Armies of Feudal Europe 1066-1300

by Ian Heath

Andalusia, Bulgaria, England, Estonia, France, the Holy Roman Empire, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Morocco, the Ordensstaat of the Teutonic Knights, the Earldom of Orkney, the Papal State, Poland, Prussia, Lithuania, the Low Countries, Kievan Russia, Scandinavia, Scotland, Serbia, Sicily, Spain, Venice, Wales and Wendland.

A WARGAMES RESEARCH GROUP PUBLICATION

FULLY REVISED SECOND EDITION

Armies of Feudal Europe

1066 to 1300

2nd Edition

Organisation, tactics, dress and weapons
147 illustrations and 149 coats-of-arms.

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INTRODUCTION

Following on where I left off in *Armies of the Dark Ages,* this book really requires little introduction, though it should be noted that it is *not* a book about the armies of feudalised Europe (which would hardly include Ireland or Russia, yet alone Andalusia and Prussia) but rather it is about the armies of mediaeval Europe during the period in which feudalism flourished and subsequently waned. From its very beginning the feudal system had possessed within it the seeds of its own demise, in the form of inherent limitations — length of service, definition of and constant dispute over obligations, and military power in the hands of a potentially hostile nobility, to name but a few — which led in time to its gradual decline during the latter part of this era until, by the end of the 13th century, feudalism had ceased to be all-important from the military point of view. Hence the choice of 1300 as my closing date.

The story of feudalism's rise and fall has been told many times before and from many different viewpoints. The difference of *this* book from the many others available is that in it I have not only attempted to explain, simply, the origins and institutions of military feudalism, and the diverse forms of its evolution throughout 11th-13th century Europe, but also I have set out to describe and illustrate not just how knights were equipped, but how the ordinary soldier was dressed and armed too, from Ireland in the west to Russia in the east, and from Scandinavia in the north to Sicily in the south. When the first edition was published back in 1978 it was my earnest hope that I had thereby plugged an over-large gap in the literature of mediaeval warfare. On reflection that was an overly bold ambition, and time has proved that in certain areas my research was not as comprehensive, nor my coverage as broad, as I would have wished it to be. Ten years later, the opportunity has arisen to rectify many — though not all, I suspect — of the first edition's errors, while at the same time expanding its scope to include less well-known countries from the fringes of mediaeval Europe, such as the earldom of the Orkneys, Prussia, Wendland and Serbia. Wales too is included this time round, a thoughtless omission from the earlier edition. Hopefully this will at least bring me slightly closer to plugging that nebulous gap.

My debts of gratitude remain unchanged since the first edition: to Phil Barker and Bob O'Brien, for their faith in a complete stranger; to the late Bruce Galloway, for his assistance during the early stages of my research for not just *Feudal Europe,* but *Dark Ages* and *Armies and Enemies of the Crusades* too; to Richard Nelson, for permission to reproduce certain material which had appeared in *Slingshot,* the Journal of the Society of Ancients; to the staff of the St Ives Library, for proving that the Inter-Library Loan system does work; and to the Cambridge University Library, for the continued use of its excellent facilities. Finally, I owe special thanks to two people: to Roman Olejniczak, who provided practically all of the information on Poland that is given here, plus much additional data on Russia in particular (I hope that my interpretation does it justice); and to the late Alan Nickels, for providing much of the material for three of the appendices, on heraldry, standards and banners, and the ranks of nobility.

Ian Heath
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ORGANISATION

FEUDALISM

Feudalism had originated in Carolingian France when constant internal warfare had weakened the central authority of the crown and impoverished many freemen; this led to a consequent increase in the power of the nobility, upon whom the freeman had to rely for protection, and the king had to rely for military support. Feudal organisation of the sort outlined below had become the norm over most of Europe by the end of the 11th century and remained so until late in the 13th century, though certain regions — such as Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, parts of the Low Countries, and even Germany — never became feudalised to the same extent as elsewhere.

The basis of all feudal organisation was the benefice (*beneficium*), which came to be known as the fee, feud or fief, from the Germanic *feodum*. The word feodum itself, derived in turn from the Frankish *fehu* and *od* (meaning livestock and movable possessions or property, ie, chattels) is characteristic of the entire feudal system, to which it gave its name, for the simplest basic definition of feudalism from the military point of view is 'unpaid service in exchange for a gift of specific value, principally a grant of land' or, in broader terms, society organised on the basis of land tenure.

The fief itself had initially been land granted to a retainer in exchange for nominal duties, such as agricultural maintenance, but before long the term had come to mean land granted for the specific purpose of supporting one or more armed men who, in exchange for the grant, were to serve their overlord (tenant-in-chief) or the king at their own expense for specified periods, in time of peace (apparently for training) or war. But in no way was the fief a standard unit by which military service could possibly be measured, since it varied considerably in size and obligations. The service required generally became standardised at 40 days during the 12th century though there were many variations from country to country and even fief to fief ranging from only a few days to a full year. In many instances the period of service could be extended, often for the same period again, in exchange for pay. Men granted fractions of fiefs performed their service in relation to the size of the fraction; J. E. Morris, in his *Welsh Wars of King Edward I*, gives the example of a man holding one-tenth of a knight's fief, who could fulfil his military obligations by supplying a sergeant (equivalent to half a knight — see below) for 8 days service.

Because of the obvious close association which existed between military service and tenure by nobility the words for cavalry soldier and gentleman inevitably became synonymous — French *chevalier*, Italian *cavaliere*, Spanish *caballero* and German *Ritter* all mean 'horseman' or 'rider'. The only exception is the English equivalent 'knight', which evolved from the Anglo-Saxon *cnicht**, meaning a household retainer or servant — the way the household soldiers of their Norman conquerors appeared to the Anglo-Saxons. Often all these terms are camouflaged by the contemporary chroniclers' use of a blanket description, *miles*, which basically indicated that the man or men in question served on horseback with armour; it could therefore, and in the early part of this period often did, include in addition men of non-knightly rank.

The man to whom a fief was granted was called a vassal, originally from the Latin *vassus* meaning a slave (a nice contradiction since a man holding a knight's fief was automatically regarded as being of gentle birth!). Becoming a vassal usually involved an oath of fealty to the king or, if a sub-vassal, the tenant-in-chief, sworn on the hilt of a sword or on holy relics. There could also be unbeneficed vassals who had merely sworn allegiance but had received no fief. The king's personal military retinue, his *familia*, often included many such men in addition to stipendiaries and others.

Those vassals who, in exchange for their fiefs, were obliged to supply a certain stipulated number of knights in addition to themselves (*servitium debitum*) could either supply all the knights personally, either from their unbeneficed household knights if they had them or by hiring mercenaries, or could ease their military obligations by subinfeudation within their fiefs, once again in exchange for military service. In the case of subinfeudation the number of knights who owed such service usually exceeded the number with which the tenant-in-chief was obliged to supply the king, neither the quota of knights owed to the tenant-in-chief nor to the king usually representing the total possible muster of a fief. Only in times of crisis or national emergency was the whole muster of a district or province, together with all other able bodied freemen, likely to be called out; this is best known by its French name of *arrière-ban* (Latin *retrobannum*). However, feudal magnates often appeared with more than their requisite quota of knights, often out of pride or loyalty but doubtless sometimes because the size of their 'official' feudal contingents could not satisfactorily guarantee their own safety in battle. On the occasions when only the stipulated quota served they were sometimes supplied and equipped at the expense of those who remained at home. In the latter part of the feudal era a system of fixed quota service generally replaced service calculated by fiefs.

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*In Germany the word *Knecht* retained its original meaning, denoting only a valet, one of the knight's armed servants.

Feudal troops serving their local tenant-in-chief (*service de chevauchée*) appear to have been paid, whereas feudal contingents constituting a tenant-in-chief's stipulated quota for the royal or provincial army (*service d'host*) had to serve at their own expense according to their feudal obligations. Sometimes such service was performed without a feudal summons even being issued; by the second half of the 13th century feudal troops not in receipt of such a summons sometimes served instead for pay. In addition the common freemen could be called up for infantry service for a similar period, usually raised at shire or town level on either a local or a national scale. Feudal contingents too were often accompanied by some infantry, usually lower-class retainers, of whom there were perhaps 2 or 3 for each knight; in camp these acted as servants.

Even church lands soon came to be held on a feudal basis, though unlike lay vassals the ecclesiastic was not usually obliged to serve in person, satisfying his military obligations instead by the maintenance of household knights or by subinfeudation. However, the latter obviously involved a considerable loss of revenue which the church was reluctant to accept, and in Germany this resulted in the *ministerialis*, the unfree knight (see page 35). It was also in Germany, where heavy reliance was placed on church contingents, that ecclesiastics were most often to be found performing their military service in person.

Scutage

Before long a money-payment in lieu of service became commonplace. This was called *scutage*, because it was 'paid according to the number of shields [*scuta*]' as one Anglo-Norman source explains. Similar systems had existed prior to this era, though development of the practise in the post-1066 period appears to have originated in England, where the Normans expanded on the existing Saxon custom of providing cash in lieu of service for the employment of a mercenary. From England it spread to the continent. Though the sum involved was initially a cash assessment of the knight's fief with a view to employing mercenary or stipendiary substitutes it later came to be levied as a general tax. Though there is some evidence as early as 1159 that the assessment of scutage in England may have been based directly on the anticipated cost of hiring substitute equivalents, positive evidence of this does not appear until the 13th century.

A variation evolved by the Plantagenet kings in England was to summon only a proportion of those owing feudal military service and call upon the knights remaining at home to support those who had been mobilised, either directly or through scutage payments. A third of the feudal levy was called out in this way in 1157, 1191 and 1194, while in 1197 King Richard proposed that just 300 knights should be equipped and financed in this way for a year's paid service in Normandy. King John similarly issued orders to the sheriffs for just one knight in every 10 to be thus equipped and paid in 1205, for service 'as long as the need shall last'.

Castle-guard

As well as service in wartime the knight was also expected to perform castle-guard at the tenant-in-chief's or king's local fortress; a single exception to this rule seems to have been Sicily, where castles had practically no garrison except in wartime. The question of castle-guard and its obligations is itself a complex one, but generally service varied from castle to castle, from 15 days required once or more than once a year to as much as 4 months in every 12. The norm was usually 3 months. Often knights who performed castle-guard were not expected to serve in the wartime muster; however, some were expected to perform castle-guard in addition to their full period of military service (though this obligation was repealed in England by Magna Carta in 1215) and yet others had to perform castle-guard only in wartime. Towards the end of the 12th century it became more common to pay scutage than perform this service, the payment again being used to employ a mercenary substitute. However, castle-guard was frequently left to sergeants, especially in France and Normandy, and to *ministeriales* in Germany.

Mercenaries

The mercenary substitutes hired with revenue obtained from scutage were principally crossbowmen and men-at-arms (the latter term also covering horsemen of less than knightly status). Despite the codes of 'chivalry' by which the knighthood often fought and sometimes lived by the end of this period knights constituted a large percentage of most European mercenaries, particularly during the 13th century, and were in no way regarded as inferior to their feudal counterparts. In fact it is only fair to say that in Europe mercenary (or stipendiary) troops were generally reliable throughout this era. The modern word 'soldier' actually derives from one of the words in use for a mercenary in this period, *solidarius*, meaning a man serving for pay.

Rates of pay were steadily on the increase throughout this era. By the beginning of the 12th century mercenary knights in England were being paid 6d a day, rising to 8d a day by 1162, 1s a day by 1173, as much as 2s a day by the early-13th century and 3s-4s a day by Edward I's reign. Sergeants and infantry were paid considerably less, between 2d and 6d a day in 1196 (2d-3d for infantry sergeants, 4d-6d for mounted sergeants), while King John paid mounted crossbowmen 7½d or 1s 3d depending on whether they served with one or two horses. At prices like these the hiring of mercenaries was an expensive business and it was inevitable that the one real problem their employment

in large numbers caused for the feudal monarch was that of finding the money to pay them; we often read of treasuries exhausted by the maintenance of such troops, as well as mercenaries with pay months in arrears.

Mercenary knights were largely Flemish, French, Breton, Burgundian, Gascon or German, the proportions changing over the years, infantry were largely Brabançon (this itself being a general term for mercenary infantry for much of the 12th century), Flemish, Italian, Aragonese, Navarrese or Basque, the last three as javelin-armed *bidets*, employed by France in particular during the 13th century. Most of these types are listed in a Lateran edict of 1179 which unsuccessfully forbade the use of mercenaries. They were generally employed individually, the usual practice seemingly being to hire a recognised mercenary captain who would then select a band of soldiers suitable to his employer's needs; almost inevitably some of the greater captains (such as William of Ypres, Mercadier, Cadoc and Fawkes de Bréauté) each gathered a small, permanent nucleus of men who remained in their personal employ. This in turn ultimately led to the evolution of the infamous freelance companies of the 14th century who sold their services to the highest bidder. The 'Grand Company of Catalans', employed in Sicily in the late-13th century, seems to have been the first of these.

Sergeants

Sergeants, or *servientes*, were technically lesser feudal tenants than knights, though by the end of the 12th century the term had come to be used rather more loosely as a distinction between noble and non-noble soldiers of all categories, both infantry and cavalry. The true feudal sergeant usually held a grant of land that by the late-12th century was called a 'sergeanty' (*serianteria*, *seriantia*); this was half the value of a knight's fief, which is why a large number of sources and documents record the service of two mounted sergeants as being equivalent to (and acceptable in substitution for) that of one knight. In general, however, the word sergeant was used as a blanket term by chroniclers to describe soldiers of less than knightly status, both feudal and non-feudal, often without even differentiating between infantry and horsemen. Later, as the number of actual knights decreased and the non-knightly elements duly increased the distinction between milites and servientes, which had become quite distinct in the course of the 12th and 13th centuries, became somewhat blurred, and the term man-at-arms (*homines ad arma*), which occurs with growing frequency during the 13th century, began to be applied to all armoured horsemen indiscriminately.

Money-fiefs

The money-fief (*fief-rente*) was a gift in cash in exchange for the agreement of the vassal to supply troops when called upon just as if it were a fief of land. However, in addition such troops usually had to be paid at the going rate by the overlord (*not* by the vassal) whenever they served. The largest money-fiefs were paid out to foreign lords, one of the earliest examples of this practice being the agreement made by Henry I of England with Count Robert II of Flanders in 1101, where in exchange for £500 a year the Count promised the service of 1,000 knights in England or Normandy or 500 knights in Maine; this was renewed on subsequent occasions during the 12th century. It can be appreciated that the availability of such substantial contingents was an important asset to a feudal monarch, limited as his military resources might otherwise be.

The particular advantage of the money-fief was that the substitution of money for land enabled feudal manpower to be increased or maintained without considerable loss of land or revenue to the crown or tenant-in-chief. For this reason it was all-important in the crusader states of Frankish Syria where land was always at a premium. Likewise in France the money-fief enabled the fundamentally weak monarchy to strengthen its position, while in Germany it was a means used principally to maintain castle garrisons. Money-fiefs became common in the 13th century.

Restor

Restor was initially a custom whereby if a knight lost any equipment on campaign it was replaced at his lord's expense. However, by the 13th century it had come to refer exclusively to the replacement of horses killed or maimed in battle, and was particularly important in the Holy Land, where Saracen archery took an especially heavy toll. Horses were generally evaluated before a battle and replaced accordingly if lost; by the 14th century at the latest, in fact, they were evaluated as soon as the army first mustered, being given a special identification mark to prevent fraud.

The decline of feudalism

By the end of this period the cavalry element of a feudal army contained very few actual knights (ie, men serving in exchange for knights' fiefs) instead consisting largely of: non-knightly holders of knights' fiefs (men either awaiting knighthood, or unwilling or not wealthy enough to accept it); retainers employed on a temporary basis in exchange for money-fiefs; landless men of knightly families; feudal tenants of less than knightly status (ie, sergeants); esquires; and stipendiaries. The fact that many holders of what had been knights' fiefs were no longer technically knights led, by the 13th century, to the adoption of the value of possessions rather than land as the qualification for

obligatory military service, thus ensuring the service of those who could best afford the horse and essential and ever more sophisticated and expensive armour of the knight. At the same time it also resulted in a considerable reduction in the size of knightly contigents throughout most of the armies of Western Europe — as an example one need only quote the case of an English baron, Hugh de Courtenay, whose quota during the reign of Edward I was reduced from 92 knights to just 3! There were also other factors which contributed to this state of affairs — the increased expense of horse and armour already mentioned, for instance, inevitably meant that fewer men could afford to be knights, and those that could did not always have the resources or the inclination to maintain large bodies of similarly armed men. Furthermore the payment of scutage had become widespread, while the liberal distribution of special exemptions had negated or considerably reduced the obligatory service of many others.

The consequent reduction of the number of feudal troops available was largely offset by a parallel increase in the employment of stipendiaries and mercenaries, who were in addition generally more reliable, better-trained and officered and could be maintained all year round. In addition many knights themselves, though still under feudal obligation, were also paid by the end of the 13th century, often thereby supplying larger contingents than they would have on a purely feudal basis and potentially for a longer period. By the 14th century terms of service were generally set out in advance in the form of a contract.

One other oft-quoted reason for the military decline of the feudal knight was the growing importance of infantry and the increased ability of the latter to withstand the charge of mailed horsemen.

Unit organisation

Wherever possible feudal army units appear to have been established on a decimal basis, or more accurately in multiples of 5,10 and 100, though this is more especially true of the militia and mercenaries than of knights. Infantry units most commonly found are of 10, 100, 500 or 1,000 men. Certainly by the middle to late-12th century French infantry seem to have been generally organised in divisions of 500 men led by an officer mounted on a barded horse (but not necessarily a knight) with the rank of constable of *chevetaine*. Similar units of 500 called *constabularia* appear in England during the late-12th century, commanded by a constable (sometimes called a *magister* or 'master') and subdivided into 5 units of 100 each under a *centenar*, also sometimes called a constable. By the 13th century each 100 was further subdivided into 5 units of 20 under officers called *vintenars*; the official strength of 100 appears to have been sometimes as low as 50 men or as high as 200. Constable and constabularia, or constabulary, seem to have become standard terms throughout Europe during the 13th century.

Terms used to describe units of men-at-arms included *masnadas*, *eschieles* (squadrons), *conrois*, *bannières* (banners) and *batailles* (battles), of which the first two are often disguised by the blanket term 'constabulary', their commanders similarly being described as constables. There is some evidence to suggest that the smallest such units comprised 10 men by the late-12th century, and King Edward I of England's men-at-arms were similarly organised into constabularies of 10 men in 1301. Even in the 12th century, however, there were also conrois or constabularies of 20 knights, while William the Marshal had more than 50 knights in his own. Constabularies of 25, 50 or even 100 knights or more were certainly in existence by the mid-13th century throughout much of Western Europe, by which time the term 'banner' was often applied to them (but only in feudal or semi-feudal armies). This word had first appeared in France c.1200, occasionally in the Latin form *vexillarius*, and denoted a unit led by a knight whose income was substantial enough to maintain such a body of men, which thereby earnt him the right to display his arms on a rectangular flag properly called a banner, the knight being deemed a 'banneret'. It is generally accepted, though on uncertain grounds, that on the Continent this unit generally comprised some 25 or 50 men, but in England (where the banneret may have only first appeared c.1240 — but see Appendix 3) it was generally smaller, the average retinue of bannerets serving for pay in Edwards I's reign being 15 knights, many numbering considerably less. The size of mercenary constabularies recorded elsewhere in Europe similarly varied, some totalling as few as 5 men, others more than 100, but it should be noted that the term constabulary itself could be used more loosely for any body of armed men within an army, irrespective of size. Likewise the title constable could be used for the commander of any such body.

The chronicler Guiart describes conrois as 'square' units, which J. F. Verbruggen (who clearly considers the words conroi and banner to be synonymous) interprets to mean that in the case of a unit of 24 men (plus banneret/constable) they would have drawn up in 8 files and 3 ranks. The largest battlefield formation, the bataille or 'battle', would therefore have consisted of a number of such smaller units drawn up side by side. The precise size of these larger divisions, however, would have depended solely on the quantity of troops available and the number of units required, the army's contingents being grouped together as the particular situation demanded, with one of its leaders taking command through feudal seniority or military prowess. However, because each contingent was commanded by its respective lord or his appointed deputy personal squabbles over seniority and authority are not infrequent in contemporary chronicles, and the resultant disaffection and lack of cohesion was the most severe handicap of feudal armies once they were in the field. (See Appendix 3 for the various ranks of the nobility.)

Technically the senior military officers were the Seneschal, the Constable and the Marshal. Their duties inevitably varied considerably from country to country and underwent constant change throughout this era, while not only the king but the upper echelon of the nobility too had such officers. In Germany the Seneschal was the commander of the Imperial familia even in the late-12th century, while in France he was at first the commander-in-chief (though Philippe II Augustus allowed the office to remain vacant after 1191, its duties being largely assumed by the Constable instead). As explained above, feudal armies generally contained far more than one constable, most of whom were no more than mercenary captains, or deputies for absentee noblemen and, as we have seen, might command constabularies of as few as 5-10 men; but invariably when a constable is found performing the duties of an army commander he is the king's officer, the Constable of the kingdom. His title derives originally from the Latin *comes stabularius* or 'count of the stable'. The Marshal (originally *marashal*, 'master of horse') usually ranked below the Constable, except in England and Scandinavia where he inherited the office of the Staller or 'Horse-thane'; the Constable only rose to importance in England in the 13th century.* One last senior military rank established in France in the mid-13th century was that of 'Master of the Crossbowmen', who was in overall command of not just the crossbowmen but all other types of foot-soldier too. This rank was created by King Louis IX and lasted until the reign of Francis II.

FRANCE

As noted above, it was in France that feudalism actually originated, evolving amidst the chaos which followed the collapse of the Carolingian Empire in the 9th century. Though unavoidable, dependence on the nobility for military support under such circumstances seriously weakened the king's authority. In fact in the course of the 10th century the 6 most powerful nobles (at that date the Dukes of Normandy, Burgundy, France and Aquitaine and the Counts of Toulouse and Flanders) stripped the crown practically bare of military power, largely by transforming the obligations of the vassals within their lands so that service previously owed directly to the crown was now owed to them personally, so that by 987 the royal demesne had dwindled to a single city and its environs. Even under the Capetian dynasty (founded by Hugh Capet in 987), responsible for the revival of the French monarchy, the king's power grew only very slowly, and throughout most of this era the principal characteristic of French feudalism was the inability of the king to exert his authority over the nobles, even within the royal demesne. Indeed, from the 10th century onwards the feudal nobility of France expended a good deal more of its energy in defying or actually opposing the king than in supporting him. In addition much of the country was constantly racked by feudal anarchy and open rivalry between the greater vassals.

It was therefore fortunate that the Capetian kings were also Dukes of France (the Ile de France, centred on Paris), otherwise their feudal military strength would have been practically zero. As it was, even the king's own tenants within the Ile de France openly defied him and were only finally brought to heel by Louis VI (1108-37). However, it was upon the unreliable contingents of the demesne that the early Capetians were obliged to rely for feudal military support, though on the whole they could also depend on additional troops being supplied from church lands. Service was owed for the standard 40-day period even in the late-13th century though, as elsewhere, this could be extended in exchange for pay, but only if the vassal wished to remain. Service was not obligatory outside of the kingdom, even for pay, and some vassals argued that it was not even due outside of their own province or county.

The feudal magnates, though technically vassals of the crown, supplied only token contingents to the royal host, of which the 12th century quota of the Count of Champagne is a classic example — only 10 knights, though his own vassals owed the count the service of as many as 2,300 knights by the mid-century! Likewise at the beginning of the 12th century the Count of Flanders was obliged to supply King Philippe I (1060-1108) only 20 knights, though he could raise more than 1,000, and the Duke of Normandy 10 knights out of a potential 2,000 or more (possibly as many as 2,500). Even in the 13th century the Duke of Burgundy owed only 60 knights, the Count of Brittany 40, the Count of Flanders 42 and the Count of Anjou 35. The insignificant total of 436 knights given in the 'Milites Regni Franciae' of 1182, and the approximate 1,200-1,300 knights estimated by Verbruggen to have been available to Philippe II Augustus at Bouvines in 1214, best portray the weakness of the French crown, though church and demesne contingents need to be added to the former figure for a more realistic total. In times of national emergency the *arrière-ban* could be summoned which, like the old Frankish *Heerbann*, obliged all able-bodied freeman (of 18-60 years of age by 1285) to perform military service, though generally it only served within a half-day's march of home; according to contemporary sources one arrière-ban summoned by Louis VI for an anticipated battle against Emperor Henry V at Rheims in 1124 mustered the improbable total of 200-300,000 men (elsewhere described as 'like locusts hiding from sight the earth with its rivers, mountains and plains'). Yet even under the arrière-ban declared for the campaign of 1214 the Count of Champagne still supplied only 180 knights to the royal army, and

*Initially, under King Henry I, there were 4 royal constables in England, serving at court in rotation, 3 months at a time. However, there appears to have been only one after the mid-12th century.

the total number of knights raised is recorded by William le Breton as only 2,000, including those under Prince Louis fighting in the south, though there was in addition an unknown number of mounted sergeants. Bearing such figures in mind it is hardly surprising to find that by the reign of Philippe II Augustus (1180-1223) reliance on feudal manpower had already begun the slow decline that reached its final conclusion in the 14th century (for the closing stages of which see *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*).

It was Philippe II who first broke the stranglehold of the feudal magnates. As a result of his victory at Bouvines in 1214 the rebel Count of Flanders was imprisoned and Anjou, Normandy and a large part of Aquitaine (formerly possessions of King John of England) passed to the French crown; the county of Toulouse, meanwhile, was being despoiled by the infamous Albigensian Crusade and itself passed to the crown in the course of the 13th century. Philippe actually tripled or even quadrupled the size of the royal demesne. The nucleus of most French royal armies, however, was now usually composed of mercenaries. Mercenary troops of various categories had steadily increased in importance in France throughout the 11th and 12th centuries, especially in royal armies since the king could not rely on his vassals for adequate support. As early as 1138 Louis VII was maintaining 200 mercenary knights and crossbowmen, and Philippe II, by introducing a form of scutage within the demesne, was able to greatly increase this nucleus of mercenary troops. By 1202 it had grown to 3,043 men, composed of:

257 knights
267 mounted sergeants
86 mounted crossbowmen
133 infantry crossbowmen
2,000 infantry sergeants
300 *routiers* under Cadoc

It is quite clear from the sources that Philippe employed an unprecedented number of mercenaries. William le Breton records that the chief of his Brabançon mercenaries, Cadoc, was paid as much as 1,000 *livres parisis* a day, which, even allowing for exaggeration and a massive cut for Cadoc himself, would have easily paid for some 10,000 infantry. However, the figure is obviously a figment of William's imagination, despite the fact that there are actual records of very large sums of money being paid out to Cadoc, as much as 4,500 livres parisis on one occasion. (Significantly, however, Cadoc was later imprisoned for extortion.) Most of the crown's mercenaries were used as garrison troops in peacetime and were only 'called up' for field service in wartime (as they were in 1214, for example). Most mercenaries employed in France were Frenchmen.

Though at first knights preferred to perform personal military service, during the course of the 13th century scutage became a 'fundamental characteristic' of French feudalism and obligatory military service a serious bone of contention between the king and his magnates. Under Philippe III in 1274 the commutation or fine required in lieu of service was standardised at the knight's or sergeant's rate of pay x 1½ x 40 (for the number of day's service commuted); a baron had to pay 5 times as much as a knight banneret, who paid twice as much as a knight, who in turn paid twice as much as a sergeant, these rates being based directly on the anticipated cost of hiring equivalent mercenary substitutes. The vassal remained free to choose between commutation and service. Late in the 13th century Philippe IV (1285-1314) transformed such commutation into a general tax (levied on 4 occasions — 1294, 1295, 1299 and 1301), from which the nobility were at first — but not for long — exempt.

By the very end of this era military service in France (and in England too for that matter) had come to be based largely on the value of possessions. In 1303 we find the service of 'a well-armed warrior of gentle birth mounted on a horse valued at 50 livres . . . covered with a coat-of-mail and a coat-of-arms [ie, a bard and a housing]' expected from each 500 livres of revenue, while the lower classes had to supply 6 sergeants for every 100 hearths. Service was due from all freemen over 18 (except for the very old or sick), for 4 months in both cases.

The Communes

By the end of Louis VII's reign (1137-80), after which the old parish and diocesan militia were effectively never summoned again, the majority of French infantry were supplied either by mercenaries or by sergeants levied from church lands and communes. The latter had begun to appear in France at the very beginning of this era (Le Mans 1070, Cambrai 1076) and as early as the reign of Louis VI were being granted charters, not least because the crown valued highly the militia contingents that they were able to raise. Louis VII confirmed as many as 25 communal charters in his reign, while Phillippe Augustus, realising their real potential as garrison troops, concentrated on granting and confirming the charters of frontier communes, particularly in the Vexin, Soissonais, Laonnais and Picardy — in fact the communal contingents which fought for him at Bouvines came largely from Picardy; William le Breton makes special mention of the communal militias of Amiens, Arras, Beauvais, Compiègne and Corbie being present at this battle, but we know from another sourve (the 'Catalogus Captivarum', which lists the share of

prisoners allotted to each commune after the battle) that the communal troops of Bruyères, Cerny and Crépy-en-Laonnais, Crandelain, Hesdin, Montdidier, Montreuil-sur-Mer, Noyon, Roye, Soissons and Vailly were also present. From the 'Prisée des Sergens' (Valuation of Sergeants) we know that these communes ordinarily fielded the following numbers of men:

Amiens	250
Arras	1,000
Beauvais	500
Compiègne	200
Corbie	200
Bruyères	120
Cerny and Crépy-en-Laonnais	80
Crandelain	40
Hesdin	80
Montdidier	80
Montreuil-sur-Mer	150
Noyon	150
Roye	100
Soissons	160
Vailly	50
	3,160

Verbruggen adds that the remaining communes — ie, those not present at the Battle of Bouvines — could field a further 1,980 men (Tournai, for instance, was expected to raise 300 men by its charter of 1188), since we know that in 1202 the kingdom's 30 communes could field in all 5,140 sergeants. The communes extant until 1194, the date of the 'Prisée des Sergens', could field 5,435 men (though this included in addition the sergeants owed by the abbeys of the royal demesne), which figure then increased, as a result of territorial expansion, to between 7,695-8,054 men, standing at 8,069 in 1202.* There is some evidence that the size of the individual communal contingents grew over the years too, since Corbie supplied 400 men to a muster of 1253 (to which the communes supplied 3,100 men in all) and Tournai supplied the crown with 200 crossbowmen and 400 spearmen for the Cassel campaign of 1328 and as many as 1,000 men in 1339-40. Doubtless many of them were uniformed by the end of the 13th century, as Tournai's contigent of 300 was at the siege of Lille in 1297 (where they wore blue jackets and white caps). All such contingents could be called upon for a period of 3 months a year, though service could be commuted by a payment of 3 livres parisis per man, the sum of 26,435 livres (ie, some 8,800 men) being raised by this means when all such services were commuted in 1202, a force of 2,000 mercenary infantry being maintained on the Normandy frontier for a full year by this means in 1203-4. Such money therefore went a long way towards paying for the mercenary or stipendiary nucleus now maintained by the French crown.

From a document of 1284, recording details of the review of sergeants owed by the abbey of Saint-Maur-des-Fossés, we know that the equipment of such militiamen was comparable with, and almost identical to, that of their English counterparts: those possessing 60 livres or more had hauberk or haubergeon, helmet, sword and knife; those with less than 30 livres had gambeson, sword and knife, those with 10 livres or more had helmet, sword and knife; and those with less had bow, arrows and knife. Probably all but the last category also had a spear or polearm and many doubtless had shields. (Compare to the equipment detailed under figures 44 and 45.)

ENGLAND

After the Norman Conquest of 1066, achieved with a largely mercenary army, King William parcelled the land out to his barons on a feudal basis, their estates being seemingly based on multiples of 5 or 10 knights. In the 13th century Swereford records a generally accepted belief that William thereby established a servitia of 32,000 knights (a figure repeated by Henry III's chief justice, Stephen Segrave, in 1233); Ordericus Vitalis goes even further and claims that 60,000 knights were present at the famous assembly of Salisbury in 1086. However, both figures are clearly ridiculous exaggerations, and modern estimates of the total of knights actually enfeoffed under William (including, at the beginning of his reign, some Anglo-Saxons confirmed in possession of their lands) range from 4,000 to 7,000. From the evidence of the 'Cartae Baronum' of 1166 (based on knight-service as it stood at the end of Henry I's reign in 1135) J. H. Round calculated 'that the whole *servicium debitum*, clerical and lay, of England can scarcely have exceeded, if indeed it reached, 5,000 knights', of which

*Some communes in fact had to supply money rather than men, the sum of 11,693 livres parisis being recorded in the 'Prisée des Sergens', the equivalent of another 3,898 men at 3 livres parisis per man (see below).

the church provided as many as 784. At least in the 12th century many knights continued to be supplied from household contingents rather than by subinfeudation, household knights remaining an important element in Anglo-Norman armies for more than a century after 1066, despite decreasing in numbers after the initial wave of Anglo-Saxon revolts had come to an end in 1075; the 'Assize of Arms' of 1181, for example (see below), requires that, where the number of knights subinfeudated within his fief falls short of the knight-service owed, each feudal tenant should maintain sufficient harness to equip knights from his household in order to make up the difference. (First to actually abandon the maintenance of household knights were the king's clerical and monastic vassals.) Feudal service is thought to have been required for 60 days at first but during the course of the 12th century was seemingly reduced to the standard 40-day period and from the end of the century was no longer willingly performed overseas (even in England's continental domains) except in exchange for pay. Under the first Plantagenet kings a 'quota system' was experimented with in place of the servitium debitum (see page 5).

Some other troops were raised by granting money-fiefs. William of Malmesbury records that even before the Conquest William I had such an arrangement with the Count of Flanders, and certainly in 1101 Count Robert II promised Henry I the service, when called for, of 1,000 horsemen or knights in England or Normandy and 500 in Maine, each with 3 horses (revised in 1110 to 500 knights irrespective of the theatre of war). This arrangement was regularly renewed until Henry's death, was probably continued by Matilda during the civil wars of Stephen's reign, and reappears under Henry II by 1163 at the latest. However, it had disappeared by the late-12th century. There were also, of course, the contingents of the crown's continental possessions, principally Normandy (until 1204) but also at one stage including Poitou, Anjou and Aquitaine, making the king of England more powerful in France than the French king himself.* Obviously these great fiefs considerably increased the king's feudal military potential (Normandy, for instance, owed at least 1,846 knights in 1172, and possibly as many as 2,500), but their contingents never appeared in England and were of an independent and unreliable disposition at home; witness Henry III's Saintonge campaign of 1242, where his Poitevin and Gascon army of 1,600 knights and 20,000 militia infantry proved next to useless, many of its leaders submitting to the French. Therefore when troops were required for continental campaigns the majority were either levied in England or else provided by mercenaries paid for from scutage money levied both in England and the crown's French territories alike. In addition there were some communal militias, a number of towns in Normandy and elsewhere being granted the status of commune under Henry II, Richard and John. The service of 4-500 Anglo-Norman knights could also be called for when necessary in Ireland, though after the mid-13th century they were mustered in any number only twice (in 1261 and 1270) and were beaten by the Irish on both occasions, auguring the demise of their military pre-eminence during Edward de Brus' invasion in 1315. In 1284 the exact number of knights anticipated in an Irish feudal array was 427.

In addition to knights there were the usual tenants of less than knightly status, initially sometimes referred to as *Francingenae* (Frenchmen) but usually called sergeants by the end of the 11th century; some documents of this date specifically record their obligation to serve with spear, axe or bow, apparently as infantry. However, the majority of English infantry at the very beginning of this era were supplied by the old Anglo-Saxon *fyrd* system, which the Normans had adopted and maintained, practically unchanged except that service could apparently now be demanded overseas (from the old 'select' fyrd at least) — in 1094, for example, William Rufus summoned as many as 20,000 men for a (non-existant) campaign in France. However, the fyrd levies were used predominantly to deal with local emergencies, as in the face of Earl Ralph's revolt in 1075. They continued to serve for the traditional 60-day period.

Although the term 'fyrd' does not specifically appear after the end of the 11th century, similar military service remained an obligation of all English freemen throughout this era, as confirmed by Henry II's 'Assize of Arms' in 1181, Henry III's similar 'Assize' in 1242, and Edward I's 'Statute of Winchester' in 1285. In 1205, when a French invasion seemed imminent, King John called up all freemen over 12 years of age and had them organised under constables in their respective borough, town or hundred, and in 1225 even villeins (unfree men) are recorded as being liable for military service in a crisis. Until the late-13th century, when Commissioners of Array took over, such militia contingents were usually the responsibility of the local sheriff, though sergeants sometimes served as 'officers' and at the Battle of the Standard in 1138 the smallest units were apparently commanded by parish priests (a practice apparent amongst French militia on one occasion as early as 1038). Such militia service was due for 40 days a year by the end of the 12th century but by the late-13th century was customarily called on for 2 weeks or a month at a time. Edward's Statute of 1285 records that it was obligatory for all freemen aged between 16 and 60. By the reign of Henry III such militiamen were paid (except when serving within their own shire) and probably they had been since at least the late-12th century.

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*With the exception of a much-shrunken duchy of Aquitaine, all of England's continental possessions had been lost by 1224, when Poitou, northern Saintonge and the important port of La Rochelle were conquered by Louis VIII of France.

Town militias also feature as sources of infantry, particularly those of London and Lincoln in the civil wars that wracked the country in King Stephen's reign. The 'Gesta Stephani' records a 1,000-strong contingent of London's militia in the royalist army at the seige of Winchester in 1141 as 'magnificently equipped with helmets and mail corselets', and Henry of Huntingdon records a large number in the king's army at the capture of Faringdon in 1145. In the 1170s another chronicler claimed somewhat optimistically that London's militia comprised 20,000 cavalry and 60,000 infantry — probably in reality 2,000 and 6,000 respectively, still a sizeable force. It later suffered heavy casualties fighting for Simon de Montfort at the Battle of Lewes in 1264. The lord of Baynard's Castle, with his own retinue of 19 men-at-arms, was hereditary commander of the London militia.

Mercenaries

In addition to the militia and the feudal contingents considerable numbers of mercenaries continued to be employed. William I only dismissed the mercenaries employed for the Conquest in 1068, and more (largely from Brittany, Anjou and Maine) were hired for the winter operations of 1069-70. In 1085, to face the threat of a Danish invasion, he brought a particularly large force of mercenaries over from France, recorded by Florence of Worcester to have comprised 'many thousands' of archers and infantry from Normandy and all of France, and by the 'Anglo-Saxon Chronicle' as 'a vast host of horse and foot from France and from Brittany which was greater than any that had ever come to this country'; most had been dismissed by the end of the year. His son William Rufus (1087-1100) was likewise a great employer of mercenaries, Flemings, Frenchmen and Burgundians all being recorded in this context in 1094-98. Rufus' brother Henry I (1100-35), though he used mercenaries on the Continent (particularly Bretons), employed very few in England, though he was admittedly the first English king to take a serious interest in Welsh archers (probably as a result of having been attacked by some in 1120). However, his successor Stephen (1135-54) is recorded to have 'collected very large bands of mercenary knights', notably a force of 300 Flemish horsemen plus some infantry under William of Ypres, hired in 1135 and still serving him in 1154. By contrast his rivals employed large numbers of Welshmen, one source claiming that Earl Robert of Gloucester had more than 10,000 scattered throughout England c.1140.

Most mercenaries employed under the Norman kings were paid for by scutage and taxes, particularly 'Danegeld', a tax peculiar to England with its origins in the levies of gold raised to pay off Viking raiders during the Anglo-Saxon era. This tax, usually levied at the rate of 2s on the hide (though William I levied it at 6s in 1084), only began to die out during Stephen's reign, and although it does not appear again after 1162 it continued to survive in various alternative forms.

After the demise of the Norman line in 1154 the Plantagenets continued to hire large numbers of mercenaries, notably Brabançons and Welshmen. Though it seems likely that the mercenaries hired for his unsuccessful Welsh campaign of 1165 included Brabançons as well as Flemings, the former are only first definitely recorded in England in 1173, when Henry II (1154-89) employed 3-6,000; in the same year the rebel earls Hugh Bigod of Norfolk and Robert of Leicester hired respectively 1,000-1,500 and 3,000 *Flandrenses* against him, the latter group apparently consisting of redundant weavers. Richard I (1189-99) likewise used considerable numbers of both Welshmen and Brabançons (the latter commanded after 1184 by a certain Mercadier), plus Genoese crossbowmen and, after the Third Crusade, some Saracen troops, both of these latter elements being utilised only in Normandy. In fact Welshmen were frequently fielded in considerable numbers in late-12th century English armies serving in the kingdom's French possessions; one account tells us that as many as 3,400 Welshmen in Richard's employ were killed in an engagement at Andely in 1197. Richard's brother and successor John (1199-1216) employed less Welshmen but larger numbers of Brabançon and Flemish mercenaries under such men as Hugues de Boves, who fought at Bouvines, and the infamous Fawkes de Bréauté. Thereafter, despite the fact that Magna Carta included a clause that all foreign mercenaries should leave the country — which they never did* — English armies tended to be more paid than feudal, the nucleus of the royal host comprising salaried household knights (the king's *familia*, which steadily increased in size) and permanent mercenary units of knights and crossbowmen. Henry III may have hired as many as 500 knights and 1,000 sergeants in Poitou in 1230 and certainly the nucleus of his army recorded campaiging in France in 1242 comprised as many as 700 mercenary Gascon crossbowmen.

Edward I

Thanks in particular to J. E. Morris' *The Welsh Wars of King Edward I*, a considerable amount of detail is available on English armies of Edward's reign (1272-1307), clearly emphasising the predominance of paid troops by the late-13th century. At Falkirk in 1298, for instance, the total strength of the household contingent and associated mercenaries was just under 800 men-at-arms, compared to only 564 supplied by the nobility. Similarly, while a

*The clause in question is cap.51, which states that the king is to 'remove from the kingdom all alien knights, crossbowmen, sergeants and *stipendiarios* [mercenaries] who have come with horses and arms to the hurt of the realm.'

feudal summons of 1300 produced only 40 knights and 366 sergeants the household cavalry and mercenaries totalled 522. (The ridiculous size of the feudal element was the result of reductions in the size of feudal quotas in the course of the 13th century, by as much as 95% or more in the most extreme cases; the very first feudal summons of Edward's reign was in fact answered by only 228 knights and 294 sergeants, the equivalent of just 375 knights in all.)

The king's familia itself was generally fairly small, varying in number from year to year but usually comprising some 40-80 knights and bannerets, plus sergeants and esquires who might double or even treble the total (each knight, for example, was to maintain 2 esquires, as well as 3 horses). However, the numbers were often greatly increased by incorporating further stipendiary or mercenary troops, such as 1,523 Gascon crossbowmen in 1282 (see below) when the familia itself totalled only 173 knights and bannerets and 72 esquires. The household troops were largely English but included Gascons and some Spaniards. The mercenaries were often organised in constabularies of 100 men, the individual troops that went to make up this unit usually averaging 10-15 men, increasing to 25-35 for the unit commander. They were generally paid for 40 days at a time (comparable to the feudal 40-day period).

Infantry, in the meantime, had come to consist largely of Welsh archers, though Edward also employed a fair number of Gascon crossbowmen, plus a few from Poitou. The numbers of the Gascon crossbowmen increased rapidly in the first decade of Edward's reign, from just 100 in 1278 to 1,313 on foot and 210 mounted during his Welsh campaign of 1282-83, when the largest individual bodies comprised 400 from Bordeaux under Guichard de Bourg and 300, commanded by 15 knights (therefore organised in units of 20 men — see below), under Gaston de Béarn. However, these suffered considerable losses and were never again employed in such numbers thereafter; in 1298, for instance, the only Gascon crossbowmen recorded are 106 mounted men attached to Edward's familia (*all* mounted Gascon mercenaries appear to have carried crossbows).

By the end of this era Welsh archers often constituted the majority of infantry in English armies (in round figures as many as 9,000 out of 15,600 in 1277, 7,300 out of 11,000 in 1287, 5,300 out of 7,800 in 1297, and 10,900 out of 14,800 in 1298). The 5,297 Welsh archers serving in the English army in Flanders in 1297-98 were organised under 45 mounted constables (interestingly under the overall command of the Captain of the *North* Welsh), which implies overstrength units of 100 men (the 2,285 English archers in the same army being organised under 21 constables). It seems likely that so many Welshmen were levied not just because they were good soldiers but also to reduce the number of effectives available to potential rebels while the king was away. If this was the theory, practise proved otherwise since the outbreak of the Welsh revolt of 1294-95 was actually timed to coincide with the day on which Welsh troops were due to muster for a campaign in France, the assembled contingents turning their arms against the English instead! Large numbers of English infantry could also be levied at need, though they took time to muster and surprisingly were more prone to desertion than the recently-conquered Welsh. After 1295 some were raised by emptying the jails, granting pardons to all criminals in exchange for military service; although, inevitably, troops raised in this way were notoriously unreliable and deserted in large numbers, there is record of 204 such outlaws being sent home with pardons at the end of the Falkirk campaign in 1298. Some Irish infantry also appeared on occasion in the 13th century, usually under their own kings, 21 of whom served in Scotland in 1242; 3,000 Irishmen served in Wales in 1245, 2,550 in Scotland in 1296, 150 in 1297, and an unknown (but probably even smaller) number at Falkirk in 1298.

Infantry organisation, previouly based on 500-man constabularies, was based on a unit of 100 men by the mid-13th century commanded by a mounted officer called a *centenar* or a constable on a barded horse, and subdivided into 5 units each of 20 men led by *vintenars*. In Wales in 1282 and 1295 larger units of 1,000 men commanded by *millenars* are also recorded but this appears to have been only a temporary institution, the hundred remaining the standard English infantry unit. The official strength of 100, however, was sometimes as low as 50 men or as high as 200, or anything in between (as has already been seen in the 1297 instance cited above, where 2,285 English and 5,297 Welsh archers were led by 21 and 45 constables respectively, while in 1242 a body of 260 Welsh infantry was commanded by 3 constables). By this date the ordinary foot-soldier, whether English or Welsh, received 2d a day, and vintenars received 4d, though Cheshire archers — apparantly already looked upon as something of an elite — received the higher wage of 3d a day as early as 1277. Gascon crossbowmen, however, received as much as 3d-4d, their vintenars being paid 6d. Constables usually received a shilling.

WALES

In this period Wales comprised a plethora of principalities, great and small, of which 3 were pre-emiment, these being Gwynedd in the north, Powys in mid-Wales, and Deheubarth in the south, of which the princes of the first and last in particular exerted a degree of influence throughout the rest of the country that fluctuated with the

passage of time. The southern Welsh reached the peak of their power under Rhys ap Gruffydd (1137-97), but thereafter it was instead the house of Gwynedd that led Welsh resistance to the English, under Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (Prince of North Wales, 1194-1240) and his grandson Llywelyn ap Gruffydd (1246-82), who in 1258 adopted the title Prince of Wales — the first and last Welsh prince to do so — which in 1267 was formally recognised by King Henry III, who acknowledged him to be the feudal suzerain of all but one of the other Welsh princes. However, at no time during this entire period did the hegemony of one prince over many succeed in curtailing the civil wars that were endemic to Welsh society; indeed, in the late-12th century Giraldus Cambrensis observed that their disunity was one of the greatest weaknesses of the Welsh, recommending that if they wished to conquer Wales the English should cultivate dissent amongst the country's rival princes and thereby turn them against one another. By the 12th century the whole country was geographically divided up into 54 territorial divisions called *cantrefs* ('100 hamlets') each with its own minor prince or lord (*uchelwr*, or 'high man'); South Wales comprised 29 cantrefs (7 of which made up Dyfed), North Wales 12, Anglesey 3 and Powys 6 (of which 3 — ie, Shropshire — had by then been occupied by the English), plus the so-called 'Four Cantrefs' in the north-east. In fact from the late-11th century a more common territorial unit was the smaller *cymwyd* or *commote* ('neighbourhood'), 'which is the quarter of a cantref'.

Military service was expected of all able-bodied Welsh freemen over 14 years of age and was readily given, being deemed a privilege rather than an obligation. Giraldus Cambrensis, in his 'Description of Wales' (c.1193/4) several times mentions the passionate devotion of Welshmen to freedom and the defence of their country: 'for these they fight, for these they suffer hardships, for these they will take up their weapons and willingly sacrifice their lives. They esteem it a disgrace to die in bed, but an honour to be killed in battle.' Elsewhere he adds that the young men 'spend their time in exercise and in practising with their weapons': 'They spend little on food and clothes. Their sole interest in life consists of caring for their horses and keeping their weapons in good order, their sole preoccupation being the defence of their homeland and the siezing of booty.' Nevertheless, exemptions from military service were already being granted occasionally even in the late-11th century, principally to tenants of church land. It is clear from old laws put into writing in the 13th century that the whole hosting of a principality (which Giraldus says was summoned by the sounding of trumpets) could be called out as many times and for as long as the prince or lord required it within his own dominion, but only once a year and for a period of just 6 weeks in the case of a 'foreign' campaign — ie, one outside the principality — though a surviving late-11th century document records the service required of a particular territory to have been for just 3 days and nights. Either way, it was at the expense of the individual. Any man incapable of personally attending had to maintain and send another in his place. Unfree men (*aillts* or bondsmen) were not permitted to share in the freeman's privilege of military service but were nevertheless sometimes conscripted for camp duties or similar, each aillt community then being obliged to provide one man, with an axe and a pack-horse. Surprisingly, however, such service had to be paid for, though aillts could also serve voluntarily.

Nucleus of a prince's army was his *teulu* ('family'), a band of mounted retainers in constant attendance upon him, who he provided with gifts of clothes, gold, weapons, sustenance, and sometimes even land. One 12th century source records that its members were fosterlings and the sons of freemen and were aged between 14-21, while in early times many were relations of the prince they served; certainly the unit's commander, the *penteulu*, was invariably a close relative even in this period, and the rest were drawn from the nobility (the uchelwyr, Giraldus' *nobiliores*). Although 300 had once been the usual strength of a teulu (see *Armies of the Dark Ages*), by the 11th century 120 men (ie, a long hundred) seems to have become the norm, though Gruffydd ap Llywelyn (Prince of North Wales 1022-63) is recorded to have had a teulu of 140 men in 1047 and at one point Gruffydd ap Cynan had 160 men in his. Some additional seasoned warriors were provided by mercenaries, sometimes Scandinavians in the early part of this period but more usually Irishmen and Ostmen (as in Gruffydd ap Cynan's armies at the battles of Gwaet Erw in 1075 and Mynydd Carn in 1081, where his troops included axe-armed Waterford Ostmen and Irish javelinmen; Ostmen even formed his bodyguard in peacetime). Indeed, the Dublin Ostmen in particular were frequently employed in the course of the 11th-12th centuries — this despite Giraldus' statement that the Welsh 'have no mercenaries and no foreign allies'. Gruffydd ap Cynan allegedly hired as many as 60 shiploads from Dublin and the Hebrides in 1094, while his son Owain Gwynedd (1137-70) hired 15 shiploads of Dublin Ostmen at the beginning of the 1140s, his other son, Owain's rebel brother Cadwaladr, employing a similar fleet in 1144. However, one of the dangers of utilising such mercenaries was that they needed to be allowed their 'customary privilege of plunder', as a contemporary put it; if denied this, they could turn against their employer, as they did against Cadwaladr, whose release was only secured by payment of a ransom of 2,000 slaves.

The forces available from these sources to the more powerful Welsh princes could be considerable: Gruffydd ap Rhys of Deheubarth, for instance, had 6,000 foot and 2,000 horse in his army when he defeated the English at the Battle of Crug Mawr in 1136, while Llywelyn ap Gruffydd had as many as 30,000 infantry and 500 cavalry in the field against Henry III by 1256 and is supposed to have provided the rebel Simon de Montfort with 5,000 men in

1265. At the other extreme, however, Llywelyn probably set out on campaign in 1282 with less than a thousand men, though by the time of the Battle of Orewin Bridge this had increased to some 7,000, including 160 horsemen (doubtless his teulu).

The marcher lordships

Ranged to the east and south of the native Welsh principalities were a collection of virtually autonomous English baronies under powerful lords who often rendered no more than lip-service to the crown; claiming the customary Welsh rights to private war and a third of all spoil taken in battle, they alone in the whole of the Kingdom of England could build castles and call their tenants to arms without needing to obtain the king's permission. In the 11th and early-12th centuries earldoms were established at Chester, Shrewsbury, Hereford and Pembroke, and their subsequent conquests in Wales were secured by programmes of castle-building which began in the south as early as 1067. Indeed, Glamorgan and Pembrokeshire were soon studded with castles and became so heavily settled by the Anglo-Normans that one area actually became known as 'Little England beyond Wales'. By the time Edward I finally conquered what was left of the independent principality of Wales in the late-13th century the marcher lords had already subdued or occupied more than half of the country.

Pre-eminent amongst the 12th-13th century marcher families were those of Bohun, Clare, Mortimer, fitz Alan, fitz Warin, Le Strange, Braouse, Bigod, Corbet, Chaworth and Valence. Some idea of their military potential can be got from the contingents raised by Earl Richard de Clare of Pembroke and some of his vassals in 1169-70 for the invasion of Ireland: Robert fitzStephen had 30 knights, 60 other mailed horsemen and 300 Welsh archers; Raymond le Gros had 10 knights and 70 archers, Maurice de Prendergast and Maurice fitzGerald similarly having 10 knights each and doubtless a comparable number of archers, fitzGerald's contingent in fact comprising 140 men; while Earl Richard himself had 200 men-at-arms and 1,000 Welsh archers and infantry. The references to Welsh archers are significant, the marcher lords of South Wales having started to employ them at an early date — perhaps by the end of the 11th century and certainly by the mid-12th century, when the seal of Earl Richard's father Gilbert (from whom, significantly, he inherited the epithet 'Strongbow') shows him holding an exaggerated arrow in one hand, doubtless to denote the source of his military strength. They seem generally to have been employed on the basis of 10 archers per knight. Welshmen continued to provide a substantial element of the marchers' armed strength in the 13th century too: John le Strange, for instance, raised 260 Welsh foot-soldiers for King Henry III's French campaign of 1242, while of the 1,000 or so men available to Thomas Corbet at about the same date well over half would have been Welsh infantry, and only about 50 of the balance are likely to have been knights.

SCOTLAND

The largest part of any Scottish force during this era was provided by the 'common army' or *exercitus Scoticanus* (the 'Scottish army'), composed mainly of poorly equipped farmers and *neyfs* (or *nativi*, actually called by the Scandinavian term *bondi* in Caithness, Fife and Stirlingshire, heavily-settled by Norsemen during the Viking era and, in the case of Caithness, still part of Norway until the 13th century*). The neyfs were — or, rather, became during this period — unfree men (but not slaves) tied to the land where they had been born, who could be sold or given away with the land. Such military service as they owed, referred to variously as common, Scottish or *forinsec* service, was assessed by the ploughshare or on the *davach*, *carucate* or *arachor* (all of which were units of arable land), the number of men required varying but most commonly involving one man per unit, though in exceptional circumstances (such as a proposed expedition into England in 1264 in support of Henry III against Simon de Montfort) up to 3 men could be demanded. On occasion such military service could even involve every able-bodied freeman of 16-60 years; certainly in Robert the Bruce's wars it was required of every man 'owning a cow'. At shire level the 'common army' was led by local, non-feudal officials called thanes (often displaced by feudal barons in the 13th-14th centuries), the muster of a whole earldom being led by its earl or, north of the Tweed, its *mormaer* (King David I, 1124-53, began the transformation of the latter, hereditary Gaelic chieftains, into feudal earls). Such contingents constituted the bulk of the Scottish forces at Northallerton (1138), Largs (1263), Stirling Bridge (1297), Falkirk (1298) and most other large-scale engagements. By the 13th century Scottish service can sometimes be found being converted to a feudal obligation.

A small number of Norman knights had been introduced into the Scottish court as early as 1052-54, in the reign of Macbeth (1040-57), and there was even an attempt to introduce Anglo-Norman feudalism under Duncan II before the end of the 11th century, though this and the employment of further Anglo-Norman knights resulted in a rebellion against him. Feudalism was only successfully introduced on a widespread basis in southern Scotland by David I and in northern Scotland by his successors Malcolm IV (1153-65) and William the Lion (1165-1214), but it never became established in the Highlands and the far north. King David had spent much of his youth at the court

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*For Norway's possessions in Scotland and the Isles see pages 19-20.

of Henry I of England and when he succeeded to the throne a large number of Anglo-Norman knights accompanied him to Scotland, soon coming to hold most of the highest offices in the royal household; indeed, English mercenary knights remained apparent in the king's household throughout the late-11th and 12th centuries.* Even in the half-century of William the Lion's reign, evidence exists for only 37 enfeoffments, of which one was for 20 knights, two were for 10 knights, one for 4 knights, two for 2 knights, one for 1½ knights and 18 for the service of a single knight each, the remaining 12 all being for fractions (a half-fief being the most common). From the evidence of 13th century enfeoffments it is apparent that even in the 12th century holdings of a half or quarter-fief usually owed the service of a sergeant, or an archer, in a light mail corselet (a *haubergel*), usually mounted but sometimes serving on foot. In part at least these probably represent the 'common army' feudalised. Feudal military service was due for the usual 40-day period, but there are also many references to 20 days. Principal military officers in Scotland's feudal hierarchy were the Steward (which post gave its name to its hereditary holders, the Stuarts), Constable and *Marischal*.

Church lands seem to have been liable only for 'common army' service, not for knight service, and even this could be satisfied under certain circumstances by payments in kind. Scutage itself does not seem to have been levied in Scotland until the 13th century.

IRELAND

Irish organisation remained basically the same as that described in *Armies of the Dark Ages*. Unit sizes continued to be decimal, based on the *cet* of 100 men; battalions of 1,000 men often occur in the Irish chronicles of this period. The *tricha cet* ('thirty hundreds') probably remained the largest theoretical unit, though the term was now applied to a territorial division of land seemingly larger than a *tuath* (kingdom), the original *tuatha* having declined in political importance until they had become simply provinces of new, larger kingdoms, the *mor-tuatha*. The tuatha were led by *toisechs*, basically provincial chieftans. High kings (*ard ri*) still existed up until the Anglo-Norman invasion, the very last being Rory O'Conor (d.1198), but few 12th century holders of this dubious distinction 'were universally recognised for more than a year at a time'†, most being described by the chroniclers as 'kings of Ireland with opposition'. During the 12th century there were 176-185 tricha cets in Ireland, each comprising 30 *ballybetaghs* or *bailles* of 100 households. Probably one man served from each household so that the ballybetagh represented a cet. Therefore the total military potential of Ireland was possibly some 550,000 men. The largest army recorded during this era was that of allegedly 60,000 at the seige of Dublin in 1171, drawn from 'all the Irish of Ireland' by the High King Rory O'Conor. His contingents alone totalled 30,000 so the various sub-kingdoms probably supplied only token units; certainly there were 8 principal kingdoms represented and undoubtedly a considerable number of smaller ones, so that 1-2,000 was probably the maximum strength of the individual contingents and many may have been even smaller. On the other hand armies of 3-5,000 are frequently mentioned being raised by individual kings on other occasions.

At some time around the middle of the 12th century a quasi-feudal system seems to have briefly appeared in some areas, obviously as a result of Anglo-Norman influence. Each of several tuatha under the control of an overking was placed under a toisech, each of whom (in the only known example) had beneath him 5-15 lesser nobles with the title *óglaich*, or 'warrior', which clearly implies military service. The establishment of a military aristocracy that this would seem to point to was doubtless a result of Anglo-Norman, or possibly Scandinavian, influence.

A separate military element, much utilised in their wars by the kings of Leinster and Munster, was that of the *Ostmen*, a name generally applied to the descendants of Scandinavian settlers because of their origins 'east' of Ireland. Their principal centres during this period were the fortified coastal towns of Dublin, Wexford, Waterford, Cork and Limerick, though the Ostmen of the first three were nominally subjects of the king of Leinster (for whom they are recorded fighting in 1137, 1149, 1156 and 1161), and those of the last two were the vassals of the MacCarthy and O'Brien kings, whose capitals their towns had become. Wexford fell to the Anglo-Normans as early as 1169, Waterford and Dublin following in 1170, but Cork and Limerick did not actually pass into English hands until 1185 and 1194 respectively, though Cork had a small English garrison as early as 1177 and both had become subject to the English crown even earlier. The strength of the Ostmen lay in ships as well as men: Dublin alone raised 90 ships in 1093, Wexford and Dublin between them mustered as many as 200 ships in the mid-12th century, while a flotilla of 32 vessels from Cork is recorded in 1173. Their fleets were active in English, Welsh, Scottish and Hebridean employ until the mid-12th century: the Ostmen of Cork, for instance, sailed to assist the Earl of

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*The only other mercenaries recorded in Scottish royal employ in this period were occasional bodies of Lowlanders, such as the Flemish spearmen hired for the campaign of 1174 that culminated in the capture of King William at Alnwick. Generally the Scottish crown was not rich enough in this period to entertain the hiring of many mercenary troops.

†*Irish Kings and High Kings*, Francis John Byrne, 1973

Shrewsbury's rebellion against Henry I in 1102, and in 1165 Dublin Ostmen were in Henry II's fleet that was defeated by the Welsh in Anglesey. It was probably Ostmen too who, as late as 1202, provided Rögnvald Godredsson, king of the Hebrides 1187-1226, with the large Irish element recorded in the army which he raised from the Hebrides and Kintyre for the conquest of Caithness from the Earl of Orkney. They could muster land forces equivalent to many of the largest Irish kingdoms: Wexford fielded 'about 2,000' men in 1169, while Waterford's forces at Dundonnell in 1170 totalled 3,000 including some Irishmen, organised in 3 battalions (the 'Song of Dermot and the Earl' puts their strength at 3-4,000). Dublin, already the principal town of Ireland, must have been able to raise some 6,000 men in order to crew her share of the 200 ships mentioned above. By the 12th century the Dublin, Cork and Waterford Ostmen at least were ruled by hereditary earls (Irish *mórmaers*), the Norse dynasty of Dublin kings having died out in the 11th century with the last — Gofraid* — being expelled by the Irish in 1094. The last Earl of Dublin was Haskulf Thorgilsson (1164-71), the last Earl of Cork was Gilbert MacTurgar (d.1173), and the last Earls of Waterford were the brothers Sitric and Ragnall MacGillamaire (d.1170); of these Gilbert was killed in battle and Haskulf and Sitric were both ignominiously executed by the English.

But the backbone of Irish armies from the 13th century onwards, right up until the 17th century, was composed of 'foreign warriors' (*gallóglaich*), mercenaries of mixed Norse-Gaelic descent from the Western Isles (consisting chiefly of the Hebrides and the Isle of Man — see page 19) and the western seaboard of Scotland. They were soldiers of a high standard but at the same time, to judge from 13th century Irish sources, boisterous ruffians. Even as early as 1154 a fleet from Arran, Kintyre, Man and the Scottish coast had been hired by King Murtough O'Loughlin of Ailech, while in 1171 Haskulf Thorgilsson, deposed Earl of Dublin, had employed perhaps as many as 10,000 mercenaries from the Orkneys and Hebrides. In the very same year King Godred Olafsson of Man attended the siege of Dublin, providing 'about 30 ships, full of warlike men' to Rory O'Conor's army. There are several recorded instances of warriors from the Isles fighting in Ireland in the 13th century too — both as raiders and mercenaries — such as in 1205, 1211, 1214, 1247 and 1258; they were usually referred to in Irish sources as *Gall-Gaedhil* ('Foreign Gaels'), which clearly indicates that such troops were in use throughout this period under names other than gallóglaich, a term which itself first appears only in 1290 (though a later, non-contemporary, source contains a reference to gallóglaich in 1265). However, it is the óglaich who appeared in the household of Aedh O'Conor in 1258 — a contingent of 160 supplied by the King of the Hebrides as a dowry for his daughter on her marriage to Aedh — who are generally accepted as having been the first of the 'true' gallóglaich, and it was the northern chieftains (particularly the O'Conors of Connacht and the O'Donnells of Ulster) who remained the chief employers of such mercenaries during this period, Donnell O'Donnell first introducing them into his own household by a similar marriage arrangement at much the same date. The first major battle in Ireland in which gallóglaich were almost certainly involved was Athankip in 1270, where Aedh O'Conor defeated the Justiciar, Robert de Ufford, and Walter de Burgh, Earl of Ulster.

The organisation of the gallóglaich is recorded much later as being 100 or 120 *spars* to a company, a spar consisting of a warrior plus a servant who carried his spare weapons or his mail corselet when not in use, and a boy who cooked and carried provisions. Normally, however, only 80 or 87 spars served, the pay owing to the difference in numbers largely going to make up the salary of the company commander. Gallóglaich units were called *corughadhs*, their commanders probably being called constables (*consapals* in Irish). During the 13th century organisation would have been little different, the 160 gallóglaich serving Aedh O'Conor probably representing 2 companies of 80 men. The spar unit derived its name during the 14th century at the latest from *sparth*, one of the alternative names for the long-handled axe which was the principal weapon of the gallóglaich.

Though undoubtedly older, probably dating back to at least the mid-12th century, native nercenaries called kerns (*ceithearn*, or Latin *kaernias*) and *buannadha* only first appear in contemporary chronicles from the late-13th century, at which time they are to be found in the service of both Irish and English lords. The Irish, in fact, seem to have been in the habit of employing fairly large numbers of mercenaries (*amuis*) when they could, and it was as mercenaries of a deposed king, Dermot of Okinselagh, that the first Anglo-Normans appeared in Ireland in 1167 (Anglo-Norman mercenaries continuing to be found in Irish employ until the early-13th century). Kings had the right to billet such troops on their subjects by means of *coinnmheadh*, or *buannacht*, literally 'billetting', and could also levy food for their sustenance from every town in the kingdom by right of *procuracio*.

SCANDINAVIA

The evolution of knighthood took place only slowly in the highly conservative Scandinavian kingdoms, where the military elite continued to be provided by paid troops of bodyguards rather than feudal knights. In Norway, now as in earlier times (see *Armies of the Dark Ages*), this paid retinue went under the title of the *Hird*, though by the end of the 11th century it comprised *gestir* ('guests'), candle-sweins, trencher-sweins and huscarls as well as true

*This was Godred (or Gudrod) Crovan, king of the Sudreyjar 1079-95.

hirdmen, though all were hirdmen in the more general sense of the word. They were usually (though not always) volunteers and could even include foreigners. Of all the Hird categories mentioned above the *hirdmenn* were the elite; they followed the king wherever he went in peace and war alike and never left the court except by special permission. Next in rank came the gestir, established in the early part of the 11th century, who were particularly valued in peacetime as spies and assassins; they received half as much pay as hirdmen. The candle-sweins (*kertisveinar*) were paid at the same rate as, but were of lower rank than, the gestir and were apparently first introduced by Olaf III the Quiet (1066-93); as their name suggests, they were torch-bearers but were liable to guard duties as well. The trencher-sweins (*skutilsveinar*), also probably introduced by Olaf III, served at table as well as performing guard duties; they seem to have performed the functions of junior officers. Lastly there were the huscarls; although in the Viking age all the king's guardsmen had been called huscarls, by the 13th century they constituted the lowest Hird element of all, performing largely menial duties. Each of these distinct elements of the Hird had its own commander and ships. The most senior hirdmen of all were the *Merkismadr* (the 'Marksman', who carried the king's standard) and the *Stallari* or Staller (of whom there was sometimes more than one; in Sweden and Denmark he was replaced by the Marshal). The Staller usually commanded a division of the army on the battlefield or one of the king's principal ships at sea.

Traditionally, and apparently constitutionally, the king's Hird numbered 120 men (the Scandinavian 'long hundred'), comprising 60 hirdmen, 30 gestir and 30 huscarls. However, Olaf III doubled it to 240 men, though even this figure represents only those at court and in addition seems to exclude candle- and trencher-sweins. Additional hirdmen were posted throughout the kingdom (sometimes even as far away as Iceland), and it was the steady increase in number of such absentee hirdmen (especially under King Sverri, 1184-1202) that led to a decline in the character and standard of the Norwegian Hird in the 13th century, even to the point at which in the early-14th century some refused to perform military service.

By this time, however, the influence of feudalism had begun to make itself felt in Scandinavia, though to a very limited extent. During the 12th century the lendermen or 'landed men', heads of the few powerful families in Norway (there were only 9 lendermen even in Hakon IV's reign, 1217-63), had been admitted to the Hird — though usually in an absentee capacity — and in 1277 it was decreed that they were henceforth to be called barons. At the same date the trencher-sweins were created knights, as presumably were the gestir and candle-sweins and perhaps the huscarls. Following the reign of Hakon V (1299-1319) the Hird declined rapidly in importance, and no more barons were created after 1308.

In Denmark the Hird was a much later introduction, only being established on the above lines by Svein Ulfsson (1047-76) in the mid-11th century. It also disappeared considerably earlier, ceasing to exist in the late-12th century, by which time its members had probably evolved into the new 'knightly' class then appearing. This new class of mounted warriors was granted tax-exemption in exchange for their services and, assuming certain civil functions as well as being permitted by law to hire the military service of other men (the Norwegian lendermen were allowed retinues of as many as 40 men, or even more if the king permitted it) they were very nearly on the same footing as the king. It was they too who led the local levy in wartime.

In Sweden this tax-exemption was introduced for all such men who served as armoured horsemen or equipped another to do so. This measure was introduced in 1279 by King Magnus Barnlock (1263-80) to encourage more men to become knights, knighthood only then attaining some of the honour it had enjoyed elsewhere in Europe for more than two centuries. Before long the privilege became hereditary, thus creating a new nobility as in Norway. However, on the whole such Scandinavian knights still remained attached to the Hird or retinue of a king or 'landed man'. Most battles were fought with no more than these retinues and a small number of locally levied militiamen. Significantly, therefore, the armies mentioned in the sources are small, on average ranging from a few hundred to about 5,000 men, the largest I have seen in any of the sagas being just 8,000 strong.

The Leidang

Alongside these royal and noble retinues the Scandinavians continued to make full use of their *leidangr* levies of men and ships, whereby each able-bodied man was liable for 4 months' military or naval service per year. A man, his equipment (some had to have mail armour, crossbows and horses) and 16 weeks' provisions were provided by each *manngerd*, *lide*, *hamma* or *hafna* (a farm, group of smaller farms or unit of land assessed at one gold mark). Under normal circumstances he served once every 3 years on a rota basis. Ships were provided by a certain number of *hafnae* combined (probably sufficient to crew the ship). As is described in *Armies of the Dark Ages* these ships were of a predetermined, regulation size, of 13, 16, 20, 25 or 30 benches by the 12th century, in the last three instances calculated by a modern authority (A. Taranger) to have normally carried about 90, 160 or 260 men. Ships employed in the Danish attacks on Rügen in the 1160s each carried 4 horses in addition to their normal complement.

The potential of this levy was considerable. Norway could raise 360 ships by 1124 and Denmark 720 by 1137, the latter figure rising to 860 ships and 36,000 men before the end of the century and reaching allegedly 1,400 ships and 160,000 men (including 1,400 knights and as many crossbowmen) by the reign of King Waldemar the Victorious (1202-41). However, all of these figures probably represent the full-leidang (*utfararleidangr*) that could only be levied in times of national emergency and most summonses resulted in fleets numbering at most 250-300 ships. Usually a half-leidang was raised if an offensive campaign was planned, otherwise only one-third would serve. The much smaller early-13th century Norwegian figures of 14,000 men and 309 ships therefore probably represents the annual peacetime muster, the 40,000 men recorded as being available in an emergency probably being the full-leidang. Whether the 100 Norwegian ships hired out to the French by King Eirik in 1295 for use against the English for 4 months a year (for a fee, be it noted, of £50,000) represents a half-leidang or the peacetime muster is not clear, but either way by this late date Norway's leidang strength was in decline.

In fact the leidang, being designed primarily for naval service and apparently deemed inadequate for the changing military needs of the age, began its decline in the 12th century, by the end of which the king could and usually did exact a payment in cash and/or provisions in place of actual service; this was the *bordleidangr*, by which a man's provisions — but no longer the man himself — had to be provided. Though King Christian I of Denmark (1252-59) attempted to exact such service even from church lands, the latter were normally exempt.

The Earldom of Orkney and the Kingdom of the Sudreyjar

The origins of these semi-independent Norwegian possessions in the north and west of Scotland date back to Viking times, Scandinavians having first begun to settle there in the late-8th century. The earldom of Orkney, including the Shetlands, was established by King Harald Finehair of Norway following their subjugation, along with the Hebrides and Isle of Man, in the late-9th century. Thereafter the earldom nominally included all the Scottish isles plus considerable tracts of northern Scotland itself, Earl Thorfinn the Mighty (1014-64) at one point supposedly holding as many as 9 Scottish 'earldoms', reaching as far south as Moray, plus the Hebrides and parts of Ireland. However, the extent of each successive earl's domains depended entirely on his ability to impose his will on his subjects, a task made all the more difficult by the tendency for all of an earl's male offspring to succeed simultaneously to his title, so that at any one time there were usually two earls and sometimes more. Civil wars were therefore endemic, with the result that for most of the period under review the Hebrides and the Isle of Man were independent; together these constituted the kingdom of the *Sudreyjar* ('southern isles'), which, since it also included Kintyre and other parts of Scotland's western seaboard, was often, confusingly, referred to as the Western Isles. After 1156, however, there were even separate, independent kings in Man and the Hebrides, who like their Orkney brethren spent much of their time fighting one another, 'and this was the cause of the downfall of the kingdom of the islands'. The first king of the Sudreyjar had been a Dublin Viking, Godfred Sihtricsson, who fought for Harald Hardrada at Stamford Bridge in 1066; and the last was Dugald Olafsson, who died in 1268. Other than a shadowy figure named Ivar, the last king of Man was Dugald's brother Magnus Olafsson (1254-65), whose acknowledgement of Scottish suzerainty was the cause of King Hakon of Norway's expedition in 1263.

As has already been seen, the earldom of Orkney had reached the height of its power in the mid-11th century under Thorfinn the Mighty. Modern authorities often say it began to decline after the mid-12th century, but significantly the 'Orkneyinga Saga', one of our principal sources, specifically states that the last of the Orkneys' three greatest earls was Harald Maddadarson, who became earl at the age of 5 (in 1134) and was sole ruler from 1158-1206. Nevertheless, the earldom's mainland possessions dwindled to little more than Caithness in the course of the 12th century, and towards the end of the same century control of the Shetlands was taken from Harald and assumed directly by the Norwegian crown (1195). Indeed, the kings of Norway were often obliged to reassert their sovereignty over the Isles by force, as Magnus Barelegs (1093-1103) did in the 11th century and Hakon IV (1217-63) did in the 13th. In fact it was King Hakon's unsuccessful campaign against Scotland's western seaboard in 1263 that resulted 3 years later in his successor Magnus' decision to surrender to Scotland Norway's claim to the Hebrides and the Isle of Man, the former thereafter being held as Scottish fiefs while the latter was subsequently annexed by Edward I of England (1290). Orkney and the Shetlands, however, remained Norwegian possessions right up until 1468 and 1469 respectively, though the Scandinavian earls of Orkney had been replaced by Scotsmen from 1231 onwards. By contrast the MacDonnells, self-styled 'Lords of the Isles', rulers of Argyll and the Hebrides on behalf of the Scottish crown, were descended directly from Somerled, King of the Hebrides 1158-64 (as, too, were the majority of gallóglaich in Ireland).

The military strength of the Isles was not considerable since, apart from Caithness on the mainland, they were not overpopulated. Harald Maddadarson, by a supreme effort, was able to raise as many as 6,000 men to fight the Scots in Caithness in 1202, these seemingly being raised just from Caithness itself and, presumably, the Orkneys. Nucleus of their armies was the earls' or kings' household retainers, comparable to the hirdmen of the king of Norway, plus the retainers of their *goedingr*, the chief landed men (who also led the district levies); however, such

retinues were not large, and in Caithness in 1158 two Orkney earls, Rögnvald Kali Kolsson (c.1137-58) and Harald Maddadarson, were accompanied by no more than 20 horsemen and 100 foot-soldiers. Larger forces were raised by a local levy that was comparable to the Scandinavian leidang, for which purpose land in the Orkneys was divided into 6 *husaby* districts totalling 216 urislands, or 'ouncelands' (from the old Norse *eyrisland*), each of which was divided into 18 'pennylands' organised into 4 quarters called *scattlands* (4½ pennylands) which would have each owed an armed and well supplied man to the leidang, which must therefore have totalled about 860 men. Such small numbers, however, could only represent the peacetime muster, since it is repeatedly stated in contemporary sources that Orcadian ships were big, high-sided vessels apparently of more than 20-benches — therefore probably 25 or 30 — and each capable of carrying large numbers of men (according to modern estimates probably between 160-260). The smallest ships mentioned in the sagas are of 10- and 20-benches, but these were used for voyaging, not for war. The most ornate, and usually the largest, ship was always the earl's, by the 12th century usually with 30 or 'more than 30' benches and a very large crew; one account even says that the ship Earl Rögnvald took on crusade in 1151 was of 35-benches, which makes it bigger even than Olaf Trygvasson's famous *Long Serpent*. However, one modern authority, Hafström, suggests that each district of Orkney, of which, you will remember, there were 6, was responsible for providing 4 vessels that were each of only 18-benches — small ships by Scandinavian standards, and incompatible with saga evidence which tells us that the 13-14 Orcadian vessels at the Battle of Floruvágar in 1194 were all bigger than the Norwegian 20-benchers. Another authority, Clouston, taking a completely different approach, puts forward a more convincing case for a full levy of 16 ships of 25- or 30-benches being available from the goedingr of the Orkneys, in which he is amply supported by the sagas, which frequently refer to joint earls of Orkney raising 7 or 8 ships from their own halves of the earldom (eg, Hakon Paulsson had 8 in 1117, while earls Erlend Haraldsson and Rögnvald Kali had 7 and 8 respectively in 1154). Earls are frequently mentioned leading their own raiding fleets of about 5 ships which must have similarly been provided by the goedingr. It is unlikely that pay was given out to such troops, who instead were probably allowed to retain much or most of whatever plunder they accumulated. Whatever means they were raised by, fleets of 14-16 ships appear to have been the largest that the 12th century earls of Orkney could muster; 13th century fleets may have been slightly larger, 20 ships being recorded on one occasion in 1231. The largest Orcadian fleet on record dates to 1046, when Earl Thorfinn raised 60 ships, though these are described as mostly quite small and they included ships from Caithness and the Hebrides in addition to Orkney; his adversary, Earl Rögnvald Brusason, had 30 ships, also small, including large contingents from Shetland and Norway.

In the Hebrides and on the Isle of Man the land was similarly divided up into ouncelands and quarters ('quarterlands'), with the ouncelands called by the Celtic term *tirunga* in the Hebrides, this being corrupted into 'treens' on Man. A much later source indicates that there were about 176 treens on the Isle of Man, which would therefore put the island's leidang-strength at about 700 men, or 17 ships if we assume an average of 20-benches (and interestingly there are 17 parishes on Man.). However, Hafström puts each of Man's 6 districts (called 'sheadings', from the old Norse *settungr*, meaning a sixth) at 36 treens like those of Orkney, which would again give rise to a levy of some 860 men. Either way, when King Magnus swore fealty to King Alexander III of Scotland he promised to provide the latter with 10 'pirate galleys' (*galeas piratas*) 'whenever there was need', of which 5 were of 24-benches and the other 5 were of 12-benches. The service recorded being owed to the Scottish crown by the Earl of Moray in exchange for the island 50 years later, in 1313, is only 6 13-bench ships, which would imply that its naval potential had by then declined considerably. After the mid-12th century Hebridean ships were much smaller than their Orcadian counterparts, *naibheags* or *nyvaigs* ('little ships') being introduced by Somerled. He constructed a fleet of 58 or 80 such vessels, with hinged rudders and masthead fighting tops, for his reconquest of the Hebrides in 1156, and in combat they proved to be more manoeuvrable and had an advantage in firepower over the more typical longships of his adversaries.

Both Orcadian and Hebridean armies could also include Scots. Hebridean armies often included Irishmen too, as, for example, in 1164 when Somerled raised a force of allegedly 160 ships (according to the 'Chronicle of Man') comprising 'a large army from Ireland and various places' according to one source, including 'Foreigners of Dublin' (ie, Ostmen) according to another. Regarding the strength of this force, a passage in the 'Carmen de Morte Sumerledi' puts it more realistically at 1,000 Hebrideans, Argyllmen and *Gallienses* — the last indicating Irishmen — though elsewhere the same source records Somerled's casualties in a battle with the Scots to have included 'thousands' of dead and 'thousands' of wounded, and the strength of the army is inflated to 10,000 men. Even as late as 1310 Norsemen and Irishmen of the Hebrides under John MacSuibhne are recorded launching a campaign against the Scottish earl of Menteith.

SPAIN

Although the service of the Spanish nobility had become basically (though far from thoroughly) feudalised by the beginning of the 11th century it was only in eastern Spain, notably in Catalonia, that its evolution ever approached the same level as that of France. In these areas the military service of vassals in exchange for their fiefs (here called

prestimonia or *honores*) was basically obligatory, though the conditions of such service could vary enormously; as set out in Aragon in 1134 service might be for as little as 3 days in the case of the nobility in general or as much as 3 months in the case of the king's own vassals, and the service of the vassal appears to have been largely at his own expense. Elsewhere in Spain the evolution of true feudalism was somewhat restricted by the widespread practice of paying vassals for their service with cash (basically fief-rente) rather than with fiefs, and on the whole nobles and prelates in western Spain continued to serve with their retinues (*mesnadas*), of however many men they could personally raise, because their social status demanded it rather than through any ties of vassalage or feudal obligation. Castile, the most powerful of the Spanish kingdoms, could possibly only raise about 5-6,000 such feudal heavy cavalry by the 13th century, and the largest reliable 13th century figure for Aragon (ie, one that can be cross-checked against contemporary official documents) gives a total of only 1,300 knights and esquires, recorded in an expedition to Majorca by Jaime I in 1229. Probably Castile fielded 1,500 knights and mounted sergeants at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, where Aragon had 1,000 and the tiny kingdom of Navarre 200.

The feudal nobility consisted of *ricoshombres* (a term which first appears in 1162; called simply *barones* in Catalonia), *fijosdalgos* or *hidalgos*, and *caballeros*; the ricoshombres and hidalgos were differentiated only by wealth. The caballeros, also called *infanzones*, provided the bulk of feudal cavalry in exchange for fiefs, pay and certain minor privileges. However, this lesser nobility had declined considerably in status by the end of the 13th century, by which time many caballeros were inadequately equipped, often with borrowed horses and arms, or else received their pay but failed to fulfil their military obligations. In addition they were often unreliable on the battlefield.

The militia and caballeros villanos

In the cities militia service (*fonsado*) technically remained an obligation of all freemen except for the very young and the very old, though clergymen and Jews (and, in Seville at least, seamen) were generally only called to arms if the city itself was attacked. However, by this period there were many who purchased exemption from such service by the payment of a form of scutage called *fonsadera*, while some towns were required to supply only cavalry or specific numbers of men, or to serve only once a year, and in some cases were obliged to do no more than defend their own walls. Nevertheless, the town militias, each commanded by a royal official called a *juez* and each with its own standard, constituted a particularly important — and large — part of most armies, especially the cavalry element (see below). By c.1120 at the latest one man generally served from each household, these being mustered and equipped by officials called *alcades* (from the Arabic *al-qadi*), who were also responsible for appointing the all-important *talayeros* or scouts. In addition municipal troops were accompanied by surgeons, *pastores* responsible for the army's livestock, and *guardadores*, who took charge of prisoners.

Municipal cavalry were supplied partly by resident knights but mostly by *caballeros villanos*, non-noble citizens wealthy enough to own armour and a horse and performing their military service on horseback in exchange for land and tax exemption. (In the first few decades of this era they still paid tax and might be obliged to render agricultural or similar services in addition.) They first begin to appear in the mid- to late-10th century, becoming an important element of the army by the end of the 11th century. Indeed, by the late-13th century their social status had risen to the same level as that of the noble caballeros and they enjoyed the same privileges. In addition the houses, lands and farms of towns in newly-conquered territories were divided up into *caballerías* and *peonías*, the former twice the size of the latter, the residents of which served as caballeros villanos or *peones* (ie, infantry) respectively; hidalgos and caballeros received similar, though larger, grants of land and property. Those of the caballeros villanos were at first granted only for a lifetime, reverting to the crown on the death of the holder, but by the 1120s they had become hereditary like those of the nobility so important had the service of such horsemen become. Even so, if their economic status declined so that they could no longer maintain the requisite horse and armour that went with their position, caballeros villanos were demoted back down to the status of tax-paying footsloggers. Likewise, a *peon* achieving the economic level of a caballero villano was obliged to buy a horse and thereafter serve on horseback; if he declined his property might be seized by the town authorities and sold off, a horse being bought for him from the proceeds.

Moslem troops

Moslems, serving as mercenaries or allied auxiliaries, were also to be found in Spanish — notably Castilian and Aragonese — armies from the beginning of this era, particularly in 13th century Aragon where much use was made of large numbers of Berber light cavalry employed from the Zanata tribe of Morocco. These were hired chiefly in Granada, though others came directly from Morocco. Called at first *Zenetes*, they gave their name to the typical Spanish light cavalryman of later centuries, called in Castilian *jinete*, in Catalan *genet* and in Portuguese *genete*. Some Marinid princes also served Aragon in the late-13th and early-14th centuries, while other mercenaries were employed after 1235 from the Banu Zayanid, another Zanata tribe, of the Algerian amirate of Tlemcen (which in turn employed Christian mercenaries — see page 25).

The *Mudejars*, Moslem subjects of the Christian kingdoms (the name derived from Arabic *mudajjan*, meaning literally 'permitted to remain' but with a hint of 'domesticated' or 'tamed' about it), could also be called on to perform military service, the Mudejars of Valencia, for instance, being called up against the French by Pere III of Aragon in 1283. In fact in many of the rural districts of recently reconquered southern Spain the Mudejars heavily outnumbered Christian settlers, and even in the town of Avila, in Christian hands since the 10th century, Mudejars continued to constitute an important element of the militia until at least 1255 and probably even later. Mudejar troops were still being used at least in Castile even as late as 1385, when each Moslem district of Murcia had to supply a fixed quota of men. By the middle (Castile 1258) to end (Aragon and Catalonia 1301) of the 13th century laws were being passed aimed at forcing the Mudejars to adopt a distinctive form of dress (being forbidden, for example, to wear bright clothes or white or gilded shoes — signs of nobility — and being obliged to wear beards and to cut their hair relatively short). However, it is evident from pictures in the 'Cántigas de Santa Maria' of Alfonso X of Castile (1252-84) that such dress was not strictly enforced, so that on the whole Mudejar troops — principally archers and spearmen in equal proportions but also including some cavalry — probably continued to resemble their Andalusian and Granadine counterparts.

The Spanish Military Orders

Another, and major, source of troops by the late-12th century was the Military Orders, which were inspired by the great Templar and Hospitaller Orders of the crusader states but whose true origins probably lay in the *hermangildas*, quasi-religious warrior confraternities established over the preceding centuries. These native Spanish Military Orders, strongest in Castile, consisted principally of:

— the Order of Calatrava, established as a confraternity in 1157 and accepted into the Cistercian Order in 1164; for a short period, between 1197 and 1212, it called itself the Order of Salvatierra.

— the Order of St James of Compostella, or St James of the Sword (Santiago), founded in 1170 and approved by Pope Alexander III in 1175. Its brethren, who were permitted to marry, were divided into knights and foot-soldiers.

— and the Order of San Julián del Pereyro, probably founded in 1156 and received papal confirmation in 1176; briefly known in Castile after 1191 as the Order of Trujillo, it was known after 1218 as the Order of Alcántara as a result of receiving the fortress of that name and other property in León from Calatrava.

Other Spanish Orders included:

— the Order of St Benedict, or Evora; established as a confraternity in 1147, they received papal confirmation as a religious Military Order in 1166 and became known after 1211 as the Knights of Avis, having obtained the castle of that name. After Santiago, Alcántara and Calatrava the fourth most important Spanish Order.

— the Order of Montegaudio, an Aragonese Order, was established c.1173 by an ex-Santiagan *comendadore*. It 'collapsed and revived several times under different names', becoming better-known as the Order of Our Lady of Montjoie 1180-88. Amalgamation with the Templars was proposed in 1186 but did not take place until 1196, Montjoie having joined itself to the Order of the Hospital of the Redeemer in the meantime (1188). Also known as the Order of Trufac, it was finally absorbed by Calatrava in 1221.

— the Order of St George of Alfama, established in 1201 and united with the Knights of Our Lady of Montesa in 1400.

— the Mercedarian Knights, a minor Order established c.1233 which ceased to be military in 1317.

— the Order of Sao Thiago, a Portuguese offshoot of Santiago, independent by 1287.

The principal role of the contingents of the Military Orders was twofold — to hold strategic frontier fortresses (*encomiendas*, 'commanderies', of 12 brethren plus auxiliaries, commanded by officers called *comendadores*), and to act as an elite nucleus around which larger armies could be built. Their senior officers were the *Maestre* (Master), the *Prior Mayor* (Grand Prior), the *Comendator Mayor* (the Grand Commander, or military commander-in-chief, usually governing the most powerful commandery), the *Clavero* (Key-bearer or Castellan), the Prior, the *Sacrist* (Treasurer), the *Obrero* (Steward or Quarter-master), and the *Alférez* (Standard-bearer). Santiago actually had a Grand Commander in each kingdom in which it had commanderies (ie, Castile, Aragon, Portugal, León and France), while in the Order of Calatrava the Master ruled the Castilian commanderies and the Grand Commander ruled those in Aragon, the Calatravan commanderies in León and Portugal instead coming under the authority of the masters of Alcántara and Avis respectively.

In addition to actual fighting brethren, both knights and sergeants, their contingents usually included *confrères* (non-brethren affiliated to an Order under certain conditions, such as donations of property), many mercenaries (both cavalry and infantry), and feudal vassals from the Orders' estates. The Orders even had many Moslem

servants and vassals, and therefore probably soldiers, by the 13th century; for example, a company of Moslem archers is recorded in the service of the Santiagan comendadore of Uclés in 1241, while in 1299 the same Order temporarily garrisoned its fortresses on the Granadine frontier with Moslem troops. Jewish soldiers could also be found in their employ (see figure 68).

By these means each of the main Orders could field considerable forces. In 1234, for example, the Master of Alcántara answered a royal summons at the head of as many as 600 cavalry and 2,000 infantry; in 1302 150 brother knights were recorded present at the Convent of Calatrava, while at one time in the 14th century the Master of Calatrava even put 1,200 cavalry in the field (undoubtedly including a fair number of mercenaries and auxiliaries, probably to about 75 per cent of the total). In 1248 270 Santiagan brethren are recorded present at the siege of Seville, and by the end of the century Santiago, the greatest of the Spanish Orders, could probably muster some 400 or more brethren, to which should be added mercenaries, confrères etc.

In addition the Orders of the Hospital and Temple held considerable estates and maintained a strong presence in Spain, particularly in Aragon and Navarre. The Hospitallers fielded 2,000 infantry and a large body of cavalry at the siege of Valencia in 1238, while the Spanish Templars sent as many as 300 'knights' to Syria during the Second Crusade of 1147-49, probably a mixture of brethren and mercenaries.

ANDALUSIA AND MOROCCO

The Taifa Amirates

Despite the demise in 1031 of the Umayyad Caliphate in Andalusia (ie, *al-Andalus*, Moslem Spain) its basic military organisation seems to have been preserved unchanged by the successor *taifa* ('party') amirates, based on a regiment of 1,000 men under an officer called a *qa'id* or *al-qa'id*, consisting of 5 companies, each of 200 men under a *naqib*, divided into 5 units of 40 men each under an *'arif* comprising 8-man sections under officers called *nazirs*. Each unit had its own standard, 10th century sources recording lion, leopard, eagle and dragon devices as being most popular. This type of organisation probably persisted amongst Andalusian regular troops throughout most of this period. Heavy reliance was placed on Berbers recruited in North Africa and on Christian mercenaries — predominantly cavalry — from the Spanish kingdoms of León, Navarre and Castile. As early as 1065 some 600 *Rum* (ie, Christian) crossbowmen were employed by al-Muqtadir, amir of Saragossa, for the siege of Barbastro. Throughout the period 1081-92 al-Muqtadir and his successors even secured the services of the celebrated Rodrigo Diaz de Bivar (nicknamed *Mio Cid* and known to posterity as 'El Cid'), while al-Qadir of Valencia ruled through Christian mercenaries supplied by Alfonso VI of Castile and led by the Cid's nephew, Alvar Fañez. During his enforced exile of 1065-72 even Alfonso himself took service with al-Ma'mun of Toledo. In addition to such regular troops there were, now as earlier, frontier volunteers or ghazis, referred to as *mujahids* or *ahl al-ribat*, who accompanied every army. These received no pay, depending on loot and pillage for their sustenance.

By the late-11th century, however, the Christian *Reconquista* was well under way, and the loss of Toledo to Castile in 1085 prompted the disunited taifa amirs, under the leadership of al-Mu'tamid of Seville, to request military assistance from a North African Moslem sect, the Murabits.

The Murabits

The strict and fanatical Murabits had been founded amongst the desert Berbers of Morocco in 1039 by a Jazzula Berber tribesman, Abd Allah ibn Yasin, their name — alternatively rendered as Almoravides — deriving from *al-Murabitun*, possibly meaning 'confederates'. They started out only some 1,000-strong, but their numbers grew rapidly by the forcible conversion to their beliefs of a large number of Berber and, after 1054, a smaller number of Negro tribes, so that by 1084 they ruled over all Morocco. In 1086 20,000 Murabits answered al-Mu'tamid of Seville's plea for help and entered Spain under Ibn Yasin's successor, the Lamtunah Berber chieftain Yusuf ibn Tashufin (1059-1106), securing a decisive victory over the Christians at Sagrajas. Thereafter, in a series of campaigns spread over the next two decades, Murabit armies brought all Andalusia under their sway, Saragossa — the last of the taifa amirates — falling to them in 1110.

As with the other desert Berber dynasties that succeeded them, in North Africa their armies included a noble elite of camelry, though with the single exception of the Battle of Sagrajas these were seemingly never utilised in Spain. Instead their armies in the Peninsula were made up predominantly of Berber infantry and light cavalry, plus assorted auxiliaries. Various contemporary descriptions of Murabit armies describe them as composed of Lamtunah, Zanata, Hasham, Rum (or Nasara) and, in just a single instance, Arabs (possibly an anachronism); Turks are also mentioned on one occasion, supposedly being present at Sagrajas, and a band of just 100 Ghuzz makes a very brief appearance in 1095. The first three elements are all Berbers, the Lamtunah being the Murabits themselves while the Zanata were tribesmen levied from the conquered kingdoms of Fez, Aghmat and the Tadla. The Hasham, however, was a conglomerate body of paid troops of mixed — but non-Murabit — Berber origins,

under Yusuf ibn Tashufin comprising Jazzula, Lamta, Zanata and Masmuda tribesmen; this was clearly an important body, being combined with the household troops and Christian mercenaries to raise 3,000 horsemen. Under Yusuf's successor Ali ibn Yusuf (1106-43) references to the Hasham become more frequent, the term even becoming synonymous with 'Murabit', which probably indicates that this non-native mercenary element of the army was the most loyal since it was not affected by the tribal jealousies that eventually undermined the Murabit dynasty. In addition there were some Negro (Sudanese) soldiers, recruited from slaves and prisoners-of-war. Yusuf allegedly had a 'Black Guard' of 4,000 Negro infantry, and cavalry are also to be found, 2,000 being recorded in 1070 and 3,000 being killed by the Almohades in 1129.

The Rum, or Nasara, were Christian cavalry, first employed in the Maghreb — as tax-collectors — by Ali ibn Yusuf and initially composed predominantly of manumitted slaves and, probably, prisoners-of-war recruited after capture. Later they were mostly soldiers of fortune, as were those who marched on Toledo in 1143, though their commander on this occasion (a Catalan knight named Reverter) had himself originally been a prisoner. Based in the Murabit capital of Marrakesh, these Christian troops constituted an important and sizeable element of the regular army, especially after 1130 when, under Reverter, they were instrumental in the defeat of the Almohades at the Battle of al-Buhaira. They were allegedly 4,000-strong by 1144, when they were destroyed in battle by the Almohades near Tlemcen, Reverter and all but 3 of his men being killed. Christian mercenaries nevertheless remained popular with the Berber rulers of North Africa thereafter (see below).

Organisation was chiefly on a tribal basis, but there is some evidence that the Murabits adopted earlier Umayyad practice in Spain, units of 40 and 200 men occurring in contemporary sources. Regarding pay, the Murabits were responsible for the introduction into North Africa of *iqta'at* (ie, the revenues of grants of land in exchange for service), though at some point in Ali ibn Yusuf's reign this practice seems to have been suspended, 'so that most of his soldiers found themselves obliged to hire out their horses' in order to earn money. Probably the regular soldiers were paid every 3-4 months under normal circumstances, from funds raised by highly unpopular taxes levied in both Andalusia and Morocco.

The Almohades

The Murabits' brief era of supremacy ended with the fall of Marrakesh in 1145 and the death of their last amir, Tashufin ibn Ali (1143-45), at the hands of a new Berber religious sect, the Almohades (*al-Muwahhidun*, 'unitarians'). This movement had been founded by a chieftain's son named Ibn Tumart who, claiming in 1121 to be the Mahdi prophesied by Mohammed, succeeded in uniting the Masmuda Berbers of the Atlas Mountains against the puritanical and (he argued) heretical Murabits, who were anyway the traditional enemies of the Masmudis. They commenced guerilla actions against the Murabits in 1121 and, although these initially met with only limited success, they were nevertheless able to undermine the structure of the Murabit state and increase the disaffection felt by the over-taxed and poorly-governed Moroccan populace. Under Ibn Tumart's successor Abd al-Mu'min (1130-63, proclaimed Caliph in 1133), Almohade control was established throughout North Africa by 1147 and extended to Moslem Spain in 1149, most of which was soon subdued by an army of just 30,000 men.

The composition of the Almohade army fundamentally differed little from that of the Murabits, consisting of Masmudis and other Berbers (the Zanata and Marinids being specifically mentioned on many occasions) plus Arabs, Ghuzz, Sudanese and the inevitable corps of Christian mercenaries, the so-called 'Militia Christiana'. At first the Berber elements included a high proportion of infantry (even in 1184 an army of 100,000 men included 70,000 infantry), but as time passed these were steadily supplanted by a larger and larger number of cavalry drawn from the mixed Arab-Berber population of the coastal regions, which was held in low repute by the desert-dwelling Berbers, resulting in a noticeable deterioration in the fighting quality of the army on the battlefield. At the same time the non-Berber elements constituted an increasingly greater proportion of the army as the years went by, with the same detrimental effect on morale as had afflicted the Murabits and with the same inevitable consequence.

The Arabs included Banu Maaqil and Banu Sulaim but were predominantly composed of Banu Hilal tribesmen, these and the Banu Sulaim having fought against the Almohades in 1152-53 when the latter invaded Hammadid-held eastern Algeria. However, they were defeated by Abd al-Mu'min at the Battle of Setif in 1153 and were subsequently deported to Morocco's Atlantic coastal plain, possibly as early as 1159 and certainly by 1181. Here they proved to be of considerable value in suppressing local Berber unrest, and they were also used against Christian Spain. Ghuzz mercenaries (*Ghuzziyyun*, also referred to as *Aghzaz*) first appeared at a similar date, arriving in Ifriqiyya from Ayyubid Egypt in or soon after 1172, an Almohade corps similarly being formed from these in 1188 after their defeat, and being constantly reinforced thereafter by prisoners taken from other bodies of Ghuzz drifting westwards (notably that of Qarabush, who was captured and executed in 1212). Modern authorities sometimes try to claim that these Ghuzz were in fact Kurds, but the sources clearly distinguish between them: Kurdish soldiers are fleetingly referred to in Almohade employ in 1159 and 1213, but they only appeared in the Maghreb in any

numbers after the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258, when two small clans took service under Caliph al-Murtada (1248-66). Negroes, on the other hand, were to be found in the Almohade army throughout the caliphate's existence, probably constituting the *'Abid al-Makhzan* recorded in 1146 and 1266. Their most famous action was at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, where they fought to the death round Mohammed II's tent.

The Almohades' first Christian mercenaries were probably inherited from the Murabits, appearing in Abd al-Mu'min's army by 1147 (in fact, it may even have been Christian mercenaries who actually admitted the Almohades into Marrakesh in 1145). Referred to as the Banu Farkhan or Ifarkhan, they were soon regarded with the same respect as they had enjoyed under the Murabits, ironically being held in higher regard and paid at considerably higher rates than were the mercenaries in Christian Spanish armies. Under Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur (1184-99) a Castilian knight, Pedro Fernández de Castro, commander of 100 mercenary cavalry, even became 'Captain-General' of the Almohade forces in Spain and was in the army that defeated the Christians at Alarcos. After 1169, however, Christian mercenaries are not recorded in the Maghreb itself until 1228, when Caliph Abu'l Ula al-Ma'mun, in exchange for the surrender of territory in Spain, was allowed to hire allegedly 12,000 Castilian cavalry (or, more credibly, 500 according to a Moslem source) from King Ferdinand III for use against the pretender Yahya. These provided the core of the Almohade army until at least 1236, and the Christian mercenary who killed the Marinid amir Mohammed Abu Marraf in battle in 1244 was perhaps one of their number. The last mention of Christian mercenaries in Almohade employ, by now predominantly Castilians and Catalans, dates to 1248 when, following the death of Abu Sa'id during his attack on Zayanid-held Tlemcen, some defected to the Zayanids while others went over to the up-and-coming Marinids. The Zayanids of Tlemcen, in fact, had been hiring Christian troops since c.1236, when they reputedly numbered 2,000 men. Others probably switched their allegiance to the Zayanids' overlords, the Hafsids of Tunis, who are known to have been employing Christian mercenaries by c.1249.* In Hafsid employ they were chiefly Catalans, part of their salary being paid directly to the Aragonese royal treasury while the King of Aragon actually had the right to appoint and dismiss their commander (called the *alcayt*, from Arabic *al-qa'id*). In both Zayanid and Hafsid employ it was these Christian mercenary cavalry, along with Negro infantry, who provided the royal bodyguard.

The Almohades revived the practice of granting iqta'at to the tribal sheikhs and their followers in exchange for military service, also exempting them from the odious land-tax introduced by the Murabits. Full-time soldiers (*murtaziqa*) received in addition regular pay, 3 times a year in the case of Berbers (4 times a year under the Hafsids), though under Ya'qub al-Mansur the Ghuzz, who he looked upon particularly favourably, were actually paid monthly. *Hushud* (conscripts), recorded under Murabits and Almohades alike, were called up as required and were paid — badly, one imagines — only for the duration of their service; they are probably the same as the *Jund*, seemingly a militia of non-Almohade Berbers and other foreigners settled in the towns. One last troop-type, who required no pay at all, was the *Mutatawwi'a*, a volunteer who fought nominally to fulfil his religious obligation of *jihad* (holy war) but effectively lived on plunder.

One last element of the Almohade Caliphate's armed forces that warrants mention was its navy, which it inherited from the conquered Hammadid and Zirid kingdoms, in Algeria and Tunisia, in the mid-12th century. By the end of the same century its reputation as one of the most powerful fleets in the Mediterranean had reached even Saladin's ears in Egypt, for in 1190 he requested its assistance in the blockade of besieged Acre, Ibn Khaldun later claiming that Ya'qub al-Mansur actually sent 180 ships (though there is no evidence to corroborate this in any other source). Later, when it had passed into Marinid hands, this Berber navy inflicted a crushing defeat on the Castilian fleet besieging Algeciras (1279).

The Marinids

From the late-1240s onwards the Marinids, or Banu Marin, a Zanata tribe hostile to the Almohades, had been supplying auxiliary troops for service in Andalusia under troublesome chieftains not wanted in their own country (ie, those with itchy sword-arms); the first contingent of 500 appears to have been serving in Spain by 1248, and as many as 3,000 such Marinid 'volunteers' are recorded in 1262 and another 1,000 in 1264. The 'Cronica de Don Alfonso X' records that it was the Marinids who were responsible for the introduction (or, more accurately, the revival) of the traditional Berber cavalry tactics which were to become characteristic of Spanish jinetes in the coming centuries.

When, after decades of civil war, the Almohade state finally collapsed in North Africa it was the Marinid sultans who disposed of the last caliph, Abu Dabbus (who they had put on the throne anyway), and captured Marrakesh. All that they effectively inherited, however, was Morocco, for the greater part of the ex-Almohade territories in North

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*In fact there is record of Christian mercenaries being employed in Tunis even as early as 1076.

Africa had already fallen in 1231 to the Zayanids and Hafsids, while most of what remained of Andalusia had long-since regained its independence (see below).

Much like their Almohade predecessors, Marinid armies are recorded as consisting of 5 principal elements, now comprising Marinid and other Zanata cavalry (the Hasham also reappeared); Andalusian exiles; Christian mercenaries from Spain; Sudanese Negroes; and bow-armed Turkish troops of Syrian origin, descendants of the old Almohade Ghuzziyyun, of whom the Marinids made considerable use in their Spanish expeditions. Some of the Ghuzz were in fact included alongside Christian mercenaries in the Marinid sultan's bodyguard. (Other Ghuzz took service with the Hafsid caliph and the amir of Tlemcen.) As has already been seen, the Christians too were inherited from the Almohades; however, these mutinied against the Marinid sultan in 1254 and were subsequently dispersed, to be replaced by a new corps, now composed predominantly of Catalans, which continued to serve throughout the rest of this era. Based in the Marinid capital of Fez, this body still consisted principally of cavalry, though it is known to have included some infantry, who would have fairly certainly been crossbowmen. Other bands were recruited separately by Castilian and, to a lesser extent, Catalan mercenary captains specifically for Marinid employ.

Granada

Andalusian independence was regained under Ibn Hud (1228-38) while the Almohades were bogged down in their Moroccan civil wars, only Valencia remaining in the hands of the latter (becoming briefly independent in 1236 before its final capture by Jaime I of Aragon in 1238). The founder of Granada's Nazairi dynasty, however, was Mohammed ibn Yusuf ibn al-Ahmar, one of several local rulers who broke away from Ibn Hud in 1235. He was officially recognised as king of Granada, Malaga and Almeria by the Treaty of Jaén in 1246, thereby becoming a vassal of the kingdom of Castile (as Granada was to be intermittently thereafter).

Ibn al-Khatib, writing in the early-14th century, states that the Granadine army was divided into two distinct bodies, these being the Andalusians, commanded by either a relation of the Amir or 'a high dignitary of state'; and the African mercenary regiments, divided up into tribal units under their own officers and commanded by a Marinid prince or a high-ranking noble. The African units, who resided in 'poorly-built barracks', comprised both Negroes and Berbers, the latter inevitably being chiefly of Zanata tribesmen, who provided the nucleus of the army. Both elements of the army were divided up into companies and squadrons, each under a captain with its own flag. Discipline was fairly high and arms were of a good standard. In addition, in keeping with traditional practice some Christian mercenaries were employed, there being 200 Spanish knights in the army of 4-5,000 horse and 30,000 foot with which Ibn Hud marched to the relief of Cordova in 1236. Finally, the frontier was now protected by a chain of fortresses and watchtowers, as well as the usual volunteer frontier guards who persistently harried and raided their Christian neighbours.

However, the military resources of Moslem Spain were now very limited indeed and the survival of Granada right down to 1492 was largely the result of some adroit political manoeuvring by successive rulers, who acknowledged the suzerainty of the king of Castile and became his vassals. As early as 1248 we even find Mohammed I supplying Ferdinand III of Castile with a contingent of 500 troops for the siege and conquest of the rival Moslem stronghold of Seville! (Granada was the last of the independent Moslem amirates of Spain to survive. Other amirs had similarly become vassals of Castile in the 13th century, but they were soon replaced by Christian governors, the amir of Murcia being the last in 1264.)

NORTHERN ITALY

The towns of Northern Italy, with a long tradition of self-dependence dating back to late Roman times, had eclipsed the great feudal estates of the nobility by the end of the 12th century and the city militia had become the nucleus of military organisation. Therefore, with the single exception of the southern kingdom of Sicily, Italian feudalism was of little military significance. That is not to say that feudal estates did not exist in the countryside surrounding the towns; but significantly a great many of the nobility actually took up residence within the local town walls, building houses with tall, fortified towers to substitute for castles and becoming in effect vassals of the town councils. Indeed, it was chiefly such noblemen who held the higher civic offices, so perhaps this should be looked upon as a variant of, rather than an alternative to, more conventional feudalism such as has been described elsewhere. These town vassals even maintained their own retinues of mounted men-at-arms in true feudal fashion (Salinguerra, for example, who was the *podesta* or 'mayor' of Ferrara, 1220-40, had a personal familia of perhaps as many as 800 horsemen), though the commune usually had to be paid at a fixed rate, and given a pledge of good conduct, for each member of such a retinue. However, it should be emphasised that true feudal vassalage within and in the immediate vicinity of a town was often harshly suppressed by the town authorities, even to the point of a death penalty being imposed for any man who swore fealty to another.

The militia

The militia of each town was traditionally divided up into *quartieres*, *sesti*, *terzo* or *portae*, basically 'quarters' or 'gates', each providing a company of infantry and a company of cavalry; as early as 705 Ravenna had divided its militia into 12 companies, while Rome's division into 7 companies may have even predated that. By the 12th century the majority of towns seem to have comprised about 6 quarters. When called up each man served in the company of his respective quarter, though only rarely (normally when a local battle was imminent) were all the quarters called up at once, the number called up at any other time varying according to circumstances; 2 or 3 quarters often served at a time by the 12th century. Usually at least one quarter was always left behind in the town to guard it, whatever the circumstances. The infantry of each quarter was organised in separate companies of archers, crossbowmen, spearmen and specialist troops such as *pavesarii* (shield-bearers who carried pavises to protect the crossbowmen), *guastatori* (sappers), etc, all with their own flags (for the different troop-types of each quarter) and officered by citizens salaried on a full-time basis but serving only in wartime. Within the quarter organisation appears to have been based on a unit of 25 men called a *venticinquina*. All able-bodied freemen between the ages of 14 and 70, or in some cases 18 and 60*, were obliged to perform such military service, though in effect only 'citizens' served, these being classified as long-standing residents or possessors of land or cash within the city. Service was obviously personal but under special circumstances, such as ill-health, a substitute might serve instead. In addition citizens deemed 'politically unreliable', such as Ghibelline sympathisers in a Guelf city and vice versa†, might also be forbidden from serving in person. The terms of service varied but sometimes only involved manning the town walls during sieges. From the early-12th century at the very latest all militiamen received pay.

By the mid-12th century, and probably earlier, all those who could afford a horse were obliged to serve as cavalry. The knights of the town nobility inevitably supplied most of this category, though many non-noble citizens also served on horseback, these being known as *milites pro commune* (knights of the commune), comparable to the caballeros villanos of Spain. Once a horse had been purchased to fulfil such a military obligation it was maintained by the commune, by whom it was replaced if killed on active service. Such cavalry service was hereditary, though the obligation could be and often was fragmented amongst a number of co-heirs who then owed the service of a cavalryman between them; indeed, this became so commonplace that as many as two-thirds of the Florentine cavalry fielded at Montaperti were provided by this means. Noblemen were obliged to supply the town's podesta with a full list of their military retinues, being personally responsible for their actions in peace as well as war.

On campaign the town infantry were supplemented by the *contado*, the surrounding rural districts, the contado nobility and their estates usually being obliged additionally to supply some cavalry. The number of men supplied by each contado district (called a *vicariatus* or vicariate) was determined by its tax assessment and could be considerable — Florence had as many as 8,000 *contadini* in arms in 1260, 4,000 in 1302 and 12,000 in 1312, while Siena fielded 3,000 in 1292 and 7,000 in 1318. By the 13th century each of a town's quarters usually had a contingent of contadini attached to it in wartime, frequently for use as guastatori since many were poorly armed (3,000 of Florence's contadini in 1260 had only scythe or hoe), as a result of which they customarily received only half the pay of town militiamen. Otherwise the contadini were brigaded separately. In addition to men the contado was often called upon to supply weapons, horses and supplies.

Overall command of a town's militia was in the hands of its podesta and a council of captains representing the various quarters. From the early-12th century one or more of a town's elected consuls (the number varying from town to town and year to year) might also be found in command of militia detachments; in one instance recorded in 1175 as few as 225 knights were commanded by 2 such consuls. Captains and consuls could include both the greater feudal nobility (the *capitani* and *vavassores*) and the common citizens.

As for total strength, Milan — the largest city during this period — claimed she could field 40,000 infantry, with another 30,000 men available from the 600 villages in her contado. In addition she had the service of 2,000 men-at-arms in the 12th century, while Matthew Paris wrote that in 1237 'a creditable Italian asserted that Milan with its dependencies raised an army of 6,000 men-at-arms', all allegedly equipped with horse-armour; this figure had increased to 10,000 by 1288. Figures of up to 50,000 cavalry and infantry exist for other towns, but these are certainly exaggerations; those of 50-500 cavalry and 2-10,000 infantry seem more realistic. Even Bologna, a very

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*The upper and lower age limits actually varied enormously from town to town: for instance, they were 14-60 in Perugia and 15-70 in Florence but 20-60 in Venice.

†The Guelfs and Ghibellines were originally supporters of the rival Bavarian and Swabian ducal families of Welf and Weiblingen (Hohenstaufen), whose 'famous antagonism', as T. F. Tout puts it, 'was extended over the Alps, and grew from a strife of hostile houses to a warfare of contending principles, and finally degenerated into the most meaningless faction fight that history has ever witnessed.' In 13th century Italy the Guelfs nominally supported, and in turn were supported by, the papacy while the Ghibellines sided with Emperor Frederick II and his successors.

large and important city, could field only 800 cavalry and 7,000 infantry in 1295 (though she succeeded in raising 1,600 knights only 3 years later), and this certainly ridicules the figures claimed for 12th century Lucca — a much smaller town — of 500 knights, 20,000 infantry and 5,000 more cavalry from the contado nobility! However, we are fortunate enough to possess at least one fairly accurate breakdown of a militia army, that which the Florentines fielded at Montaperti in 1260; as reconstructed by D. P. Waley from the 'Libro di Montaperti', this comprised—

Knights of the commune	1,400	approx
Carroccio guards	153	infantry
	48	cavalry
Mercenary cavalry	over 200	
City infantry	4,000	approx
City crossbowmen	1,000	
City archers	1,000	
City pavesarii	300	approx
Contado infantry	8,000	
	over 16,101	

The Popolo
The *Popolo* evolved in most cities in the early-13th century as an elite body of militia designed to check the power of a town's own magnates and the ambitions of its nobility whenever it felt this to be necessary. Consisting entirely of infantry, the Popolo theoretically numbered 1,000 men, though some smaller towns could only muster a few hundred while others could raise 2,000 or even more; at the time of its foundation in 1250 Florence's Popolo comprised 20 companies, each probably of 100 men. By the middle of the century most *Popoli* were commanded by a hired Captain, usually employed from outside the city (in order to ensure his impartiality) for a 6- or 12-month contract period.

Mercenaries
Little use was made of mercenaries in Italy at first (except in papal armies, for which see below), though by the end of the 12th century town militias fighting on behalf of towns other than their own were frequently paid for the service rendered. The first recorded instance of such Italian 'mercenaries' in the employ of a city (Fiesole) dates to 1124. However, there was a gradual increase in the use of genuine mercenaries, as opposed to paid allies, throughout the 13th century, spearheaded by the armies of Milan, Genoa and Siena in the 1220s and 1230s, Genoa employing 500 mercenary cavalry as early as 1227. This influx of mercenaries was in part at least a result of the obligation of individual towns to supply troops to the allied armies of various city leagues, such as the Lombard League and the Tuscan Guelf League. They continued to consist mainly of Italians from other cities, but by the second half of the 13th century they were otherwise chiefly French and German in composition, the Germans (*Oltramontani*) becoming the most numerous element by the early-14th century. The composition of the mercenary contingents in a Florentine army in 1270, consisting of Lombards, Catalans, Provençals and Germans, is fairly typical. In addition small numbers of Englishmen were sometimes hired, Bologna at one point having perhaps 100 English men-at-arms in her employ.

Before long mercenaries were usually contracted for 2 or 3 months at a time. They were principally cavalry, though infantry, particularly crossbowmen, were also employed, Siena hiring as many as 400 Genoese and 300 Spoletan crossbowmen as early as 1231; of 6,750 Florentine infantry recorded in 1302 as many as 1,000 were mercenaries. After 1267 the cavalry tended to be employed in *conestabileria* or *conestabilia* (constabularies), this word now gradually replacing the earlier *masnada*, which had been used in Italy to denote a small unit of soldiers since at least the 12th century. Constabularies were most commonly of 25 or 50 men but sometimes comprised 100 or more, and in reality their strength could vary enormously; for instance, 6 constabularies hired by Perugia in 1282 totalled 380 men, while of 8 constabularies employed in 1300 by Florence 2 consisted of 40 men, one of 30, one of 25, 3 of 20 and one of as few as 5! The commander of such a unit bore the title of *conestabilis* (constable) regardless. Large constabularies — say of 100 men or more — could be divided into smaller troops, often under officers called *gonfalonieri* (standard-bearers). Beneath these came captains and sometimes trumpeters. The officers were normally expected to have 3 horses each, though their men customarily had only one. Some contracts even specified the equipment that such mercenaries were expected to possess, a Florentine *condotta* of 1277 requiring each man-at-arms to have a good warhorse, full armour protecting body, neck, thighs and legs, a helmet, shield, lance, sword and knife.

It was also from the 1260s onwards that mercenary companies often began to be employed on a permanent basis, paid for by the *tallia* system whereby member towns of a league or alliance each contributed towards supporting a predetermined number of men according to its means. This spread the financial burden more evenly, making the

employment of far larger numbers of mercenaries possible. The Tuscan Guelf League employed as many as 2,500 cavalry by this means in 1292 (principally Provençals and other Frenchmen) in addition to militia detachments totalling some 20,000 men contributed by the member towns. Some indication of the overall numbers of mercenaries individually employed by the largest cities can be drawn from the contingents of 1,000 Italian cavalry hired by the Genoese in 1255, 800 French cavalry hired by Florence in 1267, and 600 more French cavalry in the service of Bologna ten years later.

Nevertheless, despite the steady increase in the use of mercenaries the town militias survived in regular and effective use in Italy well into the 14th century and were revived, albeit unsuccessfully, at the turn of the 16th century.

THE PAPAL STATE

Although one or other of its provinces or frontiers was almost continuously disputed by either the German Emperor or the Normans of southern Italy, the Papal State included throughout much of this era either all or parts of the March of Ancona, the Duchy of Spoleto, the Tuscan Patrimony, Campagna, Marittima ('The Maritime Province') and Romagna, all governed on behalf of the papacy by officials called rectors. Obviously the organisation of the independent city-states found within these territories has already been covered in the note on Northern Italy (see above); here we are concerned specifically with the military service they owed to the pope.

There is very little extant information on the service owed by feudal troops in this period. The first papal grant of land on a feudal basis (ie, in exchange for military service) dates to as early as 999, and instances steadily increase throughout the 11th and early-12th centuries, particularly under the only English pope, Hadrian IV (1154-59), during whose pontificate there occurs the first reference to the subinfeudation of 'knights' (1140). It is interesting to note that in some instances the terms of fealty do not specify an obligation for military service at all; certainly, however, many hundreds of knights were theoretically available from the feudal nobility for varying periods of service, often one month. Azzo d'Este, for instance, was invested with the March of Ancona in 1212 in exchange for the annual service for one month of 100 knights.

However, it seems that it was the town militias upon which the greatest reliance was placed, both for field-armies and garrison troops. Even so, the communes did not regard themselves as being under any obligation to supply troops (even where they had received money-fiefs in exchange for their services) and each papal summons was considered on its merits and either fullfilled or — very often — rejected; refusal to answer a summons usually resulted in a fine, which (if paid) was then used to employ mercenary substitutes. Indirect evidence indicates that the communes were supplying the papacy with troops by the late-12th century, though the earliest positive evidence dates only to 1231. Only token units of varying strength usually served, whose period of service was not standardised in any way — units are recorded serving for anything from 3 days to 3 months, though 6-10 (often 8) day periods appear to be the most common, extendable with the consent of the commune and sometimes at their expense. In some cases the period and likewise the number of men required varied depending on exactly where the service was to be performed — ie, in the immediate locality, elsewhere within the province, or further afield (though it was hard anyway to enforce the service of town militias beyond the frontiers of their own province). On the other hand, though the period of service was often short it was generally expected to be fulfilled 'as often and whenever required'; the town of Cagli, for example, received no less than 3 papal summonses within 2 months in 1299. Conversely this helps to explain why such summonses were so often ignored. Summonses for 3 months' service tended to be issued only under exceptional circumstances.

D. P. Waley, in his book *The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century*, quotes a large number of examples which are indicative of the different terms of service and varying numbers of troops required from town to town and summons to summons. Some appear to have only ever supplied cavalry: Perugia, for instance — probably the largest town of the State after Rome itself until the acquisition of Bologna in 1278 — supplied 50-200 cavalry, while smaller towns such as Cagli supplied units of just 10-15. Macerata, a smaller town than Perugia, supplied as many as 600 cavalry on one occasion in 1287. Other towns, particularly in the March of Ancona, supplied mixed contingents of infantry, crossbowmen (sometimes mounted) and cavalry. Macerata provides a good example of such an all-arms contingent, again in 1287, with a force comprising 10 cavalrymen with 2 horses each, 25 picked crossbowmen (probably mounted), 500 infantrymen and even 100 engineers. Waley cites another similar example, Bevagna, where there are only 15 cavalry to 600 infantry. Some towns (Waley mentions Viterbo, Rieti, Spoleto, Todi and Narni as examples) usually supplied contingents of 100-200 heavy infantry but apparently no cavalry.

A summons was not necessarily for troops, however, being just as likely to be for money for the employment of mercenaries, a practice which became increasingly common in papal as in other Italian armies as the 13th century

progressed. In fact later papal summonses issued to the communes for military service sometimes even specified that the troops provided were to be mercenaries rather than citizen militia. By the second half of the 13th century the system had been revised somewhat, the towns supplying cash on a tallia basis rather than hiring their own mercenaries, leaving to the State the final choice of where and how many to hire.

Mercenaries (chiefly Norman) were in regular use even at the very beginning of this era under Leo IX (1049-54), Nicholas II (1059-61), Alexander II (1061-73) and Gregory VII (1073-85) and probably mercenaries of various origins were employed on a large number of unrecorded occasions in the 12th century; certainly in 1199 Innocent III (whose militaristic outlook set the pattern for the next 100 years) may have employed as many as 2,000, apparently a mixture of cavalry and archers and probably largely Italians; certainly 500 are recorded garrisoning San Germano, and another 200 were raised at the end of the year for Innocent's invasion of Sicily as regent of the infant Frederick (later Emperor Frederick II). The majority of papal mercenaries were North Italians, most commonly Lombards otherwise chiefly Romagnols or Tuscans, as many as 6,000 Tuscan infantry being employed in 1245 (whom Frederick II described as 'a collection of robbers, outlaws and criminals from far and near'). But despite this preponderance of Italians, mercenaries were also sought from further afield; in 1234, for instance, mercenary aid was requested from France, Germany, Austria, Spain and Portugal in addition to Tuscany, the resultant force consisting largely of Germans and Frenchmen but even including some Englishmen, while a papal army campaigning against Frederick II in 1248 included Frisians, Gotlanders (Swedes), Russians and 'Dacians' (probably Hungarians and/or Serbians) amongst others. Matthew Paris even records a scheme devised in the 1240s (but probably never actually put into practice) whereby church prelates in England, and therefore probably elsewhere, were each to pay for the upkeep and equipment of 5, 10 or 15 mercenary men-at-arms in the service of the papacy for a period of one year.

French mercenaries became commonplace after Charles d'Anjou's final defeat (with papal blessing) of the Sicilian Hohenstaufens in 1268, though even as early as 1228 and 1229 considerable bodies of French troops had been employed against Sicily by Pope Gregory IX (1227-41). In fact it was a French force which constituted the largest single non-Italian mercenary contingent recorded in a papal army of this period, comprising 1,500 cavalry, employed in 1247 (this force never reached the Papal State, however, and had to be disbanded after the expiry of its 3 month contract, being replaced by a contingent of 1,500 Lombard mercenaries instead). After 1282 the preponderance of French mercenaries declined considerably, those Frenchmen available being hired for service in Sicily by the Angevins in the wars which commenced with the Sicilian Vespers. Thereafter Romagnols and other Italians again constituted the bulk of papal mercenaries. The Sicilian Vespers war also cut off one source of feudal troops to the papacy, Charles d'Anjou having owed 300 knights as king of Sicily.

One of the largest totals of mercenaries in the service of the pope during this period was that recorded in 1264, when something over 2,500 were employed: 1,000 were posted in the Duchy of Spoleto, 700 in the Tuscan Patrimony, 500 in the March of Ancona, and 200 Campagnols and an unknown number of Lombards in and around Rome itself. A more typical papal army was that of 3,500 men recorded in 1282 under the French marshal Simon d'Eppe: this was largely of Italians — 1,300 from Bologna, 150 other Romagnol communal troops, 350 papal and 500 Tuscan communal troops and 300 from the March of Ancona, plus 600 papal mercenaries (probably Frenchmen) and 300 supplied by Charles d'Anjou. Armies of 1283 and 1284 consisted principally of just Romagnols and Frenchmen.

One final papal means of raising troops was to declare a crusade — what has been described as a 'political crusade', ie, a crusade where neither the aim nor the motive (and sometimes not even the excuse) was in the interests of religion. Such crusades could be declared against rebellious cities within, as well as against enemies without, the State. Charles d'Anjou's conquest of Hohenstaufen Sicily in 1266, where his army included some papal troops, was one such enterprise of the latter category.

Guardsmen

Although papal bodyguards are known to have existed at an earlier date, the earliest precise details available date to the pontificate of Boniface VIII (1294-1303), at which time the bodyguard usually consisted of 30-40 horsemen. However, numbers tended to vary according to circumstances. Details from the Tuscan Patrimony in 1304-6 indicate that the rectors likewise had small regular bodyguards; that of the Tuscan rector was usually of 4-10 horsemen under a marshal, in addition to which there were regular garrison troops in 2 castles totalling about 25 more men, mostly foot-soldiers. Most papal mercenaries were similarly commanded by marshals (*marescalli*), of whom there might be several at any one time; in the late-13th century they were usually Frenchmen, such as Simon d'Eppe and Guy de Montfort. Those posted in fortresses under direct papal control were commanded by constables and castellans.

THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE

Although the territorial possessions of Venice were never great, even after her extensive conquests resulting from the Fourth Crusade, Venetian maritime power was the key to success in the eastern Mediterranean throughout this period, and Byzantines, Germans, Italians, Saracens and Romanian and Syrian Franks alike were all obliged to acknowledge this. In campaigns carried out in her own interests she was shrewd and cautious: conquests tended to follow trade, and here her chief competitors were the rival maritime republics of Genoa and Pisa. Such was the rivalry between these three cities — particularly Venice and Genoa — that open warfare was not infrequent, and the clever statesman could, and did, play one off against the other. But the geographical location of Venice assured her control of the Adriatic and the eastern — ie, the greater — part of the Mediterranean, particularly after the conquest of Constantinople in 1204. In the western Mediterranean Amalfi, Pisa and Genoa successively held sway from the 9th century through to the 13th, with Pisa predominant from the 11th century and Genoa from the early-12th. Obviously the strength of such maritime powers lay in their fleets, but Venice nethertheless indulged in occasional land campaigns too, in addition to which her ships are often recorded landing their crews to assist in siege work, as at Curzola in 1000, Tyre in 1124, Corfu in 1143 and Constantinople in 1204. In fact Venetian siege-engineers were regularly employed by the Mediterranean Latin states, and the Genoese were likewise noted for their siegecraft.

In his *Early History of Venice* Hodgson says Venetian organisation was only regularised c.1171, though the evidence indicates that this 'regularisation' was in effect simply a confirmation of earlier practice. Three distinct divisions of Venice's armed forces were thereby established, of which the most important was the *forza ordinaria*, composed entirely of Venetian citizens between 17 (later 20) and 60 years of age. These received pay in exchange for their obligatory service, which was technically for 2-6 weeks (though in reality this period appears usually to have been exceeded) and was generally performed shipboard. By the late-13th century the men were grouped by twelves (*duodene*) and drew lots to establish in what order they were to serve, which would imply that normally just one-twelfth of the fleet served at a time for a period of one month; even during the Third Genoese War (1350) only 3-twelfths were called up, despite the fact that no more than 25 galleys could be raised thereby. Those of each *duodena* who remained at home contributed towards the pay and equipment of those who served. Their galleys were supplied principally by the state, but in certain circumstances Venice's richer families could be called upon to supply galleys at their own expense, the number depending on their wealth. In 1294 these families were requested to fit out 1, 2 or 3 galleys each and between them they raised a total of 60-70, though there were only 4 families actually rich enough to be expected to supply the maximum of 3 galleys.

The forza ordinaria was usually supplemented by a second category of militiaman, the *forza sussidiaria*, which consisted of contingents from Istria, Dalmatia and other dependent regions and included in addition Venetians settled overseas (eg, in Constantinople and Syria). Unlike the ordinaria, the sussidiaria only ever supplied crews and equipment, the ships always being supplied by Venice herself (from where they were despatched with skeleton crews). In 1171, for example, the Istrian and Dalmatian towns had to supply 10 ships' complements. Provision of these contingents was obligatory like service in the forza ordinaria; indeed, *all* Venetians settled overseas could be called home for military service. Both the ordinaria and sussidiaria were composed entirely of freemen: despite the fact that prisoners-of-war are recorded to have been used as galley-slaves on one occasion as early as 849 and were sometimes used during this period by pirates, the use of freemen remained prevalent until the late-15th century. This was not so much humane as practical, since having slaves at the oars would have seriously weakened — indeed, would have crippled — the fighting strength of a galley, which by the end of this period had an average crew of some 200 men, of whom about 180 (usually including some 30 expert crossbowmen, often mercenaries) would have been oarsmen.

The third element of Venice's armed forces usually appeared only in emergencies. This was the *forza straordinaria*, which consisted of mercenaries employed on a temporary basis. It is interesting to note, however, that Genoa — whose organisation closely followed that of Venice — regarded its own paid citizens as 'mercenary', and as early as the late-12th century many citizens of both Venice and Genoa preferred to pay the equivalent of scutage to maintain a mercenary substitute rather than perform personal service.

Supreme command was in the hands of the Doge himself, and in most important campaigns he would lead the fleet in person, though this became less usual as the 13th century progressed. Beneath him certain important officers, drawn from families of patrician rank, were granted the titles of *ammiratus* (admiral), or *capitaneous* or *capimaestro* (captain). In Venice the captain was a fleet commander and the admiral a commander-in-chief who accompanied him; in Genoa the captain's fleet was less than 10 ships, while if there were 10 or more vessels the fleet became the command of an admiral. Masters of single ships were called *padroni* or, from the 13th century on, *comiti* (though *comito* was more specifically applied to masters of galleys and other oar-propelled vessels rather than to masters of sailing ships).

Much the same organisation appears to have existed on land. Mercenaries were employed in Venetian land forces by the mid-12th century (as early as the Battle of La Tomba against Padua in 1142 both the cavalry and infantry commanders of the Venetian army were Italian mercenaries) and by the 13th century Lombards supplied the bulk of Venice's mercenary troops. In 1299 Catalan crossbowmen were employed for the fist time, though as marines rather than infantry. In fact with a citizen militia composed exclusively of seamen Venice had, by the beginning of the 14th century, come to place very heavy reliance on mercenaries for her land campaigns. However, most of her conquests of the Fourth Crusade and later were parcelled out on a strictly feudal basis — the island of Crete, for example, was organised in 1212 as 132 knights' fiefs and 48 sergeanties; the knights' fiefs were later increased to 200, then to 230, and yet another 90 were added in 1252. Similarly, the island of Naxos was organised as 56 knights' fiefs. The holders of such estates were chiefly of Venetian stock, though the 1 or 2 mounted retainers each knight had to maintain were fairly certainly Greeks.

Fleet strength

The largest (credible) fleets recorded in this period are in the region of 200 ships, but until the 13th century such fleets usually included a fair number of transports and merchant vessels serving as warships. The total number of actual war-galleys was lower and seems to have remained about 100 at most until the early-13th century: 100 galleys and 20 transports were fitted out in 1171 while 50-62 galleys serving in the Fourth Crusade represented half of Venice's total strength. Certainly towards the end of this period fleets had grown considerably stronger in numbers. In 1298, during the Second Genoese War of 1294-99, a single Venetian fleet of over 100 galleys is recorded at the Battle of Curzola, and the next year another fleet of 100 galleys was fitted out in Venice. The ability to launch such a sizeable fleet two years running and yet at the same time maintain her normal trading flotillas, and smaller fleets elsewhere, would imply that Venice's total strength during the closing years of the century was at least 150 galleys and perhaps as many as 200. Significantly Genoa fitted out 165 galleys of her own in 1295, whose crews totalled 35,000 men (ie, an average of about 212 men per galley).

SICILY

Sicily was the greatest of the Italo-Norman states established in the 11th century. The conquest of the island from the Arabs by Roger I, begun in 1060, was completed by 1091, but expansion continued thereafter so that from 1128 the kingdom of Sicily* also included the Norman possessions of mainland southern Italy (Apulia and Calabria) and in the period 1134-60 Roger II (1105-54) and his son William I (1154-66) even held the ex-Zirid amirates of the Tunisian coastline. The Norman dynasty lasted until 1194 when it was succeeded by the German Hohenstaufens, thereby becoming part of the Holy Roman Empire.

Military service due from the feudal estates, prevalent here in comparison to Northern Italy, was due basically in multiples of 5 or 10 knights for a period of usually 40, but sometimes 60 or even 90, days; some instances are recorded in which service of up to a year could even be called for, though undoubtedly at the expense of the king or tenant-in-chief. By the end of Roger II's reign the feudal contingents — always mainly Apulian — could muster well in excess of 10,000 knights, the 'Catalogus Baronum' of about that date recording the service of 8,620 *milites* and 11,090 sergeants being due from Apulia alone (comprising 3,453 fiefs); Calabria and Sicily between them could doubtless add up to 5,000 more. These feudal contingents were supplemented by Lombard knights and militiamen — the latter at first including many Greeks in Sicily — supplied by the city communes; by the 13th century at the latest these served at the expense of their commune for the first 4 or 6 weeks but thereafter had to be paid by the king if further service was required. In times of crisis serfs as well as freemen could be called up in the arrière-ban.

However, the real backbone of the kingdom's armies from the late-11th century until the second half of the 13th century was provided by Sicily's Saracen community, officered by its own nobility comprising *qa'ids* and *sheikhs*. Technically these troops should be counted as auxiliaries or mercenaries, since they owed no obligation to town or feudal lord, but the tolerance with which they and their Moslem faith were treated, coupled with the preference for much of their culture openly displayed by such great rulers as Roger II and the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (king of Sicily 1198-1250) resulted in them being the most loyal and devoted element of the otherwise somewhat unreliable Sicilian army. With no fear of excommunication or anathaema they were particularly valuable in the Norman and Hohenstaufen struggles against the papacy, which viewed them with abhorrent indignation. Their Moslem faith was actually encouraged for just this reason; in 1098 Count Roger I (1072-1101), the first to realise their military potential, even forbade St Anselm from attempting to convert the 'innumerable army of Arabs' fielded for the siege of Capua, for fear that it would weaken their loyalty and his control over them as their guardian and benefactor, and would make them susceptible to papal interference. The royal bodyguard was even made up of Saracens, as too was the guard unit attached to the state treasury. In 1184/5 Ibn Jubair wrote that King William II's

*In fact Sicily only properly became a kingdom in 1130.

bodyguard comprised a large number of 'Moslem Negro slaves, with a captain of that race', all of them 'sumptuously' dressed and provided with 'agile horses'. Frederick II's bodyguard, and possibly that of Roger I too, even included units of Tunisian Berbers, Berber auxiliaries also being employed in Sicily's North African provinces in the mid-12th century.

From 1222 to 1226 Frederick II transported a large number of Sicilian Saracens to colonies in the kingdom's Italian mainland possessions, principally Lucera, where possibly as many as 60,000 (undoubtedly including women and children), and certainly at least 16,000, were settled; somewhat smaller colonies were similarly established at Nocera and Girofalco. The figures may be exaggerations, but Frederick appears to have been accompanied by 7-10,000 Saracens from Lucera in the Cortenuova campaign of 1237, while later his son Manfred (denounced by the pope in 1266 as 'Sultan of Lucera') is recorded employing 'innumerable Saracens', possibly as many as 10,000 being present at the Battle of Benevento. After the Angevin conquest of 1266, and despite a revolt against him by them in 1267, Charles d'Anjou preserved these colonies intact until the late-13th century — principally as a source of good-quality, if somewhat embarrassing, mercenaries — and Saracens still constituted an important element of the Sicilian army at the beginning of the War of the Sicilian Vespers in 1282. Charles II of Naples (1285-1309) only finally rooted them out and suppressed them in 1301.

Their organisation would appear to have been decimal, the source which records the figure of 7,000 Saracens at Cortenuova also recording that these charged in 7 divisions, the implication being that each division was 1,000-strong. Since there was a strong Andalusian influence in Sicily it is probable that smaller units consisted of 200, 40 and 8 men and that the qa'ids commanded the units of 1,000 as in al-Andalus. Under Roger I and Roger II at least they appear to have fought exclusively as infantry, particularly archers, but during the second half of the 12th century some also began to be employed as light cavalry — 500 accompanied King William II's crusade against Alexandria in 1174, for instance, alongside 1,000 knights — a role in which they are encountered in the 13th century too, as at Benevento in 1266. In addition some Saracens were employed as siege engineers, an art at which they excelled, as at Capua in 1098, at Montepolosa in 1133 (where they operated the moveable siege-towers) and at Thessalonika in 1185 (where they constructed the trebuchets). In the 13th century the Saracen mainland colonies at Lucera, Nocera and Girofalco were similarly employed in the construction of siege-engines as well as mail corselets, crossbows, clothing (uniforms?) and other weapons and equipment.

Other mercenaries were largely German by the 13th century, Frederick and his successors employing permanent bodies of mercenary German men-at-arms — a single unit of 1,600 under Count Frederick of Antioch, holding the rank of Marshal, is recorded in 1248 and another unit of 1,000 under Manfred Lancia existed at much the same date; Frederick's son Manfred was accompanied by 1,200 such German mercenary heavy cavalry at the fateful Battle of Benevento in 1266, and a few survivors appeared in Galvano Lancia's division at Tagliacozzo. Others were principally North Italians, Burgundians and, in very much smaller numbers, Frenchmen. In the War of the Sicilian Vespers (1282-1302) large numbers of Catalan, Aragonese and Almughavari mercenaries were employed against the Angevins by Sicilian rebels.

Sicily also had a fair-sized fleet. Robert Guiscard had ships constructed throughout his domains in 1081 for his campaign against the Byzantine Empire, and Roger I is known to have had ships built in Sicily as early as 1085. Roger II supposedly had as many as 300 ships constructed in 1123. Moslem sources record the equally improbable figures of 222-280 and even 600 Sicilian ships in William's attack on Alexandria in 1174, but certainly 50 galleys (with 500 knights) were sent to Tripoli by William in 1188 under one of the most famous holders of the post of Admiral, Margaritus, such a proficient seaman that he was called by contemporaries 'the King of the Sea' and 'a second Neptune': between 1184-94 he scored victories over Spaniards, Berbers, Ayyubids, Byzantines, Pisans and Genoese alike. Frederick II had plans to build up a fleet of as many as 100 galleys and 50 transports by 1225, and certainly he took 40 galleys on crusade with him in 1228. As many as 65 are recorded in 1241, while the fact that Manfred's admiral Chinardo commanded a fleet of 100 galleys in 1258 would seem to confirm that Frederick may have actually achieved his ambition. Many Sicilian seamen were in fact Genoese, though under the admiral Roger de Loria in the late-13th century many ships were crewed by Catalans.

Our modern word 'admiral' evolved in Sicily during this period, deriving via Latin *ammiratus* and Byzantine *amerrhadhos* from the Arabic *amir*, or emir. This evolution came about because the office of Admiral of Sicily, first recorded in 1110, was derived from that of the amir of Palermo, who had been replaced by a Norman 'amir' following the fall of the city to Robert Guiscard in 1072. An *amiratus Palermi* is still recorded in 1086, but under Roger I and his widow (as regent for Roger II) the responsibilities of this post expanded so that its holder became the count's (later king's) chief minister and was called instead Admiral of Sicily or, more grandly, 'Admiral of admirals and archon of archontes'. Surprisingly his responsibilities were initially, and primarily, fiscal administration as well as the organisation of the navy, but in wartime they extended to overall command of not just the fleet but of the

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*In fact Sicily only properly became a kingdom in 1130.

kingdom's land-forces too. Until the mid-12th century the office was normally held by a Greek, but after George of Antioch (d.1151/2) the kingdom's admirals were, with the notable exception of Margaritus of Brindisi, exclusively Latins.

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

Although firmly rooted and fairly well developed in the Rhineland, Franconia, Lorraine (the old Lotharingia) and Burgundy, feudalism in its widest sense was never as strong in Germany as in, say, France or England, and true knighthood and the customary granting of fiefs was unknown in Germany until the 12th century; the earliest recorded instance of knighting actually dates to 1146.

During the period under review Germany was basically a confederation of petty states led by princely families of tribal origin, of whom very few held their lands as vassals of the crown. In the first half of this era, therefore, the king (or Emperor) had to depend almost entirely on the goodwill of these autonomous princes and dukes for military support, who recognised Imperial authority only when they deemed it expedient to do so. Their principalities had largely evolved from once-independent territories and sub-kingdoms (principally Saxony, Thuringia, Burgundy, Franconia, Bavaria, Swabia, Austria, Bohemia and Moravia) and the princes continued to associate themselves with the ethnic origins of their lands. Without their support the Emperor had practically no army, and therefore no power, at all, and it was as a result of this dependence that the Imperial throne became elective in the second half of the 13th century, the most powerful princes becoming *Kürfursten* or 'Electors' whose one concern was effectively to ensure their own autonomy by the maintenance of a weak monarchy. Some idea of the princes' military potential can be got from the fact that at a *Diet* (parliament) in Mainz in 1235, where they were nearly all present, their personal retinues are recorded to have totalled 12,000 knights. An individual prince might easily raise several hundred knights (mostly *ministeriales,* for which see below), the Archbishop of Cologne reputedly fielding 500 in 1161.

Other than for the king's expedition to Rome to be crowned (the *expeditio italica*, after 1135 called the *expeditio roma* or *Romfahrt*, later *Romzug*) only the princes of the church — the abbots, bishops and archbishops — were actually obliged to render him military service, since they alone owed their positions to the crown, having been invested with their various estates and offices by the king; therefore it was on them that he relied predominantly for troops. In 1167, 1174 and 1176, for example, German armies operating in Italy* under Frederick I Barbarossa consisted almost entirely of church contingents. However, the obligations of ecclesiastical princes differed from those of feudal vassals; with them it was more a case of administering an Imperial estate and, when necessary, financing contingents of troops from the proceeds. Sometimes such proceeds were inadequate to pay for the requisite troops and it was not uncommon for the church to have to mortgage or pawn property and estates in order to raise men. Most German bishops were therefore soldiers first and churchmen second and many even commanded Imperial armies in the field, despite the fact that for most of this era there was bitter enmity between Empire and papacy. In 1257 Richard of Cornwall wrote to his brother, King Henry III of England, about the 'mettlesome and warlike archbishops there are in Germany. It would be a fine thing for you if you could create such archbishops in England.'

It was Frederick I (who added the 'Holy' to 'Roman Empire') who first sought to fully reorganise German feudalism on the model of France. Realising the necessity of pulling together the heterogenous elements that made up the Empire, Frederick made a concerted effort to ensure that all princes, both ecclesiastical and lay, were tied to the throne by bonds of vassalage, and by 1180 the structure of the feudal hierarchy had been firmly established; the princes and dukes were now tenants-in-chief (the princes of the church inevitably taking precedence over lay princes), with their vassals obliged to perform military service as knights. Where previously the king had been able to solicit military aid from his nobility chiefly only by cash payments, the late-12th century saw them serving for a standard period of 6 weeks per year, in addition to which, after an interval, their vassals could be called upon for futher service of another 6 weeks at the expense of the tenant-in-chief or crown. Unfortunately after Frederick's death in 1190 his successors were unable to maintain their hold on the nobility, his grandson Frederick II (1214-50, best known for his Sicilian and Italian exploits) issuing in 1231 the 'Statute of Favour of the Princes' which granted lay and ecclesiastical princes alike absolute autonomy within their lands and total freedom from royal interference; assorted exemptions from and limitations on obligatory military service followed (Bohemians and Saxons, for instance, could commute their obligation to participate in the Romfahrt by means of a token cash payment). Thereafter the German monarchy was purely elective and royal authority little more than nominal. Rudolf of Habsburg (1273-91) appears to have been at least partially successful in forcing the nobility back into submission,

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*Italy seems to have been considered the cornerstone of the futile dream of Empire maintained by the Salian and Hohenstaufen Emperors throughout much of this era, and it was here that most of their energy was squandered. Imperial claims to the control of Italy declined only with the establishment of elective monarchy in the Empire in the second half of the 13th century.

though he had to put dissidents down by force on a number of occasions and destroyed some 70 or more castles in the process. Nor were his achievements particularly lasting.

Since the princes were of dubious loyalty, and because the German peasantry were basically forbidden to bear arms by the late-12th century, it was inevitable that some reliance should be placed on mercenary troops (principally Germans), though they were apparently never employed in particularly large numbers. As early as the late-11th century it had been suggested to Henry IV (by Benzo of Alba) that mercenaries, paid for by a form of scutage, should replace the feudal or semi-feudal muster, and the suggestion was revived following the failure of Henry V's French campaign of 1124 and again after the decisive defeat of the Imperialists under Otto IV at Bouvines in 1214. Certainly Frederick I had depended on Brabançon mercenaries in Italy in 1166-67 (5-800 men, or perhaps 1,500 including Flemish mercenaries too) and 1174-75 (commanded by the Archbishop of Mainz), where they gained a morale ascendancy over the Italians, who were scared to death of them (or, rather, of their reputation); such *Brabanzonen* were only actively employed within Germany itself once, in Saxony in 1179 by Archbishop Philip von Heinsberg of Cologne, who fielded as many aş 4,000 mercenaries, cavalry and infantry together, of whom the Brabançons constituted the latter. The Emperors themselves tended to rely heavily on mercenaries in their personal retinues to compensate for the indifference of their vassals; for a crusading enterprise of 1196-98 Henry VI personally raised a contingent of as many as 6,000 mercenary troops, 1,500 of them knights and a further 1,500 being esquires. Many such troops were paid with money-fiefs. Hungarians too were sometimes employed, about 600 horse-archers being recorded in an army raised in 1158, while as many as 14,000 are supposed to have been present under their king in Rudolf's army at Marchfeld 120 years later.

Another considerable — and unique — element of the Imperial army (and of the ecclesiastical contingents in particular) was supplied by *ministeriales* (German *Dienstleuten*), a class of 'unfree' knights. These appeared in the first half of the 10th century but, as explained in *Armies of the Dark Ages*, were only first introduced on a large scale by Conrad II (1024-39), when they were much used for royal garrisons. They were initially non-noble freemen administering fiefs without actually holding them as vassals, and they could be granted by one lord to another, leased out as mercenaries, or even sold. Many vassals therefore had no need to involve themselves in subinfeudation, since they could utilise ministeriales to satisfy their military obligations without loss of land or revenue, and it was this aspect that made them particularly popular with the church. However, ministeriales often became important Imperial officials so that their status steadily improved. As early as 1126 we find ministeriales being made knights and by the mid-century they had to be paid for service beyond their master's own domains. Many were by this time becoming powerful and wealthy enough to be considered capable of holding lands on their own account, so that their offices were subsequently converted into feudal possessions. Their ability to hold property and thereby have vassals of their own inevitably broke down and blurred the original distinction between the 'unfree' *ministerialis* and the free knight (to the disgust of the latter), one powerful ministerialis of Frederick I's reign, Werner von Bolanden, even being reported as holding 17 castles and allegedly being owed the service of as many as 1,100 men-at-arms. By the mid-13th century — when, in South German contingents at least, as much as 95 per cent or more of an army could be composed of ministeriales — they were indistinguishable from the nobility, a considerable proportion of the latter by then being of ministerialis origin, including even dukes, counts and bishops.*

Some ministeriales appear to have served as infantry but most evidence indicates that they were cavalrymen. The same applies to the *Sariants*, or sergeants, who first appear in the 12th century. Nethertheless infantry were an important element of German armies. Many were still supplied by the *Heerbann* or its equivalent, the traditional Germanic levy of all able-bodied freemen which lasted up until the 13th century, though from the late-12th century the lower classes were being steadily excluded from military service. It lasted longest in the north and east, in Saxony, Thuringia and Bavaria; Saxon and Thuringian infantry were present in strength at Bouvines in 1214 and fought in nearly every important campaign of the 11th and 12th centuries. Other infantry were provided by town militias from the 11th century onwards, these participating in most of the civil wars which racked the reigns of every German king of this era. They were obliged to go to war whenever called upon to do so by their sovereign (ie, the ruling prince, duke, bishop etc of the state in which the town stood, which in the case of *Reichsunmittelbare* towns — those under direct royal control — was the king or Emperor himself). In most cases, however, they were not expected to do much more than defend their own town walls, except in dire circumstances when they might be called upon to serve in the field locally (this obligation frequently being reduced in the 13th century so that service could not be called for further than a half-day's march from the militia's home town). Hence the reliance on Italian, Brabançon and other indigenous or mercenary infantry when campaigning outside Germany.

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*The ministeriales are the subject of *German Knighthood 1050-1300* by Benjamin Arnold, published as these pages were originally being passed for press in 1985.

THE LOW COUNTRIES

The majority of the principalities that went to make up the Low Countries were technically fiefs of the Holy Roman Empire, though the Count of Flanders, the most powerful of the Lowland princes, was a vassal of the French crown.

From the 10th century onwards Flanders was divided for administrative purposes into *châtellenies*, regions each centred on a principal fortress (eg, Ghent, Arras, Ypres, Bruges, Lille and St Omer) and each commanded by a *châtelain* (castellan), hereditary by the mid-12th century and often styled a *vicomte* (viscount), who was responsible for raising and leading both the feudal levy and the militia contingents for which the Low Countries were justly famous. Flemish communal militias are first specifically recorded only in 1127, but it is clear even then that they had already existed for some time, probably since the last quarter of the 11th century. The first were those of Ghent, St Omer and Aire. Their armies included spearmen and archers as well as siege specialists with their own trains of equipment and baggage-wagons, the wagons generally being taken into battle with the army (one actually had the communal standard mounted on it carroccio-fashion) and used either as a fortress or else to protect the rear of the army. William le Breton claimed, somewhat exaggeratedly, that Ghent, the chief city of Flanders, could field up to 20,000 men at its own expense.

Nevertheless, the knights of the comital army remained the principal military force in Flanders until the 13th century, but in the years following the death of Count Philippe d'Alsace (1168-91) the strength of the knighthood in Flanders declined with the result that the comital army came to depend more and more heavily on its communal contingents, whose numbers were steadily growing as the cities flourished. By the end of the 12th century each able-bodied man in Flanders aged between 15-60 years (or 16-, 17- and 21-60 in some cases) was obliged to possess and bear arms 'according to his means'. The towns were divided into district constabularies, led by constables appointed by the aldermen, and later they were further subdivided into streets. By the mid-13th century the service of richer townsmen was beginning to be expected on horseback, and Bruges, introducing such an obligation in 1292, divided up its burghers into 5 distinct classes of cavalry of which the wealthiest two were even expected to ride barded horses. Bruges' other citizens were organised according to their guilds by this late date, and the whole communal militia was subdivided into 12 *vouden*, each of 96 burghers (ie, cavalrymen) and 511 guildsmen. The mustering of militia by guilds, however, first appeared only in the late-13th century, prior to which it had been usual practice instead to recruit them according to their town quarters, and in the 13th century at least richer burghers actually wore the arms of their quarter in action. Also in the late-13th century there appeared small companies of 'marksmen' (usually crossbowmen but sometimes archers), paid for and uniformed by the town authorities.

In the prince-bishopric of Liège city-militias had been established even earlier, certainly existing by the mid-11th century (that of Huy, for instance, is recorded in 1066 and may have existed as early as 1013), and the prince-bishop relied far more heavily on his militia from a considerably earlier date, despite the fact that communes as such were only officially recognised there in the second half of the 12th century. In 1253-54 the militia of Liège and its dependent towns was organised in city-districts (6 in Liège itself) comparable to Bruges' vouden, within each of which the militia formed so many units of 20 men (*vingtaines*) each under a *vingtenier*. (Though abolished in 1255 this organisation was reintroduced unchanged in 1276.)

As some indication of the principalities' potential, the county of Hainault fielded 340 knights* and 340 armoured horsemen in 1172 and allegedly as many as 10,000 infantry in 1183, while according to rather over-optimistic chroniclers the Duke of Brabant lost 3,000 men killed and 4,000 captured at Steppes in 1213. The Count of Flanders, most powerful of the Lowland princes, is recorded on one occasion leading 500 knights and 1,000 armoured horsemen in the field, in addition to which there remained an unspecified number of additional knights within his many castles. At the end of the 13th century the counts of Looz, Juliers, La Marck, Luxembourg and Namur, and the lord of Fauquemont, could each raise some 200-250 feudal cavalry and the Prince-Bishop of Liège some 700. The Duke of Brabant had himself been able to raise 700 men-at-arms in the 12th century, but by the end of this era could expect the service of only 500, a number that the Count of Hainault could now muster only by calling for support from his allies on the Rhine. All these figures are exclusive of mercenaries, who were often employed in considerable numbers.

THE ORDENSSTAAT OF THE TEUTONIC KNIGHTS

The Teutonic Knights evolved from a hospital organised in 1190 by merchants of Bremen and Lübeck for the care of German pilgrims at the siege of Acre during the Third Crusade. They turned military in 1198 by incorporating

*The knightly contingents of the armies of Hainault and other principalities of the Low Countries that came within Germany's sphere of influence included many ministeriales.

a number of German knights and received papal confirmation as a Military Order under the full title of the Teutonic Knights of the Hospital of St Mary of Jerusalem. They were often called *Krzyzacy* or 'Crossmen' by the Poles, Russians and Lithuanians, and also 'The German Order'. However, it is not true that only German knights were permitted to join; during this period many Slav noblemen joined, particularly Poles, as did pro-Imperialist Italians. All, however, had to be German-speaking. Their commander was the *Hochmeister* or 'High Master' (ie, Grand Master), who was also a prince of the Holy Roman Empire after 1226.

They saw less service in Palestine than the great Orders of the Hospital and the Temple, which had been their inspiration, despite taking part in most major engagements of the 13th century, such as La Forbie (1244) and El Mansourah (1250), a small contingent including the Hochmeister even being present at the fall of Acre in 1291. Instead they became much involved in Cilician Armenia, where as early as 1210 they suffered near destruction in an obscure campaign. However, unable to compete with the power of the other Orders in the Levant they chiefly directed their activities against the pagan tribes of Eastern Europe and the Baltic coast. For a while the Teutonic Knights fought against the Cumans in Hungary, where in 1211 King Andrew II had established the Order on several considerable estates, from which, alarmed at their growing strength, he was obliged to expel them by force in 1225. They then moved on to Poland, where Duke Conrad of Mazovia granted them the province of Kulm, south of Danzig (modern Gdansk), in 1226, in exchange for their services against the Prussians. Their real rise to fame, or infamy, began with the conquest of Prussia in a series of bloody campaigns between 1230 and 1283, fighting in the process some of the most unusual battles of this period in marshlands, deep forests, wildernesses of rivers, lakes and sand-dunes and vast frozen wastes. By these and other conquests (Kurland 1267, Semgallia 1290) they succeeded in carving out a sovereign state, the *Ordensstaat*, with the Hochmeister at its head, papal and Imperial bulls confirming their right to these Baltic lands.

At first there were rival Military Orders even here, of which the greatest was the fellow-German Order of the Knights of Christ of Livonia, the 'Sword Brethren' or 'Knights of the Sword' (called 'God's Knights' according to Hartmann von Heldrungen). Numbering at most some 120 brethren, this Order had been founded by the Bishop of Riga in 1200 to defend Livonia against pagan tribesmen. However, following their decisive defeat by the Samogitians and Semgallians at the Battle of Siauliai in 1236, where their Master and half of the Order's brethren were killed, the survivors were affiliated into the Teutonic Order, as had been a Polish Order two years earlier, the Knights of Dobrzyn, established by Duke Conrad of Mazovia and Bishop Christian of Prussia in 1228. The Livonian branch of the Order, however, continued to maintain a degree of autonomy, to such an extent that contemporary chroniclers continued to frequently refer to brother knights in Livonia as 'Sword Brethren'.

The Order's official headquarters remained at Acre until the fall of that city to the Mamluks in 1291, after which the Hochmeister transferred it to Venice, only moving to Marienburg in Prussia in 1308. Chief officers of the Order after the Hochmeister were the *Grosskomtur* (Grand Commander), the *Ordensmarschall* (also sometimes called the *Grossmarschall* or Grand Marshal), the *Spittler* (Hospitaller), the *Tressler* (Treasurer) and the *Trapier* (Quarter-master). Military command was in the hands of the Ordensmarschall, with the provincial marshals subordinate to him. Often, however, the Hochmeister would personally take command, as frequently did the provincial Masters, the *Landmeister*. At its lowest level organisation was based on the convent or *Komturei* (commandery) of at least 12 and sometimes up to 20 brother knights, plus auxiliaries, under an officer called either a *Pfleger* or a *Hauskomtur*, similar to the commanderies of the Hospitallers and Templars. There were roughly 20 such commanderies in existence in Prussia after its conquest had been completed (1283), plus a considerably larger number of small castles which each usually had a garrison of at least 2 brother knights and their men. In addition the Order had brother sergeants (as many as 6-10 per knight) plus confrères (*Halbbrüder*) and mercenaries often paid with grants of conquered land. Other knights from many parts of Germany, and sometimes even further afield, served alongside the Teutonic Knights voluntarily in the role of crusaders. In Hochmeister Hermann von Salza's day (1210-39) the Order's strength is reported as 600 brethren.

Other troops were raised from German colonists, nobility and sergeants obliged to perform military service in feudal fashion in exchange for estates of varying sizes. Feudal service as set out in the 'Culmische Handfeste' of 1233 involved the service, whenever called for, of a heavy cavalryman with full armour and spare horse from each estate of 40 or more *Hufen* (a *Hufe* being a land measure equivalent to approximately 41 acres) and of a light-armed mounted sergeant from each estate of less than 40 Hufen, when 10 Hufen was considered the minimum necessary to properly support a knight. These holdings were tax-free. Many estates of both categories were created during the conquest of Prussia, and a ratio of one heavy to 4 light cavalrymen appears to have been established by the end of this period. The sizes of the estates on which service was based gradually declined thereafter, so that by the early-14th century light cavalry served on the basis of 25-30 Hufen, declining yet further to 10-15 Hufen by the early-15th century. Further light cavalry could also be supplied by the peasants, who might be expected to provide one armed

horseman for each 6 Hufen (as in Pomerania and Rügen in 1283), and by the villages, each governed by an official called a *Locator* (basically the mayor) who held a personal estate of 3-6 Hufen in exchange for cavalry service.

On the whole, however, the German peasant-colonists and the burghers of the newly-established merchant communities provided the Order with infantry, as did converted Prussian and Lithuanian tribesmen, these latter usually being posted on the army's flanks when serving in the field, where not overmuch was expected of them. As well as military service their other obligations included the traditional maintenance of forts, roads and bridges. Such converted natives were the responsibility of a regional officer called an advocate (*Vogt*), who doubled as tax collector, judicial administrator and militia commander. He often governed a vast area, and was expected to maintain cordial relations with the local chieftains, whose forces he had to muster and lead in wartime. The number of native troops available to an advocate could be considerable: Wenden, an important castle in Livonia, had only 10 brethren c.1247, but with its locally-raised militia could field in all some 500 horse and foot, while in 1291 the advocate of Nattangia raised as many as 1,200 Prussian tribesmen to back up his contingent of 30 brethren.

By the very end of this era or the early-14th century the military obligations of both nobility and peasants were on the decline in the interior regions of the Ordensstaat, the Teutonic Knights now generally being more in need of revenue in cash or kind than military service. The obligations of peasants in the interior had in some cases declined to the providing of wagons and teams on campaign and the maintenance of the army commissariat. Only on the constantly endangered Lithuanian and Polish frontiers in Prussia, and the Russian and Lithuanian frontiers in Livonia, were grants in exchange for military service still numerous.

ESTONIA

Estonia comprised 8 principal tribal territories, consisting of Rävälä (Reval), Virumaa (Wierland), Harjumaa (Harrien), Järvamaa (Jerwen), Läänemaa (Lannien), Saaremaa (Oesel), Sakala (Saccalia) and Ugaunia (Ungannia); in addition there was a cluster of smaller districts stretching away to the west of Lake Peipus. Each had its own 'king', plus an upper-class made up of wealthy men and skilled artisans whom Henry of Livonia describes as *meliores*, *nobiles* or *seniores*, ie, noblemen or elders, who provided the nucleus of the local military levy (*maleva*), in which all freemen were obliged to serve. Such military service was performed almost exclusively on horseback, though in the capacity of mounted infantrymen rather than cavalry since they customarily dismounted to fight. From archaeological finds we know that their arms were basically the same as those employed by their neighbours elsewhere along the Baltic coast, ie, by the Livonians, Lithuanians, Kurs, Prussians and Wends — comprising long swords (measuring 37½"-41" overall), long lances with decorated, socketed blades, throwing spears, axes, knives, bows, slings and shields (apparently rectangular or almond-shaped rather than round since few bosses have been found). Most commonly they were armed with a lance, several throwing spears and a sword and/or axe and knife, but for protection generally wore at most a helmet; Henry of Livonia states that the Estonians were 'not accustomed to use armour as much as other nations', and they suffered accordingly when confronted by German crossbowmen. By 1223 some Estonians were themselves equipped with crossbows, copied or captured from the Germans and Danes, from whom the Oeselians also learnt the art of constructing stone-throwing siege-engines in 1222, by studying the petrary the Danes gave to their subjects in the fortress at Warbole. The Oeselians thereby built 17 engines for their siege of the principal Danish fortress on Oesel. Other engines and crossbows were provided by the Russian mercenaries introduced into the Estonian forts at Dorpat (200 men) and Fellin, who had captured many from the Sword Brethren and constructed others themselves.

The strength of Estonian field-armies raised by the maleva levy varied from a few hundred to several thousand. We are told by Henry of Livonia that in 1211 'all of the elders of Oesel, Rotalia and all of Estonia' fielded 'many thousands of cavalry and several thousand men who came by ship' for a campaign into Livonia, and in 1212 as many as 2,000 Estonians were killed and 2,000 horses captured at the Battle of Toreida. In 1217 a maleva of 6,000 men was raised from Sakala, Lannien, Harrien, Reval and Jerwen, which lost 1,000 men and another 2,000 horses in battle with the Sword Brethren.

After the conquest of Estonia by the Germans and Danes (completed in 1227 with the subjugation of the island of Oesel), the maleva — which the Germans called the *Malawa* or *Malve* — instead provided the Sword Brethren and, later, the Teutonic Knights with troops, a practice that persisted right up to 1498. At first these served mostly on horseback as before: the treaty drawn up between the Livonian Landmeister and Oesel in 1255, for instance, stipulated that the islanders had to perform their service on ships in the summer months and on horseback in winter, and when such levy service was subsequently feudalised each 3 *unci* of land (approximately 90 acres) was expected to provide a mounted soldier. As time went by, however, it became more usual to conscript the Estonian peasantry as foot-soldiers since their economic status had steadily deteriorated. The situation was similar in the northern part of the country (Reval, Harrien, Jerwen and Wierland), which the King of Denmark had seized in 1219: in a list of

landowners drawn up in the mid-13th century only one Estonian is to be found, the rest being German colonists (chiefly of Saxon extraction) into whose hands the feudal government of the colony had been delegated by the Danish captain and bishop installed in Reval.

LITHUANIA

Though the name 'Lithuania' occurs as early as 1009, the country only achieved nationhood in the 13th century when a line of able rulers, starting with Mindaugas (d.1263), succeeded in welding together its many individual tribes. (In 1219 Mindaugas had been only one of 21 chieftains belonging to 5 princely families, but by 1236 he had increased his own lands and power to the point where he was regarded by outsiders as the country's sole ruler; he was crowned king of Lithuania in 1253.) The Lithuanians were of the same stock, spoke the same language, and followed the same pagan religion, as the Old Prussians, and were the result of a union between several smaller tribes collectively known in earlier times as the *Aukstaiciai*. In a broader sense the term Lithuanians also embraced the Samogitians, the Yatwingi (often deemed to be Old Prussians), and the Lettish, or Latvian, peoples — ie, the Semgallians, Lettigallians and Selonians. The Kurs or Curonians were also of the same stock, though they had adopted some Finnish customs. All of these peoples dressed, armed and fought in exactly the same way and followed the same pattern of military organisation as is outlined below.

In times of war each Lithuanian tribe would mobilise as an army (*karias*, Old Prussian *karya*), organised at its lowest level on a basis of family units (*gimine* or *gentis*), by calling to arms every able-bodied man, right down to the most insignificant smallholder. The military leaders of this general levy were the tribal chieftains, at first elected from each community's bravest and ablest men but by c.1200 usually hereditary; these chieftains went under various titles, most being called *rikis* (cf. Latin *rex*) or *kunigas* (from Gothic *kuningas*, 'king'), while the lesser nobility were called *bajorija* or 'boyars'. Class structure was flexible enough for any freeman (*ukininkas*) to be able to become a *bajoras* if he managed his own farm profitably enough to afford the appropriate war-harness (Lithuanian nobility being generally armoured by the 12th century), while others enriched themselves by means of loot taken in war. Each freeman was obliged to provide his own military equipment and to perform guard duty in the community's local defensive fortress, for the maintenance of which he was also responsible. These fortresses were of earth-and-timber construction like those of the Prussians and were usually built on high ground in river loops, marshland or similar defensive sites difficult of access to an enemy. Beacons existed on nearby hilltops and were lit to warn the local population of an enemy incursion, when the women, children and livestock would take refuge in the nearest fortress or else in the depths of the forests. Some of the largest fortresses were big enough to hold several thousand people.

The largest Lithuanian armies on record in this era seem to have numbered some 30,000 men — Mindaugas led this many in 1244, and his successor Treniota led the same number, organised in 3 separate divisions (which implies decimal organisation), in 1264; most of their raiding forces, however, were considerably smaller, numbering between a few hundred and, at most, a few thousand. The sources seem to imply that these raiding parties were mostly if not entirely cavalry, and probably they were composed chiefly of the princes and boyars and their retinues (which could be sizeable — Mindaugas' numbered 600 men in 1251; see also page 47). For their winter raids they were accompanied by sleds, used to transport their booty rather than any sort of baggage, with which they appear to have been unencumbered; the 'Livonian Rhymed Chronicle' makes a point of their lack of tents on campaign, observing that 'they knew how to use wood and bushes to build huts which were comfortable in warm and cold weather alike.' The Lithuanians were also capable of constructing siege-engines, stone-throwers being used against the Teutonic Knights' castle at Amboten in 1244 and that at Wehlau in 1265.

Lithuanian armies also included many Russians, mostly from subject territories but occasionally supplied by allied princes, notably those of Gerzika and Polotsk. (Though the latter city was technically ruled by the Lithuanians its people retained much of their autonomy.) Allied Livonian forces are also occasionally to be found fighting alongside the Lithuanians, as in the raiding parties that descended on Riga in 1204 and Holm in 1206, while in 1260 Mindaugas led into Livonia an army that included considerable numbers of Livonians, Samogitians and Russians.

PRUSSIA

Prussia — a land of marshes and dense forests — comprised a total of 11 distinct tribal districts (*naciones*) in this period, these being Kulmerland (Chelmno and Lubovia), Pomesania, Pogesania, Warmia (Ermland), Nattangia, Sambia (Samland), Nadrovia, Scalovia, Sudovia (Yatwingia), Galindia and Barthia (often divided into Great and Little, or *Plicka*, Barthia).* The 14th century historian of the Teutonic Knights, Fra Petrus von Dusburg, who

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*By the 15th century, when the Polish historian Dlugosz set down a list of the Old Prussian peoples, those of Kulmerland, Pomesania and Warmia had entirely disappeared. He records only the Pogesa, Nauctaga, Sama, Nadrowa, Solava, Sudova, Galinda and Barta.

provides this information, reckoned that except for Kulmerland and Galindia, which were only sparsely populated, these could each raise about 2,000 horsemen and an 'appropriate number' of infantry, though the largest two tribes, the Sambians and Sudovians, could raise considerably more — 4,000 horsemen and 40,000 infantry in the former case and 6,000 horsemen and an 'almost innumerable' quantity of infantry in the latter. Certainly the Sambians and their Samogitian allies are supposed to have fielded '40,000 shields' between them in 1252/3, and in a major defeat in 1233 the Pogesanians are claimed to have lost 5,000 men. The clans of each tribe had their own small earth-and-timber fortresses in which they could take refuge from raiders, plus a larger, central stronghold. Each clan provided its own contingent (probably at most a couple of hundred men) to a muster, and each tribe provided for its own defence, inevitably resulting in a lack of unity amongst them that the Teutonic Knights were not slow to turn to their own advantage.

The sources indicate that of the two distinct elements into which Prussian armies can be divided — the horsemen comprising the warbands of the chieftains on the one hand, and the infantry 'militia' on the other — it was only the former who showed any great enthusiasm for fighting, displaying what William Urban calls a form of 'berserk courage' (Ibrahim ibn Ya'qub in the late-10th century described how, without waiting for the aid of others, they would individually rush into battle and fight doggedly on until overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers). However, even their chieftains recognised that the ordinary tribesmen were considerably less valorous and had a tendency to melt away when confronted by superior numbers or insurmountable obstacles; before the Battle of Durben River in 1260, for instance, the commander of the Teutonic Knights' Pomesanian auxiliaries warned the brethren that his men could only be depended on in situations where they had no alternative but to fight or die. It was inevitable, therefore, that under most circumstances Prussian armies consisted principally of the nobility and their retainers.

WENDLAND

To the Scandinavians and Germans alike all the Baltic Slavs west of Prussia were *Veneti* or 'Wends', in effect comprising by this period three principal tribal unions, all pagan, which were: (1) the Obodrites and the subject but related Wagrians, organised into a state in the mid-11th century, against whom the Crusade of 1147-48 was principally directed (the Obodrite princes at that time, Niklot and Pribislav, were founders of the later Christian duchies of Mecklenburg and Brandenburg); (2) the Liutizi (or Wilzi, ie, the 'terrible' or 'wolf' people), of whom the principal tribe was that of the Rugians, or Rani, of the island of Rügen; and (3) the Pomeranians. The prince of the Pomeranians became a Christian as early as 1127, as did the Obodrites' leaders in the mid-12th century, but the conversion of their subjects took longer, and both were far from permanent. Even in the mid-13th century the dukes of Pomerania continued to frequently ally themselves with the pagan Prussians against the Teutonic Knights.

All of these peoples were organised on a similar clan basis to that of the Prussians, based on earth-and-timber fortresses governed by chieftains called voivodes who held power from the ruling prince (*knez*) and were usually his relatives. These could call on the able-bodied men of their districts for military service, and in addition maintained their own warbands of up to several hundred horsemen; that of the Obodrite prince Henry (1093-1127) included large numbers of Saxon and Danish mercenaries, also recorded being hired by the Wilzi as early as 1057 (this despite the fact that, according to the 12th century chronicler Helmold, the Danes were 'pugnacious at home, but unwarlike abroad'). Eric Christiansen writes that amongst the Rugians a slightly different system prevailed, whereby the knez 'was merely a landowner deputed to lead the troops whenever the senate decided', and that this 'senate' of elders was dominated by the high priest of the pagan sanctuary at Arkona, who himself led a warband of 300 horsemen. The horses of the warbands belonged not to the warriors themselves but were provided by the chieftains from their own stables.

In addition those chieftains who lived along the Baltic coast each owned a number of ships, and it was as sea-raiders that the Wends, particularly those of Rügen, made their greatest impact on mediaeval chroniclers. Their career of Viking-style piracy began in the 11th century after constant warfare against the Danes, Poles and Germans had destroyed the region's economy, and ironically the majority of their raids were launched against the Danish islands and the coasts of Sweden and Norway. 'Heimskringla' includes a graphic description of a raid on Konghelle (modern Gothenburg) in 1135 by Pomeranian pirates, perhaps 660-strong, under Ratibor, a pagan prince: first they landed their horsemen to ride cross-country and attack the town from the landward side, and then they sailed on into the harbour, boarding and clearing 9 merchant ships anchored there before looting the town, from whence the population had withdrawn into their castle; the Pomeranians then burnt the town, defeated a small body of local militia who rushed to the scene, and launched several determined attacks against the castle until the townspeople, having exhausted their supply of missiles, were obliged to surrender, upon which the Pomeranians killed the old and wounded and carried the rest away into captivity, burning down the church and other buildings within the castle. One of the important points to note in this description is the landing of the horsemen, for the Wends began

to take horses with them on their raids at an early date — certainly by the early-12th century (Helmold records the Rani being accompanied by horsemen on a raid of c.1111) — and they were accomplished horsemen skilled in skirmishing tactics. 'Heimskringla' says that each of the Wendish ships in the Konghelle raid carried 2 horses and 44 men, which implies that they were probably vessels of 20-benches and therefore smaller than contemporary Scandinavian warships; however, they had flatter bottoms, and therefore shallower draughts more suitable for coastal raiding. Otherwise they were similar enough to Scandinavian ships to be occasionally mistaken for them, differing only in having their masts slightly further forward.

This era of Wendish piracy continued until the second half of the 12th century, when their sea-power was seriously weakened by the loss of a raiding fleet of allegedly 1,500 ships in a storm off the Norwegian coast in 1157. Denmark took advantage of the ensuing respite to begin a prolonged offensive against the pirates' principal stronghold — the island of Rügen — which finally fell in 1168 (upon which the ruling Rugian prince, Jaromar, was christened and reinstated, but as a Danish vassal owing military service; thereafter the Rugian fleet fought alongside the Danes). The last Wendish foray into Danish waters ended in defeat off Falster in 1172, and a combined Liutizi-Pomeranian fleet under Bohuslav of Pomerania was similarly defeated when it attempted to recapture Rügen in 1184, which disaster marked the end of Baltic Slav naval supremacy.*

POLAND

Poland first became a kingdom in 1024 under Boleslav I, consisting of a large number of federated Western Slav tribes which Boleslav's dynasty, the Piasts, had succeeded in uniting during the course of the previous century. In Poland as in Russia, however, succession unfortunately followed the appanage system whereby inheritance was divisible amongst all surviving sons, which custom — coupled with a recurrent desire amongst the various tribes to regain their independence — often resulted in bloody civil wars and the disintegration of the kingdom. In fact with the single exception of Boleslav III's reign (1102-38), in the 200 years following the death of Boleslav II in 1079 the kingdom as such did not exist, being replaced instead by a plethora of duchies under members of the Piast dynasty (as many as 72 of them at one point), of which the greatest were Little Poland (at first — until 1180 — held by the senior Piast dynast), Great Poland, Silesia, Kujavia, Mazovia and Sandomir. Eventually, in the 1270s and 1280s, several Piast dukes died without male heirs, and other fragmented duchies — notably Great Poland and Mazovia — were reunited by force of arms. The title of king was finally revived by Premyslav II, duke of Great Poland, who had himself crowned in 1295, but it was not until 1320 that the Polish monarchy was re-established on a firm footing.

In the 11th century the nucleus of military organisation was the *druzhina* ('brotherhood'), originally the king's bodyguard but now an army of paid cavalrymen, stationed in various towns and fortresses during peacetime. Boleslav I's own druzhina is said to have numbered as many as 16,000 men, later increased to allegedly 20,000, but in reality it probably numbered far less, perhaps only 4-6,000 men. After the collapse of the kingdom at the end of the 11th century the retinues of the individual princes were obviously much smaller, possibly comprising only 300 men or in some cases even less. One important point regarding the druzhinas was that on campaign they were unencumbered by a baggage-train, instead carrying all that they would need on horseback, right down to a bag of tools to carry out running repairs on their armour and equipment. However, important as these mounted retainers were, Oman's statements that Polish armies had 'no infantry' and that 'cavalry was the only arm' are without foundation. Except for the *druzynnik* (ie, members of the druzhinas) all freemen fought as infantry, within units established on a regional basis under officers called *wlodykas* or 'elders', usually the village headmen, who sometimes fought mounted. General organisation of both druzynnik and infantry was decimal with units of 10, 100 and 1,000, the last being referred to by the Ottonian term *legio* until c.1100 (see *Armies of the Dark Ages*). Thereafter the standard unit was that of 100 men, the *rota*, though confusingly this term could also be applied to larger units of up to about 800 men comprising several 100-man rotas.

By the early-12th century things had begun to change, principally due to the decline and disappearance of the druzhina system. This was a direct result of constant internal strife within Poland as contending princes — anxious to maintain ever-larger bodies of regular troops but unable to pay them — instead started to grant tax-exemptions and estates to the members of their druzhinas, who in exchange for such favours served with as many men as the estates they now held could muster. To all intents and purposes this was feudalism, and by the 13th century its

*It is apparent from the sources that the Kurs and Estonians too, particularly those from the island of Oesel, were inclined to indulge in naval forays, and continued to do so well into the 13th century. Describing one of their raids in 1203, Henry of Livonia says that Estonian ships were crewed by 30 men each, so they were clearly smaller than Wendish vessels, probably being 12- or 15-benchers. Following a defeat at the hands of the Kurs in Riga Bay in 1210 the Sword Brethren abandoned the use of similar small ships and therafter fought only in their large cogs, which gave them the advantage of height over the Kur and Estonian vessels. Oesel was eventually conquered by the Germans in 1227, while Kurland was overrun in 1231 but not finally conquered until 1267.

evolution followed much the same course as in Western Europe, with the one important exception that all of the Polish gentry (*szlachta*) were theoretically of equal rank. The new nobility or knighthood thus created served as heavy cavalrymen in wartime, each knight (called in Poland a *rycerz*, from the German Ritter) normally being accompanied by a less-heavily equipped companion, often a relative, who can best be described as an esquire. He was also generally accompanied by the elders of his estate likewise serving as cavalry but with lighter armour, these having evolved into lesser nobility comparable to feudal sergeants. These constituted the knight's retinue, their numbers depending on his wealth and rank. Supporting infantry were raised from the towns and villages by levying one man — or sometimes more — out of every 10, each man being equipped at the expense of his village. In emergencies every able-bodied freeman could still be called out, these constituting the *pospolite ruszenie*.

Mercenaries

Though these were not yet extensively employed in Poland on a freelance basis, princes and dukes were often supplied with auxiliary troops by foreign allies, particularly Germans, Bohemians and Hungarians. Such forces generally comprised small armies of all arms, paid for by trade concessions and grants of extensive tracts of tax-free land suitable for settlement. German infiltration and colonisation of this type was considerable throughout the 12th and 13th centuries, German merchants and artisans becoming so important to the Polish economy that in the late-13th century they were often granted exemption even from military service in exchange for settling. In the second half of the same century, following the Mongol invasions and the collapse of Kievan Russia, many impoverished or footloose Russian nobles were also employed in northern and eastern Poland, though not in particularly large numbers. They too were paid with grants of land and were soon absorbed into the native population. In addition some Lithuanians were employed by the 13th century, mainly as light cavalry but also, to a considerably lesser extent, as infantry.

HUNGARY

The final transformation of the once-nomadic Magyars into the mediaeval kingdom of Hungary was achieved by Stephen I (997-1038), who at the beginning of the 11th century broke the power of the Kavars, until that time the nucleus of Magyar military strength. During his reign the old tribal clans disappeared, though their members continued to owe military service and their chieftains were still recognised as a warrior aristocracy. But alongside these traditional leaders there were now new noblemen called *ispáns* (counts), chief of whom was the *Nádorispán* or count-palatine who, as the king's military deputy, performed the functions of Constable. As well as maintaining their own military retinues, each ispán administered a specific district, leading the provinical levy of freemen in wartime. In addition there was a Roumanian voivode in Transylvania and Slavic *báns* (viceroys) in Croatia (see below), Sclavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, which were all ex-Byzantine provinces annexed as defensive marches by the Hungarians under Bela III (1173-96).

However, a lack of national identity was apparent in most Hungarian armies of this period, large numbers of foreigners being employed throughout. Even as early as Stephen I's reign considerable use had been made of Bavarian mercenary knights, while his successor, the unpopular Venetian Peter Orseolo (1038-41 and 1046-47), relied heavily on German and Italian mercenaries to protect himself against the Hungarian nobility. Stephen II (1116-31) had at least 700 Frankish knights in his personal retinue, and by the end of the 12th century such troops were a privileged and highly important element of the Hungarian army, especially after the reign of Geza II (1141-62) who, to combat Byzantine incursions, from c.1143 began the introduction into the eastern part of the kingdom of large numbers of Western European mercenaries, principally Germans, Italians and Flemings but also including Frenchmen, Spaniards and even English knights. Collectively these were usually referred to as 'Saxons', and their appointed leader was called the Saxon Count. Whilst these westerners gradually became 'Magyarised' and were absorbed by the native Hungarian nobility, they exerted a considerable influence on the old tribal upper-class and were indirectly responsible for the introduction of feudalism into Hungary, supplying as they did the backbone of the kingdom's heavy cavalry. (A royal decree of 1224, confirming the privileged status of the 'Saxons', states that they were to provide 500 knights for campaigns within the kingdom and 100 — or 50 if the king himself did not lead the army — for expeditions beyond the frontier.) By contrast with the 'Saxons' the personal contingents of the Hungarian nobility were not always reliable, so that after the reign of Coloman (1095-1116) the core of the royal host became increasingly made up of servientes from the royal familia (in many ways similar to the German ministeriales); these and the *jobagiones* — lower-class soldiers serving in the royal fortresses — soon evolved into a lesser nobility, transforming the estates they administered into personal property. This heavy cavalry element of the army became particularly important under Bela IV (1235-70) after the Mongol attacks of the mid-13th century. Feudal service was due for the usual 40-day period and was performed at the vassal's own expense until a Golden Bull of 1222 decreed that with the exception of the counts, and knights receiving pay, such service could only be expected within the boundaries of Hungary itself, and only for 15 days. Service beyond the frontier was thereafter not obligatory and had to be paid for if required.

Other westerners were often employed on a temporary basis as mercenaries, but most auxiliary troops were actually of Asiatic origin. Pechenegs, for instance, were to be found in Hungarian armies from 1051 onwards and were particularly favoured by Stephen II, though they suffered some persecution after his death. The Byzantine chronicler Cinnamus records Pechenegs in a Hungarian army as late as 1150, and they still feature on occasion even in the early-13th century (they appear to be mentioned in a document of 1224, for example): however, by this time they had probably been largely absorbed by the Cumans (for whom see below). The Hungarians referred to them as *Bisseni* or *Bessi*, which seems to have given rise to the district called Bessarabia, where most were probably settled, while their leader went under the title of *Comes Bissenorum*, the Pecheneg Count. Military service was in exchange for certain privileges.

The Szeklers or Siculi mentioned in *Armies of the Dark Ages* also survived into this era and continued to guard the eastern frontiers of the kingdom under their own leader, the *Comes Siculorum* or Szekler Count; for the origin of their name see *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 2*. As a military element of considerable importance they lasted well beyond the end of this period, receiving many privileges comparable to those of the Saxons.

The most important of the country's Asiatic auxiliaries, however, were the Cumans (called by the Hungarians *Kunoks* or *Kuns*). The first of them were prisoners-of-war settled as frontier soldiers in 1070, and again in 1090, in relatively small numbers. Though shown royal favour as early as Stephen II's reign they only became important after 1239, when some 40,000 (others say 200,000) under Khan Kötöny (alternatively rendered as Kuthen, Khotian or Khotiak) were settled in Hungarian territory by Bela IV following their defeat by the Mongols that year at the mouth of the Volga. Every free and able-bodied member of their community therafter performed military service for the king when called upon. However, in 1241, in a wave of 'anti-nomad' hysteria in the face of the coming Mongol attack, Kötöny was accused of treason and killed and large numbers of Cumans were ruthlessly purged, the rest fleeing to Bulgaria. Later they were invited back and together with a smaller tribe, the Jazyges, settled on vacant land on the banks of the River Tisza and had their privileges reaffirmed. Thereafter they remained a major element in the Hungarian army and were shown great favour by several kings, notably Ladislas IV (1272-90) who was himself half-Cuman and depended on their support against the native baronial faction, from whom he thereby earnt the nickname of 'The Cuman'. Although they obviously did much to encourage a revival of the Turkic character of Hungarian militarism the Hungarians themselves greatly resented their presence, attempting to crush them again in 1280 at the Battle of Hódtó. Only late in the 13th century did the Cumans undertake to stop killing Christian Hungarians, to accept Christianity and to abandon their tents in favour of 'fixed abodes', all this in exchange for their right to retain their liberties and many of their traditional customs. Thenceforward they were gradually assimilated into the native population during the 14th-15th centuries, though their language did not actually die out until as late as the mid-18th century.

Considerably earlier than the arrival of these Cuman refugees many Khazars had also fled to Hungary (in the late-10th century). They are especially noteworthy since by the 14th century their name had possibly evolved, via the Byzantine *chosarios* and Serbo-Croat *husar*, into the word 'hussar' later applied to the characteristic Hungarian light cavalryman (but see *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 2*, page 146). It is clear from Cinnamus' description of them as Jewish that the *Chalisioi* recorded in the Hungarian army that fought against the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I in 1150, and mentioned in Hungarian sources under the name *Caliz*, were descendants of these same Khazars.*

Vlachs, Serbs, Croats, Russians and even Mongols (in 1285) were also to be found in Hungarian armies. The Croats were particularly highly regarded, being famous for their skilful use of axes in close fighting — and also as missile weapons — since at least the 10th century; indeed, in 1242 a Croat army including a large number of axemen is said to have successfully ambushed a Mongol horde as it emerged from a mountain pass and, taking advantage of the cramped space which prevented the Mongols from deploying to utilise their normal *tulughma* tactics, rapidly closed with them and cut them to pieces in close combat. As well as axes Croat infantry were equipped with spears, swords, shields and, to a lesser extent, bows, but normally they wore no armour; those that did were doubtless the lesser nobility, who apparently formed the backbone of Croat armies during the period of the country's existence as an independent kingdom (910-1089; Byzantine suzerainty was thrown off in 1076). Cavalry were provided by the nobility and their retainers, for whom military service had become generally obligatory by the 11th century. Their 10th-11th century decimal organisation, based on the *stotnik* of 100 men under a *satnik*, mustered on a clan or

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*Other remnants of the once-great Khazar nation became subject to the Russians, a Khazar general being recorded as one of the leaders of an army sent against the Cumans by the Prince of Kiev in 1106, Khazars also being recorded accompanying a Russian raid into Shirwan in Persia in the second half of the 12th century, when Khakani refers to them as 'Darband Khazars'. It seems likely that these were the ancestors of most Eastern European Jews. (See *The Thirteenth Tribe: The Khazar Empire and its Heritage* by Arthur Koestler, 1976.)

village basis, was doubtless maintained under their new Hungarian masters in the 12th-13th centuries. Prior to 1089 Croat armies were usually led by the king in person, but thereafter he was replaced by an Hungarian bán.

SERBIA

Although independence was briefly achieved in the 11th century, technically the Serbs remained part of the Byzantine Empire until the late-12th century, being obliged to supply 300 cavalry to Byzantine armies campaigning in the East, which obligation was increased in 1150 to 500 for the Eastern and as many as 2,000 for the European theatre of war. Serbian troops served in Byzantine armies fighting against the Normans at Durazzo in 1081, for instance, and against the Hungarians at Semlin in 1167 and the Seljuks at Myriokephalon in 1176. Byzantine overlordship was only finally thrown off c.1180 by Stephen Nemanja, the *velko-zupan*, or grand zupan, of Rascia. It was under his leadership that Serbia's numerous independent clan districts (*zupy*, each under its own elected chieftain, or *zupan*) were first combined into an organised state. Thereafter the country was instead divided up into provinces called *drzhava* ('holdings'), the term zupa being applied instead to their subdivisions. Each province was governed by a *knez* or prince, who was in addition its military commander, while the subdivisions were still controlled by zupans. (The rank of knez tended to be a state appointment and was non-hereditary, whereas zupan had by now become an hereditary rank and title.) After the decline of Bulgaria following Ivan Assen II's death (1241), and the collapse soon after of the Latin Empire of Romania (1261), Serbia became the most important state in the Balkan peninsula.

Although remaining culturally within the Byzantine sphere of influence, frequent alliance with Hungary (which often provided contingents of troops for service against the Byzantines), and the crowning in 1217 of Nemanja's successor Stephen II (1196-1228) as king by a papal legate, resulted in the introduction of much Western influence too, resulting in turn in an interesting mixture of styles of military equipment, Italian and Hungarian fashions predominating in the west of the country and Byzantine in the south. By the second half of the 14th century the former had begun to prevail, doubtless as a result of the practice begun in the early part of that century of employing large numbers of Western European mercenaries, financed by royal control of Serbia's rich silver mines. During the period covered by this book, however, it was Byzantine fashions that still prevailed.

Serbian armies were feudal in nature, though the country's system of military landholding was inherited from the Byzantine *pronoia* rather than the Western European fief. The pronoia itself — hereditary by some accounts, but non-hereditary according to others — is only first recorded under that name in Serbian sources in 1299 (they spell it *pronija* or *pronya* and call its holder a *pronijar*), but even as early as Stephen Nemanja's time military service was required from every able-bodied man holding another sort of land grant, of hereditary freehold land, called a *bashtina*, the holder being called either a *bashtinik* or, in the case of smaller holdings, a *voynuk*. Only monastic tenants were exempted from such field service, in exchange for which they performed part-time garrrison duties in local fortresses and fortified monasteries. The building and maintenance of such fortresses, and the maintenance of their permanent garrisons, was the responsibility of the population of each zupa, who were also required to guard their own frontier; townsmen were similarly responsible for defending the walls of their own town fortress (*grad*). The holders of bashtinas and pronijars alike constituted the nobility (the *vlastela*, or 'holders of power'*), though many of the former, called *vlastelicici* or 'very small nobles', were in effect only upper-class peasants. The nobility provided the nucleus of every Serbian army, serving as heavy cavalry (the pronijars and bashtiniks) and armoured infantry (the vlastelicici, or voynuks), and a *vlastelin* who failed to answer a summons ran the risk of having all his property confiscated. With just a few exceptions, such military service was a personal obligation and did not call for the service of a nobleman's retainers in addition, but inevitably they were normally accompanied by their retinues regardless, usually comprising as many men as could be spared from working their lands. These were maintained at the vlastelin's own expense (they were paid by the crown only when serving beyond the frontier). In addition there was the provincial *vojske i vojvodstva* ('troops and their leaders'), equivalent of the Western European arrière-ban, which in times of danger called for the military service of all the able-bodied freemen of a country or province, nobility and peasants alike.

From as early as the 11th century onwards the commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces was the grand zupan, later the king (*kral*), in whose absence (which was rare anyway) a *veliki vojvoda* or 'high military chief', equivalent to the Byzantine Grand Domestic, was appointed (though the sources indicate that the other vlastela were usually unwilling to bow to the authority of such a commander). However, up until the 14th century the king could only summon an army with the approval of the *Sabor* or *Zbor* (the National Assembly of all the country's

*In the first half of the 13th century, when Bulgaria was the predominant military power in the Balkans and Serbia was within its sphere of influence, the term *boyarin* also occurs.

chieftains and district governors), which therefore limited his military power. The solution to this particular problem was the employment by the crown of large numbers of foreign mercenaries, in this particular period notably Hungarians and Cumans but later predominantly Western Europeans. Byzantine deserters were also employed, usually being utilised subsequently against their own countrymen.

BULGARIA

Occupied by the Byzantines as far back as 1018, Bulgaria only regained its independence in 1185 with the foundation of the 'Bulgarian Kingdom of Trnovo' (today more usually referred to as the Second Bulgarian Empire). This was in effect the result of a Bulgaro-Vlach-Cuman alliance, in which the Vlach (ie, Wallachian) element predominated under the leadership of three brothers, Peter (or Kalopeter, 'tsar of the Vlachs and the most part of the Bulgarians' 1185-96), Assen (d.1196) and Kalojan (or Ioannitsa, tsar 1197-1207) who styled himself *Romaioktonos*, 'Slayer of Romans', in tardy reply to the Byzantine Emperor Basil II's nickname *Bulgaroktonos*, 'Slayer of Bulgarians', adopted in 1014. The origins of this alliance date back to at least the late-11th century, when Anna Comnena describes the Vlachs as leading nomadic lives among the Bulgars and guiding the Cumans through Balkan mountain passes to fight against the Byzantines. During the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade Villehardouin and Robert de Clari repeatedly refer to Bulgarian armies by such expressions as 'a great host of Cumans, Greeks and Vlacho-Bulgarians', the Greek element — clearly several thousands strong — being cavalry and spear-armed infantry provided by those cities of Thrace and Macedonia reconquered at that time from the Latin Empire of Romania. After Kalojan the Bulgarian Empire's only other notable ruler was Ivan Assen II (1218-41), who achieved a signal victory over the Byzantines of Epiros at Klokotnitsa in 1230, capturing the Despot, and proclaiming himself to be lord of all the lands between Adrianople and Durazzo in Albania, declaring that even the Latin Empire of Romania was under his sway: 'only thanks to me do they survive.' After his death, however, the Bulgarian Empire began a slow decline that finally ended in 500 years of Turkish occupation, beginning in 1396. (See also *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 2.*)

Staggeringly little information is available, even in Bulgaria, on the country's military organisation during the era of the Second Bulgarian Empire, ie, the 13th-14th centuries. It is known that a form of feudalism existed whereby landholding boyars personally led levies raised from their estates in addition to their personal retinues, but details are lacking. It seems likely, however, that Byzantine influence prevailed, as is apparent from the adoption of such titles as *duka* (duke), *comes* (count), *katepan* (regional military commander), *alagator* (squadron commander) and *kastrophylax* (castellan), amongst the Bulgarian military hierarchy, the last being an officer installed as commander of a conquered fortress. According to Robert de Clari, Kalojan claimed he could raise as many as 100,000 men, of whom a considerable proportion would have been horsemen — 40,000 cavalry, for instance, are recorded at the siege of Demotica in 1206 — and of these a large percentage was doubtless supplied by the Cumans since the army was accompanied in addition by 3,000 wagons: as many as 14,000 Cumans were present in the Bulgarian army that fought at Adrianople in 1205. In 1189 Tsar Peter even offered Emperor Frederick Barbarossa the services of 40,000 'Vlach and Cuman archers', though it is unclear whether these were horse or foot; probably they included both.

Auxiliaries were provided by Russians, Hungarians, Franks who had left the employ of the poverty-stricken Latin Emperor of Romania because they were underpaid, and Mongols (particularly in the reign of the ineffective Constantine Assen, 1257-77, who relied on the support of the Golden Horde to maintain himself in power). Not all of the Hungarian troops in Bulgarian armies were mercenaries; since a number of boyars in the vicinity of Vidin in Western Bulgaria, under Yakov Svetoslav, were vassals of the Hungarian crown (Vidin having been captured by Stephen V of Hungary in 1261), the king sometimes provided contingents of troops to assist them against the Byzantines, the last such occasion on record being in 1263. (The very last Byzantine army to succeed in penetrating north of the Balkan mountains did so in 1279.) After King Stephen V's death in 1272 Vidin became an autonomous and virtually independent despotate, first under Svetoslav and subsequently under Shishman, founder of Bulgaria's last mediaeval royal dynasty.

KIEVAN RUSSIA

During this period of history Russia was rarely a unified whole, consisting instead of a large number of independent and mutually hostile principalities. The greatest of these were Kiev, Suzdal, Vladimir, Smolensk, Cherginov, Polotsk, Galicia, Volhynia, and the city-state of Novgorod, with Kiev exercising a nominal seniority over the others until its sack by the Mongols under Batu in 1240. This situation resulted from the fact that in Russia lands were at first inherited by an inherently unworkable rota system and then later by the equally unworkable appanage system, whereby on his death a prince's lands were divided amongst all his sons. Inevitably such a system of subdivision amongst heirs led to a plethora of petty states, ever-decreasing in size with each generation so that on the whole only

by fratricidal civil war could principalities of any worthwhile size be maintained; indeed, nearly half of the period between 1054 and the Mongol invasion of 1223 was spent in civil war. These petty appanage states were referred to as *udely* or 'portions'. Small as some of them were, each of their armies invariably continued to consist of the same three major elements as are described in *Armies of the Dark Ages*, these being the *druzhina*, the *polk*, and mercenaries.

The Druzhina

As in Poland, the druzhina was the personal warrior retinue of a prince, similar in concept to the old Scandinavian *hird*; it has been claculated by modern Russian historians that by the late-12th century there were probably about 100 princes maintaining worthwhile retinues of this sort. As early as the 10th century some of the most powerful druzhina members also had such retinues of their own, which they led in wartime under their prince's banner, and by the close of the Kievan era, with so many minor 'principalities' in existence — some comprising no more than a village and a few acres of land — the retinues of many of the greater nobles (called *boyars* by the 11th century) were probably larger than those of some petty princes. Church dignitaries too often maintained their own substantial retinues. In exchange for their service members of the druzhinas were granted estates called *pomestiia* free of all obligations. This meant that if such a warrior should wish to leave the service of his prince or boyar he did not lose his land as a consequence, it becoming instead part of the territory of whichever new prince or lord to whom he transferred his allegiance. These estates were therefore allodial rather than feudal.

The druzhina was divided into senior and junior retainers, the senior echelon comprising the boyars and state officers (usually one and the same). The juniors, comprising the *grid*, could be promoted to senior grade either when they had established their own retinues with which to serve the prince, or upon coming of age. However, by the second half of the 12th century the boyars, their power steadily growing, made personal appearances in the druzhina less and less often so that the princes instead came to rely more and more on those retainers who had in the past constituted the grid.

The Polk

The polk was a city militia supplied by a levy of every able-bodied freeman. It could only be called out by the *Veche* or city council, over which the prince had little or no authority, so that sometimes it failed to muster when needed or else disbanded before a campaign was complete. Politically as well as militarily each city constituted a *tisiach* or 1,000-strong regiment under the command of an elected officer called a *tysiatsky* or 'commander of 1,000'. This was divided into *sotnias* ('hundreds') under a *sotsky* for each ward of the city, which were in turn subdivided into *ulitzi* or 'streets' each under an *ulitsky*, probably the same as the *desiatniky*, 'commander of 10'. However, since by the 12th century the largest of the cities could each raise militias of 3-5,000 men (including the contingents of surrounding districts and probably smaller dependent towns), the tisiach must be assumed to be an elite unit, but the balance of the levy was organised on the same decimal basis. In addition the *smerdy*, ie, land-holding upper-class peasants of the surrounding rural districts, were also called up to supplement the limited manpower of the cities, particularly in Novgorod, though they were poorly equipped, inexperienced and generally of low quality ('simple villagers, unaccustomed to battle' is how one prince described them in 1216); often, however, the rural districts supplied only horses and provisions, the towns and cities supplying the men. Militia service was performed principally on foot. However, most cities also financed very small detachments of cavalry under *bagaturs* (freelance professional soldiers of noble descent), usually comprising upper-class peasants and some impoverished boyars. They were employed mainly in the role of scouts.

The militias of the principality of Vladimir and its successors were the greatest in Russia during this period, with more towns and larger populations. The republican city of Novgorod, on the other hand, probably had the smallest pro-rata militia potential, and it was probably to help offset this that the Veche there appears to have maintained its own druzhina, the *gridba*.

Mercenaries

Throughout this era considerable use was made of Turkic auxiliaries, often referred to by the Russians as *svoi poganye*, 'our own pagans', so as to differentiate them from the 'Wild' Turks of the steppes (though these too could be, and often were, employed during Russia's endemic civil wars). These nomad mercenaries are also often referred to as Kazzaks or Kazaks, plausibly the same name as was applied to the later Cossacks; it loosely translates as 'nomad vagabond' or 'freebooter'. It has also been suggested that the term derives ultimately from 'Khazar'.

Vladimir Monomakh, Prince of Kiev 1113-25, was the first to hire large numbers of Turks since his grandfather St Vladimir's day (973-1015), employing them extensively against the Cumans (who were called *Polovtsy* by the Russians) in the late-11th century when he was prince of Pereyaslavl. These seem to have been mainly Torks, Pechenegs and Berendei (*Brodniki*), many of whom were permanently settled in South Russia, particularly in

Pereyaslavl and Cherginov. Following Vladimir's victories over the Cumans in the first quarter of the 12th century most of the remaining Tork and Pecheneg tribes acknowledged the suzerainty of Kiev. (The Pechenegs are sometimes referred to in 12th and 13th century Russian sources as Kibitki, literally 'heavy chariots', a reference to their characteristic wagons — see *Armies of the Dark Ages.*) We also hear of Kaypichi, Kovuye and Turpeye tribesmen, who collectively became the *Chernyeklobuki* (in Turkish *Karakalpaks*, or 'Black Caps', first recorded in 1146), settled as frontier guards along the greater part of Kiev's eastern frontier. The character of such Turkic allies inevitably underwent gradual change as they became more settled, inter-married and were supplemented by Russians, until eventually many became absorbed into the indigenous Russian population. Such, at least, appears to have been the fate of the 'Irregulars' introduced into Suzdal in the mid-12th century by Yuri Dolgoruki.

Some Cumans, though at first probably not many, were also allied to and settled in Russia, and it was the Cumans who supplied the bulk of Kiev's Turkic mercenaries at the time of the first Mongol attack in 1223, though these were 'Wild' Turks rather than settled allies. The Cumans and Karakalpaks alike were smashed along with the Russians in the Mongol invasions (though interestingly as late as 1325 there is record of a Cuman tribe called by the name Black Caps. The Pechenegs similarly make their final appearance in history in the 13th century as a minor Cuman horde.) The Cumans, in fact, were so heavily defeated in the invasion of 1223 that their control of the South Russian steppes was brought to an abrupt and bloody end; their demise as a major Central Asian power was underlined by a further — and final — defeat at the hands of the Mongols in 1239.

In addition to Turks we also read of Hungarian, Polish and German troops employed by or allied to various principalities. From the mid-12th century some cities also began to employ Lithuanian tribesmen under their own boyars, usually in bands of some 3-800 men at a time, though sometimes two or three boyars would join together and hire themselves out as a larger force of up to 2,000 men.

Post-conquest changes

After the Mongol conquest of 1238-40, during which nearly half the cities of Russia were destroyed, the term druzhina gradually disappeared. It was replaced by the *dvor* or 'court', a retinue of similar composition but now purely military and less noble, apparently based on the Mongol *ordu* or 'camp' (which gave rise to our word 'horde'). It consisted still of two major elements, the *slugi volnye* ('free retainers') and the *slugi pod dvorskim* ('retainers under the steward'), these latter being men serving for a specified period mutually agreed upon as a condition of employment. None of these retainers were as free to change allegiance as their druzhina predecessors had been. The slugi volnye also included the *Deti Boyarskie*, the 'Boyar Sons', initially impoverished boyars and sons of senior boyars but later extended to cover the lesser retainers in general. Organisation appears to have been decimal as in the druzhina. The greater boyars still maintained their own retinues (likewise called dvors), with which they served the prince in wartime. Since the Mongols destroyed nearly half the cities of Kievan Russia it is hardly surprising to find that the use of the city militias also declined after the conquest, and when they were revived in the early-14th century they were considerably more comprehensive than had been the polk levies of the Kievan era.

Much of South Russia, however, was now under direct Mongol rule, though in the north-east power was left in the hands of Russian 'Grand Dukes' (such as Alexander Nevski) under Mongol patents. The conquered territories were divided up on a decimal basis into military districts called *tumans*, subject levies being organised in Mongol-style units of 10,000, 1,000, 100 and 10 men, and Mongol occupation troops were stationed in various camps. John de Plano Carpini, travelling through Russia only a few years after the conquest, records that the Mongol '*Dux*' responsible for the frontier between the conquered lands and the west was based at Kurencha, somewhere near Kanev on the River Dnieper, commanding apparently as many as 60,000 Mongol troops in all. Inevitably, Mongol presence on such a grand scale had a noticeable influence on Russian organisation and equipment, and as early as 1246 we find the principality of Galicia reorganising its army along purely Mongol lines.

TACTICS

The principal characteristic of European tactics in this era was undoubtedly the charge of the mailed horseman. Armoured from head to toe by the mid- to late-12th century, and mounted on a large and powerful horse which by the 13th century was often similarly armoured, the feudal man-at-arms represented the 'tank' of mediaeval warfare, the very essence of what has been graphically described as 'mounted shock combat'. These men-at-arms charged as a close-packed mass, each with his lance — the knight's main offensive weapon — couched securely underarm so that it had the full weight of both horse and rider behind it. (It is worth noting, however, that the lance was still occasionally used overarm as a thrusting weapon — especially in Spain — sometimes even being wielded 2-handed like the old kontos even in the 13th century, as is depicted, for instance, in an illumination in the 'Maciejowski

Bible'.) Once the charging men-at-arms had made contact with the enemy, and assuming that neither side gave way on impact, the lance was discarded and hand-weapons were brought into play as the whole tangled mass degenerated into a huge, confused melee. Favourite hand-weapons were the sword and mace, though axes of various shapes and sizes could also be found in use. The shorter swords of France and Italy were undoubtedly more effective in cramped, hand-to-hand combat than were the longer, slashing weapons favoured in Germany in particular and, to a lesser extent, in England and Normandy; certainly the French victory over the heavily-armoured German mercenaries at Benevento in 1266 was due largely to their shorter swords. In the 13th century the dagger became popular in close combat for the same reason; it can be seen, held point downwards as a stabbing weapon, in many contemporary ms. illustrations.

The cavalry were usually arrayed in very close order so that their horses were almost touching; so close, in fact, that one *chanson* observes how 'the wind could not blow between their lances.' They were generally drawn up in 3 *acies* or divisions, often described as *batailles* or 'battles' in mediaeval sources. Each of these in turn generally included several individual feudal contingents or mercenary companies. They presumably drew up several ranks deep, though contemporary sources provide very little information on this point; 3-5 ranks seems a probable norm, though undoubtedly knights at least sometimes drew up in a single line only one rank deep because their pride would not permit that any man should go in front of them! Mounted sergeants were usually intermixed with the knights, though it was not uncommon to find them forming the front rank, presumably to soften up the enemy prior to the decisive charge of the knights which, after all, could only usually be launched once (though we do hear on occasion of cavalry rallying and returning for second and third charges against a stubborn — and invariably immobile — foe). Sergeants formed the first line of the French army at Benevento in 1266, for example.

The cavalry would advance at a slow trot, only gathering momentum to a full gallop over the last 75-100 yards when the order '*Pongniés*!' ('Spur!') was given. This minimised their chances of losing formation and spreading out, which would have considerably weakened the effect of their impact, which was far more destructive if they held together as a single, dense, armoured mass. Incidentally, a later source indicates that a line of cavalry charged at a slight angle with the right usually leading, so that it inflicted a series of impacts on the enemy. This must have assisted in the breaking up of the enemy line into a number of isolated, disordered bodies, which was one of the principal objectives of the cavalry charge (which is why most contemporary accounts of battles describe them in terms of collections of individual combats between groups of knights). Infantry in particular stood little chance once disarrayed thus. The feigned flight was another means of disarraying an enemy and was successfully employed at Cassel (1071) and Thielt (1128), and in the Crusade battles of Juniya (1100), Artah (1105) and Ascalon (1125); however, it was rarely employed in Western Europe after the 11th century.

On the march the army's 3 divisions or battles formed the vanguard, main body and rearguard. On the battlefield they could be marshalled in a variety of formations, choice of which depended principally on the lie of the land and the enemy's own dispositions. The main formations were *en haye* (in line, or in successive lines), *en échelon* (in echelon, with one flank advanced — usually the left — and the other refused) and column. Alternatively 2 divisions could be formed en haye with the third in reserve or concealed on one flank. In fact the variations were fairly endless, since 3 divisions, though the most common, was by no means the maximum number that could be found in a mediaeval army. Another division might be held in reserve, or detachments might be positioned far out on the flanks, both to protect them and to turn the enemy line. Reserves, in fact, were normal practice throughout this era and more often than not were led by the army commander or else one of his ablest lieutenants. The use of concealed flank detachments was not uncommon (as at Tinchebrai in 1106 and Tagliacozzo in 1268). Of the principal battle-arrays, column was undoubtedly the most risky, since if the foremost division was driven back it could disorder, or even put to flight, those behind it, as happened to the Lombard cavalry at Legnano in 1176 and to Robert of Capua's divisions at Nocera in 1132. Conversely, it enabled the support divisions to reinforce the first, as at Benevento, and facilitated the delivery of a series of successive blows against one particular section of the enemy's line. Unlike the line or echelon formations, however, its narrow front meant that it was particularly susceptible to outflanking movements (witness Evesham in 1265). Most armies, in fact, appear to have drawn up — and charged — in line or successive lines, often preceded by infantry.

One other formation, that appears to have been employed chiefly in Northern and North-Eastern Europe, was the wedge, called a 'pig-snout' or simply a 'pig' by the Russians (cf. the old Scandinavian *svynfylking* or 'swine-formation'). It usually comprised both infantry and cavalry, the latter constituting the 'snout' with the infantry and/or light cavalry behind them. It was this formation that was used by the Teutonic Knights on Lake Peipus in 1242, and possibly was also used by the German mercenaries at Benevento. Infantry too could use the wedge formation: Alfonso X of Castile, for instance, recommends it for infantry in his 'Siete Partidas' of 1260, while Helmold records 3,000 Obodrite and Wilzi raiders using it in a raid of 1147. The Flemings too used the wedge array, as in 1303, calling it a 'shield formation' (from its shape).

The standard role of infantry in this period was of an almost entirely defensive nature, an attitude which remained prevalent until the beginning of the 14th century. They were either assigned to the cavalry units or organised separately, usually as close-order phalanxes. They could be drawn up before, behind, between or on the flanks of the cavalry depending on circumstances. They might even, very occasionally, be combined with the cavalry in the same line as, for example, were the English archers at the Battle of the Standard in 1138 and the crossbowmen recorded by Trivet at Maes Moydog in 1295. At Benevento 2 infantrymen accompanied each French horseman to finish off unhorsed or wounded Sicilian men-at-arms. Modern-day statements about 'poorly armed infantry with no internal or tactical organisation' appear to be largely unjustified; many foot-soldiers were provided by retainers, civic militias and mercenaries, all of them well-armed if not always actually armoured, though inevitably the infantry element of most mediaeval armies could include poorly-equipped peasant levies too, who were of little practical use on the battlefield even though they were essential for siege-work. It is also true that most lacked sufficient drilling, though we do read on occasion of militia infantry undergoing training of some kind. To strengthen the infantry and boost their morale many commanders chose to dismount at least a percentage of their knights, particularly in the late-11th and 12th centuries; this is especially true of English, Norman and German armies. Prior to the 13th century, in fact, German knights are recorded in a number of contemporary sources as better at fighting on foot than on horse. The 12th century Byzantine chronicler Cinnamus records them as being at their best fighting on foot with the sword, comparing them to the French who were better on horseback with the lance. William of Apulia, describing Swabian knights fighting on foot at Civitate in 1053, says they were 'better with the sword than the lance since they are incapable of handling their horses or thrusting vigorously [with the lance]. But they excel with the sword.' At Damascus in the Second Crusade we even find German knights dismounting to charge, William of Tyre telling us that this 'was the custom of the Germans when circumstances obliged them to use it.' Conversely, we are told that French knights were of little value on foot, while a source of c.1120 describes Breton knights as 7 times more effective mounted than they were when dismounted.

A body of spear-armed infantry with its flanks secured by natural obstacles was hard to break if it stood firm, though paradoxically this was also its principal weakness since it meant that the formation was consequently unable to manoeuvre in the face of enemy cavalry. Obviously if it lacked cavalry support of its own it could not stand for long anyway, particularly if 'firearm' infantry were thrown against it, as the Welsh and Scots learned to their misfortune at Orewin Bridge and Falkirk; and even with cavalry support the last of the Count of Boulogne's Brabançon infantry at Bouvines stood little chance in the face of a concerted assault from all sides by 3,000 French troops. In all the latter instances, in fact, the spear-armed infantry were formed in circles (the Scottish *schiltron* formation) 2 or 3 ranks deep and 'bristling with long spears', whereas under normal circumstances Flemish spearmen at least drew up in phalanx formation. A wagon-laager, to protect the army's baggage and wounded, might be set up behind the infantry, as is recorded being done by the French at Rheims in 1124 and by Lowland armies on a number of occasions. The wagon-laager was already beginning to assume an important tactical role amongst the latter, as a battlefield fortress, even in the second half of the 12th century, when William le Marshal records that they placed their communal infantry in it for protection whilst their cavalry fought with the enemy.

Throughout most of this period archers were present on the battlefield in relatively small numbers. They and crossbowmen were usually positioned on the flanks of the army in separate units with spearmen in the centre, though they are also to be found skirmishing ahead of the main body, or else interspersed with other infantry. Archers on the left of the line, firing into the enemy's unshielded flank, would have been particularly effective, and with archers on both flanks it was possible to achieve a crossfire, as did the Tuscan crossbowmen at Campaldino in 1289. Towards the very end of this period the massed archers of English armies began to achieve a firepower ascendancy that was to go unchallenged until the mid-15th century. This resulted not so much from any sort of technical superiority in the weapon that they used, the longbow, but rather more because of the sheer numbers in which they were fielded — thousands at a time, compared to the more usual hundreds of crossbowmen in all Continental armies except those of the Italian communes (who were too busy fighting each other to have any significant effect on the general evolution of tactics). Mounted archers and crossbowmen also appear on occasion though the former at least always dismounted to fight and, except for a few contemporary pictures, there is little evidence that the latter fought from horseback either, usually being employed in a dragoon capacity instead. Only in Hungary, the Balkans and Russia with their Asiatic horse-archers, and in Spain with its javelin-armed jinetes, do we actually encounter 'firearm' cavalry.

The above general outline of tactics applies only to Western Europe; see also the battle descriptions on pages 56-73 for their diversity in practice. Below are given details of the various tactics employed in the 'frontier' states of Europe — Ireland and Wales in the west; Scandinavia and the Baltic lands in the north; Poland, Hungary, Serbia and Russia in the east; and Spain in the south.

IRELAND

The Irish fought only as infantry during this era (but see below), since — like the Welsh and Scots — they could rely to a great extent on terrain to give them a tactical advantage over horsemen. Their tactics are well summed-up by the statement of Giraldus Cambrensis that 'the Irish have no interest in castles, but use the woods as their fortresses and the marshes as their entrenchments'*, this being an allusion to their practice of erecting barricades across woodland 'passes', from behind which they would ambush or harass the enemy with missiles, and also to their general reliance on the woods (which covered a large part of Ireland at this time) as a place of refuge. Sometimes the barricades comprised nothing more than a few felled trees (as in 1171, when Strongbow's advance was obstructed thus in the Pass of Odrone), but more often they were far more sophisticated, constructed of undergrowth and branches 'plashed' together into dense wattle screens; the 12th century 'Song of Dermot and the Earl' records how King Dermot of Ossory ordered his men to 'throw up a high, wide rampart, steep and large, and to strengthen it with stakes at the back and with hurdles at the front'. Occasionally a series of such barricades and ditches would be constructed. In marshy country ditches were also dug across tracks; 'Heimskringla' relates how King Magnus Barelegs of Norway was killed in such an ambush in a bog in 1103 when 'the Irish jumped up on every side, from every bushy point of land', Magnus being killed by a blow to the neck from an Irish axe when he had reached 'the last of the ditches, difficult to cross and passable in few places.'

Except for the heavier-armed Ostmen and, later, the gallóglaich, who both preferred to fight in the open in close order, the lightly-armed Irish depended heavily on such ambushes, which, coupled with their knowledge of the terrain, often enabled them to skirmish and withdraw again virtually unhindered. In the open, of course, they stood no chance against Anglo-Norman cavalry, though Froissart (writing in the 14th century) records how their lightness of arms enabled them to scatter and hide if they were getting the worse of an encounter so that they seemed to disappear 'without trace', adding that they were so fleet of foot they could even out-run well-mounted knights; Snorri Sturlusson, in his 'Heimskringla' of c.1230, similarly states 'that there were men in Ireland so swift of foot that no horse could overtake them.'

To counter these tactics the Anglo-Normans employed combinations of cavalry and archers, the Welsh being particularly popular in the latter role since their own lightness of arms meant that they could pursue the Irish even in the most difficult country. Giraldus Cambrensis himself recommended, in his 'Conquest of Ireland', that 'in any fighting in Ireland we [ie, the Anglo-Normans] must be particularly careful to ensure that archers are always incorporated in the mounted formations, so that the damage caused by the stones with which they [the Irish] usually attack heavily-armed troops at close range — alternately rushing forward and retreating without loss to themselves because they are so mobile — may be averted by volleys of arrows from our side.'

Although Irish horsemen are sometimes mentioned in sources of this period they do not appear to have fought as cavalry; expressions such as 'the horsemen of Breffny and Uriel' probably indicate no more than those elements of an Irish army which were wealthy enough to ride to battle, and such warriors must be understood solely as mounted infantrymen. Nevertheless, it would appear that horsemen might be used for specific actions, those of Breffny and Uriel mentioned above, for instance, being despatched to cut down the English corn-fields during the siege of Dublin in 1171. (The Irish rode without saddle, stirrups or spurs, while the reins served as both bit and bridle. A cushion substituted for the saddle, while 'a stick with a crook at its upper end' — the *echflesc* or 'horse-rod' (see figure 51a)— served in place of spurs. Their horses were imported from Britain. For details of slightly later Irish horsemen, see *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*, figures 29 and 30.)

WALES

Giraldus Cambrensis has left us with fairly comprehensive details of 12th century Welsh tactics, which principally took the form of ambushes and raids.† He says that they preferred to do battle on rough or marshy terrain and that they were very fierce in their initial attack, so that a battle was 'almost always won or lost at the first onslaught', which was accompanied with loud shouts and high-pitched screeches from the 'long trumpets' they took with them. He continues: 'From their first fierce and headlong onslaught, and the shower of javelins which they hurl, they seem most formidable opponents. [But] if the enemy resists manfully and they are repulsed they are immediately

*In fact the Irish did begin to build some — though very few — stone castles (*caisdeoils*, as opposed to the usual *duns*, or forts) in the course of the 12th century, particularly under the High King Turlough O'Conor, who built 3 in Connacht in 1124, another in 1129, and yet another in 1136. Turlough's son, the High King Rory O'Conor, likewise erected a 'wonderful castle', at Tuam in 1164.

†It is clear from all the sources that to the Welsh success in war was measured by the quantity of booty taken. Giraldus says that it was their habit 'to steal anything they can lay their hands on and to live on plunder, theft and robbery'.

thrown into confusion. If there is further resistance they turn their backs without making any attempt at a counter-attack and seek safety in flight.' Nevertheless, when retreating they would often turn unexpectedly and loose arrows at unwary pursuers (which ploy Giraldus describes as 'shooting their bows from behind' like Parthians, which in turn has confused some people into thinking they fired their longbows from horseback!).

The flight of a Welsh army from the battlefield, however, did not mean that it was defeated. It is true that elsewhere in Western Europe such action would indeed be deemed a rout and morale would collapse in consequence, the survivors dispersing and fleeing to their homes; the Welsh, however, had quite a different attitude — to them flight was expedient, not demoralising. Giraldus explains: 'Although beaten today and shamefully put to flight with much slaughter, tomorrow they march out again, not at all dejected by their defeat or their losses. They may not shine in open combat or in formal battle-array, but they harass the enemy by their ambushes and night-attacks. In a single battle they are easily beaten, but they are difficult to conquer in a long war, for they are not bothered by hunger or cold, fighting does not seem to tire them, and they do not lose heart when things go wrong, and after a defeat they are ready to fight again and once more face the hazards of war.' Their inability to stand up to the English in an open field is explained anyway by their light arms and lack of armour, so that 'they rely more on their agility than on brute strength. It follows that they cannot meet the enemy on equal terms, or fight violently for very long, or strive hand-to-hand for victory.' It was for this very reason that the English found it so hard to conquer Wales, since the people would 'never draw up its force to engage an enemy army in the field' and would not permit themselves to be pinned down and besieged within 'fortified strongpoints' (of which they had few at first anyway). Instead the English could defeat them 'only by patient and unremitting pressure applied over a long period' — by encouraging dissent in their ranks, by preventing them from foraging, and by constantly resupplying, replenishing and replacing their own troops, so as to exert continuous pressure. In addition Giraldus recommends that a commander intent on beating the Welsh should use troops similarly lightly-armed and experienced in the same kind of fighting, in much the same way as the Welsh themselves were used against the Irish.

Despite all this it should not be assumed that the Welsh were incapable of fighting a pitched battle. The Battle of Mynydd Carn in 1079, for instance, fought between Gruffydd ap Cynan and King Trahaiarn of Powys, was a stand-up affair that lasted for a whole day and far into the night, while at Crug Mawr in 1136 a 3,000-strong Anglo-Norman army was annihilated in a prolonged engagement. Few details of these early battles are available, however; we know only that at Crug Mawr the Welsh drew up in 3 divisions which seemingly overlapped the Anglo-Normans' flanks. Thereafter it is not until the very end of this period that we are provided with any further details regarding battlefield formations adopted by Welsh armies, at Orewin Bridge in 1282 and Maes Moydog in 1295. On both occasions the army comprised North Welsh spearmen, and they appear to have drawn up in an array akin to the Scottish schiltron with their long spears angled to impale charging horses. The English chronicler Trivet, describing Maes Moydog, says that 'seeing themselves surrounded they fixed the butts of their spears in the earth, with the heads pointing outwards to fend off the rush of the horsemen', the 'Hagnaby Chronicle' subsequently remarking that 'the Welsh awaited us well, and attacked our people from the front, and they were the finest and bravest Welshmen that anyone had ever seen.' They were, nevertheless, beaten. An army of Welsh archers would doubtless have arrayed themselves differently and fared better, but there is no evidence that such an army ever took the field, largely because by the time the Welsh were prepared to take on the English in open war in the 13th century the centre of their power had switched from the south, where the archers were to be found, to the north. It should not be assumed, incidentally, that there were no archers in the north or spearmen in the south (the sheriff of Herefordshire and 9 other English captains were 'run through the body with lances' by young men of Gwent in 1182, for instance); they were simply outnumbered by the predominant troop-types of those regions.

For in-fighting the Welsh were provided with an assortment of weapons according to William le Breton (describing Welshmen in Richard I's employ) comprising maces, javelins, *venabula*, gisarmes and 2-handed axes; the last seem to have been introduced by Ostman mercenaries, and the 'Hanes Gruffydd ap Cynan' records that Gruffydd himself fought with such a weapon.

SCANDINAVIA

Referring to their possession of the Hebrides and Orkneys, Giraldus Cambrensis wrote c.1188 that the Scandinavians, 'more than any other nation, were accustomed to lead a life of piracy. Hence too all their expeditions and wars are decided in naval engagements.' Certainly major battles were still more often than not fought at sea throughout this period, with one or both of the opposing fleets usually lashing some or all of their big ships together as fighting platforms; the commander's ship was invariably positioned in the middle of such a platform since he usually had the biggest vessel, and high-sided merchantmen were placed on the flanks if available. As is explained in *Armies of the Dark Ages*, such sea-battles usually involved boarding and clearing the enemy platform or tackling individual enemy ships, customarily preceding boarding with a barrage of arrows and (at closer range) javelins,

stakes and stones. Oarsmen were protected by a second man who deflected such missiles with his shield, and when approaching an enemy vessel shields were held overhead 'so closely that no part of their holders was left uncovered.' All movement was by oar, masts being lowered in battle. Before the Battle of Floruvágar in 1194 King Sverri Sigurdsson of Norway (1184-1202) advised his men to look to their oars, since they would be needed regardless of the outcome, either to escape or to pursue. The wisdom of this advice is self-evident from the ensuing conflict: the enemy (principally composed of Orcadians and Shetlanders) had lashed their own ships together too hastily at the beginning of the fight, smashing so many of their oars in the process that when they later attempted to pursue Sverri's fleet they had inadequate oars left with which to manoeuvre or direct their own ships and, drifting with the current, they were surrounded and neutralised one by one. Significantly Sverri's fleet did not rope its ships together on this occasion; instead 'they let their ships move about, and made feints' with them, advancing and falling back as circumstances dictated. This is one of the first instances of more mobile naval tactics being utilised in northern waters, and even therafter the use of the traditional roped-together platform of ships prevailed — even the 'Speculum Regale', apparently written for Hakon IV, stresses the importance of turning one's ships into floating castles. This source describes in detail the use of a sort of crow's-nest at the mast-head for archers and other missile-men; the attachment to the mast of a beam, with 4 steel prongs at one end, for use as a battering-ram against the hulls of enemy ships; and a 'prow-boar', doubtless the same as the *skegg* or 'beard', a set of iron spikes attached to the prow of the ship, designed to hole enemy vessels. In addition it advises that before battle a ship 'should be fortified strongly with beams and logs built up into a tall rampart, through which there should be 4 openings, each large and wide enough for 2 fully-armed men to leap through; and outside and along the rampart on both sides of the ship a level walk of planks should be laid to stand upon.' From other sources it is apparent that such an arrangement, set up along the gunwales and braced within with strong beams, could run along the entire length of the vessel, but was perhaps often used only where the sides of the ship were at their lowest.

On land infantry still predominated and the traditional shield-wall appears to have prevailed, 'Heimskringla' describing that of a Norwegian army in 1161 as 'long, but no more than 5 ranks deep'. However, cavalry were already beginning to appear by the late-11th century, Adam of Bremen (writing c.1070) recording the Swedes to be 'outstanding warriors on both horses and ships'. Certainly the Danes had evolved a fairly substantial cavalry force by the second half of the 12th century at the very latest, probably under German influence, and these were frequently employed in combined operations against the Wends. As the 13th century progressed the heavy cavalry element became more and more important, though it was still heavily outnumbered by the infantry levies. In the one instance where it mentions heavy cavalry in a battle, 'Heimskringla' records them as being drawn up under the king's command to the rear of the infantry.

Sword, axe and spear remained the most popular weapons, and there was still something of the old Viking spirit in the mediaeval Scandinavian warrior's attitude to hand-to-hand combat, at least in the earlier part of this period — witness the occasion of King Magnus Bareleg's death at the hands of the Irish in 1103 when, despite having himself been wounded 3 times, one Vidkunn Jonsson nevertheless took to his heels only after he had cut down Magnus' killer and retrieved both the king's sword and his royal standard. The Scandinavians also continued to make considerable use of archery, though the crossbow had begun to replace the traditional yew longbow by the late-12th century. A minor skirmish with feudal cavalry in 1151 while on a raiding expedition in the North of England bears witness to the effectiveness of their fire, the knights being repulsed with heavy losses in the face of a barrage of arrows, and the well-known episode recorded in 'Orkneyinga Saga' and elsewhere in which Earl Hugh the Proud (Hugh Montgomery, Earl of Shrewsbury) was killed in 1098 by an arrow in the eye, shot by King Magnus Barelegs, is further testimony of their accuracy.

Field-armies other than those raised by a national levy (the leidang) appear to have been generally small, usually ranging from a few hundred to about 8,000, most averaging only about 3-5,000 men. Naval forces too often numbered as few as a dozen ships, 30-40 constituting a fair-sized fleet. As is mentioned above, the largest ship was invariably the king's; Hakon IV's in 1263 was of 27- or 37-benches with 4 men per half-room, which means it would have had a crew of at least 216 or 296 men.

THE BALTIC LANDS

As William Urban has observed, in their battles with the Germans — which began with the Wendish Crusade of 1147 — Baltic tribesmen only rarely fought pitched battles, and they held their ground even more rarely if the first shock of impact gave an initial advantage to the enemy; like the Welsh, they saw no dishonour in flight, only expediency. Of them all it was the Lithuanians and Estonians who displayed the greatest martial spirit and dared most often to confront the Germans on an open field. It was for this reason that a 13th century English traveller described the Lithuanians as 'stalwart men, strong warriors and fierce', while Henry of Livonia observed admiringly of the Estonians that they were prepared 'to fight as long as there yet lived just one year-old child, no

taller than a boot.' Even among them, however, forest and marshland ambushes were preferred to open battle, tribesmen either emerging suddenly from hiding to kill foragers or to harass marching columns, or else skirmishing with the enemy from behind prepared positions comprising trees felled across his line of march.

Although most tribes fielded both horse and foot, the mounted element tended to dismount on the battlefield as you went further east — the Wendish nobility, for instance, already customarily fought from horseback as early as the crusade of 1147, while at the opposite end of the Baltic the Estonians invariably dismounted and fought on foot. It seems likely that this was basically a by-product of geography, since cavalry were clearly of little value in dense forests or waterlogged marshes; this also explains why the Teutonic Knights, who remained mounted on open battlefields, chose to dismount and fight on foot when they were attacked in woodlands. The late-13th century 'Livonian Rhymed Chronicle' says that the Lithuanians too customarily dismounted to fight, but he must mean only that they did so under similar circumstances to the Knights since Henry of Livonia's chronicle, and even the 'Rhymed Chronicle' itself, frequently records Lithuanians fighting as cavalry, eg, in 1221 when they positioned 200 horsemen on one flank to pursue the enemy once he was routed, and in 1244 when they fought mounted during Mindaugas' campaign against Amboten castle.

The conventional battlefield tactic for Baltic infantry was to launch showers of spears and follow them up with a charge if circumstances permitted it; in the face of mounted German knights this would have been suicidal, of course, so that more often than not they had to assume a defensive stance instead, drawing up in a large, solid phalanx of shields and spears which the Germans invariably tried to smash through by brute force. Their cavalry favoured more flexible tactics, succinctly summarised in Henry of Livonia's description of an engagement between Lithuanian horsemen and German cavalry in 1208, when the former 'flew around them on their speedy horses. As was their custom, they rode about here and there, sometimes fleeing, sometimes pursuing, threw their lances and spears and wounded many.'

In order to avoid ambushes and to utilise their principal tactical advantage to best effect, the Germans made every effort to ensure that they fought on open battlefields where their heavy cavalry was unhampered by soft ground or thick undergrowth; otherwise, as at Siauliai in 1236, they 'could offer but weak resistance'. The Germans themselves invariably drew up in the centre of their battle-line and charged straight for the centre of the enemy's own array, which usually either broke on impact or else enveloped them and cut them to pieces. If repulsed they would withdraw behind their foot-soldiers and either reform for a second charge or else dismount and draw up on foot ready to withstand the enemy's counter-attack. The converted natives who usually accompanied them were positioned on the army's flanks, where they fought dismounted if they fought at all (they had a distressing habit of slipping away in the face of superior numbers). Better-equipped tribesmen — ie, the chieftains and their retinues — fought as cavalry alongside the Knights, though they invariably formed the rear ranks. Natives also provided the army's foragers and scouts and, more surprisingly considering their tendency to run away, its vanguard and rearguard on the march. In fact considerable use was made of converted native militiamen to bolster the military strength of Sword Brethren and Teutonic Knights alike.

POLAND

The Poles relied heavily on hit-and-run tactics and ambushes, particularly at river crossings. Normally the cavalry would be positioned to fall on the enemy's rear while the heavy infantry attempted to cut his force in two, light infantry archers and slingers meanwhile harassing his battle array. The enemy (mainly Germans and Bohemians for most of this era) were usually lured into such ambushes by Polish cavalry attacking and feigning flight. Once sufficient damage had been done, and before the enemy could recover, the Poles would disengage and withdraw. Mobility was the keynote of such tactics, infantry often riding on the cruppers of the cavalry mounts.

In a pitched battle, which was always avoided when possible, the heavy cavalry of the druzhinas would draw up in the centre, usually in 2 lines (the second acting as a reserve), with heavy infantry on the left and right and archers and slingers on the wings, taking up a sort of 'horned' formation with the wings somewhat in advance of the main body. This enabled the archers to pour a heavy barrage of missiles into the advancing enemy prior to contact and was well-suited to enveloping his flanks once he was engaged, when the missile-men would put aside their bows and 'get stuck in' with axes and clubs.

Discipline was of a high standard, which enabled a hard-pressed force to break off and withdraw in good order, covering its withdrawal with a rearguard detachment of cavalry. The army would then gather reinforcements en route from local fortresses (called *grody*, and very important to Polish strategy). If the enemy actually attacked one of these fortresses — which were usually of earth and timber even at the end of this era — he was likely to meet with stiff, almost fanatical, resistance, and the inevitable delay gave the Poles a good chance of gathering sufficient strength to cut off his line of retreat.

By the 13th century standard Western European tactics prevailed, with the cavalry now generally deployed in line. The heavier-armed infantry were drawn up behind them, while the archers were still usually positioned in advance on the wings, envelopment still being attempted whenever possible. It also became customary to hold back part of the army as a separate reserve. The proportion of cavalry to infantry in most armies remained unchanged, on a ratio of about 1:3.

HUNGARY

Even though the Hungarians began to become 'Westernised' at a relatively early date their tactics continued to include many purely Asiatic elements, notably in the use of both native and mercenary nomad horse-archers (the latter at first composed of Pechenegs but by the early-13th century principally Cumans); indeed, up until the 13th century even Hungarian heavy cavalrymen continued to often carry a bow in addition to lance and shield, and when tactically necessary they were prepared to fight as horse-archers. More usually, however, this role was left to the light cavalry, who wore no armour but dressed only in 'fair garments' and pointed caps and were usually armed with just bow, sabre and mace. Such Hungarian light cavalry either preceded the heavy cavalry in open order or skirmished from the wings — as, for example, at Marchfeld in 1278, where they rode back and forth and peppered the Bohemian right flank with volley after volley of arrows, disordering it in preparation for the charge of the Hungarian heavies. Ottokar von Steier's early-14th century 'Rhyming Chronicle' gives interesting details of a similar encounter between Hungarian light cavalry and heavily-armoured German knights in 1286. He describes how the Germans drew up in their usual close array, 'stirrup to stirrup, lance to lance', and how the Hungarians, who wore no armour, repeatedly rode at them, yelling like demons and shooting showers of arrows but never pressing their attack home; instead they wheeled away to left or right as they drew close (the order for which manoeuvre was given by rattling an arrow quiver, so Villani tells us in the mid-14th century; this noise was therefore only audible to the charging horsemen themselves, and not to the enemy). After 5 hours, during which time they had not come to grips with the Hungarians once, the exhausted Germans, with many of their horses dead or wounded, were obliged to surrender. One other prominent feature of Hungarian tactics that was doubtless a result of Asiatic, in this case Pecheneg, influence was the frequent use of wagons to fortify the army encampment, as at Mohi in 1241*. (It should be noted, incidentally, that though the Hungarians were defeated at Mohi through poor generalship, contemporary Chinese sources state that the heaviest losses inflicted on the Mongols in their European campaign of 1237-41 were suffered in a night-battle against the Hungarians just before the engagement on the Sajò.)

Sometimes the Hungarians also employed standard Western European tactics, drawing up in close order with their best troops traditionally in the front line. Their close array appears to have been the cause of their defeat at the Battle of Semlin in 1167, where the Byzantines, with an army of similar composition, deployed in a looser, more manoeuvrable formation than the Hungarians, who formed up as 'a single compact body' around their standard, which was here mounted on a carroccio (obviously under the influence of Italian mercenaries, often encountered in Hungarian armies as, for example, at Mohi). When present on the battlefield Hungarian infantry seem to have constituted the centre of the line, either behind or in front of the cavalry.

SERBIA

As events in the 14th century were to prove, the Serbians were capable of fighting — and fighting well — in the open field, but the mountainous, forested nature of their country inevitably dictated that they should favour skirmishing and ambushes (William of Tyre, who describes the Serbians as 'an uneducated and indisciplined race' of 'bold and warlike men', says their country was 'thickly wooded and very difficult of access'). This preference comes over well in Cinnamus' description of the Byzantine campaign of 1150, where, confronted by Emperor Manuel I's army, 'the Serbians fled until they were in rough country. Turning back once there, however, they came to grips [with the Byzantines]'; and again when then Byzantines 'had reached an impenetrable and steep thicket in the course of their pursuit' the Serbians, 'perceiving that they had outdistanced the rest of the Byzantines, turned about and stood facing them.' Then, when the Emperor led reinforcements forward, 'an enemy ambush leapt out of concealment and attacked the Byzantines' and subsequently 'slipped away again'. At the end of the 13th century Pachymeres similarly observed that 'the Serbians did not attack openly but mostly behaved like bandits'. In more conventional battle-array they drew up in 3 divisions as in Western Europe with infantry often to the fore at the commencement of battle (they were predominantly archers), though these would fall back behind the cavalry before the army closed with the enemy. Temperley, in his *History of Serbia* (1917), says that the 'deadliness of Serbian archers was recorded by Western crusaders'.

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*As early as the 12th century the Hungarian royal household included a company of wagon-drivers under an official called the *Major Plaustrorum*, or 'Master of the Train'.

RUSSIA

Infantry declined rapidly in importance in Russia during the 11th century, and by c.1100 most Russian armies were perhaps 60% cavalry, this percentage increasing to as high as 85% by the early-14th century, by which time Russian infantry were being generally relegated to garrison duties. The principal reason for this decline was the steadily increasing pressure throughout this era from Asiatic nomad hordes (principally Uzes, Pechenegs and Cumans, later Mongols too), against whose light and highly mobile horse-archers infantry were of little value, normally needing cavalry protection on the battlefield. If actually faced by such a nomad army Russian infantry tended to form square, their large shields forming a wall all round, archers exchanging fire with the nomads from the hollow centre of the square (the Byzantine historian Leo the Deacon records this tactic in use as early as the 10th century); such squares could advance or wheel 'like moving towers'. Otherwise infantry formed up in close order in traditional 'shield-wall' formation with spearmen in front and javelinmen and archers behind.

At the very beginning of this era Russian cavalry still tended to launch a straightforward charge at the enemy line in Western European fashion, but they were beginning to learn that such tactics were useless against the nomads, who would just wheel away and fall on their flanks or rear. Before long they adopted a crescent formation instead, with heavy cavalry in the centre (often with a reserve) and light cavalry thrown forward on the wings. The light cavalry (usually nomad horse-archers in Russian employ) would attempt to goad the enemy into attacking, on which the heavies would countercharge the most vulnerable point in his formation in the ensuing disorder. Alternatively the light cavalry would advance in line in skirmishing order and pepper the enemy with volleys of javelins and arrows, thereby concealing the advance of the heavy cavalry until the crucial moment, when they would suddenly wheel away so that the heavies could charge home, catching the enemy by surprise.

The feigned flight was also employed, usually in conjunction with a pre-arranged ambush, Russian infantry remaining particularly effective in forest ambushes to the point where after the Mongol conquest the Mongols only rarely dared enter a forested area. On the battlefield the infantry generally formed up as a second line behind the cavalry and/or on both wings.

The other important element in Russian tactics was the army encampment itself, which was encircled and fortified with wagons Pecheneg-fashion (see *Armies of the Dark Ages*), this evolving into the *gulaigorod* or 'walking fortress' of later centuries. If hard-pressed the army might actually withdraw into the camp to reorganise, as appears to have been the case with the Kievan contingent at the Battle of the Khalkha in 1223.

SPAIN

Although the tactics of the Christian kingdoms were to all intents and purposes similar to those employed elsewhere in western Europe the use of cavalry predominated more here because of the highly mobile nature of warfare against the light-armed Moslems, infantry standing little chance of combatting the fast-moving raiding parties which not only constantly pillaged and harassed the frontiers, but sometimes actually penetrated deep into Christian territory. For the same reason Spanish knights tended to wear somewhat lighter armour and equipment than their French, English or German counterparts, frequently of Moslem design or origin, and they often rode with short stirrups and a low saddle Berber-fashion.

Raiding forces on both sides were normally composed entirely of cavalry. In field armies, on the other hand, infantry were frequently present in large numbers. The Moslems appear to have actually used more infantry than the Christians (up to 70% of a Moslem army could be foot-soldiers) though the latter too employed them in greater numbers as the 12th and 13th centuries progressed, albeit usually in a very secondary role.

Abu Bekr al-Turtushi (d.1120) has left us with a good description of the standard Andalusian tactic of his day 'which has proved the most effective in engagements with our enemies'. The army would draw up in 3 lines, the first of infantry with shields, long thrusting spears and javelins, the second of specially-chosen archers, and the third of cavalry. The infantry of the first line knelt on the left knee with shields held high to their front and spear butts braced against the ground. When the enemy charged the first 2 lines would transfix them with javelins and arrows, and as they turned away from the hedge of spears the Moslem infantry would open up to left and right and the cavalry would charge through to inflict 'the will of Allah' upon the disordered foe. Obviously this tactic relied on the enemy making the first move, in which the impetuous Spanish knights usually obliged. The 3 line formation was standard practice, though the order sometimes varied. At Alarcos in 1195, for example, the first line consisted of cavalry, the second largely of archers and slingers in close formation with light cavalry on the wings, and the third of infantry; when, at their third attempt, the Spanish knights broke through the first line they were met by a barrage of missiles and routed by the light cavalry of the second line. A similar formation appears to have been used (less

successfully) at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 where many of the infantry were tied ankle to ankle, possibly to prevent flight but more likely in an effort to ensure that they maintained a close-order battle-array in the face of the Christian heavy cavalry.

The light cavalry usually formed up on the wings or behind the heavy cavalry in both Christian and Moslem armies, though sometimes skirmishing ahead of the main body. The heavy cavalry of Andalusian armies, always a minority, seem to have usually constituted the centre of the line when present; those in Christian-style armour introduced by Mohammed I of Granada in the mid-13th century appear to have charged with couched lance like Spanish knights, but this style of fighting was obviously unpopular and had died out by the early-14th century. Don Juan Manuel, who died in 1348, states quite specifically that the Moslems were neither adequately armed nor suitably mounted to endure hand-to-hand combat, while at the same time acknowledging that had they been so they would have been unsurpassed as warriors. In particular he admired their raiding tactics, stating that in this type of warfare a mere 200 could do more damage than 600 Christian knights. Abu Bekr reckoned the ideal raiding party to be 400-strong and the ideal army as 4,000, though earlier Moslem sources reckon the best size for an army to be 5,000 men. Most chroniclers, however, record much larger armies to have been used in practice.

The North African Berbers appear to have depended far more heavily on the traditional Moslem tactics of fast attack and speedy withdrawal (*al-karr wa'l-farr*). It was apparently for this reason in particular that they favoured Spanish mercenaries, who provided a firm base for such skirmishing. The celebrated 14th century historian Ibn Khaldun, having advocated the use of a solid body of troops behind an army's skirmishers in order to give it strength, goes on to say that the rulers of the Maghreb had long since identified that whereas a Berber unit put in this position might flee, 'the European Christians know only how to hold firm, because it is their custom to fight in close formation. They are, therefore, more suitable for the purpose than others. However, the Maghribi rulers employ them only in wars against the Arab and Bedouin nations in order to subdue them; they do not use them for the *jihad* [ie, against other Christians] for fear that they might take sides with them against the Moslems.' Camelry, where present, might draw up in the centre of the army (where the army commander was customarily stationed), with infantry slightly in advance on either side and cavalry, thrown slightly further forward again, on the extreme wings. An exchange of missiles intended to disorder the enemy would be followed up by a charge.

MAJOR BATTLES OF THE PERIOD

This is no more than a selection of the best-documented, better-known or most important battles of the period, providing details of contemporary tactics as actually used in practice. Many other battles have had to be excluded because insufficient details have survived the passage of time. Even the dates of many of the engagements listed here are often disputed.

SAGRAJAS, 23 October 1086

Reinforced by 20,000 North African Murabits under Yusuf ibn Tashufin, an Andalusian army under the kings of Seville, Granada, Málaga and Badajoz faced a large Christian Spanish army under Alfonso VI of Castile. The Spanish, recorded as 50-60,000 men by Moslem sources and including Aragonese, Italian and French troops, camped about 3 miles from the Murabits, who put their own camp slightly behind that of their Andalusian allies. Alfonso's vanguard, under Alvar Fañez, attacked just before dawn on the Moslem sabbath and caught the first (ie, the Andalusian) camp by surprise, most of the Andalusians being pursued from the field by Aragonese cavalry, only the Seville contingent standing firm under its king, al-Mu'tamin. The main Spanish force then stormed the Murabit lines, which Yusuf reinforced with Lamtunah Berbers while he himself led a large force of Saharan Berber tribesmen round the Spanish flank. This obliged the Christians to withdraw and form a line in front of their own encampment rather than be surrounded.

Although the Aragonese cavalry rallied from their pursuit of the Andalusians and returned to the battlefield they did not favour the turn events were taking and began a withdrawal which, under pressure from the Lamtunah Berber reinforcements sent to assist al-Mu'tamin, quickly became a rout. Many of the Andalusians who had previously fled rallied on seeing this, and the Spanish were then gradually driven from their camp to a position on a small hill, from where Alfonso and the remaining 500 knights with him managed to escape at nightfall.

The impossible figure of 300,000 is quoted for the Spanish dead by a Moslem source, which also claims that their heads were piled high enough to form minarets for the Moslems' celebrations. Other sources record 24-80,000 casualties amongst the Spanish cavalry alone, while the Moslems claim to have lost only 3,000 men.

RIVER SAN, 1097

This basically unimportant battle provides interesting details of Cuman tactics, since David of Cherginov, one of the two rival Russian princes involved, was supported by 300 Cumans under Bonyak the Scabby and Altunopa, his own followers numbering just 100 horsemen. It was Bonyak who actually marshalled the army, organising it into 3 troops: he placed David and his 100 men (organised as two squadrons of 50 men each) with the army's standard, sent forward a vanguard of 50 Cumans under Altunopa, and held the rest back under his own command in a concealed position. David's rival Yaroslav, meanwhile, had received the support of King Coloman I of Hungary, who led the numerically superior army now facing the Cumans.

The 'Russian Primary Chronicle' reports that Altunopa's troop attacked the first Hungarian division and after pouring a hail of arrows into it turned away in apparent flight. The Hungarians, who should have known better, naively gave chase and were lured past Bonyak's concealed position, from whence he now emerged in ambush, wheeling his troop and attacking the Hungarian rear as it swept past. Simultaneously Altunopa's troop suddenly faced about, and the Hungarians were surrounded and driven back and forth between the two khans in total disarray. The inevitable result was that the Hungarians broke in rout and were cut down in droves as they fled, two-fifths of those involved being killed in the battle or the ensuing rout, which lasted for 2 days.

TINCHEBRAI, 28 September 1106

King Henry I of England, with an army of Angevins, Bretons, Normans and Englishmen including 2,400 cavalry, faced a smaller Norman force under his brother Duke Robert Curthose of Normandy, which included only 700 cavalry, attempting to relieve Tinchebrai castle. Henry drew up his army in 2 lines: Norman infantry and 700 cavalry formed the first line, with mixed Norman and English infantry and dismounted knights in the second reinforced with another 700 cavalry. On the right flank he concealed a further body of 1,000 horsemen, largely Breton mercenaries.

The battle opened with the charge of the outnumbered Norman cavalry, who appear to have been formed up on Robert's flanks. His left broke the Anglo-Norman right but was checked by Henry's second line, while the Norman right failed to make any headway. When Henry's Breton reserve charged into Robert's left flank while it was still engaged in a hand-to-hand melee with his second line the flight of one of the Norman contingents resulted in a general rout. The battle had lasted little more than an hour. Robert, who like Henry had dismounted and fought with the infantry, was taken prisoner together with 400 barons and knights and a large number of infantry, the formed including William Crispin, William, Comte de Mortain, and Edgar Atheling (Edward the Confessor's son, and the legitimate heir to the throne of Saxon England). 60 of Robert's knights and 250-300 of his 6,000 infantry had died, while according to the Priest of Fécamp Henry lost only 2 knights and very few infantry killed and one knight badly wounded. With Duke Robert a prisoner Normandy was annexed to the English crown.

BRÉMULE, 20 August 1119

Based at Les Andelys, a French force under King Louis VI, operating in Normandy in support of Robert Curthose's son William Clito, persistently raided and harassed the surrounding countryside. Eventually, his whereabouts having been betrayed by the smoke of burning barns, Louis was obliged to turn aside to confront an Anglo-Norman force under King Henry I which was marching to overtake him. The French totalled only 400 knights, the Anglo-Normans 500.

Seeing the French advancing, Henry dismounted 400 of his knights and concealed them from the French, apparently by placing them behind the 100 who remained mounted. The French came on in 3 troops (or possibly only 2), the first commanded by William Clito and William Crispin, the last by the king. Crispin broke the Anglo-Norman cavalry, who fled, and then charged into the midst of the dismounted knights, where he and his 80 men were surrounded and dragged from their saddles. The second division met with a like fate, at which Louis and his men wisely turned and fled, Louis himself only escaping the Norman pursuit by jumping from his horse and fleeing alone into a wood. William Clito also escaped but 140 other knights were captured. Only 3 Frenchmen were actually killed.

BOURG THÉROULDE, 26 March 1124

A 300-strong royalist Anglo-Norman army, drawn from nearby garrisons, was successful in intercepting a smaller rebel force under Waleran, Comte de Mellent. The royalist commander — Ralph de Bayeux according to some sources but William de Tankerville or Eudes Borleng according to others — dismounted some of his men-at-arms astride the road along which Waleran was approaching but kept others mounted in reserve. In addition he had 40

archers, who had also been mounted in order to keep up with the knights, and these he placed on his left, angled forward so as to fire into the enemy's unshielded flank. When Waleran's troops charged, with the count at the head of the 40 knights in the first squadron, these archers let loose several volleys of arrows, which brought down so many horses and riders that the royalist army, launching an immediate counterattack, was successful in capturing Waleran himself and 25 or even as many as 80 of his knights.

THIELT (HACKESPOL, AXPOEL), 21 June 1128

This battle, fought between Thierry, Comte d'Alsace, and William Clito, was over the right of succession to the county of Flanders. Thierry had perhaps 300 cavalry plus a body of communal militia from Bruges and Ghent, probably numbering about 1,000 men, while William Clito had perhaps 450 cavalry but no foot-soldiers. Both sides appear to have drawn up in column in 3 divisions: Thierry commanded his reserve, composed of the infantry and a small number of knights, while William appears to have led from the front, at the head of his own vanguard. (An alternative explanation puts the front 2 divisions of each army in line, with William in command of his right flank facing Thierry in charge of his left, though this seems improbable since Thierry was not involved in the pursuit of Clito's forces.) William's third division, meanwhile, was positioned out of sight behind a hill, with orders to attack the enemy at a given moment.

William's first 2 divisions eventually gave way in the face of the enemy advance, and victory for Thierry seemed assured. But when his cavalry set off in pursuit of the fleeing Norman knights they suddenly found themselves confronted by William's unsuspected reserve, and were routed when, having rallied a substantial part of his other divisions, William himself returned to the fray, this entire manoeuvre having all been part of a carefully orchestrated feigned flight. Large numbers of prisoners were taken in the ensuing pursuit.

NOCERA, 24 July 1132

Roger II of Sicily was faced by an army of Apulian rebels led by Robert of Capua and Rainulf of Avelino, who mustered 2,500 cavalry and allegedly 40,000 Capuan infantry. Roger's own force contained a large number of Saracen infantry, but his overall strength is unknown. Crossing the river Sarno, the rebels drew up their army for battle with infantry in the centre and their cavalry in 6 divisions on the flanks, Rainulf on the right with 1,500 cavalry in 3 divisions formed in line, and Robert on the left with his 1,000 cavalry in another 3 divisions drawn up in column.

The Sicilians formed up in a column of 8 divisions opposite Robert's troops, and when the first 2 charged they drove the rebel cavalry back into the infantry, who fled across the river, several hundred drowning when a makeshift bridge collapsed under their weight. Robert's third division of cavalry then charged into the disordered Sicilians, but after a fierce struggle they too were steadily forced back. However, Rainulf saved the day by wheeling his 3 divisions, which charged into the Sicilian flank in succession, first the centre, then the right and then the left. Under this series of impacts the 2 divisions in contact with Robert's cavalry broke and carried away the other 6 in their flight. The Saracen infantry suffered heavy losses in the pursuit and 700 Sicilian knights and 20 barons were captured, Roger himself escaping accompanied by only 4 knights.

THE STANDARD (NORTHALLERTON), 22 August 1138

An army of 25,000 Scots drawn predominantly from Cumberland, Lothian, Lennox, Galloway and the Isles, invaded Northern England under King David in support of the rebel earl Robert of Gloucester. They were confronted at Northallerton by a motley English force incorporating both local militia contingents and Anglo-Norman and mercenary knights, under the overall command of William d'Aumale, Earl of Yorkshire, and Archbishop Thurstan of York. The English deployed on high ground with their front rank consisting of archers and knights (the latter fighting on foot in order to bolster the unreliable levies) with the militia ranged behind them. A reserve of more dismounted knights was positioned behind the line around a wagon on which were the standards of Beverley, York and Ripon.

As well as Scots King David's army included Englishmen from Lothian, Norman knights, Flemish mercenaries and even some Germans and 'Danes' (doubtless Norsemen from the Isles since, as we have already seen, Islesmen — *Insulani* — were present). They took up an arrowhead formation of 5 divisions; only on their extreme right wing were there any cavalry, though a reserve force under David himself contained some dismounted knights. The lead division, composed of Galwegians (javelin- and sword-armed 'Picts' from Galloway) under their chieftains Donald and Ulgerich, launched the first charge and, despite their light arms and lack of armour, they breached the English line before being driven off with heavy losses (the chronicler Aelred likening many of them to hedgehogs as a result 'of the arrows still sticking in their bodies'). The Scots cavalry, 200-strong and consisting chiefly of disaffected or

mercenary Anglo-Norman knights under David's son Henry, then charged the English left and broke through, scattering the army's horses, but the Cumberland and Teviotdale infantry supposed to be supporting them were far enough behind to allow the breach to be closed before they got there and were soundly repulsed, as too was the third line comprising the troops of Lothian, Lennox and the Isles. The left wing made one half-hearted attack and retired, after which David's reserve division drifted away, and, unsupported, the remainder of the army followed suit, having lost 10-11,000 men. Of the Scots cavalry 50 were captured and only 19 remained unwounded. By contrast English losses were relatively light, including only one knight.

LINCOLN, 2 February 1141

King Stephen, laying siege to Lincoln castle, was faced by a rebel force of Empress Mathilda's supporters which had successfully crossed a canal and marshy ground in his rear. They drew up in 3 divisions, the left wing composed of cavalry, the centre of infantry and dismounted knights, and the right also of cavalry, with a band of spear-armed Welsh mercenaries stationed in advance of the right flank. Stephen's army likewise was drawn up in 3 divisions, with cavalry on both flanks and a centre of infantry and dismounted knights under the king himself.

The king's right flank disintegrated on impact with the rebels, though his left, under William of Ypres and William d'Aumale, was routed by the rebels' reserve of dismounted knights only after it had successfully put the Welsh to flight and pushed back the cavalry drawn up behind them. The dismounted knights and infantry in the royalist centre were then hemmed in by repeated cavalry attacks in flank and rear coupled with a frontal charge by the rebels' foot-soldiers. Nevertheless they fought doggedly on for some time until Stephen was stunned by a thrown stone and consequently captured, after which his troops surrendered. Although only about 100 men appear to have died in the battle itself many more were killed during the rebel pursuit.

THE ROUT OF WINCHESTER, 14 September 1141

Short of supplies while besieged in Winchester by royalist forces, Empress Mathilda's commander-in-chief Earl Robert of Gloucester attempted a break-out. However, his army had barely left the city gates behind them when the royalists, under William of Ypres, suddenly attacked from all sides, sweeping round behind Earl Robert's rearguard to prevent any attempt by the rebels to retreat back into the city. The column suffered grievously and soon scattered in rout, though the vanguard with the Empress managed to hold together so that she and most of her escort escaped. The rearguard, 200 knights under Robert himself, also managed to maintain good order at first and fought its way as far as Stockbridge over the River Test, where it was completely surrounded and eventually forced to surrender. The royalists later released Earl Robert in exchange for King Stephen, who had been captured by Mathilda's forces earlier in the year at Lincoln (see above).

ANDRIA, September 1155

A century and a half after Norman infiltration had begun to erode Byzantine power in Apulia and Calabria, and more than 80 years after the fall of the last Imperial stronghold there, the Byzantines, with the aid of Apulian rebels, made a determined attempt at reconquest of their lost Italian possessions. The Norman forces, under the Viceroy Asclettin and Count Richard of Andria, numbering some 2,000 knights and a large number of infantry, were surrounded by the Byzantines and their rebel allies near Barletta, but Count Richard broke out with a sizeable force and 'made a dash for his own territory'. He was closely pursued by John Doukas and Robert de Bassonville, rebel count of Loritello, who caught up with him just as he reached the walls of Andria. According to Cinnamus the Normans numbered 1,800 horse and 'an innumerable army of infantry', while the Byzantines and Apulian rebels numbered just 600 horsemen and an unknown number of foot-soldiers (the Byzantine element of the former consisting largely of mercenaries, including Cumans, Alani and locally-hired Normans).

Since his town was unprepared for a siege, Count Richard decided to turn and confront his pursuers. The Byzantines then drew up in 3 lines, the first of Cumans and infantry archers 'in a solid formation', the second of cavalry under Robert de Bassonville, and the third under Doukas himself, comprising the rest of the cavalry 'and especially a company of Cumans'. Richard charged this array head-on, and the Byzantine front line 'did not withstand him even briefly'. He subsequently forced back Robert's division, then Doukas, the latter nearly being captured when he was unhorsed. As a result the Byzantines fell back in disarray, but they were able to reform behind a long drystone wall that marked a field boundary, where many of the routed Byzantine infantry who had previously fled also rallied, using stones from the wall as missiles against the Normans, whose attack now faltered. 'Observing this,' reports Cinnamus, 'Richard rushed at the enemy accompanied by 36 knights', only to be unhorsed by a stone that struck his knee and then stabbed to death by one of the Apulian rebels in Doukas' army. Seeing this, the rest of the Normans fled.

Despite this and other successes, the Byzantines — outnumbered and deserted by their Apulian allies and Norman mercenaries — were eventually defeated at Brindisi 8 months later by King William II of Sicily.

COED EULO (COLESHILL), July or August 1157

In a narrow, densely-wooded pass at Basingwerk the Welsh under Owain Gwynedd threw up an earthwork road-block (comprising a ditch, or ditches) to obstruct the advance of the English under King Henry II. However, the king sent his main force head-on against the earthwork while he took a sizeable detachment through the adjacent woods to get in Owain's rear, 'plunging into the thick of the forest' as one account puts it. He took heavy losses from ambushes prepared against this eventuality by Owain's sons Cynan and Dafydd, but — despite the loss of at least 2 barons and the flight of the royal standard-bearer — he broke through behind Owain, who was thereby obliged to disengage and fall back to the west. Giraldus Cambrensis reports that the English were 'badly mauled' and lost many men.

SEMLIN, 8 July 1167

An Hungarian army advancing towards Sirmion was confronted by a Byzantine army commanded by Andronikos Kontostephanos, nephew of Emperor Manuel I. The Hungarians, under the *Nádorispán* Dénes, described by Cinnamus as a general 'experienced in many wars', numbered over 15,000 knights, archers (some presumably mounted) and light infantry under 37 ispáns. According to Niketas Choniates (who, however, says the Hungarian army consisted 'entirely of cavalry armed with spears') they drew up in a single, compact mass around Dénes' standard, which was so large it had to be mounted on a carroccio drawn by 4 yokes of oxen. The Byzantine army, comprising a typically cosmopolitan collection of mercenaries*, formed up in depth as follows: the vanguard was composed of Cumans, Turks and a few lance-armed cataphracts, and behind them came 3 divisions of native Byzantine cavalry side by side followed up by a line of infantry, archers and 'an armoured regiment of Turks'; there followed another line of Byzantine troops, then one of 'picked Byzantines and Germans, and also Turks', and finally Andronikos' own division, comprising elements of the Imperial household troops and Italian mercenaries, with Serbs bringing up the rear.

Being aware of the Hungarian custom of putting their best troops in the first line, Andronikos' plan was for the horse-archers of his own first line to advance and skirmish, but to wheel away to left and right when the Hungarians charged, thereby encircling them. In the event, however, the vanguard panicked and fled, carrying away with it the Byzantine left wing. By contrast the Byzantine right succeeded in holding and even pushing back the Hungarian left, and Andronikos led his reserve to their support and 'made a mighty onset' which finally routed the Hungarian army in the late evening.

Many Hungarians were captured, when they reached the Sava, by the Byzantines' river-fleet, Cinnamus recording the prisoners to have included 5 ispáns and about 800 men. In addition 'many thousands' had been killed in the battle, the booty taken including Dénes' standard and over 2,000 corselets stripped from the Hungarian dead.

CLAIS AN CHRÓ, May 1169

In 1166 Dermot Mac Murrough, a Leinster king, had been deposed and had fled to England, where he succeeded in generating a certain amount of sympathy for his cause. He returned to Ireland in 1167 with a handful of Anglo-Norman mercenaries, to be joined in May 1169 by a more substantial mercenary body comprising 40 knights, 60 mounted sergeants and perhaps 500 infantry, at least 300 of them Welsh archers, under Robert fitzStephen and Maurice de Prendergast; thus began indirectly the Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland. With these troops and somewhat over 500 loyal Leinstermen, Dermot marched on the Scandinavian town of Wexford, which capitulated after only a brief assault.

By the time he turned his attention to his bitter enemy, Donal Mac Gillapatrick of Ossory, Dermot's fortunes had improved to the point of mustering 3,000 men, his motley band having been reinforced by more Leinstermen and a reluctant Wexford contingent. Donal, learning of Dermot's advance against him, prepared a forest ambush, constructing a series of 3 ramparts and ditches, each rampart surmounted by a fence of intertwined branches, defended by a total of 5,000 men. The battle which ensued lasted from morning until evening when the English contingent, despite heavy losses, finally forced its way through the barricades, upon which the Ossorians fled.

Donal himself, however, rallied 1,700-2,000 men and pursued Dermot to a second woodland 'pass'. This was a place in which Dermot had been thrice defeated in the past and all but 43 of his Leinstermen, superstitious of it,

*For the organisation and composition of Byzantine armies in this period see *Armies and Enemies of the Crusades*.

panicked and fled into the woods. However, Prendergast detached 50 archers to cover his rear and then advanced into the pass, and as Donal and his men reached the open ground behind them the English knights suddenly turned and charged, scattering them in rout (the concealed Welsh archers presumably adding to the confusion). Encouraged by this success Dermot's Leinstermen plucked up their courage and emerged from their hiding places in the surrounding woods, charging into the midst of the fleeing Ossorians. Of these they slew at least 200 as they ran, though Donal himself escaped.

DUBLIN, June 1171

In an effort to regain his throne from the English, Asgall Mac Torquil (Haskulf Thorgilsson), deposed king of Dublin, hired a fleet comprising 30 ship-loads of mercenaries from Orkney, Man, the Hebrides and possibly Norway under the command of Eoan Mear — 'John the Mad' — a famous berserk. They landed 4,500-strong (others say 9-10,000) and marched on Dublin, which was held for Earl Richard de Clare ('Strongbow') by Miles de Cogan with 300 cavalry plus several hundred archers and infantry and some Irishmen.

Issuing from Dublin, Miles drew up with infantry in front and cavalry to the rear, but he was repulsed by the Scandinavians and forced to retire back into the city through the east gate. However, as the Scandinavians rushed after them they were attacked in the rear by more of Miles' men under his brother Richard, who had emerged from the city by another gate; it therefore seems more than likely that Miles' withdrawal was part of a prearranged plan. Turning in disorder to face this new threat gaps appeared in the Scandinavian ranks, at which Miles rallied his own troop and launched another charge, his knights penetrating the centre of the Scandinavian formation. At this the Scandinavians broke and fled, some of their Irish 'allies' turning on them and joining in the English pursuit. The 'Song of Dermot and the Earl' says that 1,500-2,000 of the Islesmen were killed, including John the Mad, and 500 drowned trying to reach their ships; on which the rest ('2,000') managed to escape. Haskulf Thorgilsson himself was captured after getting stuck in glutinous mud while trying to get to his ship; he was later ignominiously executed in his own hall.

Only a few months later, probably during August, a 60,000-strong army under the High King Rory O'Conor, advancing in support of Leinster rebels, arrived and laid siege to the city in turn, surrounding it with 4 stockaded camps. However, little attention was paid to security and on one afternoon at the beginning of September 3 small divisions of Anglo-Normans — comprising in all just 90-120 knights, 180 apparently mounted archers and 300 infantry — commanded by Strongbow himself, successfully broke into Rory's own camp in a surprise attack. For the loss of only one sergeant (wounded, according to the 'Song of Dermot') as many as 1,500 Irishmen were killed, the rest fleeing in rout. The Irishmen in the other 3 camps beat a hasty retreat on learning of the High King's defeat.

FORNHAM, 17 October 1173

Earl Robert of Leicester, with 80 knights and a force of 3,000 French and Flemish mercenaries, mostly infantry, was defeated in Suffolk by a larger royalist army, under the justiciar Richard de Lucy and the constable Humphrey de Bohun, which included 300 mercenary cavalry and some knights but was principally composed of a levy of local peasants, many armed with no more than flails or pitchforks. The rebels were fording the River Lark when the royalists attacked them. With his troops disordered and split in two by the river, Earl Robert's cavalry were overwhelmed by the royalists' superior numbers, after which his Flemish infantry, obviously unable to put themselves into any kind of order in time, were routed by the victorious royalist horse. They fled into the marshy fields along the riverbank where they were ruthlessly hunted down by the peasant levy, though more allegedly drowned than were actually killed in combat. Earl Robert himself was amongst those taken prisoner.

LEGNANO, 29 May 1176

While campaigning in Italy a German army of 2,500-3,500 cavalry and some 500 Italian infantry under Emperor Frederick I was faced by a considerably larger Lombard League force including over 4,000 cavalry from Milan, Lodi, Novara, Vercelli, Piacenza, Brescia, Verona and the Marches. In the early hours the Lombards' 700-strong cavalry vanguard encountered the Germans' own vanguard of 300 which, despite being heavily outnumbered, was able to withstand their attack until Frederick's main body had deployed. The Lombard army meanwhile drew up as 4 divisions of cavalry in column with a phalanx of Milanese infantry to the rear gathered round their carroccio. Frederick's small contingent of infantry seem to have taken no part in the battle, being left to guard the army's baggage.

The charge of the German horse routed each of the Lombard cavalry divisions in turn and even began to push back the infantry, but a contingent of Milanese knights succeeded in rallying and, reinforced by a fresh body of Brescian cavalry that they encountered, charged into the German flank. In the ensuing confusion of the melee round the

Milanese carroccio Frederick's standard-bearer had already been killed, and now Frederick himself was unhorsed, so that the Germans, assuming from the absence of his standard that the Emperor was dead, broke and fled. However, many were taken prisoner while others drowned trying to cross the River Ticino 9 miles to their rear. Frederick himself escaped almost alone and was still thought to be dead when he reached Pavia 3 days later.

ALARCOS, 19 July 1195

A large force of Almohades under Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur defeated a much smaller Castilian army under Alfonso VIII. The Moslems drew up with their first line made up of Andalusian cavalry on the right and Almohades on the left and centre (the latter comprising the army's veterans), with a second line of African troops arrayed in close order, mostly bow- and javelin-armed. In addition there was a reserve division several thousand-strong which included Negro guardsmen.

Alfonso's 8,000 cavalry broke through the centre of the Moslem front line at their third charge, but the gap thus created was closed behind them and, disorganised and unsupported by infantry, they were surrounded by the Almohade archers and cavalry of the second line and decimated by volleys of arrows and javelins. Even Alfonso's rearguard, which he led into the fray in a last desperate effort, was unable to retrieve the situation. After this the Moslems' front line rallied and made a general advance against the Castilian infantry who, without the support of their cavalry, were rapidly routed with heavy losses. Some made a stand in a pass between La Zarzuela and Darazutan but were killed or taken captive. Others, including Alfonso himself and the Master of Calatrava, escaped to the castle of Guadalherza, while yet others took refuge in Alarcos, which the Almohades subsequently captured.

20-25,000 Castilians were reputedly killed or taken captive in the battle, the Master of Santiago being amongst the dead, while legend has it that the Moslems lost only 500 men.

LAS NAVAS DE TOLOSA, 16 July 1212

Proclaimed a crusade, a Spanish campaign against the Almohades mustered 60-100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, including Western European knights in addition to contingents from Castile, Navarre, Aragon and Portugal as well as Templars, Hospitallers and the Spanish Military Orders of Calatrava and Santiago. (However, many of the non-Spanish crusaders deserted on the march.) Confronted by such a formidable array, and despite their overwhelming superiority in numbers (the chroniclers records 460-600,000 men, including 100-185,000 cavalry and 30,000 Negro guards; of course, all these figures need to be scaled down drastically) the Almohades, under Caliph Mohammed abu-'Abd-Allah, withdrew south of the Sierra Morena. Here the Spanish were unable to force a defended pass, but they were eventually guided through the mountains by a local shepherd and pitched their camp close to that of Mohammed. For 2 days thereafter neither side moved, though the Almohades took the opportunity to fortify their camp.

On the third day the Spanish opened the battle with a series of cavalry charges by their vanguard, under Count Diego Lopéz of Haro, which were repulsed with heavy losses. However, a counter-attack by the Moslem centre (of Andalusian heavy cavalry) and right (which, with the left, was made up of Mauritanian light cavalry) was contained by the infantry of the Spanish centre, which included the Military Orders, commanded by Gonzalo Nuñez de Lara; it was probably at this stage that Mohammed's Andalusian contingents deserted en masse, leaving him with only the African regiments. The Spanish reserve division, under Alfonso VIII of Castile, then advanced and reinforced the wings (left and right under Pere II of Aragon and Sancho VII of Navarre respectively), as a result of which the Almohade left flank was rolled up, King Sancho's division pushing right up to Mohammed's gold-embroidered, red velvet tent in the centre of the Moslem camp, surrounded by a stockade reinforced with chains. Here, unable to flee because of being roped together ankle-to-ankle, Mohammed's infantry and his Negro guards put up a stiff fight before they were overwhelmed.* Mohammed himself escaped to Seville with 4,000 men, but he was murdered a year later by his own guards (perhaps survivors of the battle).

Almohades casualties were very high, including many trampled to death or suffocated in the rout; contemporaries record figures as high as 60-150,000, one claiming that only 1,000 Moslems escaped from the battlefield alive. Even Alfonso VIII wrote that according to information received from prisoners the Moslems lost 100,000 men, as opposed to only 25-30 casualties in the whole Spanish army! However, his estimate of the Christian dead is rather optimistic since it is known from other sources that the Military Orders at least suffered severe losses, and it can be

*It was in consequence of King Sancho's victory over Mohammed's guards in this battle that an orle of gold chain with in its centre an emerald, taken as part of the spoils, thereafter formed the royal arms of Navarre. (See shield clxxx in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*.)

safely assumed that the destruction of the Moslem host cost Alfonso's army dearly. One anecdote adds that the broken arrows and lances of the Almohade army kept the Spanish campfires burning for 3 days.

MURET, 12 September 1213

This was the main battle of the Albigensian Crusade, which had been launched against the Cathar heretics of southern France in 1208. Allied with Count Raymond of Toulouse and other Languedoc nobles, King Pere II of Aragon advanced against the town of Muret where Simon de Montfort, leader of the crusaders, had arrived shortly before. The latter had with him only about 270 knights, 5-6,000 mounted sergeants and 700 infantry, while the Aragonese and southern French mustered perhaps 2-4,000 horsemen (of whom nearly 1,000 were Aragonese, mainly Catalans) and a larger number of infantry (mainly Toulousan communal militiamen) improbably put as high as 30-40,000 men by some sources.

Repulsed by the crusader infantry after attempting to force entry into Muret through an open gate, the first of the allies' 3 cavalry divisions (under the Comte de Foix) withdrew to a distance and broke formation to take a meal, undoubtedly assuming that de Montfort had been successfully trapped within. However, while the allied assault was being repulsed de Montfort's cavalry had emerged from Muret in 3 divisions by another gate and, having formed up, the first now charged the Comte de Foix's disorganised band in flank and routed it after only a brief melee. Joined by its second division under William d'Encontre, the crusader cavalry then wheeled and charged into the centre of the allies' main battle under King Pere as it advanced towards them, while the crusaders' third division, under de Montfort himself, charged into its left wing, which had been exposed by the flight of an Aragonese flank detachment following the unhorsing of its commander. It was at about this stage that Pere, fighting in the front line as an ordinary knight, was killed, while his retinue of some 500 men was virtually wiped out. A rout ensued, only Raymond of Toulouse and most of the uncommitted third allied division managing to escape. The crusader pursuit was called off when it became apparent that the allies were incapable of rallying, de Montfort reforming and turning back towards Muret. The allied infantry, however, who had withdrawn into their encampment, appear to have misinterpreted the results of the main battle as a victory, despite the initial rout of the Comte de Foix's cavalry and some of their own number. Now they sallied out from their camp and commenced an assault on Muret from all sides, only realising their folly when they saw de Montfort returning victorious and about to fall on their rear. They broke in panic and were cut down en masse as they ran.

Allied losses were enormous, the chroniclers recording 15-20,000 dead. As well as those killed outright in the battle many drowned in the River Garonne as they tried to escape the crusader pursuit, while in addition all of the wounded were killed by the victors. De Montfort's own losses are alleged to have totalled no more than one knight and 3 or 8 sergeants. The Albigensian Crusade dragged on intermittently for many years thereafter, right up until 1244 when the last Cathar stronghold capitulated. Simon de Montfort himself was killed at the siege of Toulouse in 1218.

STEPPES, 13 October 1213

Confronted by a combined army under the Prince-bishop of Liége and Count Louis of Looz while plundering the territory of the former, a Brabançon army under Duke Henry I formed up for battle on high ground. Both sides arrayed themselves with infantry in the centre and cavalry on both wings, Count Louis and Thierry de Rochefort commanding the cavalry of the Liégeois right and left respectively.

As the Liégeois advanced the Brabançon infantry charged downhill from their position, the impetus of their attack pushing back the Prince-bishop's men in disorder. On the right Count Louis, after some initial success, was driven from the field by the cavalry of the Brabançon left, reinforced by Duke Henry. The Brabançon cavalry on the opposite flank, however, were routed in a fierce charge by Thierry, and the Liégeois infantry rallied on seeing this and counterattacked the infantry of the Brabançon centre, which broke and fled, the remainder of their cavalry following suit.

When Count Louis returned to the field of combat, having successfully rallied his own cavalry, the battle was already over. The Brabançons had lost 3,000 dead and a further 4,000 captured, including many knights.

BOUVINES, 27 July 1214

When an allied army of Germans, Flemings and English-employed mercenaries invading northern France under Emperor Otto IV encountered the smaller French army under Philippe Augustus the French retired towards the town of Bouvines, their rearguard successfully repulsing Otto's Flemish vanguard in 5 successive skirmishes. Nearing a bridge spanning the River Marque, however, Philippe realised that because of the pressure on his

rearguard he could not hope to reach safety on the far bank. He therefore turned about and drew up his army for battle in 3 divisions of 3 lines each, with crossbowmen in the first line, other infantry in the second, and cavalry in the third.

The Imperial army drew up with centre, under Otto, of Germans, Brabançons and Flemings, with spear-armed infantry in front and cavalry behind; the left flank of cavalry and infantry from Flanders and Hainault under Ferdinand of Portugal, Comte de Flandres; and the right almost entirely of English-employed mercenaries — both cavalry and Brabançon infantry — under William Longespée, Earl of Salisbury, Renaud de Dammartin, Comte de Boulogne, and Hugues de Boves. According to some authorities the Imperial army may have totalled about 6,000 cavalry and 18,000 infantry, but it was probably much smaller; several contemporary sources say the allied knights numbered only 1,300-1,500, while J. F. Verbruggen calculates that their infantry are unlikely to have exceeded 7,500 men. Since Philippe's infantry had crossed the bridge earlier and were only now returning to the field the smaller French army had to be spread much thinner than the Germans so as to forestall any attempts at outflanking. However, just before battle opened the infantry (mainly communal militiamen) joined the fighting line, bringing French strength up to perhaps 1,200-1,300 knights and 5-6,000 infantry.

The allied plan had been to charge the French centre and both flanks simultaneously, but the French seized the initiative before the Germans were ready to act and the battle began with a charge by some 800 knights and light cavalry against Otto's left wing. Almost at the same moment the Imperial centre advanced against the communal militia drawn up before King Philippe's division, driving them back onto the cavalry behind; Otto's Lowland infantry then joined the attack and a general melee ensued, the end product of which was that the entire Imperial centre was obliged to fall back, Otto himself only narrowly escaping capture. The allied left wing had meanwhile collapsed after a protracted cavalry melee lasting some 3 hours, at the end of which Count Ferdinand, wounded and unhorsed, had been taken prisoner. Otto himself, unnerved by his own near-capture, had already quit the field, and it was probably his flight that prompted the departure of Hugues de Boves and the dukes of Brabant and Limbourg along with most of the Lowland knights 'in groups, in hundreds, in fifties'. William Longespée was captured soon after, after being struck from his horse by the mace of a French bishop.

However, one company on the right flank — of 400 or 700 mercenary Brabançon infantry and a body of knights under Count Renaud — continued to fight on long after the remainder of the Imperial army had been put to flight. Renaud had formed up the spear-armed infantry in a circle, from which the knights could charge out at the French and on which they could rally to reform and rest. They were eventually surrounded and overwhelmed by the concerted onslaught of perhaps 3,000 French infantry and cavalry attacking from all sides simultaneously.

Imperialist casualties included 131 German and Flemish knights captured for ransom, including the Earl of Salisbury, the counts of Boulogne and Flanders, 2 other knights and 25 bannerets, and about 170 more were killed. Except for 1,000 Imperialists known to have been taken prisoner, losses of infantry and sergeants are not recorded for either side.

THE FAIR OF LINCOLN, 20 May 1217

In the face of a royalist army of 406 knights, 250 or 317 mercenary crossbowmen and an unknown but small number of foot-sergeants, a combined army of rebel barons and their French allies besieging Lincoln castle withdrew within the old walled Roman portion of the city, having mistakenly supposed that the royalist force was in fact larger than their own, which numbered 611 knights and 1,000 infantrymen. (This error resulted from the royalist commander, William le Marshal, having left a number of standards with his baggage-train, which from a distance therefore resembled a substantial body of troops.) The royalists were nevertheless able to enter Lincoln via a postern in the castle and also by breaking through an 'ancient' blocked gateway in the west wall, surprising the rebels between the castle and the cathedral. The royalist crossbowmen, under Fawkes de Bréauté, sallying from the castle, were repulsed, but the knights were successful in overrunning the rebels' siege-engines and routing the Frenchmen in a street-fight, killing their commander, the Comte de Perche. The rebels' flight was hampered at a narrow gate by a panic-stricken cow, as a result of which some 3-400 knights and 3 rebel earls were captured by the victorious royalists, whose own losses totalled just one knight and a handful of infantry.

DOVER, 24 August 1217

Abandoning his own siege of Dover following the defeat of his northern forces at Lincoln, Prince Louis (later Louis VIII) of France, to whom the rebel barons had offered the English crown, summoned reinforcements from Calais. These sailed over 900-strong in 70 *nefs* and 10 large warships under Eustace the Monk, the majority of them doubtless in the warships with their supplies and equipment in the nefs. They were intercepted en route to London by an English fleet of 16 Cinque Ports vessels and 20 smaller craft commanded by the justiciar Hubert de Burgh.

These managed to get to windward of the larger French fleet and then bore down on it from behind, laying down a heavy barrage of crossbow-fire and then throwing powdered quicklime, which choked and blinded the French. One by one the French vessels were overtaken and boarded, Eustace's own being surrounded by 4 English ships when it was unable to fire its trebuchet because of a severe list. Some others sank, their sides 'perforated' (either by missiles or as a result of collisions), and only 15 ships are said to have escaped. Eustace was captured and unceremoniously beheaded on his ship's rail.

As a direct result of this decisive defeat Prince Louis, with his lines of communication cut, renounced his claim to the throne and evacuated his troops from England.

KHALKHA, 31 May 1223

Following the execution of 10 Mongol envoys by Mstislav the Daring of Galicia a Mongol army under Subutai and Chepe invaded Russia. To face them the Russians mustered 82,000 men under 18 princes, including several thousands of Cuman cavalry under Khan Basti but consisting largely of militia infantry. Without awaiting the bulk of this army, Mstislav crossed the Dneiper with only 10,000 men and succeeded in routing the Mongol vanguard. In consequence of this defeat Subutai began a withdrawal, and the main Russian army now crossed the Dneiper in pursuit, reaching the River Khalkha (probably a tributary of the Kalmius) after a 9-12 day march.

Overcome by impatience again, Mstislav attacked the Mongol army with only his own cavalry and the Cumans, but the latter proved unreliable and soon fled, obliging the Russians to do the same. As a result the whole force was driven back in rout onto the main army. The Mongol pursuit was close and the Russian rout was made worse by Mstislav who, successfully recrossing the Dneiper, ordered all the boats to be destroyed to prevent pursuit. At the same time the Cumans took advantage of the confusion to plunder the Russian rear. The Russian losses in this phase of the battle were severe, including 6 princes and 70 Boyars.

Only 10,000 Kievan militia remained in the field, under their own prince, also named Mstislav, holding out against the Mongols for 3 days from their stockaded camp on a hill on the banks of the Khalkha. When they finally surrendered the Mongols massacred all of them, casualties including 3 more princes, Mstislav of Kiev among them. According to one source only a tenth of the Russians involved in this distrastrous campaign lived through it, but since 9 out of the 18 princes who led them survived it seems more likely that their army suffered about 50 per cent casualties. The Mongols failed to follow up this decisive victory, instead turning back to join Genghis Khan in the east. En route they were ambushed by the Volga Bulgars and suffered heavy losses.

SIAULIAI (SAULE), Autumn 1236

Persuaded against his will by visiting crusaders to launch a raid into Samogitia, Master Volquin Schenk led the Knights of the Sword to their destruction in this little-known engagement, which took place either at Saule in Semgallia or at Siauliai in Lithuania. After plundering for several days, the raiders found their way blocked by a small number of Samogitian and Semgallian tribesmen in a marshy place close by a river. Volquin's Knights advocated that they should attack the Samogitians straight away, despite the fact that evening was drawing in; the crusaders, however, afraid of losing their horses in the surrounding marshlands in the darkness, preferred to wait until morning, by which time the Samogitians' numbers had increased dramatically. Despite the unfavourable odds, Volquin had no choice but to fight since the enemy held the only known path through the swamp.

The 'Livonian Rhymed Chronicle' relates that because of the marshy nature of the battlefield the Knights 'could offer but weak resistance, and they were cut down like women', most of those who fled being overtaken and killed by the lighter-armed tribesmen. 'The Master and his Brothers put up a heroic defense until their horses were slain', adds the chronicle, 'and even then they fought on foot and felled many men before they were vanquished ....48 made this stand and were attacked repeatedly. Finally, and with great difficulty, the Lithuanians felled them with long spears.' Only 10 per cent of the Order's army is said to have survived this disaster, Volquin and half of the Sword Brethren being among the dead. Several authorities assert that the Lithuanians' commander in the battle was none other than Mindaugas, but others say he is more likely to have been Vykintas, a leading Samogitian chieftain.

CORTENUOVA, 27 November 1237

After the fall of the Lombard League city of Montechiaro an Imperial (in this instance Sicilian) army under Emperor Frederick II marched on Brescia. However, he was prevented from approaching the city by the proximity of a Lombard army of over 10,000 men. Frederick therefore marched southwards to lure them away from Brescia, and the Lombards, afraid that he would instead attack other undefended towns, were obliged to follow. Eventually, in mid-November, the 2 armies found themselves facing each other across a marshy tributary of the River Oglio. Since the Imperial heavy cavalry (largely German) could not operate on the marshy ground the situation was

advantageous to the Lombards, but they declined to make an attack. Frederick therefore resolved to make a feint to lure the Lombards away from their position.

He traversed the Oglio, which lay in his rear, and destroyed the bridges in sight of the Lombards once he had crossed, intending to trick them into thinking he was withdrawing into winter quarters at Cremona. To maintain this deception he even despatched his infantry and baggage towards the town, while he retained his 2,000 German heavy cavalry, 800 Italian cavalry (500 from Padua, Treviso, Viacenza and Verona, 100 from Tortona and 200 from Bergamo) and 7-10,000 Saracen infantry and proceeded upstream in the hope of intercepting the unsuspecting Lombard army.

The Lombards, confident that Frederick had retired, had meanwhile moved north, crossed the Oglio by other bridges and encamped at Pontoglio where, in mid-afternoon, the Imperial cavalry surprised them. After an hour's melee the vanguard division routed the Lombard cavalry, composed of contingents from Milan and Piacenza, of whom most fled; some, however, rallied on the infantry who, despite being caught so completely unprepared, managed to rally round the Milanese carroccio at Cortenuova before the arrival of the main body of the Imperial army under Frederick. The German cavalry then launched repeated charges against the Lombard phalanx, which was protected by the village of Cortenuova to its rear and a small ditch to its front. Frederick eventually halted his attack to await the arrival of his Saracen archers (though other authorities say they had already joined him and were involved in the assaults on the carroccio); either way, the attack was called off until morning, and the Lombards took the opportunity to abandon their carroccio and Cortenuova under cover of darkness, though they first took their flag from the former.

The Imperial pursuit, which began at dawn, was highly successful. In total the Lombards had suffered perhaps 10,000 casualties, killed or captured, including 1,100 knights, the Milanese alone losing 3,000 infantry and 800 knights including their podesta, who was captured. This victory practically finished the Lombard League, though 4 towns — Milan, Brescia, Piacenza and Bologna — continued to hold out.

LIEGNITZ, 9 April 1241

Advancing to Wahlstatt near Liegnitz a Mongol army of perhaps 100,000 men under Kaidu and Baidar encountered a Polish army of probably some 10,000 men (others claim 20-30,000) under Duke Henry II of Silesia. Henry's forces consisted principally of Silesians and Moravians (the latter under Count Boleslav), plus some Germans and contingents of Templars (500 men are said to have been raised from the Order's estates, commanded by 9 brethren), Teutonic Knights* and Hospitallers. They drew up in 4 divisions, three consisting of cavalry (two made up of Silesians and other Poles, the third of Germans) and one of Silesian peasant infantry.

The Mongols, likewise arrayed in 4 divisions (3 of 20,000 men each and one of 40,000 in reserve), laid down a smoke screen by burning reeds in order to conceal their movements. Their light cavalry disorganised the Polish vanguard with showers of arrows and the Mongol attack which followed threw it back in confusion. However, it rallied on the other two cavalry divisions and all three then counterattacked and drove off the Mongols. The Mongol flight, however, was probably feigned since Henry's cavalry had both their flanks enveloped as they advanced in pursuit. In the subsequent confusion the majority of one division inexplicably withdrew, leaving the seriously weakened Poles to be driven from the field in rout when the Mongols' reserve division advanced into the melee. Henry himself was overtaken and killed in the pursuit and the Poles allegedly suffered 10-40,000 casualties in addition. A Bohemian army of 50,000 under Henry's brother-in-law, King Wenceslas, which had been marching to reinforce him, turned back on hearing of this defeat.

MOHI, 11 April 1241

Only 2 days after Kaidu's victory at Liegnitz (some actually claim it was the same day), a numerically inferior Mongol army advancing to the Danube under Subutai and Batu Khan was confronted by an Hungarian army under King Bela IV that allegedly numbered 100,000 men and included many Cumans. Amongst the Hungarians' principal commanders were 2 archbishops (Ugolin of Kolocza and Matthias of Gran), 3 or 4 bishops and Bela's brother (or son) Duke Coloman, sometimes described as king of Ruthenia.

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*A lot of modern authorities mistakenly claim that the Teutonic Knights were led by their Hochmeister and that he was killed in the battle. (This would have been Conrad of Thuringia, who actually died on a visit to Rome.) Others say the Knights were led by the Prussian Landmeister, Poppo von Osternach. The truth of the matter, however, is that there is actually little or no evidence to indicate that any troops were despatched from Prussia at all. The confusion arises from the fact that Poppo resigned as Prussian Landmeister in 1241 and much later, after having been Hochmeister from 1253-56, was coincidentally buried at Liegnitz.

The Mongols withdrew across the River Sajó and the Hungarians pursued to the banks of the river and pitched their camp in a cramped position, surrounding it with a laager of wagons chained together. Despite their numerical strength the Hungarians' advantage was dubious, for the army seethed with disaffection, many of Bela's chief barons secretly hoping that he would be defeated. In addition they had chosen a bad position, where the close proximity of a number of rivers was to prevent them from deploying and utilising to advantage their considerable numbers. Batu Khan is himself supposed to have observed of the encamped Hungarian army that it was like a great flock of sheep 'driven into tight little pens.'

At dawn the congested Hungarian camp was subjected to arrow-fire and a naptha bombardment from 7 catapults (some authorities claiming that the Mongols actually employed gunpowder artillery). Under cover of this barrage the main Mongol body, comprising 3 *toumans* under Batu, made a frontal assault against a bridge that was protected by just 1,000 men, while another body of Mongols under Subutai, which had forded the Sajó during the night, attacked the Hungarians in flank and rear. Disordered, too close-packed to manoeuvre and under attack from all sides, the Hungarian army had disintegrated by noon. The Mongol pursuit lasted for 2 days, by which time a total of 40-100,000 Hungarians had allegedly died. Bela himself was pursued as far as the Adriatic but succeeded in escaping, though Coloman and all the archbishops and bishops were among those killed.

It is difficult to determine just how much further into Europe the Mongols might have penetrated if this campaign had continued. Certainly they reached Korneuberg and Wiener Neustadt, only 30 miles south of Vienna. However, the news which reached them there and caused their withdrawal probably saved Western Europe from 'a nasty ravage' and Eastern Europe from permanent Mongol occupation such as befell parts of Russia; for, hearing that Khan Ogodai had died, they returned to the east for the election of his successor.

THE ICE SLAUGHTER, 5 April 1242

In this famous battle on frozen Lake Peipus — graphically immortalised (and fictionalised) in Eisenstein's classic film 'Alexander Nevsky' — the Livonian Teutonic Knights were heavily defeated by the Novgorodian Russians under Alexander Nevski (so-named after his defeat of a Swedish army on the River Neva two years before). Both sides mustered large and fairly equal armies, all of the Teutonic Knights' available forces in Livonia allegedly being present under their Landmeister, Dietrich von Grüningen, reinforced by subject Estonian tribesmen and Danish auxiliaries. (A modern authority calculates that the Bishop of Dorpat supplied 300 knights and about 1,000 Estonians, and Danish Estonia provided a further 200 knights and a levy of 2 men from each village in their territory, ie, approximately another 1,000 Estonians. See *The Estonian Vikings* by Edgar Saks.) Nevski's army included a contingent from Suzdal.

Hearing of the Teutonic Knights' approach, Nevski arrayed his forces on the lakeside at a place called Raven's Rock. He appears to have drawn up with his infantry to the fore to absorb the impact of the Knights' charge, keeping his cavalry in reserve. The battle began at daybreak, with the Germans advancing confidently in wedge formation. Their charge broke through the Russian centre before Nevski in turn charged into one flank of the wedge and threw them into disorder. The Order's forces broke and fled across the ice, being pursued by the Russians almost to the far shore, many more drowning as the ice broke up under their weight.

More than 400 of the Germans and a countless number of Estonians were killed and 50 more Germans were captured according to the 'Novgorod Chronicle', though the 'Livonian Rhymed Chronicle' puts the losses of the Brethren themselves at just 20 dead and 6 captured, adding that some at least of the Estonians (the contingent from Dorpat) also escaped.

TAILLEBOURG, 20 July 1242

Encouraged by the promise of Poitevin assistance from the rebellious Hugh de Lusignan, Comte de la Marche, King Henry III of England launched a campaign intended to recapture from the French the province of Poitou, lost to them in 1224-25. Matthew Paris records the strength of the English, the Gascons and their Poitevin allies as 1,600 knights (of whom only 80 were English), 700 mercenary crossbowmen, and 20,000 other foot-soldiers levied from the towns of Gascony, while the French — under King Louis IX — had 4,000 knights and 20,000 infantry.

The two armies confronted each other at the castle of Taillebourg, which Joinville describes as 'seated on an evil river called La Charente, at a point where one cannot pass except over a very narrow stone bridge.' Henry positioned a strong guard on the bridge, but when Louis launched an attack straight across the river, landing with a body of about 1,000 knights, sergeants and crossbowmen from a flotilla of boats and pontoons, this guard fell back for fear of being taken in the rear, thus allowing the main part of the French army to cross over. Joinville reports that Louis' landing initially met with fierce resistance, but it seems that as soon as the bridge was captured Henry fell

back to the fortified town of Saintes with the French in such close pursuit that several of them got into the town with the Anglo-Poitevins and were captured. Henry subsequently sent his brother, Earl Richard of Cornwall, to make a truce with the French, and that same night set out for Gascony, abandoning his camp and baggage to the French. Hugh de Lusignan and the other Poitevin rebels wasted no time in making their own peace with Louis, and the subsequent 5-year treaty drawn up between England and France left the latter firmly in possession of all its conquests.

DURBEN, 13 June 1260

Intercepting a column of 4,000 Samogitians and Semgallians returning from a raid into Kurland, an army of Livonian Teutonic Knights was heavily defeated. The Knights, under their Landmeister, Burchard von Hornhausen, included reinforcements from Prussia under the Order's Marshal, plus Danish vassals from Estonia and auxiliary Prussian and Livonian tribesmen; all of these fought mounted, despite the advice of a Prussian chieftain who had warned the brethren that it would be better to have the whole army dismount in order to hinder attempts at premature flight. As he had predicted, when the battle began most of the Kurs and Estonians took to their heels, leaving their own chieftains and the Teutonic Knights with their Prussian auxiliaries to face the Samogitians alone. Inevitably, therefore, after a hard-fought battle that lasted several hours the heavily outnumbered Knights were overwhelmed, suffering massive losses that included not only the Landmeister and the Marshal of Prussia but also 150 other brethren and 'many' crusaders. This victory over the Order inspired a general revolt amongst the Prussians that took 17 years of bitter fighting to put down.

MONTAPERTI, 4 September 1260

A Florentine army including allied contingents from Lucca, Arezzo, Orvieta, Pistoia and other towns, marching against the rival city of Siena, encamped behind the river Arbia only 3 miles short of its objective. In the early hours of the morning the outnumbered Sienese crossed the river and caught the Florentines unprepared, attacking in 3 divisions with 800 German mercenary cavalry under Count Giordano Lancia spearheading the assault, followed by the Sienese cavalry and infantry in 2 separate divisions. The Florentines apparently did not even have time to draw up in any kind of battle-array and many of them panicked and ran, notably Florence's own cavalry (who suffered only 36 casualties as a result and were consequently accused of treachery). The Florentine infantry, on the other hand, gathered round their carroccio and fought doggedly on until a fourth Sienese division under Count Arras (Giordano's seneschal), which had worked round behind one flank and waited in hiding, launched itself into the Florentine rear. A rout inevitably ensued, though a few infantry rallied on the castle of Montaperti and held out until late in the day.

Out of a total strength of perhaps 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, a conservative (ie, Florentine) estimate records that Florence and her allies lost 2,500 men killed and 1,500 captured, the infantry contingents of Florence, Lucca and Orvieta suffering particularly heavy losses. However, considering the scale of disaster that contemporaries judged this defeat to be it would seem necessary to at least double these losses in order to arrive at a realistic figure. In addition the Florentine carroccio was captured.

LARGS, 1 October 1263

Following a Scottish raid on the Isle of Skye, at that time part of the kingdom of Norway, a large Norse fleet under King Hakon IV (160 ships and 20,000 men according to the 14th century 'Scotichcronicon') sailed against Scotland. Amongst its commanders were King Dugald of the Hebrides, King Magnus of Man and Earl Magnus of Orkney. When the fleet was anchored in the Firth of Clyde a severe night storm caused 5 ships to drag their anchors and run aground, and the next day a small body of Scots attacked these but withdrew when more Norsemen began to land from their ships' boats. According to the contemporary 'Saga of Hakon Hakonsson', by the time a locally-mustered Scots army arrived a day later there were some 8-900 Norsemen on shore including Hakon himself and 60 of his bodyguard; the Scots force improbably numbered about 500 well-equipped knights, many on barded horses, and a large number of poorly-armed infantry, most of them either archers or axemen (though many apparently threw stones as they attacked). On their approach Hakon's bodyguard persuaded him to return to the fleet in order to send back reinforcements.

As the Scots advanced one body of 200 Norsemen under a certain Ogmund Crow-dance, separated from the rest, began to fall back to the beach in some disarray, and seeing this the others thought they were in flight. A general panic set in amongst the Norse, some attempting to make off in their boats, most of which overturned and sank since a storm had again blown up. Outnumbered 10 to 1 the remaining Norsemen rallied round one of the beached longboats and a fierce fight ensued. Reinforcements, hampered by the storm, were only able to land in small numbers, but even so as the Norse gradually increased in strength towards evening the Scots fell back and eventually broke and fled. The Norsemen were then able to return to their ships. Their losses were only slight

(though they included Ogmund and several other chief men), the Scots losing considerably more; later sources which record up to 16-24,000 Norse and 5,000 Scots dead are pure fantasy. A few days after the battle Hakon sent his gestrs ashore to burn the stranded ships.

The Norse fleet subsequently withdrew to Orkney, where Hakon died only 2 months later. In 1266 Norway finally surrendered control of Man and the Western Isles to Scotland for a fee of 4,000 silver marks and an annual tribute of another 100 silver marks.

LEWES, 14 May 1264

A numerically inferior army of rebel barons under Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester (third son of the victor of Muret) faced the royalist forces of King Henry III and Prince Edward, achieving partial surprise by an early morning advance. Contemporary sources claim the armies totalled perhaps 40,000 and 60,000 men respectively, but modern estimates have reduced these figures to a more plausible 5,000 and 10,000. The royalist army allegedly contained as many as 1,500 cavalry on barded horses to the barons' 600. De Montfort organised his force in 3 divisions, the right under his sons Henry and Guy, the centre under Gilbert de Clare, Earl of Gloucester, and the left of Londoners, mainly infantry. Simon himself commanded a reserve division, planting his standard on nearby Offham Hill to mislead the royalists.

The first royalists onto the field were the majority of the cavalry under Prince Edward who, without more ado, charged and broke the Londoners on the baronial left, his cavalry then losing formation in disorganised pursuit. The remainder of the royalists had meanwhile formed up in 2 division, the right under Henry facing de Clare, and the left under Earl Richard of Cornwall facing the de Montfort brothers. Richard's division broke under a hail of arrows and slingstones, losing many men both killed and captured, and when the baronial centre and right, reinforced by Simon's reserve, charged into them the totally disorganised royalists fell back onto the town itself, reforming round the castle.

Edward succeeded in rallying his cavalry only after several hours, returning to the field in the early afternoon with men and horses too exhausted to be of much practical use. However by this time both Henry and Richard of Cornwall had been taken prisoner, the battlefield was practically deserted, and the rebels were almost in complete possession of the town. After joining the last few royalists still resisting Edward was captured too.

One source claims that the total losses of the two armies were not high in comparison to the number of men involved, though some contemporaries claim there were an unlikely 20-60,000 dead. More reliable sources record the figures of 5-6,000 dead, and certainly the royalists suffered at least 2,700 and possibly as many as 4,500 casualties.

THE MURDER OF EVESHAM, 4 August 1265

Unaware that his son and namesake Simon had already been defeated at the Battle of Kenilworth, Simon de Montfort crossed the Avon expecting to meet up with him. When he sighted an army approaching during a thunderstorm 2 days later he mistook it for that of the younger Simon, while in reality it was a superior royalist army of perhaps 7,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry under Prince Edward; another source records the royalists to have outnumbered de Montfort by as many as 7 to 2. The rebels were caught completely off their guard, and with a detached royalist force under Roger Mortimer having circled their position at Evesham and seized a bridge over the Avon in their rear they were trapped. Edward's army, arranged in 2 divisions, appears to have swept round Simon's flanks when he advanced in column, and attacked from all sides, until de Montfort's knights were forced into a circle and gradually beaten down. King Henry himself, still accompanying de Montfort as a prisoner, was wounded by royalist soldiers before being recognised and extricated from the melee.

De Montfort was killed and his army massacred, his light-armed Welsh infantry — who had fled before the first attack — being hunted down by the victorious royalists. Rebel casualties perhaps totalled as many as 160-180 knights, 18 of them barons, plus 220 esquires and 2,000 infantry, as well as perhaps 5,000 Welshmen. However, another source records the whole baronial army to have numbered only 5,000 infantry and 350 cavalry, which seems more probable. Edward's losses are recorded as just 20 knights and allegedly 2,000 infantry. In the words of a contemporary, 'such was the murder of Evesham, for a battle it was not'.

BENEVENTO, 26 February 1266

This campaign against King Manfred of Sicily was declared a crusade by Pope Clement IV, who had requested French assistance against the Sicilians. The French army under Charles d'Anjou, containing a large number of Flemish and French mercenaries as well as some Italians, initially consisted of 6,000 cavalry, 600 mounted

crossbowmen and 20,000 infantry, of whom about half were also crossbowmen. However, by the time of battle it was a considerably smaller army, since by this time the French were suffering from hunger and a shortage of horses.

The Sicilian army consisted of 1,200 German mercenary heavy cavalry under Giordano Lancia (largely equipped with 'plate' armour, undoubtedly coats-of-plates), 1,000 Tuscan and Lombard mercenary cavalry under Prince Galvano Lancia of Salerno, about 1,000 Sicilian feudal cavalry, 3-400 Saracen light cavalry, and a large number of Saracen infantry archers. They formed up with the infantry archers to the fore followed by 3 lines of cavalry, the first composed of Germans, the second of Italians and Saracens, and the third of the Sicilian feudal contingents. The French cavalry also formed up in 3 lines, the first of 900 from Provence under Hugues de Mirepoix, Marshal of France, and Philippe de Montfort; the second of 1,000 from the Languedoc and Central France under Charles himself, plus 400 Italians under Guy Guerra of Florence; and the third of 700 from Northern France and Flanders under the Constable, Guy le Brun, and Count Robert of Flanders. Each French cavalryman was accompanied by about 2 infantrymen whose task was to finish off the Sicilian wounded, while further infantry, including a large number of crossbowmen, were positioned in front of the first line to skirmish with the Saracens. The French had the advantage of the terrain, in addition to which the Sicilian army had to negotiate a narrow bridge across the River Calore to reach them; this caused considerable gaps to appear between their divisions.

The Saracen archers opened the battle, advancing before being ordered to do so. They routed the infantry sent against them but were themselves routed in turn by the first line of French cavalry, who then clashed with the German heavy cavalry. The latter advanced at a slow trot, probably in wedge formation, keeping so close together that the French could not break their ranks. The second French line advanced to support the first as it was forced back and, noting the principal weakness of the heavy German armour, they began stabbing the Germans in their armpits. When gaps appeared in their ranks the Germans broke. The Italian mercenaries of the Sicilian second line had been delayed crossing the bridge and were too far behind to help the Germans, who had charged without waiting for them to reform and catch up. By the time the Italians had deployed and charged the Germans were already in rout and Charles' third line now wheeled to attack Galvano's division in flank; the Italians, however, chose discretion rather than valour and broke before the French charge made contact.

Most of Manfred's reserve division now deserted, leaving him with only his familia and the Saracen cavalry, who had remained steadfastly loyal. Despite the hopelessness of the situation Manfred led these to the charge and was killed in the ensuing melee. Few of his army escaped since the single bridge over the Calore, their only means of escape, was blocked by fugitives and the river was in flood. Of the 3,600 Sicilian cavalry who took part in the battle only 600 escaped. The remainder were killed or captured, Giordano Lancia being amongst the latter. Benevento was looted by the French after the battle, despite being a papal rather than a Sicilian town.

TAGLIACOZZO, 23 August 1268

An army of 5-6,000 Ghibelline cavalry under Frederick II's grandson Conradin and Frederick of Baden, chiefly Germans and Italians but including some Sicilian refugees and Castilians, had its line of advance blocked by 3-5,000 Frenchmen and Italian Guelfs under Charles d'Anjou, now king of Sicily. The French formed up behind the River Salto in 3 divisions, 2 in column at a bridge and the third, of nearly 1,000 cavalry under Charles himself, hidden in a fold of ground about a mile away on the right flank. So as to persuade Conradin to think that the 2 divisions at the bridge constituted his entire force the commander of the second one, the marshal Henry de Cousances, wore Charles' surcoat and carried his standard.

The Ghibellines also drew up in 3 divisions. The first, of Spanish cavalry and Roman and Campagnol Ghibellines under the Infanta Henry of Castile*, attempted to force the bridge while the second and third — of Lombards, Tuscans and some Sicilian exiles under Galvano Lancia, and Germans under Conradin himself and Frederick of Baden — successfully forded the river downstream and charged the 2 French divisions in flank. After suffering heavy casualties the French fled when Henry de Cousances was killed and Charles' standard captured. Most of the victorious Ghibellines then scattered in pursuit and to plunder the French camp, leaving Conradin with only a small retinue. Having helplessly watched his main force routed Charles had awaited just such an opportunity as this, and when the bulk of Conradin's army had dispersed he charged suddenly from hiding with his division and, catching them unawares, routed the few Germans remaining with Conradin. On seeing this the Ghibellines looting the Angevin camp also fled. When another body of Ghibellines returned to the battlefield, rallied from the pursuit by Henry of Castile, 40 of Charles' knights feigned flight and tricked them into thinking the whole force was

*In 1267 Henry of Castile had been elected Captain-General of the Tuscan League's armed forces for 5 years, with an annual salary of 10,000 Pisan lbs and pay for 200 Spanish cavalry, in exchange for which he was to provide 2,000 cavalry on request at the expense of the Tuscan League communes.

running so that they broke ranks and charged after the Frenchmen. Henry's force, tired and confused, was then attacked frontally by Charles' division while simultaneously being charged in the flank by the 40 'fleeing' knights. After rallying once they broke.

Charles had virtually all of his prisoners executed as traitors, probably in revenge for his fearfully heavy losses; Conradin, Frederick of Baden and Galvano Lancia all escaped, but were captured some weeks later and likewise beheaded. Henry of Castile was also captured and spent the next 23 years in an Angevin prison.

MARCHFELD, 26 August 1278

A Bohemian army of perhaps 30,000 men under King Premysl Ottokar II, including Moravians, Poles, North German mercenaries and even some Russians, was faced on the banks of the River March north of Vienna by a larger Imperial army (possibly 40,000-strong) under Rudolf I von Habsburg, King of the Romans, which, as well as troops from Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Swabia, included at least 14,000 Hungarians under King Ladislas IV, some armed as knights but largely made up of light horse-archers, several thousands of whom were Cuman auxiliaries. The Bohemians formed up in 6 divisions plus a reserve, the former comprising one division of Bohemians, one of Bohemians and Moravians, one of Germans, two of Poles under Duke Henry III of Silesia, and the sixth of Bavarians and more Germans. Ottokar himself commanded the last, which consisted of 900 knights on barded horses. Rudolf's Germans drew up in 3 or 4 divisions with Ladislas' Hungarians on their left in another 3 divisions with the Cumans spread out in a loose screen before them. Rudolf himself commanded the reserve. Both sides consisted entirely of cavalry, those infantry which had accompanied them taking no part in the battle.

The Hungarian and Cuman light cavalry opened the battle, riding round the Bohemian right flank in a semi-circle and transfixing it with volleys of arrows. The Hungarian heavy cavalry then charged into the disorded flank and the Bohemian and Polish divisions there were eventually routed after a hard fight, many being killed or captured in the pursuit. On the opposite flank the Imperialists had been repulsed by Ottokar and his German mercenaries but successfully rallied on their reserve and drove him back in turn, this despite the fact that Rudolf was unhorsed at one point and nearly trampled beneath the hooves of other horses. The Bohemian reserve, commanded by the chamberlain, Milita of Diedicz, then fled (or was driven from the field by the Hungarian light cavalry) and the rest of the army followed suit, all those who were not quick enough being cut off by the victorious Hungarians and Cumans. Ottokar himself fought on to the bitter end but was finally captured and killed. His army had suffered grievous losses in the battle and many more drowned attempting to escape by swimming the March.

OREWIN BRIDGE, 11 December 1282

Anticipating the arrival of an English army of perhaps 5,000 infantry and 1,300 men-at-arms under the marcher lords Edmund Mortimer, Roger le Strange and John Giffard, a North Welsh force of some 7,000 infantry and 160 cavalry under Llywelyn ap Gruffydd positioned itself behind the River Yrfon on a steep hill overlooking the bridge by which the English would have to cross. However, unknown to the Welsh a large part of the English army's infantry had already crossed the river upstream during the night by means of a ford that a local traitor had shown them, and at dawn these fell suddenly on the flank of the Welsh position. Llywelyn was not present when the attack came, having perhaps been lured away by a treacherous invitation to a parley; as a result the leaderless Welsh fell back from the bridge to confront the flank attack, enabling Giffard's and Mortimer's men-at-arms, supported by archers, to cross the bridge unopposed. The archers then proceeded to tear holes in the close-packed ranks of Welsh spearmen, and when enough gaps had appeared in the latter's battle-array the men-at-arms charged in and completed their discomfiture, 3,000 of the Welsh infantry and all 160 of the cavalry being killed. It was at about this point that Llywelyn, having received word of the attack, arrived on the scene. As he approached the battlefield, apparently with an escort of just 18 men, he was confronted and mortally wounded by an English man-at-arms from Le Strange's contingent who did not recognise him. His brother David thereafter assumed the title Prince of Wales, but he was captured and executed the next year.

WORRINGEN (VOERINGEN), 5 June 1288

This battle, fought on the Rhine north of Cologne, was basically the finale of a war of succession for the county of Limbourg between Duke John I of Brabant on the one part and Count Henry of Luxembourg and Archbishop Siegfried von Westeburg of Cologne on the other.

The Brabançons drew up in 3 divisions, one of Brabançon knights under Duke John, the second of allied Lowland knights under Count Arnulf of Looz and Count Walram of Jülich, and the third — positioned behind and to the left of the other two — of cavalry and infantry under Count Adolf of Berg. The cavalry numbered 1,500 Brabançons plus probably about 700 allies, while the infantry probably totalled 2-3,000. Henry of Luxembourg and the Archbishop had a numerical superiority in cavalry but probably fielded a similar number of foot-soldiers. They

advanced against the Brabançons in line in 3 divisions; Count Reinald of Guelders commanded the left, Henry of Luxembourg commanded the centre, and Archbishop Siegfried commanded the right, but they were so close together and so disorderly that they seemed like 'one great formation'. This came up against Duke John's outnumbered division first, the impact of their charge initially pushing the Brabançons back. A hard-fought melee ensued, with the Brabançons holding together in close order until the division of the counts of Looz and Jülich could come to their support. Duke John was unhorsed, and his standard-bearer fell at the same instant, but one of the standard's escort managed to raise the flag again, and John successfully extricated himself from the melee on foot, mounted another horse and returned to the fray, upon which Henry of Luxembourg rushed up and attempted to pull him out of his saddle, only to be cut down by one of Duke John's knights.

Archbishop Siegfried's division had meanwhile begun to give way on the right, breaking in rout when Count Adolf of Berg's troops — which included the rebel militia of the archbishop's own city — came in on its flank and rear, the peasants of Berg hewing down men and horses alike with 'spiked clubs' (ie, *chandeliers* — see figure 38d) and overwhelming the infantry defending Siegfried's standard, mounted on a wagon. Siegfried himself surrendered to Count Adolf rather than fall into the hands of his own citizens. On the opposite flank the Count of Guelders' division, having taken no part in the early stages of the fight (when it had instead looted the Brabançon camp) was similarly routed by the counts of Looz and Jülich, bringing the battle to a close after some 8 hours of bitter fighting. Count Reinald and the Archbishop of Cologne had both been captured, while Count Henry and 1,100 of his men had been killed compared to allegedly just 40 Brabançons.

CAMPALDINO, 11 June 1289

A Tuscan Guelf League army, mainly composed of Florentines, faced a Ghibelline League force from Arezzo in the Arno valley. The Tuscans, consisting of 1,600 cavalry and 10,000 infantry (including a large number of crossbowmen), drew up with cavalry in the centre and the bulk of their infantry formed up on both flanks slightly in advance of the cavalry, thus constituting the horns of a crescent formation. The centre was covered by a detached screen of 150 light cavalry. Behind the whole array a line of wagons was drawn up, behind which was positioned a reserve of 200 cavalry plus some infantry. (The poet Dante fought in the front rank of the Florentine cavalry.)

The Ghibellines formed up in 4 lines with their 800 cavalry divided between the first, second and last lines while their 8,000infantry, with a few crossbows among them, made up the third. They opened the battle with a charge which, although it routed the Florentine light cavalry and drove the Tuscans back to their baggage wagons, committed their first three lines, the flanks of which were then subjected to a devastating crossfire from the crossbowmen on the Tuscan wings while the rest of the infantry, armed with long spears, closed in around them. The Ghibellinbe reserve line of just 50 horsemen was never committed and eventually fled, at which the Tuscan reserve came in on the rear of their disorganised first 3 lines, which were thus trapped. Ghibelline casualties totalled 1,700 killed and 2,000 captured.

MAES MOYDOG, 5 March 1295

A Welsh army under Madoc ap Llywelyn (who claimed to be a son of Llywelyn ap Gruffydd), drawn up on a hillside between two woods, was surprised at dawn by an English army of perhaps no more than 2,500 men under William Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick. The Welsh had intended to melt away into the woods if attacked by superior numbers, but in the event William sent 2 bodies of horse round their flanks to prevent this and assailed them from the front with men-at-arms interspersed with 'crossbowmen' (one between each 2 horsemen; presumably archers are intended since there are known to have been only a handful of crossbowmen in the army). The Welsh braced their spears against the ground to receive the cavalry, but were decimated by archery before the cavalry 'burst in among them'. The Welsh fled after losing 6-700 'notable' men, more drowning in the Vyrnwy and Banwy rivers, which were swollen in flood. Madoc himself was captured, either in this battle or a subsequent skirmish. English losses are recorded as just one esquire, 6 foot-soldiers and 'at least 10 horses', these last presumably impaling themselves on the Welsh spears.

STIRLING BRIDGE, 11 September 1297

Hearing of the advance from Berwick of an English army under the governor of Scotland (John de Warenne, Earl of Surrey) a Scots army of 180 knights and allegedly, but very improbably, 40,000 infantry under William Wallace and Sir Andrew Moray took up position at Stirling, commanding a narrow bridge over the Forth (wide enough for only 2 men abreast) which the English would have to cross. On reaching this bridge de Warenne encamped, and for a day futile negotiations took place between emissaries of the protagonists. Finally these negotiations broke down and the English army demanded battle. A Scottish knight in the English camp advised that they should cross the Forth by a ford only a mile away where allegedly 30 men could ride abreast, but Hugh Cressingham, the second-in-command, persuaded de Warenne that this would waste time and that they should cross by the bridge (irrespective of the fact that it would take some 11 hours to get the whole English army across).

Predictably, the Scots attacked as soon as Cressingham and the vanguard had crossed, before de Warenne and the rest of the army could come to its support from the far bank. Cut off from the bridgehead in the first rush, the English vanguard was surrounded and massacred. Probably 1,000 or more English and Welsh infantry and more than 100 knights were killed or drowned, the latter including Cressingham, while on the Scots side Moray was mortally wounded, dying 2 months later. John de Warenne, unable to force his way across the bridge in the face of the victorious Scottish infantry, was obliged to withdraw to Berwick.

FALKIRK, 22 July 1298

After laying waste most of Lothian, an English army under King Edward I marched against the Scots under William Wallace at Falkirk. Edward's army comprised some 2,400 cavalry, 3,900 English infantry (including 250 crossbowmen) and 10,900 Welsh archers. The Scots, numbering perhaps 30,000 infantry and 200 cavalry, had selected a position on rising ground with a wood to their back and a small stream and swamp to their front. They drew up in 4 circles, or schiltrons, of spear-armed infantry with companies of archers strung between them and with their inferior force of cavalry to the rear. The spearmen sat, knelt and stood in ranks behind a barricade of stakes and ropes.

The English attack was led by the cavalry, organised in 4 divisions of which one stood in reserve and the other 3 advanced in column, Edward commanding the third. Coming up against the marsh the first and second divisions, under the earls of Norfolk and Hereford and the Bishop of Durham respectively, had to turn to left and right to bypass it, putting them in the Scots' rear so that they easily rode down and all but wiped out the companies of archers between the schiltrons. At this the Scots cavalry fled, though not entirely without a fight since some 40 appear to have been killed. The same 2 English divisions then made a futile attack against the flank schiltrons but were soundly repulsed; they were rallying for a second charge when the main body under Edward arrived. The schiltrons, exposed and unsupported, were then broken by the English archers with arrows and slingstones and ridden down by the cavalry. The Welsh, who had quarrelled with the English a few days earlier, maintained a discreet distance between themselves and the English army until the Scots broke, on which they finally joined in.

Wallace and the surviving Scots, having lost perhaps a third of their men (other sources say 12-60,000), fled into the woods, many more drowning as they attempted to swim the nearby River Carron. Edward's casualties seem to have amounted to about 2,200 infantry, plus an unknown number of men-at-arms, possibly about 200. Restor was paid for the loss of 111 horses amongst his stipendiary knights and men-at-arms.

DRESS AND EQUIPMENT

1. MAIL

The fact that mediaeval artists used a variety of techniques to illustrate mail has led several authorities — starting with Sir Samuel Rush Meyrick back in 1820, and continuing right up to modern times (eg, F. Buttin in 1971) — to assume, and even try to prove, that there was more than one type of mail, often thereby showing an apparent ignorance of or disregard for the existence in mediaeval times of other forms of body-armour such as lamellar, quilt or scale; even Contamine, in his recent *War in the Middle Ages*, seems guilty of this, writing only that 'we cannot exclude the possibility that in the High Middle Ages use was sometimes made of armour made from little scales or strips (*lames*) of metal.' Meyrick, who applied detailed consideration and considerable imagination to the problem, has left us with terms such as 'trellissed', 'banded', 'mascled', etc, which, though usually rejected by serious authorities, are still repeated by many historians even today. To date, however, only one pattern of actual mail has been discovered anywhere, and that is the interlocking ring with its ends either butted or rivetted together. The patterns on which Meyrick based his impractical theories certainly exist in contemporary pictorial sources, but in general they are merely the alternative techniques of different artists who either: (a) followed a recognised convention or style for illustrating mail; (b) sacrificed detail for speed and simplicity; (c) intended to represent an entirely different type of armour, such as pourpoint, rivets, scales or lamellae (where, for instance, a single artist has used more than one technique there is every chance that he intended to represent more than one of these types of armour in addition to actual mail); or (d) firmly believed that the particular pattern they were using adequately represented mail (in this they were quite obviously under a misapprehension). There is, by the way, no such thing as 'chain-mail', this rather misleading term first being coined only in the mid-18th century.

1a and b show single rings of mail, rivetted and butted respectively. 1c shows how each individual ring was interlocked with the adjacent four. In 'double' mail, sometimes encountered in the sources, the rings were much thicker so that they overlapped considerably more. Some rings were punched from thin plate, these being used in alternate rows with the more usual rivetted or butted rings. The rings themselves seem to have varied between 1/16″ and 1″ in diameter.

2. KNIGHT c.1100

The next 15 figures are intended as a guide to the development and diversity of 'knightly' armour during this era. As with many other illustrations in this section they are shown dismounted for clarity. Inevitably, innumerable variations are to be found in the countless surviving contemporary sources and certainly at no time during this era was there any such animal as a 'typical' knight or any such thing as typical armour. This figure (an Italo-Norman



knight from a relief of c.1099-1106 in Modena Cathedral) is practically identical to those described under 124 and 125 in *Armies of the Dark Ages* (second edition), basic equipment undergoing very little real change during the first 100 years of this era. Those developments which did take place centred principally round the design of helmet and shield.

The mail *hauberk* (contemporary sources record many variant names, including *aspercote*, *ausperg*, *hausberc* and *haubert*) remained the principal form of body-armour in Western Europe throughout this period. The mail could be single or double as described above, sometimes being recorded as so closely interwoven that not even a dagger point could penetrate its links. Quilted tunics (later called *aketons* and *gambesons* — see note to figures 26-30) were usually worn under, and very occasionally over, the hauberk. The mail was sometimes gilded or silvered, more often blackened (a practice which continued up until the 17th century). In fact the painting or enamelling of armour appears to have been more common than is usually credited. Even at the very beginning of this era the Bayeux Tapestry depicts many helmets with coloured panels which may indicate that they were painted. Certainly a large number of ms. sources of the 12th-13th centuries show coloured helmets and depict mail in unusual colours such as red and green; as with blackened armour, this was undoubtedly an attempt at protection against rust. Nasal helmets of the pattern worn here survived throughout this period and lasted in use until the 14th century, though they had become decidedly 'old-fashioned' by the mid-13th century.

Principal weapons throughout the period under review were the lance, sword and mace. At the end of the 11th century the lance was usually about 7-8 feet, sometimes up to 9 feet, in length, and was most often of ash or pine according to Wace, though aspen and sycamore are also recorded in later sources. By the 12th century at the latest the lance was often if not usually painted.

3. KNIGHT c.1160

This figure, from Cagliari Cathedral in Italy, shows little real change from the last, principal difference being the addition of leg-armour. This appears at the very beginning of this era in the Bayeux Tapestry but only seems to have come into widespread use after the mid-12th century. There were two main types, one laced up the back of the leg as depicted in figure 5, the other in the form of a mail stocking drawn up to a waist-belt worn under the tunic. Such leg-pieces were called *chausses* or *hosen*.

The traditional kite-shield remained the predominant type. In fact it was to survive, in more or less modified form, even as late as the 15th century, especially in Italy and Russia. Two virtually intact 12th century examples of such shields which have come down to us are of wood (lime in one instance, cedar in the other) covered on both sides with leather and parchment respectively, with heraldic devices painted on. Prior to alteration in the 13th century the more intact example, that of Arnold von Brienz (d.1225) in the Swiss National Museum, was about 38" deep; it probably dates to the late-12th century. Throughout this era shields were almost invariably suspended by a shoulder-strap, the *guige*, and held by additional straps (*enarmes*) round the wrist and forearm. A leather pad designed to cushion the fist and forearm began to appear on the inside of the shield at about this date.

4. KNIGHT c.1175

This figure is from the seal of Count Philippe d'Alsace of Flanders and Vermandois, which some authorities (eg, A. C. Fox-Davies) date to c.1181. The flat-topped helmet he wears is of a type which first appeared at about this date and was particularly popular in England by the beginning of the 13th century. 4a, from the early-13th century effigy of Geoffrey de Mandeville, Earl of Essex, in the Temple Church in London, shows the same type of helmet but with a one-piece cheek-guard attached, padded on the inside; in this instance the helmet itself stands 7" tall. A painting of Simon de Montfort (d.1218) in a mid-13th century window at Chartres Cathedral appears to show him wearing an almost identical helmet. The tabs on the back of Count Philippe's helmet seem to have remained an indication of rank now just as they had been a century earlier (they appear on William the Conqueror's helmet in 2 scenes in the Bayeux Tapestry, for example).

The flat-topped shield appeared c.1140 and was the most common design after the early-13th century, decreasing somewhat in size as time passed. The heraldic device is repeated on the side of his helmet, a common practice by the end of the 12th century as mail, nasal or faceguard (see figure 6) came to hide more and more of the wearer's features. 4b and c are examples from Pietro da Eboli's 'Carmen de Rebus Siculis' of c.1197. This custom persisted in Spain even as late as the end of this period, despite the fact that open bascinets predominated there; 4d and e depict Aragonese and Castilian examples of the late-13th century.

5. KNIGHT c.1180

Based on the lost 'Hortus Deliciarum' of Abbess Herrade of Landsberg, a German ms. usually dated to c.1180-85,

he has a long, almost triangular shield and wears a 'Phrygian' style helmet, a type which remained popular and in widespread use throughout the 12th century. Note his mail hosen, laced up the back of the leg as described under figure 3. His hauberk has full-length sleeves (which became the norm during the 12th century) with mail *mitons* (mittens) attached, and if the dating of c.1180 is correct then this ms. contains some of (if not the) earliest surviving clear representations of such mittens, which appear to have been in general use by the end of the century. Basically they consisted of a bag for the hand with a smaller bag for the thumb, the palm-piece being of cloth or leather with a slit through which the hand could pass, leaving the mitten dangling at the wrist. The lace visible at the wrist, and often below the knee as well, was intended to support some of the weight of the sleeve or chausse.

The detail at right shows the method by which the type of sword-belt worn here was secured. The tapes were drawn through the corresponding slits at the other end of the belt and knotted together. Although buckles were in general use elsewhere this knotted type of belt, which seems to have invariably been white, was prevalent in Germany and Central Europe at this date. It is to be found in some sources even in the early-14th century.

6. KNIGHT c.1205

This figure is taken from the Charlemagne Reliquary of c.1200-7 in Aachen Cathedral. Practically identical figures appear in the Charlemagne window of c.1210 at Chartres Cathedral. There are two main differences from the last figure, these being the introduction of the surcoat and the substitution of a new type of helmet. Surcoats (sometimes called 'gowns' in contemporary sources) were probably introduced in imitation of Saracen dress during the Crusades. Nevertheless, it is usually said that they were intended to prevent armour from overheating in the sun, while a 13th century source says they were to prevent the armour from getting wet: neither reason seems particularly probable. They appear in Western sources by c.1150 at the latest (the seal of c.1141-42 of Waleran de Beaumont, Comte de Meulan and Earl of Worcester, apparently being the first pictorial representation), while a 12th century Moslem writer, Usamah, seems to describe a long green and yellow silk surcoat, apparently sleeved, in a Crusade incident of c.1127. However, they were not widely worn until the early-13th century. Although some surcoats had long sleeves they were generally sleeveless, split at the front and back to facilitate riding, and generally belted by a cord at the waist. At first they were usually white or self-coloured but by the end of the 12th century had



begun to carry heraldic devices (though Joinville implies in one passage of his chronicle that in France they were still plain even in Louis IX's reign). A fragment of a mid-13th century surcoat that survived until the 19th century was described as being made of a coarse lining overlaid with fine linen, on which the coat-of-arms was worked in embroidery and other pieces of sewn-on linen in the appropriate colours. Silk was also frequently used. Some were very sumptuously embroidered indeed, King Philippe IV of France telling Joinville that he had some which had cost as much as 800 livres parisis.

The helmet worn here, with the front extended into a face-guard, is an interim type between the ordinary open helmet and the fully-enclosing barrel helmet described under figure 8. This type first appeared c.1195 and evolved from helmets with separate faceguards attached, as depicted in 6b (Spanish, early-12th century), 6c (German, c.1180) and 6d (English, c.1190). 6e, which dates to 1217, has the back extended even further down the neck than the helmet worn by the main figure. 6a shows a quilted head-defence worn under the helmet and coif by the beginning of the 13th century at the very latest. This was the arming-cap, which remained in use almost unchanged up to the mid-16th century. During the 13th century it became common headwear for the lower classes in peace as well as war and is often depicted in mss. being worn without a helmet by foot-soldiers.

7. KNIGHT c.1220

From the German 'Eneit' or 'Eneide' ms. of Heinrich von Veldeke, dating to c.1210-20, this figure shows little change from the last, the only real difference being the addition of quilted thigh pieces called *cuisses* reaching to below the knee, making their first appearance in this ms. Illustrations in the later 'Maciejowski Bible' make it quite clear that these were tubular in construction, pulled up over the leg onto the thigh and probably laced to a waist-belt like the chausses. The 'Eneide' ms. is also interesting for the crests worn by many of its knights, featuring birds, animals, discs, flags etc. These do not bear any relation to the shield devices or surcoat heraldry of the wearer, and to judge from other sources this appears to have been not uncommon at this early date. Helmet crests (the work 'crest' derives from Latin *crista*, meaning a cock's comb) first appeared in the late-12th century, the earliest on record apparently being a pair of stag's antlers attached to the helmet of a Spanish knight at the siege of Tyre in 1187, while the seal of Count Baldwin of Flanders (1197), depicting a lion-crested helmet virtually identical to that shown here, appears to be the earliest contemporary representation; the oft-reproduced crest from the second great seal (1198) of King Richard I of England — see figure 5a in *Armies and Enemies of the Crusades* — comes a close second (though some authorities date this seal to 1195). By the end of the 13th century they had become highly ornate, often duplicating the wearer's heraldic device. They were probably mostly manufactured from parchment, feathers, wood, leather and fabric, though William le Breton records that the antlers worn on his helmet by Count Renaud at the Battle of Bouvines were made of carved whalebone.

This ms. also has other minor details worthy of note, such as mail coifs covering the whole face except for eye-holes, and a sword suspended from a cord round the wrist (other sources describing similar wrist-cords for maces). The lance was now usually about 10 feet in length.

8. MAN-AT-ARMS c.1250

Taken from the famous 'Maciejowski Bible', this man wears plate armour for the lower leg consisting of narrow iron greaves strapped to the shins. These appeared c.1240 and are usually called *schynbalds*. However, though they are to be occasionally seen in many sources of the second half of the 13th century they seem to have nevertheless remained uncommon until the 14th century. His shield is of a size more typical of the mid-13th century than that of figure 10: a surviving example, that of Conrad of Thuringia (see figure 104, also shield cxxxiii in Appendix 1), made of lindenwood with the arms embossed in leather, measures 34" deep by 28" wide. The only other feature worthy of note is his broad-brimmed helmet. This, the 'kettle-helmet' (so-called because it resembled an upturned cauldron, or 'kettle'), first appeared in the late-12th century and remained in use for as long as armour was worn, still surviving in much adapted form even today in every army throughout the world. Possibly the earliest depictions of kettle-helmets are on some of the Lewis chess pieces of c.1175 (see figures 54 and 55). The one worn here has its side panels painted red, while his surcoat is green-grey with a red lining, sword-belt is white, scabbard black and shoes brown.

9. MAN-AT-ARMS c.1250

This figure is from an effigy of an unknown knight at Malvern Abbey, Worcestershire, dating to about 1250 or perhaps a little earlier. The weapon he carries is a *martel-de-fer* (literally a 'hammer of iron'), of which this effigy is probably the earliest surviving representation. This was a small hand-axe used by horsemen, with an axe or chisel-like blade at the front and a point at the back. Similar small axes are sometimes depicted in use by infantry, though by the 14th century they usually preferred a long-handled variety. The shield he carries is a small buckler or *targe* of about 18" diameter, normally used only in foot combat. In this period it was often used in conjunction with the

falchion (see figure 27), though in later times it became more commonly associated with 'light' infantry and pikemen. It was also employed at this date in 'sword and buckler' fencing, a popular upper-class pursuit by the end of the 13th century.

The shape of his mail coif seems to suggest that he wears an almost flat-topped helmet (or possibly an arming-cap like that depicted in 10b) underneath, the coif apparently secured to it by a narrow lace or tape around the head. Exactly the same arrangement can be seen in the effigy of William Longespée, Earl of Salisbury (d.1226), in Salisbury Cathedral.

10. KNIGHT c.1250

This figure is based on Matthew Paris' depiction of the mercenary commander Hugues de Boves at the Battle of Bouvines, from the 'Historia Majora' of c.1245-53. His equipment shows little real change from that of figures 6 and 7 except that the convex shield is smaller and the helmet has now developed into the all-enclosing barrel-helm, an evolution that was complete by about 1230. Usually called a *heaume* or *casque*, or in Germany a *Topfhelm*, this had a padded lining plus laces used to secure it under the chin. The weakest point of such helmets was clearly the eye-slit, called the *ocularium*, and this was consequently nearly always reinforced by a cruciform-shaped strengthener. Even so, various sources mention men being killed by a chance thrust entering the heaume through this opening (the Comte de Perche was killed in this way at the 'Fair of Lincoln' in 1217, for example). The other principal hazard was that the heaume might be knocked askew so that the wearer's eyes were no longer in line with the eye-slits, in which case he was totally unable to see.

Detail 10a shows an iron skull-cap usually called a *cervellière*, worn over the arming-cap but (usually) under the coif. Its date of introduction is uncertain since in illustrations it would obviously be concealed by a mail hood or helmet; in fact for the same reason it is not even known whether or not a proper helmet was always worn with it. Its existence, however, could certainly explain why many knightly figures are shown in 13th century illustrations wearing a coif but no helmet. 10b is an arming cap of c.1230-40 from a statue on the west front of Wells Cathedral. This type was probably designed to help support the heaume, which implies that at this early date it may not have had the padded lining with which it was later normally fitted.





11. KNIGHT c.1260

This figure is based on the effigy of Robert de Vere, Earl of Oxford, who died in 1221 but whose monument was probably only erected c.1260, or possibly a little earlier. There are several features worthy of notice here, especially the *poleyns* (knee-cops, or knee-guards, also called *genouillières*) attached to his vertically quilted cuisses. The poleyn first appeared c.1225, at this date no more than a disc-shaped piece of iron, often attached to the cuisse but otherwise fastened directly to the mail chausse. It was often at first of *cuir-bouilli* (boiled leather) but soon became principally iron or steel. However, even bronze was sometimes used. The *couter* (elbow-cop, or elbow-guard) is added from an earlier ms. It is often said that the couter only appeared in about the mid-13th century, but it seems more probable that it evolved at much the same time as the poleyn. However, judging from its general absence from contemporary sources it would appear that it remained extremely rare until the end of this era. He wears a jewelled circlet (apparent on several 13th century monuments) and his coif is separate from the hauberk. He would wear the usual heaume in battle but it is omitted on the effigy so that Earl Robert's features may be seen.

12. KNIGHT c.1270

As well as the usual full mail armour this man, based on the brass of a Flemish knight (Brocardus de Charpignie), wears some form of additional body-armour laced at the shoulders and probably also at the sides. This is fairly certainly a *cuirie* or *curie*, a term which first appears in Wace's 'Roman de Rou' of c.1160-74, clearly deriving its name from *cuir* (leather). Initially at least it appears to have been a leather breastplate, sometimes reinforced with metal (as in 12a, from an English ms. of c.1260) and occasionally having sleeves. Before long, however, solid metal breastplates were also in use, William le Breton recording Richard I wearing a breastplate of iron in 1188. Figure 12b depicts such a *plastron de fer*, from a sepulchral relief of c.1280 in Pershore Abbey, Worcestershire; a similar defence is also to be seen in an early-13th effigy in the Temple Church, London. In both instances it is clearly worn over the hauberk but under the surcoat, which is also the way in which Wace records it used. William le Breton, however, describes it as being worn under the hauberk and the gambeson too, so clearly this was a matter of personal preference.

A kettle-helmet is worn in place of the heaume. This was in no way unusual by the mid-13th century as is proved by the frequent appearance of knights wearing kettle-helmets in many contemporary sources including the 'Chronica Majora' and 'Maciejowski Bible', and there is a passage in Joinville relating how Louis IX was loaned one by another knight during the Seventh Crusade.

The only other feature worthy of special attention is that mail gloves with individual fingers have now replaced



mittens, though still attached to the sleeves. These seem to have appeared in the late-12th century but were always rare.

13. MAN-AT-ARMS c.1280

Based on German sculptures of the late-13th century in Magdeburg and Constance Cathedrals, this figure wears a coat-of-plates, basically a surcoat lined with iron laminae and as such the precursor of the 14th century brigandine. The Magdeburg sculpture indicates that this particular type of coat-of-plates was a poncho-like construction in which the sides, extending from the front, were wrapped round and secured by buckles down the middle of the back, as the rear view shows (13a). Coats-of-plates of practically identical construction to the Magdeburg sculptures have been excavated on the site of the Battle of Wisby (1361), and 13b shows the arrangement of the plates in the excavated examples, classified as Wisby Type II. See also figure 16.

Coats-of-plates are first mentioned in two Italian documents, a war-order of Florence (1259/60) and a mercenary contract from Massa, near Carrara, (1267) both referring to the armour of German knights in the service of these cities. In addition the new-fangled 'plate' armour worn by German mercenaries at the Battle of Benevento in 1266 could only be coats-of-plates, and all the earliest sculptures, etc, depicting coats-of-plates are apparently of German origin. Bengt Thordeman, the excavator of Wisby, therefore concludes that this type of armour was probably introduced into Europe via Germany by the Mongols, though no contemporary sources seem to describe such armour in use amongst the latter. Interestingly, however, 13c depicts a very broad type of 'belt' of Polish origin which there is good reason to believe may be the forerunner of the coat-of-plates, consisting of several layers of leather, sometimes reinforced, and buckled at front or back. It appears to have evolved in Poland as early as the beginning of the 12th century, this particular example being from a ms. of c.1100. It seems more than probable, therefore, that the Germans adopted this form of armour during their campaigns against the Poles, improving on it until they arrived at the 'coat-of-plates' in the mid-13th century.

14. KNIGHT 1289

This figure is taken from a sculpture of Guillaume de Durford, a French mercenary in Florentine employ killed at Camaldino and buried in Santissima Annunziata church, Florence. In addition to poleyns and schynbalds plate cuisses are worn here, all highly decorated and therefore possibly leather rather than iron. Also of interest are the slipper-like shoes which are powdered with small dots, possibly rivets securing small plates on the inside in the fashion of a brigandine. If this is so it is one of the earliest examples of plate foot armour, though the standard type used from the early-14th century (the *sabaton*) was usually constructed of a number of overlapping metal lames covering only the front of the foot. One final interesting detail is the dagger worn at his right hip, adopted by most knights in the course of the 13th century; in use it was held point downwards as a stabbing weapon and is often depicted thus in ms. illustrations of close melees.

Another piece of armour now coming into more widespread use, though still uncommon, was the gauntlet. The earliest to appear in a contemporary source are cuffed mail gloves depicted in Matthew Paris' 'Chronica Minora' of the mid-13th century. Others were probably made of whalebone, since when whalebone gauntlets

are first recorded in a written source c.1285 they were apparently not new. Metal gauntlets of iron or brass appeared c.1296, constructed by attaching small scales or plates to a fabric or leather glove.

15. KNIGHT 1289

Taken from a brass in Trumpington church, Cambridge, previously though to date to 1289 but in fact probably later. In addition to full mail armour he wears poleyns and *ailettes* ('little wings'), the latter being generally flimsy shoulder pieces of dubious defensive value introduced c.1270 and lasting only until c.1350. They were usually rectangular or square in shape, of leather or buckram sometimes covered in cloth or fringed, and most often attached by laces at this date. They may have been introduced as additional protection for the neck (one of their German names, *Tartschen*, or 'little shields', is often quoted in this context) but it is more probable that their use was purely decorative since they displayed the wearer's heraldic device. 15a shows what could easily be mistaken for a circular ailette but is in fact an *epauler*, a shoulder defence which first appears c.1290. His helmet is of a design usually referred to as a 'sugar-loaf', which gradually replaced the flat-topped barrel-helm. It is here secured to the cord belt of his surcoat by a guard-chain, this being the earliest depiction of such a chain (first mentioned in a written source in 1285). Late-13th century German sources often show this type of helmet with a shoulder-length piece of material hanging down the back as depicted in 15a. This was the *lambriquin* or *mantling*, before long customarily worn in conjunction with the crest.

Heater-shaped shields of similar size and shape to that carried here first appeared c.1250 and were in general use by c.1270. Shields of steel are sometimes mentioned in late-13th century sources and these would have been this smaller type. Most shields, however, would still be of wood, canvas and leather, as is the Sitten shield of c.1300. Arms on shields were tooled in leather, moulded in *gesso duro* (a plaster preparation) or painted on. One or two of the extant examples have the inside painted black with a broad diagonal stripe in red; ms. illustrations also apparently sometimes show this feature, occasionally with more than one stripe, and occasionally in variant colours.

16. MAN-AT-ARMS c.1290

Quite clearly the armour worn by a knight was steadily increasing in weight as the 13th century progressed, but



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this factor has often been overexaggerated by modern authors who refer to complete mail armour weighing over 40 lbs as if this is an immense weight, despite the fact that Napoleonic foot-soldiers in 1812 carried in excess of 58 lbs of equipment. Experiments carried out some years ago by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, proved that even full plate armour post-dating this period was nowhere near as cumbersome as we have often been led to believe, and a fully-armoured man could in fact run, lie down, get up and even *jump* into the saddle without considerable effort, the latter being an exercise for which Edward I was noted. However, this would only be a fit man while he was fresh — the longer that armour was worn, the heavier it undoubtedly became. This may help to explain how, in one incident recorded as early as 1280, a knight thrown from his horse was unable to get up because of the weight of his armour, and lay helpless on the ground until captured (though it should be pointed out that this was not a young man).

This Italian knight, based on the seal of the Guild of St George of Ferrara, wears a heaume, a coat-of-plates over a hauberk, cuisses with poleyns attached and closed greaves. The coat-of-plates is of a different design to that of 13, consisting of a larger number of smaller plates rivetted to the inside of his surcoat; the outlines of the plates and rivets show quite clearly. Closed greaves, protecting both the front and back of the lower leg, first appeared at about this date. His lance, added from the early-14th century 'Manessa Codex', has an early hand-guard or *vamplate*; although such guards occasionally feature in illustrations from the early-12th century onwards, they were uncommon until the 14th century.

17, 18 & 19. SERGEANTS, 11th-13th CENTURIES

Sergeants (Latin *servientes*, French *serjants* or *sergents*) came in many different guises. In feudal terminology they were vassals of less than knightly status holding a fraction (usually half) of a knight's fief in return for services rendered, chiefly military but sometimes agricultural or domestic. Probably a knight's own non-knightly retainers bore the title of sergeant too, though the terms *clientes* and *satellites* also occur in this capacity. However, the chroniclers also tended to use the term sergeant indiscriminately for all non-knightly soldiers, without differentiating between those of feudal and non-feudal origin or even between infantry and cavalry.

The sergeants with whom we are chiefly concerned here, the non-noble vassals and retainers, usually fought as horsemen by the 12th century. Their equipment is most often described as similar to but somewhat lighter than that of knights, but in fact in the late-11th and early-12th centuries it may have been even lighter than is usually thought. The 'Inquest of Bayeux' (1133) records that men holding less than a knight's fief were to serve mounted and armed with lance, shield and sword, but does not mention armour at all, while mss. often likewise show knights accompanied by men with only lance, shield, sword and helmet who are undoubtedly sergeants. Figure 17, wearing

a red tunic and blue hose, depicts one such horseman. These unarmoured figures disappear from the sources by the middle of the 12th century. Thereafter only armoured horsemen appear, usually so little different from one another that it is almost impossible to distinguish between sergeants and knights; it can only be surmised, therefore, that figures such as 18 and 19 (an Englishman from the 'Winchester Bible' of c.1150, and a Frenchman from an illustration of the Battle of Bouvines in Matthew Paris' mid-13th century 'Historia Majora'), equipped with incomplete or old-fashioned armour, represent sergeants. The short mail corselets they both wear are usually described as *haubergeons* (the diminutive of 'hauberk'), this being the regulation form of body-armour of sergeants in the Order of the Temple, whose 12th century 'Rule' also states that their corselet sleeves were to be without mittens and their chausses without foot-pieces, in addition to which they were to substitute an iron cap for a helmet. Being less well-armoured than knights, however, they were not expected to stick it out for as long on the battlefield, the 'Rule' actually stating that sergeants 'will have the gratitude of God and the Order if they fight well, but if they see they cannot endure or are wounded, they may withdraw without asking permission, and without punishment'. However, this applied only to sergeants with little or no armour; those equipped like knights were expected to fight like knights.

After heraldry came in sergeants as well as household knights sometimes carried their lord's device on their shield, lance-pennon and surcoat (see, for example, illustrations in Pietro da Eboli's late-12th century 'Carmen de Rebus Siculis', where groups of horsemen all have the same device on shields and helmets; see also page 133). The surcoats themselves may even have been of a uniform colour within a retinue, the instance of an English outlaw in 1218 buying 100 marks' worth of cloth for his band 'as if he had been a baron or an earl' often being quoted as early evidence for this practice. Such use of liveries probably began on a small scale in the late-12th century.

20. MOUNTED SERVANT, 13th CENTURY

During this period a knight's mounted retainers or servants who accompanied him on campaign were generally described by any one of three different terms, these being valet (Latin *valletus*, often translated as 'yeoman'), esquire (Latin *armiger* or *scutifer*, French *écuyer*), or simply 'boy' (Latin *garcio*, French *puer*), not all of which necessarily denoted the same type of servant though they all received the same pay (1s. a day in 13th century England, compared to 2s. for a knight). 'Esquire' is the most commonly found, clearly denoting the origin of such servants as armour- or shield-bearers. This has led to many modern authorities mistakenly concluding that they were non-combatants, citing the 'Rule of the Temple' which describes the functions of a Knight Templar's 2 esquires as holding his lance and spare horse respectively, both withdrawing to the rear before battle was joined. Admittedly they might not be expected to play a particularly active role on the battlefield (they might only guard the baggage or the spare horses, or take captive unhorsed enemy cavalrymen, as Frederick II's did at Cortenuova), but it is clear from contemporary sources that such servants were invariably armed — even the 'boys' of an Angevin knight's retinue in Sicily in 1283 were armed with sword and knife and wore mail hoods, probably supplemented by quilted body-armour. The figure depicted here, found lurking behind his master Goliath in two scenes in the 'Maciejowski Bible' of c.1250, is less well-equipped, having only a sword and arming-cap. The latter is white, while his tunic is light brown, shoes are dark brown and hose are light green.

By the late-12th century a knight was normally accompanied on campaign by 2 esquires, or occasionally even 3, who were at that time still no more than low-born retainers. However, as the 13th century progressed it seems to have gradually become accepted practice for noble youths to get their military training by becoming esquires, with the result that they became better-equipped and assumed a more active role in battle; certainly esquires fought, and died, at battles such as Evesham (1265) and Stirling Bridge (1297). After c.1250 the terms *scutiferi, valletti* and servientes alike were used synonymously with 'men-at-arms' (*homines ad arma* or *armati*) to denote non-knightly mounted soldiers, and by the end of the 13th century they were clearly indistinguishable from knights in all but title.

21. TRUMPETER, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Trumpets were used in most armies of this era in exactly the same way as is described in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1* — ie, to transmit the orders to break camp, to prepare for battle, to commence the attack, to rally, and so on (and in Scandinavia as a signal to go to the boats, to launch them and the like). The trumpet signals — usually a series of one or more blasts — were normally used in conjunction with flag movements which indicated the direction of attack as well as giving the order to halt. In addition the flag served as a rallying point (see page 152). The figure depicted here, wearing just a mail corselet for protection, is taken from one of Matthew Paris' mid-13th century mss. Others might be entirely unarmoured.

Other than the army's commander and his marshals, the only man permitted to ride before the banners was another 'musician', the *jongleur*, who preceded armies going into battle in the earlier part of this period. Of these the best-

known is Taillefer, who rode before the Normans at Hastings. Jongleurs were responsible for boosting the army's morale with stirring words and martial songs, juggling with their swords in the face of the enemy. The last reference to a jongleur in a military context dates to c.1100.

22, 23, 24 & 25. INFANTRYMEN, 12th CENTURY

Of these 4 figures, chosen as a representative selection of the foot-soldiers to be found in late-11th and 12th century sources, 22 is a Frenchman from an early-12th century sculpture at Vezelay, 23 and 24 are Englishmen from the 'Bury Bible' of c.1121, and 25 is a German from Pietro da Eboli's 'Carmen de Rebus Siculis' of c.1197.

Figure 22 wears leather or quilted body-armour and carries a round, convex shield. Round shields became steadily less common throughout most of Western Europe as the 12th century progressed but remained popular in Spain well into the 13th century and are still to be seen elsewhere on occasion even thereafter. He is armed with a short sword (possibly a *coutel* or *cultellus*, for which see note 67); the scabbard protrudes through a slit in his body-armour at the left hip. Figure 23 is more heavily armoured, in a helmet and mail hauberk, and he is armed with a long-handled, broad-bladed axe, a very popular weapon during this era with both infantry and dismounted knights. The popularity of such axes doubtless spread to the Continent from England and Scandinavia, and they are usually referred to in contemporary sources as *haches de Dannemark*, *hachets Denesh* or *haches Danesches*, ie, 'Danish axes'. Even King Stephen wielded one at the Battle of Lincoln in 1141, and King Richard I used one at the relief of Jaffa in 1192. Armed with a spear and a knife or sword, and protected by no more than a shield and helmet, his companion (figure 24) is representative of the bulk of late-11th and 12th century infantrymen.

Unlike crossbowmen, archers remained generally unarmoured throughout the period covered by this book. In the 12th century their arrows were still normally carried in a quiver at the right hip, suspended either from the waistbelt or from a strap across the left shoulder. By the 13th century, however, they were usually carried stuffed point downwards through the belt, this being the normal way for carrying longbow arrows throughout the Middle Ages (see figures 29, 45 and 47). Archers were occasionally mounted to keep up with the cavalry, as at Bourg Théroulde in 1124, and mounted archers are mentioned several times in sources covering the Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland. However, in Western Europe they did *not* shoot their bows from horseback, horse-archery in the 12th-13th centuries being found only in Central Asia, parts of Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Orient.

26, 27, 28, 29 & 30. INFANTRYMEN, 13th CENTURY

Some of the best-known and most widely reproduced ms. illustrations of this era belong to the mid-13th century French 'Maciejowski Bible', from which most of this selection comes. Their armour is characteristic of that to be found in most pictorial sources of this date, though this particular ms. gives a far clearer picture of quilted armour than most. Figures 26, 27 and 28 all wear *aketons* and/or *gambesons*, which were quilted leather, linen or woollen tunics stuffed with wool, cotton, tow and old rags. In contemporary sources they are usually depicted coloured in pastel shades of red, blue, green, yellow and buff, with red clearly the most popular colour. The Byzantine chronicler Niketas Choniates, describing the quilted armour of Conrad de Montferrat, commander of the Byzantine army's *Latinikon* regiment in 1187, records it to have been made of as many as 18 layers of red linen, treated with a mixture of salt and rough wine so that it was allegedly impervious to sword or lance blows. Geoffrey de Visnauf, a chronicler of the Third Crusade, likewise refers to quilted armour as 'difficult to pierce'; he describes *pourpoint* (an alternative name for such armour, often decoratively embroidered) as armour 'of many folds of linen'. Its thickness obviously varied, but quilted corselets of a later date are recorded being up to 2" thick.

Such quilted body-armour had already been in existence in various forms for hundreds of years, but its use in Western Europe seems to have become more widespread as a direct result of the Crusades because of its popularity amongst the Saracens, who called it *al-qutun* (literally 'cotton'), which term was corrupted by Europeans to become 'aketon'. Significantly contemporary sources tend to make a clear distinction between the gambeson and the aketon, the former undoubtedly being the older variety of such armour since — though its name only seems to first appear in a 'Roman de Perceval' of c.1160 and Wace's 'Roman de Rou' of c.1160-74 — the term 'gambeson' is derived ultimately from the Old Frankish *wamba* (belly), and in some older texts the word *wambais* is actually substituted. Nevertheless, what differences there were must have been minimal, except that the aketon was usually sleeveless whereas gambeson sleeves are mentioned frequently. Both 26 and 27 are each clearly wearing two different quilted tunics, the inner one with long sleeves (terminating in quilted mittens in the case of figure 27) and the outer one with a stiff upright collar; these are presumably gambeson and aketon respectively. Headwear in each case consists of a padded arming cap and either a kettle-helmet or a simple hemispherical bascinet.

Figure 30, the odd man out in this group, comes from another mid-13th century ms., this time English, very similar figures also appearing in French and Spanish sources (compare him to figure 82, for instance). In most cases the

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
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
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scale corselet, undoubtedly based on a leather foundation, is sleeveless as here, with an upstanding collar similar to that of an aketon, and it is normally worn over a mail haubergeon as if the scale corselet itself was not regarded as sufficient protection. Nevertheless, scale armour seems to have remained an occasional substitute for mail during this era throughout much of Western Europe, though it is encountered only rarely thereafter except in Eastern Europe. The scales were now most commonly of iron but there is literary and illustrative evidence to indicate that horn was still very much in use in the West, certainly in the 12th century and possibly even in the 13th; for example, Emperor Henry V (1111-25) had a body of knights equipped in horn scale armour in 1115.

These figures are armed with a typical infantry assortment of spears, swords, bows and axes. The nasty-looking device wielded by 28 is probably a faus or faussal (see note to figure 38) and is sometimes depicted in the 'Maciejowski Bible' with its grip shaped like an umbrella-handle. Figure 27 has a *falchion* girded at the waist, a one-edged weapon which first appeared in the late-12th century and seems to have evolved ultimately from the *seax*, which itself remained in use until about the same date. Its Western European name derived from the French *fauchon* and the Latin *falx*, meaning a scythe, while in Eastern Europe it was later known as a *tesak* or *tasak* ('cleaver'). During the 13th century it was to be found in widespread use amongst both knights and foot-soldiers.

31, 32 & 33. CROSSBOWMEN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

The crossbow was to become an infantry weapon par excellence in the second half of the period under review, though the skill required in its production, maintenance and use often limited it to regular, therefore chiefly — though by no means exclusively (witness the Italian militias) — mercenary soldiers, with whom it enjoyed considerable popularity throughout Western Europe, Italians, Gascons and Catalans being foremost among its exponents by the 13th century. This was despite its use against Christians being banned by the Lateran Council of 1139. Crossbows were rare in England in the first half of the 12th century, but under Henry II and, particularly, his sons Richard and John, their use became commonplace, though chiefly in the siege and defence of castles; most English crossbowmen were either affluent militiamen (predominantly from London but also, at least in 1277, from Bristol, Gloucester and Winchester) or else mercenaries, mainly Gascons but including some Poitevins. It was King Richard to whom contemporaries generally attributed the reintroduction of the crossbow in Western Europe following the papal ban, and his death as a result of a crossbow wound received at the siege of Châluz was regarded by the Church as divine judgement. His contemporary Philippe Augustus was likewise deemed responsible for the widespread introduction of the crossbow in French armies (under Richard's influence according to William le Breton), and despite the papal ban being reconfirmed at the end of the 12th century and on further occasions in the 13th century the crossbow thereafter became the predominant missile weapon of French infantrymen. In Italy too the crossbow predominated by the second half of the 12th century, crossbowmen receiving higher pay and being fined three times as much as archers if they failed to attend a muster.

In the 11th and 12th centuries the bow itself was a simple self-bow of wood with a span averaging about 28″, but by the end of the 12th century composite crossbows had begun to appear, being first adopted under Eastern influence

during the Crusades. Various sources record principal materials as Spanish yew, hazel, whalebone and horn; not until the 14th century did the steel bow appear. The bolts, called quarrels (*quadrelli* or *carrieaux*, from the French *carré*) because of their 4-sided heads, were chiefly of wood, though steel bolts were in use by the end of this period. A French charter of 1256 records crossbowmen carrying 50 bolts each and Gascon crossbowmen in England in 1283 similarly each had 40-50 bolts, though these figures may include spare ammunition carried in the baggage train, as is later recorded by Guiart. A supply of 18 bolts seems to have been the norm.

During the 11th century the bow was cocked by both feet being placed within the curves of the bow itself to either side of the stock and the string being drawn back with both hands until it caught on a latch. From the second half of the 12th century at the latest an iron stirrup was added to the end of the stock to assist loading. The method of cocking the bow, depicted in figure 33, was now to put one foot within the stirrup, bend over and catch the string on a hook attached to the belt and then straighten the leg, the belt-hook drawing the string back until it caught on the latch. The hook is usually shown in the sources with only one claw but it could have two. Note that for cocking the crossbow is turned so that the string is nearest to the loader. In the mid- and late-13th century respectively the windlass and pulley-and-cord methods of cocking made their first appearance, though the former remained rare until the 14th century and and the latter never gained particular popularity; however, even at the beginning of the 15th century simple belt-hooks outnumbered windlasses. It is also by the 13th century that classification of the crossbow into two distinct categories seems to become generally commonplace, these being the *arbalista ad unum pedem* and the *arbalista ad duos pedes* (literally the 'one-foot crossbow' and the 'two-foot crossbow'). The former was probably loaded as per the second method described above, and the latter as per the first method, though the alternative explanation is that these two types fired 12-inch and 24-inch bolts respectively. Either way, it is clear that the latter was regarded as the more powerful weapon of the two, with a draw weight of about 460 lbs compared to a maximum of 320 lbs for the 'one-foot crossbow'.

Figure 31 dates to c.1197 and is taken from the 'Carmen de Rebus Siculis'; he wears a helmet but, unusually for a crossbowman, no armour. 32 is from the 'Maciejowski Bible' and wears a mail haubergeon with three-quarter length sleeves and a hemispherical bascinet. 33 comes from a copy of William of Tyre's chronicle dating to c.1280.

34. MOUNTED CROSSBOWMAN, 13th CENTURY

By the late-12th century the crossbow was also in use by horsemen (mercenaries and mounted sergeants, not knights) and mounted crossbowmen thereafter appeared in most Western European armies as well as those of Poland and even Hungary; however, they were to disappear from French armies as early as the 1280s and were never over-numerous in English employ after King John's reign. At a later date they used a cocking mechanism called a crow's-foot lever, but illustrations of mounted crossbowmen belonging to this period invariably show their crossbows with stirrups. However, the cocking of a crossbow by this means while attempting to control a horse cannot have been easy and it seems likely that where possible the butt of the crossbow was secured against waist or saddle and the string pulled back with the hands, a theory indirectly supported by the 13th century



'Speculum Regale', which specifically states that horsemen carried the 'weaker' types of crossbow 'which a man can easily draw even when on horseback'. Mounted crossbowmen would probably have dismounted to fight in most if not all instances anyway, even though they are depicted firing from horseback in a number of contemporary pictures, such as the 'Roman de Girard de Roussillon' from which this figure comes.

Many illustrations show mounted crossbowmen wearing full mail armour and helmets, but — hardly surprisingly — no shield appears to have been carried. Like knights, they generally had 2-4 horses each in the 13th century.

35, 36 & 37. ARMED PEASANTS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Figures such as these first start appearing in contemporary sources only in the mid-12th century, though lower-class infantry armed with everyday tools and makeshift weapons had probably appeared in most armies involving general levies since the beginning of this period. These three all come from mss. which depict peasants in military rather than agricultural situations so can be taken as accurate representations of such 'soldiers'. Figure 35 dates to the late-12th century while 36 and 37 belong to the mid-13th century. The latter both wear arming-caps, which became common headwear amongst the lower classes during the 13th century. Dress was largely of unbleached wool (a creamy colour) or linen (various shades of grey), sometimes with coloured hembands or borders. Dull colours such as green and brown also appear.

Their weapons are characteristic, the scythe, pitchfork and flail being foremost among those depicted or recorded in the sources, though stakes, picks, clubs, clod-mallets, spades and staff-weapons (for which see figure 38) also feature prominently. Some would have been armed with bows, spears or axes but they would have been in the minority. In fact in Germany Emperor Frederick I actually forbade peasants to carry spears or swords (though precious few would have possessed the latter). Troops of this kind were of very low quality and could perhaps be described as 'cavalry-fodder'.

38. STAFF-WEAPONS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Having just described armed peasants it is probably wise to add a note here regarding a range of weapons, initially based on agricultural implements, which evolved in a very short time into infantry staff-weapons of singular ferocity and considerable sophistication. By the 13th century such long-handled weapons as those shown here were known by a wide range of names including *godendac*, *croc*, *faus*, *fauchard*, *glaive*, *pikte*, *gisarme*, *voulge*, bill, halberd, etc, though it is never especially clear which term applies to what, for in those instances where they are described the details given are often so similar as to be virtually, if not completely, indistinguishable. It would appear, however, that many had a common ancestry, consisting basically of a long, broad cutting blade, usually with one or more points or hooks at the top or back.



The gisarme (also called a *giserne* or *gaesa*) appears in English and French sources from the 12th century onwards, occasionally being mentioned in use even as late as the 17th century. It was basically a type of axe with an elongated, crescent-shaped blade of which the lower point (or sometimes both) was usually secured to the haft by a second socket. It is sometimes described simply as an axe, while one 12th century source defines it as a weapon 'which is called a bill'. 38a and b show gisarmes from French sources of the late-13th and early-14th centuries. With a spike at the back the gisarme appears to have been known as a voulge, a term which also appears in French sources from the 12th century. The Polish *berdische* was basically a gisarme.

The bill also appeared in the 12th century, consisting basically of a pruning tool fixed to a long shaft. 38c depicts a bill from the now perished frescoes once in the Painted Chamber at Westminster. The bill seems to have always been a predominantly English weapon. The croc too was probably a kind of bill.

The fauchard appears only from the 12th century to the late-14th, mainly in French and occasionally in English sources. Contemporary descriptions indicate that it had a scythe-like blade with a point at the top and another point or hook at the back. The faus (literally 'scythe') and *faussal* are clearly related, perhaps being smaller or short-handled versions of the same weapon. The unusual cleaver wielded by figure 28 is probably a faus or faussal.

The godendac or *godendag*, literally 'good morning', occurs in Flemish and, less often, French sources in the late-13th and early-14th centuries. Much ink has been wasted in arguments over whether or not the shafted and spiked club depicted in 38d (based on the Courtrai chest and Leugemeete fresco — see note 43) represents such a weapon, but the contemporary data seems quite conclusive that the godendac had a cutting edge as well as a spear point. 38d in fact represents an entirely different weapon, the *plançon-á-picot* or *chandelier*. There is evidence to indicate that the godendac itself in fact evolved from a plough-share, Guiart describing it as a *coulter* or plough-share attached to a staff.

38e is a *flaellum*, the military version of the agricultural flail carried by figure 36. As can be seen, a spiked club has replaced the hinged limb of the latter. Others substituted a spiked wooden or metal ball attached to the staff by a short length of chain. Much shorter-handled versions, the 'ball and chain' beloved by Hollywood film producers, were in use among horsemen by the end of the 13th century but did not see much service.

The main figure is a Scandinavian of 13th century date armed with a very long-handled axe, possibly the weapon to which 14th century Icelandic saga writers applied the term 'halberd'. This word first appears, in a poem dating to before 1287, as *hallembart*; it also occurs as *halmbarde*, both words meaning 'haft-axe' or 'pole-axe'. 38f depicts an alternative axe type which frequently appears in 13th century illustrations.

39 & 40. SLINGERS, 11th-13th CENTURIES

The sling remained in general use throughout this era and is frequently mentioned in accounts of battles and sieges. Though its use declined during the second half of the 13th century there were nevertheless slingers in the barons' army at Lewes in 1264, while King Edward I is recorded raising an elite unit of slingers from Sherwood Forest even in 1303. Indeed, in Spain the sling remained the principal infantry missile weapon right up until the late-14th century, the chronicler Froissart's description of sling-fire at the Battle of Najera (1367), which 'could split a helmet in half', testifying to its effectiveness (see *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*). Figure 39, from an illustration in the 'Maciejowski Bible', indicates that some slingers at least continued to use a small circular shield of about 18" diameter in conjunction with the sling as in ancient times. That neither of the men depicted here carries any sort of weapon other than his sling and a dagger is characteristic. A passage of Matthew Paris' chronicle states that where present slingers 'always preceded the army'.

The somewhat more sophisticated staff-sling was also still in use, ultimately outlasting the hand-sling in military service. It was used principally, if not exclusively, in naval and siege warfare, often to hurl combustibles contained in pots and bottles. The staff was normally about 4 feet long. Figure 40 comes from a Spanish ms. of the mid-11th century.

41. SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, 13th CENTURY

Servientes armorum (sergeants-at-arms, sometimes referred to in contemporary sources as *serjeants à maces*) were first raised by Philippe II Augustus of France in 1191, during the Third Crusade, as a bodyguard against the Assassins. There were never many of them (Philippe IV the Fair set their number at 30 in 1285) and they were generally employed in the role of mounted aides-de-camp, though they could also be found fighting alongside the rest of the army as part of the royal familia — Philippe II's, for example, did sterling work guarding the bridge at Bouvines in 1214. During the 13th century most European kings likewise established bodies of sergeants-at-arms.



They customarily carried a mace bearing the royal arms as a symbol of office, these maces being recorded in the 14th century as decorated in silver with the arms enamelled on. By the reign of Philippe III (1270-85) their armament also included a crossbow, though this may have been part of their equipment at a considerably earlier date; certainly the bodyguard of 24 sergeants-at-arms established by Richard I of England in imitation of Philippe II's guards each carried a crossbow as well as sword and mace even in 1191. A lance, and possibly a shield, were also carried in battle by the 14th century. The particular figure depicted here, from a ms. of c.1300, represents a sergeant-at-arms at the time of Louis IX. The original picture shows 3 such figures, their surcoats dark blue, red, and turquoise, but carrying no heraldic device (see note to figure 6).

42. ROUTIER, 12th CENTURY

The 12th century saw the evolution of freelance mercenary companies on the Continent, composed of professional soldiers prepared to hire themselves out to the highest bidder. These companies, or 'bands', were variously called *routes, ruttae, rota* or *rotten*, and their members were therefore called *routiers* or *ruterii*. They were also known as *brigans, ribauds*, ravagers, *paillers* (or *palearii*, 'strawmen', for reasons now unknown), *cultellarii* (from *cultellus*, a knife) and *cothrelli, coterelli* or *cotereaux* (from *coterel*, a small haubergeon). Other descriptive terms used for them in contemporary sources give us a good idea of their principal recruiting grounds: Aragonese, Navarrese, Catalans,

Basques, Hainaulters, Brabançons, Triaverdins (from Trier), Mainades (from Maine?) and Germans. One routier commander in France even had an Arabic name, Curbaran, which may indicate he was an Andalusian exile or a Mozarab.

Walter Map, an Anglo-Norman writing c.1180, described such mercenaries as forming 'bands of up to 1,000 men', each of them 'protected from head to foot by a leather jerkin [ie, a gambeson] and ... armed with steel, staves and iron.' He concludes: 'This movement arose in Brabant, hence the name Brabançons.' Others describe them as armed with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on and 'fierce for plunder and fearless of death, cutting the throats of any who stood in their way'. In fact one gets a distinct impression from the sources that many routiers were little better than armed peasants and behaved accordingly.

In 1179 the employment of such troops was ineffectually condemned by a Lateran Council, since they allegedly had no respect for Church property or the age or sex of their victims. Their numbers dwindled after the end of the 12th century, though ironically — considering the papal ban on hiring them — many participated in the bloody Albigensian Crusade of 1208-29 against the county of Toulouse.

43. BRABANCON OR FLEMISH SPEARMAN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

This figure is based on carvings on a chest depicting scenes of the Courtrai campaign of 1302 and the Leugemeete fresco in Ghent of similar date, destroyed in the mid-19th century (see figure 66 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*). Although he therefore dates to the close of this period he is nevertheless typical of the high-quality, well armed and armoured Brabançon and Flemish mercenaries who featured in so many Western European armies of the 12th and 13th centuries that, as we have already seen, the word 'Brabançon' even became a synonym for mercenary infantryman. Though rapacious, these tended to remain loyal as long as they were paid punctually. This man wears a helmet and long-sleeved hauberk. The spear remained some 10-12 feet in length throughout this era.

The Low Countries were making extensive use of such infantry, armed with long spears called *geldons*, as early as the 11th century, but as mercenaries their heyday was the period from c.1100 to 1214, their last notable appearance in a mercenary role being at Bouvines. Fighting on behalf of their own country such Flemish spearmen were later to achieve a classic victory over the French at Courtrai.

44. ENGLISH INFANTRYMAN OF HENRY II'S REIGN

By Henry II's 'Assize of Arms' of 1181 all — and only — freemen were to perform military service when required. They were divided for this purpose into 3 distinct categories: those holding knights' fiefs or possessing 16 marks of chattels or rents (who were to have the equipment of a knight); those possessing 10 marks of chattels or rents (who were to have haubergeon, helmet and spear); and burgesses and those freemen with less than 10 marks of chattels or rents. The man depicted is armed to comply with the requirements of the third category, who were expected to supply themselves with quilted *wambais* (gambeson), iron helmet and spear. A shield is not specified but was undoubtedly carried, as quite possibly was a sword or dagger, though one of the Assize's regulations stated that burgesses at least were forbidden to actually possess more than the obligatory quota of arms and had to sell or give away any in excess of their requirements. However, since neither swords nor daggers are specified for any of the categories — not even holders of knights' fiefs — it must be assumed that by this time such weapons were normally available to most freemen and that therefore there was no need to mention them by name. Certainly contemporary illustrations from this period generally show swords in use amongst infantrymen of this type.

Despite the fact that archers had been much in evidence in both Henry I's reign (he issued an edict that men practicing archery should not be indicted for murder or manslaughter if they accidentally killed someone) and Stephen's reign (witness the prominent role of archers at the Battle of the Standard), bows are not mentioned at all in the Assize — regardless, too, of the fact that only a few days earlier the king had announced a similar assize for his Continental possessions wherein the bow *is* mentioned.* The only explanation that there can be for this is that in Henry II's reign the archers in English armies were generally supplied by Welsh mercenaries.

45. ENGLISH INFANTRYMAN OF EDWARD I'S REIGN

By the time Henry III issued a new 'Assize of Arms' in 1242 (often misquoted as 1252) the bow had nominally become the principal weapon of most categories of English infantryman. However, though Henry raised 500

*This edict similarly divided freemen up into 3 categories: those having chattels worth £100 Angevin (£25 sterling), who were to have the equipment of a knight, including a horse; those with chattels worth between £20-£40 Angevin (£5-£10 sterling), who were to have haubergeon, helmet, spear and sword; and those with less, who were to have gambeson, helmet, spear and sword or bow and arrows.

archers in the Weald in 1266 there are astonishingly few other references to archery during the civil war period of 1264-67, and evidence indicates that the bows in use at that time were still chiefly of the old 'short' variety (a bow discovered at Great Berkhampstead Castle, for instance, and tentatively dated to c.1216, is only 4 feet in length). In fact the large-scale introduction of bow-armed troops and, more specifically, the longbow into English armies seems in reality to have taken place only in the late-13th century, as a direct result of Edward I's Welsh wars of 1277-95. Certainly spearmen also featured in Edward's Welsh and Scottish wars, but by the end of the century it is the bow that is specified in practically every instance in which arms are mentioned.

Henry III's Assize had required that all freemen with 40-100s. of land or 9-20 marks of chattels should serve with bow, arrows (number not specified but presumably 24, or perhaps 30) and sword, the former also having a dagger. Edward I's 'Statute of Winchester' of 1285 was merely a confirmation that these regulations still applied; the only change evident in an update of 1298 was that knights' horses were thenceforward to be barded. Freemen with less than 40s. or 9 marks of chattels were also expected to serve with a bow if they had one but had otherwise to make do with *falces* (probably fauchards), gisarmes, knives and other 'peasant' weapons. Quilted aketons or gambesons appear to have been generally worn (the Statute does not mention body-armour for men with less than 100s. of land, but an interim edict of 1230 specifies helmet and gambeson for men with 40s. in chattels). A call to arms of 1264 provides a list of arms which includes in addition spears, crossbows and swords, while the edict of 1230 gives the arms of the poorest category (those with only 20s. of chattels) as spear and axe.

Uniforms of a sort may now have been in existence too, a Norfolk contingent recorded in 1295 deriving their name 'Blaunchecotes' from the white tunics (gambesons?) with which they were issued, along with swords and knives, by the local authorities. Uniforms and recognition devices for militia contingents are also recorded on other occasions, the figure depicted here wearing over his leather bracer a cloth armband marked with the red cross of St George, issued during Edward's Welsh wars; spearmen and cavalry substituted similarly marked lance-pennons. Amongst baronial contingents uniforms had appeared considerably earlier, certainly by the beginning of the 13th century, it being recorded in 1218 how a north country robber bought 100 marks' worth of cloth to outfit his following of 18 men 'as if he had been a baron or an earl'.

46 & 47. WELSH INFANTRYMEN, 11th-13th CENTURIES

As has already been mentioned, the predominant Welsh troop-types in this period were spearmen in the North and



archers in the South, those depicted here being taken respectively from a 12th century Welsh ms. of the 'Laws of Hywel' and an English record book of c.1295 (called simply 'Chapter House Liber A'). Their dress comprised a linen shirt and drawers, and over these a belted woollen tunic reaching to the knees or calves; Giraldus Cambrensis, writing c.1193/4, adds 'a thin cloak' and the observation (repeated by his contemporary, Walter Map) that 'they go barefoot', or else wore shoes of untanned leather 'roughly sewn together'. Even the son of the prince of Gwynedd is described as barelegged and barefoot in 1188, 'and he seemed to care nothing for the thorns and thistles.' Interestingly the 3 Welsh soldiers pictured in 'Liber A' (2 archers and a spearman; for the latter see figure 24 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*) all wear stockings and shoes on their left legs only, the right foot doubtless being kept bare for better purchase on steep hillsides. Giraldus says Welshmen wore their hair short and shaped it round their ears and eyes, though some soldiers actually shaved their heads to avoid getting their hair tangled in low branches while moving through woodlands. They customarily shaved their chins too, but many wore moustaches.

Though Giraldus describes Welsh spears as 'very long', they were nevertheless occasionally 'thrown a short distance like a javelin', under which circumstances no mail corselet was proof against them. He records the men of Merionethshire and Cynan as being particularly skilful in the use of the spear, while the best archers were those from Gwent, who he describes as having 'much more experience of warfare' than the men from other parts of the country. In his 'Journey through Wales', written in 1188, Giraldus describes Welsh elm bows as crude ('rough and unpolished') but capable of firing to a considerable distance, as well as being able to inflict deep and savage wounds at close range. He cites an anecdote in which arrows fired from such bows penetrated an oak door 4" thick, and tells how on another occasion an arrow went through a horseman's mail cuisse and the skirt of his gambeson, then through his leg and saddle, and finally penetrated deep enough into his horse's flank to kill it. As a result of such experiences the English were quick to recognise the military potential of Welsh archers, who consequently served in many English armies of the 12th and 13th centuries, featuring particularly prominently in Edward I's reign and, earlier, in the Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland, where Earl Richard de Clare inherited his father's nickname 'Strongbow' because of them. Indeed, it was from the Welsh that the famous English longbow of the later Middle Ages was adopted.

48. WELSH UCHELWR, c.1200

A description of Welshmen in Edward I's army in Flanders in 1297 speaks of them being unarmoured, wearing red linen tunics, and some armed with javelins. Though William le Breton and Giraldus himself also state that Welsh soldiers were unarmoured the latter nevertheless reports that some, clearly the upper-classes, wore light armour, which he describes as comprising helmet, short mail corselet, circular shield (also carried by infantry spearmen and described in various sources as being coloured white, gold, silver or blue) and — very occasionally — mail hosen. Such warriors were the *uchelwyr* or noblemen who constituted the teulus of the Welsh princes and fought on horseback as *marchogs* (knights), mounted 'on swift, mettlesome horses which are bred locally', but who were prepared to dismount and fight on foot whenever necessary; Richard I had such cavalry as well as archers with him in France at the end of the 12th century, paying them 4d. a day if they had one horse and 6d. if they had two. The figure depicted is based on the seal (c.1214) of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, Prince of Gwynedd 1194-1240; he differs from Giraldus' description only in the substitution of a conventional long shield in place of the round one, probably a late-12th or early-13th century development. Principal armament was probably a lance as elsewhere, though it is certainly possible, even likely, that javelins were also carried in the earlier part of this period.

It seems likely that in the course of the 13th century the uchelwyr would have been influenced by the styles of arms and armour in use amongst the contingents of the marcher lords, and that an even more 'Anglicised' harness would have resulted; in 1316, for instance, the confiscated armour of the rebel Llywelyn Bren (of the royal house of Senghenydd in Glamorgan) is recorded to have comprised an aketon, a gambeson, 3 haubergeons, an iron breastplate, a buckram armour (doubtless a coat-of-plates), an iron helmet, 2 pairs of *maunc'* (vambraces), a shield, and a pair of plate gauntlets. Though this harness is somewhat more comprehensive than that generally in use at the end of the 13th century, the significant point is that it would have made Llywelyn Bren indistinguishable from his English adversaries. In addition heraldry was in use amongst the Welsh nobility by the late-12th century, as is confirmed by surviving seals.

49. SCOTS SPEARMAN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Poorly-armed infantry such as this constituted the bulk of most Scots armies throughout this era. Dress consisted chiefly of short tunic and cloak, though many were much more scantily clad; the Galwegians at the Battle of the Standard in 1138 wore tunics that left their buttocks only half-covered, while the levy of Angus is described by one chronicler in 1173 as composed of more than 3,000 men 'more naked than I can well say'. Scottish soldiers were characteristically barelegged and often barefoot. The saffron shirt of later centuries may have been becoming common by the end of the 13th century, though it was generally an upper-class garment, while tartan (from the

Anglo-French *tiretaine*) was at this date merely a brightly coloured woollen cloth; in Gaelic it was called *breacan*, which means spotted, striped or patterned.

The main weapon of the Scots infantryman was a long spear, probably about 12 feet in length and possibly longer (a Scottish parliament of 1318 called for the use of 16-foot spears, in such a way that it could be inferred the idea was not a new one). As early as the Battle of the Standard the 'naked' (ie, unarmoured) Scots are described as carrying 'lances of extraordinary length', and their use in the famous Scottish battle formation, the *schiltron*, is well-known. The shield, which gave its name to the schiltron, was probably fairly small. Those carried at the Standard are described as 'targes' of 'barkened [tanned] bull's hide'. Heater shields were also in use by the 13th century at the latest.

Other weapons in use were javelins, axe, knife and bow; a description of the Scots infantry at Largs in 1263 speaks of them as 'poorly armoured' and armed mainly with 'bows and Irish axes'. The axe was fairly popular, in fact, as was the gisarme, specified as the regulation weapon — along with a bow and arrows — for all those with less than 40s. worth of land in a statute of King William the Lion's reign (1165-1214). The bow, however, never became overwhelmingly popular, despite frequent recommendation in various 12th-14th century statutes. The best archers available to the Scots appear to have been Highlanders and Ettrick forest men.

50. SCOTTISH KNIGHT, 12th CENTURY

As early as the end of the 11th century many disaffected Anglo-Norman knights had begun to take service with the Scottish crown, as a result of which Norman-style equipment was soon adopted by the royal family and those Scots closely associated with the king's household. The particular figure depicted here, taken from the seal of King Alexander I (1107-24) demonstrates this more eloquently than could any number of words; with his kite-shield, nasal helmet, hauberk and *gonfanon* he is indistinguishable from his southern counterparts. However, it took considerably longer for such equipment to be adopted in the north, where the old tradition of going into battle lightly-armed was only slowly abandoned: Aelred of Rivaulx reports that at the Battle of the Standard in 1138 even an important chieftain like Earl Malise of Strathearne could proudly boast that, though he wore no armour, yet he would advance further than the king's mailed 'Frenchmen'. Nevertheless, the evolution of Scottish armour basically kept pace with that of England, and by the mid-13th century Matthew Paris could speak of Scots knights mounted on horses barded in steel or linen, even though the mounts themselves were not always Spanish, Italian 'or other costly horses'.

51, 52 & 53. IRISH WARRIORS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

The Irishman and his axe (adopted prior to this period under Scandinavian influence) were inseparable, it being carried everywhere even in peacetime. Despite pictures to the contrary in his own ms., Giraldus Cambrensis reports in his 'Topography of Ireland' (c.1188) that the axe was wielded in only one hand, 'extending the thumb along the handle to direct the blow'; he adds that neither helmet nor mail was any protection against it, though he also records in one battle anecdote that an Anglo-Norman knight managed to fight free of an Irish ambush even with 3 of their axes embedded in his horse and 2 more in his shield. He describes the average warrior's other weapons as a short spear and 2 javelins, also making special mention of their accuracy at flinging stones 'when all else fails', this probably being an allusion to the use of slings (*taibell* or *clocharma*), which are recorded in many Irish sources. A sword could also be carried, though a long dagger, the *skein*, was more usual. Shields are mentioned in the sources, but rarely.

The short, light javelins or 'darts' could not pierce armour and tended to wound rather than kill an unarmoured man, and the Irish at first made no use of the bow, so that except for hails of stones their firepower was limited. However, Giraldus observes in his 'Conquest of Ireland' of c.1189 that following the Anglo-Norman invasion the Irish 'by usage and experience...gradually became skilled and versed in handling arrows'; even so, Irish archers are only first recorded in a native source, the 'Annals of Ulster', in 1243, when they are called *saighdeoiri* (a non-Gaelic word derived from the Latin *sagittarii*). The bow that the Irish adopted under Anglo-Norman influence, however, was curiously not the Welsh long-bow, but a short weapon described in the 14th century as being 'as short as half a bow of England; but they shoot as far as the English ones.' A 13th century example of what is apparently such a bow, made of yew and measuring about 35" in length, with its handle slightly off-centre, was found at Castle Desmond in the 19th century. Such short bows were still used by Irish soldiers as late as the 17th century.

The costume of 51, based on illuminations in Giraldus' 'Topography of Ireland', consists of soft shoes, a linen tunic, close-fitting trousers (which Giraldus describes as 'breeches that are at the same time hosen, or hosen which are at the same time breeches'), and a long semi-circular cloak (the *failang*) with a shaggy collar typical of Irish

mantles at this time. Giraldus describes others as wearing a close-fitting hood, the *coccula*, which he says was made of patchwork and hung 18-22″ below the shoulders; an Irish source of c.1100 records that the coccula was covered on the outside with tufts of shaggy wool. However, in reality this may have been no more than the collar of the failang pulled up over the head. The trousers may have been worn chiefly in winter since bare legs appear to have been more common amongst Irish soldiers by the 14th century (see figure 28 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*). He wears his 'flaxen hair' and 'barbarous' beard long. 51a, from the same source, depicts an *echflesc,* used by Irish horsemen in place of spurs (see page 50).

52 is based on the 'Liber A' record book, where 3 similar figures appear whose dress consists of what is either a tunic or a short shirt, apparently tucked into their breeches. Round the lower leg are gaiter-like wrappings; earlier sources record such wrappings to have been cloth or leather, but they were uncommon. Note that the breeches have a strap under the instep, also recorded in 'Heimskringla'.

Figure 53, based on a cast-bronze figurine from the reliquary of St Manchan, probably made c.1120-30, wears more traditional Irish costume, comprising a pleated tunic, bare legs and bare feet. His axe, like that of figure 52, is of a distinctly Scandinavian design, quite different from that of 51.

Despite the fact that he describes their trousers as woollen, Giraldus says that the Irish used very little wool in their clothing, and what they did use was mainly black (the colour, apparently, of most Irish sheep at this time), though he says their trousers were 'for the most part dyed.' However, we know from earlier sources that the Irish liked bright colours and there is no reason to assume that their tastes had changed. Giraldus' illustrations show clothes chiefly in light shades of green, brown, red and grey, though we know from an earlier list that purple, crimson, yellow and blue were also worn, sometimes striped or variegated. Yellow garments possibly became predominant by the end of this period and gave rise to the later saffron tunic.

The Irish at first continued to make no use of armour, being described going into battle in no more than their silk shirts even as late as 1260. However, it is hard to believe that such windfalls as the 100 mail corselets and horse bards



captured from the English at the Battle of Athankip (1270) were not put to practical use, and certainly by the end of this period at least some Irish chieftains had finally adopted armour. A poem of c.1300 dedicated to Aedh O'Conor, king of Connacht (1293-1309), describes his equipment as comprising a helmet, an aketon (*cotun*), a mail corselet (*luirech*) and a mail hood (*coiléar*) reaching to his chest; on his feet were golden spurs, and he was armed with a sword, a spear and a white shield (*sgiath*) decorated with 'dragons and golden branches'. In addition he carried behind his shoulders a red targe (called a *sdarga* or *starra*), 'which bounced a foreign spear from his back', such use of the shield being customary amongst 14th-16th century Irish cavalrymen.

54, 55, 56 & 57. ISLESMEN OR GALLÓGLAICH, 12th-14th CENTURIES

Figures 54 and 55 are Hebrideans, based on the chessmen of c.1175 found at Uig on the Isle of Lewis. We are fortunate enough to have been left with a record of the equipment of 12th century Islesmen by Giraldus Cambrensis. He describes the Orcadian and Hebridean mercenaries of Haskulf Thorgilsson at Dublin in 1171 as being armoured 'in Danish fashion completely clad in iron', either in long mail hauberks or 'iron laminae skilfully fastened together' (probably indicating lamellar armour, or possibly coats-of-plates as described under figure 13). Despite the fact that all of the Lewis chessmen have kite-shields Giraldus describes Haskulf's men as carrying circular shields, painted red with iron rims and bosses; doubtless round shields were still favoured for maritime operations, for which their shape was more suitable than the kite-shield. They were predominantly armed with axes, in the use of which they excelled like their Viking forbears; the mercenaries' commander, an Orcadian named Eoan Mear ('John the Mad', thought by some to have been Svein Asleifsson, a central character in the 'Orkneyinga Saga') personally killed as many as 9 or 10 men with his axe in the ensuing battle, the 'Song of Dermot and the Earl' describing how he chopped right through one horseman's mailed thigh with a single stroke. The axe in fact remained the characteristic weapon of the Islesmen's gallóglaich descendants right up until the 16th century, its alternative 14th century name of 'sparth' even being applied to the sub-unit (*spar*) of a gallóglaich company.

56 is from the tomb of Felim O'Conor (d.1265) at Roscommon Abbey, which depicts 8 such figures that may, however, date to a later period (along with the tomb itself). A very similar warrior is to be found at Glinsk in Co. Galway (see figure 31 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*), which has been dated to the early-13th century but is more probably of 14th century origin. He wears a short-sleeved haubergeon over an aketon. The Roscommon and Glinsk effigies are probably the earliest representations of gallóglaich in existence.

Though figure 57 is taken from a later source — the tomb of Ranald, son of the Lord of the Isles, who died in 1386 — evidence indicates that identical equipment was in use amongst the Islesmen by the 13th century at the latest. He wears a nasal helmet, mail hood and aketon. Like 56 he carries an axe and a long sword. Other figures are often





shown with spear and sword or sword only, while later sources mention gallóglaich carrying up to 3 darts in addition. No shields are ever shown in pictures of gallóglaich, though all the evidence indicates that they continued to be carried by Islesmen even in the 13th century, being alluded to in many contemporary chronicles and poems. Note the bare legs of this figure and the last, many Islesmen having adopted Gaelic forms of dress by as early as the 11th century; indeed, the Gaelic costume of 'bare legs and short tunics and over-cloaks' worn by the Norwegian king Magnus Barelegs and his men was, like the king's nickname, just as likely to have been adopted in the Hebrides or Man, where they had resided, as in Ireland. The term 'golden-legs' applied to the Orcadians who supported Sigurd Magnusson's bid for the Norwegian throne in 1193 is likewise a reference to their tanned, bare legs. Scots mercenaries recruited from the Western Isles as late as the 16th century were similarly called 'redshanks'. (Sigurd Magnusson's Orcadian supporters were also nicknamed 'Island-beardies', an allusion to their continued wearing of beards, whereas in Scandinavia proper the Western European custom of shaving the chin had by then been generally adopted.)

58, 59 & 60. SCANDINAVIAN KNIGHTS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

From the sources one is left with a general but less than accurate impression that Scandinavia lagged somewhat behind the rest of Europe in terms of armour: witness, for example, figure 58, from the oft-reproduced tapestry of c.1180 from Baldishol, Norway, which depicts a warrior little different from a mid-11th century Norman knight. However, the best and most detailed account of Scandinavian knightly equipment that we have, contained in a source called the 'Speculum Regale' (apparently written by a cleric of Hakon IV of Norway, who reigned 1217-63), describes armour comparable to that in use elsewhere: a mail hauberk over an iron breastplate (see 12b); a sleeved, thigh-length linen gambeson; a sleeveless aketon over the hauberk; mail hosen suspended from a waist-belt; quilted linen cuisses with thick iron poleyns attached; a steel heaume; a thick shield with a guige-strap; and a long, steel-bladed lance, a dagger, and two swords (one at the waist and the other at the saddle-bow — see 103). In addition it records both quilted and mail armour for horses, calling the former by the term *kovertur*, from the French *couverture*. Certainly such equipment would have made a Scandinavian knight indistinguishable from his Western European counterparts, and contemporary Danish, Swedish and, to a lesser extent, Norwegian seals confirm this.

Of the other two knightly figures depicted here, 59 is an Icelander from the doors of Valthjofsstadir Church dating to c.1200 (ie, about the time that a series of savage feuds began between the private armies of rival Icelandic chieftains — the largest on record being over 1,000-strong — that eventually resulted in the island accepting Norwegian suzerainty in 1262-64). Looking at this figure one cannot help but be reminded of the 13th century Icelandic saga-writer Snorri Sturlusson's anachronistic description of an earlier king who had 'a helmet on his head, a red shield on which was inlaid a gilded lion, and girt at his waist the sword Legbiter, of which the hilt was ivory and the handgrip was wound about with gold thread; this sword was extremely sharp. In his hand he had a short spear, and a short, red silk cloak over his coat [ie, his surcoat], on which, both before and behind, was embroidered a lion in yellow silk.'

60 is a Danish knight dating to the end of the 13th century, from the door of a reliquary in the Convent of Logum in southern Jutland. The most notable thing about his armour is that he wears a splint-lined surcoat that is clearly similar, if not identical, in construction to the Wisby type shown in figure 13. His harness is otherwise typical of that in use throughout Western Europe. The helmet is added from another source.

61. SCANDINAVIAN HIRDMAN, 13th CENTURY

The 'Speculum Regale' records the best armour for a warrior fighting on foot to be only a thick gambeson of soft linen 'thoroughly blackened', a strong shield or buckler and a heavy sword, for ship-board fighting adding a mail hauberk, a long spear and a *hangadi stalhufa* (a 'hanging steel hat'), which term describes either a kettle-helmet or possibly one like that worn by figure 55. However, even in the 12th century equipment such as that depicted here can be found described in written sources, which was typical of that worn by hirdmen and other household troops by the 13th century at the latest. It should also be noted that lamellar armour continued to be worn by some Scandinavians throughout this period, specifically by the Swedes (doubtless as a result of their trading links with Russia and Central Asia); 61a depicts a lamellar corselet from a 12th century altar front at Broddestorp Church, Vastergotland, Sweden.

The kettle-helmet, usually described in the sagas as a *vida stalhufa* ('wide steel hat'), was particularly popular in Scandinavia, remaining in common use from the 13th century to the 15th. The infamous axe of the Viking age also remained popular, though it had increased somewhat in length since the 11th century. A large number of English and Scandinavian mss. of the 12th-14th centuries show such axes with hafts up to 6 feet in length, and it is probably such weapons which the Icelandic sagas refer to as halberds (see note to figure 38). Other principal weapons were spears, swords and bows.

Shields seem to have been painted mainly red as they had been in Viking times — Giraldus Cambrensis records the Scandinavians at Dublin in 1171 as having round, red shields, for example, while they are often depicted or described as red in frescoes, ms. illustrations and sagas. A contemporary poem describing the Battle of Largs (1263) even calls the Norse soldiers 'red shields'.

62. SCANDINAVIAN MILITIAMAN, 12th CENTURY

In Denmark and Sweden, and probably in Norway too, iron helmets had become part of the militiaman's basic equipment by the 12th century at the latest. This one dates to the late-12th century and has both nasal and nape-guard. However, Scandinavian laws of this period still make little mention of armour for militiamen, though it is





apparent that some at least had to provide themselves with a mail corselet or other armour. The quilted linen or leather jerkin remained a common substitute for mail and was probably worn by most of the leidang levy whether it was called for or not. Regulation arms comprised helmet, shield, spear and sword, although an axe could be substituted for the last; the long, one-edged *seax* was also still in use until the second half of the 12th century and probably often served in place of a sword. In addition, now as in earlier times a bow or crossbow and 2 or 3 dozen arrows had to be supplied per rowing thwart or sometimes even per man, and the accuracy of individual archers is alluded to frequently in the sagas. The lowest class of militiaman was armed with no more than a club, but these were the dregs called out only in a national emergency. Shields were often still circular even in the 13th century, though by the mid-12th century the kite-shield was probably much more commonplace.

63 & 64. SPANISH KNIGHTS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Spanish knights were different enough from those of the rest of Western Europe to justify the inclusion of two examples here. To begin with their armour was often gilded and otherwise decorated because, since the Spanish courts spent much of their time 'on the road', extravagances and luxuries were more often applied to dress and equipment — ie, those things they could carry with them — than to home or furnishings: El Cid's gear, for example, is described in the contemporary 'Carmen' as including a gold-inlaid sword and shield and a highly-polished, silver-plated helmet with an electron diadem. Other sources mention jewelled shields, swords and helmets. Not that such decoration was exactly unique to Spain (as early as c.1130 St Bernard of Clairvaux, writing of knights in general, mentions reins and spurs embellished in gold, silver and precious stones); it was simply more commonplace. By the mid-13th century Castilian knights at least were expected to dress in bright colours such as red, green and crocus yellow, and to wear a sword (their symbol of rank) wherever they went. Scarlet was reserved for the king.

Figure 63, from the same source as 68, wears full mail armour including chausses (*huesos*). His round, red-tasselled leather shield, as well as the continued overarm use of the lance (which was still often thrown at this date), are the obvious results of Andalusian influence. Overarm thrusting with the lance continues to feature even in late-13th century sources, while circular shields remained popular throughout the 11th and 12th centuries and were still in use even in the 13th century, during which, however, they gradually dropped out of general favour. 63a shows the enarmes of a somewhat heavier convex round shield carried by no less a person than King Jaime I of Aragon (1213-76) on his marble tomb effigy.

Figure 64 depicts a more typical knight of the 13th century, from Alfonso X of Castile's 'Cántigas de Santa Maria' ('Songs in Praise of St Mary' — see note 77-78). There are three principal characteristics to be noted, these being the

almost straight-sided shield with a rounded base, a design apparently unique to Spain; the short-sleeved surcoat, with the shield device repeated on the sleeves (note also the floral, Berber-style decoration of the body of the surcoat); and the round-topped bascinet helmet with or without nasal, generally (but by no means exclusively) worn in place of the barrel-helm in Spain and also carrying the shield device. In fact heavier armour was only slowly adopted in Spain compared to the rest of Western Europe. Probably the hot climate was partly responsible for this, but undoubtedly the principal reason was the need to remain relatively lightly-equipped in order to meet their Andalusian and Berber foes on equal terms.

65 & 66. SPANISH TOWN MILITIAMEN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Figure 65, a Castilian of c.1125 from a painted mural at Soria, is fairly typical of the less well-equipped elements of Spain's civic militias. His tasselled leather shield is probably that type used by the Spanish which the Andalusians called by the name *hagaf*. Like their Italian counterparts, most Spanish militiamen of this period appear to have been unarmoured, but some, of whom figure 66 (dating to Alfonso X's reign) is doubtless representative, wore helmets and armour consisting of a mail haubergeon (*lorigon*) or an aketon (usually referred to as an *alcoton* or *algodon*, alternative corruptions of its Arabic name, al-qutun). The lower classes wore sombre colours, bright clothes being a monopoly of the nobility.

The specification of regulation equipment for militiamen, as in the assizes and statutes of 12th-13th century England and France, was not attempted in Spain until the late-14th century (1385). At that date the various categories of infantryman were to be armed chiefly with spear and javelins and the same is fairly certainly true of the period under review here; one category was expected to be armed with a crossbow and 36 bolts instead. Not all categories carried shields (crossbowmen and the poorest militiamen did not) and few were expected to possess swords; figure 65's sidearm is a falchion, added from the 'Cántigas' mss. Indeed, to judge from 14th century evidence many militiamen may have been armed with no more than a sling (see note to figures 38-40).

67. BIDET, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Bidets (*bideaux*, *bibaldi*) were good quality Spanish — especially Aragonese, Navarrese and Basque — javelin-armed light infantry, employed in France from the mid-12th century until the 14th (by which time they were more usually



referred to as 'bidowers', for whom see figure 23 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*). The 14th century chronicler Guiart, describing 13th century bidets, records their equipment to have consisted of a thrusting spear, 2 'darts', and a *coutel* at the waist. The coutel, or *cultellus* (whence 'cutlass'), was a popular lower-class sidearm by the 13th century, giving rise to term *cultellarii* sometimes used of infantry by contemporaries; it clearly varied considerably in shape and size but was basically a stabbing weapon, either a short sword or a long dagger such as that shown in 67a. It is possible that leather, quilted or other light armour was worn by some bidets, but contemporary sources generally speak of them as shieldless and unarmoured.

The later Almughavari (for whom see *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 2*) were very similarly equipped, the javelin remaining a popular weapon amongst the Spanish throughout this era, and particularly amongst those from mountainous areas. Almughavari appeared in the service of both Aragon and Castile in the 13th century, though strictly-speaking they were a Catalan troop-type. Their name derived from the Arabic *al-mughawir*, meaning 'one who makes hostile incursions' (or, more simply 'raider' or 'light-armed soldier'), and a late-13th century source actually records them as including 'Saracens' in their ranks. They featured particularly prominently in Aragon's war with Philippe III of France, cutting his army to pieces at Roussillon in 1285, and fighting for both King Pere III and his son Federigo (Frederick III) in the War of the Sicilian Vespers (1282-1302). Some 300 even found their way into the employ of the Guelf League by 1305, increasing to 500 by 1307.

Other noted users of javelins (*gavelocs* or *dards*) during this era were the Frisians. Matthew Paris records that these wore linen tunics and light armour, Geoffrey de Visnauf adding that their javelins had thongs, presumably designed to make them spin in flight and thereby increase their penetration.

68. JEWISH SOLDIER, 11th-13th CENTURIES

From his truculent beard and characteristic pointed cap (of which details a and b show variants) it seems fairly certain that this figure, from a Spanish ms. variously dated to the late-12th century and c.1220, represents a Jewish soldier such as are occasionally recorded serving as infantrymen in Christian Spanish armies throughout this era. Later Moslem sources refer to 'large numbers' of Jews fighting for the Christians at major battles (Sagrajas, for example), though more often they only assisted in the defence of the towns in which they lived. Nevertheless, Jews resident on monastic land, or estates belonging to the Military Orders, often actually garrisoned frontier fortresses, receiving tax reductions in exchange for their military service. Probably the only reason that they did not feature more prominently in Christian armies was the mindless anti-Semitism that was apparent even in mediaeval times — to quote but one example, Christian troops arriving to relieve Toledo in 1196 killed many of the town's Jewish defenders as infidels, despite the fact that the latter had marched out and fought against the Almohades during the siege. Even so, there are occasional references to Jewish soldiers even in the 13th-14th centuries. A document of 1266 refers to Jewish *ballesteros* (ie, archers) amongst the holders of property in Jerez de la Frontera, while Jews are recorded being killed fighting for Castile in 1272 and defending Gerona against the French in 1285. Nearly a century later, at the Battle of Montiel in 1369, King Pedro the Cruel of Castile's army is reported by Froissart to

have contained 'fierce and strong people such as Saracens, Jews and Portuguese', though with predictable bigotry he claims that 'the Jews turned their backs and fled and fought no stroke'.

The original ms. contains two such figures as are depicted here. One wears a rust-coloured tunic and brown leggings, the other a green tunic and red leggings. The hat and baldric are red in both cases and the shoes are black. 68a depicts the badge, a circle about 2″ across, that the Third (1179) and Fourth (1215) Lateran councils had decreed that all Jews should be obliged to wear so as to distinguish them from Christians. (Figure 68b wears an alternative badge that English Jews were ordered to wear in 1275, comprising two 'strips of yellow cloth, 6″ long and 3″ wide'.)

Jews were expected to perform military service in some parts of Europe other than Spain, but chiefly in an unarmed capacity (a 13th century German ms., for instance, contains a representational picture of a body of militia, amongst whom is an unarmed Jew).

69. ARAGONESE JINETE, 13th CENTURY

This figure, from a painting on wood of c.1200 from Barcelona, is fairly typical of the Berber light cavalry employed by Aragon in the 13th century. The term *jinete* itself derives from the tribal name Zanata, the principal source of such troops, as explained on page 21. Somewhat later jinetes depicted in the 'Cántigas' mss. are identical to the figures described under 77 and 78. Although the kings of Castile too employed such mercenary Berber cavalry they also made much use of native Spanish light horse equipped and trained to fight in jinete fashion. These were usually armed with 2-3 long javelins for thrusting or throwing, a sword or long knife, and the heart-shaped *adarga* shield. A reconstruction of a later Castilian jinete can be found under figure 88 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1.*

70, 71 & 72. BRETHREN OF THE SPANISH MILITARY ORDERS

Figure 70, from a ms. of the reign of Alfonso VIII (1158-1214), depicts the habit of a brother knight of the Order of Santiago, apparently made of some kind of very coarse material. Note the difference between the early *espada* device worn here and the later one depicted in 70a. Figure 71, by contrast, is a 13th century Santiagan knight in war-harness, taken from the 'Cántigas de Santa Maria'. He wears a faded red surcoat, while his helmet and shield are white, both bearing a red cross with fleur-de-lis ends and charged with 5 white cockleshells, apparently an alternative device of the Order which it also seems to have used — in a variant form — on one of its battle-flags (see *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*, figure 95f; also, figure 95e for the Order's principal flag). In the original from which he is taken some knights are depicted mounted on horses with similarly marked housings and red leather chanfrons, while others have mail bards.

Shortened, hooded habits split for riding, such as worn by figure 72 (an Alcántaran knight of c.1300, based on an engraving from an 18th century work, P. Helyot's *Histoire des Ordres Religieux*), appear to have been worn in place of surcoats by some brethren. Long cloaks, sometimes fur-lined, might also be worn, though probably not in battle. Equipment would have otherwise been identical to that described under 63 and 64 and depicted in 71, except that Calatravan brethren always wore blackened armour. Confrère brethren of Santiago at least, and probably most if not all of the other Spanish Orders, bore their own arms on their shields.

The following list provides brief details of the habits and badges of the principal Spanish Orders:

Order	**Habit**	**Emblem**
Knights of Calatrava	White, later grey or black.	Red cross with fleur-de-lis ends from 1397 (70b).
Knights of Santiago	At first a red cloak. Then a white habit, later black.	The red cloak had a cross or cockleshell thereon. Habit had an espada, a red cross with the bottom arm extended to resemble a short sword blade (70a). 14th century and later sources show the hilt and guards ending in fleurs-de-lis.
Knights of Alcántara	White	Green cross with fleur-de-lis ends from soon after 1397 (70b).

Knights of Avis	White	Green cross from c.1325.
Knights of Our Lady of Montjoie (Montegaudio)	White (G. G. King says red)	Parti-coloured red and white cross.
Knights of St George of Alfama	White	Red cross from 1400.
Mercedarian Knights	White	—
Knights of Sao Thiago	White	Espada like Santiago, except that the blade too ended in a fleur-de-lis.

73 & 74. LATE UMAYYAD WARRIORS

These figures are taken from an ivory casket of Abd al-Malik ibn al-Mansur, dating to 1005, and are typical of the clean-cut soldiers of civilised Andalusia prior to the arrival of the first wave of new Berber invasions which began in the late-11th century. Some probably still even wore uniforms. Their shields were generally circular, infantry carrying either the leather *daraqa* (also called *migann* or *hagaf*) or the wood and leather *turs*. The turs often had a reinforced rim as well as metal plates and a spiked boss, and was allegedly proof against lances and arrows. However, pictorial evidence does not support this claim, the smaller shield of 74 (a type apparently called a *broquel*) being depicted in the original pierced through by another horseman's lance. Such cavalry shields are sometimes depcited slung from the saddle-bow when not in use.

Figure 74's stirrups appear to be no more than loops of leather, though other sources of similar date quite clearly depict standard iron stirrups. At least one mounted figure on the casket rides with no stirrups at all, which tallies with a statement by Ibn Hawqal in the 10th century that Andalusians often rode with their feet dangling free of their stirrups or rode without stirrups altogether. On the other hand many Andalusians of this date wore spurs.

75. MURABIT CAVALRYMAN, 11th CENTURY

The most distinctive feature of the Murabits was their veiled turban, adopted from the Lamtunah Berbers, a branch of the Sanhaja tribe. The modern Touaregs, descendants of the Sanhaja, still wear such turbans today, which are usually very dark blue like their long topcoats, though some subject tribes wear white. Many of the Murabits, however, appear to have worn black topcoats and cloaks and therefore, presumably, black veils. (Several modern authorities say the Murabits wore blue and striped clothes and black sandals but do not cite their source for this.) It was the characteristic veiled turban, the *litham*, which gave rise to an alternative name for the Murabits — *Mulathamun*, meaning 'Veil-wearers' or 'Muffled ones'. Some Andalusian and even Negro mercenaries in Murabit employ also adopted the veil.

The Murabits carried typical Berber armament of lance, javelins, sword and shield, the last apparently often of hippopotamus hide. In addition a sheathed dagger would probably have been strapped to the left forearm, a Berber practice recorded in the 16th century and still customary amongst the Touaregs today. Murda al-Tartusi, who wrote a military manual for Saladin in the second half of the 12th century, described the Berber lance, which he called *kabarbara*, as having a shaft of 5 arm's-lengths (ie, about 11½-12½ feet) with a blade of another one arm's-length, making a total of 13½-15 feet. Although this was in Almohade times, there is no reason at all to suppose that Berber weapons changed along with their dynasties (though the 'Cántigas' pictures significantly depict shorter lances of only 9-10 feet — see figure 78). If armour was worn at all (improbable prior to the conquest of Andalusia, and uncommon among the Murabits themselves even thereafter) it was probably concealed beneath the flowing robes of camel-wool described as their characteristic costume by contemporaries. The clothing of both Murabit and Almohade chieftains alike was generally decorated with Coptic designs, which involved geometrically patterned bands and polygonal motifs.

Each Murabit or Almohade cavalry unit had its own flag and drums, the Murabits at least being trained to manoeuvre to the roll of drums.

76. NORTH AFRICAN BERBER INFANTRYMAN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

North African Berber infantry were numerous because of the mountainous nature of their homeland. They apparently fought in large, mixed units of between 800-1,500 men, armed approximately half-and-half with bows and spears, with spearmen to the fore as described at a somewhat earlier date by Abu Bekr al-Turtushi (see page 55). It has been suggested* that the type of shield being held by the spearman depicted here, measuring some 5 feet deep and 2 feet wide, is an *'absar*, a hardened leather shield described by contemporaries (who provide no clue as to its shape) as capable of turning 'the purest steel'. Shields of this shape do not occur in any Andalusian pictures, so it was fairly certainly a type only in use amongst the Berbers of North Africa; whether it is the type of shield called an 'absar, however, remains open to debate, not least because literary references to the 'absar *do* occur in Moslem Spain. Though most Berber infantry were spearmen or archers some were armed instead with javelins and fought in a light infantry capacity, and it seems likely that these carried smaller shields, probably of the turs variety. Berber

*By Robert Storm in *Slingshot 81*, January 1979.

camelry likewise carried smaller shields; their arms comprised a long lance, javelins (in a case at the saddle) and a 2-handed sword in a simple leather scabbard also fitted to the saddle (see illustrations in Robert Storm's article).

77 & 78. BERBER AND ANDALUSIAN LIGHT CAVALRYMEN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

On the whole Berber horsemen fought without armour, Ibn Sa'id stating that 'only those who are noble and influential possess mail coats'. They were armed with a light lance or javelins and a light sword, sometimes slightly curved. The lance sometimes had a small hook below the head which was used to unhorse enemy cavalrymen, and was wielded overarm, seemingly capable either of being thrown or being used to 'fence' with the enemy. Those of Almohade guardsmen in 1199 are described as inlaid with ivory and silver and fitted with coloured silk pennons. Some Berber cavalrymen may have also carried bows. The superb 'Cántigas' illustrations — drawn at first hand c.1264-81 by artists who accompanied King Alfonso X through Castile, Seville, Galicia and Murcia — certainly show bows amongst the weapons carried by horsemen, and the 14th century Andalusian authors Ibn al-Labbana and Ibn Hudayl both speak of Granadine cavalry using bows, but possibly these are all references to Turkish mercenaries in Andalusian or Berber employ. In Granada mounted crossbowmen also appear on occasion, the best representation of these being a 14th century fresco in the Partal of the Alhambra Palace (see figure 98 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*).

The characteristic heart-shaped shield, the *adarga* (a name possibly derived from *tariqa* or *daraqa*, Arabic for kite and round shields respectively), first appeared c.1150 and was almost certainly introduced into Spain under the Almohades. Manufactured and used at first only by the Berbers of the Maghreb, it was exclusive to North Africa and Spain. It was made of hardened antelope hide (*lamta*) over a wooden framework, with a reinforced central panel as depicted in 78a to protect the hand-grip. A contemporary source claims that these shields were — presumably when handled correctly — 'proof against sword and lance blows and the majority of arrows' (crossbow bolts probably excluded). They were either left as plain leather or else dyed or painted, chiefly red, white with a red rim, or black, sometimes with a simple motif painted on (a star, for instance) and invariably decorated with hanging tassels. Even in the 13th century circular shields remained in use alongside the adarga.

Despite the fact that Ibn al-Khatib, writing in the early-14th century, records that very few of the North African Berbers serving in Spain, and even fewer of the Andalusians themselves, still wore the 'Persian turban' the illustrative evidence seems to indicate that turbans (invariably white) were in fact still usually worn during this era. Nevertheless, the 'Cántigas' mss. and other sources also show many Andalusians bareheaded, while others wear a floppy cap, most often red like that of the Valencian depicted in figure 77, from a 13th century Catalan fresco. This became a common feature of Andalusian dress. Where bareheaded the 'Cántigas' figures usually have long black,



red or yellow hair; in fact fair hair was not uncommon, and Mohammed ibn Yusuf of Granada was himself called 'The Red Man' because of his red hair and fair complexion.

Moslem dress is invariably colourful in contemporary sources, red, yellow, blue and white predominating, often with gold embroidery in the case of chieftains. However, the 'Cántigas' pictures indicate that the colours tended to be pastel shades.

79 & 80. ANDALUSIAN HEAVY CAVALRYMEN, 11th-12th CENTURIES

It is clear from the work of contemporary Moslem poets that, unlike the North African Berbers, by the 12th century most Andalusian regulars wore armour — Ibn Quzman, for example, mentions corselets of light mail, while others mention double-thickness corselets called *halaq* or *muda'afa*. Though some such armour was doubtless imported from the Christian kingdoms, it was also produced within the Moslem territories, Ibn Sa'id recording in the 13th century that Murcia was an important centre for the manufacture of mail and cuirasses (ie, scale corselets). Though both from Christian sources, the figures depicted here would appear to represent such Moslem warriors. Their equipment is undeniably similar to that of the Christians, but one distinct difference is the continued preference amongst Moslem cavalry for round shields, though it would seem that kite-shields may have come into use amongst their infantry during the 12th century.

Figure 79 is taken from illustrations in a Mozarab (see next note) ms. of Beatus of Liebana's 'Comentarios al Apocalipsis' dating to c.1091-1109. He wears a long mail hauberk over a yellow tunic, mail hosen, and a fluted helmet with nasal and leather aventail. In the original the pattern on his shield is brightly coloured in green, yellow, black and red. Figure 80 comes from a 12th century Navarrese sculpture, in the ducal palace at Estella, of the mythical Saracen giant Faragut. He carries a similarly decorated shield suspended from a guige-strap, and wears a scarf round his helmet.

81 & 82. ANDALUSIAN INFANTRYMEN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Both of these figures are taken from the 'Cántigas' mss. Main weapons were spear, javelins and bow or crossbow, javelins called *marasas* being the favourite weapon of the African troops employed in Granada at the close of this era. Secondary armament consisted of either a sword or a dagger. The crossbow, called a 'Frankish' or 'Foreign' bow by the Moslems, was in use by the late-11th century and proved so popular in Andalusia that in the early-14th century Ibn al-Khatib claimed that it was in more common use than the traditional Arab bow. Ibn Sa'id similarly stated that the Andalusians customarily used the crossbow 'for arming the foot-soldiers in their encounters with the





enemy.' Indeed, crossbowmen similarly armoured to figure 82 feature in the 'Cántigas' ms. illuminations. Yet other infantrymen were slingers: staff-slings are portrayed in use in several 13th century sources, and the 14th century author Ibn Hudayl records sling-armed Andalusians (he also records infantry with maces, apparently little used during this era). A large number of slingers were present at Alarcos in 1195.

Figure 81's costume of turban, tunic and leggings is fairly typical; it seems to have been customary to roll up the tunic sleeves in combat, to the elbow or even right up to the shoulder (see also figures 77, 78, 84 and 88). Others substituted trousers for the short leggings worn here wrapped round his calves. His turban is wrapped round a pointed red cap, probably of the same sort as that worn by figure 77. As amongst their cavalry, by the 13th century the adarga had generally (though not completely) replaced the turs and daraqa amongst Andalusian infantry. The one carried here is a variant design to that of figure 78; during the 14th century this was to evolve into two near-ovals joined at the centre, in which form it lasted in use amongst horsemen (notably jinetes) right up until the 16th century, by which time it was often made of wood or even steel.

Figure 82 represents the infantry counterpart of 83, though the skin colour of some indicates that they are not all Berbers, some therefore probably being Spanish mercenaries or Mozarabs (the latter term deriving from Arabic *musta'rib*, 'one who has Arabised himself', referring to Christians — lapsed or otherwise — living in al-Andalus). Certainly ms. illustrations depict almost identically equipped soldiers in Christian Spanish armies (note also his similarity to figure 30). His armour consists of a long-sleeved mail haubergeon under a short-sleeved scale corselet. Some such figures that are certainly Moslems carry an adarga in place of the shield and substitute turban for coif and helmet. Others wear only the hauberk. 82a-d depict some alternative 12th and 13th century helmets, a, b and d being more traditional Moslem designs. As a general rule helmets only appear to have been worn by men wearing armour, though — as ever — there are exceptions.

83. GRANADINE HEAVY CAVALRYMAN, MID-13th CENTURY

Horsemen of this type, equipped in unmistakably European-style armour and using the higher saddle favoured among their Christian enemies, were first introduced in large numbers by Mohammed I of Granada (1235-73). They adopted the same shock tactics as were employed by Christian Spanish knights but in battle were still backed up by traditional, javelin-armed light cavalry. Such heavy cavalry feature frequently in 13th century Spanish sources, notably the 'Cántigas' mss., from which this figure is taken. The surcoat was not always worn, nor the cloth hood (which conceals a mail coif). Some substituted a turban for the coif and helmet, but others resembled Christian

knights even more closely (though some at least of the latter are probably in fact Christian mercenaries). Ibn Sa'id's 13th century 'Kitab al-Mugrib' describes the equipment of such Granadine heavy cavalry as full mail armour, heavy shield suspended on the back (presumably of Western European design as shown here, though adargas are also depicted in use by such horsemen in the 'Cántigas' mss.), a 'solid helmet', and a long, heavy thrusting lance with a pennon, Ibn Sa'id adding that each soldier 'had his device by which he could always be recognised' (witness the lance pennons carried by most heavy cavalrymen in the 'Cántigas' mss., where the device is often repeated on helmet and shield). Ibn al-Khatib adds that although armour of the type described above had 'previously' been worn, heavy cavalry of his time (the early-14th century) were equipped with smaller ('short and light') corselets, light helmets, long, slender lances, leather shields and Berber saddles, which he regarded as an improvement. 83a shows a type of barrel-helm worn by some heavy cavalrymen, the high crown presumably designed to accommodate a turban. Others wear normal Western European heaumes. It seems likely that both are forms of the 'Saragossa helmet' mentioned in many sources.

84. BERBER MUSICIAN

Murabit, Almohade, Marinid and Granadine armies alike were usually accompanied by muscians, particularly trumpeters and drummers. Each Murabit and Almohade cavalry unit in fact had its own drums, and it was the large drum batteries of the Murabits, first encountered at the Battle of Sagrajas in 1086, by which Christian chroniclers appear to have been most impressed; they are mentioned in nearly all the surviving sources, thundering across the battle-field and dumbfounding the Christian knights. The figure depicted here is again from the 13th century 'Cántigas' mss. Note the absence of stirrups due to his sitting well back on his horse, almost on its rump. He has a pair of kettle-drums, one slung to each side of the horse, and wears a faded red tunic, white turban, light tan leggings and black shoes.

85, 86, 87 & 88. NEGRO SOLDIERS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Andalusian and North African Berber armies contained large numbers of Negro soldiers, principally infantrymen. They are usually described as carrying 'enormous' hide shields (shape not given but probably round, or elongated like that of figure 76) and broad-bladed stabbing spears. Others were archers (particularly under the Murabits), or slingers accurate with clay pellets to considerable distances. At Sagrajas Ibn Teshufin had a Black Guard of 4,000 Negroes armed with light Indian swords, spears and hippopotamus hide shields. At Alarcos in 1195 al-Mansur likewise had a Black Guard, as did Mohammed abu-'Abd-Allah at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, the latter described as comprising 'huge' Negroes tied together ankle-to-ankle round Mohammed's tent; a 14th century source, the 'Roudh el Khartas', claims they numbered 10-30,000 men. Such guardsmen wore richly decorated clothes and probably at least some would have worn armour.





There seem to be few contemporary representations of Negro soldiers. Figure 85, armed with a sword and a round, decorated hide shield, is taken from a 12th century mosaic in Vercelli Cathedral in North Italy; his similarity to 86, from the capitals of Monreale Cathedral of c.1180 (see note to figures 97-101), would tend to indicate that he is a depiction of one of the African soldiers to be found amongst the Moslems of Sicily. Figures 87 and 88 are from the 'Cántigas' mss., in which Negro cavalry and infantry both occasionally appear, differing little from their Berber counterparts except that they are usually bareheaded. However, a few wear turbans and under the Murabits some Negro soldiers even wore the litham. In their own armies the majority of Negroes were infantry levies, mainly naked or clothed in skins, armed with bow or spear and shield. Some kings, however, had large numbers of cavalry: Emperor Dunama II or Bornu, for example, is said to have had as many as 30-40,000 horsemen. Armour of mail, iron and quilt, for horses as well as men, was only generally introduced in the Negro kingdoms in the 14th century.

89, 90 & 91. ITALIAN COMMUNAL MILITIAMEN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Though an unknown proportion of Italian communal infantrymen were armoured the majority seem to have worn for protection no more than a helmet and, at best, quilted body-armour. Principal weapons were usually sword and either a long spear or a crossbow, though bows also feature and axes were popular in some towns (Cremona, for example). The spearmen were always brigaded separately from the archers and crossbowmen. Nevertheless, by the 13th century some, called *pavesarii* (specialist troops named after the pavise or large shield they carried, which originated in Pavia), were expected to protect the archers and crossbowmen in battle. Their shields could be carried by pack mules on the march; Florentine laws of 1259 and 1260, for example, which describe their militia as divided up into companies of crossbowmen and archers on the one hand and companies of spearmen with large shields on the other, state that mules carrying pavises were always to be in close proximity to the archers on the march. Some idea of the size of pavises can be got from an incident at the Battle of Campaldino in 1289, where an observer mistook those of the Florentine pavesarii for a stockade.

Figure 89 comes from a late-12th century frieze of 9 figures on the Porta Romana once in Milan (now in Castello Sforzesco), depicting the Milanese militia returning to their city in 1166 following their eviction by Frederick I Barbarossa in 1162. Of the 9 militiamen the front 2 are armoured (see figure 93) and the other 7 are dressed as here; 4 carry spears, 2 have swords, and the seventh has a falchion. Practically identical figures, similarly representing communal militiamen, appear in a Veronese sculpture of c.1135-38, from which figure 90 is taken.

Figure 91 is from a picture in the early-14th century 'Manessa Codex' depicting German knights fighting the Guelfs of the kingdom of Naples in the late-13th century; his Angevin sympathies are evident from the red fleur-de-lis on his yellow shield. Note that he wears a quilted gambeson with ¾-length sleeves under his green tunic, plus a cloth or leather coif under his helmet. In the original he is shown holding his spear in a way that suggests he is about to throw it, which together with his smallish shield indicates that he is one of the spearmen who by the late-13th



century are to be found employed in a capacity reminiscent of the peltasts of ancient armies. They acted as light-medium infantry, armed with shortened spears, short thrusting swords and small shields or bucklers. A large number of the Florentine infantry at Campaldino were thus equipped.

92 & 93. ITALIAN HEAVY INFANTRYMEN OR KNIGHTS OF THE COMMUNE, 12th CENTURY

92 dates to c.1135 and comes from the same Veronese sculpture as 90. The small version of the town flag on his lance is probably the standard of his quarter, each of which had its own cavalry and infantry standards. He has a short mail haubergeon and, surprisingly, mail hosen. Similar flags are depicted on the Porta Romana and in other sources.

The most interesting thing about figure 93 is his long corselet of scale. The second armoured figure in this source wears a long mail hauberk instead. Though he is Milanese the device on his shield actually appears to be that of Arezzo, which was a black horse on a white field, Milan's own badge being a red cross on white. Marco Serverino gives the communal badges of other Italian towns of the period 1150-1350, as were frequently used on flags, shields and surcoats of militiamen and communal knights, as follows: Alessandria, Bologna, Genoa, Mantua and Padua — argent, a cross gules; Asti, Como, Novara, Pavia and Treviso — gules, a cross argent; Bergamo — parti per pale or and gules; Brescia — azure, a lion rampant argent, queue and langued gules; Florence — argent, a fleur-de-lis gules; Lucca — parti per fess argent and gules; Modena, Parma — or, a cross azure; Sienna — parti per fess argent and sable; Pisa — gules, a Toulouse cross argent; Cremona — barry of 6, gules and argent; Ferrara — parti per fess, sable and argent; Piacenza — parti per pale, argent and gules; Pistoia — chequy argent and gules; and Verona — azure, a cross or. The wearing of any other sort of heraldry by its citizens was forbidden by most communes as part of their 'anti-vassalage' policy. Some contadini, however, coming as they did largely from the estates of noblemen, were permitted to display their lords' coats-of-arms, and by the close of this era some towns had even begun to decree that the arms of their ruling families could be worn by the communal militia, as, for example, was the eagle of the Este family of Ferrara.

94. CARROCCIO

The carroccio was a characteristic feature of Italian warfare throughout this period and occasionally even appeared outside of Italy, such as at the Battle of the Standard in England, to which it gave its name, and in the Hungarian army at Semlin in 1167 and the German army at Bouvines in 1214. The first recorded appearance of the carroccio dates to 1038, when Archbishop Aribert introduced the custom in Milan. Though it lasted until the late-15th century, its heyday was during the 12th century.

The carroccio was a painted, ox-drawn wagon consisting of a rectangular wooden platform supporting an altar and a mast, from which the standard flew. The mast of Bologna's is recorded as being 12 feet tall, while Archbishop Aribert's is recorded to have been very tall 'like the mast of a ship', held upright by ropes and surmounted by a gold crucifix. Bologna's and Parma's carroccios carried red standards with white crosses, Florence's a parti-coloured standard of crimson over white, whilst those of other cities often displayed patron saints or crucifixion scenes. In Aribert's time Milan's was 'dazzlingly white' with 'in the centre a holy cross painted with our Saviour portrayed,



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his arms extended', but by the 1180s a portrait of the city's patron saint, Ambrose, had replaced this, to be replaced in turn in the late-13th century by a white banner with a red cross. The mast (or masts — some appear to have had two) and the wagon body were painted red, while the wagon itself was frequently covered in addition with scarlet hangings by the 13th century. It was usually pulled by up to 3 pairs of white oxen; in Milan these had white harness and housings with red crosses, while in Florence their housings were crimson.

Bologna's carroccio could hold 10 armed men, while the 'crew' of the Milanese carroccio consisted at first of a driver, a paid officer (usually a specially selected knight), a priest and 8 trumpeters, plus a guard of 8 mounted knights. Since the loss of the carroccio, and more particularly its standard, was considered a grievous dishonour and humiliation it was always accompanied by an elite guard unit in battle, principally composed of infantry; the Milanese carroccio at Legnano in 1176, for instance, was guarded by an infantry unit of 300 men, the 'Company of the Carroccio', supplemented by another unit of 900 called the 'Company of Death'. In the 13th century the Bolognese carroccio had an infantry guard of as many as 1,500 men.

The trumpeters appear to have transmitted simple commands across the battlefield, as did the bell hung from the mast. The Florentines went one step better, accompanying their carroccio with a smaller wagon which carried a larger bell than that shown here, called the 'Martinella'. Carroccios were likewise sometimes given names — that of Cremona, for example, was Christened 'Berta', and that of Parma 'Blancardo'.

95. ITALIAN SEAMAN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

By the 11th century all Italian seamen, whether oarsmen, sailors or marines, generally wore body-armour in wartime and it is referred to in many sources throughout this period. There were obvious disadvantages, though: its weight was undoubtedly responsible for the large numbers of men drowned in naval battles, while it must have been exhausting to row any great distance while wearing armour — certainly the Genoese credited their decisive victory over the Pisans at Meloria in 1284 in part at least to the fact that the latter were exhausted after rowing fully armoured in the summer heat while the Genoese themselves had stripped so were fresh for the battle. However, since seamen had to supply their own equipment lighter forms of armour, including leather helmets and jerkins, also appeared.

The principal weapon of the marines was the crossbow; others were *bellatores*, meaning they carried swords, spears, axes and the like. Oarsmen were similarly armed, the equipment of 13th century Venetians including sword, dagger, spear or javelin, helmet or cap, buckler and body-armour. A Genoese law of 1313, undoubtedly merely confirming earlier practice, lists seamen's equipment as including helmets, mail corselts, javelins, maces and swords amongst other weapons. Generally officers and higher-paid seamen were expected to have better armour and more weapons. Various other arms are recorded for shipboard use including assorted long-handled hooks and





blades for cutting rigging, smashing oars, and killing at a distance. Some 13th century illustrations of sea fights show men being dragged from the decks of ships by such weapons as 95a and b.

The arming-cap appears to have been worn by the Venetians at least as early as the Fourth Crusade and is probably the woollen cap referred to in a 13th century description of dress. The rest of the seaman's costume consisted of linen or cotton tunic and trousers (silk in the case of officers) sometimes perhaps in uniform colours to match the colours the ships were painted. However, contemporary illustrations often show seamen barelegged and sometimes barefoot.

This figure is based on sketches in Matthew Paris' 'Chronica Majora'. Further figures in the same source are shown with heater shields, helmets, mail coifs, axes, maces, flails and staff-slings. Yet others, principally representing French or English seamen, are either unarmoured or wear only quilted or leather armour and sometimes a helmet.

96. SICILIAN GREEK INFANTRYMAN, 11th CENTURY

Despite its conquest by the Arabs in the 9th-10th centuries and by the Normans in the mid-11th century, Sicily retained a large Greek-speaking element throughout much of this era, best known by the term 'Griffons' applied to them in the late-12th century by Richard I's crusaders. They performed military service alongside the Italo-Norman colonists, whom they at first considerably outnumbered. There were also many Greeks still to be found in Apulia, and to a lesser extent southern Calabria, on the Italian mainland, particularly round Otranto.

This figure, dating to the Norman era (Palermo Cathedral, c.1084), is still essentially Byzantine in appearance though the sleeve embroidery and sword (probably an Andalusian import) betray strong Moslem influence. Sicily's most famous Greek soldiers in this period were her admirals, men such as John Christodoulos, George of Antioch and Margaritus of Brindisi.

97, 98, 99, 100 & 101. SICILIAN SARACENS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Saracens were employed in large numbers by the Norman, Hohenstaufen and Angevin rulers of Sicily throughout most of this period, Frederick II even colonising large numbers of them on the Italian mainland (see page 33). Contemporary sources indicate that they were armed principally with the bow, apparently composite, and some at least wore light armour. Under Roger I and Roger II at least they appear to have been exclusively infantry (especially archers) but by the 13th century at the latest they could also serve as light cavalry. References to these being bow-armed probably indicate that they were mounted infantry, not horse-archers.

They are described on occasion as being 'splendidly uniformed', or as wearing 'resplendent garments of great price', so it seems likely that uniforms were worn; certainly the Sicilian Saracen archers accompanying Queen Adelasia to the Holy Land in 1113 all wore scarlet and gold. As can be seen, the costume and armour of the Sicilian Saracens was basically a mixture of Andalusian and Greek styles, though the former was nominally the predominant military influence. Though their favourite weapon was the bow some modern authorities curiously

refer to 'companies of Saracen crossbowmen', presumably a misinterpretation of the fact that, along with a variety of other equipment and siege engines, the Saracen arsenals of 13th century Lucera manufactured crossbows.

Of the five figures depicted here, 97 is based on a 12th century ivory coffer (with the helmet added from a painting of c.1140 in the Capella Palatina); 98 is from an illustration in Pietro da Eboli's ms., of Dietrich von Schweinspoint fighting Sicilian skirmishers in 1194 during Emperor Henry VI's campaign against King Tancred; 99 is a composite from several 12th century ivory caskets; and 100 and 101 are from capitals in Monreale Cathedral, probably dating to c.1176-89, which depict a considerable number of what are clearly Saracen soldiers, armed with a variety of weapons including swords, knives, axes, lances, maces and bows. Note the Byzantine-style scale corselet of 100; identically-equipped Moslem figures are also to be found in the 13th century ms. of John Skylitzes.

102. GERMAN WARRIOR BISHOP, 13th CENTURY

Armed bishops, archbishops and abbots, fighting at the head of their own retinues, were a common sight throughout this period, starting with Odo of Bayeux at Hastings in 1066. Though they featured in the armies of most European nations as far apart as Scotland and Hungary they were especially numerous in those of Germany. The Concordat of Worms (1122) had made all of Germany's bishops princes of the realm and expected them to serve in person when summoned to provide troops, but even this was little more than formal confirmation of a state of affairs that had existed since the 10th century. By the late-12th century, in fact, it was claimed that nearly all German bishops were soldiers, or politicians, or both. (For further details of episcopal contingents in German armies see page 34.) The particular figure depicted here, from a late-13th century Swabian ms., wears full mail armour, a red surcoat, and a gilded heaume worn under a mitre. Arms comprise the usual knightly combination of shield, sword and lance.

103. BOHEMIAN KNIGHT, 13th CENTURY

Bohemia (including Moravia from 1002) was a member-state of the Holy Roman Empire throughout this era, first becoming a kingdom in 1086. Large numbers of Germans settled there from the 10th century onwards, which inevitably resulted in the general adoption of Western European feudalism, armour and styles of dress at an early date. This particular figure is King Premysl Ottokar II (1253-78), taken from his seal. His reign saw Bohemia reach



the pinnacle of its power, Ottokar being king of Austria too (1251-78), in addition to which he seized Carinthia and Carniola (1260) and Styria (1261). The Bohemian royal army inevitably included many German knights, which resulted in the battlefield desertion on several occasions of Ottokar's Bohemian nobles, who resented the favours shown to the Germans.

Note his helmet crest, comprising two wings made up from eagle feathers; crests such as this were extremely popular amongst the Western Slavs, especially the Poles (see figure 114). The only other item of special interest is his long sword, the 'great sword' or 'sword of war' as it was called in the late-13th century. Similar long swords had been in use since the 11th century, William of Apulia describing the Swabian swords at Civitate (1053) as 'particularly long and very sharp', and they were always particularly popular in Germany. Primatus' account of the Battle of Benevento (1266) mentions the long swords of the Germans, comparing them to the shorter French weapons, and Guiart too writes of the 'big swords of Germany', said to have been favoured in addition by the English and Normans. After c.1250 the hilts of such swords were often made long enough to be gripped with both hands if necessary, the usual length of such weapons being 37-40″, with a grip of another 6½-9″. From the end of the 13th century an even longer type was also in use, measuring 45-55″. It seems probable that such long swords were often slung at the saddle-bow rather than girded at the waist. This practice is recorded as early as the 11th century and there are many references to a second sword slung at the saddle throughout this period, though unfortunately no illustrations seem to have survived.

104. TEUTONIC KNIGHT IN HABIT, 13th CENTURY

This figure is from the tomb effigy of Conrad of Thuringia, Hochmeister of the Teutonic Knights 1239-41. Like the Templars — and despite their opposition — the Teutonic Knights wore a white habit, their right to this being secured for them in 1244 by Emperor Frederick II. Prior to this date, as is clear from this effigy and various other sources, though their mantles were white their tunics were grey; sergeants of the Order continued to wear grey even thereafter (as too, seemingly, did some knights — the *Minnesänger* Tannhauser, for instance, whose picture from the early-14th century 'Manessa Codex' is often reproduced in works on the Teutonic Knights, still wears a grey tunic and cap with his white mantle). The cross on the left breast of the mantle was black and was normally considerably smaller than that depicted here, generally being about 3-4″ deep. Sergeants wore in its place a black, 3-armed *Tau* cross (also called a *crux commissa*) which looked like a capital 'T'. The hat is white. Note his beard, obligatory for all brethren.





The Sword Brethren and Knights of Dobrzyn similarly wore white habits, but in place of the black cross the former bore a red cross above a red sword point downwards (104a, from a seal of c.1225) while the latter bore a red star above the sword (104b).

105. TEUTONIC KNIGHT, 13th CENTURY

The habit was replaced by a white surcoat and cloak on active service, and contemporary sources speak of these white uniforms serving as perfect camouflage for the Knights in their winter campaigns in the frozen wastelands of Prussia; the cloak, however, was usually left with the baggage in battle. The black cross was their only ornament, personal coats-of-arms being forbidden (though interestingly while one shield on Conrad of Thuringia's tomb displays the black cross on a white field another shows a rampant red and white lion on a blue field with only a miniature white shield and black cross in one corner indicating any connection with the Order). By the mid-13th century the Hochmeister had a more elaborate cross, edged with the gold cross of the kingdom of Jerusalem from 1219 and charged with a cross fleury (granted by Louis IX of France) and the black on gold Imperial eagle (granted by Frederick II in 1239); 105a, from the shield of Hochmeister Karl Beffart von Trier (1312-24), depicts most of these features. Sergeants of the Order substituted a grey surcoat for the white one of brother knights, charged with a Tau cross.

106, 107 & 108. PRUSSIAN TRIBESMEN, 11th-13th CENTURIES

These three figures are based on depictions of Prussians on the 11th century Lance of St Maurice and the 12th century bronze doors of Gniezno Cathedral, both of which indicate that their dress was basically the same as that of the lower-classes of neighbouring Poland, though a few are shown barelegged and some wear fur jerkins reaching to the waist or hips. None wear armour and only one wears a helmet, of conical shape. From the written sources we know that their tunics and trousers were of linen and wool (the woollen clothes being generally obtained by trading furs with the Poles, Germans and Scandinavians), while their shoes were made of bark fibre or rawhide. A long, woollen cloak could also be worn, pinned with a large bronze fibula, but is unlikely to have been worn in combat. Their clothing was generally bleached, undyed or white, white tunics being banned as 'heathen' by the Teutonic Knights in the 13th century (despite their own white habits). Chieftains probably wore ornamental belts of silver or gold plaques as well as other silver and gold ornament, and might carry a dagger in a bronze-plated sheath. Helmold describes the Prussians as having blue eyes, ruddy faces and long, mainly fair hair.

Although some sources tend to indicate that round shields were still to be found in use at least in the 11th century, the pictorial sources mentioned above invariably show smallish almond-shaped wooden shields, with or without bosses and horizontal or diagonal strengtheners and sometimes apparently leather-covered and painted with a simple pattern or decorated with studs. Comparison with Polish examples indicates that the type carried by 108,

made of 3 planks with a quarter-inch gap between them (to help absorb the impact of a blow), was usually flat at the back but convex in front. Principal weapons depicted are narrow-bladed thrusting spears, swords and axes, though we know from the chronicles that they also used the bow (the quiver-cum-bowcase on figure 107's back being based on contemporary Polish practice). Swords were of both Scandinavian and Polish origin. 107a depicts one of the narrow-bladed throwing axes employed not only by the Prussians but also by the other Baltic tribes, as well as the Poles and even the Russians.

109. WENDISH TRIBESMAN, 11th-12th CENTURIES

These were basically armed and equipped identically to the Prussians, though probably somewhat more of their nobility possessed mail armour and at an earlier date, obtained both by looting and by trade with Scandinavia and Germany. The majority, however, went into battle unarmoured except for a helmet and shield, and though most men possessed these 'Heimskringla' records a Pomeranian in the forefront of the attack on Konghelle to have had neither, in addition being armed with no more than a sword. In the same attack a Wend armed with a bow is recorded to have 'killed a man with every arrow, and 2 men stood before him and covered him with their shields.' However, such a marksman was the exception rather than the norm since we know that during his war against Denmark in the 1170's, Duke Henry the Lion of Saxony (1142-81) felt it necessary to send 2 experts to his Pomeranian allies to improve their archery.

They wore their hair short (only priests being permitted long hair) and dressed in the same simple linen and woollen costume as the Prussians. We know that some wore the same sort of fur waistcoat as figures 106 and 107 from the fact that a branch of the Pomeranians were called Cassubians, meaning 'shaggy-coat men'.

110 & 111. LITHUANIAN TRIBESMEN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Starting with Volodar Glebovic of Polotsk in 1159 and 1162, from the mid-12th century onwards many Russian and, to a lesser extent, Polish princes began to make considerable use of Lithuanian mercenaries, who quickly earnt a reputation as reliable soldiers of a high standard. Many of them were light cavalry, but others were infantry armed predominantly with spear and axe. After 1279 some Semgallian tribesmen were also equipped with crossbows captured from the Teutonic Knights.*

These figures give a general idea of the appearance of Lithuanians during this period. Basic dress comprised the same woollen or linen tunic and trousers as were worn by the Prussians and Wends, the tunic being short- or long-sleeved depending on the season, and occasionally embroidered. In addition a short fur or woollen cloak was usually worn (this doubling as a blanket on campaign); figure 110 also wears fur wrappings round the lower leg, while others substituted felt boots or cross-gartered leggings (figure 111). Spurs were not worn by Lithuanian horsemen at this date, even though they were in use amongst the neighbouring Kurs. A fur-trimmed cap as depicted in figure 110a might also be worn, while others wore a leather headband. Most Lithuanians had moustache and beard and wore their hair long, this being chiefly dark brown or black.

Over his tunic figure 110 wears a studded leather jerkin for protection, poorer men often substituting a fur jerkin as worn by figures 106 and 107 (indeed, Polish reconstructions of 10th-12th century Lithuanian warriors are indistinguishable from the Prussians depicted above). Helmets were fairly common, and by the 13th century at the latest Lithuanian chieftains and boyars also wore mail or lamellar corselets: certainly the 'Livonian Rhymed Chronicle' describes a Lithuanian army in 1260 as equipped with 'many wonderful mail corselets and helmets of rich gold which glistened like mirrors and whose ornamentation shone like silver', and this same source refers to armoured Lithuanians and Samogitians in other passages too. These would have closely resembled figure 131. Principal armament comprised a *spisa* (a slender lance 8-9 feet in length, which according to Henry of Livonia could be thrown), an axe, and a dagger. Richer men might substitute a long iron sword or a sabre for the axe. Most also carried a bow of about 3 feet, the bowcase and quiver being slung from the saddle; this was a self-bow, not a composite weapon, and was used on foot, *not* on horseback. Shields were bucklers (either of iron-rimmed wood or leather-covered interwoven osiers), small almond-shaped types as depicted in figures 106-108, or rectangular, as carried by figure 111 (a Russian reconstruction of an 11th century Lithuanian foot-soldier). Rectangular shields were in widespread use amongst the Western and Southern Slavs (see also figure 119 below and figures 73 and 142 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 2*). Curonian shields at least are described as being white, so it seems likely that those of the Lithuanians and Estonians may also have been.

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*A Christian captive trained the Semgallians in their use. Crossbows were the Teutonic Knights' 'secret weapon', and the Order made every effort to ensure that their enemies did not acquire them. They did not even allow 'friendly' natives to handle them. The Prussian Sambians only first captured one in 1262, at Konigsberg, and had absolutely no idea how it worked.

112. POLISH KNIGHT, 11th-12th CENTURIES

In the 11th century mounted Polish soldiers were called *druzynnik*, but during the 12th century this term was generally replaced by *rycerz*, derived from Ritter, the German word for 'knight'. At this date their equipment was still predominantly of native Polish design and manufacture, though some was already being imported from Germany and Denmark. Scale was the most commonly worn form of armour, with or without a coif. Lamellar corselets imported from Russia also sometimes appear but were not particularly popular, while leather corselets with studs or rings stitched on were another alternative (for which see figure 120). Mail seems to have been uncommon in Poland until the mid- to late-12th century and was thus more valuable than in the West, being at first generally worn only by kings and nobles. This figure actually wears mail hosen, but others substituted scale or else wore no armour on the legs at all. Helmets were fairly elaborate affairs, made of iron or even bronze and often decorated with gold and silver inlay (as too were their spurs). Some had mail aventails and most had coloured plumes of horsehair or feathers. Bohemian and Russian helmets of similar design were also worn, these usually having nasals.

His wooden shield is about 30″ in diameter, reinforced with iron and with a boss that was often spiked. Where visible the wooden parts of the orb were painted, most often red. Being fairly heavy and apparently not fitted with a guige-strap, the shield was usually hung from the saddle when not in use. Kite-shields also came into widespread use during the 12th century, but these were generally smaller and more rounded than those of Western Europe and are consequently usually referred to as 'almond' shields. They were replaced in turn by the typical flat-topped Western European 'heater' shield during the first half of the 13th century. Arms consisted of a sword in a red, green or yellow sheath, a lance of about 8 feet and usually an axe. The lance sometimes had a horse-tail (*bunchuk*) attached as here, thought to be an indication of senior rank, others having a red pennon (bearing a family badge in the case of princes). The axe was suspended from the saddle, a thong through a hole punched in the blade often securing it, with the butt resting in a frog. The use of the axe had been generally, though not completely, abandoned by the late-12th century.

113. POLISH KNIGHT 1229

Taken from his seal, this is Prince Henry I the Bearded of Silesia, senior Piast prince of the kingdom of Poland 1234-38. Although his armour is old-fashioned by Western European standards it is nevertheless considerably more up-to-date than that of the last figure. Mail had come into more widespread use amongst Polish knights by c.1200 (though remaining uncommon amongst foot-soldiers) so that longer, long-sleeved hauberks of the type worn here began to replace the old scale corselets that had previously predominated. Similarly, in the course of the 12th century nasal helmets (called 'pot' helmets in Poland) replaced the tall, plumed type worn by 112. Nevertheless, the





older styles of equipment remained in use for the rest of this era with the knights' mounted retainers (equivalent to Western sergeants), others of whom wore armour such as that described for the infantry (see below). In the course of the 13th century such retainers also began to adopt the crossbow.

114. POLISH KNIGHT c.1241

This is Prince Henry II the Pious of Silesia, killed at Liegnitz in 1241, from a 14th century ms. illustration of the battle. He is basically indistinguishable from his Western European counterparts, the use of more traditional Polish equipment declining steadily over the preceding half-century under German influence. Some continued to wear nasal helmets like that of 113 but heaumes of the type depicted here were more commonplace amongst the gentry by the 1240s. The crest is of a characteristically Slavic type (compare that of figure 103), comprising a painted, metal-rimmed wooden centrepiece surmounted by eagle feathers. This ms. and some other 13th-14th century Polish sources would tend to indicate that such crests were worn in battle, but interestingly though the early-14th century tomb effigy of Duke Henry IV also depicts such a crested helmet a panel on the side of the tomb portraying a battle-scene shows him in an ordinary, uncrested heaume. It seems likely, incidentally, that the much later Polish winged hussar helmets evolved from crests such as this and that of figure 103.

In the original Duke Henry is shown riding a caparisoned horse, its housing possibly concealing a mail bard such as are known to have been in use amongst Polish princes and some of the wealthier nobility by about the mid-13th century. Polish horses were chiefly duns, bays and chestnuts.

115, 116 & 117. POLISH PEASANT INFANTRYMEN, 11th-13th CENTURIES

Polish dress remained basically unchanged throughout this era, consisting of an unbleached linen or woollen tunic and trousers, the tunic often having 2 or 3 red bands at cuff and collar, and the trousers being either cross-gartered or gathered at the ankles. A sheepskin jerkin shaped like a poncho, with the fur on the inside, could be worn in winter, while the tunic sleeves were often rolled up in the summer. The elders and upper classes wore longer tunics of strong linen embroidered at collar, cuffs and hem and dyed, predominantly in shades of red, blue and brown, or else left unbleached (grey) like their leggings. By the 13th century lower-class tunics could also be coloured, though mainly only in dull greens and browns. Shoes were usually leather, but the poorest wore bast shoes of birch fibres.

Lower-class men equipped like these supplied the bulk of Polish infantry, wearing no metal defensive armour except for the occasional helmet and fighting mainly with polearms, bows and slings. The bow, about 3-4 feet in length, was carried in a combined bowcase/quiver of wood slung either across the back or from the waistbelt.



Principal defensive weapons consisted of an axe, a knife or a crude wooden club, sometimes studded with nails. 116, who dates to the latter part of this period, is armed with a long-handled axe, probably an early version of the famous *berdish* or *berdische*, which appeared by the 13th century at the latest. In addition he wears a tunic and hood that are made up of several layers of wool or linen for protection, often quilted like a gambeson. The shield of about 18″ diameter carried by 115 is constructed from 2 layers of interwoven osiers covered in leather or sheepskin with the fleece outermost. Though seemingly flimsy the flexibility of this type of shield enabled it to absorb fairly heavy blows without splintering. Alternatively oval, circular or 'almond' types might be carried, that of 117 (who dates to the 11th-12th centuries) being reinforced by a cruciform arrangement of iron strengtheners.

The 'page-boy' hairstyle of 115 and 117 is typical of the lower classes, noblemen generally having shoulder-length hair. In addition most men wore a moustache (a sign of manhood in Eastern Europe) but only the nobility seem to have generally worn beards. Most Poles had blue or grey eyes and blonde or light brown hair, except for those of Silesia and Little Poland who tended to have dark hair.

118 & 119. POLISH HEAVY INFANTRYMEN, 11th-12th CENTURIES

Called *tarczownicy* or 'shield-carriers', such infantry were supplied by those able to afford heavier equipment. Their dress and arms changed little from the 11th century to the 12th. The most common type of body-armour consisted of a three-quarter length sleeveless leather or quilted linen jerkin, often reinforced with small iron plates or strips of studded leather and often fur-trimmed. 118 depicts an elder, his studded leather armour being somewhat more elaborate than that of 119. He wears a type of nasal helmet which became popular in the 12th century.

Basic arms consisted of an 8-foot thrusting spear, a shield, and secondary armament of a short sword or, more commonly, a bearded axe. Knives might also be carried. The rectangular wooden shield is a typical Slav design and was used in Russia, and possibly Serbia and Bulgaria too, at this date. It was flat, often painted, and had an iron rim, boss and ornament. From the rims and other remains of such shields that have been found, Polish archaeologists estimate that they were about 120 cm (nearly 4 feet) tall, which effectively puts them in the same class as pavises.

120. POLISH HEAVY INFANTRYMAN, 13th CENTURY

Armour was now generally heavier, though still relatively few wore actual mail. This figure wears a substitute form of body-defence that was unique to Poland, comprising a leather jerkin and coif with iron rings sewn all over them, fragments of such armours having been found by archaeologists. Others continued to wear armour similar to that of the last two figures, equipment such as that worn here probably indicating a member of a wealthy nobleman's retinue or one of the relatively well-equipped town militiamen. Tarczownicy arms had not changed except that a sword now frequently replaced the axe as secondary armament. The shield is of standard Western European design, though a large oval type, similar to the circular shield of figure 117 with boss and cruciform reinforcement, also appears during this era, in use amongst peasants as well as shield-carriers.

Some heavy infantry had also by now adopted the crossbow, though many of these were probably of mercenary origin (probably Germans) since this weapon was not at first popular in Poland. However, some of the lighter cavalrymen in the retinues of Polish knights were to be found using crossbows in the 13th century.

121. HUNGARIAN HEAVY CAVALRYMAN, 12th CENTURY

Taken from a relief on the west door of Trogir Cathedral, the equipment of this Croatian is probably characteristic of the traditional forms that prevailed in the Hungarian kingdom prior to the adoption of Western European panoply, others probably resembling those of neighbouring Poland, South Russia and western Serbia. His armour comprises a mail hood and a long-sleeved hauberk worn under a sleeveless corselet that may be lamellar, though the irregular arrangement of its plates suggests that it consists instead of a leather foundation to which the plates or scales are secured by thongs or rivets, overlapping outwards and downwards. The helmet is a brimmed variety that was seemingly popular in the Balkans since it occurs in Bulgarian frescoes even as late as the 15th century. Conical helmets with and without nasals were also in use, some being of spangenhelm construction. A single, large feather was often fixed to the crown of the helmet in Hungary as an indication of rank, this being an old Magyar custom that persisted into the mediaeval period.

122. HUNGARIAN KNIGHT, 13th CENTURY

The conversion of the Magyars by the Catholic rather than the Greek Orthodox Church inevitably resulted in Hungary coming within the European, rather than the Byzantine, sphere of influence, and the presence at the Hungarian court of German mercenary knights from an early date meant that it was German influence which prevailed in military matters (see page 42). The senior nobility associated with the king's court had already adopted German arms and armour by the beginning of this period, copying the equipment of the 'Saxon' mercenaries prevalent in the royal household, but elsewhere in the country native forms of armour such as that depicted in the last figure prevailed until the mid-12th century, when Otto of Freising tells us that rural Hungarian knights were just beginning to adopt the arms and tactics of the Germany mercenary companies. The Byzantine chronicler Constantine Manasses, writing in the first half of the 12th century, describes Hungarian knights as all having helmets, heavy armour, spears and corselets, while Niketas Choniates, in his account of the Battle of Semlin in 1167, records even heavier equipment: 'Not only were the warriors covered by corselets to the teeth, but their horses also had straps and plates of armour on their foreheads and breasts to protect them'.

The figure portrayed here, from church frescoes dating to the end of this period, depicts armour identical to that in use elsewhere in Europe at that time, comprising mail hauberk and chausses, the latter with plate poleyns attached, under a short-sleeved blue and white surcoat. Arms comprise dagger, sword and lance. Note his beard; in the earlier



part of this period most Hungarians wore beards, but by the late-13th century many had adopted the Cuman custom of shaving the chin, including even King Ladislas IV himself, who was condemned by a papal legate for 'adopting Turkish weapons . . . and shaving his beard.' (See also figure 86 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 2.*) Interestingly this knight is depicted riding with short stirrups, another indication of lasting Asiatic influence.

123, 124, 125 & 126. SERBIAN SOLDIERS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Bearing in mind that Serbia was part of the Byzantine Empire until the last quarter of the 12th century, and even thereafter remained culturally within the Byzantine sphere of influence, it is hardly surprising to find that Serbian soldiers as depicted in 12th-14th century frescoes and mss. are virtually indistinguishable from those of Byzantium, a state of affairs which only began to change as Western European influence exerted itself (via Hungary) in the course of the 13th-14th centuries. Even then, Byzantine-style equipment remained in use alongside the more characteristic Western panoply that was introduced, being especially evident in the retention of the recurved bow and traditional types of shield, sword (specifically the *korda*, a single-edged weapon with a slightly curved blade and a hilt shaped in the form of a bird's head), knife and other weapons (eg, the *kijače*, a wooden maul similar to those later used by English archers). In fact the 4 figures depicted here — 2 foot-soldiers and 2 *oklopniki* (heavy cavalrymen) — show little evidence of Western influence, with the single exception of 124's poleyns fitted to his mail chausses. Their pteruge-edged, hip-length corselets are characteristically Byzantine, right down to the reinforcing leather breast- and shoulder-bands of 123 and 124. Some idea of the defensive capabilities of such armour can be assessed from an episode recorded by Cinnamus, where during a battle in 1150 a Byzantine cataphract was unable to drive his lance through a Serbian zupan's back because of the strength of the latter's corselet.

The use of the bow by Serbian horsemen requires some further comment. That Serbian cavalry did indeed use the bow is confirmed by 13th-14th century sources: the Serbians in the Nicaean Byzantine army at Pelagonia in 1259 are described as horse-archers, and horse-archery is referred to in addition at the Battle of Velbuzhd in 1330 and elsewhere by Cantacuzene. In addition some Serbian ms. illustrations also depict men firing their bows from horseback. However, it must be emphasised that the bow was regarded as a secondary weapon by Serbian horsemen, who, significantly, were regarded by their contemporaries as skilled lancers: Serbians in the Byzantine army at Semlin in 1167 are described by Cinnamus as having just 'spears and broad shields', and his account of Emperor Manuel's fight against the Serbians on the Tara in 1150 refers only to the use of swords and lances by their cavalry. Despite their shape Serbian bows were not composite, being made chiefly of yew with horn nocks. They had an effective range of up to 165-220 yards.

Infantry were chiefly either armoured spearmen provided by the voynuks or unarmoured archers provided by the vlastela's servants, of whom figures 125 and 126 respectively, dating to c.1235 and the mid-13th century, are



characteristic. Other popular weapons were the mace (particularly amongst horsemen) and the axe, which assumed a variety of forms, most of them bearded and many also narrow-bladed like that of figure 109. The crossbow, though not unknown, only became widespread under Western influence in the 14th century, and even then was heavily outnumbered by the bow.

127 & 128. BULGARIAN CAVALRYMEN, 13th CENTURY

As has already been mentioned in the section on organisation, 13th century Bulgarian armies included Greeks, Wallachians and large numbers of Cumans, of whom the Wallachian and Cuman elements would have resembled figure 127 (from a Byzantine fresco depicting the death of Tsar Kalojan in 1207) as well as figures 129 and 130, these and Bulgarians being virtually indistinguishable. Others would have been identical to the 14th century Wallachians and Cumans depicted in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 2.* It is doubtless these elements of their armies to which Villehardouin is referring when he describes the Bulgarians as 'lightly-armed'. Though bows and javelins were the main weapons of such light cavalry (the Bulgarians in the Nicaean Byzantine army that fought at Pelagonia, for instance, were described as horse-archers), the heavier-armed horsemen who constituted the retinues of the tsar and his boyars fought instead with lances and swords. Figure 128, from a fresco in Boiana church dating to 1259, is typical of this latter troop-type, other frescoes showing long sleeves to the corselet plus, occasionally, mail coifs and some lamellar armour; note the Byzantine style of his equipment. Clothing colours appear to have been predominantly shades of red, blue and brown. Most Bulgarians were dark-haired.

129. VLACH INFANTRYMAN

Seemingly descendants of Romanised Thracian and Illyrian tribes, the *Vlachoi* or Wallachians are first recorded c.976 in Cedrenus' 11th century 'Chronicle', at which time they lived predominantly south of the Danube and were described as nomadic herdsmen and 'footpads'. Even in the 12th century Anna Comnena still describes them as nomads and in 1160 the traveller Benjamin of Tudela refers to their brigandage; nevertheless, by the beginning of the 13th century many had begun to settle as farmers north of the Danube in the territory that was to become Wallachia, while others leant their energies to the establishment of the Second Bulgarian Empire in alliance with the Bulgarians and Cumans.

This particular figure comes from a 14th century depiction of the Battle of Posada in 1330, where an Hungarian army was ambushed by the Wallachians in a mountain pass and subjected to a hail of stones and arrows from above. This was clearly a traditional Vlach tactic since Emperor Isaac II Angelus was similarly heavily defeated in a narrow pass in 1191, the Vlachs hurling stones down on his troops and simultaneously attacking from ground level, inflicting severe losses on the Byzantines. The figure depicted wears a red tunic, a pointed fur or sheepskin cap, and trousers tight at the ankles; others wore fur or sheepskin coats too (see figure 75 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume*



2). Note the length of his black or dark brown hair, a fashion that was probably adopted under Pecheneg or Cuman influence. (It seems likely that by the 11th century the Vlachs included a large Pecheneg element, while by the end of this era the Hungarians were using the terms 'Wallachian' and 'Cuman' interchangeably.) The majority of Vlachs appear to have been archers, whether on horse or on foot, with sword, sabre or mace for secondary armament.

130. CUMAN, 12th-13th CENTURIES

The Cumans or Kipchak Turks were probably descended from a branch of the Ghuzz. They appeared on the borders of Kievan Russia in 1054, crossed the Carpathians in 1070 and were established along the Danube by 1090, by which time there were effectively 5 independent groups; these were based respectively in Central Asia, the Urals, along the Donets-Don, along the lower course of the Dnieper, and on the Danube, the last group being that relevant to Hungarian and Byzantino-Bulgarian history.

In the early-13th century Robert de Clari, a participant in the Fourth Crusade, wrote the following succinct description of the Cumans: 'They are a savage people, who neither plough nor sew, and they have neither huts nor houses but instead they shelter in heavy tents made of felt, and they live on milk and cheese and meat . . . Each one has at least 10 or 12 horses, which are so well-trained that they follow anywhere they are led; and they mount first on one and then on another [and so on]. When they are on a raid, each horse has a bag hung on his nose in which his fodder is put, and he eats as he follows his master, but they do not stop moving by night or by day. And they ride so hard that they cover in one day and night fully 6 days' journey, or 7 or 8. And while they are on their way they will not seize or carry along anything until they are on their way back, but while returning they seize loot and prisoners and anything else they can get. Nor do they go armed, except that they wear a garment of sheepskin and carry bows and arrows.' Byzantine and Russian sources add lances, sabres, lassoes, maces, javelins, shields and armour to this list of equipment, the Cumans being noted for their accuracy with javelins. Shields were either circular or almond-shaped. Better-armoured types would have resembled figures 137-139 below. Like all steppe peoples they wore no spurs, instead controlling their horses with a short whip.

Though from a 14th century source (the 'Képes Krónika', illustrated in the 1360s) this figure can doubtless be taken as characteristic of at least 12th-13th century Cumans too. (See also figures 84-86 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 2*.) Dress basically comprised a long topcoat (here with side-vents), knee-length tunic, trousers, pointed cap, and boots or shoes, with brocade, linen, fur and wool all in evidence. In general appearance the Cumans were handsome, blue-eyed and blonde-haired*; despite what I have written elsewhere, it was doubtless their hair rather than their skin colour that gave rise to the Russian and German names *Polovtsy* and *Falven* given to the Cumans, these originating from words meaning 'yellow'. Their hair was worn long but they shaved their chins, though long moustaches were often worn.

*The Pechenegs, by contrast, were stocky, olive-skinned and ugly, with long black hair that in battle was often worn in a pigtail stuffed under their caps or helmets.

Although many settled in Bulgaria (especially in Dobrudja and Bessarabia) and, after the Mongol invasions, in Hungary, the Cumans remained tent-dwelling nomads for most of this period (see page 43), and utterly pagan to boot; Joinville, for instance, records the burial alive of a horse and servant in the *kurgan* of a deceased chieftain even in the mid-13th century.

131. RUSSIAN CAVALRYMAN, 11th-12th CENTURIES

At this date Russian equipment was generally very similar to that of the Poles and many 12th century cavalrymen would have borne a close resemblance to 112. However, the round shield, though still in use in Russia at the beginning of this era, was soon replaced amongst horsemen by the almond type shown here, usually painted with various devices. His helmet is one of the types most popular in Russia in the 12th century. 131a depicts an alternative also in common use, which if worn with fur trim tended to indicate a high-ranking nobleman. Helmets of more conical shape were also worn, and all had mail aventails. This man's body-armour consists of a short mail corselet with quarter-length sleeves. A quilted kaftan was normally worn beneath the corselet for added protection and, in addition, Russians quite often wore a 'riding coat' (a short-sleeved, fur-trimmed kaftan) over their armour. Otherwise clothing consisted of a long-sleeved tunic of linen, rich brocade or dyed silk reaching to below the knees, often split at the sides (surprisingly) to assist riding. The hem and cuffs were either embroidered in gold and silver thread or trimmed with fur. A cloak of coloured wool, silk or fur might also be worn.

The lance was fairly slender, used for both thrusting and throwing. Secondary armament consisted of sword, mace or axe or any combination thereof, the mace being particularly popular. The head (and sometimes the handle too) was usually of lead, bronze or iron, sometimes decorated with gold to denote rank. The sabre was also used to some extent.

132 & 133. RUSSIAN CAVALRYMEN, 13th CENTURY

Following continuous warfare with Pechenegs, Cumans and other nomadic tribes, culminating in the Mongol conquest of 1240, it was inevitable that Russia should ultimately enter the sphere of Eastern rather than Western military influence, and many features of the equipment worn by these figures is indicative of that influence.

Since the Russians were extremely conservative the older types of equipment described under 131 also remained in use, particularly among the poorer nobility, but longer mail corselets such as that worn by 132 became predominant



during the 13th century. The panel cut out at front and back was designed to assist riding. His almond shield has been adapted by the substitution of a straight top, possibly an isolated indication of Western influence. An optional shield introduced during this century was the small buckler carried by 133, constructed of two layers of interwoven osiers covered in silk or leather, elaborately painted and with a metal boss. The old almond shield also remained in service and is to be seen in many 14th and 15th century sources. 132's helmet is of a type which was also popular in the 12th century, often worn by officers with the colour of the small pennon perhaps indicating the unit. On some examples the nasal curves outward at the end so that the aventail or mail hood could be hooked up to it, leaving only the eyes exposed.

Lamellar, which had never entirely disappeared in Russia, underwent a revival in the 13th century and was especially popular amongst the wealthier boyars, remaining in common use right up to the 16th century. Russian lamellar corselets appear to have often been slit at the sides rather than the front and back, and that worn by 133 has in addition leather shoulder-pieces. The lamellae could be vertical or horizontal. The Asiatic 'mirror' armour described under 139 was also adopted. His brimmed helmet called a *kapalin*, is of Byzantine origin and could have a much taller point like that of 132. Alternatively a type very similar to the Western kettle-helmet could be worn. The Cuman and Pecheneg helmets described under 138 were also adopted, 138a being very popular amongst the wealthier boyars.

The weapon 133 carries is a *kistien*, a spherical or faceted metal head attached to a short handle by a leather thong, introduced from the East late in this period and popular for many centuries thereafter. His greaves and vambraces are also of Asiatic origin; these could be of plate or splint/lamellar construction. At least as early as the 11th century others wore boots, usually of dyed leather (mainly red, yellow or green), some with long, upturned toes.

Horses, of which 4 or 5 were taken on campaign (at least by princes), were sometimes equipped with Mongol-style horse-armour. This was generally either of several layers of leather, or of iron or leather lamellae. The chanfron at least was normally of metal. Horse colours favoured by the Russians were chestnut, bay, grey, black and white.

134 & 135. RUSSIAN MILITIAMEN, 11th-13th CENTURIES

The town militiamen were fairly well equipped, generally wearing armour of some description. These two both wear scale or lamellar corselets, 135 (a 12th century Novgorodian) wearing a sleeveless waist-length variety over a quilted tunic. Some wore even lighter armour comprising front and back only, tied together with thongs at shoulders and sides. Figure 135 wears in addition a padded leather or linen hood to protect his head and neck.

Clothing colours were the same as in Poland. Most were spearmen or archers, though up to 3 javelins could be substituted for the spear. The axe was still very popular too, both as a secondary weapon in place of the sword and as a main weapon. It was apparently slung behind the shoulder by a cord when not in use. Some still used the long-hafted Scandinavian type wielded in both hands, and throwing axes like 107a were also in use.

The painted circular shield carried by 134 (who is based on a late-11th century Kievan frieze) is similarly a result of Scandinavian influence and was used by most infantry, particularly in central and northern Russia. However, in the east and south the rectangular Slav shield described under 119 prevailed. Almond shields were also in use.

136. RUSSIAN PEASANT INFANTRYMAN, 11th-13th CENTURIES

Lower-class Russian infantrymen were practically identical to their Polish counterparts. Dress consisted of unbleached linen or woollen tunic and trousers. In winter the *kozukh*, a sleeved sheepskin jerkin with the wool innermost, could be worn, upper classes substituting fur cloaks, predominantly of bear, wolf or marten. Felt, fur and fur-trimmed hats (136a and b) were also widespread, sable and beaver fur being most common amongst the upper-classes. Footwear consisted of boots, leather moccasins or bast shoes of willow, oak or birch fibres. Russians had blonde, brown or black hair, often with swarthy complexions and pronounced cheekbones resulting from intermarriage with their Asiatic neighbours.

Few peasants possessed any form of armour and their arms consisted primarily of bow or spear with a knife or axe for defence. The self bow prevailed in central and northern Russia, though in the southern principalities it was replaced by the composite bow. Russian armies were apparently well-provided with archers (Alexander Nevski's army in 1242, for instance, is described as including 'bowmen without number'). However, according to Henry of Livonia they remained ignorant of the crossbow until the early-13th century, when they came into conflict with the German colonists and Military Orders in Estonia; even thereafter it enjoyed little or no popularity in Russia, though it may have been used in the defence of forts and fortified towns.

137 & 138. KAZAKS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Russian light cavalry were almost always supplied by allied or mercenary Asiatic nomad horse-archers, though poorer Russian nobles sometimes served alongside them in mixed units, likewise using the composite bow which was the nomads' main weapon.

These two figures (respectively a Cuman and a Pecheneg) and the next are based primarily on archaeological evidence from excavations of hundreds of kurgans (burial mounds) scattered across Russia. Clothing consisted of boots, trousers, a long under-tunic split at front or sides for riding, a kaftan, a short overtunic, and a cloak. Materials used were chiefly wool, brocade, fur, linen, silk and leather, of which the colours, embroidery and trim (often fur) depended on the wealth and social status of the wearer. The cloak was generally of fur in winter, otherwise of thick wool. Fur-trimmed felt or woollen caps similar to 111 and 127 were also worn. Possession and quality of armour similarly depended on the wealth of the individual, a wide variety being worn including scale, mail, lamellar,



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

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

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

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

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leather and quilted fabrics. 137 wears a sleeveless fur-trimmed lamellar corselet, 138 a metal-studded leather kaftan. Helmets too came in a wide variety of shapes, that worn by 138, with a strip of silk bound turban-like round the rim, being the type most popular with the Cumans. Shields were generally small and circular, of wood, leather or osiers, though the Cumans also adopted a small version of the almond shield used by the Russians. Note the absence of spurs, the nomads controlling the horse instead by the use of a small whip, the *nahaj*, looped round the wrist.

Arms usually consisted of one or more composite bows, a light lance, sabre (swords were also in limited use under Russian influence), mace or kistien, lasso (*arkhan*), and javelins, of which a case of 3-4 might be carried behind the saddle. Each man also carried perhaps 70-100 arrows, the leather bowcase (hanging at the left) containing 20-30 and the quiver (at the right) possibly 50-60. Sometimes more than one quiver was carried, slung from belt, baldric or saddle, in which case an even larger supply may have been available. The bowcase normally had a small pouch containing a spare bowstring.

139 & 140. KAZAK CHIEFTAINS, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Fighting as they did for loot, and often actually paid by the Russians and Byzantines with armour and weapons, many richer nomads possessed remarkably sophisticated equipment. Figure 139 wears much heavier armour than the last two figures, consisting of a short-sleeved scale corselet and 'mirror' armour, the latter comprising either a rectangular wad of several layers of leather or a circular metal plate on the chest with a smaller one in the centre of the back, held by cross-straps as shown. This form of armour was popular amongst the nomads and was adopted from them by the Russians in the late-13th century. Vambraces and greaves could also be worn, figure 139 wearing plate vambraces, plus splint-armour greaves over his short felt and leather boots. Of particular interest is his helmet with its mail aventail and a metal mask moulded like a bearded and moustached human face; the mask, from a 13th century kurgan, was hinged at the forehead and held by clasps shaped like ears at the left and right. This type of helmet was worn principally by the Cumans while that of 140, of Persian origin, was popular amongst the Pechenegs too. Both types were also adopted by the Russians. The body-armour of 140 comprises leather breast- and back-plates tied at the shoulders, with below them 3 leather hoops overlapping lobster-fashion and a 'skirt' of hanging iron plates.

Horses were basically the same as are described under figure 145 in *Armies of the Dark Ages* (second edition), though chieftains and richer tribesmen often rode Arab mounts.

141 & 142. HORSES, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Though by the 13th century Italian horses, especially those from Apulia, were also expensive and very highly regarded, the most popular, most expensive and reputedly the best throughout this era were of Spanish origin; William the Conqueror himself even rode a Galician horse at the Battle of Hastings.

Horses of many different types were in use by the 12th century. Most highly-prized of all was the *destrier* (Latin *dextrarius*), which could cost £20-£100 or sometimes even more — enormous sums of money when it is remembered that even at the end of the 13th century a knight was paid only about 2s-3s, or at the very most 4s, a day and an infantryman received perhaps as little as 2d. The destrier was a very tall horse (17 hands on average), strong, heavily-built and of reputable pedigree. However, it was not generally used in combat, being reserved for jousting where its limited speed and acceleration were less of a disadvantage. In battle the knight usually rode a courser (French *corsier*, Latin *cursarius*), a horse similar in most respects to the destrier but cheaper (£50 at most), somewhat smaller, and lighter. In size and performance it has been compared to the modern-day show-jumper. A knight would normally be accompanied on campaign by a minimum of 2 horses by the late-12th century, rising to 3, 4 or even 5 during the 13th century.

A third type of horse used in combat was the *rouncey* (Latin *roncinus*), similar to the courser but of no special breeding and considerably cheaper (only about £5 by the 13th century). It was usually ridden by sergeants and other horsemen of non-knightly rank, or else used to carry baggage. There was also a smaller rouncey, called a *roncinet*. One other type of horse, important in England at the very end of this era, was the native 'hobby' (*hobinos* or *ubinos*) of Ireland, standing 12-14 hands tall. It gave its name to the English 'hobilars' who first appeared in 1296 and were to feature prominently in 14th century English armies. (See figure 12 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1*.) The small Spanish horse called a jennet in England and a *genet* in France (from *jinete*) was undoubtedly of similar proportions.

The Bayeux Tapestry and other mid- to late-11th century sources indicate that already the arcons of the back and, to a lesser extent, the front of the saddle were beginning to be built up. By the late-12th century these had become considerably taller and wider, the back or cantle having evolved so that it now partially encircled the rider's hips.

The front developed similarly but the resultant plate (the burr-plate) was always narrower than the back. Both were usually painted by the early-12th century at least, later often displaying the rider's heraldic device. As depicted in 141 (from a mid-12th century English ms.), a saddle-cloth was sometimes worn over the saddle with the arcons protruding through slits.

The principal reason for the evolution of the tall, broad cantle mentioned above was to support the knight at the moment of impact, preventing him from being pushed backwards off his horse by the shock. We even hear (in Wace's 'Roman de Rou', for example) of knights tied to their saddles, the Andalusian writer Ibn Sa'id explaining how Spanish knights could have hooks on their saddles which could be fastened to the waistbelt for added security. (This type of precaution was not permitted in jousting, however). This in turn meant that the saddle had to be securely fastened on the horse's back, the breast and girth straps often being augmented by a further one or even two girth straps, sometimes strapped over the saddle itself as depicted in figure 142 (from the 'Maciejowski Bible'). Some authorities believe that the broader, curved cantle was adopted from the Arabs during the Crusades.

The bit was usually a snaffle, often with an extended branch so that in contemporary illustrations it tends to look like a curb bit. The latter, though known for many centuries, did not appear in general use until after the mid-14th century. The single rein began to be replaced by a double one c.1275, where a narrow rein was attached to the end of the branch of the curb or the snaffle and a broader rein was usually attached to the boss of the bit.

Mediaeval horse-colours were basically the same as those to be seen today judging from the descriptions used in contemporary sources, where the following terms are all to be found: *alba* (white), *badius* (bay), *balzan* (horse with white leg[s] or spot), *bauchant* or *bauceant* (half-black and half-white), *baucendus* (black and white mixed), *bauzain* or *baucayn* (parti-coloured or pied), *brunus* (brown), *clarus badius* (bright bay), *doyn* (dun), *favus* ('yellow' or reddish), *ferrandus* (dappled grey, or possibly white), *grisius* (grey), *liardus* (iron grey), *morellus* (mulberry-coloured, roan), *niger* (black), *piole* or *pile* (pied?), *pomele* (spotted), *rouge* (red) and *sorus* or *saurus* (sorrel).

143. HORSE IN HOUSING, 12th CENTURY

The housing, a cloth covering for the horse, appeared during the 12th century, probably c.1150. It was possibly originally intended to hamper infantrymen attempting to hamstring horses in close combat, but its principal purpose seems to have become displaying the rider's coat-of-arms even before the end of the 12th century. Indeed, even on the source from which this figure is taken, the seal of William fitz Empress, Comte de Poitou (c.1153-63), his arms are already a prominent feature. In 13th century illustrations the housing may frequently conceal horse-armour such as is described under the next two figures.

144. HORSE IN QUILTED ARMOUR, 13th CENTURY

Quilted coverings such as this (from the Eneide ms. of c.1220) are undoubtedly the type which contemporary sources refer to as being worn under the mail bard described below, though as this illustration and other contemporary sources prove, they were sometimes worn independently. It is not improbable that some housings, if not similarly quilted, at least consisted of several layers of thick linen. Others may even have been plate-lined like a coat-of-plates.

145. BARDED HORSE, 13th CENTURY

The use of horse-armour was almost certainly introduced (or, more accurately, revived) in Western Europe under Byzantine and Moslem influence during the Crusades, and interestingly the *Oxford English Dictionary* gives the origin of the English word for horse-armour, 'bard', as Old French *barde*, which was derived ultimately from Arabic *barda'a*, meaning a stuffed saddle or saddle-cloth.

As early as the mid-12th century patterns of small circles or scales occasionally appear in illustrations over the bodies of what are otherwise ordinary horses, and these may possibly represent mail armour. However, Wace (writing c.1160-74) appears to be the first Western chronicler of the mediaeval era to actually mention horse-armour, and although his reference is open to question it is apparently vindicated by the Byzantine historian Niketas Choniates (who wrote admittedly in the early-13th century but had access to earlier official documents), who records the horses of Hungarian knights at the Battle of Semlin in 1167 as having 'straps and plates of armour on their foreheads and chests to protect them from blows.' The next reference dates to 1190, when the Moslem historian Beha ed-Din recorded the horse of a Spanish knight at Acre with mail armour allegedly hanging down to its hoofs. That this was worth remarking upon would seem to indicate that such armour was still uncommon, but other evidence suggests that in the closing years of the 12th century it was steadily increasing in popularity; in 1187, for instance, Philippe II Augustus of France was aided by the Count of Hainault with 190 knights of whom all but

one were mounted on barded horses, and in a minor engagement in 1197 Richard I of England captured 200 French horses of which as many as 140 wore mail armour. Contemporary descriptions of the battles of Alarcos (1195) and Bouvines (1214) similarly indicate that fairly substantial numbers of knights in the Spanish and German armies respectively were mounted on armoured horses. However, despite the large number of references to horse-armour to be found in 13th century sources there are surprisingly few contemporary illustrations extant.

The armour itself, constructed of mail, is generally credited as having been of two pieces separated by the saddle, the chest-piece (or *peytral*) being split at the front to facilitate movement. However, the late-13th century illustrations on which this figure is based tend to indicate that either the bard was of one piece with a hole for the saddle, or that there was some kind of mail *flanchard* or flap below the saddle itself, leaving only a very small part of the belly exposed in order that spurs could still be effectively utilised. The head was similarly protected by mail at first, but by the second half of the century leather head-pieces called *copita* or *testerae* had begun to appear (see figure 147), to be replaced soon after by an iron headpiece called a *chanfron*. By the beginning of the 14th century at the latest this might have a spike attached to it; since stallions fight with their foreheads as well as their hoofs this spike was obviously intended as more than an ornament. Plate horse-armour probably appeared in the closing years of the 13th century. Certainly the posthumous inventory of the Constable of France, Raoul de Nesle, who was killed at the Battle of Courtrai in 1302, includes solid metal armour for crupper and flanks.

By the last quarter of the 13th century men-at-arms riding barded horses were paid at a higher rate than those mounted on unarmoured horses (up to, and even more than, twice as much under Edward I in England and Philippe IV in France), and the covering itself differentiated between 'heavy' and 'medium' cavalry. Those men mounted on armoured horses unsurprisingly tended to form the front ranks in battle.

146. BERBER HORSE, 12th-13th CENTURIES

Berbers were regarded as first-class horsemen, far superior to the Andalusian Moslems. They chiefly rode small horses (hence the European term 'jennet', from jinete), though presumably the Western-style Andalusian heavy cavalry introduced in the 13th century rode larger mounts. Most of the horses used by the Berbers appear to have been mares.

The horse depicted here, taken from illustrations in the 'Cántigas' mss., portrays characteristic Berber harness, with low saddle, short stirrups, large saddle-cloth covering most of the back, throat-lash, and ornamented breast-strap. To judge from the illustrations, some horses, apparently those of chieftains, wore in addition a sort of embroidered 'waistcoat' round the neck as is depicted in 146a. Many Andalusians continued to prefer the traditional high-pommelled Arab-style saddle to the Berber type depicted, which had been introduced into Moslem Spain by the end of the 10th century.

Ibn Sa'id says that the Berbers of Ifriqiyya, Middle Maghreb and Extreme Maghreb usually only had one horse



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

each, while the average Andalusian seems to have had at least 2-3, including one to carry his gear. Many Berbers still rode camels and some were even brought to Spain (being recorded, for instance, at Sagrajas in 1086).

147. GRANADINE HEAVY CAVALRY HORSE, MID-13th CENTURY

This figure comes from Alfonso X's 'Cántigas' mss. Note the two-piece bard, in which the apron was apparently not split at the front. The headpiece may be iron but judging from the sources was more probably leather, usually painted red, dark blue or some other colour and strengthened with iron, sometimes gilded. This type of bard appears to have been unique to Spain and was in use by Christian as well as Moslem horsemen. Ibn Sa'id points out that only the wealthiest Moslems (those 'of importance and power' as he puts it) rode barded horses. He also says that Andalusian heavy cavalry of the type depicted in figure 83 sometimes had hooks on the saddles to which the rider could fasten himself 'so that he will not fall if he receives a lance-blow'.

APPENDICES

I am indebted to the late Alan Nickels for having provided much of the material for the first 3 appendices. In order to accommodate additional information, in particular actual examples of 12th-13th century coats-of-arms and flags, I have largely rewritten these since their appearance in the first edition, and any mistakes to be found therein are consequently my own, not Alan's.

APPENDIX 1 12th-13th CENTURY HERALDRY

For as long as shields have been in use, decorative shield devices have been in evidence, but as far as is known the earliest of these were devices chosen at random and discarded at will by the owners. This was the case, for example, with the shields depicted in the Bayeux Tapestry. It is not until about the mid-12th century that we have the first occurrences of what may be described as 'true' heraldry, namely the use of a device throughout a man's lifetime and transmission of that device to his heir. The earliest, and most famous, instance is that of Geoffrey de Plantagenet, Comte d'Anjou, who when he was knighted by King Henry I of England in 1127 is recorded to have had hung round his neck a blue shield charged with 6 golden lions (azure, 6 lioncels or), which same device is to be found not only in an enamel of c.1151 on the count's tomb but also on the tomb effigy of his grandson, William Longespée, in Salisbury Cathedral, dating to 1226 (see figure cxxxix). Other evidence can be found on seals from the mid-12th century onwards, among the earliest examples being those of Waleran, Comte de Meulan and Earl of Worcester, c.1136 (a chequered lance-pennon); Gilbert de Clare, Earl of Pembroke, and his nephew and namesake the Earl of Hertford, 1141-46 (chevroned shields); Amadeus III of Savoy, 1143 (a cross on his lance-pennon); Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony, 1144 (a lion); Ramón Berenguer of Provence, 1150, and Ramón Berenguer IV, king of Aragon, 1157 (vertical stripes); Welf VI, Markgraf of Tuscany and Prince of Sardinia, 1152 (a lion); and Ottokar III, Markgraf of Styria, 1159 (a griffin). All of these bear devices subsequently adopted by the respective bearers' families. Nevertheless, evidence of early heraldry remains fragmentary for a century thereafter, the earliest surviving emblazoned 'armorials', or lists of arms and their bearers, dating only from the mid-13th century.

It is now generally supposed that the introduction of heraldry was associated with the adoption of helmets which hid the wearers' faces and thereby hindered recognition, and it may be that the assemblage of many strangers from many lands during the Crusades reinforced the need; it may also have been prompted, or at least encouraged, by the Moslems' own use of heraldic devices. It is probable that at first coats-of-arms continued to be chosen at will, but the necessity of some means of control would have soon become evident, though it was not until the mid-14th century that courts of chivalry appeared, to adjudicate disputes over the identity of and right to arms. Probably in the 12th-13th centuries such disputes arose more rarely than was later the case since less coats-of-arms then existed, and any adjudication necessary may have been resolved by reference to a herald or, possibly, the Constable or Marshal of the kingdom. Heralds, who first appeared in the late-12th century, were at first mere servants of kings and noblemen if they were permanently employed at all, and not recognised as a separate vocation (Simon de Montfort, for instance, employed a barber skilled in such matters), but their status gradually improved.

According to the most widely accepted mediaeval school of thought the bearing of heraldic arms was designed to distinguish those of 'gentle blood', and all of the earliest armorials are confined thereto. Inevitably, therefore, not long after the adoption of arms by the great lords all knights who reckoned themselves to be of gentle blood claimed the right to bear arms of their own as a distinguishing mark of their class, and it became quite usual for these to bear some resemblance to those of their feudal chiefs; thus one can trace 'families' of shields, such as the *chequy* arms of Vermandois and the quarterly arms of Mandeville (for the lineages of which see *Medieval England*, edited by Austin Lane Poole). However, it should be realised that in these early days of heraldry such arms had not yet been appropriated by the baron alone, romances and chronicles alike recording that they could be carried in addition by all his followers. William le Marshal, for example, appears to have carried a shield bearing the arms of the chamberlain of Tancarville when he was a member of the latter's retinue, and in Ireland in 1176 Raymond le Gros' retinue of some 30 kinsmen all carried shields bearing the same device. Even in the mid-13th century we read in Joinville how the Count of Jaffa possessed a galley painted in his arms with each oarsman carrying a targe and lance-pennon charged with his device. However, between 1200 and 1250 it became generally accepted that each individual knightly family should have its own distinct coat-of-arms*, which the head of the family alone was entitled to display undifferenced (ie, plain); all the other members had to 'difference' (ie, alter) them in some way, this usually being achieved by a variation in tinctures or the addition of a label (see figures cvi-cxi) or an extra charge (see figure cxii). In Germany, Hungary, Poland and some other parts of Central and Eastern Europe, however, such differencing was confined to the crest, every male member of the family being entitled to bear the same shield.

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*This was the theory. In practice unrelated families could be found simultaneously bearing identical coats-of-arms in this early period.

Arms did not go with a title except where the coat was disused, in which case they were sometimes adopted by the successors, especially where the old coat-of-arms was a famous one. The latter practice resulted in time in the evolution of 'arms of dominion', ie, the establishment of an accepted coat-of-arms for a kingdom or a great semi-independent fief. Thus, at the very beginning of the 14th century, Robert the Bruce abandoned his original arms and adopted the royal Scottish lion as King of Scotland.

The tinctures

The tinctures used in emblazoning (ie, describing) arms are described as metals and colours. The metals are *or*, signifying gold but, except for occasions of lavish display, usually represented by yellow; and *argent*, signifying silver but usually represented by white. The colours comprise *gules*, signifying red (scarlet); *azure*, signifying blue (ultramarine, not sky-blue); *sable*, signifying black; and *vert* and *purpure*, signifying green and purple respectively, both occurring far less often than the other tinctures. In early heraldic rolls these various tinctures can also be found described as *jaune* (or); *blanc* (argent); *rouge*, *vermeil* and *sinople* (gules); *bleu* (azure); and *noir* (sable). Two other colours are generally included in later heraldic manuals, namely *tenné* (tawny, or muted orange) and *sanguine* or *murrey* (dark blood-red), but in fact these are almost unknown in arms, their chief use being in the liveries of retainers, which fall outside the scope of the present volume.

In addition to the metals and colours there are the so-called 'furs', principally *ermine* (figure lxxii), in which the field — ie, the surface of the shield — is white covered with equally-spaced black 'tails'; *vair* (figure iii is an early English version; in the early continental version the tinctures were reversed), theoretically derived from squirrel-skins sewn in an alternating pattern of blue backs and silver (or white) bellies; *vairé* or *vairy*, a variant of the same pattern but in different colours (which have to be named in the blazon); and *potent*, an alternating pattern of T-shapes which probably originated as a badly-drawn vair, again in azure and argent. Variants of all 3 furs have evolved in modern heraldry.

A primary rule of heraldry is that metal must not be placed on metal nor colour on colour. There are very few exceptions to this (the most famous is the arms of the kingdom of Jerusalem — see notes to figures lviii and lxxxvi), but its limitations should be understood. If, for example, the field of a shield is equally divided between 2 tinctures the rule is not invoked, neither being 'upon' the other. Furthermore, in certain cases additional charges introduced for the purpose of differencing are also exempt from this rule; the label and the bend, for example, must obviously clash with either field or charge when painted over other charges. The bordure is also exempt when adopted for difference. The furs are not affected and may be charged upon, or have charged upon them, either metal or colour or even another fur.

When the field is powdered over with a number of small charges it is said to be *semé* (sewn) of such charges, eg, *semé-de-lis* (covered with fleurs-de-lis, as in figure cxxvi). But semé of crosses-crosslet, frequently met with, is termed *crusilly* (lxii-lxiv), and semé of billets (ie, upright rectangles) is *billety*. Similarly, the equally common field or bordure strewn with bezants (golden roundles) is called *bezanté*, or *platé* if strewn with plates (silver roundles). In modern heraldry other roundles also have specific names, such as *torteau* (gules), *hurt* (azure) and *ogress* or *pellet* (sable), but in mediaeval armorials roundles of argent and gules are both found described as torteaux or pellets, and azure roundles are also described as pellets. Some rolls even describe roundles as 'mullets', or *gastells*..

The partition lines

The lines which divide a shield or separate simple geometrical charges (the 'ordinaries' — see below) from the field may be straight or curved, or of distinctive shapes. Those of the latter in general use in the 12th-13th centuries were engrailed, indented, dancetty, and wavy or undy (to which have been added more recently invected, nebuly, embattled, raguly, potenty and dovetailed, with a few others of even rarer occurrence). Engrailed consists of a series of semi-circles, points outward from the ordinary concerned, as depicted in figure l. (Invected is the same, but with the points inward.) Indented is a series of small saw-teeth (lxxiii), dancetty a larger variant with usually not more than 3 'teeth' across the shield (xxvi); a fess dancetty was usually referred to as a *daunce* in this period, and had as its diminutive the *vivre*, which was a narrow, zig-zagging line. Wavy, or undy, explains itself (xxxiii and xxxiv), *undy de long* denoting paly wavy (xxi).

The charges

In heraldic terms anything placed on a shield, large or small, of any shape or nature, is termed a 'charge'. The simplest charges, and fairly certainly the oldest, consist mainly of mere geometrical shapes and are called 'ordinaries'. The first class, the so-called 'honourable ordinaries', are the bend (iv), the pale (xvi), the fess (xxiv), the chevron (xl), the pile (xliv), the cross (xlix), the saltire (lxv) and the chief (lxxii), with in some cases their diminutives. In theory one of the above is supposed to cover a third of the shield, and if unaccompanied by any other charges, or itself bearing other charges, it usually will. But if the field bears other charges the ordinary will generally be reduced in size to accommodate them, heraldic drawing being less a matter of draughtsmanship than of artistic judgement. In the 12th-13th centuries most ordinaries were often portrayed thinner than they would be in the 14th-15th centuries,

so that their diminutives (see below) are sometimes hard to distinguish. If the field is divided along the line of an ordinary without the ordinary itself being present it is blazoned as *parti per bend*, *parti per saltire* etc, or just *per bend*, *per saltire*, examples of which are depicted in v (per bend), xvii (per pale), xxviii (per fess) and lxviii (per saltire). The upper tincture is named first, or if divided vertically the dexter first. A field divided by vertical and horizontal lines is known as *chequy* or checky (xxxix), by bends and bends sinister as lozengy (xxxvi). Other such multiple divisions of the field also occur, eg, bendy-lozengy (xxxv).

The bend is a diagonal stripe from the dexter chief to the sinister base. Today, if a shield should be divided into an even number of such stripes it is described as bendy, say, 'bendy of (so many), argent and gules'*, while if the number of such stripes should be odd it is blazoned as, say, 'argent, 3 bendlets gules' (bendlet being the diminutive of bend). A narrower stripe still is known as a *cotise* (often referred to as a *liste* in the 13th century), but this cannot appear alone; a pair may accompany a bend or a fess, which is then described as 'cotised' (ix). Charges placed on a bend generally are not upright but follow the direction of the bend. When a charge or charges occupies the position which a bend would, it or they are said to be 'in bend'. Similarly a charge or charges along the top third of a shield are said to be 'in chief'. When the bend is reversed, running from the sinister chief to the dexter base, it is a 'bend sinister'. Though not necessarily so associated this has occasionally been utilised in cases of bastardy (eg, figure xv), though it is more usual to devise entirely new arms in such cases. (It may be noted here that the vulgar phrase 'bar sinister' is a complete misnomer as the bar, being horizontal, cannot be either dexter or sinister). In early heraldry the bend and its diminutive, the bendlet (vii-viii) were often used quite indiscriminately in varying widths.

The pale is a vertical stripe down the centre of the shield; its diminutive is the pallet (xxii). If the field is divided into an even number of pallets it is today blazoned as 'paly of (say 6 or 8)'; if uneven it is blazoned as, say, 'argent, 3 pallets gules'*. The fess is a horizontal stripe. Its diminutive in English heraldry is the bar, while in French heraldry there may be more than one fess. A field divided into an even number of bars is described as barry (xxix) (though — confusingly, the term 'bendy' was often used for barry in the 13th century), while an uneven number is blazoned as, say, 'azure, 2 bars argent'*. The chevron, coming from the French word for a rafter, is easily envisaged (xl). Its diminutive is the chevronel (xlii). A shield divided into an even number of chevronels is described as chevronny. The pile is a wedge, depending from the chief almost to the base unless otherwise described. The plain cross is composed of a pale and a fess but it developed at an early date into many variants with their individual descriptions, its popularity doubtless being a result of the Crusades; for various contemporary examples see xlix-lx. The saltire is the familiar St Andrew's cross.

The chief is the upper third of the shield. Chiefs have frequently been added as augmentations of arms, sometimes 'of honour' or sometimes temporarily in order to indicate the allegiance of the individual to a particular cause, notably in the 14th century when examples portraying the chief gules, a cross argent, of the Knights Hospitaller, or the arms of Anjou or the Empire for Guelfs and Ghibellines respectively, frequently occur. In such cases the chief might well contravene the metal on metal/colour on colour rule, and such chiefs were known in French heraldry as *chefs cousus* (Italian *capo cucito* — no comparable term exists in English or German heraldry). Ordinarily, however, the chief does not surmount any other charges on the shield. Although most authorities consider that there is no diminutive of the chief, some claim that the *fillet* (in French a *chef retrait*) — a single, narrow bar following the base line of the chief — should be regarded as such.

In addition to the 'honourable ordinaries' there are the so-called 'sub-ordinaries', which comprise the quarter, the canton, the gyron, the inescutcheon, the lozenge, the bordure, the orle, the fret, the tressure, and flaunches or voiders (which only first appear in the 14th century). Though quarterly shields abound, the single quarter (lxxiv) is rarely seen. More usual is its diminutive, the canton (lxxv), technically occupying about one-ninth of the field but often looking more like a quarter in 13th century armorials. This is usually an augmentation, and thus surmounts all other charges; it is always understood to be placed in the dexter chief corner. The gyron is triangular and is seldom seen alone, a field gyronny — ie, divided per cross and per saltire (lxix) — being more usual. The inescutcheon is a small shield (lxxxvii); a favourite design in the Middle Ages was 3 escutcheons, 2 above and one below (lxxxviii). The lozenge is diamond-shaped and has as its diminutive the narrower fusil. A lozenge pierced by a smaller lozenge shape is known as a mascle (xxxviii), in this early period also called a *fausse losange* (though voiding of lozenges was not always specified at all, and the same coat might be described in different sources as comprised of lozenges or mascles); if pierced instead by a circular hole the charge was known as a *rustre*. The bordure or border is self-explanatory (xc); its diminutive is the orle (xcv), usually referred to as a 'false escutcheon' in the 13th century, which does not extend to the edge of the shield. The tressure is an even narrower orle; it invariably appears as one of a pair known as a 'double-tressure', which is in turn almost always blazoned as *fleury-counterfleury* as in the arms of Scotland (xcvii). *Fretty* is a diagonal, interlaced latticework (xcix);

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*In the 13th century, however, no such fine distinctions were usually made, and the same coat-of-arms might be rendered with an even or an uneven number of bends, bars or pallets.

the single fret is a more modern variant. Flaunches are curved portions extending inward from the sides of the shield.

There is also the label (cvi-cxi), used as a mark of difference by the eldest son, to be removed when he succeeded his father. In the earliest days of heraldry, however, it was often used for differencing by the *second* son, and even the third, and thus in certain arms (eg, cix) became a permanent part thereof. The modern idea that a label of 3 points signifies the eldest son and a label of 5 points his son (ie, the grandson) does not apply at all to the mediaeval period, when labels of 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 or even 11 points appear. In the oldest rolls of arms the label almost invariably has 5 points, labels of 3 points only becoming commonplace in the second half of the 13th century; in addition the label was at first nearly always azure. The oldest style of label can be seen in figures cvii and cviii, at which time it was probably of cloth, secured to the shield with tacks.

Among charges other than the ordinaries innumerable animals and objects were pressed into service. The lion has been pre-eminent among animal charges since the earliest days of heraldry, usually *rampant* (rearing on its hind legs, with its front legs outstretched) but otherwise in any one of a large number of other attitudes, each with its own special description (eg, *passant gardant*, as in England's arms). Also frequently used have been the boar or its head, the bull and stag and their heads, the bear, the dog, the eagle (especially on the Continent, and particularly in the Holy Roman Empire and its satellites), the owl, the swan, fabulous beasts such as unicorns, griffins and dragons (all confined chiefly to Central Europe), and various almost indistinguishable fishes. Among a vast array of inanimate objects favourites in this period were fleurs-de-lis, roses, trefoils, cinquefoils, crescents, mullets (ie, stars), shells, garbs (cornsheaves), bugle-horns and trumpets, maunches (sleeves), buckles and towers. Special mention must be made of the martlet (French *merlette*, a diminutive of *merle* or 'blackbird'), which looks somewhat like a swift deprived, for some reason, of its feet; it is commonplace in both English and French heraldry, particularly 'in orle' around the circumference of a shield (xcvi). Examples of many of these charges and others besides can be found in the following selection of contemporary shields.

(i) The shield or *escutcheon*. When viewed from the front the left-hand side is called the *dexter* and the right-hand side is called the *sinister*, while the top is called the *chief* and the bottom is the *base*. For denoting the position of various charges within the shield a number of positions, or 'points', were soon generally recognised. These comprise (A) the dexter chief; (B) the middle chief or *point du chief;* (C) the sinister chief; (D) the honour or collar point; (E) the fess point, in French the *centre* or *coeur;* (F) the nombril point; (G) dexter base; (H) middle base, in French *à la pointe;* and (I) sinister base. However, of these the honour and nombril points do not seem to appear in mediaeval blazons, and they are not even recognised in French heraldry.

(ii) John de Ferrers of Chartley, d.1312. Vairy or and gules. A 13th century rendition of the famous Ferrers arms, from a stained glass window in Dorchester Church, Oxon.

(iii) John de Beauchamp, d.1283. Vair. Taken from the Heralds' Roll of c.1280, this is a good example of the 'square' form of vair to be found in many 13th century sources.

(iv) Richard Foliott, d.1299. Gules, a bend argent. From Glover's Roll, of which several versions exist dating to c.1253-58.

(v) Heinrich von Veldeke, d.c.1190. Parti per bend, or and gules. The arms of this German knight are found in the 'Manessa Codex'.

(vi) Robert II, Duc de Bourgogne (Burgundy), c.1297. Bendy of 6 or and azure, a bordure gules. From the 'Role d'Armes de l'Ost de Flandre', which recorded the arms of the participants in Philippe IV's campaign against Flanders.

(vii) John de Montfort, d.1296. Azure, 3 bendlets or. From Guillim's Roll of c.1295-1305.

(viii) Miles de Gloucestre, d.1143. Gules, 2 bends, the upper or and the lower argent. Attributed arms of this Constable. Originally, under King Henry I, there were 4 royal constables in England, but by the mid-12th century there was only one. In 1141 he became in addition Earl of Hereford.

(ix) Humphrey de Bohun, Earl of Hereford and Essex 1220-65. Azure, a bend argent cotised between 6 lioncels or. When Miles de Gloucestre's sons all died without issue the office of Constable passed by marriage to his eldest daughter's husband, this Humphrey's great grandfather of the same name. As a result the Bohun family arms (originally azure, a bend argent between 6 lioncels or) were augmented by the addition of gold cotises. As late



12th-13th Century heraldry

as the 1240s Matthew Paris' 'Historia Anglorum' still depicts the Bohun arms without cotises, but probably the latter were adopted some time during the first half of the 13th century.

(x) Otes de Grandison, d.1328. Paly of 6 argent and azure, on a bend gules 3 escallops or. A Savoyard knight, and a close companion of King Edward I of England. It was common practice to place charges on the bend by the end of this period.

(xi) Burggraf von Rietenburg, c.1170. Or, on a bend gules 3 roses argent. From the 'Manessa Codex', this is another example of charges placed on a bend. In 13th century heraldry 'roses' were often rendered simply as cinquefoils (for which see cxl and cxli).

(xii) Thomas de Beaumont, Earl of Warwick 1229-42. Chequy or and azure, a bend ermine. These arms belong to a family of related chequy coats that derive ultimately from Hugh, Comte de Vermandois (d.1101); see also those of de Warenne (xxxix). This rendition of the Warwick arms is from Matthew Paris' 'Historia Anglorum', which probably dates to c.1244. (Paris' other chronicles containing heraldic shields, the 'Chronica Majora' and the 'Chronica Minora', date to c.1245-59.) Later armorials indicate that the bend ermine should actually be a chevron.

(xiii) Bilebatia de Trie, c.1273. Or, a bend gobony argent and azure. A French knight, from Walford's Roll. The term 'gobony', or 'compony', indicates an ordinary — in this case a bend — composed of squares of two alternating tinctures. If there are 2 rows of such squares then it is blazoned as 'compony countercompony'.

(xiv) John le Marshal, d.1282. Gules, a bend engrailed or. In modern heraldic parlance the term 'engrailed' denotes that the edge of an ordinary is made up of small, semicircular indents, but in the 13th century it more usually meant that the ordinary was made up of a series of conjoined lozenges or fusils as here. (See also xxv.)

(xv) Reginald de Dunstanville, Earl of Cornwall, d.1175. Gules, 2 lions passant gardant or, overall a bend sinister azure. Attributed arms of this bastard son of King Henry I.

(xvi) Hugh de Grandmesnil, c.1125. Gules, a pale or. Arms later attributed to King Henry I's Steward.

(xvii) Wouter van den Bisdomme, c.1288. Parti per pale, or and azure. The Brabançon knight who killed Count Henry IV of Luxembourg at the Battle of Worringen.

(xviii) William le Marshal, Earl of Pembroke and Striguil, d.1219. Parti per pale, or and vert, a lion rampant gules. From Matthew Paris' 'Chronica Anglorum'.

(xix) Enzio Hohenstaufen, King of Sardinia 1237-49. Parti per pale or and vert, an eagle displayed sable. Enzio was the favourite, though illegitimate, son of Emperor Frederick II. These arms, a variation on those of the Holy Roman Empire, are again from Matthew Paris.

(xx) Matthew de Hathersgate, d.1259. Paly of 6, or and gules, a chief argent. From Glover's Roll.

(xxi) Ralph de Gernon, d.1247. Paly wavy of 10, argent and gules. There is actually only seal evidence for Ralph's arms, but the tinctures are known from Glover's Roll, which includes his son William (d.1258).

(xxii) Ramon Berenguer IV, King of Aragon 1137-62. 3 pallets. The arms of Aragon were later or, 4 pallets gules, but on early seals like this one the number of pallets seem to actually be 3. The arms of the counts of Foix, as seen in seals of 1241 and 1276, are identical.

(xxiii) Le Comte de Saint Pol, c.1220. Gules, 3 pallets vair, a chief or. Seal evidence only at this early date, but the tinctures are known from later armorials.

(xxiv) Henry II, Duke of Austria, d.1177. Gules, a fess argent. From a 13th century window in the Brunnenhaus Babenberger-Scheiben.

(xxv) Richard de Percy, d.1244. Azure, a fess engrailed argent. One of Magna Carta's 25 Barons. At this date an engrailed fess was one made up of conjoined lozenges or fusils. (See also xiv.)

(xxvi) William le Vavassour, d.1312. Or, a fess dancetty sable. The earliest armorial these arms occur in is Segar's Roll of c.1282.

(xxvii) Mauger le Vavassour, mid-12th century. Or, a fess dancetty sable. This exaggerated form of xxvi is from a seal. The precise identity of this individual is not known since there were several Maugers living at this time, but he was probably the ancestor of William.

(xxviii) Tannhauser. Parti per fess, sable and or. The arms of a legendary *Minnesänger,* from the 'Manessa Codex'.

(xxix) Gilbert de Gaunt, Earl of Lincoln, d.1156. Barry of 6, or and azure. Seal evidence only, but the tinctures are known from Matthew Paris, who records that his nephew of the same name bore barry of 6, or and azure, a bend gules (the bend being borne for difference).

(xxx) Robert de Hilton, d.c.1310. Argent, 2 bars azure. Robert's arms first occur in Charles' Roll and the St George Roll, 2 very similar armorials of c.1285.

(xxxi) Hugh XI de Lusignan, Comte de la Marche, d.1249. Menue barruly, argent and azure. The term 'menue', meaning small and fine, does not occur often; in being applied to a fine rendition of vair it became 'miniver' (*menu-vair*). Barruly is an old term indicating a barry field of 10 or more divisions.

(xxxii) Roald, Constable of Richmond, d.c.1281. Gules, a chief and 2 bars-gemel or. The bar-gemel is a bar voided (ie, with the middle taken out). It derives its name from the Latin *gemellus,* meaning 'double'.

(xxxiii) Gilbert Basset, d.1240/1. Barry wavy of 6, or and gules. From Matthew Paris' 'Historia Anglorum', this is an early version of barry wavy.

(xxxiv) Philip Basset, d.1271. Barry wavy of 6, or and gules. This is how barry wavy was frequently rendered in armorial rolls before the end of the 13th century; modern authorities often describe this version instead as barry nebuly, but the term does not occur in sources of this period. Philip was the younger brother of Gilbert (above).

(xxxv) Isobel d'Angoulême, Queen of England 1200-17. Bendy lozengy, or and gules. This is an early example of one of the various combinations of bendy, barry and paly that included in addition paly bendy and barry bendy. Isobel was King John's second wife.

(xxxvi) William le Blount, d.1264. Lozengy or and sable. From Glover's Roll.

(xxxvii) Hubert de Burgh, Earl of Kent 1227-43. Lozengy vair and gules. A leading baron of the early-13th century, he also held the posts of Seneschal of Poitou 1213-15, Justiciar 1215-32 and Justiciar of Ireland 1232. From Matthew Paris.

(xxxviii) William de Roumare, d.1198. Crusilly, 7 mascles conjoined. Tinctures unknown (seal evidence only). The term 'conjoined' means joined together or touching. William was the grandson and heir of another William who was Earl of Lincoln (d.c.1161), and was himself often styled 'Earl'.

(xxxix) William de Warenne, Earl of Surrey 1202-39. Chequy azure and or. Note that Matthew Paris has inadvertently reversed the tinctures, the de Warenne arms actually being chequy or and azure.

(xl) William Mauduit, Earl of Warwick 1242-67. Chequy or and azure, a chevron ermine. From Glover's Roll, this is the first appearance of the Warwick arms in this form, an ermine chevron here having replaced the bend earlier recorded by Matthew Paris (see xii).

(xli) Gilbert de Clare, Earl of Pembroke 1138-48. 7 chevronels. Tinctures unknown (seal evidence only), though the related de Clare earls of Hertford and Gloucester — descended from his elder brother Richard (d.1136) — later bore similar arms with the field or and the chevronels gules (see xlii). The seal, of c.1141-46, clearly shows at least 7 chevronels on Gilbert's shield, as too does the seal of c.1156-67 of his sister Rohese, Countess of Lincoln; this makes it highly probable that the early arms of the de Clare family were either chevronny or of 7 chevronels, and not of 6 chevronels as is usually claimed.

(xlii) Richard de Clare, Earl of Hertford and Gloucester 1230-62. Or, 3 chevrons gules. Whatever the original number of chevronels may have been, by the end of the 12th century they had been reduced to 3, the first occurrence of this more familiar version of the de Clare arms actually being on a seal of c.1170 (now lost) of the above Gilbert's son Richard (d.1176), who spearheaded the Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland.

(xliii) Robert fitz Walter, d.1235. Or, a fess between 2 chevrons gules. The arms of the fitz Walters resulted from the family's descent from a de Clare ancestor, the middle chevron being straightened to become a fess.

(xliv) John de Chandos, d.1313. Or, a pile gules and a label azure. The celebrated Sir John Chandos of the Hundred Years' War was descended from a branch of this family.

(xlv) David le Scot, Earl of Huntingdon 1185-1219. Or, 2 piles meeting in base gules. The arms of the Scottish earls of Huntingdon were actually 3 piles rather than 2, this particular rendition being taken from the seal, of 1284, of David's granddaughter Dervorguilla, Lady of Galloway.

(xlvi) Guy de Brian, d.c.1307. Or, 3 piles meeting in base azure. The tinctures of these arms are often to be encountered reversed in later rolls, though this is the correct version. From the St George Roll.

(xlvii) Ralph Basset, d.1265. Or, 3 piles meeting in base gules, a canton ermine. He was killed fighting for Simon de Montfort at the Battle of Evesham.

(xlviii) Ralph Basset, d. 1299. Paly of 6 or and gules, a canton ermine. The fact that Heralds' Roll depicts this Ralph's arms thus and blazons them paly, while Segar's Roll and the St George Roll show the same arms exactly as depicted in xlvii, proves beyond any shadow of doubt that pales and piles were originally the same thing, the latter probably evolving as a result of the visual distortion caused by the curvature of a shield's surface. This Ralph was the son of xlvii.

(xlix) Pierre, Comte de Savoie 1263-68. Gules, a cross argent. He was called 'The Little Charlemagne' by contemporaries because of his transalpine conquests.

(l) John de Mohun, d.1330. Or, a cross engrailed sable. From the Caerlaverock Roll, drawn up to commemorate the siege by King Edward in 1300 of a Scottish castle of that name.

(li) John de Pontissara, Bishop of Winchester 1282-1304. A cross humetty between 4 crosslets. Tinctures unknown. The term 'humetty' is the same as 'couped', meaning cut off at the ends.

(lii) John de Lexington, d.1257. Argent, a cross fourchée azure. Different versions of Glover's Roll describe the cross of John's arms as patonce, fourchée and fourchée *au kanée,* the last perhaps meaning that the ends of its arms were forked like a tree. Indeed, it is not always possible to tell, from the blazons alone, what form of cross the compilers of early armorials intended.

(liii) Geoffrey de Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea 1218-46. Gules, a cross moline or.

(liv) Hamon de Crevéquer, d.1263. Or, a false cross gules. A *fausse croix* was one voided; these are therefore canting arms (ie, arms which allude to the bearer's name or title), the cross being *crevé au coeur.*

(lv) Richard Siward, d.c.1310. Sable, a cross fleuretty argent. The cross fleuretty was one in which the arms ended in fleurs-de-lis, as in this rendition from Heralds' Roll (c.1280).

(lvi) William le Latimer, d.1305. Gules, a cross patonce or. Although the Falkirk Roll (1298) and the Caerlaverock Roll describe the cross of William's arms as paty, all the other contemporary armorials correctly call it a cross patonce, the form of which can be seen in this depiction, taken from his seal.

(lvii) Eustace de Vesci, d.1216. Gules, a cross paty argent. From Matthew Paris. After the mid-13th century the cross paty, or *patée*, was also known as a cross formy. Just as the compilers of the Falkirk and Caerlaverock Rolls called the cross of William le Latimer's arms patonce rather than paty, so different versions of Glover's Roll describe the cross of Eustace's son's arms as both fourchée and patonce!

(lviii) Conradin, King of Jerusalem 1258-68. Or, a cross botonny argent. Taken from the 'Manessa Codex', these

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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12th-13th Century heraldry

arms appear to have been accidentally reversed (the usual arms of the kingdom of Jerusalem being argent, a cross or, later between 4 cross-crosslets of the second). A grandson of Emperor Frederick II, Conradin was really little more than titular king, still being only 16 years old when he was executed following the Battle of Tagliacozzo.

(lix) William II de Forz, Comte d'Aûmale 1214-41. Gules, a cross patonce vair. In fact, although Glover's Roll blazons the count's arms thus, the picture is actually Matthew Paris' version, with the horizontal arms patonce but the vertical arms paty.

(lx) Anthony Bek, Bishop of Durham 1283-1310. Gules, a cross moline ermine. From the Falkirk and Caerlaverock Rolls. His elder brother John bore the cross argent, and in Charles' and the St George Rolls it is actually described as 'recercele' rather than moline.

(lxi) Raymond VII, Comte de Toulouse 1221-49. Gules, a cross paty voided or. So it is blazoned in Glover's Roll, though in modern heraldry this type of cross (today generally called a Toulouse cross) would be blazoned as a cross clechée, voided and pometty. The picture is from the 'Historia Anglorum'.

(lxii) Le Comte de Bar, mid-13th century. Azure, crusilly fitchy and 2 bars de mer (or barbels) addorsed or. A 'fitchy' cross was one with its bottom arm pointed, while 'addorsed' referred to 2 animals back-to-back.

(lxiii) Roger de Trumpington, d.1289. Azure, crusilly and 2 trumpets palewise or. Another example of canting arms. The crosses of the field in this instance, and in most others where the field is described as crusilly, are cross-crosslets. 'Palewise' means upright, as opposed to 'fesswise' or lengthways, though the trumpets would be more accurately described as 'in pile'. The picture is from a later brass, the tinctures from Heralds', Camden (c.1280) and other rolls.

(lxiv) William de Braouse, d.1290. Azure, crusilly and a lion rampant or. From Heralds' Roll.

(lxv) Robert fitz Maldred, d.c.1245. A saltire. Tinctures unknown (seal evidence only), but probably gules, a saltire argent, since those were the arms borne by his Neville descendants (for example, by his grandson Robert de Neville in Glover's Roll).

(lxvi) Bernard de Brus, d.1300. Azure, a saltire and a chief or. A cadet branch of the Brus or Bruce family.

(lxvii) Robert de Brus, c.1195. Or, a saltire and on a chief gules a lion passant gardant or. Lord of Annandale and ancestor of Robert the Bruce.

(lxviii) Jakob von Warte, d.1331. Parti per saltire, azure and argent. From the 'Manessa Codex', a Swiss knight born in 1269.

(lxix) Warin de Bassingborne, d.c.1269. Gyronny of 8, or and azure. From Heralds' Roll. Other rolls depict his arms as gyronny of 6 or 12.

(lxx) Bartholomew de Bryanson, d.1286. Gyronny of 12, argent and azure. Occurs in Heralds' and Charles' Rolls.

(lxxi) Roger de Mortimer, d.1282. Barry of 6 azure and or, on a chief or 2 pallets between 2 gyrons azure, an inescutcheon argent.

(lxxii) Thurstan le Despenser, d.1249. Ermine, a chief. Tincture known from the later Jenyns' Book.

(lxxiii) Ranulph de Glanville, d.1190. Or, a chief indented azure. These arms are recorded in Jenyns' Ordinary, a 14th century compilation of earlier armorials. In addition they, or similar arms, were borne by several families of descendants.

(lxxiv) Peter de Dreux, Earl of Richmond, d.1250. Chequy or and azure, a quarter ermine. From his seal of c.1230, the tinctures coming from later rolls. These arms are those of the French house of Dreux differenced with a quarter (sometimes blazoned as a canton) ermine. Jean de Dreux, Comte de Bretagne 1250-86, bore the same arms with a bordure gules. Both sides of the family were descended from King Louis VI's younger son, Robert.

(lxxv) Robert Sutton, d.1286. Argent, a canton sable. From Lord Marshall's and Collins Rolls.

(lxxvi) Robert de Vere, Earl of Oxford 1214-21. Quarterly gules and or, a mullet argent in the first quarter. A


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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12th-13th Century heraldry

famous coat-of-arms which occurs on Robert's tomb effigy and in most of the 13th century armorials. Robert was the younger brother and successor of the second earl, who probably bore the quarterly arms undifferenced (ie, without the mullet).

(lxxvii) Geoffrey de Mandeville, Earl of Essex, d.1144. Quarterly or and gules. Since a whole group of similar quartered arms was adopted by various families related to him by blood or marriage, it is conjectured and generally accepted that Geoffrey himself must have borne this coat. Among these related families were the de Veres (lxxvi), fitz Johns (xciii) and de Lacys (cix).

(lxxviii) Fulk fitz Warin, d.1258. Quarterly per fess indented, argent and azure. One of a long series of Fulk fitz Warins, from Glover's Roll.

(lxxix) David ap Llywelyn, Prince of North Wales 1240-46. Quarterly or and gules, 4 lions passant gardant counterchanged. From Matthew Paris' chronicles, these arms were those borne by the Welsh princes of Gwynedd hereafter. A recension of c.1310 of a work composed c.1260 assigns these arms to David's grandfather, Iorwerth Drwyndwn.

(lxxx) Hywel ap Meurig, c.1285. Paly of 6, or and azure, on a fess gules 3 mullets argent. Another example of a Welsh coat-of-arms, that of the Constable of Builth, from the St George Roll.

(lxxxi) Ferdinand III, King of Castile and Léon 1217-52. Quarterly, 1 & 4 gules, a castle triple-towered or (Castile), 2 & 3 argent, a lion rampant purpure (Léon). Though quarterly arms are fairly widespread from an early date, the quartering of 2 different coats-of-arms on the same shield in this fashion only began in 1230, when Ferdinand of Castile also succeeded to the kingdom of Léon and combined its arms with his own. The individual arms of the kingdoms of Castile and Léon had first appeared in the forms depicted in 1178 and 1157 (or possibly 1172) respectively.

(lxxxii) Otto IV, King of Germany 1198-1218. Dimidiated, dexter gules, 3 lions passant gardant or (England), sinister or, a double-headed eagle displayed sable (Holy Roman Empire). Otto was nephew of King John of England, and his arms, as depicted by Matthew Paris alongside a description of his coronation as Emperor in 1209, are one of the earliest known examples of arms marshalled (ie, grouped on one shield) by dimidiation, meaning that they are halved vertically.

(lxxxiii) Provostry of the town of Youghal, c.1274. Dimidiated, dexter or, 3 chevrons gules (de Clare), sinister argent, a saltire gules, a label of 5 points azure (fitz Gerald).

(lxxxiv) Robert de Pinkney, c.1195. Dimidiated, dexter a fess engrailed, sinister barry wavy of 6. Tinctures unknown (seal evidence only).

(lxxxv) John de Courtenay, d.1274. Dimidiated, dexter chequy or and azure, sinister vert, 2 bars argent. From Glover's Roll.

(lxxxvi) Charles d'Anjou, King of Sicily and Jerusalem, d.1309. Azure, semé-de-lis or, a label of 3 points gules (Anjou), impaling argent, a cross potent between 4 crosses or (Jerusalem). An early example of impaled arms, ie, 2 complete coats abutted side by side. Charles won the kingdom of Sicily by his victories at Benevento (1266) and Tagliacozzo (1268).

(lxxxvii) Jean de Coucy, c.1290. Ermine, an inescutcheon gules. A knight from Artois, from the Wijnbergen Armorial, dating to before 1291.

(lxxxviii) Warin de Munchensy, d.1255. Or, 3 escutcheons vair. Glover's and Walford's Rolls make the escutcheons vair, 2 bars gules, but his widow sealed with escutcheons vair, and that is the way that Matthew Paris depicted them too.

(lxxxix) Sancho I, King of Portugal 1185-1211. Argent, 5 escutcheons azure platy. From the seal of 1189 of his wife Maud, Countess of Flanders. Platy, or semé of plates, means that the field is charged with roundles argent.

(xc) William Daubeny, d.1236. Or, 2 chevrons and a bordure gules. From Glover's Roll this is another coat-of-arms derived from de Clare, from which family William's grandmother came.

(xci) Philip de Kyme, d.1242. Or, a chevron gules, a bordure sable bezanty. In the same way that platy denoted


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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12th-13th Century heraldry

semé of plates, bezanty denoted semé of bezants (roundles or). Sable bordures and ordinaries were frequently rendered bezanty.

(xcii) William de Ferrers, Earl of Derby 1247-54. Vairy or and gules, on a bordure argent 8 fers-de-cheval sable. As can be seen, 'fers-de-cheval' (often abbreviated to 'fers' in old armorials) were horseshoes. They are thought to have been borne by William in allusion to his mother Sibyll's descent from the Marshal family.

(xciii) John fitz Geoffrey, d.1256. Quarterly or and gules, a bordure vair. Descended from the Mandeville family, whence the arms (see lxxvii). From him were descended the fitz Johns.

(xciv) Roger le Strange, d.1311. Gules, 2 lions passant argent, a bordure engrailed or. The picture comes from his seal on the Barons' Letter to the Pope (1301).

(xcv) John de Balliol, d.1269. Gules, an orle argent. In the roll from which these arms are taken the orle is described as a *faux escochon,* or an escutcheon voided. His fourth son, John, was King of Scotland (see xcvii).

(xcvi) William de Valence, d.1296. Barruly argent and azure, an orle of martlets gules. A Poitevin half-brother of King Henry III who succeeded to the earldom of Pembroke (but not the title) in 1247. He was a scion of the prolific Lusignan family (compare his arms to xxxi).

(xcvii) John de Balliol, King of Scotland 1292-96. Or, a lion rampant and a double-tressure fleury-counterfleury gules. These are arms of dominion, adopted in turn by successive families of Scottish kings in place of their own arms.

(xcviii) Alexander II, King of Scotland 1214-49. Or, a lion rampant and an orle fleury gules. The lion of Scotland's arms first appeared on Alexander's seal, and clearly the orle was added soon after, this soon becoming a tressure. This is Matthew Paris' rendition of Alexander's arms.

(xcix) Jean de la Haye, c.1290. Azure, fretty or. An Artois knight, from the Wijnbergen Armorial. It is easy to see from this example that the early rolls often intended a single fret when they used the term fretty.

(c) Hugh le Despenser, d.1265. Quarterly, argent and gules fretty or, overall a baston sable. Killed at the Battle of Evesham.

(ci) Hugh de Courtenay, d.1292. Or, 3 roundles gules, a label of 5 points azure. The English Courtenays descended from Renaud, who was evicted from France c.1150, while the French Courtenays (who used the same arms but without the label) were descended from Renaud's daughter Elizabeth, who married King Louis VII's youngest brother, Pierre. Roundles gules were known as torteaux.

(cii) John de Plessis, Earl of Warwick 1247-63. Argent, 6 annulets gules. For obvious reasons annulets were sometimes blazoned as *faux rondeletts,* or 'false roundles'.

(ciii) Rauf Gorges, d.1271. A whirlpool argent and azure. Another good example of canting arms, since *gurges* meant a whirlpool.

(civ) John de Beauchamp, d.1297. Gules, a fess between 6 billets or. From Heralds' Roll.

(cv) Jake de la Plance, c.1280. Argent, goutty de poix and a lion rampant sable. The term 'goutty' described a field of drops (*gouttes*), *de poix* ('of pitch') meaning they were black. Goutty argent was blazoned as goutty *d'eau* ('of water'); goutty or as *d'or* or *aure;* azure as *de larmes* ('of tears'); gules as *de sang* ('of blood'); and vert as *d'huile* or *d'olive* ('of oil'). However, the field of Jake's arms is actually a very badly rendered form of billetty, and not really goutty at all.

(cvi) Bewes de Knovill, d.1307. Gules, 3 pierced mullets or, a label of 3 points azure. Pierced mullets are often blazoned in this period as *rouels,* ie, rowels or spurs, which seems their more probable derivation.

(cvii) Geoffrey de Neville, d.c.1242. A saltire, a label of 4 points. Seal evidence only, but descendants bore as gules, a saltire argent, a label azure.

(cviii) Edward I, King of England 1272-1307. Gules, 3 lions passant gardant in pale or, a label of 5 points azure.



























12th-13th Century heraldry

These are Edward's arms prior to his succession. The term 'in pale' denotes that the lions are arranged one above the other.

(cix) Roger de Lacy, Constable of Chester, d.1211. Quarterly or and gules, a bend sable, overall a label of 7 points argent. The picture comes from Roger's seal, the tinctures being known from armorials which include the same arms for his son John, Earl of Lincoln.

(cx) Nicholas Poyntz, d.1311. Barry of 8, or and gules, overall a label of 5 points azure. From his seal on the Barons' Letter of 1301.

(cxi) Saher de Quincy, Earl of Winchester 1207-19. Or, a fess gules, a label of 7 points azure. Taken from his seal, other versions of which show the label with 8 or 11 points.

(cxii) Hugh de Balliol, d.c.1271. Gules, an orle argent, in sinister chief on an escutcheon azure a lion rampant argent crowned or. The escutcheon bears the arms of Galloway, his mother Dervorguilla being daughter of Alan, Lord of Galloway. Glover's Roll shows it positioned in the centre of the shield, within the orle, though Hugh's seal shows it positioned as depicted.

(cxiii) Ranulph de Blundeville, Earl of Chester 1181-1232. Azure, 3 garbs or banded gules. Ranulph's seal is the first portrayal of garbs (ie, wheat-sheaves). These arms are still assigned to the Earl of Chester in armorials compiled 50 years after his death.

(cxiv) Hugues Candavène, c.1223. 5 garbs. Tinctures unknown (seal evidence only). In the mid-12th century his ancestors were the counts of Saint Pol and similarly bore garbs, though it is unknown how many.

(cxv) Robert de Ros, d.1226. Gules, 3 bougets argent. From Matthew Paris. The bouget, or water-bouget, was a stylised representation of a yoke with 2 large waterskins attached.

(cxvi) Magnus Olafsson, King of Man 1254-65. Gules, 3 legs à la quise armed (argent), in each corner a foot. The origin of this device is unknown. The blazon given here is from Walford's Roll of c.1273 in which these arms are attributed to the Scandinavian King of Man, while the illustration is based on a 13th century carving. Later blazons describe the armoured legs as proper (ie, in their natural colours), basically argent and conjoined in the fess point. The term *à la quise* means torn off at the thigh.

(cxvii) John de Beauchamp, c.1250. Argent, an eagle displayed sable, beaked and membered or. The illustration is from Matthew Paris' 'Historia Anglorum'; Glover's Roll reverses the tinctures of the eagle and the field. 'Membered' refers to the eagle's legs.

(cxviii) Henry VI, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire 1165-97. Or, an eagle displayed sable, membered gules. These arms first appeared on the seal of Emperor Conrad II, as early as 1028. The more famous double-headed eagle was only 'officially' adopted at the beginning of the 15th century, though it had actually begun to appear in the 13th century. The picture comes from a portrait of Henry in the 'Manessa Codex'.

(cxix) Ralph de Monthermer, d.c.1325. Or, an eagle displayed vert. Ralph was styled Earl of Gloucester and Hertford following his marriage to the widow of Earl Gilbert de Clare (d.1295). The picture is from his seal on the Barons' Letter, while the tinctures are known from the Falkirk and Caerlaverock Rolls and others; Charles' Roll makes the eagle beaked and membered gules.

(cxx) Wenceslaus III, King of Bohemia 1271-1306. Azure, an eagle displayed chequy argent and gules. From the 'Manessa Codex', these are actually the arms of Moravia, for Wenceslaus' kingdom included Moravia and Poland in addition to Bohemia. (See also cxxxiv.)

(cxxi) John de Courcy, d.c.1219. Argent, 3 griphs (or geires) gules crowned or. A leading figure in the Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland, he was known as the 'Conqueror of Ulster'. In his late-12th century chronicle Giraldus Cambrensis describes John's shield as bearing 'painted eagles'.

(cxxii) Piers Corbet, d.1300. Or, 2 corbyns (ravens) sable. The arms of this marcher baron occur in the Falkirk Roll and others. The picture comes from his son's seal on the Barons' Letter.

(cxxiii) Hiltbolt von Schwanagau, d.1254. Gules, a swan argent beaked and membered or. From the 'Manessa Codex'.

(cxxiv) Robert Thweng, d.1247. Argent, a fess gules between 3 popinjays vert. From Matthew Paris, these are the arms of a Yorkshire knight who led local attacks against foreign clergymen in 1231-32. 'Popinjays' are parrots.

(cxxv) Robert Aguillon, d.1286. Gules, a fleur-de-lis argent. From Heralds' Roll. With the cross, the lion and the eagle, the fleur-de-lis was one of the four commonest charges in heraldry.

(cxxvi) Louis VIII, King of France 1223-26. Azure, semé-de-lis or. This picture is from a seal of Louis' which dates to his father's reign. These arms are today known as 'France Ancient', to distinguish them from 'France Modern' (azure, 3 fleurs-de-lis or), adopted in the 14th century. It has been argued that they may have been in use as early as Louis VII's reign (1137-80).

(cxxvii) William de Canteloup, d.1239. Gules, 3 fleurs-de-lis or. From Matthew Paris; see also cxxix.

(cxxviii) John d'Eyville, d.1291. Or, a fess gules, 3 pairs of fleurs-de-lis counterchanged. 'Counterchanged' basically means 'of the other tincture', so that in this particular example the lilies are red on gold and gold on red.

(cxxix) George de Canteloup, d.1273. Gules, 3 leopard's faces reversed jessant-de-lis or. As can be seen from the picture (from Heralds' Roll), 'jessant-de-lis' meant that the leopard's face had a fleur-de-lis through it.

(cxxx) William fitz Empress, Comte de Poitou, d.1163. 2 lions combatant. Tinctures unknown (seal evidence only), but probably gules, 2 lions combatant or. William was King Henry II's brother, his surname being an allusion to his mother, King Stephen's bitter rival the Empress Mathilda. King Richard, his nephew, appears to have borne the same arms until c.1195.

(cxxxi) Henry III, King of England 1216-72. Gules, 3 lions passant gardant or. Lions passant gardant (ie, walking and looking towards the viewer) were blazoned as 'leopards' from an early date. These became the arms of England after c.1195, when King Richard's second great seal shows 3 leopards for the first time. These arms were adopted in turn by his brother John on his own succession to the throne in 1199 (prior to which he had borne gules, 2 leopards or).

(cxxxii) John le Strange, d.1309. Argent, 2 lions passant gules. From Heralds' Roll.

(cxxxiii) Conrad, Landgraf of Thuringia, d.1241. Azure, a lion rampant barry of 8 gules and argent, armed or. The picture is from his seal of c.1234, while the tinctures come from his actual shield, which has survived to the present day. The term 'armed' refers to the lion's claws.

(cxxxiv) Wenceslaus III, King of Bohemia 1271-1306. Gules, a lion rampant queue fourchée and passed in saltire argent, crowned or. The term *queue fourchée* denoted a forked tail, in this instance with its two parts crossed in the form of a saltire. From the 'Manessa Codex'. (See also cxx.)

(cxxxv) Richard, Earl of Cornwall and Comte de Poitou 1225-72. Argent, a lion rampant gules crowned or, within a bordure sable bezanty. The picture is from Matthew Paris' 'Historia Anglorum'. Brother of King Henry III, Richard was crowned King of the Romans in 1256.

(cxxxvi) Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester 1239-65. Gules, a lion rampant queue fourchée argent. The Norman baron who led the disaffected faction of the English nobility against King Henry III in the mid-13th century and in the resultant Barons' War of 1264-67. He was killed at the Battle of Evesham.

(cxxxvii) Amalric de Montfort, Earl of Gloucester, d.c.1214. Parti per pale indented, argent and gules. Amalric was Simon's cousin. The picture is based on his seal, while the tinctures come from later armorials such as Segar's Roll (which describes these arms as 'the old shield of Leicester' since they were also borne by Simon). Glover's Roll substitutes or for argent. In modern parlance parti per pale indented can be found described as barry pily.

(cxxxviii) Simon de Montfort, Comte de Montfort 1181-1218. Parti per pale indented, argent and gules. From a window in Chartres Cathedral, where these arms — a less exaggerated form of cxxxvii — are shown on a flag (and rendered gules and argent). This Simon, the father of cxxxvi, was a leader of the Albigensian Crusade. He also bore gules, a lion rampant queue fourchée argent.

(cxxxix) William Longespée, Earl of Salisbury, d.1226. Azure, 6 lioncels rampant or. The term 'lioncel' is used when several lions (today usually 5 or 6) occur in the same coat-of-arms. William was the illegitimate son of King

Henry II. These arms were borne by his grandfather Geoffrey d'Anjou (d.1151) and by his own son William (d.1250).

(cxl) Fawkes de Breauté, d.1226. Gules, a cinquefoil argent. A famous mercenary captain in King John's employ. Cinquefoils are almost invariably pierced (ie, have a hole at their centre of the same colour as the field), even when not so blazoned.

(cxli) William Bardolf, d.1289. Azure, 3 cinquefoils or. From Heralds' Roll.

(cxlii) Frank de Bohun, d.1272. Sable, 3 crescents or. From Charles' and St George Rolls. It is generally supposed that the crescent device was introduced from the East as a result of the Crusades.

(cxliii) Gilbert Hansard, d.c.1280. Gules, 3 estoiles argent. Early rolls seem to have been indifferent whether they blazoned estoiles as such, frequently substituting the term mullets instead.

(cxliv) John de Saint John, d.1302. Argent, on a chief gules 2 pierced mullets or. Seneschal of Aquitaine in 1294-97 and one of the leading military commanders of his day. The picture is from his seal on the Barons' Letter, while the tinctures come from several 13th century armorials.

(cxlv) William de Hursthale, c.1285. Azure, 3 hatchets argent. These arms are from Charles' Roll and the St George Roll. The somewhat later Powell Roll (c.1350) ascribes the same arms to Thomas Hoscarle, which more accurate rendition of the surname denotes the Saxon origin of the family and the reason for the adoption of these particular arms.

(cxlvi) Reginald fitz Urse, c.1170. Or, a bear passant sable, muzzled argent. These are the arms of one of Thomas à Becket's murderers. The picture is from a manuscript illustration of the beginning of the 13th century.

(cxlvii) Geoffrey de Lucy, d.1284. Gules, crusilly and 3 luces hauriant or. Canting arms, a 'luce' being a pike. The term *hauriant* denoted that the fish were arranged palewise, or upright.

(cxlviii) Thomas de la Roche, d.c.1313. Gules, 3 roach naiant in pale argent. Seal evidence only, but tinctures are known from the arms borne by his descendants. *Naiant* was the term used to describe a fish borne fesswise.

(cxlix) Henry de Hastings, d.1268. Or, a maunch gules. From the Dering, Camden and Heralds' Rolls. A maunch was a stylised sleeve.

(cl) Mohammad ibn Yusuf ibn al-Ahmar, King of Granada 1246-73. Argent, on a bend azure an Arabic inscription argent. As has already been mentioned under figure 83, the Moslems of Andalusia had also adopted Western-style heraldry by the mid-13th century. Mohammad ruled Granada from 1235 and was recognised as king by Ferdinand III of Castile in 1246, when these arms were probably adopted.

APPENDIX 2 STANDARDS, GONFANONS, BANNERS AND PENNONS

The assorted varieties of flag in use during this period came in many different shapes and sizes and went under a number of different names.

The standard (old French *estendart*), as may be gathered from its name, was essentially a flag which stood stationary during a battle, providing the army with a sort of headquarters to which wounded men and prisoners could be brought. It was usually mounted on a staff of some height, often erected on a cart for convenience (eg, the Italian carroccio) as, for instance, at the Battle of the Standard in 1138 and the Battle of Semlin in 1167. However, it should not be confused with the standard of the 14th-15th centuries, which was a long, tapering, round-pointed flag in the livery colours of the owner and carrying his badges.

The *gonfanon* had appeared by the mid-11th century, deriving its name from the Scandinavian *gunnefane* or 'war-flag'. A large number of gonfanons are depicted in the Bayeux Tapestry, comprising rectangular pieces of cloth

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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12th-13th Century heraldry

bearing simple devices, such as crosses and circles, and with a tail of several tapering streamers (usually 3). The largest were probably 3-4 feet in length. The use of the gonfanon was restricted to superior feudal lords; the 13th century 'Roman de la Rose', for instance, says that 'the barons will have gonfanons, the knights will have pennons', while Wace, in his 'Roman de Rou', writes that there is 'neither a lord nor a baron who has not got near him his gonfanon, either a gonfanon or another ensign by which his retinue [*maisnie*] govern themselves'. Where no device occurred the gonfanon might be of one or two colours. Knightly contingents of the 12th century might have 'equipment brilliant and plain — helms, hauberks, shields and saddles all of one tint of one colour chosen by their lord for mutual recognition' (c.1160). However, the use of just one colour seems to have been but a passing fashion — obviously even the limitations of a two-tincture system of gonfanon colouring must speedily have become apparent, yet alone of one. It probably did not survive the end of the 12th century. By 1130 seals instead frequently show the same device being used on a baron's gonfanon as is carried on his shield.

At about the end of the 12th century the gonfanon began to be replaced by the *bannière* or banner, to which was transferred the function of displaying the arms of the owner. Though it occasionally ended in numerous tails or streamers, the banner was essentially an upright rectangle, initially about 4 times as tall as it was broad (which made it an extremely awkward shape for displaying arms) but soon altered to a shape twice as tall as it was broad, which proportions it retained until the end of this era. On the Continent, especially in Germany, the top edge was frequently elongated into a pointed streamer known as a *schwenkel*, a red schwenkel being a mark of special privilege. The banner was usually stiffened either by buckram or by a batten along its top edge, so as to make it more instantly recognisable in the heat of battle. The gonfanon did not entirely disappear with the introduction of the banner, apparently surviving until the second half of the 13th century but no longer bearing heraldic arms (see note to figure clxi). When the term is used thereafter it tends to denote instead a civil or, more often, an ecclesiastical flag hung from a crossbar.

The tactical importance of banners in this period cannot be over-emphasised since those of an army's chief men were 'a symbol of resistance', as Verbruggen succinctly puts it, and their fall customarily signified defeat, even when the army commanders yet lived. For this reason they were usually carried in battle by men of proven loyalty and bravery, usually had a specially-chosen detachment of guards, and were often accompanied by a spare, which could be unfurled the moment the first flag fell or was lost. Whatever the temptation or the circumstances, the lance from which a banner flew was *never* to be used as a weapon. The knight or esquire who carried it remained at the banneret's side throughout a battle so that the banner would at all times indicate his whereabouts. It was likewise flown from a castle whenever the banneret was in residence, but would not be displayed when he rode abroad as this was a sign of war and could even be the basis of a charge of treason. It was therefore usual to unfurl one's banner only when the king or army commander unfurled his. (It should be noted, incidentally, that when viewing the reverse side of a banner or any other heraldic flag — ie, when the staff is to the onlooker's right — the entire design reverses; thus all animate charges face towards the staff and ahead, bends become bends sinister, quarters change position, and so on. The same rule also applies to the housing of a horse — see, for example, figure 143 — but *not* to the back of a surcoat.)

The pennon of the ordinary knight or sergeant was much smaller than the banner or gonfanon, usually being only 12″-18″ in length, and was always either triangular or forked. The triangle could be either isosceles, with the short side attached to the lance, or right-angled (called by many modern writers a *pavon*) with the mid-length side attached to the lance and the right angle at the base (again an awkward shape for displaying arms). Judging from mss. and other sources the arms were upright sometimes when the lance was held vertically and sometimes when it was levelled. Small pennons were termed *penoncels* or *pensils*.

Examples of most of the different types of flag described above can be found in the following representative selection taken from contemporary sources (for others see figures 2, 5, 6, 7, 50, 64, 80, 83, 92, 94, 103, 105 and 113).

(cli-cliv) Banners. Figure cli, from the 'Maciejowski Bible', shows the early proportions of the banneret's flag, roughly four times deeper than its own width, while clii and cliii are later examples, being the red and white banner held by Simon de Montfort in a painted 13th century window in Chartres Cathedral (see cxxxviii), and the banner of the Dreux counts of Brittany from a late-13th century English ms. (see note to lxxiv). Figure cliv is a German banner complete with schwenkel, from the 'Carmen de Rebus Siculis' of c.1197.

(clv) England. This depiction of England's banner is taken from Matthew Paris' portrayal of the 'Fair of Lincoln' (1217). The horizontal strips are probably buckram strengtheners intended to stiffen the flag.

(clvi) Saint George. Taken from a ms. of c.1295, this is an early representation of the flag of Saint George — a red cross on a white field — that was soon to be carried by every English field-army. A flag of Saint George was


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also frequently taken into action by the Teutonic Knights from the 13th century onwards. Other English flags included 'a dragon with fiery tongue, worked in red samite', kept in Westminster Abbey. Recorded in Richard's reign, it was later fielded against Llywelyn in 1257 and was raised at Oxford in 1264 during the Barons' War.

(clvii-clx) Pennons. The first of these comes from a Spanish ms. of c.1220 (clvii); the rest are from the 'Cántigas' mss., where knights are invariably depicted with their arms displayed on both shield and lance-pennon, and sometimes on their helmets too, but only rarely on their surcoats. The difficulties of displaying heraldry properly within the 'pavon' shape are self-evident.

(clxi) Gonfanon. This is from the seal of Conrad of Thuringia (1234). Such heavily diapered flags, bearing no heraldic device, occur frequently on 13th century seals of mounted knights, on the reverse side of which the lord in question is often depicted enthroned and holding his heraldic banner. This appears to indicate that by the mid-13th century the banner and gonfanon may have indicated one's status as a feudal ruler and a war-leader respectively; in pictures of battle-scenes, however, it is normally the banner that is carried.

(clxii) German episcopal gonfanon. This is a gonfanon of the type carried by German bishops and archbishops on 'active service'. This example is from an enamel of c.1180 which shows it being presented to a prelate (possibly the Archbishop of Cologne) on his investiture by Emperor Frederick I. It is no different from the gonfanon of a baron except that it is surmounted by a gilt cross; other illustrations sometimes show a cross embroidered in addition on the gonfanon itself.

(clxiii) Holy Roman Empire. This particular example of the Empire's black eagle on a gold field is taken from a statue of Emperor Otto II in Magdeburg Cathedral, dating to c.1240-50. During the course of the 13th century it seems to have become customary for the so-called King of the Romans (ie, the king of Germany) to have borne these arms while the Emperor bore the eagle double-headed instead. On one occasion Frederick II is recorded to have had the Imperial flag carried in a 'castle' on the back of an elephant, 'consigning its defence to the master of the elephants and the Saracens who were placed within the castle'!

(clxiv) Religious flags were very popular in this period, particularly amongst troops involved in wars against the Moslems in Spain and the Near East and pagan tribesmen in Northern Europe. This particular example comes from the 'Cántigas' mss.; it has a red field, with the Virgin Mary and Christ in white and the throne, crown, tunic hems, orb and Christ's halo all in gold. Such a flag is recorded to have been carried at the Battle of Alarcos in 1195.

(clxv-clxvi) The Papacy. The cross on papal flags apparently represented the Church, while the keys represented the see of Rome. The earliest flags bore the keys alone, as in clxv, from a mosaic of Innocent III's pontificate (1198-1216). Gregory IX's troops, campaigning against Frederick II of Sicily, fought under such flags (red, with white keys tied gold), and in addition wore *clave signati*, ie, key badges for identification. A papal flag incorporating a cross is first mentioned in 1204, but the earliest clear representation (clxvi) dates to 1316. In addition to their use by papal troops, such flags were also sent to various kings and princes at different times as an indication that their campaigns had received papal blessing: that sent to William the Conqueror in 1066 is the best-known example, but there are many others — in the early-13th century even Tsar Kalojan of Bulgaria fought under a flag 'sent to him by the pope, and bearing the papal keys upon it.'

(clxvii-clxx) Italian flags. Details of the devices found on Italian flags of this period have already been set out under figure 93. The four examples depicted here belong to (clxvii) Milan, 1166, from the same source as figures 89 and 93; (clxviii) Bologna, 1249, from a picture portraying the defeat of Frederick II's son, King Enzio of Sardinia; (clxix) Siena, 1241, from the 'Chronica Majora'; and (clxx) Venice, 1203-4, from a 13th century edition of Villehardouin's chronicle. A Venetian flag is first recorded c.1000 and doubtless featured the lion of St Mark from the outset.

(clxxi-clxxv) Andalusian flags. To judge from the 'Cántigas' mss. these were generally about 4 feet deep but varied in width, and most had a series of short, rounded tails. Of those shown here, clxxi and clxxii are Almohade flags; clxxi, very heavily embroidered in gold and coloured threads, is said to have been captured at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 and is today preserved at the monastery of Las Huelgas in Burgos, while clxxii is from a fresco depicting the Aragonese siege of Almudaina (in Majorca) in 1228 and is white with black markings and a gold star in the centre. Figures clxxiii-clxxv all come from the 'Cántigas' mss.: clxxiii is red with a black panel outlined and lettered in gold — though the inscription is meaningless, David Nicolle says that of clxxiv is the Christian artist's faulty rendering of the Arabic for 'The Banner of God' (many Andalusian flags bore such inscriptions, though others carried no device at all); clxxv is white with dark blue zig-zag markings. The flag of the vanguard of Caliph Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur's army in Spain in 1199 is described as 'blue and white



silk spangled with gold crescents.' Ibn Hud apparently favoured black flags, Mohammed *al-Ahmar* ('the Red') favoured red flags, and the Marinids favoured white ones. One source tells us that an amir's flag was called a *ra'ya*, that of a qa'id was an *'alam*, of a naqib was a *liwa*, of an arif was a *band*, and of a nazir was an *'ukda* (probably a lance-pennon).

(clxxvi-clxxvii) Aragon. Figure clxxvi is based on a surviving example of 1238 while clxxvii is from a fresco depicting King Jaime I's conquest of Majorca. Both are yellow with red stripes.

(clxxviii-clxxix) The *Oriflamme*. The Oriflamme ('Golden Flame') was the plain red banner of the Abbey of St Denis, carried by the French king from 1088 onwards as a vassal of the abbey for the fief of the Vexin. William le Breton describes it as 'a standard of bright red silk' in his account of the Battle of Bouvines, and Guiart as 'a banner made of silk stronger than gimp, it is of flaming cendal . . . without any figure upon it.' Another source describes it as being of red samite with 3 tails and green silk tassels. The number of tails apparently varied over the years, those depicted here (from a window at Chartres Cathedral and the 'Chronica Majora' of Matthew Paris) having 5 and 8 tails respectively. The staff was gilt. For further details about the Oriflamme see note 53 in *Armies of the Middle Ages, volume 1.*

(clxxx) France. From a picture in an early edition of Joinville's chronicle, depicting King Louis IX.

(clxxxi-clxxxii) Denmark. Figure clxxxi, taken from the late-14th century 'Gelre Armorial', is often claimed to be the oldest known representation of Denmark's national flag, the *Dannebrog* (thought to mean 'Danish Cloth'), comprising a white cross on a red field. This flag is supposed to have 'miraculously appeared' in King Waldemar II's hands at the Battle of Reval in 1219, where he defeated the pagan Estonians, but figure clxxxii (from a coin of his father Waldemar I's reign, 1157-82) would indicate that a similar cross-embroidered flag was already in use much earlier. By the beginning of this period Scandinavian flags were generally known as *merki*, which term had replaced the earlier *gunnefani*.

APPENDIX 3 RANKS OF NOBILITY

The origins of the ranks of the feudal nobility are to be found in the period of the Carolingian Empire. The term 'baron' derives from the Low Latin *baro* meaning a man, specifically 'king's man' — ie, a man granted land directly by the king and holding it in exchange for military service (a tenant *in capite*, or 'tenant-in-chief'). In England 'the barons' or 'the baronage' for long meant the entire nobility. The specific title of baron was known in France, but he was more usually called a *seigneur*. In Germany the equivalent title was *Freiherr*, though 'baron' was also used.

'Count' is from the Latin *comes* ('companion', that is, of the Emperor; one who was appointed to rule over a district, originally at the Emperor's pleasure). Later, especially under weak rulers, the post became hereditary. Thus we find Neustria divided into *comtés* (counties), each ruled with considerable independence by its *comte* or count. The German equivalent was *Graf*. In England we hear of counts for only a short period immediately after the Norman Conquest, but before long the more familiar title of 'earl' (cognate with the Scandinavian *jarl*) was revived in its place. In France, where inheritance from heiresses sometimes brought about the union of two counties under one count, the latter might be assisted by a deputy who became known as a *vicecomes* or *vicomte* (viscount). The title of *vidame* (peculiar to France) meant a similar deputy, but for an ecclesiastical rather than a lay lord.

In Germany various frontier provinces which, in the 10th century, had needed to be secured against the inroads of barbarians such as the Slavs and the Magyars, had been entrusted to 'counts of the march' known as *Markgrafen* or margraves (cf. the English 'marcher lords' of the Welsh border). These took precedence over the ordinary *Grafen*. From this title is derived the French *marquis*. A few large areas within the Holy Roman Empire (ie, Thuringia, Hesse, Elsatz and Lichtenburg) were instead ruled by *Landgrafen* (landgraves) who were likewise more important than the ordinary Grafen; there is no French or English equivalent of this title.

The most curious thing about the choice of 'duke' as a title for some of the most powerful feudatories and members of the blood-royal is that in origin the late Roman *dux* was actually inferior to the comes or count. With the passage of time various French counts were promoted to dukes, while in Germany and Italy the title or its linguistic equivalent (*Herzog* and *duce*) was used for the rulers of practically independent states owing a shadowy allegiance to the Emperor. The Austrian duke, in fact, dissatisfied even with this, promoted himself to archduke (*Erzherzog*).

One oft-encountered title which is apt to cause confusion is that of 'prince'. In strict protocol there is nothing wrong with the description of a duke, marquis or earl as 'the high and mighty prince', since the old earldoms, counties and duchies stemmed from what were once petty kingdoms long-since absorbed by greater ones. France, Italy and Germany have all had princes ranking after dukes, the German title for these being *Fürst*. In addition the courtesy title of prince is given to the son of a sovereign, and here the German title was *Prinz*, which distinguished neatly from the non-royal Fürst. In Germany entitlement to take part in the election of the Emperor was much sought after (as much for the bargaining power as the honour) and resulted in the title of Elector (Kürfürst), preferred by many even to the title of king.

About 1240 we find in Matthew Paris' chronicles certain reference to a new institution, that of banneret, with an intimation that their had been bannerets in existence during the rebellion in King John's reign. Probably, in fact, bannerets had existed since at least the beginning of the 13th century, occasionally being encountered under the Latin name of *vexillarius*. As has already been explained in Appendix 2, the banneret derived his title from the right to display his arms on a rectangular flag, the banner. As is witnessed by surviving armorials, bannerets included all magnates from the king down to the wealthier class of knights. The title effectively indicated that the individual had the financial resources with which to maintain a sizeable retinue in the field.

Towards the end of this era there was a growing tendency to call those knights poorer than bannerets by the term 'bachelors' (French *bachelier*, from *bas-chevalier*). Bachelors occur in literary sources in England even in William le Marshal's day but only regularly appear in official records from the mid-13th century.

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The following books and articles are those which were of the greatest value to me in the preparation of this volume. I acknowledge my debt to their authors, and others besides, without whose researches my own book would not have been possible.

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