchants shifted their trade to the Crimean port of Sudak. The route was abandoned following the Mongol conquest of Rus in about 1240. However, up to that time, Kiev’s trade via the route flourished, particularly from the eleventh to the mid-thirteenth centuries.

See also: BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; FOREIGN TRADE; KIEVAN RUS; NORMANIST CONTROVERSY; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; VIKINGS

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

RSFSR *See* RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC.

RUBLE

The basic unit of Russian currency.

The term *ruble* (*rubl'*) emerged in thirteenth-century Novgorod, where it referred to half of a grivna. The term derives from the verb *rubit* (to cut), since the original rubles were silver bars notched at intervals to facilitate cutting. The ruble was initially a measure of both value and weight, but not a minted currency. Under the monetary reform of 1534, the ruble was defined as equal to 100 kopecks or 200 dengi. Other subdivisions of the ruble were the altyn (3 kopecks), the grivennik (10 kopecks), the polupoltina (25 kopecks), and the



A five-ruble Russian banknote. TNA ASSOCIATES.

pol'tina (50 kopecks). A highly inflationary copper ruble circulated during Alexei Mikhailovich's currency reform (1654–1663), the first instance of minted ruble coins.

In 1704 the government began the regular minting of silver rubles, defined initially as equal to 28 grams of silver but declining steadily to 18 grams by the 1760s. Gold coins were minted in 1756 and 1779, copper rubles in 1770 and 1771. From 1769 to 1849, irredeemable paper promissory notes called *assignatsii* (sing. *assignatsiya*) circulated alongside the metal currency.

Nicholas I reestablished the silver ruble as the basic unit of account. In 1843 he introduced a new paper ruble that remained convertible only until 1853. In 1885 and 1886, the silver ruble, linked to the French franc, was reinstated as the official currency. Sergei Witte's reforms in 1897 introduced a gold ruble, and Russia remained on the gold standard until 1914. Fully convertible paper currency circulated at the same time. A worthless paper ruble (*kerenka*) was used at the close of World War I.

The first Soviet ruble—a paper currency—was issued in 1919, and the first Soviet silver ruble appeared in 1921. Ruble banknotes were introduced in 1934. A 1937 reform set the value of the ruble in relation to the U.S. dollar, a practice that ended in 1950 with the adoption of a gold standard. Monetary reforms were implemented in 1947, 1961, and 1997.

See also: ALTYN; DENGA; GRIVNA; KOPECK; MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET

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JARMO T. KOTILAINE

RUBLE CONTROL

The Soviet economy was predominantly centrally controlled, with production and supply targets set using physical indicators or quasi-physical units, and with prices fixed according to criteria that were far removed from any consideration of the demand and supply equilibrium. Given the dual monetary circulation in the economy, only physical or quasi-physical units were to be used inside the state sector. Households, on the other hand, participated in a mostly fixed-price cash economy. Central control of monetary units was called ruble control. It aimed both at the quasi-physical monetary units used for decision-making within the state sector and the mostly fixed-price monetary units that the household sector faced.

In the broad sense of the phrase, ruble control thus included central control over any activities

that used monetary units. This primarily encompassed prices, wages, costs, profits, investment, and finance, as well as credits. Because the use of monetary units is broadly pervasive in a multiresource and multiproduct economy, the field of ruble control was extensive, even in a centrally managed economy. In addition to being another general control tool, ruble control was supposed to focus on improving efficiency and equilibrium in the economy. The more the economy moved from direct central control of entrepreneurial and other behaviors to the more indirect control based on prices and other monetary units, the more the importance of ruble control tended to grow. However, the monetary units used were administratively determined, and enterprises had soft budget constraints with little real decision-making independence, so that ruble control remained just one more way of implementing central management, and did not become an element of market relations.

Because the centrally managed economy had a wide variety of monetary units, ruble control also had a large number of subjects, from business enterprises to governmental ministries to the State Bank. The variety of controlling agencies and their always badly defined prerogatives, as well as the inevitable divergence of interests among these disparate groups, meant that ruble control was far from an optimal management tool. Different controllers sent different or even contradictory commands, giving subordinated units at least some decision-making room. Businesses had an impact at the planning stage on the directives and parameters that would ultimately be given to them. In addition, since these enterprises had soft budget constraints, the availability of finance was not a binding constraint if a priority target threatened to go unfulfilled. This is because, although costs were theoretically under ruble control, they could be exceeded if necessary in order to meet output targets. Soviet leaders thought they could well accept inefficiency if that helped them to reach goals with a higher priority, because they believed that resources were in almost unlimited supply. In other words, central management was based on priority thinking, and ruble control had to accommodate the established priorities.

The negative consequences of this logic were visible from the very beginning of central management. Already by 1931, many proposals were circulated for enhancing ruble control. Among these were more rational pricing, fuller cost-accounting, and better coordination of different

controls, as well as increased decentralization, at least in plan fulfillment. It is revealing about the priority-planning logic that very similar, even identical proposals for rationalizing central management were put forward during all the waves of Soviet reform discussion until the 1980s. Still, in the early 1980s the system functioned very much as it had fifty years earlier, with one crucial difference: Mass terror had been abolished and increased consumption had become a priority. On one hand, this had made ruble control more important. On the other, by weakening other controls and by increasing the autonomy both of managers and households, these developments had made ruble control more difficult. There were markets and quasi-markets, but market-based policy instruments remained absent.

See also: HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS; MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET; REPRESSED INFLATION

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PEKKA SUTELA

RUBLEV, ANDREI

(c. 1360–1430), fifteenth century Russian artist.

Among all the known icon painters in Russian history, Andrei Rublev stands out as most prominent. Early in his life he joined the Trinity-Sergius Lavra Monastery, becoming a monk and a pupil of the artist Prokhor of Gorodets. Later he moved near Moscow, to the Spaso Andronikov Monastery, where he died on January 29, 1430, after painting frescoes in that monastery's Church of the Savior. He was buried in the altar crypt beside the artist, Daniel Chorni.

Rublev is considered the founder of the Moscow School of painting. The earliest reference to Rublev's work is to paintings in the Annunciation Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin. Here in 1405 he worked with the eminent Theophanes the Greek (who strongly influenced his style) and the monk Prokhov of Gorodets. On the iconostasis (the screen separating the church nave from the altar area) Rublev is credited with the scenes of the annunciations.

ation to the Virgin Mary and scenes from the life of Christ that show his nativity, baptism, transfiguration, the resurrection of Lazarus, entry into Jerusalem, and the presentation in the Temple.

Rublev worked extensively outside of Moscow as well. In about 1400, in the Dormition Cathedral on Gorodok in Zvenigorod, Rublev, assisted by Daniel Chorni, painted a number of wall frescoes, including those of St. Laurus and St. Florus, and several panel icons, including Archangel Michael, Apostle Paul, and the Christ. In the Cathedral of the Dormition in Vladimir, assisted again by Daniel Chorni, he painted frescoes of the Last Judgment in 1408. He is also credited with five surviving icons.

The last reference to Rublev's work refers to his work on the iconostasis in the Cathedral of the Trinity at Zagorsk (Trinity-Sergius Monastery), where he was assisted once again by Daniel Chorni. It was here that he produced his most famous icon, the Old Testament Trinity (1411; now in the Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow). Ordered by Nikon and painted in honor of Father Sergius of Radonezh (d. 1392), it was originally displayed at the latter's grave. The ethereal and beautifully-integrated group of three angels has never been surpassed. Of the other icons on this iconostasis, Rublev was credited with those depicting the Archangel Gabriel, St. Paul, and the Baptism of Christ. Rublev is believed to have painted two more icons for other venues: a Christ in Majesty (c. 1411, now at the Tretyakov Gallery) and a version of the Vladimir Mother of God (c. 1409, Vladimir Museum).

Rublev's fame continued to increase after his death. The Church Council held in Moscow in 1551 prescribed the official canon for the correct representation of the Trinity: ". . . to paint from ancient models, as painted by the Greek painters and as painted by Andrei Rublev." It is the other-worldly, spiritual, and contemplative quality of Rublev's painting that sets him apart from his contemporaries. His Old Testament Trinity has had by far had the strongest impact on subsequent icon painting up through the twentieth century, not only in the Russian Orthodox Church, but in Catholic and Protestant circles as well. In Soviet Russia, gifted filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky produced an epic-length, classic film titled *Andrei Rublev* in 1966. It was widely acclaimed, and continues to be shown in art theaters and at Russian conferences.

See also: DIONISY; ICONS; THEOPHANES THE GREEK

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A. DEAN MCKENZIE

RUBLE ZONE

"Ruble zone" refers to the accidental currency union that emerged when the Soviet Union broke up in December 1991, after which several independent states (former republics) each used the ruble as their primary currency. This sparked an intense debate among the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), the Russian government, the other post-Soviet governments, and the international financial institutions over the pros and cons of retaining the ruble zone. The ruble zone at first encompassed all fifteen former Soviet republics, grew progressively smaller through 1992 and 1993 as the new states introduced their own currencies, and disappeared completely in 1995 when Tajikistan adopted the Tajik ruble as its sole legal tender. The three Baltic states, having no intention of staying in the ruble zone, introduced their own currencies in mid-1992, but the other post-Soviet states initially chose to remain.

The ruble zone's existence presented a significant dilemma for the CBR, because it prevented the CBR from controlling the Russian money supply. Only the CBR could print cash rubles, because all of the printing presses were on Russian territory. However, a legacy of the Soviet-style currency system (called the dual monetary circuit) allowed any central bank in the ruble zone to freely issue ruble credits to its domestic banks. These banks then loaned the credits to domestic enterprises, which could in turn use them to purchase goods from other ruble zone states (primarily Russia). In effect, the ruble zone states self-financed their trade deficits with Russia through these credit emissions. In addition, several ruble zone states issued so-called "coupons" or parallel currencies to circulate alongside the ruble in 1992 and 1993, thereby increasing the cash money supply in the ruble zone as well.

In an attempt to mitigate the impact of this credit expansion on the Russian economy, as of

July 1992 the CBR began keeping separate ruble credit accounts for each state. In August 1992 it announced that Russian goods could be purchased only with CBR-issued credits, and it suspended the other banks' credit-granting privileges entirely in May 1993. During this process, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan left the ruble zone. The CBR then fatally undermined the ruble zone through a currency reform in July 1993. It began to print new Russian ruble notes (circulating at equivalency with the old Soviet ones) in early 1993, but did not send these new rubles to the other states; they received their cash shipments solely in Soviet rubles. On July 24, the CBR announced that all pre-1993 ruble notes would become invalid in Russia, forcing the other ruble zone members either to leave or to cede all monetary sovereignty to the CBR. Azerbaijan and Georgia left the ruble zone immediately, while Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan left in November 1993 after talks on creating a ruble zone of a new type broke down. Although this effectively destroyed the ruble zone, its formal end came in May 1995 when war-torn Tajikistan finally introduced its own currency.

See also: MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET; RUBLE

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RUMYANTSEV, PETER ALEXANDROVICH

(1725–1796), military commander, from 1774 known as Rumiantsev–Zadunaisky for his military victories "across the Danube."

Peter Alexandrovich Rumyantsev was the son of Alexander Ivanovich Rumyantsev, who rose to

prominence in the circle of Peter I, and Maria Andreyevna Matveyeva, whose father was an ambassador and senator. Early in the reign of Empress Anna (1730–1740), the Rumyantsevs fell from favor, but Alexander resumed service in 1735 and was rewarded with the hereditary title of count. In 1748 Peter Rumyantsev married Princess Ekaterina Mikhailovna Golitsyna, with whom he had three sons, Mikhail, Nikolai, and Sergei. He was estranged from his wife early in the marriage.

Despite earning a reputation for dissolute behavior, young Peter Rumyantsev received several commissions in the army. He served with distinction in the Seven Years' War (1756–1762), commanding a cavalry regiment during several successful Russian actions. Having been promoted by Emperor Peter III, he expected to be exiled when Catherine II (r. 1762–1796) seized power, but in 1764 she made him governor-general of Ukraine, with the task of integrating that territory into the Russian administrative and fiscal system. He carried out a major survey and census, introduced a new postal system and courts, and revised laws on peasants. In 1767 he was summoned to participate in the Legislative Commission and was required to investigate Ukrainian delegates to minimize claims for independent privileges and institutions for the region.

At the outbreak of the Russo–Turkish war in 1768, Rumyantsev was first given command of Russia's Second Army and charged with the responsibility of guarding the southern borders. He then took over the First Army from Prince Alexander Mikhailovich Golitsyn. He won victories in July 1770 at Larga and Kagul against great odds and went on to capture towns in Ottoman-held Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1771 he moved west to the Danube, and in 1773 he laid siege to towns in the region but was forced to retreat by supply difficulties. In 1774 Rumyantsev's forces outmaneuvered the Turkish vizier and forced him to accept peace terms at Kuchuk Kainardji.

Rumyantsev was made a field marshal and received the orders of St. George and St. Andrew, as well as lavish rewards that included landed estates. He returned to Ukraine to implement Catherine's Provincial Reform (1775). In the second Russo–Turkish War (1787–1792) Rumyantsev commanded the Ukrainian army, but was in the shadow of Grigory Potemkin. His last major campaign was in Poland in 1794 against Tadeusz Kosciusko. When he died, Emperor Paul ordered three days mourning in the army in his honor.

See also: MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; SEVEN YEARS' WAR

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RURIK

(d. 879), Varangian (Viking) leader who established his rule over the Eastern Slavs in the Novgorod region and became the progenitor of the line of princes, the Rurikid dynasty (Rurikovichi), that ruled Kiev and Muscovy.

The *Primary Chronicle* reports that a number of Eastern Slavic tribes quarreled but agreed to invite a prince to come and rule them and to establish peace. They sent their petition overseas to the Varangians called the Rus. In 862 three brothers came with their kin. Sineus occupied Beloozero and Truvor took Izborsk, but they died within two years. Consequently Rurik, who initially may have ruled Staraya Ladoga, made Novgorod his capital and asserted his control over the entire region. He sent men to Polotsk, Rostov, Beloozero, and Murom. In doing so, he controlled the major river routes carrying trade between the Baltic to the Caspian Seas. Rurik allowed two boyars, Askold and Dir, to go to Constantinople; on the way they captured Kiev. In 879, while on his deathbed, Rurik handed over authority to his kinsman Oleg and placed his young son Igor into Oleg's custody.

The chronicle information about the semi-legendary Rurik has been interpreted in various ways. For example, the so-called Normanists accept the reliability of the chronicle information showing that the Varangians, or Normans, founded the first Russian state, but the so-called Anti-Normanists look upon the chronicle reports as unreliable if not fictitious. Some identify Rurik with Rorik of Jutland, who was based in Frisia. Significantly, other written sources and archaeological evidence neither prove nor disprove the chronicle information.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; RURIKID DYNASTY; VIKINGS

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MARTIN DIMNIK

RURIKID DYNASTY

Ruling family of Kievan Rus, the northern Rus principalities, and Muscovy from the ninth century to 1598.

The Rurikid dynasty ruled the lands of Rus from the ninth century until 1598. The dynasty was allegedly founded by Rurik. According to an account in the *Primary Chronicle* he and his brothers, called Varangian Rus, were invited in 862 by East Slav and Finn tribes of northwestern Russia to rule them. Rurik survived his brothers to rule alone a region stretching from his base in Novgorod northward to Beloozero, eastward along the upper Volga and lower Oka Rivers and southward to the West Dvina River. Although it has been postulated that Rurik was actually Rorik of Jutland, there is no scholarly consensus on his identity, and the account of his arrival is often considered semi-legendary. Varangians or Vikings, however, had been operating in the region as adventurers and merchants. The tale of Rurik represents the stabilization and formalization of the relationship between these groups of adventurers and the indigenous populations.

After Rurik died (879), his kinsman Oleg (r. 882–912), acting as regent for Igor, identified as Rurik's young son, seized control of Kiev (c. 882), located on the Dnieper River. From Kiev, which became the primary seat of the Rurikid princes until the Mongol invasions between 1237 and 1240, Igor (r. 913–945), his widow Olga (r. 945–c. 964), their son Svyatoslav (r. c. 964–972), and his son Vladimir (r. 980–1015), replacing other Varangian and Khazar overlords, subordinated and exacted regular tribute payments from the East Slav tribes on both sides of the Dnieper River and along the upper Volga River. Their strong ties to Byzantium resulted in Prince Vladimir's conversion of his people to Christianity in 988. The dynasty and the church combined to provide a common identity to the disparate lands and peoples of the emerging state of Kievan Rus.

The Rurikids enlarged Kievan Rus territory and through diplomacy, war, and marriage established

ties with other countries and royal houses from Scandinavia to France to Byzantium. But the Rurikids themselves were not always unified. Vladimir as well as his son Yaroslav the Wise gained the Kievan throne through fratricidal wars. To avoid further succession struggles, Yaroslav wrote a testament for his sons before he died in 1054. In it he assigned the central princely seat at Kiev to his eldest, surviving son Izyaslav. He gave other towns, which became centers of principalities within Kievan Rus, to his other sons while admonishing them to respect the seniority of their eldest brother.

Although Yaroslav's testament did not prevent internecine warfare, it established a dynastic realm shared by the princes of the dynasty. Members of each generation succeeded one another by seniority through a hierarchy of princely seats until each in his turn ruled at Kiev. This system, known as the rota or ladder system of succession, functioned imperfectly. Ongoing discord combined with attacks from the Polovtsy (nomads of the steppe, also known as Kipchaks or Cumans) motivated the princes to meet at Lyubech in 1097; they agreed that each branch of the dynasty would rule one of the principalities within Kievan Rus as its patrimonial domain. Kiev alone remained a dynastic possession.

Under this revised method of succession Svyatopolk Izyaslavich ruled Kiev to 1113. He was succeeded by his cousin, Vladimir Vsevolodich, also known as Vladimir Monomakh (r. 1113–1125), and subsequently by Monomakh's sons. Although the system brought order to dynastic relations, it also reinforced division among the dynastic branches, which was paralleled by a weakening in the cohesion among the component principalities of Kievan Rus.

By the end of the twelfth century the dynasty had divided into approximately a dozen branches, each ruling its own principality. The princes of four dynastic lines, Vladimir–Suzdal, Volynia, Smolensk, and Chernigov, remained in the Kievan rotational cycle and engaged in fierce competition particularly when the norms of succession were challenged. One campaign, launched by Andrei Bogolyubsky of Vladimir, resulted in the sack of Kiev in 1169. Although fought to defend the traditional succession system, this campaign is often cited as evidence of the fragmentation of the dynasty and Kievan Rus.

When the Mongols invaded and destroyed Kievan Rus, many members of the Rurikid dynasty

were killed in battle. Nevertheless, with the approval of their new overlords, surviving princes continued to rule the lands of Rus. By the mid-fourteenth century, however, the dynasty lost possession of Kiev and other western lands to Poland and Lithuania. But in the northeast the princes of Moscow, a branch of the dynasty descended from Vladimir Monomakh's grandson Vsevolod and his grandson Alexander Nevsky, gained control over the principality of Vladimir–Suzdal. Symbolized by Dmitry Donskoy's victory at the Battle of Kulikovo (1380), they cast off Mongol suzerainty and expanded their realm to create the state of Muscovy.

The Moscow princes also reordered internal dynastic relations. After an unsuccessful challenge to Basil II (ruled 1425–1462) by his uncle and cousins that resulted in an extended civil war (1430–1453), a vertical pattern of succession firmly replaced the traditional collateral one. Ivan III (ruled 1462–1505), selecting his second son over his grandson (the son of his eldest but deceased son), defined the heir to the Muscovite throne as the eldest surviving son of the ruling prince. Basil III (ruled 1505–1533) divorced his barren wife after a twenty-year marriage in order to remarry and produce a son rather than allow the throne to pass to his brother.

Dynastic reorganization enhanced the power and prestige of the monarchs, who formally adopted the title "tsar" in 1547. But when Fyodor, the son of Ivan IV "the Terrible," died in 1598, and left no direct heirs, the Rurikids' seven-century rule came to an end. After a fifteen-year interregnum, known as the Time of Troubles, the Romanov dynasty, related to the Rurikids through Fyodor's mother, replaced the Rurikid dynasty as the tsars of Russia.

See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; BASIL I; BASIL II; BASIL III; DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH; FYODOR IVANOVICH; IVAN III; IVAN IV; OLEG; OLGA; RURIK; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH; VLADIMIR, ST; VIKINGS; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH; YURY VLADIMIROVICH

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RUSSIA-BELARUS UNION

Belarus and Russia were constituent republics of the Soviet Union and became independent in 1991, with the collapse of the USSR. Both countries were founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The traditionally close ties between Russia and Belarus and a relatively weak Belarusian national identity led to a drive toward reunification, which started already in the early 1990s. A preliminary agreement (which remained only on paper) on the establishment of a monetary union between Russia and Belarus was negotiated between the end of 1993 and 1994. While the two countries retained their own currencies, the integration process became high on the agenda after Alexander Lukashenko, a supporter of the "unification of all Slavic peoples," became the new president of Belarus in July 1994.

In April 1996 a "Treaty on Forming a Community" was signed by Lukashenko and Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation. The agreement promoted the coordination of the two countries' foreign and economic policies, created a Supreme Council and an Executive Committee of the community (both with little or no real powers), and led to the establishment of a Russia-Belarus parliamentary assembly. On April 2, 1997, Yeltsin and Lukashenko signed a second treaty establishing a union between Russia and Belarus and pledging further cooperation in the security and economic spheres, reiterating the final goal of creating a single currency. Yeltsin's resistance, however, prevented the two sides from defining concrete measures strengthening the integration between Russia and Belarus.

The 1996 and 1997 documents had little practical consequences. Russian reformers (some of them close to President Yeltsin) had a lukewarm attitude toward a possible confederation with an increasingly authoritarian Belarus. Another obstacle on the way of integration was the Russian authorities' concern that creating the union could encourage Russian ethnic republics to seek the same status as Belarus in the new confederation. In Russia the main advocates of integration with Belarus were chiefly found among the nationalists and communists, while the Belarusian opposition continued to regard with suspicion the creation of a Russia-Belarus Union (which for many had an old Soviet flavor).

In December 1998 Yeltsin and Lukashenko signed new treaties, including a declaration of unification where the two sides agreed to create in 1999 a union state with a single currency. However, in the following months Russia remained cautious about establishing a confederation with Belarus and opposed the creation of the post of a union president. After long negotiations a new union document was signed in December 1999. Once again, the agreement was of declaratory nature and this time set 2005 as the date for the currency union.

Since Vladimir Putin became Russian president in 2000 no other significant formal or concrete steps had been taken as of 2003 to lead the two countries toward some form of reunification. The Belarusian authoritarian regime and Soviet-style economy continued to represent serious obstacles for the integration of Belarus in a common state with Russia. In 2002 there was a crisis in the relations between the two countries, following Putin's proposals (rejected by Lukashenko) of *de facto* incorporating Belarus into the Russian Federation or, alternatively, of creating a form of chiefly economic integration based on the European Union model. Officially the Russia-Belarus monetary union remains scheduled to start in 2005, when Belarus is to adopt the Russian ruble as its legal currency.

See also: BELARUS AND BELARUSIANS; COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES; LUKASHENKO, ALEXANDER GRIGORIEVICH

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RUSSIA COMPANY

In the early modern period, different branches of international trade were controlled by large groups of merchants linked in a single company with its own charter, monopoly rights, membership, directors, and regulations. The Russia Company (also known as the Muscovy Company), founded in the mid-sixteenth century, was one of many such organizations in England. It was the first company to be organized on a joint-stock basis, thus laying the foundations for one of the most important forms of economic association and investment in the West. In addition, through its discovery of a viable water route to Russia (the White Sea or Archangel route) and its establishment of direct, regular trade with Russia, the Russia Company introduced an important new element into Western international trade and relations in general. Prior to the company's arrival, Russia's relations with the West were almost nonexistent. Russia was truly at the far periphery of Europe, both physically and conceptually. The Russia Company's activities brought Russia into the Western orbit.

The Russia Company's trade revolved around several key commodities. Its main export to Russia was woolen cloth, the staple of English foreign trade for centuries. Because of its cost, the market for English cloth was largely limited to the elite segments of Russian society, beginning with the tsar's household. Metals were another important export, particularly from the perspective of Russian state interests. England, a major exporter of metals in this period, appears to have provided mine-deficient Russia with substantial quantities of iron, copper, and lead for use in weapons manufacture. These exports were supplemented by armaments of all kinds. Exports of gold and silver went primarily to the Russian treasury, largely for the purpose of minting the country's currency. Russian commodities handled by the Russia Company revolved heavily around products needed in the construction, outfitting, and refurbishing of ships (i.e., tar, hemp, flax, cordage, and timber). The key commodity for the Russia Company was cordage (ropes), which it produced on site in Russia. The English navy and shipping industry and other trading companies were important customers for Russian cordage. Besides cordage, the company also traded in fine Russian leather (*yufti*), tallow, and potash. Russian caviar, already a renowned delicacy in the sixteenth century, was shipped by the company to Italian ports and the Ottoman Empire.

According to traditionally accepted views, The Russia Company's considerable success in Russia in the second half of the sixteenth century was followed by decline to near oblivion by the beginning of the seventeenth century, largely as a result of strong Dutch competition in the Russian market. A comprehensive reexamination of company activities, however, challenges this long-held view, providing evidence of a substantial English presence and trade in Russia into the 1640s, Dutch activities notwithstanding. According to this revised view, the company's very success in an atmosphere of growing Russian merchant opposition to foreign competition accounts for the abrogation of the company's trade privileges in Russia in 1646 and its expulsion from the country in 1649, events that brought to an end a historic century of Anglo-Russian trade and relations.

See also: CAVIAR; FOREIGN TRADE; MERCHANTS; TRADE ROUTES

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MARIA SALOMON AREL

RUSSIAN ASSOCIATION OF PROLETARIAN WRITERS

Better known for its persecution of other writers than for its own literary efforts, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (Rossysskaya asotsiatsia proletarskikh pisatelei—RAPP) played a major role in the politicization of the arts in the Soviet Union. RAPP's members argued that Soviet literature needed to be proletarian literature (i.e.,

literature written for, though not necessarily by, members of the working class); all other literature was perceived as anti-Soviet. Therefore RAPP's leaders claimed that the Communist Party should assist RAPP in establishing the dominance of proletarian literature in the Soviet Union. RAPP reached the height of its power during the Cultural Revolution (1928–1932), and it is often viewed as the epitome of the radical artistic movements that characterized this tumultuous period.

The group, founded in 1922, was known variously as the Octobrists, Young-Guardists, or VAPP (the All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers) until May 1928, when it changed its name to RAPP. Its early membership, drawn mostly from the Komсомол (Communist Youth League) and Proletkult (Proletarian Culture) movement, was disappointed with the Party's retreat from the radical policies of the civil war period, and wished to bring a militant spirit to the "cultural front." They issued violent diatribes against non-proletarian writers, particularly the so-called fellow travelers, writers with a sympathetic, but ambivalent, attitude towards the Bolshevik cause.

RAPP's early petitions for party support led to the Central Committee's highly ambiguous June 1925 resolution "On the Policy of the Party in the Area of Belles Lettres," which recognized the importance of proletarian literature, but also called for tolerance of the fellow travelers. This was seen as a relative defeat for RAPP, and the group's claims were muted over the next two years. In 1927, however, RAPP's willingness to connect literary debates with ongoing party factional struggles won it the backing of the Stalinist faction of the Central Committee. This backing, which included financial subsidies, allowed RAPP to gain control over major literary journals, to gain influence within the Federation of Soviet Writers, and to expand its membership. By extending political categories of deviation to the arts, RAPP helped to create the crisis atmosphere and militant spirit that facilitated Stalin's rise to power.

RAPP now championed a poorly developed literary style dubbed "psychological realism" and continued to demand that literature be made accessible to working-class readers. Over the next four years, RAPP used its new powers to continue its campaign against any writer or critic who refused to follow its lead. Many of RAPP's targets, who included Boris Pilniak, Yevgeny Zamiatin, and Alexei Tolstoy, found it difficult to publish their

work under these conditions, and some were fired from their jobs or even arrested; Vladimir Mayakovsky's 1930 suicide was due in part to RAPP's persecution. RAPP also became a mass movement during this period, its membership growing to ten thousand, as it promised to mentor worker-writers who were expected to create the literature of the future.

Although RAPP was the best-known proletarian artistic group of the Cultural Revolution, its tactics and ideas were adopted by similar groups in fields such as music, architecture, and the plastic arts. RAPP had local branches throughout Russia and affiliated organizations in each Union Republic. There was also a sister peasant organization (the All-Russian Society of Peasant Writers, or VOKP). RAPP's most important leaders included the critic Leopold Averbakh, the playwright Vladimir Kirschon, and the novelists Alexander Fadeyev, Fyodor Panferov, and Yuri Libidensky.

By 1931, RAPP's inability to produce the promised new cadres of working-class writers, continued persecution of many pro-Soviet authors, and claims to autonomy from the Central Committee led to its fall from favor with the party leadership. The Central Committee's April 1932 resolution "On the Restructuring of Literary-Artistic Organizations" ordered RAPP's dissolution. Its eventual replacement, the Union of Soviet Writers, was more inclusive and acknowledged its subordination to the Party. Without the complete politicization of literature spearheaded by RAPP, however, the powerful new Writers' Union was unthinkable.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION; UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS

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RUSSIAN FEDERAL SECURITIES COMMISSION

The Russian Federal Securities Commission was created in 1996 to oversee registration of equity shares issued by Russian private enterprises.

Although the stock market existed in Russia prior to mass privatization of state enterprises, the volume and significance of stock exchange transactions increased many times as a result of the rapid privatization that began in 1992. It therefore became necessary for the Russian government to develop the institutional structure necessary for a stock market and private equity ownership to work efficiently and lawfully. Among other things, this requires a public registry of stock-share ownership. This had not been required prior to 1996, and Russian enterprises maintained their own registries, a situation that was conducive to fraud, misrepresentation, and difficulty of access. The 1996 Federal Securities Law mandated that companies place stock registries with an independent organization, and created the Russian Federal Securities Commission to resolve custody disputes and settlements in accordance with international practice.

The Federal Securities Commission was also charged with coordinating the activities of the several agencies that have overlapping jurisdictions governing the securities market, including the Central Bank, the Anti-Monopoly Committee, the Ministry of Finance, and certain Parliamentary committees. This has not been an easy task. Also, although legislation gives the commission the power to levy civil and even criminal penalties, it must rely upon the police and tax inspectors to enforce any penalties. Enforcement has remained a problem, but much progress has been made since 1996.

See also: PRIVATIZATION; STOCK MARKET

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RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Russian Federation (formerly the RSFSR, one of the fifteen republics of the USSR) covers almost twice the area of the United States of America, or 17,075,200 square kilometers (6,591,100 square miles). It is divided into eighty-nine separate territories. The country reaches from Moscow in the west over the Urals and the vast Siberian plains to the Sea of Okhotsk in the east. The Russian Federation is bounded by Norway and Finland in the northwest; by Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine in the west; by Georgia and Azerbaijan in the southwest; and by Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and China along the southern land border. The Kaliningrad region is a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea and is bordered by Lithuania and Poland.

The Russian Federation was established in 1991, when the USSR disintegrated and the former RSFSR became an independent state. A declaration of state sovereignty was adopted on June 12, 1991 (now a national holiday), and official independence from the USSR was established on August 24, 1991. The Russian Federation replaced the USSR as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The term *Russia* has been applied loosely to the Russian Empire until 1917, to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) from 1917 to 1991, to the Russian Federation since 1991, or even (incorrectly) to mean the whole of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The term has also been used to designate the area inhabited by the Russian people, as distinguished from other Eastern Slavs and from non-Slavic peoples.

Moscow, the ninth largest city in the world, the largest Russian city, and the capital of the Russian Federation, was founded in 1147. The city's focal point is Red Square, bound on one side by the Kremlin and its thick red fortress wall containing twenty towers. The tsars were crowned there; in fact, Ivan the Terrible's throne is situated near the entrance. The second largest city, St. Petersburg, is situated northwest of Moscow and was known as a cultural center with elegant palaces. The city is spread over forty-two islands in the delta of the Neva River.

The terrain of the Russian Federation consists of broad plains with low hills west of the Urals; vast coniferous forest and tundra in Siberia; and uplands and mountains along the southern border

regions. Although the largest country in the world in terms of area, the Russian Federation is unfavorably located in relation to the major sea lanes of the world. Despite its size, much of the country lacks proper soils and climates (either too cold or too dry) for agriculture. It does, however, have enormous resources of oil and gas, as well as numerous trace metals.

Since 1991, Russia has struggled in its efforts to build a democratic political system and market economy to replace the strict social, political, and economic controls of the Communist period. The country adopted a constitution on December 12, 1993, and established a bicameral Federal Assembly (Federalnoye Sobraniye). Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was elected to the office of president of the Federation on May 7, 2000, with 52.9 percent of the vote, as opposed to 29.2 percent for the Communist representative, Gennady Zyuganov, and 5.8 percent for the democratic centrist, Grigory Yavlinsky.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY

The Russian Geographical Society is one of the world's oldest geographical societies, dating to 1845 ("Imperial Russian Geographical Society"). The name reappeared in 1917 after the October Revolution, only to be replaced by the "State Geographical Society" (1926–1938). After 1938, the organization became identified with the USSR until 1991, when it became the Russian Geographical Society again.

In 1917 the Geographical Society was composed of eleven subdivisions and 1,000 members. By 1971, membership had soared to 19,000 individuals, who sent delegates to an All-Soviet Geographical Congress held every five years. Between congresses, the affairs of the society were administered by a scientific council, selected by the delegates at the congress, and its presidium led by a president. Past presidents include Yuri Shokalsky, Nikolai Vavilov, Lev Berg, Yevgeny Pavlovsky, and Stanislav Kalesnik. Sergei Lavrov serves currently. By 2003, membership had again declined to one thousand.

In 1970 the Geographical Society, based in Leningrad, supervised fourteen geographical societies in the constituent republics, fifteen affiliates in the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR), and approximately one hundred sub-branches. Between 1947 and 1991, the society authorized discussion of more than sixty thousand scientific papers, the convening of a wide array of scientific conferences, and All-Union Congresses in Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Tbilisi, and several other Soviet cities. The Geographical Society also provided practical expertise and consultation to the Soviet government on issues pertaining to geography and regional development, and organized or sponsored twenty to fifty scientific expeditions every year. Society members were urged to popularize the results of their research at public meetings. More than fifty of the affiliates published their own journals, the most famous of which is the Moscow affiliate's *Problems of Geography* (*Voprosy geografii*, first published in 1946).

As of 2003, the Moscow affiliate alone could claim a mere 200 to 300 employees, who existed on paper only, coming to the offices in the affiliate's twenty-story skyscraper simply to retrieve their biweekly \$35 salary. Former members provided consulting to the Russian government, while the more ambitious went into business.

See also: GEOGRAPHY; IMPERIAL RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHY SOCIETY

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RUSSIAN JUSTICE

The chief code of law in Kievan Rus, the *Pravda Russkaya*, or “Rus Justice,” survives in about one hundred copies that may be grouped into three basic versions: Short, Expanded, and Abbreviated. The so-called Short version, usually thought to be the oldest, is attested in only two fifteenth-century copies and several from much later. Essentially a list of compensations to be paid for physical wrongs, the first section is sometimes linked with Grand Prince Yaroslav (1019–1054), whose name appears in the heading, but nowhere in the text. The second section attributes to several of Yaroslav’s successors a codification of law, providing fees for the homicide of the prince’s servitors as well as compensation for various property and criminal offenses. Separate articles establish provisions for the prince’s “bloodwite” (*wergild*) collector, as well as a tithe for the church from the prince’s fees. A final article somewhat incongruously establishes payments for bridge builders.

The Expanded version is much more detailed and survives in many more manuscripts; the oldest copies date from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but numerous other copies originated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Whereas the Short version included no more than forty-three articles, the Expanded version includes at least 121 articles and betrays a much more consciously rational form of organization, highlighted in many copies with special headings. The first articles repeat many of the measures of the Short *Pravda*, but overall the Expanded version establishes a much more detailed inventory of offenses and their resolution. Separate groups of articles examine slavery, commercial transactions, and loans, as well as inheritance disputes.

The Abbreviated version, which survives in only a handful of copies, none older than the seventeenth century, seems to have been the result of

a conscious reworking of the Expanded version, adapted to the circumstances of early modern Russia. Several traces of the Short *Pravda* remain, but the scarcity of copies along with the fact that Muscovite Rus generated its own legal codes has persuaded most scholars that this Abbreviated version had little practical importance.

The emphasis of the law in both the Short and Expanded versions is to entrust the process of conflict resolution mainly to the persons directly involved. The first article of the Short version, in fact, authorized blood vengeance by relatives of homicide victims and provided for monetary compensation only in the absence of kin. According to the second article of the Expanded version, the sons of Yaroslav outlawed vengeance justice when they met to revise the law sometime in the 1070s, after which homicides were redeemable by payment of compensation to the victim’s kin, along with a fine payable to the prince. In general, compensation alone appears as a remedy in the Short *Pravda*, but both fines and compensation figure in the Expanded *Pravda*—an indication, some have argued, of a growing political apparatus that controlled litigation in later medieval Rus.

Both the Short and Expanded versions make scant reference to judicial process, however, and describe instead a self-help process that indicates the minimal role played by judicial personnel. In cases of theft, for example, the codes describe a process of confrontment, according to which the victim who recognized his stolen property was to announce his loss, and seek the help of the current owner in finding out from whom he had acquired it, and so on, all the way back to the original thief. The Expanded version articulates an identical process for slave theft, using the slave as a witness in tracing the transactions that separated the original thief from the present slaveowner.

The *Pravda* provides considerable information on the economy of Kievan Rus. Few articles examine farming, despite the obvious importance of agriculture to the economy. The code does establish, however, compensation for livestock either lost or stolen, and also protects some farming implements. By contrast, the Expanded version dwells at length on trading and commercial transactions, suggesting to some scholars that this law served a primarily urban and commercial society. The prominence of slavery in the law indicates that the economy and society of Kievan Rus depended upon various forms of involuntary labor, much of it probably provided by war captives. Inasmuch as

the code mainly considers men rather than women, some students of Kievan society have questioned the status of women in Kievan Rus. One controversial provision seems to provide a penalty for killing a woman that is only half as large as the penalty that attached to the homicide of a man.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER; PSKOV JUDICIAL CHARTER

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RUSSIAN NATIONAL UNITY PARTY

The Russian National Unity Party (Russkoe nationalnoe edinstvo) emerged in the fall of 1990 and subsequently became one of the most active of the small fascist-style parties that sprang up in Russia in the first post-Soviet decade. Founded by disaffected members of Pamyat, the party was led by Alexander Barkashov, a former electrical worker and Pamyat activist. The party espoused an ultranationalist, anti-semitic ideology. Its program, as set forth in Barkashov's *Azbuka russkogo nationalista (ABC of Russian Nationalism)*, advocated the establishment of a "Greater Russia" encompassing Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The rule of ethnic Russians would be assured through a national dictatorship that would preside over a council dominated by ethnic Russians representing labor, management, the intelligentsia, and other groups. Non-slavic peoples would be confined to their "historic homelands" and the state would protect the genetic purity of the Russian nation through the prohibition of mixed marriages. The party advo-

cated a foreign policy that would confront the United States, which was depicted as controlled by Jewish capital, and would be dedicated to ensuring Russia's world supremacy.

Russian National Unity operated as a paramilitary organization, rather than an orthodox party. Members were organized into detachments, underwent military training, and wore uniforms. The Party claimed that its symbol, the left swastika, had been worn by medieval Russian knights and conferred mystical powers on party members. Though Party membership probably never exceeded ten thousand, local organizations were particularly active in Moscow and several other regions. In some cities sympathetic local officials allowed party detachments to operate as informal *druzhiniki* (volunteer social monitors), a practice often accompanied by acts of violence and intimidation against ethnic minorities. In the few instances in which the party put forth candidates in elections, they were soundly defeated. After 1999 the party suffered a decline, the result of increased criticism of its program and tactics and feuding among the leadership. The party's electoral bloc, called Spas, was denied registration in the 1999 Duma elections, and court orders banned local organizations in Moscow and other key regions because of their advocacy of racial hatred and their use of Nazi symbols.

See also: PAMYAT

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WILLIAM D. JACKSON

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

In 988 Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev adopted Eastern Orthodoxy from Byzantium and inaugurated a gradual Christianization of his realm. First affected were elites, with churches and observance limited to cities; several centuries elapsed before the church could penetrate the hinterland. Although the devastating Mongol conquest of 1237–1240 temporarily interrupted this process, the Mongols' religious tolerance (and tax exemptions) enabled the

church to resume the building of parishes and monasteries. Simultaneously, the church emerged as an important political force, symbolizing Slavic unity amidst inter-princely conflict; the relocation of the metropolitan to Moscow played a key role in the triumph of Muscovy. There it was instrumental in formulating a new political culture based on the “Third Rome” theory, with Muscovy—after the fall of Constantinople in 1453—claiming leadership over Eastern Orthodoxy. Church councils codified the new Russian Orthodoxy, defended ecclesiastical ownership of lands and peasants, and achieved formal autocephalous status for the church (with its own patriarch) in 1589.

That triumph turned to schism (*raskol*). The conflict erupted in the 1650s when reformist clergy attempted to modify liturgical texts and ritual practices. At issue was the model for such changes: Reformers advocated Greek models, but opponents deemed the Orthodoxy of the Third Rome inviolable and any change tantamount to apostasy. The result was a split between the official church, supported by the state, and an underground of disaffected clergy and laity, pejoratively labeled “schismatics” by the official church but self-described as “Old Believers.”

The eighteenth century brought still more profound change. Driven by the needs of war and inspired by Western models, Peter the Great seized ecclesiastical resources, restricted the church’s role in secular affairs, and in 1721 replaced the patriarchate with a more tractable Synod. Although Peter drew short of secularizing church property (a common device of new monarchies hungry for resources), Catherine the Great proved less inhibited: In 1764 she sequestered church lands and peasants and allocated a small budget (ravaged, over time, by inflation). These clouds had a silver lining: The church now concentrated on its strictly religious mission, founded seminaries to train clergy, and tackled the daunting task of catechizing the mass of pious but uncomprehending believers.

Despite such gains, nineteenth-century observers discerned serious problems and shortcomings in the church. One was competition from dissenters (Old Believers, sectarians, and disbelievers) and, in borderland areas, from established faiths such as Catholicism and Lutheranism. A further cause of concern was ecclesiastical administration—in particular, its stifling centralization, the monocratic rule of bishops, and the increasingly intrusive role of the chief procurator (lay overseer of the Synod). Dismaying too was the performance of

parish clergy, a hereditary caste that proved lacking in personal commitment, suitable material support, and professional training. The parish itself, the nuclear institution of the church, appeared increasingly moribund, chiefly because the atrophy of parishioners’ rights undermined their interest and active involvement. Another highly contentious issue was marriage and divorce: Having retained total control over this sphere, the church severely restricted marital dissolution, a policy that aroused growing discontent among elites, urban groups, and the peasantry.

The church did endeavor to address these issues. Before mid-century, it constructed an elaborate network of seminaries, secured subsidies for clergy in the poorest parishes, and expanded its internal mission. Far more systematic attempts came during the Great Reforms of the 1860s, including measures to abolish the hereditary caste, professionalize seminary training, restructure the parish (investing power in parish councils), and improve ecclesiastical administration and courts. But the reforms misfired and stalled, even before the “counter-reforms” of the 1880s. The revolution of 1905 triggered a new phase of desperate reformism, but it all came to naught, largely because of a skeptical, conservative state. Thus, by 1914, despite the immense size of the institution (54,923 churches; 953 monasteries; 94,629 in monastic orders and 117,915 in the parish clergy), the church suffered from a host of long-festering and debilitating problems.

The revolutions of 1917 promised relief, but ended in disaster. The reform expectations culminated in the Church Council of 1917–1918; the first since the seventeenth century, it reestablished the patriarchate (to ensure the church’s autonomy) and tackled the long list of overdue reforms. But it had to operate under extremely adverse conditions, especially after October 1917: The new Bolshevik regime abolished the church’s juridical status, banned clergy from education, and nationalized all church assets. The civil war of 1917–1922 brought antireligious campaigns (including the exhumation of saints’ relics to expose “clerical fraud”), the closure of many ecclesiastical (especially educational, monastic, and administrative) institutions, and the arrest and execution of clergy. By 1921 the church as an institution had virtually disappeared; it existed only as individual parish churches registered by committees of laity.

Worse was to come. Even the New Economic Policy brought no respite. In 1922 the Bolsheviks

ordered the confiscation of church valuables, ostensibly to feed famine victims, but actually to precipitate a schism between the “reactionary” patriarchal wing and pro-Soviet “renovationists.” But that strategy failed abysmally, and, alarmed by signs of religious revival, in 1929 the Stalinist regime declared open war on the church. By 1939 all but 1,744 churches (of the 28,560 in 1928) were closed; vast numbers of believer-activists, not just clergy, were arrested and many executed in the Great Terror. Although the exigencies of World War II forced some concessions (including election of a new patriarch in 1943 and an increase in churches, although mainly in Ukraine), the post-war regime gradually returned to its antireligious policies. The post-Stalinist “thaw” of Nikita Khrushchev brought no relief; on the contrary, his antireligious campaign reduced the number of churches from 13,414 (1958) to 7,773 (1964). The subsequent Brezhnev regime eschewed such traumatic campaigns, but used its powers of repression to cause a steady decline in the institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church.

During the mid-1980s the church experienced recovery. The reformist Mikhail Gorbachev cautiously restored ties to the church and permitted it to reopen parishes, monasteries, and seminaries. The breakup of the USSR in 1991 removed the last barriers. Since 1991 the church has greatly expanded the number of parishes, monasteries, and seminaries (e.g., parishes increasing from 6,794 in 1986 to over 22,000 in 2002, including 9,000 in Ukraine). The church also assumed a prominent role in public life, guardedly under President Boris Yeltsin, at least until he signed the “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” in 1997, privileging the traditional confessions and imposing limits on the activity of newer, foreign religious movements (i.e., Pentacostals). The links between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state became still more pronounced under President Vladimir Putin. Although the church faced stiff competition from other faiths (especially the proselytizing sects), it rebuilt its institutional structure and carved out a salient role in Russian post-communist life and culture.

See also: BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; HOLY SYNOD; METROPOLITAN; OLD BELIEVERS; ORTHODOXY; PATRIARCHATE; RELIGION; SAINTS

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RUSSIANS

The earliest origins of Russian culture are in dispute. Some believe that the ancestors of the modern Russians were seventh- or ninth-century migrants from the Vistula River valley (now Poland). Other archaeological evidence suggests that Slavic pastoralists may have spread across the central plains of Eurasia as much as a thousand years earlier, coexisting alongside northern Finnic and Lithuanian tribes. Whatever their prehistory, people sharing the same language, beliefs, social practices, and religion have occupied what is now Russia for at least a millennium. By the tenth century C.E., Eastern Slavic society was culturally distinct and highly developed in terms of agriculture, technology, commerce, and governance. Prince Vladimir I brought Byzantine Christianity to Kiev in 988 and sponsored the baptism of the peoples of Rus, a gradual process that blended Slavic pre-Christian practices with Eastern Orthodoxy.

The Russian Empire grew steadily from the eighteenth to the twentieth century through colonization of Siberia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The Soviet era brought further territorial expansion. Population density also grew throughout the millennium. By 1991, the year of the end of the Soviet Union, the population of the Russian Federation was 146,393,000. Ethnic Russians comprised 81 percent of this number, with more than one hundred other ethnic nationalities, many of them culturally Russified, making up the rest. There is a recognizably Russian culture among the population of the Russian Federation and strong cultural continuity among the Russians living in the newly independent republics of Central Asia, the Baltic region, and the Caucasus.

Russia’s cultural history is multifaceted, encompassing both the distinct patterns of the rural peasantry and the intricate social rituals of the aristocracy, the mercantile caste, the bureaucracy, and other groups. Russia’s thousand-year history of class stratification, imperial growth and contraction, political consolidation and disintegration, repression

and relaxation, messianism and self-examination, and socioeconomic and cultural interconnections with other nations has had far-reaching effects on every aspect of Russian national culture.

For many centuries, the question of whether Russian culture was more “eastern” or “western” was a burning issue. Situated at the crossroads of major civilizations and empires—Scandinavian, Byzantine, Persian, Chinese, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, British—the peoples of Russia have profoundly influenced and been influenced by them all in terms of trade, technology, language, religion, politics, and the arts.

Since at least the time of Peter the Great, Russian writers, artists, politicians, and philosophers, as well as ordinary people in everyday discourse, have engaged in intensive cultural self-examination. Ethnic Russians have struggled to redefine their national identity in the wake of the Soviet collapse and the turmoil that accompanied the end of communism.

The northern climate has influenced cultural, social, and political institutions, settlement patterns, household configurations, village politics, agricultural systems, and technologies. Defiance of the natural limitations of this harsh environment is seen throughout Russian history and plays a significant role in local identity.

COUNTRY AND CITY

In 1917 the population of Russia was more than 80 percent rural. The disruptions of the Soviet period—civil war, rural collectivization, world war—brought a massive migration to the cities. By 1996, 73 percent of the population was urban. Although there are still tens of thousands of small villages, many are simply disappearing as older people die and the younger generation departs. But despite the demise of rural communities, much of the urban population retains strong material and psychological ties to the countryside. Many own modest dachas within an hour or two of their city apartments and spend their weekends and summers gardening, hiking, hunting, gathering mushrooms and berries, and swimming in lakes and rivers. Some people maintain ties to their natal villages or those of their parents or grandparents and travel there to mark significant family events.

In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a tiny minority has accrued enough wealth

to build private homes and estates on the outskirts of the cities, but most people live in small apartments in apartment blocks. Space in flats can be tight, so a single room may serve as living room, bedroom, and dining room. Domestic furnishing is fairly consistent, for reasons of both cultural style and limited purchasing power. The range of consumer décor choices has become enormous in the largest cities but elsewhere only slightly better than it was during the Soviet period, when state stores offered little design variation. Architectural and domestic styles are changing gradually with growing consumer opportunities and increased attention to global fashions.

At home, people spend much time in the kitchen, eating and drinking tea (or something stronger), talking, reading, watching television, cooking, or working on crafts. When guests come, people sit at the table for the entire gathering. Public spaces around apartment blocks are often decayed and dirty, so the threshold to a family’s apartment marks a transition to private, clean space. Everyone removes shoes just inside the doorway to prevent dirt being brought inside, and slippers are worn at home.

Urban parks are an important space of everyday life. People spend leisure time strolling or sitting on benches to talk, smoke, play chess, or read. Smaller urban parks may center on a statue of a writer or political leader, and these squares are popular meeting places. Public plazas in urban centers have played a role in political and social life for centuries. The most famous of all, Moscow’s Red Square, is a historical site of government ritual, revolutionary protest, and rebellion. The central sites where parades, concerts, and state funerals are held also provide a place for festivals, family outings, and commemorations.

GENDER RELATIONS, FAMILY, AND KINSHIP

Russian society has always been structured around gendered divisions of labor. Prerevolutionary rural communities were patrilocal; newly married women moved in with their husband’s family and were fully subservient to his parents until they had borne sons. The details of household management were codified in texts such as the *Domostroi* that addressed even intimate practices of family life and patriarchal authority, influencing both the peasantry and the aristocracy. Around the turn of the twentieth century, rural and urban women of all classes experienced the loosening of gender norms,



A Russian mother and her children, dressed in their finest winter clothes, take a sled to the nearest village to watch television.

© STAFFAN WIDSTRAND/CORBIS

and many women pushed the boundaries of their social options.

After the 1917 revolution, communist ideology promoted the liberation of women and families from oppressive norms and structures. Women engaged in what had been male-only work in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing. During the Soviet period, they played increasingly significant roles in medicine, engineering, the sciences, and other fields. By the 1980s, one-third of the deputies in the Supreme Soviet were female, and women accounted for more than 50 percent of the students in higher education. But though “liberated” to work in the public sphere, women often retained the burden of household labor. Moreover, their equal employment status was not fully reflected in the workplace, where gender discrimination was common.

Some of the hard-earned status of women eroded after 1991. Unemployment increased in the 1990s, and women were frequently the first dis-

charged. Managerial jobs in the new commercial sectors were largely held by men, and a traditionalist view of work and family reasserted itself throughout society. The devaluation of women’s labor contributions has been devastating for women who need to work. Some women became entrepreneurs, but they faced stiff gender prejudice in starting businesses. The percentage of women holding political office has declined, and women’s participation in high levels of industry, the sciences, the arts, and the government has shrunk. Some young women turn to prostitution, or work in bars and nightclubs, which may seem to be a way to escape poverty.

Despite Soviet indoctrination, traditional gender ideologies never vanished: Men are not supposed to be able to cook, clean, or perform child care, whereas women are seen as driving cars, supervising others, and engaging in politics poorly. Women are held in high regard as mothers, nurturers, and bearers of culture. Although feminists have challenged these dichotomous gender norms,

and few families can afford to divide labor along strict gender lines, such ideas are widespread. Students receive equal education, but some school activities and expectations are divided by gender.

Romantic love is the standard motivation for marriage, and cultural tradition idealizes the passion of lovers, often in a tragic form. People meet partners at school or university, at work, or at clubs or music venues. Premarital sex is generally tolerated. With little variation over the decades, twenty-three has been the average age at marriage. Almost half of all marriages end in divorce, with economic hardship and alcohol abuse being contributing factors. Ethnic intermarriage became fairly common in Soviet times.

The nuclear family is the fundamental domestic unit, and married couples crave apartments of their own. Since the housing shortage and the high price of new apartments make this difficult, family units are often multigenerational. Many couples with children live with a widowed parent, often a grandmother, who provides child care and cooking. A grandparent's monthly pension may be a crucial part of family income.

Kinship is reckoned bilaterally (counting both parents' sides), but naming is patrilineal. Until the mid-nineteenth century, kin terms for more than sixty relations were in use; since then the number of terms has greatly decreased. Even across distances, people maintain strong relations with their siblings, grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins, and nieces and nephews, and many are close with even more distant relatives. Among the social factors that support such ties are the low level of geographic mobility, the importance of networks of mutual aid, and regular visits to relatives in ancestral villages for summer rest and gardening.

Childbirth practices reflect traditional ideas. Women stay in the hospital for at least a week after a birth, during which time fathers are allowed to see mother and baby only briefly. Infants used to be swaddled at birth and continue to be bundled tightly, especially when venturing outside. Many customary beliefs about medical or supernatural dangers surround pregnancy, birthing, and new babies.

Academic standards are high, and students are well trained in world history, foreign languages, music, mathematics, and science. Although the figures have gradually dropped since the Soviet years, more than 90 percent of the population completes

secondary education, and around 12 percent go on for higher education. The literacy rate is one of the world's highest. Post-secondary education confers social prestige and is more and more essential for economic success.

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

Most Russians identify themselves as Orthodox Christians. Not all are active church members, but observance of major holidays is increasing. The state has returned thousands of churches, icons, and religious objects appropriated during the Soviet period to local religious communities. Orthodox practice hinges on the emotive experience of liturgy and the veneration of icons, and the faithful light candles, pray, and bow before sacred images of the Virgin Mary and the saints. Rural houses feature a special corner where the family's icon hangs, and many apartments have an icon shelf. Religious practices were proscribed during the Soviet era but continued anyway.

Pre-Christian practices and beliefs have persisted over a millennium of Orthodoxy. Traditional beliefs about forest and house spirits, the evil eye, and metaphysical healing are found everywhere—and are especially strong in rural areas. Certain prohibitions stem from them; for example, evil intentions are attracted by bragging about good fortune or health, and can be cured only by metaphysical intervention of some kind.

Folk medicine is highly developed. Herbal remedies are used for everyday maladies. Professional practitioners advertise their services for treating serious illnesses and life problems. Homeopathy, the application of leeches, mineral baths, light therapy, and other treatments are popular. Physicians may also prescribe herbal teas, tinctures, and plasters.

Proper treatment and remembrance of the dead is important. The dead are prevented from staying among the living by covering mirrors with black cloth, laying out the body in ways that help usher out the spirit, and accompanying the deceased from home to church and from church to cemetery in elaborate processions. In the church or hall where the body is displayed, mourners circle the open coffin counterclockwise and kiss the body or put flowers on it. After burial, mourners gather to share vodka and food while remembering the deceased with stories and anecdotes. The soul remains on earth for forty days, when a second gathering is held to bid it farewell as it departs for heaven. The anniversary of a death is memorialized every year;

some people travel long distances to visit the graves of their loved ones.

CALENDRIAL RITUAL

Holidays fill the calendar. Some are Orthodox or pre-Christian, some mark historical events, some are secular, and a few, like Valentine's Day, are post-Soviet imports. March 8, International Women's Day, is a legal holiday. Men bring flowers to the women in their lives and congratulate female friends, coworkers, and relatives. May Day, commemorating international labor solidarity, heralds the coming of spring. Victory Day on May 9 celebrates the Soviet capture of Berlin and the end of World War II in Europe. This holiday is sacred to older people, who gather to remember family, friends, and comrades lost in the war. Russia Day, June 12, marks independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 with parades and fireworks. October Revolution Day, November 7, is celebrated mostly by communists nostalgic for Soviet power. New Year's Eve is the most lavish secular holiday. Grandfather Frost and the Snow Maiden leave gifts under a decorated New Year's Tree, and people gather for song, feasting, vodka, and champagne. The party may last all night. The observance of Christmas and Easter and other Orthodox holidays has grown since the end of Soviet religious repression.

FOOD

Bread and potatoes are the basic everyday foods. Cabbage, carrots, and beets are staple vegetables; onions and garlic are used liberally. Russians generally love meat. Sausage, salami, pork, beef, mutton, chicken, and dried or salted fish are widely available and inexpensive.

Breakfast is a quick snack of coffee or tea with bread and sausage or cheese. Lunch is a hot meal, with soup, potatoes, macaroni, rice or buckwheat kasha, ground meat cutlets, and peas or grated cabbage (or, for business people, a quick meal in one of the increasing number of fast-food cafés). A later supper may consist of boiled potatoes, soured cabbage, and bread or simply bread and sausage or cheese. There is a huge array of cakes, pies, and chocolates.

Russian cuisine features many dairy products, such as *tvorog*, a local version of cottage cheese, and many hard cheeses and fermented milk products. These items can be purchased from large shops or

farmers' markets or made at home. In provincial towns, fresh milk is sold from trucks, although bottles and cartons of pasteurized milk are available everywhere. Russians are great tea drinkers.

Fruits are widely cultivated in home gardens. Fruits and berries are made into preserves, compotes, cordials, and concentrates for the winter months. Mushroom picking is an art, and many people salt, dry, or pickle them. Cabbage, cucumbers, garlic, and tomatoes are salted or pickled. The chronic shortages of the Soviet era led many people to produce food for themselves. The impoverishment of the post-socialist era means that a significant portion of the population continues to depend on their own produce. Some estimates hold that 80 percent of the vegetables consumed in Russia are grown in small family plots.

Coffee has grown in popularity and is often served thick and strong. Although wine, beer, cognac, and champagne are popular, vodka reigns among alcoholic beverages.

Ceremonial occasions highlight food customs. Communal feasting marks birthdays, weddings, anniversaries, the achievement of a goal, important purchases, and major holidays. Tables are laden with salads, appetizers, sausage and cheese, and pickled foods, followed by meat and potatoes, and meat or cabbage pies. Vodka and wine are drunk throughout the meal, which may continue for many hours. Toasting is elaborate and can be sentimental, humorous, poetic, ribald, or reverential. Vodka is always drunk straight, accompanied by a pickled or salty food.

A growing number of people observe Lenten fasts during which they consume no meat, butter, eggs, or vodka. Easter provides an opportunity for a fast-breaking celebration with special foods.

EVERYDAY ETIQUETTE

Language rules play a significant part in good manners. When addressing elders, except for parents and grandparents, persons of higher status, strangers, and acquaintances, people use the second-person plural pronoun. The informal second-person singular is used only among friends, within the family, and among close coworkers of equal status. Addressing someone formally entails using the person's full name and patronymic. Misuse of the informal mode is insulting.

Table rituals are also important. Hosts and hostesses try to show unflinching generosity, and guests

must accept hospitality with a willingness to be served, pampered, and stuffed full of food and drink.

Sitting on the floor or putting one's shoes on a table is prohibited. Proper femininity requires that clothes be immaculately clean and pressed, grooming fastidious, and comportment elegant and reserved. By contrast, in crowds, on lines, and on public transport, active shoving and pushing are the norm. In Soviet times, demure, nonflashy dress was valued, but this norm has changed with the explosion of fashion and the growth of subcultural identity.

The word *uncultured* is used by older people against family or strangers as a reprimand for inappropriate behavior. The public use of this reprimand diminished as the social status of elders fell after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and as aggressive behavior in the cities became a mark of the coolness of youth.

CULTURAL SYMBOLS AND ARTS

The cupolas of Moscow's St. Basil's Cathedral are a popular visual symbol of Russia both within the country and abroad. Photographs of St. Basil's and many other churches and cathedrals adorn homes, offices, and media images.

Bread symbolizes central aspects of the national self-image. It is the mark of hospitality, as in the ritual of *khleb-sol* ("bread and salt"), welcoming visitors with a round loaf with a salt cellar on top. In broader terms, bread is the symbol of life. Other foods are also cultural symbols: black caviar, which signifies luxury; mushrooms and berries, the gifts of forest and dacha; pancakes served before Lent; the potato, symbol of survival in hard times, and vodka, symbolizing camaraderie and mischief-making.

Forest plants, animals, and objects are also important symbols. Birches conjure up the romance of the countryside; wolf, bear, and fox, are ubiquitous in folktales and modern cartoons; the peasant cottage signifies the intimate world of the past. Inside the cottage are other cultural symbols: the huge clay stove, the samovar, and the Orthodox icon in its corner. Although most Russians live in urban apartments, images of traditional rural life are still meaningful.

Conversation is rich with metaphors and proverbs, summarizing a complex view of shared identity. Russians think of the soul (*dusha*) as an internal spiritual conjunction of heart, mind, and

culture. Friendship depends on a meeting of souls, accomplished through shared suffering or joy—or by feasting and drinking. Soul is said to be one of the metaphysical mechanisms that unite Russians into a people (*narod*). Stemming from the ancient Slavic for "kin" and "birth," and meaning "citizens of a nation," "ethnic group," or "crowd," *narod* refers to the composite identity of the people through history and is often invoked by politicians. People speak in terms of belonging by "blood"; a person is thought of as having Russian blood, Jewish blood, Armenian blood, or some other ethnic blood, and culture is supposedly transmitted through the blood.

Cultural symbols abound in folk art. Animal, bird, plant, solar, and goddess motifs, and a palette of reds and golden yellows with traces of black and green prevail in painted wooden objects and embroidered textiles. Soviet state studios kept many folk media alive, and the postsocialist period has seen independent craftspersons return to traditional mythological motifs. Folk art objects are popular and are found in homes everywhere.

The end of Soviet power meant an explosive opening of Russia to the world, with all of the changes for better and worse that come with globalization. Popular culture in Russia has become characterized by the vibrant and fertile mixing of local and international styles in music, art, literature, and film. Obsessions with mafia criminals, the new wealthy (so-called New Russians), *biznis-meny*, and modern technology fill the media. Yet alongside this, indigenous artistic genres, shared symbols and values, and social practices hold their own and continue to shape the world of meaning and identity.

See also: FEMINISM; FOLKLORE; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS; NATIONALITIES POLICY, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICY, TSARIST; NATION AND NATIONALITY; ORTHODOXY; PEASANTRY; SLAVOPHILES

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NANCY RIES

RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, or RSFSR, formed on November 7, 1917, was one of the four original republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) when the latter was

founded by treaty in December 1922. The RSFSR's establishment was later confirmed in the 1924 constitution. The other three were Ukraine, Belorussia (now called Belarus), and Transcaucasia (divided in 1940 into Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia). Even after ten more republics were added, for a total of fifteen republics, the RSFSR remained the largest, with more than half the population and three-quarters of the USSR's territory (6,591,000 square miles). Moscow was the capital of both the RSFSR and the USSR as a whole. Situated in Eastern Europe and North Asia, the RSFSR was surrounded on the east, north, and northwest by the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic Oceans. It had frontiers in the northwest with Norway and Finland, in the west with Poland and the three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), and in the south with China and Outer Mongolia and the Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. In the new Soviet Union, which geographically replaced the old Russian Empire, the name Russia was not officially used. Lenin and other Bolshevik authorities intended to blend the national and the international to recognize each nationality by granting autonomy to national groups, while binding these groups together in a higher union and allowing new groups to enter regardless of historic frontiers. In 1922 the expectation of world revolution was still alive. Thus, the founding of the USSR—and the RSFSR within it—was a decisive step toward uniting the workers of all countries into one World Soviet Socialist Republic.

Although Lenin supported national self-determination as a force to undermine the tsarist empire, he adopted federalism rather late, as a response to Ukrainian and Georgian attempts to establish truly independent republics. The Red Army crushed these attempts in 1920–1921, but such use of brute force and the specter of Great Russian chauvinism troubled Lenin. He and others pressed for the federalization not only of the sovereign republics within the USSR, but also the federalization of the RSFSR. By 1960 the RSFSR consisted of fifteen “autonomous soviet socialist republics” (ASSRs), six territories (*krai*), forty-nine regions (*oblast*), six autonomous oblasts, and ten national districts (*okrug*). The federal structure undoubtedly gave some dignity, self-respect, and sense of equal cooperation to many of the numerous nationalities.

In the late 1980s, partly due to the perestroika, glasnost, and new thinking (*novomyshlenie*) policies of the incumbent general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet republics—including and espe-

cially the RSFSR—began to challenge the legislative authority of the Soviet Communist Party and the “Moscow center.” By October 1990, fourteen republics had passed declarations of either independence or sovereignty over USSR laws. The RSFSR’s declaration of sovereignty and the rising popularity of Boris Yeltsin (elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in May 1990 and then president of the RSFSR in June 1991) were key factors in prompting Gorbachev to attempt to replace the original 1922 union treaty with a new document giving the republics more power. This in turn prompted hardliners in the Kremlin to stage a coup in August 1991. When it failed, Yeltsin’s power and influence eclipsed Gorbachev’s. Yeltsin convened with leaders of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in Alma Ata in December 1991 to declare the nullification of the 1922 union treaty and announce the official extinction of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev publicly confirmed the latter on December 25, 1991. The RSFSR is now called the Russian Federation.

See also: RUSSIAN FEDERATION; UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

RUSSIAN STATE LIBRARY

The Russian State Library is the largest library in Russia; the second largest library in the world after the Library of Congress, with holdings of more than forty-two million volumes. It is also a major scientific research center for library studies, bibliography, and book studies.

Founded in the center of Moscow in 1862 as the Moscow Public Museum and Rumyantsev

Museum, the Russian State Library had its origins in the library of Count Nikolai Rumyantsev (1754–1826), whose outstanding collection of books, manuscripts, and cartographic materials, including 710 manuscripts and 28,500 books, was donated to the Russian state to form the Rumyantsev Museum in St. Petersburg in 1831. The library was administered by the Imperial Public Library from 1845 to 1861, when it was transferred to Moscow. The new library grew rapidly by means of its status as a legal depository of all publications issued in the Russian empire, a privilege granted until 1862 to only three libraries: the Imperial Public Library, the Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Helsinki University Library. It also benefited from collections donated by some of Russian’s most prominent public figures, scholars, scientists, and writers, and by their families.

In the prerevolutionary period, the library received more than three hundred private book collections, including those of statesman Avraam Norov; bibliographer and bibliophile Sergei Poltoratsky; philosopher Pyotr Chaadayev; writer Prince Vladimir Odoyevsky, who served as deputy director of the Imperial Public Library and director of the Rumyantsev Museum from 1846 until it moved to Moscow; and Empress Alexandra Fyodorovna, wife of Tsar Nicholas II. The library also acquired book and manuscript collections of writers Gavriil Derzhavin, Vasily Zhukovsky, Alexander Pushkin, Alexander Veltman, Fyodor Tyutchev, Nikolai Gogol, Mikhail Lermontov, Afanasy Fet, Alexander Herzen, Nikolai Nekrasov, Alexander Ostrovsky, Ivan Turgenev, Leo Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, Vasily Rozanov, Valery Bryusov, Alexander Blok, Mikhail Bulgakov, Kornei Chukovsky, Isaac Babel, and Sergei Yesenin; literary scholars Alexander Pypin, Izmail Sreznevsky, Alexei Sobolevsky, Boris Tomashhevsky, Pavel Sakulin, and Nikolai Gudzy; historians Vasily Klyuchevsky, Nikolai Karamzin, Mikhail Pogodin, and Sergei Soloviev; and librarians and bibliographers Vasily Sobolshchikov, Vladimir Mezhov, and Nikolai Lisovsky, among others. Within fifty years of its founding, it had become one of the preeminent cultural and educational institutions of Russia, combining the roles of public library, treasury of manuscripts and decorative art, and archeological and ethnographic museum.

With the nationalization of libraries and cultural institutions after the October 1917 Revolution and the move of the capital from St. Petersburg to Moscow in 1918, it became the main library of

the country. Its name, which had changed in 1869 to Moscow Public and Romyantsev Museum and in 1913 to Imperial Moscow and Romyantsev Museum, changed again in 1917 to State Romyantsev Museum. In 1921 the library was reorganized to become separate from the museum: It was assigned the function of a state repository, and granted the status of national library. In 1924 its name was changed to V. I. Lenin All-Russian Public Library, in 1925 to V. I. Lenin State Library of the USSR, in accordance with its new status as the national library of the USSR, and in 1992, with the dissolution of the USSR, to Russian State Library.

The Manuscript Division holds works dating from the earliest years of Slavonic script. These include the Arkhangelsk Gospel of 1092, the Mariinskoe Gospel of the eleventh century, and the Khitrovo Gospel of the late fourteenth to early fifteenth century. It possesses a valuable collection of West European manuscripts, dating as early as the twelfth century, as well as Greek, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese manuscripts. The library has holdings estimated at 80 percent of all known books printed in Cyrillic script from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, including examples of early Russian printing associated with printer Ivan Fyodorov and typographer Pyotr Mstislavets, and a vast collection of eighteenth-century books printed in the civil script developed for secular works. Highlights include first and lifetime editions of Renaissance thinkers and scientists, including Nicholas Copernicus, Galileo, Giordano Bruno, René Descartes, Johannes Kepler, and Sir Thomas More. The library prides itself on its rare editions of outstanding Russian and foreign representatives of culture and science, including Dmitry Mendeleev, Nikolai Lobachevsky, Ivan Pavlov, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Isaac Newton, Charles Darwin, Louis Pasteur, Albert Einstein, William Shakespeare, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Voltaire, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, George Gordon Byron, Heinrich Heine, Honoré de Balzac, Victor Hugo, Charles Dickens, Émile Zola, and Bernard Shaw.

The library was originally housed in the former residence of retired military officer Pyotr Pashkov, in a building known as Pashkov House, built by architect Vasily Bazhenov from 1784 to 1786 in the Russian classical style. The building had a reading room for twenty people and was expanded over many decades to accommodate readers and collections. In 1958 construction was completed on a new library building adjacent to the

original building, with reading rooms for more than 2,000 readers. In addition, a branch opened in 1975 in Khimki on the outskirts of Moscow to house newspapers and dissertations. While focused on collection, preservation, and service relating to Russia's cultural heritage, the library's mission reflects its status as one of the world's finest repositories of the creative and intellectual output of humankind.

See also: NATIONAL LIBRARY OF RUSSIA

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JANICE T. PILCH

RUSSIA'S DEMOCRATIC CHOICE

Russia's Democratic Choice (Demokraticheskyy Vybor Rossii, or DVR) was a party with a liberal-democratic orientation, in favor of deeper market restructuring combined with minimal government involvement and feasible social programs. It was formed in the spring of 1994 out of the Duma fraction of the reformist pro-government bloc that was known as "Russia's Choice." The voters' list of the latter, led by Vice-Premier Yegor Gaidar, defender of rights Sergei Kovalev, and Minister of Social Security Ella Pamfilova, received 8.3 million votes (15.5%, second place), and forty Duma seats. Moreover, twenty-four candidates were elected in single-mandate districts, allowing them to form the largest fraction, amounting to seventy-six delegates. The political ambitions of numerous "Russia's Choice" leaders, disagreement over the Chechnya war, and the party's and fraction's loss of status and power led to the loss of many members, and at the end of the term only fifty-two delegates remained.

Russia's Democratic Choice entered the 1995 elections with an array of smaller, democratically oriented parties, in the bloc "Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats." Of the first three names on the list, Gaidar and Kovalev remained, but the

actress Lidia Fedoseyeva Shushkina replaced Ella Pamfilova, who had established her own nominal bloc. The 1993 campaign slogan "Freedom, property, lawfulness" was exchanged for "Peace, welfare, justice." However, without administrative resources, and with the splintering of the democratic electorate among several electoral associations, the bloc collapsed, winning only 2.7 million votes (3.9%). Nine delegates from single-mandate districts constituted an unregistered delegate group, working with Yabloko. The DVR governmental positions were temporarily weakened, but with the arrival of Anatoly Chubais, first as leader of Boris Yeltsin's election campaign in 1996, then in the presidential administration and government, they were strengthened again. The Institute of Transitional Economy, founded by Yegor Gaidar after his exit from government in 1992 and closely aligned with the government's economic branch, played an integral role in DVR policy formation and training. In the 1999 elections, the party enjoyed success as part of the bloc "Union of Right Forces," (SPS), which Gaidar co-chaired. In May 2001, on the threshold of new elections, the SPS became a party with its own membership, at which point the DVR dissolved, along with other "forces of the right."

See also: CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; KOVALEV, SERGEI ADAMOVICH; UNION OF RIGHT FORCES; YABLOKO; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLEYEVICH

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NIKOLAI PETROV

RUSSIFICATION

The term *Russification* refers to policies designed to spread Russian culture and language among non-Russians. These programs date from the late eighteenth century, but gained importance from the 1860s. Recent historiography has discredited earlier accounts that posited a consistent plan by the tsarist government to assimilate non-Russians. Still, St. Petersburg certainly viewed Russian as the empire's predominant language, considering it natural for non-Russians to learn Russian as a means of inter-ethnic communication. While the USSR officially rejected Russification, in fact the Soviet government was vastly more successful in spreading the Russian language than its tsarist predecessors. In the post-Soviet era, nationalities such as the Tatars and Chechens often complain bitterly that the pressure of Russification has not diminished since 1992.

TYPES OF RUSSIFICATION

An American historian, Edward C. Thaden, proposed a useful distinction between three types of Russification: unplanned, administrative, and cultural. By unplanned Russification, Thaden meant natural processes of cultural assimilation by which certain individuals or groups took on the Russian language, and often the Russian Orthodox religion, as well. Administrative Russification refers to official policies such as those requiring the use of Russian throughout all branches of the government, and is often difficult to distinguish from centralization. Cultural Russification, finally, is the effort to assimilate entire populations, replacing their original culture with Russian. Cultural Russification was uncommon in the imperial period, though rather more frequent under the Soviets. Both unplanned and administrative Russification, however, played an important role in Russian nationality policy.

RUSSIFICATION UNDER THE TSARS

Unplanned Russification on an individual basis began early in the Muscovite period. As Muscovite power increased, in particular after the conquest of the Tatar capital of Kazan in 1552, the prestige of Russian culture grew and, with it, its attractiveness to non-Russians. Moscow encouraged its new subjects to adopt Russian Orthodoxy, but these efforts were neither particularly energetic nor consistent. Only in the mid-eighteenth century was a

concerted program attempted, aimed at converting animists and Muslims in the Volga region. Under this program, many Tatars and nearly all Mordvins, Chuvash, and Votyaks converted.

Catherine the Great pressed forward with administrative Russification, particularly in the lands gained for Russia in the Polish partitions and by her wars against the Turks. Catherine did not, however, envision Russifying the population of this territory culturally. She aimed rather at rationalizing the administration of these newly acquired lands, tying them more closely to St. Petersburg. Even here her successes were rather modest.

Policies resembling cultural Russification appear for the first time during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I. Of key importance here is the concept of official nationality. Nicholas's Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov, formulated this ideology, easily encapsulated in the phrase "orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality." Uvarov aimed to create a modern Russian nation, united in its loyalty to the tsar, sharing the moral fundament of Russian Orthodoxy, and speaking the Russian language. Official nationalism would appear to be a blatant case of cultural Russification, aimed at the total assimilation of non-Russian cultures. Actually, Uvarov was primarily concerned with encouraging dynastic patriotism and morality: "Nationality" was, after all, the third and last element of his tripartite formula. Uvarov did hope that, over time, the tsar's German, Asian, and Baltic subjects would adopt Russian culture, but he did little on a practical level to affect such a change.

Two of the most problematic ethnic groups for Imperial Russia were the Poles and Jews. From 1815 to 1830, the Poles enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy in the Kingdom of Poland. After the Polish insurrection of 1831, this autonomy was considerably reduced, but only after a second uprising, in 1863, did St. Petersburg adopt policies of cultural Russification. Though Polish was not entirely banned from education, imported Russian teachers set the tone. In any case, private education in Polish was forbidden. Despite all prohibitions, Polish culture continued to flourish during these decades, though Russian policies contributed to the high illiteracy rate among Poles.

For official Russia, Jews appeared to be both religiously and culturally alien. Various programs throughout the nineteenth century aimed to modernize the Jewish community, in other words

to make Jews more like educated Russians. These measures had little impact, partly because Jews widely regarded them as mere fronts for religious conversion. Only toward the end of the century did there arise a significant and rapidly growing group of Russian Jews. Indeed, the adoption of Russian culture by these Jews may be seen as one of Russification's few successes.

Few Russians considered Ukrainians and Belarusians to be separate national groups before the twentieth century. These two East Slavic groups, mainly Orthodox in religion, spoke languages that were generally seen as mere dialects of Russian. When Ukrainian nationalism gained strength from the 1860s, St. Petersburg responded with a prohibition on publishing in the Ukrainian language. Schools in Ukrainian and Belarusian areas taught in Russian, which the pupils could not always understand. Only after 1905 did Belarusians and Ukrainians gain the right to use their languages in publications and education.

During the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire acquired enormous lands in Central Asia. Administrative Russification was practiced here, and some schools for indigenous children were set up. Interest in the Russian language spread among the younger generation of educated Muslims, especially Tatars, toward the end of the century. On the whole, however, St. Petersburg lacked the funds and interest to target these groups for intensive cultural integration.

RUSSIFICATION UNDER THE SOVIETS

Officially, the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir I. Ulyanov (Lenin), explicitly repudiated all forms of national chauvinism, including Russification. In practice, the situation was more complicated. Lenin's insistence on a highly centralized party had already led to clashes with Jewish socialists (the Bund). The Bolsheviks supported national self-determination and condemned repressive policies toward non-Russians. Yet, as Marxists, they were primarily interested in creating a proletarian socialist culture. They were therefore quick to denounce bourgeois nationalism. After 1917, despite various programs to encourage the development of national (that is, non-Russian) cultures, party centralization meant that anyone wishing to reach the top of the Soviet hierarchy needed to be fluent in Russian and adopt many aspects of Russian-Soviet culture. One example of this is the Russian-style patronymics and surnames adopted by communist activists in Muslim republics of Central Asia.

Upon seizing power in late 1917, the Bolsheviks quickly issued a "Declaration to the Peoples of Russia," pledging an end to any national or religious discrimination, guaranteeing free cultural development, and even endorsing national self-determination. The actions of the Bolsheviks in the ensuing civil war years, however, made clear that while cultural development could be accepted and even encouraged, political autonomy, much less secession, would not be tolerated. The civil war brought Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Belarus back under Moscow's control. The Soviet Constitution of 1924 set down an ostensibly federal, but in fact highly centralized, state structure. The USSR, as its name implied, consisted of individual Soviet Socialist Republics (Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian; later Kazakh, Georgian, and so on), all of which officially had the right to secede from the Union. This possibility remained a dead letter until the late 1980s when the Baltic republics, seized by Stalin in the early 1940s, dared to make real use of this hitherto only theoretical right.

During the Soviet period administrative Russification was nearly total; all official documents from stamps to passports to postal forms were printed in Russian or, in union republics, in Russian and the republic language, say, Latvian. Communications within the enormous bureaucracy took place in Russian, and even a Central Asian factory director or Armenian professor needed to know Russian fluently. The material and prestige value of Russian within the USSR meant that a considerable amount of unplanned Russification or simple cultural assimilation took place. Mixed marriages between Russians and members of other nationalities, for instance, most often produced Russian-speaking offspring. Many smaller nationalities, in particular within the Russian Republic (RSFSR), witnessed considerable rates of Russification, prompting national leaders in the post-Soviet period, for example in Tatarstan, to complain of the widespread de-nationalization of their people during Soviet rule.

Culturally, matters were more complicated. While non-Russian republics did have their own schools using local languages, everyone from Tallinn to Vladivostok studied Russian in school from an early age. Radio and television programs appeared in various languages but, to give only one example, even Estonian television broadcast the Russian-language Moscow news program "Vremia" every evening. Publications appeared in dozens and even hundreds of so-called Soviet languages, and

students could study even at the university level in their union republic's language. However, all dissertations at the *kandidat* (roughly, Ph.D.) or *doktor* level were written in Russian, even by students in Vilnius, Baku, or Kiev. In the Belarusian and Ukrainian republics, even obtaining an elementary education in the local language was not always simple, and parents who insisted too much ran the risk of being branded as nationalist or anti-Soviet.

The legacy of Soviet Russification in the twenty-first century remains strong but highly differentiated. When Central Asian or Belarusian leaders speak at international fora, it is nearly always in Russian. Arguably, Russian will remain the *lingua franca* in that region for some time. In the Baltic region, however, one hears little Russian (except by native speakers) and the bilingual street signs of the Soviet era have entirely vanished. For the future, Russification will remain a problem for the Russian Federation, where 20 percent of the total population is not ethnically Russian. Some of these national groups, in particular Tatars and Chechens, seem particularly resistant to further measures of Russification. For its part, the Russian Federation has officially disavowed any desire to Russify its citizens; the future will tell just how seriously one should take this official stance.

See also: NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALISM IN THE TSARIST EMPIRE; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SLAVOPHILES

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THEODORE R. WEEKS

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

After brokering the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Russia placed itself on a collision course with Japan over the issue of spheres of influence in Manchuria. Relations between the two countries further deteriorated in 1898, when Russia occupied the Chinese fortress of Port Arthur (now Lu-shun), and again in 1903, when Russian economic interest focused on Korea. Japan's response to Russia's aggressive eastern policy became apparent on February 8, 1904 when Admiral Heihachiro Togo launched a surprise attack on Port Arthur. Having won control of the sea, the Japanese began landing land troops at Chemulpo (now Inchon), as far north as possible on the Korean Peninsula to avoid the bad roads. Nonetheless, the weather did not cooperate, and it was six weeks before General Tamemoto Kuroki's First Army was ready to march around the northern tip of the Bay of Korea and invade the Liao Tung Peninsula.

Russia, meanwhile, had entered the war unprepared for conflict in Asia. Its military planners had given priority to the empire's European frontiers and had not dedicated sufficient resources to the defense of its Asian interests. While the Japanese considered mainland northeastern Asia vital to their national security, the Russians viewed the region merely as a colonial interest for potential economic development and wealth. No one understood Russia's predicament as clearly as War Minister Alexei N. Kuropatkin, who, upon the outbreak of war, resigned his ministerial portfolio, assumed command of the Russian army, and proceeded to Manchuria, where he arrived in March 1904. Since his forces were being transferred from one end of the empire to the other on the single-track and still incomplete Trans-Siberian Railroad, Kuropatkin set

up defenses that he hoped would give Russia at least three months to build up its military presence in the Far East.

Kuropatkin began concentrating troops between Harbin and Liao Yang, but the Japanese thwarted his plan by beginning operations in the middle of March. The Japanese movements unnerved the commander of Port Arthur, General A. M. Stoessel, who immediately appealed to Nicholas II's personally appointed viceroy for the Far East, Admiral E. I. Alexiev, for help. Alexiev ordered Kuropatkin to attack the Japanese, but the commander-in-chief, holding that he was answerable only to the tsar, refused. Thinking that Port Arthur had supplies enough to withstand a long siege, Kuropatkin had no intention of deviating from his plan. Before this dispute could be resolved, the Japanese forced Kuropatkin's hand by defeating the Russians in the hotly contested Battle of Nanshan in April.

With Port Arthur's supply lines cut after Nanshan, Kuropatkin no longer had the luxury of waiting until an overwhelming force was assembled. The major battles of the war followed: Va Fan Gou (May), Liao Yang (August), and the river Sha Ho (October), effectively concluding with Mukden in February 1905. The Russians were soundly defeated in each of these battles by an enemy that first out-thought and then outmaneuvered them. Having concentrated three armies under the overall command of Marshal Iwao Oyama, the Japanese were able to fight the war on their own terms. Ironically, by the Battle of Mukden, Kuropatkin had finally achieved numerical superiority just as the Japanese reached the end of their material and human resources, but he, his staff, and the Russian intelligence services never became aware of this advantage and were intimidated by the Japanese army's maneuverability. Further aggravating the Russian predicament was the inexplicable capitulation of Port Arthur on January 2, 1905. The situation was best described by the numerous military observers representing most of the world's nations, who noted how unmotivated Russia's army seemed in comparison to the patriotic Japanese soldiers with their strong sense of national mission.

A final event that captured the attention of the world was the saga of Russia's Baltic Fleet. By the autumn of 1904, Russia's Pacific Fleet lay in ruins, and to regain control of the sea, Nicholas II ordered the Baltic fleet to the Far East. Under the command of Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky, the Baltic Fleet sortied on October 15, 1904. Its round-the-world



Allegory on Russo-Japanese peace treaty, concluded in Portsmouth, NH. © THE ART ARCHIVE/DOMENICA DEL CORRIERE/DAGLI ORTI (A)

voyage attracted the interest of the international press, which reported its attack on British fishing vessels on the Dogger Bank (the Russians mistakenly imagined that they were Japanese warships), its search to find places to refuel and refit ships that had not been designed for such an arduous journey; and its rendezvous with reinforcements at Madagascar. By the time the fleet arrived in Asia, Togo was lying in wait and had little difficulty defeating it in the Battle of the Tsushima Straits on May 27, 1905, which dashed Russia's last hopes.

The Russo-Japanese War was the first global conflict of the modern era and the first war in which an emerging Asian nation defeated a European great power. The Japanese victory inflamed Asian nationalism and contributed to the struggle against colonialism throughout the region. The military debacle exposed the weakness of the tsarist regime and is usually considered the prime cause of the Revolution of 1905. After the complete defeat of Russia's land and naval forces, the tsar sued for peace. U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt brokered the Treaty of Portsmouth (August 23, 1905), but the Japanese believed that they had lost the peace and did not trust Western diplomacy again until after World War II. Finally, from the technical standpoint, the Russo-Japanese War was a precursor to World War I. Both sides mobilized mass armies and used trenches, machine guns, and rapid-fire artillery—weapons that help define the early twentieth century battlefield.

See also: BALTIC FLEET; JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH; KOREA, RELATIONS WITH; KUIROPATKIN, ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; PORT ARTHUR, SEIGE OF; PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF; REVOLUTION OF 1905; TSUSHIMA, BATTLE OF

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RUSSO-PERSIAN WARS

Disputes over territories along the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea and in the eastern Transcaucasus led to war between Russia and Persia from 1804 to 1813 and again from 1826 to 1828. The military conflict between the two empires was nothing new, but it entered a more decisive stage with the dawning of the nineteenth century. At the root of the first Russo-Persian War was the desire of Shah Fath Ali to secure his northwestern territories in the name of the Qajar dynasty. At the time, Persia's claims to Karabakh, Shirvan, Talesh, and Shakki seemed precarious in the wake of Russia's annexation in 1801 of the former kingdom of Georgia, also claimed by Persia. Meanwhile, Russia consolidated this acquisition and resumed its military penetration of border territories constituting parts of modern Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the objective of extending its imperial frontiers to the Aras and Kura rivers.

War broke out when Prince Paul Tsitsianov marched to Echmiadzin at the head of a column of Russian, Georgian, and Armenian troops. The outnumbered Russian army was unable to overcome the town's stubborn defense and several weeks later also unsuccessfully besieged Yerevan. Throughout the war, the Russians generally had the strategic initiative but lacked the strength to crush the Persian resistance. Able to commit only about ten thousand troops, a fraction of their total force in the Caucasus, the Russian commanders relied on superior tactics and weapons to overcome a numerical disadvantage of as much as five to one. Overlapping wars with Napoleonic France, Turkey (1806–1812), and Sweden (1808–1809), as well as sporadic tribal uprisings in the Caucasus, distracted the tsar's attention. Yet state-supported, centralized military organization provided Russian

columns with considerable combat power. In contrast, the Persian forces were largely irregular cavalry raised and organized on a tribal basis. Abbas Mirza, heir to the throne, sought French and British instructors to modernize his army, and resorted to a guerrilla strategy that delayed the Persian defeat.

In 1810, the Persians proclaimed a holy war, but this had little effect on the eventual outcome. The Russian victories at Aslandaz in 1812 and Lankarin in 1813 sealed the verdict in Russia's favor. Under the Treaty of Golestan, Russia obtained most of the disputed territories, including Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan, and reduced the local khans to the status of vassals.

Another war between Russia and Persia broke out in 1826 following the death of Alexander I and the subsequent Decembrist revolt. Sensing opportunity, the Persians invaded in July at the instigation of Abbas Mirza, and even won some early victories against the outnumbered forces of General Alexei Yermolov, whose appeals to St. Petersburg for reinforcements went unfulfilled. With only twelve regular battalions, the Russians effectively delayed the Persian advance. A contingent of about eighteen hundred, for instance, held the strategic fortress at Shusha against a greatly superior force. On September 12, a Persian army under the personal command of Abbas Mirza was defeated at Yelizabetpol. In the spring of 1827, the Russian command passed to General Ivan Paskevich. He captured Yerevan at the end of September and crossed the Aras River to seize Tabriz. In November, Abbas Mirza reluctantly submitted. Under the Treaty of Torkamanchay (February 1828), Persia ceded Yerevan and all the territory up to the Aras River and paid a twenty million ruble indemnity.

See also: CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; IRAN, RELATIONS WITH; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA

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ROBERT F. BAUMANN

RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

Between Peter the Great's outright accession in 1689 and the end of Romanov dynastic rule in 1917, Russia fought eight wars (1695–1696, 1711, 1735–1739, 1768–1774, 1787–1792, 1806–1812, 1828–1829, and 1877–1878) either singly or with allies against the Ottomans. In addition, Turkey joined anti-Russian coalitions during the Crimean War (1854–1856) and World War I (1914–1918). Although these conflicts often bore religious overtones, the fighting was primarily about power and possessions. Early on, Russian incursions into Poland, the Baltics, the Crimea, and the southern steppe threatened useful Ottoman allies. By the second half of the eighteenth century, however, the issue between St. Petersburg and Constantinople had become one of titanic struggle for hegemony over the northern Black Sea and its northern and northwestern littoral. In the nineteenth century, the issue came to involve Russian aspirations for influence in the Balkans and the Middle East, access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits, and hegemony over the Black Sea's Caucasian and Transcaucasian littoral. As the rivalry became increasingly one-sided in Russia's favor, St. Petersburg generally advocated maintenance of an enfeebled Turkey that would resist outside interference and influences while supporting Russia's interests.

Russia scored its most important successes in the Black Sea basin during Catherine II's First (1769–1774) and Second (1787–1792) Turkish Wars. In particular, three of her commanders, Peter Alexandrovich Rumyantsev, Alexander Vasilevich Suvorov, and Grigory Alexandrovich Potemkin, introduced into the fight a winning combination of resolve, assets, tactical mastery, logistics, colonists, and military-administrative support. Subsequently, with Imperial Russian attention and assets diverted elsewhere, and with the increasing interference of the European powers on Turkey's behalf, St. Petersburg proved unable to repeat Catherine's successes. Outside interference was no more evident than in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, when considerable Russian gains in the Balkans were virtually erased in June–July 1878 by the Congress of Berlin.

See also: MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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BRUCE W. MENNING

RUTSKOI, ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH

(b. 1947), vice president of the Russian Federation, governor of Kursk Oblast, general-major of aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union.

Alexander Rutskoi was born on September 16, 1947 in Kmelnitsky, Ukraine, to a professional military family. He graduated from a pilot training school in 1966 and joined the Soviet Air Forces. In the 1980s he served in Afghanistan as deputy commander, commander of the air regiment, and deputy commander of aviation for the Fortieth

Army. He was shot down twice; the second time, his Su-25 crashed in Pakistan, where he was interned and then repatriated. In late 1988 he received the award Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1988 and 1989 he attended the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff. In 1990 he was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR (Russian Federation) and to the Central Committee of the newly organized Communist Party of the RSFSR. He displayed a strong Russian nationalist bias and in 1991 helped to found Communists for Democracy and supported Boris Yeltsin.

Yeltsin named Rutskoi as his vice presidential running mate in his successful campaign for the presidency of Russia. During the August Coup (against Gorbachev), Rutskoi organized the defense of the Russian White House. Yeltsin promoted him to the rank of general-major and entrusted him with a number of delicate issues, such as border issue negotiations with Ukraine and Kazakhstan and Chechen independence. When Yeltsin embarked upon radical economic reforms, Rutskoi publicly expressed his doubts concerning the direction of



Vice President Alexander Rutskoi tries to calm the crowd as his 1993 parliamentary rebellion begins to collapse. © MALCOLM LINTON/LIAISON. GETTY IMAGES

Yeltsin's policy. Yeltsin moved to effectively isolate his vice president. As a consequence of these developments, Rutskoi drifted toward the parliamentary opposition led by parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. This struggle between president and parliament came to a violent head in September and October 1993. Yeltsin crushed the revolt with armed forces and arrested its leadership. Rutskoi was arrested and removed from the office of vice president, and the position of vice president was abolished.

In 1994 the Russian parliament granted amnesty to Rutskoi and other rebels of 1993. Rutskoi went on to organize a Russian nationalist party, Power (*Derzhava*) which competed in the 1995 parliamentary elections and joined the Red-Brown opposition to Yeltsin in the summer 1996 presidential elections. A leading figure of the anti-Yeltsin nationalist opposition, Rutskoi ran for and won the post of governor of Kursk Oblast in October 1996 and served in that office to 2000. He stood for reelection but was disqualified by the Central Elections Commission, which ordered his name stricken from the ballot for election campaign law violations and abuses as governor. Rumors interpreted the government's actions as a direct response to Rutskoi's criticism of the president during the *Kursk* disaster.

See also: AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; KURSK SUBMARINE DISASTER; OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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JACOB W. KIPP

RYBKIN, IVAN PETROVICH

(b. 1946), chair of the State Duma in 1994 and 1995, secretary of the Security Council from 1996 to 1998, and leader of the Socialist Party of Russia.

Ivan Rybkin was born on October 20, 1946, in the Voronezh countryside. He graduated from the Volgograd Agricultural Institute in 1968, completed graduate school there, and worked as a teacher until 1983. With the beginning of pere-

stroika, he launched an ambitious political career and became the second secretary of the Volgograd Oblast committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1990, he was selected as a people's delegate to the RSFSR, where he headed the Communists of Russia fraction. In 1993 and 1994 he was vice-chair of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), but in April 1994 he left the KPRF. As of the fall of 1993, he was a member of the Agrarian Party, on whose list he was elected to the Duma. In this capacity he proved a pragmatic politician. He lost the support of the leftists (in 1995 he was excluded from the Agrarian Party), but gained the support of the Kremlin.

In the summer of 1995, the Kremlin brought forth an initiative to create two centrist blocs for the elections: a right-centrist bloc headed by Premier Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, and a left-centrist bloc. This latter subsequently came to be called the "Ivan Rybkin bloc," which gained 1.1 percent of the electoral votes. The bloc was dissolved, but Rybkin was nonetheless elected to the Duma by single-mandate district in his homeland, Voronezh Oblast. Before the second round of presidential elections, Boris Yeltsin created the Political Advisory Council to the President of the Russian Federation, which included representatives of parties and public associations that had not made it into the Duma. Rybkin, who had recently registered the Socialist Party, was appointed chair of the council. A few months later, Rybkin replaced Alexander Lebed as secretary of the Security Council, in which capacity he worked until 1998, focusing mainly on Chechnya. His deputy was for some time Boris Berезovsky, with whom Rybkin maintains close relations.

In 2001–2002, with the discussion and adoption of the law on political parties, which required the presence of branch offices in at least half the regions of the country, the processes of integration strengthened considerably. From mid-2001 onward, Rybkin participated in talks concerning the creation of a United Social-Democratic Party of Russia, along with Mikhail Gorbachev and other well-known politicians. The unification process was difficult, due not so much to divergence of views as to a clash of ambitions. In the fall of 2001, when the process seemed complete, Rybkin's Socialist Party even disbanded, in anticipation of joining forces with the new party, but the merger broke at the last minute. It was effected only in March 2002, and on a visibly more modest scale.

On the basis of the Socialist Party, Alexei Podberezkin's Spiritual Heritage movement, and dozens of small organizations with socialist tendencies, the Socialist United Party of Russia was finally created. Rybkin became its chair. The honeymoon period was short, however, and within a few weeks, Rybkin resigned as chair and the Socialist Party of Russia left the coalition. In April 2003, at a congress of the Socialist United Party of Russia, he was officially removed from the position of chair and excluded from the party. His alleged offenses included an open letter to Putin, which called for ending the Chechnya war and beginning negotiations with Aslan Maskhadov; collaboration with the SPS; and unsanctioned contacts with Berezovsky.

See also: CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

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NIKOLAI PETROV

RYKOV, ALEXEI IVANOVICH

(1881–1938), Russian revolutionary and Soviet politician, one of the leaders of the Right opposition.

Born in Saratov province, the son of a tradesman, Alexei Rykov joined the Social Democratic Party in 1898 and supported the Bolsheviks after their split with the Mensheviks. He played an active part in the 1905 revolution. In 1907, however, he began to work for reconciliation between the two wings of the party. In exile in Paris for two years, he returned to Russia in 1911 but was soon arrested and exiled to Siberia.

Returning to Moscow after the revolution of February 1917, Rykov became a member of the

Moscow and Petrograd soviets and participated in the October revolution. He became commissar for internal affairs in the first Bolshevik government, but resigned because of his support for a coalition government. In April 1918, however, he accepted the post of chairperson of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, and in February 1921 he became deputy chairman of Sovnarkom. After Lenin's death in January 1924 he became chairman. He was also a member of the Politburo from 1922 until 1930.

Rykov was a leading supporter of the New Economic Policy, and allied with Stalin in his struggle with Leon Davidovich Trotsky, Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev, and Lev Borisovich Kamenev, which lasted from 1926 to 1928. When Stalin lashed out against the Right Opposition, of which Rykov was one of the leaders, he was defeated, discredited, and ultimately dismissed from his senior positions by 1930. Rykov was arrested in February 1937. With Nikolai Alexandrovich Bukharin and Genrikh Grigorevich Yagoda, Rykov was one of the leading defendants at the third show trial, and was executed in March 1938.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; MENSHEVIKS; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; POLITBURO; RIGHT OPPOSITION; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY; SOVNARKOM

DEREK WATSON

RYLEYEV, KONDRATY FYODOROVICH

(1795–1826), a poet who played a leading role in organizing the mutiny of the military units in St. Petersburg that occurred on December 14, 1825 (the so-called Decembrist Uprising).

Born into the family of an army officer, Kondraty Fyodorovich Ryleyev also became an officer and served in units stationed in West Europe after the defeat of Napoleon's armies. He saw the general backwardness of Russian society sharply contrasted with the capitalist countries of Western Europe. Upon returning to St. Petersburg, Ryleyev became active in a variety of social and political circles. In 1823 he joined the secret Northern Society. Situated in St. Petersburg and headed by Nikita Muraviev and Sergei Trubetskoi, it consisted of moderate reformists who leaned toward establishment of a constitutional monarchy, modeled after

the English version. By contrast, the Southern Society, created by Pavel Pestel in Tulchin, gathered together more radical members of the movement, and demanded complete eradication of the extant tsarist autocracy and the establishment of a democratic republic based upon on universal suffrage.

With the exception of his earliest works, Ryleyev's poems are romantic in style. Their themes reflect patriotic sentiments and concern with the course of Russian history. His verses ushered in ideas about the duty to sacrifice one's artistic calling in service to the downtrodden masses well before Nikolay Nekrasov preached them in his own poetry. Tragically, Ryleyev was not able fully to develop his poetic talents, and his celebrity is mainly due to the martyrdom he underwent in the cause of freedom. He was one of the five rebels who were executed, along with Pestel, Kakhovskoi, Muraviev-Apostol, and Bestuzhev-Riumin, for their roles in the Decembrist Uprising. His sarcastic wit has also become legend. Apparently, just as Ryleyev was about to be hanged, the rope broke and he fell to the ground. Bruised and battered, he got up, and said, "In Russia they do not know how to do anything properly, not even how to make a rope." An accident of this sort usually resulted in a pardon, so a messenger was sent to Tsar Nicholas to know his pleasure. The tsar asked, "What did he say?" "Sire, he said that in Russia they do not even know how to make a rope properly." "Well, let the contrary be proved," said Nicholas.

See also: DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

RYUTIN, MARTEMYAN

(1890–1937), leader of an anti-Stalin opposition group that emerged within the Russian Communist Party in the 1930s.

Martemyan Ryutin was born on February 26, 1890, the son of a Siberian peasant from the Irkutsk province. He joined the Bolshevik party in 1914. During the civil war, he fought against Alexander Vasilevich Kolchak's forces in Siberia, and in the early 1920s he held party posts in

Irkutsk and Dagestan. In 1925, Ryutin became party secretary in the Krasnaya Presnia district of Moscow, and in 1927 he was elected a non-voting member of the party Central Committee. In the following year he incurred Stalin's wrath for his conciliatory attitude towards Bukharin and his followers.

Experience of the collectivization drive convinced Ryutin of the ruinous nature of Stalin's economic policies, and the criticisms he voiced led, at the end of 1930, to his expulsion from the party and a brief spell of imprisonment. In 1932, Ryutin and some associates circulated a manifesto, "To All Members of the Russian Communist Party," which condemned the Stalin regime and demanded Stalin's removal from power. Ryutin also composed a more detailed analysis of Stalin's dictatorship and economic policies in the essay "Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship" (first published in 1990). He was arrested, along with his group, in September 1932. Although Stalin wanted the death penalty, the Politburo, at the insistence of Sergei Mironovich Kirov, rejected the demand, and Ryutin was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Ryutin, however, was re-arrested in 1936 on a trumped-up charge of terrorism, and was executed on January 10, 1937.

See also: KIROV, SERGEI MIRONOVICH; KOLCHAK, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH; PURGES, THE GREAT; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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JAMES WHITE

RYZHKOVA, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(b. 1929), USSR prime minister under Gorbachev and a leading figure in economic reform.

Born in Donetsk Oblast, Nikolai Ryzhkov joined the Party in 1956 and graduated from the Ural Polytechnical Institute in Sverdlovsk in 1959. He spent his early career as an engineer at the Ordzhonikidze Heavy Machine-Building Institute and was named director in 1970. Following his successes in the Urals, Ryzhkov became involved in all-union economic matters.

Ryzhkov served as a deputy in the USSR Council of the Union (1974–1979) and a deputy in the USSR Council of Nationalities (1974–1984). Ryzhkov was first deputy chair of the USSR Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine-Building (1975–1979) and later first deputy chair of the USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan) (1979–1982). He became a full member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1981, chairing the Diplomatic Department (1982–1985) and later the USSR Council of Ministers (September 1985–December 1990), making him the de facto Soviet prime minister. Ryzhkov was the chief administrator of the Soviet economy in the last half of the 1980s. He became a full Politburo member in April 1985 and chaired the Central Committee Commission that assisted victims of the 1988 Armenian earthquake.

As the economy stalled, protests grew, and the Kremlin debated the Five-Hundred-Day Plan, Ryzhkov suffered a heart attack on December 25, 1990. He subsequently resigned, and Gorbachev replaced him with Valentin Pavlov.

Ryzhkov unsuccessfully ran against Boris Yeltsin for the Russian presidency in June 1991. He then assumed a variety of corporate positions, including chairman of the board of Tveruniversal Bank (1994–1995), chairman of the board of Prokhorovskoye Pole, and head of the Moscow Intellectual Business Club. He won a seat in the Russian State Duma in 1995 and 1999 as head of “Power to the People,” a bloc aligned with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; GOSPLAN; PERESTROIKA; POLITBURO; PRIME MINISTER

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

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SAINTS

In addition to the saints inherited from the Early Church and Byzantium, the Orthodox Church in Rus soon began to create its own objects of veneration. The saints belonged to three main categories: (1) spiritual and secular leaders who rendered significant service to the Church; (2) martyrs; and (3) those who exhibited extraordinary spiritual gifts, specifically the power to perform miracles, especially through their relics. Although the miracles were not a formal precondition under canon law, popular Orthodoxy placed a high value on this quality, primarily if manifested in “uncorrupted remains” (*netlennye moshchi*). The miracle of physical preservation, attested by an official examination of the crypt, reinforced belief in the power to perform miracles and hence intercede on behalf of the disabled and distressed.

Canonizations in the Russian Orthodox Church have proceeded in a highly uneven fashion. In early medieval Russia (from Christianization in 988 to the 1547 Church Council), the Russian Church canonized only nineteen figures; the first to be so honored were the princes Boris and Gleb, whose nonresistance to a violent death amidst the fratricidal warfare made them the very model of kenoticism. The first major burst of canonizations came during the Church Councils of 1547 and 1549, which, reflecting Muscovy’s new self-assertion as the Third Rome, recognized thirty-nine new saints. Subsequently the church slowly expanded the number of saints, but that process came to a virtual halt in 1721: It canonized only five new saints before Nicholas II ascended the throne in 1894 and sought to bolster autocracy by favoring canonization and emphasizing the religious foundations of autocracy. The Bolshevik Revolution brought all of that to an end; the new regime actively engaged in de-canonization, opening scores of saints’ crypts (to demonstrate that the “uncorrupted relics” were frauds) and consigning relics to museums and storage. Although the Church was able to canonize five saints in the 1960s and 1970s, an era of large-scale canonizations opened in 1988. Over the next decade the church canonized a long list of prominent medieval figures (i.e., Grand Prince Dmitry Donskoy and the icon-painter Andrei Rublev) as well as many martyred during the Soviet era.

By 1999 the Russian Orthodox Church had a total of 1,362 saints. The majority came from the hierarchy (11.5%) and monastic orders (49.9%); few of the parish clergy were canonized (1.8%), all,



indeed, on the basis of martyrdom. In addition to a substantial number of princes and tsars (6.9%), the church canonized ordinary lay martyrs (24.5%), some “fools-in-Christ” (3.2%), and laypersons venerated for their extraordinary spirituality (2.3%). These saints are, moreover, overwhelmingly male (96.4%). Since 1999, the church has begun to change these proportions, chiefly because of the ongoing canonization of martyrs (e.g., more than a thousand in August 2000). While some decisions have been exceedingly controversial (above all, the canonization of Nicholas II and his family), the church seeks to pay homage to the ordinary priests and parishioners who paid the ultimate price for their unswerving faith during the merciless repressions of the first decades of Soviet rule.

See also: HAGIOGRAPHY; ORTHODOXY; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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GREGORY L. FREEZE

SAKHA AND YAKUTS

The famous folklore scholar G. V. Ksenofontov has compared the once nomadic Sakha people to a branch of an apple tree carried around the world by the wind and finally taking root. The Sakha, or Yakut, people are the descendants of Turkic nomads and originated in the region around Lake Baikal in what is now Russia. But in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Mongols arrived from the south, along with other peoples, and the Sakha moved north and east, settling eventually in the basin of the river Lena, later called Yakutia.

In the early twenty-first century, Yakutia or the Republic of Sakha is an autonomous republic within Russia in the far northeast, five times the size of France. Known as the “Land of Soft Gold” for the rich furs that come from the region, Yakutia is home to the Sakha people, as well as four other indigenous cultural groups (the Even, the Evenki, the Yukagir, and the Chukchi). The name “Yakut” comes from the Evenk word *yako*, mean-

ing stranger. The Russians arriving in the seventeenth century adopted the Evenk word for the local population. The capitol of the Republic of Sakha is Yakutsk, its largest city.

Russians sent to gather fur and other riches for the tsar, made Yakutia a stopping point on their way to the Pacific Ocean during the eighteenth century. They brought new agricultural techniques to the Sakha, who were primarily cattle and horse breeders, but the local population paid a price in fur tax for these innovations.

In 1923 Soviet power was established in Yakutsk. It was declared an autonomous republic under the name of Yakutia, but was still economically and politically controlled by the Soviet Union. It received its official name (Republic of Sakha) when the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) was signed on September 27, 1990. The Republic of Sakha has a president, elected for a term of five years.



A Yakut cook peers out from a restaurant window encased in frozen snow. © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

Always a resource-rich region, Yakutia plays a large role in Russia's economy. The main industry in the republic is mining. The Republic of Sakha produces 99 percent of Russia's diamonds, 24 percent of its gold, and 33 percent of its silver. It is also a major producer of coal, natural gas, tin, timber, fish, and other natural resources. The diamond mining industry is the main source of Russia's foreign currency income; the multinational De Beers company partnership with the Russian company Almazy Rossii-Sakha (Diamonds of Russia and Sakha) was established in 1992.

The Sakha summer festival, Ysyakh, is held in June, celebrating the ancestors' movement of their cattle to pasture in the steppe. The festival opens with the solemn ritual of feeding the fire and includes sport contests and horse races, as well as *kumys*, a traditional beverage made of fermented mare's milk.

Since 1991, the Sakha language has been a mandatory class in primary schools, and some 92 percent of ethnically Sakha people speak their own language. It is not considered to be an endangered language, unlike the Chukchi, Even, or Evenki languages. The some 400,000 Sakha people living and working in the Republic of Sakha take pride in their strong and unique heritage.

See also: CHUKCHI; EVENKI; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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ERIN K. CROUCH

SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH

(1921–1989), physicist, political dissident, and member of the Council of People's Deputies; recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975.

Andrei Sakharov was born into an intelligentsia family in Moscow in 1921. Following in the footsteps of his physicist father, he enrolled at the physics faculty of Moscow University in 1938. Exempted from military service in World War II, Sakharov graduated in 1942 and spent the war years as an engineer at a munitions factory. There he met and married Klavdia Vikhireva (1919–1969), a laboratory technician.


After the war Sakharov undertook graduate work in the laboratory of Igor Tamm. He received his candidate's degree (roughly equivalent to a Ph.D.) in 1947. In the late 1940s, Sakharov conducted research that led to the explosion of the Soviet hydrogen bomb in 1953. The same year, he was elected a full member of Academy of Sciences. At thirty-two, he was the youngest member in the history of that institution.

Sakharov began to support victims of political oppression as early as 1951 when he sheltered a Jewish mathematician fired from the Soviet weapons program. In 1958 he published two papers on the effects of nuclear explosions and appealed for a ban on atmospheric testing. With this work he began to move beyond physics into political activism.

The 1968 publication in the *New York Times* of Sakharov's essay "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom" marked, he wrote in his memoirs, a "decisive step" in his development as a dissident. The essay called for disarmament and rapprochement with the West. As a result of the essay, Sakharov was banned from all weapons research. His wife died shortly thereafter, and Sakharov returned to Moscow and academic physics.

Sakharov became involved in the emerging human rights movement, cofounding the Moscow Human Rights Committee in 1970. Through articles, petitions, interviews, and demonstrations, Sakharov and others in the movement aided political prisoners and advocated the abolition of censorship, an independent judiciary, and the introduction of contested elections. Sakharov married fellow human rights activist Yelena Bonner in 1972. She represented him at the Nobel Prize ceremony in 1975. The Nobel Committee's citation emphasized Sakharov's linkage of human rights and international cooperation.

Sakharov's denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to his exile to Gorky in January 1980. He maintained ties with



Andrei Dimitrievich Sakharov. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS.

REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Moscow and the West via Bonner until her exile in 1984.

In 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev invited Sakharov to return to Moscow. Sakharov immediately became an important and ubiquitous figure in the democratization movement. He was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989. He participated in drafting a new constitution. He lent his personal support to numerous causes, advocating amnesty for political prisoners, disarmament, peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts, and limits on Gorbachev's emergency powers. On the eve of his death in December 1989, he was working to abolish Article 6 of the Soviet constitution, which enshrined the Communist Party's monopoly on power. The article was abolished in March 1990.

See also: BONNER, YELENA GEORGIEVNA; CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GLASNOST; HUMAN RIGHTS

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SALT *See* STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES.

SALTYKOV-SHCHEDRIN LIBRARY *See* NATIONAL LIBRARY OF RUSSIA.

SALTYKOV-SHCHEDRIN, MIKHAIL YEVGRAFOVICH

(1826–1889), one of Russia's greatest satirists.

Writing for leading radical journals of his time, *Sovremennik* (The Contemporary) (1862–1865) and *Otechestvennye zapiski* (Notes of the Fatherland) (1868–1889), Saltykov (pen name Shchedrin) created the most biting satires in Russian literature.

Among his best-known books are *Istoriia odnogo goroda* (*History of a Town*) (1869–1870) and *Gospoda Golovlevy* (*The Golovlyov Family*) (1875–1880). *History* is an account of despotic mayors' rule of a fictitious town Glupov (Foolsville). The mayors can be distinguished from each other only by the degree of their incompetence and ill will. The book is a satire on the whole institution of Russian statehood and the very spirit that pervades the Russian way of life: routine mismanagement, needless oppression, and pointless tyranny. At the same time, it is an attack on the Russian people for their passivity toward their own fate, for their acceptance of violence and oppression of their rulers.

The Golovlyov Family is a study of the institution of the family as cornerstone of society. In this novel, Saltykov describes moral and physical decline of three generations of a Russian gentry family. The nickname of the novel's protagonist, *Iudushka* ("Little Judas"), whose treacherous behavior toward his nearest family is a matter of daily business, became part of Russian speech.

Among Saltykov's other better-known works are *Pompadur i pompadurshi* (*Pompadours and Pompadouresses*) (1863–1874), *Sovremennaia idilliia*

(*Contemporary Idyll*) (1877–1883), and *Skazki (Fairy Tales)* (1869–1886).

See also: INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM

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EMIL DRAITSER

SAMI

The fifty- to eighty thousand Sami (Lapps) live mostly in northern Norway and Sweden, some in Finland, and only about 3 percent (1,600) in the Kola peninsula of the Russian Federation. They represent less than 0.2 percent of the Murmansk oblast population. They reached the Gulf of Bothnia around 1300. Sami and Finnic languages are not mutually intelligible, having split some three thousand years ago. Three to ten Sami languages are distinguished, and the standard literary Sami in the Nordic countries is difficult to understand for the Kola (Kild) Sami, who are also unfamiliar with its Latin script. The reputed Asian features are actually encountered in only 25 percent of the Sami population.

Inhabiting most of present Finland and Karelia one thousand years ago, the Sami were pushed toward the Arctic Ocean by Scandinavian, Finnish, Russian, and Karelian booty seekers. Those in the west were forced to adopt Catholicism and later Lutheranism. Greek Orthodoxy was imposed on the Kola Samis in the early 1500s, after they were subjected by Novgorod around 1300. The first western Sami book was printed in 1619, and the Bible in 1811, while the first Kola Sami book appeared in 1878.

Reindeer herding remains a major occupation. The Soviet Russian authorities annihilated the traditional Kola Sami settlements in the 1930s, relocating them repeatedly to ever larger state or collective farms, where overgrazing severely reduced the number of reindeer. By now Lujaur (Lovozero in Russian) in central Kola remains the only partly Sami district. In 1937 Moscow ordered

all Sami publications destroyed. Ten years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sami became again an optional subject in Lujaur schools, and some basic texts were published. A Kola Sami association was formed in 1989 and later joined the worldwide Sami Council.

See also: FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NORTHERN PEOPLES

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REIN TAAGEPERA

SAMIZDAT

The term *samizdat* is most often translated as "self-publishing." It refers to the clandestine practice in the Soviet Union of circulating manuscripts that were banned, had no chance of being published in normal channels, or were politically suspect. These were generally typescripts, mimeograph copies, or handwritten items.

The practice got its primary impetus in the mid to late 1950s, a period that in a socio-literary context is often referred to as The Thaw. This itself is linked to Nikita Khrushchev's campaign of de-Stalinization, which provided an opening for literary themes previously disallowed. The opening was frequently arbitrary as the case of Boris Pasternak's novel *Dr. Zhivago* proved in 1958. The novel could not be published in the Soviet Union, and Pasternak was brutally vilified despite being awarded the Nobel Prize for literature.

The fact that broad categories of literature and sociopolitical themes still could not be addressed moved much of this output underground into samizdat. Sometimes this mode of literary output was systematic as with later journals and chronicles. But much of this was done spontaneously on an individual basis. Of key importance is that samizdat is inextricably linked to what came to be the dissident movements in the Soviet Union.

These, in turn, were linked with other groups seeking, in early manifestations, protection of human rights, greater religious freedom, and more ethnic autonomy. As Scammell notes (1984, p. 507), samizdat "had come into existence in the late fifties as a result of the clash between the intellectuals' post-Stalinist hunger for more freedom of expression and the continuing repressiveness of the censorship." Freedom of expression was one thing, but it was deadly to the state's perception of what could be allowed when the political admixture was included. The fact that samizdat and dissent were coeval is impossible to avoid and had great consequences for Soviet history.

From the early 1960s to the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, samizdat had an uneven history. There were periods of extreme repression, for instance in 1972–1973. But samizdat was not quelled. Very often, trials were benchmarks in the advancement of samizdat and its many causes. The February 1966 trial of two writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who had been publishing abroad for several years using pseudonyms, was a sensation since they were given seven and five years respectively at hard labor for allegedly writing anti-Soviet material. Their arrest led to public protests by dissidents. A number of them were then arrested, and this, in turn, led to further protests and corresponding arrests. Books and pamphlets with documents from these trials were frequently compiled and circulated widely in secret. These added much fuel to the fire, and a constant cycle was created. The Soviet government was also severely criticized worldwide because of a new policy of punishing dissident writers by confining them to mental hospitals.

Samizdat and dissent grew despite all impediments. It was a cultural opposition, an independent subculture, as Meerson-Aksenov (1977) called it, and it signified that social and political judgments stemming from sources other than the state were seen to be critically significant. In reality, the Soviet state was stymied by this phenomenon because it no longer knew quite how to handle it. The blanket executions of the 1930s were out of the question. The breadth of the criticism was also sometimes incomprehensible to the government. It could include everything from opposing the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to the latest broadsides against modern art.

The most famous of the systematic publications was *The Chronicle of Current Events*, which was issued without interruption from 1968 to 1972

and sporadically thereafter. Other notable publications included the *Ukrainian Herald*, the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania*, and historian Roy Medvedev's *Political Diary* (which ran from 1964 to 1971). This is by no means to minimize the huge number of individual contributions. Together they undercut the power and prestige of the Soviet state.

See also: CENSORSHIP; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GOSIZDAT; JOURNALISM; SINYAVSKY-DANIEL TRIAL

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NICKOLAS LUPININ

SAMOILOVA, KONDORDIYA NIKOLAYEVNA

(1876–1920), Bolshevik; leader of Communist Party Women's Department.

Konkordiya Samoiloova was one of the founders of the Soviet Communist Party's programs for emancipating women. Born into a priestly family in Irkutsk, she studied in the Bestuzhevsky Courses for Women in St. Petersburg in the 1890s. In 1901 Samoiloova became a full-time member of the Social-Democratic Labor Party.

Samoiloova spent sixteen years in the revolutionary underground, mostly in St. Petersburg. An editor of *Pravda* (Truth) in 1913, she created a column on the female proletariat and, in 1914, with Inessa Armand, Nadezhda Krupskaya, and Lyudmila Stal, founded *Rabotnitsa* (Female Worker), a newspaper devoted to working-class women. In 1913 she also organized the first celebration in Russia of International Woman's Day.

In 1917 Samoiloova revived *Rabotnitsa*, which had been closed by the tsarist government. In 1918 she worked closely with Inessa Armand and Alexan-

dra Kollontai to establish a women's department (the *Zhenotdel*) within the Communist Party. While Armand and Kollontai developed the program for women's emancipation, Samoilova concentrated on building the department from the ground up. Always an enthusiastic supporter of Vladimir Lenin and a reliable, hard-working, efficient Bolshevik, Samoilova was trusted by the party leadership, despite the fact that she was as ardent an advocate for work among women as the more flamboyant Kollontai. She was also an able propagandist who crafted vivid, accessible speeches and pamphlets. Samoilova died of cholera on a propaganda trip down the Volga in 1920.

See also: FEMINISM; KOLLONTAI, ALEXANDRA MIKHAILOVNA; ZHENOTDEL

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BARBARA EVANS CLEMENTS

tion strategies to improve their operations and performance. Enterprise performance was to be gauged relative to long-run plans and norms. A system of state orders (*goszakazy*) was to replace compulsory output targets, although the distinction between state orders and plan targets was never clarified. Enterprises were granted the right to exchange goods, with contracts negotiated between firms to include output, delivery, and price components agreed upon by both firms. Enterprises were also allowed to retain a greater share of their planned profits to distribute as bonuses or to invest in additional capital. *Samoupravlenie* was an attempt to make Soviet managers responsible for the final results; that is, producing the quantity and quality of output desired by customers, whether firms or individual consumers.

See also: PERESTROIKA

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SAMOUPRAVLENIE

Samoupravlenie, or self-management, was introduced during Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika as a mechanism to induce enterprises to produce quality products desired by customers and as a way of extending democratization to the workplace. Soviet enterprises were placed on full economic accounting (*polny khozraschet*), which meant that current operations had to be self-financed from sales revenues rather than subsidized by central or ministerial authorities, and any change or expansion in operations had to be financed from retained earnings. Managers were to be elected by the employees and to work directly with a council selected from among the workers. The objective of *samoupravlenie* was to reduce "petty tutelage," the phrase for interference in day-to-day enterprise operations by planning or other administrative officials.

Samoupravlenie was part of a larger effort to promote initiative and responsibility in Soviet enterprises. For example, the number of compulsory plan targets given to enterprises was reduced, providing more flexibility for them to select produc-

SAN STEFANO, TREATY OF

The Treaty of San Stefano, signed March 3, 1878, ended the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878).

On January 31, 1878, with Russian victory over Turkey a foregone conclusion, the belligerents agreed to an armistice at Adrianople, followed by peace negotiations at San Stefano, a village near Constantinople. There, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, former ambassador to the Porte, and Savfet Pasha worked out final terms for signature on March 3, the anniversary date of Tsar Alexander II's imperial accession.

Accordingly, Turkey agreed to pay reparations of 1.41 billion rubles, of which 1.1 billion would be cancelled by cession to Russia in Asia Minor of Ardahan, Kars, Batumi, and Bayazid. In the Balkans, Turkey ceded northern Dobrudja and the Danube delta to Russia for ultimate transfer to Romania, in return for Romanian agreement to Russian occupation of southern Bessarabia. With a seaboard on the Mediterranean and an elected prince, Bulgaria remained under nominal Turkish control,

while Bosnia and Herzegovina received autonomy. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro received their independence, along with territorial enlargement. Turkey was obliged strictly to observe concessions for local participation in government that were inherent in the Organic Regulation of 1868 on Crete, while analogous regimes were to be implemented in Thessaly and Albania. The Porte was also to introduce reforms in Turkish Armenia.

The San Stefano Treaty formally went into effect on March 16, 1878, but concerted opposition from Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, together with Russia's growing diplomatic isolation, meant that the agreement remained only preliminary. Indeed, its main provisions subsequently underwent substantial revision at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878.

See also: BERLIN, CONGRESS OF; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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SARMATIANS

Between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C.E., the Sarmatians settled in what is today southern Russia, eventually replacing the Scythians as the dominant tribe in this region. They vanished from the historical record after their land was overrun by the Huns in the late fourth century C.E., and little is known about them.

They rose again, however, in the realm of mythology. According to a legend which gained popularity in Poland in the fifteenth century, the ancient Sarmatians rode into the Polish lands and gave order and stability to the primitive local population. This myth helped justify serfdom, allowing the nobles to imagine that they were of a superior racial lineage. The Sarmatian story became enormously popular, leading some to call Copernicus the Sarmatian Ptolemy.

Sarmatianism did not have any specific religious content at first, but during the Counter-Reformation, as Catholics worked to stamp out religious diversity in the Polish Republic and as the

state fought against non-Catholic foes outside the country, the legend mutated to include the idea that the Sarmatians had a mission from God to spread and defend the True Faith.

By the end of the seventeenth century, Sarmatianism had developed a xenophobic character, as many Polish nobles turned away from all "foreign" influences to glory in their indigenous Sarmatian heritage. This myth even influenced the style of clothing, art, and architecture of Poland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the nobles came to fancy pseudo-oriental designs that they felt evoked their racial heritage.

The intellectuals of the Polish Enlightenment blamed Sarmatianism for the crises of the eighteenth century and for Poland's eventual destruction and partition. Although some of the stylistic features lived on a bit longer, the broader ideology of Sarmatianism faded away in the nineteenth century or lived on as a trace element within new ideological formations.

See also: HUNS; POLAND; SCYTHIANS

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SARTS

Former term for Turkic-speaking Muslim residents of cities along the Syr Darya River, the Ferghana Valley, and Samarkand.

According to Russian Imperial sources, Sarts exceeded 800,000 people and comprised 26 percent of the population of Turkestan and 44 percent of the urban population of Central Asia in 1880. The term was the subject of lively debate in the late-nineteenth century when Russians colonized Central Asia. Vasily Bartold described the Sarts as settled peoples in Central Asia, Turkicized Old Iranian population, emerging from a conglomeration of Saka, Sogdian, Kwarazmian, and Kush-Bactrians.

The ancient Turkic word *Sart*, originally meaning “merchant,” was used by Mongols and Turks by the thirteenth century to identify the Iranian population of Central Asia. In the sixteenth century, Uzbeks who conquered Central Asia used “Sart” to distinguish the sedentary population of Central Asia from the nomadic Turkic groups settling in the region. By the nineteenth century, the urban Sart population had merged cultural, linguistic, and ethnic elements from their Persian and Turko-Mongolian lineage. They remained distinct from Uzbeks even though their language belongs to the Chagatay-Turkic group. On the eve of the Russian Revolution, “Sart” was a self-denomination distinguished from Uzbeks and Tajiks despite the cultural synthesis in Turkestan.

Soviet nationality policies made the term obsolete. Following the first counting of the 1926 census, Sarts were listed as a questionable nationality. By the end of 1927, the majority of Sarts were designated as Uzbek and others were named Sart-Kalmyks. They were not considered Tajik because they were Turkic-speaking. Of the 2,880 Sart-Kalmyks listed in the 1926 census, there were 2,550 in Kirgiz ASSR, fewer than 250 in Uzbek SSR (all located in Andijan), and none in Tajik ASSR. By the 1937 census, the ethnic marker disappeared.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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viet Union. The Ministry of Finance directly controlled this network until 1963, when it was incorporated into Gosbank (the state bank of the USSR). Sberbank’s main task was to collect the individual deposits and invest them with the state. In addition, Soviet citizens paid their bills and picked up their pension checks at their local Sberbank offices.

After the breakup of the USSR, Sberbank Russia became a quasicommercial savings bank, with the Central Bank of Russia as its majority shareholder. Sberbank continued to invest a high percentage of its resources with the government (e.g., in government securities), giving it the nickname “the Ministry of Cash.” Although commercial banks began to compete with Sberbank for retail deposits, Sberbank’s share of the retail market never fell below 60 percent in the 1990s. This occurred for three reasons. First, no new bank could compete with Sberbank’s extensive branch network. Second, the government explicitly insured deposits in Sberbank, while commercial banks had no deposit insurance system. Third, repeated commercial banking crises made Sberbank appear to be a safer choice than other banks. However, it bears noting that the vast majority of Russians chose to keep their savings outside of the banking system entirely.

See also: BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; GOSBANK; STROIBANK

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
JULIET JOHNSON

SBERBANK

Sberbank (the Savings Bank) was the monopoly, state-owned household savings bank of the USSR. It retained both its state ownership and its dominance of the retail banking market in the post-Soviet period, despite increasing competition from commercial banks. In the Soviet period, Sberbank’s retail banking network encompassed approximately 70,000 branches and smaller “cash offices” (sberkassy) on almost every corner across the So-

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Leading scientists and policy makers in the Soviet Union rapidly reached an accommodation after the revolution in October 1917. The scientific community was decimated by deaths and emigration that resulted from World War I, revolution, and civil war. Those scientists who remained recognized that the new regime, unlike the tsarist government, intended to support scientific research. They quickly established a number of research institutes and



A 1966 experiment in a chemistry laboratory at Akademgorodok—the Siberian “Academic City.” © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

received gold rubles to buy journal subscriptions, equipment, and reagents abroad. Government officials, for their part, believed that scientific and engineering expertise was critical to the establishment of communism. Hesitantly at first, they offered academic freedom as well as financial and administrative support to the scientists. They remained skeptical about the value of fundamental research. Party officials also believed that scientists, most of whom were trained in the tsarist era, required close supervision by loyal communists.

Several different bureaucracies were responsible for the administration and funding of science, and scientists were deft at playing them off against each other to increase their funding. The major ones were the Main Scientific Administration of the Commissariat of Education (*Glavnauka*) and the Scientific Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council (*NTO*). Generally speaking, in-

stitutes whose focus was basic research fell under the jurisdiction of *Glavnauka*, while those of an applied profile fell under *NTO*.

When Josef Stalin rose to power in the late 1920s, fundamental changes in science policy occurred that largely held sway until the collapse of the USSR. The changes reflected crash programs in rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. First, officials intended that scientists emphasize applied research at the expense of basic research. This led to the removal of many of the institutes under the jurisdiction of the *Glavnauka* to the Commissariat of Heavy Industry and the establishment of a technical division within the Academy of Sciences. Second, the Communist Party began a concerted effort to place personnel loyal to it in research institutes. It forced the relatively independent Soviet Academy of Sciences to create many new positions, or chairs, for permanent members in such new fields as the social sciences, and insisted that party members be voted in during elections.

Third, officials required that scientists produce detailed one-year and five-year plans of research activity. Since the Commissariat of Heavy Industry was relatively flush with funding, scientists found leeway in planning and financial documents to embark on research in several important new directions, for example, nuclear physics and cryogenics in the 1930s. Finally, officials insisted upon strict ideological control over the content of science and effectively established autarchy (international isolation) that persisted until the late 1980s.

Party officials had indicated their intention to control scientists in a series of show trials in 1929 and 1930 where they used forced confessions of engineers to prove “wrecking” of plans. They punished wrecking with long prison terms and in some cases execution. During the Great Terror of the mid-1930s, scientists, no less than other members of society, also faced arrest, interrogation, internment in labor camps (there were several special labor camps for scientists and engineers), and execution. Scientists’ professional associations were subjugated to party organizations.

Several fields of science suffered from ideological meddling. In the most notorious case, Trofim Lysenko, a biologist who rejected modern genetics, came to dominate the Soviet biology establishment from the 1940s until the early 1960s. The authorities ordered references to genetics removed from textbooks, and many geneticists lost their jobs.

World War II had a direct and long-term impact on Soviet science policy. First, it ensured continued emphasis on applied research, in particular military technology. Second, with the advent of the atomic bomb project and then rocket technology, it ensured large-scale approaches to research and development. The average size of programs and institutes in the USSR grew to several times larger than similar programs or institutes in other countries. Third, the evacuation of entire institutes and personnel from areas under the siege of German armies led to the dispersal of institutes to the Ural Mountains region and Siberia.

Nikita Khrushchev, who followed Stalin, initiated a series of reforms in Soviet society, abandoning some aspects of Stalinism (although maintaining one-party rule). The reforms had an impact on science policy as well. The most significant impact was the growth of the scientific enterprise. The total number of scientists increased from 162,500 in 1950 to 665,000 in 1965, including an increase in the number of senior and junior specialists from 62,000 to 140,000.

A second aspect of reform was decentralization of the scientific enterprise, in part because of the growth of the nuclear establishment. The most significant sign of decentralization was the construction of Akadengorodok, a city of science built in the early 1960s with twenty-one institutes, library, and university, near Novosibirsk in Siberia. Another aspect of decentralization was the removal of the technical division of the Academy of Sciences and the placement of its institutes under the jurisdiction of industrial ministries.

Under Leonid Brezhnev a number of the Khrushchev-era reforms were abandoned. While there had been such great achievements in science as the first artificial satellite (Sputnik) and successes in nuclear power, Soviet science performed poorly by such measures as scientific citation indices, Nobel prizes, and assimilation of discoveries in production. Rather than experiment with new forms of organization or new directions of research, however, the Brezhnev administration further centralized policy making in major bureaucracies, raised the level of ideological control, and established renewed vigilance toward contact with Western scientists. While the scientific enterprise grew to massive proportions—on the eve of its breakup the USSR had one-third of the world's engineers and one-quarter of its physicists—it continued to perform poorly.

Mikhail Gorbachev championed “acceleration” (*uskorenie*) of the achievements of research into the production process. Like leaders before him, he believed in the power of science to help solve the social, economic, and other problems facing the country. As part of glasnost and perestroika, Gorbachev's policies encouraged rapid decentralization of science policy and increasingly open discussion of the poor performance of the sector. Scientists reorganized professional societies for the first time since the 1930s. They gained the opportunity to travel abroad to conferences. Only the collapse of the USSR facilitated significant reevaluation of science policy in Russia. At the same time, because of rapid inflation and decline in government revenues, the scientific establishment lost much of its funding and stability for the first time since the 1920s. Salaries were not paid for months at a time, and research monies disappeared. International organizations offered aid programs to discourage emigration. In general, however, the Russian scientific community has been slow to recover from the political and economic shocks of the 1990s.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; LYSENKO, TROFIM DENISOVICH; SPACE PROGRAM

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SCIENCE FICTION

Science fiction is a literary genre that extrapolates from existing knowledge about the real world to speculate about alternative worlds. It always includes an element of the fantastic, since it aims to go beyond what is, to give a literary model of

“what if?” Unlike pure fantasy or utopian literature, however, science fiction posits a rational exploration of as-yet inexplicable phenomena and unknown corners of the human psyche. In Russia the most important works of science fiction have usually been viewed as subversive to the regime in power because of their ability to model alternative realities, to evade censorship by displacing political allegories to the juvenile realm of cosmic adventure, and to tap into the Russian readership’s persistent longings for a more just society.

The first, mid-nineteenth century works of Russian science fiction blend the rational utopianism of European models with the age-old Russian folk vision of communal justice and abundance for all. The idea that Western-oriented scientific and technological progress might be combined in Russia with egalitarian values, avoiding the evils of both autocracy and capitalism, is one of the strongest and most consistent strains in Russian science fiction. Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s 1862 novel *What Is to Be Done?* created a fictional model of this idea that inspired generations of Russian revolutionaries, including Lenin. Alexander Bogdanov’s *The Red Star* (1908) depicts a socially and scientifically progressive society on Mars that is superior to existing earthly alternatives. In the decade following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, many stories extolled a cosmic revolution, anticipating the victorious spread of classless societies to other planets with the help of futuristic technology and radically evolved human consciousness. As late as the 1970s, the writers Arkady and Boris Strugatsky countered official literary depictions of Soviet society with science fiction imaginings of alternative societies where rationality, science, and human freedom are not at odds.

A second, and opposing strain, is the dystopian vision of society dehumanized by the relentless rationalization of work, health, social, and spiritual life. Yevgeny Zamyatin’s novel *We* (1924, unpublished; 1989) is a brilliant philosophical satire depicting “mathematically happy” workers in the One State, where free will has been all but eliminated. Extrapolating tendencies from both bourgeois and socialist systems of conformity, *We* insists on the paramount value of individual free will. Zamyatin’s novel, and later Western novels based on similar ideas (e.g., George Orwell’s *1984*) were banned in the Soviet Union. After 1957, the launch of Sputnik and the gradual relaxation of ideological restrictions inaugurated a new era of Soviet science fiction. In the immensely popular works of Ivan Yefremov and the brothers Stru-

gatsky, Russian readers found a forum in which their authentic political and cultural aspirations were given a voice—along with an exciting plot. They offered richly imagined histories of the future to remind the reader of the outcome of ethical choices made in the present. Russian literature has often served as the conscience of the nation, and twenty-first century Russian science fiction continues the tradition of ideological engagement, by addressing such themes as contemporary social malaise and the search for a new, post-Soviet Russian cultural identity.

See also: CHERNYSHEVSKY, NIKOLAI GAVRILOVICH

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SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

The term *scientific socialism* was used by Friedrich Engels to characterize the doctrines that he and Karl Marx developed and distinguish them from other socialist doctrines, which he dismissed as utopian socialism. Engels regarded the Marx-Engels doctrines as scientific in that they laid bare the secret of capitalism through the discovery of surplus value, and explained (with a theory known in the USSR as historical materialism) how capitalism would inevitably be overthrown and replaced by socialism. The concept “scientific socialism” made Marxist doctrines more attractive to many than rival socialist doctrines by suggesting that equality and the end of exploitation were not only desirable but also inevitable.

Scientific socialism was introduced to Russia in the late nineteenth century. After the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, scientific socialism became

part of the official ideology of the USSR. The term itself was frequently used loosely to designate a doctrine concerning the development of a Soviet type of society. Much of the actual content of the doctrine varied over time in accordance with the concrete policies of the Soviet state.

Socialism as a comprehensive social system failed to spread to the advanced capitalist countries (although “pension fund socialism,” the growth of government welfare and regulatory programs, the expansion of employee rights, state-owned industries, public education, and universal suffrage, were widespread and important). This failure, along with other developments such as the collapse of the USSR, indicated that scientific socialism was an imperfect guide to the future. By the end of the twentieth century, the term was mainly of historical interest.

See also: IDEALISM; MARXISM; SOCIALISM

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SCISSORS CRISIS

The Scissors Crisis occurred in the Soviet Union during the New Economic Policy (NEP) era of the 1920s and refers to the movements, over time, of the relative prices of industrial and agricultural products. When the movements of relative prices are presented graphically, the observed patterns resemble the open blades of a pair of scissors; hence the term *Scissors Crisis*.

The observed price movements in the Soviet Union during the 1920s can be explained by the relatively quicker recovery of the agricultural sector (the relative prices of agricultural products falling) vis-à-vis the apparently slower recovery of the industrial sector (the relative prices of industrial goods increasing). This recovery occurred after the collapse of the Soviet economy during the tumultuous era of war communism (1917–1921). Such a pattern of recovery following collapse is not unusual. Moreover, the observed changes in relative prices would be expected in a market economy

where the degree of decline and the subsequent rate of recovery differ by sector of the economy.

The underlying issues of the Scissors Crisis are important to the understanding of Soviet economic policy in the 1920s, especially the response of the Soviet state to these price changes. Soviet agriculture during the NEP was based largely on a private peasant economy. The development of modern agriculture was a major focus, cast within the framework of socialist economic thought. Although industry was recovering after war communism, it was hampered by substantial state ownership and the concentration of industry in the form of trusts, allowing for the exercising of monopoly power. In light of Josef Stalin’s dramatic economic changes beginning in the late 1920s (full nationalization, collectivization of agriculture, and the replacement of markets by the administrative command system), the issues and discussions of the 1920s assume great importance in one’s understanding of Soviet economic history.

First, if agriculture is a major component of total output in the economy, and agricultural output is to be both a source of food and a source of financing to promote the process of industrialization, the terms of agricultural production (amount, source, and means of distribution) have a major impact on the size and the distribution of the share dedicated to the financing of industrialization.

Second, the nature of property rights and the organizational arrangements in the agricultural sector were both matters of contention during the Soviet pre-plan era. Specifically, during the 1920s, experimentation with different forms of cooperative farm organizations was intended to change production arrangements as well as state access to the agricultural product; these changes could limit or eliminate market forces.

Third, Stalin argued, as a major justification for collectivization (beginning in 1929), that in fact the pace of industrialization would be limited by the ability of peasants under private property arrangements to withhold production in part to manipulate (increase) prices. According to Stalin, this would affect the terms of trade between the city and the countryside and thus reduce the pace at which industrialization could be pursued.

Fourth, the policies chosen for addressing the Scissors Crisis form an important component of the assessment of the NEP economy of the 1920s. Specifically, it was argued that there was a significant element of monopoly in Soviet industry at

this time. State policy focused on this issue, threatening good intervention or the introduction of competing imports to force a reduction of industrial prices. In addition, threats were made to limit the access of industry to capital and thus change the behavior of the industrial sector.

Although the behavior of agricultural and industrial prices in the Soviet Union during the 1920s can be explained by the underlying market forces of supply and demand, nevertheless within the context of events of the 1920s and subsequent behavior by Stalin, the events of the Scissors Crisis have assumed major importance for understanding the NEP period. Moreover, the issues involved are fundamental components of contemporary theorizing about the process of economic development.

See also: NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

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SCYTHIANS

The Scythians were a large confederation of Iranian-speaking (or headed by an Iranian-speaking military-political elite) tribal unions, known in classical sources since around the eighth century B.C.E. or about the time they migrated to the North Pontic steppe zone where they supplanted and apparently absorbed some of the Cimmerians who occupied the region. As with their predecessors, it is not clear from where the Scythians migrated, but their most likely homeland was Central Asia from where they moved under pressure of other nomadic peoples. Organized in supra-tribal confederations, the Scythians made raids and full-blown invasions from the northern Caucasus into Media and Assyria in northern Mesopotamia, reaching as far as Palestine and Egypt throughout the period of 670–610 B.C.E. After suffering major defeats towards the end of the seventh century, they transferred their locus of power to the North Pontic

region. By the third century B.C.E., the Scythians came under pressure of the nomadic Sarmatians who destroyed and absorbed most of them into their loosely-organized tribal structure.

Nomadic in origins, the Scythian peoples and the "Scythian" culture also included agriculturalists and hunter-gatherers who paid tribute to their nomadic lords with grain and other goods that the nomads could not produce themselves. In turn, these items were traded with the Greek colonial cities of the northern Black Sea region for wine, precious metals, and other goods.

While Scythia proper, as it was known in Greco-Roman sources, was located to the north of the Black Sea region (from the Danube to the lower Don and Volga), "Scythic" culture occupied a much greater territory of Eurasia, stretching as far east as southwestern Siberia and eastern Kazakhstan. Elements of this culture can be summarized as follows: the use of (1) iron; (2) short swords; (3) conservative artistic motifs (especially the animal style, e.g., the stag and the animal combat); (4) nomadic lifestyle organized around a patriarchal, little centralized social structure; (5) improved compound bows; (6) bronze cauldrons; (7) making of deerstones; and, (8) complex horse harness. All of these components were shared across a huge area not only by Iranian-speakers, but also by Turkic and Mongolian nomads of steppelands of Inner Eurasia.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; CIMMERIANS; SARMATIANS

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SECOND ECONOMY

The second economy of the USSR included economic activities that supplemented the command, or first, economy. As defined by Gregory Gross-

man, the second economy consisted of all production and exchange undertaken directly for private gain, knowingly illegal in some substantial way, or both. This definition encompassed both legal and illegal activities, but most studies focus on the illegal part, also referred to as underground, unofficial, or shadow economy, or the black market.

The legal second economy was made up mainly of private agriculture, small-scale construction services, extraction of precious metals, hunting of valuable wild animals, and certain professional services, such as those provided by physicians, dentists, and tutors.

The illegal economy was significantly larger than the legal part of the second economy. Legal private activities often served as fronts for illegal ones. The most common illegal economic activity in the USSR was theft of state property. Presumably the second-most widespread illegal activity was the corruption that reached into the highest echelons of power; one purpose of corruption was to protect the functioning of the rest of the illegal economy. Another major illegal activity was speculation, defined as resale of goods by individuals for profit. Unlike theft from the state sector and corruption, which would be illegal anywhere, speculation was a crime only in socialist economies.

Illegal production by individuals or by teams was also significant. Much of the illegal production for private purposes took place at state enterprises. Output was usually sold privately, but sometimes it was distributed through the official retail trade network. Private manufacturing without an official facade also existed.

None of the major conditions giving rise to the existence of a large underground economy were unique to the USSR, but the way they came together in Soviet society was unusual and created a highly favorable environment for an illegal economy. These conditions included price controls on virtually all consumer goods, the prohibition of many private economic activities and high taxes on others, the ubiquity and poor protection of public property, the immense discretionary power of poorly paid bureaucrats, and social attitudes that tolerated theft of state property, corruption, and many other economic illegalities.

While the Soviet second economy was large, its magnitude, especially in the illegal sphere, is difficult to ascertain. One widely used way to estimate the extent of the second economy was based on interviewing emigrants from the USSR about their

lives prior to emigration. Three major surveys were performed in Israel and the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. The Berkeley-Duke household budget survey, the only one focused explicitly on the second economy, implied that about 27 percent of urban household income in Russia in the late 1970s was derived from the second economy. The corresponding estimates from the other two surveys were about half that amount.

Evaluating second economy dynamics is even more difficult. One methodology infers the growth of the second economy from comparisons of electricity consumption with the official Gross Domestic Product. This approach indicates that Russia's second economy grew by more than 80 percent between 1979 and 1989.

The rise of the second economy amounted to an implicit market reform within the Soviet system, but it also facilitated or even compelled the partial reforms of perestroika, which expanded the scope of the legal second economy. Nonetheless, the illegal and quasi-legal economy also mushroomed, undermining central planning and leading to the economic transition to markets starting in 1992. During the transition, the notion of a second economy was restricted to illegal activities, the growth of which continued throughout the 1990s. The reasons for this growth included persistent excessive regulation of the economy, high statutory tax rates, weakening of official institutions and their inability to protect property rights protection and enforce contracts, lack of credibility of government reform policies, and continued corruption. The illegal second economy may have benefited from the emergence of the mafia, which taxes underground firms but also provides property rights protection for its victim/clients.

The existence of a large second economy, and particularly its illegal part, had important implications for Russia's economy both before and after the collapse of the USSR. First, underground activity hinders an accurate understanding of the economy and impedes policy-making by distorting various statistics, including GDP data, household incomes and their distribution, and employment. Additionally, the illegal economy weakens the feedback to policy-makers on government decisions and actions, undermines official institutions, and promotes corruption. From an efficiency point of view, the illegal economy suffers from the black market's need for secrecy, which results in poor flows of information, greater operational uncertainty, and suboptimally small-scale production.

Economic distortions also appear because some activities are easier to hide than others. At the same time, the second economy often benefits a centrally planned economy by improving incentives and resource allocation. During the post-Soviet transition, the existence of the second economy restricted the government's ability to tax and regulate excessively. On the margin, the net balance between the second economy's costs and benefits to society depends on its size and other factors, and is a difficult empirical question.

See also: BLACK MARKET; COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY

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MICHAEL ALEXEEV

SECOND SECRETARY

The second secretary was the number-two position at every level, from top to bottom, of the administrative apparatus (secretariat) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). From Central

Committee headquarters ("the Center") in Moscow at the top to the republics, provinces, and cities below, secretariats were the Party's hands-on executive organs. They controlled the work of more than 200,000 full-time officials and employees, known collectively as the nomenklatura. The second secretaries were key figures because at every level of authority they controlled the appointment of Party and government officials.

The topmost secretary in Moscow was general secretary, or sometimes called the first secretary. The latter term was likewise applied to local number-one secretaries at the middle and lower rungs of the Party hierarchy. Second-in-command in these secretariats was the second secretary. His function was to administer crucial personnel matters throughout the given political-administrative region or locale in the USSR. In republics or other units where the first secretary was drawn from a titular ethnic group, the second secretary was always a Russian for oversight.

The second secretary had the authority to appoint and dismiss nomenklaturists at the various levels of Party and government rule. Any number of Party functionaries who were later promoted from below to Moscow Center earned their status by having served as second secretaries.

In Josef Stalin's time, one of the most powerful officials of this kind was Georgy Malenkov, who functioned largely as Stalin's number-two man-in-charge of personnel, or *de facto* second secretary. Like other second secretaries, top to bottom, Malenkov was also a member of the Party's most important political organ, the Politburo, which at the local levels was called the "Buro." After Stalin's death in March 1953, Malenkov functioned briefly as first secretary and then was transferred to the office of prime minister of the USSR.

It was not unusual for former secretaries, especially second secretaries, to assume high government office at some level of Party or state administration. Any number of important Party officials and members of the central Politburo were first secretaries at one time or another, and many were also once second secretaries on lower rungs of the Party hierarchy.

In the final period of Soviet rule (after 1985), Yegor Ligachev was perhaps the best-known second secretary. After serving as a second secretary in various provincial administration, he was transferred to Moscow in 1983. There, because he was in charge of personnel affairs at the top, Ligachev became the second most powerful figure in the

party when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary in 1985. Ligachev was soon embroiled in policy and personnel disputes with both Gorbachev and the then first secretary of the Moscow Party apparatus, Boris Yeltsin. As second secretary, Ligachev remained a key figure in the regime down to the demise of communist and Soviet rule in Russia in late 1991.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; GENERAL SECRETARY; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the administrative arm of the Communist Party. Initially a handful of party workers, the Secretariat evolved into a powerful bureaucracy with oversight of the entire Soviet political system and economy. Although the size of the Secretariat was modest in comparison to the giant governmental bureaucracy, its power was not. It was the *apparat* and those who worked in the Secretariat were the *apparatchiki*. Headed by the General (or First) Secretary and the other Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Secretariat became the body that ensured that Soviet political and economic organs followed party policy. Josef Stalin was responsible for building the Secretariat, and Nikita Khrushchev was responsible for reaffirming and renewing its power. Its influence diminished only under Mikail Gorbachev, who in his final years, turned to the power of the Presidency and a Presidential Cabinet of Ministers, which was created in 1990.

At the height of its power, the Secretariat headed by its powerful General Secretary determined the agenda of the Politburo and the Central Commit-

tee. Attention usually focused on the General Secretary, and to a lesser degree, the dozen or so Secretaries who worked with him, rather than the larger bureaucracy that constituted the Secretariat.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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NORMA C. NOONAN

SECTARIANISM

Religious dissent from the Russian Orthodox Church.

The word *sect* entered the Russian language in the eighteenth century from the Latin word *secta*. Long used in the Catholic Church to indicate groups or parties that had separated themselves from orthodox teaching, the word was adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church during the reign of Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725) to label the increasing numbers of religious dissenters.

The first substantial movement of Christian dissent occurred only in the seventeenth century in response to the liturgical and bureaucratic innovations of Patriarch Nikon of Moscow (r. 1652–1658). By the 1680s, those who opposed these new reforms called themselves “Old Believers”; many of them withdrew from the Church and society to create their own purified communities on the outskirts of the Muscovite state. Although Old Believers were sometimes tarred with the label “sect,” by the late nineteenth century Russian Orthodox hereiology began to reserve the word sectarian for the growing numbers of religious dissenters who had separated themselves from the state church for reasons other than Nikon’s reforms. In accordance with this usage, this article deals only with those sectarians who were not Old Believers. It also does not deal with the fourteenth-century Judaizers and its predecessors.

THE FAITH OF CHRIST (FLAGELLANTS) AND THE CASTRATES

The Faith of Christ (*khristovshchina*) arose in the seventeenth century. Its members continued to visit the Orthodox state church, but also met in secret assemblies where they repeated the Jesus prayer (Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner) until the Holy Spirit descended upon them and they danced, prophesied, and spoke in tongues. In their secret assemblies, they believed that they had recovered the original faith and practice of Christ. Following a realized eschatology, they also believed that Christ had returned spiritually to dwell in their leaders whom they called Christs and Mothers of God. They composed a rich repertoire of spiritual songs celebrating these leaders and their faith. The adherents of the Faith of Christ practiced an intense asceticism that included celibacy, restricted diet, long periods of prayer, and fasting. Over time, some of them flagellated themselves, and so they became known as flagellants. This label was applied indiscriminately to many different sectarians, most of whom did not practice flagellation.

The Faith of Christ established broad religious, social, and economic networks across the Russian Empire. The grave of the monastery peasant Danilo Filippov (d. c. 1700), one of the early leaders of the sect, was located in a small village near Kostroma; it attracted pilgrims from cities and towns all over central Russia for at least two centuries. The members of the Faith of Christ used money earned in the textile trade to support their co-religionists who entered Orthodox monasteries.

In 1733 and again in 1745, extensive state investigations sought to eliminate the movement by arresting and sentencing hundreds of suspects. By forcing the defendants to confess falsely to horrible crimes of secret mass orgies, infanticide, and cannibalism, the inquisitors of the second commission helped to create a powerful myth that envisioned the flagellants as a dangerous, homicidal, sexually perverted fifth column within Russian society.

By the 1760s, some members of the Faith of Christ, not satisfied with vows of celibacy, began castrating themselves. Under the leadership of the fugitive peasant Kondraty Selivanov (d. 1832), these castrates broke away from the Faith of Christ and created their own peculiar rituals and eschatology. In its rich tradition of spiritual songs, the Castrates claimed that their leader Selivanov was actually Emperor Peter III (r. 1762)—the unfortunate husband of Catherine the Great (r. 1762–1796).

Though the real Peter III was killed in Catherine's 1762 coup, the Castrates held that he actually escaped to Orel province where, as the peasant Kondratii Selivanov, he was arrested and exiled to Siberia. After Catherine's death, the legend claims that Emperor Paul (r. 1796–1801) recalled Selivanov to St. Petersburg, where he recognized him as his father.

Although Selivanov lived and taught freely in St. Petersburg from 1802 to 1820, he spent the last twelve years of his life in a monastery prison in Suzdal. Thanks in part to their severe asceticism, many of the Castrates became wealthy merchants. Because they were severely persecuted, the Castrates outwardly adhered to the Orthodox Church and often proved to be generous patrons.

SPIRITUAL CHRISTIANITY: DUKHOBORS AND MOLOKANS

Spiritual Christianity, another powerful strain of sectarianism, arose as an apocalyptic movement in the 1760s in the black-earth region of Tambov province. Preaching that the day of the Lord was imminent, Ilarion Pobirokhin (fl. 1762–1785) called on true Christians to stop venerating icons and to reject the Orthodox sacraments and priesthood. Instead of kissing icons, they kissed one another, and especially their leader, as the image of God. They met together regularly to read the Bible, sing spiritual psalms of their own composition, and listen to their teachers' sermons.

Despite state efforts to repress them, the Spiritual Christians, who were also called the Dukhobors (Spirit-Wrestlers), survived. In an effort to isolate them from their Orthodox neighbors, the Russian state in 1802 first resettled them in Melitopol in Crimea, and then in 1841–1845 forcibly moved them to the Caucasus. In these isolated colonies, the Dukhobors largely governed themselves and followed their own folkways. Led by charismatic descendants of Pobirokhin and a Council of Elders, the Dukhobors preached that God's Spirit lived in all people, both men and women. Although they used the Bible, they emphasized their own oral tradition of spiritual psalms, which they called the Living Book.

By the 1880s, the Dukhobors numbered about twenty thousand. A radical group of Dukhobors led by Petr Verigin (d. 1935) preached pacifism, rejected military service, and struggled to take over the community in 1886–1898. In 1898, Verigin led his followers to immigrate to Canada.

A second group of Spiritual Christians, known as the Molokans (milk-drinkers, because they did not observe the Orthodox fasting periods in which milk was forbidden), broke away from the Dukhobors. Semen Uklein (d. 1809), an erstwhile follower of Ilarion Pobirokhin, insisted on the authority of the Bible, and went on to preach his own version of Spiritual Christianity throughout the provinces of the lower Volga in 1790s. Like the Dukhobors, the Molokans rejected icons, sacraments, and priesthood. But as serious students of the Bible, Uklein's followers also observed Old Testament holidays and dietary restrictions.

In the 1830s, a group of inspired apocalyptic Molokan prophets predicted that the world would end in 1836 and introduced ecstatic dancing and singing into the Molokan meetings. Lukian Petrov Sokolov (d. 1858) led his followers to Mount Ararat to await the return of Christ. Despite the failure of this prophecy, these Molokan "Jumpers" retained their ecstatic practices and regrouped under a new charismatic leader, Maksim Rudometikin (d. 1877). From the late nineteenth century, new prophets taught pacifism and their new apocalyptic visions encouraged the Jumpers to emigrate and establish colonies in California, South America, Mexico, and Arizona.

WESTERN RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

In the 1830s, German pietists introduced a revival in the German colonies of the Ukraine. By the 1860s, this revival, which emphasized personal prayer and a Bible study hour [*Stunde* in German], had been adopted by Ukrainian and Russian peasants who lived near the German colonists. Although initially these Shtundists, as they came to be called, wanted to remain in the Orthodox Church, the Orthodox hierarchy rejected their independent Bible studies and the Protestant doctrine of salvation through faith alone. Ultimately, many of these Ukrainian and Russian peasants turned away from Orthodoxy to embrace Baptism. In 1867, Nikita Voronin, a convert from Molokanism, was the first Russian to receive baptism. A Russian Baptist Union was created in 1884.

Other Protestant movements also gained Russian adherents. German and American preachers brought Seventh-Day Adventism into Russia in the 1880s. In the 1870s in the northern capital of St. Petersburg, the pietistic preaching of the English Lord Radstock established a pietistic following that later helped to support the formation of a Union of Evangelical Christians in 1909.

Overwhelmed by the 1905 revolution, the tsarist government issued an edict of religious toleration that allowed much greater freedom of worship—though not of proselytizing—to most sectarians. Baptists, Molokans, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Evangelical Christians created their own legal organizations, published newspapers, books, and journals. A 1912 census counted 393,565 sectarians (not including the Old Believers). Taken together, Baptists and Evangelical Christians were the largest group, with more than 143,000 adherents; Molokans represented the next largest group with 133,935.

THE SOVIET PERIOD

After the 1917 revolution, the Bolshevik government initially courted sectarians, but this policy came to an end in 1929 with the First Five Year Plan. In the 1930s, the Soviet Union attempted to eliminate religion altogether by closing and destroying churches and arresting religious leaders. This policy failed, and resistance to the forced collectivization of agriculture actually provoked new apocalyptic sectarian movements which attacked the Soviet state as the "red dragon" of the Apocalypse. Persecution of the Orthodox Church forced some of its members underground to form the True Orthodox Church. Rejecting the Moscow Patriarchate as hopelessly compromised, the members of the True Orthodox Church claimed that they alone maintained the true faith.

The German invasion of the USSR in 1941 forced Josef Stalin to moderate his antireligious policies and to allow limited legal existence of sectarian groups. In 1944, Baptists and Evangelical Christians formed the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, and soon Adventists also were granted a national organization. Dissatisfaction with the limits on religious freedom and a renewed antireligious campaign under Nikita Khrushchev led some Baptists and Adventists to form independent, underground organizations in the 1960s: the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christian Baptists and the True and Free Seventh-Day Adventists. The Soviet period also witnessed the vigorous growth of Pentecostals, who had first appeared in Russia in 1913. In the 1970s and 1980s, circles of educated urban intellectuals sometimes faced persecution for their interest and participation in Eastern religions, including Tibetan Buddhism and the Hare Krishna movement.

THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD

In 1990 the Soviet parliament passed a law allowing complete religious freedom and ushered in a new, open spiritual marketplace. Missionaries from the United States and Western Europe helped to establish and finance Mormon ward, Jehovah's Witnesses kingdom halls, and charismatic and evangelical churches. Underground movements, such as the True Orthodox Christians, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and the Baptist Council of Churches, emerged to compete in the new atmosphere.

The new freedom, and the collapse of the Soviet economic and political systems, also encouraged the formation of new sectarian movements. Distressed by the moral degeneration of Russian society, prophets from the Church of the Transfiguring Theotokos claimed that the Mother of God had appeared to warn Russia and the world of an impending judgment. The White Brotherhood, a syncretic movement, combining elements of Hinduism and Orthodox Christianity, gathered to witness the end of the world in Kiev in 1993.

Alarmed by these apocalyptic movements and by the influx of foreign missionaries, the Russian parliament in 1997 passed a new law that favored the traditional religions of Russia. Local administrations have interpreted the law quite differently, so that the Jehovah's Witnesses, who have peacefully established their headquarters in St. Petersburg, have also had to defend themselves in Moscow courts.

Sectarianism first became significant in Russia in the seventeenth century. On the one hand, sectarianism represented the growth of individual initiative and freedom, as religious virtuosi took upon themselves the responsibility of constructing and living out new religious visions. But on the other hand, the classification and enumeration of sects reflect the growth of bureaucratic systems of social control in both state and church. The continued vitality of sectarianism in the twenty-first century is a product of the dialectic between these two opposite trends.

See also: OLD BELIEVERS; ORTHODOXY; PROTESTANTISM

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J. EUGENE CLAY

SECURITY COUNCIL

The April 1991 law creating the office of president of the Russian Federation also created a Security Council, succeeding the security council created by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in November 1990 and presumably modeled after the National Security Council in the United States. Formally established by a March 1992 law, the Security Council was chaired by the president and met once per month, with a staff of about two hundred and half a dozen commissions working at its direction. Since 1993 its membership has varied, at the discretion of the president, from seven officials in 1996 to more than twenty-five since 2000, when it included the prime minister and the heads of the "power ministries" (defense, foreign affairs, interior, emergencies, Federal Border Service, and Federal Security Service) plus the justice minister, the procurator-general, the heads of the two houses of parliament, and the governors of the seven federal districts created by President Vladimir Putin.

Back in 1992 the Security Council was supervised by State Secretary Gennady Burbulis, and its first secretary was the industrialist Yuri Skokov. It was seen as a conservative counter-balance to the liberal foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev. Some speculated that it might become a new Politburo, well-insulated from democratic accountability. In practice the council never became a decision-making forum, but merely provided analysis and advice to the president. It was supposed to exercise a coordinating role and enforce and extend presidential control, but in practice the ministries of defense and foreign affairs jealously guarded their autonomy. The council was periodically tasked with drawing up guidelines or concepts for Russian foreign policy, but these did not have much

influence on actual decision-making. And far from being a springboard for ambitious politicians, it was more a tool for Boris Yeltsin to balance rival figures.

Skokov was replaced as secretary in June 1993 by a former Soviet general, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, and then in October 1993 by a Yeltsin crony, Oleg Lobov. In June 1996 Alexander Lebed was appointed secretary, in return for his support of Yeltsin in the second round of the presidential election. Lebed was assigned to end the war in Chechnya, and much to everyone's surprise he succeeded, signing a peace accord and withdrawing Russian troops. Concerned about Lebed's growing popularity, Yeltsin created a separate Defense Council in July and fired Lebed in October, accusing him of plotting a military coup. Lebed was replaced by the anodyne politician Ivan Rybkin, with the controversial oligarch Boris Berezovsky as his deputy, in charge of reconstructing Chechnya. (Berezovsky quit in November 1997.)

From March to September 1998, the Security Council was headed by an academic, Andrei Kokoshin. He was replaced by a KGB general, Nikolai Boryuzha, who in turn was followed in March 1999 by Vladimir Putin, who was simultaneously head of the Federal Security Service (FSB). In November 1999 Putin was replaced at the council by his deputy at the FSB, Sergei Ivanov. In March 2001 Ivanov became defense minister, and the former interior minister, Vladimir Rushailo, became Security Council secretary.

During Vladimir Putin's presidency, the Security Council became slightly more visible as a forum through which he tried to press forward with military reforms obstinately resisted by the generals. The new National Security Concept drawn up by the council in 2000 stressed internal threats, such as Chechen terrorism, over traditional security concerns, such as nuclear deterrence.

See also: POLITBURO; PRESIDENCY; PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL

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PETER RUTLAND

SERAPION BROTHERS

The Serapion Brothers were a group of poets and writers who insisted on the political autonomy of the artist and the affirmation of imagination and creative art. They argued that in order to remain authentic, the writer's voice needed freedom from all social or political constraints. They denounced the use of literature for utilitarian purposes and never adopted a specific model of literary production.

The Serapion Brothers began meeting in 1921 at the Petrograd House of Arts at the suggestion of Viktor Shklovsky. The group, which eventually included Konstantin Fedin, Ilya Gruzdev, Vsevolod Ivanov, Veniamin Kaverin, Lev Lunts, Nikolai Nikitin, Elizaveta Polonskaya, Vladimir Pozner, Mikhail Slonimsky, Nikolai Tikhonov, and Mikhail Zoshchenko, adopted its name after a tale by E. T. A. Hoffmann. Shklovsky occasionally participated, and Maxim Gorky supported members with material assistance and help in publishing their work. The group met weekly to read and discuss one another's work, focusing on the refinement of the craft of writing and leaving each member to develop his or her own message, sometimes engaging in heated debates about the purpose or meaning of literature.

The closest the Brotherhood came to publishing a manifesto was Lev Lunts's "Why We are the Serapion Brothers" (*Pochemu my Serapionovy Bratya*, 1922), in which he proclaimed that "Art is real, like life itself. And, like life itself, it is without goal and without meaning: It exists because it cannot help but exist." This statement of the group's purpose sparked a sharp debate with Marxist critics who insisted on the utilitarian use of literature for common ideological purposes. Lunts, however, stressed the autonomy of literature from political purposes or control and, simultaneously, the preservation of diverse ideological positions within the brotherhood. The one collective work the group published, the *First Almanac* (*Serapionovy Brat'ia. Al'mankh pervy*, 1922) demonstrates this wide range of style and philosophy. Throughout the 1920s they promoted a nonpolitical approach to literature, tolerance, and friendship, and their connections continued after the group's dissolution in 1929.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION

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ELIZABETH JONES HEMENWAY

SERBIA, RELATIONS WITH

From the first days of the initial Serb uprising in 1804 (against the tyranny of the Janissaries, military units that had evolved from being the elite troops of the Ottoman Empire into semi-independent occupiers) until 1878 (when Belgrade obtained complete independence from the Porte at the Congress of Berlin), relations with Serbia were central to Russia's foreign policy. However, as Serbia pursued both independence from Istanbul and expansion of the state to include all Serb lands (Bosnia, Hercegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina), Russia often found itself drawn into Serbian foreign affairs as Belgrade came to depend upon (and use) Russian support for its own ends. This led to a relationship that offered Serbia the greatest advantages as St. Petersburg became captive to two critical forces: 1) the emergence of Pan Slavism, a movement that stressed the solidarity of the Slavic peoples ostensibly under Russian leadership, and 2) the Eastern Question, the increasing vacuum in southeastern Europe brought about by the rapid decay of the once great Ottoman Empire, which presented an inviting target of opportunity for the great powers.

The romantic image of Orthodox Christians fighting the Muslim Turks for freedom continuously vexed St. Petersburg. On the one hand, advisers generally supported a policy of moderation in the region and a concentration on domestic needs. However, Pan Slavists, who had a powerful effect upon Russian public opinion, attacked the notion of passivity toward their Christian and Slavic brethren who, they claimed, were suffering at the hands of either the Turks or the Habsburgs.

After the disastrous Crimean War and the subsequent humiliating Treaty of Paris in 1856, Russia was confronted by conflicting goals: the need to deal with internal problems as well as to restore its influence in the Balkans. When a revolt began in Hercegovina against the Turks in 1875, the lore and lure of Slavic Christians rising up against their Muslim occupiers proved to be intoxicating. Russians immediately volunteered to support the insurrection. General M. G. Chernyayev took command of

the Serbian army, and by 1876 Serbia was at war with the Porte.

The conflict however was disastrous for Serbia. Not only was the country poorly prepared for war, but friction arose between the Russian and Serbian forces as Chernyayev proved to be an inept commander. While events inside Serbia deteriorated, St. Petersburg concluded a series of agreements with Vienna, providing that in the event Russia went to war with the Turks, the Habsburgs would be neutral.

In April 1877, Pan Slavist pressure forced Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov to join the conflict, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. Despite military setbacks, Russia forced the Turks to sign the Treaty of San Stefano. However, Russia's victory proved to be short-lived as the other great powers quickly blocked St. Petersburg's designs to obtain primacy in the region through the creation of a "big" Bulgaria. At the 1878 Congress of Berlin, the powers compelled Russia to concede on the issue of an enlarged Bulgarian state, while the Turks were forced to grant complete independence to Serbia (as well as Romania and Greece). However, Russian support for Bulgaria had alienated Belgrade. For the next quarter-century, Serbia distanced itself from Russia. Only the murder of King Alexander Obrenovic in 1903 and the assumption of power by Peter Karadjordjevic led to a reorientation of Serbian policy back to regional cooperation and a reliance on Russia (especially after the Bosnian crisis of 1908–1909, which saw the formal annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary).

Weakened by the events of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and the Revolution of 1905, Russia could not challenge Vienna in 1908 on behalf of its Serbian client state. Nevertheless, the Bosnian crisis pushed Belgrade and St. Petersburg closer together. The former became solely dependent upon Russia for support among the great powers, while the latter realized that it had to support its Serbian ally in the future lest it lose influence in the region. Russia now sought to foster a regional alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, an act that led to the formation of a Balkan League and subsequently the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. These wars, the unintended consequence of Russia's attempt to create a defensive alliance in the region to counter the Habsburgs, further destabilized southeastern Europe and left Russia even more tethered to Belgrade.

During the days and weeks following the assassination of Habsburg archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, Russia steadfastly backed its sole remaining Balkan ally, a critical factor leading to the outbreak of World War I. In its attempt to support Belgrade against Austro-Hungarian demands, Russia now found itself immersed in a conflict for which it was ill prepared and that would lead to the destruction of the Romanov monarchy.

See also: BULGARIA, RELATIONS WITH; MONTENEGRO, RELATIONS WITH; PANSLAVISM; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH; YUGOSLAVIA, RELATIONS WITH

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SEREDNYAKI

The *serednyaki*, or middle peasants, were peasants whose households in the 1920s had enough land to support their extended family (*dvor*) and sometimes even the hiring of one of the poorer *bednyaki* or landless *batraki* of the neighborhood in busy seasons. In practice, some of the middle peasants lived no differently from the poorer classes; they too had no draft horse (*malomoshchnyi*) and might likewise hire out a family member in the village community or send him to a nearby city or rural enterprise as wage labor. Many were illiterate. Other members of this intermediate stratum of peasants, however, were prosperous (*zazhitochnye* or *krepkie*) and thus close to the richer kulaks who constituted about 5 to 7 percent of the peasantry. These better-off peasants would sell some surplus grain if provided an incentive in the form of manufactured goods, and thus were crucial to the alliance of workers and peasants (*smychka*) that was supposed

to be the political basis of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921 to 1928.

Although the Marxist-Leninist categories barely fit the complex reality of the Russian countryside, Vladimir Lenin expected the *serednyaki* to be tolerant of Bolshevik power and policies in the rural areas, and saw them as a temporary ally until such time as the regime could afford to incorporate them into more modern collective farms. There was a danger, however, that industrious middle peasants who prospered would become petty bourgeois allies of the kulaks and thus would oppose Soviet industrialization and the heavy taxes and price discrimination it required. The Marxist-Leninist category of middle peasant, unlike the traditional terms *bednyak* or *kulak*, meant little to the peasants themselves. Many other factors besides ownership of productive capital influenced their behavior. Populist students of the peasantry, notably A. V. Chayanov, and later sociologists have challenged this conceptualization of the NEP village as too static.

The schematic class analysis of the Soviet countryside was not merely ideological. Depending on one's class, one could obtain benefits or avoid penalties. Poor peasants enjoyed tax exemptions and preferential admission to schools and Communist Party organizations; kulaks (along with priests and the bourgeois) were deprived of these and even of the right to vote. Late in the NEP, taxes on middle peasants increased, though not as much as those imposed on the kulaks. Not surprisingly, middle peasants endeavored to be officially identified as poor—for example, by referring to past proletarian occupations. They would sometimes try to hide their prosperity by hiring out some labor or a horse. Nonetheless, when forced requisitioning of grain was reinstated in 1928, the prosperous peasants were affected adversely. "Dekulakization" and collectivization in 1929 to 1931 made it even more important to avoid official identification with the richest peasant stratum.

See also: KULAKS; PEASANT ECONOMY; PEASANTRY

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

SERFDOM

Serfdom is the name of the condition of a peasant who does not enjoy the rights of a free person, but is not a slave. While the slave is an object of the law, the serf is still a subject of the law. The classic definition of serfdom in the Russian context is given in Jerome Blum's *Lord and Peasant in Russia* (pp. 6–8). Thus a serf is a peasant who (1) is bound to the land; or (2) is bound to the person of a lord; and (3) is not directly subject to the state, but is subject to a lord who in turn is subject to the state (such as it may be). Thus a serf bound to the land cannot be moved by any lord, and is supposed to be a "fixture" on that land regardless of who owns or holds the land. But if a serf is bound to the person of a lord, he essentially begins to resemble a slave in that the lord nearly becomes the owner of the serf: the lord can move the serf from one plot of land to another (or even into his household), and may even be able to sell the serf to a third party. The first and second conditions are mutually exclusive, for a serf cannot be bound to the land and simultaneously bound to the person of a lord. The third condition is most difficult to comprehend, but can arise under one of two circumstances: either state power does not exist (as during the manorial era of Russia in the early period of the "Mongol yoke," from 1237 to 1300 or even 1350) and thus the sole extant conflict-resolution power is exercised by a large estate owner, or the existing state power has abdicated or ceded judicial or taxing authority to the owner or holder of land. The third condition can exist by itself or in conjunction with the first or second conditions.

Whether there was serfdom of the third category in the early Mongol period, after the collapse of Russian princely power and during the period when the sole authority may have been the owner of a large estate (*votchina*) or manor, is an issue. While there may have technically been serfdom between 1237 and 1300 or 1350, the reality was certainly such that no peasant knew he was a serf. In those decades most peasants lived on land they considered their own, not on a manor. Moreover, given

the reigning system of slash-and-burn (*assartage*) agriculture, peasants were accustomed to farming a new plot of land every three years and could freely move away from any manorial lord who was the slightest bit oppressive. Thus no one views any of the peasants of Russia as "serfs" until the second half of the fifteenth century.

Serfdom began as a result of the civil war of 1425–1453, which left much of Russia in ruins. Selected monasteries were allowed to forbid their peasant debtors to move at any time except around St. George's Day (November 26—compare with the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday), the day in the pagan calendar when the harvest was completed and thus debts could be collected. In 1497 the St. George's Day limitation was extended to all peasants; they were bound to the land and could not legally move at other times of the year. Lords were limited to collecting the traditional rent and had no authority over the peasants.

Ivan IV's mad Oprichnina (1565–1572) was responsible for initiating changes in the status of the peasant. Ivan gave his special Oprichnina troops, the *oprichniki*, control over the peasants living on the lands they possessed, which allowed them to raise their rents to whatever level they pleased. As a result the *oprichniki* "collected as much rent in one year as previously had been collected in ten." This and other barbarous acts of the Oprichnina resulted in the depopulation of much of old Muscovy as the peasants fled to newly annexed areas (colonial expansion). Certain landholders (*pomestie*) then successfully petitioned the government to repeal the peasants' right to move on St. George's Day. In 1592 this repeal was temporarily extended to all peasants. Thus serfdom became the temporary legal status of all peasants.

Limitations were placed on the recovery of fugitive peasants in 1592, but they were repealed in the Law Code of 1649 (*Ulozhenie*). According to Chapter 11, Article 1, of the *Ulozhenie* of 1649, any peasants who had been recorded as living on state, court, or peasant taxable lands could be returned to those lands without any time limits. Article 2 stated the same for peasants living on seignorial lands. Thus all peasants in Russia within the reach of the *Ulozhenie* were serfs. The code also specified how runaways should be returned, and especially what should happen if male and female fugitives married. The Orthodox Church held that marriage was inviolable, so the couple had to be returned to the lord of one of them. The most ra-



Serfs line up to draw water from a village well. © HULTON ARCHIVE

tional solution to this problem was that the lord who received a fugitive lost the couple, as punishment for having received the runaway. If the couple was on neutral territory, the contesting lords cast lots; the winner got the couple and paid the loser 10 rubles for the serf he had lost. The serf family was not inviolable, however, and under certain circumstances could be broken up.

Other articles of the Ulozhenie established rules that led to the further abasement of the serfs, ultimately to a change in their status to something resembling slaves. It started with owners of hereditary estates, who were allowed to manumit their serfs (a practice ominously borrowed from slavery) and transfer them from one estate to another. This seemed innocent enough, as the state was primarily concerned about service landholdings and having the serfs there to support whichever cavalryman might be holding it at the moment. Both

logical and juridical problems automatically arose when service landholdings were converted into hereditary estates in 1714.

Prior to that time, however, it appears that the process of converting the serf from a peasant bound to the land to a peasant bound to the person of a lord was under way. Between the Ulozhenie and the introduction of the soul tax in 1721, the extent to which this had progressed is disputed. Some transactions appear to have been concealed sales of peasants, for example. After 1721, conditions worsened. Lords were held responsible for the collection of the soul tax, which putatively gave them additional power over the serfs. Then in 1762 lords were freed from twenty-five-year (essentially lifetime) compulsory military service, so that many of them spent most of their lives on their estates and took an interest in the management of those estates. This was the *coup de grace*, which often



An illustration of serfs toiling in the field. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

converted seignorial serfdom into near slavery. Serfs were auctioned, traded, moved to wherever their lords wanted them to live, and even compelled to breed. However, lords did not own a serf's inventory, clothing, personal property, and so on. These features increasingly distinguished seignorial serfs from serfs living on state and court lands, who came to be called "state peasants" even though they were still really serfs.

Serfdom was abolished in stages, depending on which category peasants belonged to. In 1861 serfs serving in lords' households (house serfs [*dvoroye lyudi*], nominally, and probably frequently literally, descendants of house slaves who had been put on the tax rolls in 1721) and possessional serfs (those assigned to work in factories, typically textile and metallurgical, whose output collapsed in 1861) were freed in all respects

immediately. Seignorial serfs were immediately freed from landlord control (from being bound to the person of their lord) and were instead bound to the commune (i.e., to the land). This was done to avoid flooding the cities (officials knew the Manchester phenomenon) and to ensure stability (the same officials believed the commune was a stabilizing factor in the countryside). A separate emancipation freed the state serfs and peasants in 1863. Serfdom was finally abolished in 1906 and 1907, when communal control over the former seignorial peasants was abolished and they were allowed to move wherever they desired. Many peasants believed that serfdom was reinstated when the Soviets collectivized agriculture at the end of the 1920s.

See also: EMANCIPATION ACT; ENSERFMENT; LAW CODE OF 1649; OPRICHNINA; PEASANTRY; SLAVERY

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RICHARD HELLIE

SERGEI, PATRIARCH

(1867–1944), twelfth patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, 1943–1944.

The son of a provincial priest, Ivan Nikolaevich Stragorodsky graduated from the St. Petersburg Theological Academy. He became the monk Sergei in 1890 and was consecrated bishop in 1901. He presided over the famous religious–philosophical seminars in St. Petersburg (1901–1903) before becoming archbishop of Finland (1905–1917). After 1917, he wielded great influence as a metropolitan while causing controversy with his willingness to seek political compromise. Sergei recognized the schismatic Living Church Movement in June 1922, although he later publicly repented to Patriarch Tikhon for this error in judgment. The Soviet government prevented election of a new patriarch when Tikhon died in 1925. Metropolitan Peter Poliansky served as the *locum tenens* (guardian of the patriarchate) and chose Sergei as his deputy. Sergei became de facto leader of the church after Peter's arrest. Under pressure from the state and rival bishops, Sergei issued a declaration in July 1927 that proclaimed the church's loyalty to the Soviet government and brought a temporary halt to religious persecution. Orthodox leaders in the USSR and abroad condemned Sergei's declaration, however, and renounced his authority.

The fractured Orthodox Church declined under renewed persecution in the 1930s but experienced rebirth during World War II. The day of the German invasion (June 22, 1941), Sergei issued a message asking all believers to rally to the defense of the nation. He subsequently encouraged large-scale offerings by Orthodox parishes for the war effort. In September 1943, Josef Stalin met with Sergei and two other metropolitans for the purpose of reestablishing the church's national organization. That month, a council of bishops elected Sergei as patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. He served until his death on May 15, 1944.

See also: LIVING CHURCH MOVEMENT; PATRIARCHATE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; TIKHON, PATRIARCH

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EDWARD E. ROSLOF

SERGIUS, ST.

(c. 1322–1392) Saist, founder of the Trinity monastery near Moscow, leader of a monastic revival, participant in political and ecclesiastical politics, and subject of a cult as intercessor for the Russian land.

Information about Sergius's early life and much of his later public career comes from the Life composed by Epifany "the Wise" in 1418 and revisions of it by Pakhomy "the Serb" from 1438 to 1459. Baptized Varfolomei, he was the second of three sons of a boyar family of Rostov. In 1327 and 1328 the Mongols devastated Rostov, ruining his family. In 1331 Prince Ivan I "Kalita" of Moscow annexed Rostov and resettled the family in Radonezh. Varfolomei's brothers married, but he remained celibate. When his parents died, he and elder brother Stefan, a monk since the death of his wife, went to live as hermits in a nearby "wilder-ness" in 1342. They built a chapel, dedicated to the Trinity, and Varfolomei was tonsured as the monk Sergius. Stefan left for Moscow, where he met the future Metropolitan Alexei and became confessor to magnates at court. Sergius lived alone in poverty two years, sharing food with animals, tormented



Icon of St. Sergius of Radonezh by Ivan Kholshevnikov.

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by demons and the devil, an ordeal replicating narratives of hermit saints of early Christianity. He attracted twelve disciples and in 1353 acceded to their entreaties and became abbot. Sergius's example of humility, manual labor, and disdain for material things attracted more monks and brought to his house the support of neighboring peasants and landowners. While Sergius lived a simple life, and he and his disciples sought an intense spirituality resembling that of Hesychast solitaries in Byzantium, there is no evidence that he knew or practiced formal Hesychast methods of prayer.

Sergius became a historical person when a source other than his Life recorded that he founded a monastery at Serpukhov for Prince Vladimir Andreyevich and baptized Yuri, the second son of Grand Prince Dmitry I of Moscow, in 1374. Prob-

ably in 1377, at Metropolitan Alexei's behest and blessed by Patriarch Philotheos of Constantinople, Sergius established a cenobite rule at Trinity modeled on the rule of the Studios Monastery in Constantinople. It mandated communal living and control of property supervised by an elected abbot. Some monks led by Stefan, who earlier had returned probably expecting to become Trinity's first abbot, opposed this. Instead of resisting, Sergius left. This caused defections and appeals from other monks at Trinity to Metropolitan Alexei and Grand Prince Dmitry, who intervened to reaffirm a cenobite rule there and to restore Sergius as abbot.

Sergius's example inspired a wave of monastic foundings. He assisted in establishing six houses and, reportedly, four more. Biographies of at least seven other founders said their subjects were Sergius's disciples or inspired by him. These houses became engines of agricultural, industrial, and commercial development, as well as spiritual centers, contributing to the economic and cultural integration of the Russian state. In 1422 Abbot Nikon instituted worship at Trinity of Sergius's sanctity and probably originated the story related by Pakhomy that the Mother of God appeared to Sergius and put his house under her protection.

According to Pakhomy and later sources, Alexei and Grand Prince Dmitry wanted Sergius to be metropolitan upon Alexei's death in 1378, but Sergius refused. In reality a metropolitan-designate named Kiprian, installed by Constantinople to assure the unity of the eparchy in Moscow and Lithuania, was waiting in Kiev. Also Dmitry and Alexei had a candidate, Dmitry's confessor and former court official Mikhail ("Mityai"). Kiprian's three letters to Sergius and his nephew Fyodor, requesting or acknowledging their assistance, and other evidence make clear that Sergius supported his candidacy, which eventually was successful. The letters cause some to argue that Sergius, like Fyodor, was Dmitry's confessor.

Sergius is most famous as intercessor for Dmitry's Russian army that defeated the Mongols on Kulikovo Field near the Don River in 1380. It was the first Russian victory over the Mongols, and Sergius's intercession was taken to mean that God favored Russia's liberation from the Mongol yoke. Although the earliest text mentioning Sergius's intercession is Pakhomy's revision of Sergius's Life in 1438, the episode became widely accepted, and Sergius was recognized throughout Russia as a saint at some point between 1448 and 1450. Thenceforth

this episode was embellished many times in tales and histories and gave rise to legends of subsequent interventions by Sergius against Russia's enemies. Sergius remains for many the personification of Russian exceptionalism. On July 29, 1385, Sergius baptized Dmitry's son Pyotr. That same year Dmitry asked Sergius to reconcile him with Grand Prince Oleg of Ryazan and to compel Oleg to recognize Dmitry as his senior, a task he performed successfully. A story that Sergius similarly intervened for Moscow in 1365 in Nizhny Novgorod is probably apocryphal.

See also: TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

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DAVID B. MILLER

SERVICE STATE

The service state has been the major factor in the past half millennium of Russian history. It has saved Russia from foreign conquest by mobilizing and controlling at crucial moments the basic factors of the economy—land, labor, and capital. It has used major ideologies to legitimize itself and then has proceeded to try to control most areas of artistic and intellectual life. The service state has gone through three major phases which may be described as "service class revolutions" and serve as classic illustrations of path dependency.

Each service class revolution has been a response by Russia's rulers to perceptions of significant military threats from foreign adversaries. The first can be dated roughly to 1480, when Russia threw off the Mongol yoke. From then the independent state was on its own and faced foreign threats from various quarters, but the major one was from Lithuania, the largest state in Europe with holdings in Vyazma, about 100 miles (160

kilometers) from Moscow. Moscow's conquest of the Republic of Novgorod in 1478, the execution and deportation of its secular and religious elite, and the annexation of their vast lands created the opportunity for the creation of a service class, the backbone of the new service state. The Novgorodian lands were handed out as service landholdings (*pomestie*) to provincial cavalymen for their maintenance. These cavalymen had no independent base and were totally beholden to Moscow. They were ranked according to perceived service performance and compensated accordingly. In exchange for the *pomestie*, they had to serve Moscow for life. As Moscow annexed other territories, it converted them to *pomestie* tenure. In time, Moscow had a corps of 25,000 *pomestie* cavalymen at its beck and call to confront any military emergency. This method of fielding an army was deemed so effective that in 1556 the government mobilized all seignorial land and required estate owners to provide the army with one fully equipped, outfitted cavalymen for each 100 *cheti* (1 *chet* = 1⅓ acres) of populated land.

In 1480 a master ideology was lacking to support the forming service state, but it did not take long for one to appear. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Joseph, the abbot of Volokolamsk Monastery, advanced the precept of Agapetos (fl. 527–548) that "in his person the ruler is a man, but in his authority he is like God." This conflicted with the views of Grand Prince Ivan III, who wanted to annex all church lands and convert them into *pomestie* holdings; his son Basil III, who preferred to let the church continue to own a third of all the populated land of Russia; and other churchmen who believed that the church should not be so involved in "the world." This variation on the divine right of kings gave the Russian ruler unquestioned control over everything. The idea reigned at least until 1905, probably until 1917.

Such military might and autocratic pretensions needed financial means and bureaucratic coordination to support them. After 1300 the government apparatus was part of the Moscow ruler's household, but around 1480 specialization began to develop in the grand princely household administration. Around 1550 special chancelleries with their own record-keeping apparatus began to develop to keep track of the service land fund, the provincial cavalry, the new infantry arquebusiers who had been created to complement the cavalry, and the taxes needed to support these activities. By

the mid-seventeenth century there were about forty of these chancelleries, which seemingly were as efficient and professional as any similar, contemporary organs on Earth.

The last element in the construction of the service state was the inclusion of the masses. To support the cavalry, the peasantry was definitively enserfed between the 1580s and 1649. In an attempt to ensure the stability of the government's cash receipts, the townsmen were bound to their urban places of residence and granted monopolies on trade and industry and the right to own urban property. By 1650 the service state was fully formed. Its completion had been forced by the June 1648 Moscow rebellion against the corrupt regime of Boris Morozov, which compelled the government to convoke the Assembly of the Land, whose product was the Law Code of 1649.

During the Thirteen Years' War (1654–1667), the old military service class's obsolescence was revealed, and it was replaced by new formation regiments commanded by foreign officers. Yet the old landed service class retained its privileges and its monopolies over much of the country's land and peasant labor. This proved to be the trajectory of all service classes: creation, hegemony, decline, and obsolescence—yet retaining all privileges.

The second service class revolution was the product of Peter the Great's perception that Sweden's Charles XII desired to annex Russia. After losing to Charles at Narva in 1700, Peter completely revitalized the service state. All the surviving military servicemen were put back in harness, the dependency of the serfs on the landowners was strengthened, the army was reformed, the Table of Ranks of 1721 told the service state's agents where they belonged in the merit-based hierarchy, and the government apparatus was reformed. The Orthodox Church, which had been created by the state in 988 and was nearly always the state's obedient servant, was converted into a department of the state government with the creation of the Holy Synod in 1721. This continued the secularization of the church administration that had been introduced in 1649 but had been halted when Tsar Alexei died in 1676. Alexei's son Peter made the clergy more active members of the service state by requiring them to report to the police what they heard in confessions as well as to read government edicts to the populace from the pulpit.

Peter articulated one of the basic principles of the service state: anyone was eligible to serve, as

long as he performed the duties demanded of him. This was absolutely crucial in holding together an ever-expanding multinational empire. Peter articulated this in comments about his foreign minister, Pyotr Shafirov, a Jew, and other Jewish people in his administration: "I could not care less whether a man is baptized or circumcised, only that he knows his business and he distinguishes himself by probity." In the perfectly operating service state, there was no place for nationalism (such as Russification) or persecution of national minorities or alien religions (e.g., Jews). Those occurred only at times when the service state was in decline.

The Petrine service state was very successful in defeating Sweden and putting Russia's other major adversaries—the Rzeczpospolita and the Crimean Khanate—on the defensive and ultimately exterminating them. These successes lessened the demands on the service state, and in 1762 Peter III freed the gentry land- and serf-owners from compulsory military service. Need for revenue forced most younger gentry to render military service anyway.

The other major personnel segment of the service state, the peasantry, was not freed in 1762, and the condition of the seignorial serfs was abased to the extent that they became akin to slaves by 1800. Defeat during the Crimean War (1853–1856) did not provoke Russia to initiate another service class revolution, although a dozen major reforms were enacted between 1861 and 1874. In 1861 all seignorial serfs were freed from slavelike dependency on their owners, but were bound instead to their communes and were allowed to move freely only in 1906. This largely ended the second service class revolution, although the autocratic monarchy persisted until February 1917.

Certain features of the service state did not die in 1762, 1861, or even 1906. The government maintained its pretensions to control all higher culture by censoring literature, the theater, all art exhibitions, and musical performances. Secret police surveillance was continuously strengthened as the government used repression, jailing, and exile in its attempts to cope with the rising revolutionary movement opposed to the autocracy and serfdom. The industrialization of Russia launched by Minister of Finance Sergei Witte during the 1890s was a demonstration of service state power reminiscent of Peter I and anticipating Josef Stalin.

The October Revolution abolished Christianity and the Agapetos formula as the regime's ideology. The Bolsheviks replaced it with Marxist-Leninist dialectical historical materialism. Stalin, sensing a threat from the United Kingdom in 1927, used the new ideology to legitimize his launching of the third service class revolution in 1928.

The Soviet service state proved unable to manage the economy efficiently, but the service class remained during the Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982), Yuri Andropov (1982–1984), and Konstantin Chernenko (1984–1985) years. The Soviet service class had already begun to generate into a privileged elite (what Milovan Djilas termed “the new class”) by the end of the 1930s, and this degeneration had turned into a rout by 1985. By the middle of the 1970s “the working class pretended to work and the state pretended to pay them.” The general trend was for people to go to work to socialize with their friends, not to produce anything. By the time of the coup of August 19, 1991, attempting to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev, the privileged elite (the “nomenklatura”) rode around in their own private motorcars and went straight to the head of long lines for ordinary consumer goods such as newspapers and magazines while getting most of their goods from closed stores open only to the privileged elite. It was obvious that the Soviet service state was no longer working, could not make the economy grow or improve the lives of its subjects, and was little more than a debauchery of corruption. Gorbachev, another believer in socialism, tried to reform the system, but it proved impossible. The service state lost its teeth when he repealed Article 6 of the Brezhnev constitution, which had given the Communist Party a monopoly on Soviet political life. The Communist Party had also assumed a monopoly on all elite positions, so that one had to be a member of the CPSU to hold many jobs. That had not been true during the times of Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. This change was another sign of the degeneration of the service state under Brezhnev.

When Gorbachev delivered the coup de grace to the Soviet service state, no one wept. The service state was a major Russian “contribution” to the human experience. Whether there ever will be a fourth service class revolution remains to be seen.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; ECONOMY, TSARIST; INDUSTRIALIZATION; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SERFDOM

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RICHARD HELLIE

SEVASTOPOL

City and naval base on the southwestern tip of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine.

With its excellent harbors and anchorages, Sevastopol has an advantageous location from which to conduct operations in the Black Sea. The city stands on the southern shore of Sevastopol Bay and has a population of 390,000—75 percent Russian and 20 percent Ukrainian. The site of ancient settlements, modern Sevastopol was founded by Prince Grigory Potemkin in 1783 after the conquest of the Crimean Khanate. Admiral F.F. Mekenzy, commander of the newly created Black Sea Fleet, placed a naval station there, and in 1784 the settlement was named Sevastopol.

In 1804 Alexander I's government declared Sevastopol the primary naval base of the Black Sea Fleet. The naval base and the city grew significantly during the second quarter of the nineteenth century when Admiral Mikhail Lazarev served as fleet commander. By 1844 the city had a population of more than forty thousand, making it the largest city in Crimea. Sevastopol became the major base for fitting out and repairing warships. Its defenses grew in extent and quality.

In 1853 Admiral Pavel Nakhimov's squadron sailed from there to Sinope, where it annihilated a

Turkish squadron. During the Crimean War, Anglo-French forces besieged Sevastopol. The defense was immortalized by Leo Tolstoy, one of the defenders, in his *Sevastopol Tales*. Sevastopol fell to the Anglo-French forces in September 1855.

Following the Crimean War, Sevastopol suffered decline, because the peace treaty denied Russia the right to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. With the remilitarization of the Black Sea after 1870 Sevastopol regained its importance as a naval base for a modern ironclad fleet.

Sevastopol was associated with rebellion, mutiny, and civil war. In 1830 government restrictions to combat a cholera epidemic set off a revolt among sailors and civilians. In June 1905 the battleship *Potemkin* sailed from Sevastopol on its way to mutiny over bad meat. During the Russian civil war Sevastopol was the headquarters of Baron Peter Wrangel's White Army. The Red Army under Mikhail Frunze stormed Crimea in October 1920, and Wrangel evacuated his army to Istanbul.

During World War II Sevastopol was the site of an eight-month siege by German and Rumanian forces under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and fell in July 1942. On May 9, 1944, the Soviet Fourth Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin liberated the city.

Following the end of the existence of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and Ukraine entered into negotiations over Sevastopol. During the early twenty-first century the city is a special region within Ukraine, not under the government of Crimea, and the Russian and Ukrainian navies share the naval base.

See also: BLACK SEA FLEET; CRIMEA; CRIMEAN WAR; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS; WHITE ARMY

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JACOB W. KIPP

SEVEN-YEAR PLAN

Following the rise of Nikita Khrushchev to primacy among the leaders of the Soviet Union, the sixth five-year plan (1956–1960) was abandoned as in-

feasible, leaving the country without a perspective plan for the first time in three decades. In one of his many reorganizations, Khrushchev substituted a Seven-Year Plan to run from 1959 to 1965. It included his new priorities for a much larger chemical industry, more housing, substitution of oil and gas for coal in the production of electricity and for powering the railroads, and more emphasis on agriculture, especially in the eastern areas.

Planned targets for 1965 were ambitious, and some were even raised in October 1961. Despite considerable growth of housing construction, meat production, and consumer durables, fulfillment was not achieved in many areas. Khrushchev had grand hopes for the chemical industry and agriculture, but the targets for mineral fertilizers, synthetic fibers, and the grain harvest were all missed. Civilian investment rates fell, and national income (defined in Marxist concepts) was underfulfilled by four to seven percent. Gross production volume of producers goods did exceed the long-term plan, with an index (1959=100) of 196 achieved versus 185–188 planned, while consumer goods fell below it, 160 actual versus 162–165 planned.

The shortfalls can perhaps be explained by the strain of increased expenditures on space and military ventures in these years and the complexity of planning for more tasks. The continual *sovmarkhoz* (regional economic council) reorganizations, which put considerable strain on Gosplan to coordinate supplies, probably also had a negative impact on overall results.

See also: FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GOSPLAN

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

SEVEN YEARS' WAR

The Seven Years' War (1756–1763) involved nearly every European state and was watershed in world history. It arose as a result of the Anglo-French colonial rivalry and because of the growing might of Prussia in central Europe, which threatened the interests of Austria, France, and Russia. The out-

come ensured that England became the dominant power in North America, and the war consolidated the growing power and prestige of Frederick the Great's Prussia. For this, he could thank Russia and its bizarre participation in the war. Internally, Russian actions in the Seven Years' War also brought about a palace coup and the subsequent rule of Catherine II.

Prussia had emerged as a potential European power by the middle of the eighteenth century. Under Frederick II (r. 1740–1786), Prussian policies became increasingly ambitious. Frederick wanted to consolidate his power and territories gained at the expense of Austria during the 1840s. Austria, for its part, desired a return of territories such as Silesia. Russia and France also worried over Prussian power and potential incursions near their respective borders. When war broke out between France and England over their North American territories, Prussia signed an alliance with England in January 1756. The alliance brought a rapprochement between France and Austria. By the end of 1756, Russia signed a new alliance with its traditional ally, Austria. The sides had been drawn.

After war broke out in 1756 on the continent, Frederick's forces enjoyed success against the Austrians. By April 1756 the Prussians reached Prague. In the Bohemian capital the Austrians rallied, and Frederick's forces retreated. At that point Austria's allies, including Russia, entered the conflict. Despite the numbers stacked against him, Frederick continued to win surprising victories, and 1757 established his reputation as a brilliant commander.

The following year brought mixed results and mounting casualties for the Russians, who lost twelve thousand troops at August's Battle of Zorn-dorf. In 1759 the allies, and particularly Russia, ratcheted up the pressure. Led by General Pyotr Saltykov, the Russian army occupied Frankfurt in June 1759. By 1760 Frederick had only half the numbers of his Russian and Austrian opponents, who began to close the circle against Frederick. Russian commanders in particular focused on Berlin, and even occupied the Prussian capital for three days in September and October 1760. Exhausted by the continuous marching demanded of eighteenth-century warfare, the two sides fought no serious battles for the rest of 1760 and most of 1761. Frederick's situation, however, was grave. Russia and Austria could count on more soldiers and supplies, and Prussia was cut off from Silesia, a major supplier of food.

Then the situation changed dramatically. On January 5, 1762, the Empress Elizabeth died. Her successor, Peter III, was a fervent admirer of Frederick II and all things Prussian. When he took the throne, Peter ended the war with Prussia, called his troops back, and returned all territorial gains. As a result, Frederick recovered and defeated the Austrians. France, defeated in North America and more disinterested about the continental war, also signed a treaty with Prussia. Frederick's "miracle" had resulted from Russia's flip-flop, and his victory brought the first step toward Prussian domination of Germany.

At home, Peter III's decision ran counter to Russia's strategic and political interests. Contemporaries called the conflict the "Prussian War," and even popular prints of the time depicted the war as a struggle solely between Russia and Prussia. The decision to hand Frederick victory thus did not go over well within any segment of the population. Catherine, Peter's German wife, led a palace coup against her husband that toppled him from power on July 9, 1762. Catherine II's rise to power would have been inconceivable had it not been for Russia's participation in the war.

See also: AUSTRIA, RELATIONS WITH; CATHERINE II; ELIZABETH; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH; PETER III; PRUSSIA, RELATIONS WITH

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STEPHEN M. NORRIS

SHAHUMIAN, STEPAN GEORGIEVICH

(1878–1918), Bolshevik party activist and theorist on the nationality question; principal leader of the Bolsheviks in Baku during the Russian Revolution who perished as one of the famous Twenty-Six Baku Commissars.

Born into an Armenian family in Tiflis (Tbilisi), the young Shahumian was educated in local

schools before entering the Riga Polytechnic Institute in 1900. Active in Armenian student political circles, he turned toward Marxism in Riga. Expelled for his political activities, Shahumian continued his studies at the University of Berlin, where he joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RS-DRP). He grew close to Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks, translated the *Communist Manifesto* into Armenian, and was elected a delegate to the Fourth (Stockholm) and Fifth (London) Congresses of the RSDRP. Shahumian was active in the strike movement in Baku during the first Russian revolution (1905–1907) and throughout the years of reaction and repression of the labor movement, and was arrested and imprisoned several times. When the February Revolution broke out, he returned from exile in Astrakhan and assumed leadership of the Baku Bolsheviks.

Elected chairman of the Baku Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, Shahumian was the most important figure in Baku politics in 1917 and 1918. After the October Revolution, Lenin's government appointed him Extraordinary Commissar for the Affairs of the Caucasus. Shahumian headed the Council of People's Commissars, the de facto government of the Baku Commune, from April through July 1918. Although he was moderate in temperament and tolerant of diverse political parties, his brief tenure was marked by a brash attempt to expand Soviet power throughout the Caucasus by military means. As the Turkish army approached Baku, the soviet voted to invite Persia-based British forces to defend the city. Shahumian's government stepped down and soon was arrested. On September 20, 1918, anti-Bolsheviks brutally executed twenty-six commissars, among them Shahumian, in the deserts of Transcaspia (now Turkmenistan). The Soviet government blamed the British for their deaths and commemorated them as martyrs to the revolution. Reburied in a mass grave in Baku, they became the inspiration for paintings, songs, poems, and films. But with the fall of the Soviet Union, anticommunist Azerbaijanis disinterred their corpses and destroyed their monuments.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; BAKU; BOLSHEVISM; CAUCASUS; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY

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RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

SHAKHRAI, SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH

(b. 1956), lawyer and former minister of nationalities.

Sergei Shakhrai trained as a lawyer at Rostov State University and attained the rank of candidate of juridical sciences from Moscow State University (MGU) in 1982. He then taught law at MGU until 1990. Shakhrai was a Party member from 1988 to August 1991.

In 1990, Shakhrai was elected to the new RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, where he quickly became chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation. He simultaneously served Boris Yeltsin as a counselor for legal and nationalities affairs. In 1992 he was named a member of the Russian Federation Security Council and deputy chair responsible for nationality issues. During the November–December 1992 ethnic unrest in North Ossetia and Ingushetia, Shakhrai served as head of the temporary regional administration. A Terek Cossack, he also chaired the Russian parliamentary committee on the rehabilitation of the Cossacks. In November 1992, Shakhrai was appointed a deputy prime minister.

In legal matters, Shakhrai argued Yeltsin's case in the 1992 Constitutional Court hearings on the legality of the president's banning of the CPSU, a decree written by Shakhrai himself. He also served as Yeltsin's representative to the 1993 Duma commission drafting a new Russian constitution and negotiated many of the subsequent federal power-sharing treaties. Shakhrai became leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord in October 1993, running on their ticket in the December 1993 Duma election. However, he resigned from the party when the party joined the Our Home is Russia movement in August 1995.

Shakhrai was transferred from deputy prime minister to minister of nationalities and regional policy in January 1994. This move was soon overturned; by April he was reappointed deputy prime minister and in May removed as minister of nationalities. However, he continued to influence the decisions of his replacement, Nikolai Yegorov.

Shakhrai's work in law and nationality affairs combined in the issue of Chechnya. Despite Chechen president Dzhokar Dudayev's assertions otherwise, Shakhrai insisted that Chechnya remained an integral part of the Russian Federation. When Dudayev refused to ratify the new constitution, despite Shakhrai's repeated attempts at negotiation, he

provided the legal pretext for an invasion. Shakhrai and minister of defense Pavel Grachev convinced Yeltsin that an attack on Chechnya would be quick and painless; ultimately, the attack was launched in December 1994. Shakhrai's prediction proved false, however, as the first Russo-Chechen war lasted until August 1996.

Yeltsin summarily fired Shakhrai in June 1998, when the lawyer questioned the constitutionality of a possible third term as president for Yeltsin. However, Shakhrai was not unemployed for long. In October, prime minister Yevgeny Primakov appointed Shakhrai as his own legal advisor. Shakhrai also won a Duma seat for Perm oblast during the 1999 election. As of 2003 he was a member of the influential Russian Foreign and Defense Policy Council and was teaching at Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO).

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; PARTY OF RUSSIAN UNITY AND ACCORD

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

SHAKHTY TRIAL

This famous trial based on fabricated charges was used by Stalin to start a three-year attack on the technical intelligentsia of the USSR and to discredit moderates within the political leadership. Fifty-three mining engineers and technicians, including some top officials and three German engineers, were accused of acts of sabotage and treason dating back to the 1920s and taking part in a conspiracy directed from abroad (involving French



Courtroom scene from the Shakhty sabotage trial in 1928. © TASS/SOVFOTO

finance and Polish counterespionage). The story of conspiracy was fabricated by the Unified State Political Administration (OGPU) officials in the North Caucasus mining district known as the Donbass and focused on such acts as wasting capital, lowering the quality of production, raising its costs, mistreating workers, and other forms of "wrecking."

Held in a large auditorium at the House of Trade-Unions in Moscow, this six-week-long trial was arranged for maximum publicity, with movie cameras, a hundred journalists in attendance, and a different public audience each day. The presiding judge over the specially organized judicial presence was Andrei Vyshinsky, famous for his appearance as prosecutor at the major show trials of the 1930s; the prosecutor at the Shakhty trial was the Bolshevik jurist Nikolai Krylenko. For evidence, the prosecution relied on confessions of the accused, but twenty-three of the defendants proclaimed their innocence, and a few others retracted their confessions at trial. As a political show trial Shakhty was imperfect. Still, all but four of the accused were convicted, and five of them executed.

In the wake of the Shakhty trial, non-Marxist engineers and technicians were placed on the defensive and many fell victim to persecution. "Specialist baiting" ranged from verbal harassment to firing from jobs, not to speak of arrests and convictions in later trials, including the well-known "Industrial Party" case. By 1931, when Stalin called a halt to the anti-specialist campaign, Soviet engineers had been tamed and any nascent threat of technocracy defeated.

On the political level, the Shakhty trial served Stalin as a vehicle for radicalizing economic policy and sending a message of warning to moderates in the leadership (such as Alexei Rykov and Nikolai Bukharin). If nothing else, the persecution of the "bourgeois specialists" weakened one of the constituencies that supported a relatively cautious and moderate approach to industrialization. With hindsight it is clear that the Shakhty trial, along with the renewal of forced grain procurements, signaled the coming end of the class-conciliatory New Economic Policy and the start of a new period of class war that would culminate in the forced collectivization from 1929 to 1933. An important manifestation of the new class war was the Cultural Revolution from 1928 to 1931, in which young communists in many fields of art, science, and professional life were encouraged to attack and supplant their non-Marxist senior colleagues.

See also: SHOW TRIALS; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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PETER H. SOLOMON JR.

SHAMIL

(1797–1871), the most famous and successful anti-Russian Islamic resistance leader during the nineteenth century; lionized by Chechen and Dagestani nationalists and co-opted by Russian literature and the public consciousness as a sign of tsarist imperial expansion and the Russian mission in Asia.

Born in Gimri, modern Dagestan, Shamil demonstrated an early skill with weapons and horses. He entered a madrassah where he learned grammar, logic, rhetoric, and Arabic. There he joined the Murids, of the Naqshbandi-Khalidi Sufi order, in 1830. Following the transfer of Dagestan from Persia to the Russian Empire, Murids initiated a jihad against Russia under the leadership of Shamil's mentor, the first imam of Dagestan, Ghazi Muhammed. After his death and the brief leadership of Hamza Bek, Shamil became the third imam of Dagestan and declared it an independent state in 1834. His personal charisma, political acumen, state building, and military ability as well as his blending of an egalitarian interpretation of Shari'a (Islamic Law) with proclamations of jihad against the Russian advance made him a popular political and religious leader (even among the non-Muslims of the North Caucasus).

For twenty-five years (1834–1859), Shamil led raids on Russian positions in the Caucasus. He reached the peak of prestige in 1845 devastating the advance of Mikhail Vorontsov, who organized an army to complete the final conquest of the Caucasus. In these years of struggle, Shamil unified the disparate communities of the North Caucasus, built a state, organized a regular army, and completed the Islamicization of Dagestan and Chechnya. In

1857, the Russian Empire took a more aggressive stance; Generals Alexander Baryatinsky and Nikolai Evdokimov overwhelmed the weaker and exhausted forces of Shamil. By April 1859 his fortress at Vedeno fell and Shamil retreated to Mount Gunib. On September 6, 1859, Shamil surrendered to the Russians and the resistance movement never recovered. He was taken to St. Petersburg for an audience with Tsar Alexander II, paraded around Russia as a hero and menace, and then exiled to Kaluga. In March 1871 he died and was buried in Medina.

Drawing from the rich literary tradition of Alexander Pushkin, Mikhail Lermontov, and Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, Shamil emerged as a Caucasian hero of Russian Romanticism and a symbol of Russian expansion and its civilizing mission. Shamil was an international celebrity; his exploits serialized in numerous languages. Soviet historians initially lauded Shamil as a hero of a national liberation movement against tsarist imperialism; this became problematic when his name was linked with anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik opposition. Thus, Shamil was depicted by Soviet historians during the second half of the twentieth century as personally progressive while his movement was corrupted by anti-popular and religious elements.

See also: CAUCASUS; ISLAM; NATIONALISM IN THE TSARIST PERIOD

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MICHAEL ROULAND

SHAPOSHNIKOV, BORIS MIKHAILOVICH

(1882–1945), marshal (1940), general staff officer, military theorist, and chief of the Red Army General Staff.

Originally a career officer in tsarist service, Shaposhnikov graduated in 1910 from the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff, then served in Turkestan, where he possibly contracted malaria, and in the Warsaw Military District. He attained regimental command during World War I, joined the Red Army in 1918, and occupied high staff positions during the Russian civil war, usually as

planner or intelligence officer. He next served on the Worker's and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) staff, then from 1925 to 1928 commanded the Leningrad and Moscow military districts. From 1928 to 1931 he was RKKA chief of staff, followed by a tour as commander of the Volga Military District. From 1933 to 1935 he headed the Frunze Military Academy, after which he commanded the Leningrad Military District. From 1937 to 1940 he served as second chief of the newly created Red Army General Staff, followed by appointment after the Winter War (1939–1940) as deputy Defense Commissar. At the end of July 1941, despite ill health, he replaced Georgy Zhukov to serve as chief of the General Staff until May 1942. While recovering from either nervous exhaustion or malaria, he reverted to assignment as deputy defense commissar, followed in 1943–1945 by tenure as chief of the Academy of the General Staff.

An officer of intellect and experience, Shaposhnikov left his mark on nearly every important military organizational and doctrinal innovation of the 1920s and 1930s. His most important scholarly work was *Brain of the Army* (published in three volumes, 1927–1929), in which he studied the Austrian model of Conrad von Hoetzendorf and the tsarist experience in 1914 to argue for the creation of a modern Soviet general staff headed by an “integrated great captain.” The consummate general staff officer, Shaposhnikov was one of the few officers who enjoyed Josef Stalin's open respect, and nearly every subsequent chief of the Red Army/Soviet General Staff considered himself Shaposhnikov's disciple.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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BRUCE W. MENNING

SHATALIN, STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH

(1934–1997), Soviet economist; advocate of decentralization and market reforms.

Born in a family of upper-level functionaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Stanislav Shatalin graduated from the economics department of the Moscow State University and

entered academia in the era of the Thaw. In 1965 he joined an influential school of economists at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (TsEMI) who were developing and advocating the System of Optimal Functioning for the Economy (SOFE) based on mathematical modeling. He shared the highest-ranking State Award, served as deputy director of the All-Union Institute for Systems Studies and director of the Institute for Economic Forecasting that had separated from TsEMI, and became full member of the Academy of Sciences in 1987. In 1989 and 1990, he emerged as a key advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev and a rival to the government economic team of Leonid Abalkin, and was appointed to the Presidential Council. He coauthored the Five-Hundred-Day Plan, a reform program that was eventually declined by Gorbachev, partly because of its emphasis on the decentralization of the Union, but was widely acclaimed in the West. This program contained, albeit in a different sequence, the essential elements of the subsequent reforms of the 1990s (although some argue that the five hundred days was more gradual and mindful of the social consequences of drastic deregulation).

After briefly taking part in liberal politics, Shatalin established and chaired the Reforma Foundation. His twilight years were overshadowed by the Audit Chamber's inquiry into a mutually profitable relationship between a bank affiliated with his foundation and government managers of social security funds.

See also: FIVE-HUNDRED-DAY PLAN

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DMITRI GLINSKI

SHCHARANSKY, ANATOLY NIKOLAYEVICH

(b. 1948), prominent Jewish dissident.

Anatoly Shcharansky was arrested on March 15, 1977, after being denied permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union. A twenty-nine-year-

old computer expert at the time, Shcharansky had been a leading figure in the Helsinki Group, the oldest human rights organization in the Soviet Union, founded by Yuri F. Orlov on May 12, 1976, for the purpose of upholding the USSR's responsibility to implement the Helsinki commitments. The Helsinki Agreement had been promulgated a year earlier (August 1975), its text published in full in both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. The formation of the Moscow Helsinki Group sparked the creation of several human rights organizations throughout the Soviet Union. Shcharansky was a founding member of the group, along with Yelena Bonner (Andrei Sakharov's wife), Anatoly Marchenko, Ludmilla M. Alexeyeva, and others. In the first three years of the group's work, nearly all of its members were arrested or sentenced to psychiatric hospitalization as a way to repress their activities.

Shcharansky's arrest was part of a Soviet campaign against dissidents begun in February 1977. Others were arrested before him: Alexander Ginsburg (February 4), Ukrainian dissidents Mikola Rudenko and Olexy Tikhy (February 7), and Yuri Orlov (February 10). In June 1977, Shcharansky was charged with treason, specifically with accepting CIA funds to create dissension in the Soviet Union. After a perfunctory trial, he was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. He was finally released in February 1986, when he and four other prisoners were exchanged for four Soviet spies who had been held in the West. Shcharansky finally emigrated to Israel, where he first changed his name to Natan Shcharan before settling on Natan Shcharansky. He is active in Israeli politics.

See also: JEWS; REFUSENIKS

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

SHCHEPKIN, MIKHAIL SEMEONOVICH

(1788–1863), an actor from the serf estate who revolutionized acting styles with his realistic portrayals.

Born in Ukraine into a family owned by Count G. S. Volkenshtein, the young Mikhail Shchepkin began performing in the private theater maintained on the estate. Indeed, many nobles used their serfs' skills for entertainment, and Shchepkin represented an important source of talent for the professional stage. Especially gifted, by 1800 he was allowed to participate in amateur productions in nearby Kursk. Though still a serf, he joined several provincial touring companies as he rose to stardom. Finally, in 1822, one of his noble fans, Prince N. G. Repin, persuaded his owner to free him. Later that year Shchepkin made his debut in Moscow, and in 1824 he began his legendary rule at the imperial Maly Theater, where he dominated in comedy and drama, including William Shakespeare's corpus, for the next forty years. From his theatrical base in Moscow, he also toured the provinces and appeared on St. Petersburg's imperial stage.

Shchepkin's artistic significance lies in his influence over the transformation of acting styles, developing multi-dimensional characters instead of simulating the single stereotype. His breakthrough came in 1830, in his characterization of the fatuous Muscovite nobleman Famusov in Alexander Griboyedov's *Woe from Wit*. Six years later, Shchepkin's rendition of Khlestakov, the petty bureaucrat mistakenly identified by corrupt provincial officials as one of the tsar's investigators in Nikolai Gogol's *The Inspector General*, assured the move toward realism.

His great talent, and popularity on stage, gave him access to Russia's highest literary circles, where he helped novelist Ivan Turgenev write for the stage. Ironically, though, he surrendered his place at center stage when he refused to modify his style to accommodate the next level of realism, plays written in colloquialisms by Russia's historically most popular playwright Alexander Ostrovsky from the 1860s.

See also: THEATER

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LOUISE McREYNOLDS

SHCHERBATOV, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH

(1733–1790), historian, publicist, and government servitor.

Mikhail Mikhailovich Shcherbatov was a scion of one of Russia's oldest families of the nobility. His father-in-law, Prince Ivan Shcherbatov (1696–1761), was Russian minister to the court of St. James from 1739 to 1742, and from 1743 to 1746. Upon retirement from military service in 1762 following Peter III's Manifesto on the Freedom of the Nobility, Mikhail Shcherbatov went on to serve as a deputy to Catherine II's Legislative Commission (1766–1767), and then as Russia's official historiographer, beginning in 1768.

Shcherbatov is perhaps best known for his publication *On the Corruption of Morals in Russia* (*O Povrezhdenii Nravov v Rossii*), in which he criticizes Peter the Great's introduction of the Table of Ranks (1722). He argued that the rank system reduced the prestige of the old nobility and allowed the rise of a mediocre and materialistic class of servitors. "By the regulations of the military service, which Peter the Great had newly introduced," he wrote, "the peasants began with their masters at the same stage as soldiers of the rank and file: It was not uncommon for the peasants, by the law of seniority, to reach the grade of officer long before their masters, whom, as their inferiors, they frequently beat with sticks. Noble families were so scattered in the service that often one did not come again in contact with his relatives during his whole lifetime." Shcherbatov believed in the innate inequality of human beings and genetic superiority of the noble aristocracy. He lamented the decline of the pre-Petrine nobility's influence during the eighteenth century, because he did not believe one could achieve the genetic superiority of the latter by meritorious service alone. While he did advocate a constitutional form of government, he urged that Russia be ruled by a hereditary monarch, who would be constrained only by a constitution and checked only by a Senate composed of the old nobility with extensive financial, judicial, and executive powers.

See also: KULTURNOST; TABLE OF RANKS

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD AMVROSIEVICH

(b. 1928), foreign minister coincident with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Eduard Shevardnadze was minister of internal affairs of the Georgian Republic from 1965 to 1972, first secretary of the republic from 1972 to 1985, foreign minister of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1990 and again in 1991, and president of the Republic of Georgia from 1992 onward.

Until 1985, Eduard Shevardnadze's career had been entirely within the Soviet republic of Georgia. The character traits he brought with him from Georgia would serve him well during his years as foreign minister. He was a man of considerable vi-



As foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze implemented Gorbachev's "new thinking" in international relations. ARCHIVE

PHOTOS, INC. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

sion, with a strong sense of purpose. He was also a superb politician—opportunistic, flexible, pragmatic, and ruthless. He was a natural actor, as every great politician must be, and he was a man of action, a problem-solver impatient with obstacles, and a brutal political infighter. Perhaps most important, he was a Georgian with cosmopolitan leanings, not a Russian who distrusted the West.

Shevardnadze used the available instruments of power to advance his career and further his policy objectives in Georgia at the outset of his career. He repressed dissidents and removed real and potential opponents. An outstanding Soviet apparatchik, he acted the role of sycophant to the leaders of the Soviet Union, extolling the virtues of those in a position to help him. But he brought to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow a commitment to radical change, a willingness to implement reform in an unorthodox manner, and the political skills and strength to accomplish his goals.

When Shevardnadze was appointed foreign minister of the Soviet Union in 1985, it was widely assumed that he would be little more than a mouthpiece for Mikhail Gorbachev, who would conduct his own foreign policy. In turning to a regional party leader with no foreign-policy background, however, Gorbachev was relying on personal instinct and political acumen. As party leader in Georgia during the 1970s and early 1980s, Shevardnadze battled corruption and introduced the most liberal political and economic reforms of any Soviet regional leader. Gorbachev's long association with Shevardnadze was rooted in shared frustration with the inefficiencies and corruption of the communist system, and he believed that his friend had the understanding and political skills necessary to formulate and implement a new foreign policy.

Shevardnadze played a critical role in conceptualizing and implementing the Soviet Union's dramatic about-face during the 1980s. Considered the moral force behind "new political thinking" in the former Soviet Union, Shevardnadze was the point man in the struggle to undermine the forces of inertia at home and to end Moscow's isolation abroad. Two U.S. secretaries of state, George Shultz and James Baker, have credited him with convincing them that Moscow was committed to serious negotiations with the United States. Each became a proponent of reconciliation in administrations that were intensely anti-Soviet; each concluded that the history of Soviet-U.S. relations and the end of the Cold War would have been far different had it not been for Shevardnadze.

Commitment to the nonuse of force became Shevardnadze's most important contribution to the end of communism and the Cold War, permitting the virtually nonviolent demise of the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself. Shevardnadze was more adamant on this issue than was Gorbachev; he opposed the use of force in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 1989 and in the Baltics in 1990. Shevardnadze recognized from his Georgian experience that the use of force against non-Russian minorities would be counterproductive, and particularly opposed Gorbachev's reliance on the military. Shevardnadze resigned as foreign minister because of Gorbachev's turn to the political right wing and, during his resignation speech in December 1990, he predicted that the use of force would undermine perestroika. The violence in Lithuania and Latvia three weeks later, condoned by Gorbachev, proved him right.

When Shevardnadze returned to Georgia, he initially ruled by emergency decree, without the legitimacy of law and with the support of corrupt and brutal paramilitary forces. Finally elected Georgia's second president in 1995 (and reelected in 2000), he embarked on another campaign to rid Georgia of corruption, reform the economy, and restore political stability.

In 1992 Shevardnadze returned to an independent Georgia that was far worse off than when he had departed for Moscow nearly seven years earlier. His predecessor, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, an ultra-nationalist who was both inept and corrupt, used his office to restrict civil liberties and to accumulate great personal wealth. Civil strife was destroying the country, and the economy was in ruins. As the head of the state, Shevardnadze was forced to pursue a humiliating course, taking Georgia into the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States in 1993 and requesting a Russian military presence in western Georgia to counter secessionist forces in Abkhazia. Just as he had been accused of favoring Western interests when he was Soviet foreign minister, now he was charged with betraying Georgian interests as chairman of his ancestral homeland.

Shevardnadze survived at least two well-organized assassination attempts in 1995 and 1998 as well as bloody conflicts with ethnic separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian wars in nearby Chechnya led to increased pressure on his government from Moscow and a greater Russian presence along Georgia's borders. Increased Russian involvement in the Caucasus, instability in Central Asia, and weak neighboring

governments in Armenia and Azerbaijan added to the pressures on Shevardnadze. Numerous scandals within the Georgian military weakened national security and gave Russian forces greater opportunities to penetrate the Georgian military. Increased U.S. involvement in Central Asia because of the war against terrorism, the Russian interest in the Caucasus because of the war in Chechnya, and the overall political and military weakness of the states of the Caucasus had the potential to contribute to Shevardnadze's vulnerability.

Shevardnadze, who could have retired from public life in 1991 as an honored statesman, engaged in yet another battle, this time to keep his country from self-destruction. The opposition of high-ranking Russian general officers, who blamed Shevardnadze for the demilitarization and breakup of the Soviet Union, were likely to contribute to the discontinuity of his government in Tbilisi. Unlike Gorbachev, who turned to writing books and delivering lectures, Shevardnadze chose a different path—one that nearly cost him his life on more than one occasion. With its breathtakingly beautiful Black Sea coast, mountains, ancient culture, rich agricultural land, and energetic people, Georgia could certainly emerge as a peaceful and prosperous modern state, and Shevardnadze's first priority was to advance the country toward that goal.

See also: GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS

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MELVIN GOODMAN

SHEVCHENKO, TARAS GREGOREVICH

(1814–1861), Ukraine's national poet.

Born a serf, Taras Shevchenko was orphaned early in life. His owner noticed his artistic ability

while he was serving as a houseboy and apprenticed him to an icon and mural painter. In 1838 some Russian and Ukrainian intellectuals in St. Petersburg organized a lottery and used the proceeds to buy his freedom. Afterwards, Shevchenko studied under Karl Briullov at the Academy of Fine Arts, graduating in 1845. While still a student, he published a short collection of romantic poems, *Kobzar* (*The Bard*, 1840), that established his reputation as a poet. His early folklorism and idealization of the Cossacks soon gave way to poetry of social critique that prophesied rebellion. Shevchenko's poems of the 1840s denounced serfdom and the Russian autocracy and celebrated Slavic brotherhood. In 1847 he was arrested in Kiev on the charge of belonging to the secret Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. A search by the gendarmes discovered his satirical poems, including an unflattering portrayal of Nicholas I and his wife, and in consequence the tsar sentenced Shevchenko to military service in Central Asia, adding a special prohibition on writing and painting. Following his release in 1857, Shevchenko was not permitted to reside in Ukraine. He settled in St. Petersburg, where he died in 1861.

Shevchenko was a realist artist of note. Even during his lifetime, his contribution to the development of modern Ukrainian culture and national consciousness earned him the reputation of Ukraine's "national bard." His sophisticated poetical works transformed folk idioms into a modern literary product, while his vision of popular justice and democracy influenced generations of Ukrainian activists. After Shevchenko's death, Ukrainian patriots transferred his remains to Chernecha Hill near Kaniv, in Ukraine, which immediately became a place of pilgrimage. The cult of Shevchenko continued to grow in Ukraine during the twentieth century, for patriots viewed him as a symbol of national culture and statehood. In the eyes of the communists, however, Shevchenko was a symbol of social liberation and friendship with Russia. In post-Soviet Ukraine Shevchenko is the most revered figure in the pantheon of the nation's "founding fathers."

See also: CYRIL AND METHODIUS SOCIETY; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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SERHY YEKELCHYK

SHLYAPNIKOV, ALEXANDER GAVRILOVICH

(1885–1937), highly skilled metalworker, trade union leader, and revolutionary.

Alexander Shlyapnikov, an ethnic Russian from the town of Murom in central Russia, joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1902 and became a Bolshevik in 1903; he was imprisoned in 1904 and 1905–1907. From 1908 to 1916 he lived in Western Europe. During World War I, Shlyapnikov organized a route through Scandinavia into Russia for smuggling illegal Marxist literature and Bolshevik correspondence.

In February 1917 Shlyapnikov led the Bolshevik Party organization in Petrograd and became a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Subsequently Shlyapnikov became chairman of the All-Russian Metalworkers' Union (1917–1921). He became commissar of labor (1917–1918) after the October 1917 Revolution. During the Russian civil war, Shlyapnikov was chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caspian-Caucasian Front (1918–1919).

From 1919 to 1921 Shlyapnikov led the Workers' Opposition and advocated the role of unionized workers in directing and organizing the economy. Shlyapnikov continued to criticize Soviet economic policy and treatment of workers throughout the 1920s. In 1933 he was purged from the Communist Party. In 1935 he was arrested on false charges, imprisoned, and sent into internal exile. In 1936 he was arrested again. In September 1937, in a closed session, the Military College of the USSR Supreme Court found Shlyapnikov guilty of terrorist activities, based on false testimony from compromised witnesses, and ordered his execution. Shlyapnikov was rehabilitated of criminal charges in 1963 and restored to membership in the Communist Party in 1988.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY; WORKERS' OPPOSITION

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BARBARA ALLEN

SHOCK THERAPY

The term *shock therapy* has come to arouse a great deal of controversy. Its original use was related to the use of electrical shocks as therapy in psychiatric treatment. In economic policy, it has been used to describe powerful austerity measures designed to break spirals of very rapid inflation. More recently, it has been used as a blanket term for policies designed to reform the postsocialist economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The latter also is where the main controversies have arisen.

The divergence of opinion concerning reform policy can be attributed in large part to the disparate nature of the tasks involved. Setting out to break inflation is different from seeking to undertake a broad socioeconomic transformation from failed centrally planned economies into functioning market economies. Above all, the political implications are very different.

In a first stage, beginning after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, postsocialist governments in Central Europe embarked on economic reform programs that featured rapid liberalization and broad-based privatization. It has been held by some that those who succeeded did so because they applied shock therapy. Others, notably so people from the region, have rejected such claims, arguing that foreign advice had little to do with their achievements.

The main test of shock therapy came in the first half of 1992, when the Russian government of Yegor Gaidar sought to implement rapid and radical systemic change. The bulk of all prices were liberalized and state owned enterprises were informed that their life support systems, in the form of direct financial links to the state budget, would be terminated.

It was believed that this "shock" to the system also would bring a form of therapy in its wake. As enterprise managers realized that they could no longer count on automatic subsidies from the state

budget, they would be forced into producing goods that could be sold on real markets, at prices that would cover their costs. It was expected that within a period of one-half of one year or so the transition should be completed. From there on the Russian economy would be growing at a healthy pace, and no more foreign economic support would be needed.

By the summer of 1992 it became painfully evident that the project was failing. Enterprises had responded to the government's austerity measures not by cultivating markets, but by developing a subsequently chronic practice of non-payments. Losses of government subsidies were met by reduced payments on due taxes and wages. Failures to receive payments from customers were met by refusals to pay suppliers. Reduced government orders were met by reductions in output, but could not result in closures since there was no bankruptcy law.

It was also clear that the associated ambitions of bringing stability to government finance had met with equal disaster. Inflation was spiraling out of control, ending up at well more than 2,000 percent for the year as a whole, and persistent deficits in the state budget would come to haunt the government for several years to come.

Ten years later the evidence remains fairly bleak. Between 1991 and 1998, the Russian economy lost around 40 percent of GDP and more than 80 percent of capital investment. There was mass impoverishment of the population, serious decay of the country's infrastructure, and a general widening of the technology gap against the industrialized world. In August 1998, a brewing financial crisis produced a massive crash, leaving investors with tens of billions of dollars in losses.

In the policy debates that surrounded the initial failures of rapid systemic change, two different sides emerged. One side, representing many market analysts, argued that the reason behind the initial failures was linked to insufficient shock. In their view, the crash of 1998 actually was a good thing, laying the groundwork for the economic upturn in 2000 and 2001.

The other side, representing mainly non-economists and a minority of uninvolved academic economists, held that the policy of shock therapy as such has been at fault, and that a set of alternative policies would have allowed much of the destruction to be avoided. Today it would seem fair to say that the latter represents the majority view.

See also: ECONOMY, CURRENT; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; PRIVATIZATION; YELTSIN, BORIS.

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STEFAN HEDLUND

SHOCKWORKERS

Shockworkers (*udarniki*), a term originating during the Russian Civil War to designate workers performing especially arduous or urgent tasks, reemerged during the late 1920s and was applied thereafter to all workers and employees who assumed and fulfilled obligations over and above their work assignments. The rise of the Stakhanovite movement in 1935 reduced the prestige of the shockworker title, and it all but disappeared during the late 1940s and early 1950s, only to resurface again under the guise of shockworkers of Communist labor. From about ten million in 1966, the number of such workers increased to 17.9 million in 1971 and twenty-four million (or twenty-six percent of all wage and salary workers) by 1975.

The checkered history of shockwork in the USSR faithfully mirrors changing approaches by the Communist Party to the task of mobilizing workers and stimulating their commitment to raising labor productivity. If during the Civil War it was associated with voluntary Communist Saturdays (*subbotniki*), then during the late 1920s it arose primarily among young industrial workers who were eager to demonstrate their skills on new equipment and methods of production. From 1929 onward, shockwork invariably was linked with socialist competitions in which brigades of workers overfulfilling production quotas or meeting other obligations assumed in competition agreements were rewarded with prizes and privileged access to scarce goods and services.

But as the number of shockworkers increased to slightly more than forty percent of all industrial workers, the value of the title became debased. Moreover, the brief period of extra physical exer-

tion (known as "storming") associated with shockwork was ill suited to complex and interrelated production processes. Shockwork became a regular feature of Soviet industrial and agricultural life in the post-Stalin era as a result of the responsibility placed on lower-level trade union, Komsomol, and party officials to exercise leadership and record progress along bureaucratically predetermined lines. Workers seeking to extract favors from these organizations or demonstrate their suitability for promotion into their ranks went along with the game.

See also: INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET; STAKHANOVITE MOVEMENT; SUBBOTNIK

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LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM

SHOLOKHOV, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH

(1905–1984), Russian writer and Soviet loyalist who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1965.

Mikhail Sholokhov was born in the Don Cossack military region in 1905. During the civil war he joined the Bolsheviks, twice being on the verge of execution for his views. In 1922 he moved to Moscow to pursue a career as a writer. In 1924 he published his first short story and then published regularly throughout the 1920s. After 1924 he moved back to the Cossack regions to remain close to his stories.

The first volume of his most important work, the *Quiet Flows the Don* (*Tikhii Don*, 1928–1940) was published in 1928. It is a portrayal of the struggles of the Don Cossacks against the Red army in Southern Russia, and is noted for its objectivity and lack of positive Bolshevik characters. The work was an instant success. Sholokhov would publish three more volumes in the course of his lifetime. This work has been tainted by unsubstantiated claims of plagiarism.

His second major novel was the story of the triumph of collectivization in the early 1930s, entitled *Virgin Soil Uplifted* (*Podnyataya tselina*, 1932–1960). This work was trumpeted as one of the masterpieces of Socialist Realism.

Sholokhov joined the Communist Party in 1932 and was a loyal adherent to the party line for the rest of his life, though outspoken in his criticism of the quality of Soviet writing.

He was one of the most honored authors of the Soviet period. His short stories and novels were published in massive editions. He was a member of the Supreme Soviet and Central Committee, awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, and won both the Lenin and Stalin Prizes. He was acknowledged for his writing in the West as well, receiving the Nobel Prize of literature in 1965 for *Tikhii Don*.

See also: SOCIALIST REALISM

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KARL E. LOEWENSTEIN

SHORT COURSE

The central text of the Josef Stalin-era party catechism, *The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*—*Short Course* was compulsory reading for Soviet citizens of all walks of life between 1938 and 1956. This textbook traced the origins of the Russian revolutionary movement to tsarist industrialization efforts after 1861. Early agrarian populists gave way during the 1880s to Marxist Social Democrats, who acted in the name of the nascent working class. By the mid-1890s, Vladimir Ilich Lenin had emerged to guide this movement through police persecution and internal division (versus the Mensheviks, “Legal Marxists,” and Economists); his leadership allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power in 1917. Subsequently, Lenin plotted a course through civil war and foreign intervention toward the construction of a socialist economy. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin navigated the USSR successfully through shock industrialization, agricultural collectivization, and the defense of the revolution’s gains against internal and external enemies. All but several sections on dialectical materialism were actually drafted by E. M. Yaroslavsky, P. N. Pospelov,

and V. G. Knorin before being edited for publication by Stalin and members of his entourage.

A seminal text, the *Short Course* epitomized a belief held by Soviet authorities after the early 1930s that history ought to play a fundamental role in party indoctrination efforts. This was signaled by a letter Stalin wrote to the journal *Proletarskaya revolyutsia (Proletarian Revolution)* in 1931 in which he denounced party historians for daring to question even minor aspects of Lenin’s leadership. Party historians floundered in the wake of this scandal, forcing Soviet authorities to clarify the party’s new expectations on “the historical front.” Existing party histories were too inaccessible and insufficiently inspiring for what was still a poorly educated society. A long-standing focus on anonymous social forces and abstract materialist analysis was to be replaced by a new emphasis on heroic individuals, pivotal events, and the connection of party history to that of Soviet society as a whole. These demands reflected the Soviet leadership’s intention to treat both party and state history as motivational propaganda.

Editorial brigades under Yaroslavsky, Knorin, P. P. Popov, Lavrenti Beria, and others struggled to address these new demands, although the situation was complicated by the Great Terror. Repeated exposure of traitors within the Soviet elite between 1936 and 1938 made it difficult to write a stable narrative about the party. A lack of progress led the party leadership to ask Yaroslavsky, Pospelov, and Knorin to combine forces on a single advanced text. Knorin’s arrest during the summer of 1937, however, forced Yaroslavsky and Pospelov to focus exclusively on the jointly authored manuscript, redrafting it under the supervision of Stalin, Andrei Zhdanov, and Vyacheslav Molotov.

Released in the fall of 1938, the *Short Course* was hailed as an ideological breakthrough that succeeded in situating party history within a broader Russo-Soviet historical context. Moreover, its tight focus on Lenin and Stalin ensured that the text would survive future purges (although at the cost of conflating party history with the cult of personality). Ubiquitous after the printing of more than forty-two million copies, the *Short Course* reigned over party educational efforts for eighteen years, authoritative until Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and the personality cult in 1956.

See also: STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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DAVID BRANDENBERGER

SHOSTAKOVICH, DMITRI DMITRIEVICH

(1906–1975), highly controversial composer, at the same time outstanding musical representative of the Soviet Union and tragic figure in tension between acceptance and rejection of his music by the Soviet regime.

Dmitry Shostakovich's acculturation and his musical training at the Petrograd, then Leningrad, conservatory took place in the new Soviet state. Overnight Shostakovich rose to fame with a rousing performance of his first symphony in 1926. He was seen as a beacon of hope in Soviet music. The young composer succeeded in fulfilling the high-flying expectations in the following years. Overwhelming applause was given to the opera *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk District* (1934). This coarsely realistic work based on a novel by Nikolay Leskov was celebrated as a first milestone in the development of a genuine Soviet musical theatre. In 1936, however, a devastating review based on ideological criteria was published in *Pravda*. Shostakovich was caught—after Josef Stalin had watched the opera with greatest displeasure—in the trap of the aggressive, intrigue-dominated cultural policy. The composer was branded in public as aesthetizing formalist and his work as extreme left abnormality. These typical expressions of Soviet politico-cultural discourse meant that his music was too dissonant and complicated for Party taste. Ensuing condemnations not only by the officialdom but even by previously enthusiastic fellow composers greatly worried Shostakovich, as did the arrest and execution of his friend and patron Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the course of the Great Terror in 1937. Nonetheless, during the same year he managed to rehabilitate himself with his fifth symphony. In fact, the work signals a clear stylistic turn to a more moderate musical language, but to attribute this exclusively to political pressure seems misguided. Previous works indicate a break with aesthetic radicalism; moreover, Shostakovich practiced all his life through diverse styles of composi-

tion. He even wrote operetta-like light music, which cannot be dismissed simply as reluctantly performed commissioned work. From the end of the 1930s, however, Shostakovich successfully developed forms of musical expression that realized his aesthetical ideas and at the same time met the demands of Socialist Realism for comprehensibility and popular appeal. His individuality and heterogeneity, his inclination toward the grotesque and sarcasm, and the profound seriousness and expressiveness of his works left the audience fascinated, but again and again provoked conflicts with the official state organs. In spite of vehement accusations in 1948, he soon was integrated again into the Soviet music elite, but only the Thaw following Stalin's death made general conditions more favorable for the composer and his oeuvre. During his last two decades he could act as a respected personality of Soviet cultural life.

Shostakovich and his work have been highly disputed and exposed to ideologically charged interpretations. Shostakovich was seen as a faithful communist, an opportunistic conformist, a secret dissident, or an oppressed genius. In any case, he was a Soviet citizen, who, like many others, stood by his home country but also got in trouble with its officials. Regardless of all political factors, he was one of the outstanding composers of the Soviet Union and perhaps the last great symphonist of music history.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION; MUSIC; PURGES, THE GREAT; THAW, THE

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MATTHIAS STADELMANN

SHOW TRIALS

Staged trials of opponents of the Soviet regime held in Moscow between 1936 and 1938.

The most visible aspect of Josef Stalin's Great Purges was a series of three Moscow show trials

staged in August 1936, January 1937, and March 1938. Former leading members of the Bolshevik Party were put on trial for treason and generally confessed, often after being physically tortured, to participation in elaborate terrorist conspiracies against the Soviet state, ranking officials of the Communist Party, and Stalin personally. The trials were carefully staged and scripted, covered in the national and international press, and intended to justify in public the purges of the Party and the state apparatus that Stalin was implementing in 1937 and 1938.

The sixteen defendants at the first trial, including Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev, described by the prosecutors as the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center," were charged with plotting to kill Stalin and several of his top lieutenants, including Sergei Kirov, who had been assassinated in 1934, very likely on Stalin's orders. All sixteen were found guilty and shot within twenty-four hours of the verdict.

The defendants at the second trial, including Yuri Piatakov, Karl Radek, and fifteen other prominent Old Bolsheviks, termed the "Parallel Center" by the prosecutors, were charged with plotting terrorist acts and engaging in active espionage in the service of Japan and Nazi Germany. Thirteen of the defendants were shot.

The final and most important of the three trials included several of the most prominent members of the Bolshevik old guard: Nikolai Bukharin, Politburo member and chief theorist of the NEP; Alexei Rykov, chair of the Council of People's Commissars; and Genrikh Yagoda, head of the Secret Police (NKVD) until 1936. The twenty-two defendants in this trial, members of a putative Anti-Soviet Right-Trotskyite Bloc, confessed under extreme physical pressure to terrorism, conspiracy to kill Party leaders, espionage, the murder of Maxim Gorky, and the attempted murder of Vladimir Lenin in 1918, among other crimes. Bukharin, the most important defendant, accepted responsibility for all the crimes named in the indictment but refused to confess to specific criminal actions; nonetheless, he was sentenced to death along with eighteen of the other defendants. Stalin and his secret police tightly controlled all three trials from behind the scenes; the outcome was preordained.

The term *show trials* usually refers to the Moscow trials, but it can also denote the numerous other trials staged throughout the USSR in 1937 and 1938, under orders from Stalin and the

Politburo. The Bolsheviks organized these provincial show trials, at least seventy of which were approved by the Politburo, to show the people that saboteurs, "wreckers," and traitors were a threat even at the local level.

Finally, the term can also describe any number of staged political trials held throughout the early Soviet period, especially between 1921 and 1924 and again from 1928 to 1933, such as the Industrial Party trial of 1930, in which eight prominent technical and engineering specialists were accused of sabotage and espionage and were sentenced to terms in prison.

See also: GREAT PURGES, THE; GULAG; STALIN, JOSEF VISARIONOVICH

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PAUL M. HAGENLOH

SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH

(1552–1612), tsar of Russia (1606–1610).

Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky was a descendant of one of the oldest and most illustrious princely families of Russia. His uncle, Ivan Petrovich Shuisky, was one of the regents of the mentally retarded Tsar Fyodor I, and Vasily became a boyar at Fyodor's court. During the late 1580s, Boris Godunov (Tsar Fyodor's brother-in-law) managed to become sole regent, and Shuisky clan members were banished from Moscow; some of them died mysteriously while in exile. By 1591, however, Vasily and his three younger brothers (sons of Ivan Andreyevich Shuisky) were back in the capital, where Vasily became the leader of the family and resumed his place in the boyar council. When Dmitry of Uglich (Tsar Ivan IV's youngest son) died mysteriously in 1591, Vasily Shuisky was chosen to lead the investigation; he concluded that the boy accidentally killed himself.

Upon the death of Tsar Fyodor in 1598, Shuisky made no attempt to prevent Boris Godunov from becoming tsar; nevertheless, Tsar Boris feared and persecuted the Shuisky clan. During False Dmitry's invasion of Russia, however, Tsar Boris turned to Vasily Shuisky for help. In January 1605 Shuisky took command of the tsar's army fighting against False Dmitry and defeated Dmitry's forces at the battle of Dobrynichi. Shuisky then waged a terror campaign against the population of southwestern Russia that had sided with False Dmitry. In the meantime, the rebellion in the name of the true tsar spread like wildfire. After Tsar Boris's death in April 1605, Shuisky was recalled to Moscow by Tsar Fyodor II, and he did not participate in the rebellions that overthrew the Godunov dynasty.

At the outset of Tsar Dmitry's reign, Shuisky was convicted of treason but was only briefly exiled. Back in Moscow, he secretly plotted to overthrow Tsar Dmitry, claiming that Dmitry was an impostor named Grigory Otrepev. During the celebration of Tsar Dmitry's wedding to the Polish Princess Marina Mniszech in May 1606, Shuisky created a diversion while his henchmen killed the tsar. Shuisky managed to seize power, but many Russians were unwilling to accept the usurper Tsar Vasily IV. His enemies circulated rumors that Tsar Dmitry had survived the assassination attempt and would soon return to punish the traitors. Within a few weeks, Tsar Vasily was confronted by a powerful civil war that spread from southwestern Russia to over half the country. In the fall of 1606, rebel forces under Ivan Bolotnikov besieged Moscow and nearly toppled Shuisky. Tsar Vasily's armies drove the rebels back and eventually defeated Bolotnikov in late 1607, but by then another rebel army supporting the second false Dmitry challenged Shuisky's weak grip on the country. For many months Russia had two tsars and two capitals, and chaos reigned throughout the land. In desperation, Tsar Vasily eventually turned to Sweden for support. In 1609 King Karl IX sent military forces into Russia to aid Shuisky and seize territory. That prompted Polish military intervention, and in June 1610 Tsar Vasily's army was crushed by Polish forces at the battle of Klushino. In Moscow a rebellion of aristocrats (including the Romanovs) toppled Tsar Vasily, forcing him to become a monk. Soon Moscow opened its gates to the Polish army, and Shuisky was shipped off to Poland, where he was imprisoned and died in September 1612.

See also: BOLOTNIKOV, IVAN ISAYEVICH; DMITRY, FALSE; FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH; MNISZECH, MARINA; TIME OF TROUBLES

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CHESTER S. L. DUNNING

SHUMEIKO, VLADIMIR FILIPPOVICH

(b. 1945), Russian legislator.

Vladimir Shumeiko graduated from Rostov Polytechnical Institute with an engineering degree in 1972. He made his early career as an engineer in Krasnodar. After working at the Krasnodar Electrical Measurement Instruments Factory (1963–1970), he moved to the All-Union Research Electrical Measurement Instruments Institute (1970–1985), then returned to Krasnodar as head of the electrical instruments production association.

Shumeiko's political career began in 1990, when he was elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. He followed that victory with a seat in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Also in 1990, he was named deputy chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Economic and Property Reform. As "shock therapy" reforms unfolded, Boris Yeltsin brought several industrial directors into his government. Shumeiko, president of the Confederation of Associations of Entrepreneurs, was appointed first deputy prime minister in June 1992; in December the new prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin reappointed him as first deputy chair.

In the fall of 1993, the Supreme Soviet began investigating several members of Yeltsin's cabinet for corruption, including Shumeiko. He briefly resigned from the government on September 1 and

joined Yeltsin in plotting what to do with the recalcitrant legislature. Shumeiko returned to the government on September 22, after Yeltsin's order to dissolve parliament. The next month, Yeltsin named him Minister of Press and Information.

Shumeiko switched to the newly created Federation Council, becoming chair of that house in January 1994, a post that also gave him a seat on the Russian Security Council. He formed his own political movement, Reforms—New Course, in December 1994. Shumeiko lost his seat in January 1996, when Yeltsin changed the basis of membership in the Federation Council. Since then, Shumeiko has unsuccessfully tried to return to a legislative office. As of 2003 he was chairman of the petroleum company Evikhon.

See also: YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

ANN E. ROBERTSON

SIBERIA

Often called the "Wild East," beautiful but austere, Siberia is one of the least populated places on earth. Western Siberia is the world's largest and flattest plain, across which tributaries of the Ob and Irtysh rivers wend their way north to the Arctic Ocean. This orientation means that in spring the mouths of the rivers are yet frozen while their upper reaches thaw, creating the world's largest peat bog in the middle of the plain; thus, the lowland is arable only in the extreme south. Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East tend to be rugged and mountainous, with thin soils at best. Beneath this chiefly soil-less veneer lies some of the world's oldest rock. Higher mountains and active volcanoes rise along the easternmost edge, where the Pacific Ocean plate subducts beneath Asia. Here also the majority of the rivers drain northward, perpendicular to the main east-west axis of settlement. Only along the Pacific seaboard do the rivers flow east, the longest of which is the Amur, which, together with its tributaries, forms the boundary between China and Russia. On the border between Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, the region boasts the world's oldest and deepest lake, Baikal. Including some of the purest water on earth, Lake Baikal holds more than twenty percent of the globe's freshwater resources.

Human settlement resembles a mostly urban, beaded archipelago strung along the Trans-Siberian

Railroad from the Urals cities of Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg to Vladivostok, 4,000 miles away in the east. In between, rest the large cities of Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk. Novosibirsk, which means "New Siberia," is largest of all with 1.5 million people.

The densest settlement pattern conforms to Siberia's least severe climates, which align themselves in parallel belts from harsh to harshest at right angles to a southwest-northeast trend line. Deep within the interior of Asia and surrounded by mostly frozen seas, Siberia experiences the most continental climates on the planet. One-time maxima of more than ninety degrees Fahrenheit (35 degrees Celsius) are possible in the relatively short Siberian summers except along the coasts, whereas one-time minima of minus-ninety degrees Fahrenheit (-68 degrees Celsius) have been recorded in the long winters of Sakha (Yakutia). This broad range of temperatures is not recorded anywhere else. Fortunately, the winter frost is typically dry and windless, affording some relief to the isolated towns and hamlets located in the sparsely populated northeast.

Although western geographers accept the entire northeastern quadrant of Eurasia as the region known as Siberia, Russian geographers officially accept only Western and Eastern Siberia as such, excluding the Russian Far East, or Russia's Pacific Rim. Including the Russian Far East, Siberia spans 5,207,900 square miles (13,488,400 square kilometers) and makes up more than three-fourths of the Russian land mass. By this definition, Siberia is a fourth bigger than Canada, the world's second largest country. It extends from the Ural Mountains on the west to the Pacific Ocean on the east. North to south it spans an empty realm from the Arctic Ocean to the borders of Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and China. It is empty because, although it occupies 23 percent of Eurasia, it environs less than 1 percent of the continent's population. Siberia is so massive that citizens of the U.S. state of Maine are closer to Moscow than are residents of Siberia's Pacific Coast.

The Russian word *Sibir* has at least six controversial origins, ranging from Hunnic to Mongolic to Russian. The Mongol definition is "marshy forest," which certainly typifies much of the Siberian landscape.

To many Westerners, the name evokes a popular misconception that people who live in Siberia are exiles or forced laborers. Although it is accurate



Schoolchildren cross-country ski on the frozen Tura River near Tyumen. © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

to suggest that the region became a place of exile as early as the 1600s and remained that way long after, most Siberians freely migrated there. The Great Siberian Migration, which occurred between 1885 and 1914, witnessed the voluntary movement of 4 million Slavic peasants into the southern tier of the area, facilitated by the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (1891–1916). In fact, the tributary area of that railway became, and remains, the primary area of Siberian settlement. The rest of Siberia represents a vast underdeveloped backwater, containing fewer than one person per square mile.

Soviet dictator Josef Stalin successfully endeavored to force the development of the “backwater” by creating a vast system of labor camps, further tarnishing Siberia’s image. At least 1.5 million forced laborers and convicts occupied the region’s north and east between 1936 and 1953. Some of the camps remained in use until the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991). Between 1953 and 1991, extraordinary financial and material incentives lured the vast majority of migrants to the

harshest regions. After 1991, when the incentives were terminated, hundreds of thousands of residents departed for more hospitable and economically stable destinations.

Although Siberia’s future is unpredictable, the region remains rich in resources. Most lie in austere, largely unexplored areas far from potential consumers. Thus, like their relatives of the past, modern Russians continue to refer to Siberia as the future or cupboard of the nation. Unfortunately, although teeming with natural wealth, the cupboard remains locked.

See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; FAR EASTERN REGION; NORTHERN PEOPLES; PACIFIC FLEET; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

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VICTOR L. MOTE

SIGNPOSTS See VEKHI.

SIKORSKY, IGOR IVANOVICH

(1889–1972), scientist, engineer, pilot, and entrepreneur.

Igor Sikorsky designed the world's first four-engined airplane in 1913 (precursor to the most successful bomber of World War I) and the world's first true production helicopter. His single-rotor design, a major breakthrough in helicopter technology, remains the dominant configuration in the early twenty-first century. The winged-S emblem still signifies the world's most advanced rotorcraft.

Born in Kiev, Russia, Sikorsky was the youngest of five children. His father, a medical doctor and psychologist, inspired him to explore and learn. He developed a keen interest in mechanics and astronomy. While still a schoolboy he built several model aircraft and helicopters, as well as bombs. After completing formal education in Russia and France, Sikorsky attracted international recognition in 1913 at the age of twenty-four when he designed and flew the first multimotor airplane. In 1918, Sikorsky decided to flee his native country: "What were called the ideals and principles of the Marxist revolution were not acceptable to me." He left Petrograd (St. Petersburg) by rail for Murmansk and from there boarded a steamer for England. Having lost all his savings, he arrived in England with only a few hundred English pounds.

He settled in the United States in 1919, eventually founding the Sikorsky Aero Engineering Corporation, the forerunner of the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies. In the early twenty-first century the corporation manufactures helicopters for sale around the world. Continually designing aircraft, Sikorsky received many other patents, including patents for helicopter control and stability systems. He grasped the humanitarian advantages of helicopters over airplanes. "If a man is in need of rescue," he said, "an airplane can come in and throw flowers on him, and that's just about all . . . but a direct-lift aircraft could come in and save his life." In the 1930s, Sikorsky designed and manufactured a series of large passenger-carrying flying boats that pioneered the transoceanic commercial air routes in the Caribbean and Pacific.

See also: AVIATION

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

SILVER AGE

From the late nineteenth century until World War I, the Russian visual, literary, and performing arts achieved such creative brilliance that observers—not least the critic and poet Sergei Makovsky (1878–1962)—described the period as a "Silver Age." Many individuals, institutions, and ideas contributed to this renaissance: Sergei Diaghilev (1872–1929) and the St. Petersburg World of Art; painters Lev Bakst (1866–1924), Viktor Borisov-Musatov (1870–1905), and Mikhail Vrubel (1856–1910); writers Konstantin Balmont (1867–1942), Andrei Bely (pseudonym of Boris Bugayev, 1880–1934), Alexander Blok (1880–1921), Valery Bryusov (1873–1924),

and Vyacheslav Ivanov (1866–1949); the Ballets Russes; the new theaters with their repertoires of Ibsen and Maeterlinck; and the architecture of the *style moderne*—all shared the eschatological mood of the *fin de siècle* heightened by the disasters of the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution.

There was a climactic and ominous sense in the culture of the Russian Silver Age, for its poetry spoke of *femmes fatales* and fleshly indulgence, and its painting depicted twilights and satanic beasts. Perhaps even more than the Western European Symbolists, the Russian poets, painters, and philosophers made every effort to escape the present by looking back to an Arcadian landscape of pristine myth and fable or by looking forwards to a utopian synthesis of art, religion, and organic life. For Russia's children of the *fin de siècle*, Symbolism became much more than a mere esthetic tendency; rather, it represented an entire worldview and a way of life that informed the intense visions of Bely, Blok, and Vrubel; the religious explorations of the priest, mathematician, and art historian Pavel Florensky (1882–1937); the decorative flourishes of Bakst and Alexandre Benois (1870–1960); and even the abstract systems of Vasily Kandinsky (1866–1944) and Kazimir Malevich (1878–1935). Bely's novel *Petersburg*, Blok's poem "The Stranger," Vrubel's images of torment and distress, and the galvanizing music of Alexander Skryabin (1872–1915) all express the nervous tension and febrile energy of the Russian Silver Age.

Its most original artist was Vrubel, whose fertile imagination produced disconcerting pictures such as *Demon Downcast* (1902, Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow; hereafter "TG"). While the definitions "Art Nouveau" and "Neo-Nationalism" come to mind in the context of his work, Vrubel approached the act of painting as a constant process of experimentation, returning to his major canvases again and again, erasing, repainting, altering. His releasing of the energy of the ornament and his intense elaboration of the surface even prompted future critics to consider his painting in the context of Cubism, for his broken brushwork strangely anticipated the visual dislocation of the late 1900s.

Even so, a characteristic of the Russian Symbolists was more recreative than experimental in nature, characterized by the aspiration to restore an esthetic unity to the disciplines through the rediscovery of a common philosophical and formal denominator. To this end, they often explored more than one medium simultaneously. In keeping with

this interdisciplinarity, the principal artistic and intellectual society with which many of them were associated was called the "World of Art." Hostile toward both the Academy and nineteenth century Realism, the World of Art owed its singular vision, practical organization, and public effect to Diaghilev, who in 1898 launched the famous magazine of the same name (*Mir iskusstva*, 1898–1904), sponsored a cycle of important national and international exhibitions, and propagated Russian art and music successfully in the West. The World of Art artists and writers never issued a written manifesto, but their attention to artistic craft, cult of retrospective beauty, and assumed distance from the ills of sociopolitical reality indicated a firm belief in "art for art's sake" and a sense of measured grace, which they identified with the haunting beauty of St. Petersburg.

The fame of several World of Art painters, particularly Bakst and Benois, rests primarily on their set and costume designs for Diaghilev's Ballets Russes (1909–1929), which, with its emphasis on artistic synthesis, evocation of archaic or exotic cultures, and invention of a new choreographic, musical, and visual communication, can be regarded as an extension of the Symbolist platform. The ease with which the World of Art transferred pictorial ideas from studio to stage (for instance, productions such as *Cléopâtre* of 1909, designed by Bakst, *Petrouchka* of 1911, designed by Benois, and *Le Sacre du Printemps* of 1913, designed by Nicholas Roerich [1874–1947]) was indicative of a general tendency toward "theatralization" evident in the culture of the Silver Age. Here was an exaggerated sensibility, but also a conviction that artistic movement was the common denominator of all "great" works of art. This could take the form of physical movement, such as dance, rhythm, and gesture, or of abstract equivalents, such as poetical meter and music, which, for all the Symbolists, was the highest form of expression, the most intense and yet the most minimal material.

A bastion of the Symbolist cause, the World of Art encompassed a multiplicity of artistic phenomena: the consumptive imagery of Aubrey Beardsley and the stylizations of the early Kandinsky; the Art Nouveau designs of Charles Rennie Mackintosh and Elena Polenova (1850–98); and the Decadent verse of Zinaida Gippius (1869–1945) and Dmitry Merezhkovsky (1866–1941). The World of Art fulfilled the practical function of propagating Russian art at home and abroad and of granting the Russian public access to the work of modern



Improvisation V. by Vasily Kandinsky. The abstract works by Kandinsky can be traced to the symbolism of the Silver Age. © GEOFFREY CLEMENTS/CORBIS

Western artists through exhibitions and publications.

The Russian Silver Age was not confined by strict geographical or social boundaries, for it also flourished—and perhaps more luxuriously—in Moscow and the provinces. Even Saratov, a small town to the south of Moscow, became a major center of Symbolist enquiry, thanks to the activities of the painter Borisov-Musatov, who, together

with Vrubel, exerted a profound and permanent influence on the evolution of Russian Modernism. Impressed by Puvis de Chavannes and the Nabis during his residence in Paris, Borisov-Musatov incorporated their monumentalism and subdued palette into his elusive depictions of such wraith-like women as in *Gobelin* (1901, TG) and *Reservoir* (1902, TG). Evoking a gentler and more tranquil age, Borisov-Musatov shared the Symbolists' desire to escape from their troubled time, and one of

his central motifs, the “Eternal Feminine,” aligned him with poets such as Bely and Blok.

Borisov-Musatov also established a short-lived but crucial school of painters, for he was the direct instigator of the “Blue Rose,” a movement which can be considered the real beginning of the avant-garde in Russian art. Apologists of Bely’s esthetics and Blok’s poetry, the Blue Rose artists, especially their leader, Pavel Kuznetsov (1878–1968), used a particular repertoire of symbols (blue-green foliage, fountains, and vestal maidens) in order to evoke the global orchestra that they heeded beyond the world of appearances. Concerned with the oblique and the intangible, they dematerialized nature and thereby heralded the radical concept of the picture as a self-sufficient, abstract unit. The Symbolist journals, *Vesy* (Scales, 1904–1909 [last issues appeared only in 1910]), *Iskusstvo* (Art, 1905) and *Zolotoe runo* (Golden Fleece, 1906–1909 [last issues appeared only in 1910]), did much to promote their ideas and imagery.

Reference to the Symbolist heritage helps to explain a number of subsequent developments in Russian art, especially the abstract investigations of Kandinsky and Malevich, for in many respects they expanded ideas supported by the Russian intelligentsia of the Silver Age. As Kandinsky explained in his major tract *On the Spiritual in Art*, the intuitive and the occult, not science, were the path to true illumination. Like the Symbolists, Kandinsky also felt that music could undermine the cult of objects and that the inner sound could be apprehended at moments of supersensory or deviant perception. Similarly, Kandinsky was fascinated with the synthetic aspect of the esthetic experience and aspired to reintegrate the individual arts into a *Gesamtkunstwerk*. Reasons for this approach differed from person to person, although Benois, Diaghilev, and V. Ivanov agreed that Wagner was to be admired for the way in which he had combined narrative, musical, and visual forces in the operatic drama so as to produce an expressive whole. For Kandinsky, Wagner was a source of visual inspiration and, similarly, Skryabin’s efforts to draw distinct parallels between the seven colors of the spectrum and the seven notes of the diatonic scale prompted him to investigate the possibility of a total art.

Even as he was writing *On the Spiritual in Art*, Kandinsky also pointed the way toward new esthetic criteria, for he emphasized the value of the primitive, the ethnographic, and the popular, es-

tablishing a fragile alliance with a new generation of Moscow artists such as Natalia Goncharova (1881–1962) and Mikhail Larionov (1881–1964). Praising the color and simplicity of Gauguin and Matisse, on the one hand, and the vitality of indigenous art forms, on the other, the “new barbarians” rejected Symbolist mystery in favor of the concrete and the material. Their first major exhibition, “The Jack of Diamonds” of 1910–1911, signaled the tarnishing of the Silver Age, for it showed the vulgar and the ugly, promoting graffiti, children’s drawings, and store signboards as genuine works of art instead of the impalpable visions of the astral plane and religious ecstasy.

The destiny of the Russian Silver Age was both full and empty. On the one hand, the Symbolists left a positive construction, because some of their ideas and artifacts prefigured the linguistic and visual experiments of the avant-garde in the 1910s and 1920s, including the geometric reductions of Malevich known as Suprematism. Even the notion of a single and cohesive style joining architecture and the applied arts, promoted by the Constructivists in the wake of the October Revolution, can be viewed as outgrowths of the Symbolists’ concern with the total, organic work of art. On the other hand, if the Russian Symbolist poets and painters glimpsed beyond the veil, they rarely completed the voyage to the other shore. As they journeyed, they erred in bold transgressions and called for synthesis and synaesthesia as they sought a spiritual equilibrium for their uneasy era. Ultimately, if their fine antennae did pick up the celestial signals, the sound was so powerful that it caused a “*dérèglement de tous les sens*”—and not just metaphorically, but in the literal meaning of that phrase.

See also: DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH; FUTURISM; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; KANDINSKY, VASILY VASILIEVICH

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JOHN E. BOWLT

SIMEON

(1316–1353), prince of Moscow and grand prince of Vladimir.

Like his father Ivan I Danilovich "Moneybag," Simeon Ivanovich ("the Proud") collaborated with the Tatar overlords and secured a preferential status. After Ivan I died in 1340, Simeon and rival claimants visited the Golden Horde in Saray to solicit the patent for the grand princely throne. Khan Uzbek gave it to Simeon, who became the khan's obedient vassal and was thus able to wield at least limited jurisdiction over rival princes. He also obtained the khan's backing for his campaigns against Grand Prince Olgerd of Lithuania who, in the 1340s, increased his incursions into western Russia. Simeon waged war on Novgorod and forced it to recognize him as its prince and to pay Tatar tribute to him. With the help of Metropolitan Feognost he asserted greater control over the town than his father had done. During Simeon's reign the principality of Suzdal–Nizhny Novgorod replaced Tver in the rivalry for supremacy with Moscow. Although the Tatars helped Simeon fight foreign enemies, after 1342 Khan Jani-Beg refused to help him become stronger than his rivals in northeast Russia. Specifically, he prevented Simeon from increasing the size of his domain and his power as grand prince.

Simeon's agreement with his brothers in the late 1340s alludes, for the first time, to the appanage system of Moscow. The document describes the relationship between the grand prince and his brothers and recognizes the domains that Ivan I al-

located to his sons as hereditary appanages. On April 26, 1353, Simeon died from the plague.

See also: APPANAGE ERA; GRAND PRINCE; MOSCOW; MUSCOVY

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MARTIN DIMNIK

SIMONOV, KONSTANTIN MIKHAILOVICH

(1915–1979), Russian writer and Writers' Union official who specialized in describing the Great Patriotic War.

Konstantin Mikhailovich Simonov was born in Petrograd, the son of a military schoolteacher. He entered a factory school and began working in various factories while he began writing poetry. He published his first poems in 1934 and enrolled in the Gorky Literary Institute. After graduation in 1938, he worked as a journalist and served as a correspondent for *Red Star* (*Krasnaya zvezda*) during the war.

During the war, he began to write plays and fiction about his experiences and became quite popular during the 1940s and 1950s. The novel *Days and Nights* described the battle of Stalingrad in a realistic, natural manner. His other work was noted for its adherence to dictates of Socialist Realism. He won numerous awards, including six Stalin prizes, a Lenin prize, and the Hero of Socialist Labor medal.

Simonov served in many editorial and administrative positions during his career. He was editor-in-chief of *Literaturnaia Gazeta* (1950–1953), a secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers (1946–1950, 1967–1969), a member of Central Committee of Communist Party (1952–1956), and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet. Most interestingly, he was editor-in-chief of *Novyi mir* from 1954–1958, where he presided over the publication of Vladimir Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* (*Ne khlebom edinim*). Under attack, he soon retreated from this liberal position and thereafter remained within the official bounds of propriety.

In his posthumous memoirs, *Through the Eyes of a Man from My Generation* (*Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia*), Simonov provides great insight

into the world of Soviet literary politics under Stalin and after. His life and work demonstrate the compromises some writers chose as they negotiated the contours of official Soviet culture.

See also: JOURNALISM; NOVY MIR; WORLD WAR II

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KARL E. LOEWENSTEIN

SIMONOV MONASTERY

The Simonov Monastery in Moscow was founded in 1370 by Fyodor, a disciple of Russia's greatest and most influential medieval saint, Sergius. Over the centuries, the Simonov was to become one of the richest monasteries in Russia. Early twentieth century official church records place the Simonov in the top 10 percent based on wealth.

The monastery had six major churches on its grounds. Among them were churches dedicated to The Tikhvin Icon of the Mother of God, to the Dormition of the Virgin, and to St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker. Many churches had attached side chapels (or side altars) as well. The Tikhvin Icon church had, for example, side chapels dedicated to Basil the Blessed, a famous holy fool; to the martyrs Valentina and Paraskeva; to St. Sergius; to Athanasius of Alexandria and the martyr Glykeria; and to saints Xenophont and Maria. This indicated a complex and intricate pattern of church structure, one that pertained to the larger, better endowed monasteries.

Two of the Simonov Monastery's leading figures became patriarchs of the Russian Church. Job, who was appointed abbot of Simonov in 1571, was the first patriarch in Russia (1589). In 1642, Joseph, the archimandrite of the Simonov Monastery, was elected to the patriarchy.

During the War of 1812 the Simonov was looted by the Napoleonic armies when they entered a burning Moscow. However, it quickly regained its material well-being. Much of its income was derived from visitors, pilgrims, and donations. Land holdings outside Moscow generated income from the production and milling of grain. In these prac-

tices, it typified many other Russian monasteries. Of the many famous people buried there, one of the better known is the nineteenth-century writer Ivan Aksakov.

See also: CAVES MONASTERY; KIRILL-BELOOZERO MONASTERY; MONASTICISM; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SERGIUS, ST.; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

NICKOLAS LUPININ

SINODIK

The *sinodik pravoslaviya* corresponds to the synodicon adopted at the council of the Greek Orthodox Church in 843 that condemned the iconoclasts. By the twelfth century, the term also came to mean "memorial book."

The *sinodik pravoslaviya* contains the decisions of the seven ecumenical councils, the names of those under anathema, and a list of important persons who deserve "many years of life," that is, to be remembered eternally. The text was read only once per year in the Orthodox rite, on the first Sunday of Lent. In addition to the Greek version, there are also more recent Georgian, Serbian, and Bulgarian versions. The *Russian Primary Chronicle* mentions a *sinodik* under the year 1108, but the Greek form was probably not replaced by a Russian translation until 1274. Starting around the end of the fourteenth century, the names of fallen warriors were also entered in the *sinodik pravoslaviya*. In 1763, the metropolitan of Rostov, Arseny Matseyvich, read aloud the anathema in the *sinodik pravoslaviya* on those who touch church property as a protest against Catherine II's planned secularization of church landholdings.

The word *sinodik* took on a second meaning in twelfth-century Novgorod and later in Muscovite Russia. In this second sense it refers to a memorial book, corresponding to the Greek Orthodox diptych, containing the names of dead persons who are to be commemorated in the daily liturgical cycle. Around the end of the fifteenth century, when the number of donors began to grow rapidly, Muscovite monasteries developed a system not found in other Orthodox countries: Donors' names were entered in books organized around the size of the donation. So-called eternal *sinodiki* listed the names of donors who had given relatively modest gifts and were read throughout the day. "Daily lists"

(the names vary) commemorated the donors of more substantial gifts and were read only at certain fixed points in the liturgical cycle. This segmented system flourished until the beginning of the seventeenth century. Beginning in the late fifteenth century, and quite often in the seventeenth, *sinodiki* included "introductions" that detailed the importance and value of care for the deceased. Many Russian monasteries and churches still maintain *sinodiki*.

See also: DONATION BOOKS; ORTHODOXY; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

LUDWIG STEINDORFF

SINOPE, BATTLE OF

The battle of Sinope, fought on November 30, 1853, was the last major naval action between sailing ship fleets. The battle resulted from worsening relations between the Ottoman and Russian empires. For naval historians, the battle is notable for the first broad use of shell guns, marking the end of the use of smooth bore cannon that had previously been the primary naval weapon for nearly three centuries. In the spring of 1853 Tsar Nicholas's emissary Admiral Alexander Menshikov broke off negotiations with the Ottoman Empire. Menshikov opposed plans for a preemptive strike against the Bosphorus, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet subsequently prepared for a defensive war within the Black Sea. The Ottoman government ordered a squadron of Vice Admiral Osman Pasha to the Caucasus coast in early November 1853 in support of Ottoman ground forces, but bad weather forced the ships to seek shelter at Sinope. A Russian squadron under Vice Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov on his flagship *Imperatritsa Maria*-60 decided to attack. Following a war council, Nakhimov ordered his officers in an evocation of Nelson at Trafalgar: "I grant you the authority to act according to your own best judgment, but I enjoin each to do his duty." With six ships of the line and two frigates with 720 guns, Nakhimov attacked an Ottoman squadron of seven frigates, three corvettes, two steamers, two brigs, and two transports mounting 510 guns under shore defenses with 38 pieces of artillery. The shell guns proved lethal in Nakhimov's two-columned assault; the only Ottoman vessel that managed to escape the carnage was the steam frigate *Taif*-20 carrying the British

officer Slade, who brought news of the defeat to Constantinople. Ottoman losses totaled 15 ships and 3,000 men with the Russians taking 200 prisoners; on the Russian side, 37 were killed and 235 wounded. Osman Pasha, wounded in the engagement, was taken prisoner.

See also: MENSHIKOV, ALEXANDER DANILOVICH; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; NAKHIMOV, PAVEL STEPANOVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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JOHN C. K. DALY

SINO-SOVIET SPLIT *See* CHINA, RELATIONS WITH.

SINYAVSKY-DANIEL TRIAL

In September 1965, Soviet authorities arrested a well-known literary critic, Andrei Sinyavsky, and a relatively obscure translator, Yuly Daniel, and charged them with slandering the Soviet system in works published abroad pseudonymously. The works in question were often satirical but in no sense anti-Soviet; in his essay *On Socialist Realism*, for example, Sinyavsky (or "Abram Tertz") advocated nothing more radical than a return to the adventurous style of Vladimir Mayakovsky. Nonetheless, following a January 1966 press campaign of vicious denunciations, the pair was convicted at a show trial in February. Sinyavsky received seven years, and Daniel five, in a strict-regime labor camp.

Conservative elements in the Leonid Brezhnev-Alexei Kosygin regime, determined to crack down on the intellectual experimentation of the Nikita Khrushchev years, presumably intended the affair as the signal of a stricter cultural line and as a warning to intellectuals to keep quiet. But the signal was ambiguous—the conservatives were not yet firmly in control—and the warning ineffectual. Sinyavsky and Daniel refused to play their assigned roles, pleading not guilty and defending themselves in court vigorously. A public Moscow protest against the arrests in December 1965 was followed by a petition campaign, an increase in open protest and *samizdat*, and, ultimately, the appearance of the *Chronicle of Current Events* in April 1968. In fact, the Sinyavsky-Daniel case is widely viewed as a

spark that galvanized the dissident movement by raising the specter of a return to Stalinism and by convincing many intellectuals that it was futile to work within the system.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; MAYAKOVSKY, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; SHOW TRIALS; THAW, THE

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JONATHAN D. WALLACE

SIXTH PARTY CONGRESS *See* OCTOBER REVOLUTION.

SKAZ

A literary term originally defined as "orientation toward oral speech" in prose fiction, can also indicate a type of oral folk narrative.

Boris Eikhenbaum first described skaz, derived from the verb *skazat* ("to tell"), in a pair of 1918 articles as a kind of "oral" narration that included unmediated or improvisational aspects. Formalists and other critics developed this analytical tool during the 1920s, including Yuri Tynianov (1921), Viktor Vinogradov (1926), and Mikhail Bakhtin (1929). Tynianov analyzed the effect of skaz, arguing that it enabled the reader to enter the text, but did not really clarify the mechanism through which it worked.

Vinogradov and Bakhtin helped refine the concept of skaz as a stylistic device. Vinogradov developed the idea that skaz comprised a series of signals that aroused in the reader a sense of speech produced by utterance, not writing. Bakhtin placed skaz within his own larger theory of narration, defining it as one kind of "double-voiced utterance" (the others being stylization and parody) in which two distinct voices—the author's speech and another's speech—were oriented toward one another within the same level of conceptual authority. The effect of oral speech is, therefore, not the primary characteristic of skaz for Bakhtin.

Since the 1920s skaz has been identified both as a distinctive characteristic of Russian literature (in the work of Gogol, Zamiatin, Zoshchenko, and

others) and as a narrative device present in most world literatures. Since the beginning of the 1980s and the rediscovery of Bakhtin's work, his concept of skaz has served as a starting point for further debate: for instance, over whether the relationship between author and narrator is mutual and interactive.

See also: BYLINA; LESKOV, NIKOLAI SEMENOVICH; BAKHTIN, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH; GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILIEVICH

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ELIZABETH JONES HEMENWAY

SKOBELEV, MIKHAIL DMITRIYEVICH

(1843–1882), famous officer in the Russian imperial army active in the conquest of Turkestan and in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1888.

Born to a Russian noble family, Mikhail Skobelev became a member of the officer corps of the Russian army. In 1869, having received an education in military schools, he joined Russian forces completing the conquest of Central Asia.

He first distinguished himself in military operations in the Fergana Valley (now in Uzbekistan), where in 1875 anti-Russian rebel forces had overthrown the khan of Kokand (allied with Russia). He quickly formulated his own strategy of colonial war, summed up in the guidelines "slaughter the enemy until resistance ends," then "cease slaughter and be kind and humane to the defeated enemy." He destroyed several rebel towns during his campaign, leaving thousands of dead among the rebels and the civilian population. When leaders of the revolt surrendered, he recommended to the tsar that they be pardoned. As a reward for his military triumph, he was promoted to the rank of major general and, at the age of thirty, became the military ruler of the Fergana Valley.

When the Russian Empire declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877, Skobelev joined the Russian armies moving against the Turks. His bravery and military skill earned him the command of one of the Russian armies in the campaign. He led his troops in the capture of the key Ottoman-fortified city along the western Black Sea coast protecting Constantinople. His desire for rapid victory resulted in heavy losses among his troops, but his exploits preserved his image in Russia as the triumphant "White General."

Skobelev's final military triumph came in another war in Central Asia. Faced with the revolt of nomadic Turkmen tribes, the tsarist government sent him in 1880 to force the nomads to submit to imperial rule. He was successful, applying once again his brutal strategy of colonial warfare. In early 1881 his troops stormed the major Turkmen fortress of Geok-Tepe (now in Turkmenistan), slaughtering half of the defenders as well as many civilians. His reputation among Russian imperialists was at its peak. However, the new tsar, Alexander III, was suspicious of his desire for fame and his political ambitions. Following Skobelev's triumph in Turkestan, the government sent him to a remote military post in western Russia. There he began a public campaign to restore his reputation, but died shortly afterward of a heart attack.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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DANIEL BROWER

SKRYPNYK, MYKOLA OLEKSYOVYCH

(1872–1933), Ukrainian Bolshevik leader and advocate of ukrainization.

Born in Ukraine, Mykola Skrypnyk joined the revolutionary movement in 1901 as a student at the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, from which he never graduated. Until 1917 he lived the

life of a professional revolutionary, organizing the Bolshevik underground in Saratov, Odessa, Kiev, and Moscow. During this period, Skrypnyk was arrested fifteen times and repeatedly exiled to Siberia, and spent more than a year in voluntary exile in Switzerland. During the October Revolution he was a prominent member of the Military Revolutionary Committee in Petrograd. In 1918, on the suggestion of Vladimir Lenin, Skrypnyk moved to Ukraine to counterbalance the Russian chauvinism of the local Bolshevik leadership. He served there as people's commissar of labor and later as head of the People's Secretariat, the first Soviet government in Ukraine, and in April 1918 he was instrumental in the creation of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. After the Bolsheviks were forced to withdraw from Ukraine by the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Skrypnyk joined the Cheka, but he returned to Ukraine when the Civil War ended.

As people's commissar of justice of the Ukrainian Republic (1922–1927), Skrypnyk helped to build a Soviet Ukrainian state and ensure its rights within the Soviet Union. Starting in 1923, when the Kremlin introduced the policy of nativization, he actively promoted the implementation of its Ukrainian incarnation or ukrainization. During his tenure as people's commissar of education (1927–1933), he was active in ukrainizing the republic's press, publishing, education, and culture. Although Skrypnyk remained an orthodox Bolshevik and an enemy of Ukrainian nationalism, he stood out as the Ukrainian leader who was most vocal in his opposition to Moscow's centralism and great-power chauvinism. He also distinguished himself by engineering the standardization of Ukrainian orthography—the so-called Skrypnykivka system (1927)—and founding the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism (1928). In 1933, when Josef Stalin condemned his ukrainization policies as nationalistic, Skrypnyk committed suicide. He was rehabilitated in the mid-1950s, and in post-Soviet Ukraine he is respected as a defender of Ukrainian culture and sovereignty.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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SERHY YEKELCHYK

SLAVERY

Slavery in one form or another has been a central feature of East Slavic and Russian history from at least the very beginning almost to the present day. Its presence and its offshoots have lent a particular coloration to Russian civilization that can be found in few other places.

One common social science definition of slavery is that the slave is an outsider; namely, that he or she is of a different race, religion, caste, or tribe than that of his or her owner. In cases where that was not true, slaveholders resorted to fiction, which made the slave (usually an infant abandoned by its parents) appear to be an outsider. Or a slave might be a lawbreaker who by his crime had placed himself outside of society: one who, in Orlando Patterson's phrase, was "socially dead." This could include debtors, who were regarded as thieves because they could not or would not repay borrowed money or goods, or criminals who could not pay fines.

Russia included such outsiders as slaves, but (along with Korea) also enslaved its own people. This was unusual and made Russian slavery distinctive. Because of its atypical nature, some people have questioned whether Russian *rabstvo* and especially *kholopstvo* were in fact "really slavery." However, a thoughtful examination indicates that all such individuals in fact were slaves. All varieties of slaves were treated equally under the law.

From the dawn of Russian history, as everywhere else on Earth at the time, slaves were typically products of warfare—East Slavic tribes fighting with each other or with neighboring Turkic, Iranian, Finnic, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Polish, Germanic, and other peoples. Such victims were true outsiders who could be either enslaved in Rus itself or taken abroad into the international slave trade. Slaves were mentioned in every Russian law code. As the earliest such code, the *Ruskaia pravda*, grew in size from its earliest redaction compiled in about 1016 to its full size, the so-called Expanded *Pravda* a special section on slavery was added. It enumerated some of the avenues into slavery, such as sale of prior slaves, self-sale, becoming a steward, and marriage of a free person to a slave. An

indentured laborer could be sold into slavery as recompense for crimes. As in all slave systems, the owner was responsible for a slave's offenses, much as an owner is responsible for his dog. The heyday of medieval Russian slavery followed the collapse of political unity after 1132, and each of the dozen or so independent principalities waged civil war against each other as well as the steppe nomads and neighboring sedentary peoples to the west. As always—until probably the 1880s—Russia was a labor-short country, so those desiring extra hands often enslaved them. Much of twelfth-century farming was done by slaves living in barracks.

The Mongol invasion and conquest made the situation worse. The Mongols enslaved skilled individuals and dispatched them to Karakorum, Sarai, and other corners of the earth. The dozen or so principalities of Rus in 1237 fragmented into fifty, perhaps even one hundred—each enslaving the labor of other principalities. Many of these slaves were shipped to Novgorod, whose famous slave market was at the busy intersection of Slave and High Streets, where professional readers and writers set up their business composing and reading for customers the famous birch-bark letters. Slaves from Novgorod were shipped into the Baltic, to England, to other Atlantic countries, and into the Islamic lands of the Mediterranean.

While the unification of the East Slavic lands by Moscow put an end to the capture of other East Slavs into slavery, Russia was still short of labor, and the appetite for slaves did not decline. In Kievan Rus the Orthodox Church had provided charity, but this diminished with the rise of Moscow. In order for the impoverished to survive, the practice began to develop of those in need selling themselves into what was described as "full slavery." This was a form of perpetual, lifelong slavery in which offspring were described as hereditary slaves. Most societies could not withstand the tension inherent in enslaving their own people, but this did not seem to bother the Russians. From the outset Russian society had consisted not only of East Slavs, but also the ruling Varangian/Viking element, conquered indigenous Iranians, Finns, and Balts, plus any Turkic, Mongol, or other people who wanted to live in Rus. There were no barriers to intermarriage among these peoples, and the sole distinction came to be (perhaps after 1350, or even the 1650s) those who allegedly were Orthodox Christians and those who were not. Thus the insider-outsider dichotomy was weakly developed, and this perhaps permitted Russians to enslave their own people.



Russian Slave Life by Sergei Vladimirovich Ivanov. © SUPERSTOCK

In the sixteenth century full slavery came to be replaced by what is best translated as limited service contract slavery (*kabalnoye kholopstvo*), known elsewhere (in Parthia) as antichresis. It worked as follows: A person in need or who did not desire to control his own life found a person who would buy him. (Two-thirds of the cases involved primarily young males, the other third females.) They agreed on a price; the slave took the money from his buyer and agreed to work for him for a year in lieu of paying the interest on the money. If he did not repay the loan (or a third person—presumably another buyer—did not repay it for him), he defaulted and became a full slave. By the 1590s there were many such slaves. Serfdom was in full development, and the slave had the advantage that he had to pay no taxes, whereas the serf did. Slavery was becoming so popular that the powerful government unilaterally changed the terms of limited service contract slavery: The limitation was changed from the one year of the loan to the life of the person giving the loan. There was a dual expropriation here: The person taking the loan (i.e., selling himself) could no longer pay it off, and the person

granting the loan (i.e., buying the slave) could not pass the slave to his heirs. This became the premier form of slavery until the demise of the institution in the 1720s. Two changes were introduced: in the 1620s a maximum price of two rubles, and in the 1630s an increase of the maximum to three rubles. This meant that some would-be slaves could find no buyer because their price was too high, whereas others were forced to sell themselves for less than their “market price” would have been without the price controls. Regardless, slavery introduced a form of dependency such that those who were manumitted almost always resold themselves upon the death of the owner, often to the deceased owner’s heirs. About 10 percent of the entire population were slaves.

Russia was the sole country in the world with a central office (the Slavery Chancellery) in the capital controlling the institution of slavery. All slaves had to be registered. In the 1590s a reregistration of all slaves was required, in which about half of all slaves were limited service contract slaves and the others were of half a dozen other varieties. There were military captives, subject to return

home upon the signing of a peace treaty with the enemy belligerent. There were debt slaves, who had defaulted on a loan which could be “worked off” at the rate of 5 rubles per year by an adult male, 2.50 rubles per year by an adult female, and 2 rubles per year by a child over ten. There were indentured slaves, who agreed to work for a term in exchange for cash, training, and often a promise that the owner would marry them off before the end of the term. Those who married slaves were themselves enslaved, as were those who worked for someone else for over three months. There were hereditary slaves, those born to slaves and their offspring. The very complex practices of the Slavery Chancellery were codified into chapter 20 (119 articles) of the Law Code of 1649.

Slavery had a profound impact on the institution of serfdom which borrowed norms from slavery. Farming slaves were converted into taxpaying serfs in 1679. Household slaves (the vast majority of all slaves) were converted into house serfs by the poll tax in 1721. After 1721 serfdom increasingly took on the appearance of slavery until 1861.

See also: BIRCHBARK CHARTERS; EMANCIPATION ACT; ENSERFMENT; FEUDALISM; GOLDEN HORDE; KIEVAN RUS; LABOR; LAW CODE OF 1649; MUSCOVY SERFDOM

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RICHARD HELLIE

SLAVO-GRECO-LATIN ACADEMY

Titled in its first fifty years variously as “Greek School,” “Ancient and Modern Greek School,” “Greco-Slavic School,” “Slavo-Latin School,” and “Greco-Latin School,” the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy was the first formal educational institution in Russian history. Established in 1685, the Academy became the breeding ground for many secular and ecclesiastical collaborators of Tsar Peter I. Its founders and first teachers were the Greek brothers Ioannikios and Sophronios Leichoudes. From its inception, the Academy followed the well-established

lines of the curriculum and formal structure of contemporary Jesuit colleges. The Leichoudes divided the curriculum into two parts: The first part included grammar, poetics and rhetoric; the second comprised philosophy (including logic) and theology. The grammar classes were divided into three levels: elementary, middle, and higher. The middle and higher levels were themselves divided into sub-levels. Instruction was in Greek and Latin, with an attached school that provided basic literacy in Church Slavonic. The Leichoudes authored their own textbooks, largely adapted from contemporary Jesuit manuals. As in Jesuit colleges, the method of instruction included direct exposure to ancient Greek and Latin literary and philosophical texts, as well as an abundance of practical exercises. Student work included memorization, competitive exercises, declamations, and disputations, as well as parsing and theme writing. On important feast days, students exhibited their skills and knowledge in orations before the Patriarch of Moscow or royal and aristocratic individuals.

Students were both clergy and laymen, and came from various social and ethnic backgrounds, from some of Russia’s top princely scions and members of the Patriarch’s court, down to children of lowly servants in monasteries, and included Greeks and even a baptized Tatar. Several of these students made their careers in important diplomatic, administrative, and ecclesiastical positions during Peter I’s reign.

In 1701 the Academy was reorganized by decree of Tsar Peter I and staffed with Ukrainian and Belorussian teachers educated at the Kiev Mohylan Academy. Until the end of Peter’s reign, the student body betrays a slight “plebeianization”: Fewer members of the top aristocratic families attended classes there. In addition, many more of the students were clergymen. The curriculum retained the same scholastic content, but the language of instruction now was exclusively Latin.

Reorganized in 1775 under the supervision of Metropolitan Platon of Moscow (in office, 1775–1812), the Academy expanded its curriculum to offer classes in church history, canon law, Greek, and Hebrew. Finally, in 1814, the Academy was transferred to the Trinity St. Sergius Monastery and was restructured into the Moscow Theological Seminary.

See also: EDUCATION; LEICHOUDES, IOANNIKIOS AND SOPHRONIOS; PETER I; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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NIKOLAOS A. CHRISSIDIS

SLAVOPHILES

The origins of Slavophilism can be traced back to the ideas of thinkers such as Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov, Alexander Radishchev, Poshkov, Nikolai Novikov, and Nikolai Karamzin, all of whom contrasted ancient pre-Petrine Russia with the modern post-Petrine embodiment, stressing the uniqueness of Russian traditions, norms, and ideas. Most exponents of this school of thought were of noble birth, and many held government posts, so they were quite familiar with the workings of the tsarist autocracy. They were prominent during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855) and emerged after the Decembrist uprising of 1825 and the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe.

Peter Chaadayev's (1794–1856) ideas in the *Philosophical Letter* (1836) and other works acted as a catalyst for the emergence of Slavophile ideology. Chaadayev gave special emphasis to the need for Russia to link up with Europe and the Roman Catholic Church. His views on religion, nationality, tradition, and culture stimulated the famous Slavophile-Westerner debate.

Building on Chaadayev's legacy, the Slavophiles developed three main beliefs: *samobytnost* (originality), the importance of the Orthodox Church, and a rejection of the ideas of Peter the Great and his followers. In addition, they promoted respect for the rule of law, opposed any restriction on the powers of the tsar, and advocated freedom of the individual in terms of speech, thought, and conduct.

The Slavophiles believed that Russian civilization was unique and superior to Western culture because it was based on such institutions as the Orthodox Church, the village community, or *mir*, and the ancient popular assembly, the *zemsky sobor*. They supported the idea of autocracy and opposed political participation, but some also favored the emancipation of serfs and freedom of speech and press. Alexander II's reforms achieved some of these goals. Over time, however, some Slavophiles became

increasingly nationalistic, many ardently supporting Pan Slavism after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1854–1856). However, these thinkers were not united, except insofar as they were radically opposed to the Westerners, and individually their ideas differed.

CLASSICAL SLAVOPHILISM

The Slavophiles, by and large, can be grouped into three categories: classical, moderate, and radical. Like their opponents, the Westerners, they had a particular view of Russia's history, language, and culture and hence a certain vision of Russia's future, especially its relations with the West. Perhaps their greatest concern, from the 1830s onwards, was that Russia might follow the Western road of development. They were vehemently opposed to this, arguing that Russia must return to its own roots and draw upon its own strengths.

Most Slavophiles opposed the reforms introduced by Peter the Great on the grounds that they had destroyed Russian tradition by allowing alien Western ideas (such as the French and German languages) to be imported into Russia. They also maintained that Russia had paid too high a price to become a major European power, namely, moral degradation. Furthermore, the bureaucracy established by Peter the Great was a source of moral corruption, because the Table of Ranks stimulated personal ambition and subordinated the nobility to the bureaucracy. These views were in many ways shaped by the social and political conditions that prevailed during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855).

In general, the Slavophiles saw the Westward swing as a threat to the church, the peasant and village community, and other Russian institutions. Many classical Slavophiles were initially influenced by Nicholas I's Official Nationality slogan: "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality." The most important proponent of classical Slavophilism was Ivan Kireyevsky (1806–1856), who could read French and German, had traveled in Russia, and understood the importance of Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835). Kireyevsky rejected the main intellectual developments of the time (rationalism, secularism, the industrial revolution, liberalism) and argued that Russia, as a backward young nation, was not in a position to imitate a civilized Europe. He pointed, for example, to the differences in religion (Catholicism versus Orthodox Christianity) and to the fact that Russian society consisted of small peasant communes founded upon common land tenure. Like

Kireyevsky, Alexei Khomiakov (1804–1860) also warned against blindly following the West and criticized the impending emancipation of the serfs (1861). He emphasized spiritual freedom (*sobornost*) and Russia's unique historical mission. Whereas the West was built upon coercion and slavery, he said, Russia was founded and maintained by consent, freedom, and peace. Yuri A. Samarin (1819–1879) supported Khomiakov's view, arguing that society, if left to its own devices, would be torn apart by division and conflict because individualism only promoted selfishness and isolation, and thus a strong centralized state and leader were needed to maintain order. This was a clear reference to the danger that Russia would see a rerun of the Revolutions of 1848. As he saw it, chaos would ensue if Russia followed the example of Western liberalism by introducing constitutionalism and a system of checks and balances. Other proponents included the Aksakov brothers, Ivan and Konstantin. Ivan, at the height of his influence in the late 1870s, favored the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, whereas Konstantin advocated the emancipation of the serfs and was a proponent of the village commune (*mir*). Both wanted to preserve Russian traditions and maintain the ties between the Slavic peoples. In Ivan Aksakov in particular, one sees clear evidence of the emergence of Panslavism, which advocated the political and cultural unity of the Slavic peoples.

MODERATE AND RADICAL SLAVOPHILISM

Classical Slavophilism eventually gave way to two other variants of the doctrine. The moderate wing of the Slavophile movement is associated with Mikhail P. Pogodin (1800–1875) and Fyodor I. Tyutchev (1808–1873). Pogodin, a historian and publisher whose conservative journal *The Muscovite* (1841–1856) defended the policies of Nicholas I, was professor of Russian history at Moscow University (1835–1844) and wrote a history of Russia (7 vols., 1846–1857) and a study of the origins of Russia (3 vols., 1871). Tyutchev was a lyric poet and essayist who spent most of his life (1822–1844) abroad in the diplomatic service and later wrote poetry of a nationalist and Panslavist orientation.

The radical wing of slavophilism was epitomized by Nikolai Y. Danilevsky (1828–1855). As outlined in his *Russia and Europe* (1869), Danilevsky's aim was to unite all the countries and peoples who spoke Slavic languages on the grounds that they possessed common cultural, economic, and political goals. Whereas in the seventeenth century such

aims only received limited government support, Panslavism became stronger than ever in the post-Napoleonic period and especially after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, as Prussia tried to assimilate the Slavs, the Slavophiles called for solidarity against foreign oppression, and with this goal in mind many advocated the establishment of a federation. This was necessary, in Danilevsky's view, in order to protect all Slavs from European expansion in the east. The Russian government in the 1870s used these ideas to justify russification and an increasingly expansionist policy. All in all, with the advance of Russian liberalism and constitutionalism at the end of the nineteenth century, the Panslavists tried to distance themselves from the classical and moderate Slavophiles.

THE SLAVOPHILE LEGACY

The demise of Slavophilism in the nineteenth century was primarily due to the widespread divisions between those favoring conservative reform and those advocating a more extremist Panslavism. Like the populists, many Slavophiles argued that Nicholas I was incapable of reform, as shown by his repressive reign, and thus a more nationalist stance was needed.

Between the Russian Revolution and the rise of Josef Stalin, this ideology was largely rejected by the Soviet regime, but following the rise of National Socialism in Germany, Panslavism was revived, and it became very prominent during World War II. In the late Soviet period and especially in the post-communist era, the Slavophile ideology was once again promoted by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and other nationalists who sought to put Russia first and to protect it against a hostile West. Many neo-Slavophiles wished to see the restoration of the USSR and the Soviet Empire, and a return to Orthodoxy. Thus the legacy of the Slavophiles remains important and influential in contemporary Russia.

See also: MIR; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; NATION AND NATIONALITY; PANSLAVISM; NICHOLAS I; PETER I; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; RUSSIFICATION; TABLE OF RANKS; WESTERNIZERS

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

SLUTSKY, BORIS ABROMOVICH

(1919–1986), Russian poet and memoirist.

Brought up in Kharkov, Boris Abramovich Slutsky moved to Moscow in 1937 to study law and soon began a simultaneous literature course. On the outbreak of World War II he volunteered and went into battle as an infantry officer. Soon wounded in action, he spent the remainder of the war as a political officer, joining the Party in 1943. He ended up as a highly decorated Guards major, having campaigned all the way to Austria.

In 1945 he returned to Moscow and after convalescence made a living writing radio scripts, but in 1948 he was deprived of this work because of his Jewish origin. Sponsored by Ilya Erenburg, he was accepted in the Union of Writers in 1957 and thereafter was a professional poet. He made a lasting reputation with unprecedentedly unheroic poems about the war, but he was soon upstaged by the more flamboyant younger poets of the Thaw under Nikita Khrushchev, poets more concerned with the future than with the past. Slutsky steadily continued publishing original poetry and also translations, until on the death of his wife in 1977 at which point he suffered a mental collapse, which was underlain by the lingering effects of his wounds. Thereafter he was silent. From the beginning of his career Slutsky acquiesced in the censoring of his work, never moving into dissidence; notoriously, in 1958 he spoke and voted for the expulsion of Pasternak from the Union of Writers, an action for which he privately never forgave himself.

After Slutsky's death, it was found that well over half of his poetry had never been published. The appearance of this suppressed work in the decade after he died revealed that Slutsky had been by far the most important poet of his generation. In hundreds of short lyrics he had chronicled his life and times, paying attention to everything from high politics to the routines of everyday life and tracing the evolu-

tion of his society from youthful idealism through terrible trials to decline and imminent fall. He created a distinctive poetic language, purged of conventional poetic ornament, that has been highly influential. His prose memoirs about his military service, equally plain and unconventional, were only published fifty years after the end of the war.

See also: THAW, THE; UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS; WORLD WAR II

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GERALD SMITH

SLUTSKY, YEVGENY YEVGENIEVICH

(1880–1948), mathematical statistician and economist.

The most profoundly original of all Russian contributors to economic theory, Yevgeny Slutsky was born in Yaroslavl and studied mathematics in Ukraine. His first major publications were in the field of statistics and on the importance of cooperatives. In 1915 he published a seminal article on the theory of consumer behavior. This demonstrated how the consequence of a price change on the quantity of a good demanded could lead to a residual variation in demand, even with a compensating increase in income. John Hicks rediscovered this work in the West in the 1930s, naming the Slutsky equation the "Fundamental Equation of Value Theory." After 1917 Slutsky worked on analyzing the effects of paper currency emission, on the axiomatic foundations of probability theory, and on the theory of stochastic processes. This yielded a new conception of the stochastic limit.

As a consequence, in 1925 Nikolai Kondratiev asked Slutsky to join the Conjuncture Institute in Moscow, for which he wrote his groundbreaking paper on the random generation of business cycles. This opened up a new avenue of cycle research by hypothesizing that the summation of mutually independent chance factors could generate the appearance of periodicity in a random series. In the 1920s Slutsky also worked on the praxeological foundations of economics, but with the closure of the Conjuncture Institute in 1930, he turned back to statistics. He subsequently worked in the Central

Institute of Meteorology, in Moscow University, and in the Steklov Mathematical Institute. Here Slutsky computed the functions of variables, which led to the posthumous publication of tables for the incomplete Gamma-function and the chi-squared probability distribution. He died of natural causes in 1948.

See also: KONDRATIEV, NIKOLAI DMITRIEVICH

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VINCENT BARNETT

SMOLENSK ARCHIVE

The Smolensk Archive comprises the Smolensk regional records of the All-Union Communist Party from the October Revolution in 1917 to the German invasion of the USSR in 1941. The German Army captured the Smolensk Archive when it invaded Russia in 1941 and in 1943 moved the contents to Vilnius. They were subsequently recovered by the Soviet authorities in Silesia in March 1946. American intelligence officers removed the files to a restitution center near Frankfurt am Main in 1946.

The archive contains the incomplete and fragmentary records of the Smolensk and Western Oblast (regional) committees (*obkom*). These include the minutes of meetings, resolutions, decisions, and directives made by Communist Party officials, as well as details on Party work relating to agriculture, especially collectivization policy, machine tractor stations, trade unions, industry, armed forces, censorship, education, women, the control commission, and the purges. The archive also contains secret police, procuracy, court, and militia reports as well as private and personal files and the miscellaneous records of the city (*gorkom*) and district (*raikom*) committees. Between 5 and 10 percent of the archive does not pertain to Smolensk, but comprises material seized by the Germans in other parts

of the USSR. The originals of these documents were presented to the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Pursuant to an agreement made at the 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust Era assets, the United States returned most of the archive to Russia on in December 2002. The archives were especially important to Western scholars because they provided an insider's perspective on many historical developments that would otherwise have been unavailable in the era before Mikhail Gorbachev raised the restrictions on access to Soviet archival materials.

See also: ARCHIVES; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

SMOLENSK WAR

This unsuccessful campaign to recover the western border regions lost to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the Time Of Troubles marked Muscovy's first major experiment with the new Western European infantry organization and line tactics.

The Treaty of Deulino (1618) ended the Polish military intervention exploiting Muscovy's Time Of Troubles and established a fourteen-year armistice between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But it came at a high price for the Muscovites: the cession to the Commonwealth of most of the western border regions of Smolensk, Chernigov, and Seversk. This was a vast territory, running from the southeastern border of Livonia to just beyond the Desna River in northeastern

Ukraine. It held more than thirty fortress towns, the most strategic of which was Smolensk, the largest and most formidable of all Muscovite fortresses and guardian of the principal western roads to Moscow. Upon his return from Polish captivity in 1619, Patriarch Filaret, father of Tsar Mikhail, made a new campaign to recover Smolensk, Chernigov, and Seversk from the Poles the primary objective of Muscovite foreign policy.

Most of the diplomatic preconditions for such a *revanche* appeared to be in place by 1630, and by this point the Muscovite government had succeeded in restoring its central chancellery apparatus and fiscal system. It was now able to undertake a massive reorganization and modernization of its army for the approaching war with the Commonwealth. It imported Swedish, Dutch, and English arms to the cost of at least 50,000 rubles; it offered large bounties to recruit Western European mercenary officers experienced in the new infantry organization and line tactics; and it set these mercenary officers to work forming and training New-Formation Regiments—six regiments of Western style infantrymen (*soldaty*), a regiment of heavy cavalry (*reitary*), and a regiment of dragoons (*draguny*). These regiments were drilled in the new European tactics and outfitted and salaried at treasury expense, unlike the old Pomestie-based cavalry army. The New Formation infantry and cavalry would comprise a little more than half of the 33,000-man expeditionary army on the upcoming Smolensk campaign. Muscovy had never before experimented with New Formation units on such a scale.

The death of Polish King Sigismund III in April 1632 led to an interregnum in the Commonwealth and factional struggle in the Diet. Patriarch Filaret took advantage of this confusion to send generals M. B. Shein and A. V. Izmailov against Smolensk with the main corps of the Muscovite field army. By October, Shein and Izmailov had captured more than twenty towns and had placed the fortress of Smolensk under siege. The Polish-Lithuanian garrison holding Smolensk numbered only about two thousand men, and the nearest Commonwealth forces in the region (those of Radziwill and Gonsiewski) did not exceed six thousand. But the besieging Muscovite army suffered logistical problems and desertions; their earthworks did not completely encircle Smolensk and did not offer enough protection from attack from the rear. Meanwhile the international coalition against the Commonwealth began to unravel, with the result that in August 1633, Wladyslaw IV, newly elected King

of Poland, arrived in Shein's and Izmailov's rear with a Polish relief army of 23,000 and placed the Muscovite besiegers under his own siege. In January 1634 Shein and Izmailov were forced to sue for armistice in order to evacuate what was left of their army. They had to leave their artillery and stores behind.

On their return to Moscow, Shein and Izmailov were charged with treason and executed. By the terms of the Treaty of Polianovka (May 1634) the Poles received an indemnity of twenty thousand rubles and were given back all the captured towns save Serpeisk. The next opportunity for Muscovy to regain Smolensk, Seversk, and Chernigov came a full twenty years later when Bogdan Khmelnit-sky and the Ukrainian cossacks sought Tsar Alexei's support for their war for independence from the Commonwealth.

See also: FILARET ROMANOV, METROPOLITAN; NEW-FORMATION REGIMENTS; POLAND; THIRTEEN YEARS' WAR

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BRIAN DAVIES

SMOLNY INSTITUTE

Catherine II (the Great) founded the Smolny Institute for Girls, officially the Society for the Upbringing of Noble Girls, in 1764. Its popular name comes from its site in the Smolny Monastery on the left bank of the Neva River in St. Petersburg. Inspired by Saint-Cyr, a boarding school for girls in France, Smolny was part of Catherine's educational plan to raise cultured, industrious, and loyal subjects.

Ivan Betskoy, the head of this reform effort, was heavily influenced by Enlightenment theorists. Drawing on the ideas of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Betskoy's pedagogical plan for Smolny emphasized moral education and the importance of environment. Girls lived at Smolny continuously from age five to eighteen without visits home, which were deemed corrupting. As at all-male schools such as the Corps of Cadets and the Academy of Arts, Smolny stressed training in the fine arts, especially dance and drama. The curriculum also included reading, writing, foreign languages,

physics, chemistry, geography, mathematics, history, Orthodoxy, needlepoint, and home economics. The range of subjects led Voltaire to declare Smolny superior to Saint-Cyr. In 1765, a division with a less extensive curriculum was added for the daughters of merchants and soldiers.

Catherine held public exams and performances of plays at Smolny, and took her favorite pupils on promenades in the Summer Gardens. Portraits of these favorites were commissioned from the painter Dmitry Levitsky. Smolny also became a stop for visiting foreign dignitaries. Its graduates were known for their manners and talents and were considered highly desirable brides. Some became teachers at the school, and a few were promoted to ladies-in-waiting at court.

Peter Zavodovsky, who directed Catherine's commission to establish a national school system, succeeded Betskoy as de facto head of Smolny in 1783. He replaced French with Russian as the school's primary language and altered the curriculum to emphasize the girls' future roles as wives and mothers.

After Catherine's death in 1796, Maria Fedorovna took over the institute and made changes that set Smolny's course for the rest of its existence. The school's administration became less personal and more bureaucratic. The age of admittance was changed from five to eight, in recognition of the importance of mothering during the early years of a child's life, and the rules forbidding visits home were relaxed.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Smolny maintained its reputation as the most elite educational institution for girls. Its name was regarded as synonymous with high cultural standards, manners, and poise, although sometimes its graduates were considered naive and ill-prepared for life outside of Smolny. The many references to Smolny in the Russian literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries attest to the school's cultural significance.

In October 1917, Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks appropriated the Smolny Institute and made it their headquarters until March 1918. Since then, the Smolny campus has continued to be used for governmental purposes, eventually becoming home to the St. Petersburg Duma. Several rooms have been preserved as a museum of the institute's past.

See also: CATHERINE II; EDUCATION; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; ST. PETERSBURG

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ANNA KUXHAUSEN

SMYCHKA

Smychka, meaning "alliance" or "union" in Russian, was used during the New Economic Policy (NEP), particularly by those Bolsheviks who supported a moderate policy toward the peasantry, to describe a cooperative relationship between workers and peasants.

In 1917 the revolutionary alliance of proletariat and peasantry against the tsarist ruling classes led to victory, but by the end of the Civil War the *smychka* had been severely weakened by harsh War Communism policies of forcible confiscation of grain. Vladimir Lenin introduced the NEP in 1921 to restore the *smychka*, ending confiscatory policies toward the peasantry and allowing limited private enterprise.

The Bolsheviks were in the awkward position of claiming to represent the proletariat but actually ruling over a peasant population that they regarded as potentially bourgeois. In the 1920s they debated what policies should be applied to the peasantry, that is, what the *smychka* should mean. In his last writings, particularly "On Cooperation" and "Better Fewer, But Better" (both 1923), Lenin argued that the *smychka* meant gaining the peasants' trust by recognizing and meeting their needs. Through cooperatives, he said, the vast majority of peasants could be gradually won over to socialism. Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and others members of the right built their program of gradual evolution to socialism on Lenin's last writings, seeing the *smychka* as a permanent feature of Soviet life and calling for concessions to the peasantry. The left feared that the peasant majority could swallow the revolution and resisted concessions, hoping that rapid industrialization would end the need for alliance with the peasantry.

The inherent tensions between Bolshevik goals and peasant needs threatened to rupture the *smychka*. In the 1923 Scissors Crisis, prices for agri-

cultural products plummeted at the same time that those of state-produced manufactured goods rose sharply, opening a price gap that discouraged peasants from marketing agricultural products. Adjustments kept the *smychka* in place, and 1925 was the high point of pro-peasant policies. The Grain Crisis of 1928 and subsequent defeat of the right weakened the *smychka*, and the massive collectivization drive of 1929–1930 ended it completely.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; GRAIN CRISIS OF 1928; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; SCISSORS CRISIS; WAR COMMUNISM

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SOBCHAK, ANATOLY ALEXANDROVICH

(1937–2000), law professor; mayor of St. Petersburg.

Anatoly Sobchak was one of the leading liberal politicians of the perestroika era. Born in Chita, he completed a law degree at Leningrad State University in 1959. He settled permanently in Leningrad in 1962 and joined the faculty of Leningrad State University in 1973, heading the economic law institute and rising to be dean. Unusually for so senior an academic, Sobchak was for many years not a member of the Communist Party. He only joined during the presidency of Mikhail Gorbachev, becoming a candidate member in May 1987, and a full member in June 1988. The next year he was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies, where he became a leader of the Inter-Regional Deputies group and chaired the committee investigating the massacre of demonstrators by Soviet troops in Tiflis in April 1989.

A loyal supporter of Boris Yeltsin, Sobchak was elected mayor of Leningrad in June 1991, the same day that a referendum approved changing the city's name to St. Petersburg. He opposed the August 1991 coup attempt and persuaded the army not to deploy troops in the city. Sobchak presided over the liberalization of the city's economy, whose many defense plants had suffered greatly from the Soviet

Russian politician Anatoly Sobchak was a mentor to President Vladimir Putin. © VITTORIANO RASTELLI/CORBIS

economic collapse. On the recommendation of the rector of Leningrad State University, Stanislav Merkouriev, Sobchak hired a young ex-KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, to handle relations with foreign investors. Putin had been a student in one of Sobchak's classes but they were not personally acquainted. Putin became Sobchak's deputy in 1993 and ran his re-election campaign in July 1996. Sobchak, surprisingly, lost to a challenge from his former deputy, Vladimir Yakovlev.

The next year Yakovlev (known as governor rather than mayor) filed a libel suit against Sobchak after the latter accused him of ties to organized crime in a newspaper interview. In October 1997 Sobchak suffered a heart attack while being questioned by police about corruption allegations, mainly pertaining to the distribution of city-owned apartments. Sobchak went to France for medical treatment and remained there in voluntary exile—beyond the reach of investigators.

The rise of Putin (who became head of the Federal Security Service in July 1998) and the dismissal of Procurator Yuri Skuratov in April 1999 enabled

Sobchak to return to Russia in July 1999. The charges against him were dropped, but his public image was tarnished, and he failed to win a seat in the State Duma in the December 1999 elections. Sobchak died of a heart attack in February 2000 while on a trip to Kaliningrad as Putin's envoy. An emotional Putin attended his funeral and pledged revenge on his enemies, blaming them for his death. Observers took this as referring to Vladimir Yakovlev, but Putin failed to prevent Yakovlev's reelection as St. Petersburg governor in May 2000.

Sobchak's career, in which he evolved from a principled liberal to a defender of Russian capitalism and backer of Vladimir Putin, reflected the broader hopes and disappointments of the Russian transition from communism. Sobchak himself was aware of the contradictions, commenting just before his death that "We have not achieved a democratic, but rather a police state over the past ten years."

See also: PERESTROIKA; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; ST. PETERSBURG; YAKOVLEV, ALEXANDER NIKOLAYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER RUTLAND

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY

Social democracy was a product of capitalism in Imperial Russia around 1900. Until the 1890s, Russian socialism meant agrarian Populism, an illegal, conspiratorial, and terrorist movement of the educated intelligentsia that placed its faith in the peasant village commune. After state-funded railroad building inspired rapid industrial growth in Russia, many intellectuals became Marxist Social Democrats.

Social Democrats believed that they could combine socialism with democracy, without any centralized state nationalization of property. Karl Marx had criticized capitalism as both inefficient and unjust, a cause of violent class struggle that would lead inevitably to a proletarian class seizure of power from the property-owning bourgeoisie, or capitalist class. Industrial capitalism would cause its own demise.

The Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) originated in 1898 in Minsk. The party's central organizer and later source of internal division was Vladimir Ilich Lenin (V. I. Ulyanov). The RSDWP modeled itself after the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD), whose Marxist orthodoxy was then challenged by revisionism. Revisionists argued that reform, not revolution, would best serve worker interests, and favored elections over strikes.

The RSDWP split into Menshevik (minority) and Bolshevik (majority) factions in 1903. The Mensheviks believed that workers should lead the party and constitute its membership. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, believed that well-organized professional revolutionaries could better organize the party against the imperial police. Such revolutionaries would force revolutionary consciousness upon workers, who might otherwise turn to revisionism and reform.

The RSDWP played a minimal role in the 1905 Russian Revolution. Tsar Nicholas II legalized labor unions and allowed a new freely elected parliament, or Duma. But as police cracked down on radical peasants, workers, and non-Russian nationalities seeking independence, party members went underground. Many emigrated to Europe. The Mensheviks broadened their base among factory workers inside Russia. The Bolsheviks robbed banks, fled to Europe, and disagreed over whether or not to participate in elections to the bourgeois Duma. The police succeeded in penetrating the party, arresting many members (including Josef Stalin) and recruiting police agents. By 1914 the RSDWP was divided and weak, competing for support with rival liberal (Constitutional Democrat), agrarian socialist (Social Revolutionaries), and national (Jewish Bund) parties.

In February 1917, Imperial Russia collapsed under the pressures of World War I. A Provisional Government tried to continue the war and carry out democratic and agrarian reforms. But the army began to disintegrate, and the urban and rural masses, organized in soviets (councils), moved increasingly leftward, seizing factories and land. The Bolsheviks slowly developed into a mass party.

In April 1917, Lenin returned to Petrograd (St. Petersburg) from Swiss exile. He immediately declared war on the bourgeois Provisional Government. In November, the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, Moscow, and other towns. Lenin headed a new socialist government advocating workers

control of factories, peasant land reform, and peace with the Central Powers.

Russia then became the world's first socialist state, led by a single party, the Bolsheviks, renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), or (RKP (b)) in 1918, then the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1924. Lenin quickly created his own police state and arrested, tried, and exiled old political enemies, especially Mensheviks, Kadets, and Social Revolutionaries. Many ordinary citizens died in war, civil war, famine, and terror as a new party ruled in their name.

After the Bolshevik–Menshevik split, the RSDWP became essentially two parties. The Bolsheviks led Russia down a separate path to civil war, industrial growth, collectivization of agriculture, and totalitarianism. The Mensheviks became exile critics of a revolution they helped create and barely survived. In 1991, the RSDWP's greatest achievement, the Soviet Union, collapsed.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MENSHEVIKS; OCTOBER REVOLUTION

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ROBERT C. WILLIAMS

SOCIALISM

Broadly speaking, socialism is the ideology of collective ownership of the means of production and the joint distribution of goods. There were two principal currents in Russian socialism. One held that the peasants, who comprised more than 80 percent of the population, would be the driving force in the creation of the new society; and the other assigned that role to the industrial proletariat. The first current was initially advocated by Alexander Herzen (1812–1870), who had been a supporter

of the Decembrists and left Russia for the West in 1847 to escape persecution. The failure of the Revolutions of 1848, which he attributed to the conservatism and attachment to private property of most Europeans, disappointed him deeply. He concluded that the chances for socialism were much better in his native country because the peasant commune had accustomed the Russian people to communal life and egalitarianism. The Russian peasant, Herzen contended, “has no morality save that which flows instinctively, naturally, from his communism.” These ideas came to be known as *narodnichestvo*, which literally means “populism” but is perhaps better translated as “Russian socialism.” Taken up by such thinkers and activists as Mikhail A. Bakunin (a radical anarchist), Nikolai K. Mikhailovsky, and Nikolai G. Chernyshevsky, the populists gained a substantial following among the intelligentsia by the 1860s and 1870s. Although all populists agreed that Russia could by-pass capitalism in its evolution toward socialism, there was considerable disagreement over the means to achieve the final goal. Toward the end of his life, Herzen believed that socialism could be attained by peaceful means. Peter I. Lavrov was another strong advocate of peaceful methods; from the 1860s until his death in 1900 he argued that it was the obligation of intellectuals to educate the people politically and thus prepare them to undertake their own liberation. Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, did not believe that force could be avoided.

The failed attempt by the populist Dmitry V. Karakozov to assassinate Alexander II in 1866 and the ensuing repression prompted many revolutionary intellectuals to opt for peaceful tactics. Early in the 1870s, idealistic young *narodniki* launched the Go to the People movement; hundreds of them moved to the countryside and lived with the peasants in order to teach them to read and write as well as the rudiments of modern technology. But the ultimate goal of the populists was to prepare the masses for the revolution. Many peasants were baffled by the visitors and feared they were trying to lead them astray. Some peasants even turned them in to the police, who in the mid-1870s arrested many of the populists, bringing the well-intentioned project to a close. But the ideas of the populists remained alive and were incorporated by the largest socialist movement in Russia, the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs), founded in 1902. The SRs advocated the transfer of all land to peasant communes or local associations, which in turn would assign it on an egalitarian basis to all who wished to earn their living by farming. Industry

would be similarly socialized. Although the Socialist Revolutionaries insisted that the final goal, socialism, must be achieved by means of persuasion, they tolerated the "Combat Organization," an independent organ of the party that carried out dozens of political assassinations. Political terror, many believed, was necessary to bring about the dismantling of the autocratic regime.

In the meantime, in the late 1870s, a small group of intellectuals led by Georgy V. Plekhanov founded a Marxist movement in the name of the industrial working class, and this represented the second major current in Russian socialism. The Marxists contended that Russia's development would be similar to trends in Central and Western Europe. The country would be industrialized, and would undergo a bourgeois revolution during which the autocratic system would be replaced by a constitutional order dominated by a middle class committed to capitalism. Eventually, when industrialization had reached maturity and the proletariat had become a powerful force, it would stage a second, socialist revolution. In 1898, the Russian Marxists founded the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which five years later split into two factions.

The split occurred over the seemingly minor question of how to define a party member, but it soon turned out that the differences between the Bolsheviks (majoritarians) led by Vladimir I. Lenin and the Mensheviks (minoritarians) led by Yuli O. Martov and Paul B. Axelrod touched on fundamental issues. Lenin, in keeping with views he had expressed in 1902 in *What Is to Be Done?*, favored a highly centralized, elitist, hierarchically organized political party, whereas the Mensheviks stressed the necessity and desirability of broad working-class participation in the movement's affairs and in the coming revolutionary events. In short order, it also became evident that while both factions subscribed to a revolutionary course, the Mensheviks tended to adopt more moderate tactics than did the Bolsheviks.

On November 7, 1917, after the country had endured three years of war that caused untold devastation and loss of life and eight months of revolutionary turbulence, the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government, which consisted of moderates committed to democracy and had been formed when the tsarist regime collapsed earlier that year, in March. Then, on November 8, one day after the Bolsheviks had formed a new government,

Lenin sought to placate the peasants, still the vast majority of the population, by adopting the SR land program. He ordered the abrogation of the property rights of the nobility and placed land in the rural regions at the disposal of land committees and district soviets of peasants' deputies for distribution to the peasants. But the Bolsheviks also remained faithful to their own program by introducing workers' control in industry and in commercial and agricultural enterprises, abolishing distinctions and special privileges based on class, eliminating titles in the army, and outlawing inequality in wages. Lenin was convinced that the economically more advanced countries of Europe with large proletarian populations would soon follow Russia's example in adopting socialism.

When this did not happen, his successor, Josef V. Stalin, in 1924 formulated the doctrine of "socialism in one country," according to which Russia was strong enough economically to reach the final goal of socialism by itself. Four years later, the Soviet government launched a second revolution by forcing the peasants into collectives and speeding up the process of industrialization. Much more so than ever before, the major economic decisions were now made by officials in Moscow. Then, in 1936, Stalin formally declared that the goal of socialism had in fact been attained. This claim was disputed by Leon D. Trotsky, the man he had defeated in the struggle over the leadership of the country after Lenin's death in 1924. Trotsky maintained that socialism could triumph only on a worldwide basis. Stalinist socialism remained the regnant ideology of the country until 1991, although many Stalinist methods of rule were gradually abandoned following Stalin's death in 1953.

See also: BOLSHEVIKS; HERZEN, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MARXISM; MENSHEVIKS; POPULISM; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY; SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; STALIN, JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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ABRAHAM ASCHER

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

The question of whether socialism could be built in the USSR provoked a great ideological and political debate in the Soviet Union that lasted from 1924 to 1927. In response to Leon Trotsky, who, on the basis of his theory of “permanent revolution,” believed that “the genuine rise of socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe,” Josef Stalin first propounded his doctrine of “socialism in one country” in a newspaper article of December 1922. The difference between the two theories was based on a distinction between the processes of making a socialist revolution and a socialist economy. Every Bolshevik believed that the revolution that had proved victorious in October 1917 was a socialist revolution, but according to party doctrine it was impossible to build a socialist economy in a lone backward country, even though it was now clear that the foundations of a socialist economy were being laid. Stalin did not deny the importance of the international revolution or its likelihood in the near future because of the crisis in capitalism. But seizing on a few scattered passages of Lenin, including, from the last speech Lenin ever made, the quote, “NEP [New Economic Policy] Russia will become socialist Russia,” Stalin argued that because the “dictatorship of the proletariat” had been established in Russia through the peculiar conditions of the 1917 revolution—the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry—the complete organization of a socialist economy in the USSR was possible, as part of the process of building social-

ism. He qualified this by saying that “for the final victory of socialism, for the organization of Socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient” (*Problems of Leninism*, 1926), and, moreover, that the victory of socialism could not be considered secure while the USSR was encircled by hostile capitalist powers.

Stalin developed the theory over the next two years, particularly in *Problems of Leninism* (1926). It was a very effective formula. Politically it was used as a stick with which to beat Trotsky, the Left, Leningrad, and United Oppositions: Stalin condemned his critics for lack of faith in the possibility of building socialism in the Soviet Union. Economically it was used as a basis for the industrialization of the USSR through the Five-Year Plans and the collectivization of agriculture, and it came to mean the opposite of NEP. It provided a slogan expressive of Bolshevik self-confidence after victory in the civil war and the establishment of the new regime, and in contrast to “permanent revolution” held out the prospect of stability. Its appeal lay partly in its reawakening of national pride in the self-sufficiency of the Russian revolution of 1917 and in the potential and destiny of the Russian people to become the progenitor of a new civilization. Through “socialism in one country” Stalin established himself as an ideologue, and the theory became the supreme test of loyalty in the Stalinist party and state.

See also: NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

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DEREK WATSON

SOCIALIST REALISM

On April 23, 1932, the Party Central Committee of the USSR adopted socialist realism (SR) as the official artistic mandate for Soviet literature (de facto

for art, music, film, and architecture as well), a practice that, theoretically, governed the production of any work of art until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. While most frequently associated with literature (especially since the adoption of SR occurred practically simultaneously with the dissolution of all literary groups and their subjugation into one Union of Writers), socialist realism provided the guidelines according to which any artist should craft his work.

Yet the very concept of socialist realism problematizes the process of definition. Over the course of its implementation socialist realism's practitioners and critics have referred to it as a method, doctrine, framework, or style. Precisely the inability to definitively label it points to its inherent contradictions. Indeed, the best label for socialist realism could well be critic Yevgeny Dobrenko's term—an aesthetic system. This moniker implies that socialist realism dictated far more than the form of an artistic work; in addition, socialist realism strove to control how an artist worked and how an audience received and perceived any work of art. Just as events in the Soviet Union unfolded, so, too, did socialist realism adjust to the new demands of changing times. Consequently, socialist realism was realized as a totalizing system that would inculcate Soviet citizens into the new ideological system, the result of the Bolshevik revolution, and the emergence of Stalinism.

Andrei Zhdanov, then Leningrad Party boss and frequent spokesman for Party policy, delineated the program of SR at the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934. Increasingly critics identify the Soviet writer Maxim Gorky as the true instigator behind the movement given his active role in establishing journals (such as *Nashi Dostizheniya* [Our Achievements]) and literary series (such as *The History of Factories and Plants*), as well as his editorship of volumes such as *The History of the Construction of the Stalin White Sea–Baltic Canal*. Indeed many of Gorky's polemical and didactic articles of the time delineate how writers were called to document, applaud, and encourage the building of the new Soviet state, especially vis-à-vis the first two Five-Year Plans, even though Gorky himself produced no original works of literature during this final period of his career. In addition, as had been proposed most vociferously by RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) in the 1920s, common workers should emerge as the chief arbiters of artistic production. It was believed that if properly trained, any worker could become a So-

viet writer or artist, especially because, ideologically speaking, only workers had the appropriate class pedigree.

Not surprisingly, although attempts were made to reforge (a common metaphor of the early 1930s) workers into masterful artists, much of this activity was in vain. As readers in the early 1930s were quick to point out, badly written or executed SR art was neither appealing nor inspiring. Indeed, recently some critics have noted that the reading and viewing public of the early 1930s played a much larger role in determining what kind of art would be produced, thanks to their active response to any artistic production that did not meet with their aesthetic sensibilities or did not conform to their conception of a typical work of Soviet art. This did not imply, however, that subsequent works of socialist realist art had uniformly high quality and were superior works of art; most were not.

Hence, mounting pressure was applied to members of the various artistic establishments to embrace the new aesthetic model of socialist realism. In the literary arena some writers, most notably Mikhail Bulgakov, Osip Mandelshtam, Yevgeny Zamyatin, and Anna Akhmatova to name but a few, consistently resisted the pressure to produce Party-mandated art; consequently they found it essentially impossible to have their work published. Others such as Mikhail Zoshchenko, Viktor Shklovsky, and Valentin Katayev attempted to find a compromise position that enabled them to continue to be published while maintaining a modicum of personal artistic style and integrity. Yet others, among them Alexander Fadeyev, Alexei Tolstoy and Vera Inber, subscribed completely to the Party mandate by producing literary works that strove to comply as closely as possible with socialist realism. Here, too, the issue of artistic quality emerged as a concern.

Yet the outline above should not suggest that the divisions among artists were black and white categories that did not allow for subversions of the socialist realist canon or deviations from the "Party line" within an artist's oeuvre. Consequently, it is not uncommon to find musical comedies in the 1930s, which, while celebrating the heightened class consciousness and loyalty of Soviet citizens, also featured musical production numbers, slapstick comedy, and lighthearted romance (e.g., *Volga, Volga*, *The Jolly Fellows*, *Circus*). In addition, in literature the early "canonical" works of socialist realism, which were posited as models for future works, predated the adoption of the socialist

realist aesthetic. These include Gorky's novel *Mat* (Mother, 1906), Fyodor Gladkov's post-Civil war story *Tsement* (Cement, 1925), Dmitry Furmanov's Civil War epic *Chapayev* (1923), and Alexander Fadeyev's Bolshevik drama *Razgrom* (The Rout, 1927) all of which presented the struggle for socialism from authors who understood how to present Soviet reality in its revolutionary development. As these examples illustrate, in literature the socialist realist genre of choice was the novel. Similarly, in music the symphony reigned supreme, while in tactile art, sculpture, and architecture massive, grandiloquent, and neoclassical exemplars managed to concretize the physical manifestations of socialist realism.

Indeed, in one respect socialist realism's lineage harkened back to the nineteenth century since its foundation rested on the aesthetic principles of realism and its purported ability to truthfully depict life as it was happening. Moreover, the populist movements of the second half of the nineteenth century, which greatly appealed to Bolshevik ideologists, including Vladimir Lenin, provided the prototypes not only for the appropriate psychological makeup of a character. In addition, these populist models served to situate socialist realist aesthetics in a revolutionary context that applauded the development of socialism.

In addition, some critics have traced socialist realism's genealogy through early twentieth-century Russian symbolism, a development that thereby enabled the Russian artistic and political avant-garde movements to share the notion of a perfect future life. The artistic avant-garde drew on the work of the Russian symbolist philosopher Vladimir Soloviev as the basis of its doctrine, while the political avant-garde followed Marxist ideology on its path to create a new Soviet society. Both avant-garde projects shared many of the same ideas, metaphors, and terminology in describing the "new world" they hoped to create. For example, while Soloviev espoused the idea that art was an instrument for creating the future, Marxists maintained that art was an instrument for transforming life, a process that, by its very nature, would create new men and women. Indeed, the Left Front Futurist theorist Nikolai Chuzhak links Solovievian symbolist principles with Marxist ideology, thereby creating a Marxist aesthetic that blended the theurgic impulse of Solovievian thinking with Marxist dialectics. Chuzhak labels this end product "ultra-realism," a construct that "would express the dialectical collision between 'what is' and 'what will

be'" (Gutkin, 1999, p. 46). According to this interpretation, the artistic and political avant-garde movements already had sown the seeds of socialist realism long before its actual adoption.

Similarly, the critic Boris Groys has argued, among other notions, that socialist realism was more avant-garde than the avant-garde itself. Whereas the avant-garde provided numerous theoretical models, mandates, and pronouncements for how the future world *should* be, they were neither willing nor able to completely replace or even destroy the traditions that preceded and produced them. In fact this futuristic vision could never fully be realized, precisely because the avant-garde sought to construct it on the existing cultural structure. Conversely, socialist realism was, according to Groys, able to achieve that which the avant-garde never could—to reject traditional cultural structures and in their place to construct a new system of artistic production that reflected the new society that was supposedly being created in the Soviet Union.

Critics such as Herman Ermolaev and C. Vaughan James have argued that the basis for socialist realism rests firmly on Communist Party ideology and its desire to control cultural production to serve its ideological and propagandistic needs. Finally, the writer and literary critic Andrei Sinyavsky has proposed that the aesthetic system after which socialist realism was modeled harkened back not to nineteenth-century realism, but rather to the neoclassicism of the late eighteenth century. As Sinyavsky notes, the necessity to produce state-mandated art; the directive to applaud the glory, power, and vision of the State, especially vis-à-vis its own citizens and other cultures; the proclivity to build, write, paint, or compose works of art that were massive in structure, grandiose in their praise, and fraught with visions of how life should be, not as it actually was—these elements paralleled the demands put to socialist realism.

Clearly the development and historical precedents in Russian cultural history for socialist realism are richer and more complicated than originally thought. In fact, even the proposed elements that had to be included in an artistic production to make it truly socialist realist were reconfigured and reemphasized as this aesthetic system continued through successive eras in the development of the Soviet Union.

Initially a number of characteristics were required of a work of socialist realism. First, it had to depict Soviet life not as it was, but as it *should* be. Hence, any work of socialist realist art would

exemplify for its reader or viewer a behavior, event, or image that captured an “ideal” rather than reality. As stated in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (September 3, 1934), “Socialist realism, being the basic method of Soviet literature and literary criticism, demands from the artist the truthful, historically concrete depiction of reality in its revolutionary development. At the same time, truthfulness and historical concreteness of the artistic depiction of reality must be combined with the task of ideologically remodeling and educating the working people in the spirit of socialism.” While this statement specifically refers to literature, the parameters it sets forth were applicable to any artistic production.

In essence, any work of socialist realism should depict the bright future that Soviet public rhetoric continually promised its citizens, provided that they followed the socialist realist model. The epitome of this model was the “new Soviet man/woman” who through his or her Party-mindedness, intensive labor, class identity, and singlemindedness achieved great feats that resulted in a happy ending and that glorified the Soviet Union, thereby demonstrating the correctness of its ideology. In literature these new Soviet men and women were created by Soviet writers, the “engineers of human souls,” as Josef Stalin called them. Hence, almost from its inception Socialist realism was redolent with industrial metaphors and images. Writers, indeed all artists, were engineers charged with “reforging” or reconstructing characters, images, words, and deeds into manifestations of Party policy and Soviet power.

Originally a work of socialist realism should contain four key elements. The first was *ideinost*—the work must be anchored in and resonate with Soviet ideology, i.e. Marxism-Leninism. Second, the work must convey *klassovost*—class-consciousness. The socialist realist heroes and heroines must personify their class heritage. Preferably they were to be members of the working class or, more rarely, enlightened peasants or intellectuals, who embraced the new ideology and demonstrated through their lives and work their allegiance to their class, and, ultimately, to the Soviet Union. Third, a socialist realist work must contain *partynost*—Party-mindedness. This meant that the firm, guiding hand of the Communist Party of the USSR constantly exerted its presence in a work of socialist realism, either in the character of an ideal Party member in a work of literature, or through the visual or aural presentation of a theme or motif that exuded strength, decisiveness, and grandiosity. Finally, works of socialist realism should have

narodnost—the content of a work of art should represent the interests and viewpoint of the people (*narod*) rendered in an intelligible, approachable manner.

Throughout the 1930s the aforementioned guidelines were strictly applied to artistic production. Whereas in the early 1930s collective heroism and collective labor (consonant with the goals of the first two five-year plans) were glorified and promoted, in the latter half of the 1930s up to the advent of World War II, individual heroes, from Stalin to polar explorers, from collective farm workers to Stakhanovites, were extolled. As the war years unfolded, the official enforcement of socialist realist imperatives lessened but definitely did not disappear. The slight flexibility, afforded writers in particular, to depict the brutality of battle during World War II (but not any mistakes of Stalin or his military commanders) was counterbalanced by the heroic music, art work, and films that understandably lauded the honest heroism displayed by common Soviet citizens in the face of the war.

Nonetheless, when the war concluded, a redoubling of efforts to enforce strict principles of socialist realism emerged. Primary responsibility for this enforcement fell, once again, to Andrei Zhdanov, then chair of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Zhdanov’s most virulent wrath fell on poet Anna Akhmatova and writer Mikhail Zoshchenko, whose work Zhdanov aggressively attacked in the press. Consequently, the canonical elements of socialist realism reemerged and prevailed until the so-called Thaw in the late 1950s.

This period (1953–1963) witnessed another lessening of the paradigmatic strictures that defined socialist realism. During this period relatively greater flexibility marked artistic endeavors. In particular, literary works were permitted to explore previously untouchable topics—the Soviet concentration camps, the difficulties of life in the countryside, the trauma of the post-war years—in a more humanely artistic, less formulaic way. This did not mean that Party supervision of artistic production diminished completely, nor were all works of literature written at this time permitted to be published (e.g., Lidia Chukovskaya’s *Sofia Petrovna*, Solzhenitsyn’s *First Circle*). Rather, a slight lessening of the controls enabled some artists to produce works that stretched the boundaries of socialist realism.

This short-lived easing of control over artistic production ended with a further tightening of the

parameters that defined socialist realism. While these parameters never approached the strictness of the early years of Soviet power, they persisted nonetheless. Ironically during this ensuing period—called Stagnation (1964–1985)—a number of interesting, original films, works of literature, art, and music appeared either through official channels or through the burgeoning artistic underground. This underground phenomenon permitted a host of officially censored or unacceptable works to be circulated among appreciative audiences through *samizdat* (self-publication) or *tamizdat* (publication abroad). Consequently, with each passing year, the hold that the socialist realist aesthetic exerted on Soviet culture gradually lessened until it dissolved into the period of glasnost in the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, the village and urban prose movements of the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that socialist realism’s elasticity was greater than one might have imagined. Indeed, the traditional view that the artistic value of any work of socialist realism was compromised by virtue of the fact that it was Party-mandated, has lost some of its urgency. While not all works of socialist realism deserve attention and appreciation, many do. When coupled with the non-socialist realist works of this period, most notably Mikhail Bulgakov’s novel *The Master and Margarita*, we are left with a rich, variegated artistic legacy.

Moreover, the fundamental fact that socialist realism changed with the ideological and political demands of a particular time period argues for an inherent organicity that infused the system since its inception. Our understanding and, perhaps, even appreciation of socialist realism has grown thanks not only to the post-glasnost flood of archival texts and documents, but also thanks to the broader vision that hindsight provides.

See also: BULGAKOV, MIKHAIL AFANASIEVICH; GORKY, MAXIM; MOTION PICTURES; RUSSIAN ASSOCIATION OF PROLETARIAN WRITERS; SAMIZDAT; SILVER AGE; SOLOVIEV, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH; THAW, THE; ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

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CYNTHIA A. RUIDER

SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES

The Russian Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party arose between 1900 and 1902. Industrial growth, peasant unrest, and the rise of the Marxist Social Democratic movement spurred an array of leaders

from the earlier populist movement, as well as new figures, to create a party that adapted the older movement's traditions to the new realities. Socialist Revolutionary ideology, organizational base, and personnel therefore reflected, but was not identical to nineteenth-century, Russian populism. The prime mover was Victor Chernov, the educated grandson of a serf. Chernov hailed from the Volga region, the new party's first bastion. Chernov's neo-populist theory maintained that industrialization had created a sizable proletariat and that the peasants had become a revolutionary class. In the SR view, a coalition of the radical intelligentsia, the industrial proletariat, and the peasants would make the coming revolution, whereas Russia's middle class would remain quiescent. Consequently, the revolution would be socialist, hence the party's title. This complex of views gave birth to a program aimed at propagandizing and recruiting workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. In addition, the SRs utilized terrorism to destabilize, rather than overthrow, the existing regime. The actual revolution, they insisted, would result from hard organizational work and a popular uprising.

During the early 1900s, the party laid down a network of peasant-oriented organizations and in the cities challenged the Social Democrats among the proletariat. The SR Party won over some of the Social Democrats' following through its popular terror program and appeal to both peasants and urban workers and as a result of splits within Social Democracy. By the 1905–1907 Revolution, the latter party still had an edge among the proletariat, but the SRs operated virtually unchallenged among the peasants. The SRs' special attention to arming workers and peasants allowed them to play a lively role in armed struggles in Moscow, Saratov, and elsewhere during 1905. However, as Chernov later admitted, none of the socialists proved capable of uniting the opposition to overthrow the regime. Beginning in 1908, the Stolypin repression damaged all socialist organizations and destroyed SR-oriented national peasant, railroad, and teachers' unions. Debates and splits characterized party life, as the party put the terror program into abeyance. Furthermore, the revelation that party leader Evno Azev was a police spy further demoralized party cadres. Yet the party survived and plunged into the nascent labor movement. This tactic brought the SRs to virtual parity with the Social Democrats in many industrial areas and provided them with the means to become fully involved in the post-1912 revival of the revolutionary movement.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 gave the regime its last opportunity to suppress the radical movement. Like the Social Democrats, the SRs split over the war issue. Leftists, known variously as Left SRs or SR-Internationalists, opposed the war, whereas Right SRs supported the government's war effort. By 1916 the government's ability to control the revolutionary movement waned. SR organizations opposed the war and propagandized revolution, often in coordination with Social Democrats. The February 1917 Revolution reflected protracted, sustained revolutionary activity, not least by SRs, who were also the revolution's prime early beneficiaries. After tsarism's fall, the SRs strove to reunite the party's left, right, and center in order to dominate the new revolution. Moderate SRs and Mensheviks, in alliance with the liberals, soon led the Provisional Government, which the SR Alexander Kerensky headed after July. Still, the dedication of the moderate socialist-liberal coalition to pursuing the war gave ammunition to the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs, who began to call for soviet, socialist power. Leftist SRs gradually moved away from the moderate leadership, which by then included Chernov and other former radicals. By the fall of 1917, the SR-Mensheviks' cooperation with the liberals discredited those parties in the eyes of many workers and soldiers, who supported the Bolsheviks and other leftists. During the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks removed the Provisional Government from power in the name of the soviets. Deprived of the reins of government, the SRs' residual support from the peasantry held them in good stead in the November 1917 Constituent Assembly elections, a success that proved untranslatable into political power. After the Soviet government dismissed the Constituent Assembly in early January 1918, many SR delegates, including Chernov, formed a government in Samara that sought legitimacy in association with the Constitutional Assembly. This government, like other SR-oriented governments in Arkhangelsk and Siberia, failed to stand up to Red and White military forces, in part owing to the shift of peasant support to the Left SRs, now a separate party.

By late 1918 the SR Party had once again become an underground resistance movement, in this case against the communists, a status that party leaders managed to sustain until 1922. Massive arrests and the famous SR trials of that year effectively ended the party's existence inside Soviet Russia. Chernov and many leaders escaped and lived in the European and North American emigration but had no real influence from abroad. Although the SR approach had initially won the party a huge back-

ing during 1917, its combined worker, peasant, and intelligentsia program proved too broad to exercise power. Likewise, Chernov's post-October 1917 "third way," which hoped to unite democratic elements of the population between the two extremes of Bolshevism and the reactionary Whites failed, to catch hold in the chaos of civil war.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; CHERNOV, VIKTOR MIKHAILOVICH; CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; LEFT SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; MENSHEVIKS; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; POPULISM; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; REVOLUTION OF 1905; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY

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MICHAEL MELANCON

SOKOLOVSKY, VASILY DANILOVICH

(1897–1968), marshal of the Soviet Union (1946), military commander, and theoretician.

Native of the Hrodna region, from a peasant family, Vasily Sokolovsky entered the Red Army in February 1918 and studied in a short course for commanders. During the Civil War, he served with cavalry units. He later was transferred to central Asia and was attached to the Turkestan Military District and commanded units in Samarkand and Fergana, which were engaged in fighting against the Basmashi guerrillas. In 1921 he graduated from the military academy. Between 1922 and 1930, he served as chief of staff of a division and corps, and from 1930 to 1935 as commander of a division and chief of staff of the Volga, Ural, and Moscow Mil-

tary Districts. He joined the Communist Party in 1931. Sokolovsky was fortunate not to come under suspicion during the Great Terror. In May 1940 he received the rank of lieutenant general. In February 1941 he was appointed as deputy chief of staff of the Red Army. In the beginning of the war, after Stalin ordered the arrest and execution of the leadership of the shattered West Front, Sokolovsky was appointed chief of staff of this front (July 1941–January 1942 and May 1942–February 1943). Along with these appointments, he was also the chief of staff of the Western Theater (July–October 1941 and May 1942). After the Battle of Moscow, the West Front, under Georgy Zhukov and Ivan Konev, failed in repeated attempts to break through the enemy lines, suffering massive losses for little gain, except for preventing the German units from being deployed elsewhere. Sokolovsky was involved in all these battles, and in February 1943, he was appointed commander of the West Front. His tenure in this position was marked by a lack of success even in sectors where the Red Army enjoyed a 10–1 superiority over the enemy. Sokolovsky was removed from command in April 1944 and replaced by Ivan Chernyakhovsky, and it was under his leadership that the West Front, now renamed the Third Belorussian Front, managed to roll over the enemy lines. During the great summer offensive of 1944, Sokolovsky returned to staff positions. He was attached to the First Ukrainian Front in April 1945 and took part in the Berlin Operation. Despite a rather undistinguished record during the war, Sokolovsky's star rose in the postwar years. In 1945 he was Deputy Commander of the Soviet forces in Germany, and after Zhukov's departure in 1946, the commander. In 1945 he also received the title of hero of the Soviet Union, a rarity for a staff officer. In 1946 Sokolovsky was elected to the Supreme Soviet. From 1946 to 1949 he was a member of the Allied Control Commission. In March 1946 he was the first deputy minister of the armed forces (from February 1950, war minister). In June 1952, he headed the General Staff and continued to hold the position after Stalin's death until April 1960. He was also the first deputy war minister (from 1953, minister of defense). In 1952 he was elected to the Central Committee, but was demoted to candidate member in 1961. He was removed from active command in June 1960 and was attached to the Red Army inspectorate. He is buried at the Kremlin Wall. Sokolovsky's fame rests mainly on his views on military strategy, published first in 1963, which have been studied in depth by Western strategists as the "Bible" of Soviet military doctrine.

See also: MILITARY ART; MILITARY DOCTRINE; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; WORLD WAR II

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MICHAEL PARRISH

SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT

In the summer of 1980, Poland experienced labor unrest on an unprecedented scale. Faced with nationwide strikes, the ruling Communist Party was forced to sanction, for the first time in a Soviet-bloc country, the creation of independent trade unions, free of state control.

The emergence of the Solidarity trade union movement was viewed with acute anxiety by the leaders of Poland's neighboring socialist states, the USSR in particular. How, given that the living and working conditions of Soviet workers were at least as bad as those of their Polish counterparts, could the development of similar labor unrest be forestalled in the USSR? The rise of Solidarity accordingly contributed to a far-reaching debate over political and economic reform in the USSR. The debate was even more significant since it occurred at a moment when the Soviet leadership was facing a major generational shift and concomitant power struggle. The aging leadership of Leonid Brezhnev had allowed social and economic problems to accumulate to such an extent that the USSR was experiencing stagnation in economic growth. This threatened the informal social contract between leaders and rank-and-file workers.

In the early months of the Polish crisis (late 1980 and early 1981), after deciding against an invasion, the Brezhnev leadership adopted a series of stopgap measures to ward off the danger of contagion. For example, the jamming of Western radio broadcasts was resumed, while government financial priorities were revised to put increased emphasis on consumption.

By the time martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981 it was clear that the danger of spillover to the USSR—if it ever existed—had been averted. Apart from a few isolated strikes and scattered leafleting in the USSR's western republics, the Polish events evoked little sympathy among Soviet workers, who were inclined to believe that the USSR was subsidising its Warsaw Pact allies anyway.

Faced with a continuing slowdown in the rate of economic growth, which was leading to stagnation, if not actual reduction, of popular living standards, the Soviet leadership abandoned carrots for sticks. This was exemplified by the brief leadership of Yuri Andropov (1982–1983), who launched a massive campaign to raise workplace discipline and crack down on crime, corruption, and alcoholism, with only limited results.

The Polish events continued to reverberate when, in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet communist party. Gorbachev publicly identified himself with reformist Soviet academics who argued that the Polish crisis was attributable not simply to the mistakes of Poland's leaders but to a general weakness afflicting all single-party, planned economies of the Soviet type. Members of the reformist camp used the Polish example to press for radical reforms of the Soviet political and economic system. The Polish experience can accordingly be said to have acted as a catalyst to Gorbachev's policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring).

Gorbachev's efforts to persuade Soviet workers and managers to take responsibility for the quality of their work, in return for enhanced rewards, met first with apathy, then with hostility and resistance. Gradually he adopted more radical measures, culminating in his efforts to strip the communist party of its monopoly on power. In attacking the party, however, Gorbachev was attacking the mainspring of the Soviet system. The result was the collapse of the USSR itself.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; LABOR; POLAND; TRADE UNIONS

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ELIZABETH TEAGUE

SOLOVIEV, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH

(1853–1900), philosopher, theologian, journalist, poet, literary critic.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Vladimir Soloviev sought to counter the secular trend in Russian thought by articulating a world view grounded in Christianity. As a young man, Soloviev seemed destined to become the foremost academic philosopher of the Slavophile school, and his early works, such as *The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists* (1874), reflected Slavophile themes, but in time he gravitated from Slavophilism to Westernism, much like his father, the renowned historian Sergei Mikhailovich Soloviev. When Alexander II was assassinated in 1881, Soloviev called upon the new tsar to set an example of Christian forgiveness by sparing the lives of the terrorists. The ensuing scandal led to his exile from Russia's government-controlled universities, a lifelong career as an independent writer, and eventually an association with the liberal journal *Vestnik Evropy* (European Messenger). Soloviev led an unconventional life as a kind of secular monk dedicated to intense intellectual work; the result was a remarkable output of philosophy, theology, poetry, literary criticism, and social commentary.

Soloviev's philosophical approach was a synthesis of Western philosophy (particularly German idealist thought) and the Orthodox faith in which he had been raised. His philosophical system emphasized the integration of science, philosophy, and religion. At the center of his philosophical outlook was the concept of the unity of all—the idea that the world was an Absolute in the process of becoming. On this basis, he developed a unique Christian metaphysics in his *Lectures on God-Manhood* (1877–1881). He argued that reality had been fractured by the Fall, and that history, the center of which was the Incarnation of Christ (the “God-man”), was a process leading to renewal of the unity of all. In this work, he also introduced the elusive concept of Sophia, which at various times he referred to as the “world soul,” the ideal of a perfect humanity, and the “eternal feminine” principle in the Divine.

Soloviev's fascination with Sophia was reflected in personal mystical experience. His reputation as a mystic derived from his poetry, most famously the poem “Three Meetings,” in which he described three encounters with Sophia, first as a young boy, then during his studies in the British Museum, and finally in the Egyptian desert.

Meanwhile Soloviev was developing a liberal theology similar to the Social Gospel movement in the West. He criticized conservative intellectuals for compromising the moral claims of the Gospels, and

advocated unification of the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches. Soloviev's enthusiastic ecumenism provoked a nationalist backlash, which in turn led to his Christian critique of nationalism (*The National Question in Russia*, 2 vols., 1888, 1891). Soloviev went on to produce a wide-ranging ethical treatise, *The Justification of the Good* (1897), in which he provided an overall theory as well as practical discussion of such issues as nationalism, capitalism, and war. He also contributed to the development of a liberal philosophy of law in Russia.

In the year of his untimely death at age forty-seven, Soloviev published *Three Conversations on War, Progress, and the End of History*, a controversial work of fiction that questioned the efficacy of human action in an evil world. The work concluded with “The Short Tale of the Anti-Christ,” a futuristic story about the end of the world. Some scholars argue that Soloviev here rejected his liberal theology, but others contend that the central meaning of the story is consistent with his earlier work, because a unified, truly ecumenical humanity triumphs.

A uniquely independent thinker during his life, Soloviev had great influence after his death. His theology inspired social activism among some Orthodox clergy, a trend cut short by the Bolshevik Revolution. His philosophy paved the way for Orthodox thinkers like Sergei Bulgakov and Pavel Florensky. His mystical poetry inspired symbolists like Alexander Blok and Andrei Bely. And after the Soviet Union came to an end, many Russians returned to Soloviev as a guidepost for creating a new Russian philosophy.

See also: BELY, ANDREI; BLOK, ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH; BULGAKOV, SERGEI NIKOLAYEVICH; ORTHODOXY; SILVER AGE

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GREG GAUT

SOLOVKI ISLAND See GULAG.**SOLOVKI MONASTERY**

Located on the Solovki Archipelago in the White Sea, the Solovki (Solovetsk) monastery was founded between 1429 and 1436 by the hermits Savaty and German, followed by the monk and future abbot Zosima. By the early sixteenth century, Savaty and Zosima had become the patron saints of the White Sea region. Solovki, also a garrison, was one of Russia's most important cloisters with extensive territories, earning income from trade, salt, fishing, and rents. Metropolitan Phillip II of Moscow contributed significantly to Solovki's architectural development while serving as abbot (1546–1566). Its monastic rule, formulated in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, became a template for later communities.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich's troops besieged Solovki from 1668 to 1676 in a conflict traditionally linked to Old Belief. Solovki's leaders and a large part of the brotherhood first accepted, then rejected, Patriarch Nikon's liturgical reforms. However, rebellion against central authority combined religious concerns with anti-Moscow sentiment fostered by political exiles imprisoned at Solovki. After their defeat, many monks left, ultimately to swell the number of trans-Volga elders—hermits who served as spiritual fathers to disaffected Orthodox communities.

Solovki remained an active monastery and popular pilgrimage site until the October Revolution, after which the Soviet government transformed it into a military training camp. It became a labor camp in the 1920s and 1930s for political prison-

ers. Abandoned soon afterward, Solovki was reopened as a museum in the 1970s, then closed again until the end of Soviet rule, when it was reopened to the public.

See also: KIRILL-BELOOZERO MONASTERY; MONASTICISM; OLD BELIEVERS; SIMONOV MONASTERY; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

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JENNIFER B. SPOCK

SOLZHENITSYN, ALEXANDER ISAYEVICH

(b. 1918), Nobel Laureate for Literature, one of the most prominent Soviet dissidents of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn was born in the southern resort town of Kislovodsk. His father, a tsarist officer, died before his birth, and he was raised by his mother in Rostov-On-Don. He studied math and physics at Rostov University and was married in 1940 to his first wife, Natalia Reshetovskaya. Solzhenitsyn served as an artillery officer in the Red Army during World War II and was arrested by the secret police in February 1945 for criticizing Josef Stalin in his personal correspondence.

Solzhenitsyn was sentenced to eight years, which he served in a number of facilities, including a *sharashka* (a special scientific installation/prison) and a labor camp in Kazakhstan. He was released from the camp system in February 1953, and then was sent into enforced internal exile in rural Kazakhstan, where he taught high school. Solzhenitsyn was diagnosed and treated for cancer during this period. He also reconciled with his wife, from whom he was divorced during his imprisonment. He was allowed to move to Ryazan, where he taught physics, after his conviction was overturned in 1957.

ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH


Solzhenitsyn burst abruptly onto the national and international stages in November 1962, with the publication of his novella *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, in the journal *Novy mir* (New World). This deceptively simple novella describes a normal day in the life of a prisoner in a Soviet forced-labor camp in the early 1950s. It was the first work he had submitted for publication, though he had been writing for thirty years. *Novy mir's* chief editor, Andrei Tvardovsky, passed the story on to one of Nikita Khrushchev's aides. Khrushchev, who had started a second round of de-Stalinization in 1961, personally approved its publication, which would have been impossible otherwise.

The publication of *Ivan Denisovich* caused a sensation. Although millions of Soviet citizens had been released from the camps or internal exile in the late 1950s, the topic had never been discussed publicly. The novella immediately sold out several press-runs totaling almost a million copies, provoking widespread discussion. Many liberal Soviet intellectuals hoped, in vain, that its appearance presaged a further loosening of artistic controls. It was also translated into numerous foreign languages and held up as a triumph of Soviet art. The combination of the novella's content and artistic quality made Solzhenitsyn an internationally recognized writer. He published several short stories in the months that followed, all in *Novy mir*.

SOLZHENITSYN AS A DISSIDENT

The ten years after 1963 saw a rapid deterioration of the relationship between Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet leadership, devolving into open hostility by 1969. A crackdown against outspoken writers began in late 1963 and intensified greatly after Khrushchev was ousted from power in 1964. In this new environment, Solzhenitsyn was unable to publish anything, including two new semi-autobiographical novels: *The First Circle*, based on his *sharashka* experiences, and *Cancer Ward*, both of which were highly critical of the Soviet system. Their publication, even in revised form, was blocked by Party hardliners, who instead tried to coerce Solzhenitsyn to write more positive works about the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, some of Solzhenitsyn's works began to circulate in samizdat, and a few were published abroad without his permission. These developments, along with the accidental discovery by



Alexander Solzhenitsyn holds his first press conference in the West after being expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974.

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the KGB of some of his most critical writings in 1965, led to a hardening of official attitudes towards Solzhenitsyn. In 1967, Solzhenitsyn attacked the powerful Union of Soviet Writers, criticizing it for persecuting writers on behalf of the state, instead of protecting their artistic freedom. Solzhenitsyn's approval of the foreign publication of *Cancer Ward*, *The First Circle*, and other works, created further friction. Party and state officials responded by launching an escalating campaign of harassment, slander, and threats, including his expulsion from the Writers' Union in 1969.

Although Solzhenitsyn was part of a larger dissident movement of the 1960s and 1970s, he was unique in a number of ways. His international prominence, which only grew after he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970, protected him from arrest, and allowed him to be more confrontational in his actions than most other dissidents. It also allowed him access to Western reporters.

Solzhenitsyn also had his own unique political agenda. While most Soviet dissidents focused on the need for basic human rights, by the early 1970s Solzhenitsyn began to focus on the issue of morality. He believed that the Russian people could only be saved by a rejection of Bolshevik ideas and the resurrection of what he considered a unique set of moral values developed in Russia over centuries under the influence of Orthodox Christianity. He looked to pre-Revolutionary Russia for guidance, not to the West; indeed, he believed that these Russian spiritual values could save the West as well.

Solzhenitsyn criticized Western culture for its decadence and argued it was weakening the United States to the point where it would soon no longer be able to stand up to the communist threat. He denounced the policy of détente, saying that the Soviet Union was using the process to take advantage of the United States' weakness. Solzhenitsyn's religiously tinged nationalism was similar to that of the nineteenth-century Slavophile movement. Although hinted at in interviews, Solzhenitsyn's philosophical opinions only became widely known after his arrival in the West in 1974.

THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO

In the mid-1960s, Solzhenitsyn began work on a project titled *The Gulag Archipelago*. The title referred to the extensive system of prisons and forced-labor camps that had begun shortly after 1917 and expanded dramatically under Stalin; the term *Gulag* was the Russian acronym for the Main Directorate for Camps. The book, which Solzhenitsyn termed "an experiment in literary investigation," was based on his own experiences and those of over two hundred former prisoners. This epic work eventually ran to three large volumes. Although the manuscript was completed and copies smuggled to the West in 1968, Solzhenitsyn delayed its publication abroad until the end of 1973, when his hand was forced by the KGB's seizure of a manuscript copy.

The *Gulag Archipelago* was by far Solzhenitsyn's most damning work on the Soviet system. It described, in horrifying detail, the ordeal that prisoners underwent, from arrest through life in the camps, including the systematic use of torture and attempts to dehumanize prisoners. It also argued that the organized use of state terror was an integral part of Soviet communism from the start, and that Stalin only expanded the system created by Vladimir Lenin. Solzhenitsyn predicted, correctly,

that the appearance of this work would intensify state actions against him; he was arrested and expelled from the Soviet Union shortly after its publication in the West.

The publication of the *Gulag Archipelago's* first volume had a huge impact outside the Soviet bloc, particularly in Europe and the United States, where it sold millions of copies. It is widely considered to have done more than any other single book to shatter Western illusions about the nature of the Soviet dictatorship. The term *Gulag* entered widespread use in many languages. The book's influence was particularly strong in France, where many intellectuals had remained sympathetic to Soviet communism until its publication. The book's impact was heightened by its presentation, which mixed fiery rhetoric with literary skills, separating it from standard historical writings. Appropriately, Solzhenitsyn used his profits from the project to aid the families of jailed Soviet dissidents.

Many readers were overwhelmed by the book's size, however, and sales of the next two volumes were considerably lower. Although some of Solzhenitsyn's specific facts and details are now contested, the *Gulag Archipelago* remains one of the definitive works on the Soviet prison system.

EXILE AND RETURN

In February 1974 Solzhenitsyn was arrested, charged with treason, stripped of his Soviet citizenship, and expelled to West Germany. Party leaders believed that exiling Solzhenitsyn would be less damaging to their international reputation than sending him to prison. His second wife, Natalia Svetlova, and their sons were allowed to follow him a short time later. After a brief period in Europe, Solzhenitsyn moved to the United States, settling in Vermont.

After a tumultuous reception, Western sympathies towards Solzhenitsyn cooled after he articulated his moral philosophy in a series of articles and lectures, which concluded with his 1978 Graduation Address at Harvard. His attacks on Western culture alienated many, and he eventually withdrew into self-imposed seclusion in Vermont, where he worked on his *Red Wheel* series of novels. Solzhenitsyn also engaged in heated polemics with members of the dissident and emigré communities who disagreed with his views and tactics.

In 1989 Solzhenitsyn's writings began to appear in the Soviet Union, starting with *The Gulag*

Archipelago. Although he published some additional articles in the Soviet press, his absence from the scene limited his influence during the period of transition. Solzhenitsyn finally returned to Russia, amid great publicity, in 1994. Upon his return, he had a short-lived television talk show (1994–1995) and published several books. His didactic style has limited his audience, however, and he has had relatively little influence on Russian society since his return. Solzhenitsyn continues writing; one of his works, *Dvesti let vmeste* (Two Hundred Years Together, 2000), revived old accusations of anti-Semitism, charges which Solzhenitsyn and many observers reject as false.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GULAG; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS; NOVY MIR; SAMIZDAT; SLAVOPHILES; UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS

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BRIAN KASSOF

SOPHIA

(1657–1704); regent to Tsars Ivan V and Peter I, 1682–1689.

The fifth daughter of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and his first wife Maria Miloslavskaya, Sophia spent her youth in the *terem*, where her freedom was restricted, but she also came into contact with the new cultural trends of Tsar Alexei's later years. Many historians describe her as a pupil of Simeon Polotsky, but, although she was literate, there is no hard evidence that she studied with him. Those who regard Sophia as ambitious believe that she prepared for power during the reign of her brother Tsar Fyodor (r. 1676–1682) by attending his sickbed and making political alliances, notably with Prince Vasily Golitsyn, whose lover she is said to have become. However, evidence of an intimate relationship, which would have seriously breached Muscovite moral codes, rests mainly on hearsay and rumor, as do Sophia's early political ambitions.

Following Fyodor's death in 1682, in the absence of mature males of royal blood, Sophia entered the political arena, as Muscovite conventions allowed royal women to do. She was motivated by the decision to make her half-brother Peter (b. 1672) sole ruler in preference to the elder, but physically and mentally handicapped, Tsarevich Ivan (b. 1666). Exploiting the Moscow militia's (musketiers') action to air grievances and take revenge on unpopular officers and officials in Peter's government, in May 1682 Sophia and her party were able to secure Ivan's accession as joint tsar with Peter. Most historians refer to Sophia as regent to her brothers, although she was never formally appointed as such. Even so, she was widely regarded as ruler and consolidated her authority by successfully quelling the continuation of musketeer unrest in 1682 during the period known as the Khovanshchina. She began to add her name to those of her brothers in royal edicts and to take part in public ceremonies and receptions, discarding some of the restrictions of the *terem*.

The dual monarchy required a new configuration of power at court in order to defuse tensions and achieve a consensus. Many additional men were promoted to boyar status. The ascendancy of the Miloslavsky clan was marginal, and by the late 1680s they lost ground to Peter's maternal relatives the Naryshkins and their clients. Sophia relied on Prince Vasily Golitsyn to spearhead both her foreign and her domestic policy, although later the



Portrait of Regent Sophia Alexeyevna by Ilya Repin. © ARCHIVO
 ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS

secretary Fyodor Shaklovity rose to prominence. The regime's crowning achievement was the 1686 treaty with Poland, which ratified the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667) in return for Russia's agreement to sever relations with the Ottoman empire and enter the Holy League, a stepping-stone toward Russia's ascendancy over Poland, achieved later in Peter I's reign. At home, efforts continued to maximize the fulfillment of service requirements and the payment of tax liabilities and to maintain law and order. Mildness in some areas, for example banning the cruel practice of burying alive women who murdered their husbands, was offset by savage penalties against Old Believers (edict of 1685). At the same time, developments in foreign policy forced the regime to relax restrictions on non-Orthodox foreigners, which annoyed conservatives. Russia offered sanctuary from persecution to French Protestants and made concessions to foreign merchants and industrialists to encourage them to set up businesses. In 1689 commercial treaties were signed with Prussia. Russia's first institute of

higher education, the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, founded in 1685, also relied on foreign teachers.

Like many powerful women, Sophia has been accused of Machiavellian tendencies. Although there is no evidence that she intended Peter harm, she did adopt a highly visible rulership profile and began to use the feminine form of the title "autocrat" (*samoderzhitsa*). She sponsored an impressive building program in the fashionable Moscow Baroque style and had her portrait with crown, orb, and scepter painted and reproduced in prints. Poets praised her, playing on the associations of her name (Sophia the Holy Wisdom). All this fueled fears that she planned to be crowned and spawned rumors of plots against Peter and his mother. Ultimately, her regime was undermined by the failure of two military campaigns against the Crimea in 1687 and 1689, leading to a standoff provoked by Peter's supporters. This time the musketeers' support for Sophia was lukewarm and did not quell her opponents. Some of her supporters were executed, and Sophia herself was banished to a convent. In 1698 the musketeers rebelled again. Rumors circulated that Sophia was the instigator, but the evidence was inconclusive. Nevertheless, Peter forced her to take the veil under the name Susannah. She died in the Novodevichy convent in Moscow in 1704.

See also: FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH; GOLITSYN, VASILY VASILIEVICH; IVAN V; PETER I; STRELTSY

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LINDSEY HUGHES

SORGE, RICHARD

(1895–1944), Soviet spy.

Richard Sorge was born to a German family in Baku. His father was a petroleum engineer and his grandfather, Friedrich Sorge (1828–1906), a col-

league of Marx. In 1910 the family returned to Germany, where Sorge later studied in Berlin and Hamburg Universities. Drafted into the German army, he was a participant in World War I, and the combat experience converted him to socialism. In 1919 he joined the Communist Party of Germany. He held various positions as teacher and miner before returning to the Soviet Union in 1924, where a year later he joined the Communist Party and worked for various institutions before joining the military intelligence (GRU) in 1929. His duties took him to London and Los Angeles, and in 1930 to China. Returning to Germany, he established contacts with the military intelligence and Gestapo and was sent undercover as a journalist to Tokyo, and eventually as the press attaché in the German embassy. His scandalous life, which included heavy drinking and several affairs, served as a cover for his activities as a Soviet agent. The German military attaché was the source of much information, and through him, Sorge found out the plans for Operation Barbarossa and duly informed Moscow. This news went counter to Josef Stalin's belief, who did not anticipate war in 1941, and he even thought Sorge was a double agent. Beria also discounted similar reports from his own agents in Germany, which confirmed Sorge's warnings. The end result was the greatest military disaster to befall the Soviet Union, when Hitler attacked as Sorge had reported. In his work, Sorge received help from the Japanese communists and from his radio operator, Max Klausen (1899–1979). Born in Germany, Klausen immigrated to the Soviet Union in 1927 and a year later joined the military intelligence. After serving in China, he was sent to Japan in September 1935, where he joined up with Sorge. Like Sorge, he was arrested in 1941, but he survived and lived in East Germany.

Sorge's loose life finally brought him to the attention of the Japanese counterintelligence, which arrested him in October 1941. After two years in prison, Sorge was sentenced to death on September 29, 1943, and was hanged. There is no evidence that the Soviet government in any way intervened in his behalf, and in fact, Sorge's long-suffering wife, E. A. Maximova (1909–1943), was arrested (September 4, 1942) by the NKVD and perished in prison camp. Only during Nikita Khrushchev's Thaw were Sorge's services to the Soviet Union recognized, and on November 11, 1962, he was posthumously awarded the title of hero of the Soviet Union, and his wife was rehabilitated. Sorge's life has been subject of numerous books, but his legacy remains that of one of the greatest intelligence

coups of all time gone to waste because those in the position of power failed to heed it.

See also: MILITARY INTELLIGENTSIA; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; WORLD WAR II

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MICHAEL PARRISH

SOROKOUST

The *sorokoust*, or forty divine liturgies (i.e., eucharistic services), is a series of orthodox liturgical commemorations celebrated in memory of a dead person.

The number forty derives from the Orthodox tradition that it takes the soul forty days to reach the throne of God. Because of the similarity in sound, it is sometimes thought that the term is connected to the Russian *sorok*, "forty," and *usta*, "month," but in fact it derives from the Middle Greek *sarakoste*, "forty" (ancient Greek *thessarakoste*). The forty liturgies are part of the standard Orthodox ritual for the dead, corresponding genetically and functionally to the Catholic *tricenarius*, or thirty masses. A tale from the *Dialogues* of Pope Gregory the Great (590–604) about the helpfulness of the thirty masses for the souls of the departed (bk. IV, chap. 57) appears in Greek and Russian manuscripts with the number changed to forty. The first Old Russian sources that mention the sorokoust date from twelfth-century Novgorod. Canonical texts decry the practice of arranging for *sorokousty* in advance of a person's death or even of celebrating them while the person is still alive. Last wills and testaments from Muscovite Russia frequently provide for comparatively small donations to be distributed by the departed's executor to as many as forty churches where sorokousty were to be celebrated for the departed. A more limited version of the sorokoust, a commemoration in the regular liturgy for forty days, is still practiced in the early twenty-first century in Russian Orthodox churches.

See also: ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SINODIK

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LUDWIG STEINDORFF

SOSKOVETS, OLEG NIKOLAYEVICH

(b. 1949), industrialist, inventor, powerful minister in the Russian government from 1993 to 1996.

Trained as a metallurgical engineer, from 1971 until 1991 Oleg Soskovets worked at the Karaganda Metallurgical Factory in Kazakhstan, rising from the shop floor to become the general director in 1988. In 1991 a police investigation of financial abuses led to the arrest of several of his colleagues, but he himself was not prosecuted.

In 1989 he was elected to the newly formed USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and in 1991 he served briefly as minister of metallurgy in the USSR government. In January 1992 President Boris Yeltsin named him to head a state metallurgy commission, but that spring he was made deputy prime minister and minister of industry in the government of Kazakhstan. Again, he left after a few months, when the attorney general's office reopened the factory corruption case.

Named to head a state committee on metallurgy, Soskovets returned to Moscow in October 1992, only for Yeltsin five months later to appoint him deputy prime minister and overseer of Russian industry. He became close to Yeltsin's security aide Alexander Korzhakov and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and chaired government meetings in the latter's absence. He was a hawk on the first Chechnya war, and in February 1995 Yeltsin sent him to Chechnya with the thankless task of restoring economic and social life in the still war-torn republic. Later, unanswered allegations suggested that he had profited handsomely from the government cash sent to Chechnya for reconstruction.

Over time, Korzhakov started pressing Yeltsin to replace Chernomyrdin with Soskovets. In January 1996 Yeltsin named him to head the campaign for Yeltsin's reelection. However, Soskovets and Korzhakov favored postponement of the election, fearing that Yeltsin might lose. Eventually forced into a runoff, Yeltsin fired them both in June.

After this, Soskovets became an assistant to Mayor Yuri Luzhkov of Moscow and continued his

work for the Association of Financial-Industrial Groups, of which he became chairman in 1995. Press and TV exposés linked him to allegedly criminal activity by the Mafia-connected brothers Mikhail and Lev Chernoi, colleagues of his in the metals industry. Although he made no effective response to the charges, he was not prosecuted.

See also: KORZHAKOV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER REDDAWAY

SOSLOVIE

By the mid-nineteenth century, the term *soslovie* (pl. *sosloviya*) had come to designate hereditary groups such as the nobility, clergy, townspeople, and peasantry. Although *soslovie* is often regarded as the Russian equivalent to West European terms (the English *estate*, the French *état*, and the German *Stand*), it differed from these in several important respects.

Above all, the term appeared quite belatedly—in its modern sense only in the early nineteenth century. In contrast to medieval Europe, where estates had long been the basis of the social hierarchy, medieval Muscovy knew nothing similar—in language or social reality—to the corporate estates of Western Europe. Instead, just as the Muscovite state had “gathered in” principalities and lands, so too had it accumulated but not amalgamated disparate status groups based on occupation, residence, and ethnicity. Indeed, one lexicon of Muscovite language recorded nearly five hundred status groups. Although Muscovy sometimes used generic terms like *chin* (rank) to designate elite groups and bifurcated society into “service” (*sluzhilye*) and tax-bearing (*tiaglye*) categories, it recognized the distinct status of individual groups. Characteristically, even the nobility lacked a collective name; the service people (*sluzhilye liudi*) remained kaleidoscopic: elite princely clans and aristocratic boyars at the apex, with marginal, interstitial groups such as single-homesteaders (*odnodvortsy*) and musketeers (*streltsy*) at the bottom. The peasantry, similarly, consisted of various groups, from serfs and indentured slaves to crown and state peasants.

Desperate to mobilize human resources, the eighteenth-century state sought to simplify this social order. One key impulse came from Peter the Great's new poll tax, which forced the state to identify the specific subgroups of the privileged and to merge the numerous categories of the disprivileged. Amalgamation was first apparent in collective terms for the privileged nobility, initially as *shlyakhetstvo* (a Polish loanword) and by mid-century as *dvoryanstvo*, the modern term. From the 1760s, chiefly in an effort to transplant West European models of an urban third estate, some officials groped for a new terminology, but did not settle upon a generic term to describe and aggregate the smaller social units.

Only in the first decades of the nineteenth century did the term *soslovie* finally emerge in its modern sense. The word had earlier denoted "gathering" or "assembly," but nothing so abstract as corporate estate. In the early nineteenth century, however, the term *soslovie* came to signify not only formal institutions (such as the Senate), but also corporate social groups. Although other, competing terms still existed (such as *zvanie* and *sostoianie* to designate occupation and status groups), the term *soslovie* became—in law, state policy, and educated parlance—the fundamental category to describe huge social aggregates such as the nobility. The new terminology gained formal recognition in a new edition (1847) of the Academy dictionary of the Russian language, which defined *soslovie* as "a category of people with a special occupation, distinguished from others by their special rights and obligations."

The term not only persisted, but conveyed extraordinary intensity and complexity. *Soslovie* was more than a mere juridical category; it signified a group so hermetically sealed, so united by kinship and culture that some lexicographers invoked the word *caste* (*kasta*) as a synonym. The estate system, moreover, proved highly adaptable: New status groups—privileged subgroups (i.e., merchants), ethnic groups (i.e., Jews), and new professions (i.e., doctors)—became distinct *sosloviya*. The proliferation of estates reflected the regime's desire to fit other groups into the existing *soslovie* order, as well as the ambition of these groups to gain formal legal status. Hence the complex of Russian *sosloviya* was far more differentiated and protean than a simplistic four-estate paradigm would suggest.

The *soslovie* system reached its apogee, in legal recognition, lexical clarity, and social reality, in

the mid-nineteenth century, but it was increasingly subject to erosion and challenge. In part, the regime itself—which had celebrated the *soslovie* as a bulwark of social stability against the revolutionary forces sweeping Western Europe—concluded that some social mobility and change was essential for the country's development and power. To be sure, the Great Reforms of the 1860s made the inclusion of all estates (*vsesoslovnost*) a fundamental principle; the reforms sought not to abolish estates but to mobilize them all, whether for supporting new institutions (e.g., the organs of local self-government) or for supplying soldiers and officers for the army. But the emergence of revolutionary movements increased the regime's concern about social stability and, especially from the 1880s, inspired much rhetoric and some measures to reaffirm the *soslovie* order.

At the same time, modernizing processes like urbanization and industrialization were steadily eroding the *soslovie* boundaries. Rapid economic growth, in particular, had a critical, corrosive impact: the plethora of new professions and semi-professions, together with the rapid growth of the industrial labor force, undermined the significance of the estate marker. Not that the *soslovie* was irrelevant; it was still the only category in passports, it was often correlated with opportunity and occupation, and it bore connotations of prestige or stigma. Nevertheless, social identities became blurred and confused; profession and property, not estate origin, became increasingly important in defining status and identity.

As a result, by the early twentieth century, the distinctive feature of Russian society was the amorphousness and fluidity of social identities. In contrast to the traditional Western paradigm ("estates into classes"), Russian society exhibited a complex of "estates and classes," with mixed and overlapping identities. The government itself, with its franchise laws and policies in the wake of the 1905 Revolution, came increasingly to count upon property, not hereditary status, in allocating electoral power and defining its social base. The privileged, such as conservative nobles, fought to preserve the *soslovie* order; the propertied and progressive deemed abolition of *sosloviya* a precondition for the creation of a modern civil society. Although the Bolshevik regime on October 28, 1917, dissolved all estate distinctions (one of its first acts), it did not in fact dispense with this category as it endeavored to identify adversaries. Hence personnel documents, from university applications to judicial

records, regularly required information about the prerevolutionary *soslovie* status—an unwitting testimony to the enduring significance ascribed to *soslovie* in the formation of social identities.

See also: ALEXANDER II; ALEXANDER III; CLASS SYSTEM; GREAT REFORMS

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SOUL TAX

The soul tax (*podushnaya podat*) was a capitation or poll tax levied on peasant communes and some urban inhabitants according to the number of males of all ages, as estimated by the periodic censuses (*revizy*) that began in 1718. Enacted by Peter the Great by decree on January 11, 1722, the poll tax was intended to maintain the armed forces in the peasants' vicinity. For example, the support of an infantry soldier required payments from about thirty-six "souls." During the Muscovite and early Petrine period there were numerous exemptions to the land and household (*dvor*) taxes, but by the mid-eighteenth century all peasants, whether private, state, or church, were supposed to pay around eighty kopeks. The latter two categories of enserfed peasants also paid rent (*obrok*) of 1.5 (later, 2) rubles, as well as some dues in kind. They could be drafted for work on roads and canals, for example.

The rates of money taxation differed considerably depending on the class of taxpayer. Court, ecclesiastical, and state peasants, including free settlers (*odnodvortsy*), were supposed to pay about four times the rate for private serfs; merchants and burghers paid somewhat less—about triple the rate for private serfs. Nobles, officials, and clergy were exempt from the poll tax.

At first the soul tax was collected by military units directly. Subsequently the serf owners had to collect the tax for their private serfs, and district administrators collected it for state or church serfs in their jurisdiction. Landowners collected the soul

tax even though it would have been more in their interest to raise rents instead. Since some males were either too young or too old to have income, the head of household had to pay for everyone. While the soul tax appeared to be per head, the village commune often distributed the burden on an ability-to-pay basis. The rate of tax per male soul, however, was fixed, as increases were considered politically dangerous, so higher yields came mainly from population growth. Efforts were made at each census, or *revisia*, to reduce the tax-exempt population. All "idling" and "free" persons were included, as well as peasants of many kinds, including bondsmen (*kholopi*). The revenue from tax and rents, however, failed to cover the cost of the standing army during peacetime, not to mention the great expenditures of the Northern War, which may have actually reduced the taxable population. Owing to the tax and labor burdens imposed on them, then as well as later on, many peasants fled to the borderlands and across the frontier.

The soul tax had obvious administrative advantages over the previous household tax. Under the new system, young men could not avoid paying tax simply by postponing their departure from the ancestral home, as they could under the household tax. Nor could peasants combine nuclear families into one extended household for the purpose of avoiding tax.

Russian historians of an earlier era considered the poll tax an increased burden on peasant households, but this seems unlikely, since the apex of war expenses and innovative kinds of taxes was reached in the years 1705 to 1715. For most serfs the monetary liability (as distinct from taxes in kind) under the poll tax appears to have been slightly lower than under the household tax. Furthermore, because the poll tax was the same regardless of the amount of land cultivated, there was an incentive to increase arable land at the expense of waste, and, in fact, the amount of cultivated land did increase during this period. That the poll tax is remembered as harsh is explained by the poor grain harvests of the time, which required peasants to buy food at high prices. After Peter's death in 1725 the poll tax rate was lowered to seventy-four, then seventy kopeks, but during Catherine II's reign it was raised to one ruble. The highly destructive Napoleonic Wars saw a further increase to two, then three rubles. The poll tax was eliminated between 1883 and 1886, but land taxes and redemption payments continued to the end of the empire.

See also: CATHERINE II; GREAT NORTHERN WAR; PEASANTRY; PETER I; TAXES

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; REVOLUTION OF 1905

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DAVID PRETTY

SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR *See* AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH.

SOVIET

Soviet (*sovet*) is the Russian word for “council” or “advice.”

Its political usage began during the Revolution of 1905 when it was applied to the councils of deputies elected by workers in factories throughout Russia. Although suppressed in 1905, the soviets reappeared in nearly every possible setting immediately following the February Revolution of 1917. With the soviet in Petrograd setting the tone, they very quickly became the organs of power that the majority of the population saw as legitimate. Although the moderate socialists who initially led the soviets were reluctant to take executive power from the Provisional Government, most Russians seem to have favored rule by the soviets alone; the Bolsheviks’ call for “All Power to the Soviets” may well have been their most successful slogan. The October Revolution was timed to coincide with the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, both to forestall its taking power without Bolshevik initiative and to gain legitimacy from its approval. The new Bolshevik-led government was thus initially based on soviets, and the state structure formally remained so until Mikhail Gorbachev. For most of the Soviet era, the Supreme Soviet was theoretically the highest legislative organ, although the Communist Party held practical power. Throughout their history, soviets generally proved too large for day-to-day governance, a role filled by a permanent executive committee elected by the full soviet. Some scholars have suggested that the soviet became so popular an institution because it was an urban counterpart to the village commune assembly, a governing system with which most Russians, even in the cities, were familiar.

SOVIET-FINNISH WAR

The Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940, which lasted 103 days and is commonly known as the “Winter War,” had its origins in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939. The secret protocols of that non-aggression accord divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet security zones. Finland, which had been part of the Russian Empire for more than a century prior to gaining its independence during the Russian Revolution, was included by that agreement within the Soviet sphere. Shortly after the dismemberment of Poland by Germany and the USSR, the Soviet government in October demanded from Finland most of the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad, a naval base at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, and additional land west of Murmansk along the Barents Sea. The USSR offered other, less strategically important, borderland as compensation. After Finnish President Kosti Kallio rejected the proposal, the Red Army, on November 30, invaded along the extent of their border as the Soviet Air Force bombed the Finnish capital, Helsinki.

Finland’s most formidable defenses were a line of hundreds of concrete pillboxes, bunkers, and underground shelters, protected by anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire, which stretched across the Karelian Isthmus. General (and later Field Marshal) Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, a former tsarist officer, had organized these defenses, and he commanded Finland’s armed forces during the war. During the first two months of conflict, Finland astonished the rest of the world by defeating the much larger and more heavily armed Soviet forces, especially along the Mannerheim Line. In snow—at times five to six feet deep—with temperatures plunging to -49° F,



A Finnish village burns after a February 1940 air raid by Soviet planes. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

the Finnish defenders were clad in white-padded uniforms, and some attacked on skis. The Red Army troops were entirely unprepared for winter combat. In early February, the USSR enlarged its forces to 1.2 million men (against a Finnish army of 200,000) and increased the number of tanks and aircraft to 1,500 and 3,000, respectively. In March the Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line and advanced toward Helsinki. Finland was compelled to accept peace terms, which were signed in Moscow on March 12, 1940. The USSR acquired more territory than it had demanded before the war, including the entire northern coastline of Lake Ladoga and parts of southwestern and western Finland. Approximately 420,000 Finns fled from the 25,000 square miles of annexed territories.

Soviet victory, however, came at a very high cost. Whereas Finland lost about 25,000 killed in the war, Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov acknowledged that immediately after the war almost 49,000 Soviet troops had perished. In 1993 declassified Soviet military archives

revealed that 127,000 Soviet combatants had been killed or gone missing in action. The Red Army overwhelmed Finnish defenses with massive formations. For example, to take one particular hill, the USSR attacked its thirty-two Finnish defenders with four thousand men; more than four hundred of the Soviet assault troops were killed. Material losses were similarly lopsided in the war. Altogether, the Soviet Air Force lost about one thousand aircraft; Finland around one hundred.

The world's attention was focused on the Soviet-Finnish War, because at that time despite British and French declarations of war against Germany in September 1939 over Germany's invasion of Poland, there was no other fighting taking place in Europe. Finland was much admired in the democratic West for its courageous stand against a much larger foe, but to Finland's disappointment, that admiration did not translate into significant outside assistance. By contrast, Soviet aggression was widely condemned, and the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. More importantly, So-

viet military weakness was exposed, which served to embolden Hitler and confirm his belief that Germany could easily defeat the USSR.

Defeated Finland became increasingly worried when in the summer of 1940 the USSR occupied Estonia, which lay just forty miles across the Baltic Sea. Finland found a champion for its defense and a means to regain the lost territories when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. The USSR provided a convenient pretext for the start of the "Continuation War" (as the resumed hostilities are known in Finland), when it bombed several Finnish cities, including Helsinki, on June 25. While the Red Army retreated before the Nazi blitz to within three miles of Leningrad and twenty of Moscow, Finland invaded southward along both sides of Lake Ladoga down to the 1939 boundary. During the nearly nine hundred day siege of Leningrad, Finnish forces sealed off access to the city from the north. Close to one million Leningraders perished in the ordeal, primarily from hunger and cold in the winter of 1941–1942. Finland, which relied heavily on German imports during the war, rebuffed a Soviet attempt through neutral Sweden in December 1941 to secure a separate peace and relief for Leningrad. At the same time, the Finnish government refused German requests to attempt to cross the Svir River in force to link up with the *Wehrmacht* along the southeastern side of Ladoga. The lake remained Leningrad's only surface link with the rest of the USSR during the siege.

Finland's position in southern Karelia became increasingly vulnerable as its ally Germany began to lose the war in the USSR in 1943. In late February 1944, a month after the Red Army smashed the German blockade south of Leningrad, the Soviet Air Force flew hundreds of sorties against Helsinki and published an ultimatum for peace, which included, among other things, internment of German troops in northern Finland and demobilization of the Finnish Army. After Finland refused the harsh terms, the Red Army launched a massive offensive north of Leningrad on June 9. In early August Mannerheim managed to shore up Finnish defenses near the 1940 border at the same time that the Finnish parliament appointed him the country's president. However, continued German defeats and Soviet reoccupation of Estonia convinced President Mannerheim to agree to an armistice on September 19. The agreement restored the 1940 boundary, forced German troops out of Finland, leased to the USSR territory for a military base a few miles

from Helsinki (which was later returned), and saddled Finland with heavy reparations. Although the Soviet Union basically controlled Finnish foreign policy until the Soviet collapse in 1991, of all of Nazi Germany's wartime European allies, only Finland avoided Soviet occupation after the war and preserved its own elected government and market economy.

See also: FINLAND; FINNS AND KARELIANS; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; WORLD WAR II

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RICHARD H. BIDLACK

SOVIET-GERMAN TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1939

After declining relations throughout the 1930s and then a flurry of negotiations in the summer of 1939, Germany (represented by Karl Schnurre) and the Soviet Union (represented by Yevgeny Babarin) signed a major economic agreement in Berlin in the early morning hours of August 20. The treaty called for 200 million Reichsmark in new orders and 240 million Reichsmark in new and current exports from both sides over the next two years.

This agreement served two purposes. First, it brought two complementary economies closer together. To support its war economy, Germany needed raw materials—oil, manganese, grains, and wood. The Soviet Union needed manufactured products—machines, tools, optical equipment, and weapons. Although the USSR had slightly more room to maneuver and a somewhat superior bargaining position, neither country had many options for receiving such materials elsewhere. Subsequent economic agreements in 1940 and 1941, therefore, focused on the same types of items.

Second, the economic negotiations provided a venue for these otherwise hostile powers to discuss political and military issues. Hitler and Stalin signaled each other throughout 1939 by means of these economic talks. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed a mere four days after the economic agreement.

Because raw materials took less time to produce, Soviet shipments initially outpaced German exports and provided an important prop to the German war economy in late 1940 and 1941. Before the Germans could fully live up to their end of the bargain, Hitler invaded.

See also: FOREIGN TRADE; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; WORLD WAR II

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EDWARD E. ERICSON III

SOVIET MAN

For many years, the term *novy sovetsky chelovek* in Soviet Marxism-Leninism was usually translated into English as “the new Soviet man.” A translation that would be more faithful to the meaning of the original Russian would be “the new Soviet person,” because the word *chelovek* is completely neutral with regard to gender.

The hope of remaking the values of each member of society was implicit in Karl Marx’s expectations for the progression of society from capitalism through proletarian revolution to communism. Marx reasoned that fundamental economic and social restructuring would generate radical attitudinal change, but Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin insisted that the political regime had to play an active role in the transformation of people’s values, even in a socialist society. It remained for the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted at the party’s Twenty-Second Congress in 1961 in accordance with the demands of Nikita Khrushchev, to spell out the “moral code of the builder of communism,” which subsequently was elaborated at length by a wide variety of publications. The builder of communism was expected to be educated, hard working, collectivistic, patriotic, and unfailingly loyal to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During the transition to a fully communist society, as predicted by Khrushchev, such vestiges of past culture as religion, corruption, and drunkenness would be eradicated. The thinking associated with the Party Program of 1961 represented the last burst of revolutionary optimism in the Soviet Union.

Over time, it became increasingly difficult to ascribe “deviations from socialist morality” to the influence of pre-1917 or pre-1936 social structures. Indeed, testimony from a variety of sources suggested that reliance on connections, exchanges of favors, and bribery (which had by no means disappeared in the Stalin years) were steadily growing in importance during the post-Stalin decades. In the mid-1970s Hedrick Smith’s book *The Russians* described the members of the largest nationality in the USSR as impulsive, generous, mystical, emotional, and essentially irrational, behind the facade of a monochromatic ideology imposed by an authoritarian political regime. Though the Brezhnev leadership still insisted that the socialist way of life (*sotsialisticheskyy obraz zhizni*) in the Soviet Union was morally superior to that in the West with its unbridled individualism and moral decay, the sense of optimism concerning the future was slipping away. Ideologists complained ever more about amoral behavior by citizens, and the political leaders seemed to become more tolerant of illegal economic activity and corruption. Despite those general trends, problematic as they were, some Soviet citizens did strive actively to serve their fellow human beings, including the most vulnerable members of society.

See also: KRUSCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILLICH; MARXISM

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SOVIET-POLISH WAR

The Soviet-Polish War was the most important of the armed conflicts among the East European states emerging from World War I. The Versailles settlements failed to delineate Poland’s eastern border. The Entente powers hoped that the Bolshevik Revolution was temporary, and that a Polish-Russian

border would be established after the victory of White Russian forces. As the eastern command of the German Army withdrew after the armistice of November 11, 1918, Vladimir Lenin in Moscow and Józef Pilsudski in Warsaw planned to fill the vacuum. Lenin hoped to export revolution, Pilsudski to lead an East European federation.

In early 1919, Lenin's main concern was the White Russian forces of Anton Denikin. Pilsudski did not support Denikin, a Russian nationalist who treated eastern Galicia as part of a future Russian state. In late 1918, Pilsudski watched as the Red Army moved on Vilnius and Minsk. Pilsudski's offensive began in April 1919, his forces taking Vilnius on April 21 and Minsk on August 8. In collaboration with Latvian troops, Poland took Daugavpils on January 3, 1920, returning the city to Latvia. By then Denikin was in retreat, and the Red Army could turn to an offensive against the remnants of independent Ukrainian forces.

The Ukrainian National Republic of Symon Petliura allied with Poland in April 1920. With Ukrainian help, Pilsudski took Kiev on May 7, 1920, only to find his troops overwhelmed by the forces of Soviet commanders Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Semen Budenny. On July 11 Great Britain proposed an armistice based upon the Curzon Line, which left Ukraine and Belarus to Moscow. These terms displeased Pilsudski, but Polish prime minister Stanislaw Grabski had agreed to similar ones in negotiations with British prime minister David Lloyd George. Moscow's replies questioned the future of independent Poland, and the Red Army encircled Warsaw in August.

With the exception of its Ukrainian ally, Poland faced this attack alone. The French sent a military legation, but its counsel was unheeded. Pilsudski himself planned and executed a daring counterattack against the Bolshevik center, shattering Tukhachevsky's command. He then drove the Red Army to central Belarus. The Battle of Warsaw of August 16–25, 1920, was called by D'Abernon "the eighteenth decisive battle of the world." It set the westward boundary of the Bolshevik Revolution, saved independent Poland, and ended Lenin's hopes of spreading the Bolshevik Revolution by force of arms to Germany.

The Soviet-Polish frontier, agreed at Riga on March 18, 1921, was itself consequential. Poland abandoned its Ukrainian ally, as most of Ukraine was still under Soviet control. Yet the war forced the Soviets to reconsider nationality questions, and

led to the establishment of the Soviet Union as a nominal federation in December 1922. During the 1930s, Josef Stalin blamed Polish agents for shortfalls in Ukrainian food production, and he ethnically cleansed Poles from the Soviet west. These preoccupations flowed from earlier defeat.

Riga divided Belarus and Ukraine between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Red Army seized western Belarus and western Ukraine from Poland in September 1939 thanks to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, undoing the consequences of Riga and encouraging forgetfulness of the Polish-Bolshevik War. Yet more than any other event, the Polish-Bolshevik War defined the political and intellectual frontiers of the interwar period in eastern Europe.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; POLAND; WORLD WAR I

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TIMOTHY SNYDER

SOVKHOZ

The sovkhoz, or state farm, the collective farm (kolkhoz), and the private subsidiary sector, were the three major organizational forms used in Soviet agricultural production after the collectivization of Soviet agriculture, a process begun by Josef Stalin in 1929. Although the concept of the state farm originated earlier under Vladimir Lenin during the period of war communism, the serious development of state farms began during the 1930s as the Soviet state exercised full control over the agricultural sector.

The state farm might be described as a factory in the field in the sense that it was full state property,

financed by state budget (revenues flowed into and expenses were paid by the state budget), and subject to the state planning system, and workers (*rabochy*) on state farms were paid a contractual wage. All of these major characteristics of the state farm distinguished it from the collective farm.

The sovkhoz was organized in a fashion similar to an industrial enterprise. The farm was headed by a state-appointed director, and the connection between labor force and sovkhoz resembled the structure of the industrial enterprise. Most important, capital investment for the sovkhoz was funded by the state budget. Thus, although prices paid by the state for sovkhoz produce were lower than for compulsory deliveries from collective farms, state farms were in a financially much better position. This was a major reason for the subsequent conversion of weak collective farms into state farms in the post-World War II years, a process enhanced by the Soviet policy of agro-industrial integration and the ultimate development of the agroindustrial complex comprising collective and state farms and industrial processing capacity.

The role of state farms in Soviet agriculture grew steadily during the Soviet era. The number of state farms grew from less than 1,500 in 1929 to just over 23,000 by the end of the Gorbachev era in the late 1980s. This expansion resulted partly from state policy—the amalgamation and conversion of collective farms to state farms—and partly from the use of state farms in special programs expanding the area under cultivation, such as the Virgin Lands Program. State farms were large. During the 1930s, for example, state farms were on average roughly 6,000 acres of sown area. By the 1980s, they averaged more than 11,000 acres of sown area per farm.

There were considerable differences in the output patterns between collective and state farms, and state farms were viewed as more productive and more profitable than collective farms. Generally speaking, the role of the state farms increased over time from modest proportions in the early 1930s. The sovkhoz came to be important in the production of grain, vegetables and eggs, less important for meat products. During the transition era of the 1990s, state farms were reorganized using joint stock arrangements, although the development of land markets remained constrained by opposition to private ownership of land.

See also: AGRICULTURE; COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

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ROBERT C. STUART

SOVNARKHOZY

Regional bodies that administered industry and construction in the USSR.

The Sovnarkhozy (acronym for Sovety Narodnogo Khozyaistva, or Councils of the National Economy) were state bodies for the regional administration of industry and construction in Russia and the USSR that existed from 1917 to 1932 and again from 1957 to 1965.

The first Sovnarkhozy were created in December 1917 by the Supreme Council of the National Economy. Each of them had power over areas ranging in size from small districts up to several provinces. They were associated with local institutions such as soviets and were responsible to the Supreme Council for restoring the economy of their area after World War I and then the civil war. As the Soviet economy developed during the 1920s, control of industry was divided between the Supreme Council of the National Economy (which retained control of important strategic industries) and the Sovnarkhozy. The Sovnarkhozy were abolished in 1932 when the Supreme Council was divided into three separate industrial commissariats.

Sovnarkhozy were reintroduced during Nikita Khrushchev's 1957 effort to decentralize the economy. The USSR was divided into 105 Sovnarkhozy responsible to republican Councils of Ministers for the industry in the regions, except armaments, chemicals, and electricity, which at first remained under central control. The system had a fundamental weakness due to the lack of centralized direction and coordination, and Sovnarkhozy often pursued local interests and considered only the needs of their own region. In 1962 and 1963 attempts were made to reform the system, such as amalgamating the Sovnarkhozy and reviving the

Supreme Council of the National Economy, but in 1965 Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin abolished the Sovnarkhozy and reestablished the central industrial ministries.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; KOSYGIN REFORMS; REGIONALISM

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SOVNARKOM

Acronym for Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov (Council of People's Commissars), the government of the early Soviet republic.

Sovnarkom was formed by Vladimir Lenin in October 1917 as the government of the new revolutionary regime. The word *commissars* was used to distinguish the new institution from bourgeois governments and indicate that administration was being entrusted to commissions (commissariats), not to individuals. Initially membership included Lenin (chairperson), eleven departmental heads (commissars), and a committee of three responsible for military and naval affairs. Until 1921, under Lenin, Sovnarkom was the real government of the new Soviet republic—the key political as well as administrative body—but after 1921 political power passed increasingly to Party bodies.

With the creation of the USSR in 1924, Lenin's Sovnarkom became a union (national) body. Alexei Rykov was chairperson of the Union Sovnarkom from 1924 to 1930, then Vyacheslav Molotov from 1930 to 1941, and Josef Stalin from 1941 to 1946, when the body was renamed the Council of Ministers. There were two types of commissariats: six unified (renamed "union-republican" under the 1936 constitution), which functioned through parallel apparatuses in identically named republican commissariats, and five all-union with plenipotentiaries in the republics directly subordinate to their commissar.

In 1930 Gosplan was upgraded to a standing commission of Sovnarkom and its chairperson

given membership. By 1936 the number of commissariats had risen to twenty-three, and by 1941 to forty-three. A major trend was the replacement of an overall industrial commissariat by industry-specific bodies.

The 1936 constitution granted Sovnarkom membership to chairpersons of certain state committees. It also formally recognized Sovnarkom as the government of the USSR, but deprived it of its legislative powers. By this time the institution was and remained a high-level administrative committee specializing in economic affairs.

See also: COMMISSAR; COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MOLOTOV, VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH; RYKOV, ALEXEI IVANOVICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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DEREK WATSON

SOYUZ FACTION

The Soyuz faction was a group of hardliners in USSR Congress of People's Deputies at the end of the Soviet era. Its leaders, Viktor Alksnis and Nikolai Petrushenko, had been elected as deputies from Latvia and Kazakhstan respectively, regions with large ethnic Russian populations that conservatives were trying to mobilize (in organizations called "interfronts") to counter the independence movements that had sprung up under perestroika. While nationalists and communists dominated the USSR Congress of People's Deputies elected in March 1989, democratic forces won the upper hand in the Russian Federation Congress of People's Deputies, elected in the spring of 1990, which chose Boris Yeltsin as its leader.

Alksinis came up with the idea of the Soyuz faction in October 1989. It was launched on February 14, 1990, but only became highly visible toward the end of the year, when conservatives mobilized to deter Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev from adopting the Five-Hundred Day economic reform program. Soyuz had close ties to the

army and security services, and its goal was to preserve the USSR. At its formal founding congress on December 1, 1990, Soyuz claimed the support of up to one quarter of the deputies in the USSR Congress. Its sister organization in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet was Sergei Baburin's Rossiya faction. Soyuz put increasing pressure on Gorbachev to end democratization by introducing presidential rule, suppressing disloyal political parties, and cracking down on nationalist movements in the non-Russian republics. It reportedly persuaded Gorbachev to fire Soviet Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, who had agreed to the creation of separate interior ministries in each of the union republics. On November 11, 1990, Alksnis persuaded Gorbachev to address a meeting of one thousand military personnel elected as deputies to various soviets; he got a hostile reception. A week later, speaking in the USSR Supreme Soviet on November 17, Alksinis effectively called for Gorbachev's overthrow. Still, no one could be sure whether Gorbachev would stick with democratization or opt for an authoritarian crackdown.

In January 1991 KGB teams tried to overthrow the independent-minded governments in Latvia and Lithuania. This drew fierce international criticism, and Gorbachev disowned it. Apparently he had given up the idea of using force to hold the USSR together, for he now began pursuing a new union treaty with the heads of the republics that made up the USSR. In response, a Soyuz conference in April 1991 called for power to be transferred from Gorbachev to Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov or Anatoly Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Clearly the Soyuz group was laying the political and organizational groundwork for the coup attempt of August 1991, but the failure of the putsch sealed the fate of the USSR and of Soyuz, its most loyal defender. Alksnis was later one of the defenders of the anti-Yeltsin parliament in the violent confrontation of October 1993. Interviewed in 2002, he insisted that the USSR could have been saved if Gorbachev had acted more resolutely and not been "afraid of his own shadow."

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; DEMOCRATIZATION; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH

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
SPACE PROGRAM

The Russian space program has a long history. The first person in any country to study the use of rockets for space flight was the Russian schoolteacher and mathematician Konstantin Tsiolkovsky. His work greatly influenced later space and rocket research in the Soviet Union, where, as early as 1921, the government founded a military facility devoted to rocket research. During the 1930s, Sergei Korolev emerged as a leader in this effort and eventually became the "chief designer" responsible for many of the early Soviet successes in space in the 1950s and 1960s.

Under Korolev's direction, the Soviet Union in the 1950s developed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), with engines designed by Valentin Glushko, which was capable of delivering a heavy nuclear warhead to American targets. That ICBM, called the R-7 or Semyorka ("Number 7"), was first successfully tested on August 21, 1957. Its success cleared the way for the rocket's use to launch a satellite.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union had announced their intent to launch an earth satellite in 1957 during the International Geophysical Year (IGY). Fearing that delayed completion of the elaborate scientific satellite, intended as the Soviet IGY contribution, would allow the United States to be first into space, Korolev and his associates designed a much simpler spherical spacecraft. After the success of the R-7 in August, that satellite was rushed into production and became Sputnik 1, the first object put into orbit, on October 4, 1957. A second, larger satellite carrying scientific instruments and the dog Laika, the first living creature in orbit, was launched November 3, 1957. Three Soviet missions, Luna 1–3, explored the vicinity of the moon in 1959, sending back the first images of its far side. Luna 1 was the first spacecraft to fly past the moon; Luna 2, in making a hard landing on the lunar surface, was the first spacecraft to strike another celestial object.

Soon after the success of the first Sputniks, Korolev began work on an orbital spacecraft that



A Soyuz-TM rocket sitting on its launch pad at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan on April 2, 2000. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

could be used both to conduct reconnaissance missions and to serve as a vehicle for the first human space flight missions. The spacecraft was called Vostok when it was used to carry a human into space. The first human was lifted into space in Vostok 1 atop a modified R-7 rocket on April 12, 1961, from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. The passenger, Yuri Gagarin, was a twenty-seven-year-old Russian test pilot.

There were five additional one-person Vostok missions. In August 1961, Gherman Titov at age twenty-five (still the youngest person ever to fly in space) completed seventeen orbits of Earth in Vostok 2. He became ill during the flight, an incident that caused a one-year delay while Soviet physicians investigated the possibility that humans could not survive for extended times in space. In August 1962, two Vostoks, 3 and 4, were orbited at the same time and came within four miles of one another. This dual mission was repeated in June 1963; aboard the Vostok 6 spacecraft was Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman to fly in space.

As U.S. plans for missions carrying more than one astronaut became known, the Soviet Union worked to maintain its lead in the space race by modifying the Vostok spacecraft to carry as many as three persons. The redesigned spacecraft was known as Voskhod. There were two Voskhod missions. On the second mission in March 1965, cosmonaut Alexei Leonov became the first human to carry out a spacewalk.

Korolev began work in 1962 on a second-generation spacecraft, called Soyuz, holding as many as three people in an orbital crew compartment, with a separate module for reentry back to Earth. The first launch of Soyuz, with a single cosmonaut, Vladimir Komarov, aboard, took place on April 23, 1967. The spacecraft suffered a number of problems, and Komarov became the first person to perish during a space flight. The accident dealt a major blow to Soviet hopes of orbiting or landing on the moon before the United States.

After the problems with the Soyuz design were remedied, various models of the spacecraft served the Soviet, and then Russian, program of human space flight for more than thirty years. At the start of the twenty-first century, an updated version of Soyuz was being used as the crew rescue vehicle—the lifeboat—for the early phase of construction and occupancy of the International Space Station.

While committing the United States in 1961 to winning the moon race, President John F. Kennedy

also made several attempts to convince the Soviet leadership that a cooperative lunar landing program would be a better alternative. But no positive reply came from the Soviet Union, which continued to debate the wisdom of undertaking a lunar program. Meanwhile, separate design bureaus headed by Korolev and Vladimir Chelomei competed fiercely for a lunar mission assignment. In August 1964, Korolev received the lunar landing assignment. The very large rocket that Korolev designed for the lunar landing effort was called the N1.

Indecision, inefficiencies, inadequate budgets, and personal and organizational rivalries in the Soviet system posed major obstacles to success in the race to the moon. To this was added the unexpected death of the charismatic leader and organizer Korolev, at age fifty-nine, on January 14, 1966.

The Soviet lunar landing program went forward fitfully after 1964. The missions were intended to employ the N1 launch vehicle and a variation of the Soyuz spacecraft, designated L3, that included a lunar landing module designed for one cosmonaut. Although an L3 spacecraft was constructed, the N1 rocket was never successfully launched. After four failed attempts between 1969 and 1972, the N1 program was cancelled in May 1974, thus ending Soviet hopes for human missions to the moon. On July 20, 1969, U.S. astronaut Neil Armstrong stepped from Apollo II Lunar Module onto the surface of the moon.

By 1969, the USSR began to shift its emphasis in human space flight to the development of Earth-orbiting stations in which cosmonaut crews could carry out observations and experiments on missions that lasted weeks or months. The first Soviet space station, called Salyut 1, was launched April 19, 1971. Its initial crew spent twenty-three days aboard the station carrying out scientific studies but perished when their Soyuz spacecraft depressurized during reentry. The Soviet Union successfully orbited five more Salyut stations through the mid-1980s. Two of these stations had a military reconnaissance mission, and three were devoted to scientific studies. The Soviet Union also launched guest cosmonauts from allied countries for short stays aboard Salyuts 6 and 7.

The Soviet Union followed its Salyut station series with the February 20, 1986, launch of the Mir space station. In 1994–1995, Valery Polyakov spent 438 continuous days aboard the station. More than one hundred people from twelve countries visited

Mir, including seven American astronauts between 1995 and 1998. The station, which was initially scheduled to operate for only five years, supported human habitation until mid-2000, before making a controlled atmosphere reentry on March 23, 2001.

The Soviet Union in the 1980s developed a large space launch vehicle, called *Energiya*, and a reusable space plane similar to the U.S. space shuttle, called *Buran*. However, the Soviet Union could no longer afford an expensive space program. *Energiya* was launched only twice, in 1987.

To continue its human space flight efforts, Russia in 1993 joined the United States and fourteen other countries in the International Space Station program, the largest ever cooperative technological project. Two Russian cosmonauts were members of the first crew to live aboard the station, arriving in November 2000, and it is intended that at least one cosmonaut will be aboard the station on a permanent basis. Russian hardware plays an important role in the orbiting laboratory. Russia's role was increased when the U.S. space plane *Challenger* burned up on entry in February 2003. The Soyuz "lifeboat" became the only way in or out until regular U.S. flights were resumed.

In addition, the Soviet Union has carried out a comprehensive program of unmanned space science and application missions for both civilian and national security purposes. Spacecraft were sent to Venus and Mars. Other spacecraft provided intelligence information, early warning of missile attack, and navigation and positioning data, and were used for weather forecasting and telecommunications.

In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union had no space agency. Various design bureaus had influence within the Soviet system, but rivalry among them posed an obstacle to a coherent Soviet space program. The Politburo and the Council of Ministers made policy decisions. After 1965, the government's Ministry of General Machine Building managed all Soviet space and missile programs; the Ministry of Defense also shaped space efforts. A separate military branch, the Strategic Missile Forces, was in charge of space launchers and strategic missiles. Various institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences proposed and managed scientific missions.

After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia created a civilian organization for space activities, the Russian Space Agency, formed in February 1992. It quickly took on increasing responsibility for the management of nonmilitary space activities and, as

an added charge, aviation efforts. It later was renamed the Russian Aviation and Space Agency.

See also: GAGARIN, YURI ALEXEYEVICH; INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION; MIR SPACE STATION; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY; SPUTNIK; TSIOLKOVSKY, KONSTANTIN EDUARDOVICH

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JOHN M. LOGSDON

SPANISH CIVIL WAR

In July 1936, after months of unrest and politically motivated assassinations, a junta of nationalist generals, including Francisco Franco, led an uprising against the Spanish Republic. When Franco had difficulty transporting his forces from Africa to Spain, he appealed for aid from Germany and Italy. Hitler and Mussolini were only too happy to oblige. The Republicans also asked for help from the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Britain, France, and the United States decided to adopt a strict policy of nonintervention, but Josef Stalin began secretly supplying the Republic with the weapons it needed to survive.

Soviet aid, however, came with a price. Stalin provided thousands of Red Army, NKVD, and GRU (secret police) officers who often furthered his aims while acting as advisers for the Republicans. Meanwhile the Spanish government shipped its vast gold reserves to Moscow, where the Soviets deducted the cost of armaments for the war, at exorbitant prices, from the bullion. Yet without Soviet tanks and

airplanes it is certain that the Republic would have fallen much more quickly than it did.

Stalin and the Stalinist Spanish Communist Party wanted a say over the political future of Spain. From the start of the war, the Soviets pushed the Republicans to eliminate anyone who did not follow the party line. This hunt for Trotskyists was tolerated by the Republican governments in order to retain the favor of their only great power supporter. Most Spanish leaders, however, were able to resist Soviet attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of their country, and steered their own course during the war.

The Soviet Union and the Comintern also took a direct hand in combat. The European Left sent more than 30,000 enthusiastic volunteers to fight for the Republicans, some of whom came to Spain to support a revolution, on the model of the Soviet Union, while others wanted only to defend democracy. A large number of the commanders for these International Brigades were regular Red Army officers, although their origins were disguised and never acknowledged by the Soviet Union. The Internationals, and armaments sent by the Soviets, were critical for the Republicans' successful defense of Madrid in December 1936. The Republican cause also benefited from Soviet and International participation in other engagements, including the battle of Jarama in February 1937 and the defeat of Italian troops at Guadalajara in March 1937, while Soviet tank operators and pilots were of crucial importance throughout the war.

Of the Soviet soldiers who saw action in the Spanish arena, dozens were recalled to Moscow and executed during the military purges of 1937–1939. At the same time others, such as Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Konev, Alexander Rodimtsev, and Nikolai Kuznetsov, had brilliant careers during World War II and after.

In the end, Soviet aid could not alter the outcome of the war. As the international climate worsened, Stalin decided to withdraw support for the Spanish government in 1938 and by the end of the year could only offer his condolences as the Republic faced utter defeat.

See also: COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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MARY R. HABECK

SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES

The twentieth century saw a great upsurge in the interest in and use of military special forces, both in war and for peacekeeping, antiterrorist, and other missions. The Soviets were ardent advocates of such forces, and created many, tasked with a large and varied array of missions. This reflected three main considerations. First of all, small, highly motivated and well-trained units were vital to carry out operations beyond the capabilities of the USSR's mass conscript army, which demanded speed, precision, or finesse. Secondly, the Soviets approached warfare in an intensely political way, seeing the aim as being not necessarily to win on the battlefield, but to destroy the enemy's will and ability to fight in the first place. Special forces could play a key role in this. Thirdly, the Soviets regarded their armed forces also as integrated elements of their apparatus of rule, and specialized forces emerged to meet particular needs that had less to do with war-fighting but political control. The post-Soviet regime has upheld this tradition. Indeed, the proportion of special purpose units within the Russian military actually increased, not least because at a time when the majority of the armed forces were virtually unusable, at least these elements retained the discipline, training, and morale to fight.

Special forces of a fashion had existed during the civil war (1918–1921), including the elite Latvian Rifles who guarded Vladimir Lenin, but these units tended to be essentially ad hoc elements of Bolshevik militants and Cossack horsemen. They subsequently either dissolved or were incorporated into the Red Army or police, losing their identity and élan in the process. The true genesis of Soviet special purpose forces took place in 1930, when the USSR became only the second nation in history to experiment with a military parachute drop. Excited by the possibilities, the Soviet high command immediately began training paratroop units: The first battalions were formed a year later.

This was the genesis of the Air Assault Troops, this also led to the rise of true special purpose forces. After all, while the paratroopers and other formations such as the Naval Infantry (marines) were a cut above the regular conscript infantry, they could hardly be considered "special forces" in the modern sense of the term. As the army began raising its paratroop forces, so too smaller, more specialized units began to be created within them, given the name Special Designation forces (*Spetsialnogo naznacheniya*, *Spetsnaz* for short). Elite units were also formed by the NKVD, the political police force (which had a sizable parallel army of paramilitaries), that instead called its forces *Osnaz*, for *Osobennogo naznacheniya*, or Specialized Designation. During World War II, these forces would see extensive action. Army and navy reconnaissance commandos penetrated German lines and, along with NKVD *Osnaz* saboteurs and infiltrators, organized partisan units, targeted collaborators and attacked supply routes.

This duality continued after the war and into the post-Soviet era. The armed forces maintain substantial *Spetsnaz* forces under the overall command of the GRU, military intelligence. Their main roles are to operate behind enemy lines gathering intelligence and launching surprise attacks on strategic assets such as headquarters and nuclear weapons. There are eight brigades of regular *Spetsnaz* and four of Naval *Spetsnaz*. However, most of these ostensibly elite units are still largely manned by conscripts, albeit the pick of the draft. There is thus an elite within the elite, largely made up of professional soldiers. Generally a single company within each brigade is kept at this standard, as well as a company in each of the paratroop divisions. These elements include athletes and linguists trained to pass themselves off as nationals of target nations and are genuinely comparable to such units as the U.S. Green Berets or British SAS.

Meanwhile, the security apparatus also retains its own smaller *Osnaz* elements. The KGB created several specialized teams, including Alfa (an anti-terrorist strike force), *Zenit* and *Vympel* (trained for secret missions abroad), and *Kaskad* (a covert intelligence team). All served during the war in Afghanistan (1979–1989), and all survived the end of the USSR and the dismemberment of the KGB, being attached to new, Russian security agencies. The same is true of the *Osnaz* elements within the Interior Troops and the security arm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the Border Troops. Indeed, it has become almost a mark of institutional

prestige to have such units, so they have also been joined by such new units as the Justice Ministry's *Fakel* commando team (which specializes in breaking prison sieges). Thus, if anything, special purpose forces are becoming even more important in the post-Soviet era.

See also: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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MARK GALEOTTI

SPERANSKY, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH

(1772–1839), Russian statesman, one-time adviser to Tsar Alexander I.

Mikhail Speransky attempted during the years 1807–1811 to influence the Russian monarch in the direction of instituting major political reform in Russia's government. Only a few of his carefully drafted plans ever saw the light of day.

Born into a family of a poor Russian Orthodox clergyman, Speransky, called by one Russian historian a "self-made man," won the attention of the tsar and rose to become a count. He was considered brilliant and well-read in the study of European governmental structures, becoming in effect Alexander's unofficial prime minister. Working in secret (on the tsar's orders), he drew up a number of reforms. His idea, which the tsar evidently did not wholly endorse, was to retain a strong monarchy but reform it so that it would be based strictly on law and legal procedures of the type found in some European monarchies of the time.

Speransky's reform plans did not closely resemble, say, the English or French governmental

systems. Yet while Speransky could probably not be considered a liberal reformer on West European terms, by Russian standards his reformism bordered on the radical. This made Speransky extremely unpopular with the tsar's court, causing the tsar to keep such plans under wraps lest they unduly alienate his court.

In 1809 and 1812, Speransky drew up the draft of a Russian constitution that bore some resemblance to those of West European monarchies. In one of his projects Speransky even proposed separation of the powers of legislature (in the Duma), judiciary, and the governmental administration. Yet all three were to branch out from the crown. Suffrage would be based on property, at least in the beginning. Election of the Duma would be indirect and necessitate a cautious, four-stage electoral process. Speransky also supported a program for future abolition of serfdom in Russia, reform that he viewed as crucial for any serious top-to-bottom governmental change.

Historians note that certain measures enacted in 1810–1811 brought “fundamental change to the executive departments of government.” Personal responsibility, it is noted, was to be imposed on ministers, while the functions of executive departments were precisely delimited. Unwarranted interference with legislative and judicial functions would be eliminated. Comprehensive rules were actually enacted for the administration of the ministries.

Although Speransky's efforts to reform the antiquated Russian court system failed, his administrative reforms overall modernized the whole bureaucratic machine. These structures remained in effect until the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, or October Revolution, of late 1917.

After serving as the tsar's close adviser for some five years, Speransky left St. Petersburg as the appointed Governor-General of the Siberian region. In that post he continued to author reform plans. Some of these were adopted and changed the governmental structure of that large administrative area. But it was in the period of his service as the tsar's adviser that Speransky made his name in the annals of Russian history, especially as recounted by the famous early nineteenth-century Russian historian, Nikolai M. Karamzin.

In 1821 Speransky returned to the Russian capital to become a founder of the Siberian Committee for Russian Affairs Beyond the Urals.

See also: ALEXANDER I; WESTERNIZERS

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

SPIRIDONOVA, MARIA ALEXANDROVNA

(1884–1941), Socialist Revolutionary terrorist and Left Socialist Revolutionary leader who spent most of her life in prison or exile because of her popular appeal as a revolutionary heroine.

Maria Spiridonova, daughter of a non-hereditary noble in Tambov Province, became a public symbol of heroic martyrdom during the first Russian revolution of 1905–1907. In January 1906 she shot provincial councilor G. N. Luzhenovsky at the Borisoglebsk Railroad Station, carrying out the death sentence that the Tambov Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) had passed on Luzhenovsky for his cruel suppression of peasant unrest in the district. Spiridonova's case excited national interest, thus distinguishing her from the many other SR terrorists throughout the empire. A letter Spiridonova wrote from prison was published in a liberal newspaper and debated widely in the national press because it described her torture at the hands of police officials, hinting as well at sexual abuse. Liberal newspapers in particular waxed eloquent about the brutalities inflicted on this beautiful and chaste young woman of the Russian upper classes who had killed a sadistic bureaucrat.

In March 1906, however, a court-martial sentenced Spiridonova to hanging, then commuted her sentence to life imprisonment, the usual practice in cases of females convicted of political crimes until mid-1906. Eleven years of incarceration in the Nerchinsk penal complex in Siberia followed, during which Spiridonova suffered from depression, nervous prostration, and frequent flareups of tuberculosis, her chronic illness. The Provisional Government's amnesty of all political prisoners shortly after the February Revolution allowed Spiridonova to return to European Russia in the spring of 1917. Here she was welcomed, given her reputation as heroine and martyr, into the highest level of revolutionary politics in Petrograd and Moscow.



Maria Spiridonova endorsed violence for revolutionary goals and was a leader of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. BROWN

BROTHERS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

As a leader of the Left SR Party, Spiridonova employed the aura of her martyrdom, along with her personal charisma and oratorical skills, to sway peasants, workers, and soldiers against the Provisional Government and to popularize the October Revolution. While she did not hold an official post in the first Soviet government, a Bolshevik-Left SR coalition, she was elected chairperson of the Peasant Section of the Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the second, third, and fourth Soviet Congresses. Indeed it was her lifelong concern for the peasants and their welfare that ultimately turned Spiridonova against the Bolsheviks.

Spiridonova had been an early supporter of Vladimir Lenin's push to sign a separate peace with Germany, however punitive, because the Russian population was opposed to continuing the war. She adhered to this position despite her party's objections to the "shameful" Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and withdrawal from the government in protest in

March 1918. But when Russian concessions to Germany led to a food supply crisis that the Bolsheviks attempted to resolve with stringent grain-procurement measures in May, Spiridonova repudiated the treaty along with Bolshevik policy. She took a leading role in planning the Left SRs' assassination of the German ambassador, an attempt to break the treaty and spark a popular uprising that was aborted by the Bolsheviks in July. With her party's consequent banishment from Soviet politics, a second martyrdom began for Spiridonova. From 1920 on she lived either in prison, under house arrest, in Central Asian exile, or in sanatoria, up to her execution on Josef Stalin's orders during the German invasion in 1941.

See also: BREST-LITOVSK PEACE; LEFT SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; TERRORISM

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SALLY A. BONIECE

SPIRITUAL ELDERS

The spiritual elder (*starets* in Russian, *geron* in Greek) first appeared in the earliest days of monasticism in Asia Minor. Some elders had far-ranging reputations and attracted other monks who emulated their way of life, sought their counsel, and profited from their experience in acquiring the Holy Spirit. One of the signs of the Spirit is the gift of discernment (*diarasis*), which means, first, knowledge of the mysteries of God, and, second, an understanding of the secrets of the heart. One who has the gift of discernment can undertake the spiritual direction of others. In the opinion of some Eastern writers, the same gift allows the Spirit to work miracles through the God-bearing practitioners of perfect prayer.

In fourteenth-century Byzantium the spiritual elder became central to the hesychast movement associated with Gregory Palamas (1296–1359). The hesychasts combined the practice of the so-called Jesus Prayer (“Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me”) with the doctrine of *theosis*, or deification. Mount Athos became their chief center, and from there eldership spread to the Slavic world, producing Russia’s most famous medieval spiritual elder, Nil (Maikov, 1433–1508).

After a long period of decline, eldership revived first in Ukraine and then in Russia through the efforts of several remarkable elders: Paisy (Velichkovsky, 1722–1794), translator of the *Philokalia*, a basic collection of texts on pure prayer; Serafim (Mashnin, 1758–1833) of Sarov, Russia’s most important modern saint; and Amvrosy (Grenkov, 1812–1891), the hermit model for Elder Zosima in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s *Brothers Karamazov*. The popular impact of eldership is recorded in a remarkable anonymous work, *The Pilgrim’s Tale*. By 1900, the contemplative renaissance had reached its peak, although its creative power could still be seen in the lives of the parish priest John (Sergiev, 1829–1908) of Kronstadt and Mother Yekaterina (1850–1925) of Lesna, who worked among the poor.

See also: BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; MONASTICISM; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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ROBERT L. NICHOLS

SPORTS POLICY

The Soviet Olympic program, which would produce more medalists than any other country from 1952 through 1992, got off to a slow start internationally. Early Soviet contacts with foreign competitors were sparse, as the Soviet Union avoided international federations in the 1920s and stayed out of the Olympics, which it regarded as a means of turning workers’ attention from the class struggle and of preparing them for war. This was paralleled domestically by the banning of bourgeois from sports societies.

In a 1929 resolution, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union condemned what it called “record mania.” However, by the 1930s party slogans began to call for breaking bourgeois sports records.

After World War II, the Soviet Union, perhaps because it now could compete with the capitalist countries on an even footing, began an effort to do so and thereby to demonstrate the virtues of its social system. Accordingly, beginning in 1946 Soviet sports associations joined international federations, including, in 1951, the International Olympic Committee.

By 1946, weightlifter Grigory Novak became the first Soviet world champion in any sport, and in December 1948, the Central Committee explicitly stated as a goal the achievement of “world supremacy in the major sports in the immediate future.” At first the Soviet Union participated mainly in sports in which it had a good chance to win, but at the 1952 Summer Olympics Soviet athletes competed in all sports except field hockey. The Soviet Union first participated in the Winter Olympics in 1956.

The Soviet drive to surpass the capitalist countries could not always override domestic political considerations. In the late 1940s, some athletes who had competed against foreigners before the war were arrested. Purges, including executions, occurred in 1950, some as part of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign carried out by the government. Similarly, many officials and athletes had been victims of the purges of the 1930s.

REASONS FOR SOVIET SUCCESS

One likely reason for the rise of Soviet sports was the urbanization of the country. As elsewhere, sport in the Soviet Union was predominantly urban and remained so even after the Soviet government began to push rural sport in 1948. As late as 1972, it was reported that only ten of the 507 Soviet athletes at the Munich Olympics belonged to rural sports clubs. This was partly a result of rural attitudes and partly because of lack of facilities.

Another reason for Soviet successes was the relative lack of disapproval of women athletes, a phenomenon matched in Soviet society by the presence of women in heavy labor, both urban and rural. For example, Soviet domination of bilateral track and field competitions with the United States—the Soviets won eleven of thirteen from 1958 to 1975—was largely due to the superior athleticism of Soviet women, as they defeated the American women



Soviet athletes perform as part of the celebrations for Moscow's 800th birthday in 1947. © YEVGENY KHALDEI/CORBIS

twelve times while Soviet men won only three times. Thus it was for practical as well as propaganda reasons that in 1956 and 1960 the Soviet Union proposed the expansion of the Olympic program, especially to include more women. On the other hand, just as sexism coexisted with celebration of women's achievements in Soviet society, for a long time there was Soviet opposition to female participation in such allegedly harmful sports as soccer, judo, and karate.

The Soviets also looked for special opportunities to excel, as when they made a concerted (and successful) effort to field an Olympic champion in team handball when that sport was introduced into the Olympics.

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Domestically there were a number of programs designed to encourage athletic talent. Perhaps the best known was GTO (*Gotov k Trudu i Oborone*—Prepared for Labor and Defense), which was established in 1931 and granted badges of various kinds to people in different age brackets who had achieved certain government-set athletic goals. As in other areas

of Soviet life, quotas were set for the earning of badges, and also as in other areas of Soviet life, the setting of quotas often led to falsification of results, in this case leading to the granting of unearned awards.

Stricter, no doubt, were the standards for the All-Union Sports Classification System established in 1949 with its five categories. At the top was Merited (Zasluzhenny) Master of Sport, followed by Master of Sport, then Classes A, B, and C. Masters of Sport were expected not only to achieve but also to serve as political and ideological examples and to pass on their experience to younger athletes.

On a national scale, elite athletes were showcased in the Spartakiads. The first Spartakiad was held in 1928, to be revived on a regular basis in 1956, then held quadrennially from 1959.

By 1963 the Soviet Union already had fifteen institutes of physical education and a much larger number of special secondary schools (*tekhnikумы*) as well as departments of physical education at pedagogical institutes and schools. There were also scientific research institutes in Moscow, Leningrad,

and Tiflis. Despite this, physical education instructors often complained that their subject was given insufficient emphasis in schools compared with academic subjects. Moreover, N. Norman Shneidman has described physical education in Soviet schools as “generally poor,” contrasting this with the excellent boarding schools, extended day schools, regular sport schools, clubs, and organizations for the best school-age athletes. The special schools were introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Graduate departments of the leading institutes of higher learning were responsible for developing methods of training and new equipment and wrote most of the physical education textbooks and reference books. In addition, many leaders and coaches of Soviet national teams had advanced degrees and authored scholarly publications.

Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union showed a renewed willingness to learn from the West after the extreme xenophobia of the late Stalin years. Sports was no exception here, as the Soviets invited the American Olympic weightlifting champion Tommy Kono to the Soviet Union in order to interview and film him. The Soviets accorded similar treatment to speed skater Eric Heiden in the late 1970s. In turn, the Soviet Union aided other countries, furthering propaganda goals in the process, by providing training, camps, facilities, and equipment to athletes from Africa and Asia, often for free. Soviet coaches also shared their expertise with other socialist countries, some of which surpassed the Soviet Union in certain sports and went on to send their own coaches to other countries. A notable example of this is Bulgaria in weightlifting.

During glasnost there was considerable criticism of the regimentation of child athletes. Specialization and rigorous training occurred as early as age five, and former Olympic weightlifting champion and future member of Parliament Yuri Vlasov referred to “inhuman forms of professionalism” among twelve- and thirteen-year-old gymnasts, swimmers, and other athletes. Young teenagers often had to spend considerable time away from their families and had to choose a specialty at this young age. However, it should be noted that these phenomena also existed in the United States.

GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZATION OF ATHLETES

Soviet government subsidization of elite athletes, notorious during the era of allegedly pure ama-

teurism, occurred as early as the 1930s. By 1945 the Council of People’s Commissars established a system that paid cash bonuses for records. In May 1951, in their successful attempt to gain admission to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Soviet delegates to an IOC meeting falsely stated that bonuses were no longer paid.

Many of the athletes were employed by the three largest sports organizations, Dinamo (Dynamo), run by the security forces; the Soviet Army; and Spartak, run by the trade unions. As in other countries, rival sport societies often lured athletes away from other societies. The best athletes were freed from military and other duties so that they could devote full time to their sports. The result was that Soviet athletes enjoyed a privileged lifestyle, at least while they were bringing glory to the state; after they retired, their standard of living often declined steeply. Of course it was forbidden for Soviets, whether journalists, athletes, or anyone else, to discuss any of this publicly.

Whatever internal politics (e.g., cronyism) may also have been involved, another phenomenon not unknown in the United States, selection to international teams was based primarily on the likelihood that the athlete would place highly, irrespective of recent victories in national championships. The final selection would be made on the basis of the athlete’s condition at training camp before departure for the competition.

Supporting this sporting activity for both practitioners and fans was an extensive Soviet press dedicated to sport. *Sovetsky Sport* was the most prominent among over a dozen Soviet sports newspapers and periodicals. The publishing house *Fizkultura i sport*, founded in 1923, published 40 percent of all Soviet titles on sports. According to certain unofficial Soviet sources, articles submitted for publication in scholarly journals were carefully screened to keep important research findings from the Soviets’ competitors.

SCARCITY OF RESOURCES

Despite their outstanding success, the Soviets often lacked resources. As late as 1989 there were only 2,500 swimming pools in the Soviet Union, compared with more than one million in the United States. There were shortages of gymnasiums and equipment, and many schools lacked athletic play areas.

Preference for elites over the masses sometimes provoked popular resentment alongside national



Soviet athletes march through Red Square during the “physical culture” portion of a May Day parade. © HULTON ARCHIVE

pride. Even Soviet leaders were sometimes critical of the neglect of mass physical fitness in favor of elite athletes, although obviously the latter were too valuable for propaganda purposes for the situation to be changed. At the same time, facilities, equipment, and sports clothing were sometimes lacking even for elites, leading to relative Soviet weakness in downhill skiing, for example. Moreover, Soviet athletes often found it necessary to use foreign equipment in international competition. Sports historian Robert Edelman has praised the Soviets for “using limited resources efficiently,” pointing out that Soviet Olympic victories were achieved “on a shoestring.”

POLITICS

In addition to demonstrating their athletic superiority, the Soviets used sports internationally to make political statements. The Soviet Union was among the leaders in isolating South Africa from international sport because of its policy of apartheid. It also canceled bilateral track and field meets with the United States from 1966 through 1968, giving the Vietnam War as the reason. The Soviet boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, on the other hand, was almost certainly intended as retaliation for the American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which had protested the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Even before the American boycott, however, the Soviet Union had already seen the political implications of hosting the Olympics. For example, one of the members of the USSR Olympic Organizing Committee was G. P. Goncharov, the head of the Communist Party propaganda machine. Moreover, in the fall of 1979 the government arrested dissidents and warned other people who complained even mildly about conditions. In Moscow there was a campaign to remove drunks, the unemployed, and even teenagers and children from the city during the Olympics.

CONCLUSION

Soviet sports actually survived the Soviet Union in a sense, as in the 1992 Olympics athletes from the former Soviet Union competed together on what was known as the Unified Team. Although afterward the separate independent nations fielded separate teams, the memory persisted into 1996, as some Russian newspapers could not resist a brief mention that, added together, the former Soviet republics combined for the highest number of medals of any country. Economic problems would persist for the former Soviet sports programs, sometimes interfering with athletes' training, but so would national pride and excellence, as the Russian Federation, for example, won 88 medals, second only to the United States with its larger population, in the 2000 Summer Olympics.

See also: MOSCOW OLYMPICS OF 1980

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VICTOR ROSENBERG

SPUTNIK

On October 4, 1957, Soviet space scientists launched the first manmade Sputnik, or satellite, to orbit the earth. Sputnik had great significance on several counts. It indicated that the USSR was a world leader in science and engineering. It was a great propaganda achievement, enabling the nation's leaders to claim both scientific preeminence and the superiority of the Soviet social system. Sputnik also triggered the space race, as the United States and the USSR committed to an expansive effort to be the first in a series of other space firsts. The USSR followed Sputnik with several other achievements: the first man in space (Yuri Gagarin); the first woman in space (Valentina Tereshkova); the first two-person and three-person orbital flights; the first space walk; and so on. Sputnik also revealed that the USSR was or would soon be capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Sputnik was important to the Soviet people as well. It demonstrated to them that after years of sacrifice under Stalin the nation was truly on the road to communism based on the achievements of science. Tens of thousands of citizens gathered in the evenings to track Sputnik through the sky, using binoculars or amateur radios to pick up its signal. School children sang odes to Sputnik; poets wrote poems to Sputnik.

Sputnik was only the first Soviet satellite: More than 2,700 others followed into space. While their primary purposes were military, they also served such ends as communication, meteorology, and global prospecting.

See also: GAGARIN, YURI ALEXEYEVICH; SPACE PROGRAM; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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PAUL R. JOSEPHSON

STAKHANOVITE MOVEMENT

On August 31, 1935, Aleksei Stakhanov, a thirty-year-old miner in the Donets Basin, hewed 102 tons of coal during his six-hour shift. This amount represented fourteen times his quota, and within a few

days his feat was hailed by *Pravda* as a world record. Anxious to celebrate and reward individuals' achievements in production that could serve as stimuli to other workers, the party launched the Stakhanovite movement. The title of Stakhanovite, conferred on workers and peasants who set production records or otherwise demonstrated mastery of their assigned tasks, quickly superseded that of shockworker. Day by day throughout the autumn of 1935, the campaign intensified, culminating in an All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites in industry and transportation that met in the Kremlin in November. At the conference, outstanding Stakhanovites mounted the podium to recount how, defying their quotas and often the skepticism of their workmates and bosses, they applied new techniques of production to achieve stupendous results for which they were rewarded with wages that reached dizzying heights. Josef Stalin captured the upbeat mood of the conference when, by way of explaining how such records were only possible in the land of socialism, he uttered the phrase, "Life has become better, and happier too." Widely disseminated, and even set to song, Stalin's words served as the motto of the movement.

The Stakhanovite movement thus encompassed lessons not only about how to work, but also about how to live. In addition to providing a model for success on the shop floor, it conjured up images of the good life. Many of the same qualities Stakhanovites were supposed to exhibit in the one sphere—cleanliness, neatness, preparedness, and a keenness for learning—were applicable to the other. These qualities were associated with *kulturnost* (culturedness), the acquisition of which marked the individual as a New Soviet Man or Woman. Advertisements for perfume, articles about Stakhanovites on shopping sprees, photographs of Stakhanovites sharing their happiness with their families, newsreels showing them driving new automobiles—presented to them as gifts—and moving into comfortable apartments all symbolized *kulturnost*. Wives of male Stakhanovites had an important part to play in the movement as helpmates preparing nutritious meals, keeping their apartments clean and comfortable, and otherwise creating a cultured environment in the home so that their husbands were well-rested and eager to work with great energy. It was also important to demonstrate that Stakhanovites were admired by their comrades and considered worthy of holding public office.

Notwithstanding the enormous publicity surrounding Stakhanovites and their achievements,

they were not necessarily popular. Even before the raising of output norms in early 1936, workers who had not been favored with the best conditions, and consequently struggled to fulfill their norms, expressed resentment of Stakhanovites by verbally and even physically abusing them. Foremen and engineers, only too well aware that record mania and the provision of special conditions for Stakhanovites created disruptions in production and bottlenecks in supplies, also on occasion sabotaged the movement. At least that was the accusation made against many who often served as scapegoats for the failure of the Stakhanovite movement to fulfill its promise of unleashing the productive forces of the country. Nevertheless, the Stakhanovite movement continued into the war and even enjoyed something of a revival in the postwar years, when it was exported to Eastern Europe.

See also: INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET; KULTURNOST; SOVIET MAN

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LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM

STALIN CONSTITUTION *See* CONSTITUTION OF 1936.

STALINGRAD, BATTLE OF

The Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942–February 2, 1943) was the most significant Red Army victory during World War II. It included the Red Army's defense against Operation "Blau" (Blue), the German Army's summer 1942 advance to Stalingrad, and offensive operations in the fall of 1942 and winter of 1943 to defeat German and other Axis forces in the Stalingrad region.

The defensive phase of the battle began on July 17, after German Army Groups "A" and "B" smashed the defenses of the Red Army's Briansk,



A Red Army soldier waves a flag while trucks gather in the square below during the Battle of Stalingrad. © HULTON ARCHIVE

Southwestern, and Southern Fronts in southern Russia and advanced to the Don River west of Stalingrad. Initially, the newly formed Stalingrad Front, commanded by marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, defended the Stalingrad region with the 21st, 62d, 63d, 64th, and 57th Armies, the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, and the 8th Air Army, which opposed the 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army of Army Group "B." After overwhelming the 62nd and 64th Army's defenses west of the Don River in late July and defeating a major counterstroke by the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, in late August General Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army broke through Soviet defenses along the Don River and reached the Volga River north of Stalingrad, while General Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army reached the city's southwestern suburbs. The twin blows isolated the Soviet 62d and 64th Armies in Stalingrad and initiated two months of vicious and costly fighting for possession of the city. The fighting consumed the bulk of German forces and forced them to deploy weak Italian and Rumanian armies along their

overextended flanks north and south of the city. While Stalin fed enough forces into Stalingrad to tie German forces down, the Stavka planned a counteroffensive, Operation "Uranus," orchestrated by General A. M. Vasilevsky, to encircle and destroy Axis forces at Stalingrad.

The offensive phase of the battle commenced on November 19, 1942, when the forces of General N. F. Vatutin's and A. I. Eremenko's Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts pierced Axis defenses north and south of the city and joined west of Stalingrad on November 23, encircling more than 300,000 German and Rumanian forces in the city. Offensives by the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts along the Chir, Don, and Aksai Rivers in December destroyed the Italian 8th Army and frustrated two German attempts to rescue their forces besieged in Stalingrad. On February 2, 1943, after Bryansk, Voronezh, Southwestern, and Southern (former Stalingrad) Front forces attacked westward from the Don River and toward Rostov, General K. K.

Rokossovsky's Don Front defeated and captured Paulus's 6th Army and almost 100,000 men.

At a cost of more than one million casualties, including almost 500,000 dead, missing, or captured, during the battle the Red Army destroyed or badly damaged five Axis armies, including two German, totaling more than fifty divisions, and killed or captured more than 600,000 Axis troops. The unprecedented German defeat was a turning point indicative of eventual Red Army victory in the war.

See also: WORLD WAR II

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DAVID M. GLANTZ

STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

(1879–1953), general secretary of the Communist Party, Soviet dictator.

Josef Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, who in revolutionary work was called Koba before adopting the *nom de plume* Stalin, was born in Gori, Georgia, to a working-class family; his father was a cobbler and his mother a domestic servant. Many of the details of his early life remain in dispute, but his education was gained at a local church school and the Tiflis (Tbilisi in Georgian) Orthodox seminary, from which he was expelled in 1899. He joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party soon after its foundation, and in 1901 was elected to the Tiflis Social Democratic Committee. Following the split in the party in 1903, Stalin became a Bolshevik. For the following decade and a half, he was involved in a variety of revolutionary activities, including the publication of illegal materials, organizational work among workers and within the party, and bank raids to garner funds to sustain party work. He met Vladimir Lenin in 1905, and briefly traveled abroad on party business to Stockholm, London, Krakow, and Vienna. In 1912

he was elected in his absence onto the party Central Committee and became an editor of the party newspaper, *Pravda*. In 1913 he wrote his most important early work, *Marxism and the National Question*. His revolutionary work was interrupted by arrest in 1902, 1909, 1912, and 1913; he escaped from the first three bouts of exile and returned to Petrograd from the last one when the tsar fell in February 1917. In 1903 he married his first wife, Yekaterina Svanidze, his son Yakov was born in 1904, and his wife died of tuberculosis in 1907.

When Stalin returned to Petrograd soon after the tsar's fall, he was one of the leading Bolsheviks in the city. He was elected to the newly established Russian bureau of the party and to the editorial board of *Pravda*. Along with Vyacheslav Molotov and Lev Kamenev, he championed the policy of support for the Provisional Government and a defencist position on the war, until Vladimir Lenin returned in April and overturned these in favor of a more revolutionary stance. Stalin went along with Lenin's views. During the revolutionary period, Stalin seems to have spent most of his time on organizational work. He was not a stirring speaker like Trotsky or someone with the presence of Lenin, and therefore after the return of Lenin and the emigrés, he was not seen as one of the leading lights of the party. Nevertheless, following the seizure of power in October, Stalin became people's commissar for nationalities, a position that from April 1919 he held jointly with the post of people's commissar of state control (from February 1920, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate). The latter post was concerned with the elimination of corruption and inefficiency in the central state machine. During the civil war, Stalin was active on a series of military fronts, and it was at this time that his first major clash with Leon Trotsky occurred. More importantly, when the Politburo, Orgburo, and Secretariat of the Central Committee were established in March 1919, Stalin became a member of all three. He was the only member simultaneously of these bodies and the CC, and was therefore in a place of significant organizational power. In April 1922 he was elected general secretary of the party, and therefore the formal head of the party's organizational machine. With Lenin's illness from May 1922 and his death in January 1924, Stalin was able to make use of this power to consolidate his control at the top of the party structure.

Lenin's death was followed by intensified factional conflict among his would-be successors.



Josef Stalin in January 1946. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

Between 1923 and 1929, Stalin and his supporters successively outmaneuvered Trotsky and his supporters, the Left Opposition, the United Opposition, and the Right Opposition, so that by the end of the decade, Stalin was *primus inter pares*. Stalin's success in these factional conflicts has usually been attributed to the organizational powers stemming from his ability to use the machinery of the party to promote his supporters and exclude the supporters of his opponents. This was clearly a significant factor in his ability to outflank his opponents at party meetings and use those symbolically to defeat them through a party vote. Stalin was the source of jobs, and therefore someone who was attractive to many with ambitions in Soviet politics. But Stalin was also a person who espoused the sorts of policies that would have appealed to many rank-and-file Bolsheviks: The ability of the USSR to build socialism in one country rather than having to wait for international revolution and the need to shift from the gradualist framework of NEP into a more

revolutionary attempt to build socialism, were two of the most important of such policies. Thus through a combination of the weaknesses of his opponents, the strength of his organizational power, and the attractiveness of many of the positions he espoused, Stalin was able to triumph over his more fancied rivals for leadership; he was even able to overcome the negative evaluation of him in Lenin's so-called Testament.

Stalin's defeat of his more prominent rivals did not mean that he was secure in the leadership of the party in the early 1930s. At the end of 1927, at Stalin's behest the party adopted the first of a series of decisions that led to the abandonment of the moderation of the New Economic Policy and its replacement by an increasingly rapid pace of industrialization and agricultural collectivization. This produced continuing strains within the party, even when the most prominent opponents of this new course—the Right Opposition led by Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Mikhail Tomsky—had been defeated in 1929. In late 1930 the Syrtsov-Lominadze group and in 1932 the Ryutin Platform were two important instances of high-ranking party members criticizing the course of economic policy, with the latter even calling for Stalin's removal. For many within the party's leading ranks, the gamble on forced pace industrialization and agricultural collectivization, while justifiable in terms of the achievement of the ultimate goal of a socialist society, was in practice proving to be more costly and disruptive than they had been led to believe. The reports of widespread popular opposition to collectivization raised the specter of the increased isolation of the party within the society; the trials of so-called saboteurs in 1930 and 1931 only increased this sense. They were not reassured by the increasing glorification of Stalin personally that began on his fiftieth birthday in December 1929. The cult of Stalin that thus emerged was clearly an attempt to shift the basis of political legitimacy away from the party and onto the person of Stalin.

At this time of political uncertainty, in November 1932 Stalin's second wife, Nadezhda Allilueva who he had married in 1919, died. At the time it was announced that she had died of a heart attack, but it was widely believed that she had shot herself. There have also been rumors that Stalin himself killed her, but the truth is still not known.

In 1933 a party purge, or *chistka*, was announced. This was to be a bloodless affair involving a check on the performance of all party members and the expulsion of those whose per-

formance was found to be deficient. This was followed by similar campaigns in 1935 and 1936. Against this background of suspicion of the true beliefs and commitment of some party members, the seventeenth congress of the party was held in January–February 1934. This congress, the so-called Congress of Victors, announced the successful completion of collectivization, and although there was a significant level of public glorification of Stalin, there was also evidence of some high-level dissatisfaction with him. In December of that year, Leningrad party boss and close associate of Stalin, Sergei Kirov, was assassinated. Kirov's death was used as an excuse to crack down on various elements including so-called Trotskyites and Zinovievites. In January 1935, Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, and seventeen other members of a reputed "center" were tried and convicted of moral and political responsibility for the death of Kirov, and were sentenced to imprisonment. This wave of purging tapered off by the middle of 1935. However, it surged once again in 1936, paradoxically at the time of the discussion of the new Stalin state Constitution adopted in December 1936, lasting unabated until the end of 1938. The so-called Great Terror, symbolized by the show trials of Old Bolsheviks in August 1936, January 1937, and March 1938, destroyed all semblance of opposition to Stalin and left him supreme at the apex of the party. He was now the unchallenged leader of the country, the *vozhd*, untrammelled by considerations of collective leadership, the absolute arbiter of the futures of all of those who worked with him in the leadership and in the country as a whole.

The personal primacy of Stalin, symbolically celebrated in a new peak of adulation at the time of his sixtieth birthday, occurred at a time of increasing international tension. In August 1939 the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed, an agreement that Stalin had actively sought. The results of that pact were played out in the following two years, with Soviet territorial gains on its western border. In May 1941 Stalin became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, or prime minister, to add to his position as General secretary. The following month, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, ushering in a new phase in Stalin's leadership, that of the war leader.

From the time of the attack, Stalin was closely involved in organizing the defense of the Soviet Union. The long public delay in any announcement from him following the opening of hostilities led many to claim that Stalin, who had seemingly ig-



Josef Stalin attends a meeting commemorating the completion of the first segment of the Moscow subway system in 1935.

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nored all warnings about the likelihood of German attack, had been mentally paralyzed by the attack and took no part in the initial Soviet response. However, it has now become clear that Stalin was busy in meetings during this time, participating as he did right through the war in the resolution of issues not just of civil government but of military strategy and tactics. Throughout the conflict, Stalin was closely involved in a practical capacity in directing the Soviet war effort. He was also important symbolically. By mobilizing Russian nationalism and presenting himself as its personification, Stalin became the ultimate symbol of both the Soviet populace and its armed forces. His refusal to leave

Moscow, even when German troops were at its gates, reinforced this image. It is probable that the war ushered in the highest point of Stalin's real, as opposed to cult-presented, popularity. Stalin became known as the Generalissimo.

With the end of the war, the Soviet Union was clearly one of the leading powers remaining and Stalin was an international figure, as symbolized by his presence at the conferences with the British and U.S. leaders in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. He ruled over not only the Soviet Union, but also the newly established socialist states in Eastern Europe. At home, there was a return to orthodoxy as controls were tightened once again following the relaxation of the wartime period. Stalin's personal control remained undiminished. The leadership functioned as Stalin demanded; formal party organs were largely replaced by loose groupings of individual leaders summoned at Stalin's whim and carrying out whatever tasks he accorded to them.

Always a suspicious man, Stalin's sense of paranoia seems to have grown in the post-war period, something fueled by the Cold War. Although there were no purges on the scale of the 1930s, the more limited use of coercion and terror occurred in the Leningrad affair of 1949–1950, the Mingrelian case of 1951–1952, and the Doctors' Plot of 1952–1953. As in the 1930s, such purging occurred against a backdrop of the apogee of the Stalin cult at the time of his seventieth birthday in 1949. In this period, Stalin was probably more detached from the daily process of political life than he had ever been. But this does not mean that he was any less powerful; he still set the tenor of political life, and he was in a position to be able to decide any issue he wished to decide, which is the true measure of a dictator. His colleagues, really subordinates, may have maneuvered among themselves for increased power and for particular policy positions, but none challenged his primacy. Stalin died on March 5, 1953, probably of natural causes; some have argued that some of his leadership colleagues may have poisoned him, but there has been no evidence to sustain this accusation.

Both of Stalin's wives died at an early age, and he seems to have had difficult relations with his children. From his second marriage he had a son, Vasily (b. 1921) and a daughter Svetlana (b. 1926), both of whom outlived him. Stalin seems to have had little personal contact with either of these children or with Yakov, his son by his first marriage. Vasily joined the air force during the war and

through his father's patronage quickly rose to a leadership position. He subsequently became an alcoholic. Yakov was in the army and was captured by the Germans; reports suggest that Stalin refused a prisoner swap that would have returned Yakov to him. After Stalin's death, Svetlana married a citizen of India, and when he died in 1966 she took his body to India and decided to remain abroad, returning briefly in 1984.

Stalin was the longest-serving leader of the Soviet Union and clearly left a major imprint on its development. He has been described as cruel, secretive, manipulative, opportunistic, doctrinaire, paranoid, devoid of human feelings and sentiment, single-minded, and power-hungry. All of these descriptions can find sustenance in different aspects of Stalin's biography. Where the balance lies remains a matter of debate. What is clear is that when he believed it was required, he could be ruthless in the actions he took against both enemies and supposed friends. In this sense, he was a man of action. He was not an intellectual, despite the claims of the cult. His literary output was moderate in size and generally both turgid in prose and mechanical in its arguments, but it did gain the status of orthodoxy within the USSR, a function of his political dominance rather than the intrinsic merit of his work.

Stalin's life remains the subject of debate. Many aspects are still highly controversial, with scholars disagreeing widely on them. The following are among the most important of these.

Why was Stalin victorious? This question has often been posed in a broader form: Why did the Stalinist system emerge in the Soviet Union, the first attempt to create a socialist society on a national scale? Debate on this question has been vigorous precisely because of the implications its answer was seen to have for socialist aspirations more generally. Many, particularly on the right of the political spectrum, argued that such a system was a logical, even inevitable, result of revolution and the sort of system that Lenin set in place. Others argued that, while the Leninist system may have made a highly coercive, undemocratic system more likely, this was neither the necessary nor inevitable outcome of either the revolution or Leninism. Many argued the primacy of organizational factors, especially the power Stalin was able to gain and exercise within the party apparatus. Others emphasized the importance of Stalin's personality, skills, and talents, especially in contrast to those of

his opponents. Another strand of argument focused upon the regime's desire to bring about substantial socioeconomic change in an economically and politically backward society, a situation requiring a high level of centralization and coercion. Others noted the role of the party's isolation in Soviet society and the nature of the recruits flowing into its ranks. This question remains unresolved, but an answer, most now agree, involves elements of all of the arguments noted above.

Was Stalin responsible for Kirov's assassination? Those supporting the view that Stalin was responsible argue that Kirov was seen as a possible challenge to or replacement for Stalin, and accordingly Stalin had him assassinated. Other suggestions have been that Kirov's killer was indeed working for a bloc of oppositionists as Stalin and his supporters claimed, that he was working alone, or that it was the security apparatus who had planned a failed assassination attempt to boost their institutional stocks but that this went wrong. Despite research in the archives, no definitive answer has been forthcoming, and all cases remain circumstantial.

There is now no doubt about Stalin's responsibility for the terror. This was not a normal party purge that went off the rails. Given Stalin's position in the party organization and the position occupied by his supporters, this could not have gone ahead without his permission. He probably did not have an exact idea of how many people suffered during the terror, but he must have had an idea of the general dimensions, and he certainly knew of some of the individuals who perished, because he signed lists of victims submitted to him. Ultimately Stalin was responsible, even if the primary role in the direction of it lay with his henchmen.

Was Stalin planning another major purge when he died? Those who argue in favor of this point to the buildup of pressure through the Leningrad affair, the Mingrelian case, and the Doctors' Plot, and the enlargement of the party Presidium at the nineteenth congress of the party in October 1952. This was seen as preparatory to purging some of the older established leaders and bringing newer ones forward. Many of those who accept this logic also accept that Stalin was poisoned. There is no firm evidence about Stalin's intentions either way, and unless compelling evidence comes from the archives, this will remain a moot point.

Finally there is the question of the costs and benefits of Stalin and his regime. Under his rule,

the Soviet Union moved from being a backward, predominantly agricultural country to one of the two superpowers on the globe. The living standards of many of its people rose significantly, as did literacy and education levels. Urbanization transformed the landscape. And the Soviet Union won the war against Hitler, something that would have been highly unlikely without high-level industrialization. But critics point to the costs: millions killed as a result of famine, terror, and collectivization; the massive wastage of resources; the establishment of an economic system that ultimately could not sustain itself; the development of a society which crushed individual initiative and free thinking. This was an ambiguous legacy, and one that therefore was difficult for the regime to handle. Under Khrushchev, destalinization was a limited policy that refused to come to grips with the reality of the Stalin regime. When discussion was again permitted, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the political circumstances of the time prevented a balanced evaluation from emerging. Russia still must broach this question, but it is likely that this will only happen in a satisfactory way when the Stalin issue is not seen to have contemporary political relevance. That may be some time off.

See also: COLD WAR; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; CULT OF PERSONALITY; DE-STALINIZATION; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET; KIROV, SERGEI MIRONOVICH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; PURGES, THE GREAT; SHOW TRIALS; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; WORLD WAR II

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GRAEME GILL

STALIN REVOLUTION *See* INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET.

STANISLAVSKY, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH

(1863–1938), actor, director, acting teacher.

The first creator of a comprehensive guide to actor training, Stanislavsky emerged as one of the most influential theater personalities of the twentieth century. His work continues to shape theatrical discourse into the twenty-first century.

Born Konstantin Sergeyevich Alexeyev to the wealthy Alexeyevs, he first performed in a fully equipped home theater outside Moscow. Because of his social class, he limited his theatrical ambitions to the amateur sphere. In 1888 he founded The Society of Art and Literature, a critically acclaimed theater club, where he established himself as an outstanding actor and emerging director. As his talents became known, he adopted “Stanislavsky” (1884) to protect his family name. In 1897 Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko, playwright and head of the only acting school in Moscow, invited Stanislavsky to cofound The Moscow Art Theater (MAT) as a professional venture. The two agreed to produce plays of contemporary import, bring European stage realism to Russia, and ensure that the work of directors, designers, and actors would embrace unified dramatic visions. The theater opened with an historically researched production of Alexei Tolstoy’s *Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich* (1898). Anton Chekhov’s *The Seagull* (1898) secured the company’s fame. Stanislavsky directed and acted in productions such as premieres of Chekhov’s plays (1898–1904), Henrik Ibsen’s *An Enemy of the People* (1902), and Maxim Gorky’s *The Lower Depths* (1902).

In 1906 Stanislavsky lost inspiration as an actor and retreated to Finland in despair. The crisis induced his passionate desire to systematize acting. He devoted the rest of his life to collecting, developing, and teaching ways to control inspiration. His “System” went through continuous evolution incorporating the experience of great actors, behaviorist psychology, yoga, and other sources that illuminate the creative process. Stanislavsky’s experimental stance caused friction, which ignited in 1909 when he applied his ideas to Ivan Turgenev’s *A Month in the Country*. Nemirovich’s hostility prompted Stanislavsky to transfer his experiments into a series of studios, adjunct to the main company, even as he continued to act and direct at MAT. The First Studio, founded in 1911, became his most famous laboratory, because it laid the System’s foundation.

With the Bolshevik revolution, Stanislavsky and MAT were reduced to poverty. From 1922 to 1924, Stanislavsky toured Europe and the United States with the company’s earliest and most famous productions in an effort to recoup financial stability. During this period, he also began to write, publishing *My Life in Art* in 1924. This period guaranteed his international influence.

Upon returning to Moscow, Stanislavsky faced growing Soviet control over the arts. His connections with the West and his production of Mikhail Bulgakov’s play about White Russians, *The Days of the Turbins* (1926), came under attack. From 1934 to 1938, during the Soviet purges, Stanislavsky was weakened by an enlarged heart and confined to his home. Stalin simultaneously canonized the director’s realistic work as the vanguard of Socialist Realism. Isolated from the wider world, Stanislavsky continued to write, teach, and develop his ideas in his home until his death in 1938 of a heart attack.

See also: BULGAKOV, MIKHAIL AFANASIEVICH; CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; MOSCOW ART THEATER; SOCIALIST REALISM; THEATER

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SHARON MARIE CARNICKE

STARCHESTVO *See* SPIRITUAL ELDERS.

STAROVOITOVA, GALINA VASILIEVNA

(1946–1998), martyred political figure and human rights activist.

Galina Starovoitova was one of Russia’s leading human rights advocates and served in the first post-Soviet Russian government. Murdered by unknown assailants on November 20, 1998, in St. Petersburg, she was eulogized as “a symbol of courage and outspokenness,” “one of the brightest lights of Russian independence and reform move-

ment," and a leader with an "uncompromising dedication to democracy."

Starovoitova was born in Chelyabinsk, earned B.A. and M.A. degrees in social psychology, and in 1980 received a Ph.D. from the Institute of Ethnography, USSR Academy of Sciences. She worked as an ethnographer and psychologist, and published scientific works in both fields, with a specialization in inter-ethnic relations and cross-cultural studies.

Her political activities began in the late 1980s with the Moscow Helsinki Group, a human rights organization led by Andrei Sakharov and other prominent dissident leaders. She joined with Sakharov to campaign for the rights of Armenians in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, and in 1989, in appreciation, was elected to the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies from Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. The Congress elected her to serve in the Supreme Soviet, where she became one of the co-founders of the pro-reform Inter-Regional Group of Deputies. A year later, she was elected to the Russian parliament from a constituency in St. Petersburg and became a co-chair of the Democratic Russia Party.

After the USSR collapsed, Starovoitova became an adviser to President Boris Yeltsin on inter-ethnic affairs, but she resigned in 1992 because of disagreements over policy in the Caucasus region and frustration with a government still beholden to elements of the old Soviet system. From 1993 to 1994 she was a fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., and the following year she taught at Brown University.

In 1995 Starovoitova was elected to the Russian Duma, where she became a prominent spokeswoman on human rights, the war in Chechnya, the environment, women's rights, wage issues, housing, antisemitism, and religious freedom. In 1996, she ran for the presidency, the first Russian woman to do so. She talked of running again in 2000, and before her death announced that she would run for governor of Leningrad oblast. Starovoitova saw Russia's communists and nationalists as standing in the way of democratization, and they in turn were her main opponents. Shortly before her death, she spoke out forcefully about political corruption, and many speculate that her investigations in this area precipitated her murder.

Millions of Russians mourned Galina Starovoitova's death, and a kilometer-long line of people waited in the cold to pay their respects. The inves-



Democratic activist Galina Starovoitova was murdered outside her apartment in St. Petersburg. © ANTONOV/RPG/CORBIS SYGMA

tigation of her murder was turned over to the highest authorities, but despite the interrogation of hundreds of witnesses, the detention of hundreds of suspects, and pledges to catch those guilty of the crime, no one was charged. Several Russians view the murder as a political assassination perpetrated either by organized crime or corrupt political officials.

See also: ORGANIZED CRIME; SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH

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PAUL J. KUBICEK

START *See* STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS.

STASOVA, YELENA DMITRIEVNA

(1873–1966), Bolshevik, secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, 1919–1920.

Yelena Stasova belonged to a prominent St. Petersburg intelligentsia family. In the early 1900s she became a secretary of the illegal St. Petersburg committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. Stasova was an effective administrator and conspirator, as well as a staunch supporter of Vladimir Lenin. Arrested in 1907, she spent the next ten years in exile, first in the Caucasus and then in Siberia.

After the revolution, in 1917 and 1918, Stasova was a secretary of the Petrograd party committee. She chose to concentrate on the mundane but crucially important work of administration, keeping records, dispersing funds, and handing out job assignments. In 1919, when Central Committee Secretary Yakov Sverdlov died, Lenin tapped Stasova to replace him. She struggled to improve the organization of the party's central administration, but her efforts did not dispel charges of chronic inefficiency in the Secretariat. In 1920, Lenin responded by replacing Stasova with three male secretaries. She left the party leadership having played an important part in building the Communist Party's apparatus.

For the rest of her long life Stasova took insignificant assignments. In the 1930s she headed the International Organization for Aid to Revolutionaries. Her obscurity probably helped her survive the party purges and aid some of its victims. In the 1950s and 1960s she published several versions of her memoirs, all dedicated to restoring the reputation of the party's founders. Stasova died of natural causes.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; FEMINISM

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BARBARA EVANS CLEMENTS

STASOV, VLADIMIR VASILIEVICH

(1824–1906), music and art critic whose aesthetics of realist and national expression in the arts served as a model for socialist realism.

Born into a prominent upper-class family (his father was a noted architect), Vladimir Stasov graduated in 1843 from the elite St. Petersburg School of Jurisprudence and also studied piano. After a period in various undistinguished civil service jobs, he was appointed secretary to Prince Antaoly N. Demidov in 1851 and spent almost three years in the West, mostly in Florence. Back in Russia he found employment in the Imperial Public Library in the capital, and from 1872 until his death he headed its arts department.

Stasov's voluminous writings consist of polemical feuilletons, monographs on individual musicians and painters, and long overviews of developments in the arts (both in Russia and the West), as well as on Russian architecture and archeology. Inspired by the radical literary critic Vissarion Belinsky, Stasov promoted realist and national artistic forms that would engage the public in current social and historical issues. His original, liberal, and open-minded stance in opposition to the regnant academicism invigorated the cultural scene. But by the 1890s his aesthetics had turned conservative and chauvinistic, condemning as decadent the new artistic trends that were challenging national realism, which had by then become a new form of academicism.

With the publication of his monograph on Mikhail Glinka in 1847, which stressed the composer's originality in using folk motifs, Stasov began to advocate Russianness in music. Thereafter he consistently championed young, independent composers—Miliy A. Balakirev, Alexander P. Borodin, César A. Cui, Modest P. Musorgsky, and Nikolai A. Rimsky-Korsakov—whom he jointly called "The Mighty Five" (*moguchaya kuchka*). They all were self-taught, opposed the hidebound rules of the conservatory, and strove to create, in Glinka's footsteps, a distinctly Russian school of music. Stasov supported these composers with polemical publications and contributed significantly to their creative work, suggesting topics, supplying historical documentation, and commenting on compositions. He was especially close to Musorgsky, whose genius he was the first to recognize.

In the 1860s Stasov began to comment regularly on the situation in the pictorial arts, questioning the authority of the Imperial Academy of Arts with its Italianate tastes. Instead, he advocated art that depicted Russian subjects in a manner that would instruct the public about the country's realities. He became closely associated with young painters who in 1863 had quit the academy in protest against its outdated routines and in 1871

founded the independent Association of Traveling Art Exhibits. Commonly known as the *peredvizh-niki* (wanderers or itinerants), these artists painted Russian landscape, social genre, or historical scenes that were literally read by both Stasov and the public as critical commentary on current events. Stasov was very closely associated with Ilya Repin, the foremost painter of the school.

In the 1890s, as aestheticism began to supplant national realism, Stasov's renown and influence waned. Prior to World War I and during the first decade of the Soviet regime, Stasov's views were not respected, and were even derided, by the creative intelligentsia. His standing was restored by the Communist Party after the imposition of socialist realism as the guiding ideology for literature and the arts in 1932. But Stasov's views were increasingly distorted to legitimate a narrow politicization of the arts and cultural isolationism that bore little resemblance to his original position in his creative period from 1860 to 1890. The pedestal on which Stasov stood as the preeminent art and music critic was toppled during the period of glasnost.

See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; MIGHTY HANDFUL; MUSIC; OPERA; SOCIALIST REALISM

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ELIZABETH K. VALKENIER

STATE CAPITALISM

The term *state capitalism* was coined by political economists to describe market economies heavily regulated or controlled by the state, on behalf of property owners. Unlike stateless capitalism, where markets function without governmental assistance, commonly called "free enterprise," political authorities play a powerful role in state capitalist systems. The government is the agent of property holders, and functions as the executive committee of the capitalist class, even though it usually claims to rule in the interests of all the people. Social democratic regimes such as those of France and Ger-

many, and big-government systems such as the United States that rely on Keynesian and other macromanagement methods, are often classified as state capitalist. Post-Soviet Russia, which describes itself as a mixed social economy, combining state and private ownership of the means of production with an autocratic state, can also be listed under this heading.

Even states dominated by administration and planning, with restricted markets such as the Soviet Union during the era of the New Economic Policy (NEP) 1921–1929, have been accused of being state capitalist by alleging that self-serving bureaucrats, or capitalist roaders had subverted and co-opted the state. Post-Maoist China provides a good example of how a socialist society governed by a Communist Party can serve the interests of property holders from the perspective of Marxist-Leninism.

These distinctions are devoid of any rigorous economic content. They may serve some useful purpose for ideologues, but the classification reveals nothing about the productive potential, economic efficiency, or welfare characteristics of any particular state capitalist regime, or even whether the system relies primarily on markets or plans. The burden of the term is to place most economies outside the hallowed pale of Marxist socialism. Only North Korea and Cuba appear to be mostly directive regimes, with strong states and a socialist credo, in the twenty-first century.

See also: CAPITALISM; COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; MARKET SOCIALISM

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STEVEN ROSEFIELDE

STATE COMMITTEES

The first state committees in the USSR, STO (Sovet truda i oborony, the Council of Labor and Defense) and Gosplan (State Planning Committee) were standing commissions of Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars). Their number grew during the 1930s, and the 1936 constitution granted Sovnarkom membership to the chairpersons of the All-Union Committee for the Arts (Komiskusstv or Vsesoyuzny komitet po delam iskusstv) and the All-Union Committee for Higher Education (Komvysshshkol or Vsesoyuzny komitet po delam vysshei shkoly). Chairpersons of other committees, such as the All-Union Committee for Physical Culture and Sport (Komfizkult or Vsesoyuzny komitet po delam fizkultury i sporta), were not granted this status. During World War II, the State Defense Committee (GKO or Gosudarstvenny komitet oborony), chaired by Josef Stalin, was created as the extraordinary supreme state body to direct military and civilian resources and the economy, in order to achieve victory. This body was very significant during the war, and was the most powerful of all state committees during the USSR's existence.

In the 1950s and 1960s, with the increasing complexity of the economy of the USSR, and the increased importance of science and technology, the system of state committees developed rapidly as central interdepartmental agencies that coordinated and supervised the work of ministries and other state departments in their areas of responsibility. Although the state committees were formed theoretically by the Supreme Soviet, and their structure was approved by the Council of Ministers, the real decisions concerning their existence and structure lay with the Politburo. State committees were allocated administrative powers to organize, coordinate, and supervise the state departments with

which they were concerned, their instructions having the force of law within the area of their jurisdiction. Like ministries, they could be either all-Union, with plenipotentiaries in the republics, or union-republic, functioning through parallel apparatuses in the republics.

The State Committee of the USSR on Defence Technology (GKOT or Gosudarstvenny komitet SSSR po oboronu tekhnike) was created in 1957 but incorporated into a newly created Ministry of General Machine Building in 1965. The committee was responsible for all strategic ballistic missiles, spacecraft, and satellites developed in the USSR. By 1973 the following state committees existed:

- State Planning Committee (Gosplan or Gosudarstvenny planovyy komitet).
- State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Construction (Gosstroim or Gosudarstvenny komitet soveta ministrov SSR po delam stroitelstva). Formed in 1950 to secure increased efficiency in construction.
- State Committee on Labor and Wages (Gosudarstvenny komitet po voprosam truda i zarabotnoi platy). Formed in 1955 to oversee wages and working conditions.
- Committee for State Security (KGB or Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti.) Formed in 1954 when the police apparatus was reorganized. The much feared secret police acted with more autonomy than most other government bodies and with a large degree of independence from the Council of Ministers.
- State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations (Gosudarstvenny komitet po vneshnim ekonomicheskim svyazam). Formed in 1957 to develop economic cooperation with foreign countries and ensure the fulfilment of obligations. It was also responsible for overseeing organizations responsible for exporting equipment to socialist and developing countries.
- State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the Supervision of Work Safety in Industry and for Mining Supervision (Gosgortekhnadzor or Gosudarstvenny komitet po nadzoru za bezopasnym vedeniem raboty promyshlennosti i gornomu nadzoru). Established in 1958.
- State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education (Gosudarstvenny komitet po professionalno-tekhnicheskomu obrazovaniyu). Formed in 1959 to implement and

supervize policy for training skilled workers both in vocational and technical institutions and in the workplace, to develop a system of educational institutions in this area, and to watch over students in these institutions.

State Committee for Science and Technology (Gosudarstvenny komitet po nauke i tekhnike). Formed in 1965 to coordinate policy to maximize the development and utilization of science and technology for economic purposes.

State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab or Gosudarstvenny komitet po materialno-tekhnicheskomu snabzheniyu). Formed in 1965 to supervise distribution to consumers, coordinate cooperation in delivery, and ensure fulfilment of plans for supply of output.

State Price Committee (Gosudarstvenny komitet tsen). Formed in 1965 as a subcommittee of Gosplan, it became a full state committee in 1969. Its tasks included price regulation, pricing policy, and the use of prices to stimulate production.

State Forestry Committee (Gosudarstvenny komitet lesnogo khozyaistva). Formed in 1966 to manage state forests and coordinate the activities of forest agencies.

State Committee for Television and Radio (Gosudarstvenny komitet po televideniyu i radioveshchaniyu). Formed in 1970.

State Committee on Standards (Gosstandart or Gosudarstvenny komitet standartov). Established in 1970 to encourage standardization and ensure standards in the quality of output.

State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Cinematography (Gosudarstvenny komitet po kinematografii). Created in 1972, its main task was to supervise the activities of film studios in the USSR.

State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Publishing, Printing, and the Book Trade (Gosudarstvenny komitet po pechati). Established in 1972 to supervise publishing and the content of literature in the USSR.

State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries (Gosudarstvenny komitet po delam izobreteniy i otkryty). Established in 1973.

A law of 1978 granted membership in the Council of Ministers to all chairpersons of state committees.

After the fall of the USSR, the RSFSR continued the use of state committees, forming the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Communications and Informatization (Goskomsvyaz or Gosudarstvenny Komitet Rossisskoi Federatsii po Svyazi i Informatizatsii) in 1997 from its Ministry of Communications. It was responsible for state management of communications and the development of many forms of telecommunications and postal services, including space communication in conjunction with the Federal Space Program of Russia.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1936; GOSPLAN; POLITBURO; SOVNARKOM; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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STATE COUNCIL

The State Council was founded by Alexander I in 1810. It was the highest consultative institution of the Russian Empire. The tsar appointed its membership that consisted of ministers and other high dignitaries. While no legislative project could be presented to the tsar without its approval, it had no prerogatives to initiate legislation. Ministers sent bills to the State Council on the tsar's command, reflecting the Council's ultimate dependence on the tsar for its institutional standing and activity. Since the right of legislation belonged to the autocratic tsar, the State Council could only make recommendations on bills sent to it that the tsar could accept or reject. Additionally the State Council examined administrative disputes between the different governmental organs.

After the Revolution of 1905 and the October Manifesto the State Council's role changed: It became the upper house of Russia's new parliamentary system. Every legislative bill needed the

Council's approval before becoming law. It also had the right to review internal policy of the Council of Ministers, the state's budget, declarations of war and making of peace, and ministerial reports. Several departments under the State Council's jurisdiction prepared briefs and more importantly analyzed legislation proposed by the Council of Ministers.

The State Council, like all upper houses in Europe at the time, served as a check on the lower house, the Duma. The tsar appointed half of the Council's members, while the other half were elected on a restricted franchise from the *zemstvos*, noble societies, and various other sections of the elite, making it by nature more conservative. In the period 1906–1914 the State Council, with the support of Nicholas II, played a large role in checking the authority and activities of the Duma, which led to general discontent with the post-1905 system.

Following the failed coup of August 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev created a State Council consisting of himself and the leaders of the remaining Union Republics. Gorbachev hoped the State Council could craft a reconfigured USSR, but republic representatives increasingly failed to attend Council meetings. By the end of 1991, the State Council—and the USSR—had petered out.

Russian President Vladimir Putin created his own State Council in 2000, consisting of the leaders of Russia's eighty-nine administrative components.

See also: ALEXANDER I; DUMA; FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF 1906; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

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STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

With the intent of more effectively coordinating decision-making for the war effort, on June 30, 1941, Josef Stalin created the State Defense Council (also known as State Defense Committee or GKO). According to his speech in which he announced this

body “all the power and authority of the state are vested in it.” Its decisions and resolutions had the force of law. The initial membership was composed of Stalin as Chairman, Vyacheslav Molotov as Deputy Chairman, Kliment Voroshilov, Georgy Malenkov, and Lavrenti Beria. Stalin added Nikolai Voznesensky, Lazar Kaganovich, and Anastas Mikoyan in February, 1942.

The GKO met frequently, but informally, sometimes on short notice and often without a prepared agenda but acted on issues that were foremost on Stalin's mind. Meetings always included people additional to the GKO, usually some Politburo members, members of the Central Committee, officers of the High Command, and various others with special knowledge requested to help address specific issues. The GKO did not develop its own administrative apparatus, but primarily implemented its decisions through the existing government bureaucracy, especially the Council of Peoples' Commissars (Sovnarkom), the individual commissariats, and the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). Emulating Vladimir Lenin and his use of the Defense Council during the crisis years of the civil war, Stalin and the GKO often relied on plenipotentiaries endowed with broad powers to handle critical tasks. Decision-making bodies of the Communist Party and government were no longer asked for input and were seldom called upon to ratify the GKO's decisions.

Each GKO member had specific areas of responsibility to supervise and obtain results. Molotov was to oversee tank production; Malenkov aircraft engine production and the forming of aviation regiments; Beria armaments, ammunition, and mortars, Voznesensky heavy and light metals, oil, and chemicals; Mikoyan supplying the Red Army with food, gasoline, pay, and artillery. Rather less specific was the requirement that each member of the GKO assist in inspecting fulfillment of decisions of Peoples' Commissars in the course of their work.

The chief strengths of the GKO were that it provided for quick decision-making on critical issues and speedily disseminated vital information to those at the top who needed to use it. The weaknesses of the GKO were that a few men were burdened with a multitude of tasks without a supporting administrative structure to distribute authority rationally and evenly, or to allow initiative. By relying on the existing Party and government structures, which had proven inefficient and prone to parochialism in defending their bureaucratic turf, the GKO was unable to capitalize fully on the unity at the top.

Furthermore, the commissariats other government offices through which the GKO implemented its decisions had been evacuated to the interior of the USSR while the GKO remained in Moscow. The physical distance between the GKO and the commissariats hindered communication and efficient supervision. The government apparatus did not begin returning to the capital until 1943. With the end of the war, the GKO was formally dissolved on September 4, 1945.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; STALIN, JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II

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STATE DEFENSE COUNCIL *See* STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE; WORLD WAR II.

STATE ENTERPRISE, LAW OF THE

Of the many pieces of legislation passed during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, the Law of the State Enterprise (enacted 1987) was perhaps the most important. It represented yet another effort to separate long-term perspective planning from day-to-day operational control of enterprises. The latter function was to be the exclusive responsibility of the management, without the petty tutelage characteristic of the Soviet system. Enterprises could now enter into contracts (direct links), make quality improvements, and sell over-plan output without the approval of superior agencies. Local party organs would be banned from using enterprise personnel and materials for their own purposes. The centralized system of supply would control only the essential minimum necessary through orders (*zakazy*) from customers, rather than plan targets, as before. Accordingly, legal enforcement of contracts through *arbitrazh* (civil arbitration) courts and other legal institutions would be enhanced. A new agency was instituted, *Gospriyemka* (State Acceptance), independent of enterprise management along the military model, with the duty to check whether quality met state standards. Along with enhanced managerial ac-

countability, these provisions were designed to assure that enterprises produced what the public really wanted to buy.

But, perhaps inevitably, the centralized supply organs would still have to check whether the correct volumes, assortments, and qualities of goods had been delivered on time to essential operations, such as the military-industrial complex. Ministries would retain some influence through norms and other indirect instruments, if not direct orders. Aside from some minor products, the State Standards Committee would still set minimum quality requirements. Moreover, party control of personnel and promotions remained untouched until the end of Soviet rule.

See also: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PERESTROIKA

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STATE ORDERS

The introduction of state orders, as a part of perestroika, was an attempt to move from a total state control over the economy toward introduction of some market elements. During the mid-1980s, the Soviet communist leadership realized that the country was losing the economic competition to the West. The last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, introduced cautious policies designed to set up some market elements. One such change was the introduction of state orders.

Prior to perestroika, state enterprises were supposed to produce goods according to the state plan and deliver them to the state for distribution. Gorbachev's idea was to replace the state plan with state orders. Enterprises first had to produce and sell to the state production to fulfill their state orders. However, the state order should be for only part of their production. After enterprises fulfilled the state order—a guaranteed quantity of products that would be purchased by the state and production for which the state provided necessary resources—they

could sell the remainder to customers at negotiated prices. The state order was supposed to constitute only a portion of a plant's potential output. It was included in the state plan, and the resources for its implementation were supposed to be allocated by Gosplan. The percentage of state orders of total output was supposed to decline, giving way to a marketlike economy.

See also: GOSPLAN; MARKET SOCIALISM; PERESTROIKA.

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PAUL R. GREGORY

STATE PRINCIPLE

State principle is the leading principle of writing and explaining Russian history in nineteenth-century and, with some modifications, twentieth-century national historiography.

Professor Johann Philipp Georg Ewers (1781–1830) was the first to apply to the study of ancient Russian law the Hegelian theory of peoples' evolution from family or kin phase to that of a state. This idea was adopted and further elaborated by the founders of the so-called state (or juridical) school in Russian historiography, Konstantin Kavelin (1818–1885) and Sergei Soloviev (1820–1879). According to Soloviev, the transition from kin relations as the dominant system to the strong state organization in Russia took about four hundred years, from the end of the twelfth century till the reign of Ivan IV. Only after that, having endured severe experience in the Time of Troubles, the young Russian state found its place among other European powers. Thus the whole course of Russian history was presented as a progressive and logically necessary movement toward the modern centralized and autocratic state.

Though Soviet scholars, unlike Soloviev, considered Kievan Rus to be a feudal state, and thus found state organization even in the ninth century, they remained loyal to the state principle in their own way. Thus, disunity of the Rus lands in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries was regarded as a negative phenomenon, and historians explicitly sympathized with the process of gathering Rus'

by Muscovite princes, dating the beginning of this process as early as possible, in the early fourteenth century (e.g., Cherepnin, 1960). Since the 1950s, well into the 1980s, it was much debated who had been allies and enemies of Muscovite centralization, but "centralization" itself was still perceived as an absolute good.

In spite of its teleological and nationalistic implications, the state principle can be detected in post-Soviet Russian historiography as well.

See also: HISTORIOGRAPHY; KIEVAN RUS; MUSCOVY; SOLOVREY, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

MIKHAIL M. KROM

STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

The political police and other organs of state security have played a prominent role in Russian and Soviet history. For almost two hundred years they have served a variety of state interests, including among their functions the surveillance of the population; censorship; the quashing of political and intellectual dissent; foreign and domestic espionage; and the guarding of borders. At times they have shared duties or been subsumed within the Ministry (or Commissariat) of Internal Affairs, and at other times they have been self-standing organs, often operating in parallel with the regular police or militia.

Although the political police in the modern understanding of the term originated in Russia in the early nineteenth century, various forms of special security forces existed well before this. The first such organ to play a prominent role was Ivan IV's (the Terrible) infamous *oprichniki*, who terrorized the Russian aristocracy in the late sixteenth century in order to root out Ivan's real and imagined foes. In the mid-seventeenth century Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (r. 1645–1676) made use of a "Secret Department" (*tainy prikaz*) to keep him informed of events in the capital and to confirm the accounts of his foreign embassies. Crimes of "word and deed," that is, either speech or action deemed inimical to the tsar, were vigorously investigated.

Alexei's successors continued to keep private security forces. Peter I (the Great) (r. 1682–1725) maintained the "Preobrazhensky Department" and later a "Secret Investigative Chancellery" staffed with

close friends and trusted allies to maintain his personal power and to guard against insurrection. These institutions were preserved in various forms throughout the century, despite occasional gestures toward limiting their power; their agents became powerful instruments of the throne and were often feared and loathed among court circles. Despite reaffirming her ill-fated husband Peter III's (r. 1761–1762) abolition of the Secret Chancellery, Catherine II (the Great, r. 1762–1796) made much use of an agency called the "Secret Expedition" to root out opposition. Its leader, Stepan Sheshkovsky, was particularly noted for his brutal methods of interrogation, especially in the latter years of Catherine's reign, when the French Revolution prompted an intensification of repression.

These institutions (in general) had a narrower focus and scope than would the genuine political police that originated in the nineteenth century. This had its root not only in the ideals of the Enlightenment-era "well-ordered police state," but also, ironically, in the French Revolution, which attempted to protect itself through institutions such as the Committee for Public Safety. Hence the organs of state security in Imperial Russia were concerned not only with the possibility of immediate rebellion within court circles, but with dissent in a more general sense.

The early reforming efforts of Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) included the aspiration to establish a more rational government system. Of course this did not appear all at once, but it did involve the creation of a ministry system, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which soon acquired competence over all policing matters. In the latter years of Alexander's reign, several different groups functioned as secret police forces, including the Secret Chancellery within the Ministry of the Interior.

The true consolidation of a secret police force came early in the reign of Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855). Nicholas's accession had been met with a revolt of military officers known to history as the Decembrist uprising, and Nicholas became adamant that such an occurrence not repeat itself. As part of his efforts to strengthen his own autocratic powers vis-à-vis the ministerial system erected by his brother Alexander, he had formed a set of agencies under his own personal dominion, known collectively as His Majesty's Own Chancery. The infamous "Third Section" of His Majesty's Own Chancery formed the first modern secret police force in Russia. It was originally headed by General Alexander Benckendorff and included much of the

staff of Alexander's Secret Chancery. The Third Section vastly expanded the range of surveillance functions and incorporated other government officials in its scope, using army gendarme units to spy on the populace; the censors within the Ministry of Education to detect subversive writings; and the postal service to begin the practice of perustration, or examining the contents of letters. Benckendorff also served as the head of the Corps of Gendarmes, an army unit that came to serve as the Third Section's information-gathering apparatus.

The power of Nicholas's secret police grew during a time when political opposition in Russia was relatively muted. It concentrated therefore on rooting out intellectual dissidents. During the European Revolutions of 1848, the Gendarmes rounded up members of the so-called Petrashevsky circle, including the young Fyodor Dostoyevsky. It was under Alexander II (r. 1855–1881), the Tsar-Liberator who at last emancipated the serfs, that revolutionary opposition began truly to appear. In the early 1860s, student riots broke out at St. Petersburg University, and in 1866 a demented ex-student attempted to assassinate the tsar. From this time the Third Section under Count Peter Shuvalov was given immense powers to eradicate subversives. It soon became involved in a number of high-profile prosecutions, including the notorious Nechayev Affair. Despite the judicial reforms of 1864, Shuvalov continued to use extralegal means whenever security and expediency required it. Through the 1870s, however, public sympathy increasingly rested with the defendants in a series of celebrated trials prosecuting revolutionary terrorists and other radicals. This culminated in the scandalous acquittal in 1878 of the man who had shot and wounded the much-loathed St. Petersburg police chief General Trepov. Political crimes were soon transferred to military courts to better control the outcome. In 1880, in an effort to better consolidate control, Alexander II transferred the responsibilities of the Third Section to a newly created Department of State Police within the Ministry of Interior, then headed by the moderate Count Mikhail Loris-Melikov.

On March 1, 1881, Alexander II was assassinated by a conspiracy of the People's Will terrorist organization led by Andrei Zhelyabov and Sofia Perovskaya. His son and successor, Alexander III (1881–1894), and his chief advisor Konstantin Pobednostsev demanded a firm accounting. The remnants of People's Will and other terrorist groups of the late 1870s were ruthlessly sought out and expunged. Loris-Melikov was replaced by

Nikolai Ignatiev, who soon promulgated a set of temporary measures providing for greater emergency policing powers. Establishing a system of quasi-martial law, these measures were renewed periodically until 1917, and they were used by the government when necessary to circumvent its own legal institutions.

Henceforth the minister of the Interior would have broad powers to quell real and potential disturbances and dissent to maintain public order. Within the Interior Ministry's Police Department was formed a new section in charge of political crimes, called the Division for the Protection of Order and Public Security, better known as the *Okhrana*. During the 1880s, political proceedings were much less publicized than they had been, and the authorities began to expand the practice of administrative exile of political prisoners—that is, deportation with no trial at all.

The *Okhrana* expanded the business of state surveillance further than it had ever been before, using undercover agents to infiltrate revolutionary organizations. It also established a Foreign Agency to operate among emigré groups conspiring against the Russian government. From the assassination of Alexander II to the fall of the Romanov dynasty, the regime and its opponents were thus locked in a bitter struggle replete with murder and intrigue.

Revolutionary terrorists, and in particular the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR), carried out several spectacular assassinations, including several ministers of the interior—Dmitry Sipiagin in 1902 and the much-loathed Vyacheslav von Plehve in 1904. In response, the *Okhrana* increasingly used double agents to gather information on and control subversive groups, especially with the explosion of terrorist activity during and after the Revolution of 1905. The most infamous of the *agent provocateurs* was Evno Azev, who served the *Okhrana* while heading the SR's Combat Organization, completely unbeknownst to his comrades, until his dramatic exposure by the rabble-rousing journalist Vladimir Burtsev. After 1908, there were increasingly fewer assassinations of top tsarist officials, with the major exception of the assassination of Prime Minister Peter Stolypin in 1911.

Despite the *Okhrana*'s successful efforts at infiltrating revolutionary groups and the awe and fear it inspired among the public, security officials faced several important obstacles. There was division over how to deal with the vigilante violence of radical nationalists, aimed at Jews, revolution-

aries, and intellectuals. Many officials sympathized with the politics of right-wing organizations, which after all were bent on defending the monarchy, and the *Okhrana* became involved in the printing of anti-Semitic materials and condoned pogroms; but others were leery of permitting popular disorder. There was also disagreement over to what degree the police could circumvent the rule of law in its efforts to disrupt revolutionary activities.

In the end, the tsarist organs of state security were unable to prevent the overthrow of the imperial regime, despite a marked increase in surveillance during World War I. The growing unpopularity of the tsar and his government was greatly exacerbated by the quixotic influence of Grigory Rasputin, whose rise to prominence concerned leaders of the *Okhrana* proved powerless to prevent. After the February Revolution in 1917, the Provisional Government abolished the *Okhrana* and Gendarmes and sponsored a series of hearings into the abuses of power that had occurred during the previous regime.

The Council of People's Commissars established the first Soviet organ of state security in December 1917, creating the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, better known by its Russian acronym as the Cheka. It was headed by the inimitable Felix Dzerzhinsky, recognized as the founder of the Soviet secret police. Under Dzerzhinsky's leadership the Cheka, headquartered in the Lubyanka in central Moscow, quickly became a critical part of the Bolshevik efforts to stamp out all opposition in the difficult early days of power.

Opponents of Soviet power were targeted starting soon after it was founded. The Red Terror began after the assassination of the Petrograd Cheka chief M. S. Uritsky and an unsuccessful attempt on Lenin's life, both on August 30, 1918. Hundreds of real and imagined enemies were shot in an effort to quell all opposition, including Socialist Revolutionaries, landlords, capitalists, and other people associated with the old regime. Both the Bolsheviks and the various counterrevolutionary governments that formed during the civil war established intelligence services and made ample use of terror in attempting to win the struggle.

At the end of the civil war, some voices from within the Bolshevik leadership began to press for the establishment of revolutionary legality and a reduction in the extralegal methods of the Cheka. With Vladimir Lenin's support, the Cheka was abolished in February 1922 and replaced with the



KGB bodyguards ride on a ZIL government car through the streets of Moscow. © TASS/Sovfoto

State Political Administration, or GPU. The GPU was to be made nominally subordinate to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, or NKVD, and subject to the laws of Soviet Russia. However, from the start this proved more illusion than reality. Dzerzhinsky remained both commissar of internal affairs and head of the GPU, and within a year and a half the GPU had reacquired most of its former powers and been removed from NKVD oversight (and renamed the OGPU). The transformation from Cheka to OGPU, from civil war extraordinary to ordinary organ, marked the institutionalization of the security police in the Soviet system.

During the 1920s the OGPU competed with several other Soviet institutions for control of political policing operations. The system of administrative exile was reestablished along with a growing system of forced labor camps known as gulags. Political prisoners soon populated these destinations as they had under the old regime, and many individuals who had been exiled under the tsars found themselves once again in prison. In addition, the

OGPU and the other organs of state security created a system of surveillance that would soon dwarf that of its tsarist predecessors. State censorship was unified in 1922 under a new organ, called Glavlit, which also worked closely with the secret police. At the same time, infiltration of Russian emigré groups and external espionage commenced.

A dramatic intensification of secret police activity marked the end of the 1920s, when Josef Stalin solidified his hold on power. Dzerzhinsky and his successors as head of the OGPU, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky and Genrikh Yagoda, allied themselves with Stalin and were instrumental in helping purge the opposition centering on Leon Trotsky. At the end of the decade, a series of show trials were orchestrated with OGPU support in which purported opponents of Soviet power were exposed and eliminated. This period ushered in the rapid intensification of Soviet industrialization campaigns and the collectivization of agriculture. It also featured the expansion of the system of administrative exile and prison camps, most notably through the campaign against the wealthier peasants, or kulaks, who were thought to

be congenitally resistant to collectivization. The OGPU conducted a campaign of rooting out and deporting several hundred thousand kulaks and their families in the early 1930s in order to eliminate opposition to the collectivization of agriculture.

By 1931–1932 the OGPU had vastly expanded its extralegal authority and had gained primary competence over the rapidly growing penal apparatus. Its ability to control and observe the population was augmented through the introduction of an internal passport system in 1932. The 1930s and in particular the latter half of the decade are the period in which the punitive functions of the Soviet organs of state security reached their notorious zenith. Driven by a desire to purge the country of all real and imagined enemies, Stalin and his henchman in the secret police unleashed a wave of arrests, deportations, and executions, later known as the Great Terror.

In 1934 the OGPU was transformed once again into the Main Administration of State Security (GUGB) within a reconstituted Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), under the leadership of Genrikh Yagoda. The first wave of purges focused on Stalin's former colleagues in the Politburo who had been part of the several oppositions in the previous decade. The pretext for these purges was the December 1934 murder of the Leningrad Party chief Sergei Kirov, an event that, according to some historians, was actually ordered by Stalin himself. In any event, the increasingly militant atmosphere following Kirov's death, in which accusations against loyal Leninists reached infamously absurd proportions, culminated in the show trials of 1936–1938. Such well-known old Bolsheviks as Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, and Nikolai Bukharin were accused of plotting against the Soviet state and executed. Yagoda himself was caught up in the wave of purges; he was replaced as NKVD chief by Nikolai Yezhov in September 1936 and arrested along with a number of his colleagues the following year.

Toward the end of the decade, the NKVD-led purges changed dramatically in tone and scope. Starting in 1935, mass deportations of particular ethnic groups deemed potentially unreliable had begun, and in 1937–1938 Stalin and Yezhov unleashed the most concentrated wave of the Terror. Hundreds of thousands of Party officials, former oppositionists, intellectuals, military officers, and ordinary citizens were arrested and imprisoned, deported, or summarily executed under Article 58 of the criminal code. Arrest numbers were approved a priori from the center but consistently increased

based on requests from the localities. The Gulags were expanded dramatically. The exact number of victims has been a measure of some dispute and is still being debated by scholars more than a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The start of World War II exacerbated the felt need to remove potential fifth columns and intensified the deportation of ethnic groups, including Koreans, Poles, Germans, the Baltic peoples, Chechens, and Tatars. Yezhov had been removed and been replaced with the powerful Central Committee member Lavrenti Beria, marking yet another purge of leading NKVD cadres. Under the leadership of Beria and his equally notorious lieutenants, the organs of state security changed names several times, eventually reconstituting as the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB), which was renamed the Ministry of State Security (MGB) in 1946, functioning alongside and sharing some duties with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

In 1953, soon after Stalin's death, the two ministries were fused, and a separate Committee for State Security (KGB) was established the following year. Beria was arrested by his anxious colleagues and executed toward the end of the year. Thus the three most notorious heads of the state security apparatus during the height of repression, Yagoda, Yezhov, and Beria, were all eventually removed by the system they had turned into an instrument of mass terror. The collective leadership that emerged took careful steps to reestablish Party control over the state security apparatus, and the security and regular police were now separate organs.

The period of de-Stalinization under Nikita Khrushchev brought with it the gradual end of the terror and camp system that had characterized the Stalin period, and Khrushchev's exposure of the excesses of Stalin's rule changed the nature of the security organs. At the same time, the transition did not by any means diminish the authority of the KGB under the leadership of Ivan Serov, Alexander Shelepin, and their successors. While the abuses of the previous period were decried, and socialist legality once again stressed, the infiltration and surveillance of society by the security organs continued to intensify. In addition, the foreign counterespionage apparatus now reached a position of supreme importance in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War and the establishment of Soviet client states in Eastern Europe and around the world.

That the KGB had emerged again as a powerful force in Kremlin politics is evidenced by the fact that Shelepin and his handpicked successor, Vladimir

Semichastny, were instrumental in the coup that overthrew Khrushchev in October 1964. The KGB enjoyed increased prestige and a further expansion of extralegal powers under the Brezhnev-led collective leadership that followed. In conjunction with high Party leaders, the KGB began the well-known crackdown on internal dissidents in 1965 with the arrest of the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel and the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1974. Under the leadership of Yuri Andropov, who chaired the KGB from 1967 until 1982, it became a stable and critical part of Brezhnev-era mature socialism.

The reforms of the Gorbachev era, with their emphasis on openness and legality, threatened the central tenets of the security police, as did its loss of control over the Soviet satellite empire. The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the formal end of the KGB, which was replaced with several successor institutions within Russia, the most important of which came to be called the Federal Security Service (FSB). Nevertheless, despite the changed political circumstances in post-Soviet Russia, the FSB has maintained a great deal of authority, as is evidenced by the rise of former FSB chief Vladimir Putin to the presidency. While critics of the security police can now complain about its abuses, the legacy of centuries of powerful state security organs continues in the early twenty-first century.

See also: AUTOCRACY; OPRICHNINA; NICHOLAS I; PURGES, THE GREAT; RED TERROR; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; TERRORISM

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STUART FINKEL

STATE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE *See* GOSKOMSTAT.

STATUTE OF GRAND PRINCE VLADIMIR

Allegedly authored by Grand Prince Vladimir (r. 980–1015), who is credited with the conversion of Kievan Rus to Christianity, the Statute established the principle of judicial separation between secular and clerical courts and forbade any of the Prince's heirs from interfering in the church's business. The Statute provided that all church personnel would be tried in church courts, no matter what the subject under litigation. The text scrupulously lists those who qualified for clerical jurisdiction, identifying not only monastics and members of church staffs, but also various social outsiders: pilgrims, manumitted slaves, and the blind and lame, for instance. In addition, the Statute granted church courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain offenses, even if secular subjects of the prince were involved. Divorce, fornication, adultery, rape, incest, disputes over inheritance, witchcraft, sorcery, charm-making, church theft, and intrafamilial violence were among the subjects assigned to church courts. Over and above the income generated by church courts, the Statute assigned the church a tithe from all the Rus land and a portion of various fees that the Prince collected. Finally, the text authorized bishops to supervise the various weights and measures employed for trade.

More than two hundred copies of the Statute survive, but none is older than the fourteenth century, a relatively late date for a document of such ostensible importance. In addition, the text includes some obvious errors that have helped undermine confidence in the legitimacy of the Statute. For instance, in the opening section the Statute reports that Grand Prince Vladimir accepted Christian baptism from Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who died almost a century before Vladimir converted to Christianity.

The most recent study of the Statute, however, has concluded that, if not in Vladimir's own time, then very soon thereafter, something like the Statute must already have existed. Archetypes of different parts of the Statute probably did originate in the reign of Vladimir, but the archetype of the entire Statute seems not to have arisen before the mid-twelfth century. This document, no longer extant, fathered two new versions in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, and each of these, in turn, contributed to a host of local reworkings, especially during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As many as seven basic versions of the Statute survive, each evidently revised to correspond to local circumstances and changing times.

No later than early in the fifteenth century, however, the Statute had come to enjoy official standing in the eyes of both churchmen and secular officials. In 1402 and again in 1419 Moscow Grand Prince Basil I (1389–1425) confirmed the judicial and financial guarantees laid out in the Statute. As a result, most extant copies survive along with other texts of secular and canon law in manuscript books like the *Kormchaya kniga* (the chief handbook of canon law) and miscellanies of canon law. Medieval secular codes, such as the Novgorod Judicial Charter and Pskov Judicial Charter, confirm that church courts in Rus did exercise independent authority, just as the Statute of Vladimir decreed.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER; PSKOV JUDICIAL CHARTER; STATUTE OF GRAND PRINCE YAROSLAV; VLADIMIR, ST.

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DANIEL H. KAISER

STATUTE OF GRAND PRINCE YAROSLAV

The Statute is reported to have come from the hand of Grand Prince Yaroslav (r. 1019–1054), son of Kievan Grand Prince Vladimir, who is credited with the conversion of Rus to Christianity and also with the authorship of the Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, which instituted church courts in Kievan Rus. Inasmuch as no copy of Yaroslav's Statute from before the fifteenth century survives, many historians doubted the authenticity of the document, but modern textological study has rehabilitated the Statute.

Scholars now know of some one hundred copies of the Statute, which may be divided into six separate redactions that reflect changes in the document's content as it developed in different parts of the Rus lands in the medieval and early modern period. The archetype of the Statute evidently did appear in Rus in the reign of Yaroslav, and gave birth to the two principal versions that dominated all later modifications in the text. The archetype of the Expanded version came into being in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, then spawned a host of specially adapted copies in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. The Short version seems to have arisen early in the fourteenth century, also stimulating many further variations in the document's content and organization in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. No later than early in the fifteenth century the Statute came to enjoy official standing in the eyes of both churchmen and secular officials. In 1402 and again in 1419 Moscow Grand Prince Basil I (1389–1425) confirmed the judicial and financial guarantees laid out in the Statute. Most extant copies, consequently, survive along with other texts of secular and canon law in manuscript books such as the *Kormchaya kniga* (the chief handbook of canon law).

According to the statute's first article, Grand Prince Yaroslav, in consultation with Metropolitan Hilarion (1051–1054), used Greek Christian precedent and the example of the prince's father to give church courts jurisdiction over divorce and to extend to the church a portion of fees collected by the

Grand Prince. The various versions of the statute contained additional provisions, whose specifics depended upon the place and time that the version was created. Among other subjects, articles consider rape, illicit sexual intercourse, infanticide, bigamy, incest, bestiality, spousal desertion and other issues of family law and sexual behavior. The Statute also attempted to regulate Christian interaction with Muslims, Jews, and those who were faithful to indigenous religions. Finally, the Statute confirmed the precedent articulated in the Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, according to which both monastic and church people would be subject exclusively to the authority of church courts. Later versions sometimes provided for punishment by secular authorities, but in the main version the Statute relied upon monetary fines to punish wrongdoers.

No records of litigation that employed the Statute survive from Kievan Rus, but similar statutes that arose in Novgorod and Smolensk suggest that something like Yaroslav's Statute existed in Kiev. In addition, secular codes such as the Novgorod Judicial Charter and Pskov Judicial Charter confirm that church courts in Rus did exercise jurisdiction independent of secular courts.

See also: BASIL I; KIEVAN RUS; STATUTE OF GRAND PRINCE VLADIMIR; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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STAVKA

Stavka was the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Russian armed forces (SVG, 1914–1918), or of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet armed forces during World War II.

During World War I, the Imperial Russian version of Stavka constituted both the highest instance of the tsarist field command and the location

(successively at Baranovichi, Mogilev, and Orel) of the Supreme Commander. A succession of incumbents, including Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, Tsar Nicholas II, and Generals Mikhail Alexeyev, Alexei Brusilov, and Lavr Kornilov, wielded broad powers over wartime fronts and adjacent areas. The scale, scope, and impact of modern wartime operations demonstrated the need for such a command instance to direct, organize, and coordinate strategic actions and support among lesser headquarters, functional areas, and supporting rear. However, for reasons ranging from failed leadership to inadequate infrastructure and poor communications, the organizational reality never completely fulfilled conceptual promise. Between 1914 and March 1918, when Vladimir Lenin abolished a toothless version of Stavka upon conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk agreement, the headquarters grew from five directorates and a chancery to fifteen directorates, three chanceries, and two committees. In 1917, before occupation by the Bolsheviks in December, Stavka also served as an important center of counterrevolutionary activity.

During World War II, a Soviet version of Stavka again constituted the highest instance of military-strategic direction, but with a mixed military-civilian composition. Known successively as the High Command, Supreme Command, and Supreme High Command, Stavka functioned under Josef Stalin's immediate direction and in coordination with the Politburo and the State Defense Committee (GKO). Stavka's role was to evaluate military-strategic situations, to adopt strategic and operational decisions, and to organize, coordinate, and support actions among field, naval, and partisan commands. The General Staff functioned as Stavka's planning and executive agent, while all-powerful Stavka representatives, including Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, frequently served as intermediaries between Moscow headquarters and major field command instances.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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BRUCE W. MENNING

STEFAN YAVORSKY, METROPOLITAN

(1658–1722), metropolitan of Ryazan and first head of the Holy Synod.

Born to a poor noble family in Poland, Yavorsky and his family moved to Left-Bank Ukraine to live in a territory controlled by Orthodox Russia. After studying in the Petr Mohyla Academy in Kiev, Yavorsky temporarily converted to Byzantine-Rite Catholicism so he could continue his education in Catholic Poland. In 1687, he returned to Kiev and the Orthodox Church and became a monk. As a teacher in the Kiev Academy, Stefan's eloquence attracted the favorable attention of Peter I, who made him metropolitan of Ryazan in 1700. After the death of Patriarch Adrian I in 1700, Peter made Stefan the *locum tenens* of the Patriarchal throne.

Initially Stefan supported Peter's reform program. But over time, Peter's treatment of the Orthodox Church elicited Stefan's criticism and brought a corresponding decline in his influence. Stefan quietly objected to the secularization of church property and new restrictions on monasticism. Tensions between Peter and Stefan were only exacerbated by Stefan's zealous prosecution of the Moscow apothecary Dmitry Tveritinov, whose heresy trial lasted from 1713 to 1718. Influenced by Lutheran ideas, Tveritinov rejected icons and sacraments and claimed that the Bible alone provided sufficient guidance for salvation. The heresy trial naturally brought up unpleasant questions about Western Protestant influence in Peter's reforms. Indeed, Stefan's attack on Lutheranism, *The Rock of Faith*, completed in 1718, could not be published until 1728, after Peter's death. To make matters worse, Stefan's political reliability came in to question after Alexei, Peter's son, fled abroad; in one of his sermons shortly before Alexei's flight, Stefan called him "Russia's only hope."

In the meantime, Peter's new favorite, Feofan Prokopovich, authored the *Spiritual Regulation*, a radical church reform that replaced the office of Patriarch at the head of the Orthodox Church with a Holy Synod—a council of bishops and priests. In a vain attempt to halt the rise of his rival, Stefan accused Feofan of heresy, but was forced to withdraw the charge and apologize. In 1721 Peter nevertheless appointed Stefan to become the first presiding member of the new Holy Synod. He died a year later.

A transitional figure between the patriarchal and the synodal periods of the Orthodox Church, Stefan

embodied the contradictions of early eighteenth-century Russia. One of several learned Ukrainian prelates who became prominent under Peter, Stefan both promoted Westernization and sought to limit it. He was deeply influenced by the thought of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, and helped to introduce this theology into Russian Orthodoxy through his writings.

See also: HOLY SYNOD; PETER I; PROKOPOVICH, FEOFAN; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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J. EUGENE CLAY

STENKA RAZIN

(c. 1630–1671), leader of a Don Cossack revolt and hero of folksong and legend.

Stepan Timofeyvich Razin, also known as Stenka Razin, is the hero of innumerable folksongs, legends and works of art. The most popular motif is his (legendary) sacrifice of his bride, a Persian princess, whom he throws into the Volga River for the sake of Cossack solidarity. Over the past three centuries, the name of Stepan Razin has been associated in the Russian popular mind with freedom, social justice, and heroic and adventurous manhood. The philosopher Nikolai A. Berdyaev, assessing the phenomenon of communism in Russia, characterized it as a synthesis of Marx and Stenka Razin.

Stepan Razin, the son of a Don Cossack *ataman* (military leader) and, it is said, a captive Turkish woman, rose to prominence among the Cossacks at a relatively young age. Thus there was no shortage of volunteers when he led a series of brigandage expeditions to the lower Volga in 1667 and the Caspian Sea in 1668 and again in 1669, especially from among the many impoverished newcomers to the Don region, mostly former peasants escaping serfdom. Unlike other Cossack leaders, Razin welcomed the newcomers and cultivated the spirit of Cossack brotherhood and equality (obsolete by his time) among his men. His expeditions were unusually successful—Russian and Persian caravans were plundered, Persian commercial settlements and towns were devastated, a Persian fleet was defeated, and Razin's warriors won riches and glory.

Upon returning to Russia, Razin departed from tradition by keeping his band intact and not sharing his booty with the established Cossack leaders. Moreover, as he passed through the lower Volga cities of Astrakhan and Tsaritsyn, hundreds of townsmen, fugitive peasants, and even regular soldiers flocked to his standard. The commanders of the Russian garrisons did not dare to stop the popular hero and let him and his men return to the Don region unimpeded.

Having raised an army of perhaps seven to ten thousand, Razin announced a new campaign in 1670, aimed at settling scores with the tsar's boyars and officials, the "traitors and oppressors of the poor." The towns of Saratov and Samara opened their gates to him; Russian peasants and indigenous peoples rose up in revolt by the tens of thousands throughout the lower and middle Volga region. The rebels intended to march on Moscow, although they maintained that they were loyal to the tsar. They were defeated, however, when they besieged the next large town, Simbirsk, crushed by the government's regular army, which exploited the lack of coordination between Cossacks and peasants. Stenka Razin fled to the Don region, where in 1671 he was captured by the men of his godfather, Kornilo Yakovlev, a leader of the Don Cossacks. Stenka Razin and his younger brother Frol were delivered to Moscow in an iron cage and executed on June 6, 1671.

See also: COSSACKS; FOLKLORE; PEASANTRY

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ELENA PAVLOVA

STEPASHIN, SERGEI VADIMOVICH

(b. 1952), general-lieutenant of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, member of Supreme Soviet and chair of the Defense and Security Committee, head of the Counter-Intelligence Service, minister of Internal Affairs, prime minister, and head of State Audit Commission.

Sergei Stepashin joined the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union and served there until 1990. He graduated from the Military Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In his last years in the Ministry of Internal Affairs he was involved in the Ministry's response to such "hot spots" as Baku, the Fergana Valley, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Sukhumi. In 1990 he was elected to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet from Leningrad, and he served as chairman of the Committee on Defense and Security. He served in the Russian parliament until 1993. A political ally of President Boris Yeltsin, Stepashin was also appointed deputy minister of security in 1991 and held that post until 1993. In 1993 Stepashin supported Yeltsin in his struggle with the Russian parliament; Yeltsin appointed him deputy minister, then, in March 1994, minister, of the Counter-Intelligence Service. Stepashin played a leading role in unsuccessful covert efforts to overthrow the Dudayev government in Chechnya in the fall of 1994. In 1995 Yeltsin officially fired Stepashin for the fiasco in handling the Chechen raid on Budennovsk in Russia but continued his involvement in counter-intelligence activities. In 1997 Yeltsin appointed him minister of Justice. In the administrative turnover of the last years of Yeltsin's second term, Stepashin moved up rapidly. He was appointed minister of Internal Affairs in April 1998 and then prime minister in May 1999 to replace Yevgeny Primakov. Stepashin directed the government's initial response to the raid of Chechen bands into Dagestan, but was replaced as prime minister by Vladimir Putin in September 1999. In 2000 Putin appointed Stepashin to head the State Auditing Commission.

See also: CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; YABLOKO; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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JACOB W. KIPP

STEPENNAIA KNIGA See BOOK OF DEGREES.

STEPPE

To the forest-dwelling, inland-looking Eastern Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarus), the steppes of Central Russia and Eurasia historically were much like the oceans and seas to maritime civilizations. In song and verse, these vast grasslands were the *dikiye polya* (wild fields) inhabited by the equivalent of untamed, bloodthirsty pirates. Between 700 B.C.E. and 1600 C.E., the steppes were the realm of marauding horse-riding nomads, scions of the *Völkerwanderungen* (peoples' migrations), such as the Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans, Huns, Avars, Magyars, Pechenegs, Polovtsy, Mongol-Tatars, and multi-cultural free-booting Cossacks. Indeed, until the invention of the steel-tipped, moldboard plow in the nineteenth century, Eastern Slavic farmers were unable to cultivate the rich black-earths (chernozems) of the steppes, and they confined their settlements mainly to the forest zones.

Steppe climates are sub-humid, semiarid continental types. Summer lasts from four to six months. Average July temperatures range from 70 to 73.5 degrees Fahrenheit (21 to 23 degrees Celsius). Winter, by Russian standards, is mild, with January averaging between -4 and 32 degrees Fahrenheit (-13 and 0 degrees Celsius). It generally persists for three to five months. There is a distinctive lack of soil moisture. Average annual precipitation is 18 inches (46 centimeters) in the north and 10 inches (26 centimeters) in the south. Most of it derives from summer thunderstorms. The depth of snow cover in winter ranges from 4 inches (10 centimeters) in the south to 20 inches (50 centimeters) in the north.

Steppe ecology exhibits subtle diversity. Herbaceous vegetation abounds. The only natural forests follow the river valleys and ravines, but shelterbelts, planted since the 1930s, parallel the roads and farms to trap snow in winter. Salinized soils (*solonets*) occasionally interrupt the predominant chernozems and chestnut soils. Small mammals typify the steppe, including marmots, hamsters, social meadow mice, jerboas, and others.

This zone and the wooded-steppe to the north yield Russia's best farmland. Between 1928 and 1940, most of the steppe was converted to state and collective farms. In the 1950s, long-term fallow lands (*perelog* and *zalezh*) were plowed in Rus-

sia's Altay Foreland and in northern Kazakhstan (the "Virgin Lands"); thus most of the natural steppe is gone. Common crops are wheat, barley, sunflowers, and maize.

See also: CLIMATE; GEOGRAPHY

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VICTOR L. MOTE

STILIAGI

A Soviet youth subculture that emerged in the late 1940s and extended into the early 1960s.

The term *stiliagi* first appeared in the Soviet press in 1949 to provide a negative characterization of young men who pursued what they believed to be Western models of behavior, leisure, clothing, and dance styles. *Stil'* (style) was essential for them and the very first *stiliagi*—almost exclusively men—sporting elaborate haircuts and colorful suits and ties. In the early 1950s the *stiliagi* clothing style became more subdued as they adopted a more "American" look and wore narrow black pants and thick-soled shoes. The *stiliagi*, displaying a pronounced American orientation, called themselves *shtatniki* (United States-niks). They listened to American jazz, smoked American cigarettes, and used American slang. In the late 1950s and early 1960s some *stiliagi* embraced rock culture as it began to spread in the West. Nightlife was important for the *stiliagi* and they regularly gathered in public and private spaces to listen to jazz and dance Western dances.

The *stiliagi* phenomenon is most strongly associated with the ideological relaxation and the growing material well-being in the post-Stalin period. The predominant majority of the *stiliagi* were students of higher educational institutions in major urban centers. They came from families of the Soviet professional, political, and managerial elite, also known as the *nomenklatura*. Under Stalin and later Soviet leaders, the *nomenklatura* received a

number of privileges (e.g., access to special stores, trips abroad, better housing, financial bonuses) in exchange for political conformity. The stiliagi phenomenon reflected the growing consumerist and leisure-oriented mentality of the upper crust of Soviet society.

The stiliagi culture was widely denounced by the Soviet media. The official Komsomol campaign targeted their “parasitic” and immoral attitude toward work, lack of political involvement and loyalty, and pro-Western spirit. In individual cases, the stiliagi were forced to change their dress and hairstyles and were expelled from the Komsomol.

In the mid-1980s, parallel to glasnost and perestroika, there was a revival of the stiliagi culture. The new stiliagi included girls and adopted a dress code of black suits, white shirts, and narrow ties. They were fans of the Soviet rock ‘n’ roll bands “Brigada S” and “Bravo.” This new generation of stiliagi was part of the growing number of *neformaly* (non-formal), youth groups that emerged outside of the official youth culture controlled by the Komsomol and reflected the growing crisis of cultural and political identity among Soviet youth.

See also: NOMENKLATURA

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LARISSA RUIDOVA

STOCK EXCHANGES

Stock market exchanges are a real or virtual location for the sale and purchase of private equities. A way for private enterprises to raise investment funds.

The first stock market exchange in post-Soviet Russia was primarily trade in privatization vouchers. As privatization proceeded apace, so did the volume of transactions on Russian exchanges. Shares



Trade at the Moscow Stock Exchange, August 29, 1998.

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in certain Russian enterprises, particularly those of oil and gas companies, were also increasingly offered on the market, but the stock market or markets in Russia have yet to offer enterprises significant sources of either domestic or foreign investment funds.

Initially, the Russian stock exchanges were wild and risky places to venture funds. The early days witnessed two major boom and bust cycles: 1994–96 and 1996–98. Following the financial crisis of 1989, the Russian stock market almost ceased to exist. The Russian government sought to regulate the market step by step. Prior to 1996 enterprises were not required by law to maintain independent, public registries of stock outstanding, and both domestic and foreign investors learned to their dismay that they could be defrauded of their equity claims. The 1996 Russian Federal Securities Act required public registries and created the Federal Securities Commission and charged it with coordinating the various federal agencies that were

responsible for governing the securities market. Conditions have improved for investors, but much remains to be done to create a reasonable market in equities comparable with those in more advanced capitalist countries. It remains more a site for speculation than for raising significant amounts of investment funds.

See also: ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET

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JAMES R. MILLAR

STOLBOVO, TREATY OF

Signed February 27, 1617 in Stolbovo village, this treaty terminated Swedish intervention in Russian affairs after the Time of Troubles. King Gustavus Adolphus recognized Mikhail Romanov as the legitimate tsar of Russia; withdrew the claim of his brother Charles Philip to the Russian throne; and evacuated Novgorod. Russia ceded eastern Karelia and Ingria to Sweden, foregoing direct access to the Baltic Sea, and paid an indemnity of twenty thousand rubles.

King Charles IX had initially intervened in 1609 to provide aid against Polish attempts to place a pretender on the Russian throne. Following the deposition of Vasily Shuisky in 1610, the boyars' council agreed to accept Prince Wladyslaw, son of King Sigismund III, as the next tsar of Russia. Sweden declared war and advanced the candidacy of Charles Philip to the vacant throne. Novgorod was seized in July 1611.

Sweden found it difficult to control northwestern Russia effectively, and its occupation drained away military resources needed to protect Swedish interests in Central Europe. The Stolbovo terms met Sweden's primary objective, ensuring that the Baltic coast—and with it, the primary east-west trade routes remained in Swedish hands.

Stolbovo marks the high point of Sweden's eastward expansion beyond the border first confirmed by the 1323 Treaty of Nöteborg. The Swedish

government promoted Lutheran missionary activity among the Orthodox inhabitants and encouraged settlement from other Swedish dominions. The Stolbovo settlement was reconfirmed by the 1661 Treaty of Kardis, but overturned by the Treaty of Nystad (1721) that ended the Great Northern War.

Sir John Merrick, an English merchant, helped to negotiate the treaty, testifying to Russia's growing links with Western Europe. The treaty is also connected with a famous relic, the Tikhvin Icon of the Mother of God, a copy of which was brought to Stolbovo for the negotiations.

See also: NOVGOROD THE GREAT; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH; SMOLENOK WAR; SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH; TIME OF TROUBLES

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STOLNIK

The highest general sub-Duma rank of military and court servitors in Muscovy.

Literally meaning "table-attendant," *stolnik* first appears in 1228 and 1230 for episcopal and princely court officials. As Moscow grew, younger and junior memoirs of the top families and provincial serving elites needed a place at court. Accordingly *stolnik* lost its earlier meaning and was granted to many members of these strata. Above it was the much smaller number of *postelniks* (chamberlains), and below a large contingent of *striapchis* (attendants, servants—a term that appears by 1534), and Moscow *dvorianins*. The service land reforms of the 1550s and 1590s assigned Moscow province estates to these ranks.

From the end of the sixteenth century to 1626, the numbers of *stolniks*, *striapichis*, and Moscow *dvorianins* grew respectively from 31–14–174 to 217–82–760, plus another 176 *stolniks* of Patriarch Filaret, much of that growth occurring during the Time of Troubles. After measured growth to 1671, the numbers of *stolniks* mushroomed from 443 to

1307 in 1682 and 3233 in 1686. By this time an elite category of chamber stolniks arose, growing from 18 in 1664 to 173 in 1695. Some stolnik were always in the tsar's suite, attending to his needs.

In 1638, the average stolnik land-holding was seventy-eight peasant households, sufficient to outfit an elite military servitor and several attendants, as opposed to 24 and 28–29 respectively for the average *striapchiu* and Moscow *dvorianin*, and 520 for the average Duma rank.

The most eminent family names virtually filled the stolnik rosters in the early seventeenth century. Among those on the 1610–1611 list were Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, the military hero of 1612 and the young “Mikhailo” Romanov, elected tsar in 1613. The percentage of non-aristocratic stolniks surpassed two-thirds toward the end of the century. Under Peter I (the Great) these terms disappeared, but former stolniks and their progeny constituted the critical mass of the upper ranks of his service-nobility.

See also: BOYAR; DUMA; MUSCOVY; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

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STOLYPIN, PETER ARKADIEVICH

(1862–1911), reformist, chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1906–1911.

Peter Arkadievich Stolypin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1906–1911, attempted the last, and arguably most significant, program to reform the politics, economy, and culture of the Russian Empire before the 1917 Revolution. Stolypin was born into a Russian hereditary noble family whose pedigree dated to the seventeenth century. His father was an adjutant to Tsar Alexander II, and his mother was a niece of Alexander Gorchakov, the influential foreign minister of that era. Spending much of his boyhood and adolescence on a family estate in the northwestern province of Kovno, Stolypin came of age in an ethnically and religiously diverse region where Lithuanian, Polish,

Jewish, German, and other communities rendered privileged Russians a distinct minority. Stolypin's nationalism, a hallmark of his later political career, cannot be understood apart from this early experience of imperial Russian life.

As did an increasing number of his noble contemporaries, Stolypin attended university, entering St. Petersburg University in 1881. Unlike many noble sons intent on the civil service and thus the study of jurisprudence, Stolypin enrolled in the physics and mathematics faculty, where among the natural sciences the study of agronomy provided some grounding for a lifelong interest in agriculture. Married while still a university student to Olga Borisovna Neidgardt (together the couple would parent six children), the young Stolypin obtained a first civil service position in 1883, a rank at the imperial court in 1888, but a year later took the unusual step of accepting an appointment as a district marshal of the nobility near his family estate in Kovno. He spent much of the next fifteen years immersed in provincial public life and politics.



Peter Stolypin introduced key agrarian reforms under Nicholas II. © HULTON ARCHIVE

Scholars generally agree that these years shaped an understanding of imperial Russia, and the task of reform that dominated his later political career. Of primary importance was his experience of rural life. For much of the 1890s the young district marshal of the nobility also led the life of a provincial landowning gentleman. Residing on his family estate, Kolnoberzhe, Stolypin took an active interest in farming, managing income earned from lands both inherited and purchased. He also experienced the variety of peasant agriculture, perhaps most notably the smallholding hereditary tenure in which peasant families of nearby East Prussia often held arable land.

Stolypin's understanding of autocratic politics also took shape in the provinces. There he first encountered its peculiar amalgam of deference, corruption, bureaucracy, and law. In 1899 an imperial appointment as provincial marshal of nobility in Kovno made him its most highly ranked hereditary nobleman. Within three years, in 1902, the patronage of Viacheslav von Pleve, the Minister of Internal Affairs, won him appointment as governor of neighboring Grodno province. Early 1903 brought a transfer to the governorship of Saratov, a major agricultural and industrial province astride the lower reaches of the Volga river valley. An incubator of radical, liberal, and monarchist ideologies, and the scene of urban and rural discontent in 1904–1905, Saratov honed Stolypin's political instincts and established his national reputation as an administrator willing to use force to preserve law and order. This brought him to the attention of Nicholas II, and figured in his appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs, on the eve of the opening of the First State Duma in April 1906. When the tsar dissolved the assembly that July and ordered new elections, he also appointed Stolypin to chair the Council of Ministers, a position that made him the de facto prime minister of the Russian Empire.

His tenure from 1906 through 1911 was tumultuous. Typically, historians have assessed it in terms of a balance between the conflicting imperatives of order and reform. Ironically enough, contemporary opponents of Stolypin's policies, most notably moderate liberals and social democrats who pilloried Stolypin for sacrificing the possibilities of constitutional monarchy and democratic reform to preserve social order, offered opinions of his politics that found their way, however circuitously, into Soviet-era historiography. In this view, Stolypin favored punitive force, police power, clandestine financing of the press, and a general negli-

gence of the law to dominate political opponents and assert the preeminence of a superficially reformed monarchy. Hence, in August 1906, he established military field court-martials to suppress domestic disorder. More drastically, he undertook the so-called *coup d'état* of June 3, 1907, dissolving what was deemed an excessively radical Second State Duma and, in clear violation of the law, issuing a new electoral statute designed to reduce the representation of peasants, ethnic minorities, and leftist political parties.

A second view, shared by a minority of his contemporaries but a majority of historians, accepted that Stolypin never entirely could have escaped the authoritarian impulses widespread in tsarist culture and especially pronounced among those upon whom Stolypin's own influence most depended—moderate public opinion; the hereditary nobility, the imperial court; and ultimately the tsar, Nicholas II. Given such circumstances, without order the far-reaching “renovation” (*obnovlenie*) of the economic, cultural, and political institutions of the Empire envisioned by Stolypin would have been politically impossible. Of central importance to this interpretation was the Stolypin land reform, first issued by administrative decree in 1906 and approved by the State Duma in 1911. This major legislative accomplishment aimed to transform what was deemed to be an economically unproductive, politically destabilizing peasant repartitional land commune (*obshchina*) and eventually replace it with family based hereditary smallholdings. Yet, the reform initiatives of these years were not limited only to this “wager on the strong,” but extended into every important arena of national life: local, rural, and urban government; insurance for industrial workers; religious toleration; the income tax; universal primary education; university autonomy; and the conduct of foreign policy.

In September 1911, Stolypin's career was cut short when Dmitry Bogrov assassinated him in Kiev. Once a secret police informant, Bogrov's background spawned persistent rumors of right-wing complicity in the murder of Russia's last great reformer, but by all authoritative accounts the assassin acted alone. Some scholars argue that Stolypin's political influence, and especially his personal relationship with Nicholas II, was waning well before his death, in large measure as a result of the western *zemstvo* crisis of March 1911. Yet, Abraham Ascher, Stolypin's most authoritative biographer, credits the claims of Alexander Zenkovsky that Stolypin was contemplating further substan-

tive reforms of the empire's administrative and territorial structures in the last months of his life. Stolypin's historical reputation continues to be the subject of scholarly debate, the character and consequences of his policies intertwined with larger debates about the stability and longevity of the tsarist regime.

See also: AGRARIAN REFORMS; DUMA; ECONOMY, TSARIST; NICHOLAS II

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ST. PETERSBURG

From 1712 until 1918, St. Petersburg was the capital of the Russian Empire. Peter I (the Great) began the construction of the city as his "Window on the West" in 1703. During the subsequent three centuries, St. Petersburg was identified with the three major forces shaping Russian history: Westernization, industrialization, and revolution. The city was renamed Petrograd in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, because it sounded less German, was then named Leningrad after the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924, and again became St. Petersburg in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. Confusingly, the surrounding region (oblast) is still known as Leningrad.

In the early twenty-first century, with a metropolitan population of 4.8 million people, St. Petersburg is the second-largest city in Russia and the fourth-largest in Europe (behind Moscow, London, and Berlin). It is also Russia's second-most important industrial center, having benefited from Soviet investment in heavy industry, research and development, military-industrial production, and military basing and training. The city is a major international port and tourist destination, with tourists flocking there in May and June for the legendary "White Nights," during which the sun seems to never set.

CAPITAL OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Peter the Great seized control over the confluence of the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland from Sweden in 1703. Inspired by a visit to Amsterdam, he decided to build a major city on this barren marshland to better integrate Russia into Western Europe and secure a Baltic port. Thousands of peasants and prisoners-of-war were pressed into service to build the city's numerous canals and palaces. When the harsh climate combined with malaria to kill tens of thousands of them, their bodies were dumped into the construction sites, leading to St. Petersburg's nickname as the "city built on bones." Construction was hampered by floods, which also ravaged the city in 1777, 1824, 1924, and 1955.

Empress Elizabeth, Peter's daughter, improved upon her father's vision by commissioning European architects such as Bartolomeo Rastrelli to construct baroque landmarks, including Winter Palace, the Smolny Institute, and the palaces of Tsarskoe Selo. Catherine II (the Great) subsequently purchased the paintings, drawings, and other priceless artworks that are now the core of the Hermitage Museum's holdings. She also established the Russian Academy of Arts to further aesthetic production, and she commissioned the Pavlovsk Palace, the Hermitage, and the Tauride Palace, later the meeting place of the first Duma and the Provisional Government.

The city's remarkable transformation from swamp to showcase paralleled the emergence of Russia as a major European power, from Peter's 1709 victory over the Swedes at Poltava to Alexander I's 1814 arrival in Paris. The city came to represent precisely this change from isolation to European integration. Petersburg's growing symbolic dominance preoccupied the country's intelligentsia and nobility alike, with Tsar Nicholas I



An eighteenth-century engraving of Peter the Great supervising the construction of St. Petersburg. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

complaining that “Petersburg is Russian but it is not Russia.”

During the imperial era, Russia’s leading politicians, intellectuals, and cultural figures were brought together by the major institutions based in St. Petersburg to generate events that vitally affected the life of every member of Russian society. The Decembrist uprising of 1825 culminated in Senate (now Decembrist) Square. In January 1905, Father Gapon led a peaceful march of workers and their families to the Winter Palace to petition the tsar; the resulting slaughter is remembered as Bloody Sunday. Following that tragedy, the workers of St. Petersburg became increasingly militant. Forced to live and work in squalor due to Russia’s rapid forced industrialization, they began to protest and strike for improved conditions.

By the dawn of the twentieth century, the city was the fifth-largest in Europe, behind London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, and was widely viewed

as representative of imperial Russia’s new military and industrial might. But with industrialization there also emerged a surging revolutionary movement, and “Red Petrograd” soon became the “cradle of the Revolution.”

UNDER THE SOVIETS

With the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Nicholas II russified the capital city’s name to Petrograd. In the early days of the war, the streets of Petrograd were filled with young men volunteering for military service. But as Russian losses mounted and the economy declined still further, Petrograd became the focus of anti-tsarist sentiment. The Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, founded in 1917 and modeled on a 1905 organization, was the most active. In March (February O.S.) 1917, workers struck and soldiers mutinied, leading to the eventual abdication of Nicholas II. A Provisional Government was in-

stalled, but constantly battled the Petrograd Soviet for control of the city. During the "July Days," the Soviet nearly succeeded in gaining power. On November 7 (October 25, O.S.), members of Trotsky's Red Guards stormed the Winter Palace, and the Provisional Government fled. For the next seventy-four years, the communists would control Russia.

The Soviet regime's shift of its seat of government to Moscow in March 1918 stripped Petrograd of many of its most creative and powerful institutions and prominent individuals. The city was renamed Leningrad after the death of Lenin in 1924. Its standing was further undermined by the December 1934 assassination of Leningrad Party leader Sergei Kirov in his office at the Smolny Institute, which precipitated Josef Stalin's mass purges. Mass graves containing the victims were still being discovered outside the city as recently as 2002.

World War II took a particularly heavy toll on Leningrad. For nine hundred days the Germans laid siege to the city, and there were anywhere from 700,000 to more than 1 million civilian deaths from attack and starvation. Although the Nazis never entered the city proper, they looted and burned many of the palaces in the environs, including Peterhof and the Catherine Palace.

During the post-Stalin era Leningrad was an important economic and intellectual center, though still trailing Moscow. Aside from Kirov, one of Leningrad's best-known political leaders was the rather ironically named Grigory Romanov. As first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee from 1970 to 1983, Romanov encouraged production and scientific associations, as well as links among such groups to innovate and implement new technologies. As a result, Leningrad achieved enviable production levels. Romanov also made use of the city's extensive scientific establishment, linking the research and production sectors to improve production.

THE POST-SOVIET ERA

Although Romanov eschewed Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, other Leningrad leaders embraced the changes. Anatoly Sobchak was elected to the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 and in 1991 became the city's first elected mayor. A major figure in Russia's democratic movement, Sobchak oversaw a difficult transition in his city. His resistance to the hardline August 1991 putsch was critical to its defeat. Following the coup's collapse,

Sobchak immediately renamed the city St. Petersburg. As the city's economy suffered under the national shift to capitalism, St. Petersburg experienced a severe rise in organized crime. Sobchak was unable to eradicate corruption, and in 1996 lost his bid for reelection to Vladimir Yakovlev.

St. Petersburg is the cultural capital of Russia. Among its most famous residents were the painters Marc Chagall and Ilya Repin; the writers Nikolai Gogol, Alexander Pushkin, Anna Akhmatova, and Fyodor Dostoevsky; the composers Peter Tchaikovsky and Dmitry Shostakovich; and the choreographers Marius Petipa and Sergei Diaghilev. Among its many art galleries, the Hermitage, the Russian Museum, and the Stieglitz boast collections unparalleled in the world. St. Petersburg is the home of the renowned Mariinsky ballet company (known as the Kirov in Soviet times). Shostakovich named his Seventh Symphony *Leningrad*. Falconet's *Bronze Horseman* sculpture of Peter the Great, located in Decembrist Square, was commissioned by Catherine the Great and immortalized by Pushkin in a poem of the same name. Many palaces and Orthodox churches have been restored, including the Romanovs' Winter Palace, St. Isaac's Cathedral, and the Kazan Cathedral. On the north bank of the Neva, the Peter and Paul Fortress has a long history as both a prison and, in the Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul, the burial site of all the Romanov tsars from Peter I to Nicholas II.

St. Petersburg had begun to recapture some its lost splendor by 2003. UNESCO designated the city a World Heritage site. Extensive renovation, funded in part by a \$31 million loan from the World Bank, took place in preparation for the city's tercentennial celebration in May 2003. Partly contributing to the city's renaissance was the fact that President Vladimir Putin was born in St. Petersburg. In addition to promoting the tercentennial commemoration, Putin oversaw the renovation of the Peterhof Palace into a world-class conference center. There was also talk of creating a presidential residence in St. Petersburg and even some sentiment to move the capital from Moscow. Whether or not St. Petersburg regains the political eminence of a century ago, it remains a vibrant, culturally rich European city, much as Peter envisioned.

See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; ADMIRALTY; BLOODY SUNDAY; CATHERINE II; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; ELIZABETH; MUSEUM, HERMITAGE; PETER I; PETER AND PAUL FORTRESS; WINTER PALACE

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES

Coming on the heels of the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the two components of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) represented a willingness by the United States and the Soviet Union to constrain an arms race that both recognized was costly and potentially destabilizing. Soviet nuclear advantage in the early 1970s concerned the United States, and the Soviets recognized that American fears would likely translate into a massive weapons program aimed at regaining nuclear superiority. Thus the Soviet Union chose to forsake short-term advantage in favor of guaranteed parity over the long term. Both sides agreed that strategic parity would significantly contribute to stability.

The chief products of SALT I were the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, and an interim agreement which set limits on the total number of offensive missiles allowable (further addressed in SALT II). The ABM Treaty limited the number of defensive weapons, indicating that both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the idea that mutual vulnerability would increase stability—thereby institutionalizing mutual assured destruction (MAD). SALT II limited the total number of all types of strategic nuclear weapons. However, although agreed upon by both countries, SALT II was never ratified because American President Jimmy

Carter withdrew his support after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

While the SALT agreements represent important progress in terms of quantitative arms limitation, a significant flaw was that they failed to address the issue of qualitative advancements in weapons systems—which threatened the utility of the MAD regime. This qualitative problem was addressed in the subsequent Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

See also: ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY; ARMS CONTROL; DÉTENTE; STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

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MATTHEW O'GARA

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) were predicated on the concept of “minimum deterrence”—a regime in which both the United States and the Soviet Union would reduce nuclear arsenals to the minimum level needed to deter the other from attempting a first strike. As with previous bilateral nuclear weapons treaties between the United States and the USSR, the goal of START was to reduce the costs associated with a gratuitous arms buildup, while simultaneously increasing system stability by ensuring mutual vulnerability.

Prior agreements limited the number of weapons each nation possessed, but advancements in technology made these previously agreed upon levels untenable to the United States; in the early 1980s it was perceived that the Soviet Union was close to a first strike capability—the ability to attack enough targets in the United States so as to prevent a retaliatory strike.

This perception of a “window of vulnerability” prompted the Reagan Administration to undertake a massive weapons modernization program, in addition to pursuing the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviets believed that SDI was destabilizing and therefore were willing to make cuts in offensive nuclear arms in exchange for re-

strictions on American research and development of space-based defensive systems. As with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), the Soviet Union was once again forsaking short-term superiority in favor of long-term stability.

START mandated cuts in the number of nuclear delivery systems by about 40 percent, reduced the number of warheads by roughly 30 percent, and also established more complete verification procedures.

The treaty was signed by President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on July 31, 1991 in Moscow.

See also: ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY; ARMS CONTROL; DÉTENTE; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

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STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was a United States military research program that President Ronald Reagan first proposed in March 1983, shortly after branding the USSR an "evil empire." Its goal was to intercept incoming missiles in mid-course, high above the earth, hence making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Nicknamed "Star Wars" by the media, the program entailed the use of space- and ground-based nuclear X-ray lasers, subatomic particle beams, and computer-guided projectiles fired by electromagnetic rail guns—all under the central control of a supercomputer system.

The Reagan administration peddled the program energetically within the United States and among NATO allies. In April 1984 a Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was established within the Department of Defense. The program's futuristic weapons technologies, several of which were only in a preliminary research stage in the mid-1980s, were projected to cost anywhere from \$100 billion to \$1 trillion.

After Reagan's SDI speech, General Secretary Yuri Andropov denounced the program, telling a *Pravda* reporter that if Washington implemented SDI, the "floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive" would open. Painfully aware of U.S. scientific and engineering skills, the Soviet leadership sought to eschew a costly technological arms race in which the United States was stronger.

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and USSR, signing of the START I and II treaties, and the 1992 presidential election of Bill Clinton, the SDI received lower budgetary priority (like many other weapons programs). In 1993 Defense Secretary Les Aspin announced the abandonment of SDI and its replacement by a less costly program that would make use of ground-based antimissile systems. The SDIO was then replaced by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).

In contrast to the actual expenditures on SDI (about \$30 billion), spending on BMDO programs exceeded \$4 billion annually in the late 1990s.

See also: ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY; ARMS CONTROL; DÉTENTE; STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

STRAVINSKY, IGOR FYODOROVICH

(1882–1971), Russian composer.

Among the most influential composers of the twentieth century, Igor Fyodorovich Stravinsky epitomized the new prominence of Russian emigré

creative artists and their presence on the international scene in the years following the 1917 Revolution. Like the contributions of his emigré colleague writer Vladimir Nabokov and choreographer George Balanchine–Stravinsky’s enormous contribution to his art significantly altered the course of twentieth-century music. Stravinsky’s compositions encompass every important musical trend of the period (neonationalism, neoclassicism, and serialism, to name a few) and include examples of all the major Western concert genres (opera, ballet, symphony, choral works, solo works, and numerous incidental works, including a polka for circus elephants).

The son of a St. Petersburg opera singer, Stravinsky attained international fame with his early ballet, *The Firebird* (1910), composed for Sergei Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes (with choreography by Michel Fokine). Several important ballets followed, including *Petrushka* (1911, also with Fokine) and the seminal *Rite of Spring* (1913, choreography by Vaslav Nijinsky), among the most famous works of art of the twentieth century. Stravinsky’s compositions for the theater continued to trace a path through the most significant musical and theatrical idioms of his century, and include *Les Noces* (1923, choreography by Bronislava Nijinska), *Apollo musagète* (1928), and *Agon* (1957, both choreographed by Balanchine). Although Stravinsky was a supremely cosmopolitan figure, his music nonetheless retained traces of its Russian origins throughout his long career.

See also: DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH; FIREBIRD; MUSIC; PETRUSHKA

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TIM SCHOLL

STRELTSY

The musketeers, or *streltsy* (literally “shooters”), were organized as part of Ivan IV’s effort to reform Russia’s military during the sixteenth century. In 1550 he recruited six companies of foot soldiers

armed with firearms, organized into tactical units of five hundred, commanded and trained by officers from the nobility. These units were based from the beginning in towns, and eventually took on the character of garrison forces. Over time their numbers grew from three thousand in 1550 to fifty thousand in 1680.

Militarily, they were ineffectual, mainly because of their economic character. The musketeers were a hereditary class not subject to taxation, but to state service requirements, including battlefield service, escort, and guard duties. During the seventeenth century, the state provided them with grain and cash, but economic privileges, including permission to act as merchants, artisans, or farmers, became their principal support. One particular plum was permission to produce alcoholic beverages for their own consumption. They also bore civic duties (fire fighting and police) in the towns where they lived. Pursuing economic interests reduced their fighting edge.

Throughout the seventeenth century the musketeers proved to be fractious, regularly threatening, even killing, officers who mistreated them or represented modernizing elements within the military. By 1648 it was apparent that they were unreliable, especially when compared with the new-formation regiments appearing prior to the Thirteen Years War (1654–1667) under leadership of European mercenary officers. Rather than disband the musketeers entirely, the state made attempts to westernize them. Many units were placed under the command of foreigners and retrained. Administrative changes were made during and after the war, including placing certain units under the jurisdiction of the tsar’s Privy Chancery, which appointed officers and collected operations reports. The Privy Chancery, and by extension, the tsar, was at the center of the attempt to transform the musketeers into more thoroughly trained western-style infantry.

Further pressure to reform included official neglect, even to the point of refusing to give the musketeers weapons. Later decrees (1681, 1682) replaced cash payments with grants of unsettled lands as compensation for service. This change in support reduced their status, without improving their overall military effectiveness, and the musketeers vehemently opposed it. By 1680, many regiments had been retrained and officered by foreigners, but the conservative musketeers were anxious to be rid of the hated foreigners and regain their eroded

prestige. Thus, in 1682, they were willing to believe rumors that Tsar Fyodor Alexeyevich had been poisoned, and were anxious to punish those responsible with death.

Peter I's (the Great) reign was marred by an uprising in 1698 of military units stationed in Moscow called musketeers or *streltsy* (literally, "shooters"). The musketeers disliked the tsar's westernizing policies and governing style. Peter rejected traditional behaviors and practices, including standards of dress, grooming, comportment, and faith, but more importantly, he sought to reform Russia's military institutions, which threatened the musketeers' historical prerogatives.

Peter crushed the rebellion with great severity, executing nearly twelve hundred musketeers, and flogging and exiling another six hundred. The Moscow regiments were abolished and survivors sent to serve in provincial units, losing privileges, homes, and lands. They carried with them seeds of defiance that eventually bore fruit in Astrakhan in 1705–1706, and among the Cossacks in 1707–1708. Although the last Moscow regiments of musketeers disappeared before 1713, the musketeers continued to exist in the provinces until after Peter's death.

Peter's response to the 1698–1699 uprising may have arisen from his memories of the 1682 musketeer revolt. The musketeers suspected the Naryshkins (Peter's mother, Natalia's family) of having poisoned Tsar Fyodor and of planning to kill the Tsarevich Ivan, both sons of Tsar Alexei's first wife, Maria Miloslavskaya. The Miloslavskys encouraged these suspicions in order to use their regiments against the Naryshkins. On May 25, 1682, the musketeers attacked the Kremlin. Natalia Naryshkina showed Ivan and Peter to the rioting musketeers to prove they were still alive. Nonetheless, the rebellion was bloody, and the government was powerless because it had no forces capable of stopping the musketeers. From this rebellion came the joint reign of Ivan and Peter with their sister and half-sister, Sophia, who issued decrees in their names, and who was a favorite of the musketeers.

In 1698 the *streltsy* were unable to see that Peter I was implacable in his rejection of conservatism and that the musketeers represented for him a dangerous and disloyal element. In the final clash, the musketeers were unable to reshape their world, and eventually disappeared.

See also: FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH; IVAN IV; PETER I; SOPHIA; WESTERNIZERS

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W. M. REGER IV

STRIKES *See* WORKERS.

STROIBANK

Stroibank USSR (the All-Union Bank for Investment Financing) managed and financed government investment in the Soviet period. Founded as Prombank (the Industrial Bank) in October 1922, it merged with several smaller banks and became Stroibank during the April 1959 banking reform. The USSR Council of Ministers appointed its board of directors, and it was officially part of the Gosbank (State Bank of the USSR) network. It supported government investment both through direct (nonrepayable) financing and through short- and long-term credits. In 1972 Stroibank had over 1,200 subsidiary components throughout the USSR.

In 1988 a series of economic reforms created a two-tiered banking system in Russia. Gosbank became a central bank, while three specialized banks split from Gosbank. During this process, Stroibank USSR became Promstroibank USSR (the Industrial-Construction Bank). During the battle for sovereignty between Russian and Soviet leaders in 1990 and 1991, Promstroibank USSR was commercialized and individual branches given the opportunity to strike out on their own or form smaller networks with other Promstroibank branches. The largest remnant of the Promstroibank network, Promstroibank Russia, remained under the control of former Promstroibank USSR director Yakov Dubnetsky. Promstroibank Russia remained a large and powerful bank throughout the 1990s, while many reorganized Promstroibank USSR branches retained strong positions in Russia's regions and continued to serve their traditional clients. In the late 1990s, the state-owned energy giant Gazprom acquired a controlling interest in Promstroibank Russia.

See also: BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; GOSBANK; SBERBANK

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JULIET JOHNSON

STRUMILIN, STANISLAV GUSTAVOVICH

(1877–1974), economist, statistician, and demographer.

Stanislav Gustavovich Strumilo–Petrashkevich was a Social Democrat (Menshevik) before 1917. Involved in revolutionary activities, he was arrested several times.

In the Soviet period, Strumilin held various high positions in the State Planning Board Gosplan (deputy chairman several times, chairman of the economic-statistical section during the 1920s) and in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1931 full membership and doctor of economics honoris causa). For decades he also worked as a professor.

Strumilin published on economic planning, the economics of labor, industrial statistics, and economic history, and he took sides in all important economic debates. He combined theoretical argumentation with empirical statistics and also incorporated sociological perspectives (e.g., in his pioneering time-budget studies). During the politicized economic debates of the 1920s, he was a radical advocate of a planned economy and responsible for the drawing up of the First Five-Year-Plan. He opted for the teleological method of planning, which takes the final (production) targets as a starting point. His demographic works, among them a prediction regarding the number and age–sex composition of the population of Russia for 1921–1941, were influential in the Soviet Union and gained international attention.

Strumilin managed to survive the purges of the Josef Stalin period and benefited from the rehabilitation of the economists after World War II. He then concentrated on labor issues and the impact of education on wage differentials, participated actively in the economic debates of the 1950s and 1960s, and published until 1973. He represented the first generation of Soviet Marxist economists.

See also: FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GOSPLAN; MENSHEVIKS

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JULIA OBERTREIS

STRUVE, PETER BERNARDOVICH

(1870–1944), liberal political leader, economist, and author.

As a young man Peter Bernardovich Struve rose to prominence on the liberal left. In the 1890s he joined the Social Democratic party and authored its manifesto. He was then a proponent of a moderate legal Marxism. Struve, however, was not a doctrinaire. He was dedicated to learning and loved literature and poetry. By contrast, the Russian militants saw such a pursuit as a distraction from the task of revolution.

As Russia moved toward revolution Struve moved toward a liberal conservatism. From 1902 to 1905 he edited the journal *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation), a liberal publication. He eventually joined the Constitutional Democratic party (Cadet). In 1906 he won election as a deputy to the second Duma. In 1909 he contributed to *Vekhi* (Landmarks) as one of a group of prominent intellectuals who broke sharply with the militant leftists, seeing them as a threat to Russia's liberation from despotism and its transformation into a liberal and democratic constitutional state. He was deeply patriotic as well as liberal in orientation. In 1911 he wrote a series entitled *Patriotica*. From 1907 to 1917 he engaged in scholarship as well as politics as a professor at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. After the 1917 October Revolution Struve briefly joined an anti-Bolshevik government in southern Russia and then was forced to emigrate to the West where he spent the remainder of his life as a scholar and writer on economics and politics.

See also: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY; VEKHI

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CARL A. LINDEN

STUKACH

From the common slang word *stukachestvo*, *stukach* was widely used in the Soviet period to describe “squealing,” or informing on people to the government authorities. The word is evidently derived from *stuk*, Russian for the sound of a hammer blow.

The government, and especially the security police, in all communist-ruled or authoritarian countries, depended on informers in order to keep tabs on the loyalty of the populace. In the *Politics*, Aristotle had observed that tyrannical regimes must employ informers hidden within the population in order to keep their hold on absolute power.

In such countries as the USSR, Nazi Germany, Maoist China, Cuba, and so forth, informers were sometimes made heroes by the regime. Thus, in the Soviet Union, Pavlik Morozov, a twelve-year-old boy living in the Don farming region when Stalin was enforcing collectivization of the peasants’ farms in the early 1930s, became a *stukach*. He informed on his parents when they allegedly concealed grain and other produce from the authorities. The boy was killed by vengeful farmers. He was thereupon iconized as a martyr by the communist authorities. Statues of Pavlik sprang up throughout the country.

The Soviet writer Maxim Gorky urged fellow writers to glorify the boy who had exposed his father as a kulak and who “had overcome blood kinship in discovering spiritual kinship.” Another well-known Soviet novelist, Leonid Leonov, depicted a fictitious scientist of the old generation who as a *stukach* had nobly betrayed his son to the authorities.

Stukachestvo was expected of any and all family members, schoolchildren, concentration-camp prisoners, factory workers—in short, every Soviet citizen, all of whom were expected to place loyalty to the State above all other linkages.

See also: GORKY, MAXIM; MOROZOV, PAVEL TROFIMOVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

STÜRMER, BORIS VLADIMIROVICH

(1848–1917), government official who reached the rank of president of the State Council, or premier, of the Russian Empire.

Boris Stürmer studied law at St. Petersburg University and then entered the Ministry of Justice. He was appointed governor of Novgorod Province in 1894 and of Yaroslav Province in 1896. In 1902 he became director of the Department of General Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior and in 1904 was appointed to the Council of State. From January to November 1916 he was president of the Council of State, serving simultaneously as minister of the interior (March–July) and minister of foreign affairs (July–November). Nicholas II dismissed Stürmer after Paul Milyukov’s famous “Is this stupidity or is it treason?” speech in the Duma, in which Milyukov accused Stürmer of being a German agent. In fact, he was not. Arrested after the February Revolution of 1917 and placed in the Peter and Paul Fortress, Stürmer died there in August 1917.

Stürmer owed his rise to his arch-conservatism and friends in high places, including the Empress Alexandra Fyodorovna and Grigory Rasputin, who reputedly referred to Stürmer as “a little man on a leash” and to whom Stürmer reported weekly and received instructions. Stürmer has received universal scorn. Contemporaries called him a “nonentity” (Vasily Shulgin), “totally ignorant of everything he undertook” (Milyukov), “a man of extremely limited mental gifts” (Nikolai Pokrovsky, his successor as minister of foreign affairs), “a man who had left a bad memory wherever he occupied an administrative post” (Sergei Sazonov), and “an utter nonentity” (Mikhail Rodzianko). Historians have seen Stürmer as “an instrument of the personal rule of the Empress [and Rasputin]” (Mikhail Florinsky), “a reactionary [who] brought discredit on the extreme Right” (Marc Ferro), and “an obscure and dismal product of the professional Russian bureaucracy” (Robert Massie).

See also: ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH

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SAMUEL A. OPPENHEIM

SUBBOTNIK

Communist *subbotniki* (Communist Volunteer Saturday Workers) were shockworkers who volunteered their free Saturdays for the Bolshevik cause.

Subbotniki were lauded as heroes of socialist labor, as prototypes of the new unselfish man, and role models for the working class. Their actions may have reflected spontaneous enthusiasm among some workers, but they were also encouraged by the Communist Party to mobilize effort. The phenomenon was a mixture of socialist idealism and coercion.

The KS (Communist subbotniki) movement is said to have started by the communists on April 12, 1919 at the Moscow-Kazan railway depot, and was praised by Vladimir Lenin in an article entitled "*Velikii pochin*," July 28, 1919. During the summer and autumn of 1919, KS mobilized to defeat Denikin, and surmount the "fuel crisis."

During World War II, the KS and *voskresniki* (Sunday volunteers) are said to have inspired the war effort. Celebrations commemorating their achievements and encouraging the movement's continuation were held frequently during the seventies.

See also: SOVIET MAN; STAKHANOVITE MOVEMENT

STEVEN ROSEFELDE

SUBWAY SYSTEMS

The original line of the Moscow metro, completed in May 1935, laid the foundation for one of the world's most impressive subway systems. In its first fifty years, the Moscow metro grew from thirteen stations to more than 120, and the average

number of passengers carried daily increased from 177,000 to more than six million, making the Moscow system the world's busiest. The Moscow metro organization also reproduced its various structures in similar metro systems across the former Soviet Union and behind the Iron Curtain. It became, in the words of one official, "the mother of all socialist metros." Symbols of Soviet power accompanied riders in the metros of Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Baku, Tiflis, Tashkent, Minsk, Gorky, Erevan, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, and Volgograd—not to mention those systems built partly by Moscow engineers and architects in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

For Soviet leaders, Soviet subways were more than transportation systems. The metro provided what one Soviet propagandist called "a majestic school in the formation of the new man." For the 1935 inaugural line of the Moscow metro, the Soviets constructed each of the stations on different themes of socialist life. Stations celebrated Soviet leaders, the Communist Party, Soviet achievements in education, and the supposed superiority of the Soviet system. The Soviets lavished scarce resources on the first thirteen stations, including 23,000 square meters of marble facing, chandeliers, and crystal. Metro builders boasted that they used more marble in the first line of the Moscow metro than had been used in the entire Tsarist period. Through the end of the Stalin era, stations became more ornate and monumental as the metro grew. Like a mirror held up to Soviet self-perceptions, an elaborate political iconography reflected a sense of approaching perfection in Soviet society. To convey this message, architects calculated that a passenger would spend roughly five minutes per station. In the words of one: "Within that time the architecture, emblems, and entire artistic image should actively influence him." Soviet subway systems thus celebrated Soviet socialism, provided a pulpit for preaching its values, and offered an effective way to get to work in the morning.

Lazar Kaganovich, a ruthless Bolshevik leader of working-class origin, assumed managerial responsibility for construction of the original metro line. His chief deputy on the project was Nikita Khrushchev, who later became general secretary of the Communist Party. Kaganovich believed that the metro "went far beyond . . . the typical understanding of a technological construction. Our metropolis is a symbol of the new socialist society being built." Under his management, the Soviets deployed a variety of improvised Western tech-

niques to build the metro in the treacherous geology of Moscow's subsoil, which was laced with underground rivers and quicksand. Builders bored through layers of Jurassic clay and fissured limestone, soaked with water. Khrushchev recalled that the builders had only "the vaguest idea of what the job would entail." The party mobilized public opinion to gather necessary resources and labor. Days of voluntary labor became festive occasions as bands played and able-bodied Muscovites roamed the shafts looking for work. Prominent officials picked up shovels and joined Moscow's masses. Compared to the construction of the New York subway system, however, only a handful of Soviet workers died—and the Soviets trumpeted the successful construction as proof of the superiority of the socialist order. Nonetheless, the Soviets benefited greatly from the long experience of foreign engineers who had helped construct the world's other great subway systems. They used the drafts of a failed 1908 Moscow subway plan, whose backers were unable to secure financing. Soviet engineers visited the Berlin subway, studied engineering plans for the London and Paris subways, and hired American engineers as consultants.

The story of the first Soviet subway was as much the subject of Soviet propaganda as the actual metro stations. Soviet memoirs, official histories, metro architecture, and newspaper accounts wove the events and personalities of the metro's construction into a mythical microcosm of the new Soviet society. The epic tale of its construction, which was recounted in two elaborately bound volumes published in 1935, relayed an ideal conception of socialist engineering and its ability to conquer and transform nature (human and otherwise). In this story, successful technological construction did more than fulfill the party plan for transportation; it proved the inevitable success of the revolution and the party's vision of itself as an instrument of a supposedly scientifically determined historical destiny.

See also: KAGANOVICH, LAZAR MOYSEYEVICH; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

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ANDREW JENKS

SUCCESSION, LAW ON

Peter I published the Law on Succession, a manifesto on the succession to the Russian imperial throne, on February 16, 1722.

The Law on Succession was the first such written law in Russian history. Russia's rulers in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries favored primogeniture (inheritance by the first-born son), although this custom could be bypassed for pragmatic reasons. Peter, prompted by the defection of his eldest son Alexei (condemned to death for treason in 1718), and by the death of his only surviving son in 1719, rejected primogeniture and issued a succession law. The new law required the reigning monarch to nominate his successor with regard to worthiness. It placed no restrictions on age or gender, but it did not specifically direct the reigning monarch to look beyond the imperial family, by raising a commoner, for example. The work *The Justice of the Monarch's Right to Appoint the Heir to the Throne* (1722), attributed to Feofan Prokopovich, justified the new law with reference to scripture, history, and natural law. Peter himself died without nominating a successor, but Alexander Menshikov claimed to be implementing Peter's wishes by choosing his widow Catherine, thereby inaugurating a period of female rule. Catherine I, Anna, Elizabeth, and Catherine II all nominated their own successors, while Elizabeth and Catherine II took the throne from legally nominated emperors on the pretext of protecting the common good. Paul I repealed the law in 1797, replacing it with a new law based on primogeniture.

See also: PAUL I; PETER I; PROKOPOVICH, FEOFAN

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LINDSEY HUGHES

SUCCESSION OF LEADERSHIP, SOVIET

Like other authoritarian systems, the USSR did not adopt a formal system of succession. Over time, the system developed an informal process of succession, which eventually evolved into a predictable pattern. In 1922, at the age of 52, Vladimir Lenin, the first Soviet leader, suffered a major stroke from which he never fully recovered. After his death in 1924, there was considerable struggle within the Politburo of the Communist Party before Josef Stalin emerged as the top leader. Since Lenin had functioned as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (later called the Council of Ministers), the emergence of the general secretary as the pre-eminent leader was not predictable. Lenin's position was equivalent to that of prime minister. The general secretary initially had been considered an administrator with little policy responsibility. Despite the fact that Stalin led the USSR for almost thirty years, it was not clear after his death that the position of general secretary of the CPSU would remain the pre-eminent one. Stalin had been prime minister also since 1941, and it was hard to say where his power base lay.

After Stalin's death, Georgy Malenkov chose to be prime minister when forced to select between the positions of chairman of the Council of Ministers or general secretary of the Communist Party. The less well-known Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the top leader in the succession struggle that ensued during the next five years through his role as first (renamed from general) secretary of the Communist Party. By 1958 Khrushchev was both prime minister and first secretary, although not with the degree of power that Stalin had had before him.

Leonid Brezhnev also used the position of general secretary to rise to the top position within the collective leadership after Khrushchev was deposed. Although he wanted to be prime minister as well, the Politburo denied him that title in the interest of maintaining collective leadership. In 1977 Brezhnev became president of the USSR (chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), a nominal position that gave him the position of chief of state in international protocol, even though his power base remained the CPSU.

With the death of Brezhnev (1982), the process flowed smoothly in the appointment of Yuri Andropov as both general secretary and president, and a short time later both titles passed to Konstantin Chernenko after Andropov's death (1984). Within

the Politburo there appeared to be agreement on a successor and on giving the top leader both a party and government position.

There was nothing in either the Party Charter or the Soviet Constitution to guarantee that the process would remain the same. After the death of Chernenko in 1985, power passed to a younger generation. Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary, after serving as de facto second secretary under both Andropov and Chernenko. Gorbachev, however, did not become president. The title went to an elder statesman, Andrei Gromyko. Only in 1988 did Gorbachev assume the presidency, which was subsequently restructured as part of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *demokratizatsiya* (democratization). Gorbachev had the real power, not merely the title, of chief of state and functioned as president in both domestic and international politics.

Had the Soviet system continued, it is fair to say that succession would probably have been institutionalized in the constitution. Even under Gorbachev, however, the Soviet president was not popularly elected. Gorbachev was selected by the restructured parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies; a new Supreme Soviet, selected from the Congress, was a working parliament, not merely a rubber stamp that met once or twice per year.

Even without formal institutionalization, political succession had become predictable, especially by the 1980s when the ailing Andropov and Chernenko were successively chosen to lead the USSR. The selection process was concluded within days of the leader's death. The selection of Gorbachev seemed to be equally smooth, but when one examines the difficult road that Gorbachev pursued to undertake reform, one realizes how superficial consensus was. Gorbachev faced opposition from the conservatives and liberals within the Politburo and the CPSU throughout his tenure.

Political succession, although never formalized in writing, became, nonetheless, a well-established and even reasonably predictable process in the mature Soviet Union. The failure to establish a constitutional succession process, even after Gorbachev's democratization, was one of many contributing factors in the rapid demise of the USSR after the 1991 attempted coup.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; GENERAL SECRETARY; POLITBURO; PRIME MINISTER

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NORMA C. NOONAN

SUDEBNIK OF 1497

The 1497 Sudebnik was Russia's first national law code. Unlike earlier immunity charters, which pertained only to a private landholder and his land, and the Dvina Land Charter (1397) and White Lake Charter (1488), which pertained only to particular localities, it promulgated rules of general application for Muscovite courts. Adopted after Ivan III had gathered in the lands of Novgorod, Tver, and other principalities, the Code is usually interpreted as part of Ivan's policy of nationbuilding. The short preamble states that the Code was adopted by Grand Prince Ivan with his children and boyars. Thus, unlike some of Muscovy's other legislation, it was not associated with an assembly of important prelates and servicemen.

A single copy of the Code has come down to us, which was found and published by Pavel Stroeve in 1817. Most modern editors divide it into sixty-eight articles, but the original also contains thirty-seven chapter headings. Articles 1 through 25, in general, concern courts presided over by boyars and *okolnichy*, the two highest service ranks, with some attention also to the court of the grand prince. Clerks (*dyaki*) were to sit with the boyars and *okol-*

nichy in these courts, and were to prepare not only a written trial record but also a written judgment. These courts were to exercise jurisdiction over major crimes, such as murder, robbery, and theft, and the death penalty was provided for certain crimes. Articles 26 through 36 concern judicial documents such as summonses, warrants, and default judgments, as well as the duties of judicial officials such as bailiffs. The bailiffs were charged not only with serving such judicial documents but also with interrogating suspected criminals. Articles 37 through 45 concern the courts of the *namestniki* and *volosteli*, the grand prince's vicegerents in rural areas. The jurisdiction of these courts depended on whether the judge was granted full jurisdiction. Many of the provisions of the first section are repeated in the third.

The Code thus either established or confirmed the previous existence of at least three levels of courts: that of the grand prince, that of the boyars and *okolnichy*, and that of the vicegerents. These were probably not permanent or standing courts in the modern sense, because the officials serving as judges had substantial other administrative and military duties. All courts used documents at nearly every stage of judicial proceedings: to initiate the lawsuit, to summon the defendant, to procure attendance of witness, and to record the judgment. The first three sections of the code are largely devoted to the procedural and more specifically the financial side of litigation. No less than thirty-six articles deal with fees and payments to be made to the court, and another fifteen concern damages and payments to private persons. Prohibition of bribery is mentioned several times. Plainly one of the priorities of the Code was to prevent bribery and the exaction of excessive fees. There are also numerous provisions on judicial duels, but actual court records indicate that such duels were seldom used to resolve litigation. Eyewitnesses and torture are also prescribed to resolve certain types of matters. The 1497 Code thus represents the transition, albeit incomplete, from so-called archaic law, characterized by composition (bloodwite), no judicial officials, and irrational modes of proof (trial by ordeal and combat), to a modern system of criminal penalties, judges and other judicial officials, and the use of witnesses and documents as evidence. The Code was also significant in introducing or confirming a document-based system of litigation.

The fourth section, starting at article 46, contains miscellaneous rules of substantive versus

procedural law, the most famous of which is article 57, which requires a peasant to pay his lord a certain fee in the week before or the week after St. George's day if he is to have the right to move elsewhere. There are also various provisions on inheritance, manumission of slaves, loans, and boundaries. The fourth section, however, does not contain all of the substantive rules of law that would be necessary to administer justice. For example, most of the reported cases of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries deal with title to and ownership of land, but the Code contains virtually no rules or standards for deciding such cases.

Because the Code is primarily a procedural statute and contains only an incomplete listing of substantive rules of law, one might ask where the judges would look to find the substantive rules. Commentators have suggested that the judges would look to customary law or to certain Byzantine law manuals. Another possibility is that, in most cases, judges simply applied their own rough sense of justice, and that litigation was not generally conceived as the application of published or even customary rules.

See also: IVAN III; LAW CODE OF 1649; LEGAL SYSTEMS; MUSCOVY; OKOLNICHY; SUDEBNIK OF 1550; SUDEBNIK OF 1589

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GEORGE G. WEICKHARDT

SUDEBNIK OF 1550

The 1550 Sudebnik was a law code compiled by Ivan IV (the Terrible) and his boyars. In 1551 it was submitted for confirmation to the Hundred Chapters Church Council (*Stoglav*), on which sat the highest clerical officials. It proclaims that it is to govern all criminal and civil litigation. While the protograph is not extant, forty-three remarkably consistent copies survive. In all copies the text is divided into ninety-nine or one hundred articles.

The structure of the text closely follows that of the 1497 Code: the first section (articles 1–44)

deals with the central courts, held before the grand prince, his boyars, and his *okolnichy*; the second (articles 45–61) deals with judicial documents and the duties of bailiffs; the third (articles 62–75) deals with the provincial and rural courts held before the tsar's vicegerents; and the fourth (starting with article 76) contains provisions of substantive law on such subjects as slavery, disputes over land, inheritance, and the sale of chattels and other goods.

Like the 1497 Code, the 1550 Sudebnik is primarily a procedural statute, and a large number of its provisions deal with the financial side of litigation: fees, penalties, amounts to be recovered in civil disputes. The 1550 Code is, however, more than twice the length of the 1497 Code. Its additional and different provisions probably reflect what its draftsmen thought was in need of amendment: that is, where the previous statute was perceived as not working or in need of clarification. While the 1497 Code simply prohibits bribery and favoritism, the 1550 Code provides specific penalties for these offenses, including fines and knouting. One new set of provisions (articles 22–24) deals with bringing suit in the central courts against vicegerents, which probably indicates that corruption and misfeasance by rural officials was perceived as an important problem. Procedure in the provincial and rural courts was also regulated in much more detail. One of the obvious goals of the 1550 amendments was thus to strengthen the provisions designed to counter corruption and favoritism. Another provision prohibits the issuance of new immunity charters, under which landholders, usually monasteries, had received jurisdiction over all legal cases except major crimes. The prohibition of further immunity charters increased the centralization of the administration of justice and reduced the legal rights of the monasteries.

Two other new provisions (25–26) provide that assault without robbery is to be treated as dishonor (*beschestie*), an offense that also included defamation. The amount to be recovered by the dishonored party is set forth. Various rational modes of proof, such as an inquest (*obysk*) in the community, are set forth in greater detail than in the earlier code. Some changes from the 1497 Code are, however, only as to form and provide additional detail. For example, articles 8–14 of the 1497 Code, which deal with prosecuting various crimes, were expanded and moved, somewhat illogically, to the second section of the 1550 Code (articles 53–60). The 1550 Code nevertheless represents a more advanced and complete transition from archaic law,

which was characterized by composition, irrational modes of proof, and the absence of judicial officials, to a relatively modern system of criminal penalties, rational modes of proof, and the use of judges to resolve disputes. It nonetheless still contains several provisions on judicial duels (although, in fact, such duels were seldom used).

There were several significant additions to the provisions on substantive law in the fourth section. Six sections on slavery describe in detail how one becomes a slave, such as by selling oneself to pay a debt; how a slave can be manumitted; the documents associated with slavery; and new provisions that create a rule of *caveat emptor* with respect to purchase of a fugitive slave. Section 85 codified the right to redemption by the seller's clan as to land sold by any clan member. Such land could be redeemed by a clan member within forty years at the original purchase price. While the provisions of substantive law are set forth in more detail than in the 1497 Code, the 1550 Code still does not purport to set forth all principles of substantive law. Important rules, such as how to resolve disputes over the ownership of land, remained subject to customary rules or to the discretion of the judge.

In its attempt to deter corruption and its greater detail as to both procedural and substantive matters, the 1550 Code demonstrates the progress of the Muscovite legal systems to a system more predictable and rational.

See also: CHURCH COUNCIL, HUNDRED CHAPTERS; IVAN IV; LAW CODE OF 1649; LEGAL SYSTEMS; SUDEBNIK OF 1497; SUDEBNIK OF 1589

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GEORGE G. WEICKHARDT

SUDEBNIK OF 1589

The Sudebnik of 1589 was the third in a series of four Russian legal monuments by that name. They comprise the core of middle Muscovite jurisprudence. The first two Sudebniki were compiled in

1497 and 1550, the last in 1606. This series of legal compilations was crowned by the *Ulozhenie* of 1649, one of the greatest of all Russian legislative documents and one of the most impressive in the entire early modern world.

The codes of 1497, 1550, 1606, and 1649 were all promulgated by governments in Moscow, but the Sudebnik of 1589 was compiled anonymously in the Russian North, the Dvina Land, for unknown purposes. The 1550 Sudebnik remained the major operational legal code throughout Muscovy for the next ninety-nine years—to the extent that there was one during and after the Time of Troubles. Few copies of the 1589 document are extant, but it is known that it was occasionally cited by others—probably because it contained the 1550 Sudebnik and its seventy-three supplemental articles, as well as special laws of interest to the Dvina Land.

The Sudebnik of 1589 has been thoroughly studied, and it is known which of its 289 articles originated in which of the sixty-eight articles of the Sudebnik of 1497 and in which of the one hundred articles of the Sudebnik of 1550. About 64 percent of the 1589 code's articles originated in 1550 (some of them were expanded), about 9 percent came from statutes of 1556, and about 27 percent were new.

By 1589 Russian law had completed the move from the medieval dyadic legal system to the more modern triadic system. In the medieval era, state authority barely existed, and law was as much a device for raising revenue by officials as it was a tool for conflict resolution. In the first third of the sixteenth century, state officials began to play a much more active, inquisitorial role in the judicial process and tried both to deter and to solve crimes. Medieval wrongs were treated as torts, but by 1589 they were regarded as crimes. Crimes included murder, arson, battery, robbery, theft, treason, bribe-taking, rebellion, recidivism, sacrilege, slander, and perjury. Sanctions included fines, capital and corporal punishment, mutilation, and incarceration.

Around 1550 the importance of literacy increased dramatically, and Muscovy began its transition from an oral society to one in which documents were increasingly important. The evolution was crucial in the laws of evidence, as faith-based evidence such as oaths, ordeals, and the casting of lots began to yield to written evidence. Witnesses, visual confrontations, general investigations, and confessions also grew in importance.

The law as a revenue instrument for officials remained strong in 1589, and those officials were not supposed to be corrupt. The 1589 code paid considerable attention to establishing judicial procedures.

There was considerable social legislation in the 1589 *Sudebnik*. Slaves of various sorts were mentioned, as was the fact that the peasants, discussed frequently, were in the process of being enserfed. Only perhaps 2 percent of the population were townsmen, but commerce was important in the Dvina Land. The collection of interest was permitted, at a maximum of 20 percent per year. Like most law, the *Sudebnik* of 1589 was concerned with cleaning up "social messes" and providing an infrastructure for the orderly resolution of conflicts in property and inheritance disputes, especially important in the Dvina Land where peasants still owned most of the land. Priority was also given to the preservation of the social order, particularly male dominance and other gender distinctions.

See also: LAW CODE OF 1649; LEGAL SYSTEMS; MUSCOVY; SUDEBNIK OF 1497; SUDEBNIK OF 1550

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RICHARD HELLIE

SUKONNAYA SOTNYA

A privileged corporation of merchants.

Sukonnaya sotnya (Cloth[iers'] Hundred) was a privileged corporation of merchants who were ranked third in importance and wealth below the *gosti* and members of the *Gostinaya sotnya*. *Sukonnaya sotnya* was formed in the late sixteenth century and based on previously extant corporations of clothiers in Moscow and elsewhere.

The legal status of *Sukonnaya sotnya* members was defined by a charter issued to them at the turn of the seventeenth century. Members were exempt from direct taxation. They were not subject

to local authorities and received higher compensation when dishonored. However, *Sukonnaya sotnya* members were not allowed to purchase estates of patrimonial land or to travel abroad.

Less prosperous than their counterparts in the other two corporations, *Sukonnaya sotnya* members tended to assist other government merchants and administer smaller enterprises. However, they were held responsible for shortfalls in revenue collection.

In the early seventeenth century, there were 250 members of the *Sukonnaya sotnya*. This figure declined to 130 in 1630 and to 116 by 1649, despite the appointment of 156 members between 1635 and 1646. In spite of the government's demands, not all members of the *Sukonnaya sotnya* had houses in Moscow.

Sukonnaya sotnya steadily declined in importance in the second half of the seventeenth century. By 1678 there were only fifty-one houses belonging to *Sukonnaya sotnya* members in the capital. Apparently, the corporation was effectively disbanded in the 1680s, and many of its members joined the *Gostinaya sotnya*.

By the early eighteenth century, all members of the *Sukonnaya sotnya* were registered in guilds, in 1724 in Moscow and four years later in the rest of the country.

See also: GOSTI; GOSTINAYA SOTNYA; MERCHANTS

JARMO T. KOTILAINE

SULTAN-GALIEV, MIRZA KHAIDARGALIEVICH

(1892–1940), prominent Tatar Bolshevik and Soviet activist during the Russian Revolution and civil war.

Mirza Khaidargalievich Sultan-Galiev's rapid rise to prominence, sudden fall from grace, and subsequent vilification in Stalin's Russia has provided several generations with a metaphor for the promise and frustrations of early Soviet nationality policy.

Born in Ufa province in 1892, Sultan-Galiev had brief careers as a schoolteacher, librarian, and journalist, turning to revolutionary activities around 1913. In July 1917 he joined the Bolshevik party in Kazan, but maintained ties to many intellectuals and moderate socialists in the Muslim community.

Sultan-Galiev played a major role in the establishment of Soviet power in Kazan and helped suppress an anti-Bolshevik Tatar nationalist revolt there in the first part of 1918. He was an early advocate of the ill-fated Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic, promulgated in March 1918 but never implemented, and of the Tatar Autonomous Republic founded in 1920 (today the Republic of Tatarstan). An able organizer and public speaker, Sultan-Galiev served the Soviet state during the civil war as chairman of the Central Muslim Military Collegium, chairman of the Central Bureau of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East, and member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Nationality Affairs. This last position made him the highest-ranking member of a Muslim nationality in Soviet Russia.

Sultan-Galiev's numerous newspaper articles and speeches outlined a messianic role for Russia's Muslim peoples, who would bring socialist revolution to the subject peoples of Asia and help them overthrow the chains of European empires. Chief theorist of the so-called right wing among the Tatar intelligentsia, he hoped to reconcile communism with nationalism. Although personally an atheist, he advocated a cautious approach toward anti-religious propaganda among Russia's Muslim population. These views cause some emigré and foreign scholars to characterize Sultan-Galiev as a prophet of the national liberation struggle against colonial rule.

By the end of 1922 Sultan-Galiev had come into direct conflict with Josef Stalin's nationality policy, which he openly attacked in party meetings. He was particularly concerned with two issues, (1) plans for the new federal government (USSR), which would disadvantage Tatars and other Muslim groups that were not granted union republic status, and (2) the persistence of Russian chauvinism and of a dominant Russian role in governing Muslim republics. In an effort to silence this criticism, officials acting on Stalin's initiative arrested Sultan-Galiev in May 1923 and charged him with conspiring to undermine Soviet nationality policy and with illegally contacting Basmachi rebels. Although Sultan-Galiev was soon released—stripped of his party membership and all positions—a major conference on the nationality question in June 1923 emphasized that Stalin's policies in this area were not to be challenged.

By the end of the 1920s, Sultan-Galievism (*sultangalievshchina*) had become a common charge leveled against Tatars and other Muslims and was later deployed widely during the purges. Sultan-Galiev was rearrested in 1928 and tried with seventy-six others as part of a "Sultan-Galievist

counterrevolutionary organization" in 1930. His death penalty was soon commuted, and he was released in 1934 and permitted to live in Saratov province. However, his third arrest in 1937 was followed by execution in January 1940. The case of Sultan-Galiev was reviewed by the Central Committee in 1990, leading to his complete rehabilitation and emergence as a new and old national hero in post-Soviet Tatarstan.

See also: ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF NATIONALITIES; TATARSTAN AND TATARS

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DANIEL E. SCHAFER

SUMAROKOV, ALEXANDER PETROVICH

(1717–1777), playwright and poet.

Ranked with Racine and Voltaire during his day, Alexander Petrovich Sumarokov was a founder of modern Russian literature, and arguably one of Russia's first professional writers. Together with Mikhail Lomonosov and Vasily Trediakovsky, Sumarokov helped introduce syllabotonic versification, created norms for the new literary language, and established many literary genres and tastes of the day. Sumarokov created the first Russian tragedies, comedies, operas, ballet, and model poetic genres including the fable, romance, sonnet, and others. He established the national theater in 1756, with the help of Fyodor Volkov's Yaroslav troupe (it became a court theater in 1759, and lay the foundation for the Imperial Theaters). Sumarokov published the first private literary journal, *Trudolyubivaya pchela* (The Industrious Bee, 1759), inspiration for the "satirical journals" of the late 1760s and 1770s. An early supporter of Catherine II, after her ascension to power (or coup) he was given the right to publish at her expense, of which he made prolific use. Despite poetic admonitions to fellow noblemen to treat their serfs humanely, when Catherine asked his opinion of freeing the serfs at the time of the Nakaz, Sumarokov was dismissive. Gukovsky (1936) and others have tried to link Sumarokov to a so-called noble "fonde" and to

the “Panin party,” not altogether convincingly. Sumarokov’s reputation went into total eclipse in the nineteenth century, when the literary movement he spearheaded was declared merely “pseudo-Classicism.” It was not until the Soviet period that his achievement began to be reevaluated.

See also: CATHERINE II; LOMONOSOV, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH; THEATER

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SUPREME SOVIET

The Supreme Soviet was described in the 1936 and 1977 constitutions as the “highest organ of State power.”

In the USSR, the bicameral Supreme Soviet was the chief, central legislative organ of the Soviet state. The constitutions of 1936 and 1977 followed closely the wording of the two preceding constitutions of 1918 and 1924 in describing the powers and functions of this body (earlier known as the Congress of Soviets) and its executive Presidium.

As in preceding years, the deputies to the Supreme Soviet, elected to four-year terms throughout the republics, regions, provinces and other political-administrative subdivisions of authority throughout the USSR, were said to represent the interests of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals. That the deputies would faithfully serve those interests, it was claimed in documents explaining the workings of the central legislature, was guaranteed by fact that the Communist Party at all levels played the determining role in selecting the single-list candidates for election to the legislative body. By the 1936 and 1977 constitutions, non-Party deputies could run for election and be elected. These deputies, too, were carefully vetted by the Party “aktivs.” Polling places for election of deputies seldom provided voting booths.

The USSR Supreme Soviet was divided into two chambers, called the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The former was based on representation by geographic, political-administrative territorial units nationwide; the latter was

based on national, or ethnic, territorial units. The rationale given for this in official documents was that in this way the Soviet people would be represented both by geographic location as well as by ethnicity.

Representation was based on one deputy per every 300,000 of the population. There was no class restriction as found in the first, 1918, constitution.

The numbers of deputies in each body tended to increase over the years. This reflected the growth in population. No officially recognized cap was put on the total number of deputies, yet a limit nevertheless seemed to be in effect. The Soviet authorities apparently preferred to keep both bodies at approximately equal and manageable size. In that sense, the Communist Party leadership exercised control over the size of the legislative bodies as well as the texts of the bills submitted to it for enactment—always enacted unanimously by a show of hands.

From 1937 to the 1960s, the Soviet of the Union increased from 569 to 791 deputies. The members of the second, or lower, chamber during the same period climbed from 574 to 750. The increase in the latter came from the addition of several new Union Republics to the USSR. These were the result of territorial annexations made before and during World War II.

Both chambers met either separately or in joint session in the Supreme Soviet building within the Kremlin. They would meet jointly especially when the powerful executive Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was elected (every four years) along with elections of the USSR Supreme Court and of the Council of Ministers (formerly, Council of People’s Commissars), or government and cabinet. The chairman of the Presidium was considered to be, as head of state, the Soviet President. By the constitution the chambers were to meet twice per year in which the closely regulated sessions lasted only about a week. Prior to the 1950s, the two Soviets sometimes met more than twice per year.

Besides effecting indirect Communist Party control over the legislative proceedings, each chamber of the Supreme Soviet established a Council of Elders. This body, though unmentioned in the constitution, served as a further conduit for Party control. Each council numbered approximately 150 elders. It consisted of leading figures from the republics, territories, and provinces. Besides proposing legislation, the councils supervised the formation of legislative committees, known as commissions,



The Yakutsk delegation to the Supreme Soviet in 1938 included secret police chief Nikolai Yezhov, bottom left. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

within both houses. The committees oversaw affairs concerned with the State budget, legislation, the courts, foreign affairs, credentials, and so forth.

The work of the committees was closely regulated. Often a leading member of the Communist Party Central Committee would chair a committee, such as that concerned with foreign affairs.

Soviet propaganda aimed at a foreign audience boasted of the heterogeneous, democratic makeup of the USSR Supreme Soviet. One such document, Andrei Vyshinsky's *Law of the Soviet State (Gosudarstvo i pravo)*, noted that in the 1930s and 1940s the Soviet legislature had a far greater proportion of women deputies than Western parliaments or the U.S. Congress. The alleged working-class backgrounds of the deputies was also touted. Party representation in the legislature stood at around 18 percent, or several times that of the percentage of Party members within the population at large. Government officials were said to constitute some 15 percent of the deputies.

Soviet juristic writings explicitly denied that the Soviet Union's political system recognized the

Western principle of the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial organs. Instead, it was claimed, the Soviet political system stressed the merging of executive, legislative, and judicial functions that was further afforded by the system's centralized structure. Such unity was further enhanced by the parallel Communist Party hierarchy that was likewise structured to emphasize unity of function at all levels of administration and political authority.

When the time came for voiced criticism of the system—beginning to surface within the illegal reform movement, or *samizdat*, of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s—the dissidents, some of whom were put on trial and served sentences in the labor camps, called in some instances for retaining the basic structure of the soviets. Yet they demanded radical overhaul of the functions of the soviets at all levels of authority as well as elimination of exclusive Communist Party supervision of soviet elections and legislative deliberations. Some reformers called for incorporation of the principle of separation of powers.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES; CONSTITUTION OF 1936; CONSTITUTION OF 1977; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; PRESIDIIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET; STATE COMMITTEES

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SUSLOV, MIKHAIL ANDREYEVICH

(1902–1982), high-ranking Communist Party leader.

Mikhail Suslov was a member of the Politburo from 1955 to 1982 and headed the agitation and propaganda department of the Central Committee from 1947 to 1982. An ideologist of the Stalinist school, Suslov was a reactionary and doctrinaire defender of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Like many in his generation of party leaders, Suslov had humble origins. He was born into a peasant family in 1902 in the village of Shakhovskoye, within present-day Saratov oblast. From 1918 to 1920 he served as assistant secretary of the Committee of Poor Peasants (*Kombed*) and organized a Komsomol branch in his village. In 1921 he joined the Communist Party and enrolled in a school for workers in Moscow. He went on to study economics at the Institute of Red Professors and the Plekhanov Economics Institute before entering the party-state apparatus in 1931. Suslov was a ruthless player in the party purges of the Josef Stalin era and rose through the ranks by moving into positions opened up by mass arrests. In 1937 he became a Rostov oblast party committee secretary. Two years later he headed the Stavropol regional party committee, a position he held until 1944. In 1944, as chairman of the Central Committee's bureau for Lithuanian affairs, he supervised the incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR and the subsequent deportation of thousands of people.

In 1947 Suslov became a secretary of the Central Committee in charge of shaping, protecting, and enforcing official ideology. He also held au-



Mikhail Suslov, shown here in 1956, headed the Communist Party's agitation and propaganda department from 1946 until his death in 1982. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

thoritative positions in foreign affairs and was noted for his demand for strict adherence to Soviet foreign policy by foreign communist parties. In 1949, at a Cominform meeting in Budapest, he denounced the Yugoslav Communist Party for its independent stance and in 1956 went to Hungary with Anastas Mikoyan and Marshal Grigory Zhukov to supervise the suppression of the Hungarian uprising. Suslov was a shrewd political operator who served three Soviet leaders: Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Leonid Brezhnev. Very different from Khrushchev in temperament and outlook, he opposed de-Stalinization and economic reform, but supported him in 1957 against the anti-party group. In 1964, however, he turned on his former boss and was instrumental in the removal of Khrushchev and the installation of Brezhnev as first secretary of the Communist Party. Eschewing the limelight, Suslov did not seek the highest party or state positions for himself, but was content to remain chief party theoretician and ideologist.

Deeply conservative, Suslov oversaw the official press and personally scrutinized publications to ensure conformity. According to Fedor Burlatsky (1988), he would also comment on everything written by members of the Central Committee departments. In 1969 he directed the dismissal of the progressive *Novy mir* editorial board. A hardline supporter of communism, he disliked the company of Westerners. At one Kremlin reception he placed tables between himself and foreign diplomats. Known as the “sea-green incorruptible of the Soviet establishment,” Suslov protested against increasing corruption in the party. In 1982 he died from a stroke that reportedly followed a heated discussion with an individual who was trying to cover up Brezhnev family scandals.

See also: AGITPROP; CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMITTEES OF THE VILLAGE POOR; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

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ELAINE MACKINNON

SUVORIN, ALEXEI SERGEYEVICH

(1834–1912), publisher, editor, critic, playwright.

Alexei Sergeyeovich Suvorin was born into a provincial military family and, by becoming a journalist, made his greatest contribution to Russia as publisher and editor of its most influential pre-Revolution conservative daily newspaper, *New Times*, and as publisher of Chekhov.

First commissioned in the military, Suvorin resigned at age nineteen to concentrate on teaching, journalism, and literature. After working for several Russian newspapers and periodicals over the next fifteen years, he and a partner acquired the faltering St. Petersburg daily, *New Times*, in 1867. It became the flagship of a financially successful business that came to include book publishing, sales in company bookstores and railway station kiosks, and a school for printers. Suvorin grasped the op-

portunities provided by a relaxation of tsarist censorship in 1865, the demands of an increasingly literate population, the mass production made possible by the new printing technology, and fast reporting of news by means of the telegraph.

As a seasoned literary critic and aspiring playwright, Suvorin in 1895 started his own theatrical company and installed it in his own theater. He wrote the revealingly personal *Diary of A. S. Suvorin* (1923), an account of the literary and political life of his time never translated into English.

Suvorin recognized the literary promise of Anton Chekhov when he first published stories in small Russian publications. During their thirteen-year collaboration from 1886 to 1899, Chekhov published major stories and plays with Suvorin. The two became close friends, and that bond eased for Suvorin the tragedies of his own family life. Both his first wife and a son committed suicide, while another son and a daughter died of illnesses.

See also: CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; JOURNALISM

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CHARLES A. RUIID

SUVOROV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH

(1730–1800), generalissimo (1799), prince, field marshal, and count.

Perhaps the greatest Russian military leader of all time, Alexander Suvorov never lost a battle. He is generally credited among the founders of the Russian school of military art. Suvorov entered service in 1748 and first saw conventional combat during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). As a regimental commander from 1763 to 1769, he devised a regulation that became a model for combat training and service practices. As a brigadier and major general from 1768 to 1772 he was instrumental in defeating the Polish Confederation of Bar. During Catherine II’s First Turkish War (1768–1774)

he won ringing victories at Turtukai and Kozludji (both 1773). Suvorov subsequently (1776–1779, 1782–1784) campaigned in the Crimea and the Kuban, where he imposed greater Russian control and where he refined unconventional tactics appropriate to circumstance and enemy. During Catherine's Second Turkish War (1787–1792), he defended Kinburn (1787), fought at Ochakov (1788), won battles of near-annihilation at Fokshani and Rymnik (1789), and successfully stormed Izmail (1790). After service against the Swedes in 1791, he returned to the southwest, where in 1794 and 1795 he subjugated rebellious Polish patriots.

Though briefly banished under Paul I (1796–1801), Suvorov served in the war of the Second Coalition against revolutionary France. In Italy during 1799, he led Austro-Russian armies to dazzling victories on the Adda and the Trebbia and at Novi. After disagreement with the Austrians, Suvorov in September 1799 successfully extricated Russian forces from northern Italy over the Swiss Alps in a campaign that probably exceeded the achievements of Hannibal two millennia before.

Suvorov left three important legacies to his military heirs. First, he insisted on progressive, realistic training tailored to the characteristics of the peasant soldier. Second, he left in his *Art of Victory* (1795–1796) a set of prescriptions for battlefield success. He saw the primary objective in war as the enemy's main force. He counseled commanders in pursuit of victory to observe his triad of "speed, assessment, and attack." Speed was all-important: "One minute decides the outcome of battle, one hour the success of a campaign, one day the fate of empires . . . I operate not by hours but by minutes" (Menning, 1986, pp. 82–83). Third, Suvorov's record in the field inspired emulation from subsequent generations of Russian military officers. However, many would-be inheritors forgot his admonitions about flexibility, and sought slavish imitation rather than flexible adaptation.

See also: MILITARY ART; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS

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BRUCE W. MENNING

SVANS

Svans call themselves Mushwän (plural Shwanär). Nominally Georgian Orthodox, they preserve many pagan beliefs and practices. They inhabit a high mountainous area in northwestern Georgia beneath the main Caucasus chain, in the upper reaches of the rivers Ingur (Upper Svanetia) and Tskhenis-Tsqali (Lower Svanetia). Svan was first to split from the Common Kartvelian that also produced Georgian, Mingrelian, and Laz. The four main (and divergent) dialects are: Upper and Lower Bal (Upper Svanetia); and Lent'ekh and Lashkh (Lower Svanetia), although linguistic particularities characterize virtually each hamlet. The language is not taught, and all Svans educated in Svanetia since the introduction of universal schooling by the early Soviets have received instruction in Georgian. The largely mono-ethnic population of Svanetia is usually estimated at 50,000, although the disastrous winter of 1986–1987 caused many to abandon the region, especially Upper Svanetia. In the 1926 Soviet census, 13,218 declared Svan nationality, although thereafter all Kartvelian speakers became classified as Georgians. Annual heavy snowfalls meant that Svans were historically excluded from the outside world for months, penned up with their livestock inside appropriately compartmentalized stone dwellings, alongside which stood the unique, twelfth-century, square towers for which Svanetia, especially Upper Svanetia, is famous. While rich in forests and minerals, the limited arable areas produce little apart from grass and hay, potatoes, and barley, the source of the local hard liquor (*haräq'*). Goiters were frequent through iodine deficiency; the difficulties associated with providing another staple were depicted in the silent film *Salt for Svanetia*. Ibex, chamois, and bears have long been hunted. Svan men often served as migrant laborers in Mingrelia during the winter months.

During the early nineteenth century, Lower Svanetia became part of Dadiani's Mingrelia. In 1833 the Dadishkelian princes of western Upper Svanetia accepted Russian protection, governing their own affairs until the principedom was abolished in 1857. The eastern part of Upper Svanetia acknowledged no overlord, thus becoming known as "Free Svanetia." Later in the century, Russia took control of the area through military action, completely destroying the village of Khalde, as described in a moving short story by Sergo Kldiashvili.

See also: CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MINGRELIANS

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B. GEORGE HEWITT

SVECHIN, ALEXANDER ANDREYEVICH

(1878–1938), military theorist and intellectual.

Alexander Svechin was one of the key intellectual leaders of the Red Army during the golden age of Soviet military theory (1918–1937). Svechin, an artilleryman, was a crucial figure in establishing a new and revolutionary understanding of modern war. Drawing on military thinkers of the nineteenth and late eighteenth century and his own intense study of the imperial Russian military experience, Svechin reformulated the meaning of the term *strategy*. Classically, strategy meant the art of conducting military campaigns. With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, war became thoroughly mechanized and industrialized—and total. Svechin was one the earliest theorists to recognize that the material and creative challenges of total war would revolutionize the very concept of strategy.

Svechin published his views in print under the title *Strategy*. The work was published in two editions in 1926 and 1927. Here he defined strategy as “the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal for the armed forces set by the war.” Through much of his professional career Svechin carried on a lengthy debate with another important Soviet theorist, Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky. Svechin’s work in *Strategy* and elsewhere informed his view that modern war would be characterized by attrition (*izmor*). Tukhachevsky argued a contrary view, that with the help of technology, states could still fight swift decisive wars of annihilation (*sokrushenie*). In the end, history decided the argument in Svechin’s favor.

A prolific writer, Svechin was also a brilliant teacher who educated a generation of Soviet military leaders who helped win World War II. He was executed as an enemy of the state on July 29, 1938.

See also: MILITARY ART; MILITARY DOCTRINE; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; TUKHACHEVSKY, MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEVICH

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JAMES J. SCHNEIDER

SVYATOPOLK I

(c. 980–1019), grand prince of Kiev, replacing Vladimir Svyatoslavich, the Christianizer of Rus.

The identity of Svyatopolk’s father is uncertain. Around 980, after Vladimir had his half-brother Yaropolk killed, he slept with Yaropolk’s Greek wife, a former nun, and she gave birth to Svyatopolk. Because he was born of adultery, the chronicler explains, Svyatopolk (“the Cursed,” by which appellation he came to be known) was stigmatized for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, Vladimir treated him as his son. Before 988, it appears, he gave Svyatopolk the town of Turov. While there, Svyatopolk established friendly relations with the Poles and, around 1013, married the daughter of Boleslaw I and accepted Latin Christianity. Later he plotted with the Poles against Vladimir, and the latter imprisoned him. After Vladimir died in 1015, Svyatopolk, allegedly his eldest surviving son, bribed the Kievans to accept him as their prince, even though many preferred his half-brother Boris, perhaps in keeping with Vladimir’s wish. Because Svyatopolk’s succession was challenged, he initiated a fierce campaign to eradicate his half-brothers, who posed a threat to his rule. Thus he had Boris, Gleb, and Svyatoslav killed. In 1016, however, Yaroslav of Novgorod and his Varangians defeated Svyatopolk and his Pechenegs near Lyubech. Svyatopolk fled to the Poles, where Boleslaw I joined him; together they evicted Yaroslav from Kiev in July 1018. In 1019, after the king departed, Yaroslav attacked Svyatopolk and defeated him. As Svyatopolk fled, his reason and strength failed him, and he died somewhere between the Polish and the Czech lands.

See also: GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; VLADIMIR, ST.; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

SVYATOPOLK II

(1050–1113), prince of Polotsk, Novgorod, and his patrimony of Turov, and grand prince of Kiev.

Svyatopolk, son of Izyaslav and grandson of Yaroslav Vladimirovich (the Wise), became grand prince in 1093 after the death of his uncle Vsevolod. He and his cousin Vladimir Vsevolodovich (Monomakh) of Pereyaslavl sought to unite the princes of Rus against the nomads, but their cousin Oleg Svyatoslavich of Chernigov refused to cooperate. In response, they evicted Oleg from Chernigov and, in 1097, forced him to accept their terms at a congress of princes at Lyubech. They all pledged loyalty to each other and agreed that each one would retain the patrimony of his father. Soon after, Svyatopolk broke his pledge by ordering the blinding of Vasilko Rostislavich of Terebovl, whom David Igorevich falsely accused of plotting against Svyatopolk. When Monomakh and Oleg waged war against Svyatopolk, he promised to punish David, but instead attempted to seize Galician towns from Vasilko and his brother. When the latter cut off the wheat and salt supply to Kiev, Svyatopolk confiscated salt from the Caves Monastery and sold it at inflated prices. In 1100, at Vitichev (Uvetichi), he concluded peace with Monomakh and Oleg, and punished David by appropriating his patrimony of Vladimir in Volyn. After that, he and his cousins campaigned against the Polovtsy in 1103, 1107, and 1111. Their resounding victories forced the nomads to stop their incursions for over a decade. Svyatopolk died on April 16, 1113, and was buried in the Church of St. Mikhail in Kiev, which he had built.

See also: CAVES MONASTERY; GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

SVYATOSLAV I

(c. 942–972), son of Igor and Olga; nominal grand prince of Kiev.

Svyatoslav I Igorevich became the nominal grand prince of Kiev in 945, after his father Igor's death. He expanded Kievan Rus to its furthest limits, but overreached himself and failed to consolidate his rule. Svyatoslav was the first prince with a Slavic name, but he remained a Varangian at heart and refused to adopt Christianity.

According to the *Primary Chronicle*, he assumed power between 956 and 964 when his mother, the regent, was deposed. Around 963 he attacked the Khazars on the lower Don and eventually destroyed their state and opened the steppe to other nomads. He also defeated the Vyatichi and the Volga Bulgars in the northeast, and the Yasians (Ossetians) and Kasogians (Cherkasses) in the Kuban region. His southeastern campaigns took him to the Caspian Sea. He thus secured control of all the trade routes between the Dnieper and the Volga. In 967 he captured northern Bulgaria and made Pereyaslavets his headquarters. The Pechenegs attacked Kiev in 968, forcing him to return home and drive them into the steppe. At that time he partitioned Rus between his sons: Yaropolk received Kiev, Oleg the Derevlyane, and Vladimir Novgorod. He then returned to Pereyaslavets, which he proposed to make his capital. He campaigned against the Greeks in Bulgaria and Thrace until 971, when Emperor John I Tzimisces forced him to accept humiliating peace terms. While Svyatoslav was returning to Kiev in 972, the Pechenegs attacked and killed him. They used his skull as a drinking cup.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; PECHENECS; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; RURIKID DYNASTY; VLADIMIR, ST.; YAROPOLK I

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MARTIN DIMNIK

SVYATOSLAV II

(1027–1076), grand prince of Kiev and progenitor of the dynasties of Chernigov, Murom, and Ryazan.

Before Svyatoslav's father Yaroslav Vladimirovich the Wise died in 1054, he gave Svyatoslav Yaroslavich the patrimony of Chernigov, including Murom, Ryazan, and Tmutarakan. After his father's death, Svyatoslav and his brothers Izyaslav and Vsevolod ruled as a triumvirate for some twenty years. They asserted their authority over all the other princes and defended Rus against the nomads, primarily the Polovtsy (Cumans). In 1068 Svyatoslav scored a great victory over the Polovtsy, after which he formed alliances with them. The following year the Kievans invited him to replace Izyaslav as prince, but he refused to depose his brother. Svyatoslav became the most powerful prince in the land. In addition to his patrimonial lands, he established his rule over the Beloozero region and Novgorod. In 1072, when the brothers translated the relics of Saints Boris and Gleb in Vyshgorod and issued the Law Code of Yaroslav's Sons (*Pravda Yaroslavichey*), he expressed solidarity with Izyaslav for the last time. The following year he evicted Izyaslav from Kiev and therewith disobeyed his father's directive to live at peace with his brothers. By doing so, however, he gave his heirs the right to rule Kiev after him. Four years later, in 1076, he died in Kiev. Svyatoslav was a patron of culture, learning, and the Church. He commissioned two miscellanies and founded monasteries in Chernigov and Kiev. He probably completed building the Cathedral of St. Savior in Chernigov where he was buried.

See also: IZYASLAV I; KIEVAN RUS; VSEVELOD I; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH

The establishment, starting in the late eighth century, of a number of Swedish settlements in the eastern Baltic led to regular interaction with East-

ern Slavs. Staraya Ladoga (Aldeigjuborg) became an important Scandinavian center on the southeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, but the Varangians gradually extended their operations southeastward along the Novgorod-Kiev axis. Many of them served in *Gardariki* (the "land of towns") territory as dukes, merchants, and mercenaries and were collectively known as Rus (the basis for the word *Russia*). The local princes, starting with Rurik (Rörik) who became the ruler of Novgorod (Holmgard), had exclusively Scandinavian names.

Even as the Scandinavian elite became Slavicized by the tenth century, a special relationship—in the form of dynastic marriages and joint military campaigns—continued into the early twelfth century. However, almost endemic conflict soon followed as Finland became a focus of the expansionist impulses of Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Novgorod alike. The Karelian tribes were baptized by Novgorod, whereas Swedish crusades into southwestern Finland began in the 1150s. By the late thirteenth century, the Swedes reached Karelia and established the fortress of Viborg (Vyborg in Russian), as well as Landskrona in the Neva estuary. The 1323 Treaty of Orekhovets/Nöteborg between the two rivals drew a border stretching across central Finland to the Viborg district, but did little to stall Swedish expansionism into northern Finland. A century and a half of relative calm was followed by renewed warfare in the late fifteenth century, but protracted peace negotiations with the newly independent Vasa Sweden and a growth of trade led to a gradual normalization of relations after the 1520s.

The weakening of the Livonian Order created a power vacuum in the eastern Baltic and the basis for renewed conflict between Sweden and Muscovy. Gustav Vasa's 1555 attack on Russia marked the beginning of Swedish aspirations for regional hegemony. The "Great Eastern Program" was designed to turn Sweden into a pan-Baltic power that could enrich itself by taxing the rapidly growing trade flows between Eastern and Western Europe. The Livonian War of 1533–1584 ultimately left Sweden in control of the northern coast of Estonia, while Muscovy gained temporary control of Narva, which became the country's leading export port. The Teusina/Tiavzino peace (1595) formally recognized Swedish control of Finland.

Sweden intervened during the Russian Time of Troubles, initially in support of the Moscow government but soon as a conqueror of the Novgorod region (in 1611–1612). Following the failure of

efforts to place a Swedish candidate on the Russian throne, Gustav Adolf (Gustavus Adolphus) sought to force a union between Novgorod and Sweden and directed his expansionist attention at the Kola and White Sea coast, albeit unsuccessfully. The 1617 treaty of Stolbovo marked the peak of Swedish expansion into Russia, leaving the country in control of Ingria (Ingermanland; roughly today's St. Petersburg region) and the Western half of Lake Ladoga. Novgorod was returned to Russia.

Russian-Swedish relations were strong after the war, and the new Romanov rulers subsidized Swedish involvement in the Thirty Years' War in 1630–1634, among other things. In spite of a steady expansion of trade, political ties deteriorated under Queen Christina. Russia renewed its attempts to gain access to the Baltic in the 1650s and attacked Sweden in 1658. In spite of some initial territorial gains, the Peace of Kardis in 1661 ratified the prewar status quo. The closing decades of the century saw a steady expansion in Russian trade via Swedish possessions, even in the face of periodic diplomatic disputes. Tsar Peter I (the Great) in the late 1690s managed to assemble an international alliance designed to challenge Swedish supremacy in the Baltic region. The Great Northern War of 1700–1721 led to the Swedish loss of its Baltic provinces and the establishment of Russian hegemony in the region.

Russia in the eighteenth century took an active interest in Sweden's internal affairs. Although Russian engagement on the Ottoman front led to alliance treaties with Sweden, Swedish revanchism triumphed at home, and a campaign against Russia from 1741 to 1743 sought to regain the lost eastern territories. The catastrophic war was followed by the loss of southeastern Finland to Russia. A defensive alliance was signed between the two countries, and the absolutist regime of Gustav(us) III in the 1770s sought Russian support for a Swedish conquest of Norway. A lack of success eventually led to another war against Russia from 1788 to 1790. The Peace of Värälä reaffirmed the prewar status quo, while Gustav crowned his career by establishing an alliance with Russia.

Sweden and Russia were allies against Napoleon until the French managed to use the Treaty of Tilsit to induce Alexander I to conquer Finland in the last Russo-Swedish war of 1808–1809 (Treaty of Fredrikshamn). Royal attempts to continue the war were made impossible by a bourgeois revolution in Sweden. The French Marshall Jean Baptiste Bernadotte (Karl Johan) was elected Swedish heir to the

throne in 1810 in order to gain Napoleon's support for the reconquest of Finland. However, he instead turned to France's opponents in order to make possible a Swedish takeover of Norway. In 1812, Sweden declared itself neutral in European conflicts, but a secret alliance was signed with Russia.

Popular Russophobia increased in the 1830s and 1840s, and Oskar I began to pursue closer ties with Great Britain and Denmark. A border dispute with Russia in the 1850s led Sweden to seek British-French guarantees. The two powers in 1856 forced Russia to demilitarize the Åland Islands. Anti-Russian sentiment was further boosted by the Polish uprisings and the Russification measures adopted in Finland toward the end of the century. In spite of this, the government defined its neutrality even more strictly in 1885. Nonetheless, Russia's recognition of Norwegian independence in 1905 was caused by suspicions of pan-Nordic union and Sweden's pro-German stance.

The gradually more tense political relations did not prevent the establishment of growing economic and cultural ties. Russia accounted for 5 to 6 percent of Swedish imports in the late nineteenth century, but in the years leading up to the October Revolution, Russia was the third- or fourth-largest destination of Swedish exports. Swedish direct investment grew and, for instance, Nobel Industries developed a substantial presence in Russia. Sweden harbored many intellectual refugees from Russia.

Sweden remained neutral in World War I, in spite of popular pressures for an alliance with Germany. The neutral position allowed Sweden, as the first Western power, to establish relations with the new Bolshevik regime. A Swedish-Soviet trade treaty was signed in the autumn of 1918, although formal diplomatic recognition only followed in 1924. Ties again deteriorated in the 1930s but, following the rise of fascism, Sweden backed Soviet membership in the League of Nations. In spite of an official position of neutrality during World War II, Sweden openly supported its neighbor during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940. A brief conflict with the Soviets in 1942 followed Soviet efforts to sink Swedish freight ships carrying German goods. Another source of tension came from the flight of many Balts (mainly Latvians and Estonians) to Sweden. While 160 Baltic military officers were returned to the USSR in 1945 and 1946, civilian refugees were permitted to stay in Sweden.

The Soviets strongly opposed Swedish efforts to establish Nordic security cooperation after the

war, and Sweden returned to its policy of non-alignment, albeit with secret cooperation with the West. Moscow valued Sweden's decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the two countries often found themselves adopting similar positions regarding international disputes. Sweden gained further favor by staying out of the European Economic Community and by supporting the ESCE (European Coal and Steel Community) process. Growing tensions were caused by Afghanistan and sightings of Soviet submarines in Swedish waters, one of which was stranded in 1981. Ties were normalized under Gorbachev. Commercial relations were relatively modest during the Soviet and post-Soviet period.

See also: DENMARK, RELATIONS WITH; FOREIGN TRADE; GREAT NORTHERN WAR; LIVONIAN WAR; NARVA, TREATY OF; NORWAY, RELATIONS WITH; NYSTADT, TREATY OF; STOLBOVO, TREATY OF

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SYN BOYARSKY

A ranking in the Muscovite state service system, held by provincial petty noble cavalymen who comprised the bulk of the campaign army up to the middle of the seventeenth century.

The *syn boyarsky* (pl. *deti boyarskie*) comprised Muscovy's middle service class, below the metropolitan nobility but higher in status than the contractually recruited commoner cossacks and musketeers. *Syn boyarsky* literally means "boyar's son," reflecting this group's mixed origins (younger sons of Moscow boyars, slave or free retainers of formerly independent appanage princes, sons of clergymen or peasants, etc.) in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

The *syn boyarsky* was legally free in the sense that he was exempt from taxes, and he was entitled to own peasants and to sue in defense of his precedence honor. But he was required to serve the

sovereign for life in the field army, in the garrisons, and in the lower levels of provincial administration. A few *deti boyarskie* owned some allodial land, but most depended primarily upon the sovereign's bounty in service-conditional land and cash and grain issues to outfit themselves and their retainers for duty. The *syn boyarsky's* bounty entitlements were determined in part by his service capacity as assessed at inspection and in part by his past service, past rank, and the services and ranks of his forebears. The average *syn boyarsky* owned no more than five or six peasant tenants. Upon retirement his son or another male kinsman usually received part or all of his service lands and took over his service obligations.

See also: BOYAR; MESTNICHESTVO; MUSCOVY; POMESTIE; STRELTSY

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BRIAN DAVIES

SYTIN, IVAN DMITRIEVICH

(1851–1934), Russia's leading pre-Revolution publisher of books, magazines, and the top daily newspaper, *Russian Word* (*Russkoye slovo*).

Ivan Dmitrievich Sytin, had literate but poor peasant parents and only two years of schooling in his native village of Gnezdnikovo, Kostroma Province. Venturing first to the Nizhny Novgorod Fair at fourteen as helper to a fur-trading uncle, he apprenticed at fifteen to a Moscow printer-merchant who helped him start a business in 1876, the year of his marriage to a cook's daughter who would be vital to his success.

Like his mentor, Sytin issued calendars, posters, and tales that itinerant peddlers sold to peasants throughout the countryside. When in 1884 Leo Tolstoy needed a publisher for his simple books (the *Mediator* series) meant to edify the same readership, his choice of Sytin raised this unknown to respected status among intellectuals. Sytin then began to publish for well-educated readers and branched into schoolbooks, children's books, and encyclopedias by investing in the new mass-production German presses that cut per-unit costs. His rise as an entrepreneur who exploited the latest technol-

ogy led contemporaries to tag him "American" in method.

Sytin claimed that he became a newspaper publisher in 1894 at Anton Chekhov's urging, and he hired able editors and journalists who made his Russian Word the most-read liberal daily in Russia. Lessening censorship and rapid industrialization in the last decades of the tsarist regime helped Sytin add to his publishing ventures and kept him a millionaire through the economic disruption of World War I. After the 1917 Revolution, Sytin received assurances from Vladimir Lenin that he could publish for the Bolshevik regime, only to be cast off as a capitalist after Lenin died in 1924. The final decade of his life was marked by gloom, austerity, and obscurity, offset only by his church attendance and his writing of memoirs (published in

the USSR in 1960 in a shortened edition). His downtown Moscow apartment is today an exhibition center in his honor.

See also: JOURNALISM

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CHARLES A. RUIID

TABLE OF RANKS

The Table of Ranks [or rankings] of all official posts (Tabel' o Rangakh Vsekh Chinov) divided government service into three vertical columns: military (*voinskie*), civil (*statskie*), and court (*privdvornye*). The military column was further subdivided into infantry, guards, artillery, and navy. These vertical columns were divided horizontally into ranks or classes (*klassy*), from rank fourteen up to rank one, each containing a variable number of posts or offices (*chiny*). The most crowded ranks were the civilian ones, with sometimes a dozen or more posts packed into each to accommodate newly created central and provincial officials, whereas each rank in the guards column contained just one post. Nineteen explanatory points accompanied the chart.

Like many of Peter I's modernizing reforms, the Table of Ranks rationalized changes that had already occurred piecemeal and replaced the old overlapping ranking systems inherited from the seventeenth century, which did not differentiate between civilian and military posts. It incorporated titles such as general, major, and colonel that had been in use in certain regiments since the 1630s, new offices such as chancellor and vice-chancellor, and court grades introduced after Peter's marriage in 1712 for use in the new tsaritsa's court. The 1722 edict also contained points from foreign ranking systems, especially from Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. Peter himself edited the final version and incorporated suggestions from the Senate and governmental departments.

As the grid layout made plain, one of the purposes of the Table of Ranks was to correlate status across different branches of service. For example, chancellor in the civil service and field marshal-general in the army both held rank one. To occupy a position on the table at all was to be privileged, for the fourteen ranks related only to the officer class in the armed forces and its equivalent in the civil service. Noncommissioned officers, regular troops, and their civilian equivalents were not included. The table was strict about qualifications for jobs. Neither post nor rank could be inherited or bought. At the same time, birth and marriage continued to confer privilege. The first of the accompanying explanatory points confirmed the precedence of princes of the blood and royal sons-in-law. Point eight allowed sons of princes, counts, barons, and other aristocrats free access to places



where the court assembled before others holding lowly office (*chin*), but the sovereign still wished to see them distinguish themselves from others in all cases according to their merit. Even the highest born would not be awarded any rank until they had served the tsar and the fatherland. Conversely, non-nobles who managed to enter the table received hereditary noble status upon attaining military rank fourteen or civilian rank eight. Civil offices in ranks nine to fourteen conferred personal noble status only. Women were ranked according to their husbands or fathers, depending on their marital status, apart from ladies-in-waiting, holding court service ranks in their own right.

The Table of Ranks endorsed the belief that nobles were the natural leaders in a society of orders composed of categories with unequal rights. It did not demonstrate a consistent commitment to meritocracy to the detriment of lineage, nor did it specifically raise commoners at the expense of nobles. Nobles who failed to attain a post on the table did not lose their noble status. The Holstein envoy H. F. de Bassewitz writes: "What [Peter] had in mind was not the abasement of the noble estate. On the contrary, all tended towards instilling in the nobility a desire to distinguish themselves from common folk by merit as well as by birth." The final explanatory point specified that people were to have clothing, carriages, and livery appropriate to their office and calling.

Peter did not intend to diminish the traditional elite in principle, nor did he do so in practice. In 1730, of the 179 army and navy officers and officials in ranks one through four of the table, nine-tenths were descended from old Muscovite noble clans and a third from men who recently had been boyars. Over the centuries, some posts on the table were abolished and others were created to accommodate the staff of academies, universities, and other new institutions. Orders and medals became associated with various grades. It became harder for non-nobles to enter the table. But the basic principles established by Peter I continued until 1917, and consciousness of rank and striving for promotion and honors left a deep imprint on Russian society and culture.

See also: PETER I

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LINDSEY HUGHES

TAGANKA

The Taganka emerged in 1964, under the leadership of Yuri Lyubimov, as one of the young theaters reflecting the generational split within the Soviet intelligentsia following the year of protest (1956). A theater of young comrades-in-arms, Taganka believed in its mission: making audiences aware of contemporary moral, political, and social dilemmas. Aesthetically, it revived Meyerhold's tradition. A theater of synthesis, it mobilized various resources: music, dance, pantomime, acrobatics, masks, the shadow-play, and others. Many shows began outside and proceeded through the lobby into the auditorium. The Taganka opened with Bertolt Brecht's *The Good Person of Szechwan*, putting into practice Brecht's own theory of epic theatre. The Taganka's approach to the repertoire was unique: it often produced prose adaptations (*A Hero of Our Time*, 1964; *Master and Margarita*, 1977); and poetic montage (*Antiworlds*, 1965; *Listen! Mayakovsky!*, 1967). Lyubimov's Taganka, with its brilliant actors, such as Vladimir Vysotsky, Veniamin Smekhov, and Valery Zolotukhin, and no less brilliant designer, David Borovsky, quickly became a cultural landmark. Despite continuous battles with censorship, it was never closed down and was held out to the West to display artistic freedom in the USSR. However, Lyubimov lost his Soviet citizenship in 1984, while in London. The Theater's new leader, Anatoly Efros, a follower of Konstantin Stanislavsky, took it in a different direction. Whereas Lyubimov had developed shows, Efros developed actors. Under perestroika, the Taganka lost its status as gadfly of the society. Lyubimov's return in 1989 did little to reinstate the status. A split within the theater, initiated by N. Gubenko, dealt a serious blow to the Taganka and it never recovered the status that it held before 1984.

See also: PERESTROIKA

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MAIA KIPP

TAJIKISTAN AND TAJIKS

The Tajiks are the most prominent indigenous non-Turkic population in Central Asia. They are of Persian/Iranian ethnic descent, although their exact origin is subject to debate. Legends link the Tajiks with Alexander the Great and his campaign in the region north of Afghanistan and west of China—what is today Tajikistan. More likely, contemporary Tajiks are descendants of the Persian-speaking population that resided in the sedentary regions of what is now Central Asia, particularly in the country of Tajikistan.

Tajikistan had a population of 6,719,567 in 2002, of which approximately 4,361,000 were ethnic Tajik (64.9%). However, if one adds to that the million or so Tajiks that live in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, respectively, the number increases to well above six million Tajiks in Central Asia. What makes these calculations difficult is the fact that defining oneself as a Tajik is a construct of the Soviet era. Prior to the early twentieth century, people in the region defined themselves more on tribal and clan affiliations or by their adherence to Islam than to an ethnic identity. In neighboring Uzbekistan, for example, ethnic Tajiks claim that they are actually more prominent than the official statistics of that country suggest. Within the Republic of Tajikistan, other significant minorities include Uzbeks (25.0%) and Russians (3.5%). Many Russians emigrated from Tajikistan immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union, particularly during the period of the civil war (1992–1997). Most of the Uzbeks live in the northern region of Sogd, previously known as Leninobod (Leninabad). The remaining Russians live in the capital city of Dushanbe, which in 2002 had an overall population of 590,000, although that figure undoubtedly was an underestimation.

The Tajiks speak an eastern dialect of Farsi, the language of Iran. The languages are mutually intelligible; although as modern Tajik is written in the Cyrillic script and not in the Arabic script, there can be difficulties between the two. Indeed, throughout the past century, Tajik has been writ-



An elderly Tajik man drinks tea as another plays a traditional musical instrument at a Dushanbe street market. © AFP/CORBIS

ten in Arabic, Latin, and Cyrillic scripts. It is the intention of the current government to return to the Arabic script, although the practical difficulties of such a move have slowed any such effort.

In contrast to the Iranians, the Tajiks are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School, not Shi'a Muslims like Iranians. This is the result of the history of religious centers in the region, such as Bukhara and Samarkand in Uzbekistan, where a number of ethnic Tajiks live. More importantly, the Safavid dynasty that made Shi'a Islam the official religion of Persia did not control the traditional Tajik territories. There is a small sect of Isma'ili Shi'a in the Badakhshon area of eastern Tajikistan that is loyal to the spiritual leader of the Aga Khan. In addition, the non-Tajiks in the country practice a range of religions.

Tajiks point to the Sassanid dynasty of the early tenth century as a founding moment in their history. Traditionally, the Tajiks—or Tajik speakers—occupied urban areas of Central Asia, especially the key trading cities of Samarkand and Bukhara.



Tajikistan, 1992. © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

Indeed, many were the economic and political elite of the Bukharan Emirate, which was prominent in the sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries. The Emirate eventually became a Protectorate of the Russian Empire in the 1870s and until 1917 was closely associated with the tsarist regime. After the Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil War, which brought about the Uzbek S.S.R., the Tajik Autonomous S.S.R was established. On October 5, 1929, the Soviet government officially declared it a full-fledged Union Republic. At 143,000 square kilometers, Tajikistan is one of the smaller countries in the region. It is largely mountainous, with the Pamirs dominating the eastern part of the coun-

try (the region known as the Badakhshon Autonomous Region).

Within a year of independence from the USSR, the Tajik government collapsed due to infighting among rival groups and a five-year civil war ensued (1992–1997). The war was largely seen as a struggle between regional rivals. In 1997, the opposing sides agreed to form a National Reconciliation Committee (NRC) that set the stage for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. President Imomali Rakhmonov successfully consolidated his authority in the postwar era and in the early twenty-first century has a firm control of the coun-

try, which continues to be dominated by regional and clan rivalries.

Tajikistan is an overwhelmingly mountainous country that has few natural resources other than mineral wealth. Tajikistan was the source of strategic minerals for the Soviet nuclear program and continues to be a supplier of other minerals for export. In particular, aluminum is deemed important and is the foundation for one of the region's largest aluminum processing plants in Tursun-Zade. There are modest oil and gas deposits, but these are used exclusively for domestic consumption. Cotton is also a product traditionally exported.

Because of the civil war, economic development in the country has been abysmally low. It is estimated that the production levels of the country are less than half of the 1991 figures. Since 2001, international financial institutions have increased their commitments to Tajikistan to begin the process of rebuilding the economy. Of particular interest are the possibilities in hydroelectric energy and continued development of mineral reserves. The total gross national product (GNP) for 2001 was \$7.5 billion, giving an estimated purchasing power parity (PPP) at \$1,140 per capita. Per capita income is actually less than \$600, with many earning as little as \$10 per month in actual salary.

Because it is a landlocked country that requires open access to outside trade routes, Tajikistan is dependent upon building strong relations with its neighbors—China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. Of particular importance is the fact that Tajiks are prominent in neighboring Uzbekistan, especially in the historic cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. Another key issue for Tajikistan is the fact that Iran feels some affinity toward the country. Iran played a key role in facilitating the peace talks in the mid-1990s and, at least at that time, felt it could be a more significant player in the country.

Finally, Tajik support of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan has paid modest returns. There is currently a small U.S.-base facility in Dushanbe and strategic assistance from the United States to Tajikistan has increased substantially. Tajikistan is now part of the NATO Partnership for Peace program. The Tajik government hopes that these increased external relations will eventually translate into increased economic assistance. In turn, this aid will help stabilize a very precarious domestic situation.

See also: ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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ROGER KANGAS

TALE OF AVRAAMY PALITSYN

The Tale of Avraamy Palitsyn is one of the earliest, most popular and widely diffused (over 200 manuscript copies are known to exist) narratives about the Time of Troubles. Although the author was a monk, he took part in many important events of the period such as the negotiations with the Poles in 1610. He used eyewitness accounts and official documentation to compose the tale some time around 1617. The first six chapters, which some scholars attribute to another author, narrate the onset of the Troubles from the time of Ivan IV to the reign of Vasily I. Shuisky. The core of the tale (in chapters seven through fifty-two) is comprised of an epic, eyewitness description of the siege of the Trinity St. Sergius monastery between 1608–1610 by Polish forces. The last chapters are

devoted to the liberation of Moscow, the process of electing Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov, and the end of the conflict with the Poles. The text emphasizes the important role played by the Trinity monastery in stopping the Polish advance and organizing resistance. Avraamy also stresses the role he played in inspiring the liberation movement and assisting it with his deeds and prayers. The tale exists in several versions, but scholars disagree over the extent to which variations represent authorial interventions. Like other works of the period, the tale displays both stylistic and structural innovations. It has long been appreciated by scholars for its range of linguistic registers, use of direct speech, rhythmic prose, and rhetorical skill.

See also: IVAN IV; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; SHUIISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

BRIAN BOECK

TAMBOV UPRISING *See* ANTONOV UPRISING.

TANNENBERG, BATTLE OF

The Battle of Tannenberg, in August 1914, was the consequence of Russia's commitment to an immediate offensive during World War I. On the grand strategic level, the tsarist empire's major problem involved making sure its major continental ally, France, was not forced out of the war before Russia could bring its full strength to bear. That in turn justified taking strategic risks. The principal question was whether the attack should concentrate on Germany or Austria, and the Russian army seemed to have ample strength to pursue both options.

Russia's war plan against Germany involved sending two armies against the exposed province of East Prussia, defended by what seemed little more than a token force. The First Army, under General Pavel Rennenkampf, advanced west across the Niemen River; the Second Army, under General Alexander Samsonov, moved northwest from Russian Poland. Both initially achieved local successes against indecisive opposition. The Russian commanders, however, failed to coordinate their movements and to press their advantage. Poor logistics and intelligence further slowed the advance, particularly in the Second Army's sector. That gave

a new German command team of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff time to develop plans already outlined by staff officers on the ground—to concentrate their entire force against the Second Army.

After five days of hard fighting, between August 26 and August 30, there were 50,000 Russian casualties, and 90,000 prisoners. Samsonov committed suicide and the Germans turned on *Rennenkampf*, driving the First Army back over the frontier between September 7 and 14, in the Battle of the Masurian Lakes.

The Russians came closer to victory in East Prussia than is generally realized. Their failure was primarily a consequence of attempting a campaign of maneuver arguably beyond the capacity of any army under the tactical conditions of 1914. But while the losses in men and material were replaced, the blow Tannenberg inflicted on Russian national morale was never restored throughout the war.

See also: WORLD WAR I

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DENNIS SHOWALTER

TARKOVSKY, ANDREI ARSENEVICH

(1932–1986), Russian film director.

Tarkovsky was born in the village of Zavrzhye on the Volga river in the Ivanovo province, northeast of Moscow. His father, Arseny Alexandrovich (1907–1989), was a poet, at that time working as a translator before achieving acclaim in later years. His mother, Maria Ivanovna (Vishnyakova), had studied with Arseny at the Moscow Institute for Literature but was working as a proofreader for First State Publishing House in Moscow. Soon after the family moved to Moscow in 1935, Tarkovsky's parents separated and later divorced. Tarkovsky remained with his mother and sister, but his father continued to play an important role in his intellectual and emotional development.

Tarkovsky started school in Moscow in 1939, but after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union was

evacuated in 1941 to relatives in the town of Yuryevets, near his birthplace. In 1951 Tarkovsky entered the Institute for Oriental Studies but soon abandoned his academic life. In 1953 he joined a geological expedition to Siberia. On returning, he enrolled the following year at the All-Union State Institute of Cinematography, where he studied under the supervision of the renowned Soviet director Mikhail Romm. Fellow students included Andrei Konchalovsky, who also later achieved international fame as a director, and Vadim Yusev, who worked as director of photography on several of Tarkovsky's early films.

In 1957 Tarkovsky married classmate Irma Rausch. In 1960 he graduated from film school with honors. For his diploma work, he wrote and directed a fifty-minute feature film called *The Steamroller and the Violin*, which treats several themes—childhood, innocence and loss, male friendship, and the redemptive power of art—which later become central to his work. In 1961 Tarkovsky started work on a Mosfilm commission, released the following year under the title *Ivan's Childhood*. This film, which explores the relationship between a young boy and two adult soldiers experiencing the physical and psychological dislocations of war, immediately won international acclaim. Tarkovsky's next film, *Andrei Rublev*, is considered by many to be his masterpiece. This long, complex account of the life of the early fifteenth-century Russian icon painter took five years to complete (1961–1966) and, because of its unconventional treatment of national history, its vivid depiction of medieval cruelties, and its central concern with the relationship between spirituality and artistic creation, encountered the hostility of the Soviet authorities, who delayed its release by another three years. During this period, Tarkovsky left his first wife and, in 1970, married the actress Larisa Pavlovna (Yegorkina), who worked in many of his later films.

During the next decade, Tarkovsky directed three more films in the Soviet Union, each intellectually challenging and stylistically innovative: *Solaris* (1972), a profound reflection, in a science-fiction setting, on human relationships, mortality, and the nature of existence; *Mirror* (1975), a kaleidoscope of autobiographical episodes exploring themes of childhood, maternal love and marriage, time, memory, and loss, which provoked official disapproval for its subjective nature but won widespread critical acclaim; and *Stalker* (1979), a grim allegory of the human quest for moral salvation. Tarkovsky's next film, *Nostalgia* (1983) was a

joint Soviet–Italian production. Following its completion, the director decided to remain in Western Europe. He finished his final film, *Sacrifice* (1986), while already suffering from lung cancer. He died in Paris at the end of the year. In the late 1980s Mikhail Gorbachev's new cultural policy inaugurated a posthumous celebration of Tarkovsky's work in the Soviet Union. Since 1991 his reputation, both in Russia and internationally, as one of cinema's great artists has not diminished.

See also: MOTION PICTURES; RUBLEV, ANDREI

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NICK BARON

TASHKENT

Tashkent is the capital city of the Republic of Uzbekistan, a country located in the region of Central Asia between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. The city itself is located on the Zarafshan River, just to the west of the Ferghana Valley. The history of Tashkent goes back more than 2,500 years, to a time when there was evidence of habitation in the region. The name itself means “city of stone,” perhaps indicative of the stones used in its construction. It grew to be a significant stop on the great silk road in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, yet remained in the shadows of the more important city of Samarkand, which is approximately 300 kilometers (185 miles) to the south.

The city's fall to Russian forces in 1865 signaled the beginning of Imperial Russian rule over the region. It was designated as the capital city of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship and was the Russian capital of Central Asia. Indeed, as the city grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, distinct districts were formed, for both indigenous peoples and for the European colonizers. Tashkent was the scene of some of the bitterest



Boy selling musical instruments at a Tashkent market. © NEVADA WIER/CORBIS

fighting during the Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the subsequent civil war. For much of this period, Tashkent was a Red bastion, surrounded by anti-Bolshevik forces.

The political importance of Tashkent continued through the Soviet period. While Samarkand was initially designated as the capital of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR), in 1929 the honor was given to Tashkent. During World War II, numerous factories and industries were moved to Tashkent from areas within Russia and Ukraine that were threatened by invading German forces. Consequently, Tashkent became industrialized from the 1940s onward, giving the city a strong economic importance to Central Asia and the Soviet Union as a whole.

In 1966 Tashkent experienced a devastating earthquake that left significant portions of the city in ruins. The Soviet government made the city's reconstruction a national effort, and citizens from all parts of the country moved to Tashkent to help in the rebuilding, with a number staying afterward.

As a result, the population of the city quickly exceeded one million, and by the late 1980s was more than 2.5 million. As of 2002 the official population of the city was 2.6 million residents, although some estimates are closer to 3.0–3.5 million, or 12–14 percent of Uzbekistan's total population. While Samarkand and Bukhara make claims to be the cultural centers of Uzbekistan, Tashkent remains the political and economic power of the country. Moreover, it is a major transportation and trade hub for Central Asia.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS

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ROGER KANGAS

TASS

TASS, the Telegraph Agency of the USSR, was founded in July 1925 with the goal of centralizing control over the distribution of foreign news in the Soviet Union under the oversight of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars (*Sovnarkom*). Until the collapse of the USSR, TASS remained the single most important supplier of foreign news to the Soviet mass media, a major producer of domestic news, and a key instrument for conveying information and propaganda from the Soviet government to foreign governments and populations. After 1991 TASS became ITAR-TASS (Information Telegraph Agency of Russia), the central information distributor for the Russian Federation.

TASS's predecessor, the Russian Telegraph Agency, or ROSTA, was founded by the Bolsheviks in September 1918 and charged with an array of functions including provision of news reports to the Soviet press, instruction of journalists in training, and supervision of provincial newspapers. ROSTA staff and financial resources were clearly not adequate to these huge tasks and, in fact, the provincial press was run by local initiatives during the civil war. In the winter of 1921 to 1922 the newly created Press Section of the Party Central Committee's Agitprop Department took over supervision of the provincial press and ROSTA was restricted to wire service functions.

TASS never had a monopoly on the collection and distribution of either foreign or domestic news. Until the late 1920s RATAU, the Ukrainian Republic's official wire service, maintained correspondents abroad and engaged in a series of turf wars with ROSTA/TASS over distribution of foreign news in Ukraine. Major newspapers such as *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and *Trud* (the central labor union newspaper) generally posted several correspondents abroad.

In addition to its public news distribution functions, TASS supplied "Not for Press" information

bulletins to Soviet leaders during the late 1920s and most likely for most of Soviet history.

See also: JOURNALISM; SOVNARKOM

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MATTHEW E. LENOE

TATARSTAN AND TATARS

Tatarstan is a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, located at the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers, with its capital at Kazan. Originally formed as the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920, it was renamed the Republic of Tatarstan in 1990. Tatars, sometimes referred to as the Volga Tatars or Kazan Tatars, form the indigenous population of Tatarstan. They form the second largest nationality in Russia (5.5 million in 1989) and one of the largest in the former Soviet Union. As of 1989, about one quarter of Tatars lived in Tatarstan (1.8 million), with large communities in Bashkortostan (1.1 million) and other republics and provinces of the Volga-Ural region and Siberia. Additionally, about one million Tatars lived in other republics of the former Soviet Union, primarily in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere in Central Asia. The Tatar language belongs to the Kipchak branch of the Turkic language family and has several dialects. Most Tatars are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi legal school, with smaller numbers of Kriashen, or Christianized Tatars.

Finno-Ugric tribes, the earliest known inhabitants of Tatarstan, were joined by Turkic-speaking settlers after the third century c.e. Most important were the Volga Bulgars, who arrived in the seventh century and by the 900s had established a state that soon dominated the entire Middle Volga. Bulgar economic life combined agriculture, pastoralism, and commerce, making the Bulgar state one of the most important trading partners of Kievan Rus. The Volga Bulgars officially adopted Islam in 922 during the visit of Ibn Fadlan, an emis-



Tatars of Kazan. © JAMIE ABECASIS/SUPERSTOCK

sary of the Caliph. In 1236 their capital at Great Bulgar was captured and destroyed during the Mongol invasion, and Bulgars subsequently became a subject people of the Mongol empire and the Golden Horde.

Russians and Europeans often referred to these invaders as Tatars, a term that originated with a Turkic tribe in the Mongol army but by the nineteenth and early twentieth century was applied by Russians to several different Turkic Muslim groups, including ancestors of today's Kazan or Volga Tatars, Crimean Tatars, and Azerbaijanis. The implication that these peoples are descended from the Mongol invaders was long commonplace. While scholars agree that Mongols and their allied tribes may have played some part in the formation of today's Tatar people, most also assert that contemporary Tatars owe a much larger debt both genetically and culturally to the Volga Bulgars, with an admixture of local Finno-Ugric peoples and several Turkic tribes that migrated to the region over ensuing centuries.

In the 1440s, as the Golden Horde disintegrated, a separate khanate emerged at Kazan, in what some scholars see as a restoration of Bulgar statehood. In 1552 the Kazan Khanate was conquered and destroyed by Muscovy, marking the first Russian incorporation of large Muslim populations into their expanding empire. Under Russian rule, intense Christianization campaigns alternated with periods of greater toleration. In the late eighteenth century, Catherine II granted the Tatars the right to trade with the Muslims of Central Asia and allowed them to form a spiritual board at Ufa to regulate the religious affairs of Muslims in European Russia. With their superior knowledge of Turkic language and customs, Tatar merchants quickly established a virtual monopoly over trade between Russia and Central Asia. This contributed to the formation of Tatar commercial and industrial classes, urbanization, formation of a small industrial working class, and emergence of a secular national intelligentsia. These factors made the Tatars, like the Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus, one of the most economically integrated Muslim groups in the empire.

The nineteenth century saw important intellectual and cultural changes, most importantly the Jadid movement to reform Islamic education by introducing the secular subjects taught in Russian schools, and the emergence of Western forms of culture such as novels, plays, theater, and newspapers. The development of national identity and cultural nationalism proceeded as well with the creation of a standard Tatar literary language. However, the broader questions of national language and the parameters of the nation remained controversial. Intellectuals who imagined all or most Turkic-speakers as belonging to a single nation of Turks quarreled with those who defined a narrower Tatar nationality, while others emphasized the larger Islamic community. Nevertheless, as Russia drifted toward revolution in the early twentieth century, most members of the educated elite shared a belief that their community formed the natural leadership of Russia's Muslim Turkic population.

Tatars were divided by the same social and political conflicts as Russians during the revolutionary period. The question of national autonomy was intertwined with these conflicts, with a serious division emerging in 1917 between supporters of extraterritorial cultural autonomy and those favoring the autonomy of a large territorial Idel-Ural (Volga-Ural) state within a Russian federation. Local Bolsheviks and Left SRs (Socialist Revolutionaries), both Russian and Tatar, secured Soviet power



Engraving of a Tatar family in their home. © JAIME ABECASIS/SUPERSTOCK

through Moscow's proclamation of a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic in March 1918 and suppression of anti-Bolshevik Tatar factions. Throughout the civil war, Tatar leftists such as Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev supported Soviet power in part because of its positive attitude toward ethnic federalism, though many other prominent Tatar leaders, such as the writer Ayaz Iskhakov, sympathized with the Whites. Moscow's decision to create a Bashkir republic in 1919 led to abrogation of the Tatar-Bashkir republic and promulgation of a separate Tatar republic in 1920.

Tatarstan experienced all the economic trials of the Soviet period, including famine in 1921 and 1922 and the collectivization of agriculture, but also notable industrial development with the emergence of an oil industry since the 1940s, construction of the immense Kama automobile factory (KAMAZ) in Naberezhnye Chelny (1970s), and significant urban growth. Cultural policies were similarly inconsistent: The Tatar language was shifted from the Arabic alphabet to the Latin in the 1920s

but then Cyrillicized in 1938; and elements of Tatar history and culture that were celebrated in the 1920s were vilified under Stalin's rule, only to be carefully rehabilitated in Tatar journals in the 1960s and 1970s.

During the Gorbachev years, new Tatar political organizations raised concerns about the survival and perpetuation of Tatar national culture, both within Tatarstan and in the extensive Tatar diaspora, where assimilation was more common. The governing circles of Tatarstan responded by declaring the republic's sovereignty and unilaterally raising its status to union republic (1990), writing a new authoritative constitution (1992), and signing a treaty (1994) and other agreements with the Russian federal government that delineated division of powers, responsibilities, and resources in a form widely studied as the Tatarstan model. There was relatively little interethnic violence in the republic, in part because Russian residents (43.3% of the population in 1989, compared to 48.5% Tatar) benefited from many of these steps as well.

One continuing political problem in the 1990s was concern over the status of Tatars living in neighboring Bashkortostan.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; KAZAN; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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DANIEL E. SCHAFER

TAXES

Taxation of the population is the basic way governments raise the revenue necessary to carry out their functions, including administration of justice, defense, and construction of infrastructure, such as canals, roads, and public buildings. When taxes are inadequate, as they often were in Russia, they were supplemented by domestic and foreign borrowing (possible after the 1770s), confiscations, or disposal of state property. The various modes and objects of taxation also clearly demonstrate the level of economic development of Russia through the centuries, as well as the shifting class basis of state power.

Prior to the establishment of the Russian Empire, most taxation came from the revenues of the tsar's estates. As a major serf owner, he collected rent from them. Following the reduction of the independent *boyar* class, the Russian state demanded service from *pomeschiki*, nobles and gentry, in exchange for their property in land and serfs. The state also monopolized the export of certain commodities, such as grain, farmed out the sale of alcohol, and minted silver and copper coins. Where deficits persisted, the Muscovite princes simply defaulted on state obligation. Quantitative estimates are, however, nearly unavailable until the eighteenth century, when some quantitative studies of the state budgets were written, most notably those by Paul N. Mil'yukov and S. M. Troitsky.

The main taxes in the 1700s were the fixed poll (soul) tax, excise taxes on alcohol and salt, revenues from the export monopoly of certain commodities, tax on iron and copper, customs tariffs, and mint revenues. During emergencies these were supplemented by special taxes (such as on beards of religious dissenters), debasement of the coinage, or printing paper money (*assignats*). The last two, which caused an inflation tax on holders of cash, occurred mostly during the frequent wars of those times. All peasants paid the poll tax according to population estimates, except during periods of natural hardship or on the accession of a new ruler, when rates were temporarily reduced. Throughout the century the government increased the rate of indirect taxes on alcohol, as well as demanding customs duties in hard currency. On the other hand, burdens on miners and iron-masters appeared to slacken in the post-Petrine period.

To collect net fiscal revenue the Russian state employed either tax farmers, agents who paid for the privilege of collecting levies, or direct distribution of salt and alcohol. For these monopolized commodities the tax was simply the difference between the retail price and the cost of production. In 1754 the state granted gentry and members of the aristocracy its former monopoly in the sale of alcohol, from which incomes increased steadily, unlike those on salt, a prime necessity. The salt tax was actually abolished in 1881. Despite these measures, tax payments were frequently in arrears (*nedoimki*), particularly during wars or famine. Peasants would try to avoid taxes by emigrating to the frontier areas of Siberia and the southern steppes, but the system of joint responsibility meant that fellow villagers would try to prevent their leaving. Little seemed to change in the tsarist

regime during the more than half a century from Catherine's rule to the Crimean War and the subsequent Emancipation. Exemptions from taxation and a stagnant industrial economy meant that tax revenues did not increase much. Transcaucasia began to supply customs revenues from the 1830s, but the new areas of the southern fringe were expensive to conquer and hold. Fiscal inadequacy became painfully clear when Russia's poorly supplied troops were defeated at Sevastopol by English, French, and Turkish forces. That the Russian roads and river routes were so obviously inadequate for mobilization led to great interest in expensive and extensive railroad projects, requiring both more money and new industries.

The late nineteenth century was a period of rapidly rising governmental outlays, doubling between 1861 and 1890, and again between 1901 and 1905. Railroad building in this vast country accelerated, primarily for military purposes; debt service, health, and education also increased their share in state expenses, though the latter two were still small by international standards. To meet these expenditures, the government was able to increase indirect tax revenues, chiefly on vodka, but also by its monopoly on the sale of sugar, tobacco, kerosene, and matches. As was understood, reduced peasant net incomes meant more grain for export. Royalties and transportation tariffs on coal and iron also increased. Customs duties rose significantly, both as a result of higher rates and larger import volumes. Tax policy protected industry at the expense of agriculture, as direct taxes on company profits and capital plus redemption payments hardly increased at all between 1890 and 1910.

Despite some discussion of this possibility before World War I, most individual incomes were not taxed, but apartment rents and salaries of civil servants and joint-stock company employees were. This pattern points to the strongly regressive nature of tsarist taxation. According to estimates by Albert L. Vainstein, the tax burden on peasants averaged 11 percent of their total income in 1913, but probably more than one-quarter of their cash receipts.

Following the October Revolution, the Bolshevik government depended on confiscations and fiat money, but this chaotic strategy of covering expenditures soon led to peasant uprisings, and the government had to switch to a tax in kind (*prod-nalog*)—replaced by cash in 1924—on the peasantry. After meeting their obligations, rural agriculturists could sell their surpluses on the local market. How-

Table 1.

	1940	1965	1984
Total Revenue (billion rubles)	18.0	102.3	376.7
Turnover tax	59%	38%	27
Payments from profits	12	30	31
Cooperatives' taxes	2	1	1
Mass bond sales	5	<1	<1
Direct taxes	5	8	8
Social insurance contributions	5	5	7
"Other"	12	17	27

SOURCE: *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo* (National Economy), 1973, 1978, and 1984. Courtesy of the author.

ever, government efforts to keep the procurement price for grain low increased the actual surplus taken. Moreover, the nepmen had to pay a temporary tax on super-profits starting in 1926.

During the Stalinist period the government greatly increased the burden of taxation to an estimated 50 percent of household income. As shown, the principal mode of taxation was on the nationalized manufacturing and mining sectors, plus heavy exactions in kind from the collective and state farms. The Finance Ministry also conducted compulsory bond sales, but these were phased out during the 1950s.

In more recent Soviet times the regime imposed a mild income tax on employees, with a top rate of 13 percent above a certain exempt amount. But authors, physicians in private practice, tutors, landlords, craftsmen and like independents would pay at treble these rates or up to a marginal rate of 81 percent. Bachelors (and small families until 1958) paid a 6 percent surtax, but military personnel, students, and dwarfs were exempt. There was also a fairly stiff tax (from 12 to 48% by 1951) on money and imputed incomes from private plots in addition to a small tax on *kolkhoz* net income. This was in addition to forced deliveries at lower than market prices.

Soviet authorities strongly preferred indirect taxes over those imposed directly on persons. Apparently they believed workers would be more sensitive to their wages and wage differentials than to the prices they paid—money illusion. However, after 1947 they also endeavored to reduce official prices on goods of mass consumption.

While the turnover tax remained the single largest source of revenue until the 1960s, the type



A female entrepreneur watches as a Moscow tax-police inspector confiscates goods from her unlicensed shop. PHOTOGRAPH BY ALEXANDER SALYUKOV/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

of tax which increased the most during later Soviet times was that on profits. In 1950 the turnover tax accounted for 56 percent of the total, while deductions from profits provided only about 10 percent. By 1970, however, turnover tax declined to 32 percent, while deductions from profits rose to 35 percent of the consolidated USSR budget. However, the distinction between these two taxes is not sharp: both are enterprise taxes unrelated to the ability of citizens to pay.

To these taxes on profits, which after all belong to the state as owner, might be added retained profits devoted to state-mandated investments. After 1965 the regime added a small charge on net capital and broader rental payments in addition to remittances of the free remainder of profits. The miscellaneous category included large and rising profits from foreign trade—for example, on imported grain or exported oil—a stamp duty on legal documents, an inheritance tax, a local property tax, and a tax on automobiles, boats, and horses. All this added up to a considerable burden of tax-

ation—approximately 45 percent of Soviet national income in the postwar period, about half again as much as in the United States and among the top tax-collection rates on the European continent. Nevertheless, except in oil boom years, the budget usually concealed a 2 to 8 percent deficit, financed by monetary emissions and resulting in inflation during the 1980s especially.

Some of the revenues mentioned above are retained by local or republican governments for their own expenditures. This was particularly high in the less developed regions of Central Asia, as part of the regional subsidy characteristic of Soviet welfare colonialism, as it has been called.

See also: ALCOHOL MONOPOLY; BEARD TAX; TAX, TURNOVER

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

TAX, TURNOVER

Turnover tax (*nalog s oborota*) was a tax on enterprise gross output, the main source of government revenue during the first several decades of Soviet planned economy, officially considered part of the surplus product in Marxist terms. It was introduced in 1930 for the purpose of unifying previously diverse taxes.

The difference between the final retail price for consumer goods (and most fuels) and the industry's wholesale price, as set by the Soviet pricing authorities, less any handling charges, is the turnover tax. (Before 1949 this tax was also applied to producer goods for reasons of fiscal control.) Sometimes this levy was imposed as a unit tax, as a percentage of the sale price, or in other ways. Regardless of the method of collection, the turnover tax rate is thus the difference divided by the wholesale (or retail) selling price. These rates differed widely. In the case of agricultural products, the turnover tax comes from the difference between the procurement price and that at which the produce is resold by state organs. On salt and vodka, the turnover tax resembled an excise tax. In 1975 about one-third of the entire revenue from turnover taxes came from wines and spirits, hence any effort to reduce drinking, to the extent they were successful, posed a fiscal dilemma, as the Mikhail Gorbachev campaign discovered.

The turnover tax was administratively simple. Collecting the tax was easier from the relatively small number of industrial enterprises and wholesale organizations, most of which had decent accounts. Income taxes would have had to be collected from millions of citizens, many of whom were still illiterate or at least innumerate. The variable markup allowed retail prices to be changed when inventories warranted, without altering the industry wholesale price on which planning indices depended. For example, turnover taxes on food were lowered several times during the 1950s to allow the state to pay higher procurement prices without affecting politically sensitive retail prices. A

similar situation applied to fuels for household consumption. From 1954 until the late 1960s, official retail prices were held approximately constant, quite probably to save administrative effort. It also permitted certain prices to be disproportionately low, such as those on children's clothing and approved reading material.

As compared to other sources of revenue, the turnover tax was quite large in the 1930s, but fell in relation to taxes on profits and incomes during the 1950s.

See also: TAXES

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MARTIN C. SPECHLER

TBILISI *See* TIFLIS.

TCHAIKOVSKY, PETER ILYICH

(1840–1893), Russian composer.

Arguably the most famous Russian composer, Tchaikovsky was the first to achieve renown beyond Russia's borders and establish a place for Russian music in the repertoires of Western concert halls and musical theaters. The first professional Russian composer to receive a thorough musical education, the import of Tchaikovsky's achievement owes much to his mastery of the dominant nineteenth-century musical genre: the symphony. Yet Tchaikovsky's enormous range, versatility, and output—he composed in all the major genres, including symphonies, operas, ballets, chamber works, songs, as well as compositions for solo instruments—assure the composer's place among the most popular and prolific European composers of his day.

Tchaikovsky's virtual dominance of the Russian musical scene by the end of his life aroused

the envy of the nationalist composers known as the Mighty Handful, yet Tchaikovsky's ability to adapt native folk material to established Western compositional structures proved more successful than their more earnest attempts to craft from those materials a unique native musical language. Four Tchaikovsky masterworks, representing three genres in which Tchaikovsky particularly excelled, were the fruits of an unprecedented final creative flourish: the opera *Queen of Spades* (1891), the ballets *Sleeping Beauty* (1889), *The Nutcracker* (1892), and the *Sixth Symphony* (1893).

Although Tchaikovsky's music was deemed bourgeois in the relatively radical period following the 1917 Revolution, these criticisms faded in the Josef Stalin era, when the monumental art of the previous century once again found favor, and Tchaikovsky was hailed as a symphonist par excellence—the composer's homosexuality, the perceived melancholy of his music, and his conservative politics notwithstanding. Tchaikovsky died of cholera in St. Petersburg in 1893, though a very active party of mostly Russian researchers allege the composer's death was the result of a suicide brought about by a crisis over his homosexuality.

See also: MUSIC

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TIM SCHOLL

TECHPROMFINPLAN

In the final stage of the annual central planning process, Soviet enterprises received each year a com-

prehensive document, the techpromfinplan (technical-industrial-financial plan), which they were required by law to fulfill. Divided into quarterly and monthly subplans, the techpromfinplan governed the operation of the firm by specifying output targets and input allocations, as well as a large number of financial characteristics, delivery schedules, capacity utilization norms, labor staffing instructions, planned increases in labor productivity, and other targets. In total, as many as one hundred targets were specified in the techpromfinplan, the most important of which involved output targets. Fulfilling output targets, measured either in quantity or value, formed the basis for calculating bonus payments for managers and workers.

In a very broad sense, the techpromfinplan was the means by which Soviet planners' preferences were implemented. Social and economic goals set at the highest level of the political bureaucracy and conveyed to Gosplan, the State Planning Committee, were disaggregated by sector, region, and industry, and sent to individual firms. More narrowly, the techpromfinplan specified the scope of the firm's operations for the year.

The production component of the annual enterprise plan identified the quantity, ruble value (*valovaia produktsia*), and commodity assortment of output to be produced. Input allocations, supply schedules, capacity and resource utilization norms, as well as other technical indicators, were devised to support the firm's ability to fulfill the production targets. Current production targets were typically based on a percentage increase in the firm's past performance, adjusted for quality-improvement targets. The process of planning from the achieved level meant that Soviet enterprises were subject to a "ratchet effect" in terms of quantity targets.

The financial component of the enterprise plan consisted of profitability norms, planned cost reductions, credit plans for purchasing inputs, a wage bill, and other financial indicators. The comprehensive nature of the financial plan paralleled the production plan, allowing planners to monitor the firm's monthly and quarterly output performance. Moreover, through the financial plan, ministerial officials exercised ruble control (*kontrol' rublem*) over the enterprise by restricting access to financial resources, as well as by redistributing profits. Unlike managers of firms in market economies, however, whose performance is measured in terms of financial indicators, Soviet man-

agers placed highest priority on fulfilling the production plan targets.

In addition to production, financial, and distribution components, the techpromfinplan also specified a variety of labor staffing targets, including the distribution of labor force by wage classifications, the total amount of wages that the firm could pay, average wages by occupational category, and planned increases in labor productivity, but left the manager with some discretion over staffing issues within these constraints.

Legally obligated to fulfill the techpromfinplan and motivated by large monetary bonuses paid for fulfilling output targets, Soviet enterprise managers nonetheless exhibited a significant degree of flexibility in both the production and distribution activities of the firm.

See also: CENTRAL PLANNING; PLANNERS PREFERENCES

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SUSAN J. LINZ

of relief for the Red Army was a major victory. Considerable discussion of the question of Poland's postwar boundaries produced no definitive solution, though there was a consensus that Poland's eastern boundary would be the Curzon line and that Poland would be compensated in the West with territories to be taken from Germany. Stalin successfully pressed for confirmation of Soviet gains as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939. In turn Stalin agreed to engage Japanese forces in the Pacific theater after the defeat of Germany. There was also agreement to cooperate in a postwar United Nations organization to maintain peace. In a separate protocol the Big Three agreed to maintain the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran.

See also: NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; POTSDAM CONFERENCE; WORLD WAR II; YALTA CONFERENCE

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JOSEPH L. NOGEE

TEHERAN CONFERENCE

The Teheran Conference was the first summit meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. It met from November 28 through December 1, 1943, in Teheran, Iran. The general purpose of the conference was to strengthen the cooperation between the Big Three allies in the conduct of the Second World War and to determine the outlines of a postwar global order. Though the Western allies—particularly Roosevelt—sought to conciliate the Soviet dictator, the conference was marked by underlying tension over differences among the allied leaders. The major agreement reached was the decision to launch the long-awaited invasion of Europe (Operation Overlord) as a cross-channel invasion of France in May 1944 (later changed to June). For Stalin, this promise

TELEOLOGICAL PLANNING

The concept of teleological planning refers to national economic planning that is *directive* in character (planners determine plan directives), as opposed to genetical planning, *indicative* in character, in which plan targets are influenced by market (demand) forces.

The discussion of alternative approaches to national economic planning was an important component of the early development of planning in the Soviet Union. The teleological school was represented by major economists such as S. Strumilin, G. L. Pytatakov, V. V. Kuibyshev, and P. A. Fel'dman, while the geneticists were represented by N. D. Kondratiev, V. A. Bazarov, and V. G. Groman, all well-known economists. The debate ended with Stalin's adoption of the teleological approach.

The distinction between the two different approaches remains important. The teleological concept

implies that planners' preferences prevail; that is, planners determine the objective function of the economy (e.g., the mix of output by sector or product) with consumer preferences being passive. The genetical approach, on the other hand, has important implications for planning in a pluralistic political setting, in that consumer preferences can prevail and serve as the basis for plan directives. The geneticist view is effectively the foundation for the contemporary development of indicative planning.

See also: CENTRAL PLANNING; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET

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ROBERT C. STUART

TELEVISION AND RADIO

Present-day Russian television and radio have come a long way. Today's domestic news and entertainment broadcasts can hardly be told from their Western counterparts. The successors of Soviet television and radio are characterized by a state-of-the-art style of presentation, modern advertising, and professional journalism. The Russian mass media have undergone a series of profound transformations, notably since the end of the Soviet era, but they continue to be under the influence of powerful interest groups.

Journalism, especially news coverage, is subject to various restrictions. There is a wide gap between the official policy, its provision for the freedom of the media, and the actual situation. The regulation of television and radio in the Russian Federation has shown indications reminiscent of the centralized media control during the Soviet regime. But economic influences and the opinion-leading value of television both create a competitive environment considered irrevocable and therefore immune to attempts to reinstate a Soviet-like authoritarian rule

over the media, mainly due to Russia's matter-of-fact accession to international politics, and liberal values.

In 2002 the Ministry of Press, Broadcasting, and Mass Communications (MPTR) registered 3,267 television channels and 2,378 radio stations, more than half wholly or partly state owned. Almost every Russian household owns at least one television set, whereas a radio can be found in four out of five households. Many listeners still rely on the old wire radio through which state-run Radio Mayak and Radio Rossiya have been broadcasting their programs. The fact that no fees need to be paid for broadcast reception contributes to a high penetration of the population and dominance over the print sector. Less than a quarter of Russians read newspapers on a daily basis, and almost half of those age thirty and younger do not read newsprint at all. State-owned national TV Channel One (ORT) and Television Rossiya (RTR) reach practically all viewers, and together with private channel NTV achieve 60 percent viewer ratings. The radio audience ratings are dominated by Radio Mayak, Radio Rossiya, and private Radio Europe Plus, Russkoye Radio, and Echo Moskv.

SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF MEDIA POTENTIALS

The media's assignment life was plotted by mass communication experts from the Politburo and pursued with measures like enforced subscriptions to print media and various obstructions to diversity of broadcast programs. From the 1920s on, wire radio receivers were installed in almost every household, whereas small and remote villages received collective loudspeakers. Because they could not be switched off, only muted, these primitive mass information instruments already bore the sign of inescapability, which transcended into the 1980s. Soviet wireless radio started its career with its first transmission in 1924 and quickly developed into a public voice of the party. In the early Soviet days, broadcasting owned its significance to widespread illiteracy. Not only could radio and later television reach large masses of people without them being able to read, broadcasting influenced how information was perceived and accepted by the audience. Television's potential, though being experimentally tested since the 1930s, was not acknowledged until decades later.

In 1960 the Central Committee commanded broadcasting to actively support the propagation



TV6 anchors Andrei Norkin (right) and Vladimir Kara-Murza (left) speak to the media on January 11, 2002, after judges ordered the closure of the last independent channel on Russian national television. PHOTOGRAPH BY IVAN SEKRETKAREV/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY

PERMISSION.

of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and the mobilization of the working class. Major investments in technical infrastructure followed and by the end of the decade Moscow neighborhood Ostankino became home to the national broadcasting organization. It provided the Soviet population with two television and four radio programs. Later accessibility was enhanced, and further television programs were added. Until the late 1980s the Soviet Union boasted a uniform information sphere designed to reach most of its 285 million inhabitants. Television was broadcast in forty-five union languages, and radio in seventy-one. The programs were centrally produced in Moscow and transmitted to the far reaches of the Soviet world. They incessantly stressed the political meaning of each news item. As there was no other medium of information, and no access to foreign news sources, the audience was inescapably exposed to propaganda through mass media.

BROADCAST PROGRAMMING AND AUTONOMY

In Soviet times the majority of television and radio programming was dedicated to broadcasts of party sessions and statements by government officials. Next in importance was news from the economic sector. Educational and cultural programs followed. The only television news show, *Vremya*, contained coverage of international events. All programming was subject to austere censorship and depended on one sole information source, the government. The fact that people's values and their image of the world were given a one-sided direction through mass indoctrination enhanced the impact of the new freedom the media experienced when Soviet society started to unravel.

From 1986 to 1993 the media won a hitherto unknown autonomy owing to their role in the per-

estroika reforms, and the dissolution of political structures that rigidly controlled mass communication. While Mikhail Gorbachev encouraged the investigation and discussion of state problems, new leaders fought against old bureaucrats and economic obstructions; first the press, then television and radio, gained momentum. The Russian society broke into a fragmented mass of people hungry for Western achievements and individual liberties, and the media made use of the vacuum created by the loss of a uniform ideology and morals. Most did not aim to serve democratic ideals but looked for financial profits. Not many of the exceptions to this rule have survived the struggles. Independent broadcasters, NTV Television, and TV6, formerly controlled by oligarchs, were recently restrained by court orders referring to their financial situation. Radio Echo Moskv, founded in August 1991, has retained its independence, although still harrassed by occasional interferences by the authorities.

PROBLEMS OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

Privatizations of media outlets during the first years of the newly founded Russian Federation created opportunities not only for the staffs of media organizations. State-controlled plants and the new business elite soon profited from the hardships imposed on the media by repeated financial crises. Even in the early twenty-first century, most television and radio stations were dependent either on state subventions or on financing by oligarchs. Their influence relates to formalities such as licensing and provision of technical equipment, as well as to media content. Reporting often reflects only two positions, that of the government and the ruling businessmen. The media may convey oppositional messages, but not on behalf of society. This is even more pronounced in the vast regions of the Russian Federation, where local governors and plant owners exercise arbitrary power over the struggling local media industry.

This competition has led to media wars between businessmen like Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Vladimir Potanin, who during President Boris Yeltsin's quest for voting consensus acquired liberties through behind-the-scenes arrangements. In Yeltsin's 1996 campaign, television was recognized as effective to influence voters. Other major players who contributed to the broadcasting media being used as instruments of power were at times Prime Minister Viktor

Chernomyrdin, Deputy Prime Ministers Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, and Moscow's mayor Yuri Luzhkov. After President Vladimir Putin's concerted actions to reinstate central power over opinion-leading mass media, private competitors retreated to the print sector and own minor stakes in broadcasting. Nevertheless, the ownership structures in the media industry have been characteristically intransparent. It remains difficult to discern the origin of financial and ruling power over a great number of media outlets.

In Soviet times the usurpation of the right to intervene in daily media business was based on the well-oiled censorship apparatus. Journalists had to be party members and follow guiding principles that adhered to government interests. Russian journalism bears some of these traits into the twenty-first century. On the one hand, many of the Soviet journalists have remained in their profession. On the other hand, many journalists are young, have put the historical past behind them, and aspire to meet modern professional standards. They, too, have to make amends to the kind of censorship imposed on them by the special interests of the owners of the media organization. The positive coverage of state or oligarch activities, or the rumor-based reporting on competitors' faults, are also often ordered and paid for, not selected by journalistic processes.

MODERN MEDIA POLICIES

Until 1990 there were no specific laws concerning the mass media. More than thirty laws and dozens of decrees have been passed since then. Under the Soviet regime, two constitutions (1936 and 1977) alluded to the freedom of expression, which had to be in accordance with interests to develop the socialist system. Such ideological baggage was discarded by the constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993, and the Supreme Soviet had in 1990 already passed a law to lift censorship from the media.

In 1991 the Russian Federation adopted the Law on Media of Mass Information, which allowed for fundamental freedoms of the media. It was revised in 1995 and significantly limited the media's choice of diversity for the portrayal of political parties. Such undemocratic hindrances, along with the lack of a law conceding to the specific needs of broadcasting media, continue to the present day. Other laws are On Procedure of Media Coverage of State

Authorities by State Media (1994); On the Defense of Morality in Television and Radio Broadcasting (1999); On Licensing of Certain Activities (2001); and the Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation (2000), which links media autonomy with national security.

See also: PERESTROIKA

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LUCIE HRIBAL

TEMPORARY REGULATIONS

In response to the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, Tsar Alexander III enacted a statute enabling the government to crack down on the political opposition by imposing emergency regulations more extensive than any that had previously been enforced. Although the statute was initially enacted as a temporary measure, it remained on the books until 1917 and has been regarded by historians as the real constitution of the country. Its implementation demonstrated, perhaps more than anything else, that Russia was not a state based on law.

The statute provided for two kinds of special measures, Reinforced Security (*Usilennaya okhrana*) and Extraordinary Security (*Chrezvychaynaya okhrana*). The first could be imposed by the Minister of Internal Affairs or a governor-general acting with the minister's approval. The second could be imposed only with the approval of the tsar. Vague concerning what conditions could justify placing a region in a state of emergency, the statute gave the authorities in St. Petersburg and the provinces considerable leeway in applying it.

The arbitrary powers invested in local officials (governors-general, governors, and city governors) under the exceptional measures of 1881 were enormous. Under Reinforced Security, officials could keep citizens in prison for up to three months, impose fines, prohibit public gatherings, exile alleged offenders, transfer blocks of judicial cases from criminal to military courts, and dismiss zemstvo (regional assembly) employees. Under Extraordinary Security, a region was placed under the authority of a commander in chief, who could dismiss elected zemstvo deputies, suspend periodicals, and close universities and other centers of advanced study for up to one month. Implementation of the exceptional measures depended largely on the inclinations of local officials: in some provinces they acted with restraint, whereas in others they used their powers to the utmost. At times up to 69 percent of the provinces and regions of the Russian Empire were either completely or partially subjected to one of the various emergency codes.

See also: ALEXANDER III; AUTOCRACY; CENSORSHIP; NICHOLAS II; ZEMSTVO

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ABRAHAM ASCHER

TEREM

The separate living quarters of women in Muscovite Russia; also, the upper story of a palace, often with a pitched roof, as in the Terem Palace in the Moscow Kremlin.

Historians have generally used the word *terem* to denote the room or rooms to which Muscovite royal and boyar women were confined to separate them from men, both to underpin the custom of arranging marriages without the couple meeting in advance and to preserve women's chastity before and after marriage. The Mongols are said to have introduced the *terem* between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, but this theory is questionable: The practice of female seclusion reached its height in the seventeenth century, long after the Mongol occupation of Russia ended. Recent reassessments also argue that the *terem* in the sense of apartments where women were imprisoned like slaves is partly a construct of foreign travelers, who were unlikely ever to have seen or entered one. It matched foreign expectations concerning Muscovite orientalism and servitude. Revisionist historians perceive the royal *terem* not as a sign of women's helplessness and marginalization, but rather as the physical representation of a separate sphere of influence or power base, with its own extensive staff, finances and administrative structure. From within it, royal women dispensed charity, did business, dealt with petitions, and arranged marriages. These arrangements were replicated on a smaller scale in boyar households.

This does not mean that Muscovite elite women were not subjected to restrictions when compared with their Western counterparts. With the exception of weddings and funerals, they took no part in major court ceremonies and receptions, which were all-male affairs. Balls, masques, and other

mixed-sex entertainments were out of the question, and the Muscovite court knew no official cult of beauty. Women used curtained recesses in church, traveled in carriages shielded by curtains, and wore concealing clothing. Married women always covered their hair. Girls were not to be seen by their fiancés until their wedding. The taboos extended to portraits from life. Portraits of Muscovite men are rare, but those of women almost nonexistent. In the Kremlin the sense of exclusiveness and mystery cultivated by the tsar naturally extended to the women, whose quarters were out of bounds to all except designated noblewomen, priests, and family members. Attached to the *terem*, the Golden Hall of the Tsaritsy, decorated with frescoes featuring women rulers from Biblical and Byzantine history, provided a space for female receptions. Outside the Kremlin, in the few surviving boyars' mansions, it is difficult to identify rooms specifically designated as a *terem*, but noblewomen were expected to behave modestly. Lower down the social scale segregation was impractical, but at all levels marriages were arranged by parents.

Peter I (r. 1682–1725) is credited with abolishing the *terem*, to the extent that he forced women to socialize and dance with men, take part in public ceremonies, and adopt Western fashions. Even so, as elsewhere in Europe, Russian royal palaces preserved the equivalents of the king's and queen's apartments, while in the provinces older traditions of female modesty survived.

See also: MUSCOVY; PETER I, WESTERNIZERS

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LINDSEY HUGHES

TER-PETROSSIAN, LEVON

(b. 1945), Armenian philologist and statesman.

The first president of the second independent republic of Armenia (1991–1998), Levon Ter-

Petrosian was born in Aleppo, Syria, and migrated to Soviet Armenia with his family in 1946. Ter-Petrosian graduated from Yerevan State University and received his doctorate in philology from Leningrad University. Until 1988 he was an academic researcher in Yerevan.

In 1988 he joined and became a leader of the Karabakh Committee that led the movement in support of the rights of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh—the Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan—and eventually in support of Armenia's independence. In 1989, having spent six months in prison in Moscow, he was elected member, and in 1990 president, of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR. Having successfully managed the peaceful transition of power from the Communists, in 1991 he was elected president of Armenia and reelected in 1996. He resigned in February 1998 and currently lives as a private citizen in Yerevan.

Ter-Petrosian has received honorary doctorates from a number of academic institutions, including the universities of Sorbonne and Strasbourg, in recognition of his scholarly research in ancient and medieval philology and history, as well as his contribution to modern Armenian statehood.

The dominant figure in Armenia's history from 1988 to 1998, Ter-Petrosian initiated fundamental institutional, political, and economic reforms, including a radical land privatization program. He guided the drafting and adoption of a constitution in 1995 that has proven effective in resolving major political crises.

In foreign policy Ter-Petrosian advocated the speedy integration of Armenia in international institutions and processes, and the normalization of relations with all neighbors—including Turkey—as the best guarantee for Armenia's long-term security and prosperity. In the process, Ter-Petrosian's pursuit of a special relationship with Russia led to the 1997 comprehensive Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship, which, among other provisions, formalized and regulated the presence of the Russian military base in Armenia.

Ter-Petrosian led the Nagorno-Karabakh war to a successful conclusion with a cease-fire agreement in 1994. He also considered peace with Azerbaijan a necessary precondition for the economic and social development of Armenia. The absence of a final solution to the status problem, which he pursued aggressively, stymied political and economic transformation; it also prevented the

normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Ter-Petrosian's pragmatic policies invited the opposition of extremist forces. After 1995, criticisms of his administration, including charges of corruption, abuse of power by some ministries, and tampering with elections, increased. His acceptance in 1997 of a compromise solution to the Karabakh problem, opposed by some of his closest associates in the executive branch, led to his resignation.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; NAGORNO-KARABAKH; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN

TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was established on December 30, 1922, on the basis of a union treaty that was subsequently incorporated into the USSR constitution of January 31, 1924. The new federal state consisted of a complicated hierarchy of territorial-administrative units. This hierarchy was subsequently modified by amendment, by the adoption of new constitutions in 1936 and 1977, and by federal law. By the time Mikhail S. Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985, the hierarchy consisted of 15 Soviet socialist republics (SSRs, or union republics), 20 autonomous Soviet socialist republics (ASSRs), 8 autonomous oblasts (AOs), and 10 autonomous districts (*okruga*), for a total of 53 ethnically defined administrative units. There were in addition 120 nonethnically defined administrative units—the oblasts and 7 *kraya*. In addition, Moscow and Leningrad (St. Petersburg) were designated federal cities with an administrative status equal to that of the oblasts and *kraya*. With the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the fifteen union republics became independent states.

The Soviet successor state with by far the greatest number of territorial-administrative units within it was Russia (known in the Soviet period as the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, or RSFSR, and renamed the Russian Federation in late 1991). Russia, which was also the only Soviet successor state that was formally designated a federation, included 31 ethnically defined administrative units—16 autonomous republics, 5 autonomous oblasts, and 10 autonomous okruga—which together covered approximately one-half of the territory of the RSFSR. In addition, the Russian Federation was made up of 49 oblasts, 6 kraya, and the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Transforming Russia into a genuine federation with a well-designed and constitutionally protected division of powers between the federal government and the subjects of the federation has significantly complicated Russia's transition from Soviet socialism. In 1991, the 16 autonomous republics and 4 of the 5 autonomous oblasts were given the status of republics. The remaining subjects of the federation—the 49 oblasts, 7 kraya, the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Jewish autonomous oblast, and the 10 autonomous okruga—were in effect equalized under law and became known as Russia's regions. In April 1992, the Russian legislature recognized the division of Checheno-Ingushetia into separate Chechen and Ingush republics, which brought the total number of republics under Russian law to twenty-one. However, the refusal of Chechnya to accept its status as a constituent unit of the federation, and Chechnya's insistence on recognition as an independent state, helped precipitate a war between Chechen independence supporters and the federal government in 1994 and again in 1999.

See also: CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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EDWARD W. WALKER

TERRORISM

A half-century of Russian history was bloodstained by revolutionary terrorism. Its first outburst was the abortive April 1866 assassination attempt against Tsar Alexander II by Dmitry Karakozov. From then on, extremists of different ideological persuasions, with varying degrees of success, resorted to acts of terror as part of their struggle against the contemporary sociopolitical order.

Terrorist activity had a particularly strong impact on the country's life during two distinct periods. The first was the so-called heroic period, between 1878 and 1881, when the Party of the People's Will (*Narodnaya Volya*)—the first modern terrorist organization in the world—dominated the radical camp. Its campaign against the autocracy culminated in the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881. Alexander III's government succeeded in disintegrating the People's Will; yet, after a twenty-year period of relative and deceptive calm, a new wave of terrorism erupted during the reign of Russia's last tsar, Nicholas II (1894–1917). Its perpetrators were members of various newly formed left-wing organizations, who implicated themselves in terrorist acts even when their parties in theory rejected terrorism as a suitable tactic. As radical activity reached its peak during the 1905–1907 crisis, terrorism became an all-pervasive phenomenon, affecting not only the elite civil and military circles but every layer of society. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the terrorists were responsible for approximately 17,000 casualties throughout the empire. Their attacks were indiscriminate, directed at a broad category of alleged "watchdogs of the old regime" and "oppressors of the poor."

Although terrorism subsided by late 1907, largely as a result of severe repressive measures employed by Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, until the collapse of the imperial order in 1917 it remained

a threatening weapon in the hands of extremists seeking the demise of the tsarist regime.

See also: NICHOLAS II; PEOPLE'S WILL THE; RED TERROR; ZHELYABOV, ANDREI IVANOVICH

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ANNA GEIFMAN

THAW, THE

The Thaw describes the loosening of restrictions over the arts when Nikita Khrushchev served as general secretary of the Communist Party, after the death of Josef Stalin in 1953 until the mid-1960s. Although associated with the Secret Speech at the Twentieth Congress in 1956 when Khrushchev denounced some of Stalin's dictatorial activities, the name derives from Ilya Ehrenburg's 1954 book *The Thaw*. The novel hinted that Stalin's death signaled an end to the long winter of sacrifice and persecution, and that a new era for socialism was emerging in which individuals' private lives were valued as much as industrial productivity. Censorship eased, but its intensity varied as party leaders struggled to redefine the priorities of Soviet society.

During the Thaw, all artistic media offered new themes and stylistic innovation that had been banned under Stalin. Literary magazines, called "thick" journals, published a wide array of new works. Most notably, in 1961 *Novy mir*, edited by Alexander, published Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, a portrayal of a labor camp inmate's efforts to survive and maintain his dignity over the course of one day. Theater also flourished, especially with the 1956 creation of the *Sovremennik*, a troupe of recent graduates of the School of the Moscow Art Theater led by Oleg Efremov. The company championed the work of Viktor Rozov and young dramatists. Yuri Lyubimov directed Shchukin Theater School students in a watershed production of Bertolt Brecht's *The Good Person of Sechuan* and in 1964 assumed the leadership of the Taganka Theater, which subsequently premiered several controversial plays.

Theaters were increasingly able to stage synthetic theater, a movement that uses lights, sets, and music to evoke meaning rather than the rigid naturalist approach of accurate historical detail. Amateur student troupes, both traditional dramatic and sketch comedy, thrived. A new generation of poets emerged, including those whose works were later staged as poetic theater by Lyubimov. One of those poets, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, penned "Babi Yar" (1961), which commemorated the Nazi slaughter of Jews and alluded to ongoing Soviet anti-Semitism. The poem became the basis of Dmitri Shostakovich's *Thirteenth Symphony*, which premiered in late 1962 and was sharply criticized in the press. A new musical genre, with performers known as bards, performed private concerts of their guitar poetry. Films also appeared that focused on the difficulties of private lives, often with respect to the enormous losses of World War II: Mikhail Kalatozov's *Cranes are Flying* (1957), Georgi Chukhrai's *Ballad of a Soldier* (1958), and Andrei Tarkovsky's *Ivan's Childhood* (1961).

There were definite limits to the party's toleration of this expression. Boris Pasternak's novel *Dr. Zhivago* was published in Italy in 1957 after it was banned at home. Awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1958, Pasternak declined the award after he was attacked in the press and expelled from the Writers' Union. In 1964 poet Joseph Brodsky was charged with parasitism, spent over two years in an Arctic labor camp, and later emigrated. When young painters and sculptors, including Ernst Neizvestny, showed their abstract works at the Manezh exhibition hall in late 1962, Khrushchev and other leaders expressed their acute dislike. On various occasions, Pasternak, Shostakovich, Neizvestny, Yevtushenko, and others apologized for works that were deemed unacceptable.

In spite of the expanded opportunities, the absence of freedom of expression and other civil liberties led some intellectuals, labeled "dissidents" by the Party, to more direct opposition to the status quo. Beginning in this era, they circulated essays, memoirs of labor camps, and literature in manuscript form, known as *samizdat*, rather than submit their work to censors. They smuggled other works, referred to as *tamizdat*, abroad for publication. Although this group of intellectuals was small in number, it included scientist Andrei Sakharov, who called for an end to nuclear testing in the late 1950s and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1968. When it became clear that the Thaw had been temporary, these individuals grew increasingly active

and were persecuted and sometimes imprisoned by the KGB.

Scholars disagree on the end date of the Thaw. Some argue that it was 1964, when Khrushchev was ousted. Others maintain that the 1966 trial of dissidents Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel marks its end. A third interpretation suggests 1968, when Soviet-led troops invaded Czechoslovakia, where the Thaw threatened the hegemony of its Communist Party.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; EHRENBERG, ILYA GRIGOROVICH; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; TAGANKA; THEATER

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SUSAN COSTANZO

THEATER

Although modern theater in Russia was imported from Europe in the seventeenth century, earlier traditions demonstrate the importance of spectacle in Russian lives. Russians participated in numerous rituals associated with life transitions, such as marriages, births, and deaths, as well as seasonal agricultural rites. These rituals had both pre-Christian and Christian origins. From the eleventh until the mid-eighteenth century, both elite and peasant Russians were most often entertained by *skoromokhi*, musicians whose singing, dancing, pup-

petry, acrobatics, and animal acts included bawdy material that was reviled by the Russian Orthodox Church. Western-style theater arrived in Russia in the mid-seventeenth century when Tsar Alexei and his court enjoyed numerous foreign performers in various genres, and the first court theater operated from 1672 to 1676.

Theater expanded as westernization accelerated in the eighteenth century. In addition to court theater, public theaters flourished in many cities in the first half of the century. The Kunst-Fuerst theater, considered the first public theater, staged translations using German actors from 1702 to 1706. Educational institutions established school theaters, the most influential of which operated in the Land Forces Cadet School. Its productions in the early 1750s included the works of Alexander Sumarokov (1718–1777), who also translated and directed plays in the style of classicism, the dominant trend in Europe at that time. Fyodor Volkov (1729–1763) organized a theater in Yaroslavl and moved his troupe to St. Petersburg in 1752. In 1756 Tsarina Elizabeth incorporated Volkov's troupe into the Russian State Theater (the future Alexandrinsky Theater). Sumarokov directed this first state-subsidized theater, and Volkov played the leads. Dramatic works of the era included comedies, chivalry tales, biblical adaptations, and plays that glorified the monarchy and Russian Empire. Monarchs typically believed that theater should serve a didactic function, an assumption that continued well into the twentieth century.

These trends continued during the reign of Catherine II in the second half of the eighteenth century. She built the Hermitage Theater in the Winter Palace. After the creation of the Imperial Theatrical School in 1779, Russian-born professional actors increasingly appeared on stage. Beginning in 1783 the Administration of Theaters oversaw and censored public theatrical activity. In addition to court theaters, St. Petersburg (and Moscow early in the next century) boasted heavily subsidized imperial theaters. Many provincial cities also maintained popular public (*narodnye*) theaters that reached a broad audience with a diverse repertoire. Count Peter Sheremetev and other wealthy nobles also operated private serfs' theaters, which did not come under state supervision. Playwright Denis Ivanovich Fonvizin (1745–1792) is credited as the founder of authentically Russian drama, best exemplified by his comedy *The Minor* (1781). Classicism eventually gave way to sentimentalism, a style that emphasized emotion over reason.

Under Nicholas I, who reigned from 1825 to 1855, the Imperial Theater Administration developed an extensive series of rules and regulations for all aspects of theatrical activity. In spite of severe censorship, several outstanding dramas were written in an increasingly realist style. Alexander Griboedov (1794–1829) completed *Woe from Wit* (1824), an examination of the alienation of young disillusioned army officers who were scorned by a corrupt and superficial Russian elite after the Napoleonic wars. Other major Russian writers of this era wrote plays along with other genres. Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837) penned dramatic scenes, most notably his tragedy *Boris Godunov* (1825), in verse form. Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852) wrote *The Government Inspector* (1836), his most acclaimed work that satirizes corrupt officials and the supercilious elite of a Russian provincial town who mistake a stranger for a government inspector. Ivan Turgenev (1818–1883), also a well-respected novelist, wrote several plays, including *A Month in the Country* (1849–1850), that depict the everyday life of the elite.

As plays achieved greater realism, the role of actors in the theatrical process changed. They too attempted to portray characters with greater naturalism, and as a result relied more on the author's original intention and less on their own embellishment of roles. This evolution occurred in influential theater schools affiliated with the Alexandrinsky Theater in St. Petersburg and the Maly Theater in Moscow. The latter trained Mikhail Shchepkin (1788–1863), who is considered one of the greatest Russian actors. In the later part of the nineteenth century, new stars further developed the naturalist approach. The ranks increasingly included actresses, such as Maria Yermolova (1853–1928), Glikeria Fedotova (1846–1925), and Maria Savina (1854–1915). Their popularity was enhanced by the repertory system, whereby a theater with a permanent company alternated many productions, rather than the single, long-running play with contractual performers.

Alexander Ostrovsky (1823–1886) dominated playwriting in the 1860s and 1870s. His innovative depiction of all levels of society in his dramas was called "national realism" and often contrasted cruel, self-serving individuals with their simple, decent victims. He wrote almost fifty plays, including his most acclaimed, *The Forest* (1870). Another prominent playwright, Alexander Sukhovo-Kobylin (1813–1906), followed the tradition of Gogol's satirical commentaries in *Krechinsky's Wed-*

ding (1854), *The Case* (1861), and *The Death of Tarelkin* (1869). Later in the century, Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), better known for his novels, wrote plays and adapted many of his didactic short stories for theater.

Popular and provincial theaters complemented developments in the nineteenth century. Circuses, *Petrushka* puppet shows, and fairground theaters (*balagany*) amused spectators. Provincial theaters offered a wide variety of genres in an effort to appeal to a wide audience. In the latter part of the century after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and their increasing migration to urban areas, the people's theater movement emphasized theatrical performance as a means to enlighten the masses. Beginning in 1882, private commercial theaters, such as the *Korsh*, were allowed in the capital cities and elsewhere, but censorship continued to hinder problematic plays. Amateur troupes provided added opportunities for performances.

The undisputed turning point in Russian theater occurred when Konstantin Stanislavsky (1863–1938), an amateur actor and director, and Vladimir Nemirovich Danchenko (1858–1943), a playwright who also taught at the Philharmonic Drama School, joined forces and created the Moscow (Popular) Art Theater in 1898. In productions that reflected trends in Europe at the time, an overall conception of the director united all parts of a production: script, actors, movement, costumes, sets, and lights. They also tried to create the impression that audiences were observing real people with psychological depth in realistic circumstances by incorporating historically accurate costumes, sets, and props. These hallmarks of naturalism were most successful in productions of Anton Chekhov's (1860–1904) plays, but the theater also staged works by Maxim Gorky (1868–1936), Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906), Gerhart Hauptmann (1862–1946), and many others in its long history. The theater fostered many outstanding performers, including Ivan Moskvitin (1874–1956), Olga Knipper (1868–1959), and Mikhail Chekhov (1891–1955). In a series of studios, Stanislavsky experimented with actors' training and developed his "system," also known as the Method, which has had a profound impact on theater and film in the West.

The era of 1898 to 1929 was the richest period for Russian theater. Stanislavsky's pupil, Vsevolod Meyerhold (1874–1940), rejected naturalism and strove to maximize the theatrical elements of performances, an approach that did not always enamor him to the public or to performers

such as Vera Kommissarzhevskaya (1864–1910), a great actress of the day. Evgeny Vakhtangov's (1883–1922) brief career culminated in his *Princess Turandot* (1922), an example of his style of fantastic realism, which bridged Vsevolod Meyerhold's abstractions and Stanislavsky's naturalism. At the Kamerny Theater, Alexander Tairov (1885–1950) created an atmosphere for the expression of the deepest emotions of performers through movement rather than naturalistic acting. While writing plays and theatrical theory, Nikolai Evreinov (1879–1953) directed at Kommissarzhevskaya's theater and his own *Crooked Mirror*, an example of popular small theaters at that time. Symbolism, a neoromantic movement that arose in reaction to realism and emphasized aesthetics and the spiritual, influenced some of the era's important playwrights, including Leonid Andreyev (1871–1919), Fyodor Sologub (1863–1927), and Alexander Blok (1880–1921).

Following the Russian Revolution in October 1917, theater experienced an outpouring of innovation. Theaters were divided into two groups: former important theaters became academic theaters with substantial subsidies and considerable freedom, while smaller theaters received less support with greater controls. In 1923 the government established Glavrepertkom, the organization responsible for censorship over theaters. Meyerhold developed his theory of movement known as biomechanics. Increasingly influenced by cubism and constructivism, he and other directors of the day often turned to abstract artists, such as Lyubov Popova (1889–1924) for set designs. The Jewish Habima Theater and the Moscow State Yiddish Theater also flourished. Important playwrights including Vladimir Mayakovsky (1893–1930), Mikhail Bulgakov (1891–1940), Nikolai Erdman (1901–1970), and Sergei Tretyakov (1892–1939) offered critiques of the young Soviet society.

Popular participation in theater exploded at this time. Proletkult, an organization that called for a new culture by and for workers, supported such activities as TRAM (Theaters for Working Youth), whose actors worked in chosen professions by day and rehearsed and performed during their free time. Other amateur troupes formed in army units, factories, and local clubs. Their performances sometimes involved courtroom scenarios, known as agit-trials, with audiences as juries to debate current issues. Traveling companies of "living newspapers" and "blue blouses" performed a series of short skits of news and other issues to illiterate au-

diences. Amateurs and professionals worked together to realize "mass spectacles" that recreated major historical events, such as *The Storming of the Winter Palace* (1920), which involved five hundred musicians, eight thousand performers, and over one hundred thousand spectators.

As Communist Party controls tightened in the 1930s, theater and all arts were expected to follow the guidelines of socialist realism, which called for upholding Communist Party policies in an easily understandable realist style. This highly didactic formula presented "positive heroes" for the public to emulate, and plays always pointed toward an optimistic socialist future. Experimentation in text and technique ended. In this environment playwrights such as Nikolai Pogodin (1900–1962), Alexander Afinogenov (1904–1941), Vsevolod Vishnevsky (1900–1951), and Alexei Arbusov (1908–1986) managed to create meaningful dramas in spite of the limitations. A new generation of directors also attempted to offer interesting but safe productions: Nikolai Okhlopkov (1900–1967), Yuri Zavadsky (1894–1977), and Nikolai Akimov (1901–1968). Others suffered. Accused of "formalism," a euphemism for nonconformity, Meyerhold was executed in 1940. Playwrights Tretyakov and Vladimir Kirshon (1902–1938) met a similar fate. Tairov struggled to stage permissible plays. TRAM theaters came under state control as professional Komsomol theaters.

Although many professional troupes performed for frontline troops and new plays supported the war effort during World War II from 1941 to 1945, strict controls were reestablished after the war until Josef Stalin's death in 1953. Tairov was removed as director of his Kamerny Theater in 1949. As part of the rootless cosmopolitan campaign predominantly against Jews, Solomon Mikhoels (1890–1948), a famous actor and head of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, was killed. Dramatists were expected to adopt the no-conflict theory that corresponded to the supposedly new level of socialist achievement in the Soviet Union: no longer was society divided into bad opponents of the system and good supporters. Now socialism and drama reflected struggles between the good and the better. Without meaningful conflict, the quality of drama declined. Theater attendance fell, and the party renounced the theory in 1952.

The period following Stalin's death is considered the Thaw in Soviet society and culture. In the theatrical realm Glavrepertkom was abolished, and

the Ministry of Culture assumed responsibility for censorship. Although socialist realism continued, theaters increasingly staged productions with non-realist sets and pessimistic or ambiguous endings. Productions also began to breach the “fourth wall” by incorporating the audience in the action. Two important theaters emerged: the newly created *Sovremennik* under the leadership of Oleg Efremov (1927–2000) and the Taganka led by Yuri Lyubimov (b. 1917), whose group of recent theater school graduates performed Bertolt Brecht’s *Good Person of Sechuan* and revived the moribund troupe. Its later productions included adaptations of Yuri Trifonov’s (1925–1981) prose works and recent poetry by Andrey Voznesensky (b. 1933) and Yevgeny Yevtushenko (b. 1933). The *Sovremennik* emphasized new playwrights such as Viktor Rozov (b. 1913) and Vasily Aksenov (b. 1932). At the same time, talented directors Anatoly Efros (1925–1987) and Georgy Tovstonogov (1915–1989) took the helm at reputable theaters. Arbuzov and young dramatists, such as Alexander Vampilov (1937–1972), Alexander Volodin (b. 1919), and Eduard Radzinsky (b. 1936), explored the dilemmas of everyday life. Many recent foreign dramatists were published in translation. Student theaters thrived.

After Nikita Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964, a more conservative approach to the arts ensued, but innovation continued. Although important directors continued to work, Efros and Lyubimov repeatedly had their productions banned or censured by the press. While socialist realism represented official policy, synthetic theater, which emphasized the use of music and lighting to augment the emotions and messages of a production, allowed greater flexibility in staging. By the early 1980s most professional theaters in Leningrad and Moscow created “second stages” that allowed for further experimentation. In this venue promising directors, such as Lev Dodin (b. 1944), Kama Ginkas (b. 1941), and Peter Fomenko (b. 1932), could stage new works, and young actors gained valuable experience because important roles on the main stage were reserved for senior performers. On the Taganka’s small stage, Anatoly Vasilev (b. 1942) staged Viktor Slavkin’s *Cerceau*, considered one of the most innovative productions of the 1980s. Ludmilla Petrushevskaya’s (b. 1938) plays, whose language has been described as “tape recorder” for its ability to copy natural speech, were first performed by amateurs. Both playwrights addressed the elusive nature of a meaningful life in modern Soviet society. Amateur stages provided rich alternatives for both pro-

fessional and amateur directors as well as spectators who were seeking new approaches to theater.

The final decade of the Soviet era began with severe censorship, but the twentieth century ended with almost complete freedom. In 1982 Yuri Andropov became General Secretary of the party, and initiated a strict anti-Western policy that adversely affected theatrical repertoires. Under his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, Yuri Lyubimov was forced into exile in 1984. Mikhail Gorbachev’s *glasnost* policy reversed this trend, and by 1989 theaters operated without political censorship. Theaters attempted to operate under self-financing, which removed governmental subsidies. Lenin Komsomol Theater director Mark Zakharov (b. 1933) led the effort to establish independence for troupes. The number of theaters mushroomed when the government allowed the formation of theaters without official supervision. However, the success of some troupes depended on those earlier conflicts with the state, and Lyubimov’s return to the Taganka in 1989 could not revive its former glory. The Moscow Art Theater split into two companies: Chekhov MAT, led by Oleg Efremov, who had led the combined troupe since 1970; and Gorky MAT, led by Tatyana Doronina (b. 1933). In the 1990s Vasilev and Fomenko formed their own troupes to accommodate their unorthodox approaches to rehearsals and performances. Like many troupes desperate for funds, Dodin’s theater toured abroad extensively and was awarded the Europe Theater prize in 2000. However, most troupes, including former amateur companies, discovered the near impossibility of surviving without some government subsidy and sought to receive some support while retaining repertory freedom. Since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian theater has operated under an economic censor, as in the West.

See also: ANDREYEV, LEONID NIKOLAYEVICH; BOLSHOI THEATER; CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILYEVICH; GORKY, MAXIM; GRIBOEDOV, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; MEYERKHOLD, VSEVOLOD YEMILIEVICH; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; SHCHEPKIN, MIKHAIL SEMEONOVICH; SUMAROKOV, ALEXANDER PETROVICH; TAGANKA; THAW, THE; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH; TURGENEV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH

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SUSAN COSTANZO

THEOPHANES THE GREEK

(c. 1340–1410), renowned artist and philosopher.

Theophanes the Greek began his career as an artist in the Byzantine capital, Constantinople. He worked in the media of fresco, egg tempera for panel painting (icons), and tempera for book illustration. In the 1380s he immigrated to Russia, first of all to Novgorod. An important source for his life is a letter written by Hieromonk Ehiphaniu to Cyril around 1415. He states that Theophanes was an artist, a sage, and a philosopher. The stone churches he decorated with frescoes include several in Constantinople, Chalcedon, Galata, and Caffa. Altogether, he painted frescoes in over forty churches. In Russia his most important surviving frescoes are to be found in the Church of the Savior of the Transfiguration, Novgorod (1378). He worked swiftly without the use of pattern books. Nor did he mind spectators. As his fame spread, he was invited to Moscow in the 1390s. Among other projects in the 1390s, he painted a panorama fresco of Moscow (nonextant) in the stone palace of Prince

Vladimir Andreevich. The most important surviving projects in Moscow are the main icons (1405) for the iconostasis of the Annunciation Cathedral, Cathedral Square, and the Moscow Kremlin. Here he was assisted by the Elder Prokhor of Gorodets and Andrei Rublev, according to the Troica Chronicle. Another separate icon attributed to him is the Bogomater Donskaya (Virgin of the Don) and on the back, the Dormition of the Virgin, 1380s (Tretyakov Gallery). A very expressive early fifteenth-century Transfiguration of Christ icon (Tretyakov Gallery) has been attributed to Theophanes as well. His figures tended to be very tall and severe, with dark faces and long, thin arms. Mystical elements in his paintings are believed to reflect the influence of Hesychasm. Theophanes was truly one of the greatest of the early Russian icon painters.

See also: DIONISY; ICONS; RUBLEV, ANDREI

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A. DEAN MCKENZIE

THICK JOURNALS

For more than two hundred years, Russian and Soviet "thick" journals (*tolstye zhurnaly*)—a term alluding to their usually 200-plus pages per issue—played the role of social and cultural trendsetters. Traditionally, prose works and poetry were first published in such journals and only later as books. Published among the literary works were nonfiction articles and essays on a large variety of topics. Literary reputations were fostered mainly through thick journals. Some, such as the twentieth century's *Novyi mir*, were considered more prestigious than others.

Edited by Gerhard Friedrich Mueller of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, the first independent Russian journal was *Ezhemesiachnye sochineniya, k pol'ze i uveseleniyu sluzhashchie* (Monthly Writings Serving Purpose and Enjoyment; 1755–1797). Inspired by the principles of the European Enlightenment, it was followed by an ever-increasing number of similar undertakings on different subjects, includ-

ing literature. Nikolai Karamzin's *Moskovskii Zhurnal* (Moscow Journal; 1791–1792) already could count Russia's leading authors among its contributors.

The early nineteenth century saw another increase in the number of thick journals, most of which were short-lived. However, some boasted sizable circulations; the prestigious *Vestnik Evropy* (*Messenger of Europe*) had about 1,200 subscribers; *Biblioteka dlia chteniya* (Library for Reading) had 4,000; and *Otechestvennye zapiski* (*Notes of the Fatherland*) had close to 4,000. Despite strictly enforced censorship, the leading thick journals managed to develop a recognizable aesthetic and ideological profile. For example, *Sovremennik* (*The Contemporary*; 1836–1866), founded by Alexander Pushkin, catered to the liberal public, whereas *Russkaia beseda* (*Russian Conversation*; 1856–1860) targeted Slavophile readers.

In the aftermath of the 1861 Reforms that included some censorship relief, hundreds of new thick journals emerged, providing a multifaceted forum for Russian public discourse. Most influential were *Russkii vestnik* (*Russian Messenger*), in which Ivan Turgenev, Leo Tolstoy, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky published major works, and *Russkaia mysl'* (*Russian Thought*; 1880–1900), to which Vladimir Korolenko, Dimitri Mamin-Sibiriak, Nikolai Leskov, and Anton Chekhov contributed.

By the end of the nineteenth century, illustrated weekly journals outnumbered the thick monthlies. Then the 1917 Bolshevik coup destroyed this pluralistic journalistic scene in less than a year. The New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s reconstituted some variety, but all within a framework of loyalty to the Soviet regime. Thus *Krasnaya nov'* (*Red New Soil*; 1921–1942) in the 1920s was the forum of the less politicized *poputchiki* (*fellow-travelers*), whereas *Kuznitsa* (*The Smithy*; 1920–1922) belonged to militant proletarian writers.

No other period of Russian history increased—or inflated—the importance of thick journals more than Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, which caused a veritable explosion in circulation, with several journals printing more than a million copies each month. Glasnost transformed decades-old, dogmatic publications into thought-provoking, open intellectual forums. In hindsight, the formation and formulation of diverse viewpoints would have been impossible without journals such as *Novy mir* (*New World*; 1925–), *Druzhba narodov* (*People's Friendship*; 1939–), and *Znamia* (*Banner*; 1931) on the liberal side, and *Nash sovremennik* (*Our Contemporary*;

1964–) and *Molodaia gvardiia* (*Young Guard*; 1922–) on the conservative.

However, with the meltdown of the Soviet system, thick journals rapidly lost their significance. Despite the press law of August 1, 1990, which formally abolished censorship and gave these journals economic and legal independence, few of them survived commercial pressure, competition against electronic media, and overall cultural disintegration.

See also: GLASNOST; INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PERESTROIKA; THIN JOURNALS

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PETER ROLLBERG

THIN JOURNALS

Whereas “thick” journals circulated among the intelligentsia and established a critical forum for political discussion among Russia's elites, “thin” journals were marketed toward those developing a civic consciousness and awareness of the outside world in post–Great Reform society. Combining the journalistic tradition of specialized, entertaining journals such as the humorous *Oskolki* (*Splinters*) or *Teatr i zhizn'* (*The Theater and Life*) for theatergoers with informative and educational features, thin journals helped to give the reading public a broad worldview.

The most successful of these journals was A. F. Marx's *Niva* (*The Cornfield*), founded in 1870. Though Marx was aiming for a family audience, he quickly tapped into the expanding provincial audience, especially schoolteachers and those whom they educated, Russia's burgeoning middle classes. Offering Russia's literary classics as supplements, *Niva* enjoyed a circulation of 200,000 by the turn of the twentieth century. Readers who could not afford even its modest price could still find this and other thin journals in their village libraries.

Eventually, *Niva* faced competition from other journals that adapted its formula of combining di-

dactic and entertaining features. A. A. Kaspari's *Rodina (The Motherland)*, for example, founded in 1879, appealed specifically to members of the lower classes who desired self-improvement. Two preeminent newspaper publishers also entered the thin journal market, S. M. Propper and I. D. Sytin, both of whom lowered prices and increased the news component. Propper's *Ogonek (The Flame)*, founded in 1908, ultimately became the most widely circulated of these journals, reaching 700,000 subscribers by 1914. Sytin purchased *Vokrug sveta (Around the World)* in 1891, and though circulation never topped 50,000, the journal offered a vision of life beyond Russia's borders. Both of these journals continued publication into the Soviet era, with modified editorial content.

Thin journals stimulated the voracious Russian reading appetite, which the subsequent Soviet government fed with its own variety of thin journals, from the satirical *Krokodil (The Crocodile)* to the informational *Za Rubezhem (Abroad)*. Despite censorship, the tradition of thin journals helped many Russians develop interest and glean information about the world.

See also: GLASNOST; INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PERESTROIKA; THICK JOURNALS

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LOUISE McREYNOLDS

THIRD PARTY PROGRAM *See* KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH.

THIRD ROME

Third Rome refers to the doctrine that Russia or, specifically, Moscow succeeded Rome and Byzantium as the ultimate center of true Christianity and of the Roman Empire. This is the most generally misunderstood and abused of the several expressions of Russia's new place in the world re-

sulting from domestic and international events of the 1430s and 1520s. The monk Filofei of the Pskov-Eliazarov monastery formulated it in one or two epistles, written between 1523 and 1526, which were then reworked during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Neither epistle survives in its original form or a manuscript assuredly from Filofei's time. The first, probably written in 1523 to 1524 to the state-secretary administrator of Pskov, Mikhail Misiur-Munekhin, attacks astrology, the Roman Catholic Church, and the claims of the Holy Roman Empire, and in this connection asserts that Russia, with Moscow's Dormition Cathedral at its center, is the third and final Roman Empire according to the prophetic books. Filofei's unnamed opponent was Basil III's German physician Nicholas Bülew, who promoted astrology and Church union with Rome. The second epistle, addressed to an unnamed tsar—perhaps Basil III (1524–1526) or possibly Ivan IV (1533–1584)—and conceivably not by Filofei at all, calls upon the addressee to enforce the proper application of the sign of the cross by his subjects; protect church wealth; suppress homosexuality; be an ethical, just, and pious ruler; and, in oblique form, fill hierarchical vacancies.

Third Rome thinking served to elevate Russia's conception of its place within the Orthodox Christian world and the requirement to preserve the faith and its rituals in unadulterated form. If this potentially messianic doctrine played a role in the establishment of the Russian patriarchate in 1589, and may have helped Russians acquire a sense of responsibility toward the Orthodox and later Uniate subjects of Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire, at no time did it figure in aggressive policies toward non-Orthodox or non-Uniate peoples. Modern attempts to enshrine it as an essential element of Russian consciousness since the early 1500s have no basis.

The Christian notion of migrating sacrosanct goes back to the foundation of Constantinople as New Rome (still in the official title of the patriarch of Constantinople) and its subsequent claims to be a New Jerusalem, the center of a messianic kingdom. In the course of competing with Byzantium, even before the Eastern and Western Churches separated (over the course of the 860s to 1054), the German (Holy Roman) emperors also claimed to represent the true Rome. Similarly, while the Byzantine Empire still existed, among the Orthodox Slavs, Bulgarians claimed that their capital, in

this case, Trnovo, was the New Imperial City (Constantinople) in the 1300s.

Russians did not seriously dispute Byzantium's pretenses until after the Council of Ferrera-Florence, from 1438 to 1439, when factions of the Greek and Russian Orthodox church accepted union with Rome. By defending Orthodoxy against Roman Catholicism, the Moscow metropolitans treated first Basil II and then Ivan III as new Constantine. With the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, Muscovy/Russia became the Orthodox monarchy. As Ivan III discarded the legal and ceremonial remnants of subordination to the Qipchak (Golden Horde) khans during the period of 1476 to 1480, Archbishop Vassian Rylo of Rostov argued the absurdity of an inviolable oath from a genuine tsar to a false one of brigand descent. In presenting new Eastern tables for the years following the year 1492 C.E., which Orthodox calendars considered to be the millennial year 7000 since Creation, Metropolitan Zosima declared Moscow to be the new Constantinople, which itself was the New Rome in one early copy and New Jerusalem in several others. Ivan's diplomacy vis-à-vis Imperial German pretenses on the 1480s to 1490s and the coronation ceremony of his grandson Dmitry in 1498 emphasized the historic equality of Russia and Byzantium's rulers. In the 1510s Joseph of Volok, while claiming that the Orthodox Tsar is in power like unto God, asserted that any wavering from Orthodoxy would lead to the fall of Russia, as other Orthodox kingdoms had ended due to apostasy. Historical works produced in the 1520s by this school of thought (*Russian Chronograph*, *Nikon Chronicle*) underscored the preeminence of Russia among Orthodox realms, while genealogical inventions used for state diplomacy asserted Roman dynastic origins of Russia's ruling house.

Filofei was not the only Russian churchman of his time to oppose Bülew's ideas; so did Metropolitan Daniel and Maksim Grek. Others also asserted a new world-historic claim for Russia.

See also: BASIL II; BASIL III; CATHEDRAL OF THE DORMITION; IVAN III; IVAN IV; PATRIARCHATE; POSSESSORS AND NON-POSSESSORS

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DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

THIRTEEN YEARS' WAR

The Thirteen Years' War (1654–1667) consisted of three phases of conflict between Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, and Sweden. Its roots can be found in Bogdan Khmelnytsky's Cossack revolt against Poland-Lithuania, which began in 1648. The Russians supported the Cossacks initially with favorable trade contacts and military supplies, and then eventually, following the 1653 Polish invasion of Ukraine, the Russians allied themselves formally with the Cossacks and entered the war in 1654.

Muscovy's Tsar Alexei led around 100,000 men, including his Zaporozhian Cossack allies, into Polish-Lithuanian territory and thus began the first phase of the war. The Russians enjoyed initial success, overwhelming the Polish forces and taking several important towns, such as Smolensk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk. Russian and Cossack forces regained much of the Ukrainian territories and even invaded Poland as far as the town of Brest. The Polish-Lithuanians counterattacked but could not dislodge the Russians. Poland's King John II Casimir, who had fled the country, managed to negotiate a truce with the Russians, and hostilities temporarily ended between the two nations with a three-year truce (1656).

At this point, while Sweden was involved in the First Northern War (1655–1660) against Poland and Denmark, Muscovy sought to regain territory it had formerly lost to the Swedes and moved to capture several towns, including Dinaburg, Dorpat, and Keksholm. The Russians failed, however, to take Riga, which they besieged during the summer of 1656, because they had no naval force and could not cut Riga off from its lines of supply. The Swedes launched a powerful counterattack, scattering the Russian army and forcing the tsar to flee for his life. When the war with Denmark took a turn for the worse in 1657, the Swedes sought peace with Muscovy (Truce of Valiesari, 1658).

The third and final phase of the war began when the truce between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania ended in 1658. The Russians fought a se-

ries of fierce battles with the Poles in Lithuania and Belarus, defeating them at Vilnius, Kaunas, and Grodno, but losing twice at Mogilev (1661, 1666), and Vitebsk (1664). In the Ukrainian lands, the Russians suffered significant defeats at Konotop (1659), Lubar (1660), and Kushliki (1661). Complicating factors in the south included the defection of the Russians' Cossack allies under Vyhovsky, which isolated the Russians against the Poles, and Lubomirsky's Rebellion, which weakened the government of King John II Casimir at a critical moment and forced the Poles to accept peace with Muscovy. Early in 1664, the tsar approached the Poles to begin negotiations, but it was not until 1667 that a provisional peace agreement was signed at Andrusovo. Despite its losses, Muscovy came out of the war with sizeable gains in territory, not least of which included the key cities of Smolensk and Kiev.

See also: NEW-FORMATION REGIMENTS; SMOLENSK WAR

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W. M. REGER IV

THREE EMPERORS' LEAGUE

The Three Emperors' League, or *Dreikaiserbund*, was part of the diplomatic web created by Otto Bismarck (1815–1898) to keep France isolated. An initial agreement between Alexander II of Russia, William I of Prussia, and Francis-Joseph of Austria-Hungary was reached in September 1873. This phase of the Three Emperors' League is sometimes referred to as the Three Emperors' Treaty. The agreement was renewed in June 1881, with the same signatories for Prussia and Austria-Hungary, but with the new tsar, Alexander III, representing Russia.

The dual goals of the league were to prevent intervention by Austria-Hungary or Russia in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between France

and Germany and to prevent friction between Austria-Hungary and Russia over territorial claims in the Balkans. Both of these goals are apparent in the terms of the agreement. Article 1 addresses the potential of a Franco-German conflict by stating, "In case one of the High Contracting Parties should find itself at war with a fourth Great Power, the two others shall maintain towards it a benevolent neutrality and shall devote their efforts to the localization of the conflict." The issue of potential conflict over the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire is dealt with in Article 2. It states, "The three Courts, desirous of avoiding all discord between them, engage to take account of their respective interests in the Balkan Peninsula. They further promise one another that any new modifications in the territorial status quo of Turkey in Europe can be accomplished only in virtue of a common agreement between them."

Ultimately, this alliance foundered over the issue of Balkan territorial claims. The Austro-Hungarian Empire contained a sizeable number of Slavs who were sympathetic to the plight and aspirations of their Balkan brothers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Simultaneously, the Russian tsar was under pressure from the Pan-Slavs to intervene in the Balkans because the Pan-Slavic movement regarded Russia as the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire.

A series of uprisings against the Ottoman Empire and reprisals by the Turkish forces occurred in the Balkans in the mid-1870s. These events led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. Although the Russians decisively defeated the Turkish forces, opposition from Austria-Hungary and Great Britain led to the final settlement being decided at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Under the auspices of the honest broker Bismarck, much of the fruit of the Russian military victory was plucked from their hands. The Russians felt that they had won the war but lost the diplomatic negotiations. Both the Balkan nationalists and the Russian Pan-Slavists felt a lingering resentment toward Austria-Hungary and Germany for depriving them of the fruits of the Russian military victory.

The Three Emperors' League was not renewed when it expired in 1884. Instead, Russia moved closer diplomatically to France. This shift culminated in the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. The dissolution of the Three Emperors' League took Europe a step closer to the outbreak of World War I.

See also: AUSTRIA, RELATIONS WITH; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; PANSLAVISM; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; WORLD WAR I

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THREE-FIELD SYSTEM

The three-field system predominated in Russian peasant agriculture until the Stalin era. Plowland was divided into three sections: each year one section was sown in the winter, a second was sown to another grain in the spring, and a third was left fallow to restore its fertility. The following year the section that had been sown in the winter was sown in the spring, the section sown in the spring was left fallow, and the previous year's fallow was sown in the winter. Land not sown to grain was kept outside the three-field system.

Similar forms of rotation prevailed across Europe well into the eighteenth century. These forms were displaced by systems that promised higher productivity and money profits. In Russia, however, the Agricultural Revolution did not make significant inroads on the three-field system, though it prompted learned landowners to reproach peasants for superstitiously clinging to an outmoded system.

In fact, the three-field system remained an appropriate adaptation to Russian conditions for a long time. It assumed a relative abundance of land and took into account the harshness of the climate and (often) the poor fertility of the soil. In contrast to profit-seeking farmers, Russian peasants sought, above all, to avert the threat of starvation. The forms of rotation practiced in the West entailed the intensive application of fertilizers, in the form of manure and of crops such as clover. The animals that provided the manure and ate the clover produced dairy and meat products for the market. Rus-

sia's vast spaces and poor system of transportation meant that most peasants did not have the access to markets required for relatively perishable products (as opposed to grain, which peasants did market). As railroads improved access to markets, many peasants did adapt. As late as 1920, however, for most peasants, abandoning the three-field system meant pursuing illusory gains and running unacceptable risks. It was not yearning for profits but the pressure of population on land that brought the three-field system into crisis. What peasants perceived as a problem of land shortage fueled the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

See also: AGRICULTURE; PEASANT ECONOMY

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DANIEL FIELD

TIFLIS

Tiflis (Tbilisi in Georgian) is the capital of the Republic of Georgia. Its legendary origins begin with the early medieval king of eastern Georgia (Kartli), Vakhtang Gorgasali (c. 447–522), who is said to have shot a deer that fell into a pool of hot spring water on the spot where he then decreed his capital to be built. The city's name derives from the Georgian word for "warm" (*tbili*). From its origins, Tiflis was in the Iranian sphere of cultural influence, as was much of eastern Georgia, and even today the oldest parts of the city, around Maidan (square) and stretching up the Holy Mountain (Mtatsminda) have a Middle Eastern appearance with their narrow winding streets and elaborately carved balconies. From the arrival of the Arab conquerors in the seventh century, the city was often in the hands of Muslim rulers. Indeed, in 853 the caliph of Baghdad sent an army to put down the rebellious Muslim emir of Tiflis and had the city burned to the ground, thus ending any pretension of the town becoming the center of a rival Islamic state.

After nearly four hundred years in Muslim hands, Tiflis was taken by the Georgian king David



The ancient buildings of Tiflis (Tbilisi) are shown in this lithograph from 1849. © HISTORICAL PICTURE ARCHIVE/CORBIS

the Builder (1089–1125) and reached its medieval zenith in the reigns of Queen Tamar (1184–1212) and her son Giorgi the Resplendent. In the centuries that followed the Mongol invasions (thirteenth–fourteenth centuries), Georgia suffered a long, slow decline, and Tiflis and eastern Georgia came under the hegemony of Iran. In the mid-eighteenth century the last great king of eastern Georgia, Erekle II (1744–1798), recaptured the city, which became the center of a multinational empire that reached north to the Great Caucasus and south into Armenia.

After a devastating invasion by the Persians that destroyed large parts of the city, the Russians marched into Tiflis (1800), which soon became their principal administrative center in Caucasia. The city was then largely Armenian in population, but through the century the percentage of Georgians increased steadily until they became a majority in Soviet times. In the twentieth century

Tiflis (Tbilisi) was successively the capital of the Transcaucasian Federation (1918), the first independent Georgian Republic (1918–1921), the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia (1921–1991), and the second independent Republic of Georgia (since 1991). Today it is a city of more than one million people, but since the end of the Soviet Union Tiflis has lost much of its cosmopolitan flavor as Armenians, Russians, and Jews have steadily migrated elsewhere. The post-Soviet disintegration of Georgia and the collapse of its economy have taken a toll on the town, but the beauty of its buildings and natural setting remains intact.

See also: CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; ISLAM; TRANSCAUCASIAN FEDERATIONS

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EDWARD E. ROSLOF

TIKHON, PATRIARCH

(1865–1925), eleventh patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, 1917–1925.

The son of a provincial priest, Vasily Ivanovich Bellavin attended the Pskov seminary and the theological academy in St. Petersburg. He took monastic vows in 1891, adopting the name “Tikhon,” and was elevated to the episcopacy in 1897. Over the next twenty years, he served dioceses in Russia and North America. He became the first popularly elected Metropolitan of Moscow in July 1917 and president of the national church council that convened in August. After the October Revolution, the council chose Tikhon as the first Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia since 1701. Patriarch Tikhon anathematized the Bolsheviks and their supporters in January 1918, but then backed away from direct confrontation in the face of government reprisals, adopting a strictly neutral political stance during the civil war. Nonetheless, the Bolsheviks saw Tikhon as a counterrevolutionary. They split the church in 1922 by supporting the Living Church Movement. Tikhon spent a year under arrest and interrogation. He was released in mid-1923 after signing a statement repenting his political crimes and condemning foreign church leaders. Tikhon’s last years were spent under constant threat of arrest as he worked to reunite the Church. His death in April 1925 led to new schisms when the government prevented election of a new patriarch and promoted rivalries among Orthodox bishops. Despite official Soviet depictions of Tikhon as an arch-reactionary, Orthodox believers revered him due to his suffering at the hands of the Communists in defense of the faith. The Russian Orthodox Church canonized Patriarch Tikhon in 1989.

See also: LIVING CHURCH MOVEMENT

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TILSIT, TREATY OF

The Treaty of Tilsit is the name of the document signed by Emperor Napoleon I of France and Tsar Alexander I of Russia on July 7, 1807, following a famous meeting between the two on a raft in the Niemen River. The treaty focused on three questions: (1) the peace terms between Russia and France; (2) how to handle a war that had erupted between Russia and Turkey; (3) the status of the defeated kingdom of Prussia, which had risen up against Napoleon only the year before. For Alexander, negotiating on behalf of the Prussian king, Frederick William III, Tilsit was a decisive moment. Not only had he experienced murderous military reversals at Danzig and Friedland in June, he was now confronted by the prospect of intrigue and disorder at home, and in this his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, figured conspicuously and ominously. Most of all, Alexander desired in the most intimate way to bring peace to Europe, and he came to realize that this could only be done if Britain, alone now against Bonaparte, was brought to heel. The treaty was an extremely onerous instrument—a prize example, in fact, of the ruthless brutality of Napoleonic power. The treaty left Russia untouched, but it reduced Prussia to a makeshift territory east of the River Elbe, occupied by Napoleon’s troops, and ringed by his puppet states old and new. It tore away one-third of Prussia’s territory and placed it under the control of the king of Saxony in a new Napoleonic satellite called the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It pledged Russia would go to war with Britain if the latter did not accept Napoleon’s peace terms; it pledged Napoleon would do the same with respect to Turkey. It was at Tilsit that the whole of Napoleon’s unconscionable ambition found its fullest and most virulent expression.

See also: ALEXANDER I; NAPOLEON I



Illustration of Napoleon I of France, Frederick William III of Prussia, and Alexander I at Tilsit, July 7, 1807.

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DAVID WETZEL

TIME OF TROUBLES

In the decade and a half before the founding of the Romanov dynasty in 1613, Russia endured what has been known ever since as the Time of Troubles, a period of severe crisis that nearly destroyed the country. It followed the death of Tsar Fyodor I in 1598 and ended with the election of Tsar Mikhail Romanov in 1613. The Time of Troubles has long fascinated and puzzled the Russian people and has inspired scholars, poets, and even musicians. To

many Russians who lived through the Troubles, it was nothing more or less than God's punishment of their country for the sins of its rulers or its people. Others since then have sought more secular explanations, noting that at the center of the Troubles was the most powerful uprising in Russian history prior to the twentieth century, the so-called Bolotnikov rebellion (named after the rebel commander, Ivan Bolotnikov). Focusing on that event, historians erroneously concluded long ago that at the heart of the Troubles was Russia's first social revolution of the oppressed masses against serfdom. Recently, that interpretation has been decisively overthrown; instead of a social revolution, the Time of Troubles produced Russia's first civil war, a conflict that split Russian society vertically instead of horizontally. The long and bloody civil war occurred in two distinct phases: 1604–1605 and 1606–1612.

The Time of Troubles began with the extinction of Moscow's ancient ruling dynasty. After

Tsar Fyodor I's death in 1598, Boris Godunov (regent for mentally retarded Fyodor) easily defeated his rivals to become tsar. Nevertheless, many people questioned the legitimacy of the new ruler, whose sins supposedly included having Tsar Ivan IV's youngest son, Dmitry of Uglich, killed in 1591 in order to clear a path to the throne for himself. During Tsar Boris's reign Russia suffered a horrible famine that wiped out up to one-third of the population. The effects of the famine, coupled with serious long-term economic, social, demographic, fiscal, and political problems, contributed to the decline in legitimacy of the new ruler in the eyes of many Russians. Then in 1604 the country was invaded by a small army headed by a man claiming to be Dmitry of Uglich, miraculously saved from Godunov's assassins. Many towns, fortresses, soldiers, and cossacks of the southern frontier quickly joined Dmitry's forces in the first popular uprising against a tsar. When Tsar Boris died in April 1605, resistance to the Pretender Dmitry (also known as "False Dmitry") broke down, and he became tsar—the only tsar ever raised to the throne by means of a military campaign and popular uprisings.

Tsar Dmitry reigned for about a year before he was murdered by a small group of aristocrats. His assassination triggered a powerful civil war, essentially a duplicate of the civil war that had brought Dmitry to power. The usurper Vasily Shuisky denounced the dead tsar as an impostor, but Dmitry's supporters successfully put forward the story that he had once again miraculously escaped death and would soon return to punish the traitors. So energetic was the response to the call to arms against Shuisky that civil war raged for many years and produced about a dozen more pretenders claiming to be Tsar Dmitry or other members of the old ruling dynasty. Starting in 1609, Russia's internal disorder prompted Polish and Swedish military intervention, resulting in even greater misery and chaos. Eventually, an uneasy alliance was formed among Russian factions, and the Time of Troubles ended with the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613.

ORIGINS OF THE TROUBLES

The origins of the Time of Troubles were very complex. In the age of the gunpowder revolution, the princes of Moscow unified Russia, quickly transformed their country into a highly effective state geared to war, and expanded their realm with dizzying speed. In the process of building the largest

country in Europe, however, they created a coercive central state bureaucracy that subjugated virtually all elements of Russian society and grossly overburdened the bulk of the population. Russian autocracy and imperialism contributed significantly to the development of a serious state crisis by the beginning of the seventeenth century. Tsar Ivan IV ("the Terrible") personally deserves some of the blame for the Time of Troubles. His unsuccessful Livonian War (1558–1583) and his dreaded *Oprichnina* contributed to Russia's serious problems, as did his imposition of high taxes and his decision to allow the lords to collect taxes directly from their peasants. Ivan's policies and actions retarded Russian economic activity and resulted in the massive flight of peasants and townspeople to untaxed lands or to the southern frontier. That in turn contributed to declining state revenue and to the weakening of the tsar's gentry militia, which was heavily dependent on peasant labor.

In spite of clear signs of economic and social distress, Tsar Ivan's successors continued Russia's imperial drive to the south. Acting as Fyodor I's regent, Boris Godunov took drastic steps to shore up state finances and the gentry cavalrymen in order to continue Russia's rapid expansion to the south and east. In the 1590s, Godunov enforced the Russian peasants, bound urban taxpayers to their tax-paying districts, and converted short-term contract slavery into real slavery. Those harsh measures did not solve Russia's fiscal problems and actually made things much worse. Many towns became ghost towns, and Russia's already staggering economy continued to decline. Godunov's harsh policies of exploiting the population of the southern frontier and harnessing the cossacks to state service also contributed to the country's problems. By the time Tsar Fyodor I died, Russia was suffering from a severe economic and social crisis, and many blamed Boris Godunov for their misery.

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE TROUBLES

The Time of Troubles began with the political struggle following the extinction of the old ruling dynasty in 1598. Godunov easily defeated his rivals, including Fyodor Romanov (the future Patriarch Filaret, father of Mikhail Romanov), and quickly became tsar; but his reputation suffered badly in the process. Boris was accused by his rivals of having arranged the murder of Dmitry of Uglich in 1591 in order to clear a path to the throne for himself. He also suffered from a commonly held view that boyars were supposed to advise tsars,

not become tsars. During the reign of Tsar Boris (1598–1605), Russia's severe state crisis continued to deepen. In addition, Boris's harassment of certain aristocratic families caused some of them to enter into secret conspiracies against him. It was the great famine of 1601–1603, however, that ruined Tsar Boris's reputation and convinced many of his subjects that God was punishing Russia for the sins of its ruler. Successive crop failures resulted in the worst famine in Russian history, which wiped out up to a third of Russia's population. When a man claiming to be Dmitry of Uglich appeared in Poland-Lithuania in 1603 seeking support to overthrow the usurper Godunov, many of Tsar Boris's subjects were inclined to believe that this man really was Dmitry, somehow miraculously rescued from Godunov's assassins and now returning to Russia to restore the old ruling dynasty—and God's grace. Tsar Boris and Patriarch Job denounced the Pretender Dmitry as an impostor named Grigory Otrepev, but that did not stop enthusiasm for the true tsar from growing, especially on the southern frontier and among the cossacks.

Russia's first civil war started with the invasion of the country by the Pretender Dmitry in October 1604. Helped by self-serving Polish lords such as Jerzy Mniszech (father of Marina Mniszech), Dmitry managed to field a small army for his campaign for the Russian throne. As soon as he crossed the border into southwestern Russia, Dmitry was greeted with enthusiasm by much of the frontier population. Several towns voluntarily surrendered to him, and many Russian soldiers (and their commanders) quickly joined Dmitry's army. Large numbers of cossacks also swelled the Pretender's forces as he advanced. In December 1604, Dmitry's army defeated Tsar Boris's much larger army near Novgorod-Seversky, but in January 1605 the Pretender was decisively defeated at the battle of Dobrynichi. Dmitry hastily retreated to Putivl while Tsar Boris's army wasted time waging a terror campaign against the local populations that had dared to support the Pretender. By the spring of 1605, Dmitry had recovered, and his forces were growing rapidly. Tsar Boris's army, by contrast, got bogged down trying to capture rebel-held Kromy, a key fortress guarding the road to Moscow. The death of Boris Godunov in April 1605 paved the way to tsardom for Dmitry. Boris was succeeded by his son, Tsar Fyodor II, but the rebellion of Fyodor's army at Kromy on May 7 sealed the fate of the Godunov dynasty. On June 1, 1605, a bloodless uprising in Moscow overthrew Tsar Fy-

odor. Dmitry then entered the capital in triumph, and he was crowned on June 20.

THE SECOND PHASE OF THE TROUBLES

Tsar Dmitry ruled wisely for about a year before being assassinated by Vasily Shuisky, whose seizure of power reignited the civil war. Dmitry's reign is controversial; many historians have been convinced that he was an impostor named Grigory Otrepev who never commanded the respect of the aristocracy or of the Russian people. In fact, Tsar Dmitry was not the monk-sorcerer Otrepev; instead, he impressed his contemporaries as an intelligent, well-educated, courageous young warrior-prince who truly believed that he was Ivan the Terrible's youngest son. Tsar Dmitry was also a popular ruler. He did, however, open himself up to criticism for his lack of zealotry in observing court rituals and for a perceived laxity in his commitment to Russian Orthodox Christianity. Criticism notwithstanding, it is significant that Tsar Dmitry was toppled by a coup d'état involving a small number of disgruntled aristocrats, not by a popular uprising. His assassination, during the celebration of his wedding to the Polish Princess Marina Mniszech in May 1606, shocked the nation and very quickly rekindled the civil war that had brought him to power. The renewed civil war in the name of the true tsar Dmitry raged for years and nearly destroyed Russia.

Within a few hours of Tsar Dmitry's assassination, his supporters successfully put forward the story that he had once again miraculously escaped death and would soon return to punish Shuisky and his co-conspirators. One of Tsar Dmitry's courtiers, Mikhail Molchanov, escaped from Moscow and assumed Dmitry's identity as he traveled to Sambor (the home of the Mniszechs) in Poland-Lithuania. There he set up Tsar Dmitry's court and began seeking support for the struggle against Shuisky. Molchanov sent letters to Russian towns and to the cossacks of the southern frontier declaring that Tsar Dmitry was still alive and urging them to rise up against the usurper Tsar Vasily. Those appeals had a powerful effect. Enthusiastic rebel armies led by Ivan Bolotnikov and other commanders quickly pushed Tsar Vasily's forces out of southern Russia and reached the suburbs of Moscow by October 1606. During the siege of the capital, however, Shuisky bribed two rebel commanders to switch sides. Istoma Pashkov's betrayal of the rebel cause occurred during a major battle on December 2, forcing Bolotnikov's men to break off the siege and re-

treat south. After enduring long sieges in Kaluga and then Tula, Bolotnikov was finally forced to surrender to Tsar Vasily in October 1607, but his men (with their weapons) were allowed to go free. Many of them immediately rejoined the civil war against Shuisky by entering the service of the second false Dmitry, an impostor who suddenly appeared in southwestern Russia during the summer of 1607.

The second false Dmitry was nothing more than a puppet of his Polish handlers, but his name attracted men from far and wide. Soon Dmitry took up residence in the village of Tushino and waged war against Shuisky in Moscow. The second false Dmitry managed to attract many Russian aristocrats into his service; Filaret Romanov became Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in Tushino. When Marina Mniszech was released by Tsar Vasily, she, too, went to Tushino where she recognized her putative husband and eventually produced an heir, little Ivan Dmitriyevich. For over a year, war-torn Russia had two tsars and two capitals. Just as Shuisky's luck appeared to be running out, however, the excesses of Tsar Dmitry's foreign troops and cossacks caused a full-scale revolt against the second false Dmitry throughout much of northern Russia. Starting in late 1608, ordinary townspeople began fighting back against constant pillaging by Tsar Dmitry's troops and heavy taxes collected by his rapacious agents.

Tsar Vasily eventually turned to Sweden for assistance against the second false Dmitry. In early 1609, troops raised by King Karl IX crossed the border and assisted Shuisky's forces in clearing Dmitry's supporters out of north Russia. Karl also gobbled up Russian territory for himself, immediately provoking Polish intervention in Russia. The Polish king Sigismund III invaded Russia and laid siege to the great fortress of Smolensk. Under pressure from all sides, the Tushino camp broke up during the winter of 1609–1610. The second false Dmitry and Marina fled to Kaluga, but some Tushinite courtiers traveled to Smolensk to beg Sigismund to permit his son, Wladyslaw, to become tsar of Russia. The king seemed to agree, and soon a Polish army headed toward Moscow. In June 1610, at the battle of Klushino, the Poles decisively defeated Tsar Vasily's army. In July, exasperated Russian aristocrats seized Tsar Vasily and forced him to become a monk. Eventually, the powerful Russian lords who gained control of Moscow (the Council of Seven) agreed to allow the Poles to occupy the capital in the name of Tsar Wladyslaw.

A grand procession of Russian dignitaries (including Filaret Romanov and Vasily Shuisky) was then sent to parley with King Sigismund about Wladyslaw's accession, but the king threw them in prison. Sigismund had decided to conquer Russia and not to rule it indirectly through his son. In Moscow, the Council of Seven was unceremoniously shoved aside as a brutal military dictatorship was established by the Poles.

The Polish occupation of Moscow shocked much of Russia, and soon ordinary people began to organize to oust the foreigners. The murder of the second false Dmitry in December 1610 was celebrated by the Poles, but it actually removed the chief obstacle to unifying the Russian people against foreign intervention. A powerful but still disjointed patriotic movement slowly began to develop throughout the land and even in Moscow. Various Russian factions warily reached out to one other and with great difficulty coordinated operations against the hated Catholic Poles. Inside Moscow, protests against the Latin heretics by Patriarch Hermogen got him thrown into prison; but, before he starved to death, Hermogen sent letters to many towns urging his fellow Orthodox Christians to rise up and throw the evil foreigners out of Russia. Hermogen's call to arms was highly effective.

By early 1611, a patriotic Russian commander, Dmitry Pozharsky, forged an uneasy alliance with forces that had been loyal to the second false Dmitry, including the cossack commander Ivan Zarutsky, who championed the cause of Marina Mniszech and Ivan Dmitriyevich. Pozharsky attempted to liberate Moscow in March; but, after bitter street fighting during which the Poles burned much of the outer city, Pozharsky's patriots were forced to retreat and regroup. By June 1611, the patriots managed to form a highly representative council of the entire realm to coordinate military operations against the foreigners and to lay the foundation for a temporary national government. Pozharsky and others made sure that militarily useful cossacks who were willing to join the national militia received adequate food and the promise of freedom even if they had formerly been serfs or slaves. Such unprecedented promises attracted many new recruits to the patriot cause. Due to rivalry among its commanders, however, the national liberation movement stumbled during the following months. The unscrupulous Zarutsky tried to take over as militia commander, but other patriots wanted nothing to do with his unruly cossacks or little Ivan Dmitriyevich. Unfor-

unately, various factions ended up fighting against each other, and for many months chaos reigned in Russia. Shortly after the Poles captured Smolensk in June 1611 and the Swedes captured Novgorod in July, some beleaguered Russians asked the king of Sweden to consider putting his son on the Russian throne. Most patriots, however, dreamed of a Russian tsar.

By late 1611, a new patriotic movement and a new military force capable of salvaging Russia's national sovereignty began to take shape in Nizhny Novgorod. There a butcher named Kuzma Minin convinced his fellow citizens to raise money for an army to liberate Russia and to restore order to the realm. Minin chose Prince Pozharsky to be the commander-in-chief of the new militia, and Minin himself became the patriotic movement's treasurer with very broad powers. Many Russian towns and villages quickly joined the movement, and Yaroslavl soon emerged as the headquarters of the provisional government. Pozharsky succeeded admirably in getting cossacks and others to join his growing militia; and once Zarutsky broke with the national liberation movement and rode off to the south with Marina Mniszech and Ivan Dmitriyevich, Pozharsky was able to concentrate on the siege of Moscow.

The Polish garrison in Moscow surrendered on October 27, 1612. As soon as the capital was liberated, urgent and unprecedented messages were sent throughout the country calling for representatives of all free men (nobles, gentry, soldiers, townspeople, clergy, peasants from crown and state lands, and cossacks) to come as quickly as possible to Moscow. Soon the most representative Assembly of the Land (Zemsky sobor) in Russian history gathered to choose a new tsar. Under intense pressure from the cossacks (who by then made up half of the national militia), Filaret Romanov's son Mikhail was elected on February 7, 1613.

The Time of Troubles officially ended with the crowning of Tsar Mikhail on July 21, 1613, but it took several years to restore order to a devastated land. While bureaucrats and members of the Assembly of the Land worked feverishly to rebuild the Russian government, Tsar Mikhail dispatched military forces to destroy Zarutsky, Marina Mniszech, and Ivan Dmitriyevich. They were finally captured and executed in 1614. Kicking the Poles and Swedes out of Russia proved to be far more difficult. Only after a Swedish invasion was stalled by the heroic defense of Pskov in 1615–1616, did King Gustavus

Adolphus agree to negotiate with Tsar Mikhail. The Treaty of Stolbovo (1617) restored Novgorod to the Russians, but the Swedes kept enough captured territory to block Russian access to the Baltic Sea until the time of Peter the Great. After 1613, Polish armies tried repeatedly to try to put Tsar Wladyslaw on the Russian throne. The sturdy defense of Moscow in 1618 by Prince Pozharsky, the capital's civilian population, and the cossacks (who were very badly treated by the Romanov regime) finally convinced the Poles to negotiate. Poland gained many west Russian towns (including Smolensk) from the Truce of Deulino (1618), but Filaret Romanov was released from Polish captivity. In many ways, the celebration of Patriarch Filaret's return to Moscow in 1619 marked the real end of the Time of Troubles.

The Time of Troubles had been a terrible nightmare for the Russian people. By the time the Troubles ended, Russia's economy was shattered and many towns were ruined. As a result, the early Romanovs faced serious fiscal problems. The conditions of overtaxed townspeople, serfs, and gentry cavalymen actually worsened during the early seventeenth century and set the stage for sharp conflicts under Tsar Mikhail's son, Tsar Alexis. Ironically, the rapid expansion of the Romanov empire after 1613 caused many people to conclude incorrectly that the Time of Troubles did not have much long-term impact. In fact, the terrifying experience of the Troubles produced a powerful consensus within Russian society in favor of enhancing the already great authority and prestige of the tsar (and the patriarch). That consensus significantly strengthened Russian autocracy and imperialism, and it also slowed down the development of capitalism and the emergence of civil society in Russia.

See also: ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; BOLOTNIKOV, IVAN ISAYEVICH; DMITRY OF UGLICH; DMITRY, FALSE; FEDOR IVANOVICH; FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; OPRICHNINA; OTREPEV, GRIGORY; POZHARSKY, DMITRY MIKHAILOVICH; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH

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CHESTER DUNNING

TITHE CHURCH, KIEV

The most ancient church in Kiev was built between 989 and 996 by Prince Vladimir, who dedicated it to the Virgin Mary and supported it with one-tenth of his revenues. Destroyed by a fire in 1017 and reconstructed in 1039, the church was looted in 1177 and in 1203 by neighboring princes, and it was finally destroyed in 1240 during the siege of Kiev by the Mongol armies of Khan Batu. Various stories exist concerning the cause of the structure's collapse; as one of the last bastions of the Kievans, it came under the assault of Mongol battering rams, and it may have been further weakened by the survivors' attempt to tunnel out. Nonetheless, part of the eastern walls remained standing until the nineteenth century, when, in 1825, church authorities decided to erect a new church on the site. Rejecting the idea of incorporating the old walls into

the new, they leveled the existing walls down to the foundations and commissioned the architect Vasily Stasov to construct a neo-Byzantine church. This church was demolished by the Soviets in 1935 and the site covered with pavement.

From twentieth-century excavations, however, there emerged a plausible notion of the original plan, with the arms of a cross delineated by the aisles at the center of the church. While there is no way of determining with any accuracy the church's appearance, some sense of its decoration may be gleaned from the salvaged fragments of mosaics, frescoes, and marble ornaments. The walls were probably composed of alternating layers of stone and flat brick in a mortar of lime and crushed brick.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, KIEV; KIEVAN RUS; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

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WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

TKACHEV, PETR NIKITICH

(1844–1886), revolutionary Russian writer.

The voluminous writings of the revolutionist Petr Nikitich Tkachev were considered by Vladimir Lenin to be required reading for his Bolshevik followers. Lenin said that Tkachev, a Jacobin-Blanquist revolutionary in Russia of the 1870s, was, "one of us."

Indeed, Soviet publicists in the 1920s (before Lenin's death) treated Tkachev, once a collaborator of the terrorist Sergei Nechayev, as a prototypical Bolshevik. As one writer put it, he was "the forerunner of Lenin." This apposition was dropped, however, after 1924, when Stalin introduced the Lenin Cult. This Stalinist line did not acknowledge any pre-1917 revolutionary as a match for Lenin's vaunted status as mankind's unique, genius thinker.

The proto-Bolshevik concepts developed by Tkachev in such publications as the illegal newspaper *Nabat (Tocsin)* and in publications in France,

where he resided as an exile, consisted of the following points: 1) a revolutionary seizure of power under Russian conditions must be the work of an elitist group of enlightened, vanguard thinkers; to wait for the “snail-like . . . routine-ridden” people themselves spontaneously to adopt true revolutionary ideas was a case of futile majoritarianism; 2) the revolutionary socialist elite would establish a dictatorship of the workers and a workers’ state; 3) new generations of socialists could thus be reeducated and purged of old, private-property mentality; 4) rejecting Hegel and his protracted dialectic, Tkachev called for a proletarian revolution tomorrow, claiming that to wait for private property-mindedness to sink deeper within the Russian population was unacceptable; instead, a revolutionary jump (*skachok*) must be made over all intermediate socioeconomic stages (Tkachev parted with the Marxists on this point, describing Hegelianism as metaphysical rubbish); 4) to ensure the purging of old ways, the new workers’ state must set up a KOB (*Komitet Obshchestvennoi Bezopasnosti*), or Committee for Public Security, modeled on Maximilien Robespierre’s similar committee in striking anticipation of the Soviet Cheka, later OGPU and KGB.

In a famous letter written to Tkachev by Friedrich Engels, the latter disputed Tkachev on the Tkachevist notion that Russia could become a global pacesetter by independently making the social revolution in Russia, a backward country, in Marxist terms, building socialism directly on the basis of the old Russian commune (*obshchina*). In his letter to Engels in 1874, Tkachev had lectured Marx’s number one collaborator to the effect that Karl Marx simply did not understand the Russian situation, that Marxist strategies were “totally unsuitable for our country.” Ironically, this allegation became the mirror image of Georgy Plekhanov’s *point d’appui* in his dispute with Russian Jacobins in the mid-1880s, since Plekhanov, basing himself on Hegelian historical teaching of orthodox Marxism, regarded Jacobinism and Blanquism as a distortion of true Marxian revolutionism. For his part, years later Lenin, echoing Tkachev, retorted by describing Plekhanov as a feeble, wait-and-see gradualist.

When Tkachev died in a psychiatric hospital in Paris in 1886 (he was said to have suffered paralysis of the brain), the well-known Russian revolutionist Petr Lavrov delivered the eulogy together with others such as the French Blanquist Eduard Vaillant. Years later, Tkachev’s body was disin-

tered since the cemetery plot in the Cimetière Parisien d’Ivry was not adequately financed. His remains were cremated.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; ENGELS, FRIEDRICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

TOGAN, AHMED ZEKI VALIDOV

(1890–1970), prominent Bashkir nationalist activist during the early Soviet period and well-known scholar of Turkic historical studies.

Born in a Bashkir village in Ufa province and educated at Kazan University, Ahmed Zeki Validi (Russianized as Validov) had begun a promising career as an Orientalist scholar before the revolution. In May 1917 Validov participated in the All Russian Muslim Congress in Moscow, where he advocated federal reorganization of the Russian state and criticized plans of some Tatar politicians for extraterritorial autonomy in a unitary state. By the end of the year, Validov had emerged as primary leader of a small Bashkir nationalist movement that promulgated (in December 1917) an autonomous Bashkir republic based in Orenburg. Arrested by Soviet forces in February 1918, Validov escaped in April and joined the emerging anti-Bolshevik movement as full-scale civil war broke out that summer. Attempts to organize the Bashkir republic and separate Bashkir military forces under White auspices flagged, particularly after Admiral Kolchak took charge of the White movement. In February 1919 Validov and most of his colleagues defected to the Soviet side in return for the promise of complete Bashkir autonomy. However, sixteen months of increasingly frustrating collaboration with Soviet power ended in June 1920 when Validov departed to join the Basmachis in Central Asia, hoping to link the Bashkir search for autonomy to a larger movement for Turkic independence from Russian colonial rule. These hopes were dashed with Basmachi defeat.

After leaving Turkestan in 1923, Validov taught at Istanbul University in Turkey (1925–1932), where he adopted the surname Togan. He went on to earn a doctorate at the University of Vienna (1932–1935) and taught at Bonn and Göttingen Universities (1935–1939). Togan returned to Istanbul University in 1939 and remained there until his death in 1970. Togan's scholarly output was prodigious, with over four hundred publications, largely in Turkish and German, on the history of the Turkic peoples from antiquity to the twentieth century, including his own remarkable memoirs (*Hatıralar*). During these years of exile, Validov and Validovism (*validovshchina*) lived on in the Soviet lexicon as the epitome of reactionary Bashkir nationalism, and accusations of connection with Validov proved fatal for hundreds if not thousands of Bashkirs and other Muslims in Russia. Since the early 1990s Togan's name has been rehabilitated in his homeland, where he is now recognized as the father of today's Republic of Bashkortostan.

See also: BASHKORTISTAN AND THE BASHKIRS

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TOLSTAYA, TATIANA NIKITICHNA

(b. 1951), Russian writer.

Tolstaya is an original, captivating fiction writer of the perestroika and post-Soviet period. Born in 1951 in Leningrad, she graduated from Leningrad State University with a degree in Philology and Classics, then worked as an editor at *Nauka* before publishing her first short stories in the early 1980s. Their imaginative brilliance and humane depth won success with both Soviet and international readers. Her activities expanded subsequently to include university teaching (at Skidmore College, among other institutions), journalistic writing, and completion of a dark futuristic novel, *The Slynx*.

Tolstaya's initial impact on Russian letters was made by a series of short stories centering on the conflict between imagination, spirit, and value, on the one hand, and a bleak social order of conformity and consumerism, cultural and spiritual degradation, and rapacious and cynical materialism on the other. Although she draws on the texture of late Soviet reality with witty, acerbic penetration, her critique of modern society travels well. The mythical dimensions of this conflict are highlighted in her stories by frequent use of fantastic elements and folkloric allusions, such as the transformation of the self-centered Serafim into Gorynych the Dragon (Serafim), or the bird of death, Sirin, symbolizing Petya's loss of innocence in "Date with a Bird."

Her most notable stories are works of virtuosic invention. Denisov of the Dantesque "Sleepwalker in the Mist" awakens in mid-life surrounded by dark woods and takes up the search for meaning; his various attempts at creation, leadership, and sacrifice ending in farce. Peters of "Peters" is a lumpish being without attraction or charm (one coworker calls him "some kind of endocrinal dodo") who spends his life in quixotic search of romantic love; in old age, beaten down by humiliation, he triumphs by his praise of life: "indifferent, ungrateful, lying, teasing, senseless, alien—beautiful, beautiful, beautiful." Sonia of "Sonia" is a half-witted, unattractive, but selfless creature, tormented by her sophisticated friends through the fiction of a married admirer, Nikolai, whom she can never meet. The fabrication is kept up through years of correspondence in which the chief tormentor, Ada, finds her womanhood irresistibly subverted. In the Leningrad blockade Sonia gives her life to save Ada/Nikolai, without realizing the fiction.

The fantastic elements in Tolstaya's works have led to comparisons with the magical realism of modern Latin American fiction, comparisons which are only roughly valid. The association of Tolstaya's work with the women's prose (*zhenskaya proza*) of late Soviet literature also requires qualification: although women are frequently protagonists in her stories as impaired visionaries and saints, they are just as often the objects of bitter satire, implacable enforcers of social conventionality.

Tolstaya's remarkable novel *The Slynx* depicts a post-nuclear Moscow populated by mutants, combining the political traits of the Tatar Yoke and Muscovite Russia with characteristics of Stalinist

and later Soviet regimes. The narrative, displaying to advantage Tolstaya's humor and ear for popular language, presents a negative *Bildungsroman*. The uncouth but decent and robust protagonist, Benedikt, given favorable circumstances including a library, leisure to read, and friends from the earlier times, fails to develop and cross the line from animal existence to spiritual, and as a consequence the culture itself fails to regain organic life. This pessimistic historical vision seems rooted in the disappointments of post-Soviet Russian political and social life.

See also: PERESTROIKA

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Russian State, from which he lifted passages verbatim for his own work.

Tolstoy's lyric poetry, most notably "Against the Current" (1867) and "John Damascene" (1858), were strongly influenced by German romanticism. He also wrote satirical verse. Collaborating with the Zhemchuzhnikov brothers, he created the fictional writer Kozma Prutkov, a petty bureaucrat who parodied the poetry of the day and wrote banal aphorisms. Karamzin's *History* also served as the inspiration for Tolstoy's *History of the Russian State from Gostomysl to Timashev*, a parody of Russian history from its founding until 1868, which contained vicious characteristics of the Russian monarch. The manuscript circulated privately between 1868, when it was completed, and 1883, when it first appeared in print.

See also: KARAMZIN, NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH

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ELIZABETH JONES HEMENWAY

TOLSTOY, ALEXEI KONSTANTINOVICH

(1817–1875), writer of drama, fiction, and poetry; considered to be the most important nineteenth-century Russian historical dramatist.

A member of the Russian nobility, Alexei Tolstoy was expected to serve at court and in the diplomatic service, which prevented him from writing full time until relatively late in his life (1861). Nevertheless, he managed to produce a novel (*Prince Serebryanny*, 1862) and a dramatic trilogy (*The Death of Ivan the Terrible*, 1866; *Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich*, 1868; *Tsar Boris*, 1870), both based on the time of Ivan the Terrible. Although, by the time *Prince Serebryanny* was published, the fad for historical novels had long passed, it nevertheless enjoyed some popularity. Due to censorship restrictions, only the first of the three plays was performed during the author's lifetime, but all three were produced numerous times during the Soviet period. For all these works, Tolstoy relied on Karamzin's *History of the*

TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH

(1828–1910), Russian prose writer and, in his later years, dissident and religious leader, best known for his novels *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*.

CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH (1828–1852)

The fourth son of Count Nikolai Ilich Tolstoy and Princess Maria Nikolaevich Volkonskaya, Tolstoy was born into the highest echelon of Russian nobility. Despite the early deaths of his mother (1830) and father (1837), Tolstoy led the typically idyllic childhood of a nineteenth-century aristocrat. He spent virtually every summer of his life at his family's ancestral estate, Yasnaya Polyana, located about 130 miles (200 kilometers) south of Moscow.

Although he initially flunked entrance exams in history and geography, Tolstoy entered Kazan University in 1844. He was dismissed from the department of Oriental languages after failing his first



Leo Tolstoy sitting at his desk in Yasnaya Polyana in 1908. © CORBIS

semester's final examinations. He reentered the next year to pursue a law degree, and, two years later, knowing that he was about to be dismissed once again, he requested leave for reasons of spoiled health and domestic circumstances. Tolstoy returned to Yasnaya Polyana with grandiose plans for self-improvement, experiments in estate management, and philanthropic projects. Over the next few years, he made little headway on these plans, but he did manage to acquire large gambling debts, a bad reputation, and several bouts of venereal disease. He also began keeping a detailed diary that, with some significant lapses, he kept for his entire life. These journal entries occupy twelve volumes, each several hundred pages long, of his *Complete Collected Works*.

EARLY LITERARY WORKS AND YASNAYA POLYANA SCHOOL

Tolstoy's first published work, *Childhood* (1852), appeared in the influential journal *The Contemporary*, and was signed simply "L.N." The work was enthusiastically praised for the complex psychological analysis and description conveyed by the work's seemingly simple style and episodic, nearly plotless, structure. The five years after the publication of *Childhood* saw Tolstoy's literary star rise: he published sequels to *Childhood* (*Boyhood* [1852–1864] and *Youth* [1857]) and a handful of war stories. (Tolstoy had enlisted as an artillery cadet in 1852 and seen action in the Caucasus and later in the Russo-Turkish war). Almost without exception, the stories enjoyed success with both critics and readers.

In 1857 Tolstoy left the army as a decorated veteran and traveled Europe, where he wrote a run of poorly received stories and novellas that were praised for their artistry but sharply criticized for their plainspoken condemnation of civilization and apathy toward the burning questions of the day. In part because of this criticism Tolstoy announced in 1859 his renunciation of literary activity, declared himself forevermore dedicated to educating the masses of Russia, and founded a school for peasant boys at Yasnaya Polyana, which he directed until its closure in 1863. Tolstoy produced few literary works during this time, though he wrote several articles on pedagogy in the journal *Yasnaya Polyana*, which he published privately. This was not the last time Tolstoy was involved in education. A decade after closing the second Yasnaya Polyana school he began an educational series *The New Russian Primer for Reading*, and spent nearly two decades working on it. The primer sold more than a million copies, making it the most read and most profitable of Tolstoy's works during his lifetime.

MARRIAGE AND THE GREAT NOVELS (1862–1877)

In the fall of 1862 Tolstoy married Sofya Andreevna Behrs, the daughter of a former playmate and a girl half his age. Their marriage of nearly fifty years produced ten offspring who survived childhood and several who did not. Though tumultuous, their early relationship was mostly happy. In 1863 Tolstoy closed his school and commenced work on his magnum opus, *War and Peace* (1863–1869). Partly a historical account of the period from 1805 to 1812, partly a novelistic description of quotidian life of fictional characters, and partly a historiographical animadversion on conventional historical accounts, *War and Peace* was initially perceived as defying generic convention, sharing characteristics with the didactic essay, history, epic, and novel. Perhaps reflecting its chaotic structure, *War and Peace* portrays war as intensely chaotic. It ridicules the tsar's and military strategists' self-aggrandizing claims that they were responsible for the Russians' victory over *la Grande Armée*. The sole effective commander was General Mikhail Kutuzov, who in previous historical accounts had been portrayed as an inept blunderer. In the novel he is depicted as the ideal commander inasmuch as his *modus operandi* derives from the maxim "patience and time"—that is, he relies little on plans and military science, and instead on a mix of instincts and resignation to fate. The true

heroes of the war, the novel contends, were instead individual Russians—soldiers, peasants, nobles, townspeople—who reacted instinctively and unconsciously, yet successfully, to an invasion of their homeland.

In 1873 Tolstoy began his second great novel, *Anna Karenina* (1873–1878), which has one of the most famous first lines in world literature: "All happy families resemble one another, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." The novel's unhappy families are the Karenins, Aleksey and Anna, and the Oblonskys, Stiva (Anna's brother) and Dolly. Anna feels herself trapped in marriage to her boring if devoted husband, and begins an affair with an attractive if dim officer named Vronsky. Aleksey denies Anna's request for a divorce, and she decides defiantly to live openly with Vronsky. Their illicit affair is simultaneously condemned and celebrated by society. Stiva is a charismatic sybarite who philanders through life taking advantage of Dolly's innocence and preoccupation looking after the household. The third, happy couple of the novel, Konstantin Levin and Kitty (Dolly's youngest sister), are unmarried at the beginning of the story. Their inconstant courtship and eventual marriage take place mostly as the background to the drama of the Oblonskys and Karenins. The novel ends with Anna, nearly insane from guilt and stress, throwing herself beneath a train. Levin, now a family man, undergoes a religious conversion when he realizes that his constant preoccupation with questions of life and death, combined with an innate inclination to philosophize, had prevented his seeing the miraculous simplicity of life itself.

CONVERSION AND LATE WORKS

Notwithstanding his sensual temperament, Tolstoy had always suffered from sporadic bouts of intense desire to adopt an ascetic's life. While still at work on *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoy began *A Confession* (1875–1884), the first-person narrative of a man—very similar to Levin at the end of *Anna Karenina*—who, despite his success and seeming happiness, finds himself in the throes of depression and suicidal thoughts from which he is rescued by religion. Although the rhetoric of the work suggests a radical conversion—Tolstoy later described the time as an "ardent inner perestroika of my whole outlook on life"—some critics have cast doubt on the fundamentality of the conversion. As early as 1855, for instance, Tolstoy wrote in his diary plans to create a new religion "cleansed of faith and mys-

tery, a practical religion, not promising future bliss, but giving bliss on earth.”

Tolstoy spent the 1880s and 1890s developing his religious views in a series of works: *A Critique of Dogmatic Theology* (1880), *A Translation and Unification of the Gospels* (1881), *What I Believe* (1884), and *The Kingdom of God Is within You* (1893). Most of these works were banned by the religious or secular censor in Russia, but were either printed illegally in Russia or printed abroad and clandestinely smuggled in, thus adumbrating the fate of many Soviet works printed as *samizat* or *tamizdat*. The core of Tolstoy’s belief is contained in God’s commandments in the Sermon on the Mount: do not resist evil, swear no oaths, do not lust, bear no malice, love your enemy. Tolstoy is everywhere and at pains to point out that adherence to these injunctions, especially nonresistance to evil, inevitably leads to the abolition of all compulsory legislation, police, prisons, armies, and, ultimately, to the abolition of the state itself. He described his beliefs as Christian-anarchism. Vladimir Nabokov described them as a neutral blend between a kind of Hindu Nirvana and the New Testament, and indeed Tolstoy himself considered his beliefs as a syncretic reconciliation of Christianity with all the wisdom of the ages, especially Taoism and Stoicism. Following this creed, Tolstoy became a vegetarian; gave up smoking, drinking, and hunting; and partially renounced the privileges of his class—for instance, he often wore peasant garb, embraced physical labor as a necessary part of a moral life, and refused to take part in social functions that he deemed corrupt.

His new life led to increased strife with his wife and family, who did not share Tolstoy’s convictions. It also attracted international attention. Beginning in the 1880s, hundreds of journalists, wisdom-seekers, and tourists trekked to Yasnaya Polyana to meet the now-famous Russian writer-turned-prophet. Tolstoy, who had always kept up extensive correspondence with friends and family, was inundated with letters from the curious and questing. In his lifetime he wrote 10,000 letters and received 50,000. In 1891 he renounced copyright over many of his literary works. Free of copyright restriction and royalties, publishing houses around the world issued impressive runs of Tolstoy’s works almost immediately upon their official publication in Russia. In 1901 his international fame was increased when Tolstoy was excommunicated for blasphemy from the Russian Orthodox Church.

In addition to works on philosophy, religion, and social criticism, Tolstoy penned during the last decades of his life a number of works of the highest literary merit, notably the novella *The Death of Ivan Ilich* (1882), the affecting story of a man forced to admit the meaninglessness of his own life in the face of impending death; and *Hadji Murat* (1896–1904, published posthumously), a beautifully wrought but uncompleted novel set during the Russian imperialistic expansion in the Caucasus. Tolstoy’s third long novel, *Resurrection* (1889–1899), though inferior in artistic quality to his other novels, is a compelling casuistical account of a man’s attempt to undo the wrongs he has committed. Tolstoy also wrote an influential and debated body of art criticism. *What Is Art?* (1896–1898) attacked art for not fulfilling its true mission, namely, the uniting of people into a universal collective. His *On Shakespeare and Drama* (1903–1904) dismissed Shakespeare as a charlatan.

Increasingly distressed by domestic conflict and angst over the incommensurability of his life with his beliefs, Tolstoy left home in secrecy in the autumn of 1910. His flight was immediately broadcast by the international media, which succeeded in tracking him down to the railway stop Astapovo (later renamed Leo Tolstoy), where he lay dying of congestive heart failure brought on by pneumonia. What could only be described as a media circus was assembled outside the stationmaster’s house when Tolstoy died early in the morning of November 7, 1910. His final words were “Truth, I love much.”

See also: ANARCHISM; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE

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TOMSKY, MIKHAIL PAVLOVICH

(1880–1936), Russian union activist.

Tomsky was a leading Old Bolshevik and trade union activist who committed suicide before he could be tried during Josef Stalin's purges. Tomsky was born Mikhail Efremov into a working-class environment. He began to work in a factory in adolescence and eventually became a printer. He joined the Social Democrats in 1904 and soon turned to union organizing. Between 1906 and 1909 his activities led to a series of arrests that was interspersed with party work whenever he was free. During this period he adopted the pseudonym Tomsky. In 1911 he began a five-year term of hard labor that was followed by exile to Siberia. After the collapse of the monarchy, Tomsky returned to Petrograd and his union work. In 1919 he was elected to the Central Committee and chosen to head the Central Trade Union Council. Three years later he became a member of the Politburo. He was one of the eight pallbearers at Vladimir Lenin's funeral in 1924. The next year he sided against Leon Trotsky and his followers in the party struggles that followed Lenin's death. In 1928 he joined with Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov to protest the pace and methods of collectivization. After this opposition group was defeated, Tomsky was expelled from the Politburo and removed from his position as trade union leader. In 1931 he was appointed head of the State Publishing House. Tomsky shot himself after learning that he had been implicated in one of Stalin's show trials. At Bukharin's trial two years later fabricated evidence named Tomsky as the link between members of the Right Opposition and an oppositional group in the Red Army.

See also: BUKHARIN, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; POLITBURO; RYKOV, ALEXEI IVANOVICH

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TORKY

The nomadic Torky (known as Torky in Rus and Oghuz in Eastern sources) spoke a Turkic language and probably practiced shamanist-Täri religion. They formed into a tribal confederation in the eighth century in the Syr Darya–Aral Sea steppe region. In the late ninth century, joined by the Khazars, they expelled the Pechenegs from the Volga-Ural area and forced them to migrate to the South-Russian steppe. In 965, joined by the Rus, the Torky destroyed the Khazar state, and in 985 the two allies attacked Volga Bulgaria. The migration of the Polovtsy, Torky's eastern neighbors, forced the latter into the South-Russian steppe by 1054 or 1055. In 1060, the Rus staged a major offensive and scored a victory over the Torky. While many Torky fled west, some remained in the South-Russian steppe zone and joined other nomadic peoples to later develop into Rus border guards known as *Chernye Klobuky* or Black Hoods. From around 1060 to 1140, Chernye Klobuky remained outside the formal political boundaries of the Rus state and maintained a largely nomadic lifestyle. During this period, they were often involved in the military affairs of the Rus princes and, at times, came to settle within the Rus borders in return for their services. After 1140 the institution of Chernye Klobuky became formalized, and they came to be viewed as mercenaries and vassals of the Kievan Grand Princes. As vassals, the Chernye Klobuky maintained allegiance not to any particular branch of the royal Rus family, but to the holder of the title of Grand Prince of Kiev.

See also: KHAZARS; KIEVAN RUS; POLOVTSY

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ROMAN K. KOVALEV

TOTALITARIANISM

The concept of totalitarianism was used to describe the more extreme forms of the hypertrophic states of the twentieth century, with their ideologies, elaborate mechanisms of control, and uniquely invasive efforts to diminish or even obliterate the distinction between public and private. The term was coined in the early 1920s, in Fascist Italy, by Mussolini's opponents and was expanded in the early 1930s to include National Socialist Germany. Although the term was coined by opponents of Fascism and early usages were largely hostile, it was also episodically employed by supporters of the Italian and German regimes, such as Giovanni Gentile and Mussolini himself, to differentiate their governments from the allegedly decadent liberal regimes they so detested. The very early Italian usages connoted extreme violence, but as Italian Fascism evolved from its movement phase and became an ideology of government, the term increasingly suggested the intent of the state to absorb every aspect of human life into itself. This notion was in harmony with the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile. The term was most systematically and positively used in Germany by Carl Schmitt, but Hitler eventually forbade its positive use, since it evoked an Italian comparison, which he disliked.

Even in the 1920s and early 1930s, there were a number of people who suggested that the Soviet Union bore certain similarities to both Italy and Germany. After Hitler's blood purge in 1934, the similarities between the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy became the subject of frequent and systematic comparison; after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939), such comparisons became widespread. Only in strongly pro-communist circles was there an understandable reluctance to conclude that the Soviet Union had degenerated so badly that it could be compared with Nazi Germany.

In the aftermath of World War II, however, this comparison came to dominate the term's us-

age, right up to the end of the Cold War. The Truman administration suddenly began discussing the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime when it had to justify the strongly anti-Soviet turn in American foreign policy that began in 1947, expressed most vividly in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

Prewar usages in the 1920s and 1930s had been unsystematic and largely journalistic, though such dedicated students of Russia as William Henry Chamberlin had compared the Soviet Union and Germany more systematically as early as 1935. But World War II and the development of the Cold War created a community of Russian experts in academia, where the term became thoroughly institutionalized in the early 1950s. The first systematic and grand-scale comparison, however, was not by an American academic, but by a German-Jewish émigré, Hannah Arendt, whose brilliant but uneven *Origins of Totalitarianism* was a sensation when it appeared in 1951. The most influential academic treatment of the term was *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, which appeared in 1956 and had a long and controversial life. Brzezinski and Friedrich's account provided what was variously called a syndrome and a model to classify states as totalitarian. To be accounted, a state had to exhibit six features: an all-encompassing ideology; a single mass party, typically led by one man; a system of terror; a near-monopoly on all means of mass communication; a similar near-monopoly of instruments of force; and a centrally controlled economy.

Although *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* achieved wide acceptance in the 1950s, the restricted nature of its comparison, as well as the changing political times, made it highly controversial in the following two decades, with most of the academic community turning against it. Its fate was intimately bound up with the Cold War, which lost its broad base of popular support among Western academics and intellectuals during the 1960s. The viability of a term as value-laden as totalitarianism, in light of the demand for analytical rigor in the social sciences, was now considered highly debatable. In addition, as American historians of Russia became more and more enamored of social history, the focus of the totalitarian point of view on the politics of the center seemed far too restrictive for their research agenda, which was more focused on the experiences of ordinary people and everyday life, especially in the provinces.

During the Reagan years, the term was revived by neoconservatives interested in a more aggressive political and military challenge to the Soviet Union and also in distinguishing the Soviet Union and its satellites from the (allegedly less radical) rightist states whom the Reagan administration regarded as allies against Communism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the term has become less politically charged and seems to be evolving in a more diffuse fashion to suggest closed or antidemocratic states in general, particularly those with strong ideological or religious coloration.

See also: AUTOCRACY

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ABBOTT GLEASON

TOURISM

Though tourism was not a product of the Russian Revolution, the Bolshevik emphasis on raising the cultural level of the masses and educating through practical experience made tourism one of the concerns of the new regime. The government created a number of institutions to encourage development in this field. Within Narkompros and Glavprolitprosvet, excursion sectors were established as early as 1919 to organize educational trips throughout

the country; a number of these bureaus later developed into scientific-research bodies such as the Central Museum-Excursion Institute in Moscow. The two major organizations for Soviet tourism—the Society for Proletarian Tourism (OPT RFSFR, created by decree of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and the joint-stock society Soviet Tourist (created by Narkompros in 1928)—merged in 1930 under the name of the All-Union Society of Proletarian Tourism and Excursions (OPTE) under the direction of N. V. Krylenko. It was also at this time that mass tourism began to develop as a movement among Soviet youth, marked by the establishment of a separate bureau within the Komсомol in 1928. Students, pioneers, and other young Soviets went on tours of the country organized under themes such as "My Motherland—the USSR." Excursions were designed to acquaint citizens with national monuments, the history of the revolutionary movement, and the life of Vladimir Lenin. This so-called sphere of proletarian tourism was thus intended as an integral aspect of the construction of socialism within the Soviet Union.

The importance of travel was not limited, however, to shaping Soviet ideology within the country. The state recognized that foreigners visiting the Soviet Union also represented a significant means through which socialism might gain expression and adherents throughout the world; additional consideration was given to the inflow of capital from international tourists. Though certain privileged groups of *udarniki*, fine arts performers, musicians, students, and government officials traveled beyond Soviet borders in the country's initial years, millions of visitors ultimately toured the Soviet Union throughout its roughly seventy-year history.

To aid in the maintenance of foreign tours and international travel to the Soviet Union, on April 12, 1929, the Council for the Labor and Defense of the USSR adopted the decree "On the organization of the All-Union Joint-Stock Company for Foreign Tourism in the USSR." Otherwise known as Intourist (an acronym of Gosudarstvennoe aktsionerное obshchestvo po innostrannomu turizmu v SSSR and an abbreviated form of Inostrannyi turist), the company was supported by a number of Soviet organizations such as the People's Commissariat of Trade, Sovtorgflot, the People's Commissariat of Rail Transport, and the All-Union Joint-Stock Company Otel'. A. S. Svanidze was its first chairman. Though Intourist was occasionally responsible for organizing the visits of more

prominent foreigners such as Bernard Shaw and Theodore Dreiser, in its initial years it played host primarily to international labor delegations as part of the movement to acquire foreign technical assistance. Only in the post-World War II period did Intourist experience rapid growth and an expansion of its services. This was the result, first, of the general postwar spirit of internationalism and faith in international organizations and, second, of the new friendships between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Intourist became a member of numerous national and international bodies such as the World Tourism Organization and participated in various conferences on tourism such as those hosted by the United Nations. More importantly, however, was the creation of a unified commercial organization for international tourism and satellite travel bureaus in each of the socialist Eastern Europe nations. This network facilitated exchanges among worker delegations, students, theater troupes, trade unions, kolkhozes, and other social groups. It was also during this time that Intourist constructed the basic infrastructure of hotels, autoparks, and restaurants used by foreign visitors until 1989, when the organization was withdrawn from the control of the central state apparatus and restructured as an independent enterprise.

Intourist's operations raise numerous questions about the meaning of leisure and privilege in a socialist society. Its advertisements and exhibit materials throughout the Soviet period spur consideration of the various messages the state promoted about itself to the outside world. And its list of itineraries that, at one point, covered 150 cities of the Union republics—with cruises along the Dniepr from Kiev to Kherson, along the Black Sea to Odessa, along the Dunau to Rus in Bulgaria or to Dzurduz in Romania—give credence to the geopolitical power of the entity that was the Soviet Union.

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SHAWN SOLOMON

TRADE ROUTES

Three-fourths of Russia is more than 250 miles (400 kilometers) away from seas and oceans; Russia is the world's most continental country. Even though Russia's coastline is the second longest (after Canada), the presence of sea ice hampers traffic in and out of the country's few ports during much of the winter. Murmansk, for example, Russia's only warm-water port, is plagued by shorefast ice for two months out of the year. These and other factors hampered the development of a Russian navy until the eighteenth century, when Peter the Great built St. Petersburg, his famed "Window on the West." Accordingly, Russian historic trade routes have been negotiated largely within its vast interior.

EARLY ROUTES

Commerce in the Black Sea Basin may be traced to intercourse between the Scythians and Greeks circa 250 B.C.E. Scythian nomads extracted grain, fish, and slaves from their sedentary subjects and traded them in the Greek ports for wine, cloth, metalware, and luxury items. Before the Hun invasion (375 C.E.), Persian Alans and Germanic Goths established a commercial confederation between the Baltic and Black Seas.

International trade in Eastern Europe after 850 C.E. literally created Kievan Rus. Using the interlocking system of rivers and portages on the Russian plain, Varangian (Viking) traders and soldiers sought the markets of the lower Volga and Don rivers, where they traded fur, slaves, and wood items for silver coins and spices from Central Asia, Arabia, and Byzantium. Originally traversing the Saracen Route between the Gulf of Finland, Lakes Ladoga and Onega, down the Volga River to the Caspian Sea and beyond, the Vikings eventually preferred trade with Byzantium, which was in its heyday. After the founding of Kievan Rus in 879, the Dnieper (Dnipro) trade route from the Varangians to the Greeks carried flax, hemp, hides, slaves, honey, wax, grain, and furs from the north in exchange for silks, naval equipment, wine, jewelry, glassware, and art items (particularly icons after the introduction of Orthodox Christianity in 988).

The collapse of the Khazar Empire (600–900 C.E.) opened the steppes to menacing Kypchak Turks, who eventually cut off Kievan Rus from the all-important salt deposits (virtually the only food preservative) of the Crimea; thus, the major trade routes shifted from a north-south orientation to

east-west paths. Beginning in the eleventh century, salt was hauled from Halych in Galicia-Volhynia to Kiev. Later, the importance of the salt of Galicia-Volhynia to not only the Kievan Rus, but also the Teutonic Knights of the Baltic coast, brought a reemphasis of the north-south Baltic-Black Sea trade west of the Crimea. Galicia-Volhynia's power and influence, based on the salt trade, lasted well into the second century of Mongol-Tatar domination of the rest of Russia (1237–1387).

The Mongol Yoke (1237–1556) isolated the Russians from the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the High Gothic period, among other major changes in the West. Because they survived on tribute paid by their Russian subjects and the customs duties paid by those involved in international trade, the Mongols permitted merchants the use of the north-south trade routes, this time between the Baltic, Novgorod, and Muscovy (in the north) and the Arabic Middle East and the Black Sea (in the south). They even encouraged the revival of the Crimean ports, which were then under the leadership of Italian merchants from Venice, Pisa, and Genoa; cities with Greek names then became Italian.

POST-MONGOL TRADE

Ivan the Terrible's defeat of the Astrakhan Tatars in 1556 largely sealed the fate of the former Golden [or Kypchak] Horde. The Volga trade route was now in Muscovy possession all the way to Central Asia, from which the tsar could import horses, which would serve in his Swedish campaigns. Ivan also sought trade with Great Britain: in the second half of the sixteenth century, he established commerce between the White Sea port of Arkhangelsk (logs and lumber) and Hull in eastern England (finished products).

An unlikely servant of Tsar Ivan was a cossack named Yermak, who raided the Volga riverboats laden with horses from Central Asia. Yermak and his minions would later defeat the Siberian Tatars and claim Western Siberia in the name of the tsar in the 1580s. This event opened Siberia and the Russian Far East to Russian expansion and trade.

First using the river and portage method, cossacks and merchants traversed Siberia from west to east, reaching the Pacific coast within a century. Along the way, they traded trinkets to the natives for valuable furs. The Russian quest for fur led them to Alaska, down the North American Pacific coast to San Francisco (Fort Ross), and even to Hawaii. Later, coach transportation was used on

the bone-jarring Great Siberian Tract. Between 1891 and 1916, Russian laborers built the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is still the only transcontinental thoroughfare in the country. Between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, a trade route flourished between Russia and China at the border crossing of Kyakhta. Chinese tea, silks, furs, and luxuries were imported in exchange for Russian raw materials.

SOVIET TRADE POLICY

For much of the period that it existed, the Soviet Union was an island that strove for self-sufficiency while remaining insulated from the rest of the world. Like that of imperial Russia, Soviet foreign trade was limited in total value, in quantity of commodities exchanged, and in number of trading partners. Between 1917 and 1991, Soviet trade with other socialist countries never fell below 67 percent. By the late 1980s, trade with the developed world was approximately 22 percent, with the balance going to developing countries.

Throughout the Soviet period, military strategists sought to expand the Soviet navy, which by extension included the merchant marine. An especially important goal was the development of a northern sea route through the use of heavy reinforced—ultimately atomic—icebreakers. By the 1980s, such icebreakers had successfully negotiated the Soviet Union's vulnerable Arctic coast between Murmansk and the Bering Strait.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia's foreign trade was more open than ever before, but, as in the distant past, its own exports continued to be raw materials or crudely processed finished goods, while its imports consisted of quality finished products. Major trading partners include China, Germany, the United States, and Japan.

See also: EXPLORATION; FOREIGN TRADE; GEOGRAPHY; TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667

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VICTOR L. MOTE

TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667

The Trade Statutes of 1653 and 1667 governed domestic and foreign trade in seventeenth-century Russia, and streamlined a highly complex and confusing system of some seventy different internal customs duties that added to transportation costs and created ample opportunity for corruption and cheating. Subjecting all goods and merchants to a uniform and consistent set of customs duties promoted efficiency by making long-distance trade more profitable and predictable. The statutes also became key elements in the implementation of a mercantilist agenda designed to promote the interests of domestic merchants.

The commercial code (*Torgovy ustav*) of October 1653 was adopted in direct response to an August 1653 petition by leading Russian merchants against transit duties and for a unified rate of customs duty. The code combined a uniform internal rate with an overall increase in imposts. It further adopted uniform measures of weight and length throughout the country. A basic 5 percent impost was levied on sold goods, with the exception of salt (double the rate), furs, fish, and horses (old duties applied). No duties were levied on foreign currency sold to the government at a fixed rate. A special duty of 2.5 percent was applied to goods offered exclusively in border towns for export. Under the 1653 code, foreign merchants were required to pay a 6 percent duty in the Russian interior, in addition to a 2 percent transit duty. However, exports from Arkhangel'sk were taxed at only 2 percent. A related 1654 decree (*Ustavnaya gramota*) abolished transit duties on noble and church lands.

The dual agendas of mercantilism and protectionism culminated in the New Commercial Code (*Novotorgovy ustav*) of 1667, again in an apparent response to a petition by Muscovite merchants. The New Commercial Code was apparently primarily authored by Afanasy Lavrentevich Ordin-Nashchokin, G. Dokhturov, and L. Golosov, and signed by ninety Russian merchants. The statute consists of a preamble, ninety-four main articles, and a seven-article appendix, *Ustav torgovle*, governing foreign trade. The introduction of the New Commercial Code spells out the leading principles of the government's commercial policy and constitutes the most elaborate expression of mercantilist ambitions in seventeenth-century Russian policy making. In addition to increasing government revenues, the statute sought to support do-

mestic merchants by organizing facilities for credit and by promoting companies combining large- and small-scale merchants in an attempt to reduce the influence of foreign traders. However, the practical importance of these pronouncements remained marginal at best.

The new statute significantly increased the tax burden facing foreign merchants and made a further attempt to confine them to border cities through both restricted access to the interior and prohibitive transit duties. The New Commercial Code designated Arkhangel'sk, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Putivl', and Astrakhan' as "border towns" beyond which foreigners could operate only with special permission. Foreign specie receipts were to be maximized not only through higher tax rates, even on unsold goods, but also through a compulsory system of exacting those payments in foreign specie at a rigged exchange rate. The basic impost was increased to 5 percent on weighed goods and 4 percent on unweighed goods. An additional 9 percent was levied on transit by foreigners into the Russian interior. A sales tax of 6 percent, imposed in the towns of the interior, took the overall duty facing foreigners to an unprecedented 20–21 percent. Exacting the duty in foreign silver coin at a rigged rate yielded the crown two rubles in pure profit for every seven rubles collected. Emulating Western practices, the New Commercial Code imposed quality controls on import and export goods alike, although this measure appears to have been implemented with mixed success at best. Slightly preferential treatment was given to Asian merchants in the interior.

The immediate impact of the New Commercial Code was negative. Customs receipts declined, and tensions between Westerners and hostile *gost* (privileged merchant) administrators increased, as confiscations of goods as "contraband" multiplied. The concessions to Russia's elite merchants may in fact have been based on unrealistically rosy expectations at a time when a commercial treaty with Persia was set to ensure an increase in silk trade, while a peace treaty with Poland put an end to prolonged warfare in the West. A period of protectionism under Fyodor Alexeyevich's reign severely limited the right of Western merchants to operate in the Russian interior and sought to change the terms of trade at Arkhangel'sk in favor of Russians. This policy was only relaxed in the 1680s when Peter I's government finally conceded some key demands of Western merchants. The more hostile business environment at Arkhangel'sk not only deterred

Western merchants but also contributed to a general diversion of Russian trade to the Baltic. The New Commercial Code remained in force, with minor modifications, until the adoption of the 1755 customs code.

See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST; FOREIGN TRADE; GOSTI; MERCHANTS

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JARMO T. KOTILAINE

TRADE UNIONS

The trade union movement in Russia had its origins in the strike movements of the nineteenth century. Labor organizations, originally modeled on village institutions, spontaneously formed around particular grievances, but proved temporary in nature. More permanent labor representation in the form of delegates, *starostas*, eventually took hold at the factory, local, and industry levels. By the late nineteenth century local broad-based organizations gave way to associations by industry or occupation, along with the adoption of more institutionalized negotiation methods between labor and capital.

Trade unions first gained legal recognition after the Revolution of 1905. Unions adopted principles of class identity (membership being restricted to workers) and independence from state institutions and political parties. During the period immediately following the Revolution, attempts to establish central labor organizations produced both soviets of workers' delegates and trade union councils, which sought to unite extant unions and provide support for new ones. Unions remained relatively weak, with union activity declining significantly during World War I in response to governmental restrictions.

The period from 1917 to 1920 saw the reemergence of the old trade unions in competition with autonomous factory-level worker councils. Unions

eventually secured power over the councils, but only as they underwent their own transformation. As a result, three features were to characterize trade unions throughout the Soviet period: branch unionism, union subordination to both the state and Bolshevik Party, and the assumption of dual functions on the part of all unions. This meant that every employee in a particular industry or branch of the economy belonged to one union and that trade unions as state organizations were to fulfill a twin purpose: to mobilize workers to meet production targets and to defend workers' rights, as defined by the state, against arbitrary managerial actions. The particular methods employed by unions shifted over time, with emphasis on discipline and punishment in the 1930s giving way to positive incentives and greater job protection rights by the 1950s.

At the enterprise level, union activity was integrated into a larger triangular relationship, known as the union-management-party troika. The union worked chiefly with management to increase labor productivity. Its control over the distribution of nonwage benefits to the workforce ensured labor cooperation, while its control over the grievance process and its mandatory participation in all personnel decisions provided the means to defend workers' legal rights. Simultaneously, the union coordinated efforts with party officials to direct the cultural life of the factory. In this capacity, the union acted as a transmission belt between party and society, orientating the workforce to the goals of the state.

At the national level, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) was the supreme agency within a complex trade union bureaucracy. In its role as administrator, it maintained control over two parallel hierarchical structures, one based on branch-level union committees, with the central committee of each union as the leading institution, and an all-union hierarchy organized geographically, with the republican all-union councils as the governing bodies. The primary union agency, the factory-level committee, was responsible to both groups. Union resources came from three critical sources: membership dues, the national social insurance fund, and considerable property holdings associated with the social and welfare benefits distributed to the workforce.

The post-Soviet period has been marked by two important developments: the plurality of trade union organizations and the declining power of unions in general. Alternative trade unions, orga-

nized along occupational and professional lines, have challenged the monopoly of the traditional union bureaucracy, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), the successor to AUCCTU. Although FNPR remains by far the dominant institution, the alternative unions function as catalysts for organizational change. In addition, trade unions have lost considerable power, deepening their subordination in practice to management and the state. Declining union membership and the loss of income and important administrative duties have undermined the traditional base of union power.

See also: TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667

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CAROL CLARK

TRANSCAUCASIAN FEDERATIONS

Federalism would be a rational enterprise for the three states that occupy Transcaucasia. The Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani peoples have always been interconnected by trade, transport, and even culture, despite religious differences. Under the Russian Empire, the three peoples were incorporated into a Caucasian administrative region. After the 1917 February revolution, the Transcaucasian leaders tried to maintain political and economic unity through the formation of regional Transcaucasian Soviets, a Transcaucasian Revolutionary Committee (*Revkom*), and finally, a few days before the October Revolution, by a Transcaucasian Committee of Public Safety.

After the October Revolution, an anti-Bolshevik coalition of Transcaucasian leaders formed a Transcaucasian Commissariat. This was the first attempt to create a proper federal structure, though the vertical and horizontal divisions of authority

were unclear. The Commissariat, which governed alongside a Transcaucasian Seim (parliament), was divided within itself by the war with Turkey and Germany. It collapsed after five months, in April 1918.

Newly independent Transcaucasian states were formed, but were soon overthrown by the Red Army. The independent Georgian republic was the last to fall, in February 1921. Soviet power, with its emphasis on large, efficient territorial units and class solidarity, reestablished unified Transcaucasian organizations, such as the Transcaucasian Economic Bureau. In March 1922, despite resistance from regional leaders, and the Georgians in particular, Moscow established a Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia (FSSRZ) in February 1922. Its supreme organ was a plenipotentiary conference of Transcaucasian representatives. In December 1922 this loose federation of republics was transformed into a single federated republic, or the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (ZSFSR). The new federation was highly centralized, and the republics were given only six commissariats (ministries). The remainder were given to the federal Transcaucasian government. The Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee (ZtsIK) was the executive organ of the federation and, along with the Transcaucasian Council of People's Commissariats (*Sovnarkom*), could overrule the republics on almost any issue. The Transcaucasian republics were subject to dual authority, from the Transcaucasian central organs and from Moscow. However, the real power was in the unitary Communist Party, an organization hostile to the idea of federation.

In 1936 the Stalin constitution dismantled the ZSFSR and established separate union republics in Transcaucasia. Administratively, they were now directly subordinate to Moscow, with no intermediate Transcaucasian administration. However, within the republics, the autonomous republican or regional status of a number of national minorities was retained. Azerbaijan included the Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Region and the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan. Georgia incorporated three separate administrative units: the South Ossetian Autonomous Region and the Abkhazian and Ach'aran Autonomous republics. Although Azerbaijan and Georgia were never described or operated as federations, they resembled them administratively. There was a division of power which devolved considerable social and cultural authority to the national minority governments within the

union republics. This remained the case until the breakup of the USSR, itself a quasi-federation, in December 1991.

After the collapse of the USSR, the Transcaucasian states reclaimed their independence; Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war over Nagorno-Karabagh. This war, and intense competition over scarce resources, made the concept of a new Transcaucasian Federation unrealized, although there were half-hearted discussions and calls from the new leaders for a common Caucasian Home or Forum of Caucasian Peoples. President Shevardnadze of Georgia spoke of a federation within Georgia to end the country's interethnic problems. However, despite encouragement from Western powers for more Transcaucasian cooperation, there is no significant Transcaucasian political movement calling for federation today.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASIA; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS

STEPHEN JONES

TRANS-DNIESTER REPUBLIC

The label Transnistria has historically applied to lands that today lie inside both the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, but it now refers specifically to the area between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border. Since 1990, residents of this territory have claimed independence from Moldova. Despite a lack of international recognition, the Dniester Moldovan Republic (DMR) functions as a de facto sovereign state.

The DMR sits upon a thin strip of land, less than thirty kilometers wide and only 4,118 square kilometers in area. Although the political and economic elite is primarily of Slavic origin, 39.9 percent of the population are ethnic Moldovan (Romanian speaking). Ukrainians form the largest minority with 28.3 percent, and 25.5 percent of the population claim Russian heritage. There is a Slavic concentration in the urban centers, particularly in the capital of Tiraspol. The Moldovan population constitutes a majority in the countryside.

Despite its plurality of Romanian speakers, Transnistria has never been part of the greater Ro-

manian lands to the west of the Dniester. The region formed part of Kievan Rus and then the Galicia-Volhynian Kingdom between the ninth and fourteenth centuries. It was subsequently drawn into the Ottoman Empire before being annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812. Following the Bolshevik Revolution and ensuing civil war, Transnistria was briefly incorporated into Soviet Ukraine.

In 1924, land stretching from the Dniester in the west to the Bug River in the east was carved off of Soviet Ukraine to form the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). The creation of the MASSR formed part of the Soviet Union's policy of national liberation, which was designed to draw bordering states (Bessarabia) away from the influence of bourgeois neighbors (Romania). Tiraspol was named capital of the MASSR in 1929, though the right was reserved to shift the capital to Chisinau upon reunification with rump Moldova. Following the Soviet Union's annexation of Bessarabia in 1940, six western districts were integrated with Bessarabia to form the Moldovan Soviet Social Republic (MSSR). The remaining MASSR territory reverted to Soviet Ukraine.

Despite the merging of Transnistria and Bessarabia between 1940 and 1991, social, political, and economic differences between the two regions remained. Having been significantly sovietized between World War I and World War II, the Transnistrian political elite was considered by Moscow to be more reliable than its Bessarabian counterpart. Moldovan Communist Party (CPM) members from Transnistria were, therefore, relatively overrepresented in the Moldovan Soviet structure. Transnistria was the focus of Soviet industrial expansion in the region, particularly the steel industry, while Bessarabia remained agrarian. Sizable Ukrainian and Russian immigration also shifted the demographic balance during this period, though ethnic Moldovans remained in the majority.

From 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika allowed ethnic Moldovans to seek a redress of the socioeconomic imbalance in the MASSR. A devolution of power from Moscow to the constituent republics, and the introduction of direct elections to the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1989, enabled Bessarabians to increase their influence over national policy.

Conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol began to mount from 1989. Tensions were exacerbated

by the introduction of a number of restrictive language laws that favored the Moldovan language over Russian. Sporadic violence began in 1989 and continued intermittently until a peace accord was signed in July 1992.

Transnistrian resistance was initially led by the United Council of Work Collectives, under the leadership of Ukrainian national Igor Smirnov. Protests swiftly became violent, as industrial managers mobilized their workers against Moldovan police forces. An autonomous Dniester Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed on September 2, 1990. This proclamation was followed by a declaration of full independence on August 27, 1991, with Smirnov as president.

Conflict peaked in the summer of 1992 following the intervention of the Russian Fourteenth Army, which was stationed in Transnistria. Although Moscow claimed credit for taking swift action, the decision to engage was likely taken by Fourteenth Army commander Yuri Netkachev, without official sanction from the Russian government. Netkachev was soon replaced by Alexander Lebed. Throughout the conflict, the Fourteenth Army provided troops and armaments to the Transnistrian forces. With a disorganized defense—led by poorly armed police forces—Moldovan troops were unable to retain control of their positions in Transnistria and suffered considerably more casualties than Transnistrian and Russian forces. Overall casualties have been estimated at between seven hundred and one thousand. A pact signed on July 21, 1992, between Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Moldovan president Mircea Snigur ended armed hostilities, and Russian forces began to withdraw in 1994.

At the turn of the century, the DMR remained autonomous, though the international community refused to recognize its claims to statehood.

See also: LEBED, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH; MOLDOVA AND MOLDOVANS; PRIMAKOV, YEVGENY MAXIMOVICH

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JOHN GLEDHILL

TRANSITION ECONOMIES

The term *transition* has been applied to the countries that have abandoned the Soviet-type political and economic system at the end of the twentieth century. As it suggests a passage from one state to another, it is important to define both the point of departure and the point of arrival.

The point of departure may be considered the communist system that appeared in Russia following the October 1917 Revolution, and which was imposed on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe under Soviet rule after World War II. The core of this system may be described in terms of three features. First, economic life was under the control of a single party. In the USSR, this was the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). All the national parties in Central and Eastern Europe were subordinate to the CPSU until the very end of the system, notwithstanding some crises, even though not all were officially labeled communist. The two exceptions were Yugoslavia and Albania, whose leaders broke with the Soviet system in 1948 and 1961, respectively. The second feature was that the economic institutions were based upon state ownership of the means of production. The private sector was nonexistent or negligible, and market ways of operating could only be found in an illegal underground economy. Finally, the third feature was compulsory central planning that regulated production, trade, and distribution of incomes.

The transition process began as a rejection of these three foundations of the communist economic system. The initial shock came with the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, which triggered the collapse of the communist parties and the beginning of a threefold process: from one-party rule to democracy, from state ownership to private property, and from plan to market. In the Soviet case, the transition process also included the collapse of the Soviet state as a federation of republics; this led to the independence of the three Baltic states, and later of the other twelve former republics. Officially the Soviet Union was dissolved

in December 1991. The Russian Federation was the biggest Soviet Republic and the dominant one, both economically and politically.

All the former communist countries in the world, with the exceptions of North Korea and Cuba, became engaged in a transition process. In the case of the Asian countries, particularly China and Vietnam, the transition process was well under way in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Although perhaps more advanced economically than in some former European communist countries, the transition did not touch the political system, which remained communist. Can one still speak of transition? The question is debated.

In all the countries the basic transition policies were identical in their economic design. They were prepared by the new governments with the help of Western experts and international organizations, with the dominant influence of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the first institution created solely for the purpose of assisting the transition). The building blocks of the transition were again threefold. First, there was an overall liberalization of the economic activities. Prices that had been fixed or controlled by the state were freed, as were the rates of exchange (for converting foreign into local currencies and vice-versa) and the rates of interest. People became free to undertake business activities and engage in domestic and foreign trade. Second, a stabilization program was instituted to eradicate inflation, control the budget deficit, and limit the foreign debt. Third, a structural transformation was intended to create the institutions of a market economy. The main component of the transformation was privatization: the task not only of putting the former state ownership into private hands—individual or corporate—but also of creating a new private sector. Transformation also implied a banking reform, which would put an end to the monopoly of a single state bank and allow the new private sector to be financed by credit. Tax reform and the building of a modern financial market were on the agenda. In order to replace the former social security system where the citizens were in complete charge of the state through subsidized health, education, housing, and even recreation systems, a market-type social security safety net only partly financed by the state was needed.

These measures were applied in Russia as in most of the Central and East European countries,

under a program that started with Boris Yeltsin's first term on January 2, 1992, and was conducted by a team of reformers headed by Yegor Gaidar. Liberalization was swift and stabilization was achieved, albeit with difficulties and some crises. However, structural transformation progressed slowly and unevenly, and, ten years later, it could not be considered finished. The private sector was dominant, but the restructuring of the former state enterprises had not been completed, and monopolies prevailed in such crucial sectors as energy. The private companies were not applying the rules of a transparent corporate governance. The banking reform continued, with the banking sector suffering as a result of the financial crisis of 1998. The social security reform was not implemented.

The former Soviet Republics were in a still more difficult position. They were hit by the collapse of the USSR. Their links with Moscow and among themselves, defined by the former central plan, were disrupted. Most of them, except for states rich in oil and natural resources, such as Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, could only rely on foreign assistance to conduct their reforms. Some of them, such as Belarus, or to a lesser extent Ukraine, hardly began their structural transformation. Some others, such as the Caucasian states, or the southern republics of Central Asia, are still plagued by ethnic conflicts or border wars.

The full transition to a market economy was not yet completed in Russia ten years after its beginning. Why has it been a much more chaotic process than in the countries of Central Europe, or even Eastern Europe? Several factors may explain these differences: the length of the Communist rule in Russia; Russia's size and diversity; paradoxically, its huge natural resources, which relieved the state of the need for more radical reforms and allowed a small minority of corrupt businessmen to grab these resources through the mechanisms of privatization; and, the lack of incentives and assistance, which were provided to Central and Eastern Europe through the European Union enlargement process but were not available to the CIS countries.

See also: ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; MARKET SOCIALISM; PRIVATIZATION

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MARIE LAVIGNE

TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway between 1891 and 1916 ended the era of great transcontinental railway building. The Trans-Siberian stretches 5,776 miles between Moscow's Yaroslavsky Station and Vladivostok (6,117 miles from St. Petersburg). It takes a minimum of a week to traverse that distance by train.

The longest railway in the world, the Trans-Siberian project was mired in controversy from the moment Tsarevich Nicholas shoveled an inaugural spade full of dirt into an awaiting wheelbarrow in Vladivostok on May 31, 1891, until the completion of the Amur River Bridge at Khabarovsk in 1916. A technological marvel at the time, it soon bore the reputation of "a monument to bungling." The rails and crossties were too light, causing frequent derailments; the wooden bridges were flimsy; and, since the builders were mostly exiles and convicts, there was justifiable reason to believe that much of the line had been sabotaged.

Moreover, the estimated costs in 1916 U.S. dollars ranged from \$770 million to \$1 billion, which represented one-fifth of Russia's national debt at the time. During its construction, the Trans-Siberian was a serious drain on the Russian economy and, between 1914 and 1916, on the war effort. Despite the criticism, the great railway more than paid for itself during the twentieth century. Still the only transportation artery to span Siberia and the Russian Far East, the Trans-Siberian has solidified Moscow's hold on Russia's eastern periphery.

Fanatically supported by high-ranking tsarist officials like Count Sergei Witte (1849–1915) and Anatoly Kulomzin (1838–1924), the Trans-Siberian's influence was immediate. The annual number of migrants to Siberia and the Russian Far East doubled (to 88,000) between 1896 and 1904 and then doubled again (to 174,000) between 1905 and 1914. Between 1895 and 1916, a total of 2.5 million land-poor peasants migrated to the region from European Russia. This Great Siberian Migration represented 57 percent of everyone who had migrated to Siberia and the Russian Far East since 1796. Additionally, the Siberian economy, which had been almost nonexistent, exploded. New settlers rapidly cultivated West Siberia's virgin black earth, doubling the sown area. The region quickly became one of Russia's major breadbaskets. Flour mills sprang up like mushrooms. West Siberia's butter industry jumped from nonexistence to becoming the second leading butter exporter behind Denmark. Virtually every railhead had sawmills, stockyards, and slaughterhouses. Without the Trans-Siberian Railroad, Siberia's industrial revolution never would have succeeded.

The Trans-Siberian's principal commodities are coal, oil and oil products, and wood and wood products. Major non-Russian users of the railway, which is now double-tracked and electrified for much of its distance, are China, Japan, and South Korea.

See also: RAILWAYS; SIBERIA; TRADE ROUTES

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VICTOR L. MOTE

TRIANDAFILLOV, VIKTOR KIRIAKOVICH

(1894–1931), military theorist and intellectual.

Triandafillov was one of the key intellectual leaders of the Red Army during the inter-war period (1918–1939). Triandafillov was instrumental

in formulating a new and revolutionary understanding of modern war. Up until the Industrial Revolution, military campaigns had consisted of a single decisive battle or series of inconclusive combats. The industrialization of war set in motion a revolutionary change in the means and methods of waging war. Campaigns became more protracted, battles were less decisive, and armies were more widely distributed in a theater of operations. Triandafillov, along with Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, Alexander A. Svechin, Boris M. Shaposhnikov, Mikhail V. Frunze, and G. S. Isserson, recognized that the material transmutation of war demanded a corresponding conceptual transformation. He believed that one could no longer think about modern war using a Napoleonic paradigm.

Triandafillov's unique contribution was to help overturn the old Napoleonic cut that framed war in the dual strategy-tactics creative structure. The German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) had associated each of the levels of military art with a particular activity. Strategy was concerned with campaigns and tactics with battles. Other Soviet theorists argued that the complexity of war demanded a new creative component that they referred to as operational art (*operativnoe iskusstvo*). The creative domain of operational art became the operation (*operatsiia*). Triandafillov made his seminal theoretical contribution concerning the modern operation in a book entitled *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies* (1929, 1932, 1936, and 1937). Triandafillov defined the modern operation as a distinct military activity consisting of a "mosaic" of battles and maneuvers, distributed in space and time but unified by aim and purpose, conducted for the object of strategy. Triandafillov was killed in a plane crash in July 1931 while he was in the process of revising his work to consider the practical problems of creating a mass mechanized Red Army.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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JAMES J. SCHNEIDER

TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

Sergius and his brother Stefan founded the monastery in 1342 in an uninhabited forest, thirty five miles northeast of Moscow, now the city of Sergiev Posad, and dedicated it to the Trinity. When Stefan left, Sergius lived as a hermit. His piety attracted disciples who in 1353 made him abbot. As their numbers grew, Sergius introduced a cenobite rule based on that of the Studios Monastery in Constantinople. It mandated communal property, prayer, work, and meals presided over by an elected abbot. Until his death in 1392, Sergius maintained strict discipline and vows of poverty. His example inspired the founding of other houses. Destroyed by the Mongols in 1408, Trinity was reestablished by Sergius's disciple Abbot Nikon. In 1422 Nikon inaugurated worship of Sergius's sanctity. Helped by the local prince and the brother of Moscow's ruler, whom Sergius had baptized, he built a stone church to house Sergius's tomb and commissioned Andrei Rublev and Danyl Cherny to decorate it with frescoes. Andrei painted his famous icon of the Trinity for its iconostasis. Thenceforth pilgrims flocked to Trinity to be healed, to request feasts and prayers for their souls and those of their family and ancestors, and to be buried. In return they gave Trinity land and money. Princes also favored Trinity with immunities from taxes and other obligations. In 1446 Grand Prince Vasily II of Moscow unsuccessfully sought refuge at Trinity during a dynastic war. Nevertheless, after his victory in 1447, he returned to bask in Sergius's charisma and be its patron. Tsaritsas went to Trinity to pray for heirs. Tsar Ivan IV "the Terrible" made many pilgrimages and provided state monies for construction and lavish personal gifts. Tsar Boris Godunov was buried there. During the Time of Troubles the monastery's walls withstood a Polish siege from September 1608 to January 1610. Afterward Archimandrite Dionisy and Cellarer Avramy Palitsyn sent appeals throughout Russia to organize an army to free Moscow from the Poles and reconstitute the Russian state. In gratitude Mikhail Romanov stopped at Trinity in 1613 en route to his coronation in Moscow.

By the 1640s Trinity housed 240 monks organized in a social order that was a microcosm of Russian society. It controlled numerous subsidiary monasteries and owned over 570,000 acres of tilled land, 100,000 serfs, and many urban properties throughout European Russia. The original communal order became relaxed, and wealthy monks



Exterior view of the Trinity St. Sergius Monastery. © DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS

controlled their own property. As of 1561, Trinity's abbot held the rank of Archimandrite, senior to the heads of all Russian monasteries. Trinity again was important in 1682 when child co-tsars Ivan V and Peter I "the Great" and Ivan's sister and regent Sophia hid there until a military revolt was pacified. In 1689 Peter fled to Trinity from Sophia and her soldier allies, rallied support, and returned to Moscow as sole ruler. Neither the Law Code of 1649, nor the religious reforms of rulers Peter I and Anna I Ivanovna, materially diminished Trinity's status. It was designated a *lavra* in 1744, the highest class of monastery, one of four in Russia, and a seminary was established there. Catherine II "the Great," however, ordered that monastic lands and serfs be turned over to the state in 1764. Trinity was limited to one hundred monks and a state subsidy. It recovered during the 1800s, aided by a religious revival and the easing of restrictions on monastic landholding. In 1814 the Moscow Theological Academy took residence at Trinity. When Russia celebrated the five-hundredth anniversary of Sergius's death in 1892, the Trinity Monastery had

over four hundred monks and novices and controlled five new monastic communities. After the Russian Revolution, the Soviets confiscated Trinity's properties, disinterred Sergius's remains, dispersed its monks, and closed the theological academy. It became a museum of Russian history and art. Many of its treasures and most of its archive were brought to Moscow. In 1946 Stalin allowed the monastery to reopen and rebury Sergius's remains. When Soviet power ended in 1991, Trinity flourished anew as a cult center.

The Trinity Sergius Monastery remains a treasure-house of Russian art and architecture. The Church of the Trinity (1422–1427) and the Church of the Holy Spirit with its graceful bell tower (1486) are the oldest buildings. The ceremonial center is the five-domed Cathedral of the Dormition (1559–1585). The huge refectory with a church of St. Sergius (1686–1692), the tsars' palace (c. 1690) in the Moscow Baroque style, and the five-tiered bell tower (1740–1770) are also noteworthy. Trinity's scriptorium and workshops produced impor-

tant chronicles and religious writings, clothing, icons, and religious utensils to supplement equally lavish gifts from its patrons. In 1993 UNESCO recognized the ensemble as a World Heritage site.

See also: KIRILLO-BELOOZERO MONASTERY; MONASTERIES; SERGIUS (SAINT); SIMONOV MONASTERY; SOLOVETSK MONASTERY

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DAVID B. MILLER

TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

(1879–1940), number-two leader of the Bolshevik Revolution, and subsequent rival of Stalin.

A prominent left-wing Menshevik after his leading role in the Revolution of 1905, Leon Trotsky (né Lev Bronstein) joined the Bolsheviks in 1917, became Vladimir Lenin's de facto second in command during the October Revolution and the civil war, and then went into opposition until he was exiled and eventually murdered at Josef Stalin's behest.

PREREVOLUTIONARY CAREER

Trotsky was born in the village of Yanovka in what is now Ukraine on November 7 (October 26, O. S.), 1879. His father was a prosperous farmer of Russified Jewish background. Young Bronstein was sent to school in Odessa, where he lived with a relative who belonged to the intelligentsia, and he began to display the intellectual brilliance that marked his entire life. He was attracted to the revolutionary movement and Marxism, helped organize an illegal workers' movement, and was arrested in 1898. He spent four years in prison and in Siberian exile, but escaped in 1902 (under the pseudonym Trotsky), leaving behind a wife and two baby daughters.

Making his way to Western Europe, Trotsky joined Lenin in publishing the Marxist paper *Iskra* (Spark), but at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party in 1903 he sided with the Mensheviks and spoke out against Lenin's authoritarian concept of the party. Meanwhile he married Natalia Sedova, by whom he had two sons.

When revolutionary uprisings shook the tsarist regime in 1905, Trotsky returned to Russia. He joined the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies and became its most vocal leader. For this he was arrested, put on trial, and again sent to Siberia. In jail he wrote *Results and Prospects*, setting forth his theory of permanent revolution to predict that a bourgeois revolution would go on permanently until it turned into a workers' revolution in Russia and triggered proletarian revolution elsewhere.

After escaping from Siberia again in 1907, Trotsky settled in Vienna to work as a journalist (notably during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913) and to participate in émigré Social-Democratic politics as a left-wing Menshevik. With that group he opposed Russian participation in World War I, a position for which he was expelled from one European country after another, and he found himself in New York when the February Revolution broke out.

REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR

Trotsky welcomed the fall of the tsarist regime as the beginning of the permanent revolution he had predicted. Following a brief detention in Canada he made his way back to Russia in May 1917. There he took the lead of the left Mensheviks who called themselves the Interdistrict Group and agreed with the Bolsheviks on opposing the war and pushing for a new revolution. Although jailed by the Provisional Government after the abortive July Days uprising, Trotsky and his group were absorbed into the Bolshevik Party at the Sixth Party Congress in August 1917, and Trotsky was elected to the Central Committee.

Released from jail after the failed right-wing putsch by General Lavr Kornilov, and responding to the upsurge in popular revolutionary sentiment, Trotsky took the lead in agitating for a revolutionary takeover by the Petrograd Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Yet, like most of the Bolshevik leaders, he resisted Lenin's call for an armed coup prior to the Second Congress of Soviets that was scheduled for late October 1917. As

chairman of the Petrograd Soviet from September on, Trotsky is generally credited with being the organizer of the October Revolution, though how deliberately the Bolshevik takeover was prepared is debatable. Evidence of a planned uprising is lacking, apart from improvised steps to mobilize pro-Bolshevik troops and workers' Red Guards to defend the Soviet against the Provisional Government. When the government attempted a preemptive raid on October 24, Trotsky sent troops and workers' Red Guards out to take over the city of Petrograd; proclaimed the overthrow of the Provisional Government; and presented the Congress of Soviets with a *fait accompli* when it convened on October 25. Subsequently he denied that he had differed with Lenin about waiting for the Congress of Soviets, claiming that his statements to that effect had only been intended to deceive the government.

Immediately after the Bolsheviks' takeover of Petrograd and their capture of the Winter Palace, the Congress of Soviets approved a new Soviet government with Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Trotsky became Commissar of Foreign Affairs. In the next few days he directed pro-Bolshevik forces in beating back an attempt by Alexander Kerensky to regain power, and he supported Lenin in rejecting a government coalition with the moderate socialists.

As foreign commissar Trotsky directed diplomatic overtures to end the war, and, failing that, to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers. Repelled by Germany's demands, he and his supporters abstained in the crucial 7-4 vote in the Central Committee to accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and he resigned the foreign affairs portfolio in protest. However, he was immediately made Commissar of War, and in this capacity set about organizing a new, disciplined Red Army to replace the old army that had virtually disintegrated. He rejected the guerrilla tactics favored by many Bolsheviks and made the controversial decision to employ former tsarist officers as military specialists under the supervision of political commissars. When civil war broke out in May 1918, Trotsky commanded the communist Red forces and turned back offensives by the counterrevolutionary White forces that year and the next. He became a member of the Communist Party Politburo when it was created in 1919. Once victory had been won over the Whites in 1920, Trotsky proposed a military approach to rebuilding the country's economy, including militarization of labor and absorption of the trade unions into the state, an approach that



Born Lev Davidovich Bronstein, Leon Trotsky became Stalin's principal rival for power. ARCHIVE PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

led later commentators to regard him as a precursor of the Stalinist planned economy. However, in the Trade Union Controversy of 1921, Trotsky and his friends were defeated by Lenin in the name of a more moderate policy of state capitalism, presaging the New Economic Policy (NEP). Lenin was supported by Trotsky's future rivals Josef Stalin and Grigory Zinoviev, with whom Trotsky had already clashed during the civil war. Nevertheless, Trotsky took charge of suppressing the March 1921 rebellion at the Kronstadt naval base near Petrograd that had been brought on by Communist abuses.

IN OPPOSITION

Set back at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, Trotsky remained Commissar of War during Lenin's subsequent illness, while the troika of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Lev Kamenev maneuvered to keep him from succeeding Lenin as party leader. In his celebrated Testament, Lenin noted Trotsky's exceptional abilities, but faulted his too far-reaching self confi-



Leon Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk, 1918. THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSÉE DES 2 GUERRES MONDIALES PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

dence. He nevertheless invited Trotsky to lead an attack on Stalin, but Trotsky passed up the opportunity (fearing anti-Semitism, as archives opened in 1990 revealed). Some months later, in October 1923, Trotsky launched a behind-the-scenes attack on the rest of the communist leadership for violating democratic procedures within the party. Going public with a series of articles, "The New Course," Trotsky was in turn denounced by his rivals for violating the party's rule against factionalism. While Trotsky fell ill, his supporters were crushed in the New Course controversy and condemned at the Thirteenth Party Conference in January 1924 as a petty-bourgeois Menshevik deviation. Coming barely a week before Lenin's death, this was the decisive defeat for Trotsky and his friends, and for political pluralism within the Communist Party. Trotsky's subsequent struggle against Stalin was futile and anti-climactic.

Denounced again at the Thirteenth Party Congress in May 1924, Trotsky sarcastically affirmed the infallibility of the party. He took the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Bolshevik Revo-

lution to denounce Zinoviev and Kamenev as failed revolutionary leaders. This act triggered a new outburst of official denunciation of Trotskyism and the theory of permanent revolution as anti-Leninist heresy. In January 1925 the leadership went further and removed Trotsky from the Commissariat of War.

When Zinoviev and Kamenev broke with Stalin later in 1925, Trotsky sat on the sidelines. After their defeat, he belatedly joined them in the United Opposition, vainly fighting Stalin in 1926 and 1927 over the issues of party democracy, excessive concessions to the peasantry, and Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country" that downplayed world revolution. Trotsky was removed from the Politburo in October 1926 and from the Central Committee just one year later. After attempting a demonstration on the tenth anniversary of the revolution in November 1927, he was expelled from the party. The same fate awaited his followers at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December, where not a single voice was heard in defense of the opposition.

Despite his declining political fortunes, Trotsky wrote widely during the mid-1920s, producing such works as *Literature and Revolution* and *Problems of Life*, along with a series of books on international politics and a stream of platforms and polemics that remained unpublished in his lifetime.

EXILE AND DEATH

In January 1928 Trotsky and many of his followers were exiled; many were sent to Siberia and Central Asia, Trotsky himself to Alma Ata in Kazakhstan. There he continued to correspond with his sympathizers and to criticize Stalin's new industrialization drive. As a result, in January 1929, he was deported from the Soviet Union to Turkey, where he continued to write, completing his autobiography and his *History of the Russian Revolution*. In 1933 he moved to France, and in 1934 he proclaimed the formation of a Fourth International challenging the legitimacy of the Third Communist International. In many countries Trotskyist parties split off from the communists, including the Socialist Workers' Party in the United States and, in Spain, the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista), suppressed by Stalinist sympathizers in the course of the Spanish Civil War.

Expelled from France in 1935, Trotsky moved to Norway, whence he was expelled under Soviet

pressure in 1936. He then settled in Mexico, in the town of Coyoacán, where he lived until his assassination in 1940. Trotsky was virtually expunged from official Soviet history, becoming an “unperson” in George Orwell’s term; writings by or about him were completely suppressed. During the Moscow Trials of 1936–1938 he was vilified in absentia as a counterrevolutionary traitor, a charge of which he was absolved by an American investigating committee headed by the philosopher John Dewey. Trotsky fired back in numerous writings, notably *The Revolution Betrayed*, charging that Stalin’s regime was a bureaucratic perversion of socialism and calling quixotically for a new workers’ revolution.

Trotsky was murdered on August 20, 1940, by an undercover agent of the Soviet secret police, a Spanish communist named Ramón Mercader, who had gained entry to the victim’s household under a pseudonym. The Soviet government denied involvement, though its role has since been well established. Mercader served a twenty-year prison sentence. Trotsky continued to be demonized in the Soviet Union, and the Gorbachev government never got around to rehabilitating him officially as it did other purge victims. His personal archive has been preserved at Harvard University.

Trotsky was a brilliant writer and a charismatic revolutionary leader. As a politician, however, he was by all accounts arrogant and arbitrary, and he antagonized most of his communist associates in the years when personal opinions still counted. His military methods during the civil war are often regarded as an anticipation of Stalinism, though in later years he protested the violation of democratic procedures and the growth of bureaucratic privilege in the Soviet Union. He is often viewed as an apostle of world revolution, in contrast with Stalin’s nationalism. In any case, Stalin became obsessed with destroying Trotsky and anyone connected with him, including family members.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MENSHEVIKS; PERMANENT REVOLUTION; STALIN, JOSEF VISARIONOVICH

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ROBERT V. DANIELS

TRUDODEN *See* LABOR DAY.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE *See* COLD WAR.

TRUSTS, SOVIET

At the behest of Vladimir Lenin, war communism, which was introduced during the civil war and sought to achieve full state ownership and operation of the economy immediately, was abandoned as unwieldy, unworkable, and premature. It was replaced by the NEP, under which state industry

was divided into two categories: the commanding heights and a decentralized sector. The former industries, which included fuel, metallurgy, the war industries, transportation, banking, and foreign trade, remained under direct supervision of the government in the form of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). These industries continued as part of the central budget and were subject to centralized allocations of supplies and outputs.

The decentralized industries, consisting mainly of firms serving ordinary consumers, were encouraged to form into trusts. VSNKh created sixteen new departments, which replaced the fifty or so *glavki*, to supervise the largest and most important trusts. About a quarter of the trusts, mainly involved in light industry, were supervised at the decentralized level of the *sovmarkhozy*. By mid-1923 there were 478 trusts composed of 3,561 enterprises and employing about 75 percent of the total industrial workforce. Subsequently, many trusts were amalgamated into even larger units, known as syndicates.

The consolidation of industries into trusts and of trusts into syndicates was obviously intended to make control and coordination of the economy simpler and more effective. These large-scale organizations posed certain problems, especially when their managers sought to use the monopoly power they provided against consumers or other sectors of the economy. The Soviet trust disappeared with the beginning of rapid industrialization and the five-year plan era of the 1930s.

See also: COMMITTEE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

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
TSARSKOYE SELO

Tsarskoye Selo (known as Detskoye Selo between 1918 and 1937, Pushkin thereafter) is a suburb of St. Petersburg best known for its imperial palaces and its lyceum. The town was established in 1708

on the site of a conquered Finnish village, not long after the founding of St. Petersburg. The first railroad in Russia, opened in 1837, connected Tsarskoye Selo to the capital, about twenty-five kilometers (fourteen miles) away. In 1887 Tsarskoye Selo also became the first European town to be illuminated by electricity.

Tsarskoye Selo (literally “the Tsar’s Village”) was among the residences of the imperial family from the time of its founding until 1917. Celebrated as the Russian Versailles, the town’s layout and culture owed much to the admiration that the Emperor Peter the Great and his successors felt for the French original and other European models. Initially, between 1708 and 1724, Tsarskoye Selo served as the residence of Peter’s wife, the Empress Catherine I. The original Catherine Palace, named after her, was constructed at that time. Substantial rebuilding of the complex was undertaken during the reign of the Empress Elizabeth (1741–1762), with many famed architects and artists taking part in the project. The most famous example is the architect Francesco Bartolomeo Rastrelli’s work on the imperial palace. It is acknowledged as a masterpiece of Russian baroque. The stucco decorations of the facade of the immense palace were gilded so lavishly that, according to contemporaries, in sunlight one could not bear to look at the building directly. To correct this defect and reduce maintenance costs, the gilding was soon replaced by ochre paint. The contrast between the azure paint of the walls and the ochre color of the decorations continues to define the palace’s look. Further notable changes and additions were made during the reign of Empress Catherine II (1762–1796). Among them was the construction of the classicist Alexander Palace, commissioned by the empress to honor her favorite grandson and future monarch, Alexander I. Aside from the elaborate palaces decorated with impressive art works, Tsarskoye Selo also featured lavish parks and the quarters for various regiments of the imperial guard. In the words of the poet Nikolai Gumilev, “barracks, parks, and palaces” defined the appearance of the town.

Numerous grand dukes lived in Tsarskoye Selo throughout its existence, but the town gained greater official stature after 1905, when Nicholas II made it his permanent residence. It was in Tsarskoye Selo that the last emperor of Russia was arrested by the Provisional Government during the February Revolution of 1917, and it was from there that he was exiled with his family to Siberia in July of that year.



View of the Catherine Palace at Tsarkoye Selo, from an 1807 publication by Georg Reinbeck in which he describes his 1805 travels from St. Petersburg through Moscow and other Eastern European destinations to Germany in a series of letters. THE ART

ARCHIVE/BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA VENICE/DAGLI ORTI (A)

The Lyceum, a school for the offspring of the nobility, opened in Tsarskoye Selo in 1811. The stated mission of this prestigious school was to train young men for service to the state. Between 1817 and 1895 the Lyceum produced fifty-one classes, shaping the *crème de la crème* of the empire's political and cultural elite. The most famous graduate was the poet Alexander Pushkin, whose poetry featured repeated allusions to his alma mater and immortalized Tsarskoye Selo as a literary image. Among the numerous other prominent alumni were literary figures Anton Delvig, Lev Mei, and Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin; scholars Grigory Danilevsky, Yakov Grot, and Alexander Veselovsky; Decembrists Wilhelm Küchelbecker and Ivan Pushchin; and counselor Alexander Gorchakov.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the poets Anna Akhmatova, Gumilev, and Innokenty Annensky made Tsarskoye Selo their home. Nu-

merous painters, attracted by the allure of the Russian Versailles, were also drawn to the town. Among them were Alexandre Benois, Mstislav Dobozhinsky, Alexander Golovin, Yevgeny Lansere, and Konstantin Somov.

During the Soviet period, Tsarskoye Selo was the subject of both passive neglect and active destruction. The town's central church (St. Catherine's Cathedral, erected in 1840, designed by Konstantin Ton) was detonated in 1939. A large statue of Lenin, erected in 1960, still stands in its place. During World War II, the town was captured and looted by the Nazis. Much of its artistic heritage was destroyed and only partially reconstructed in the postwar period. Despite all this, Tsarskoye Selo remains an important tourist destination. Retaining an aristocratic aura, the town constitutes a cultural preserve of literary and artistic traditions.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; NICHOLAS II; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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ANNA PETROVA
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TSAR, TSARINA

The term *tsar* and its variants derive from the Latin word *caesar*, or emperor. During the fifteenth century, Muscovite grand prince Ivan III began using the term to introduce an added level power and majesty to his rule. In 1547 his son, sixteen-year old prince Ivan IV, crowned himself tsar of all Russia. Indicating the increased significance of Orthodoxy, Ivan adopted other conventions from the Byzantine Empire at the same time, including a variety of court rituals and the double-headed eagle emblem. The eagle signified the uniting of eastern and western Christianity through Ivan III's marriage to Sophia Paleologue, a niece of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI.

Russian leaders continued to be tsars until 1721, when Peter the Great styled himself as "Emperor of All Russia." Peter chose the more Western style because he wanted to reflect Russia's observance of the rule of law and entry into the Age of Reason. However, the term *tsar* remained in common usage to designate the Russian ruler.

Tsar is used for the male sovereign; his consort is the *tsarina*. In the event of a female sovereign, such as Catherine the Great, she is crowned *tsaritsa*. The heir to the throne is designated the *tsarevich* a word derived from *tsar* plus the male patronymic suffix "evich."

The term itself has outlived the Russian monarchy. Russian leaders who exhibit autocratic tendencies, most notably Boris Yeltsin, have been derided or lampooned as tsars (e.g., Tsar Boris). Even in the United States, individuals with considerable personal authority have been dubbed tsar. For example, the leader of U.S. drug policy was informally known as the drug tsar.

See also: AUTOCRACY

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

TSIOLKOVSKY, KONSTANTIN EDUARDOVICH

(1857–1935), Russian space technology expert.

Born in Izhevskoye, Tsiolkovsky was a pioneer of rocket technology and astronautics, known in Russia as cosmonautics. Tsiolkovsky might be termed the "Robert Goddard of Russia," after the American rocket expert, who, like Tsiolkovsky, began testing rockets in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Tsiolkovsky is generally credited with deducing for the first time the laws of motion of a rocket as a body of a variable mass in space without gravity. This, in turn, demonstrated the possibility of using rockets for interplanetary exploration. He also investigated the effect of air drag on rocket motion. Such theories and research became subjects of his writings, which included *Space Rocket Trains*, published in 1929, which explored the theory of multistage rockets.

Among Tsiolkovsky's major influences on future space flight, and in particular on the successful orbiting of the world's first sputnik (in October 1957), was his work on liquid-propellant engines. In such research and writing he developed the specifications for rocket-engine design. Modern rocket engines still incorporate many of his basic ideas.

Much attention is given in Tsiolkovsky's writings to problems of organizing interplanetary travel and its prospects. He argued that beginning with artificial earth satellites (sputniks), interplanetary stations and flights to the planets could become a way of establishing communities in outer space and adapting space for human needs.

With the advent of Soviet power in Russia, Tsiolkovsky's work received the full support of the state. In 1918 he was elected to the Socialist Academy of Science. Later honors included membership

in Russia's main cosmonautics society and the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy. His collected scientific writings appeared in the USSR from 1951 through 1964.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; SPACE PROGRAM

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

TSSU *See* CENTRAL STATISTICAL AGENCY.

TSUSHIMA, BATTLE OF

In the early twentieth century Russia expanded its economic and military presence in the Far East, inspired by Minister of Finance Sergei Witte and Russian nationalists close to Nicholas II. Three events were interpreted by Japan as a direct assault on its own continental expansion: the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, begun in 1892; its subsequent shortcut, the Chinese Eastern Railway, built across Manchuria at the turn of the century; and the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur to the south as a naval base. After diplomatic efforts yielded little satisfaction, the modern Japanese navy suddenly struck at the two major Russian bases, Vladivostok and Port Arthur, in February of 1904. By this action they destroyed most of the Russian Far Eastern fleet, and blockaded what remained of it. Russia fared badly in the ensuing Russo-Japanese War on land, because of poor leadership and geography, and because of the domestic unrest that resulted in the Revolution of 1905.

Belatedly, and as a classic example of poor planning, Russia dispatched the much larger Baltic fleet, under the command of Admiral Rozhdestvenski, to sail around Africa to the Pacific with the goal of regaining naval dominance in its Far Eastern waters. Large, unwieldy, and exhausted after the long voyage, the Russian fleet entered the Straits of Tsushima (between Japan and Korea) on its way to Vladivostok in May 1905. The new, modern Japanese navy, under the command of Admiral Togo, was waiting for it. The result was one of the worst disasters in naval history, with most of the

Russian ships quickly sunk or immobilized, and with little loss on the other side. Only a few Russian ships, including the cruiser *Aurora*, of 1917 revolutionary fame, managing to escape.

The consequences of this defeat were enormous. The battle signaled the end of the war and a search for peace, negotiated through the arbitration of President Theodore Roosevelt at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The loss was a major blow to Russian military prestige, lowering morale especially in the navy. Moreover, it prepared the background for the June 1905 mutiny of the battleship *Potemkin* when it was rumored to be among the next ships to be sent to the Pacific. The defeat also fomented antigovernment agitation that crystallized in the October Uprising and the Moscow Uprising in November. The navy, often referred to, subsequently, as the Tsushima department, never recovered, and was prone to radical revolutionary activism in 1917.

See also: POTESKIN MUTINY

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NORMAN E. SAUL

TSVETAeva, MARINA IVANOVNA

(1892–1941), twentieth-century poet, playwright, translator, and essayist.

Marina Tsvetaeva, one of the most original and complex poets of the twentieth century, led a life of fierce passion, material hardship, and ostracism. Her "poetry of whirling and staccato rhythms" (Obolensky, 1965) stands outside the trends of her time, though it shares some of the mysticism of the Symbolists, the bold experimentation of the Futurists, and the directness of the Acmeists.

Tsvetaeva was born in Moscow. Her father was a professor of art history; her mother, a talented but frustrated pianist who wanted Marina to follow in her footsteps. Tsvetaeva began writing verse at age six. In 1902 the family moved to Europe to



Poet Marina Tsvetaeva lived in Switzerland, Germany, Prague, and France before returning to Russia. © SOVFOTO

seek tuberculosis treatment for Tsvetaeva's mother. They returned to Russia in 1905 and settled in Yalta (Crimea), where Tsvetaeva's mother died in 1906. At age eighteen Tsvetaeva wrote her first collection of poems, *Evening Album (Vecherny albom)*, which drew praise from critics such as Valery Bryusov and Maximilian Voloshin.

In 1912 Tsvetaeva married Sergei Efron and bore her first child, Ariadna (Alya). Her second collection, *Magic Lantern (Volshebny fonar)*, and a collection of her early poetry, *From Two Books (Iz dvukh knig)*, received lukewarm response. In her next collection, *Juvenilia (Yunosheskie stikhi)*—not published during her lifetime—she embarked on new forms and treated unconventional themes, including her affair with Sophia Parnok, a literary critic and lesbian. (Tsvetaeva's affairs and passionate friendships played a key role in her poetry, as did her feverish devotion to her husband.) *Juvenilia* was followed by *Mileposts I (Versty I)*, which celebrates

her complex friendship with poet Osip Mandelstam and abounds with innovation.

Tsvetaeva rejected the Russian Revolution, but her views would prove complex over time: She would come into conflict with reactionary émigré circles. At the onset of the Russian civil war, Efron joined the White Army and lost contact with the family. Tsvetaeva and her daughters spent five years of poverty in Moscow. Tsvetaeva sent her younger daughter, Irina, to an orphanage, only to learn later that she had died there. Tsvetaeva's collection *Demesne of the Swans (Lebediny stan)*, unpublished until 1957, expresses support for the White Army. Other work during this period includes the collections *Mileposts II (Versty II)* and *Remeslo (Craft)*.

In 1922 Tsvetaeva and Alya emigrated to join Efron, who was in exile. They lived in Berlin, then Prague, then Paris. She gave birth to her son Georgy (Moor) in 1925. Her creative output during this period includes the poetry collections *After Russia (Posle Rossii)* and *Verses to My Son (Stikhi k synu)* and the plays *Ariadne* and *Phaedra*. Alienated from both her homeland and the Parisian émigré circles, Tsvetaeva suffered extreme isolation.

Efron's political sympathies shifted, and he became a spy for the Soviet Union. Alya, who shared his views, returned to the Soviet Union in 1937; Efron followed later that year. Tsvetaeva and her son joined them in 1939. Boris Pasternak helped her find translation work, but she was otherwise ostracized by the government and by established poets. In 1941 Efron was shot and Alya sent to a labor camp. Tsvetaeva and her son were evacuated to Yelabuga (Tatar Republic), where they lacked means of support. Tsvetaeva committed suicide on August 31, 1941.

See also: GULAG

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DIANA SENECHAL

TUGAN-BARANOVSKY, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH

(1865–1919), political economist and social theorist.

The most significant prerevolutionary Russian and Ukrainian contributor to economics, Tugan-Baranovsky was born near Kharkov, Ukraine, and attended Kharkov University. As a leading member of the Legal Marxist group, Tugan attempted to reform orthodox Russian Marxism by adding a large dose of neo-Kantian ethics, together with insights from British classical economics and a dash of the German historical school. In economic theory Tugan's most significant work was *Industrial Crises in Contemporary England* (1894). This pioneered the detailed empirical description of trade cycles—together with concern for their social consequences—alongside a theoretical explanation combining maldistribution of income, disproportion between industrial branches, and a mechanistic steam engine analogy using free loanable capital as the motor force. This approach influenced Western macroeconomic theorists such as John Maynard Keynes, Dennis Robertson, and Michal Kalecki.

Tugan also wrote a major work examining the history of the Russian factory using legislative and business history sources, a widely read account of the principles of political economy, and a study of cooperative institutions. In addition, Tugan made notable contributions to social theory, monetary economics, conceptions of socialist planning, and the history of economics. Towards the end of his life Tugan's allegiance shifted from Russia back to Ukraine, and he was Ukrainian Minister of Finance from August to December 1917. During 1918 he helped to establish the Academy of Science in Kiev, and died on a train headed for Paris the following year.

See also: INDUSTRIALIZATION

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VINCENT BARNETT

TUKHACHEVSKY, MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEVICH

(1893–1937), prominent Soviet military figure; strategist, commander, weapons procurer.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky is one of the most important and controversial figures in the history of the Soviet armed forces. Born into aristocracy, he attended prestigious imperial military schools and academies before joining the communist cause and becoming a fervent Bolshevik. He served in World War I and was taken prisoner by the Germans. He escaped, and later commanded Red Army troops in the civil war. Tukhachevsky held numerous important posts within the Red Army, including chief of the Red Army Staff, Chief of Armaments, and Commander of the Leningrad Military District. In 1935 he was awarded the highest military honor of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Tukhachevsky was an innovative and shrewd military strategist who theorized combat scenarios for future wars, created new means of employing forces, and worked tirelessly for the implementation of his ideas into the rearmament and reform of the armed forces. He incessantly called for more resources to be devoted to rearmament, in spite of numerous competing demands on limited resources from other state sectors.

Tukhachevsky wrote many articles about military tactics and strategy, the most important of which was *Future War* (1928). This 700-page treatise surveyed the combat potential of all countries neighboring the USSR, offering a range of combat scenarios in the event of war. Together with his military colleagues, Tukhachevsky developed the tactical force employment concept of deep battle. This maneuver involved the use of tanks and aircraft to penetrate deep into the enemy's defense and destroy his forces. The deep battle concept was incorporated into Soviet 1936 Field Regulations and was utilized in the Red Army's combat operations against the German Army in the second half of World War II. The deep battle concept also found expression in NATO military doctrine in the 1980s. Tukhachevsky's contributions arguably rendered him the most prescient and talented strategist in the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s.

While commander of troops in the Leningrad Military District, Tukhachevsky worked closely with designers and theorists to develop a variety of new weapons and methods for employing them. In addition, he mastered the technical details of

complex weapons systems, from aircraft engines to dirigibles and rocket propulsion systems. Tukhachevsky also oversaw aspects of the secret military collaboration with German aircraft and chemical weapons experts, urging the Germans to share more of their knowledge and experience than they were sometimes willing. When tensions developed in Manchuria in 1931, presenting the threat of war to the Soviet Union from East and West, defense production became a higher priority, and many of Tukhachevsky's projects came to fruition.

Tukhachevsky's relationship with Josef Stalin, who ordered his execution in 1937 during the Great Terror, is controversial and unresolved. The origins of the tension between Stalin and Tukhachevsky have been traced to several events, documents, and rumors. Possible factors include: conflicts between Stalin and Tukhachevsky over the command of the Battle for Warsaw in 1920; Tukhachevsky's criticism of the role of the cavalry army in the civil war for which Stalin served as chief political commissar; Tukhachevsky's warnings of the German military threat to the USSR; and documents falsified by Germans or Czechoslovak agents alleging Tukhachevsky's intent to overthrow the Soviet leadership together with Nazi forces.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; PURGES, THE GREAT

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SALLY W. STOECKER

TUPOLEV, ANDREI NIKOLAYEVICH

(1888–1972), patriarch of Soviet aircraft design.

Andrei Tupolev was one of the most important aircraft designers in the Soviet Union during the interwar period and was awarded the honor of "Hero of Socialist Labor" three times in his career. Tupolev is considered by many to be the father of

Soviet nonferrous metal aircraft construction, and he developed more than fifty original aircraft designs and over 100 modifications. In addition to fighter aircraft and heavy long-range bomber aircraft, Tupolev also designed aero-sleighs, dirigibles, and torpedo boats. Educated at the prestigious Bauman Technical School in Moscow, he was one of the founders of the Central Aviation Institute in 1918 and created a design bureau within it. He spent most of his career at the design bureau and in 1936 received orders from the Heavy Industry Commissariat to transfer to GUAP (State Directorate of Aviation Industry) as their chief engineer who oversaw aircraft production. In May 1937, Tupolev's ANT-7 flew to the North Pole successfully. One month later, he was accused of being an enemy of the state and was arrested for his alleged role in espionage. After serving one year in regular prison, Tupolev was permitted to continue his design work in a special prison as a means of avoiding hard labor. Although his name was temporarily withdrawn from public, his stature was restored in the post-Stalin era.

See also: AVIATION

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SALLY W. STOECKER

TURGENEV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH


(1818–1883), Russian novelist, playwright, and poet.

Turgenev was born into an extremely wealthy family on an estate with 500 serfs near Oryol, in the Mtsensky *uezd*, in central European Russia. His mother, a tyrannical shrew, savagely beat her serfs and her sons and despised all things Russian. The family spoke only French in the home. His father was an attractive and dissipated rake. Turgenev's childhood nurtured in him an animosity toward the institution of serfdom and a profound understanding of the culture of rural, aristocratic culture of pre-Reform Russia—the very cultural wellspring from which so many of the characters in his novels were to emerge.

Turgenev is nearly universally mentioned, along with Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Leo Tolstoy, as one of the great masters of the psychological novel, although Turgenev himself disparaged more than once the emphasis on psychological analysis that marks the works of the other two members of that triumvirate. Turgenev further distinguished himself from Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky by beginning his career as a poet: his first major work was the long poem *Parasha*, published in 1843—a year before Dostoyevsky's entrée into literature and nearly a decade before Tolstoy's. *Parasha* was followed by a handful of other significant verse works, though Turgenev later wrote that he felt a nearly physical antipathy toward his verse works.

Although his poetry was enthusiastically received by Vissarion Belinsky, the leading literary critic of the time, Turgenev's first work of lasting influence was a series of sketches of what Turgenev knew first-hand from his childhood: the manorial, rural, and peasant milieus. The brief, episodic descriptions were initially published separately, beginning in 1847, and then as a single work, *A Huntsman's Sketches*, in 1852. The work exercised a profound influence on the public that is often likened to that of Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, published the same year. Turgenev's work is one of the highest artistic quality—exquisite, tightly crafted descriptions of the physical world combined with engaging and complex portraits of peasants (generally positively portrayed) and gentry (generally negatively portrayed).

Beginning soon after the death of Nicholas I in 1855, Turgenev, always sensitive to the winds of change, wrote his four most significant novels: *Rudin* (1856), *Home of the Gentry* (sometimes translated, more literally, as *Nest of Gentlefolk*) (1859), *On the Eve* (1860) and *Fathers and Sons* (more precisely *Fathers and Children*) (1862). All are penetrating chronicles of the quickly shifting alliances, mores, and institutions that marked the initiatory period of the Great Reforms, with all its optimism and surety of a brighter future. The greatest of these, *Fathers and Sons*, depicts the intergenerational conflict between the liberal men of the 1840s, with their refined, European (more specifically, Gallic) sensibilities and an inclination toward incrementalism in social and political change; and the new people of the younger generation, nihilists (a word Turgenev brought into coinage), men of science who embraced German-inflected positivism, disparaged aesthetics per se, and believed in the creative potential of destruction. The older generation



Ivan Turgenev, engraving from a French publication of 1881.

THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSÉE CARNAVALET PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

found Turgenev's portrait of their brethren dismissive and patronizing, and the younger generation found their reflection insulting and patronizing. Turgenev, criticized from nearly every political angle, responded by quitting Russia for Western Europe. From his refuge in Baden-Baden, Turgenev wrote *Smoke* (1867), a venomous satire that attacked, *inter alia*, the radicalized intelligentsia in exile, the Europeanized Russian aristocracy, and the conservative Slavophiles.

Poems in Prose, Turgenev's final work, sealed his reputation as the first Russian stylist. The final poem famously praises the Russian language as great, powerful, truthful, and free, a tribute perhaps nowhere truer than when the Russian words flowed from Turgenev's own pen. He died near Paris in 1882, and, according to his wishes, his body was transported back to St. Petersburg where it was interred in perhaps the largest public funeral in Russian history.

See also: DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH

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MICHAEL A. DENNER

TURKES TAN

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and southern Kazakhstan cover the territory of former Turkestan. The region is mostly desert and semi-desert, with the exceptions of the mountainous east and the river valleys. The major rivers are the Amu Darya, Zeravshan, Syr Darya, Chu, and Ili. Of the five major ethnic groups, most Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs were still nomads in 1900, but most Uzbeks had taken up agriculture or urban life, the traditional pursuits of the Tajiks.

Russia was drawn into Turkestan by the need for a stable frontier and the desire to forestall British influence. The Turkestan oblast was formed in 1865, subject to the Orenburg governor-general, from territories recently conquered from the Kokand khanate. These included Tashkent, one of the two largest towns in the region (the other was Bukhara). In 1867 the Turkestan government-general was established, consisting of two oblasts—Syr Darya and Semireche—responsible directly to the war minister, with Tashkent as its capital.

Further annexations from the Uzbek khanates expanded the government-general. Bukhara's defeat in 1868 added the Zeravshan *okrug*, including Samarkand. The right bank of the lower Amu Darya was annexed to the Syr Darya oblast as a result of Khiva's defeat in 1873, and the remainder of Kokand was annexed as the Fergana oblast in 1876. In 1882 Semireche was transferred to the new Steppe government-general, reducing Turkestan to two oblasts, but four years later the Zeravshan

okrug, enlarged at the expense of Syr Darya, was renamed the Samarkand oblast. In 1898 Semireche was returned to the Turkestan government-general and the Transcaspian oblast was added to Tashkent's jurisdiction.

Turkestan's value to Russia was primarily strategic until the late 1880s. In the wake of the construction of the Central Asian Railroad, connecting the Caspian seacoast with Samarkand in 1888 (extended to Tashkent in 1898), the government-general's importance as a source of cotton grew rapidly. It supplied almost half of Russia's needs by 1911. The opening of the Orenburg-Tashkent railroad in 1906 facilitated imports of grain to deficit areas like Fergana, where 36 to 38 percent of the sown area was given over to cotton by World War I. To the same end the construction of a line from Tashkent to western Siberia was begun before the war. Cotton fiber and cottonseed processing were the major industries.

As of the 1897 census, Turkestan's five oblasts contained 5,260,300 inhabitants, 13.9 percent of them urban. The largest towns were Tashkent (156,400), Kokand (82,100), Namangan (61,900), and Samarkand (54,900). By 1911, 17 percent of Semireche's population and half of its urban residents were Russians, four-fifths of them agricultural colonists. In the other four oblasts in the same year, Russians constituted only 4 percent of the population, and the overwhelming majority lived in European-style settlements alongside the native quarters in the major towns.

The Soviet government reorganized the government-general in 1918 as the Turkestan ASSR of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In 1924 the Turkestan republic was abolished. Its northern districts, inhabited by Kazakhs, were incorporated in the Kazakh ASSR of the Russian republic; its eastern districts, inhabited by Kyrgyz, were joined to the Kazakh republic as the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast. The remainder of Turkestan was divided into the Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics, the latter's southeast forming the Tajik ASSR.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA

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SEYMOUR BECKER

TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

Through most of the 500 years preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Turkey were enemies. Initially it was an expanding Ottoman Empire that conquered traditionally Russian lands, but then as the Ottoman Empire weakened, it was tsarist Russia's turn to expand at the expense of the Ottomans. Highlighting Russian expansion was the Treaty of Kuchuk Karnadji in 1774, which not only gave Russia the Crimea, but also the right to intervene in the Ottoman Empire to protect orthodox believers. Then, in the nineteenth century, it was Russian military pressure, in cooperation with Britain and France, that helped free Greece from Ottoman control in 1827. While the Russian drive against the Ottoman Empire and Moscow's efforts to control the Turkish Straits failed during the Crimean War (1853–1853), twenty years later (in 1876–1877) Russia helped free the Bulgarians from Ottoman control in a war against the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were on opposite sides, with Russia's ally Britain promising the straits to Moscow to help keep it in the war.

Following World War I, when the communists seized control of Russia and Kemal Attaturk took power in Turkey, there was a brief warming of relations as Moscow supplied weapons to help Turkey drive out the armies of their common enemies, France and Britain. During World War II, Turkey was ostensibly neutral but appeared sympathetic to the Germans, and at the end of the war Stalin demanded bases in the Turkish Straits and Turkish territory in Transcaucasia. Stalin, however, was unable to implement Russian demands because of U.S. support for Turkey. At the same time, however, by solidifying its control over the Eastern Balkans, Moscow posed a threat to Turkey on its border with Bulgaria.

Throughout the early stages of the Cold War, Turkey was a loyal member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), sending troops to help the United States in the Korean War—much to

the anger of Moscow. Relations between Moscow and Ankara, however, began to warm in the 1970s (in part because of the U.S.–Turkish conflict over Cyprus) and in the 1980s the two countries negotiated an important natural gas agreement. Still, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations could be seen as correct if not particularly friendly.

RELATIONS SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR

Since the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union was dissolved, Turkish–Russian relations have gone through three stages. The first period, 1991 to 1995, saw a mixture of economic cooperation and geopolitical confrontation; the second period, 1996 to 1998, witnessed an escalation of the geopolitical confrontation, and the third period, 1998 to 2003, following the economic crisis in Russia in August through September 1998, saw the relationship transformed into a far more friendly and cooperative one.

In the first period trade was the primary factor fostering the relationship. By the time of the Russian economic crisis of 1998, trade had risen to \$10 billion per year, making Turkey Russia's primary Middle East trading partner and at the same time creating a strong pro-Russian business lobby in Turkey, composed of such companies as Enka, Gama, and Tekfen. Indeed, Turkish companies even got the contract to rebuild the Russian Duma, damaged in the 1993 fighting, and Turkish merchants donated \$5 million to Yeltsin's 1996 reelection campaign. Moscow also sold military equipment to Turkey, including helicopters (prohibited for sale to Turkey by NATO) that the Turks could use to suppress the Kurdish uprising in Southeast Turkey.

If economic and military cooperation was evident during this period, so was competition. With the collapse of the USSR, Moscow feared Turkish inroads into Central Asia and Transcaucasia seen by the Russian leadership as the soft underbelly of the Russian Federation. Reinforcing this concern were Turkish efforts to promote the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline route for Caspian Sea oil that would rival Moscow's Baku–Novorossisk route. For its part, Turkey complained about the Russian military buildup in Armenia and Georgia, about the ecological dangers posed by Russian oil tankers going through the straits, and about Russian aid to the Kurdish rebels. On the other hand, once the first Chechen war had erupted in December 1994,

Moscow complained about Turkish aid to the Chechen rebels.

Relations between Turkey and Russia sharply deteriorated in 1996 after Yevgeny Primakov became Russia's foreign minister. Primakov sought to create a pro-Russian grouping of states such as Greece, Armenia, Syria, and Iran to outflank Turkey. Furthermore, he supported the sale in January 1997 of a very sophisticated SAM 300-PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system to the Greek portion of Cyprus, something that, if deployed, would threaten the airspace of a large part of southern Turkey. Turkey took the proposed SAM-300 sale seriously and threatened to destroy the missiles if they were deployed. Finally, Moscow stepped up its diplomatic support for the Kurdish rebellion, allowing Kurdish conferences to be held in Moscow.

The only bright spot in Turkish-Russian relations during this period came in December 1997 when then Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin came to Ankara to sign the Blue Stream natural gas agreement, which would increase the amount of natural gas Turkey would import from Russia from 3 billion cubic meters per year in 2000 to 30 billion cubic meters per year in 2010, with 16 billion cubic meters coming from the Blue Stream pipeline under the Black Sea and 14 billion cubic meters coming from enlarged pipelines through the Balkans.

Following the Russian economic crisis of August–September 1998, confrontation gave way to cooperation in the Russian–Turkish relationship. This was due to a number of causes. First, Primakov's efforts to build an alignment of Iran, Armenia, Syria, and Greece against Turkey fell apart as Greece and Turkey had a major rapprochement. Second, the economic crisis weakened Russia so that Primakov, who had become prime minister in September 1998, realized that Russia simply did not have the economic resources to implement the multipolar diplomatic strategy he had sought to promote, at least until Russia had rebuilt its economy. The consequences for Russian–Turkish relations were almost immediate, as Russia began to prize Turkey as an economic partner instead of confronting it as a geopolitical rival. Thus in October 1998, Russia refused to grant diplomatic asylum to Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan. Next, Moscow acquiesced in the deployment of the SAM-300 system on the Greek island of Crete instead of on Cyprus. Then, Moscow indicated it would not oppose the Baku–Tibilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Finally,

Moscow stepped up its efforts to find external funding for the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline, which it made the centerpiece of its policy toward Turkey.

This change in policy direction toward Turkey was reinforced after Vladimir Putin became Russia's president in January 2000. In October 2000 Russian prime minister Mikhail Khazyanov came to Ankara and stated that cooperation, not confrontation, was the centerpiece of Russian policy toward Turkey, and in November 2001, at the United Nations, then Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed an action plan for Turkish–Russian cooperation in Eurasia.

Tensions remained over Kurdish and Chechen issues, over Russian military deployments in Transcaucasia, and over the passage of Russian oil through the straits. However, by the beginning of 2003, even with an Islamist now heading the Turkish government, Russian–Turkish relations were better than at any time in the last 500 years. Whether this rather halcyon condition will continue is a question only the future can decide.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; FOREIGN TRADE

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ROBERT O. FREEDMAN

TURKMENISTAN AND TURKMEN

The Turkmen are probably the least-known major ethnic group in Central Asia, as they are a tribal-based people who live in the desert region between Iran and Uzbekistan. Turkmen are Sunni Muslims, although the affinity with Islamic practices is weaker than those of other ethnic groups in the region. Linguistically, the Turkmen language is part of the larger Turkic language group, and is considered to be closer to Azeri and Turkish, to the point of being mutually intelligible.

The Turkmen are known in the region as being nomadic peoples who have rarely been incorporated into regional empires. While a significant percentage of Turkmen live in the country of Turkmenistan, many live in bordering states. It is estimated that more than one million Turkmen live in Iran, slightly fewer in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively, and nearly 500,000 live in Uzbekistan. The country of Turkmenistan itself is home to 4.8 million people, of whom 3,696,000 (77%) are ethnic Turkmen. The significant minorities in Turk-

menistan are Uzbeks (9.2%), Russians (6.7%), and Kazakhs (2.0%). The capital city of Ashgabat has an estimated population between 600,000 (official) and one million (unofficial). This discrepancy belies a rather unusual problem in the country: there has not been an official census since the Soviet-era census of 1989, thus it is difficult to ascertain with some level of confidence most population figures. The government declared at the beginning of 2000 that the population would exceed five million as a result of significant return migration of Turkmen from around the world. Non-governmental observers have not corroborated this figure, nor have they done the same for the current government claim that there are 5.7 million Turkmen living in the country.

The early history of the Turkmen is generally told by outside writers and observers. Turkmen (or Turcomen) tribes were noted by early travelers in the region and were often the source of concerns, for the Turkmen were noted for looting caravans and raiding settlements. Such stereotypes plagued the Turkmen up through the nineteenth century,



Women walking along a street in Turkmenistan, one of the most isolated regions of the Soviet empire. © GÉRARD DEGEORGE/CORBIS



Turkmenistan, 1992. © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

when the Russian Empire expanded to the region known as Transcaspia. Since the 1700s, Russian officials had heard complaints of Turkmen raiders taking Russian settlers in what is now Kazakhstan and selling them into slavery. In the 1870s, it was decided that the Russian empire should incorporate the region of Transcaspia into their southern holding. In 1880, Russian forces launched from the port of Fort Alexandrovsk along the eastern banks of the Caspian Sea and headed eastward. Initially repelled at the fortress of Goek Tepe, they regrouped under the leadership of General Skobelev and subdued the Turkmen resistance in the following year. The final southernmost border of the Russian empire was established in 1895 in a treaty with Great Britain, effectively ending any competition over Central Asia in the so-called Great Game.

However, tsarist control of Transcaspia was short-lived. With the outbreak of World War I, there was a concurrent increase in tribal activity against their Russian overlords. Turkmen participated in the 1916 draft law rebellion and effectively became autonomous with the collapse of the Russian empire in 1917. Throughout the Russian Revolution and Civil War, the region of Transcaspia was under the control of various competing powers, including a Turkmen tribal leader named Juniad Khan, as well as forces from the British Army who were sent to protect Allied interests in the region.

Eventually, the region fell under the control of the Red Army as the Bolshevik Revolution and civil war came to a close. The actual notion of a Turkmen state was not realized until the twentieth cen-

tury, with the creation of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924. Carved out of the territories between Uzbekistan and the bordering countries of Iran and Afghanistan, Turkmenia, later called Turkmenistan, was created for the tribal groups in the region. These nomadic tribes, from the Tekke, Yomud, and others, slowly developed a common Turkmen identity. Through the period of Soviet rule, Turkmenistan was one of the least-integrated union republics in the Soviet Union. It was noted for providing raw materials such as cotton and gas to the country's planned economic system. It was also viewed as the strategic front line against U.S.-supported Iran.

In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and, like the other union republics, Turkmenistan became an independent state. The First Secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party was declared president, first of the Turkmen S.S.R. and later the Republic of Turkmenistan. Saparmurat Niyazov has been president ever since. In the process, he has created a strong cult of personality that includes ever-visible displays of his pictures, statues, and overall domination of the state-run media. His work of the late 1990s, the *Rukhnama*, has become a spiritual foundation for the Turkmen state and is something that all Turkmen must learn. Indeed, any opposition to Turkmenbashi Birigi (Father of the Turkmen, the Great) centers on challenging this personalistic rule.

Economic development in the country remains a paradox. In spite of a great potential in energy wealth, it remains mired in poverty. And while there are magnificent new buildings in the center of the capital city of Ashgabat, the countryside is dotted with substandard housing and living conditions. Turkmen traditionally have been nomadic herders, with an economy that is relatively autarkic. However, since independence, there has been a push to exploit the oil and gas reserves of the country. Because of an inability to find reliable, paying customers, Turkmenistan has not been able to benefit greatly from this natural resource. As of the early twenty-first century, Turkmenistan is listed as having 150 trillion cubic feet of gas, which is one of the top ten deposits in the world. However, a lack of firm agreements with energy companies has resulted in much of this remaining unexplored.

The estimated 2002 gross national product (GDP) of the country was \$21.5 billion, resulting in an estimated purchasing power parity (PPP) of \$4,480 per capita. However, real per capita income was closer to \$1,000 with most living on less than

\$200 per annum. An artificial exchange rate, vast corruption, and the concentration of wealth at the top level all have created conditions of abject poverty for the majority of Turkmen. Trade remains limited to countries such as Russia and Ukraine, the latter of which uses barter deals to finance Turkmen gas imports. There are also modest trade relations with neighboring Iran, capitalizing on a rail link that crosses the Turkmen-Iranian border.

Because Turkmenistan neighbors Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the north, and Afghanistan and Iran to the south, these four states, plus Russia, play a decisive role in Turkmen foreign policy. However, tempering any effort at expanding relations is the current Turkmen foreign policy of "positive neutrality," which was declared in December 1995. According to this concept, Turkmenistan is not to be part of regional alliances and security arrangements. Thus, while it is technically part of the NATO Partnership for Peace program and the Commonwealth of Independent States, Turkmenistan rarely participates in conferences and meetings and never participates in joint security exercises. The magnitude of internal problems, though, may eventually compel the Turkmen government to more actively engage with outside states, particularly if it ever hopes to benefit from the energy reserves that have been underutilized.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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ROGER KANGAS

TUR, YEVGENIA

(1815–1892), Russian journalist, writer, critic, and author of children's books.

Born Elizaveta Vasilievna Sukhovo-Kobylyna, Tur was a well-known salon hostess, prose writer, journalist, critic, and author of children's fiction. The sister of the playwright Alexander Sukhovo-Kobylin and the artist Sofia Sukhovo-Kobylyna, she was the first woman to win a gold medal from the Imperial Academy of Arts. Her son, Yevgeny Salias, became a popular author of historical fiction.

Tur began her career in Russian letters as a translator and proofreader for *Teleskop* (*Telescope*), a prominent journal in the 1830s. She was romantically involved with its editor, and her tutor, Nikolai Nadezhdin, but her family forbade the match because they did not want her to marry a seminarian. In 1837 she reluctantly married Count Andrei Salias de Tournemire, a French citizen. After spending her dowry, Salias was exiled to France in 1844 for fighting a duel. Tur became a writer, in part, to support their three children. She was one of the first women in Russia to earn a living by writing.

Tur's salon in Moscow included some of the most important intellectuals of the day: the authors Konstantin Leontiev and Ivan Turgenev, the poet Nikolai Ogarev, the historians Timofei Granovsky and Peter Kudriavtsev, and the journalist Mikhail Katkov. Salons were fruitful ground for cultural production, and Tur's was no exception. Her first published fiction was a novella, *Oshibka* (*A Mistake*) in 1849. She then published several novellas and novels, the most famous of which is *Antonina* (1851). These stories had a large readership. They were published in the most widely circulated journals of the day (*Otechestvennyye zapiski*, *Russkii vestnik*, and *Sovremennik*), as well as in separate editions, and her works were reviewed by such luminaries as Ivan Turgenev and Nikolai Chernyshevsky.

Tur edited the fiction section of Katkov's *Russky vestnik* from 1856 to 1860 and then published and edited a journal, *Russkaya rech* (*Russian Speech*), in 1861. The journal's subtitle indicates its scope: "A Review of Literature, History, Art, and Civic Life in the West and in Russia." Tur stopped publication in 1862 and, to avoid investigation by the Third Section, moved to Paris, where she lived for ten years and again hosted a salon. In these years she worked closely with Alexander Herzen; she also published a regular column, "Paris Review," in Andrei Kraevsky's newspaper *Golos* (*The Voice*). As a critic, Tur's intellectual range was broad—she wrote articles on Jules Michelet, George Sand, Mme. de Recamier, Charlotte Brontë, and Elizabeth Fry, as well as Turgenev, Dostoevsky, and Leo Tolstoy. Each of her essays is a rich engagement with aesthetic and social issues.

In her fiction, criticism, and journalism Tur addressed the "woman question," one of the foremost social issues of the day. In her fiction she often reversed common cultural stereotypes about women (such as making the unmarried woman the arbiter of moral goodness in *Oshibka* and creating a superfluous man who is not noble in *Antonina*). In her journal Tur often published fiction by women writers. In her criticism she addressed the issue of the position of women in society, both through ironic, incisive assessments of Michelet, Proudhon, and others and in a debate with the educator Natalia Grot.

In 1866 Tur began writing exclusively for children. These works were extraordinarily well received and went into many editions. Tur's children's fiction, too, became an important cultural influence, mentioned as formative by Zinaida Gippius, Marina Tsvetaeva, and others.

See also: JOURNALISM

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
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JEHANNE M. GHEITH

TUVA AND TUVINIANS

The Tuva Republic in southern Siberia is one of the twenty-one nationality-based republics within the Russian Federation that was recognized in the Russian constitution of 1993. Previously called the Tuva Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), the constitution recognized it as Tyva, the regional form of the name. With an area of 65,810 square miles (170,448 square miles), Tuva lies northwest of Mongolia and directly east of Gorno-Altai. Tuva's capital is Kizyl, and its other key cities are Turan, Chadan, and Shagonar. Drained by the headstreams of the Yenisey River, the western part of Tuva lies in a mountain basin, walled off by the Sayan and Tannu Olga ranges, which rise to 10,000 feet. The eastern portion is dominated by a wooded plateau. The climate is extreme, with summer temperatures reaching 43° C (110° F) and winter temperatures dropping to -61° C (-78° F). However, the region's three hundred sunny, arid days per year help the people withstand the summers and winters.

Tuva is inhabited by a majority of Tuvinians (more than 64%); the remainder are primarily ethnic Russians (32%). More than 200,000 Tuvinians live in the Russian Federation, and smaller communities live in Mongolia and China. The Tuvinians are hardy Mongol natives, related to the Kyrgyz ethnic branch. Because it is difficult to specify physical features that are common to all the Turkic peoples, it is the shared cultural feature of language that identifies members of a particular group. The Turkic languages strongly resemble one another, most of them being to some extent mutually intelligible. The peoples of Siberia fall into three major ethno-linguistic groups: Altaic, Uralic, and Paleo-Siberian. The Tuvinians are one of the Altaic peoples, and the Tuvian language belongs to the Uighur-Oguz group of the Altaic language family. Together with the ancient Uighur and Oguz languages, these linguistic groups form the subgroup of Uighur-Tüküi. Even if a special Decree on Languages in the Tuva ASSR had not been ratified in 1991 stipulating that all academic subjects be taught in Tuvian, the Tuvian language would



Camel herd and herder. © NOVOSTI/ISOVOTO

not be forgotten. The indigenous language is most widely spoken in rural areas, where 67–70 percent of Tuvinians live. The official *lingua franca* (Russian) is spoken mainly in Tuva's four major towns.

For roughly 150 years Tuva formed part of the Chinese Empire, and later was subject to Mongol rule. An independent state, called Tannu Tuva, was established on August 14, 1921. Tuva nevertheless voluntarily joined the USSR in 1944 as an autonomous oblast. In 1961 Tuva became an autonomous republic.

Tuvinians are mostly engaged in agricultural activities, such as cattle raising and fur farming. Oats, barley, wheat, and millet are the principal crops raised. Recently, farmers from northern China have introduced the Tuvinians to vegetable farming. Many Tuvinians still live as nomadic shepherds, migrating seasonally with their herds. Those who inhabit the plains traditionally live in large round tents, called *gers* (yurts), made from bark. The main industrial activity in the Tuvinian Republic is mining, especially for asbestos, cobalt, coal, gold, and uranium. Other Tuvinians are engaged in processing food, manufacturing building materials, and crafting leather and wooden items.

Most Tuvinians were illiterate until the advent of the Russians. Thus, the Tuvinian culture is noted for its rich, oral epic poetry and its music (throat singing). The Tuvinian use more than fifty different musical instruments, and traveling ensembles often perform outdoors. The Tuvinians in East Asia have never been affected by Islam. In the early twenty-first century, one-third of the Tuvinians are Buddhists, one-third are shamanists (believing in an unseen world of gods, demons, and ancestral spirits), and the remaining one-third are non-religious.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; KYRGYZSTAN AND KYRGYZ; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

TWENTY-FIVE THOUSANDERS

At the November 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, it was decided to mobilize 25,000 industrial workers to help with collectivization and provide the countryside with thousands of loyal cadres.

Over 70,000 workers volunteered to serve as Twenty-Five Thousanders (*Dvadsatipiatitysiachniki*). The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) directed and organized the mobilization campaign, set selection criteria, and established regional quotas. Of the 27,519 workers selected, nearly 70 percent were members or candidate-members of the party, and over half were under thirty years old.

Following short preparatory courses, the Twenty-Five Thousanders arrived in the countryside during the first phase of forced collectivization in early 1930. Most were assigned to work as chairmen of large collective farms. Others were to work in state farms, machine tractor stations (MTS), village soviets, or various local Party organizations. However, owing to the hostility of local officials, a great many Twenty-Five Thousanders were put to other tasks or ignored, and often not given adequate food or housing. Some were assaulted or murdered by angry peasants. Despite the obstacles, many farms headed by Twenty-Five Thousanders earned awards from party and collective-farm organs for being model collective farms.

The Twenty-Five Thousanders were expected to remain in the countryside until the end of the First Five-Year Plan in 1932. However, only 40 percent finished out their terms. Nonetheless, the Twenty-Five Thousanders were hailed as heroes of socialist construction. Many were promoted into rural party and government work, and several earned the distinguished honor of Heroes of Socialist Labor.

See also: COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

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KATE TRANSCHEL

TYUTCHEV, FYODOR IVANOVICH

(1803–1873), Russian poet.

Widely considered one of the greatest poets in world literature, Tyutchev can be classified as a late romantic, but, like other persons of surpassing genius, he was strikingly unique. Tyutchev's literary legacy consists of some three hundred poems (about fifty of them translations), usually brief, and several articles. Although recognition came slow to Tyutchev, in fact, he never had a regular literary career, eventually books of his poetry came to be the treasured possessions of every educated Russian.

Many of Tyutchev's poems deal with nature. Some of them offer luminous images of a thunderstorm early in May or of warm days at the beginning of autumn. Others express the pantheistic beliefs of romanticism ("Thought after thought / Wave after wave / Two manifestations / Of one element"), particularly its preoccupation with chaos. Indeed, the philosopher Vladimir Soloviev considered Tyutchev's treatment of chaos, which he represented as the dark foundation of all existence, whether of nature or human beings, to be the central motif of the poet's creativity, more powerfully expressed than by anyone else in all literature. Tyutchev's poem *Silentium* can be cited as the ultimate culmination of the desperate romantic effort to, in the words of William Wordsworth, "evoke the inexpressible." A somewhat different, small, but unforgettable group of Tyutchev's poems deals with the hopelessness of late love ("thou art both blessedness and hopelessness"), reflecting the poet's tragic liaison with a woman named Mademoiselle Denisova.

An aristocrat who received an excellent education at home and at Moscow University, Tyutchev was a prime example of cosmopolitan, especially

French, culture in Russia. Choosing diplomatic service, he spent some twenty-two years in central and western Europe, particularly in Munich. The service operated in French, and Tyutchev's French was so perfect that, allegedly, other diplomats, including French diplomats, were advised to use Tyutchev's reports as models. Tyutchev was prominent in Munich society and came to know Friedrich Schelling and other luminaries. He married in succession two German women, neither of whom spoke Russian.

Politically, Tyutchev belonged to the Right. Not really a Slavophile in the precise meaning of that term, he stood with the Petrine imperial government, where he served as a censor (a tolerant one, to be sure) as well as a diplomat. He may be best described as a member of the romantic wing of supporters of the state doctrine of Official Nationality and, later, as a Panslav. Tyutchev's most prominent articles, as well as a number of his poems, were written in support of the patriotic, nationalist, or Panslav causes. They lacked originality and even high quality, at least by the poet's own standards. Yet Tyutchev's power of expression was so great that occasionally these items became indelible parts of Russian consciousness and culture:

One cannot understand Russia by reason,
Cannot measure her by a common measure:
She is under a special dispensation—
One can only believe in Russia.

See also: GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE

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NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

U-2 SPY PLANE INCIDENT

On May 1, 1960, an American high-altitude U-2 spy plane departed from Pakistan on a flight that was supposed to take it across the USSR to Norway. Shot down near Sverdlovsk, with its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, captured, the flight triggered a Cold War crisis, aborted a scheduled four-power summit meeting, and poisoned Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's relations with U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Aware that U-2 spy flights constituted a grave violation of Soviet sovereignty, Eisenhower reluctantly approved them beginning in 1956 to check on the Soviet missile program. Even after the May Day 1960 flight was shot down, Khrushchev hoped to proceed with the summit scheduled for May 16 in Paris. But by not revealing he had shot down the plane and captured its pilot, and by waiting for Washington to invent a cover story and then unmasking it, Khrushchev provoked Eisenhower to take personal responsibility for the flight. After that, Khrushchev felt he had no choice but to wreck the summit, cut off relations with Eisenhower, and await the election of Eisenhower's successor.

It is highly uncertain whether the Paris summit could have produced progress on Berlin and a nuclear test ban. Russian observers such as Fyodor Burlatsky and Georgy Arbatov contend that Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as an excuse to scuttle what he anticipated would be an unproductive summit. More likely, Khrushchev was lured by the flight and its fate into a sequence of unintended consequences that undermined not only his foreign policy but his position at home.

See also: COLD WAR; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

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WILLIAM TAUBMAN

UDMURTS

Of the 747,000 Udmurts (1989 census), formerly called Votiaks, approximately 497,000 live in the Udmurt Republic, north of Tatarstan, but many live in Bashkortostan. Their language belongs to



the Finno-Ugric family and is mutually semi-intelligible with Komi, further north. Most are Caucasian, with a remarkable number of redheads, but Asian features also occur.

Southern Udmurts were subjected to the Bolgar Empire from 1000 C.E. on, and later to the Kazan Khanate. After annexing the multinational Viatka Republic (1489), Moscow laid formal claim to all Udmurt lands but controlled only the north. The south was occupied after the destruction of Kazan (1552), yet massive uprisings continued up to 1615. Most Udmurts were forcibly baptized in the mid-1700s, but spectacular anti-animist trials flared as late as 1894–1896, and 7 percent of Udmurts declared themselves animist in the 1897 census. An Udmurt-language calendar started in 1904 and the first newspaper in 1913.

An Udmurt national congress convened in 1918. A Votjak Autonomous Oblast was formed in 1920 and upgraded to Udmurt Autonomous Republic in 1934. Native-language schooling developed rapidly, but as early as 1931 a trumped-up anti-Soviet “Finno-Ugric plot” decimated the elites. Udmurtia itself became the site of numerous slave labor camps. All Udmurt textbooks were ordered destroyed around 1970.

Udmurtia (population 1.6 million), on the borderline of forest and steppe, is dominated by its capital, Izhar (*Izhevsk* in Russian; population 600,000), a major center of Soviet military industry. Russian immigration reduced the Udmurts from 52 percent of the Republic population in 1926 to 31 percent in 1989. Russian passersby chastised those few who dared to speak Udmurt in city streets.

Within the Republic 76 percent of Udmurts consider the ancestral language their main one. Liberalization enabled an Udmurt cultural society to form in 1989. Later called *Demen* (Together), it spawned an activist youth organization, *Shundy* (The sun). Udmurtia’s Russian-dominated Supreme Soviet proclaimed Russian and Udmurt coequal state languages, but implementation has been limited. In 1991 an Udmurt National Congress established a permanent Udmurt *Kenesh* (Council). Udmurt-language schooling began to develop slowly.

See also: FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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REIN TAAGEPERA

UEZD

The uezd is an administrative-territorial unit that was used in pre-Soviet Russia and the early Soviet Union. During the formation of the Moscow state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it designated an area that included both a town and its hinterland, and which came under the jurisdiction of a *namestnik* (governor). From the late sixteenth century, the uezd was under the jurisdiction of a *voyevod* (military governor). Under Peter I, the uezd became a subdivision of governments and provinces. Between 1775 and 1780, Catherine II’s reform of the Russian Empire’s territorial administration recreated the uezd as the primary subdivision of a *guberniya* (government), based on a (male) population of between twenty and thirty thousand.

Each uezd, which was itself subdivided into *volosti* (boroughs), came under the jurisdiction of an *ispavnik* (district captain) who was elected every three years by the district assembly of the nobility. The district captain held responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for fiscal administration. In European Russia, the 1864 *zemstvo* reform created assemblies at the uezd level, elected on a restrictive property-based franchise. Every three years, the uezd assembly elected an executive board responsible for district administration. It also elected delegates to an assembly at the *guberniya* level. Provincial governors had to ratify the appointment of the president of each uezd board and, from 1890, of all its members (at the same time the assembly franchise was further narrowed). After the February Revolution in 1917, the Provisional Government introduced the office of district commissar to represent the central state in the localities; after the Bolshevik revolution authority passed to the executive committee of the uezd soviet. At the end of the 1920s, the Soviet government dissolved both the uezd and *volost* levels of territorial administration, subdividing the new *oblasti* (regions) directly into *raiony*.

See also: LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

NICK BARON

UGRA RIVER, BATTLE OF

The decisive moment of the defensive campaign led by Ivan III against the horde of Khan Ahmad, in October–November 1480.

Relations between the Great Horde and Moscow entered a crisis in the 1470s. Ivan III refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of Akhmad or to pay him tribute. Entering into an anti-Muscovite alliance with the grand prince of Lithuania and the Polish King Casimir, Ahmad started to campaign in the late spring of 1480. Ivan III adopted defensive tactics: In July he marched to the town of Kolomna and ordered his troops to guard the bank of the Oka River, but Ahmad made no attempt to force the Oka; instead he moved westward to the Ugra River where he hoped to meet his ally, King Casimir. The latter, however, never came.

For several months both sides temporized, and only in October did fighting break out. Muscovite troops, led by Ivan's III son Ivan and brother Andrew, repulsed several Tatar attempts to cross the Ugra. Clashes alternated with negotiations which, however, met with no success. Finally, on November 11, 1480, the khan withdrew, thus acknowledging the failure of his attempt to restore his lordship over Rus.

In Russian historical tradition this event is celebrated as the end of the Mongol yoke. The roots of this tradition date back to the 1560s, when anonymous author of the so-called Kazan History wrote of the dissolution of the Horde after the death of Ahmad (1481) and hailed the liberation of the Russian lands from the Moslem yoke and slavery. In modern historiography, Nikolai Karamzin was the first to link the liberation with the events of 1480. Later, Soviet publications echoed this view. Another judgment of the same events was pronounced by the famous nineteenth-century Russian historian, Sergei Soloviev, who ascribed the downfall of the yoke not to the heroic deeds of Ivan III but to the growing weakness of the Horde itself. The same argument was put forward by George Vernadsky (1959), who maintained that Rus freed itself from dependence on the Horde not in 1480 but much earlier, in the 1450s. In Anton Anatolevich Gorskii's view, the liberation should be dated not to 1480 but to 1472, when Ivan III stopped paying tribute to the khan.

Military aspects of the 1480 event also remain controversial. Some scholars consider the battle a

large-scale military operation and honor the strategic talent of Ivan III; but others stress his hesitations or even deny that any battle took place, referring to the events of 1480 as merely the "Stand on the Ugra River" (Halperin, 1985).

See also: GOLDEN HORDE; IVAN III

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MIKHAIL M. KROM

UKAZ

A decree, edict, or order issued by higher authority and carrying the weight of law. In English, ukase.

The *Dictionary of the Imperial Russian Academy* (1822) defined *ukaz* (plural *ukazy*) as "a written order issued by the Sovereign or other higher body." Senior churchmen and the Senate, for example, could issue an ukaz, but no one had power independent of the ruler. An edict or order signed personally by the ruler was known as *imennoi ukaz*. Up to the end of the seventeenth century, the tsar's ukazy were recorded by scribes, but from the 1710s onwards the more important ones were printed, either as individual sheets or in collections. In 1722 Peter I issued an ukaz on the orderly collection, printing, and observance of existing laws. It ended: "Let this ukaz be printed, incorporated into the regulations, and published. Also set up display boards, according to the model supplied in the Senate, to which this printed ukaz should be glued, and let it always be displayed in all places, right down to the lowest courts, like a mirror before the eyes of judges. . . . This ukaz of His Imperial Majesty was signed in the Senate in His Majesty's own hand." The very sheets of paper bearing the ruler's printed command were imbued with his authority.

Given the significance attached to the Russian sovereign's written command and signature, the anglicized term "ukase" has connotations of absolutism. It is often coupled with other instruments

of autocratic rule, such as the knout and exile to hard labor, as a symbol of despotic government.

See also: PETER I

LINDSEY HUGHES

UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe, the second most populous among the Soviet successor states and Europe's second largest country after Russia. Its population in 2001 was 48,457,100, with ethnic Ukrainians comprising 77.8 percent of the total. Russians constitute by far the largest ethnic minority in the country (17.3%). Ukrainians are an Eastern Slavic people who speak the Ukrainian language, which is closely related to Russian and uses the Ukrainian version of the Cyrillic alphabet. The capital of Ukraine is Kiev (Kyiv). Geographically, Ukraine consists largely of fertile level plains that are ideal for agriculture. The country's main river is the Dnieper (Dnipro).

EARLY HISTORY

Ukraine did not exist in its current territorial form until the twentieth century. In ancient times, different parts of Ukraine were inhabited by the Scythians and Sarmatians, but Slavic tribes moved into the area during the fifth and sixth centuries. During the ninth century, the Varangians, who had controlled trade on the Dnieper, united the East Slavic tribal confederations into the state known as Kievan Rus. During the late tenth century, the Rus princes accepted Christianity and began developing a high culture in Church Slavonic. Scholars, however, believe that modern Ukrainian is a lineal descendent of the colloquial language that was spoken in Kievan Rus. The power of Kievan Rus began declining during the twelfth century, and during the thirteenth it was conquered by the Mongols. After the fall of Kiev, linguistic divergences between the languages spoken by Eastern Slavs in the Ukrainian and Russian lands began to harden.

Indigenous state tradition in the Ukrainian territories was extinguished during the early fourteenth century with the decline of the Galician-Volhynian Principality in the west. During the second half of this century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a rising Eastern European empire at the time, annexed virtually all the Ukrainian lands ex-

cept Galicia, which was claimed by Poland. But the East Slavic lands preserved considerable autonomy, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania even adopted the local Ruthenian language as its state language. This changed in 1569, when the dynastic union between Lithuania and Poland evolved into a constitutional union. The indigenous nobility gradually became Polonized, cities came to be dominated by Poles and Jews, and the local peasantry was ensnared and exploited. In 1596 a crisis in the Orthodox Church and pressure from Polish Catholics prompted the majority of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to sign an act of union with Rome, resulting in the creation of the Uniate Church and a religious rift between the Orthodox and Uniate churches. From that time, social grievances of the Ukrainian lower classes coalesced with religious and national anxieties.

These growing tensions found their expression in the Cossack rebellions. The Cossacks were a class of free warriors that emerged during the sixteenth century on Ukraine's southern steppe frontier. Although originally employed by Polish governors to defend steppe settlements against the Crimean Tatars, the Cossacks, many of whom had been peasants fleeing serfdom, identified with the religious and social concerns of lower-class Ukrainians. In 1648 a large Cossack revolt turned into a peasant war. Led by a disgruntled Cossack officer named Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the rebels, who had secured Tatar support and had seen their ranks swelled with peasant recruits, inflicted several crushing defeats on the Poles. Khmelnytsky, who had been elected the Cossack leader, or hetman, and calling himself a defender of Orthodoxy and the Ruthenian people, soon began building a de facto independent Cossack state. Looking for allies against Poland, in 1654 Khmelnytsky concluded the Pereiaslav Treaty with Muscovy; the significance of this treaty remains a subject of controversy.

Whether it was intended as a temporary diplomatic maneuver or a unification of two states, according to the treaty, the Cossack polity accepted the tsar's suzerainty while preserving its wide-ranging autonomy. In the long run, however, the Russian authorities gradually curtailed the Cossacks' self-rule and, by the late eighteenth century, had established their direct control of Ukraine. The last serious attempt to break with Russia took place under Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who joined Charles XII of Sweden in his war against Tsar Peter I, but



Ukraine, 1992. © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

the Russian army and the loyalist Cossacks defeated the united Swedish-Ukrainian forces in the Battle of Poltava (1709). The last hetman, a largely symbolic figure, was forced to resign in 1764, and in 1775 the Russian army destroyed the Zaporozhian Host, the principal bastion of the Ukrainian Cossacks.

IMPERIAL RULE

Poland remained the master of Galicia, Volhynia, and other Ukrainian lands west of the Dnieper until its partitions in the years from 1772 to 1795. Following the disappearance of the Polish state, Galicia became part of the Austrian Empire, while other Ukrainian territories were incorporated into the Russian Empire, ruled by the Romanov Dynasty. The Ukrainian people's experience within the two empires was markedly different.

The Romanovs abolished the administrative distinctiveness of Ukrainian territories and promoted the assimilation of Ukrainians. The apogee of this policy was the 1863 official ban on Ukrainian-language publications, which was reinforced in 1876. Yet, the Russian conquest of the Crimea in 1783 opened up the southern steppes for colonization, thus greatly expanding Ukrainian ethnic territory. Following the abolition of serfdom in 1861, industrial development began in earnest in southeastern Ukraine, resulting in the creation of large coal and metallurgical centers in the Donbas and Kryvyi Rih regions. The Russian cultural physiognomy of cities and industrial settlements produced an assimilated working class, which would identify politically with all-Russian parties.

Like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Ukrainian national revival began with the discovery of a

new notion of nationality as a cultural and linguistic community. Literature soon emerged as the primary vehicle of cultural nationalism, and the great poet Taras Shevchenko came to be seen as its high priest. Together with other members of the Cyril and Methodius Society (1845–1847), Shevchenko also laid the foundations of Ukrainian political thought, which revolved around the idea of transforming the Russian Empire into a democratic federation. Such was the reasoning of the *hromady* (communities), secret clubs of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which spearheaded the Ukrainian national movement during the second half of the century. Ukrainian political parties began emerging at the turn of the twentieth century, yet could not build a mass support base during the short period of legal existence between the Revolution of 1905 and the beginning of World War I.

The Habsburg Empire, in contrast, was based simultaneously on accommodating its major nationalities and pitting them against each other. In addition to Transcarpathia, which for centuries had been part of the Hungarian crown, during the late eighteenth century the Habsburgs acquired two other ethnic Ukrainian regions: Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovyna. In Galicia the landlord class was overwhelmingly Polish, whereas in Bukovyna Ukrainians competed with Romanians for influence. Although they were never Vienna's favorites, the Ruthenians of the Habsburg Empire did not experience the repressions against their national development that were suffered by the Little Russians (Ukrainians) in the Russian Empire. Ukrainians benefited from educational reforms that established instruction in their native language, and by the official recognition of the Uniate Church, which would become their national institution.

Ukrainians emerged as a political nationality during the Revolution of 1848, when they established the Supreme Ruthenian Council in Lviv and put forward a demand to divide Galicia into Ukrainian and Polish parts. The abolition of serfdom in 1848, however, did not lead to the industrial transformation of Ukrainian territories, which remained an agrarian backwater. Land hunger and rural overpopulation resulted in mass emigration of Ukrainians to North America, beginning in the 1880s. Modern political parties began emerging during the 1890s, and the introduction in 1907 of a universal suffrage provided Ukrainians with increasing political representation. However, the Ukrainian-Polish ethnic conflict in Galicia deepened during the early twentieth century. Developments

in Bukovyna largely paralleled those in Galicia, while Transcarpathia remained politically and culturally dormant.

WORLD WAR I AND THE REVOLUTION

Galicia and Bukovyna were a military theater during much of World War I. The annexation of these lands and the suppression of Ukrainian nationalism there was one of Russia's war aims, but Russian control of Lviv proved short-lived. In the Russian Empire, the February Revolution of 1917 triggered an impressive revival of Ukrainian political and cultural life. In March of that year representatives of Ukrainian parties and civic organizations formed the Central Rada (Council) in Kiev, which elected the distinguished historian Mykhail Sergeyevich Hrushevsky as its president. Instead of a dual power, the situation in the Ukrainian provinces resembled a triple power, with the Russian Provisional Government, the Soviets, and the Rada all claiming authority.

With the Rada's influence steadily increasing, the Provisional Government was forced to recognize it and, in July 1917, grant Ukraine autonomy. Following the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd on November 7, the Rada refused to recognize the new Soviet government and proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, in federation with a future, democratic Russia. Meanwhile, at the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (Kharkiv, December 1917), the Bolsheviks proclaimed Ukraine a Soviet republic. In January 1918 Bolshevik troops from Russia began advancing on Kiev, prompting the proclamation by the Central Rada of full independence on January 22.

Following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks were forced to evacuate their troops from Ukraine. The Rada government returned with the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, but it was too left-leaning for the Central Powers. In April 1918 a German-supported coup installed General Pavlo Skoropadsky as Hetman of Ukraine. This conservative monarchy lasted in Ukraine until December, when the defeated Central Powers withdrew their troops, and was replaced by the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The new government was at first a dictatorship of several Ukrainian socialists and nationalists, who had previously been associated with the Rada, but later all power became concentrated in the hands of Symon Petliura.

As the Austro-Hungarian Empire began disintegrating in October 1918, the Ukrainian political

leaders there declared the creation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. On January 22, 1919, the two Ukrainian republics proclaimed their unification, which, however, was never carried through. The Western Republic found itself fighting a civil war against the Poles, who claimed all of Galicia for their new state and eventually defeated the Ukrainian forces in July 1919. In the meantime, the Eastern Republic was being torn apart in an even more confusing and brutal civil war fought among the Directory, the Reds, the Whites, and various anarchist armies. The collapse of civic order in 1919 resulted in Jewish pogroms, which were committed by all the participating armies, but especially by unruly peasant rebels. By early 1920 Soviet forces controlled all Ukrainian territories of the former Russian Empire except Volhynia and Western Podolia, which were occupied by Poland. A Polish-Soviet war in the spring and summer of 1920 briefly restored the Petliura government in Kiev, but ultimately resulted in the affirmation of Ukraine's division between the USSR and Poland. Northern Bukovyna became part of the Kingdom of Romania, while Transcarpathia found itself within a newly created Czechoslovak republic.

INTERWAR UKRAINE

The Ukrainian territories under Bolshevik control had been constituted as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which in 1922 became a founding member of the Soviet Union. Although it possessed all the structures and symbols of an independent state, Soviet Ukraine was effectively governed from Moscow. During the early years of Bolshevik rule, the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, or CP(b)U, was predominantly Russian and Jewish in its ethnic composition. The proportion of Ukrainians increased to some 20 percent only in 1920, after the absorption of the Borotbisty, a non-Bolshevik communist party in Ukraine. Still, the CP(b)U always remained an integral part of the All-Union Communist Party.

During the 1920s, in order to reach out to the overwhelmingly peasant population and disarm the appeal of Ukrainian nationalism, the Bolsheviks pursued the policy of Ukrainization. This affirmative action program fostered education, publishing, and official communication in the Ukrainian language, and sponsored the recruitment of Ukrainians to party and government structures. By the late 1920s the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians in the CP(b)U exceeded 50 percent. The Ukrainization drive eventually caused resis-

tance among Russian bureaucrats in Ukraine and uneasiness in Moscow. Yet, some Ukrainian Bolsheviks, led by the vocal Mykola Skrypnyk, defended the policy of Ukrainization. Peasant resistance to the forcible collectivization of agriculture during the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) led to Moscow's denunciation of Ukrainization and its defenders. Skrypnyk killed himself in 1933, the same year that millions of Ukrainian peasants died in a catastrophic famine, which was caused by state policies. Ukrainian cultural figures suffered disproportionately during the Great Terror. Stalinist-era industrialization, however, turned the Ukrainian republic into a developed industrial region.

In interwar Poland and Romania, Ukrainians experienced discrimination and assimilationist pressure. By the mid-1930s, popular discontent with the inability of mainstream Ukrainian political parties, such as the National Democrats, to counter Polish oppression, propelled Ukrainian radical nationalists to prominence. The conspiratorial Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN, founded in 1929) became increasingly influential among Ukrainian youth. The situation was different in Czechoslovakia, where the government promoted multiculturalism and modernized the economy in Transcarpathia. When Hitler began dismembering Czechoslovakia in 1938, this region was granted autonomy and briefly enjoyed independence as Carpatho-Ukraine before being occupied by Hungary.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 1939) transferred Poland's Ukrainian territories and Romania's Northern Bukovyna to the Soviet sphere of influence. The USSR occupied these regions in September 1939 and June 1940, respectively, under the guise of reuniting the Ukrainian nation within a single state structure. The OUN had just split into a more moderate wing led by Andrii Melnyk and a more radical one under the leadership of Stepan Bandera. The infighting between the OUN(M) and OUN(B) effectively prevented radical nationalists from putting up any resistance.

WORLD WAR II AND THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD

The surprise Nazi attack on the USSR in June 1941 turned the Ukrainian republic into a battlefield. The Germans scored one of the war's biggest victories when they took Kiev in September at a cost of 600,000 Soviet fatalities and an equal number of soldiers who were taken prisoner. By the end of 1941 the German armies controlled practically all

of Ukrainian territory. In Lviv on June 30, 1941, the OUN(B) attempted the proclamation of a Ukrainian state, but the Gestapo soon began arresting the leading Banderites. The German administration divided Ukraine into several administrative entities and discouraged Ukrainian national aspirations. The economy was exploited and the population brutalized. The Nazis exterminated between 600,000 and 900,000 Ukrainian Jews, including 34,000 who were machine-gunned during a two-day massacre in the ravine of Babi Yar in Kiev (September 1941). The Red Army began the liberation of Ukraine in mid-1943, and completed it by October 1944. In Western Ukraine, Soviet troops encountered fierce resistance from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which continued its guerilla war in the region until the early 1950s. In 1945 Czechoslovakia ceded Transcarpathia to the Soviet Union, thus completing the unification of all Ukrainian ethnic lands within the Ukrainian SSR.

The first postwar decade was characterized by economic reconstruction and the Sovietization of Western Ukraine. In 1946 the authorities forcibly dissolved the Uniate Church, the national institution of Galician Ukrainians. In Ukraine, the *Zhdanovshchina* (Zhdanov's time) campaign from 1946 to 1948 was aimed primarily at real and imaginary manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism, and to reinstall in Soviet culture Bolshevik values. In 1949 the long-serving first secretary of the CP(b)U, Nikita Khrushchev, left for a higher position in Moscow, but continued to consider the republic as his power base. Therefore, his ascendancy to power in the Kremlin after Stalin's death signaled the Ukrainians' promotion to the status of the Russians' junior partner in running the USSR. This change was sealed by the celebrations in 1954 of the tercentenary of Ukraine's "reunification" with Russia and the transfer of the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. By 1959 ethnic Ukrainians constituted more than 60 percent of the membership of the Communist Party of Ukraine (renamed the CPU in 1952) and dominated its Central Committee and Politburo. Following a long line of non-Ukrainian party leaders, after 1953 all first secretaries were Ukrainian. In particular, Petro Shelest, who headed the CPU from 1963 to 1972, distinguished himself as a defender of the republic's economic interests and culture until his removal on charges of being soft on nationalism.

His replacement and Leonid Brezhnev's faithful client, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky (1972–1989) began his rule with a purge of patriotic intellectuals.

From the late 1950s Ukraine was a hotbed of the dissident movement. In addition to human rights issues, Ukrainian dissidents focused on the defense of the Ukrainian language and culture. In 1975 the movement acquired more political coloration, when the writer Mykola Rudenko founded a Helsinki Watch Group. However, by the late 1970s the KGB succeeded in breaking up organized dissent in the republic. The Shcherbytsky regime promoted Russification and consumerism, but could do nothing to halt the deterioration of the economy. The crisis was brought home by the world's worst nuclear accident, at Chernobyl power plant near Kiev in April of 1986.

Glasnost was slow to develop in Ukraine due to Shcherbytsky's perseverance in his post, but the first mass demonstrations in Lviv and Kiev took place in 1988. The next year saw the emergence of a mass popular front, Rukh (Movement), and the defeats of many prominent party leaders in free elections. The elections to the Ukrainian Parliament in 1990 broke the Communist Party's hold on political power, while Rukh openly proclaimed independence as its ultimate aim.

INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

In the wake of a failed coup in Moscow, on August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament proclaimed the republic's full independence, an act endorsed by more than 90 percent of voters in a referendum in December 1991. Under President Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994), Ukraine experienced hyperinflation and a sharp drop in the gross national product. The state promoted Ukrainization of education and culture and in foreign affairs sought to develop closer ties with the West. In the elections of 1994 Kravchuk lost to Leonid Kuchma, who advocated economic reform and the restoration of Ukraine's special relationship with Russia. By dividing the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine (1995), Kuchma resolved the tension between the two countries. In 1997 he signed a comprehensive friendship treaty with Russia. Kuchma was re-elected in 1999 and, after a long period of decline, the economy began to recover during Victor Yushchenko's tenure as prime minister from 1999 to 2001. For most of the 1990s Ukraine was among the largest recipients of U.S. financial aid. Relations between the West and Kuchma's administration cooled in 2001 and 2002 due to rampant corruption in Ukraine, as well as the president's alleged involvement in a journalist's murder and the sale of a sophisticated radar system to Iraq.

See also: BOROTBISTY; COSSACKS; CRIMEA; CRIMEAN TATARS; CYRIL AND METHODIUS SOCIETY; ENSERFMENT; KRAVCHUK, LEONID MAKAROVICH; MUSCOVY; ROMANOV DYNASTY; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SKRYPNYK, MYKOLA OLEKSIIOVYCH; UNIATE CHURCH; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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SERHY YEKELCHYK

ULOZHENIE OF 1649 *See* LAW CODE OF 1649.

UNIATE CHURCH

The traditional name for Eastern or Byzantine rite churches in communion with the Roman Catholic Church.

The largest church within the Uniate Church is Ukrainian Catholic Church, which emerged as a result of the church union of Berestia (Brest-Litovsk) in 1596. Of the Soviet successor states, smaller pockets of Byzantine-rite Catholics also exist in Belarus. Although the historic term “Uniates” is still widely used in Russia, Ukrainian Catholics in the early twenty-first century considered it imprecise and pejorative.

By the end of the sixteenth century, a crisis within the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, combined with pressure from Polish

authorities, prompted some Orthodox bishops to advocate union with Rome. Part of their motivation was to ensure the equal treatment of Orthodox believers and clergy in the Catholic Commonwealth. Having received assurances that the Byzantine liturgy, rites, and entitlement of priests to marry would be respected, in 1595 four Orthodox bishops and the metropolitan of Kiev agreed to recognize the pope's supreme authority in matters of faith and dogma. Following the approval of Pope Clement VIII, the union was proclaimed in October 1596 at a synod in Berestia.

Opposition from other bishops within the Kiev metropolity and the Orthodox nobility sparked a fierce religious polemic. The Ukrainian Cossacks proved themselves to be staunch opponents of the union. During the Cossack-Polish wars of 1648–1657, the Cossacks often massacred Uniates en masse. The Cossack state under Bohdan Khmelnytsky dissolved the Uniate Church, but it continued to exist in Poland. The partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century split the Uniate church between the Russian and Austrian empires. Russian tsars encouraged the conversion of Uniates to Orthodoxy until 1839, when Nicholas I declared the Union of Berestia null and void, thus forcing all Uniates into the fold of the Russian Orthodox Church.

In contrast, the Uniate Church in Austria was granted equal status with the Roman Catholic Church. In 1807 Pope Pius VII created the Uniate metropolity of Halych with its see in Lviv, the capital of Galicia. Austrian rulers established educational institutions and provided support for the clergy of what they renamed the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church. During the nineteenth century it became the national church of Galicia's Ukrainians, culminating in the long tenure of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky (1900–1944), who achieved the stature of a national symbol. In 1939 the church had some 5.5 million faithful.

In April 1945, with Western Ukraine under Soviet control, Stalin ordered the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy imprisoned. In March 1946 the authorities convened in Lviv a spurious *sobor* (church council), which reunited the Uniates with the Orthodox Church. However, the Uniate Church continued to exist underground, as well as in the Ukrainian diaspora. A mass movement to restore the Ukrainian Catholic Church began during the glasnost period and culminated in the church's legalization in December 1989. It quickly regained its position as a dominant church in Western

Ukraine. As of 2003, the Ukrainian Catholic Church had 3,317 parishes in Ukraine and was headed by Major Archbishop Lubomyr Cardinal Husar.

See also: CATHOLICISM; ORTHODOXY; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

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SERHY YEKELCHYK

UNION OF RIGHT FORCES

The Union of Right Forces (*Soyuz Pravykh Sil*, or SPS) was a political party that grew out of an association, geared toward the 1999 Duma elections, of a number of leaders' structures, not one of which was able to enter the previous Duma on its own. The SPS included: the democratic bloc "A Just Cause"; the bloc "Voice of Russia," founded as a gubernatorial bloc; and the movement "New Force" of the ex-premier Sergei Kiriyenko. "A Just Cause" brought a number of groups together around the party Russia's Democratic Choice: the movement "Forward, Russia!," "Common Cause," the movement "Democratic Russia," the party "Democratic Russia," and an array of smaller organizations. In "Voice of Russia," which originally consisted of seven organizations, only two, with Samara governor Konstantin Titov at the head, joined with the SPS; the others entered "All Russia." "A Just Cause" had less severe losses at the time of the association: it only lost "Forward, Russia!" with Boris Fyodorov, who joined with Our Home Is Russia (NDR). The SPS list was headed by reformers from the second wave: Kiriyenko ("New Force"), ex-deputy prime minister and former Nizhegorod governor Boris Nemtsov (Russia's Democratic Choice), and ex-minister Irina Khakamada ("Common Cause"). In the organization of the campaign and the elaboration of the program, a leading role was played

by veteran reformers Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar.

The SPS leaders, presenting themselves as liberal statist, unequivocally supported the incipient war in Chechnya and entered into a full-format union with the Kremlin, using the patriotic sentiment in society and the growing popularity of premier Vladimir Putin (the campaign slogan was "Putin for president, Kiriyenko in the Duma!"). Alongside massive stadium shows as part of the "You're Right!" campaign aimed at youth, the SPS advertised with a collection of signatures in support of a referendum to be held with four questions: concerning the protection of private property, the removal of immunity from the deputies of the Federal Assembly, limitation of military participation to those in service or under contract, and limitations on the president's right to dismiss members of the government. After the elections, the Central Electoral Commission rejected almost one million of the 3.6 million signatures collected and refused to hold the referendum. The SPS candidates balloted in sixty-five majority districts and won in five, winners including Nemtsov and Khakamada. The original count was small (thirty-two delegates), but the experienced SPS did not become head of the pro-government coalition. Although in the second half of the term it gained control of several important committees, the SPS, under the leadership of Nemtsov (in May 2000, Kiriyenko, the original leader, was appointed plenipotentiary to the president in the Privolga federal district), started to move in a highly oppositional direction. The SPS political council included Gaidar and Chubais, as well as Nemtsov, Khakamada, and Kiriyenko, who had suspended his membership.

Deeming the years of activity of the government formed in 2000 as a time of squandered possibilities, the SPS proposed a formula for success consisting of three components: a strong and effective state, a private competitive economy, and individual freedom. The SPS considered the following tasks of primary importance: (1) the defense of federalism (prohibition of a third term for governors, nationwide elections of the members of the Soviet Federation, and guaranteed funds for local self-government); (2) the creation of conditions for the attraction of capital and the return of emigrés to Russia; (3) immediate realization of the following constitutional rights of citizens: the right to ownership of land, the right to move and to choose one's place of residence, the right to information, which presupposes the defense of the independence

of the media organizations (SMI), and the right to an independent and fair trial; (4) the introduction of a cumulative pension system, liberalization of labor relations, and effective restructurings in the Residential-Communal Management (ZhKKh) sphere; (5) guarantee of equal access to education, introduction of a single exam into the *VUZy* (institutions of higher learning); (6) creation of political conditions for full-scale regulation in Chechnya; and (7) military reform, providing for six-month service and transition to a contracted army no later than 2005.

Positioning itself as the mouthpiece of business interests, the SPS had an array of serious sponsors (including the energetic monopolist RAO UES of Russia, headed by the unofficial leader of the SPS, Anatoly Chubais, "Alpha-Group," "Interros," and so forth), allowing it to act with relative independence.

See also: CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH; DUMA; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; KIRIYENKO, SERGEI VLADILENOVICH; NEMTSOV, BORIS IVANOVICH

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NIKOLAI PETROV

UNION OF SOVEREIGN STATES

Gorbachev's last effort to reconfigure and maintain the territorial integrity of the USSR.

During 1990 and 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev led efforts to reconfigure center-periphery relations in the USSR. He sought a new Union Treaty that would give more autonomy to the union republics and make the Soviet Union an actual functioning

federation. Working with the recently elected presidents of the union republics, Gorbachev fashioned a Union of Soviet *Sovereign* Republics. However, six republics (Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova) refused to participate in the treaty negotiations and announced that they were seeking outright independence.

The nine remaining union republics reached agreement on June 17, 1991. A Party plenum approved the new treaty and scheduled a signing ceremony for August 20. But on August 19, hard-liners staged a coup in order to prevent the imminent demise of the USSR. When the coup failed, Gorbachev attempted to save some semblance of union. As an interim solution, a State Council, consisting of Gorbachev and the presidents of the remaining republics, was announced on September 5. Ten republics attended the first State Council session on September 6 and voted to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Georgia and Moldova did not attend.

In mid-September, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies voted to work toward forming a Union of Sovereign States. The republics would receive much greater autonomy, while currency, defense, and foreign affairs would remain centrally controlled. There would be a USSR president and prime minister, but with fewer powers than under the Soviet system.

Gradually, Boris Yeltsin took the initiative away from Gorbachev. Yeltsin dissolved many USSR structures and reassigned others to Russian control. At a November 25 State Council meeting, he argued for a confederal structure in which the members conducted their own diplomacy and could form their own militaries. Outraged, Gorbachev stormed out of the room. Most republic leaders had been stalling until Ukraine's referendum on independence, scheduled for December 1. When Ukraine voted for independence, the union's fate was sealed.

Meeting in the Belovezh forest on December 8, Yeltsin, Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk, and Belarusian parliamentary chair Stanislav Shushkevich nullified the 1922 USSR Union Treaty. The remaining republics were caught by surprise, but they quickly signed onto the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) structure formed by the Belovezh Accords. Gorbachev was left out of the discussion and not invited to the first CIS meeting on December 21. Faced with the inevitable, Gorbachev resigned on December 25. Barely 40 of the 173 Council of Republic deputies reported to work

on December 26, where they formally voted to dissolve the USSR. The Soviet Union was no more.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; UNION TREATY

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Although the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in November 1917, it was not until 1922 that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formed. At that time there were only four Soviet republics—the Russian republic (officially called the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic or RSFSR), Ukraine, Belorussia, and Transcaucasia. The name, USSR, was chosen deliberately to avoid that of any particular nation or country, since the hope of its founders was that, gradually, more and more countries throughout the world would join its ranks.

The USSR came to embrace almost every part of the Russian Empire at its most expansive. The Baltic states were forcibly incorporated in 1940, and in the post-World War II Soviet Union there were fifteen Union Republics. Some of them contained so-called Autonomous Republics which, like the Union Republics, were named after a nationality for which that territory was a traditional homeland.

According to the Soviet Constitution the USSR was a federation, but in reality many of the basic features of a federal system were lacking. The deficits included the lack of a clear definition of what lay within the jurisdiction of the component parts of the federation and what was the sole responsibility of the central authorities, the lack of any real autonomy for the fifteen republics, and the absence of an independent judicial body that

could adjudicate in cases of dispute between the republics and Moscow. Moreover, the doctrine of democratic centralism that governed relations within the Communist Party (and in Brezhnev's time was made a principle of the organization of the entire Soviet state) made a mockery of the federal principle. Democratic centralism was interpreted by Soviet communists to mean that the decisions of higher party organs were unconditionally binding on lower party bodies, and that they applied to the subjects of the federation, such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, or Latvia, just as much as to a Russian province.

In practice, the degree to which the nationals of the various Soviet republics ran their republics, and the extent to which they were given some latitude to introduce local variation, changed over time. It was, however, only during the perestroika period that the federal forms gained legitimacy. Pressure grew from below, burgeoning from arguments in favor of a genuine federalism to press for a loose confederation and culminated in demands for complete independence. With the liberalization and partial democratization of the Soviet system after 1985, the fact that the Soviet Union had been divided administratively along national-territorial lines gained immense significance. Institutions that had made modest concessions to national consciousness in the case of nations of long standing (such as Armenia) and had contributed, unwittingly, to a process of nation-building in parts of Soviet Central Asia, began to use the resources at their disposal to pose fundamental challenges to the federal authorities in Moscow.

Not all the republics demanded independence, however, the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were in the vanguard of the independence movement, and separatist sentiments also grew in Georgia. Ukraine was divided and only later fully embraced independent statehood. The Central Asian republics had independence virtually thrust upon them when Boris Yeltsin joined the leaders of Ukraine and Belorussia in December 1991 to proclaim that the USSR would cease to exist. Surveys of public opinion in Russia both before and after 1991 showed a majority of Russians in favor of preserving the Union, but in the aftermath of the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev of August 1991, Yeltsin chose to assert Russia's independence from the USSR. Since Russia comprised approximately three-quarters of the territory of the USSR and roughly half of its population, this was the final blow to the state. The flag of the Union

was lowered from the Kremlin on December 25, 1991, and replaced by the Russian tricolor. By the end of the month the USSR had ceased to exist.

A distinction can be drawn between the dismantling or transformation of the Soviet system, and the disintegration of the USSR. From the standpoint of democracy, the former was a necessity. The breakup of the Soviet Union was more ambiguous in respect of democratic developments. Some of the republics—notably the three Baltic states—became relatively successful democracies once they had gained their independence. A number of other successor states to the USSR became more authoritarian than they were in the last years of the Soviet Union.

During most of its existence the USSR was a major player on the international stage. While maintaining a highly authoritarian regime—except for the years of high Stalinism, when it is more appropriately termed totalitarianism, and the perestroika period that saw the development of political pluralism—the Soviet state was able to project its power and influence abroad. Its success in doing so depended more upon military might than on its economic achievements or political attractiveness.

Nevertheless, the USSR played *the* major part in the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe in World War II and earned the gratitude of many citizens of Western Europe. The Soviet "liberation" of Eastern Europe, by contrast, led to the imposition of Soviet-style dictatorial regimes in that half of the continent and the suppression of freedom within East-Central Europe for another four decades. The interaction between the Soviet Union and what was known as the Communist bloc led ultimately, however, to important two-way influence once serious reform got underway in Moscow in 1987–1988. The changes in the USSR emboldened reformers and advocates of national independence in East-Central Europe. The fact that Soviet troops stayed in their barracks as the countries in the Eastern part of the continent broke free of Soviet tutelage in 1989 encouraged the most disaffected nationalities within the USSR itself, with the Lithuanians in the vanguard, to demand no less for themselves than had been attained by Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs. Thus, the Soviet control over Eastern Europe that had once seemed a source of strength of the USSR turned out, in the last years of the Soviet regime, to add to its own entropic pressures.

Following the disintegration of the Union, the permanent place on the United Nations Security Council, which had belonged to the USSR since the formation of the United Nations, passed to the largest of the Soviet successor states, Russia.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; UNION OF SOVEREIGN STATES

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ARCHIE BROWN

UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS

The Union of Soviet Writers (*Soiuz sovetskikh pisatelei*) was the first creative union organized by the Communist Party to solidify its influence on the arts. The Party leadership considered literature and other arts to be potent weapons which could work for or against them. For almost sixty years, the Union employed a mixture of enticements to mobilize writers behind the Party's agenda, and punishments to discipline those believed to have transgressed.

The Union's creation marked the final step in the politicization of Soviet literature. It replaced the less-inclusive Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), which was dissolved in 1932. The new Union was open to all loyal Soviet writers. Although the Union's creation was announced in May 1932, its founding Congress did not occur until August 1934. In the interim, an Organizational Committee dominated by Party officials developed the vaguely defined aesthetic doctrine of Socialist

Realism, which became the guiding tenet of Soviet literature. Maxim Gorky was also involved in the Union's creation, though scholars disagree about his actual role. The Union's First Congress was a widely publicized event, with speeches by leading writers and prominent political figures.

The Union had chapters at the All-Union, republic, regional, and city level; however, there was no Russian Republic chapter until 1955. In theory, the Union's activities were funded by membership fees; in reality it was heavily subsidized by the Soviet state. The Union's controlling body was known at different times as the Presidium, Secretariat, or Litburo (Literary Bureau). Appointments to this body were controlled by the Communist Party's Central Committee. Union leaders, who were often little-known writers, were expected to ensure the implementation of Party policies in literature. By having writers police one another, the Central Committee created the illusion of peer review and undermined group solidarity.

The Union oversaw Soviet literary journals and ran its own publishing house, *Sovetskii pisatel*. It organized meetings where writers were encouraged to discuss themes favored by the Party, and local chapters sometimes held preliminary readings of members' works. Its main task, however, was to reward or punish writers, depending on their level of cooperation with the Party's agenda. The Union controlled many aspects of its members' everyday lives, from housing, medical care, and vacations, to access to consumer goods; the quality and extent of these benefits depended on writers' cooperation. Rewards could be considerable. As a result, election to the Union was a coveted prize.

On the other hand, the Union could publicly censure members or prevent the publication of their work. Under Stalin, Union leaders were expected to sanction members' arrest or execution. After 1953, however, the Union's worst sanction was expulsion from its ranks. Not only were expelled members deprived of access to Union resources, but they could no longer publish in the Soviet Union. Only Union members could engage in writing as their main profession. The poet Joseph Brodsky, who was not a Union member, was arrested in 1964 as a social parasite.

The Writers' Union provided the template for other creative unions, such as those for composers, filmmakers, and artists. The Union's influence ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, though some branches have reconstituted themselves. The

Russian Federation branch has become a bastion of extreme nationalism.

See also: BRODSKY, JOSEPH ALEXANDROVICH; GORKY, MAXIM

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BRIAN KASSOF

UNION OF STRUGGLE FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF LABOR

Although preceded by several smaller groups, the Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class was the first important Marxist revolutionary organization founded inside Russia in the 1890s. Established in 1895 in St. Petersburg, it adopted its permanent name in December of that year. Its twenty or so members, mainly students and student-age intellectuals, included future leaders of Social Democracy, the movement that gave birth to Bolshevism, Menshevism, and the October Revolution. Among them were Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), the future Bolshevik, and Iuly Tserderbaum (Martov), the future Menshevik. Some workers were associated with the Union, but not with membership rights.

During its first years the Union's most noteworthy activity was the distribution of agitational leaflets to Petersburg workers in support of their strike actions. As a matter of caution, the Union tended to avoid leaflets that were overtly political or revolutionary, but because strikes were still illegal, even leaflets confined to workers' economic grievances were treated as acts of rebellion by the police. In the winter of 1895–1896 and again that summer, the Union was weakened by arrests, anticipating many more arrests and hence frequent turnovers in its membership and a weakening of its effectiveness. Nevertheless, it continued functioning, and in early summer 1896 and January 1897 it played a major role in supporting the mil-

itant textile strikes that forced the government to recognize the power of workers and to reduce the length of the workday (law of June 2, 1897). During this period the Union spawned similar organizations in other cities and maintained contact with revolutionaries abroad.

In 1896 and 1897 the successes of the Petersburg workers' movement precipitated conflicts within the Union. Younger members (*molodye*) believed that the time was ripe to open the organization's ranks to worker representatives chosen by participants in the grassroots labor movement, while the somewhat older "veterans" (*stariki*), including exiled founders of the Union such as Lenin, while not opposing the admission of individual workers who met their political and ideological standards, balked at the admission of workers chosen by worker groups lest their presence dilute the Union's political ideology. Tensions over this issue persisted, but as Lenin and the *stariki* became less influential, the organization became increasingly worker-friendly. From 1898 to 1902 it was run mainly by worker-phile Marxists whose position was subjected to intense and exaggerated criticism by Lenin, Martov, and others, who accused it of economism. Although the influence of the Union waxed and waned, it managed to survive this period of internal disagreement, rivalry, and fragmentation among Russia's Marxists, remaining a focal point of organized Social Democracy in St. Petersburg. Until the summer of 1902, when it briefly and tentatively adhered to the organization "Iskra"—then dominated by Leninist fears of worker spontaneity—the Union was mainly a close ally of workers' organizations. By 1903, however, its independent identity was lost, as its niche in the organizational life of Russian Marxism became indistinguishable from that of the Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; MENSHEVIKS; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' PARTY; WORKERS

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REGINALD E. ZELNIK

UNION TREATY

The Union Treaty, often referred to as the new Union Treaty, represented an attempt by Soviet party leader and president Mikhail Gorbachev to renegotiate the terms of the original treaty that established the USSR in December 1922 in the hope of precluding the disintegration of the country. The first of several drafts of the new treaty was made public in November 1990, but it was never signed.

The notion that a new Union Treaty was necessary to redress the balance between the central authorities in Moscow and the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR was first advanced in the Baltic republics in 1988. By early 1990 even the conservative party leadership in Ukraine recognized that a new Union treaty would be required. Initially Gorbachev and his team resisted demands for a new basic document that would give the republics more rights and prerogatives within the Soviet federation. At the long awaited plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, convened in September 1989 to discuss interethnic relations, the platform adopted by the party on nationalities policy specifically rejected the need for a new Union treaty, arguing that the Soviet constitution itself was a treaty document and that it was sufficient to guarantee the rights of the republics.

Secessionist pressures in the republics, however, particularly in the Baltic states, forced Gorbachev to change his course. In February 1990 both Estonia and Lithuania demanded that bilateral negotiations begin to restore their independence. In March Lithuania declared outright that it had reestablished independence.

The first indication that Moscow was prepared to consider a new federative arrangement came at the February 1990 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In his report to the plenum, Gorbachev, although not conceding that a new document should be drawn up, referred to the need for a further development of the treaty principle and

suggested that different constitutional arrangements were possible with individual republics. But it was not until mid-June of that year that the USSR Council of the Federation—a body created the previous March and initially composed of the presidents or parliamentary chairmen of the fifteen Union republics—decided to set up a working group of representatives from the Union republics to draft the treaty. Toward the end of the month the working group held its first session.

The decision to begin work on a new Union Treaty was prompted by the belated realization that the relatively democratic parliamentary elections held in the republics in the spring would result in legislative bodies that would be much more forceful in defending their national rights and much less willing to compromise with Moscow than their predecessors. Interestingly the Council of the Federation acted on the same day (June 12) that the Russian republic proclaimed its sovereignty. In the meantime, pressure had been building in the republics, most of which were no longer satisfied with a looser federation and were now insisting on confederation. The Baltic representatives, for their part, refused to even participate in the working group.

The first draft of the new Union Treaty was made public at the end of November 1990. It consisted of a brief introduction and three sections devoted to (1) fundamental principles, (2) the structure of the Union, and (3) the organs of power and administration. The draft omitted references to socialism and proposed that the country be renamed the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics. It enhanced the role of the Council of the Federation, which was upgraded from a consultative body to a policymaking organ with the power to make decisions, and abolished the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Although the document contained some concessions to the republics that had been legislated earlier in the year, it fell far short of the expectations that had already been voiced by almost all of the republics. Most importantly the draft was completely out of step with the sovereignty declarations of the republics and it continued to retain the federative principle. It also upgraded the status of the autonomous units, most of which were in the Russian republic. This was seen as a calculated step directed against the Union republics. In sum, the new draft treaty was very much a product of decisions made by the central leadership rather than an agreement between the republics and the center.

By the end of 1990 the three Baltic republics, Armenia, and Georgia had either declared their independence or stated that they would regain independence after a transitional period—that is, they were not prepared to sign the new Union Treaty under any circumstances. Most of the autonomous formations had declared sovereignty. In Ukraine student demonstrations in October brought down the government and resulted in a parliamentary decision not to sign a new Union treaty until the political and economic situation in the republic was stabilized and a new constitution was adopted. In practice this meant indefinite postponement. Once again Gorbachev was offering too little, too late. Gorbachev seems not to have understood the nature of the national mobilization that was rapidly gaining momentum throughout the Soviet Union, confidently predicting that the new Union Treaty would be signed by the end of the year. In December he gained approval from the Congress of People's Deputies to hold a referendum on a renewed federation on March 17, 1991, the results of which he hoped would pressure the republics into signing a new treaty.

A second draft of the treaty, which gave more rights to the republics but still retained the federal structure, was published in early March and sent to the republics for approval. It was the product of negotiations among eight Union republics (the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), over a dozen autonomous units, and representatives of the center; Azerbaijan participated as an observer. The document was immediately dismissed by the Russian and Ukrainian leaders, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk. Although the referendum yielded a 76 percent majority in favor of a renewed federation (the Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova boycotted the vote), negotiations on the new Union Treaty remained stalled. In response Gorbachev convened a meeting in Novo-Ogarevo outside of Moscow on April 23 with representatives of the nine Union republics that took part in the referendum. The result, a five-point statement known as the 9+1 agreement, was considered to be a major breakthrough to the extent that it recognized the sovereignty of the republics and recognized the need for a cardinal increase in their role. In the final analysis, however, it was nothing more than an agreement about the need for an agreement. In June the Ukrainian parliament ruled that it would postpone negotiations until after mid-September. The ensuing negotiations throughout the summer in Novo-Ogarevo, commonly referred to as the Novo-

Ogarevo process, were difficult and contradictory, but an agreement was finally reached that five republics (the RSFSR, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) would initial the draft treaty on August 20; Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan said they would sign in September. The abortive coup in Moscow on August 19, whose organizers wanted to forestall the signing of the treaty, effectively brought the Novo-Ogarevo process to an end.

In the radically transformed political situation after the attempted coup, with Gorbachev's standing severely diminished and one after another of the republics declaring their full independence, prospects for a new Union Treaty seemed remote. In particular, Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24 stunned observers both within and outside the USSR. Thereafter, Ukraine refused to partake in any discussions about the future of the country until after its referendum on independence scheduled for December 1. Nevertheless, Gorbachev pressed ahead, threatening to resign and predicting global catastrophe if a new treaty was not signed. In October he and the leaders of eight republics, including Yeltsin, issued an appeal to the Ukrainian parliament to reconsider. Ukrainian lawmakers responded that they would not entertain the prospect of being included in another country. By November Kravchuk was saying that a new Union Treaty was nonsense.

Russia, in contrast, continued to support the idea of some kind of union until the very end. In mid-November it agreed in principle (along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan) to sign the latest version of the treaty, which now foresaw a confederation called the Union of Sovereign States. The text was published by *Izvestia* on November 25. On the same day, seven republics met again with Gorbachev—this time Azerbaijan was absent but Uzbekistan was present—who expected the draft to be signed by those attending. Instead the session broke up in rancor and the representatives of the republics revised the text once again, without Gorbachev.

After December 1, 1991, when more than 90 percent of Ukraine's voters endorsed their parliament's independence declaration, discussion about a new Union treaty became irrelevant. The following week the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; UNION OF SOVEREIGN STATES

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ROMAN SOLCHANYK

UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations, successor to the League of Nations, was conceived and created by the allies during World War II. In 1944 the USSR and the United States, with other major nations, met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., to plan a postwar organization that would provide a forum for the settlement of disputes. Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill solidified plans for the United Nations at Yalta (1945), compromising on substantive issues regarding voting procedures, territorial trusteeships, and the admission of various countries. In April 1945 the allies met in San Francisco and wrote the charter of the new organization, and the United Nations officially came into existence on October 24, 1945, following the charter's ratification by the major powers. All member nations received one vote in the General Assembly, but the five major powers enjoyed the right of veto in the Security Council.

Disputes in the United Nations between the Soviet Union and the United States paralleled the growing bitterness of the Cold War. In 1946 the Soviet Union and the United States clashed over the issues of Soviet troops in Iran and the control of atomic weapons. In both cases American victories led to increasing Soviet disaffection from the international body. The United States scored another success in 1950, when a boycott of the Security Council by Soviet ambassador Yakov Malik over the seating of China allowed the United States to win United Nations support for military assistance for South Korea.

The United Nations remained largely impotent in the face of a determined superpower. When Soviet troops moved to crush the Hungarian uprising in 1956, appeals for assistance from the

freedom fighters to the United Nations were ignored. Nevertheless the USSR and the United States agreed that same year to allow United Nations monitors into the Middle East to help end the Suez Crisis. In the fall of 1960 Khrushchev attended the opening session of the General Assembly and delivered a speech attacking the Western powers. During a reply to the Soviet leader, members of his delegation hit their fists on the desk in protest; Khrushchev proceeded to bang the table with his shoe, creating one of the more memorable images of the Cold War. In October 1962, when the USSR denied that it had placed offensive missiles in Cuba, the United States presented photographic evidence of the missile sites at the United Nations and convinced world opinion of its position.

The Soviet view of the United Nations slowly changed over the next two decades, as the emergence of new nations in Africa and Asia shifted the balance of power in the General Assembly away from the United States. After seeing the United Nations as an unfriendly body for its first twenty years of existence, and thereby exercising its right to veto many United Nations resolutions, the Soviet Union began to perceive the General Assembly as a more sympathetic body. Both the USSR and the United States continued to use the United Nations as a forum for influencing other nations. Fierce arguments continued over the Middle East, surrogate wars in Africa, Korean Airline 007, and other issues.

During the Gorbachev era the USSR sought better relations with the West and became more cooperative at the United Nations. The first major test of this new policy occurred when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, and Gorbachev brought Soviet policy into line with that of the Western powers. Since that time, Russia has attempted to maintain cordial relations with the United Nations.

See also: COLD WAR; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

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KATE TRANSCHEL

UNITED OPPOSITION

Formed in April 1926, the United Opposition was an alliance between Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, and Grigory Zinoviev. These former foes headed a loose association of several thousand anti-Stalinists, including remnants of other opposition groups, as well as Vladimir Lenin's widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya. The United Opposition's main goal was to offset support for Josef Stalin among rank-and-file party members.

In July 1926, United Oppositionists openly clashed with Stalin at a Central Committee plenum. Chief among their many complaints was the failure of state industry to keep pace with economic development, thus perpetuating a shortage of goods. They advocated a program of intensified industrial production and the collectivization of agriculture, the same program that Stalin would adopt two years later. The Central Committee responded by charging Zinoviev with violating the Party's ban on factions and removed him from the Politburo.

Thus blocked in the Central Committee, the United Opposition took its case directly to the factories by staging public demonstrations in late September. Within a month, under fire from Stalin's supporters, Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev capitulated and publicly recanted. Trotsky was removed from the Politburo, and Kamenev lost his standing as a candidate member. Further machinations and conflicts resulted in the expulsion of the trio from the Central Committee in October 1927. The following month Trotsky and Zinoviev were purged from the party altogether, followed by Kamenev's removal from the party in December 1927. The defeat of the United Opposition set the stage for Stalin to move against what he labeled the Right Opposition, thereby consolidating his power.

See also: KAMENEV, LEV BORISOVICH; LEFT OPPOSITION; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH; ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YERSEYEVICH

UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

The history of the interactions between the two great powers of the last half of the twentieth century ranged from a close and mutually beneficial understanding to intense hostility, yet they never fought directly against each other. For long periods, in fact, their experience was one of similar goals, of respect, and even of adulation, tempered by periods of fear—the American fear of a threat to its free and democratic way of life from an “evil empire,” whether Russian or Communist, and the Russian fear of encirclement by a superior power taking advantage of its transitional weaknesses and vulnerability. The relations of Russia—as an empire, a Soviet socialist state, or as a fledgling democracy—with the United States have had a profound impact upon the history of both countries and on the whole world. Already in the seventeenth century, Russian expansion overland through Siberia had reached the Pacific coast and contact with Asian powers such as China. Peter the Great, endowed with great energy and curiosity, commissioned Vitus Bering to explore the waters and determine whether Asia (Russia's Siberia) was connected by land to North America. This drew political and economic attention to the region, especially for the valuable sea otter skins (for exchange with China for tea), and Russian hunting camps soon appeared on the Aleutian Islands and along the Alaskan coast and would result in direct relations with American colonies settled by Europeans from across the North Atlantic.

A mutually advantageous and friendly distant friendship between Russia and the American colonies began in the 1760s and was based on Russian hostility toward British supremacy. At the time, Britain dominated oceanic trade and a huge empire that included India near the Russian southern borderland, Britain's American colonies, and most of the world's open water. Both Russia and the colonies were deeply involved economically in an Atlantic trade system that brought cargoes of rice,

tobacco, sugar, and other products to Russia from the Americas in exchange for iron products (anchors, chains, and nails), coarse linen (sailcloth), and processed hemp (rope). This direct trade benefited the growing American economy considerably, especially since it avoided the restrictions of the British Navigation Acts. Inspired by Catherine the Great, Russia continued to explore the waters of the North Pacific, through the voyages of Vitus Bering and Ivan Chirikov, to discover not only that America and Asia were separated by water, but that there existed a large continental land mass just east of the Russian Empire. Moreover, Russia was rich in fur-bearing animals that would advance Russia's lucrative Siberian fur industry. The British-Spanish imperial rivalry along the western North American coast (the Nootka Sound controversy of 1788) instigated a more clearly defined Russian presence in what would become known as Russian America, later Alaska.

During the American Revolutionary War, Russia intervened against Britain with Catherine the Great's declaration of Armed Neutrality (1780), a treaty signed by several European countries that attempted to protect neutral shipping from Britain's

high-handed policies at sea, to the benefit of those North Americans seeking independence. Moreover, several Russians, most notably Fyodor Karzhavin, directly assisted the American cause and inspired an American effort to consolidate a diplomatic union with Russia with the mission of Francis Dana (1781). Though nothing came of this, the notion of a community of interests remained, both politically and commercially. Direct commerce steadily increased in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, reaching a zenith during the Napoleonic period of continental blockade and embargo between Britain and France (1807–1812). During this time full diplomatic relations were established, with John Quincy Adams serving as the first American minister in St. Petersburg. This period of diplomatic relations also provided a precedent for a quasi-alliance between Russia and the United States that would prevail until late in the nineteenth century. The alliance was confirmed by a Treaty of Commerce in 1832 that assured each country of reciprocity in economic and political relations, and indicated the importance that each country attached to their mutual interests.

In 1797 the Russian government chartered the Russian America Company, under the capable management of Alexander Baranov, to oversee and develop its barely occupied territories in North America from headquarters first at Kodiak, then at Sitka. The main goal was economic: to preserve access to the rich sea otter fur sources along the coast as far south as California. Russia's fur trade depended especially on New England ship captains, such as John D'Wolfe of Bristol, Rhode Island, but it also involved intense, and often hostile, relationships with Native Americans and the establishment of a costly, distant supply base in Northern California (Fort Ross) from 1812 to 1841. Russians and Americans thus very soon became the dominant on the West Coast of North America; this led Russians and Americans to refer to "their manifest destinies"—one eastern, the other western.

Mutual economic and political interests continued through the Crimean War (1854–1856) with large shipments of cotton, sugar, rice, weapons, and other American products to Russia. The American import of Russian products slackened, however, as new sources replaced Russian rope and iron, and cotton canvas replaced linen sailcloth. Nevertheless, trade between the United States and Russia in the Pacific expanded through the middle of the nineteenth century, with American shippers providing essential services for the distant Russian



General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan greet the White House press corps. WHITE HOUSE PHOTOS/ARCHIVE PHOTOS.

bases in Alaska. During the Russian conflict with France and Britain, the United States provided valuable military and other supplies, and more than thirty Americans served as physicians to the Russian Army, thus reducing the isolation of Russia and augmenting the sense of a common interest.

The coincidence of a liberal, reformist government in Russia under Alexander II (1856–1881) and the U.S. Civil War formed an even closer bond, resulting in Russian naval squadrons visiting New York and San Francisco in 1863 to demonstrate support for the North. Their presence may have been influential in restraining France and Britain from more overt support of the Confederacy, thus ensuring Union victory. The aftermath witnessed several much-publicized exchange visits that included that of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox to Russia in 1866 and Grand Duke Alexis hunting buffalo in Nebraska and Colorado with George Armstrong Custer and William (Buffalo Bill) Cody in early 1872. These visits may have marked the peak of the unlikely friendship of autocratic Russia with republican America.

In the cultural arena there were at first relatively few direct contacts, despite a Russian fascination with the works of James Fenimore Cooper, Washington Irving, and Harriet Beecher Stowe. Later in the century, Americans reciprocated with an appreciation of Ivan Turgenev, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and especially Leo Tolstoy, whose works produced in America a veritable craze for things Russian. This was accompanied by renewed Russian interest in American life as portrayed in stories of Mark Twain and the art of Frederic Remington, among others. Russia's *amerikanizm* (obsession with American models for society and technological advance) was demonstrated especially by the adoption of Hiram Berdan's rifle design for the Russian army and the considerable Russian presence at the Chicago World's Fair (Columbian Exposition) in 1893.

American companies, primarily Singer and International Harvester, served the Russian quest for modernization in exchange for monopolistic rights and independent factories. By 1914 they numbered among the very largest private concerns in Russia, employing more than thirty thousand each. New York Life Insurance Company, dominating that sector in Russia, was reported to be the largest holder of Russian stocks. Westinghouse and the Crane (plumbing) businesses partnered to produce air brakes for the Trans-Siberian Railroad, launched in 1892. A result was that the manager of the Russ-



Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev confer during a walkabout in Red Square, near St. Basil's Cathedral, May 31, 1998. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ian enterprise, Charles R. Crane, became devoted to Russian culture and religion and promoted its appreciation in America by sponsoring lectures by the liberal historian Pavel Milyukov, endowing a chair at the University of Chicago, and financing tours of Russian choirs and other artistic groups through the United States. His advocacy of preserving the true Russian culture would continue through the Russian Revolution, civil war, and purges.

By the 1880s two major issues clouded the earlier harmony in relations. One was the Russian arrest and prosecution of political dissenters after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 and the resulting Siberian exile system that George Kennan so eloquently depicted in a series of articles for *American Mercury* in the 1880s. This elicited considerable American sympathy for those Russians

who were challenging the autocratic regime for their democratic and socialist causes and suffering at the hand of a police state. The other was Russian policy toward its Jewish population, which required the Jews to abide by strict limitations on activities, to emigrate, or to convert to another, more acceptable religion. Encouraged by American immigrant Jewish aid societies, many Russian Jews departed for the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These factors not only produced a generally negative opinion of religious and political rights in Russia, but also resulted in the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty of 1832. The agreement had stipulated that Americans would be assured the same rights in Russia as Russians, but Russia took this to mean that American Jews could only have the same restricted rights as Russian Jews. The Russian effort to alleviate the problem by denying entry visas to American Jews on grounds of religion only aggravated the situation. After considerable debate, the U.S. Senate formally abrogated the treaty in 1912, but this had practically no effect on commerce between the two countries.

In World War I (1914–1918), the United States and Russia were intimately involved and eventually on the same side. As one of the initial participants, Russia suffered a series of defeats. With the cutting off of regular trade routes through the Black and Baltic Seas and overland across Europe, Russia faced severe economic shortages and a breakdown of transportation. Its relations with the United States also intensified as Washington agreed under terms of the Geneva Convention to supervise German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman prisoners of war in Russia, resulting in a considerable number of additional Americans traveling through the country to inspect the Russian camps. Russia also depended upon supplies of munitions and transportation equipment, unfortunately delayed by America's own needs and a higher priority for the Western Front.

The February 1917 Revolution that brought an end to the Russian autocracy facilitated American entry into the war "to make the world safe for democracy." Large American loans delivered vital goods to the Russian ports of Vladivostok, Archangel, and Murmansk. Unfortunately, the steadily deteriorating state of rail transport left most of the deliveries piled up at the ports. American delegations came to advise and bolster Russia's continuation of the war. One delegation, led by elder statesman Elihu Root, sought to strengthen the Provisional

Government, first headed by Paul Milyukov and then by Alexander Kerensky, with a symbolic show of American support. Railroad, American Red Cross, and other missions followed, but little could be done while the Allies placed higher priority on the Western Front. The radical left wing of the revolution seized power in October, thus dashing American expectations that Russia was headed down the path toward representative democracy.

After considering aid to the new Bolshevik-dominated Soviet government, a policy urged by American Red Cross mission director Raymond Robins, the American embassy essentially broke off direct relations by moving to Vologda at the end of February 1918, when the Soviet government moved to Moscow. When the Soviets departed from the war by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March, the Allies, hardened by a sense of Russian betrayal, opted for armed intervention to prevent the vast arsenal of supplies at ports from falling into German hands and to assist a considerable anti-Bolshevik resistance in Russia. Reluctant to participate in intervention, but mindful of Communist-inspired disruptions (the "Red Scare" of 1919), the United States created a massive relief program (1921–1923) but stipulated that the aid be administered directly by the American Relief Administration.

The American offer and Soviet acceptance were grounded in humanitarian concerns, but both Russian and American interests were disappointed that it did not result in full diplomatic relations. The United States withheld recognition during the 1920s because of the general American isolationism after the war (and disillusionment with the peace), concerns about violations of religious rights, Bolshevik renunciation of imperial debt, and, more vaguely, a belief that the Soviet Union did not deserve recognition because of its abuse of human rights and the Soviet-sponsored Communist International's support of the American Communist Party. However, some Americans argued that Communism could be tempered by contacts, that much good business could be done, and that new international developments of the 1930s (the rise of an aggressive Japan and Germany) required accommodations. This led to formal diplomatic recognition (1933) and eventually to the "grand alliance" of World War II. The success of the Big Three (Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin) and their countries in forging victory in Europe and the Pacific was a major accomplishment of the twentieth century.

That achievement was soon diminished by postwar conflict. The Red Army's occupation of a large part of Central Europe, and the agreements (Yalta and Potsdam) granting Soviet control of much of the area, resulted in a line across Europe, designated by Winston Churchill as the "Iron Curtain." Instability across Europe and in the former colonial regions aggravated the divisions and produced a series of political and military conflicts: the Berlin blockade (1948–1949), Communist seizures of power in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the Korean War (1950–1953). Western Europe, fortunately, was stabilized by the Marshall Plan (1948) and the establishment of NATO (1949). The postwar period was still dominated by a risky and unpredictable arms race escalating into enormous productions of nuclear, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately, saner heads prevailed on both sides and resulted in the post-Stalin "spirit of Camp David" (Khrushchev and Eisenhower summit meetings). One important result of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" was the inauguration of cultural exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s that would continue without interruption and expand.

Unfortunately, additional frictions—the U-2 spy plane incident (1960), building of the Berlin wall (1961), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), Soviet suppression of the Czechoslovak "socialism with a human face" (1968), repression of internal dissent, the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the Korean Airliner incident (1983)—kept the Cold War alive into the 1980s. The Brezhnev-era détente, however, had produced a number of softer, more realistic policies that led to expanded exchanges, arms limitations talks, additional Soviet-American summit meetings, and limited emigration of Jews and other voices of Soviet dissent.

Throughout the Cold War, mutual respect prevailed in regard to cultural and scientific achievements, creating pressure in both countries for more communication and efforts at understanding. This culminated in the Gorbachev-era relaxations of the once officially closed society. The rewriting of distorted history, the opening of archives, the liberation of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and, finally, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism seemed to herald the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era in Soviet-American relations. This conclusion, however, is clouded by an unfinished and indistinct search for new identity and purpose in both countries.

See also: ALASKA; ALLIED INTERVENTION; ARMS CONTROL; COLD WAR; CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; DÉTENTE; GRAND ALLIANCE; JEWS; U-2 SPY PLANE INCIDENT; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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NORMAN E. SAUL

UNITY (MEDVED) PARTY

Boris Yeltsin's second and final term as president would expire in June 2000, and he anxiously searched for a viable successor. In summer 1999 a serious challenge emerged from two powerful regional leaders, Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Tatarstan president Mintimer Shaimiev. They merged the two movements they headed, Fatherland and All Russia, into an alliance headed by Yevgeny Primakov, the prime minister whom Yeltsin had fired in March. Victory for Fatherland/All Russia in the State Duma election in December 1999 would give Luzhkov or Primakov a good chance of defeating the Kremlin's candidate for the presidency in June 2000.

In response the presidential staff hastily created a new loyalist party, Yedinstvo (Unity), also known as *Medved* or Bear (from its official name, Interregional Movement "Unity," whose first letters spell MeDvEd). Unity was launched in September 1999, just three months before the election. Unity mobilized the administrative resources of government ministries and regional governors, thirty-two of whom backed the new electoral alliance. Unity's philosophy was simple: support for Prime Minister Putin, who was leading the fight against Chechen bandits. Putin declined to lead Unity; its official head was the ambitious young minister for emergency situations, Sergei Shoigu. In 1999 Unity was helped by oligarch Boris Berezovsky, whose television station ORT launched relentless personal attacks on Unity's rivals, Luzhkov and Primakov. Ironically, a year later Berezovsky fell out with the Kremlin and was forced into exile.

Apart from Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Russian political parties were exceptionally weak and unstable. Previous attempts to create a pro-government party, such as Russia's Choice (1993) or Our Home is Russia (1995), had failed. People were willing to vote for a strong president but voiced their discontent by voting for opposition parties in parliamentary elections. About 20 to 30 percent of voters supported the communists, and a similar number supported the various democratic parties. Unity hoped to pull support from across the spectrum, especially from voters who were skeptical of all ideologies and preferred pragmatic leaders.

Much to everyone's surprise, Unity did well in the December 1999 election, winning 23 percent on the national party list, close behind the Commu-

nists' 24 percent, and ahead of Fatherland/All Russia at 13 percent. This cleared the way for Putin's successful run for the presidency. Unity then forged a tactical alliance with the Communists in parliament, and in 2000 and 2001 the Duma passed nearly all of Putin's legislative proposals, from START II ratification to land reform.

Surveys suggested that Unity was maintaining its electoral support and gaining some influence in regional elections. In July 2001 Luzhkov's Fatherland party, recognizing Unity's administrative muscle and fearing defeat in the next election, reluctantly merged with Unity. Shaimiev's All-Russia later followed suit. The three parties held a founding congress to form a new party, called United Russia, on December 1. The party claimed to have 200,000 members, but its support seemed to derive entirely from Putin's popularity.

In November 2002 legislator Alexander Bepalov was replaced as head of United Russia by Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov, signalling the Kremlin's desire to keep tight control over the party as it prepared for its main test: the December 2003 State Duma elections. A new July 2002 law introduced party list elections for half the seats in regional legislatures, giving Unified Russia a chance of establishing a presence at a regional level throughout Russia.

See also: PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

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PETER RUTLAND

UNIVERSITIES

In 1725 Peter the Great founded the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, which, unlike its Western models, included a school of higher education known as the Academic University. The primary task of the university was to prepare selected young men to enter the challenging field of scientific scholarship. The university encountered difficulties in attracting and retaining students. Because all instructors—members of the Academy—were foreigners, there



Students gather for class at Moscow State University. © MICHAEL NICHOLSON/CORBIS

was also a serious language barrier. The general atmosphere did not favor the new teaching venture, and the university folded before the end of the century.

After a slow start, Moscow University, founded in 1755, ended the century as a dynamic enterprise with a promising future. The initial charter of the university guaranteed a high degree of academic autonomy but limited the enrollment to free estates, which excluded a vast majority of the pop-

ulation. In 1855, on the occasion of the centenary celebration of its existence, the university published an impressive volume on its scholarly achievements.

The beginning of the nineteenth century manifested a vibrant national interest in both utilitarian and humanistic sides of science. During the first decade of the century, the country acquired four new universities. Dorpat University, actually a reestablished Protestant institution, immediately

began to serve as a link to Western universities and as an effective center for training future Russian professors. The universities at Kharkov, Kazan, and St. Petersburg benefited from an initial appointment of Western professors displaced by the Napoleonic wars. St. Petersburg University also benefited from the presence of the Academy of Sciences in the same city.

It was not unusual for the members of the Academy of Sciences to offer courses at the university. Kiev University was founded in 1833 with the aim of contributing to the creation of a new Polish nationality favorably disposed toward the spirit of Russia, a quixotic government plan that collapsed in a hurry allowing the university to follow the normal course of development.

The 1803 university charter adopted the Western idea of institutional independence and opened up higher education to all estates. Conservative administrators, however, continued to favor the upper levels of society. The liberalism and humanism of government management of higher education was a passing phenomenon. In the 1820s, the Ministry of Public Education, dominated by extreme conservatism, encouraged animosity toward foreign professors and undertook extensive measures to eliminate the influence of Western materialism on Russian science. Geology was eliminated from the university curriculum because it contradicted scriptural positions.

In a slightly modified form, extreme conservatism continued to dominate the policies of the Ministry of Public Education during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855). The 1833 university charter vested more authority in superintendents of school districts—subordinated directly to the Minister of Public Education—than in university rectors and academic councils. Professors' writings were subjected to a multilayered censorship system.

Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1855–1856 stimulated rising demands for structural changes in the nation's sociopolitical system; in fact, the Epoch of Great Reforms—as the 1860s were known—was remembered for the emergence of an ideology that extolled science as a most sublime and creative expression of critical thought, the most promising base for democratic reforms. As Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, the famed neurophysiologist, noted, the Nihilist praise for the spirit of science as an epitome of critical thought sent young men in droves to university natural-science departments.

Inspired by the waves of liberal thought and sentiment, the government treated the universities as major national assets. Budgetary allocations for the improvement of research facilities reached new heights, as did the official determination to send Russian students to Western universities for advanced studies. New universities were founded in Odessa and Warsaw. In 1863 the government enacted a new university charter with a solid emphasis on academic autonomy.

At the same time, the government abrogated the more crippling provisions of the censorship law inherited from the era of Nicholas I. This reform, however, had a short history: In response to the Nihilists' and related groups' growing criticism of the autocratic system, the government quickly restored a long list of previous restrictions. This development, in turn, intensified student unrest, making it a historical force of major proportions. The decades preceding the World War I were filled with student strikes and rebellions.

The 1884 university charter was the government's answer to continuing student unrest: It prohibited students from holding meetings on university premises, abolished all student organizations, and subjected student life to thorough regimentation. The professors not only lost their right to elect university administrators but were ordered to organize their lectures in accordance with mandatory specifications issued by the Ministry of Public Education.

Student unrest kept the professors out of classrooms but did not keep them out of the libraries and laboratories. The waning decades of the tsarist reign were marked by an abundance of university contributions to science. Particularly noted was the pioneering work in aerodynamics, virology, chromatography, neurophysiology, soil microbiology, probability theory in mathematics, mutation theory in biology, and non-Aristotelian logic.

World War I brought so much tranquility to universities that the Ministry of Public Education announced the beginning of work on a new charter promising a removal of the more drastic limitations on academic autonomy. The fall of the tsarist system in early 1917 brought a quick end to this particular project. During the preceding twenty years new universities were founded in Saratov and Tomsk.

The last decades of Imperial Russia showed a marked growth of institutions of higher education outside the framework of state universities. To bol-

ster the industrialization of the national economy, the government both improved the existing technical schools and established new ones at a university level. The St. Petersburg Polytechnical Institute was a major addition to higher education. There was also a successful effort to establish Higher Courses for Women financed by private endowments and treated as equal to universities. Shaniavsky University in Moscow, established by a private endowment, presented a major venture in higher education. In the admission of students, it was less restrictive than the state universities and was the first institution to offer such new courses as sociology.

In 1899 the total enrollment of students in state universities was 16,497. Forty percent of regular students sought law degrees, 28 percent chose medicine, 27 percent were in the natural sciences, and only 4 percent chose the social sciences and the humanities. Law was favored because it provided the best opportunity for government employment.

The February Revolution in 1917 placed the Russian nation on a track leading to a political life guided by democratic ideals. The writer Maxim Gorky greeted the beginning of a new era in national history in an article published in the popular journal *Priroda* (*Nature*) underscoring the interdependence of democracy and science. The new political regime wasted no time in abolishing censorship in all its multiple manifestations and granted professors the long-sought right to establish a national association for the protection of both science and the scientific community. A government decision confirmed the establishment of a university in Perm.

Immediately after the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik authorities enacted a censorship law that in some respects was more comprehensive and penetrating than its tsarist predecessors. The new government began to expand the national network of institutions of higher education; in 1981, the country had 835 such institutions, including eighty-three universities. The primary task of universities was to train professional personnel; scholarly research was relegated to a secondary position. This policy, however, did not prevent the country's leading universities with research traditions from active scholarship in selected branches of science. The universities also concentrated on Marxist indoctrination. The curriculum normally included such Marxist sciences as historical materialism, dialectical materialism, dialectical logic, and Marxist ethics. To be admitted to postgraduate

studies, candidates were expected to pass an examination in Marxist theory with the highest grade. Marxist theory was officially granted a status of science, and Marxist philosophers were considered members of the scientific community.

In their organization and administration, Soviet universities followed the rules set up by institutional charters, specific adaptations to a government-promulgated model. Faculty councils elected high administrators, but, according to an unwritten law, the candidates for these positions needed approval by political authorities. Local Communist organizations conducted continuous ideological campaigns and tracked the political behavior of professors. In the post-Stalin era political control and ideological interference lost much of their intensity and effectiveness.

During the last two decades of the Soviet system the government encouraged a planned expansion of scientific research in all universities. Selected universities became pivotal components of the newly founded scientific centers, aggregates of provincial research bodies involved primarily in the study of acute problems of regional economic significance. Metropolitan universities expanded and intensified the work of traditional and newly established research institutes. Leading universities were involved in publishing activity, some on a large scale. In university publications there was more emphasis on theoretical than on experimental studies. Mathematical research, in no need of laboratory equipment, continued to blossom in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev universities.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; EDUCATION

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ALEXANDER VUCINICH

UNKIAR SKELESSI, TREATY OF

Signed July 8, 1833, between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi reflected the interest of Tsar Nicholas I in preserving

legitimate authority and the territorial integrity of existing states in Europe and the Near East. Nicholas was concerned about the domino effect of successful revolutions against dynastic states. Unable to contain the rebellion of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, the Ottoman state was threatened by his advance across Syria and Anatolia in 1832. In response, on February 20, 1833, a Russian naval squadron arrived in Constantinople, followed by Russian ground forces, with the intent of protecting the Sultan's capital from the rebels.

The treaty created an eight-year alliance between Russia and the Ottomans and provided for Russian aid in the event of an attack against the Sultan. It reconfirmed the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, which recognized Russian gains in the Balkans and the Caucasus as well as providing free access through the Straits for Russian merchant ships. A secret addendum to the treaty also required the Ottoman Empire to close the Straits to foreign warships. Nicholas and his foreign minister, Count Karl Nesselrode, preferred to see the Straits remain in Ottoman hands rather than risk the disintegration of the Ottoman state whereby another European power such as France or Britain might take control of this strategic waterway.

The treaty appealed to Nicholas's sense of Russia as the premier defender of legitimacy in post-Napoleonic Europe. It also confirmed Russian supremacy in the Black Sea basin and guaranteed the free passage of Russian commercial vessels into the Mediterranean, an important point given the growing importance of Russia's export trade from ports such as Odessa.

The treaty was superseded by the Straits Convention of July 13, 1841, when a five-power consortium guaranteed the permanent closure of the Straits to all warships. Hopes for a more permanent Russo-Ottoman alliance were dashed, however, when the alliance was not renewed, helping to lay the groundwork for the Crimean War.

See also: NICHOLAS I; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

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NIKOLAS GVOSDEV

USHAKOV, SIMON FYODOROVICH

(1626–1686), renowned Russian artist.

Simon Ushakov has been called the last great master of Russian painting. At the age of twenty-two (1648) he was appointed court painter and entrusted with the state icon painting studios in the Armory Palace. He not only painted icons, but made signs, did jewelers' work, embroidered, and even designed coins. In addition, he became an expert on fortifications, mapmaking, and engraving. As the head of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov's (r. 1645–1676) workshop, he painted several portraits of the tsar and the royal family. The tsar had a profound interest in western European culture and hired foreign actors and musicians to perform at court. Western architecture also held the ruler's interest, so it is understandable why Ushakov's westernized icon style became the most acceptable form in court circles.

Ushakov became involved in theoretical art discussions. He wrote "Words to the Lovers of Icons," which advanced his views on painting with an emphasis on naturalism. The idealization of the saints' faces in his icons led others to refer to him as a Slavic Raphael. The colors Ushakov favored included rose pink, olive green, pale lilac, occasionally sky blue, and shades of tans and brown. Western influence can be seen not only in the saints' lifelike faces but also in the use of classical architecture, as well as landscapes and scenery borrowed from German paintings and etchings.

One of themes that Ushakov painted frequently was the *Mandilion* (*Spas Nerukotvorny* or "The Savior Painted without Use of Human Hands"). Even though he continued to use egg tempera, rather than the new oil painting broadly adopted in the West, he nevertheless abandoned the traditional two-dimensional, bright-colored style that emphasized intense inner spirituality. Instead he prettified the faces, creating images that in many ways resembled the Madonnas painted by the Italian Renaissance master, Raphael. A mixed style characterizes Ushakov's work at this time. His style became the official Orthodox style, copied by many contemporary Russian icon painters.

Ushakov's most famous and revolutionary icon is the *Vladimir Mother of God and the Planting and Spreading of the Tree of the Russian State*, painted in 1668. This is a blatantly political icon. A huge rosebush symbolizes the Muscovite state; within it is a

representation of the most venerated icon in Russia, the Vladimir Mother of God. Christ appears at the very top, directing his angels to spread his sheltering cloak. The rosebush springs out of the Kremlin; Metropolitan Peter and Grand Duke Ivan Danilovic water it. The tsarist family appears near the planting, while within the spreading branches are medallions depicting Russia's secular and ecclesiastical princes and her most famous saints.

With his mixed technique Ushakov had a very strong impact on the development of icon painting in Russia. Among his pupils who became famous icon painters were Georgy Zinoviev, Ivan Maximov, and Mikhail Malyutin. After Ushakov's time, the traditional style that had preceded him survived, but progressive artists adapted his more Western style up to the twentieth century.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; ICONS

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A. DEAN MCKENZIE

USSR *See* UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

USTINOV, DMITRY FEDOROVICH

(1908–1984), marshal of the Soviet Union; Soviet minister of defense; member of the Politburo, leader of wartime production in the Soviet Union during World War II; Hero of the Soviet Union.

Dmitry Ustinov was born in Samara before the Bolshevik Revolution. In 1922, at the age of fourteen, he volunteered for service in the Red Army. In 1923 he was demobilized and attended a polytechnical institute in Makarev and then began to work in defense industry. A member of the emerging Soviet technical intelligentsia, he joined the Communist Party in 1927, graduated from the Military Mechanical Institute in 1934, and joined the Scientific-Technical Institute for Naval Artillery the same year. In 1937 he began work as a design engineer at the Bolshevik defense industry complex in Leningrad and in 1938 became the plant director. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union

he was appointed people's commissar of armaments. In this capacity he played a leading role in organizing production of Soviet defense industries and was a leading member of Stalin's war cabinet, the State Committee of Defense. In 1944 he was promoted to the military rank of colonel-general. In the postwar period Ustinov continued his leadership of Soviet defense industries down to 1957. He held the posts of deputy chairman of the Council Ministers and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1957 to 1965. From 1965 to 1976 he served in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, where he directed the activities of research institutions, design bureaus, and enterprises. Ustinov was a candidate member of the Politburo in 1976 and a Full Member from 1976 until his death in 1984. In April 1976 he was appointed minister of defense. During his tenure as minister, the Soviet Union began its ill-fated intervention in Afghanistan.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE; WAR ECONOMY

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JACOB W. KIPP

UVAROV, SERGEI SEMENOVICH

(1786–1855), minister of education (1833–1849) and Academy of Sciences president (1818–1855).

Sergei Uvarov was the longest-tenured and most influential minister of education and Academy of Sciences president in Imperial Russian history. From 1810 to 1821, he also served as superintendent of the St. Petersburg Educational District. Indeed, Uvarov spent his entire life involved with the arts and sciences. He published poetry in his teens; actively participated in the literary quarrels of his day; authored two dozen essays on literary and

historical topics; and in retirement, completed the work for a doctorate in classical studies.

As a statesman, from the 1810s Uvarov acted upon a certainty that Russia was in its youth and developing into a West European-style nation. He was determined, however, that the process of maturation would occur without European-style revolutions and that the educational system would provide the map for following this special path. He gave his system a slogan, "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality" (*Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost*). This tripartite formula offered a simple, accessible, patriotic affirmation of native values and an antidote against revolutionary ideas. Devotion to the Russian Orthodox Church would offset modern materialism. Autocracy would provide stability with patriarchal but progressive tsarist leadership. The concept of nationality promoted an indigenous attempt to answer the problems of modern development, a quest, though, that was to be defined and guided by the state, not the *narod*, or people.

Uvarov believed that raising the Russian educational system to a level of excellence was the *sine qua non* for the empire's progress toward maturity. He transformed the Academy of Sciences from a shambles into a world-renowned center of learning. Uvarov created two first-rate universities, St. Petersburg (1819) and St. Vladimir's (1833) and brought the others to a golden age. He reformed the *gymnasia* by introducing the classical curriculum and the study of Russian grammar, history, and literature. He patronized a new emphasis on technology and science in education, and he oversaw the birth of Oriental, Slavic, classical, and philological studies. For these accomplishments, he received the title of count in 1846.

While Uvarov's accomplishments are notable, his reputation suffered during his lifetime because of his personal traits, such as greed and arrogance, and his autocratic handling of his ministry, especially in the area of censorship. Historians have tended to dismiss Uvarov as a liberal during the reign of Alexander I and a reactionary during the time of Nicholas, ascribing this to his groveling before the powers-that-be. This interpretation is gainsaid by the fact that he resigned twice, in 1821 and 1849, when tsarist policy turned reactionary and threatened the aim of educational excellence to which he had dedicated his life.

See also: EDUCATION; UNIVERSITIES

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CYNTHIA HYLA WHITTAKER

UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS

The Uzbeks are a people who settled in the oases regions of Central Asia more than five hundred years ago. Early references to Uzbeks suggest that they were nomadic peoples who lived in the steppes of what is today Kazakhstan and southern Siberia, although there is conflicting evidence as to their origin. Gradually moving southward, they became a political force in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and were associated with the region between the great rivers of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. During the early twenty-first century, ethnic Uzbeks can be found in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, as well as smaller communities in Turkey and China. The majority of Uzbeks live in the country of Uzbekistan, which is located among the states noted above in the region between the Aral Sea to the west and the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains to the east. Uzbekistan has an area of 447,400 square kilometers (172,700 square miles) and a population estimated at 25,563,441 people. Approximately 20,450,000 of these citizens are ethnic Uzbeks (80%). Significant minorities in Uzbekistan include Russians (5.5%), Tajiks (5.0%), Kazakhs (3.0%), Karakalpaks (2.5%), and Tatars (1.5%). The capital city of Uzbekistan is Tashkent, which has an estimated population of 2.6 million, although unofficial counts place the number at nearly 3.5 million people. Other significant cities include Samarkand, Bukhara, Andijon, Namanagan, and Fergana.

The majority of Uzbeks are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School. Given that several key cities of Uzbekistan, specifically Bukhara and Samarkand, were centers of learning in the Islamic world for centuries, the traditions of that faith are strong in the country. Even during the Soviet period, when there were stringent restrictions on Islamic practices, the religion was practiced in the country.



Uzbekistan, 1992. © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

Other religions coexist in Uzbekistan and reflect the ethnic minorities, such as the Russians.

Linguistically, Uzbek is a Turkic language and, to varying degrees, is mutually intelligible with the other Turkic languages in the region such as Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Karakalpak, and Turkmen. Originally Uzbek was written in the Arabic script. During the Soviet period, this was switched to the Latin script in the 1920s and later to the Cyrillic script in 1940. In the post-Soviet period, the Uzbek government decided to return to a Latin script, using Turkish orthography.

There are significant discussions as to the origins of the Uzbeks and when they arrived in the region they occupy today. Indeed, it is accepted that Tamerlane (Timur the Lame) was an Uzbek and the first Uzbek unifier of Central Asia. Interestingly,

the Timurid dynasty under Babur (Tamerlane’s grandson) was defeated by Shaybani Khan, an Uzbek leader, at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Many international historians consider this event to be the true introduction of Uzbeks to the region and the first Uzbek state in Central Asia. For the next four centuries, three main Uzbek states developed in Central Asia—the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand. Identity at this time focused on which city one belonged to, or more importantly, to one’s faith—Islam. At the time, these states were not really identified with the ethnic group of Uzbeks, which was seen as a population more divided by and distinguished among tribal sub-groupings. Up through the twentieth century, these states more often used Persian as the court languages, while Uzbek was used among the common people.



An elderly woman and children in Muyank, Uzbekistan, in 1989. © DAVID TURNLEY/CORBIS

During the 1850s and 1860s the Russian empire began to aggressively seek control over the various regions of Central Asia. This has often been couched in terms of the Great Game with the British Empire, which was a contest for dominance in the region. In 1865 Russian military forces systematically took over cities in the Kokand Khanate and Bukharan Emirate, beginning with the sacking of Tashkent in that year. By 1876 the Khanate of Kokand was dissolved and incorporated into the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan. The Khanate of Khiva in the west and the Bukharan Emirate were reduced to the status of protectorates. During the next forty years, this region was part of the Russian empire. In general, the Russian overlords sought to obtain taxes and raw materials from the region and left the indigenous populations to their own social and cultural traditions.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War resulted in radical changes for Central Asia.

Eventually, the region was consolidated under Bolshevik rule and new political structures were created. The first entity called Uzbekistan appeared in 1924 with the National Delimitation in the Soviet Union. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic actually included the Tajik Autonomous Republic. This easternmost portion was granted full Union Republic status in 1929. With modest border adjustments over the ensuing decades, the Uzbek S.S.R. was considered to be the homeland for the Uzbeks living in the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Uzbek S.S.R. declared its independence and has henceforth been called the Republic of Uzbekistan.

For much of the Soviet period, Uzbekistan was the primary cotton-producing region of the Soviet Union, with annual quotas exceeding four and five million metric tons by the 1980s. In addition, Uzbekistan was a major supplier of gold, strategic minerals, gas, and agricultural products. In the post-Soviet period, these commodities remain the foundation for Uzbekistan's economy. Uzbekistan is one of the few states of the former Soviet Union that did not experience a radical drop in production and income during the 1990s, largely because of its reliance on exporting these goods. However, the country's economy has not rebounded quickly because of difficulties in the currency market and the obstacles faced by foreign investors. Moreover, the steady increase in population has resulted in a growing labor force that continues to experience a high unemployment rate.

Politically, there was also continuity at the time of independence. In 1991 the president of the Uzbek S.S.R., Islam Karimov, was elected President of Uzbekistan. In 1999 and 2000 the militant Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) unsuccessfully attempted to destabilize the country. The government since considers Islamic extremism to be a major security concern for the country, whether it is in the guise of the IMU or the broader, internationally-based group Hezb-ut Tahrir.

Throughout the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, Uzbekistan has tried to assert itself as a leading state in Central Asia. Of great importance was the desire to reduce the influence of Russia and remove the notion of an elder brother in the region. Consequently, Uzbekistan has diplomatic and economic ties with a number of important powers, such as China, India, the United States, the European Union, Turkey, and Iran. Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent U.S. led actions in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan has been

more active in NATO Partnership for Peace programs and bilateral security relations with the United States. Ultimately, Uzbekistan would prefer to see a greater emphasis on a Central Asian regional security arrangement, with itself as the key member.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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ROGER KANGAS

VALUE SUBTRACTION

Value subtraction, or negative value added, occurs when resources and other inputs used in the production process generate output with a lower value than that of the original resources and inputs. The management of Soviet state-owned enterprises, focusing on fulfilling plan targets in order to receive a bonus, tended to fulfill the main plan target, quantity of output, with little regard for cost or efficiency considerations. At the same time, enterprises faced centrally determined prices for both the input used and the output produced. Soviet centrally determined prices were not based upon supply and demand conditions in either the domestic or global market, nor were they adjusted in response to obvious surplus or shortage conditions. Consequently, neither the prices nor the corresponding profits or losses generated in the planning process provided meaningful information to Soviet firms in terms of whether to expand or contract their operations. The primary obligation of each firm was to fulfill annual output plan targets.

Value subtraction characterized the operation and performance of Soviet firms when their inputs and output were valued at world market prices. World market prices were more accurate reflections of the economic cost of producing an item than Soviet centrally determined prices, because they incorporated marginal rather than average costs of production, and because they adjusted to surplus and shortage conditions generated by ever-changing actions of buyers and sellers. Typically, Soviet prices were well below world market prices for the majority of resources and other inputs used in the production process. Consequently, when world market prices were applied by Western researchers and analysts to the actual resources and inputs used in the Soviet production process, the newly calculated costs of production were much higher. These higher costs were not offset by applying world market prices to the produced output, however, because the technological level of Soviet enterprises and abject quality assessments kept Soviet output valuations low in comparison to world standards. The existence of value subtraction, or negative value added, was confirmed by Soviet economists and analysts when glasnost and perestroika in the late 1980s allowed more frank and detailed discussions of actual conditions in the Soviet economy.



See also: HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS; RATCHET EFFECT; VIRTUAL ECONOMY

SUSAN J. LINZ

VARANGIAN *See* VIKINGS.

VARENNIKOV, VALENTIN IVANOVICH

(b.1923), commander-in-chief of the Soviet Ground Forces; deputy minister of defense; General of the Army; Hero of the Soviet Union; member of the State Duma.

Valentin Krasnodar was born on December 13, 1923, in Krasnodar in the Kuban region of South Russia. He joined the Red Army in 1941 as an officer cadet and was commissioned in 1942. He took part in the defense of Stalingrad as an artillery officer and served in that capacity through the war to the assault on Berlin. Varennikov was a stand-bearer at the Victory Parade in Red Square in 1945. After the war he commanded artillery and infantry units. In 1954 he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy.

Varennikov advanced in the army leadership and graduated from the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff in 1967. During the late 1960s and early 1970s he commanded an army and served as deputy commander of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany and as commander of the Carpathian Military District. In 1979 he was head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, which planned the military intervention in Afghanistan. In 1984 he assumed the post of deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff with responsibility for direct oversight of operations in Afghanistan; he later oversaw the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

In January 1989 Varennikov was made commandor of Soviet Ground Forces. In August 1991 he was an active participant in the conspiracy to remove Mikhail Gorbachev and prevent the proclamation of a new union treaty. During the attempted coup Varennikov was in Kiev. Arrested and jailed when the coup collapsed, Varennikov refused to accept an amnesty when it was offered in March 1994. Later that year, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court ruled that he was not guilty of treason. In December 1995 he ran for election to the State Duma as a candidate from the Commu-

nist Party and won. He won re-election in 2000 and serves as chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

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JACOB W. KIPP

VARGA, EUGENE SAMUILOVICH

(1879–1964), major figure in the Soviet economics establishment and expert on the world capitalist system who fell afoul of Stalinist dogma.

Eugene Varga was educated at the universities of Paris, Berlin, and Budapest, receiving a doctoral degree from the last in 1909. He joined the Hungarian Social Democratic Party in 1906 and was a writer and editor on economic matters for its central organ. When the communists came to power in Hungary in 1919, he served as commissar of finance and then as chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. After the regime fell he moved to the USSR.

Varga's specialty was capitalist political economy and economic conditions in the capitalist world, on which he was an influential and authoritative spokesman during the interwar period. He was elected a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1939 and was director of its Institute of World Economics and Politics until 1947, when the institute was shut down because of the views he expounded in *Changes in the Capitalist Economy as a Result of the Second World War*. Varga defended himself vigorously at a conference of economists held to attack him, but was forced to recant. In the post-Stalin period Varga was ultimately restored to a position of honor, and in 1959 his eightieth birthday was celebrated as a notable jubilee presided over by Academician Konstantin Ostrovitianov, who had orchestrated the attack on him in 1947. In 1963 he was awarded the Lenin

Prize for “scientific treatment of the problems of modern capitalism.”

Despite his independence in analyzing economic developments in the capitalist world, and his courage in fighting Stalinist dogmatism, Varga was a thoroughly orthodox Marxist, and a critic of the ideas of Soviet econometricians and mathematical economists.

See also: MARXISM

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ROBERT W. CAMPBELL

VASILEVSKY, ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH

(1895–1977), Soviet military hero of World War II.

A member of the Communist Party from 1938, Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky was born in the village of Novo-Pokrovka, now Ivanovo Oblast. He graduated from military school in 1914. He served as a junior officer in the tsarist army during World War I. From 1918 to 1931 he commanded a company, then a battalion, then an infantry regiment in the Red Army. From 1931 to 1936 Vasilevsky held executive posts in combat training organs within the People’s Commissariat of Defense and Volga Military District. From 1937 to 1941 he served on the General Staff, from 1941 to 1942 as deputy chief, and from 1942 to 1945 (during World War II or the Great Patriotic War) as Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and concurrently, deputy people’s commissar of defense of the USSR.

Upon instructions from the Supreme Command Headquarters, Vasilevsky helped to elaborate many major strategic plans. In particular, Vasilevsky was among the architects (and participants) of the 1943 Stalingrad offensive. He coordinated actions of several fronts in the Battle of Kursk and the Belorussian and Eastern–Prussian offensive operations. Under Vasilevsky’s leadership, a strategic operation aimed at routing the Japanese Kwantung army was successfully carried out between August and September of 1945.

Increasingly, after the German invasion of June 1941, officers with world-class military skills, who

either emerged unscathed by Stalin’s purges or were retrieved from Stalin’s prisons and camps, came to the fore. Vasilevsky was among these men. Although Stalin was loath to trust anyone fully, this innate distrust did not prevent him from tapping the resources of his most talented military strategists during World War II. In the first year of the war, when the USSR was on the defensive, Stalin often made unilateral decisions. However, by the second year, he depended increasingly on his subordinates. As Marshal Vasilevsky has recalled,

He came to have a different attitude toward the General Staff apparatus and front commanders. He was forced to rely constantly on the collective experience of the military. Before deciding on an operational question, Stalin listened to advice and discussed it with his deputy [Zhukov], with leading officers of the General Staff, with the main directorates of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, with the commanders of the fronts, and also with the executives in charge of defense production.

His most astute generals, Vasilevsky and Georgy Zhukov included, learned how to nudge Stalin toward a decision without talking back to him.

While serving as a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party between 1952 and 1961, Vasilevsky also held the post of first deputy minister of defense from 1953 to 1957. Twice named Hero of the Soviet Union, he was also twice awarded the military honor, the Order of Victory, and was presented with many other orders, medals, and ceremonial weapons. He retired the following year and died fifteen years later.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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JOHANNA GRANVILLE

VAVILOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(1887–1943), internationally famous biologist.

Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov achieved international fame as a plant scientist, geographer, and geneticist before he was arrested and sentenced to death

on false charges of espionage in 1940. Born into a wealthy merchant family in pre-revolutionary Russia, Vavilov was renowned for his personal charm, integrity, and international scientific prestige. He graduated from the Moscow Agricultural Institute in 1911, continued his studies of genetics and horticulture in Europe the following year, and in 1916 led an expedition to Iran and the Pamir Mountains to search for ancestral forms of modern agricultural plant species. "The Law of Homologous Series in Hereditary Variation," his first major theoretical contribution, published in Russia in 1920 and then in the *Journal of Genetics*, argued that related species can be expected to vary genetically in similar ways.

Vavilov spoke many languages and traveled extensively throughout the United States and Europe to meet with colleagues and study scientific innovations in agriculture. He is best known for *The Centers of Origin of Cultivated Plants* (1926), in which he established that the greatest genetic diversity of wild plant species would be found near the origins of modern cultivated species. Until 1935 he organized expeditions to remote corners of the world in order to collect, catalog, and preserve specimens of plant biodiversity. In the Soviet Union Vavilov was a powerful advocate and organizer of scientific institutions, and he tirelessly promoted research in genetics and plant breeding as a means of improving Soviet agriculture. Vavilov was director of the Institute of Applied Botany (1924–1929), a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, director of the All-Union Institute of Plant Breeding (1930–1940) and the Institute of Genetics (1933–1940), president and vice-president of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1929–1938), and president of the All-Union Geographical Society (1931–1940).

Vavilov's increasingly vocal and uncompromising opposition to the falsification of genetic science propagated by Trofim Lysenko and his followers culminated in his arrest in 1940. His death sentence was commuted to a twenty-year prison term in 1942; he died of malnutrition in a Saratov prison one year later. Vavilov is considered a founding father in contemporary studies of plant biodiversity. He left an important legacy as one of the great Russian scientific and intellectual figures of the early twentieth century.

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YVONNE HOWELL

VECHE

The veche was a popular assembly in medieval Russian towns from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries. Veche became particularly active at the turn of the twelfth century, before falling into decline except in the towns of Novgorod, Pskov, and Viatka. At times, the veche in Novgorod participated in selecting or dismissing the *posadniks* (mayors) and *tysiatskiis* (thousandmen). Originally, one *tysiatskii* was head of the town militia but over time, several were chosen and became judicial and civil officials. The veche also chose the archbishop, and the heads of the major monasteries. It also tried cases, ratified treaties, and addressed other public matters. Meetings sometimes turned violent. In Imperial and Soviet historiography, the veche was often used as an example to demonstrate whether Russia had any democratic tradition or had always been autocratic.

The veche remains an enigmatic phenomenon. The word is rooted in the words *ve* and *veshchati*, the latter meaning: to pontificate, play the oracle, or to lay down the law. However, medieval chroniclers used the term not only to mean popular assemblies, but also to speak of crowds or mobs. Primary sources are often silent as to the origin or demise of the veche, the scope of its authority, its specific membership, or the rules and procedures governing its activities.

Primary sources indicate that, at least in the cities of Novgorod and Pskov, the veche may have had a broad social base. In the case of the veche that confirmed the Novgorod Judicial Charter in 1471, its members included the Archbishop-elect, the *posadniks*, the *tysiatskiis*, the boyars, the *zhi-tye liudi* (the ranking or middle class citizens), the merchants, the *chernye liudi* (lit. black men, referring to the lower class or tax-paying citizens), and "all the five ends (boroughs), and all Sovereign Novgorod the Great." Other documents show veche of narrower membership. For example, a 1439 treaty signed between Novgorod and the Livonian city of Kolyvan (Tallinn) lists only the *posadniks* and *tysiatskiis* as being members of the veche. A commercial document signed the same

year between Novgorod and the German merchants lists only one *posadnik*, one *tysiatskii*, and “all Lord Novgorod the Great” as constituting the *veche*. The different composition of these *veches* indicate that there probably was no set membership, or that *veches* were perhaps more democratic when the entire city needed to reach consensus, as when the city’s Judicial Charter needed ratification, but were smaller and more oligarchic (or republican rather than democratic) in nature when the entire city did not need to ratify a decision, such as with commercial treaties or peace treaties.

Valentin Lavrentovich Ianin and other scholars argue that Novgorod’s government was oligarchic rather than republican in nature, and that the *veche* had no real power. They argue that it was an oligarchy of landowners who wielded real power in the city. Some argue it is these landowners who are referred to in the Rigan chronicle as the three-hundred golden-girdled men and made up the Council of Lords (Soviet *gospod*) that ran day-to-day government in Novgorod. However, the Rigan chronicle is the only such reference to the three-hundred golden-girdled-men, and Russian sources mention neither the Council nor the three hundred. The *veche* lasted longest in Pskov, and was disbanded by Grand Prince Basil III in 1510, when he brought that city under the direct rule of Moscow.

See also: GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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MICHAEL C. PAUL

VEKHI

Vekhi (“Landmarks” or “Signposts”), a collection of seven essays published in 1909, ran through five editions and elicited two hundred published rejoinders in two years. Historian Mikhail Gershenzon proposed the volume reappraising the Russian in-

telligentsia, wrote the introduction, and edited the book. Pyotr Struve selected the contributors, five of whom had contributed to a 1902 volume, *Problems of Idealism*, and had attended the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference that laid the foundation for the Union of National Liberation. Himself a founder of the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) Party in 1905, Struve had served in the Second Duma in 1907, then went on to edit the journal *Russian Thought*. In his essay he argued that the intelligentsia, because it had coalesced in the 1840s under the impact of atheistic socialism, owed its identity to standing apart from the government. Thus, when the government agreed to restructure along constitutional lines in 1905, the intelligentsia proved incapable of acting constructively toward the masses within the new framework.

Bogdan Kistyakovsky discussed the intelligentsia’s failure to develop a legal consciousness. Their insufficient respect for law as an ordering force kept courts of law from attaining the respect required in a modern society. Alexander Izgoyev (who, like Gershenzon, had not contributed to the 1902 anti-positivist volume) depicted contemporary university students as morally relativist, content merely to embrace the interests of the long-suffering people. Russian students compared very unfavorably to their French, German, and British counterparts, lacking application and even a sense of fair play. Nikolai Berdyayev, considering the intelligentsia’s philosophical position, found utilitarian values had crowded out any interest in pursuing truth. Sergei Bulgakov showed how the intelligentsia had undertaken a heroic struggle for socialism and progress but lost sight of post-Reformation Europe’s gains with respect to individual rights and personal freedom.

For Semen Frank, as for Gershenzon and Struve, the intelligentsia’s failure of leadership in the 1905 revolution warranted a reappraisal of their fundamental assumptions. His essay emphasized the nihilistic sources of the intelligentsia’s utilitarianism: material progress, national education, always viewed as a *means* to another end. Moreover, he saw Russian Marxists as obsessed by a populist drive to perfect society through redistribution and faulted them for their penchant for dividing all humanity into friends and enemies. Gershenzon asserted, in the book’s most controversial sentence, that “so far from dreaming of union with the people we ought to fear the people . . . and bless this government which, with its prisons and bayonets, still protects us from the people’s fury.”

The essays suggested Russia had reached a milestone and was ready for turning. Five of the contributors had earlier abandoned Marxism under the influence of neo-Kantian concerns over personal freedom and morality. They had participated in the establishment of a liberal political party, but now recoiled at the Cadet Party's recklessness and ineffectiveness in parliamentary politics. A modernist document, *Vekhi* called for a rethinking of the enlightenment project of acculturation and proposed exploration of the depths of the self as an alternative to venerable populist and nihilist programs.

See also: BERDYAYEV, NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH; CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DUMA; INTELLIGENTSIA; STRUVE, PETER BERNARDOVICH

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GARY THURSTON

VERBITSKAYA, ANASTASIA ALEXEYEVNA

(1861–1928), prose writer, playwright, scenarist, and publisher.

Anastasia Verbitskaya enjoyed a lengthy career in which she first published prose fiction in serious "thick journals," but then turned to writing novels in a popular vein, garnering herself a wide reading public on the eve of World War I. At this time she also embarked on a film career, writing scripts for several movies that brought her even more renown. Most of Verbitskaya's writing centers around the keys to happiness for the modern woman caught between competing desires and interests—work, love, sexuality, and motherhood.

Verbitskaya was the middle child of a professional military man stationed in Voronezh and a mother who was born to a provincial actress but who confined herself to performances in amateur productions. Verbitskaya was eventually sent off to boarding school, the Elizavetinsky Women's Institute in Moscow. In 1879 she entered the Moscow

Conservatory to study voice, leaving after only two years to accept a job as a music teacher at her former boarding school. In 1882 she married Alexei Verbitsky, an engineer, with whom she had three sons. The family needed money, so Verbitskaya worked at various jobs, in 1883 obtaining her first stint at a newspaper. Her inaugural fiction, a novella entitled "Discord," appeared in 1887 in the thick journal *Russian Thought*. It contains many of the themes that will appear subsequently in much of Verbitskaya's work. The story encompasses the roles that can often be found in left-leaning fiction espousing women's liberation—economic independence and service to the downtrodden—but also establishes new roles and goals for the heroine. Verbitskaya and other contemporary women writers would develop these themes further in the 1890s and early twentieth century: the search for self-fulfillment in relations with men, including sexual fulfillment and an exploration of one's artistic creativity.

During the 1890s Verbitskaya's fictional works became longer, and she produced her first novel, *Vavochka* (1898). She also wrote plays, the best of which is the comedy *Mirages* (1895), which was staged at the Maly Theater. By 1902, Verbitskaya had decided to become independent of others' literary tastes and created her own publishing house, issuing her own work and the translated novels of Western European writers concerned with the woman question. Not only did this venture show her quest for independence, it also showed her interest in literature as a commercial venture. Verbitskaya continued to demonstrate her commitment to the woman question through extra-literary activities. She was a member of various charitable and civic organizations that helped women, in 1905 becoming the chair of the Society for the Betterment of Women's Welfare.

In the politically charged atmosphere after the 1905 revolution and with the censorship greatly curtailed, Verbitskaya embarked on the first of her popular novels, *Spirit of the Time* (1907–1908). She seems to have found a formula that would render this and her next novel, *The Keys to Happiness* (1908–1913), bestsellers. She combined highbrow political, philosophical, and aesthetic concerns with frequent, titillating scenes of sexual seduction. Both these novels sold in numbers that were unheralded in Verbitskaya's day. She also managed to produce an interesting two-volume autobiography *To My Reader* (1908 and 1911) while she was writing *Keys to Happiness*.

In 1913 when Verbitskaya had completed *Keys*, she was invited to write the screenplay for a full-length film based on the novel. The film was a great box-office success, breaking all previous records, and catapulted Verbitskaya into a movie career. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Verbitskaya's career suffered because of official scorn for her "boulevard" novels. She died in 1928. However, with the revival of the commercial book market in post-Soviet Russia, Verbitskaya has made a bit of a comeback: Three of her popular novels were reprinted in 1992 and 1993.

See also: FEMINISM; THICK JOURNALS

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VIENNA, CONGRESS OF

The Vienna Congress provided the conclusion to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Negotiations took place in France from February to April of 1814, in London during June of that year, in Vienna from September 1814 to June 1815, and then again in Paris from July to November of 1815. The chief representatives included Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereigh of Britain; his ally, Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich of Austria; Fürst Karl August von Hardenberg of Prussia; and Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de Bénévnt of France. Tsar Alexander I directed the Russians, aided and influenced by his diverse multinational coterie of assistants: Count Andreas Razumovsky, who was ambassador to Austria; the Westphalian Graf Karl Robert von Nesselrode, who served as a quasi-foreign minister; the Corfu Greek

Count Ioánnis Antónios Kapodstrias; the Corsican Count Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo; the Prussian Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein; the Alsatian Anstedt; and the Pole Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski.

At the peak of his influence in early 1814, Alexander directed the non-punitive occupation of Paris and the exile of Napoleon I to Elba. The Treaty of Chaumont established the Quadruple Alliance to contain France, while the first Treaty of Paris restored the French monarchy. Alexander also helped block a Prussian scheme to frustrate France and Austrian designs on Switzerland and Piedmont-Sardinia, but supported the attachment of Belgium to the Netherlands and part of the Rhineland to Prussia as checks on French power. In London, however, he frightened the British with plans to reunite the ethnic Polish lands as his own separate kingdom.

At Vienna, the British, Austrians, and French thwarted this scheme, which was supported by a Prussia bent on annexing all of Saxony. By January 1815 Alexander was ready to compromise, an attitude strengthened by Napoleon's temporary return to power in March. The Final Act of June 4, 1815, drawn up by Metternich's mentor, Friedrich Gentz, reflected this spirit of compromise. Austria retained Galicia, and Prussia regained Poznan and Torun, and also acquired part of Saxony and more of the Rhineland. Most of the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw became the tsarist Kingdom of Poland. Denmark obtained a small duchy as partial compensation for Norway, which the Swedish crown acquired as Russian-sponsored compensation for the loss of Finland. A German Confederation dominated by Austria and, to a lesser extent, Prussia, but with Russian support for such middle-sized states as Württemberg, replaced the defunct Holy Roman Empire. The Ottomans remained outside the Final Act, refusing to allow Anglo-French-Austrian mediation of differences with Russia as a precondition of a general guarantee.

Back in Paris, Alexander promoted the Holy Alliance, which Metternich insisted be an ideal brotherhood of Christian sovereigns, not peoples, as the Russian emperor envisioned. Of the Europeans, only the British, the Papacy, and the Ottomans refused to sign it. The (Congress of) Vienna system weathered revolutions and diplomatic crises. Except for Belgian independence in 1830, Europe's borders remained essentially stable until 1859.

See also: ALEXANDER I; FRENCH WAR OF 1812; NAPOLEON I

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VIETNAM, RELATIONS WITH

The Soviet Union began its relationship with Vietnam through the Communist International (Comintern), one of whose purposes was to support the liberation of colonized peoples from Western colonial powers. From the last half of the nineteenth century until 1954, the formerly unified nation of Vietnam was divided into three segments (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina), along with Cambodia and Laos, within the French colony Indochine (Indochina).

Prior to 1930 some politicized members of Vietnamese society had a connection to the Soviet Union through membership in the French Communist Party or its political fronts. During the 1920s the Comintern invited several radical Vietnamese political activists to Moscow for political education and training. The most prominent of these was a man of many aliases whose most frequent alias prior to World War II was Nguyen Ai Quoc, a founding member of the French Communist Party who later became better known through his final alias, Ho Chi Minh. Quoc became a full-time functionary of the Comintern and, on their instructions, founded the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930. Although most of its members were Vietnamese, the ICP staked a claim to succeed France politically in all of its Southeast Asian colonies. The idea of an Indochinese Federation, modeled on the Soviet Union—with the Vietnamese playing the same dominant role vis-à-vis the Cambodians and Laotians as the Russians did with the other nationalities and republics within the USSR—was a Comintern political concept that was to both guide and bedevil the politics of the Southeast Asian region for much of the twentieth century.

From 1930 until 1950 the Soviet Union's relations with the Vietnamese revolutionaries in French Indochina were limited mainly to training and political advice. At the end of World War II, during

the brief power vacuum that followed Japan's surrender and withdrawal from the region, Ho Chi Minh led a small band of ICP controlled guerrillas, though under the guise of its political front, the Viet Minh, to seize power in a Bolshevik-style *coup d'état*. He proclaimed the independence of the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945. The DRV was not recognized by any nation, and France's return to reclaim its former Asian colonies led to the outbreak of war between France and the DRV/Viet Minh at the end of 1946.

Geography prevented the Soviet Union from effectively aiding Ho Chi Minh until 1950, when the victory of the Chinese communists in the Chinese civil war changed the balance of power in Asia. In January 1950 Josef Stalin agreed to Ho's request for increased aid. Thus in early 1950 all of the Soviet bloc nations recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and China undertook the Soviet Bloc's task of direct military, economic, and political assistance to the Vietnamese communists.

Following the Geneva Conference of 1954, of which the Soviet Union was cochair, France agreed to abandon its former colonies, and Indochina was divided into the independent nations of Cambodia and Laos, with Vietnam temporarily divided at the seventeenth parallel into the communist controlled DRV (North) and the noncommunist Republic of Vietnam (South). The United States replaced the French as the patrons of the noncommunist Vietnamese in South Vietnam, and the Soviet Union along with its then-ally China, maintained substantial political, economic, military, and diplomatic support to North Vietnam. During the late 1950s the Vietnamese communists in Hanoi began an uprising against the government in South Vietnam. The Soviet Union supported the DRV against the American-backed South. This Soviet commitment to the Vietnam War increased during the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, as China's split with the Soviet Union, which had emerged publicly in 1963, caused a competition between Moscow and Beijing for influence in Hanoi. Thousands of Soviet citizens were sent to Vietnam as military and economic advisers during the 1960s. After 1968 Hanoi turned more toward Moscow as its principle source of aid and advice. Yet the USSR, fearing that it would be dragged by the Vietnamese into a direct confrontation with the United States, wanted to find a political rather than a military settlement to the Vietnam War. However, the domestic opposition to the war within the United States caused a cut-back of American aid to South Vietnam during

1974–1975, and a precipitate military collapse of South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese army in April 1975.

During the 1970s Moscow and Hanoi increased their ties, at Beijing's expense. The Soviet Union acquired access to the former U.S. military base at Cam Ranh Bay, and thus was able to project its naval and air power into Asia on a scale never before realized. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was signed in November 1978. When the SRV came into conflict with the China-backed Cambodian communists (known in the West as the Khmer Rouge), Soviet arms facilitated the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Moscow and its allies supported Vietnam's subsequent decade-long occupation of Cambodia, but the rest of the members of the United Nations condemned the occupation. Vietnam became a diplomatic as well as an economic liability for Moscow.

With the transformation of Soviet foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachev, away from confrontation and toward meaningful cooperation with the West, Vietnam ceased to have much value to the Kremlin. Deciding to reduce its commitments to Hanoi, Moscow encouraged a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, as well as a political settlement under United Nations auspices.

The Russian Federation, founded in 1991, was focused on its own economic transformation, not with subsidizing impoverished Third World clients. Yet it had inherited an unpaid debt of \$10 billion from Vietnam. Overcoming the massive debt that had resulted from the failed political-ideological crusades of the twentieth century assumed greater significance than any other goal for Russia in its relations with Vietnam at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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STEPHEN J. MORRIS

VIKINGS

From the 750s to the 1050s, the Vikings were warriors, pirates, and traders from Scandinavia who employed the most sophisticated naval technology of the time in Northern Europe to launch extensive raiding and trading expeditions stretching west to Canadian Labrador and east to the Caspian Sea.

Vikings (called *Rus* in the Arabic and *Varangians* in the Greek sources), primarily from Sweden and the Isle of Gotland, first entered European Russia in small groups in search of trade and tribute in the second half of the eighth century. By the ninth century, the Rus had established a complex commercial network stretching from the Baltic to the Islamic Caliphate. By the tenth century, the Rus extended this network southward to the Byzantine Empire via Kiev, continuing the eastern trade through intermediaries on the middle Volga in Volga Bulgaria. Also by the tenth century, the Vikings traveling through Russia had entered the service of the Byzantine Emperor (tenth through twelfth centuries) and helped found the first East Slavic kingdom, Kievan Rus.

The *Russian Primary Chronicle* relates that in 862 the Viking Rurik and his kin were invited by Slavic and Finnic tribes to come and rule over them, after which they developed a system of tribute that encompassed northwestern Russia, Kiev, and its neighboring tribes. The *Chronicle's* account is substantiated by finds of Scandinavian-style artifacts (tortoise shell brooches, Thor's hammer pendants, wooden idols, armaments), and in some cases graves, found at Staraya Ladoga, Ryurikovo Gorodishche, Syaskoe Gorodishche, Timerevo, and Gnezdovo. These sites were tribal and commercial centers and riverside waystations, typical of those found along trade routes used by the Rus, most notably that of the Volga Route to the Islamic Caliphate and the Route to the Greeks along the Dnieper.

In contrast to Viking activity in the West, which is characterized primarily by raiding and large-scale colonization, the Rus town network and subsequent tribal and political organization was designed for trade. Subject tribes living along river systems supplied the Rus with the furs, wax, honey, and slaves that they would further exchange for Islamic silver (especially dirhams), glass beads, silks, and spices in southern markets. The Rus expansion into Byzantine markets began in earnest in the early tenth century, with Rus attacks

on Constantinople in 907, 911, and 944, which resulted in trade agreements. By the end of the century, in 988–989, Vladimir I (ruled 980–1015), a quarter Viking through his father Svyatoslav, had married into the Byzantine royal family and converted to Byzantine Christianity, thereby laying the foundation for the Eastern Slavic relationship with the Greek world.

The tenth century marks the high point of Viking involvement in the East. Much of the Scandinavian-style jewelry found in European Russia and a majority of the Scandinavian-style graves date to the second and third quarters of the tenth century. Vladimir I and his son Yaroslav the Wise (ruled 1019–1054) enlisted Viking mercenary armies in internecine dynastic wars. In the eleventh century, however, the Viking foot soldier armies had become obsolete as the Rus princes were forced to adapt to another enemy in the south, the Turkic nomads who fought on horseback. The defeat of Yaroslav's Viking mercenaries by a nomadic army at the Battle of Listven (1024) is indicative of this trend.

See also: GNEZDOVO; KIEVAN RUS; NORMANIST CONTROVERSY; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; ROUTE TO GREEKS; VLADIMIR, ST.; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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HEIDI M. SHERMAN

VILNIUS

The capital of the Lithuanian Republic and historically the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilnius occupies a special place in a number of national cultures. Lithuanians constitute a majority of the city's 543,000 inhabitants. Russians make

up about 20 percent, Poles 19 percent, Belarusians 5 percent, and Jews 2 percent. Jews, who according to the Russian census of 1897 had constituted a plurality of the population, have called "Vilna" (or in Yiddish "Vilne") the "Jerusalem of the North," a center of rabbinic learning. Poles considered "Wilno" Polish in culture. Some Belarusians, pointing to the Grand Duchy's multinational character, insist that Vilna should be part of their state. Under Russian rule in the nineteenth century, Vilna was the administrative center of the empire's Northwest Region.

When the great Eastern European empires collapsed at the end of the World War I, Vilnius became a bone of contention between the newly emerging states. Between 1918 and 1923, the flag symbolizing sovereignty over the city and region changed at least eight times. The two major contenders were Lithuania and Poland, although the city also briefly served as the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and then the Lithuanian-Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. In July 1920, as part of its recognition of Lithuanian independence, Soviet Russia agreed with Lithuania's claims to Vilnius, but in October 1920 Polish forces seized the city, establishing the rogue state of Central Lithuania. In 1923, Poland formally incorporated the territory, but Lithuania refused to recognize Polish sovereignty. Still claiming Vilnius as their capital, the Lithuanians called Kaunas their provisional capital and insisted that Poland and Lithuania were in a state of war.

After Soviet forces had occupied Eastern Poland in September 1939, the Soviet government turned Vilnius over to the Lithuanians. The Polish government in exile protested the Lithuanians' move into Vilnius, but after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the western powers chose not to challenge the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland. In 1940, and again from 1944 to 1945, Soviet troops occupied Lithuania, and Vilnius was the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic until 1991.

Under Soviet rule, Lithuanians dominated the city's cultural life. Before World War I, when Lithuania lay on the border between Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany, the Russians had limited the economic growth of the region and the development of the city. Therefore few Lithuanians had come to the city from the countryside. After 1945 the Soviet government permitted and even encouraged Poles to emigrate from the USSR to the Polish People's Republic, and Lithuanians flowed to the city. The decade of the 1960s, when the

Lithuanian population reached 45 to 47 percent, was decisive in the development of the city's Lithuanian character.

In January 1991 Soviet troops in Vilnius seized a number of public buildings in an unsuccessful effort to crush Lithuanian independence, and the city became a symbol of the failure of Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika.

See also: JEWS; LITHUANIA AND LITHUANIANS; POLAND

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ALFRED ERICH SENN

VINIUS, ANDREI DENISOVICH *See* WINIUS, ANDRIES DIONYSZOON.

VIRGIN LANDS PROGRAM

Nikita Khrushchev promoted two major agricultural programs in his first years as general secretary: the corn program and, as he called it, the virgin and wasteland program. These two programs were interrelated. An important objective of agricultural policy was to increase the production of meat and milk significantly to meet the demands of the population. To produce more meat and milk required more feed. His solution was to expand greatly the production of corn (maize) throughout the Soviet Union. The virgin lands program was created to prevent the reduction of the wheat area as the corn area increased. This aspect of the virgin lands program is often missed, but in a speech on February 14, 1956, Khrushchev highlighted it: "The interests of increasing production of grain required a change in the structure of acreages, for the purpose—while extending the acreage under wheat, groats, and other crops—of sharply increasing acreage under corn." He noted that in 1955 there were 18 million hectares of corn sown, some 13.6 million hectares more than in 1954. Without the virgin lands program, the area of wheat would have been substantially reduced, and a crisis in the bread supply would have occurred. The new lands were located primarily in Khazakstan and Siberia, areas of limited rainfall.

Khrushchev's objective had been to reclaim 28 to 30 million hectares of virgin land and wasteland. The estimated area of virgin and fallow land developed from 1954 to 1956 was 36 million hectares. Prior to institution of the virgin lands program, the sown area of grain in the USSR was approximately 100 million hectares; in 1954 it was 102 million. By 1956 the grain area had increased to 128 million hectares, while the wheat area had increased from 48 million hectares in 1953 to 62 million hectares in 1956, and maize sown for grain from 3.5 to 9.3 million hectares. Thus he achieved his objective of increasing the total cropped area and increasing both wheat- and maize-sown areas.

Not all of the increase in grain area came from plowing up virgin and wasteland. Aradius Kahan concluded that 10 million hectares of the increased sown area could be attributed to the reduction of the area of fallowed land—land that was in cultivation but cropped only every other year. In areas of limited rainfall, land is often fallowed as a way of accumulating moisture and nitrogen from one year to the next, which both increases and stabilizes yields. The practice of fallow is to leave land idle for a year, but cultivate it to prevent the growth of weeds that would utilize the available moisture. The accumulation of moisture and nitrogen through fallow will increase the yields by 50 or more percent, and, with the saving of seed, the increase in net yield is even greater. In this light, more than a quarter of the reported increase in sown area represented a fraud: The land was neither virgin nor waste.

Was the virgin lands program successful by Khrushchev's criteria, namely, increasing the output of wheat and other grains as the corn area expanded? It appears so. In part this was due to good luck—the weather in the virgin land area in the late 1950s was quite favorable. The national yield of grain per hectare, as estimated by the government, was actually higher from 1955 to 1959 than from 1950 to 1954, even though the virgin land area normally had a somewhat lower yield than the national average. One positive feature of the virgin lands program was that annual yields in the area generally were negatively correlated with the yields in the European area of the USSR. This meant that the year-to-year variations in yields tended to be offsetting to a significant degree, thus adding stability to the national average. The average of the official (and exaggerated) estimates of grain production from 1956 to 1960 was 121 million tons, or 41 percent more than in 1954. Not all of this increase was due to the virgin lands program, but much of it was.

The corn program, however, was a dismal failure and was later largely abandoned. Corn requires a relatively long and warm growing season and much more moisture than wheat or most other grains. Most of the farm areas of the USSR were short on all three of these. Hardly any of the corn grown in new areas reached maturity—it had to be utilized as green feed or silage.

Overall grain production in the USSR more than doubled between the early 1950s and the late 1980s. Part of this increase was due to the virgin lands program, but most was due to increased yields from seed improvements and increased applications of fertilizer. However, with the demise of the USSR, grain production has fallen by about 40 percent, while fertilizer use declined by much more.

See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

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D. GALE JOHNSON

VIRTUAL ECONOMY

The term *virtual economy* has been used to describe conditions in Russia's transition economy where privatized enterprises continued to engage in value-subtracting production because they maintained buyers from the Soviet era who were willing to purchase goods at prices that failed to accurately reflect production costs or market value. Relying on relational capital, contacts and connections with other managers and government officials developed in the Soviet economy, enterprise directors in Russia's transition economy were able to acquire resources and goods without cash payments either prior to, or after, the acquisition. Since neither the privatization process nor their ongoing operations provided Russian manufacturing firms with funds to renovate their obsolete capital stock, enterprise managers faced few options for upgrading product quality or changing the firms' production assortment in order to compete effectively in domestic and global markets. In effect, the term virtual econ-

omy refers to the situation where Russian privatized firms continued to operate as they had in the Soviet economy despite the facade that profitability considerations and market forces governed their activities.

As Russia's transition process progressed in the 1990s, purchases between manufacturing firms increasingly involved barter and other non-monetary transactions, reducing the cash available for firms to acquire materials or pay taxes. In a virtual economy, barter and other non-monetary transactions play an important role in sustaining ongoing operations which transfer value from productive activities to loss-making sectors of the economy. Reliance on barter transactions restricts the firms' ability to restructure their operations in order to produce higher value-added output.

See also: VALUE SUBTRACTION

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SUSAN J. LINZ

VKLADNYE KNIGI *See* DONATION BOOKS.

VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

(1053–1125), one of the ablest grand princes of Kiev and the progenitor of the Monomashichi of Vladimir in Volyn, Smolensk, and Suzdalia. Born Vladimir Vsevolodovich, he inherited his sobriquet "Monomakh" from his Greek mother, a relative of Emperor Constantine IX Monomachus.

In reporting his early career in his autobiographical "Instruction" to his sons, Monomakh writes how his father Vsevolod, a son of Yaroslav Vladimirovich the Wise, had him administer

Pereyasavl, Rostov, Smolensk, Turov, and Novgorod, and how he campaigned against Polotsk and the Czechs. In 1078, when Vsevolod became grand prince of Kiev, he transferred Monomakh from Smolensk to Chernigov, therewith depriving his nephews, Svyatoslav's sons, of their patrimony. In 1093, when his father died, Monomakh declined the Kievans' invitation to be their prince, evidently not wishing to violate the ladder system of succession allegedly introduced by Yaroslav the Wise. He deferred to his genealogically elder cousin Svyatopolk Izyaslavich, with whom he formed an alliance against the Polovtsy. The latter attacked the cousins, inflicted a crushing defeat on them, and then intensified their raids on Rus.

In 1094 Oleg Svyatoslavich and the Polovtsy evicted Monomakh from Chernigov, forcing him to occupy his father's patrimony of Pereyasavl. Because Oleg refused to join him and Svyatopolk against the nomads, the two drove him out of Chernigov. After Oleg fled to Murom, where he killed Monomakh's son Izyaslav, Monomakh wrote him an emotionally charged letter (the text of which survives) pleading that he be pacified. Oleg responded by pillaging Monomakh's Suzdalian lands. In response, Monomakh's son Mstislav of Novgorod marched against Oleg, defeated him, and forced him to attend a congress of princes in 1097 at Lyubech, where Oleg submitted to his cousins. Soon afterward, Svyatopolk broke the Lyubech agreement by having Vasilko Rostislavich of Terebovl blinded. Monomakh therefore joined his cousins, the Svyatoslavichi of Chernigov, against Svyatopolk, and the princes met at Uvetichi in 1100 to settle the dispute. After that, all the cousins, led by Monomakh, campaigned successfully against the Polovtsy in 1103, 1107, and in 1111, when they inflicted a crushing defeat on the nomads at the river Don.

After Svyatopolk died in 1113, Monomakh hesitated to occupy Kiev, but the citizens rioted, allegedly forcing him to assume power. He thus preempted the Svyatoslavichi who were higher in seniority. After occupying the throne he issued laws, the so-called "Statute of Vladimir Monomakh," to alleviate exorbitant interest rates on loans and to stop other abuses. During his twelve-year reign Monomakh continued his campaigns against the Polovtsy, and in 1116 he captured three of their towns on the river Don. He also waged war against the Poles, the Chud, the Lithuanians, and the Volga Bulgars. He devoted much of his energy to consolidating his rule by evicting disloyal princes

from their domains and replacing them with his men. Thus, before his death, in addition to Kiev he controlled Pereyasavl, Smolensk, Suzdalia, Novgorod, Vladimir in Volyn, Turov, and Minsk. Moreover, he hoped to secure his family's supremacy in Rus by persuading the Kievans to accept his eldest son Mstislav and his heirs as their hereditary dynasty. By doing so, he attempted once again to break the system of lateral succession to Kiev allegedly instituted by Yaroslav the Wise. He died on May 19, 1125.

See also: GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; POLOVTSY; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

VLADIMIR, ST.

(d. 1015), grand prince, best known for his role in the Christianization of Kievan Rus.

Sources about Vladimir are scanty, and the most comprehensive one (generally though inaccurately called the *Russian Primary Chronicle*) is full of spurious material. Still the following cautious sketch of the prince's career is probably accurate for the most part. Vladimir's male ancestors, though Scandinavian, had been ruling the largely Slavic-speaking land of Rus for at least two generations by the time of his birth. His grandmother Olga had been baptized, probably in Constantinople at some time during the 950s, but had failed to convince his father Svyatoslav to follow her lead. In 970 Svyatoslav installed Vladimir (perhaps still a child) as his subordinate prince in Novgorod. Two years later Svyatoslav died, leaving Vladimir's brother Yaropolk to become grand prince. In 976 a power struggle between Yaropolk and a third brother, Oleg, led to Oleg's death and caused Vladimir to flee Novgorod for Scandinavia. Vladimir returned to Novgorod in 980, presumably with Scandinavian troops, and marched against Yaropolk. In the

same year he or his advisers ordered the assassination of Yaropolk at a peace conference. Yaropolk's death left Vladimir in undisputed control of the Kievan realm.

In the year that he came to power, Vladimir erected several idols in Kiev and allegedly authorized that humans be sacrificed to them. He remained a pagan for roughly the first eight years of his reign, during which time he, like his father, expanded and consolidated his power through a series of wars against neighboring tribes. He also fathered several sons including Boris and Gleb, Russia's two most important native saints, and Yaroslav the Wise, who would eventually succeed him.

Vladimir's conversion to Christianity is described at considerable length in the *Primary Chronicle*, but many details of this account are dubious. However, as the *Chronicle* suggests, the prince was probably influenced by missionaries and possibly by memories of his Christian grandmother. Political considerations were also important in his decision to convert. Vladimir's own baptism was certainly a condition for his final marriage (the one that forced him to annul multiple prior marriages) to Anne, sister of the Byzantine emperor Basil II. There is some controversy over the precise date of this baptism, as well as the location (the Greek city of Cherson, according to the *Chronicle*, or Kiev). In any case, Vladimir's personal baptism in 987 or 988 was followed almost immediately by the official Christianization of Rus. After baptism the prince seems to have embarked enthusiastically on a program of destroying pagan temples, building churches, and educating new clergy. The latter two projects were to be vigorously continued by his son Yaroslav.

Although there were Christians in the Kievan state before Vladimir's time, the prince's official conversion of the land marked a historical turning point. As Christians, Vladimir's successors had a religion in common with their counterparts in the rest of Europe, fostering communication and political alliances. The conversion also stimulated the development of literacy in Kievan Rus and its successor states. The conversion had problematic aspects as well. Vladimir's decision to adopt the religion from Byzantium rather than Rome would separate Russia culturally from the West in many respects. The schism between the Western and Eastern churches, already underway in Vladimir's time, became official in 1204 and continues into the early twenty-first century. Moreover, while literate Westerners of all nationalities would communicate with each other freely in Latin for

centuries to come, the primary written language of Russia would be Slavic. These factors contributed greatly to the exclusion of Russia (and, to some extent, of Ukraine and Belarus) from many Western European intellectual and cultural developments up to the end of the seventeenth century.

During the Muscovite period Vladimir was regularly represented as the founder of the Russian state. This practice ended with the death of his last ruling descendant through the male line in 1598. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, his reign was romanticized in poems, paintings, and novels. He may also be the prototype of a folkloric ruler named Vladimir in Russia's oral epic poetry.

See also: CHRISTIANIZATION; KIEVAN RUS; OLGA; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; SAINTS; YAROPOLK I; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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FRANCIS BUTLER

VLASOV MOVEMENT

The Vlasov Movement (*Vlasovskoye Dvizhenie*), or Russian Liberation Movement, designates the attempt by Soviet citizens in German hands during World War II to create an anti-Stalinist army, nominally led by Lieutenant-General Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov (1900–1946), to overthrow Stalin. Vlasov gave his name to the movement and died for his role in it. He did not create the situation and had little influence over developments.

Vlasov has been interpreted both as a patriotic opponent of Communism and as a treacherous opportunist. The Vlasov movement illustrates the way in which Nazi policy towards the USSR was developed by the competing requirements of ideology and military expediency and the various agencies involved in policy.

The outbreak of war witnessed popular disaffection within the territories of the USSR. Many opposed to Stalinism hoped that the Germans would come as liberators. Hitler saw the war in racial terms, and his main aim was to acquire living space (*Lebensraum*).

A successful commander, Vlasov had impressed Stalin. Having fought his way out of the Kiev encirclement, he was appointed to repulse the German attack on Moscow in December 1941. In March 1942 Vlasov was made deputy commander of the Volkhov front and then commander of the Second Shock Army. For reasons that are still unclear, the Second Shock Army was neither strengthened nor allowed to withdraw. On June 24, Vlasov ordered the army to disband and was captured three weeks later. As a prisoner-of-war, Vlasov met German officers who argued that Nazi policy could be altered. Relying on his Soviet experience, Vlasov believed that their views had official sanction and agreed to cooperate.

In December 1942 the Smolensk Declaration was issued by Vlasov in his capacity as head of the so-called Russian Committee, and was aimed at Soviet citizens on the German side of the front. In response, Soviet citizens began to sew badges on their uniforms to indicate their allegiance to the Russian Liberation Army, which in fact did not exist although the declaration referred to it. In the spring of 1943, Vlasov was taken on a tour of the occupied territories and published his Open Letter, which attracted much support among the population. Hitler was opposed to this and ordered Vlasov to be kept under house arrest as there was no intention of authorizing any anti-Stalinist movement. Dabendorf, a camp near Berlin, became the main focus of activity. Mileti Zykov was particularly influential in developing some of the program at Dabendorf. Finally, on September 16, 1944, Vlasov met Heinrich Himmler, who authorized the formation of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR, *Komitet Osvobodzheniya Narodov Rossii*). The Manifesto was published in Prague on November 14, 1944. Two divisions were formed, but Soviet soldiers already serving in the Wehrmacht were not allowed to join.

In May 1945, the KONR First Division deserted their German sponsors and fought on the side of the Czech insurgents against SS troops in the city. Vlasov wished to demonstrate his anti-Stalinist credentials to the Allies, but when it became clear that the Americans would not be entering Prague, the First Division was eventually ordered to disband. Vlasov was captured, taken back to Moscow, tried, and hanged as a traitor in August 1946. For many years, mention of Vlasov and the anti-Stalinist opposition was taboo in the USSR. Since the 1980s more material has been published. An attempt to rehabilitate Vlasov and to argue that he had fought against the regime—not the Russian people—was turned down by the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Court on November 1, 2001.

See also: STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II

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CATHERINE ANDREYEV

VODKA

Prior to the twentieth century, the Russian word *vino* indicated the class of beverages known in English as vodka. The term refers to all alcoholic drinks made from distilling grain. (Confusingly, *vino* could also mean wine.) The Russian word *vodka* usually referred to the higher grades of spirits.

Precisely when spirits appeared in Russia is difficult to discern. Some historians note references to vodka in written chronicles as early as the twelfth century. Others argue that spirits arrived in Russia in the late fourteenth century. One source claims that Livonians and Germans were granted permission to sell aqua vita, or vodka, in certain areas of Moscow in 1578. A commonly held view is that drinks such as present-day vodka spread to Russia only in the sixteenth century when Russians learned the art of distilling grain from the Tatars. The most widely held consensus is that vodka came from the west in the first half of the sixteenth century, but its consumption was initially limited to foreign mercenaries.

From the outset, the government exercised control over the trade in spirits. Beginning in 1544, the state owned and regulated drink shops (*kabaki*) that distilled and sold vodka in the towns. The Law Code of 1649 extended state control to all the Russian provinces and established a monopoly over production, distribution, and sale of spirits, from which the nobility were exempt. In the mid-sixteenth century, the state began farming out the rights to collect taxes on vodka, and by 1767 liquor tax farming spread throughout the empire as the primary means of extracting revenues from vodka until an excise system was set up in 1863. The excise system, however, made regulation difficult, so in 1892, Minister of Finance Sergei Witte introduced a reformed state monopoly. Except for a brief experiment with prohibition from 1914 to 1925, the state retained a monopoly over the vodka trade until 1989. Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, liquor taxes comprised between 26 and 33 percent of all state revenues.

Historically, peasants drank mead, ale, and beer on festive occasions. Since vodka involved distilling, peasant households did not have the equipment, technology, or resources to produce their own. In its quest for revenues, the state expanded commercial production and sale of vodka to the rural population throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the expansion of the vodka trade, the use of beer was increasingly replaced by vodka as the favored ceremonial drink among the lower classes.

By the nineteenth century, vodka was the single most important item in lower-class diets. In the villages, peasants drank vodka at church festivals, rites of passage, family celebrations, weddings and funerals, and any special occasions in the life of the rural community. Such ceremonial drinking was as much an obligation as it was a pleasure. Tradition and custom demanded drunkenness on certain occasions, and those failing to respond dishonored themselves before the community. In order to avoid this stigma, families often spent their last pennies, and even sold property, to purchase vodka for an upcoming event. A funeral could not be arranged, a wedding conducted, or a bargain sealed without the required amount of vodka. To be binding, every type of transaction had to conclude with all parties wetting the bargain—sharing a drink of vodka. Custom established firm norms on the amount of vodka to be provided, below which a peasant family could not go without being shamed.

Vodka was also a valuable exchange commodity used to maintain networks of patronage and manipulate village politics. Often decisions concerning the levying of taxes, election of officials, or the punishment of offenders depended upon who bought whom how much vodka. A defendant or petitioner could ply village elders with vodka to insure a favorable outcome; this was known as softening up the judge. Once a punishment had been decided upon, the perpetrator often treated the village to vodka in order to win forgiveness and readmittance into the community. It was also common for the victim to treat the community to vodka, thereby affirming his or her acceptance of the punishment.

The political and economic uses of vodka were linked in the important village institution of work parties. Seeking to gather as many people as possible to get an urgent task done, such as repairing a road or bridge, building a church, or bringing in the harvest, the host would supply copious amounts of vodka. The provision of drink signaled his respect for the peasants, and they reciprocated by working for respect. Vodka was the reward for their labor, but more importantly, it symbolized the mutuality of the exchange, reinforcing the web of interdependent relationships in the community.

From the 1890s, as Russia embarked upon a course of modernization, vodka retained its centrality in the everyday lives of the working classes. With the beginning of industrialization, millions of peasants entered the urban workforce bringing their traditions with them, especially the practice of wetting the bargain. In the village, sharing a drink of vodka signified an equitable economic arrangement had been made. In the hiring market, former peasants forced potential employers to wet the bargain before they would agree to the terms of employment. The toast was a type of social leveling, forcing employers (at least symbolically) to respect the workers' dignity and humanity.

Practices at the workplace centered on drinking vodka strengthened shop solidarities, reinforced hierarchies among workers, and symbolized a rite of passage into the world of real workers. Among male workers in shops, commercial firms, and factories, each new man underwent an initiation rite, which involved obligatory buying and drinking of vodka. Often, a newcomer was not addressed by name but called "Mama's boy" until he provided the whole shop with vodka.

With the accelerated growth of the urban working class during the rapid industrialization of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1933), the practice of treating with vodka took on greater significance, and in most factories it became nearly impossible for workers to receive training or secure the proper tools without bribing foremen with vodka. It was quite common for skilled workers to demand payment in vodka for training new recruits. As with rural communities, in the factories custom set firm limits on the amount of drink required. So prevalent was the practice of treating, a nationwide survey conducted in 1991 revealed that the workplace was the primary place for imbibing. Moreover, in 1993 average consumption levels were placed at one bottle of vodka for every adult Russian male every two days.

See also: ALCOHOLISM; ALCOHOL MONOPOLY; FOOD

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KATE TRANSCHEL

istry of Defense, eventually becoming deputy chief (1984–1988) of the Main Political Administration.

Although known as an ideological hardliner, Volkogonov's foreign experiences gave rise to grave doubts about the Soviet system. Travels in the Third World taught him that revolutionary leaders sought only cynical advantage from the Soviets. An academic visit to the West convinced him that capitalist societies had produced greater equalities than their supposedly egalitarian socialist counterparts. He was already reading suppressed writers when he learned the truth about his father's death—that he had been executed as an enemy of the people. Hence sprang the desire to expose the truth about Stalin and his times.

Estrangement from the military-political leadership precipitated Volkogonov's transfer to the USSR Institute of Military History. There, while chief from 1988 to 1991, his subordinates' revisionist draft history of the Great Patriotic War, coupled with his growing adherence to democratic ideals and an unorthodox evaluation of the Stalinist legacy, provoked clashes with the Ministry of Defense. Following the Soviet collapse, he served from 1991 to 1995 as security adviser to President Boris Yeltsin, while simultaneously championing democratic causes and chairing several parliamentary commissions as a Duma deputy associated with the Left-Centrist Bloc. Before his turn against Soviet convention, Volkogonov's more significant works, including *Marxist-Leninist Teachings about War and the Army* (1984) and *The Psychology of War* (1984) reflected orthodox zeal. However, his subsequent conviction that the Soviet system had been flawed from the beginning permeated his historical works, including a revisionist biography of Stalin, *Triumph and Tragedy* (1990), and later volumes on Trotsky, Lenin, and other significant early Soviet leaders.

See also: STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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VOLKOGONOV, DMITRY ANTONOVICH

(1928–1995), Soviet and Russian military and political figure, historian, and philosopher.

Colonel General Volkogonov was born in Chita province, the son of a minor civil servant who was shot in 1937. Without knowledge of his father's true fate, Volkogonov entered military service in 1949 and rose rapidly in rank. As a political officer after 1971, he held various posts within the Soviet Min-

Volkogonov, Dmitri. (1998). *Autopsy for an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime*, tr. and ed. Harold Shukman. New York: Free Press.

BRUCE W. MENNING

VOLSKY, ARKADY IVANOVICH

(b. 1932), political leader and industrial lobbyist in the 1990s.

Arkady Ivanovich Volsky began his career in the military-industrial sector as deputy chief of the Department of Machines from 1978 to 1984. He became active in politics by serving on several high-profile committees dealing with industry and gained national recognition as Mikhail Gorbachev's special representative in Nagorno-Karabakh during the crises there from 1988 to 1990. Volsky is best known for founding the Union of Science and Industry in 1990, which he renamed the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs after the failed 1991 coup. He used this position to establish the perception that he spoke for the interests of managers and business entrepreneurs during the crucial era of privatization and transition to capitalism. In mid-June 1992 he was a central figure in the formation of the Civic Union, a broad alliance of political parties and parliamentary factions that played an important role in forcing alterations to the program of rapid privatization and economic reform presented by Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. Volsky was widely seen as one of the key forces behind the June 1993 replacement of Gaidar with Viktor Chernomyrdin and others who favored a slower transition with a greater role for incumbent managers. Although Volsky continued to head the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, its influence, and his, peaked in 1993 and rapidly declined thereafter. By the late 1990s privatization had transformed the economic and political landscape, bringing power and influence to a small and shifting group of wealthy, well-connected oligarchs, deeply undermining his claim to speak for the business class.

See also: CIVIC UNION; PRIVATIZATION

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ERIC LOHR


VORONTSOV, MIKHAIL SEMENOVICH

("Minga") (1782–1856), leading statesman during the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I.

Although Mikhail Vorontsov was considered a military hero (his portrait hangs in the Hero's Hall of the Hermitage), mainly for his generalship at the Battle of Borodino (1812) and his command of the Russian occupation army in France (1815–1818), his historical significance is due to his rule as governor-general and viceroy in New Russia and Caucasia from 1823 to 1854. Born a count in an illustrious and wealthy family of imperial servitors, he was awarded the titles of field marshal and most illustrious (*Svetleyshy*) prince of the Russian Empire for his service.

Vorontsov was an unshakably loyal servitor to the emperors, yet thanks to his upbringing in England (his father, Semen Vorontsov, was the Russian ambassador) and an excellent education, as well as his high social status and fabulous wealth, in attitude and action he was more Western, liberal, and business-minded than his conservative Russian colleagues. The poet Pushkin out of spite called him "half lord and half merchant." He was one of Russia's largest serf-owners. Although he supported emancipation in principle, he spurned overtures to join the Decembrist plotters, many of whom received their inspiration in France under his command. The serfs, he said, could be freed only when the Emperor decided to do so. Indeed, he was named by Nicholas I to serve on the commission set up in 1826 to investigate the Decembrist conspiracy.

Vorontsov excelled in the field of imperial administration. In New Russia, from its capital Odessa, and in Caucasia from Tbilisi, his government brought vast improvements to the economic life and sheer physical appearance of these southern regions. He attempted, with limited success, to improve the operation of the notoriously corrupt and inefficient imperial bureaucracy. He decentralized decision making in these peripheral territories of the empire, partly by bringing educated locals into the civil service. He also fought constantly, with limited success, for some autonomy from the jealous central ministries in St. Petersburg. He encouraged local businesses. He brought steamboats from England to improve transportation up the rivers and on the Black Sea. He established and supported educational and cultural institutions. He personally supervised the design and construction of parks and public buildings in the major cities.



An engraving of Mikhail Semenovich Vorontsov that appeared in the *London News*. © MARY EVANS PICTURE LIBRARY

A bitter opponent of the Crimean War and the unexpected enmity with his beloved England, Vorontsov retired in 1854 in failing health, after a third of a century of service, and died two years later. In an unusual expression of public admiration for Imperial Russia, public subscriptions paid for commemorative statues of him in Odessa and Tbilisi. A beautiful museum dedicated to his good works and lasting memory, currently open to the public, is located in one of his former palaces, the famous Bloor-designed palace in Alupka, not far from Yalta on the "Russian Riviera," the beautiful Crimean coast.

See also: CAUCASUS; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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ANTHONY RHINELANDER

VORONTSOV-DASHKOV, ILLARION IVANOVICH

(1837–1916), viceroy of the Caucasus.

At a moment of great danger to the regime Tsar Nicholas II appointed his friend and councilor, Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov, viceroy (*namestnik*) of the Caucasus in 1905. A loyal courtier, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov faced open rebellion, with most of western Georgia in the hands of insurgent peasants led by the Marxist Social Democrats. Harsh policies toward the Armenian Church (in 1903 their properties had been seized by the government), repression of the workers and peasants, and general disillusionment with the autocracy as the Russo-Japanese War went badly, led to the collapse of tsarist authority south of the Caucasian mountains. The new viceroy agreed to ameliorate the state's policies, return the Armenian church properties, and negotiate with the rebels. The tsar did not approve of these moderate policies and thought the best place for rebels was hanging from a tree. "The example would be beneficial to many," he wrote. But the viceroy prevailed, using both conciliatory and repressive measures to pacify the region.

The liberal methods of the viceroy improved relations among the various nationalities in the Caucasus. He was thought by many to be pro-Armenian, and did favor that nationality as it was well represented in local representative institutions and possessed great wealth and property. Vorontsov-Dashkov wrote to the tsar that the government had itself created the "Armenian problem by carelessly ignoring the religious and national views of the Armenians." But he also attempted to placate the Georgians and the Muslims and permitted education in the local languages. By the time Russia went to war with Turkey in 1915, Armenians formed volunteer units to fight alongside the Russian army against the Turks. Although there was resistance to the draft among Caucasian Muslims, and Georgians were unenthusiastic about the war effort, no major opposition was expressed. In 1915 Vorontsov-Dashkov left the Caucasus and was replaced by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. As Vorontsov-Dashkov departed Tiflis, he was made an honorary citizen of the city by the Armenian-dominated city *duma*, but neither the Georgian nobility nor Azerbaijani representatives appeared to bid him farewell.

See also: CAUCASUS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

VOROSHILOV, KLIMENT EFREMOVICH

(1881–1969), leading Soviet political and military figure, member of Stalin's inner circle.

A machinist's apprentice who joined the Bolsheviks in 1903, Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov spent nearly a decade underground and in exile, then emerged in late 1917 to become the commissar of Petrograd. In 1918 he assisted Felix Dzerzhinsky in founding the Cheka, then fought on various civil war fronts, including Tsaritsyn in 1918, where he sided with Josef V. Stalin against Leon Trotsky over the utilization of former tsarist officers in the new Red Army. A talented grassroots organizer, Voroshilov was adept at assembling ad hoc field units, especially cavalry. Following the death of Mikhail V. Frunze in late 1925, Voroshilov served until mid-1934 as commissar of military and naval affairs, and subsequently until May 1940 as defense commissar. Known more as a political toady than a serious commander, he served in important command and advisory capacities during World War II, often with baleful results. During the postwar era he aided in the Sovietization of Hungary, but at home was relegated to largely honorific governmental positions. To his credit Voroshilov objected to using the Red Army against the peasantry during collectivization, and, despite complicity in Stalin's purges, he occasionally intervened to rescue military officers. Notwithstanding a cavalry bias, he oversaw an impressive campaign for the mechanization of the Red Army during the 1930s, including support for the T-34 tank over Stalin's initial objections. After Stalin's death in 1953 Voroshilov was named chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a post he held until he was forced to resign in 1960 after participating in the anti-Party group opposed to Nikita Khrushchev.

See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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BRUCE W. MENNING

VOTCHINA

Literally, "patrimony" (the noun derives from Slavonic *otchy*, i.e. belonging to one's father); in medieval Russia, inherited landed property that could be legally sold, donated or disposed in another way by the owner (*votchinnik*).

In the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, the term mainly indicated the hereditary rights of princes to their principalities or appanages. Thus, according to Nestor's chronicle, the princes who gathered at Lyubech in 1097 proclaimed: "Let everybody hold his own patrimony (*otchina*)."¹ It was in this sense that Ivan III later applied the word *votchina* to all the Russian lands claiming the legacy of his ancestors, the Kievan princes.

In the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, as land transactions became more frequent, the word *votchina* acquired a new basic meaning, referring to estates (villages, arable lands, forests, and so forth) owned by hereditary right. Up to the end of fifteenth century, *votchina* remained the only form of landed property in Muscovy. The reforms of Ivan III in the 1480s created another type of ownership of land, the *pomestie*, which made new landowners (*pomeshchiki*) entirely dependent on the grand prince who granted estates to them on condition of loyal service. In the sixteenth century, Muscovite rulers favored the growth of the *pomestie* system, simultaneously keeping a check on the circulation of patrimonial estates. Decrees of 1551, 1562, and 1572 regulated conditions under which alienated patrimonies could be redeemed by the seller's kinsfolk. The same legislation stipulated that each case of donation of one's patrimony to a monastery must be sanctioned by the government. (In 1580, the sale or donation of estates to monasteries was totally prohibited.)

Historians have stressed the growing similarity between *votchina* and *pomestie*. On the one hand, as Vladimir Kobrin points out, *pomestie* from the very beginning tended to become hereditary property; on the other hand, the owners of patrimonies were obliged to serve in the tsarist army (legally, since 1556), just as *pomestie* holders did.

S. B. Veselovskii cites some cases from the 1580s, when the authorities ordered the confiscation of both *pomestia* (pl.) and *votchiny* (pl.) of those servicemen who had ignored the military summons.

But some difference between the two forms of landed property remained: In the eyes of landowners, *votchina* preserved its significance as the preferable right to one's land. As O. A. Shvatchenko put it, *votchiny* formed the material basis of the Russian aristocracy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In spite of governmental regulations and limitations and severe blows of the *Oprichnina*, the *votchina* system survived the sixteenth century, and after the Time of Troubles experienced new growth. Beginning with Vasily Shuisky (1610), the tsars began to remunerate their supporters by granting them the right to turn part of their *pomestie* estates into *votchiny*. Thus, new types of *votchina* appeared in the seventeenth century. The Law Code of 1649 also stipulated the possibility of exchanging *pomestie* for *votchina*, or vice versa. Finally, *pomestie* and *votchina* merged during the reforms of Peter the Great: specifically, in the 1714 decree on majorats.

See also: GRAND PRINCE; IVAN III; LAW CODE OF 1649; OPRICHNINA; PETER I; POMESTIE

MIKHAIL M. KROM

VOTIAKS *See* UDMURTS.

VOYEVODA

In texts from the era of Kievan Rus, the term *voyevoda* designated the commander of a military host of any significant size, be it an entire field army, a division, or a regiment. It might also be used to refer to the administrator or governor of some territory. Researchers therefore frequently encounter the term as a translation of the Greek *archon* and *satrapis* as well as *strategos*.

By the 1530s, the practice of annually stationing regimental commanders (*godovye voyevody*) on the Oka River defense line to protect Moscow from Tatar raids had begun to blur the distinction between the military command responsibilities of the regimental commanders and the administrative re-

sponsibility of the vicegerents and fortifications stewards of the towns: first siege defense, then fortifications labor and fiscal administration were gradually shifted to the former. By the 1560s and 1570s, general fiscal and judicial as well as military authority in certain southern and western frontier districts was entirely in the hands of these *godovye voyevody*; the vicegerents and fortifications stewards were eliminated or subordinated to them. *Godovye voyevody* had evolved into town governors (*gorodovye voyevody*). During the Time of Troubles, the breakdown of central chancellery authority left responsibility for mobilizing military resources and coordinating the struggle against the Pretenders and foreign interventionists largely up to the town governors of the upper Volga and North. The town governor system of local administration was therefore universalized after the liberation of Moscow and the foundation of the new Romanov dynasty. By the 1620s most districts were under a town governor, usually appointed for two to three years from the lower ranks of the upper service class (*stolniki*, Moscow *dvoryane*) and given a working order (*nakaz*) from the appropriate chancellery.

The town governors had broad responsibilities: They commanded district garrison forces and defended their districts from attack; they helped mobilize district military manpower into the regiments of the field army; they supervised fortifications corvee; they policed and combated banditry; they investigated and adjudicated civil and criminal cases and registered deeds; they searched out, tried, and remanded fugitive peasants; they conducted reviews determining service entitlement awards, paid out cash and grain service subsidies, and implemented chancellery instructions to assign *pomestie* allotments; they helped surveying and cadastral inventorying; and they supervised repartitions of communal property to reapportion tax burdens. The quality of their administrative service was often deficient, however, as they were not administrative specialists but notables appointed to governorships most often as a respite from their command responsibilities in the field army or their ceremonial duty at court; governorships were less likely to give them rank promotions than field army duty or court duty. They received no special additional salary for service as governors (even raises to their regular service subsidies, in recognition of meritorious service, were rare), and they therefore sought out their compensation on their own by soliciting bribes and arranging for community feeding prestations (*kormlenie*).

Moscow did develop practices and institutions to reinforce central chancellery control over the town governors. The compulsory service ethos and the precedence (*mestnichestvo*) system had some restraining influence on them; they were usually removed from their posts after their third year, unless the community petitioned for their retention; their working orders were made increasingly specific and comprehensive; and it was general practice to reduce the range of decisions left to their discretion so that most of their actions required explicit preliminary authorization from the chancelleries. Over the course of the seventeenth century, additional control procedures were developed: the multiplication and refinement of record forms; the introduction of end-of-term audits; and the organization of special investigative commissions to respond to community complaints of abuses of authority.

See also: FRONTIER FORTIFICATIONS; KORMLENIE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

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BRIAN DAVIES

VOZNESENSKY, NIKOLAI ALEXEYEVICH

(1903–1950), Soviet economic official who for many years was close to Stalin.

Born into a foreman's family near Tula on December 1, 1903, Nikolai Alexeyevich Voznesensky was appointed chief of Gosplan, the USSR State Planning Commission, in January 1938. He subsequently became first deputy prime minister, a member of Stalin's war cabinet, and a Politburo member, and until his arrest in March 1949 remained at the center of Soviet politics and economics.

Voznesensky advanced in the Soviet hierarchy because of his aptitude for economic administration, his undeviating loyalty to the party line, the patronage of Leningrad party chief Andrei Zhdanov, and good luck. He sponsored several measures designed to improve the economic outcome of the command system, including new monitoring systems to identify and manage the most acute short-

ages, the realignment of industrial prices with production costs, and detailed long-term plans. As a party loyalist he expertly rationalized each new turn in official thinking about the economic principles of socialism and capitalism. While many competent and loyal officials were repressed, Voznesensky benefited from Zhdanov's protection and had the good fortune to gain high office just as Stalin's purges were beginning to taper off.

Voznesensky's first task was to revive the Soviet economy, which had been stagnating since 1937. He was still trying when World War II broke out in 1941. The war exposed the inadequacy of prewar plans for a war economy, and for a while the planners lost control. While war production soared, the civilian sector neared collapse. The victory at Stalingrad in 1942 and Allied aid made it possible to restore economic balance in 1943 and 1944. Voznesensky was involved in every aspect of this story of failure and success.

By the end of the war Voznesensky had become one of Stalin's favorites. Stalin relied on his competence, frankness, and personal loyalty. The same attributes led Voznesensky to fall out with others, in particular Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenti Beria. The rivalry was personal; there is no serious evidence of differences between them on political or economic philosophy. After Zhdanov's death in September 1948, Voznesensky's good luck ran out. Malenkov and Beria were soon able to destroy Stalin's trust in him. He became ensnared in accusations relating to false economic reports and secret papers that ended in his dismissal, arrest, trial, and execution. Voznesensky was not the only prominent figure with connections to Zhdanov to disappear at this time in what was later known as the Leningrad affair.

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; LENINGRAD AFFAIR; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

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MARK HARRISON

VSEVOLOD I

(1030–1093), grand prince of Kiev.

Although Vsevolod was grand prince of Kiev, son of the eminent Yaroslav Vladimirovich the Wise, and father of the famous Vladimir Monomakh, his own career was not outstanding. He was allegedly Yaroslav's favorite son and married to a relative of Byzantine emperor Constantine IX Monomachus.

Before his death in 1054, Yaroslav bequeathed southern Pereyaslavl to Vsevolod along with territories in the upper Volga, including Rostov, Suzdal, and Beloozero. Yaroslav also designated him heir to Kiev, along with his elder brothers Izyaslav and Svyatoslav. For some twenty years the three acted as a triumvirate, asserting their authority over all the other princes, including their brothers Vyacheslav of Smolensk and Igor of Vladimir in Volyn. As prince of Pereyaslavl, Vsevolod had to defend his domain against attacks from the nomads, especially the Polovtsy (Cumans). In 1068 after the latter defeated the three brothers, the Kievans forced Izyaslav to flee to the Poles. Vsevolod joined Svyatoslav in persuading the citizens to reinstate Izyaslav in Kiev. In 1072 Vsevolod and his brothers translated the relics of Saints Boris and Gleb into a new church in Vyshgorod and together issued the Law Code of Yaroslav's Sons (*Pravda Yaroslavichy*). In 1073, however, they quarreled, and Vsevolod helped Svyatoslav evict Izyaslav from Kiev. After Svyatoslav died in 1076, Vsevolod succeeded him briefly in Kiev until Izyaslav reclaimed the throne. In 1078 Izyaslav was killed in battle, and Vsevolod occupied Kiev, where he ruled until his death. His most difficult task was to satisfy his many nephews with territorial allocations. He died on April 13, 1093.

See also: GRAND PRINCE; IZYASLAV I; POLOVTSY; SVYATOSLAV II; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

VSEVOLOD III

(1154–1212), Vsevolod Yurevich "Big Nest," the last grand prince of Vladimir on the Klyazma to rule all of Suzdalia, including Rostov and Suzdal.

In 1169 Vsevolod, son of Yury Vladimirovich "Dolgoruky," participated in the sack of Kiev organized by his elder brother Andrei "Bogolyubsky." Four years later he ruled Kiev briefly as Andrei's lieutenant. After his boyars assassinated Andrei in 1174, his relatives fought for the throne of Vladimir; in 1176, Vsevolod won. He adopted Andrei's centralizing policy and stifled all opposition from the neighbouring princes of Murom and Ryazan. He destroyed Polovtsian camps on the river Don and waged war against the Volga-Kama Bulgars and the Mordva tribes to secure the trade route from the Black Sea. He increased his domains by strengthening the defenses on the middle Volga, building outposts along the Northern Dvina, seizing towns from Novgorod, and appropriating its lands along the Upper Volga. He had limited success, however, in bringing Novgorod itself under his control.

Around 1199, when Vsevolod secured pledges of loyalty from the Rostislavichi of Smolensk and the Mstislavichi of Vladimir in Volyn, they recognized him as the senior prince in the dynasty of Monomakh. The Olgovichi of Chernigov, for their part, acknowledged his military superiority and formed marriage alliances with him. In this way Vsevolod asserted his primacy over the southern dynasties and the grand prince of Kiev. Before his death, however, he divided his domain among all his sons and designated the second eldest Yury his successor. These actions weakened the power of the prince of Vladimir. Vsevolod died on April 13, 1212.

See also: BOYAR; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; POLOVTSY; YURI VLADIMIROVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

VYBORG MANIFESTO

The Vyborg Manifesto ("To the People from the People's Representatives") was an appeal given by a group of members of the First State Duma to the people of Russia, on July 23, 1906, in the city of Vyborg. It was intended as a sign of protest against the dissolution of the Duma. After the dissolution of the Duma, on July 21, 1906, deputies of the Labor Group (Trudoviks) called for an assembly in

St. Petersburg with the purpose of issuing a manifesto of insubordination to the act of dissolution and calling for the people to support them. Holding an assembly in St. Petersburg was impossible, because both the Duma building and the Cadet (Constitutional Democrat) Party Club were surrounded by police and military forces. At the proposition of the Cadets, between 220 and 230 Duma deputies, mostly Cadets and Trudoviks, met in Vyborg, Finland, on the eve of July 22. The chairman was the chairman of the Duma, Sergei Muromtsev. During the night, the deputies discussed two possible versions of the manifesto. The first, prepared by the Trudoviks and the Social Democrats, called for the army and navy to support the cause of the revolution and for the people not to follow the orders of the government. The second, prepared by the Cadets and written by Pavel Milyukov (who was not a deputy), called for passive resistance: ignoring military service, not paying taxes, and refusal of state loans unless the Duma approved. The final draft of the Manifesto, processed by the approval committee, was close to the Cadets' version. Despite the remaining controversies, on July 23 the final revision of the appeal was signed, because an order came from St. Petersburg of the dissolution of the assembly and the danger of "fatal consequences for Finland." The Vyborg Manifesto was signed by 180 deputies, later to be joined by 52 more. It was printed in the form of a leaflet on July 23, 1906, in Finnish and then Russian in 10,000 copies, and was reprinted abroad. The reprint of the Vyborg Manifesto by Russian newspapers was punished with the confiscation of the press run, and spreading the leaflets was punished with arrests. On July 29, 1906, a court case was started against those who signed the Manifesto, which called for the nation to oppose the law and the lawful orders of the government. The Vyborg Manifesto had no significant impact on the people. In December 1907, the so-called Vyborg trial was held in St. Petersburg. At the trial, 167 of the 169 former deputies of the Duma were sentenced to three months of incarceration, which meant that they were bereft of the right to run for position in the Duma and other civil services.

See also: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DUMA; REVOLUTION OF 1905

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

VYSHINSKY, ANDREI YANUARIEVICH

(1883–1955), prosecutor, scholar, diplomat; best known for conduct of show trials during the Great Terror.

Andrei Yanuarevich Vyshinsky distinguished himself as a prosecutor (prosecutor-general of Russia, 1931–1933; deputy prosecutor general of the USSR, 1933–1935; prosecutor general of the USSR, 1935–1939); as a scholar (author of authoritative legal texts, including *The Theory of Evidence in Soviet Law*, published in three editions); and as a diplomat (deputy foreign minister, 1940–1949, 1953–1955; foreign minister and Soviet representative to the United Nations, 1949–1953). In all of these roles he displayed unflinching loyalty to his master and sometime confidant, Josef V. Stalin.

Erudite and a brilliant orator, as skilled in sarcasm as in logic, the dapper Vyshinsky was trained as a jurist. He belonged to the Menshevik party before becoming a Bolshevik in 1920. While working in educational administration during the 1920s, Vyshinsky proved his political mettle in performances as judge in early show trials (such as Shakhty). Later, as prosecutor-general, Vyshinsky continued to develop the political show trial, serving as prosecutor at the major show trials of 1936 through 1938, at which leading politicians from the past (e.g., Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Grigory Pyatakov, Nikolai Bukharin, and Alexei Rykov) were humiliated and forced to confess to extraordinary acts of betrayal. Archival sources reveal that Vyshinsky worked closely with Stalin in manufacturing the charges and writing the scripts. Vyshinsky was also a member of the Special Board of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) that during the years 1936 through 1938 processed most of the contrived cases of alleged saboteurs and counterrevolutionaries.

As Stalin's prosecutor, Vyshinsky also helped to restore the authority of law in the post-collectivization era, eliminate the influence of anti-law Marxists such as Yevgeny Pashukanis, and develop a jurisprudence that supported the use of terror against political enemies. Long after leaving the administration of justice, Vyshinsky remained

the top authority in legal theory, and he is remembered for reviving the pre-1845 doctrine of "confession as the queen of evidence" in political cases. During Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, Vyshinsky's theory of law was condemned, and his position as a legal authority undermined.

See also: PURGES, THE GREAT; SHOW TRIALS

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PETER H. SOLOMON JR.

VYSHNEGRADSKY, IVAN ALEXEYEVICH

(1831–1895), scientist and mechanic, Russian finance minister from 1887 to 1892.

Ivan Vyshnegradsky was born into a priest's family. After graduating from the Tver Theological Seminary and later from the Main Pedagogical Institute, he taught mathematics and mechanics (engineering) at St. Petersburg military educational institutions, headed the department of mechanics at the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, and served as the Institute's director from 1875 to 1878. Vyshnegradsky is known as a prominent scientist in the sphere of mechanics and mechanical engineering and also as the author of several fundamental works and manuals. He participated in managing a number of joint-stock companies and earned fame as a talented entrepreneur. By the time he was appointed a government minister, his fortune amounted to nearly a million rubles. In 1884 Vyshnegradsky became a member of the Council of the Minister of Public Instruction. He drew up a program for technical education and participated in the composition of the university code.

In 1886 he was appointed a member of the State Council and in 1887 became the head of the Ministry of Finance. In this post, Vyshnegradsky, like his predecessor Nikolai Bunge, pursued a policy aimed at settlement of the budget deficit, stronger government interference in setting freight rates for private railways, nationalization of the

least profitable railways, support of domestic industry, and preparation of a monetary reform. By increasing indirect taxes, converting state loans and reducing interest payments on them, encouraging grain exports and limiting imports, and increasing railway freight rates, Vyshnegradsky managed to balance the budget, accumulate gold reserves, strengthen the paper ruble, and prepare the introduction of gold circulation. In 1891 a new tariff, the most protectionist in Europe, was introduced. It signified the transition from a safeguard system of tariffs to a consistently protective one. In order to ease criticism on the part of landowners and rightists, Vyshnegradsky described his course as nationalist and supported landlords through the Nobleman's Bank (*Dvoryansky bank*). In 1892 he was discharged from office for health reasons.

See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST; MINISTRIES, ECONOMIC

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BORIS N. MIRONOV

VYSOTSKY, VLADIMIR SEMYONOVICH

(January 25, 1938–July 25, 1980), poet, actor, singer.

Vladimir Semyonovich Vysotsky was born and brought up in central Moscow. He made his living as an actor, joining Yuri Lyubimov's company at the Taganka Theatre in 1964 and performing there to the end of his life. He was a mainstay of the theatre's ensemble style, but also took the leading role in several epoch-making productions, notably as Galileo in Brecht's play, and then as a generation-defining Hamlet. Besides the theatre, Vysotsky regularly appeared in films, usually playing "bad boy" roles. Part of his stock-in-trade as an actor was the performance of songs to guitar accompaniment, and it was in this genre, delivering his own words, that he became more famous in his own lifetime than any other Russian creative artist.

The beginning of Vysotsky's professional life coincided with the appearance of guitar poetry, which in its turn was enabled by the availability of the portable tape recorder in the USSR. Vysotsky's songs could therefore be recorded free of



Singer-actor Vladimir Vysotsky performing one of his popular ballads. © TASS/SOVFOTO. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

official controls, and the results duplicated. The popularity of these homemade tapes, and the semi-legal appearances Vysotsky made in clubs and other institutions, brought him to the attention of the authorities. He was subjected to harassment because, in official eyes, the content and especially the style of his songs, saturated with robust humor, were unacceptable even within the relatively permissive boundaries of Socialist Realism in its later phases. Vysotsky was regularly censured by various official bodies, but, shielded by his unprecedented popularity, he was never subjected to serious reprisals.

Vysotsky was a prodigious creator of lyrics, consistent with his extravagant, extravert personality. His songs fall broadly into two successive chronological phases and two generic categories. In the earlier phase, he created hundreds of songs in which the author speaks through a persona. They include songs about military life, which formed the most officially acceptable segment of the repertoire and were in many cases created for theatre productions or films. Then there were songs about sport (running, soccer, weightlifting, even chess). There was also a series of love songs, which portray relationships in either a disenchanted, even cynical manner, or else idealize the female. The

most dubious songs from the official point of view concern criminals; they are violent in their actions and crude and direct in their thoughts. The second, and on the whole later, segment of Vysotsky's repertoire consists of songs in which the author speaks from an explicitly autobiographical stance. These songs express mounting frustration and despair; they were driven by Vysotsky's addictive personality and the ravages it inflicted on his physical and mental stability.

While there was constant disagreement during his lifetime about whether Vysotsky was a mere entertainer or merited serious consideration as a poet, his work illustrated the arbitrariness of this distinction. The literary establishment regarded him as an embarrassment, often out of envy and resentment for his genuine popularity, and connived with their political masters in denying Vysotsky access to the public media. His spectacular marriage, his third, to the French film star Marina Vlady was another source of friction. Vysotsky made a few records in the USSR, most of them bowdlerized, but he was never allowed to publish a book. This attitude changed only after his death, especially with the onset of glasnost; a small collection of lyrics appeared in 1982, and since then there has been a torrent of publication and discussion.

Vysotsky's songs imply a crude but coherent system of values whose core is masculinist individualism. The consequences may be tragic for him, but he still rises to the test. The appeal of this hero, to men and women alike throughout the social spectrum of Soviet Russia, made Vysotsky an idol who was felt to speak for the people more genuinely than any other contemporary; there is no more telling case of the discontinuity between popular acclaim and official recognition in the Brezhnev period.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; MUSIC; OKUDZHAVA, BULAT SHALOVICH

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WAGES, SOVIET

Wages in the Soviet Union were supposed to conform to Marx's notion of the lower stage of communist society in which workers would be paid according to their contributions to the social product and on the basis of equal rewards for equal work. Factors taken into account in the assignment of wage levels typically included the arduousness and dangerousness of work, skill levels or necessary qualifications, and the degree of responsibility. Occupations in which women predominated, such as teaching, medicine, infant care, cleaning, and clerical and sales work, invariably were graded below male-dominated occupations.

In early 1918 Lenin advocated the use of piecework as opposed to time-based wages as an appropriate system to stimulate labor discipline and productivity. He also grudgingly acknowledged the necessity of paying specialists (e.g., managers and engineers) more than ordinary workers. Although these policies were opposed by the Left Communist faction and many rank-and-file Bolsheviks, they were incorporated into the wage scales constructed by respective trade unions. During the years of war communism, labor was in effect an obligatory service to the embattled state, which in turn assumed the responsibility to provide work and at least a caloric minimum in the form of employee rations. Payment in kind was ubiquitous, and no sooner did workers receive their wage than they repaired to the black market to barter it for other goods.

The semblance of a normal monetary system of wages, based on contractual agreements between trade unions and corresponding trusts, developed under the New Economic Policy, and wages rose steadily. By 1927 nominal wages were estimated to be about 11 percent above the 1913 average, and this did not include the socialized wage consisting of free medical care, social insurance, and other welfare provisions. Whereas the First Five-Year Plan envisioned a further increase in nominal wages of 44 percent and real wages of nearly 68 percent—in fact, the standard of living of wage earners plummeted. It is estimated that by 1932 real wages were at about 50 percent of their 1928 level. Moreover, shortages in cooperative stores drove workers to rely on the private market, where prices of agricultural produce were approximately eight times higher than in 1928. The prevailing labor shortage caused employers to resort to various sleights of hand to attract and retain workers. They included paying workers at grades higher than



those outlined in wage handbooks, granting special bonuses that amounted to permanent additions to their basic pay, paying for fictitious piece work and defective output, and manipulating the use of the progressive bonus system for overfulfillment of production quotas. Despite their technical illegality, these practices became permanent features of Soviet economic life.

In 1931 the state introduced a wage-scale reform under the banner of combating petty bourgeois egalitarianism that widened differentials between lower and higher wage-tariff categories. Simultaneously it expanded the use of progressive piece-rates that would rise with the increase of individual workers' actual output. This approach remained in force until the late 1950s when a new wage reform was gradually phased in. It entailed increases in basic wages and production quotas, the reduction in the number of wage scales and the simplification of rates within each scale, the elimination of progressive piece-rates, and a modest shift of pieceworkers to time-based wages. The major objective of the reforms—to create a stable and predictable system of incentives—appears to have failed largely because of the uncertainties and irregularities of supplies and managerial collusion with workers in compensating for them. Hence the Brezhnev-era aphorism, "They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work."

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; MONETARY OVERHANG; WAR COMMUNISM

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LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM

WANDERERS, THE *See* GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS.

WAR COMMUNISM

The Bolshevik Party seized power in Russia in October 1917. Historians use the term *war commu-*

nism for the economic system of Soviet Russia during the civil war that followed this revolution. This term, not used at the time, was first applied when the civil war had already drawn to a close. In the spring of 1921, advocating a shift toward a more liberalized internal market, Lenin described the system as "that peculiar war communism, forced on us by extreme want, ruin and war." He went on to define its core as the centralized system of confiscating all of the peasants' food surpluses, and more, in order to feed the urban workers and the soldiers of the Red Army. He meant that war communism was a temporary phenomenon—not real communism—just a necessary evil required by wartime circumstances. He intended thereby to distance himself from it and inaugurate a more relaxed regime later known as the New Economic Policy (NEP).

A few years later, however, Stalin adopted policies that resembled war communism in several features, including specifically the confiscation of peasant food surpluses. Consequently many historians now reject Lenin's claim that war communism was an unintended consequence of special circumstances, and argue that the Bolsheviks always intended to build a society based on centralization and force.

It took more than six months for a full-scale civil war to break out after the October 1917 revolution. The Bolsheviks did not try immediately to centralize the economy. They negotiated for a separate peace with Germany to take Russia out of World War I. They brought representatives of the non-Bolshevik left into a coalition government. While they legislated to nationalize the landed estates of the aristocracy, they sought a coexistence of capitalist and commercial private property with state regulation and workers' rights of inspection.

The results, however, threatened the Bolsheviks with a loss of control on each front. The peace treaty signed with Germany in March 1918 provoked military intervention by Russia's former allies. Its humiliating terms drove the Bolsheviks' coalition partners toward the monarchist counter-revolution. Under the treaty, Russia lost the Ukraine; this cut the food available to Russia's nonfarm population. The wartime system of food distribution that the Bolsheviks had inherited from the imperial government was ineffective: While the urban population was entitled to receive a food ration at low fixed prices, at the same prices the peasants would not sell food to the government for distribution. As the situation worsened, many groups of

workers blamed the factory owners, expelled them, and declared the factories to be state property. In the countryside, instead of government takeover of the great estates, the peasants divided the land among themselves.

As of 1918 the Bolsheviks began to travel a path of extreme political and economic centralization. They nationalized the banks in January. In April they enacted state monopolies in foreign trade as well as internal trade in foodstuffs. In June they brought the commanding heights of industry into the public sector. This path ended in a one-party state underpinned by a secret police and a demonetized command economy with virtually all industry nationalized and farm food surpluses liable to violent seizure. The Bolsheviks traveled willingly, justifying their actions in the name of socialism. They blamed their difficulties on a minority of speculators and counterrevolutionaries with whom there could be no compromise. This intensified the polarization between Reds and Whites that ended in civil war.

Food shortages drove this process along. Shortages were felt first by the towns and the army, because peasants fed themselves before selling food to others. Shortages arose primarily from the wartime disruption of trade, the loss of the Ukraine, and the government's attempts to hold down food prices. The Bolsheviks overestimated peasant food stocks; this meant that when they failed to raise food they blamed the peasants for withholding it. They specifically blamed a minority of richer peasants, the so-called kulaks, for speculating in food by withholding it intentionally so as to raise its price. Between April and June of 1918 they slid from banning private trade in foodstuffs to a campaign to seize kulak food stocks and then to confiscate their land as well. Since rural food stocks were smaller and more scattered than the government believed, such measures tended to victimize many ordinary peasants without improving supplies.

Under war communism between the summer of 1918 and the spring of 1921, goods were distributed by administrative rationing or barter; with more than 20 percent monthly inflation, prices rose in total by many thousand times, and the money stock lost most of its real value. The government seized food from the peasantry, but, as there was not enough to meet workers' needs, black markets developed where urban residents bartered their products and property with peasants for additional food. Industry was nationalized far more widely than the commanding heights listed in the June

1918 decree. By November 1920 public ownership extended to many artisan establishments with one or two workers. Public-sector management was centralized under a command system of administrative quotas and allocations.

War communism was not an economic success. Food procurements rose at first, but industrial production and employment, harvests, and living standards fell continuously. The fact that the Bolsheviks emerged victorious from the civil war owed more to their enemies' moral and material weaknesses than to their own strengths. Despite this, they did not abandon war communism immediately when the war came to an end. By the spring of 1920, fighting continued only in Poland and the Caucasus. Still, war communism was upheld. While Lenin defended the system of food procurement against its critics, other Bolsheviks advocated extending control over peasant farming through sowing plans and over industrial workers through militarization of labor.

Such dreaming was rudely interrupted in early 1921 by an anti-Bolshevik mutiny in the Kronstadt naval base and a wave of peasant discontent concentrated in the Tambov province. It was not the end of the civil war, but the threat of another, that brought war communism to an end. This does not prove that the Bolsheviks had always intended to introduce something like war communism; however, it shows that Lenin was disingenuous to suggest that war communism was only a product of circumstances. In the case of war communism, the Bolsheviks willingly made virtues out of apparently necessary evils, then took them much further than necessary. Moreover, one product of civil war circumstances was never abandoned: the one-party state underpinned by a secret police.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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MARK HARRISON

WAR ECONOMY

The German invasion of June 22, 1941, was an event for which the Soviet Union had been preparing for fifteen years. Soviet war preparations were started in the mid-1920s at a time when no immediate threat of war existed. Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders were preoccupied by the fate of the Russian Empire in World War I. Although Russia entered that war with a substantial food surplus, its economy was destabilized by the mobilization of industry; this deprived the countryside of manufactured commodities, and peasant farmers ceased to sell food in exchange. As a result, the towns and military units went increasingly hungry to a point where industry and the army collapsed. Stalin intended to avoid a repetition. Forced industrialization would raise the economy's capacity for producing weapons, while farm collectivization would prevent the peasants from retreating again into self-sufficiency. Although brutally and wastefully executed, these policies contributed significantly to Soviet resistance when Germany attacked.

At first the war went worse than envisaged in the most pessimistic prewar plans. Soviet territory was deeply invaded; the real output of the territory under Soviet control fell by one-third; and the burdens of defense increased both relatively and absolutely. By 1943 three-fifths of Soviet output was devoted to the war effort, the highest proportion observed at the time in any economy that did not subsequently collapse under the strain. A railway evacuation of factories and machinery from the zones threatened by occupation shifted the geographical center of the war economy hundreds of kilometers to the east. The production of weapons rose to a level that exceeded Germany's throughout the war.

There was little detailed planning behind this; the important decisions were made in a chaotic, uncoordinated sequence. The civilian economy was neglected and it declined rapidly. By 1942, food, fuels, and metals produced had fallen by half or more. Living standards fell on average by two-fifths while millions were severely overworked and undernourished; however, the state procurement of food from collective farms ensured that industrial workers and soldiers were less likely to starve than peasants. Still the process might have ended in another economic collapse without the stunning victory over the German army at Stalingrad at the end of 1942. This enabled a return to economic planning and a partial restoration of resources to civilian uses. Foreign (mostly American) aid, which added about 5 percent to Soviet resources in 1942 and 10 percent in 1943 and 1944, also relieved the pressure.

The war had lasting economic consequences. It took the lives of one in six Soviet citizens living at its outset, and destroyed perhaps one quarter of the Soviet prewar capital stock. Economic and demographic recovery took decades. The success of the war effort also had lasting consequences: It confirmed the authority of Stalin, as well as that of a new generation of wartime industrial and political managers who survived him and remained in power for thirty more years. The success of the war economy was used to discourage critical thinking about basic economic policies and institutions. For example, Stalin claimed that the war demonstrated the superiority of the Soviet system over capitalism for organizing economic life in both wartime and peacetime.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; STALINGRAD, BATTLE OF; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

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WAR OF THE THIRD COALITION

One of the Napoleonic wars, the War of the Third Coalition, occurred between 1805 and 1807. Russia first participated in the conflicts arising from France's efforts to expand its dominance over continental Europe and the Middle East in 1798, in the War of the Second Coalition, along with Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and the Ottoman Empire. Most of the direct Russian involvement was in the Eastern and Northern Mediterranean, with Admiral Fedor Ushakov occupying the Ionian Islands and General Alexander Suvorov campaigning through Italy. Emperor Paul, however, became annoyed with his allies, especially Britain. In 1800 he withdrew and formed an alliance with France, led by Napoleon Bonaparte. This dramatic reversal contributed to a reaction and the assassination of Paul in March 1801.

His successor, Alexander I, influenced by pro-British and anti-French advisers such as Adam Czartoryski, signed an alliance with Britain in April 1805. This was the linchpin of a third coalition war against Napoleon that also included Austria, Naples, and Prussia. Russian action again centered on the Mediterranean, with a fleet under Admiral Dmitri Seniavin sent from the Baltic to assure dominance of the Adriatic Sea and curb French expansion into the Balkans, especially at the fortress-stronghold of Ragusa (Dubrovnik). Though the British reaffirmed their supremacy over the French at sea at the Battle of Trafalgar (September 1805), poor Russian and Austrian leadership on land in Central Europe led to Napoleon's decisive victories, especially at Austerlitz in December 1805. Austria was forced to sign a peace treaty, while Russia suffered additional defeats. Finally, at a historic meeting between Napoleon and Alexander I at Tilsit in July 1807, Russia agreed to peace terms that abandoned its Mediterranean positions to Napoleon and joined the French Continental System against Britain, thus leaving all of Europe except Russia under French dominance. Napoleon's effort to expand that dominance to Russia in 1812 provoked another coalition war that led to his eventual defeat.

See also: ALEXANDER I; AUSTERLITZ, BATTLE OF; NAPOLEON I; TILSIT, TREATY OF

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WARSAW, BATTLE OF *See* WORLD WAR II.

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), also referred to as the Warsaw Pact, was created on May 14, 1955, by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Officially known as the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, it was a Soviet-led political and military alliance intended to harness the potential of Eastern Europe to Soviet military strategy and to consolidate Soviet control of Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The organization was used to suppress dissent in Eastern Europe through military action. It never enlarged beyond its original membership, and was dissolved in 1991, prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself.

The Soviet and East European governments presented the WTO as their response to the creation of the Western European Union and the integration of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955. Though often described as an alliance, the facade of collective decision-making in WTO masked the reality of Soviet political and military domination. The 1955 treaty established the Joint Command of the armed forces (Article 5) and the Political Consultative Committee (Article 6), both headquartered in Moscow. In practice, however, the Joint Command, as well as the Joint Staff drawn from the general staffs of the signatories, were part of the Soviet General Staff. Both the Pact's commander in chief and its chief of staff were Soviet officers. The Joint Armed Forces had no command structure, logistics, directorate of operations, or air defense network separate from the Soviet defense ministry.

Over the years the military structure of the Warsaw Pact was adjusted to reflect the evolution of Soviet strategy and changes in military technology. During the first decade of the organization's existence, political control over the non-Soviet forces was its principal focus. Following Stalin's death, East European militaries were partly renationalized, including the replacement of Soviet officers in high positions with indigenous personnel, and a renewed emphasis on professional training. The Polish October of 1956, and the Hungarian revolt that same year, raised serious concerns in Moscow about the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces.

In the 1960s the lessons learned from de-Stalinization, as well as Albania's defection from the Warsaw Pact, brought about greater integration of the WTO through joint military exercises, intensified training, and the introduction of new Soviet equipment. The most significant reorganization of the WTO took place in 1969, including the addition of the Committee of Defense Ministers, the Military Council, the Military Scientific Technical Council, and the Technical Committees. These and subsequent changes allowed increased participation from the East Europeans in decision making, and helped the Soviets better coordinate weapons research, development, and production with the East Europeans.

In addition to its external defensive role against NATO, the Warsaw Pact served to maintain cohesion in the Soviet bloc. It was used to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again to prepare for an invasion of Poland in 1980 or 1981 if the Polish regime failed to suppress the Solidarity movement. The Warsaw Pact was also an instrument of Soviet policy in the Third World. In the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet Union relied on several non-Soviet WTO members to assist client states in Africa and the Middle East.

The alliance began to unravel with the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the Soviet Union, and his attendant redefinition of Soviet-East European relations. Though the alliance was renewed in 1985, as required by the treaty, deteriorating economic conditions and the rising national aspirations in Eastern Europe put its future in question. The Soviet military attempted to adjust to the shifting political landscape. In 1987 the WTO modified its doctrine to emphasize its defensive character, but this and other proposed changes proved insufficient to arrest the decomposition of the alliance. The key development that

hastened the WTO's demise was the unification of Germany, which constituted an irreparable breach in the Pact's security perimeter. Under pressure from Eastern Europe, the decision to abolish the military structures of the Pact was taken at a Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest in late February 1991; the remaining political structures were formally abolished on July 1, 1991.

The overall value of the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet Union during the Cold War remains a point of debate. Clearly, the organization legitimized the continued Soviet garrisoning of Eastern Europe and provided additional layers of political and military control. In addition, the potential contributions of the East European armed forces to Soviet military strategy, as well as the use of the members' territory, were significant assets. On the other hand, throughout the Warsaw Pact's existence, the ultimate reliability and cohesion of its non-Soviet members in a putative war against NATO remained in question. In addition, the declining ability of the East Europeans to contribute to equipment modernization, especially as their economies deteriorated in the late 1970s and 1980s, raised doubts about the overall quality of the WTO armed forces.

See also: COMMUNIST BLOC; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

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ANDREW A. MICHTA

WESTERNIZERS

The word *Westernizers* appeared in Russia at the turn of the eighteenth century as the antonym to *Easternizers* and was used to denote Russian religious figures who minimized the difference between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The Orthodox Easternizers interpreted the term *West* as “sunset,” “decline”; hence for them *Westernizers* embodied decline and darkness. In the 1840s, in the course of a heated discussion held in the Russian press as well as in St. Petersburg and Moscow literary salons, Russian thinkers discussed the specific character of Russian culture, the interrelation of Russia and Europe, and the further development of Russia—either with Europe or along its own special path. Those who advocated rapprochement between Russia and Western Europe and adoption of the European way of life were called Westernizers. Those who defended a nativist course for Russia’s development were called Slavophiles. These terms born in polemics were widely used in the press, literature, and everyday language of the intelligentsia. They were used for the division of people into allies and opponents. They were also used to mobilize the public under one banner or the other. After the 1860s, the term *Westernizers* was applied to the representatives of a variety of ideological trends whose pedigree could be traced to the Westernizers of the 1840s.

In modern scholarly literature, the term *Westernizers* is used in both a broad and a narrow sense. In its broad meaning the term denotes all people of a pro-Western orientation, irrespective of historical period, from the ninth century to the present time who, unlike Slavophiles, regard Russia and western European countries as indivisible parts of a united Europe, with common cultural and religious roots and a common destiny. In the narrow sense the term is used to denote Westernizers of the first post-Decembrist generation of the 1830s through the 1860s, and in this case they are called classical Westernizers.

Classical Westernizers had European education and largely belonged to the privileged nobility estate and intellectual elite—publicists, literary men, scientists, and university professors. In St. Petersburg of the late 1840s, some of them formed a group known to society as the Party of St. Petersburg Progress, which mainly consisted of young officials.

The philosophical views of Westernizers were formed under the influence of Western enlighteners and philosophers such as Georg Hegel, Johann Herder, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schelling, Johann Fichte, and Auguste Comte. As a way of thinking, Westernism was based on the recognition of the leading role of human intellect. Intellect pushed back faith, offering an opportunity to conceive of the world (including the world of social relations) as a system of cause-and-effect relations, governed according to laws common to animate and inanimate nature. The historical views of Westernizers were largely derived from the contemporary western European scholars Henry Buckle, François Guizot, Barthold Niebuhr, Leopold Ranke, and Auguste Thierry. Westernizers perceived historical process as the progress of society, a chain of irreversible qualitative changes from worse to better. They asserted the value of the human being as the carrier of intellect. They opposed individualism to traditional social corporatism (*korporativnost*) and defined a just society as one that held all the conditions for the existence and self-realization of the individual.

The views of the Westernizers cannot be contained in a single work or document because these views had numerous shades and peculiarities. Some views differed substantially. As early as the 1840s two trends took shape among Westernizers: a radical one (A. I. Gertzen and N. P. Ogarev were its brightest representatives) and a liberal one comprising the overwhelming majority of Westernizers. Representatives of the first trend were not numerous. Some lived as emigrants and justified the use of violence for changing the existing political system. Representatives of the second trend were advocates of peaceful reforms. They advised bringing the pressure of the public opinion upon the government and spreading their views in society through education and science. Despite differences, however, the Westernizers’ sociopolitical, philosophical, and historical views shared common features. They denounced serfdom and put forward plans for its abolition. They demonstrated the advantages of hired over serf labor. They criticized censorship, the absence of legal rights, and persecutions on ethnic and religious grounds. They contrasted the Russian autocratic system with the constitutional orders of western European countries, especially those of England and France. They advocated civil rights, democracy, and representative government. They called for a speedy development of industry, commerce, and railways, and

supported the replacement of protectionism with a free-trade economic policy. Nevertheless, many Westernizers maintained a critical attitude toward the sociopolitical system of western European countries, which they regarded as a point of reference and not an ideal for blind imitation.

During the reign of Nicholas I, when practical political activities outside the frame of official ideology were impossible, Westernism was a purely ideological trend. Under Alexander II, Westernizers seized new opportunities for practical work: They played an active role in the preparation and implementation of the Great Reforms of the 1860s and early 1870s. In the post-reform era, Westernism provided the theoretical basis for the politics of liberalism. It also became the ideology of radical theories, which promoted ideas for changing an unjust society, based on belief in the value of the individual and the inadequacy of the official Orthodox religion.

After 1985 Westernism experienced a rebirth in Russian social thought. Polemics between supporters and opponents of Russia's rapprochement with the West continue to rest on arguments first articulated by the classical Westernizers and Slavophiles.

See also: GREAT REFORMS; INTELLIGENTSIA; SLAVOPHILES; THICK JOURNALS

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BORIS N. MIRONOV

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The question "What Is To Be Done?" crystallized critical issues inherent in the Russian revolutionary movement between 1850 and 1917. Specifically, it defined the focus and direction of the struggle to reform and modernize Russia's archaic political, economic, and social structure of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which had subsequently given rise to the Russian autocracy and Russian state. Ultimately, two distinct responses emerged, generated by Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky in 1863 and Vladimir Ilich Lenin in 1902. Interestingly, each was titled "What Is To Be Done?" Although the works were separated by forty years, they had much in common.

As a proponent of change in pre-industrial, populist Russia, Chernyshevsky accepted the peasant *obshchina* (commune) as the basis for the new Russia. He believed that the *obshchina* not only represented a truly democratic (egalitarian) socialist society, but also enabled Russia to avoid the evils of capitalism that existed in European industrial societies. However, Chernyshevsky insisted that revolution, not gradualism, was necessary for the transformation of Russia, and even then it could occur only through the dedicated commitment of revolutionary activists, which he called the new revolutionary archetypes.

By 1902 proletarian (Marxian) socialism had replaced agrarian populism within the Russian revolutionary movement. Faced with a declining socialist revolutionary radicalism, Lenin sought its revitalization. Like Chernyshevsky, Lenin favored the overthrow of the tsarist government and rejected the economic gradualism (called economism) of his time. Lenin did more than create a new revolutionary prototype; however, he formulated a new revolutionary catechism (Bolshevism) for conducting the revolution, one that eventually overthrew the tsarist government in 1917.

See also: CHERNYSHEVSKY, NIKOLAI GAVRILOVICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH

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DAVID K. MCQUILKIN

WHITE ARMY

Within weeks of the October 1917 Revolution, thousands of tsarist officers and supporters of the Provisional Government began armed resistance against the new regime. The Bolsheviks, who saw the anticommunists as more united than they actually were, named these men "White," a term taken from the reactionary forces during the French Revolution (the communist forces against which the Whites fought were called the Reds). There were, in fact, many disparate White armies, each under its own commander and with its own objectives. They lacked a central authority to coordinate action or policies on the far-flung battlefields of the Civil War. Politically they were just as divided because some White officers were monarchists while others wanted re-establishment of the Provisional Government. In the end the White armies were bound only by a common hatred of the communists and a shared desire to retain the old borders of the Russian Empire.

The lack of unity among the White armies was but one of the reasons for their defeat. When they were successful on the battlefield, the Allied powers (Britain, France, and the United States) provided critical military assistance, but as the Whites began to lose, the aid disappeared, consigning the Whites to their fate. The fluid nature of the civil war also meant that the Whites never created permanent institutions. Matters were not helped by the officers' reluctance to involve themselves in political matters, leaving chaos and banditry to reign in much of their territory. Thus, although it was not deliberate policy, White troops were allowed to commit atrocities during the war, such as pogroms against the Jews who lived in White-occupied lands. None of this endeared Whites to the population. Most devastating for the Whites was a paucity of new solutions to the problems that their country faced and a consequent inability to rally ordinary Russians and other nationalities to their cause.

The best known of the White armies were those led by Anton Denikin, Alexander Kolchak, and Nikolai Yudenich. Large Cossack units also fought alongside several of the White armies. One of the first anticommunist forces was the Volunteer Army, commanded first by Mikhail Alekseev and then Lavr Kornilov. When Kornilov was killed in battle, Denikin took command and led an offensive that came within 300 kilometers (186.4 miles) of Moscow. The Red Army, with twice as many men

and strong cavalry units under Semeon Budenny, stopped him and forced the Volunteer Army into headlong retreat. Denikin resigned and was replaced by Peter Wrangel, whose counteroffensive was also pushed back. The tattered remnants of the Volunteer Army were evacuated from the Crimea in March 1920.

Denikin never coordinated his attacks with Kolchak's forces, which in 1919 made spectacular gains against the Bolsheviks in eastern Russia. Kolchak claimed to represent the legitimate authority of Russia, but when Red units led by Mikhail Tukhachevsky defeated his men (including Siberian and Western armies), his bid to win the recognition of the Allied powers was doomed. Yudenich meanwhile tried and failed to capture Petrograd with his Northern (later "Northwestern") Army. The collapse of their armies forced most White officers into exile in Germany and Paris, where they would plot their return to Russia for the next seventy years.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; COSSACKS; DENIKIN, ANTON IVANOVICH; KOLCHAK, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH; YUDENICH, NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH

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MARY R. HABECK

WHITE MOVEMENT *See* CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; WHITE ARMY.

WHITE SEA CANAL

The White Sea (Belomor) Canal in Karelia rises from Lake Onega in the south to a maximum of 108 meters (118.1 feet) at Lake Vyg and then descends to the White Sea in the north. The canal, which is 227 kilometers (141.1 miles) long (including thirty-seven artificially constructed waterways, nineteen locks, fifteen dams, and forty-nine dikes),

was constructed in twenty months (November 1931–July 1933) by more than 100,000 gulag prisoners using local natural resources (rock, peat, dirt, timber), an endless supply of slave labor, and primitive tools (pickaxes, wheelbarrows, shovels, horses, and wooden pulleys). Because the shipping season is limited to six months and the canal is often shallow and narrow, traffic consists mainly of barges and small passenger or cargo vessels.

Contemplated since the sixteenth century and constructed under Josef V. Stalin, the canal shortened the journey from Leningrad to Arkhangelsk from twenty days to eight. Originally a secret military project, it was designed to enable northern troops and supply transports and sea access should Leningrad face a Baltic blockade. Economically, the canal was intended to exploit Karelia's natural resources. Politically, it was a signature forced-labor, large construction project of the first Five-Year Plan. The government promoted the waterway as emblematic of Soviet power and Stalinist ideology, and as exemplifying retraining, the process through which hard labor re-education programs, supervised by the secret police, remade common criminals and political prisoners into model Soviet citizens. Many retrained workers perished during the construction of the canal; the survivors were transferred to the Moscow–Volga Canal project or freed. The White Sea Canal embodies the excesses of Stalinism and immortalizes the thousands who died there.

See also: FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GULAG

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CYNTHIA A. RUDER

WINIUS, ANDRIES DIONYSZOOM

(1605–1662), merchant and factory owner.

Known in Russia as Andrei Denisovich Vinius, Andries Winius was born in Amsterdam in 1605 and died in Russia in 1662. His parents were Dionysius Tjerckszoon Winius and Maritgen Andries-

dochter Vekemans. He married Geertruyd van Rijn in 1628 and had three children: Andreas, Maria, and Matthias.

Winius began to trade in Russia in 1627. He was granted a patent (*zhalovannaya gramota*) for trade in the Russian interior in 1631 and exported 100,000 *chetverti* of Treasury grain the same year. In 1632 Winius, together with his brother Abraham and his partner Julius Willeken, were authorized to build an iron mill in the Tula district. The partners admitted Peter Marselis and Thomas de Swaen to their company and were given a ten-year monopoly on iron and weapons production. The water-driven Tula works was the first industrial iron producer in Russia.

Following a petition, Winius received a new patent in 1634 for trade, with improved conditions, and was appointed *gost* (privileged merchant). In the same year, Winius moved with his family to Moscow. The Tula partnership appears to have disintegrated by 1638; in 1639 Winius and Marselis, together with Thielman Akkema, became the holders of the charter of privilege. The new arrangement lasted until 1647, by which time a serious conflict arose between Winius and his partners. In 1648 Marselis and Akkema took control of the ironworks. Winius, in contrast, withdrew from iron production altogether. The same year, he petitioned to become a Russian subject. As compensation for his losses in Tula, Winius was granted a monopoly on tar production and trade, which he held between 1649 and 1654. He enjoyed the exclusive right to produce tar in the Northern Dvina and Sukhona valleys.

In 1652 Winius and his second wife, Gertrud Meyer (married in 1648), converted to Orthodoxy and became Russian subjects. In 1653 Winius and Ivan Yeremeyev Marsov were dispatched by the tsar to the Netherlands to acquire weapons, munitions, and woollen cloth for uniforms, as well as to hire military officers for service in the Muscovite army. They sold Treasury grain and potash to finance these purchases. Winius returned to Russia in 1654. He served as a diplomatic representative of the Russian government in the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany.

Winius's eldest son Andreas (known as Andrei Andreyevich Vinius) served as an interpreter at the Diplomatic Chancellery as of 1664. He was sent to France, Spain, and England for diplomatic service from 1672 to 1674. He served in the Apothecary Chancellery from 1677 to 1689. He was ennobled

in 1685 and headed the diplomatic postal service thereafter. Deputy head of the Diplomatic Chancellery from 1689 to 1695, he was appointed Duma Secretary in 1695. He headed the Siberian Chancellery from 1697 to 1703 and the Artillery Chancellery as of 1701, and built iron mills on the Urals. He was dismissed from government service in 1703 for embezzlement and delay in supplying the army. He escaped to the Netherlands in 1706 but, pardoned by Peter I, returned to Russia in 1708. He translated foreign books about military matters and technology and was an important bibliophile and art collector. He died in 1717.

See also: FOREIGN TRADE; GOSTI; MERCHANTS

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JARMO T. KOTILAINE

WINTER PALACE

The institution of the Winter Palace dates from the first decade of St. Petersburg's existence, when the first Winter House was constructed for Peter I in 1711. With the transfer of the capital from Moscow in 1712, the winter residence of the tsar-emperor acquired the status of a major state building. The next Winter Palace was built on the Neva River embankment in 1716–1719 to a plan by Georg Mattarnovi and was expanded in the 1720s by Domenico Trezzini. In 1732 Bartolomeo Francesco Rastrelli began work at the command of Empress Anna on a third version of the Winter Palace, which was under construction for much of the 1730s.

The planning of a new Winter Palace for Empress Elizabeth began in the early 1750s under the direction of Rastrelli, who intended to incorporate the existing third Winter Palace into the design of a still larger structure. However, as work proceeded in 1754, he concluded that the new palace would require not simply an expansion of the old, but would have to be built over its foundations. Construction continued year round despite the severe winters, and the empress—who viewed the palace as a matter of state prestige during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763)—continued to issue orders for

its rapid completion. The 859,555 rubles originally allotted for construction of the Winter Palace were to be drawn, in a scheme devised by the courtier Pyotr Shuvalov, from the revenues of state-licensed taverns. (Most of Rastrelli's army of laborers earned a monthly wage of one ruble.) Cost overruns were chronic, and work was occasionally halted for lack of materials and money at a time when Russia's resources were strained to the limit by the Seven Years' War. Ultimately the project cost some 2,500,000 rubles, drawn from alcohol and salt taxes placed on an already burdened population. Elizabeth did not live to see the completion of the palace: She died on December 25, 1761. The main state rooms and imperial apartments were ready the following year for Tsar Peter III and his wife Catherine.

The basic plan of the Winter Palace consists of a quadrilateral with an interior courtyard decorated in a manner similar to the outer walls. The exterior facades of the new imperial palace—three of which are turned toward public spaces—were decorated in a late baroque style. On the Neva River facade the palace presents, from a distance, an uninterrupted horizontal sweep of more than 200 meters, while the opposite facade (on Palace Square) is marked in the center by the three arches of the main courtyard entrance—immortalized by the film director Sergei Eisenstein as well as by artists who portrayed, in exaggerated form, the “storming of the Winter Palace.” The facade overlooking the Admiralty is the one area of the structure that contains substantial elements of the third Winter Palace.

A strict symmetry reigns over the facades. Two hundred fifty columns segment some seven hundred windows, not including those of the interior court. The palace has three main floors situated over a basement level, and the structure culminates in an elaborate cornice supporting 176 large ornamental vases and allegorical statues. The original stone statuary, corroded by Petersburg's harsh climate, was replaced in the 1890s by copper figures. The sandy color that Rastrelli intended for the stucco facade has vanished under a series of paints ranging from dull red (applied in the late nineteenth century) to turquoise in the early twenty-first century.

The interior of the Winter Palace, with its more than seven hundred rooms, has undergone many changes, and little of Rastrelli's rococo decoration has survived. Work on the interior continued for several decades, as rooms were changed and



The Marshals' Salon displays the ornate decor typical of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. THE ART ARCHIVE/BIBLIOTHÈQUE DES ARTS DÉCORATIFS PARIS/DAGLI ORTI. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

refitted to suit the tastes of Catherine the Great and her successors. Still more damaging was the 1837 palace fire that burned unchecked for more than two days and destroyed the interior. During the reconstruction most of the rooms were decorated in eclectic styles of the mid-nineteenth century or restored to the neoclassical style used by Rastrelli's successors in decorating the palace, such as Giacomo Quarenghi. Only the main, or Jordan, staircase and the corridor leading to it (the Rastrelli Gallery) were restored by Vasily Stasov in a manner close to Rastrelli's original design. Yet the Winter Palace remains associated above all with the

name of Rastrelli, the creator of this baroque masterpiece.

In 1918 the Winter Palace and its art collection were nationalized, and in 1922 most of the building became part of the State Hermitage Museum. Substantial restoration work was interrupted by the outbreak of war, during which the museum staff performed heroically. The State Hermitage Museum reopened in 1945, and since that time the former Winter Palace has become the object of scrupulous preservation efforts devoted to one of the world's greatest museums.

See also: ELIZABETH; FRENCH INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA; MUSEUM, HERMITAGE; RASTRELLI, BARTOLOMEO; ST. PETERSBURG

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WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

WITCHCRAFT

Russian witchcraft is best seen as a remnant of East Slavic, pre-Christian, pagan practices, elements of which survived into modern times. The earliest written record that mentions witchcraft dates to 1024 and appears in a chronicle describing the execution of sorcerers in Suzdal. Literary sources continued to speak of sorcery in later centuries and, in most cases, were connected to allegations of witchcraft causing inclement weather, droughts, crop failure, and other phenomena that resulted in famine and pestilence.

During the Kievan era (roughly 900 to 1240) the most common form of popular (extralegal) witch trial appears to have been ordeal by cold water and execution by burning at the stake. As early as the second half of the eleventh century, however, Rus princes granted the Church official authority over witchcraft trials. Contrary to the Byzantine canonical practice of executing suspected witches, the Rus princes established relatively nominal monetary penalties for practicing sorcery. Despite this, unofficial persecutions of sorcerers continued to take place on occasion.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Muscovy saw a marked increase in the preoccupation with witchcraft. With the 1551 *Stoglav* Council headed by Ivan IV (1533–1584), the Muscovite government and church took an active interest in battling witchcraft. The council recommended that the state impose the death penalty for sorcerers, and that the church excommunicate such offenders. Ivan IV's Decree of 1552, while disregarding the recommendation of imposing the death penalty, transferred witch trials to state jurisdiction, thereby transforming witchcraft into a civil offence. This formed the background for the use of allegations of criminal witchcraft for political purposes. Dur-

ing the reign of Ivan IV, and more so through the subsequent Time of Troubles, the Muscovite ruling elite invoked charges of witchcraft to persecute their political enemies, both at court and outside of Moscow.

Witchcraft trials saw their heyday during the seventeenth century, when the death penalty came to be systematically applied to the guilty. However, the Muscovite witch hunts were much smaller in scale than those that were occurring in contemporary communities of Western Europe. Although the tsars sent directives to the provinces to fight sorcery until 1682, the orders were not systematic and organized, nor were the persecutions. This, in large part, is because of the deep-rooted *dvoeverie* (dual-faith, the holding of conflicting belief systems) among most Russians, including the ruling elite, who had ambivalent views toward remnants of pagan practices. Also, unlike in the West, where much of the "witch craze" was directed against women, the Muscovite "witch scare" charged a proportional number of men (warlocks) with sorcery. This was probably connected to the occupation of the accused—unlike in the West, Muscovy men often acted as herbalists and village healers, which were professions commonly associated with witchcraft.

During the reign of Catherine II (1762–1796), the death penalty for witchcraft was abolished and the crime lowered to the level of fraud. In 1775 she transferred cases dealing with witchcraft to courts handling such affairs as popular superstition, juvenile crimes, and the criminally insane. Sorcery, however, persisted among the East Slavic peasants into the nineteenth century, in large part because of their continued use of charms, spells, potions, and herbs in folk medicine.

See also: IVAN IV; KIEVAN RUS; TIME OF TROUBLES

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WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH

(1849–1915), minister of communication (1892); minister of finance (1892–1903); chairman of the



Sergei Witte, a gifted Russian statesman, drafted the 1905 October Manifesto. THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSÉE DES 2 GUERRES MONDIALES PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

Committee of Ministers (1903–1905); prime minister (1905–1906); responsible for program of industrialization and political reforms.

Sergei Witte descended from russified Lutheran Germans on his father's side and from Russian nobility on his mother's side. He was born in Tbilisi. In 1865 he finished a Tbilisi gymnasium and in 1870 graduated from the Department of Physics and Mathematics at Novorossysk University (Odessa). He dreamt of an academic career, but on his relatives' insistence he entered the state service on the Odessa Railway. In 1877 Witte moved to the privately owned Society of Southwestern Railways and there made a brilliant career, soon becoming its manager. In 1883 he published a book *The Principles of Railway Tariffs for the Transportation of Goods*, which earned him renown as a railway expert.

In the 1870s Witte fell under the sway of Slavophile ideas. He took a great interest in the theological writings of Alexei Khomyakov and participated in activities of the Odessa Slavic Philan-

thropic Society. Here he became a friend to Mikhail Katkov, an influential right-wing journalist. Witte also published feuilletons under a pen name. In 1881 and 1882 he participated in the pro-monarchist secret aristocratic society *Svyataya Druzhina* (The Holy Retinue) organized on Witte's advice by his uncle General Rostislav Fadeyev, a well-known military historian and publicist of Slavophile views. In 1882 the society was liquidated.

In 1887 Witte was appointed director of the Railway Department of the Ministry of Finance. In 1892 he advanced to the post of minister for railways and then to minister of finance. Witte soon became the most influential minister in the government, and his ministry the center of the entire state government. Witte proved to be an outstanding politician, capable of getting his bearings in the most complicated situations, designing long-term programs, and then carrying them out effectively. Soon Witte gave up his Slavophile views and turned into a modernizer of the European type. He sought to accelerate the industrial development of Russia with the aid of state support and foreign capital. He contended that Russia would catch up with advanced Western countries industrially within a decade and would secure a strong position for Russian manufactured goods in the markets of the Near, Middle, and Far East.

The program of industrialization, "the Witte system," as he called it, included (1) intensive railway building; (2) protectionism and state subsidies for private entrepreneurs; and (3) a great influx of foreign capital to industry, banks, and state loans. Never before in Russia had state economic intervention been used so widely and effectively. The state acted by purely economic means through the state bank and institutions of the Ministry of Finance, which monitored the activities of joint-stock commercial banks. In order to penetrate the markets of China, Mongolia, Korea, and Persia, the Ministry of Finance founded the Russo-Chinese, Russo-Korean, and Loan and Discount Banks. Witte's program achieved the desired results. In the period from 1892 to 1902, state finances were strengthened, foreign investment capital poured in (over 3 billion rubles or 1.544 billion dollars), and a stable monetary system was formed. The highest rates of economic development in Europe were attained (from 1883 to 1904 the volume of industrial output increased 2.7 times, or 6% per year). The annual growth rate of the national income averaged nearly 3.5 percent. The intensive economic development of Russia was accompanied by the improvement of the living stan-

dards of the broad masses of the population, as data on the increase in the height of recruits testify.

After setting industry on its feet and ensuring its self-development, Witte planned to carry through an agrarian reform. His attempts, however, met fierce resistance of conservatives. He was able only to simplify passport rules and abolish the rules on shared responsibility for taxes and other obligations laid on the peasants. The other aspects of the agrarian program designed by Witte were later introduced by his successor, Petr Stolypin.

Although Witte was transferred to the less influential post of Chairman of the Committee of Ministers in August 1903, the deteriorating political situation in the country, caused by Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, and the insistence of public opinion brought him back to active service in the summer of 1904. Witte led the Russian delegation that concluded peace with Japan in the Treaty of Portsmouth. He then participated in preparing the October Manifesto of 1905, in which the emperor granted civil freedom. Witte took the post of prime minister in the new government and ran political affairs in a European style. He paid attention to public opinion, regarded the Russian and foreign presses as representative of public opinion, and exerted influence upon the public through the press. His government introduced the political rights granted by the October Manifesto, worked to appease the population and win it over to the government's side, curbed punitive excesses and pogroms, and conducted the elections to the Duma. Witte's activities, however, received criticism from all sides. The emperor viewed him as a rival in influence and popularity. The wealthy were disappointed in the Duma elections, whose results proved unfavorable for them. Revolutionaries cursed Witte for his repressive measures. Liberals censured him for his defense of the monarchical prerogatives in the Basic Laws and his other concessions to rightists. Conservatives were dissatisfied with Witte's participation in the demolition of the old political system and transition to a new one. After Witte had concluded the Portsmouth Peace Treaty with Japan, brought troops from the Far East back to European Russia, restored public order in the country, prepared the Basic Laws, organized elections to the Duma, and secured a big loan in Europe (843.75 million rubles or 434.16 million dollars) that brought stability to government finances, he was forced to resign.

Until his final days Witte hoped to return to power. In order not to be forgotten, he used all

means available to him: the rostrum of the State Council, the press, intrigues, and connections in the West. Witte died in 1915 at the age of 66, his health undermined by hard work and forebodings. He opposed Russia's participation in World War I and predicted grave consequences similar to the upheavals that occurred after the Russo-Japanese War.

See also: ECONOMY, IMPERIAL; INDUSTRIALIZATION; OCTOBER MANIFESTO; PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF; RAILWAYS; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

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WOMEN OF RUSSIA BLOC

Women of Russia (*Zhenshchiny Rossii*, or ZhR) was formed as a political movement on the eve of the 1993 Duma elections. It contained the Union of Russia's Women (formerly the Committee of

Soviet Women), Association of Russia's Women Entrepreneurs, and the Union of Women of the Navy. The movement was headed by Alevtina Fedulova, leader of the Union of Women; Yekaterina Lakhova, adviser to Boris Yeltsin on matters of family, childbearing, and children; and the popular actress Natalia Gundareva, and received 4.4 million votes (8.1%, or fourth place) and twenty-one Duma seats in 1993. The success was due to the amorphousness of the political scene, where the lack of parties and transience of elections made a good flag sufficient. In the Duma, the ZhR faction, which was called the first of its kind in the history of world parliamentism, basically supported the government and did not distinguish itself in any way. At the beginning of the 1995 campaign, ZhR was regarded as a potential participant in a broad left-centrist coalition, but it chose to enter independently. In the end it did not attain the 5 percent threshold required to merit proportional representation, winning 3.2 million votes (4.6%, fifth place); three candidates, including Lakhova, were elected in single-mandate districts. At the time, incidentally, most electoral associations included their women candidates in the top three places on the lists.

In 1997, Lakhova, leaving ZhR, founded her own Sociopolitical Movement of Russia's Women (OPDZh). In the beginning of the 1999 campaign, both Fedulova of ZhR and Lakhova of OPDZh entered Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland, then the bloc Fatherland-All Russia (OVR). After Lakhova was included in the central part of the OVR list, and Fedulova was not, ZhR announced its departure from the bloc, with the explanation that OVR, in assembling its list, had demonstrated its traditional, conservative approach to women's role in society. The ZhR results (2.0%, eighth place) were much lower than expected, partly because "women" diverged: some stayed in the OVR; in addition, ZhR had a double, the Russian Party for the Defense of Women (0.8%). Moreover, social problematics fundamental to ZhR were actively exploited by more powerful electoral associations: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and OVR. On the threshold of the 2003 elections, a paradoxical situation arose, when Fedulova's virtual ZhR, having met for the last time in an all-Russian conference in the summer of 1999, and not having shown a sign of existence since that time, gathered 4 to 7 percent support in a social referendum. Lakhova's OPDZh, having dissolved into United Russia, tried to resurface politically, entering the April 2003 elections with the somewhat vague bill

"concerning governmental guarantees of equal rights and freedoms of men and women and equal opportunities for their realization."

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA; FEMINISM

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NIKOLAI PETROV

WOMEN'S DEPARTMENT *See* ZHENOTDEL.

WORKERS

In the general sense of the term, there have of course been workers present since the dawn of Russian history, including slave laborers and serfs. Viewed more narrowly to mean persons employed in industry and paid a wage, however, workers became important to the Russian economy only in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, especially during the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725), who placed a high priority on Russia's industrial development. But even under Peter most workers employed in manufacturing and mining were unfree labor, forced to toil long hours either in privately owned enterprises or in factories owned by the government. The continued coexistence of free and forced labor at a time when forced labor, except for convicts, had virtually vanished from the European scene was a noteworthy and notorious characteristic of Russian society until as late as 1861, when serfdom was abolished and almost all labor was placed on a contractual footing.

With the abolition of serfdom, Russia began a new spurt of industrial development. In the 1890s Russian industry expanded rapidly, growing at an average rate of 8 percent per annum. The number of industrial workers, if viewed as a percentage of the overall population, was still small by the end of that decade; according to the 1897 census, the Empire's population was over 125 million, while the number of workers was roughly two million. However, their social and political importance became increasingly evident, in part because of their concentration in politically sensitive areas such as St. Petersburg (the capital), Moscow, the port city of Baku, and the industrial regions of Russian-occupied Poland.

The most dramatic manifestation of the workers' importance was their participation in strikes and demonstrations. If *strike* is loosely understood as any work stoppage in defiance of management, then strikes certainly took place in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but they began to be taken seriously by Russian officials, publicists, and political activists only in the 1870s and especially the 1890s. By the early twentieth century a fierce and sometimes agonizing competition had begun between radicals of various persuasions (Social-Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, etc.), liberals, religious organizations, and the government for working-class political support. In the 1905 Revolution, radicals emerged as the clear winners in this competition, though with no single faction dominating. At least in major urban industrial centers, workers played the leading role in the revolutionary struggles of that year. Their moment of greatest triumph came with the October general strike and the creation of citywide workers' councils (soviets), one of which virtually became the governing body of the city of St. Petersburg. However, the bloody suppression of the armed uprising of Moscow workers in December 1905 marked the end of the workers' triumphant period. Although labor unrest continued in 1906, workers ceased to pose a serious threat to the Russian government until the labor movement revived in the period between 1912 and 1914.

Nevertheless, the 1905 Revolution did bear some fruit for Russia's workers, including the government's recognition for the first time of their right to form unions and engage in strikes (albeit within very tight restrictions) and the right to elect their own delegates to the new Russian Parliament, the Duma (albeit under a very restricted franchise). Russian industry soon began to recover from the

setbacks it had undergone in the first few years of the century, and by 1910 was again experiencing a robust expansion. As the position of workers in the labor market became more favorable, workers grew less and less tolerant of management misconduct and government repression. A government massacre of Russian goldminers in the spring of 1912 resuscitated the dormant labor movement and ushered in a two-year period of militant strike activity and demonstrations in many parts of Russia, most dramatically in St. Petersburg and, in 1914, Baku. Politically, this worker militancy worked to the tactical advantage of the Bolsheviks and, to a lesser extent, the Socialist Revolutionaries, while working to the disadvantage of the more moderate Mensheviks, who feared that workers' passions had been aroused to a degree that could prove counterproductive. Some historians have argued that Russian industrial centers were on the cusp of a new revolution when the onset of World War I, in the summer of 1914, put a temporary damper on worker unrest. However, it must also be acknowledged that the labor movement was dying down before war was declared.

Be that as it may, once the war began to go badly for Russia, there were growing signs of a revival of the labor movement, especially in 1916. By late February 1917, St. Petersburg workers (women textile workers as well as the traditionally militant, mainly male, metal and munitions workers) were joining with other elements of the urban population, including the military garrison, in increasingly confrontational demonstrations. Workers now played a prominent role in the overthrow of the tsarist regime and, in cooperation with the radical intelligentsia and their party activists, resurrected an updated version of the soviets of 1905, this time with the crucial participation of soldiers. Over the next few months, worker militancy in the form of strikes, street demonstrations, factory occupations, and participation in the organizations of the revolutionary parties added enormously to the difficulties of the new Provisional Government, which was simply unable to satisfy worker demands under wartime conditions. Hence when the Bolsheviks succeeded in overthrowing the Provisional Government in October 1917 and dispersing the recently elected Constituent Assembly the following January, they would do so with a great deal of working-class support, though this support was not for Bolshevik single-party rule but for a soviet government consisting of a coalition of left parties and supportive of worker democracy within the factory. The ensuing Civil War of 1917–1921

was a period of bloodshed, hunger, and, eventually, draconian measures such as the militarization of labor and the introduction of strict one-man management, inflicted by a relentless Bolshevik regime on recalcitrant workers. Though indispensable to the Reds in their struggle against the Whites in these years of civil war, workers emerged from the war demoralized and, in many cases, thanks to the damage suffered by Russian industry, declassed. Workers now ceased to be a significant independent force in the country's political life.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; LABOR; OCTOBER GENERAL STRIKE OF 1905; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; REVOLUTION OF 1905; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; UNION OF STRUGGLE FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF LABOR

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WORKERS' CONTROL

The slogan "workers' control," popular among radical Russian workers during the 1917 Revolution and the early years of Bolshevik rule, designated a program that was supposed to lead directly to so-

cialism. The program called for the proletariat to seize and operate the capitalists' factories and to plan and manage production and distribution throughout Russian industry. The concept had its roots in nineteenth-century European socialism and especially in the syndicalist movement, which espoused economic units organized and run by workers.

Immediately after the February 1917 Revolution, demands for workers' control began to spread among activist workers in large enterprises. The slogan attracted growing support in the summer and fall of 1917 as economic conditions worsened, real wages fell, and some factories closed, while workers were locked out of other plants. Several Bolshevik leaders espoused workers' control as early as April 1917, and Lenin, recognizing the slogan's broad appeal, adopted it as part of the Bolshevik platform in June, encouraging its use in Bolshevik propaganda.

In August, September, and October 1917, workers seized some factories, and more were taken over after the Bolsheviks came to power. But faced with shortages of basic supplies, chaotic markets, labor absenteeism, and inadequate technical and managerial know-how, proletarian owners had little success in getting factories back into production. Lenin soon soured on the practice of workers' control, and beginning in early 1918 he started centralizing economic decision-making. He also called for unitary or one-man management (*edinonachalie*) in industries and individual enterprises as well as use of bourgeois specialists—former engineers, technicians, and managers—to help operate the factories and reenergize the economy. Although workers' control was largely dropped, a faction within the Bolshevik party known as the Workers' Opposition campaigned unsuccessfully during 1919 and 1920 for trade unions to have a greater role in running the Soviet economy.

See also: EDINONACHALIE; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; WORKERS' OPPOSITION

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WORKERS' OPPOSITION

The Workers' Opposition (*Rabochaya oppositsia*) was a group of trade union leaders and industrial administrators within the Russian Communist Party who opposed party leaders' policy on workers and industry from 1919 to 1921. The group formed in the fall of 1919, when its leader, Alexander Shlyapnikov, called for trade unions to assume leadership of the highest party and state organs. Leading members of the Metalworkers' Union supported Shlyapnikov, who criticized the growing bureaucratization of the Communist Party and Soviet government, which he feared would stifle worker initiative. The Workers' Opposition advocated management of the economy by a hierarchy of elected worker assemblies, organized according to branches of the economy (metalworking, textiles, mining, etc.).

Shlyapnikov, the chairman of the All-Russian Metalworkers' Union, was the most prominent leader of the Workers' Opposition. Thirty-eight individuals signed the theses of the Workers' Opposition in December 1920. Most of them had been metalworkers; they represented the Metalworkers' Union, Miners' Union, and the leading organs of heavy industry. Alexandra Kollontai advised the Workers' Opposition and was a spokesperson for it. She wrote a pamphlet about the group (*Rabochaya oppositsia*), which circulated among delegates to the Tenth Communist Party Congress in 1921.

Leaders of the Opposition used the resources and organizations of major trade unions (metalworkers, miners, textile workers) to mobilize support. Many meetings were arranged by personal letter or word of mouth. Metalworkers or former metalworkers composed the membership, all of whom were also Communists.

The Workers' Opposition drew attention to a divide between Soviet industrial workers and the Communist Party, which claimed to rule in the name of the working class. Party leaders feared that the Workers' Opposition would inspire opponents of the regime. At the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, the party banned the Workers' Opposition.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; KOLLONTAI, ALEXANDRA MIKHAILOVNA; SHLYAPNIKOV, ALEXANDER GAVRILOVICH

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BARBARA ALLEN

WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTORATE

See RABKRIN.

WORLD REVOLUTION

When Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels implored workers of the world to unite, they announced a new vision of international politics: world socialist revolution. Although central to Marxist thought, the importance of world revolution evoked little debate until World War I. It was Vladimir Lenin who revitalized it, made it central to Bolshevik political theory, and provided an institutional base for it. Although other Marxists, such as Nikolai Bukharin and Rosa Luxemburg, devoted serious attention to it, Lenin's ideas had the most profound impact because they persuasively linked an analysis of imperialism with the struggle for world socialist revolution.

In *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), Lenin argued that modern war was due to conflicts among imperialist powers and that any revolution within the imperialist world would weaken capitalism and hasten socialist revolution. The contradictions of capitalism and imperialism provided the soil that nourished world revolution. In the fall of 1917, when Lenin cajoled his comrades to seize power, he argued that the Russian Revolution was "one of the links in a chain of socialist revolutions" in Europe. He believed in the imminence of such revolutions, which he deemed essential to the Bolshevik revolution's survival and success. His optimism was not unfounded, as revolutionary unrest engulfed Central and Eastern Europe in 1918–1920.

In 1919 Lenin helped to create the Communist International (Comintern) to guide the world revolution. As the revolutionary wave waned in the 1920s, Stalin claimed that world revolution was not essential to the USSR's survival. Rather, he argued,

developing socialism in one country (the USSR) was essential to keeping the world revolutionary movement alive. Other Bolshevik leaders, notably Leon Trotsky, disagreed, but in vain. Nonetheless, until it adopted the Popular Front policy in 1935, the Comintern pursued tactics for world revolution. Unlike previous Comintern policies, which sought to spark revolution, the Popular Front was a defensive policy designed to stem the rise of fascism. It marked the end of Soviet efforts to foment world socialist revolution.

See also: LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH

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WORLD WAR I

Imperial Russia entered World War I in the summer of 1914 along with allies England and France. It remained at war with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Turkey until the war effort collapsed during the revolutions of 1917.

In 1914 military theory taught that new technologies meant that future wars would be short, decided by initial, offensive battles waged by mass conscript armies on the frontiers. Trapped between two enemies, Germany planned to defeat France in the west before Russia, with its still sparse railway net, could mobilize. Using French loans to build up that net, Russia sought to speed up the process, rapidly invade East Prussia, and so relieve pressure on the French. Berlin therefore feared giving Russia a head start in mobilizing and, rightly or wrongly, most statesmen accepted that if mobilization began, war was inevitable.

On June 28, 1914, a nationalist Serbian student shot Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, at Sarajevo. To most statesmen's surprise, this provoked a crisis when Austria, determined to punish the Serbs, issued an unacceptable ultimatum on July 23. Over the next six days, pressure mounted on Nicholas II but, rec-

ognizing that mobilization meant war, he refused to order a general call-up that would force a German response. Then Vienna declared war on Serbia, Nicholas's own efforts to negotiate with Kaiser William II collapsed, and on July 30 he finally approved a general mobilization. When St. Petersburg ignored Berlin's demand for its cancellation within twelve hours, Germany declared war on August 1. Over the next three days Germany invaded Luxembourg, declared war on France on August 4, and by entering Belgium, added Britain to its enemies.

THE WAR OF MOVEMENT:

SUMMER 1914–APRIL 1915

Some Social Democrats aside, Russia's educated public rallied in a Sacred Union behind their ruler. Strikes and political debate ended, and on August 2, crowds in St. Petersburg cheered Nicholas II after he signed a declaration of war on Germany. Local problems apart, the mobilization proceeded apace as 3,115,000 reservists and 800,000 militiamen joined the 1,423,000-man army to provide troops for Russian offensives into Austrian Galicia and, as promised, France and East Prussia.

Although Nicholas II intended to command his troops in person, he was pressured into appointing instead his uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich the Younger. Whatever its merits, this decision split the front administratively from the rear thanks to a new law that assigned the army control of the front zone. This caused few problems when the battle line moved forward in 1914 and early 1915. However, without the tsar as a civil-military lynchpin, it led to chaos during the later Great Retreat.

The Grand Duke established his skeleton Stavka (Supreme Commander-in-Chief's General Headquarters) at Baranovichi to provide strategic direction to the Galician and East Prussian offensives. These were to open on August 18–19 under the direct supervision of the separate operational headquarters of the Northwest and Southwest Fronts. Yet on August 6 Austria-Hungary declared war and on the next day invaded Russian Poland. This forestalled the Southwest Front (Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Armies, with 52% of Russia's strength) and it opened its own Galician offensive on August 18. Despite early enemy successes, the Front's armies trounced the Austrians and captured the Galician capital of Lvov (Lemberg) on September 3. A week later the Russians won decisively at Rava Ruska, and by September 12 they had foiled an Austrian attempt to retake Lvov. By September

16 they had besieged the major fortress of Przemyśl and reached the San River. Resuming their offensive, they then pushed another 100 miles to the Carpathian passes into Hungary. Over seventeen days the Austrians lost 100,000 dead, 220,000 wounded, 100,000 prisoners, and 216 guns, or one-third of their effective strength.

The Northwest Front (First and Second Armies, with 33% of Russia's forces) was less successful. Ordered forward to aid the desperate French on August 13, Pavel Rennenkampf's First Army advanced slowly into East Prussia, was checked at Stallupönen, then defeated the Germans at Gumbinnen on August 20, and turned against Königsberg. To the south, Alexander Samsonov's Second Army occupied Neidenburg on August 22, and all East Prussia seemed open to the Russians. But by August 23, when the new German commander Paul von Hindenburg arrived with Erich von Ludendorff as chief of staff, General Max von Hoffmann had implemented plans to defeat the Russians piecemeal. Accordingly, on August 23–24 the Germans checked Samsonov and, learning his deployments through radio intercepts, withdrew to concentrate on Tannenberg. When the Second Army again advanced on August 26, it was trapped, virtually surrounded, and then crushed. Samsonov shot himself, and by August 30 the Germans claimed more than 100,000 prisoners.

This forced Rennenkampf's withdrawal, and during September 9–14, he too suffered defeat in the First Battle of the Mansurian Lakes. Despite German claims of a second Tannenberg and 125,000 prisoners, the First Army escaped and lost only 30,000 prisoners, as well as 70,000 dead and wounded. The Germans then advanced to the Niemen River before the front stabilized in mid-September. Again alerted by radio intercepts, they forestalled a Russian thrust at Silesia by a spoiling attack on September 30. Counterattacking in Galicia, the Austrians then cleared the Carpathian approaches and relieved Przemyśl before being halted on the San in mid-October.

The Russians, repulsing a secondary attack in the north, finally held the Germans before Warsaw. As the latter withdrew, devastating the countryside, the Russians again drove the Austrians back to Krakow and reinvested Przemyśl. This set the pattern for months of seesaw fighting all along the front. In the north, despite German use of poison gas in January 1915, the Russian Tenth Army withstood the bloody Winter Battles of Mansuria and held firm until April. In the south, by Decem-

ber they again were deep into the Carpathians, threatening Hungary, and holding positions 30 miles from Krakow. When relief efforts failed, Przemyśl finally fell (with 117,000 men) in March 1915, leaving the Russians free to force the Carpathians.

Meanwhile, on October 29–30, 1914, two German-Turkish cruisers had raided Russia's Black Sea coast. On declaring war, the tsar set up an autonomous Caucasian Front in which the talented chief of staff Nikolai Yudenich exercised real command. As he prepared the Caucasian Army to meet a Turkish invasion, the Turkish Sultan-Khalifa's call for jihad (holy war) fueled pro-Turkish uprisings in the borderlands. Then on December 17 Enver Pasha launched his Third Army, still in summer uniforms, on a crusade to recover lands ceded to Russia in 1878. By December 25 the Russians were fully engaged in the confused battles known as the Sarykamysh Operation. In twelve days of bitter winter combat Yudenich's troops, despite heavy losses, decisively crushed the Turks, and in January 1915 they invaded Ottoman Turkey.

During this period, the Russians held their own against three enemies in two separate war zones and showed that they had capable generals by routing two enemies and fighting a third, the Germans, to a draw. For most, the heavy losses at Tannenberg and other locations were overshadowed by the stunning victories elsewhere. Like other combatants, Russia was slow to recognize that it faced a long war, but it had avoided the trench warfare that gripped the French front. Yet Grand Duke Nikolai already had complained of shell shortages in September 1914. The government responded by reorganizing the Main Artillery Administration, and a special chief assumed responsibility for completely guaranteeing the army's needs for arms and munitions by both state and private production. If this promise was illusory, and other ad hoc agencies proved equally ineffective, for the moment the Russian command remained confident of victory.

THE GREAT RETREAT:

MAY–SEPTEMBER 1915

On May 2 the seesaw struggle in the East ended when the Austro-Germans, after a four-hour "hurricane of fire," broke through the shallow Russian trenches at Gorlice-Tarnow. This local success quickly sparked the disastrous Great Retreat. As the Galician armies fell back, a secondary German strike in the north endangered the whole Russian



The Russian 10th Army, February 1915. Fighting in heavy snow, one Russian corps is defeated at Masuria while the others stood firm until April. © SEF/ART RESOURCE, NY

front. Hampered by increasing munitions shortages, rumors of spies and treason, a panicked Stavka's ineffective leadership, administrative chaos, and masses of fleeing refugees, the Russians soon lost their earlier conquests. Despite Italy's intervention on the Allied side, Austro-German offensives continued unabated, and in midsummer the Russians evacuated Warsaw to give up Russian Poland. Some units could still fight, but their successes were local, and overall, the tsar's armies seemed overwhelmed by the general disaster. The only bright spot was the Caucasus, where Yudenich advanced

to aid the Armenians at Van and held his own against the Turks.

The munitions shortages, both real and exaggerated, forced a full industrial mobilization that by August was directed by a Special Conference for Defense and subordinate conferences for transport, fuel, provisioning, and refugees. Their creation necessitated the State Duma's recall, which provided a platform for the opposition deputies who united as the Progressive Bloc. Seeking to control the conferences, these Duma liberals renewed attacks on the regime and demanded a Government of Public



Russian soldiers lie in wait ahead of their final assault on the Turkish stronghold Erzurum, April 1916. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

Confidence (i.e., responsible to the Duma). Yet by autumn Nicholas II had weathered the storm, assumed the Supreme Command to reunite front and rear, and prorogued the Duma. As the German offensives petered out, the front stabilized, and a frustrated opposition regrouped. With the nonofficial voluntary societies and new War Industries Committees, it now launched its campaign against the Dark Forces whom it blamed for its recent defeats.

RUSSIA'S RECOVERY:

AUTUMN 1915–FEBRUARY 1917

In early December 1915, Stavka delegates met the allies at Chantilly, near Paris, to coordinate their 1916 offensives. Allied doubts about Russian capabilities were somewhat allayed by a local assault on the Strypa River and operations in support of Britain in Persia. Still more impressive was Yudenich's renewed offensive in the Caucasus. He opened a major operation in Armenia in January 1916, and on February 16 his men stormed the strategic fortress of Erzurum. Retreating, the Turks abandoned Mush, and by July, the Russians had captured Erzingan. V. P. Lyakhov's Coastal Detachment, supported by the Black Sea Fleet, also advanced and on April 17–18, in a model combined-

arms operation, captured the main Turkish supply port of Trebizond. In autumn 1916 the Russians entered eastern Anatolia and Turkish resistance seemed on the verge of collapse.

Assuming the mauled Russians would be inactive in 1916, Germany opened the bloody battle for Verdun on February 21. Yet increased supplies had permitted a Russian recovery, and on March 18, Stavka answered French appeals with a two-pronged attack on German positions at Vishnevskoye and Lake Naroch, south of Dvinsk. Two days of heavy shelling opened two weeks of mass infantry assaults over ice, snow, and mud. The Germans held, and the Russians lost heavily but, whatever its impact on Verdun, this battle showed that trench (or position) warfare had arrived in the East. And like generals elsewhere, Russia's seemed convinced that only a single, concentrated infantry assault, preceded by heavy bombardments, and backed by cavalry to exploit a breakthrough, could end the deadlock.

Some saw matters differently. One was Yudenich, who repeatedly smashed the Turks' German-built trench lines. Others included Alexei Brusilov and his generals on the Southwest Front. Like Yudenich, they devised new operational and

tactical methods that gained surprise by avoiding massed reserves and cavalry, and by delivering a number of simultaneous, carefully prepared infantry assaults, at several points along an extended front, with little or no artillery preparation. Despite Stavka's doubts, Brusilov won permission to attack in order to tie down the enemy forces in Galicia. When Italy, pressed by Austria in the Trentino, appealed for aid, Brusilov struck on June 4, eleven days before schedule. With no significant artillery support, his troops achieved full surprise on a 200-mile front, smashed the Austrian lines, and advanced up to eighty miles in some sectors. On June 8 they recaptured Lutsk before fighting along the Strypa. Again the Germans rushed up reserves to save their disorganized ally and, after their counterattack of June 16, the line stabilized along that river. In the north, Stavka's main attack then opened before Baranovichi to coincide with Britain's Somme offensive of July 1. But it relied on the old methods and collapsed a week later. The same was true of Brusilov's new attacks on Kovno, which formally ended on August 13. Even so, heavy fighting continued along the Stokhod until September.

Brusilov had lost some 500,000 men, but he had cost the Austro-Germans 1.5 million in dead, wounded, and prisoners, as well as 582 guns. Yet his successes were quickly balanced by defeats elsewhere. Russia had encouraged Romania to enter the war on August 27 and invade Hungarian Transylvania, after which Romania was crushed. By January 1917 Romania had lost its capital, retreated to the Sereth River, and forced Stavka to open a Romanian Front that extended its line 300 miles. This left the Russians spread more thinly and the Central Powers in control of Romania's important wheat and oil regions.

Yet the Allied planners meeting at Chantilly on November 15-16 were optimistic and argued that simultaneous offensives, preceded by local attacks, would bring victory in 1917. Stavka began implementing these decisions by the Mitau Operation in early January 1917. Without artillery support, the Russians advanced in fog, achieved complete surprise, seized the German trenches, and took 8,000 prisoners in five days. If a German counterstrike soon recovered much of the lost ground, the Imperial Army's last offensive shows that it had absorbed Brusilov's methods and could defeat Germans as well as Austrians.

By this date Russia had mobilized industrially with the economy expanding, not collapsing, under wartime pressures. Compared to 1914, by 1917

rifle production was up by 1,100 percent and shells by 2,000 percent, and in October 1917 the Bolsheviks inherited shell reserves of 18 million. Similar increases occurred in most other areas, while the numbers of men called up in 1916 fell and, by December 31, had numbered only 3,048,000 (for a total of 14,648,000 since August 1914). Yet their quality had declined, war weariness and unrest were rising, and, in late June 1916, the mobilization for rear work of some 400,000 earlier exempted Muslim tribesmen in Turkestan provoked a major rebellion. By 1917 a harsh winter, military demands, and rapid wartime industrial expansion had combined to overload the transport system, which exacerbated the tensions brought by inflation, urban overcrowding, and food, fuel, and other shortages.

Despite recent military and industrial successes, Russia's nonofficial public was surprisingly pessimistic. If war-weariness was natural, this mood also reflected the political opposition's propaganda. Determined to gain control of the ministry, the liberals rejected all of Nicholas II's efforts at accommodation. As rumors of treason and a separate peace proliferated, the opposition dubbed each new minister a candidate of the dark forces and creature of the hated Empress and Rasputin, whose own claims gave credence to the rumors. This "assault on the autocracy," as George Katkov describes it, gathered momentum when the Duma reopened on November 14. Liberal leader Paul Milyukov's rhetorical charges of stupidity or treason were seconded by two right-wing nationalists and long-time government supporters. The authorities banned these seditious speeches' publication, but the opposition illegally spread them throughout the army, and some even tried to suborn the high command. The clamor continued until the Duma adjourned for Christmas on December 30, when a group of monarchists murdered Rasputin to save the regime. Yet the liberal public remained unmoved and its press warned that "the dark forces remain as they were."

REVOLUTION AND COLLAPSE:

FEBRUARY 1917-FEBRUARY 1918

Russia therefore entered 1917 as a house divided, the dangers of which became evident as a new round of winter shortages, sporadic urban strikes and food riots, and military mutinies set the stage for trouble. On February 27 the Duma reconvened with renewed calls for the removal of "incompetent" ministers, and 80,000 Petrograd workers went on strike. But the tsar, having hosted an In-



Russian troops land at Salonika, Greece, to fight Bulgarian forces. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

ter-Allied Conference in Petrograd, returned to Stavka confident that his officials could cope.

Events now moved rapidly. On March 8, police clashed with demonstrators protesting food shortages on International Women's Day. Over the next two days protests spread, antiwar slogans appeared, strikes shut down the city, the Cossacks refused to fire upon protestors, and the strikers set up the Petrograd Soviet (Council). When Nicholas II ordered the garrison to restore order, its aged reservists at first obeyed. But on March 12 they mutinied and joined the rebels. The tsar's ministers were helpless before two new emergent authorities: a Provisional Committee of the State Duma (the prorogued Duma meeting unofficially) and the Petrograd Soviet.

This list now included soldier deputies, and on March 14 the Petrograd Soviet issued its famous Order No. 1. This extended its power through the

soldiers' committees elected in every unit in the garrison, and in time in the whole army. For the moment, the Soviet supported a newly formed Provisional Government headed by Prince Georgy Lvov. When Nicholas tried to return to personally restore order, his train was diverted to the Northwest Front's headquarters in Pskov. There he accepted his generals' advice and on March 15 abdicated for himself and his son. His brother, Grand Duke Mikhail, followed suit, the Romanov dynasty ended, and the Imperial Army became that of a de facto Russian republic.

At first both the new government and soviets supported the war effort, and the army's command structure remained intact. Plans for the spring offensive continued, although the changing political situation forced its delay. By April antiwar agitation was rising, discipline weakening, and Stavka was demanding an immediate offensive to restore

the army's fighting spirit. Hopes for success rose when Brusilov was named commander-in-chief, and a charismatic radical lawyer, Alexander Kerensky, War and Naval Minister. Finally, on July 1, the Southwest Front's four armies, using Brusilov's tactics, opened Russia's last offensive. Initially successful, it collapsed after only three days, and the Russians again retreated. In two weeks they lost most of Galicia and more than 58,000 officers and men, while a pro-Bolshevik uprising in the capital (the July Days) threatened the government.

Kerensky survived the crisis to become premier, while Lavr Kornilov, who advocated harsh measures to restore order, replaced Brusilov. The Bolshevik leaders were now imprisoned, underground, or in exile in Finland, but their antiwar message won further soldier-converts on all fronts. The Germans tested their own Brusilov-like tactics by capturing Riga during September 1–6, but otherwise remained passive as the revolutionary virus did its work. Riga's fall revealed Russia's inability to fight even defensively and helped provoke the much-debated Kornilov Affair. When Stavka ordered units to disperse the Petrograd Soviet, Kerensky (whatever his initial intentions) branded Kornilov a traitor and used the left to foil this Bonapartist adventure.

Bolshevik influence now made the officers' position impossible. Desertion was massive, and units on all fronts dissolved. After Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky took power on November 7, the army became so disorganized that a party of Baltic sailors easily seized Stavka and murdered General Nikolai Dukhonin, the last real commander-in-chief. The army no longer existed as an effective fighting force and, with peace talks underway at Brest-Litovsk, the so-called demobilization congress of December sanctioned the harsh reality. In February 1918 the army's remnants mounted only token resistance when the Austro-Germans attacked and, despite desperate attempts to create a Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, forced the Soviet government to accept the *diktat* (dictated or imposed peace) of Brest-Litovsk on March 3.

CONCLUSION

Western accounts of Russia's war are dominated by the Tannenberg defeat of 1914, the Great Retreat of 1915, and the debacle of 1917. Yet the Imperial Army's record compares favorably with those of its allies and its German opponent, and

surpassed those of Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. Despite many real problems, the same is true of efforts to organize the war economy. But the regime's failures were exaggerated, and its successes often obscured, by a domestic political struggle that undercut the war effort and helped bring the final collapse.

See also: BREST-LITOVSK PEACE; JULY DAYS OF 1917; KERENSKY, ALEXANDER FYODOROVICH, KORNILOV AFFAIR; NICHOLAS II; STAVKA; TANNENBERG, BATTLE OF; YUIDENICH, NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH

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DAVID R. JONES

WORLD WAR II

World War II began in the Far East where Japan, having invaded China in 1931, became involved in full-scale hostilities in 1937. In Europe the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, brought Britain and France into the war two days later. Italy declared war on Britain on June 10, 1940, shortly before the French surrender on June 21. Having defeated France but not Britain, Germany attacked the Soviet Union a year later on June 22, 1941. Then the Japanese attacked United States naval forces in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and British colonies in Hong Kong and Malaya the following day. The subsequent German and Italian declarations of war on the United States completed the lineup: Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Axis powers of the Anti-Comintern Treaty of 1936, against the Allies: the United States of America, the British Empire and Dominions, and the Soviet Union. Only the Soviet Union and Japan remained at peace with each other until the Soviet declaration of war on August 8, 1945, two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

The pattern of the war resembled a tidal flow. Until the end of 1942 the armies and navies of the Axis continually extended their power through Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Toward the end of 1942 the tide turned. The Allies won decisive victories in each theater: the Americans over the Japanese fleet at Midway and over the Japanese army on the island of Guadalcanal; the British over the German army in North Africa at el Alamein; and the Soviet army over the German army at Stalingrad. From 1943 onward the tide reversed, and the powers of the Axis shrank continually. Italy surrendered to an Anglo-American invasion on September 3, 1943; Germany to the Anglo-American forces on May 7, 1945, and to the Red Army the following day; and Japan to the Americans on September 7, 1945. The war was over.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR

Why did the Soviet Union become entangled in this war? German preparations for an invasion of the Soviet Union began in 1940, following the French surrender, for three reasons. First, the German leader Adolf Hitler believed that the presence of the Red Army to his rear was the main reason that Britain, isolated since the fall of France, had not come to terms. He expected that a knockout blow in the east would finish the war in the west. Second, if the war in the west continued, Hitler believed that Britain would use its naval superiority to blockade Germany; he planned to ensure Germany's food and oil supplies by means of overland expansion to the east. Third, Hitler had become entangled in the west only because of his aggression against Poland, but Poland was also a means to an end: a gateway to Ukraine and Russia where he sought Germany's "living space." Thus an immediate attack on the Soviet Union promised to overcome all the obstacles barring his way in foreign affairs.

At the same time the Soviet Union was not a passive victim of the war. Soviet preparations for a coming war began in the 1920s. They were stepped up following the war scare of 1927, which strengthened Josef Stalin's determination to accelerate military and industrial modernization. At this stage Soviet leaders understood that an immediate war was unlikely. They did not fear Germany—which was still a democracy and a relatively friendly power—but Poland, Finland, France, or Japan. They feared for the relatively distant future, and this is one reason why Soviet rearmament, although determined, was slow at first; they understood that the first task was to build a Soviet industrial base.

In the early 1930s Stalin became sharply aware of new real threats from Japan under military rule in the Far East and from Germany under the Nazis in the west. In the years that followed he gave growing economic priority to the needs of external security. However, for much of the decade Stalin was much more concerned with domestic threats; he believed his external opponents to be working against him by plotting secretly with his internal enemies rather than openly by conventional military and diplomatic means. In 1937–1938 he directed a savage purge of the Red Army general staff and officer corps that gravely weakened the armed forces in which he was simultaneously investing billions of rubles. The same purges damaged his own credibility on the world stage; as a result those

countries with which he shared common interests became less likely to see him as a worthy ally, and his external enemies became more likely to attack him. Stalin therefore approached World War II with several deadly enemies, few friends in foreign capitals, and an army that was growing and well equipped but morally broken.

Conflict between the Soviet Union and Japan was different from conflict with Germany. Japan first: From their base in north China in May 1939,

the Japanese armed forces began a series of probing border attacks on the Soviet Union that culminated in August with fierce fighting and a decisive victory for the Red Army at Khalkin-Gol (Nomonhan). After that, deterred from encroaching further on Soviet territory, the Japanese shifted their attention to the softer targets represented by British and Dutch colonial possessions in southeast Asia. In April 1941 the USSR and Japan concluded a treaty of neutrality that lasted until August 1945;



Map shows Operation Barbarossa and subsequent Nazi advances into the USSR, late 1941. © BETTMANN/CORBIS



Soviet tanks roll into action to repel the Nazi invasion of June 22, 1941. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

it lasted because, while Japan was fighting America and the Soviet Union was fighting Germany, neither wanted war on a second front.

In contrast to Japan, Germany was too near and too powerful for the Soviet Union to be able to deter single-handedly. Stalin's difficulty was that he lacked willing partners. Therefore, when Hitler unexpectedly offered the hand of friendship in the summer of 1939 Stalin accepted it. The result was the notorious nonaggression pact of August 23, 1939, that secretly delineated the Soviet and German spheres of influence in eastern Europe, giving western Poland to Hitler and eastern Poland and the Baltic to Stalin. Germany was to move first. When Germany did so, Britain and France entered the war.

For nearly two years Stalin stood aloof from the war in the west, exploiting the conditions created by the pact with Hitler. He traded with Germany while still preparing for war. The preparations were costly and extensive. The Red Army continued to rearm and recruit. Stalin annexed Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the northern part of

Romania, and moved his defensive lines toward the new western frontier with Greater Germany. Attacking Finland he won a few kilometers of extra territory with which to defend Leningrad at a cost of nearly 400,000 casualties, one-third of them dead or missing. The utility of these preparations appeared doubtful. The communities living in the Soviet Union's new buffer zone were embittered by the imposition of Soviet rule; when war broke out the territory passed almost immediately into the hands of the invader. Moreover, Stalin believed these preparations to be more effective than his enemy did. He thought he had postponed war several years into the future just as Hitler was accelerating forward plans to end the peace with a surprise attack.

Stalin's true intentions, had he successfully put off a German attack in 1941, are still debated. Some have read his speeches and the plans of his generals as indicating that he envisaged launching an aggressive war on Germany; beyond that lay a future in which a defeated Germany and an exhausted Britain would leave it open to him to dominate the whole continent. Some of Hitler's generals pro-

moted this idea after the war in order to justify themselves. While Stalin's generals sometimes entertained the idea of a preemptive strike, and Soviet military doctrine supported attack as the best means of defense, the Russian archives have demonstrated clearly that Stalin's main concern was to head off Hitler's colonial ambitions on Soviet territory; he had no plans to conquer Europe himself.

At all events it is clear that Hitler caught Stalin and the Red Army by surprise. Stalin's culpability for this has been much debated. His view of Hitler's intentions was strongly held and incorrect, and he did not permit those around him to challenge it. Still, it is worth recalling that democratic leaders could also be taken by surprise. For example, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, though not a brutal dictator, was surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

COURSE OF THE WAR

Barbarossa, the German operation to destroy the Red Army and seize most of the European part of Russia, began on June 22, 1941. For the next three years Hitler committed no less than 90 percent of his ground forces to the campaign that followed. German troops quickly occupied the Baltic region, Belarus, Ukraine, now incorporating eastern Poland, and a substantial territory in Russia. Millions of Soviet soldiers were surrounded. By the end of September, having advanced more than a thousand kilometers on a front more than a thousand kilometers wide, the invaders had captured Kiev, established a stranglehold around Leningrad, and stood at the gates of Moscow.

The Germans advanced rapidly but suffered unexpectedly heavy casualties and equipment losses to chaotic and disorganized Red Army resistance. They were met with a policy of scorched earth: The Soviet authorities removed or destroyed industrial facilities, food stocks, and essential services before the occupiers arrived. German supply lines were stretched to breaking point.

In the autumn of 1941 Stalin rallied his people by appealing to Russian nationalism and imposing harsh discipline. Soviet resistance denied Hitler his chance of a quick victory at the cost of hideous casualties. Moscow was saved, and Leningrad did not surrender. In December Stalin ordered the first strategic Soviet counteroffensive. It was too ambitious and only achieved a few of its goals, but for the first time the Germans were

caught off balance and had to retreat. There followed a year of inconclusive moves and counter-moves on each side, but the new German successes appeared more striking. In the spring and summer of 1942 German forces advanced hundreds of kilometers further across the south of Russia towards Stalingrad and the Caucasian oil fields. Then, at the end of the year, these forces were largely destroyed in the Red Army's defense of Stalingrad and its winter counteroffensive.


After Stalingrad the position of the German forces in the south became untenable, and they were compelled to retreat. In the summer of 1943, Hitler staged his last strategic offensive in the east on the Kursk salient; the offensive failed and was answered by a more devastating Soviet counter-offensive. The German Army could no longer hope to force a stalemate, and its eventual defeat became certain. Even so, the liberation of Soviet territory from German occupation took an additional eighteen months. The German army did not collapse in defeat. As a result, the Red Army's journey from Kursk to Berlin occupied two years of bloody fighting.

THE ALLIANCE

The German invasion not only turned friends into enemies but also enemies into friends. In July 1941 the British signed a pact with the Soviet Union for mutual assistance. In September President Roosevelt authorized the supply of aid to the Soviet Union under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, the United States joined the war against Germany and the three countries formed an alliance that laid the foundation for the United Nations.

The Alliance was held together by a common interest in the defeat of the Axis powers. Moreover, the Soviet resistance to Hitler electrified world opinion, nowhere more than in the Allied countries. The courage of the Soviet people in the face of suffering aroused respect and admiration. Much of this was focused on the figure of Stalin, who thereby gained an extraordinary political advantage.

Behind the scenes the Alliance was fraught with tension. This was for two reasons. One was the division of labor that quickly emerged among the Allies: The richer countries supplied economic aid to the Soviet Union, which did most of the fighting. It could not be done more efficiently in any other way. Still, not all Russians felt grateful, and Stalin repeatedly demanded that the British and Ameri-



Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, and Josef Stalin confer at the 1945 Potsdam Conference. © SNARK RESOURCE/ART RESOURCE

cans open a second front to draw off the German ground forces to the west. This did not happen until the Allied invasion of France in June 1944.

The other source of tension was a difference in conceptions of the postwar world. The Americans sought a liberalized global economy without empires, while Stalin wanted secure frontiers and a wide sphere of influence across eastern Europe. The British wanted to defend their own empire but were also committed to an independent postwar Poland, their reason for entering the war in 1939. Anxieties increased as it became clear that Stalin intended eastern Europe generally, and Poland in particular, to become subservient to Soviet interests after the war.

THE WAR EFFORT

The outbreak of war in 1941 brutally exposed Stalin's miscalculations. Although badly shocked,

he was not paralyzed. Among his first measures he created a Chief Headquarters, the Stavka, and began to evacuate the armor steel rolling mills on the Black Sea coast. While ordering ceaseless, often futile counterattacks, he also authorized the establishment of a broader framework for the evacuation of people and assets from the frontline regions. On June 28 his nerve gave way, and he gave in briefly to depression. On the afternoon of June 30, other leaders came to urge him to form a war cabinet, and he pulled himself together. The result was the State Defense Committee (GKO).

The progress of the war forced Stalin to change his style of leadership. At first he closely involved himself in the detail of military operations, requiring the Red Army to attack continually and ordering vengeful punishments on all who authorized or advocated retreat. He executed several generals. Communications with the front were so poor that a degree of chaos was inevitable, but on a number

of occasions Stalin prevented large forces from extricating themselves from encirclement and capture. Evidently he came to recognize this style as counterproductive, because he eventually drew back from micromanaging the battlefield. He gave his generals greater freedom to decide operational details and speak their minds on strategy, although he retained unquestioned authority where he chose to exert it. This led to more effective decision making and, combined with the growing experience and confidence of his officers, laid the foundations of later victories.

Soviet victory in World War II is often cited as the justification for Stalin's prewar policies of industrialization and rearmament. From a comparative standpoint the success of the Soviet war effort is nonetheless surprising. Why did the Soviet Union not simply fall apart under massive attack, as Russia had done under rather less pressure in World War I? As industrial production was diverted to the war effort, farmers withdrew from the market. Food remained in the countryside, while the war workers and soldiers went hungry. The burdens of war were not distributed fairly among the population, and this undermined the Russian war effort both materially and psychologically. In World War II the Soviet Union was still relatively poor. Other poor countries such as Italy and Japan also fell apart as soon as the Allies seriously attacked them. Italy and Japan were relatively reliant on foreign trade and thus vulnerable to blockade. The Soviet Union depended on getting food from tens of millions of low-productivity farm workers to feed its armies and industries; this supply could easily have failed under wartime pressures.

Stalin and his subordinates did not allow the Soviet government and economy to disintegrate. The Soviet institutional capacity for integration and coordination matched that of much more developed economies. As a result, despite still being relatively poor, the USSR was able to commit a significant share of national resources to the war effort. After a wobbly start, war production soared. Food was procured and rationed effectively: Enough was allocated to soldiers and defense workers to permit sustained effort in disastrous circumstances. There was not enough to go around, and millions starved, but morale did not collapse in the way that had destroyed the tsarist monarchy. Thus collective agriculture, although a disaster in peacetime, proved effective in war.

Things nearly went the other way. The outbreak of war was a huge shock not only to Stalin

personally but more generally to Soviet institutions. The bureaucratic allocation system did not collapse, and planners went on churning out factory plans and coordinating supplies, but these soon became irrelevant. On the supply side, many important military-industrial centers were lost, and the capacities they represented existed only on paper. On the demand side, army requirements to replace early losses with new supplies of soldiers and equipment were far greater than the plans. For some time the gap between real needs and real resources could not be bridged.

The first phases of mobilization were carried out in an uncontrolled way, and this proved very costly. Munitions production soared, but the production of steel, fuel, and other basic industrial goods collapsed. In 1942 an economic crisis resulted not just from the successful German offensives but also from uncontrolled mobilization in 1941. The heart of the war economy now lay in the remote interior, where many defense factories had been relocated from the west and south. But these regions were unprepared for crash industrialization: They lacked transport, power, sources of metals and components, an administrative and commercial infrastructure, and housing and food for the new workforce. Without these there was no basis for a sustained war effort.

After 1942 several factors allowed the situation to ease. Soviet victory at Stalingrad changed the military balance and the growing Allied air offensive against Germany from the west also helped to draw German resources away from the eastern front. More resources also relaxed the pressure: These came from the recovery of output from its post-invasion trough, the completed relocation of defense industry, and greater pooling of Allied resources through economic aid. It is estimated that in 1943 and 1944 the U.S. Lend-Lease program contributed roughly 10 percent of the total resources available to the Soviet economy. From the Soviet consumer's point of view, 1943 appears to have been even worse than 1942, but in 1944 and 1945 there were marked improvements.

In the most dangerous periods of the war, Soviet society was held together by a combination of individual voluntarism, national feeling, and brutal discipline. There were crucial moments when the army wavered. In August 1941 and July 1942, Stalin issued notorious orders that stigmatized those who allowed themselves to be taken prisoner as traitors, penalized their families, and ordered the summary execution of all who retreated without



Steel-helmeted German soldiers play drums as they march through the streets of Riga, Latvia. © HULTON ARCHIVE

orders. By these barbarous methods, order in the armed forces was restored. In the civilian economy minor offenses involving absence from work as well as unauthorized quitting were ruthlessly pursued, resulting in hundreds of thousands of criminal cases each year; those convicted were sent to prison or labor camps. Food crimes involving abuse of the rationing system were severely punished, not infrequently by shooting. Spreading defeatist rumors was punished in the same way, even if it was the truth. It is not so much that everyone who supported the war effort was terrorized into doing so; rather, such measures made it much easier for individuals to choose the path of collective solidarity and individual heroism. The barbarity of German occupation policies also contributed to this outcome.

WAR LOSSES

The Soviet experience of warfare was very different from that of its Allies, Britain and the United States. Large in territory and population, the Soviet Union was poorer than the other two by a wide margin in productivity and income. It was Soviet territory that Hitler wanted for his empire, and the Soviet Union was the only one of the three to be invaded. Despite this, the Soviet Union mobilized its resources and contributed combat forces and equipment to Allied fighting power far beyond its relative economic strength.

These same factors meant that the Soviet Union suffered far heavier costs and losses than its Allies. After victory, Hitler planned to resettle Ukraine and European Russia with Germans and



Women farmers line the road to greet Red Army soldiers riding atop a captured Nazi tank, October 31, 1943. ASSOCIATED PRESS.

REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

to divert their food supplies to feeding the German army. He planned to deprive the urban population of food and drive much of the rural population off the land. Jews and communist officials would be killed and the rest starved into forced migration to the east.

The Soviet Union suffered roughly 25 million war deaths compared with 350,000 war deaths in Britain and 300,000 in the United States; many war deaths were not recorded at the time and must be estimated statistically after the event. Combat losses account for all U.S. and most British casualties; the German bombing of British cities made up the rest. The sources of Soviet mortality were more varied. Red Army records suggest 6.4 million known military deaths from battlefield causes and half a million more from disease and accidents. In addition,

4.6 million soldiers were captured, missing, or killed or presumed missing in units that failed to report. Of these approximately 2.8 million were later repatriated or reenlisted, suggesting 1.8 million deaths in captivity and a net total of 8.7 million Red Army deaths. But the number of Soviet prisoners and deaths in captivity may be understated by more than a million. German records show a total of 5.8 million prisoners, of whom 3.3 million had died by May 1944; most of these were starved, worked, or shot to death. Considering the second half of 1941 alone, Soviet records show 2.3 million soldiers missing or captured, while in the same period the Germans counted 3.3 million prisoners, of whom 2 million had died by February 1942.

Subtracting up to 10 million Red Army war deaths from a 25-million total suggests at least 15

million civilian deaths. Thus many more Soviet civilians died than soldiers, and this is another contrast with the British and American experience. Soviet sources have estimated 11.5 million civilian war deaths under German rule, 7.4 million in the occupied territories by killing, hunger, and disease, and another 2.2 million in Germany where they were deported as forced laborers. This leaves room for millions of civilian war deaths on territory under Soviet control, primarily from malnutrition and overwork; of these, one million may have died in Leningrad alone.

In wartime specifically Soviet mechanisms of premature death continued to operate. For example, Soviet citizens continued to die from the conditions in labor camps; these became particularly lethal in 1942 and 1943 when a 20 percent annual death rate killed half a million inmates in two years. In 1943 and 1944 a new cause of death arose: The deportation and internal exile under harsh conditions of ethnic groups such as the Chechens who, Stalin believed, had collaborated as a community with the former German occupiers.

The war also imposed severe material losses on the Soviet economy. The destruction included 6 million buildings that previously housed 25 million people, 31,850 industrial establishments, and 167,000 schools, colleges, hospitals, and public libraries. Officially these losses were estimated at one-third of the Soviet Union's prewar wealth; being that only one in eight people died, it follows that wealth was destroyed at a higher rate than people. Thus, those who survived were also impoverished.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

The war had a greater effect on the external position of the Soviet Union than on its internal organization and structure. The Soviet Union became a dominant regional power and quickly thereafter an atomic superpower. The wartime alliance soon fell apart, but the Soviet Union soon replaced it with a network of compliant neighboring states in central and eastern Europe and remodeled them in its own image. This set the stage for the Cold War. In the process the popular sympathy in the west for the Soviet Union's wartime struggle quickly dissipated.

Within the country, the victory of the wartime alliance gave rise to widespread hopes for political relaxation and an opening outward but these hopes

were soon dashed. Living conditions remained extremely tough. Millions were homeless; it was just as hard to restore peacetime production as it had been to convert to a war footing; and the pressure to restore food supplies on top of a bad harvest led to one million or more famine deaths in Ukraine and Moldavia in 1946. In addition, Stalin used the victory not to concede reforms but to strengthen his personal dictatorship, promote nationalism, and mount new purges although with less publicity than before the war. After an initial phase of demobilization, the nuclear arms race and the outbreak of a new conventional war in Korea resulted in resumed growth of military expenditures and revived emphasis on the readiness for war. Not until the death of Stalin did the first signs of real relaxation appear.

After the famine of 1946 the Soviet economy restored prewar levels of production of most commodities with surprising speed. It took much longer, possibly several decades, to return to the path that the economy might have followed without a war. It also took decades for the Soviet population to return to demographic balance; in 1959 women born between 1904 and 1924 outnumbered men of the same generation by three to two, despite the fact that women also fought and starved.

One of the most persistent legacies of the war resulted from the wartime evacuation of industry. After the war, despite some reverse evacuation, the war economy of the interior was kept in existence. Weapons factories in the remote interior, adapted to the new technologies of nuclear weapons and aerospace, were developed into closed, self-sufficient company towns forming giant, vertically integrated systems; they were literally taken off the map so that their very existence became a well kept secret. Thus, secretiveness and militarization were taken hand in hand to new levels.

It is easier to describe the Soviet Union after the war than to say what would have happened if the war had gone the other way. World War II was a defining event in world history that engulfed the lives of nearly two billion people, but the eastern front affected the outcome of the war to a much greater extent than is commonly remembered in western culture and historical writing.

See also: COLD WAR; LEND LEASE; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WAR ECONOMY; WORLD WAR I; YALTA CONFERENCE

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MARK HARRISON

WRANGEL, PETER NIKOLAYEVICH

(1878–1928), general and commander-in-chief of the anti-Bolshevik forces in South Russia and leader of the White emigrant movement.

One of the most talented, determined, and charismatic of the anti-Bolshevik generals (and one of the few who was authentically—and unashamedly—aristocratic), Peter Wrangel was born in St. Petersburg into a Baltic family of Swedish origin. He graduated from the St. Petersburg Mining Institute in 1901, but then joined a cavalry regiment as a private before volunteering for service at the front during the Russo–Japanese War, where he served with a unit of the Trans-Baikal Cossacks. In 1910 he graduated from the General Staff Academy and in World War I commanded a cavalry corps. He took no significant part in the events of 1917, but after the October Revolution he went to Crimea, where he was arrested by local Bolsheviks and narrowly escaped execution. He joined General Mikhail Alexeyev's anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army in August 1918 and rose under General Denikin to command the Caucasian Army (largely made up of

Kuban Cossacks) of the Armed Forces of South Russia. In that role he led a successful offensive against the Red Army on the Volga, capturing Tsaritsyn in July 1919. However, the haughty Wrangel never liked the plebian Denikin and, after a fierce quarrel with him over strategy during the Whites' Moscow offensive of the autumn of 1919, he was accused of conspiracy, dismissed, and exiled to Constantinople. Following the collapse of Denikin's efforts, Wrangel was recalled and found enough support among other senior generals to be chosen, in March 1920, to succeed Denikin as commander-in-chief of the White forces in South Russia, which were now largely confined to Crimea.

As a political leader, he was intolerant of opposition, distrusted all liberals, and remained a convinced monarchist, but he nevertheless promulgated a radical land reform in a belated attempt to win the support of the population (and the western Allies, who were by then despairing of the Whites). As commander, he was a strict disciplinarian, and he successfully reorganized the army (renaming it the Russian Army). However, a quarrel over command undermined a projected alliance with Pilsudski's Poland. Although Wrangel's forces managed during the summer of 1920 to pour out of Crimea into Northern Tauria, once the Bolsheviks had made peace with Poland in October, the Red Army was able to concentrate its vastly superior forces on the south and to drive the Russian Army back into Crimea. In November 1920 Wrangel organized a very remarkable and orderly evacuation of over 150,000 of his men and their dependents to Turkey, which was then under Allied control. They were poorly treated by the British administration of the Constantinople district and were subsequently scattered around Europe but remained unified through their shared experiences, their resentment of the Allies, and their veterans' organization, the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), forged by Wrangel in 1924. Through ROVS Wrangel hoped to offer financial and social support to his men and to keep the émigré soldiers battle-ready and pure of political affiliation, while striving to unite monarchists and republicans under the banner of non-predetermination (i.e., by not prejudging issues regarding the future, post-Bolshevik, government of Russia). However, in November 1924, he announced his recognition of the claim to the Russian throne of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. Wrangel died in Brussels in 1928, just as he and his associates were planning the creation of terrorist organizations to



An experienced veteran of the Russian Imperial Army, Baron Peter Wrangel commanded the White forces during the civil war. © CORBIS

be sent into the USSR. His children believed he had been poisoned by the Soviet secret police. He is buried in the Russian Cathedral in Belgrade.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; WHITE ARMY

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JONATHAN D. SMELE

YABLOKO

Yabloko was one of the leading liberal opposition parties in the newly democratic Russia of the 1990s. Yabloko's founder and leader was Grigory Yavlinsky, a liberal economist who had stayed aloof from the new democratic political movements being formed between 1989 and 1991. A strong critic of Boris Yeltsin's privatization program, Yavlinsky condemned both the anti-Yeltsin rebellion by the Congress of People's Deputies in September 1993 and Yeltsin's use of force to suppress it in October.

In the wake of the October crisis, Yavlinsky teamed up with Yuri Boldyrev, an anticorruption campaigner, and Vladimir Lukin, ambassador to Washington until September, to form a bloc to run in the December 1993 State Duma election. Taking their three initials (Y, B, L), they named their alliance *Yabloko* (which means "apple"). Three small parties also joined Yabloko: the Republican Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Russian Christian-Democratic Union.

The three founders of Yabloko were allies of convenience: They had a liberal orientation but were not part of Yeltsin's team. Lukin wanted a foreign policy that was less pro-Western than that pursued by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, an aspiration that contradicted Yavlinsky's pro-Western orientation. Boldyrev subsequently quit Yabloko in 1995.

Yabloko's candidates were mostly young professionals and intellectuals. In the December 1993 election they won 7.9 percent of the vote and twenty seats in the national party-list race, and seven single-mandate districts. They were the sixth-largest party in the 450-seat Duma. Yabloko took up a position of principled opposition to the Yeltsin government. It opposed the new December 1993 constitution, refused to sign Yeltsin's Civil Accord in May 1994, and repeatedly voted against government-proposed legislation.

Yavlinsky ran Yabloko as a tight ship. Deputies who did not vote the Yabloko line were expelled from the party. In January 1995 Yabloko formally converted itself from an electoral bloc into a party. It claimed branches in more than 60 regions of Russia, although its most visible strength was in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and, curiously, the Far East. Yabloko projected an image that was partly liberal and partly social democratic, but nearly always critical of the government. They competed



for the liberal electorate with the pro-government reform party (at first Russia's Choice, then Union of Right Forces). Party identification among Yabloko voters was rather weak, and surveys indicate that they were scattered across the entire political spectrum.

In the December 1995 Duma election Yabloko maintained its position, finishing fourth with 6.9 percent of the vote, thirty-one seats on the party list, and fourteen seats in single-mandate races. Yabloko established a visible presence in the parliament through articulate young leaders such as Alexei Arbatov, deputy chair of the defense committee. In November 1997 Yabloko's Mikhail Zadornov, the head of the Duma's budget committee, joined the government as finance minister. In May 1999 Yabloko voted for impeaching Yeltsin because of his actions in the first Chechen war. In August 1999 former prime minister and anticorruption campaign Sergei Stepashin chose to join Yabloko rather than the rival Right Cause. But in the December 1999 Duma elections Yabloko's support slipped to 5.9 percent (yielding sixteen seats, plus four in the single mandates). It was probably hurt by Yavlinsky's criticism of the government's new war in Chechnya.

Yabloko mainly existed as a vehicle for its leader, Yavlinsky. The rise of Vladimir Putin sunk Yavlinsky's presidential chances, leaving Yabloko as a visible but relatively powerless voice of opposition.

See also: CONSTITUTION OF 1993; YAVLINSKY, GRIGORY ALEXEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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PETER RUTLAND

YAGODA, GENRIKH GRIGOREVICH

(1891–1938), state security official, general commissar of state security (1935).

Genrikh Grigorevich Yagoda was a native of Rybinsk, the son of an artisan and the second cousin of the revolutionary leader Yakov Sverdlov, to whose niece he was married. He finished eight classes of gymnasium in Nizhni Novgorod before joining an anarchist-communist group (1907), and

later the Social Democratic Party (December 1907). In 1912 he was arrested and exiled to Simbirsk. After returning from exile, he joined the army as a soldier and corporal in the Fifth Corps (1914–1917) and was wounded in action. In 1917, Yagoda worked with the journal, *Soldatskaya Pravda*, before taking part in the October Revolution in Petrograd. He entered the Cheka (military intelligence service) in November 1919 and was attached to the Special (00) Branch (watchdog of the military), and by July 1920 was a member of the Cheka Collegium. He worked his way up in the Cheka-GPU-OGPU (*Obyedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie*, forerunner of the KGB), heading the Special Branch and later the Secret Political Department (watchdog of the intellectual life). In July 1927 he was the First Deputy Chairman of OGPU, but was later replaced by Ivan Akulov and demoted to deputy chairman. During the last two years, serving under the sickly Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, Yagoda actually ran the punitive organs. Taking an active part in working against Josef Stalin's enemies, he was rewarded by being elected as candidate member of the Central Committee (1930) and later as a full member (1934). After Menzhinsky's death in May 1934, the OGPU was re-formed as NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) on July 10, 1934, and Yagoda became its first commissar, the only Jew to hold this position. In 1935, when the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union was introduced in the Red Army, Yagoda received the equivalent rank of commissar general of state security, held by only two others (his successors Nikolai Yezhov and Lavrenti Beria).

For the next two years, Yagoda faithfully served Stalin and played a major part in organizing the Great Terror. He worked closely with Andrei Vyshinsky in organizing the first show trials and in the slaughters of the Red Army high command. More than a quarter of a million people were arrested during 1934 and 1935. The Gulag was vastly expanded under Yagoda's stewardship, and the use of slave labor became a major part of the Soviet economy. Stalin, however, was not satisfied with Yagoda's performance and organized a campaign to remove him, using, among others, Lazar Kaganovich, who began to complain about the organs' laxness toward "Trotskyists." Stalin's telegram of August 25, 1936, from Sochi to members of the Politburo, sealed Yagoda's fate. Yagoda was then appointed as the Commissar of Communications (1936–1937). Arrested on March 28, 1937, Yagoda was tried as a member of the "Right-Trotskyist Bloc" in the last of the show trials. Yagoda and other

defendants had to face Vyshinsky and the hanging judge, Vasily Ulrikh, with whom Yagoda had worked closely in the past. The former chief of the secret police remained stoical despite the obvious measures used to extract the necessary confessions. Sentenced to death, he was executed on March 15, 1938, a fate shared by several members of his family, but his son miraculously survived. Yagoda has not been rehabilitated.

See also: PURGES, THE GREAT; SHOW TRIALS; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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MICHAEL PARRISH

YAKOVLEV, ALEXANDER NIKOLAYEVICH

(b. 1922), secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (March 1986 to mid-1990) and member of the Politburo (mid-1987 to mid-1990).

Alexander Yakovlev was General Secretary Gorbachev's closest advisor and most loyal supporter in the Soviet leadership during the first five years of perestroika. During the 1960s and early 1970s Yakovlev held a series of responsible positions in the propaganda department of the Central Committee. In 1972, while serving as the acting director of the department, he published a scathing attack on the growing Russophile tendency within the Communist Party; this alienated a segment of the party leadership and led to his exile as ambassador to Canada, where he remained until 1983. When Gorbachev visited Canada that year as the head of a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was reportedly so impressed with Yakovlev that he named him the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences's major research institute on international affairs.

With Gorbachev's selection as General Secretary in 1985, Yakovlev emerged as Gorbachev's most influential advisor on both foreign and domestic policies. Yakovlev was often characterized as the architect of perestroika, but it is impossible to determine the accuracy of this assertion. He was



Alexander Yakovlev drew upon his time in the United States and Canada to help formulate Gorbachev's reforms. © PETER

TURNLEY/CORBIS

named the director of the propaganda department of the Central Committee in 1985 and was a member of the small Soviet delegation to the first summit conference with President Reagan in November of that same year. He attended all subsequent summit meetings.

In early 1986 Yakovlev was named a Secretary of the Central Committee and soon became locked in a battle with Secretary Yegor Ligachev for control of the party's ideological and cultural policies. Over the next two years he emerged as an articulate supporter of Gorbachev's new thinking in international relations, championed democratization and glasnost at home, defined the objectives of cultural life in humanist rather than socialist terms, and challenged orthodox definitions of Marxism-Leninism. He often proved more radical than Gorbachev in his definition of democratization, his enthusiasm for the establishment of cooperatives, and for private economic activity.

Yakovlev's orientation seemed to change after the reform of the Secretariat and apparat in the fall of 1988, which led to his appointment as the director of the Central Committee's new commission on international policy. Over the next two years he emerged as a social democrat and political liberal who insisted that the extension of individual freedom was the true objective of reform. After his selection as a deputy to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, he championed the extension of electoral politics, expressed doubts about the capacity of the Communist Party to lead reform, and endorsed a multiparty political system.

With Gorbachev's selection as President of the USSR in March 1990, Yakovlev was named to Gorbachev's advisory council and retired from his positions as Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo in mid-1990. Increasingly disillusioned with the Communist Party, in mid-1991 he helped to form an alternative, rival political movement, publicly repudiated Marxism, and resigned as Gorbachev's advisor. In August 1991 he quit the Communist Party and warned of an impending coup against the President.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; LIGACHEV, YEGOR KUZMICH; PERESTROIKA

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JONATHAN HARRIS

YALTA CONFERENCE

The Yalta Conference was the second wartime summit meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. It met from February 4 through February 11, 1945, in the Crimean city of Yalta. A mood of optimism prevailed at the conference because German armies were in retreat throughout Europe and victory was assured. The principal agenda item was Germany. Although there were sharp policy differences be-

tween the three parties, the Yalta Conference reached agreement on most issues, and the Big Three came away convinced that allied unity had been preserved.

Germany, it was agreed, would be divided into three zones of occupation (a fourth zone was carved out of the British and American zones for France). Occupation policy would be made by a Four Power Allied Control Commission to be located in Berlin. Reparations were to be extracted from Germany, with the details to be determined by an Allied Reparations Commission in Moscow. Nazism and German militarism were to be extinguished, and war criminals were to be justly and swiftly punished.

Poland proved to be an intractable problem. Churchill and Roosevelt sought unsuccessfully to persuade Stalin to recognize the London-based government in exile, but he continued to support the government installed by the Soviet Union in Lublin. At most, the Western leaders secured from Stalin a commitment to free and unfettered elections as soon as possible. No decisions were reached re-



Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill are shown laughing in the conference room of Livadia Palace, during the Yalta Conference. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.



The “Big Three” at Yalta in February 1945: Winston Churchill, a gravely ill Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin. COURTESY OF THE RARE BOOKS AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

garding Poland’s postwar boundaries, although it was understood that the eastern boundary would be the Curzon line. As to the liberated countries in Eastern Europe, the conferees pledged in a Declaration on Liberated Europe to respect “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.”

A secret protocol stipulated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan within three months after Germany’s surrender. As compensation, Russia’s losses to Japan resulting from the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 1905 would be restored. These included southern Sakhalin, adjacent islands, and the Kuril Islands. The Soviet Union also received the lease of Port Arthur, internationalization of the port of Dairen, and partial control over the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads as concessions.

Regarding the United Nations, it was agreed that a United Nations conference would be held in the United States on April 25, 1945. The United States and Britain agreed to accept Ukraine and Belorussia as original members, thus giving the Soviet Union three votes in the General Assembly. Also, important provisions related to the voting rules of the Security Council were formulated, including a provision for the veto power of the five permanent members.

Because Stalin ultimately succeeded in imposing communist regimes on the peoples of Eastern Europe, some critics have accused Roosevelt of “selling out” Eastern Europe. However, the consensus of scholarly opinion is that the superior military position of the Red Army at the end of the war virtually guaranteed Soviet predominance, regardless of the decisions made at Yalta.

See also: POTSDAM CONFERENCE; WORLD WAR II

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JOSEPH L. NOGEE

YANAYEV, GENNADY IVANOVICH

(b. 1937), USSR vice president, coup plotter.

Gennady Yanayev graduated from Gorky Agricultural Institute in 1959 and earned a history degree from the All-Union Law Institute in 1967. Before joining the Party in 1962, Yanayev worked in the agro-industry sector. After securing Party membership, he soon began working in the Gorky Komsomol organization (1963–1968). He was promoted to chairman of the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations (1968–1980) and later to deputy chair of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies (1980–1986). He switched to working in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in 1986, becoming chair in 1990.

Yanayev rose following the Twenty-eighth CPSU Party Congress. In July 1990 he was named to the Central Committee and Politburo and given the Central Committee foreign policy portfolio. Following the creation of the Soviet presidency in late 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev nominated Yanayev as his vice president on December 27. The Congress of People's Deputies approved him on the second ballot. He then resigned from his Central Committee and Politburo posts effective January 31, 1991.

Yanayev disagreed with Gorbachev's reforms and was the public face of the group that plotted the abortive coup of August 19–21, 1991. He went on international television to claim that, as vice president, he had assumed the acting presidency of the Soviet Union. His quivering hands, constant sniffing, and stilted delivery suggested his lack of

conviction—or his inebriation. Along with Yeltsin's appearance atop a tank, Yanayev and his shaking hands became a central image of the putsch. Yanayev was arrested immediately following the coup's collapse and was amnestied by the Duma in February 1994. He went on to become a pension fund consultant.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH

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ANN E. ROBERTSON

YARLYK

A decree or pronouncement by a Mongol khan.

The *yarlyk* (Mongolian *jarligh*; Tartar *yarligh*) was one of three types of non-fundamental law (*jasagh* or *yasa*) pronouncements that had the effect of a regulation or ordinance, the other two being *debter* (a record of precedence cases for administration and judicial decisions) and *bilig* (maxims or sayings attributed to Chinghis Khan). The *yarlyki* provide important information about the running of the Mongol Empire.

From the mid-thirteenth to mid-fifteenth centuries, all Rus princes received *yarlyki* authorizing their rule. Initially, those *yarlyki* came from the qaghan in Karakorum, but after Batu established his khanate, they came from Sarai. None of these *yarlyki*, however, is extant. In the mid-fifteenth century, Basil II began forbidding other Rus princes from receiving the *yarlyk* from Tatar khans, thus establishing the right of the Moscow grand prince to authorize local princely rule.

In the Rus metropolitan archive are preserved six *yarlyki* (constituting the so-called Short Collection) considered to be translations into Russian of authentic patents issued from the Qipchaq Khanate: (1) from Khan Tiuliak (Tulunbek) of Mamai's Horde to Metropolitan Mikhail (Mitia) (1379); (2) from Khatun Taydula to the Rus' princes (1347); (3) from Khan Mengu-Temir to Metropolitan Peter (1308); (4) from Khatun Taydula to Metropolitan Feognost (1343); (5) from Khan Berdibek to Metropolitan Alexei (1357); and (6) from Khatun

Taydula to Metropolitan Alexei (1354). A seventh yarlyk, which purports to be from Khan Özbeġ to Metropolitan Peter (found in the so-called full collection) has been determined to be a sixteenth-century forgery. The yarlyki to the metropolitans affirm the freedom of the Church from taxes and tributes, and declare that the Church's property should be protected from expropriation or damage as long as Rus churchmen pray for the well-being of the khan and his family.

See also: GOLDEN HORDE

DONALD OSTROWSKI

YAROPOLK I

(d. 980), son of Svyatoslav and the grandson of Igor and Olga; fourth grand prince of Kiev.

The date of Yaropolk Svyatoslavich's birth is unknown, but the *Primary Chronicle* reports that in 968 he and his two brothers were under Olga's care. In 970 their father Svyatoslav gave Kiev to Yaropolk, the Derevlyane lands to Oleg, and Novgorod (after Yaropolk and Oleg rejected it) to their half-brother Vladimir. Yaropolk married a Greek woman, a former nun whom Svyatoslav had taken captive. In 973, after the death of his father, Yaropolk became the grand prince of Kiev. In 977, after Oleg killed the son of Yaropolk's commander Sveneld while on a hunting trip, Yaropolk avenged his death by attacking Oleg. The latter died in battle, and Yaropolk appropriated his domain. When Vladimir learned of Oleg's fate, he feared for his own life and fled to Scandinavia to seek aid from the Varangians. Yaropolk then appointed his man to Novgorod and became sole ruler in all Rus. In 980 Vladimir returned to Novgorod and attacked Yaropolk because the latter had killed Oleg and refused to divide Oleg's domain with him. On June 11, 980, Vladimir's men treacherously killed Yaropolk. Vladimir then took Yaropolk's pregnant wife to himself, and she gave birth to Svyatopolk, who would later have Vladimir's sons Boris and Gleb murdered. In 1044 Vladimir's son Yaroslav "the Wise" exhumed the bodies of Yaropolk and Oleg, baptized them, and buried them in the Church of the Mother of God (the Tithe Church) in Kiev.

See also: GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; OLGA; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; SVYATOPOLK I; VLADIMIR, ST.; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

(c. 980–1054), Yaroslav "the wise"; grand prince of Kiev which he secured for his family; the main agent of the so-called Golden Age of Kievan Rus.

Yaroslav's father was Vladimir Svyatoslavich, the Christianizer of Rus, and his mother was Princess Rogneda of Polotsk, of Scandinavian ancestry. Vladimir first sent Yaroslav to Rostov, but around 1010 transferred him to Novgorod. While there, he developed close ties with the townspeople and the Varangians of Scandinavia. He also minted coins and issued two charters granting the Novgorodians special privileges. In 1014 Yaroslav rebelled against his father by refusing to pay the annual tribute. He summoned Varangians to help him fend off the expected punitive attack, but before Vladimir could set out from Kiev, he died. Svyatopolk, his eldest surviving son succeeded him and decided to consolidate his rule by eliminating his half-brothers, beginning with Boris, Gleb, and Svyatoslav.

After Yaroslav learned of his father's death and Svyatopolk's treachery, he marched south with the Varangians and the Novgorodians. In 1016 his forces confronted Svyatopolk and the Pechenegs around Lyubech and defeated them. Svyatopolk fled to the Poles, and Yaroslav occupied Kiev. In 1018, however, Svyatopolk returned with his father-in-law, Boleslaw I, and forced Yaroslav to flee to Novgorod. In 1019, after the king returned home, Yaroslav evicted Svyatopolk from Kiev once again and occupied it a second time. Nevertheless, his rule was not secure. Taking advantage of his absence from Novgorod, Bryacheslav Izyaslavich of Polotsk captured the town and took many captives, forcing Yaroslav to attack him and free the Novgorodians. A greater threat to his power came in 1024, when Yaroslav's brother Mstislav of Tmutarakan attempted to take Kiev from him while he was looking after northern affairs. Yaroslav brought the Novgorodians against Mstislav, but the latter defeated him at Listven west of Chernigov. All the

same, Mstislav did not occupy Kiev but took Chernigov and the entire left bank of the Dnieper. In 1026, therefore, Chernigov and Kiev became two autonomous domains, with Yaroslav, the elder brother, enjoying seniority in Kiev. When Mstislav died without an heir around 1034, Yaroslav repossessed Chernigov and the left bank. After he imprisoned his only surviving brother Sudislav, he became sole ruler of the entire land except for Polotsk, which remained independent of Kiev.

Yaroslav also waged war against external enemies. In the early 1030s he recaptured the Cherven towns that Boleslaw I had seized. In the 1040s he strengthened his ties with Casimir I by forming marriage alliances with him and by sending him military aid. He was also the first prince of Kiev to form marriage ties with the Germans and the French. He was married to Ingigerd, the daughter of the King of Sweden. In the 1030s and 1040s he expanded Novgorod's western and northern frontiers into the neighboring lands of the Lithuanians and the Chud, where he founded the outpost of Yurev (Tartu). To the south, Yaroslav encountered no serious aggression from the Pechenegs after 1036, when they failed to capture Kiev. In 1043, however, he organized an unsuccessful expedition against Constantinople. Historians do not concur on his motive for attacking the Greeks. Nevertheless, he restored good relations with them and concluded a marriage alliance with the imperial family three years later.

Yaroslav made Kiev his political and ecclesiastical capital and strove to make it the intellectual, cultural, and economic center in imitation of Constantinople. He founded monasteries and churches such as the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, the metropolitan's church. Around 1051, evidently in an unsuccessful attempt to assert the independence of the Church in Rus from Constantinople, he appointed Hilarion as the first native metropolitan of Kiev. Yaroslav promoted the writing and translation of religious and secular texts, assembled a library, and brought scribes and master builders from Byzantium. His secular building projects, such as the new court and the defensive rampart around Kiev, its Golden Gate adorned with a chapel, enhanced the capital's prestige. Yaroslav issued a Church Statute and the first version of the first written code of civil law (*Russkaya Pravda*). He bequeathed to each of his sons a patrimonial domain. In an effort to ensure a peaceful transition of power in the future, and to keep the land unified, Yaroslav issued his so-called Testament. In it he outlined the

order of succession to Kiev that his sons and their descendants were to follow. He designated Izyaslav, his eldest surviving son, as his immediate successor. Yaroslav died on February 20, 1054, and was buried in the Cathedral of St. Sophia.

See also: CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, KIEV; GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; HILARION, METROPOLITAN; MSTISLAV; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; PECHENECS; SVYATOPOLK I; VIKINGS; VLADIMIR, ST.

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MARTIN DIMNIK

YAROSLAV VSEVOLODOVICH

(d. 1246), grand prince of Vladimir and grand prince of Kiev.

Before dying in 1212, Yaroslav's father Vsevolod Yurevich "Big Nest" gave Yaroslav the patrimony of Pereyaslavl Zalesky. In 1215 Yaroslav also occupied Novgorod, but lost control of it in 1216 when he joined Yuri against their senior brother Konstantin, who defeated them at the river Lipitsa. After the latter died in 1218, Yuri replaced him as grand prince of Vladimir. Although Yaroslav helped Yuri campaign against the Polovtsy and the Volga Bulgars, his main objective was to assert his rule over Novgorod. He helped the citizens by marching against the Lithuanians, the Chud, and other tribes. In his quest for more power over the town, he antagonized many Novgorodians to the point where, in 1224, they asked Mikhail Vsevolodovich of Chernigov for

help. After the latter occupied Novgorod and curtailed Yaroslav's authority, he developed a lifelong hatred for Mikhail. In 1232 Yaroslav finally secured his rule in Novgorod; in 1236 he briefly occupied Kiev. After the Tatars killed his brother Yuri in 1238, Yaroslav became grand prince of Vladimir and appointed his sons Alexander "Nevsky" and Andrei to Novgorod. In 1243 Yaroslav traveled to Saray, where he was the first prince to submit to the khan Batu. Although the khan made him the grand prince of Kiev, Yaroslav did not occupy it. More important was his acquisition of Batu's patent for Vladimir, through which he secured the town for his heirs. Two years later the Tatars summoned Yaroslav to Mongolia, to the Great Khan's court in Karakorum, where they poisoned him. He died on September 30, 1246.

See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; BATU KHAN; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VSEVOLOD III; YURI VSEVOLODOVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

YAROSLAV YAROSLAVICH

(d. 1271), grand prince of Vladimir, the first independent prince of Tver, and the progenitor of the town's dynasty.

Yaroslav Yaroslavich became prince of Tver in 1247 when his uncle Svyatoslav gave patrimonies to all his nephews, the sons of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich. Soon after, Yaroslav's elder brothers, Alexander "Nevsky" and Andrei, quarreled over succession to the patrimonial capital of Vladimir. Yaroslav sided with Andrei. In 1252 the khan Batu sent a punitive force against them, and they were defeated at Pereyasavl Zalessky. Nevertheless, Yaroslav remained at odds with Alexander and had to flee from Tver two years later. In 1255 the Novgorodians invited him to rule, but he withdrew from the town after Alexander threatened to attack. Later he was reconciled with his brother, and, in 1258, he traveled to the Golden Horde and received the patent for Tver. After Alexander died in 1262, Yaroslav challenged his elder brother Andrei for control of Vladimir and sought help from Saray. In 1263 Khan Berke appointed him grand prince of Vladimir.

Following this victory, the Novgorodians asked him to be their prince; in 1265 he agreed to rule according to their terms. While waging war against Novgorod's enemies and concluding treaties with German merchant groups on its behalf, he also increased his power over the town. His heavy-handed measures, however, antagonized the citizens, and they expelled him in 1270. Yaroslav attacked Novgorod, and, after Metropolitan Cyril intervened, the townspeople accepted him as prince. Yaroslav was summoned to Saray but died on September 16, 1271, while traveling from the Tatars.

See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; POLOVTSY; YAROSLAV VSEVOLODOVICH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

YAROSLAV THE WISE *See* YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH.

YAVLINSKY, GRIGORY ALEXEYEVICH

(b. 1952), liberal economist and party leader.

Grigory Alexeyevich Yavlinsky was a prominent advocate of economic reform under Mikhail Gorbachev and went on to found Yabloko, one of the few liberal parties to survive the turbulent 1990s. Yavlinsky was a consistent advocate of market reform, liberal democracy, and partnership with the West, but his principled stance meant that he declined repeated invitations from President Boris Yeltsin to take up a government position.

Yavlinsky was born into a teacher's family in Lvov (Ukraine) and studied labor economics in Moscow, finishing a graduate degree in 1976. He worked at various research institutes before being appointed deputy head of the new State Commission for Economic Reform in 1989. The next year he coauthored the bold "400 days" reform plan (later renamed "500 days"), which was never implemented because of the political chaos that preceded the Soviet collapse.

During the August 1991 coup, Yavlinsky joined the defenders of the White House, and afterwards he became deputy prime minister in the new Soviet government, which fell when the USSR was dissolved in December. Rival economist Yegor Gaidar joined Yeltsin's team in the Russian Federation government, and it was he, not Yavlinsky, who oversaw Russia's transition to a market economy. Yavlinsky was left criticizing the program of what he called "*nomenklatura* privatization" from the sidelines.

Yavlinsky's consuming ambition was to be elected as president. Intelligent, articulate, and principled, he had some important admirers in the West. But he was less successful in forging alliances with other politicians (i.e., regional leaders, or retired general Alexander Lebed) that could have brought him closer to power.

Given the absence of an obvious successor, had Yeltsin resigned on health grounds, Yavlinsky would have had a good shot at the presidency. However, the sickly Yeltsin soldiered on. In the first round of the presidential election on June 16, 1996, Yavlinsky placed a disappointing fourth with 7.3 percent. Yavlinsky reportedly received substantial financial backing from banks such as Most and Menatep; he was certainly able to mount an expensive TV ad campaign. Yavlinsky refused to support Yeltsin in the second round of the election, thereby deeply angering the Yeltsin camp.

Yavlinsky hung on, waiting for Yeltsin's resignation. After the August 1998 financial crisis brought down Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, the communists in the Duma refused to approve the return of Viktor Chernomyrdin as prime minister. Yavlinsky resolved the impasse by proposing Yevgeny Primakov as a compromise candidate. But then, in typical Yavlinsky fashion, he refused to join Primakov's cabinet.

When Yeltsin resigned in December 1999 he was able to hand over the presidency to his chosen successor, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who easily won election in March 2000. Yavlinsky ran once again, but finished a distant third, with 4.8 percent. He then stood by as Putin went on to introduce many of the reforms that Yavlinsky had advocated for years: a flat tax on income and profits, land reform, and tighter control over oil revenues.

Yavlinsky comes across as a man of integrity and ambition who failed to realize his potential. In

the words of one commentator, he was "the best president Russia never had."

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; YABLOKO

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PETER RUTLAND

YAZOV, DMITRY TIMOFEYEVICH

(b. 1923), minister of defense and marshal of the Soviet Union.

A veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Dmitry Yazov joined the army as an enlisted man before he was commissioned in 1942 and served as a combat infantry officer. In the postwar decade Yazov rose through the officer ranks and attended the Frunze Military Academy from 1956 to 1958. He spent the next decade in service with Soviet Group of Forces in Germany, in the Leningrad Military District, and in Cuba during the missile crisis. From 1968 to 1970 he attended the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff. Yazov went on to command the Thirty-fourth Army Corps and Fourth Army. From 1976 to 1979 he headed the Main Directorate for Cadres in the Ministry of Defense. There followed a series of senior positions: deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District, commander of the Central Group of Force, and commander of the Central Asian Military District. In 1987, in the aftermath of the Rust Affair, Yazov was appointed minister of defense to replace Marshal Sokolov. Yazov oversaw the Ministry during the final days of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the negotiation of key arms control agreements, and a period of mounting criticism of the military under glasnost and perestroika. During his tenure Soviet forces were used to intervene in domestic hot spots in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Baltic Republics. In 1991 Yazov joined an eight-man junta, the State Committee of the Emergency Situation, composed of senior party, military, and security service personnel, who gambled on a putsch to remove Gorbachev and prevent the dismemberment of the Union. Between August 19 and 21, Yazov was responsible for the movement of forces to ensure an orderly transfer of power.

He failed and the coup collapsed. Yazov was arrested for his part in the coup and sent to jail, but in February 1994 he received a parliamentary amnesty. In 1998 Yazov was appointed as an advisor to the Directorate of International Cooperation in the Ministry of Defense.

See also: AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; ARMS CONTROL; AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH

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JACOB W. KIPP

YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

(b. 1931), charismatic anticommunist reformer, first president of post-Soviet Russia.

Democrat or impatient revolutionary, corrupt schemer or populist, Boris Yeltsin displayed a certain recklessness from his childhood through his rise to the presidency of Russia. While Yeltsin orchestrated the peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union, he succumbed to poor health and personal rule and failed to build a strong new Russian state.

Yeltsin was born on February 1, 1931, and raised in Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg) Oblast in the Ural Mountains. He received a degree in construction engineering from Urals Polytechnical Institute in 1955 and spent the early years of his career in a variety of construction and engineering posts in Sverdlovsk, moving from project manager to top leadership positions in the building administration. He joined the CPSU in 1961 and in 1968 became chief of the Construction Department of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee (*obkom*). In 1975 he was appointed industry secretary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom.

Yeltsin was known for encouraging innovation, and his production successes made a name for him in Moscow. In 1976 he was named first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom. Among his notable policies from this period, he ordered the midnight bulldozing of the Ipatiev House, the execution site of Nicholas II and his family, as the Kremlin feared it was becoming a shrine. He built a reputation for honesty and incorruptibility mixed with impatience and a tendency toward authoritarian leadership.

Yeltsin's Party career continued to flourish as he moved up the ranks. He served as a deputy in the Council of the Union (1978–1989), a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Transport and Communications (1979–1984), a full member of the CPSU Central Committee (1981–1990), member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1984–1985), and chief of the Central Committee Department of Construction (1985).

AGAINST THE GRAIN

Yeltsin soon became part of the new team of young, reform-minded communists under new CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. On the advice of CPSU ideology and personnel secretary Yegor Ligachev, Gorbachev brought Yeltsin to Moscow in April 1985. Yeltsin quickly grew restless at a desk job and welcomed his promotion to first secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee, succeeding the aging Viktor Grishin. Subsequently, Yeltsin also was elected a candidate member of the Politburo (February 1986) and a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1986). Yeltsin was extremely popular as Moscow's *de facto* mayor, known for riding the subways, dropping in unannounced at local shops, and championing architectural preservation, while exposing and criticizing the privileges enjoyed by the Party elite.

Eventually Yeltsin clashed with key members of the Party leadership. Yeltsin complained openly about the pace of perestroika, criticizing the senior Kremlin leadership for complacency and lack of accountability and Gorbachev for timidity. In particular, he locked horns with Ligachev. Yeltsin's campaign to remove complacent Grishin cronies infringed upon Ligachev's personnel portfolio. Ligachev also pointedly objected when Yeltsin began to close Moscow's special shops and schools for Party officials. Yeltsin became so frustrated that he tendered his resignation in the summer of 1987. Gorbachev refused to accept it, asking him to hold

his complaints until after the upcoming celebration for the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution so that a united front would lead the festivities. Yeltsin declined to heed this advice.

Yeltsin aired his grievances at the Central Committee Plenum on October 21, 1987. The plenum agenda included approving Gorbachev's anniversary speech, but that was not the presentation that attracted the most attention. Following Gorbachev's presentation, Yeltsin delivered an impromptu speech, lasting for about ten minutes, complaining about the slow pace of reforms, Ligachev's intrigues, and a new cult of personality emerging around Gorbachev. Yeltsin charged that leaders were sheltering Gorbachev from the harsh realities of Soviet life. Though this secret speech was not published at the time, its contents soon became public. The plenum itself turned into three hours of criticism heaped on Yeltsin. He was criticized not so much for the content as for the style and the timing of his comments. Yeltsin regularly had opportunities to voice such concerns at weekly Politburo meetings; that he had chosen this particular forum against the direct order of Gorbachev indicated Yeltsin's immaturity and arrogance. Gorbachev now accepted Yeltsin's prior resignation from the Moscow Party Committee and asked the Central Committee to enact appropriate resolutions for his removal. He was also stripped of his seat on the Politburo. Yeltsin thus became the first high-level Gorbachev appointee to lose his position.

Yeltsin was not exiled back to Siberia, however. Gorbachev appointed Yeltsin to be first deputy chair of the USSR State Committee for Construction, a post that allowed him to remain in Moscow and in the political limelight. Yeltsin also remained popular with Muscovites, many of whom felt they had lost an ally. Almost one thousand residents of the capital staged a rally to support Yeltsin, which had to be broken up by police. Yeltsin was unavailable. As would frequently occur during his political career, times of high political drama tended to incapacitate him. At the time of the Central Committee Plenum, Yeltsin was hospitalized for an apparent heart attack. He was literally taken from his hospital bed to attend the session of the Moscow City Committee to be formally fired.

Yeltsin reappeared in public at the 1988 May Day celebration, joining other Central Committee members to watch the annual parade. He was selected as a delegate from the Karelian Autonomous

Socialist Republic for the extraordinary Nineteenth CPSU Conference in June; Party officials may have selected the remote constituency to reduce publicity for Yeltsin. Instead, the publicity came on the last day of the Conference.

Gorbachev allowed Yeltsin to speak at the Conference in order to clear the air of rumors regarding the October affair and to see what this "man of the people" had to say. On live television, Yeltsin began by responding to criticisms recently levied against him by his fellow delegates and then tried to clarify his physical and mental condition at the Moscow City Plenum. He repeated his criticism of the slow pace of reform and of privileges for the Party elite. Then, for the first time in Soviet history, a disgraced leader publicly asked for rehabilitation. Yeltsin was followed to the podium by Ligachev, who continued to criticize and denigrate the fallen Communist. When the Conference ended, Yeltsin had not been reinstated. But in a move suggesting that Gorbachev had some respect for Yeltsin's point of view, Ligachev was soon reassigned to agriculture.

RIISING DEMOCRAT

Yeltsin began a remarkable political comeback with the March 1989 elections to the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies (CPD). Although the Central Committee declined to put Yeltsin on its slate of candidates, some fifty constituencies nominated him. Yeltsin opted to run from Moscow—not Sverdlovsk—and won almost 90 percent of the vote, despite an official smear campaign. When the CPD announced candidates for the new Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin was not on the ballot. Large popular protests began in Moscow, and delegates were swamped with telegrams and telephone calls supporting Yeltsin. Ultimately Alexei Kazannik, a deputy from Omsk, offered to relinquish his seat to Yeltsin—and Yeltsin only. Yeltsin became co-chair of the opposition Inter-Regional Group and called for a new constitution that would place sovereignty with the people, not the Party. Further signaling his break with Gorbachev, during the July 1990 Twenty-eighth Party Conference, Yeltsin dramatically resigned from the CPSU, tossing his party membership card aside and striding out of the meeting hall. He had cast his lot with the Russian people.

Meanwhile, Yeltsin had established roots in the RSFSR, giving him a political base to challenge Gorbachev. He was elected to the Russian Congress of

People's Deputies in March 1990 and became chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet in May 1990. He declared Russia sovereign in June 1990, triggering a war of laws between his institutions and those of Gorbachev. In June 1991 Yeltsin was elected to the newly created office of RSFSR President. Unlike Gorbachev as president of the USSR, Yeltsin had been popularly elected, a mandate that gave him much greater legitimacy than Gorbachev could claim for himself. He even called for Gorbachev's resignation in February 1991. During the negotiations for a new union treaty in early 1991, Yeltsin demanded that key powers devolve to the republics. Eventually the two leaders came to an agreement, and Yeltsin planned to sign the new Union Treaty on August 20, 1991.

When hard-line communists tried to block the treaty and topple Gorbachev, Yeltsin sprang into action. While Gorbachev was under house arrest in the Crimea, Yeltsin was at his dacha outside Moscow. Refusing his family's and advisers' pleas that he go into hiding, Yeltsin eluded the commandos surrounding his dacha and went to the Russian parliament building, known as the White House. Climbing atop one of the tanks surrounding the White House, Yeltsin denounced the coup as illegal, read an Appeal to the Citizens of Russia, and called for a general strike. Yeltsin's team began circulating alternative news reports, faxing them out to Western media for broadcast back into the USSR. Soon Muscovites began to heed Yeltsin's call to defend democracy. Thousands surrounded the building, protecting it from an expected attack by hard-line forces. Throughout the three-day siege, Yeltsin remained at the White House, broadcasting radio appeals, telephoning international leaders, and regularly addressing the crowd outside. When the coup plotters gave up, Yeltsin had replaced Gorbachev as the most powerful political figure in the USSR. Yeltsin banned the CPSU on Russian soil, effectively ending its operations, but did not call for purges of communist leaders. Instead, he left for his own three-week Crimean vacation.

While Yeltsin inexplicably left the capital at this critical time, Gorbachev was unable to rally support to himself or his reconfigured Soviet Union. Upon his return to Moscow, Yeltsin seized more all-union assets, institutions, and authorities until it became obvious that Gorbachev had little left to govern. Then, on the weekend of December 8, 1991, Yeltsin met with his counterparts from Belarus (Stanislau Shushkevich) and Ukraine (Leonid Kuchma). The three men drafted the Belovezhskaya

Accords, in which the three founding republics of the Soviet Union declared the country's formal end.

THE STRUGGLE FOR RUSSIA

Yeltsin began the simultaneous tasks of establishing a new state, a market economy, and a new political system. Initially the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) served to regulate relations with the other Soviet successor states, although Ukraine and other western states resented Yeltsin's argument that Russia was first among equals. Yeltsin, for example, commanded the CIS military, which he initially used in lieu of creating a separate Russian military. Domestically, he faced secessionist challenges from Chechnya and less severe autonomist movements from Tatarstan, Sakha, and Bashkortostan. Radical economic policy was implemented as Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar's economic shock therapy program freed most prices as of January 1, 1992, and Anatoly Chubais led efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises. The two policies combined to bring Russia to the brink of economic collapse. Not only did Yeltsin face public criticism on the economy, but his own vice president, Alexander Rutskoi, and the speaker of parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, also denounced his policies.

On the political front, Yeltsin found himself in uncertain waters. Although work was underway to draft a new constitution, the process had been interrupted by the collapse of the USSR. Russia technically still operated under the 1978 constitution, which vested authority in the Supreme Soviet. However, the Supreme Soviet had granted Yeltsin emergency powers for the first twelve months of the transition. As these powers neared expiration, Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet became locked in a battle for control of Russia. As a compromise, Yeltsin replaced Gaidar with an old-school industrialist, Viktor Chernomyrdin, but that did not appease the Congress, which stripped Yeltsin of his emergency powers on March 12. Narrowly surviving an impeachment vote, Yeltsin threatened emergency rule and called a referendum on his rule for April 25, 1993. Yeltsin won that round, but the battle between executive and legislature continued all summer.

On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin issued decree number 1400 dissolving the Supreme Soviet and calling for elections to a new body in December. Parliament, led by Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, refused, and members barricaded themselves in the



Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Polish president Lech Walesa confer, August 25, 1993. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

White House. Rutskoi was sworn in as acting president. Attempts at negotiation failed, and on October 3, the rebels seized the neighboring home of Moscow's mayor and set out to commandeer the Ostankino television complex. Yeltsin then did what the hardliners did not do in August 1991: He ordered the White House be taken by force. Troops stormed the building, more than one hundred people died, and Khasbulatov, Rutskoi, and their colleagues were led to jail.

Parliamentary elections took place as scheduled in December. Simultaneously, a referendum was held to approve the super-presidential constitution drafted by Yeltsin's team. If the referendum failed, Russians would have voted for an illegitimate legislature. Fearing rivals for power, Yeltsin had eliminated the office of vice president in the new constitution, but he also refused to create a presidential political party. As a result, there was no obvious pro-government party. Gaidar and his liberal democrats lost to the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and the

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Rumors persist that turnout was below the required 50 percent threshold, which would have invalidated the ratification of the constitution itself.

The Duma, the new bicameral parliament's lower house, began with a strong anti-Yeltsin statement. In February it amnestied the participants in the 1991 putsch and the 1993 Supreme Soviet revolt. Yeltsin tried to accommodate the red-brown coalition of Communists and nationalists in the Duma. Economic liberalization eased, privatization entered its second phase, and a handful of businessmen—the oligarchs—snatched up key enterprises at deep discount.

Yeltsin reached out to regions for support, with mixed results. A series of bilateral treaties were signed with the Russian republics, especially Tatarstan, giving them greater autonomy than specified in the federal constitution. However, one republic, Chechnya, remained firm in its refusal to recognize the authority of Moscow, and a showdown became imminent. A group of hardliners

within the Yeltsin administration orchestrated an invasion of Chechnya on December 11, 1994. Although they had expected a quick victory, the bloody war continued until August 1996.

Yeltsin approached presidential elections scheduled for June 1996 with four key problems. First was the ongoing and highly unpopular war in Chechnya. Second, the communists dominated the 1995 Duma elections. Third was his declining health. (He had collapsed in October 1995, triggering a succession crisis in the Kremlin.) Fourth, his approval ratings were in the single digits, and advisors Oleg Soskovets and Alexander Korzhakov urged him to cancel the election. But yet again, Yeltsin launched an amazing political comeback. He fired his most liberal Cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev whose pro-West policies had angered many, and floated a new peace plan for Chechnya.

In a campaign organized by Chubais and Yeltsin's daughter Tatiana Dyachenko, Yeltsin barnstormed across the country, delivering rousing speeches, handing out lavish political favors, and dancing with the crowds. The campaign was bankrolled by the oligarchs—a group of seven entrepreneurs who had amassed tremendous wealth in the privatization process under questionable circumstances and wanted to protect their interests. The Kremlin boldly admitted to exceeding the campaign-spending cap. Yeltsin failed to win a majority of the votes in the election, forcing him into a run-off with CPRF candidate Gennady Zyuganov.

Between the first election and the run-off, Yeltsin suffered a massive heart attack. This news was kept from the Russian population, who went to the polls unaware of the situation. Only after Yeltsin had secured victory was news of his health released. He underwent quintuple bypass surgery in November 1996, contracted pneumonia, and was effectively an invalid for months. During this time, access to the president and the daily business of running the country fell to Yeltsin's closest advisors: Chubais and Dyachenko, known as "The Family."

Yeltsin's last years in office were marked by a declining economy, rising corruption, and frequent turnover in the office of prime minister. The oligarchs soon turned on each other, fighting for assets and access. Yeltsin's immediate family was implicated in a variety of graft schemes. With the economy declining, Yeltsin embarked on prime minister roulette. He fired Chernomyrdin, replacing



Russian president Boris Yeltsin appeals to the people to vote in the 1993 referendum. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

him with Sergei Kiriyenko (March–August 1998), Chernomyrdin again (August 23–September 10), then Yevgeny Primakov (September 10, 1998–May 12, 1999), and Sergei Stepashin (May 12–August 8). In August 1998 the ruble collapsed, and Russia defaulted on its foreign loan obligations. Next in line as prime minister came ex-KGB agent Vladimir Putin.

In 1999 Yeltsin associates floated the idea of his running for a third term. They argued that the two-term limit imposed by the 1993 constitution might not count Yeltsin's 1991 election, as it occurred under different political and legal circumstances. Yeltsin's health was a key concern, as was his family's complicity in a growing number of corruption schemes. Before Yeltsin could leave office he needed a suitable successor, one that could protect him and his family. On New Year's Eve, 1999, Yeltsin went on television to make a surprise

announcement—his resignation. According to the constitution, Prime Minister Putin would succeed him, with elections called within three months. As acting president, Putin's first action was to grant Yeltsin immunity from prosecution.

Yeltsin retired quietly to his dacha outside of Moscow. Unlike Gorbachev, he did not form his own think tank or join the international lecture circuit. Instead, Yeltsin wrote his third volume of memoirs, *Midnight Diaries*, and largely kept out of politics and public life.

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; CHECHNYA AND THE CHECHENS; CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH; DYACHENKO, TATIANA BORISOVNA; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; KHASBULATOV, RUSLAN IMRANOVICH; KORZHAKOV, ALEXANDER VASILEVICH; OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; RUTSKOI, ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH

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YELTSIN CONSTITUTION *See* CONSTITUTION OF 1993.

YERMAK TIMOFEYEVICH

(d. 1585), Cossack chieftain, leader of an expedition that laid the basis for Russia's annexation of Siberia.

Little is known about Yermak's early biography, and many of the details of his Siberian cam-

paign are still disputed. Most sources indicate that he was a Volga Cossack who fled north in 1581 in order to escape punishment for piracy; Ruslan Skrynnikov, however, argues that Yermak was fighting in the Livonian War in 1581 and went to Siberia in 1582. Yermak and his Cossack band were hired by the Stroganovs, a family of wealthy Urals merchants, to protect their possessions against attacks by the Tatars and other indigenous peoples of Siberia. Thereafter Yermak and his band of a few hundred men set off along the Siberian rivers in lightweight boats; it is not clear whether the Stroganovs sent them to attack the Siberian khanate, or whether the decision to go on to the offensive was taken by the Cossacks. In October 1582 they defeated the Siberian khan, Kuchum, and occupied his capital, Kashlyk (Isker). The local peoples recognized Yermak's authority and rendered him tribute. In 1585, however, Khan Kuchum launched a surprise attack on the Cossack camp and killed most of the band. Yermak himself, according to legend, drowned in the River Irtysh, weighed down by a suit of armour that he had received as a gift from the tsar. Subsequent expeditions continued the Russian annexation of Siberia that Yermak had pioneered. After his death Yermak became a folk hero; his achievements were celebrated in oral tales and songs, and later depicted in popular prints (*lubki*).

See also: IVAN IV; SIBERIA

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MAUREEN PERRIE

YESENIN, SERGEI ALEXANDROVICH

(1895–1925), popular poet of the Soviet period, known for his evocations of the Russian countryside and the Soviet demimonde.

Sergei Alexandrovich Yesenin (also spelled Esenin) born in 1895 in Konstantinovo, a farm village in the Riazan province, where he attended school. He came to prominence in Petrograd in 1915 as part of a group of "Peasant Poets." His early work was noted for its elegiac portrayal of rural life and religious themes.

Yesenin was an ambivalent supporter of the October Revolution and the Soviet state. He tried to write on revolutionary themes, but his explorations of intimate relationships, urban street life, and the disappearance of old rural Russia were more popular. Yesenin was also known for his charisma, heavy drinking, and scandalous behavior. He was married three times, once to the American dancer Isadora Duncan. Yesenin committed suicide in December 1925, shortly after writing his final poem, "Good-bye, My Friend, Good-bye," in his own blood.

Yesenin's popularity continued after his death, as readers were drawn to his unconventional lifestyle and introspective poetry. This concerned the Communist leadership, who believed that Yesenin had both reflected and encouraged a growing sense of disaffection and "hooliganism" among Soviet youth. Numerous attacks on "Yeseninism" appeared in the Soviet press in 1926 and 1927. He was also criticized by the so-called proletarian writers for his anti-urban bias and individualism. As a result, official policy toward Yesenin's works was ambivalent, and no new editions of his work were published between 1927 and 1948.

There was increased interest in Yesenin's work in the 1960s and 1970s. His influence was evident on the rising generation of bard-singers, such as Vladimir Vysotsky, and also on the emerging "Village Prose" movement. One of Yesenin's illegitimate sons, Alexander Volpin-Yesenin, was an early dissident and human rights advocate. Major collections of Esenin's work include *Radunitsa* (1916), *The Hooligan's Confession* (1921), and *Selected Works* (1922).

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BRIAN KASSOF

YEVTUSHENKO, YEVGENY ALEXANDROVICH

(b. 1932), Russian poet, playwright, novelist, essayist, photographer, film actor; member of Congress of People's Deputies, 1989-1991.

Yevgeny Yevtushenko was brought up in Siberia by his mother; when she moved with him to Moscow in 1944 she registered his date of birth as 1933. He published his first poem in 1949 and his first book in 1952. Yevtushenko studied at the Union of Writers' training school, the Gorky Literary Institute, Moscow, in the early 1950s. He emerged after 1956 as one of the leading lights of the Thaw under Nikita Khrushchev, in many ways epitomizing its values and aspirations, and has remained a public figure ever since. His personal lyrics expressed a new and liberating sense of passionate individuality, and his poems on public themes called for and declared a fresh commitment to revolutionary idealism, in the spirit of Mayakovsky. His attitudes were underpinned by a frequently asserted commitment to the supremacy of Russia as a fountainhead of positive human values, notwithstanding Russia's own dark history and the blandishments of Western civilization.

Yevtushenko declaimed his poetry in a histrionic manner that has reminded some Americans of U.S. fundamentalist preachers. In the early 1960s Yevtushenko became hugely popular in Russia, and his recitals (often in the company of his then wife Bella Akhmadulina, Andrei Voznesensky, and Bulat Okudzhava) attracted large crowds to the stadiums in which they were characteristically held. Yevtushenko's national and international reputation was established by two poems in particular, "Baby Yar" (published September 1961) and "The Heirs of Stalin" (published in *Pravda*, October 1962), which call respectively for unrelenting vigilance against anti-Semitism and the recurrence of Stalinism in Russia.

Yevtushenko soon began travelling abroad, a proclivity that has eventually taken him by his own count to ninety-five different countries. More than any other aspect of his activities, his freedom and frequency of travel led others to question the fundamental nature of his relationship with the Soviet authorities. His own protestations about how he was continually censored, rebuked, and restricted, and how he persistently used his position to plead for others in more parlous situations, have increasingly been interpreted as part and parcel of his conniving in being used as a licensed dissident

whose fundamental adherence to the Soviet system and willingness to accommodate himself to it never wavered. His outstanding poetic mastery has never been in doubt, but beginning in the 1970s, the rise of poets who rejected Yevtushenko's flamboyant style, public posturing, and acceptance of privilege led to a growing view of him as a figure of the hopelessly compromised past. Partly in response, Yevtushenko branched out into other areas of creativity. During the later 1980s he demonstratively led the way in publishing Russian poetry that had been censored during the Soviet period. Since the collapse of the USSR he has lived mainly in the United States, regularly traveling back to Russia for public appearances, and has continued to publish prolifically in a variety of genres and argue his case in media interviews.

See also: MAYAKOVSKY, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; OKUDZHAVA, BULAT SHALOVICH; THAW, THE

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GERALD SMITH

YEZHOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH

(1895–1940), USSR State Security chief (1936–1938); organizer of the Great Terror of 1937–1938.

Of humble origins and scant education, Nikolai Yezhov rose from tailor to industrial worker, soldier, and Red Army and Communist Party functionary. Since the early 1920s he was a provincial party secretary in Krasnokokshaisk (Mari province), Semipalatinsk, Orenburg, and Kzyl-Orda (Kazakh republic). In 1927 he was transferred to Moscow to become involved in personnel policy for the party Central Committee and the USSR People's Commissariat of Agriculture. In 1930 he was promoted to chief of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee. In 1934 he was included in the Central Committee and appointed chief of the party Control Commission.

From 1935 on, as Secretary of the Central Committee, he was in the top echelon of the party. He was charged with supervising the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), or state

security service, and its investigation of Leningrad party chief Sergei Kirov's murder, as well as with organizing major purge operations in the party in order to curb the party apparatus, which Josef Stalin deemed too independent. From 1936 on he organized major show trials against Stalin's rivals in the party. On September 25, 1936, Stalin appointed him People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. This was followed by a large purge operation in the NKVD involving the liquidation of his predecessor Genrikh Yagoda and his supporters, as well as mass arrests within the party.

On July 30, 1937, by order of Stalin and the Party Politburo, Yezhov issued NKVD Order 00447, "Concerning the Operation Aimed at the Subjecting to Repression of Former Kulaks, Criminals, and Other Anti-Soviet Elements." The operation was to involve the arrest of almost 270,000 people, some 76,000 of whom were immediately to be shot. Their cases were to be considered by "troikas," or bodies of the party chief, NKVD chief, and procurator of each USSR province, who were given quotas of arrests and executions. In return, the regional authorities requested even higher quotas, with the encouragement of the central leadership.

Another mass operation was directed against foreigners living in the USSR, especially those belonging to the nationalities of neighboring countries (e.g., Poles, Germans, Finns). The Great Terror was intended to liquidate elements thought insufficiently loyal, as well as alleged "spies." All in all, from August 1937 through November 1938, more than 1.5 million people were arrested for counter-revolutionary and other crimes against the state, and nearly 700,000 of them were shot; the rest were sent to Gulag concentration camps. By order of Yezhov, and with Yezhov personally participating, the prisoners were tortured in order to make them "confess" to crimes they had not committed; the use of torture had the approval of Stalin and the Politburo.

In April 1937, Yezhov was included in the leading five who in practice had taken over the leading role from the Politburo, and in October of that same year he was made a Politburo candidate member. In April 1938, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Water Transportation was added to his functions. But in fact, it was the beginning of his decline. In August, Stalin appointed Lavrenty Beria as his deputy and intended successor. After sharp criticism, on November 23, 1938, Yezhov resigned from his function as NKVD chief, though for the time being he stayed on as People's Commissar of

Water Transportation. People close to him were arrested, and under these conditions his wife, Yevgenia, committed suicide; Yezhov abandoned himself to even more drinking than he was accustomed to.

On April 10, 1939, he was arrested. He could not bear torture and during interrogation confessed everything: spying, wrecking, conspiring, terrorism, and sodomy (apparently, he had maintained frequent homosexual contacts). On February 2, 1940, he was tried behind closed doors and sentenced to death, to be shot the following night.

His fall was given almost no publicity, and during the ensuing months and years he was practically forgotten. Only since the 1990s have details about his life, death, and activities become known. In spite of this, during the de-Stalinization campaign of the 1950s, he was brought up as nearly the only person responsible for the terror; the term *Yezhovshchina*, or the time of Yezhov, was brought into use. Some historians of the Stalin period indeed tend to stress Yezhov's personal contribution to the terror, relating his dismissal to his overzealousness. As a matter of fact, Stalin suspected him of disloyal conduct and of collecting evidence against prominent party people, including even Stalin himself. Others believe that he obediently executed Stalin's instructions, and that Stalin dismissed him when he thought it expedient.

See also: GULAG; PURGES, THE GREAT; STALIN, JOSEF VISARIONOVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

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MARC JANSEN

YUDENICH, NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH

(1862–1933), general in the Imperial Russian Army, hero of World War I, and anti-Bolshevik leader.

Of noble birth, Nikolai Yudenich began his glittering military career upon graduating, with first-class marks, from the General Staff Academy in 1887. He served on the General Staff in Poland and Turkestan until 1902, participated in the Russo-Japanese War (earning a gold sword for bravery), worked as deputy chief of staff from 1907, and became chief of staff of Russian forces in the Caucasus in 1913. During World War I, Yudenich distinguished himself as Russia's most consistently successful general, inflicting numerous defeats upon Turkey, notably at Sarikamish (December 1914) and, in August 1915, repulsing Enver Pasha's invasion in 1915, and in capturing Erzurum, Trebizond, and Erzincan (February–July 1916). He consequently figured prominently in Russian wartime propaganda. With the overthrow of the Romanovs in February 1917, Yudenich regained overall command of the Caucasus Front. However, dismayed by the revolution and reluctant to cooperate with the Provisional Government, he was retired from active service in May. He returned to Petrograd and lived underground for a year after the October Revolution, before fleeing to Finland. Thereafter he headed anti-Bolshevik forces in the Baltic region, as commander-in-chief of the Northwest Army. Like other White leaders, Yudenich failed to establish an effective political regime or to attract sufficient support from the Allies, and suffered strained relations with the non-Russian peoples of his base territory. Nevertheless, he masterminded the Whites' advance to the outskirts of Petrograd in the autumn of 1919. However, Trotsky pushed his forces back into Estonia, where they were interned before being disbanded in 1920. Yudenich was briefly arrested by the Estonian government, but was allowed to settle into exile in France. He largely shunned émigré politics until his death, in Saint-Laurent-du-Var.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; WHITE ARMY; WORLD WAR I

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JONATHAN D. SMELE

YUGOSLAVIA, RELATIONS WITH

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was proclaimed on December 1, 1918, and was renamed Yugoslavia on October 3, 1929 by Alexander Karadjordjevic. The creation of the new enlarged South Slav state and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia together ruptured the once-strong bonds between Russia and the South Slav lands, especially Serbia.

Russian support for Serbia in the summer of 1914 had helped precipitate World War I, which destroyed the Romanov dynasty and eventually brought the Bolsheviks to power. Like its neighbors,



Marshal Josip Broz Tito defied Stalin and introduced his own brand of communism in Yugoslavia. © HULTON-DEUTSCH

COLLECTION/CORBIS

the new Yugoslav state was fiercely anticommunist. In 1920 and 1921 the kingdom joined Romania and Czechoslovakia in a series of bilateral pacts that came to be known as the Little Entente. The alliance was primarily aimed at thwarting Hungarian irredentism (one country's claim to territories ruled or governed by others based on ethnic, cultural, or historic ties), since the former kingdom of Hungary had lost approximately 70 percent of its prewar territory. The Little Entente also served as part of France's eastern security system designed to contain both Germany and Bolshevik Russia. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, relations between Moscow and Belgrade were but a shadow of that which had preceded World War I. Not only was Yugoslavia a supporter of the postwar settlements that had aggrandized its territory, but it also sought to isolate the Bolshevik revolution; moreover, it had little trade with the new Soviet state, in part because prewar relations between St. Petersburg and Belgrade had been based almost entirely on diplomatic and cultural rather than economic links. In addition, the rise of Nazi Germany left much of Yugoslav trade within the Third Reich's orbit.

In 1941 Germany occupied Yugoslavia. Two groups, the Chetniks, led by Dra a Mihailovic, and the Partisans, under Josip Broz Tito, a Moscow-trained communist, fought the Germans and at the same time vied for supremacy within Yugoslavia. Although Tito emerged victorious and Stalin's so-called Percentages Agreement with Winston Churchill gave Moscow 50 percent influence in Yugoslavia, the Red Army had not occupied the country, and thus the Soviet Union was unable to influence developments there as it could in other areas of central and southeastern Europe. Tito's popularity and mass following stood in contrast to the situation in the other countries of the future "bloc," where there were at best small native communist parties dominated by the Soviet Union.

As a result, the communist state created in Yugoslavia in 1946 was independent of Soviet stewardship even though its constitution was initially modeled on the Soviet constitution. From the outset, Tito pursued an independent domestic policy and an aggressive foreign one. His ambitions threatened both Stalin's leadership (by his promotion of national communist movements) and also peace in Europe (by such actions as the shooting down of American planes during the Trieste Affair, the Italian-Yugoslav border dispute, and his support for the communists in the Greek Civil War). When Tito attempted to create a separate customs

union with Bulgaria without consulting the Soviet Union beforehand, and refused to abandon the effort as Stalin demanded, a break, usually referred to as the Tito-Stalin split, quickly followed.

On June 28, 1948, the Cominform, the umbrella communist propaganda organ directed by Moscow, expelled Yugoslavia, charging Tito with betraying the international communist movement. Stalin hoped that this would force Yugoslavia to submit to Soviet leadership, but he miscalculated. Instead, Tito turned to a West that was all too willing to forget his ideology and past actions and provide assistance to enable Yugoslavia to pursue its own command economy and an independent diplomatic and political stance that served as a counterforce to the Soviet leader. Yugoslavia, for example, supported the United Nations resolution authorizing resistance to the invasion of South Korea in June 1950. Tito soon became one of the founders of the nonaligned movement, which held its first conference in Belgrade in 1961.

Stalin's death in 1953 opened the door for a partial rapprochement with Belgrade. Issues such as navigation and trade along the Danube River were resolved, but the ideological rift never entirely healed. In May 1955 Nikita Khrushchev visited Belgrade, and the following year Tito visited to Moscow, and the Cominform, which dissolved in April 1956, renounced its earlier condemnations. Despite seemingly cordial relations, however, the strains between Moscow and Belgrade persisted, especially after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, which saw the independent-minded Hungarian revolt crushed, and the arrest and subsequent murder of Imre Nagy, the Hungarian prime minister, who had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest from 1956 until 1958. In 1957 Tito angered Moscow by refusing to sign a declaration commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

In the wake of the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s, another reconciliation took place, most notably in the area of trade. However, Yugoslavia continued to develop economic ties with western Europe, as witnessed by the hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs who went west for employment as well as by western investment in Yugoslavia. For Belgrade, improved relations with Moscow were but one part of a foreign policy that also looked to the West (despite anti-American rhetoric), China (after a reconciliation in the early 1970s), and the Third World for influence and economic advantages. Soviet leaders in turn realized that the ideological squabble with Belgrade served little purpose.

The death of Tito in 1980 began the fracturing of a Yugoslav state strained by economic problems and national resentments, and by 1990 the country fragmented. Similarly, the Soviet Union lost its empire in eastern Europe in 1989, and by 1991 the Soviet Union itself dissolved.

The break-up of the two states ironically brought both of them full circle. During the nineteenth century, Russia had been the sole great power supporter of Serbia. Although a "Yugoslavia" continued to exist after 1990, the name denoted a rump state that comprised only Serbia and Montenegro. As the wars in the former Yugoslavia raged, Moscow again served as Belgrade's principal benefactor, citing historical, religious, and cultural ties. From military aid to peacekeeping in the wake of Slobodan Milosevic's failed attempt to promote Serb authority through the brutal suppression of the Albanian Kosovars, Russia had regained an influence in Belgrade that it had not seen since the early days of World War I.

See also: BALKAN WARS; COMMUNIST BLOC; COMMUNIST INFORMATION BUREAU; MONTENEGRO, RELATIONS WITH; SERBIA, RELATIONS WITH

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RICHARD FRUCHT

YURI DANILOVICH

(d. 1325), grand prince of Vladimir and the prince of Moscow who initiated the rivalry for supremacy between Moscow and Tver in northeastern Russia.

In 1303 Yuri succeeded his father Daniel Yaroslavich to Moscow. After Grand Prince Andrei Alexandrovich of Vladimir died in 1304, Yuri challenged Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tver for the grand princely throne. He visited Khan Tokhta in Saray, intending to buy the patent for Vladimir with gifts, but Mikhail won. Because Yuri rejected the decision, Mikhail attacked Moscow unsuccessfully in 1305 and 1308. His son Dmitry also marched against Yuri, but Metropolitan Peter, who supported Moscow, stopped him. The Novgorodians also preferred Yuri and invited him in 1314 to be their prince. Mikhail, however, repossessed the town in Yuri's absence in 1316 when Yuri visited the Golden Horde. On that occasion the khan gave him the patent for Vladimir. He returned home with Tatar troops to consolidate his rule, but, when he attacked Mikhail in 1318, the latter defeated him. To resolve the stalemate, they rode to Saray for a judgment. Khan Uzbek appointed Yuri grand prince once again and had Mikhail put to death. In 1322, while Yuri helped defend Novgorod against the Germans, Mikhail's successor and son Dmitry persuaded the khan, with the usual bribes, to give him Vladimir. After Yuri assisted the Novgorodians by building a fortress on the river Neva and by capturing Ustyug on the Northern Dvina, he traveled to Saray to challenge Dmitry's appointment. On November 21, 1325, Dmitry murdered Yuri at the Golden Horde to avenge his father's death.

See also: DANIEL, METROPOLITAN; DMITRY MIKHAILOVICH; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; MOSCOW; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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MARTIN DIMNIK

YURI VLADIMIROVICH

(d. 1157), prince of Suzdalia and grand prince of Kiev; nicknamed "Long-arms" ("Dolgoruky") probably because he meddled in the affairs of distant Kiev.

Yuri's father Vladimir Vsevolodovich "Monomakh" gave him Suzdalia as his patrimony. In

1125 Yuri moved his capital from the older Rostov to Suzdal, probably to gain more freedom from the well-established boyar families. He also asserted Suzdalia's independence from Kiev, which was ruled by his eldest brother Mstislav. In consolidating his rule, he founded new towns and fortified existing ones such as Pereyasavl Zalesky, Dmitrov, Yurev Polsky, Galich, Zvenigorod, and perhaps Kostroma. He appropriated Moscow from a local boyar. He campaigned against the Volga-Kama Bulgars to gain control of the trade route from the Caspian Sea, and he attempted to assert his influence over Novgorod's Baltic trade. Yuri, who began the tradition of building churches in Suzdalian towns in 1152, is credited with erecting some five churches. After his brother Mstislav died in 1132, he became the champion of the Monomashichi against the Mstislavichi (rival dynasties) for control of Kiev. That is, in keeping with the system of lateral succession to Kiev allegedly drawn up by Yaroslav Vladimirovich "the Wise" in his so-called testament, Yuri held that Monomakh's younger sons had prior claims over their nephews, Mstislav's sons. In his many battles against the latter, he was supported by the princes of Chernigov and the Polovtsy. In 1155, after his elder brother Vyacheslav died in Kiev, Yuri successfully seized the town. However, he was unpopular with the Kievans, and they poisoned him. He died on May 15, 1157.

See also: BOYAR; GRAND PRINCE; MSTISLAV; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

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MARTIN DIMNIK

YURI VSEVOLODOVICH

(1189–1238), grand prince of Vladimir on the Klyazma, in northeast Russia, when it was attacked by the Tatars.

In 1211 Yuri's father Vsevolod Yurevich "Big Nest" had him marry Agafia, daughter of Vsevolod

Svyatoslavich "the Red," grand prince of Kiev and member of the Olgovich dynasty. The alliance would serve both dynasties well. Before his death in 1212, Vsevolod designated Yuri, the second son in seniority, as his successor to Vladimir. Yuri's elder brother Konstantin challenged his succession and defeated Yuri and his brother Yaroslav at the river Lipitsa in 1216. Konstantin ruled as grand prince until his death in 1218, at which time Yuri reclaimed Vladimir. After 1221 he sent his lieutenants to Novgorod, but the townspeople rejected them. Three years later he attempted to appease the Novgorodians by inviting his brother-in-law Mikhail Vsevolodovich, senior prince of the Olgovich dynasty in Chernigov, to act as his mediator with them. They accepted his offer but his brother Yaroslav objected. Yuri therefore washed his hands of Novgorod affairs in 1226 and turned them over to Yaroslav. Although Yuri was less powerful than his father had been, he took effective military action to stop the Volga Bulgars from attacking Suzdalia. In 1221 he concluded peace with them. After

that, he organized campaigns against the Mordva tribes and, in 1232, subdued them. Moreover, to secure his eastern frontier he built the outpost of Nizhny Novgorod. In February 1238, when the Tatars devastated Vladimir, his wife and sons perished. Later the invaders confronted Yuri and his troops at the river Sit, where he was waiting in vain for Yaroslav to bring reinforcements. On March 4 of that year he fell in battle.

See also: GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

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MARTIN DIMNIK

ZADONSHCHINA

Zadonshchina (roughly, The Battle Beyond the Don) is the conventional title for a medieval literary work about the historically important Battle of Kulikovo Field (1380). Written some years after the historical event, in the late fourteenth or possibly the beginning of the fifteenth century, it is attributed in one of the surviving copies to a Sofonia of Ryazan about whom nothing is known. The text is preserved in a longer and a shorter redaction, giving rise to the usual arguments in these cases over which was the "original." Primacy is important to the crucial question of *Zadonshchina's* relationship to the *Lay of Igor's Campaign*. The short redaction appears to be an incomplete extract and not the author's text.

There can be no doubt of a close association with the *Lay* in view of extensive similarities that go beyond any mutual dependence on some third source or tradition. *Zadonshchina* was almost certainly written as an imitation of the *Lay* and a response to it, treating the victory at Kulikovo as revenge for the defeat of Igor at the hands of a different steppe enemy. The writer sought to reverse circumstances of 1185 as described in the *Lay*, turning Igor's unsuccessful campaign upside down, so to speak. In the process he distorted history: For example, by exaggerating the unity of the princes in 1380 in order to counterbalance the disunity of 1185. Most of his figures of speech are borrowed from the *Lay* and often ineptly combined and overused. For these reasons, *Zadonshchina* is considered derivative and inferior.

See also: FOLKLORE; LAY OF IGOR'S CAMPAIGN

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NORMAN W. INGHAM

ZAGOTOVKA

State agricultural procurement.

The term *zagotovka* refers to the process through which agricultural products (e.g., grain) were pro-



cured by the Soviet state, usually from collective farms (kolkhozes) in the form of compulsory deliveries (*obyazatelnye postavki*) at low prices set by the state. The procurement process was important in that the underpinning of the Soviet strategy of industrialization was the extraction of grain and other agricultural products from the countryside for use as a source of domestic food and as a means to finance industrialization through export. Moreover, beginning under Lenin during the period of War Communism, when forced requisitioning (*prodrazverstka*) was introduced, the role of the state in the production, acquisition, and distribution of agricultural products increased, especially after the collectivization of agriculture in the late 1920s.

In addition to the earlier use of forced requisitioning and the subsequent introduction of compulsory deliveries extracted from collective farms, deliveries were also made by state farms (*sdacha sovkhovov*), payments in kind (*naturoplata*) were required for the services of the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS), and taxes in kind (*prodnalog*) were levied.

The mechanisms of procurement introduced by the Soviet state served, in part, to eliminate the market of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s in order to organize the interaction between the agricultural and the industrial (urban) sector. Moreover, as state controls replaced the NEP market, the terms of trade between the countryside and the urban industrial sector could increasingly be dictated by the state.

See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

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ROBERT C. STUART

ZASEKA *See* FRONTIER FORTIFICATIONS.

ZASLAVSKAYA, TATIANA IVANOVNA

(b. 1927), economist and influential sociologist.

Tatiana Ivanovna Zaslavskaya graduated from the Economics Faculty of Moscow University in

1950 and became a member of the Communist Party in 1954. She completed a doctoral thesis for the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, Department of Agriculture, where she worked until 1963. In that year, Zaslavskaya moved to the Novosibirsk Institute of Industrial Economics to work with Abel Aganbegyan. She subsequently became head of the Institute's Sociology Department, in 1968. At the same time, Zaslavskaya became a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, becoming a full member in 1981. From the late 1960s she headed the Social Problems department of the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where she remained until the mid-1980s. During this period, Zaslavskaya developed a model capable of predicting trends in Soviet agriculture.

Zaslavskaya came to prominence in early 1980s, when her Novosibirsk report was leaked to the public. Later on, when Mikhail Gorbachev was introducing his policies of glasnost and perestroika, Zaslavskaya became a key player and senior government adviser in the field of socioeconomic and agricultural reform, from 1985 to 1987. She was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 as Russian Academy of Sciences representative. In 1986 Zaslavskaya was elected President of the Soviet Sociological Association, before moving on to head to the new Institute of Sociology in 1987 and the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTS-IOM) in 1988. In 1990 Boris Yeltsin elected Zaslavskaya to his consultative council. Since then Zaslavskaya has gone on to become head of the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences.

See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; NOVOSIBIRSK REPORT; PERESTROIKA

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

ZASULICH, VERA IVANOVNA

(1849–1919), Russian revolutionary.

Born into a relatively poor noble family, Vera Ivanovna Zaslulich became a populist as a young woman. She had a keen sense of social justice, sym-

pathized with the downtrodden and the oppressed, and opposed autocracy. An active participant in the populist movement, she was imprisoned from 1869 to 1871 and was in administrative (internal) exile from 1871 to 1875. She spent most of her life in poverty and poor health, with a bohemian lifestyle. Her partner, Lev Deich, was arrested in 1884 for smuggling revolutionary literature to Russia and was exiled to Siberia, where he remained until 1901. While in Siberia, he married another woman. Zasluch achieved fame and heroine status for shooting Fyodor Trepov (Governor of St. Petersburg) in 1878, in an assassination attempt (Trepov survived). Acquitted at a jury trial, she fled abroad to escape rearrest and lived in political exile (in Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) from 1878 to 1905 (with the exception of two brief returns to Russia for four months in 1879–1880 and for three months in 1899–1900). She corresponded with Karl Marx and was a friend of Friedrich Engels. She was one of the founders of the first Russian Marxist organization, the Liberation of Labor (*Osvobozhdenie truda*) group in Geneva in 1883. Author of numerous books, articles, and translations, she was an editor of *Iskra* ("Spark") from 1900 to 1905. A participant in the 1903 second congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, she helped found the Menshevik movement and made frequent attempts to reconcile factions of the revolutionary movement. After 1905 Zasluch retired from revolutionary activities. She was in her late fifties, in poor health, and there was an amnesty for political exiles. She subsequently supported Russian participation in World War I. As an old Menshevik and supporter of the war, she naturally opposed the October Revolution.

See also: ENGELS, FRIEDRICH; MARXISM; MENSHEVIKS

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MICHAEL ELLMAN

ZEALOTS OF PIETY

The Zealots of Piety (1646–1653) were a group of clergy and laity who energetically sought to elevate the religious consciousness and spiritual life

of the people by reforming popular religious practices, improving the liturgy, introducing sermons, and strengthening the role of the clergy. The reformers gathered around Stefan Vonifatiev, archpriest of the Annunciation Cathedral in the Kremlin and confessor to Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich. Individuals associated with the Zealots included leading figures at court, such as the Boyar Boris Ivanovich Morozov and gentrymen (*dvoryane*) Fyodor Rtishchev and Simeon Potemkin. The head of the Printing Office, Prince Alexei Mikhailovich Lvov, supported the Zealots, as did several of the correctors (*spravshchiki*), including Mikhail Rogov (archpriest at the Archangel Cathedral), Ivan Nasedka (priest at the Dormition Cathedral) and Shestak Martemianov (layman). Nikon, archimandrite of the New Savior Monastery in Moscow (patriarch from 1652) was also a participant. Ivan Neronov, a provincial reformer, became archpriest of the Kazan Cathedral in Moscow in 1649 and took his place among the Zealots of Piety. Other representatives of the provincial secular clergy active in the group included the archpriests Avvakum of Yurev, Daniil of Temnikov, Login of Murom, and Daniil of Kostroma. Traditional historiography opposed the Zealots to Patriarch Iosif and the Church Council, although some historians have questioned this opposition. Nikon, a leading Zealot, became patriarch in 1652, and his actions split the circle. Avvakum led several members of the group in opposition that ultimately led to schism and the emergence of Old Belief.

See also: AVVAKUM PETROVICH; MOROZOV, BORIS IVANOVICH; NERONOV, IVAN; NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVERS; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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ZEMSKY NACHALNIK *See* LAND CAPTAIN.

ZEMSKY SOBOR *See* ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND.

ZEMSTVO

Zemstvo was a system of local self-government used in a number of regions in the European part of Russia from 1864 to 1918. It was instituted as

a result of the zemstvo reform of January 1, 1864. This reform introduced an electoral self-governing body, elected from all class groups (*soslovii*), in districts and provinces. The basic principles of the zemstvo reform were electivity, the representation of all classes, and self-government in the questions concerning local economic needs.

The statute of January 1, 1864, called for the institution of zemstvos in thirty-four provinces of the European part of Russia. The reform did not affect Siberia and the provinces of Archangel, Astrakhan, and Orenburg, where there were very few noble landowners. Neither did the reform affect regions closest to the national borders: the Baltic States, Poland, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia.

According to the statute, zemstvo institutions in districts and provinces were to consist of zemstvo councils and executive boards. The electoral system was set up on the basis of class and possessions. Every three years, the citizens of a district elected between fourteen to one hundred or so deputies to the council. The elections were held in *curias* (divisions), into which all of the districts' population was divided. The first curia consisted of landowners who possessed 200 or more *desiatinas* of land (about 540 acres), or other real estate worth at least 15,000 rubles, or had a monthly income of at least 6,000 rubles. This curia consisted mainly of nobles and landlords, but members of other classes (merchants who bought nobles' land, rich peasants who acquired land, and the like) eventually grew more and more prominent. The second curia consisted of city dwellers who possessed merchant registration, or who owned trading and industrial companies with a yearly income of at least 6,000 rubles, or held real estate in worth at least 500 rubles (in small cities) or 2,000 rubles (in large cities). The third curia consisted mainly of representatives of village societies and peasants who did not require a special possession permit. As a result of the first of these elections in 1865 and 1866, nobles constituted 41.7 percent of the district deputies, and 74 percent of the province deputies. Peasants accounted for 38.4 and 10.6 percent, and merchants for 10.4 and 11 percent. The representatives of district and provincial assemblies were the district and provincial marshals of nobility. Zemstvo assemblies became governing institutions: They elected the executive authorities: the provincial and district executive boards (three or five people).

The power of the zemstvo was limited to local tasks (medicine, education, agriculture, veterinary

services, roads, statistics, and so on). Zemstvo taxes ensured the budget of zemstvo institutions. The budget was to be approved by the zemstvo assembly. It was compiled, mainly, from taxes on real estate (primarily land), and in this case the pressure was mainly on peasant land. Within the limits of their power, zemstvos had relative independence. The governor could only oversee the legitimacy of the zemstvo's decisions. He also approved the chairman of the *uezd* executive board and the members of the provincial and *uezd* executive boards. The chairman of the provincial executive board had to be approved by the minister of the Interior.

As a result of the zemstvo counterreform of 1890, the governor gained the right not only to oversee the reasonableness of the zemstvo's decisions. A special supervising institution was created, called the Governor's Bureau of Zemstvo Affairs. Over half of the voters in 1888 were bereft of electoral rights. The composition of zemstvo assemblies was changed in favor of the nobles. In the 1897 zemstvo elections, nobles constituted to 41.6 percent of district deputies and 87.1 percent of provincial deputies. The peasants obtained 30.98 and 2.2 percent.

The structure of zemstvo institutions contained no "minor zemstvo unit," understood to mean a *volost* (rural district) unit that would be closest to the needs of the local population of all classes. Neither was there a national institution that would coordinate the activity of local zemstvos. In the end, zemstvos became "a building without a foundation or a roof." The government opposed cooperation between zemstvos, fearing constitutionalist attitudes. Zemstvos did not have their own institution of compulsory power, which made them rely on the administration and police. All this soon made zemstvos stand in opposition to autocracy. They were especially active in the 1890s, when a so-called third element (professionals employed by zemstvos, or predominantly democratic members of the intelligentsia) became influential. In the early twentieth century, liberal *zemtsy* became overtly political, and in 1903 they formed the illegal "Union of Constitutionalist-Zemtsy." In November of 1904, an all-Russian assembly of zemstvos was held in St. Petersburg, and a program of political reforms was developed, including the creation of a national representation with legislative rights. Later, many members of the movement joined the leading liberal parties, the Constitutional Democrats and the Oktobrists.

By 1912 zemstvos had established 40,000 primary schools, approximately 2,000 hospitals, a network of libraries, reading halls, pharmacies, and doctors' centers. Their budget increased to 45 times its 1865 level, amounting to 254 million rubles. In 1912, 30 percent of zemstvo expenditure went to education, 26 percent went to healthcare, 6.3 percent went to the development of local agriculture and the local economy, and 2.8 percent went to veterinary services. In 1912 zemstvos employed approximately 150,000 specialist teachers, doctors, agriculturists, veterinarians, statisticians, and others. By 1916 zemstvos were operating in 43 of the 93 provinces and regions.

After the beginning of World War I, on August 12, 1914, zemstvos created the National Union of Zemstvos in aid to sick and wounded soldiers. In 1915 this Union united with the National Union of Cities. For the coordination of the two organizations, a special committee called "Zemgor" was created. Besides aiding the wounded, it also helped supply the army and helped refugees. After the March Revolution of 1917 the Zemgor chairman, prince Georgy Lvov, became the prime minister of the Provisional Government. The chairmen of the zemstvo executive boards were appointed the plenipotentiaries of the Provisional Government in their districts and provinces. Zemstvos were instituted in 19 more provinces and regions of Russia and *volost zemstvos* were created, forming the lowest institutions of local self-government. Re-elections were held in all levels of the zemstvo on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret voting. After the October Revolution, on January 17, 1918, by decree of the Soviet Government (*Sovnarkom*), the main committees of the Zemstvo and City Unions were dismissed and their possessions were given to the Supreme Council of National Economy. By July 1918 zemstvos in the territories controlled by the Bolsheviks were removed, but were reinstated in territories controlled by the White Armies and abroad. In 1921 a Committee of Zemstvos and Cities, once again called Zemgor, was established in Paris to provide aid to Russian citizens living abroad. Divisions of the Zemgor also operated in Prague and the Balkans. The Paris Zemgor exists to this day.

See also: LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

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ZERO-OPTION

Originally conceptualized in 1979 by the Social Democratic party of West Germany, the concept of a "zero option" led to the first, albeit more symbolic than substantive, nuclear disarmament treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although it began as a simplistic rhetorical slogan among West German anti-nuclear activists, the concept of having zero nuclear missiles on the European Continent was embraced by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and eventually codified as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

On November 18, 1981, Reagan announced the United States' support for canceling the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, in exchange for Soviet withdrawal of nuclear missiles already positioned in its Eastern European satellite states. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev immediately dismissed the idea, noting its asymmetric nature: The Soviets were being asked to dismantle an entire class of weapons (from Asia as well as Europe) in exchange for the United States' non-deployment in Europe alone. As a result of a continued stalemate, Reagan ordered the deployment of nuclear missiles into Western Europe in 1983. Neither Reagan nor Brezhnev and his successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, were willing to compromise.

Credit for the eventual success of the zero-option concept, as solidified through the signing of the INF Treaty, rests largely in the hands of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who applied a new spirit to Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev offered a series of unilateral concessions that essentially meant acceptance of a final treaty mirroring Reagan's initial 1981 proposal. Ironically, as the 1980s progressed and the INF Treaty gained political momentum, it was the Western European nations that balked, voicing fears about Soviet conventional superiority in Europe.

Such fears were quelled by the non-inclusion of British and French nuclear weapons in the final treaty, which was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on December 8, 1987.

See also: ARMS CONTROL; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; INTERMEDIATE RANGE; NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

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ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

(1896–1948), Soviet political leader.

Andrei Zhdanov was one of Stalin's most prominent deputies and is best known as the leader



Andrei Zhdanov, leader of the Leningrad Communist Party from 1934 to 1948. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

of the ideological crackdown following World War II. After the assassination of Leningrad leader Sergei Kirov in 1934, Zhdanov became head of the Leningrad party organization. Also in 1934 he became a secretary of the party's Central Committee and in 1939 a full Politburo member. He spent most of World War II leading Leningrad, which was besieged by Hitler's troops.

Zhdanov was transferred to Moscow in 1944 to work as Central Committee secretary for ideology and began playing a growing leadership role, which intensified his rivalry with Central Committee Secretary Georgy Malenkov. Zhdanov, as chief of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, became identified with official ideology, while Malenkov, chief of the party's personnel and industrial departments, was identified with management of party activity and industry. In the maneuvering between these leaders, Zhdanov scored a victory over his rival by starting an ideological crackdown in August 1946, denouncing deviations by some literary journals and harshly assailing prominent writers. During Zhdanov's campaign, Malenkov lost his leadership posts and fell into Stalin's disfavor, while Zhdanov became viewed as Stalin's most likely successor.

Zhdanov's role in the harsh postwar ideological crackdown earned him the reputation of the regime's leading hardliner; the wave of persecution of literary and cultural figures became known as the *Zhdanovshchina*. In June 1947 Zhdanov denounced ideological errors and softness toward the West in Soviet philosophy. At a September 1947 conference of foreign communist parties, Zhdanov laid out the thesis that the world was divided into two camps: imperialist (Western) and democratic (Soviet). Zhdanov's pronouncements fostered development of the Cold War and an assertion of basic hostility between Soviet and Western ideas.

However, the worst excesses of the Zhdanovshchina ironically were committed after Zhdanov's death and were directed against Zhdanov's allies. Zhdanov refused to back biologist Trofim Lysenko's attacks on modern genetics, and Zhdanov's son, who was head of the Central Committee's Science Department, actually denounced Lysenko's ideas in April 1948 and was later forced to recant publicly. In July 1948 Zhdanov was sent off for an extended vacation, during which he died on August 31, 1948. Malenkov returned to power in mid-1948, and, as Zhdanov was dying in August 1948, Lysenko was given free reign in science and

initiated the condemnation of genetics and other allegedly pro-Western scientific ideas. In 1949 a campaign against Jews as cosmopolitans began. Also in 1949 Zhdanov's proteges in Leningrad were purged (the Leningrad Case), many of them eventually executed. Zhdanov himself was spared public disgrace, unlike his proteges and his Leningrad party organization, which was cast into disfavor for years. Zhdanov continued to be treated as a hero, and when Stalin concocted the Doctors' Plot in 1952, he cast Zhdanov as one of the victims of the Jewish doctors, who allegedly had poisoned the Leningrad leader.

Although the symbol of intolerance in literature and culture and of hostility toward the West, Zhdanov was probably no more hard-line than his rivals. His denunciations of ideological deviations appeared largely motivated by his struggle to retain Stalin's favor. But Stalin turned to a crack-down and a break with the West and drove the Zhdanovshchina into its extremes of anti-Semitism, Lysenkoism, and the execution of Leningrad leaders and Zhdanov proteges.

See also: JEWS; LYSENKO, TROFIM DENISOVICH; MALENKOV, GEORGY MAXIMILYANOVICH; PURGES, THE GREAT; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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ZHEL'YABOV, ANDREI IVANOVICH

(1851–1881), Russian revolutionary *narodnik* (populist) and one of the leaders of the People's Will party.

Andrei Zhelyabov was born in the village of Sultanovka in the Crimea to the family of a serf. He graduated from a gymnasium in Kerch with a silver medal (1869) and attended the Law Department of the Novorossiysk University in Odessa. He was expelled in November of 1871 for being involved in student-led agitation, and was sent home

for one year. Upon returning to Odessa, in 1873 and 1874 he was a member of the Chaikovsky circle and spread revolutionary propaganda among workers and the intelligentsia. In November 1874, he was arrested but bailed out before the trial. Zhelyabov faced charges of revolutionary propaganda as part of the Trial of 193 (1877–1878) in St. Petersburg. He was declared innocent on the basis of insufficient evidence. After his release, he lived in Ukraine, where he spread revolutionary propaganda among the peasants.

Disappointed with the ineffectiveness of his propaganda, Zhelyabov concluded that it was necessary to lead a political struggle. In June 1879 he took part in the Lipetsk assembly of terrorist politicians and was one of the authors of the formulation of the necessity of violent revolt through conspiracy. He joined the populist organization *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom) and became one of the leaders of the Politicians' Faction. After the split of *Zemlya i Volya* in August 1879, Zhelyabov joined the People's Will and became a member of its executive committee. On August 26, 1879, he took part in the session of the executive committee where emperor Alexander II was sentenced to death. He supervised the preparation of the assaults on Alexander II near Alexandrovsk in the Yekaterinoslav province in November 1879, where an attempt was made to blow up the tsar's train. Zhelyabov also supervised the assault on the tsar in the Winter Palace on February 17, 1880, and an unsuccessful attempt to blow up Kamenny Most (Stone Bridge) in St. Petersburg while the tsar was passing there in August 1880.

Zhelyabov took part in the devising of all program documents of the party. He is also credited with the creation of the worker, student, and military organizations of the People's Will. He was one of the main organizers of the tsar's murder on March 13, 1881, but on the eve of the assault he was arrested. On March 14, he submitted a plea to associate him with the tsar's murder. During the trial, Zhelyabov, who refused to have a lawyer, made a programmatic speech to prove that the government itself, with its inappropriately repressive means of dealing with peaceful propagandists of socialist ideas, forced them to take the path of terrorism. Zhelyabov was sentenced to death and hanged on April 15, 1881, at the Semenovskiy parade ground in St. Petersburg.

See also: ALEXANDER II; LAND AND FREEDOM PARTY; PEOPLE'S WILL, THE

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OLEG BUDNITSKII

ZHENOTDEL

The Women's Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (1919–1930).

In November 1918 Alexandra Kollontai, Inessa Armand, Nadezhda Krupskaya, Konkordia Samoiloova, Klavdia Nikolayeva, and Zlata Lilina organized the First National Congress of Women Workers and Peasants. This was not actually the first national women's congress, as Russian feminists had held a huge conference in St. Petersburg in December 1908. Kollontai and her comrades, however, explicitly rejected any parallels to the earlier conference, arguing that they sought not to separate women's issues from men's but rather to weld and forge women and men into the larger socialist liberation movement. Despite serious ambivalence over whether to create a separate women's organization, the Congress passed a resolution requesting the party Central Committee to organize "a special commission for propaganda and agitation among women." The organizers limited their designs for this commission, however, initially claiming that it would serve "merely as a technical apparatus" for implementing Central Committee decrees. This was not, they insisted, a feminist organization.

The Central Committee now sanctioned the formal creation of women's commissions at the local and central levels. In September 1919 the Central Committee passed a decree upgrading the commissions to the status of sections (*otdely*) within the party committees, thus creating the *zhenotdel*, or women's section.

Several factors played into the creation of the women's sections. The top leadership of the party, including Vladimir Ilich Lenin, were well aware of the German Women's Bureau and International Women's Secretariat created by Clara Zetkin and the German Social Democratic Party. Many of the

top women Bolsheviks (especially Kollontai and Armand) had begun their social activism by working among women, while others (including Krupskaya, Samoiloova, Nikolayeva, and Lilina) had worked on the party's journal *The Woman Worker (Rabotnitsa)* in 1913 and 1914.

One reason motivating Kollontai in particular as early as the spring of 1917 was a fear that if the Bolshevik Party did not organize an effective women's movement, Russian women living under conditions of war and privation might well be drawn into the remnants of the prerevolutionary feminist or Menshevik movements. Related to that was a persistent anxiety among Bolsheviks of all outlooks that if they did not recruit women into the official party, their (i.e., women's) backwardness would make them easy targets for all manner of counterrevolutionary forces. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the early party-state desperately needed to mobilize every woman and man to support the Red Army in the Civil War.

Nonetheless, the ambivalence of the 1918 Congress dogged the women's section for the whole of its existence. The leaders themselves expressed ambivalence about the project on which they were embarking. Were they creating special sections and special conferences so that, in the long run, they could eliminate the need for such sections and conferences? Many female activists, moreover, had personally chosen socialist organizing and activism because they sought an escape from gender stereotyping; they did not want to be thought of as women, let alone as professionally responsible for women's advancement.

From the outset the top leadership of the *zhenotdel* faced a wide range of organizational problems. These included constant turnover of their personnel as their best members were siphoned off for other projects; communication difficulties between Moscow and the regions; resistance of rural and urban women to outside organizers; and resistance of male party members who thought this work completely unnecessary.

Despite all these difficulties the *zhenotdel* made significant gains in the area of organization-building during the period from 1919 to 1923. Often working in special interdepartmental commissions, they established relations with the Maternity and Infant Section (OMM) of the Commissariat of Health, as well as with the Commissariats of Education, Labor, Social Welfare, and Internal Affairs. They addressed issues of abortion and motherhood, prostitution, child care, labor conscription, female unemploy-

ment, labor regulation, and famine relief. They argued vehemently with the trade unions that there should be special attention to female workers. They published special “women’s pages” (*stranichki rabotnitsy*) in the major newspapers, two popular journals (*Rabotnitsa* and *Krestyanka*), and *Kommunistka*, which was geared toward organizers and instructors working among women.

With the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, zhenotdel activists faced a whole host of new problems: rising and disproportionately female unemployment; cutbacks in budgeting for local party committees which prompted them to try to liquidate their women’s sections altogether; cutbacks in the social services (child care, communal kitchens, etc.) that zhenotdel activists had hoped would assist in the emancipation of women from the drudgery of private child care and food preparation. Kollontai and her colleagues now began insisting, in Kollontai’s words, on not eliminating but strengthening the women’s sections. They wanted the women’s sections to have more representatives on the factory committees and Labor Exchanges (which handled job placements for unemployed workers), in trade unions, and in the Commissariats.

The party responded to this increased insistence with charges of feminist deviation. In February 1922 Kollontai (now tainted as well by her involvement in the Workers’ Opposition) was replaced as head of the zhenotdel by Sofia Smidovich. Smidovich, a contemporary of Kollontai, was much more socially conservative and less adamant about all the injustices to women. Kollontai and her close assistant, Vera Golubeva, did not cease to sound the alarm about women’s plight, even when Kollontai was reassigned to the Soviet trade union delegation in Norway. From her exile in 1922, Kollontai, calling the New Economic Policy “the new threat,” expressed fears that women would be forced out of the workforce and back into domestic subservience to their male companions. She now even began to question whether *feminism* was such a negative term.

The Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 reacted vehemently against the possibility of any such feminist deviations. At the same congress, Stalin (normally reticent on women’s issues) now praised women’s delegate meetings organized by the zhenotdel as “an important, essential transmission mechanism” between the party and the female masses. As such, they should be used to “extend and direct the party’s tentacles in order to under-

mine the influence of the priests among youth, who are raised by women.” Through such tentacles, the party would be able to “transmit its will to the working class.” Three months later Smidovich announced that *Kommunistka* would no longer carry theoretical discussions of women’s emancipation.

Unfortunately, the historical record of the zhenotdel for the period after 1924 is less clear than the earlier record because the relevant files of the women’s section are missing from the party archives. The women’s section in 1924–1925 was headed by Nikolayeva, herself a woman of the working class and long-time activist in the Leningrad women’s section. In May 1924 the Thirteenth Party Congress again attacked the zhenotdel, accusing it this time of one-sidedness (*odnostoronnost*) for focusing too much on agitation and propaganda rather than working directly on issues of women’s daily lives. Soon thereafter Nikolayeva, Krupskaya, and Lilina became embroiled in the Leningrad Opposition. It is quite likely that the zhenotdel records were purged because of this.

Alexandra Artyukhina, newly appointed as director of the section (replacing Nikolayeva), made a point of arguing that the women’s sections should propagandize against the Leningrad Opposition on the grounds that otherwise female workers would fall for their false slogans in favor of “equality” and “participation in profits.” Now more than ever the women’s sections strove to prove their original contention that they had “no tasks separate from the tasks of the party.” During the second half of the 1920s the women’s section toed the party line, participating in military preparedness exercises for women workers during the war scare of 1927, as well as in the collectivization and industrialization drives of 1928–1930.

In January 1930 the Central Committee of the CPSU announced that the women’s sections were being liquidated as part of a general reorganization of the party. While the decree declared that work among the female masses had “the highest possible significance,” this work was now to be done by all the sections of the Central Committee rather than by special women’s sections. In some parts of the country, especially Central Asia, the women’s sections were replaced by women’s sectors (*zhensektory*). *Kommunistka* was completely closed down. Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin’s spokesman for this move, claimed that since the women’s section had now completed the circle of its development, it was no longer necessary. The historic “woman question” had now been solved.

The impossible position of the women's sections can be clearly seen in resolutions and criticisms of the last years of their existence. They were sometimes criticized for devoting too little attention to daily life (*byt*), while other times they were attacked for too much of a social welfare bias in helping women in their daily lives. If they were too outspoken, they were accused of feminist deviations, while if they were not visible enough in their work, they were accused of passivity. Ultimately, the untenable position of the women's sections arose from their position as transmission belts between the party and the masses. While the founders of the *zhenotdel* had hoped that they could carry women's voices and needs to the party, the party insisted that the principal role of the women's sections was to convey the party's will to the female masses.

See also: ABORTION POLICY; ARMAND, INESSA; FEMINISM; KOLLONTAI, ALEXANDRA MIKHAILOVNA; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE; SAMOILOVA, KONDORDIYA NIKOLAYEVNA

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ELIZABETH A. WOOD

ZHENSOVETY

The *zhenskije sovety* (women's councils), or *zhensovety* in shortened form, were set up after 1958 under Nikita Khrushchev as part of his attempt to mobi-

lize the Soviet people around issues concerning their lives. Involvement in trades unions, comrades courts, and citizens' volunteer detachments was also encouraged during this period. The *zhensovety* were part of Khrushchev's "differentiated approach" to politics, according to which women's organizations were now acceptable again on the grounds that they targeted one particular group of citizens, just as other organizations dealt with particular groupings, such as youth and pensioners. From 1930 when Stalin declared the "woman question" to be solved, separate organizations for women, with the exception of the movement of wives (*dvizhenie zhen*), were closed down on the grounds that they smacked of "bourgeois feminism" and were divisive of working-class unity. Now it was recognized that the political education of women was one of the weakest areas of party work and in need of attention.

Zhensovety were formed in factories and offices and on farms. They were set up at regional (*oblast*), territory (*kray*), and district (*rayon*) levels of administration. Their sizes varied from around thirty to fifty members at regional levels and fifteen to twenty at district level to smaller groups of five to seventeen in factories and farms. There was no uniform pattern across the women's councils, as some were closely affiliated with the party, others with the soviets, and still others with the trade union. They divided their work into sections such as daily life, culture, mass political work, child care, health care, and sanitation and hygiene. Their activities usually reflected official party priorities for work among women.

The *zhensovety* continued to exist on paper in the years of Leonid Brezhnev's leadership but in fact did very little. They were formal in most areas rather than active. As part of his policy of democratization, Mikhail Gorbachev revived and restructured them. In 1986, at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in Moscow, Gorbachev called for their reinvigoration. By the spring of 1988, 2.3 million women were active in 236,000 *zhensovety*. As in the past, each women's council was preoccupied with issues of local concern. Their work was divided into the typical sections of "daily life and social problems," "production," "children," and "culture."

At the nineteenth All-Union Conference of the CPSU in June 1988, Gorbachev argued that women's voices were not heard and that this had been the case for years. He regretted that the women's movement was at a "standstill," at best "formal." He placed the *zhensovety* for the first

time under the hierarchical umbrella of the Soviet Women's Committee. In 1989 Gorbachev reformed the electoral system. In the newly elected Congress of People's Deputies, the zhensoveti had 75 "saved" seats among the 750 seats reserved for social organizations.

See also: FEMINISM; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

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MARY BUCKLEY



Ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy rails against the United States during a January 19, 2003, rally in Moscow. © AFP/CORBIS

ZHIRINOVSKY, VLADIMIR VOLFOVICH

(b. 1946), founder and leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, deputy speaker of the State Duma.

Born in Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan, Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy was the son of a Jewish lawyer from Lviv and a Russian woman. After his father's death he was raised by his mother. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1969, then served in the army in Tiflis, where he worked in military intelligence. From 1973 to 1991 Zhirinovskiy worked at various jobs in Moscow and at night attended law school at Moscow State University. In the 1980s he directed legal services for Mir publishing.

With the coming of perestroika Zhirinovskiy began his political career. In 1988 he founded the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the second legal party registered in the Soviet Union. In 1991 he ran for the presidency of Russia and received 6 million votes. Emphasizing populism and great-power chauvinism and denouncing corruption, he built up a loyal party organization. In the December 1993 parliamentary elections, Zhirinovskiy

parlayed discontent with Boris Yeltsin into a plurality in the State Duma. In the complex election system for individual candidates and party slates, the LDPR received 23 percent of the total vote, fifty-nine of the party seats in the Duma, and five individual seats.

In the December 1995 Duma elections, the LDPR vote fell sharply to 11.1 percent, and the party won only fifty-five seats in the parliament, well behind the resurgent Communist Party. In 1996 Zhirinovskiy ran for president again, but this time he finished fifth (5.7 percent) in the first round of voting and was eliminated.

In the Duma elections of 1999 the LDPR drew 6.4 percent of the vote and got nineteen seats. Zhirinovskiy was elected deputy speaker of the Duma. In the 2000 presidential election he ran again and drew only 2.7 percent of the vote, or a little more than 2 million out of the 75 million who voted. Zhirinovskiy supported both the first and the second Chechen War. An acute student of mass media, he remained in the national spotlight by combining outlandish behavior, populist appeal, and authoritarian nationalism. His antics included fist fights on the floor of the Duma and throwing

orange juice on Boris Nemtsov during a television debate. He made headlines by threatening to take Alaska back from the United States and to flood the Baltic republics with radioactive waste. Zhirinovsky has called for a Russian dash to the south that would end "when Russian soldiers can wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean."

See also: LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

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JACOB W. KIPP

ZHORDANIA, NOE NIKOLAYEVICH

(1868–1953), Menshevik leader; president of Georgia.

The most important leader of the Georgian Social Democrats (Mensheviks), Noe Nikolayevich Zhordania was born in western Georgia to a petty noble family. Educated at the Tiflis Orthodox Seminary (just years before Josef Stalin entered that institute that bred so many revolutionaries), Zhordania went on to Warsaw for further education and there was introduced to Marxism. His writings in the Georgian progressive journal *kvali* (trace) in the early 1890s inspired young radicals soon to be known as the *mesame dasi* (third generation). Zhordania combined a Marxist critique of Russian autocracy and the Armenian-dominated capitalism of his native Georgia with a patriotism that appealed broadly to workers, students, and peasants. By 1905 he had affiliated with the more moderate wing of Russian Social Democracy, the Mensheviks, and took the bulk of Georgian Social Democrats along with him. Radicals like the young Stalin were isolated in the Georgian party and eventually made their careers outside the country.

During the first Russian Revolution in 1905–1906, the Mensheviks dominated Georgia, essentially routing tsarist authority in the country, but brutal repression restored the rule of the government. In 1906 Zhordania was elected to the first State Duma, the new parliament conceded by the tsar. But within a few months the tsar dissolved the duma, and Zhordania and other radicals signed the Vyborg Manifesto protesting the dissolution. Zhordania was forced into the political underground, writing for clandestine newspapers and sparring in print with Stalin over the question of non-Russian nationalities.

With the outbreak of the revolution in 1917 Zhordania became the chairman of the Tiflis Soviet. He was an opponent of the Bolshevik victory in Petrograd in October of that year and was instrumental in the declaration of an independent Georgian republic on May 26, 1918. Zhordania was elected president of the republic and served until the invasion of the Red Army in February 1921. From exile in France he planned an insurrection against the Communist government, but the revolt of August 1924 was bloodily suppressed by the Soviets. Zhordania spent his last years in exile, largely in France, writing his memoirs, conspiring with Western intelligence agencies against the Soviets in Georgia, still the acknowledged leader of a movement whose members fought bitterly one with another.

See also: CAUCAUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MENSHEVIKS

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RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

ZHUKOV, GEORGY KONSTANTINOVICH

(1896–1974), marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), four-time Hero of the Soviet Union, and the Red Army's "Greatest Captain" during the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War (World War II).

Stalin's closest wartime military confidant, Georgy Zhukov was a superb strategist and prac-

tionner of operational art who nonetheless displayed frequent tactical blemishes. Unsparring of himself, his subordinates, and his men, he was renowned for his iron will, strong stomach, and defensive and offensive tenacity.

A veteran of World War I and the Russian Civil War, Zhukov graduated from the Senior Command Cadre Course in 1930 and became deputy commander of the Belorussian Military District in 1938 and commander of Soviet Forces in Mongolia in 1939. After Zhukov defeated Japanese forces at Khalkhin Gol in August 1939, Stalin appointed him commander of the Kiev Special Military District in June 1940 and Red Army Chief of Staff and Deputy Peoples' Commissar of Defense in January 1941.

During World War II, Zhukov served on the Stavka V GK (Headquarters of the Supreme High Command) as First Deputy Peoples' Commissar of Defense and Deputy Supreme High Commander, as Stavka V GK representative to Red Army forces, and as front commander. In June 1941 Zhukov orchestrated the Southwestern Front's unsuccessful armored counterstrokes near Brody and Dubno against German forces in Ukraine. As Reserve Front (army group) commander from July to September, Zhukov slowed the German advance at Smolensk, prompting Hitler to delay his offensive against Moscow temporarily. Zhukov directed the Leningrad Front's successful defense of Leningrad in September 1941 and the Western Front's successful defense and counteroffensive at Moscow in the winter of 1941–1942.

In the summer of 1942, Zhukov's Western Front conducted multiple offensives to weaken the German advance toward Stalingrad and, in November–December 1942, led Operation Mars, the failed companion piece to the Red Army's Stalingrad counteroffensive (Operation Uranus), against German forces west of Moscow. During the winter campaign of 1942–1943, Zhukov coordinated Red Army forces in Operation Spark, which partially lifted the Leningrad blockade, and Operation Polar Star, an abortive attempt to defeat German Army Group North and liberate the entire Leningrad region. While serving as Stavka V GK representative throughout 1943 and 1944, Zhukov played a decisive role in Red Army victories at Kursk and Belorussia, the advance to the Dnieper, and the liberation of Ukraine, while suffering setbacks in the North Caucasus (April–May 1943) and near Kiev (October 1943). Zhukov commanded the First Belorussian Front in the libera-



Marshal Georgy Zhukov led the Red Army to victory in World War II and helped bring Nikita Khrushchev to power in 1953.

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tion of Poland and the victorious but costly Battle of Berlin.

After commanding the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces, Germany, and the Soviet Army Ground Forces, and serving briefly as Deputy Armed Forces Minister, Zhukov was "exiled" in 1946 by Stalin, who assigned him to command the Odessa and Ural Military Districts, ostensibly to remove a potential opponent. Rehabilitated after Stalin's death in 1953, Zhukov served as minister of Defense and helped Khrushchev consolidate his political power in 1957. When Zhukov resisted Khrushchev's policy for reducing Army strength, at Khrushchev's instigation, the party denounced Zhukov, ostensibly for "violating Leninist principles" and fostering a "cult of Comrade G.K. Zhukov" in the army. Replaced as minister of Defense by Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky in October 1957 and retired in March 1958, Zhukov's reputation soared once again after Khrushchev's removal as Soviet leader in 1964.

See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II

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DAVID GLANTZ

ZHUKOVSKY, NIKOLAI YEGOROVICH

(1847–1921), scientist whose research typified the innovative avionics of prerevolutionary Russia.

Like a number of other outstanding Russian scientists of the early Soviet period, Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukovsky was trained in the tsarist era and began his scientific career before the revolution. A specialist in aerodynamics and hydrodynamics, he supervised the construction of one of the world's first experimental wind tunnels in 1902 and founded the first European institute of aerodynamics in 1904. He was a corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. Early in the Soviet period, Zhukovsky was chosen to head the new Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute.

Zhukovsky developed the principal concepts underlying the science of space flight, and in that sense he was a pioneer, not only of aviation in prerevolutionary Russia, but of the later strides made by Soviet scientists. One of his innovations was the testing of intricate aerial maneuvers (e.g., loop-the-loop, barrel rolls, spins) based on his earlier studies of the flight of birds. Vladimir I. Lenin called Zhukovsky the "father of Russian aviation." He died of old age at seventy-four.

See also: AVIATION; SPACE PROGRAM

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ALBERT L. WEEKS

ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH

(1883–1936), Bolshevik revolutionary leader and associate of Lenin who after 1917 became first an ally, then rival, of Stalin and later fell victim to the Great Purge.

Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev was born as Yevsei-Gershon Aronovich Radomyslsky in Yelizavetgrad (later renamed Zinoviesk, now Kirovohrad, Kherson province, Ukraine). Of lower-middle-class Jewish origin, and with no formal education, he joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1901. When the party split in 1903, Zinoviev followed Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik faction. Having gained experience as a political agitator in St. Petersburg during the 1905 Revolution, he became a member of the party's Central Committee in 1907. After a brief term in prison the following year, Zinoviev was released because of his poor health and joined Lenin in western European exile. A fiery orator and provocative political writer, during the next ten years Zinoviev edited numerous Bolshevik publications and supported Lenin against opposition from both within the party and other revolutionary groups. In April 1917, after the overthrow of the tsar at the end of February, Zinoviev returned with Lenin to Russia on the "sealed" train through Germany and took over editorship of the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* until it was banned in July. During the year, however, Zinoviev increasingly took issue with Lenin's confidence in Bolshevik strength and his refusal to collaborate with other socialist groups. In October, Zinoviev together with Lev Kamenev opposed the Bolshevik leader's plans for an armed seizure of power. When Lenin the following month refused to include representatives of other socialist parties in the new Soviet government, Zinoviev (with four others) resigned from the Bolshevik Central Committee in protest. He was readmitted only a few days later after publication of his "Letter to the Comrades" in *Pravda*, in which he submitted to Party discipline. In January 1918, Zinoviev became head of the Petrograd Revolutionary Committee. In March 1919 he was elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the newly founded Communist International (Comintern). By 1921, he was a full member of the Politburo, chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, and leader of the regional Party organization. After Lenin's death in January 1924, Zinoviev and Kamenev joined with Josef Vissarionovich Stalin in a tactical "triumvirate" to counter the aspirations of Leon Trotsky to the Party leadership. After Trot-

sky's defeat in 1925, Stalin turned against his former allies, who strove to maintain their authority by realigning themselves with Trotsky in the United Opposition against Stalin. Politically outmaneuvered, Zinoviev lost control of the Leningrad party organization and the Comintern in 1926 and in November the following year was expelled from the Communist Party. By publicly recanting his opposition to Stalin on several occasions, Zinoviev strove in vain to rehabilitate himself. In January 1935 he was arrested on charges of "moral complicity" in the assassination of Leningrad Party leader Sergei Mironovich Kirov, tried in secret, and sentenced to ten years in prison. In August 1936, Zinoviev was brought before the public in the first Moscow show trial. Abjectly accepting all the charges of terrorism and treason levelled against him, Zinoviev was condemned to death and executed on August 25, 1936. He was rehabilitated by the Soviet government in 1988.

See also: COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; SHOW TRIALS; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; UNITED OPPOSITION; ZINOVIEV LETTER

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NICK BARON

ZINOVIEV LETTER

Letter of mysterious provenance purporting to have been sent by Grigory Zinoviev, head of the Communist International (Comintern), to the British Communist Party with instructions to prepare for revolution.

The letter was first published on October 25, 1924, four days before a general election, in the British newspaper *Daily Mail* under the headline "Civil War Plot by Socialists' Masters." Its appearance caused great embarrassment to the Labour government of Ramsey MacDonald, which on February 2 of that year had bestowed diplomatic recognition on the Soviet Union and on August 10 had concluded a series of trade treaties, now awaiting parliamentary ratification. A conservative vic-

tory in the October 29 elections signaled instead the launch of a vigorously anti-Soviet line, culminating in the abrogation of diplomatic ties in May 1927. Denounced immediately by the Soviet government as a forgery, investigations at the time and since have failed to discover conclusive proof of the letter's authorship, which has been variously attributed to White Russian émigrés, Polish spies, the British secret services, communist provocateurs, or possibly even to Zinoviev. In January 1999, the British government published a report on the letter based on research in British and Russian secret service archives. This proposed that the document was a forgery instigated by White Russian agents in Berlin, carried out in Riga, Latvia, drawing on genuine intelligence information concerning Comintern activities, and channeled by British intelligence to Britain, where certain right-wing members of the security service proved eager to vouch for its authenticity and ensure it reached the press. The letter and subsequent "Red scare" did not, however, cause Labour's electoral defeat or discredit the party, which had already suffered a parliamentary vote of no confidence and loss of Liberal support. Indeed, the Labour party's vote in 1924 grew by one million over the previous year's election.

See also: GREAT BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH; ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH

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NICK BARON

ZUBATOV, SERGEI VASILIEVICH

(1864-1917), senior security police official.

Born and raised in Moscow, the son of a military officer, Sergei Zubatov was a staunch defender of the Russian monarchy who reorganized the Russian security police and created progovernment

labor organizations. These activities earned him fear and anger from the revolutionary activists with whom he matched wits, as well as from more conservative government officials.

Zubatov had exceptional rhetorical talents and a magnetic personality. He was the best-read student in his high school and the leader of a discussion circle. Although he associated with radical intellectuals, he advocated reform and opposed revolution. A self-proclaimed follower of Dmitry Pisarev, he believed that education and cultural development offered the best path to social improvement. He left high school before graduation, in 1882 or 1883, worked in the Moscow post office, and married the proprietress of a private self-education library that stocked forbidden books. Yet he developed monarchist views and became a police informant in 1885. He openly joined the security police in 1889 after radical activists discovered his dual role.

As director of the Moscow security bureau from 1896, Zubatov led the antirevolutionary fight. Activists who fell into his snares found a well-read official who argued passionately that only revolutionary violence was preventing the absolutist monarchy from implementing reforms. Using charm and eloquence, he recruited talented, and sometimes dedicated, secret informants who laid bare the revolutionary underground. He systematized the use of plainclothes detectives, created a mobile surveillance brigade staffed with two dozen such detectives, and trained gendarme officers from around the empire. The major revolutionary organizations found it hard to withstand Zubatov's sophisticated assault.

Zubatov himself was not a gendarme officer, but a civil servant who attained only the seventh rank (*nadvornyi sovetnik*), or lieutenant colonel in military terms. Had he risen through the hierarchical, regimented military, he probably would not have conceived of "police socialism." This policy advocated not the redistribution of wealth but the backing of workers in economic disputes with employers. In 1901, with the patronage of senior Moscow officials, he organized societies that provided cultural, legal, and material services to factory workers. Within a year, analogous societies sprang up in other cities, including Minsk, Kiev, and Odessa.

In the fall of 1902 Zubatov was invited to reorganize the nerve center of the Russian security police. As chief of the Special Section of the Police

Department in St. Petersburg, he created a network of security bureaus in twenty cities from Vilnius to Irkutsk. He staffed many of them with his proteges trained in the new methods of security policing and encouraged to deploy secret informants within the revolutionary milieu.

Meanwhile, however, his worker societies slipped out of control. In July 1903 a general strike broke out in Odessa and labor unrest swept across the south. Zubatov advocated restraint, but the Minister of Interior, Vyacheslav Plehve, used troops to restore order. Disillusioned with Zubatov's labor policies and suspecting him of personal disloyalty, Plehve banished him from the major cities of the empire. Zubatov refused invitations to return to police service after Plehve's assassination in 1904. A monarchist to the last, he fatally shot himself following the emperor's abdication in 1917.

See also: PLEHVE, VYACHESLOV KONSTANTINOVICH

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JONATHAN W. DALY

ZYUGANOV, GENNADY ANDREYEVICH

(b. 1944), Russian politician, chair of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and head of its parliamentary faction since 1993.

Gennady Andreyevich Zyuganov was born on June 26, 1944, in Mymrino, Russia. A member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) ideological department from 1983, Gennady Zyuganov sympathized with the conservative opposition to Gorbachev and helped found the anti-reform Russian Communist Party within the

CPSU in 1990. He first gained notoriety as an anti-Gorbachev polemicist on the eve of the August 1991 coup and as a defender of the Russian Communist Party when Yeltsin banned it (from August 1991 to November 1992).

As a prolific opposition publicist from the early 1990s, Zyuganov's achievement was the rehabilitation of communism as a serious intellectual and political force. Ideologically, however, his "conservative communism" came to owe less of a debt to its Marxist-Leninist forebears and instead drew heavily from the idea of a Soviet "national Bolshevism," which justified communist rule more for its service to national greatness than for its promise of a classless future. Zyuganov argued that Marxism was only one of the methods necessary for analyzing modern society, in which defense of Russian cultural and historical traditions, preservation of a global zone of influence, and the forging of broad alliances with national capitalists against the West took precedence over class revolution within Russia itself.

Zyuganov realized that the communists urgently needed new ideas and allies merely to survive during and after the ban on their party, and that following the collapse of the USSR they could ignore issues of personal, ethnic, and national security only at their peril. More perceptively, he judged that Russia's post-1991 intellectual commitment to market liberalism was deeply equivocal and offered in its stead a kind of "state patriotism," based on the idea that communists and non-communists alike could unite in defending Russia's state as the cradle of their common cultural heritage. This, he believed was a unifying vision that could fill the "ideological vacuum" left by Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, Zyuganov sought to reverse the liberal consensus that the period from 1917 to 1991 was a "Soviet experiment." To achieve this, he argued that liberalism itself was the imposition alien to the collectivist and spiritual traditions that had been best expressed under communism. Simultaneously, Zyuganov was an energetic and practical politician; his alliance-building with nationalist and other opposition politicians helped him to become Communist Party leader in February 1993 and to formulate a consistent theme. He based his presidential bids on broad "national-patriotic fronts" that sought to extend the communists' appeal.

Zyuganov has presented a complex figure, whose leadership, ideas, and personality have been



Gennady Zyuganov, chair of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, was Boris Yeltsin's foe in parliament and for the presidency. PHOTOGRAPH BY MISHA JAPARIDZE. AP/WIDE

WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

much critiqued. The prevalent Western view of him as a plodding party bureaucrat is a caricature, highlighting his lack of charisma while underestimating his tactical and organizational skill. The view of Zyuganov as a fascistic nationalist, most trenchantly argued by academic Veljko Vujacic, identifies his dalliance with Stalinism and anti-Semitism, while underplaying his moderate conservatism. Marxist charges that he renounced socialism and radicalism entirely correctly identify his debts to conservative Russian nationalism, while underestimating the necessity he faced of making ideological and electoral compromises. Even judged by his own aims, Zyuganov remains a paradoxical figure. His leftist critics have alleged that he failed to move Russia "forward to socialism" by failing to provide an intellectually coherent socialist alternative. While his arguments have found increasing appeal, particularly in governing circles, and his party was the most popular in parliamentary elections in the 1990s, he lost to Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election run-off, and Vladimir Putin beat him by over twenty percent in the first round of the presidential election in March 2000.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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POWER, POLITICS, & TECHNOLOGY

A makeshift memorial stands before the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine, 1992, six years after the accident. Ironically, the testing of security equipment triggered a malfunction, blowing the roof off the reactor, and causing the worst nuclear disaster in history. © GROCHOWIAK EWA/CORBIS

Below: The Chernobyl nuclear plant, 1986, six months after the accident. An estimated 3.5 million people continue to live in the 100,000-square-mile contaminated zone.

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Top: A serviceman passes by an opened SS-18 intercontinental ballistic multiple-warhead Satan missile silo in the town of Kartaly in Russian's Chelyabinsky region, August 16, 2002. Western intelligence experts fear lax security at Russia's 15,000 non-strategic tactical nuclear weapons sites present a greater danger than an accidental launch. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS



Middle: The Kursk nuclear submarine in its mooring in the base of Vidyayevo. The Kursk sank in the Barents Sea on August 12, 2000, killing all 118 aboard. © AFP/CORBIS




Bottom: Deactivation of nuclear missiles in Surovatikha, Russia, January, 1995. Following the collapse of the USSR, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine surrendered all the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on their soil to Moscow. © EPIX/ CORBIS

Top: Soviet troops parade through Palace Square, Leningrad, under the watchful gaze of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. The square was the starting point for both the Revolution of 1905 (Bloody Sunday) and the October Revolution in 1917. © ELIO CIOL/CORBIS


Bottom: A unit of Soviet soldiers march in Red Square on the 70th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Moscow, 1987. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS



Top left: The Russian Flag. Peter the Great returned from the Netherlands with plans for a Russian navy and introduced a tricolor flag inspired by the Dutch flag. Originally adopted as the national flag in 1799, the tricolor returned in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union. © ROYALTY-FREE/CORBIS



Below: Demonstrators take to the streets of Moscow to defend democracy during the anti-Gorbachev coup, August 1991. Key Soviet leaders, including the vice president, feared Gorbachev's policy of democratization would mean the end of the Soviet Union, and their own power, and placed him under house arrest. The coup was thwarted by its planners' incompetence, popular resistance, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who banned the Communist Party from all Russian territory. © DAVID TURNLEY/CORBIS



Top: Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev stands at the podium with U.S. President Ronald Reagan at a White House summit, December 7, 1987. The two leaders ushered in the end of the Cold War, which had seen the two nations at odds since the ending of World War II. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS



Middle: U.S. President Bill Clinton (right) laughing with Russian President Boris Yeltsin during a press conference after their meeting at Hyde Park, October 23, 1995. © AFP/CORBIS



Bottom: Russian President Vladimir Putin after adjusting the ribbon on a wreath placed outside the mausoleum of late president Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, March 2, 2001. The Soviet Union had backed Vietnam (Indochine) in its struggle for independence from France, and during the war against the United States. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS



Top left: Two Chechen rebels, armed with a heavy machine gun, rest from patrolling the city. They are fighting Russian troops for their independence. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

Below: A woman cries after another woman is badly injured by a Russian shell in Grozny, Chechnya. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS



Top right: A Proton rocket carrying the Zvezda (meaning "star" in Russian) service module is being prepared at the launch pad at Baikonur, Kazakhstan, July 8, 2000. Zvezda, an integral part of the International Space Station, is responsible for the crew living quarters, life support systems, electrical power distribution, data processing systems, flight control systems, and propulsion system. © AFP/CORBIS



Below: The Russian Space Station MIR (meaning both "peace" and "world" in Russian) photographed from the cargo bay of the U.S. Space Shuttle Atlantis. The first module of MIR was launched February 20, 1986. After far exceeding its expected service life, the station was destroyed through controlled re-entry over the Pacific Ocean on March 23, 2001. CORBIS

